http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/03/06PORTAUPRINCE559.html
26 March 2006
WikiLeaks: DOS: Haiti Ambassador Sanderson to Washington
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RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0997
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C O N F I D E N T I A L PORT AU PRINCE 000559
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2010
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM HA
SUBJECT: PREVAL IN WASHINGTON: SEEKING STATUS
Classified By: DCM Douglas M. Griffiths for reasons 1.4(b).
1. (C) President elect Rene Garcia Preval's goal for his
visit to the White House and State Department is to send an
unequivocal message to Haitians at home and observers abroad
that the USG is fully committed to supporting his government.
He believes that a meeting with President Bush (and the
accompanying photo-op) would be the most tangible
demonstration of that commitment. Beyond that, he will bring
a large delegation of advisors and supporters from various
sectors to witness the show of support he expects to receive
from his interlocutors. Preval has frequently communicated
his firm desire to maintain close relations with the United
States, most notably during his March 12 meeting in Santiago,
Chile with Secretary Rice. We should reassure him that we
want him to succeed, and stand ready to supply the tools to
help him institutionalize transparent and democratic
institutions. Preval has declined invitations to visit
France, Cuba, and Venezuela in order to visit Washington
first. Preval has close personal ties to Cuba, having
received prostate cancer treatment there, but has stressed to
the Embassy that he will manage relations with Cuba and
Venezuela solely for the benefit of the Haitian people, and
not based on any ideological affinity toward those
governments.
2. (C) In the period between his election and his
inauguration, which he now expects to occur in mid-May,
Preval has concentrated on bolstering Haiti's international
support and in his words "appearing presidential," while
avoiding sensitive domestic issues before his government is
in place. Preval will cover a well-rehearsed set of points
both with the USG and in his meetings at the UN and the OAS.
He has consistently stated that his priorities are
strengthening Haiti's institutions, particularly those that
decentralize political power, and the encouragement of
private investment and job creation. Preval has also
stressed the importance of fighting corruption and
implementing police reform. The Ambassador has encouraged
Preval's advisors to communicate his vision for Haiti's
future as a prosperous democratic society, rather than
present a laundry list of requests for assistance.
3. (C) That said, Preval has clear goals for the visit. He
wants to bury once and for all the suspicion in Haiti that
the United States is wary of him. He is seeking to enhance
his status domestically and internationally with a successful
visit to the United States. In his frequent meetings with
us, he has repeatedly stressed that he wants to move Haiti
from reliance on development assistance, to growth through
private investment - both foreign and domestic. He wants
international development assistance to facilitate that
transition through investment in Haiti's weak institutions,
in education and in agriculture. Investment is the key to
employment generation, which Preval insists is the only way
to build a more stable society. For team Preval, access to
the U.S. market would boost employment generation. Preval
will push preferential trade legislation on his trip to the
United States, and will be accompanied by a number of private
sector representatives. He will likely reiterate the issue
of combating drug trafficking. Preval believes that he had
only lukewarm U.S. cooperation on drugs during his first
mandate. We have reassured him of our full commitment, but
he will be looking for U.S. planes and boats in the complete
absence of Haitian resources. Preval has also repeatedly
underscored the need for skilled advisors to re-build Haitian
institutions. We are ready to commit existing USAID funds to
support him.
4. (C) Preval has decisively broken with former President
Aristide and the Famni Lavalas party. He has asked all of
this international supporters to help make clear to the
government of South Africa that he does not welcome
Aristide's return to Haiti. (Note: We do not have a reliable
account of Preval's meeting with President Mbeki in Santiago.
End Note) At home, Preval has stuck, when asked, to a
constitutional formulation that Aristide is legally allowed
to return, but has otherwise steered clear of the subject.
While Aristide's militant supporters may still attempt to
foment disorder on his behalf, we believe that the with the
support of MINUSTAH the Preval government will have the means
to control these elements and the vast majority
of Haitian's now expect Preval himself to meet their
expectations for improved living conditions and a new
direction for Haiti.
SANDERSON