

The following is an excerpt from the recent Department of Defense release of the February 18, 1992 draft Defense Planning Guidance that was leaked to *The New York Times*. Readers can see the excerpts that the *Times* published on March 8, 1992 overlaid on the excised portions of the Pentagon release.



STRATEGY
AND
RESOURCES

~~SECRET / NOFORN~~

PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

18 FEB 1992

In reply refer to:
I-91/28291

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PROGRAM ANALYSIS & EVALUATION
COMPTROLLER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: FY 94-99 Defense Planning Guidance Sections for Comment (U)

(U) Attached for your review and comment is the draft FY 1994-1999 Defense Planning Guidance. Please provide your response by COB Friday, February 21st.

(U) We ask that you focus your comments on major substantive concerns, and encourage you to highlight those you deem of greatest importance. Also, please recognize that this draft is probably at about the desired length and level of detail; therefore, lengthy inserts are unlikely to be workable. Finally, we ask that you consider both the policy and program planning implications of the overall guidance in your comments. It is very important that the guidance be fiscally realistic.

(U) We envision the DPG including these sections, plus an illustrative planning scenario appendix. To facilitate handling of future DPG-related drafts and documents, please identify a member of your staff as a single point of contact; OUSD/Policy contacts are Mr. Andrew Hoehn (Policy and Strategy section) and Mr. Rod Fabrycky (Programming section), 1C469, x79478. By prior arrangement the Joint Staff (J-8) will provide this package to the CINCs and assemble and forward their responses.

Dale A. Vesser (Acting)

Attachment:

a/s

cc:

- Chief of Staff of the Army
- Chief of Naval Operations
- Chief of Staff of the Air Force
- Commandant of the Marine Corps
- Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management & Personnel)
- Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)
- Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications & Intelligence)
- Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs)

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Classified by: ADUSD/R&P
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED DEC 10 2007
Authority: EO 12958, as amended
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

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II. Defense Policy and Strategy (U)

A. Trends and Prospects in the International Environment (U)

1. Soviet Threat Reduction (U)

(S) Central to these new objectives is clear recognition that we no longer will focus on the threat of a short-warning Soviet-led, European-wide conflict leading quickly to global war and perhaps escalating just as quickly to nuclear war. We continue to recognize that collectively the conventional forces of the states formerly comprising the Soviet Union retain the most military potential in all of Eurasia; and we do not dismiss the risks to stability in Europe from a nationalist backlash in Russia or efforts to reincorporate into Russia the newly independent republics of Ukraine, Belarus, and possibly others. However, for the foreseeable future the continued fragmentation of the former Soviet state and its conventional armed forces have altered so fundamentally the character of the residual threat as to eliminate the capacity to wage global conventional war or even to threaten East/Central Europe without several months of warning. A limited objective attack against Western Europe appears beyond Russia's capabilities without several years of reconstitution. Further erosion of the former Soviet defense industrial base and continued evolution of separate national armies will make the likelihood of a future attack even more remote.

2. Increasing Regional Challenges (U)

(S) As the threat posed by the defunct Soviet Union decreases in magnitude, other threats become more important in the context of defense planning. In most cases, this is because they appear greater relative to the residual Soviet/Russian threat and thus are more likely to drive actual requirements. In other cases these threats may have become greater in absolute terms because of the end of the Cold War. Some regional powers, freed of the constraints of the Cold War, may feel more entitled for historical, cultural or other reasons to use of force to establish local hegemonies -- although the decisive nature of our victory in the Persian Gulf will hopefully discourage such actions.

It is improbable that a global conventional challenge to U.S. and Western security will re-emerge from the Eurasian heartland for many years to come. Even in the highly unlikely event that some future leadership in the former Soviet Union adopted strategic aims of recovering the lost empire or otherwise threatened global interests, the loss of Warsaw Pact allies and the subsequent and continuing dissolution of military capability would make any hope of success require several years or more of strategic and doctrinal re-orientation and force regeneration and redeployment, which in turn could only happen after a lengthy political realignment and re-orientation to authoritarian and aggressive political and economic control. Furthermore, any such political upheaval in or among the states of the former U.S.S.R. would be much more likely to issue in internal or localized hostilities, rather than a concerted strategic effort to marshal capabilities for external expansionism -- the ability to project power beyond their borders.

[REDACTED]

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There are other potential nations or coalitions that could, in the further future, develop strategic aims and a defense posture of region-wide or global domination. Our strategy must now refocus on precluding the emergence of any potential future global competitor. But because we no longer face either a global threat or a hostile, non-democratic power dominating a region critical to our interests, we have the opportunity to meet threats at lower levels and lower costs -- as long as we are prepared to reconstitute additional forces should the need to counter a global threat re-emerge. . . .

[REDACTED]

OSD 1.4 (C)

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(S) The disintegration of the Soviet Union also affects the dynamics of low-intensity conflict. We no longer have the Soviets fueling and exploiting low-intensity conflict to the detriment of US security. However, the demise of the Soviet Union has not put an end to destabilizing national and ethnic antagonisms in regions where the US has important security interests. Regional actors determined to pursue anti-American agendas may choose to use indirect and unconventional means. Moreover, there are trans-national security problems such as drug trafficking and terrorism which, along with unfavorable demographic and economic trends, undermine the security of the US, friendly governments and emerging democracies.

(S) Clearly, the passing of the Cold War reduces pressure for US military involvement in every potential regional or local conflict. Indeed, absent a global ideological challenge, we have opportunity to exercise far greater selectivity in our commitments, to rely more heavily on multilateral efforts to resolve regional or local crises that do not directly threaten our interests, and to draw more fully on non-military instruments as a means of conflict resolution. This applies in a variety of conflict situations. Nevertheless, if current trends hold, it is clear that DoD may be called upon during the FY 1994-1999 period to respond to regional challenges. The nature of that response may vary from humanitarian assistance to "presence" or peacekeeping missions to the use of force. In most cases, it is likely that the

OSD 1.4 (a)

C. Regional Threats and Risks

With the demise of a global military threat to U.S. interests, regional military threats, including possible conflicts arising in and from the territory of the former Soviet Union, will be of primary concern to the U.S. in the future. These threats are likely to arise in regions critical to the security of the U.S. and its allies, including Europe, East Asia, the Middle East and Southwest Asia, and the territory of the former Soviet Union. We also have important interests at stake in Latin America, Oceania, and Sub-Saharan Africa. In both cases, the U.S. will be concerned with preventing the domination of key regions by a hostile power. . . .


(U) To appreciate the applicability and relevance of our strategy to specific regional situations requires a more detailed analysis of the linkages and cross-currents within and among various regions. This also requires a more complete discussion of how the regional defense strategy will accomplish its dual mission of both protecting U.S. national interests and concurrently sustaining our commitment to stability and order in a complex, interrelated world.

1. Former Soviet Union (U)

The former Soviet state achieved global reach and power by consolidating control over the resources in the territory of the former U.S.S.R. The best means of assuring that no hostile power is able to consolidate control over the resources within the former Soviet Union is to support its successor states (especially Russia and Ukraine) in their efforts to become peaceful democracies with market-based economies. A democratic partnership with Russia and the other republics would be the best possible outcome for the United States. At the same time, we must also hedge against the possibility that democracy will fail, with the potential that an authoritarian regime bent on regenerating aggressive military power could emerge in Russia, or that similar regimes in other successor republics could lead to spreading conflict within the former U.S.S.R. or Eastern Europe.

For the immediate future, key U.S. concerns will be the ability of Russia and the other republics to demilitarize their societies, convert their military industries to civilian production, eliminate or, in the case of Russia, radically reduce their nuclear weapons inventory, maintain firm command and control over nuclear weapons, and prevent leakage of advanced military technology and expertise to other countries.


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
OSD 1.4 (α)

2. Western Europe (U)

NATO continues to provide the indispensable foundation for a stable security environment in Europe. Therefore, it is of fundamental importance to preserve NATO as the primary instrument of Western defense and security, as well as the channel for U.S. influence and participation in European security affairs. While the United States supports the goal of European integration, we must seek to prevent the emergence of European-only security arrangements which would undermine NATO, particularly the alliance's integrated command structure.



OSD 1.4 (α)



3. East/Central Europe (U)

OSD 1.4 (a)

(S) The end of the Warsaw Pact and the dissolution of the Soviet Union have gone a long way toward increasing stability and reducing the military threat to Europe. The ascendancy of democratic reformers in the Russian Republic, should this process continue, is likely to create a more benign policy toward Eastern Europe.

However, the U.S. must keep in mind the long history of conflict between the states of Eastern Europe, as well as the potential for conflict between the states of Eastern Europe and those of the former Soviet Union. . . .

The most promising avenues for anchoring the east-central Europeans into the West and for stabilizing their democratic institutions is their participation in Western political and economic organizations. East-central European membership in the (European Community) at the earliest opportunity, and expanded NATO liaison. . . . The U.S. could also consider extending to the east-central European states security commitments analogous to those we have extended to Persian Gulf states.

Should there be a re-emergence of a threat from the Soviet Union's successor state, we should plan to defend against such a threat in Eastern Europe, should there be an alliance decision to do so.

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
4. East Asia/Pacific (U)

. . . Defense of Korea will likely remain one of the most demanding major regional contingencies. . . Asia is home to the world's greatest concentration of traditional Communist states, with fundamental values, governance, and policies decidedly at variance with our own and those of our friends and allies.

To buttress the vital political and economic relationships we have along the Pacific rim, we must maintain our status as a military power of the first magnitude in the area. This will enable the U.S. to continue to contribute to regional security and stability by acting as a balancing force and prevent emergence of a vacuum or a regional hegemon.

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(S) We must endeavor to curb proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as ballistic and cruise missiles. Where appropriate, as on the Korean peninsula, we can explore selective conventional arms control and confidence building measures, but we must avoid proposals that would erode U.S. naval strength critical to our forward deployed posture. We need better intelligence yielding improved strategic warning to permit us to benefit from greater economy of force. We should pursue our cooperation with friendly regional states, including assistance to combat insurgency, terrorism and drug trafficking.

5. Middle East and Southwest Asia (U)

In the Middle East and Southwest Asia, our overall objective is to remain the predominant outside power in the region and preserve U.S. and Western access to the region's oil. We also seek to deter further aggression in the region, foster regional stability, protect U.S. nationals and property, and safeguard our access to international air and seaways. As demonstrated by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, it remains fundamentally important to prevent a hegemon or alignment of powers from dominating the region. This pertains especially to the Arabian peninsula. Therefore, we must continue to play a strong role through enhanced deterrence and improved cooperative security.


OSD 1.4 (a)

We will seek to prevent the further development of a nuclear arms race on the Indian subcontinent. In this regard, we should work to have both countries, India and Pakistan, adhere to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and to place their nuclear energy facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. We should discourage Indian hegemonic aspirations over the other states in South Asia and on the Indian Ocean. With regard to Pakistan, a constructive U.S.-Pakistani military relationship will be an important element in our strategy to promote stable security conditions in Southwest Asia and Central Asia. We should therefore endeavor to rebuild our military relationship given acceptable resolution of our nuclear concerns.




We can help our friends meet their legitimate defensive needs with U.S. foreign military sales without jeopardizing power balances in the region. We will tailor our security assistance programs to enable our friends to bear better the burden of

defense and to facilitate standardization and interoperability of recipient country forces with our own. We must focus these programs to enable them to modernize their forces, upgrade their defense doctrines and planning, and acquire capabilities such as anti-tank weapons, integrated air defense systems, and improved intelligence and communications systems.



OSD 1.4 (G)

(S) The infusion of new and improved conventional arms and the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction during the past decade have dramatically increased offensive capabilities and the risk of future wars throughout the region. We will continue to work with all regional states to reduce military expenditures for offensive weapons, slow the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and long-range missiles, and prevent the transfer of militarily significant technology and resources to states which might threaten U.S. friends or upset the regional balance of power.



OSD 1.4 (G)

(S) The presence of drug production and trafficking in Southwest Asia complicates our relations with regional countries. We will support the efforts of U.S. counter-narcotics agencies in the region in their mission to curtail the drug trade..

6. Latin America and the Caribbean (U)

(U) In Latin America and the Caribbean, the US seeks a stable security environment. As in the past, the focus of US security policy is assisting nations in the region against the threat posed by insurgents and terrorists, while fostering the development of democratic institutions. In addition, the US must assist its neighbors in combating the instability engendered by illicit

narcotics, as well as continuing efforts to prevent illegal drugs from entering the United States.

Cuba's growing domestic crisis holds out the prospect for positive change, but over the near term, Cuba's tenuous internal situation is likely to generate new challenges to U.S. policy. Consequently, our programs must provide capabilities to meet a variety of Cuban contingencies which could include an attempted repetition of the Mariel boatlift, a military provocation against the U.S. or an American ally, or political instability and internal conflict in Cuba.

OSD 1.4 (a)

(U) Countering drug trafficking remains a national security priority of the Department of Defense. Our programs must be geared toward attacking drug trafficking at the source, in the producing and refining countries, and along the transit routes to the US. In particular, we need to help stabilize and bolster the counter-insurgency capabilities of the government of Peru, which is facing a serious and growing drug-linked insurgency. DOD is the lead federal agency for detection and monitoring of drug traffic destined for the United States. Our programs must therefore