NYT: Pentagon Drops Goal of Blocking New Superpowers

Related:

8 March 1992, NYT: Excerpts From Pentagon's Plan: 'Prevent the Re-Emergence of a New Rival'

8 March 1992, NYT: U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop

18 February 1992, National Security Archive: DOD: Defense Planning Guidance (NYT leak) (PDF)

18 February 1992, DOD: Defense Planning Guidance, FY 1994-1999 (PDF)

http://www.nytimes.com/1992/05/24/world/pentagon-drops-goal-of-blocking-new-superpowers.html

May 24, 1992

Pentagon Drops Goal of Blocking New Superpowers

By PATRICK E. TYLER

The Pentagon has revised a draft of its post-cold-war strategy, dropping language from an earlier document advocating the perpetuation of a one-superpower world in which the United States would work to prevent the rise of any "competitors" to its primacy in Western Europe and East Asia.

The new document, approved by Defense Secretary Dick Cheney on Friday, sharpens the American commitment to collective military action as a "key feature" of United States strategy and looks forward to the decline of military investment as the principal means of balancing power among nations.

With far more diplomatic language than in an earlier draft, the new document forsakes any goal of preventing the emergence of "any potential future global competitor" and stresses the importance of strengthening international organizations like the United Nations for resolving disputes.

Input From Cheney

The elimination of what was a dominant theme in the earlier draft reflects high-level input from both Mr. Cheney and Gen. Colin L. Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, senior Pentagon officials said. The new language represents a significant retrenchment and appears to have discredited the idea, expressed in internal Administration foreign policy discussions, that the United States should focus its energies on containing German and Japanese aspirations for regional leadership.

The nearly final draft has been circulating in the Pentagon since April 16. A copy was provided to The New York Times by an Administration official who believes the debate on post-cold-war strategy should be conducted in public.

Earlier Draft Criticized

The earlier draft, dated Feb. 18, was roundly criticized in the White House and in foreign capitals after its contents were disclosed in The New York Times in March. Prepared under the supervision of the Pentagon's Under Secretary for policy, Paul Wolfowitz, the earlier draft implied that a competing power or alliance of nations, bolstered by surging economic strength in Germany or Japan, could arise from these nations and eventually express their rivalry with America through military competition.

To keep this from happening, the earlier draft proposed that the United States build a new order based on "convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests."

The new draft reflects an American foreign policy establishment far less threatened by ascending roles for important allies, even leadership by those allies when their interests are more directly affected. Yet a goal of the new draft is to seek to preserve a leading American role in strategic deterrence and regional alliances that will, by their demonstration of military cooperation, deter hostile and non-democratic powers from seeking to dominate important regions.

On Friday, Germany and France announced the formation of an all-European military corps and invited other nations to join. The new security alliance would work with NATO in crises where NATO'S 16 member nations declared an interest, but would also respond independently in crises where NATO interests were not involved.

The later Pentagon draft substantially softens the earlier document's expressed opposition to emerging security alliances in Europe while also emphasizing the need to preserve a key role for NATO, where American power and influence have been pre-eminent.

Striking Change of Tone

With a striking change of tone, the later draft states, "One of the primary tasks we face today in shaping the future is carrying longstanding alliances into the new era, and turning old enmities into new cooperative relationships."

For the first time in the memory of military officials who have drafted policy, the new draft states that while a strong defense to deter potential foes will continue to be an important concept in American security, a leveling of military investment coupled with greater economic and security cooperation will create a more stable world.

"It is not in our interest or those of the other democracies to return to earlier periods in which multiple military powers balanced one another off in what passed for security structures, while regional, or even global peace hung in the balance," it said.

The new document places greater emphasis on international military cooperation, with a special emphasis on cooperation with Russia, Ukraine and the other republics of the former Soviet Union, as a means of providing "security at lower costs with lower risks for all."

The document, known as the Defense Planning Guidance for the 1994-99 fiscal years, has never been made public and parts of it are classified. It is a policy that is an internal planning guide for the Pentagon and prepared every two years. As such, it represents "guidance" from the President and the Secretary of Defense to the four military services on how to prepare their budgets and forces in the future.

Additional Refinements Made

A senior Pentagon official, commenting on the April 16 draft, said that it "more carefully reflects" the thinking of Mr. Cheney, but that additional refinements and editing changes have been made since that version was circulated. He said the major elements remain.

Though Mr. Cheney signed the document Friday, it was not clear whether it would be subject to additional comment or revision after circulating to the White House and State Department.

The new draft continues to make the case for the Bush Administration's concept of a "base force" military of 1.6 million uniformed troops and rejects calls in Congress for a greater peace dividend that could be derived from deeper military cuts. And while it strengthens the Administration's commitment to act in concert with allies and through international bodies like the United Nations, it preserves a commitment "to act independently, as necessary, to protect our critical interests."

A central theme of the later draft, which echoes Mr. Cheney's and General Powell's public testimony, is that a precipitous decline in military spending could "break" the organizational competence of the American military and tempt adversaries like Iraq to seek to dominate critical regions.

Commitment to Israel

The later draft also makes a specific commitment to the security of Israel and to providing Taiwan with modern military equipment.

The later version of the planning document, like its predecessor, calls on the four military services to be prepared to fight two major regional wars simultaneously while maintaining sizable military presence in Europe, where the old Soviet-led Warsaw Pact threat has disappeared.

"We must recognize what we are so often told by the leaders of the new democracies -- that continued U.S. presence in Europe is an essential part of the West's overall efforts to maintain stability even in the midst of such dramatic change," it states.

Even with significant adjustments, the later draft is likely to have little impact on the military services. The battle over the document's tone, emphasis and language is more a struggle of ideas about the future of American foreign policy and military strategy.

Potential Threats Reformulated

The later draft, in stating potential threats, retreats to a more narrow formulation, which calls for the United States to prevent "any hostile power from dominating a region critical to our interests." It adds that such "consolidated, non-democratic control of the resources" in a region "could generate a significant threat to our security."

The February draft had stated that while the United States could not become the world's policeman in the future, "we will retain the pre-eminent responsibility for addressing selectively those wrongs which threaten not only our interests, but those of our allies or friends, or which could seriously unsettle international relations."

The later draft abandons the broad sweep and unilateral tone of the earlier draft and stresses a more narrow point that where possible, the United States will act in concert and cooperation with allies, "but we must maintain the capabilities for addressing selectively those security problems that threaten our own interests."

A specific goal of restraining India's "hegemonic aspirations" in South Asia also was dropped in the later draft in favor of language promoting a reduction of tensions between India and Pakistan.

Some Fine Nuances

In some cases, the nuances of change in the new draft seem to draw distinctions without a difference. For instance, the new document drops the claim of an allied "victory" over the Soviet Union, a claim that former President Mikhail S. Gorbachev had criticized after the earlier document was made public. Instead, the new draft characterizes as a "great success" the overall discrediting of Communism as an ideology and the collapse of the Soviet empire.

But other changes in emphasis appeared to be driven by a more fundamental recognition that in the post-cold-war era, diplomatic and economic tools will become more effective instruments in international relations while military tools will recede to a lower status.

"Our tools include political and economic measures and others such as security assistance, military-to-military contacts, humanitarian aid and intelligence assistance, as well as security measures to prevent the emergence of a non-democratic aggressor in critical regions," the new draft states.

While the role of the United Nations was left unrecognized in the earlier draft, it is prominently mentioned in the new document, which says, "In this more secure international environment, there will be enhanced opportunities for political, economic, environmental, social and security issues to be resolved through new or revitalized international organizations, including the United Nations, or regional arrangements."

Key Sections of Pentagon Document on Post-Cold-War Strategy

Initial Draft (Feb. 18, 1992)

1) Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival, either on the territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere, that poses a threat on the order of that posed formerly by the Soviet Union. This is a dominant consideration underlying the new regional defense strategy and requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to general global power.

2) The U.S. must show the leadership necessary to establish and protect a new order that holds the promise of convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests. In non-defense areas, we must account sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order. We must maintain the mechanism for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role.

3) Like the coalition that opposed Iraqi aggression, we should expect future coalitions to be ad hoc assemblies, often not lasting beyond the crisis being confronted, and in many cases carrying only general agreement over the objectives to be accomplished. Nevertheless, the sense that the world order is ultimately backed by the U.S. will be an important stabilizing factor.

4) While the U.S. cannot become the world's policeman, by assuming responsibility for righting every wrong, we will retain the preeminent responsibility for addressing selectively those wrongs which threaten not only our interests, but those of our allies or friends, or which could seriously unsettle international relations.

5) We continue to recognize that collectively the conventional forces of the states formerly comprising the Soviet Union retain the most military potential in all of Eurasia; and we do not dismiss the risks to stability in Europe from a nationalist backlash in Russia or efforts to reincorporate into Russia the newly independent republics of Ukraine, Belarus, and possibly others....We must, however, be mindful that democratic change in Russia is not irreversible, and that despite its current travails, Russia will remain the strongest military power in Eurasia and the only power in the world with the capability of destroying the United States.

6) In the Middle East and Southwest Asia, our overall objective is to remain the predominant outside power in the region and preserve U.S. and Western access to the region's oil.

Latest Draft (April 16, 1992)

1) Our most fundamental goal is to deter or defeat attack from whatever source. . . . The second goal is to strengthen and extend the system of defense arrangements that binds democratic and like-minded nations together in common defense against aggression, build habits of cooperation, avoid the renationalization of security policies, and provide security at lower costs and with lower risks for all. Our preference for a collective response to preclude threats or, if necessary, to deal with them is a key feature of our regional defense strategy. The third goal is to preclude any hostile power from dominating a region critical to our interests, and also thereby to strengthen the barriers against the re-emergence of a global threat to the interests of the U.S. and our allies.

2) One of the primary tasks we face today in shaping the future is carrying long standing alliances into the new era, and turning old enmities into new cooperative relationships. If we and other leading democracies continue to build a democratic security community, a much safer world is likely to emerge. If we act separately, many other problems could result.

3) Certain situations like the crisis leading to the Gulf War are likely to engender ad hoc coalitions. We should plan to maximize the value of such coalitions. This may include specialized roles for our forces as well as developing cooperative practices with others.

4) While the United States cannot become the world's policeman and assume responsibility for solving every international security problem, neither can we allow our critical interests to depend solely on internation mechanisms that can be blocked by countries whose interests may be very different than our own. Where our allies interests are directly affected, we must expect them to take an appropriate share of the responsibility, and in some cases play the leading role; but we maintain the capabilities for addressing selectively those security problems that threaten our own interests.

5) The U.S. has a significant stake in promoting democratic consolidation and peaceful relations between Russia, Ukraine and the other republics of the former Soviet Union.

6) In the Middle East and Persian Gulf, we seek to foster regional stability, deter aggression against our friends and interests in the region, protect U.S. nationals and property, and safeguard our access to international air and seaways and to the region's oil. The United States is committed to the security of Israel and to maintaining the qualitative edge that is critical to Israel's security. Israel's confidence in its security and U.S.-Israel strategic cooperation contribute to the stability of the entire region, as demonstrated once again during the Persian Gulf War. At the same time, our assistance to our Arab friends to defend themselves against aggression also strengthens security throughout the region, including for Israel.