http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/11/world/the-reach-of-war-the-insurgency-iraq-s-rebellion-develops-signs-of-internal-rift.html

July 11, 2004

Iraq's Rebellion Develops Signs of Internal Rift

By IAN FISHER and EDWARD WONG

BAGHDAD, Iraq, July 10 -- Tension appears to be rising between the homegrown Iraqi resistance and the foreign Islamist fighters who have entered the country to destroy the American military here. This is one reason, experts speculate, that Iraq has not had the kind of spectacular attack meant to spread terror and defy the American agenda for a long two weeks, even during the transfer of formal sovereignty back to the Iraqis.

Evidence has emerged in sniping between groups on Arabic television and Web sites, and in interviews with Iraqi and American officials, as well as from members of the resistance and people with close ties to it. All speak of rising friction between nationalistic fighters and foreign-led Islamists over goals and tactics, with some Iraqi insurgents indicating a revulsion over the car bombs and suicide attacks in cities that have caused hundreds of civilian deaths.

But such friction does not mean there is a "submission by the resistance," said Dhary Rasheed, a professor at the University of Baghdad who lives in Samarra, a center for the resistance. "It is a phase of reconstruction and re-evaluation in order to push the operations out of the cities," so as "not to have innocent people killed."

Large car-bombings -- thought to be carried out more often by foreigners, who make up a tiny percentage of the rebels -- have "disgraced the reputation of the resistance," Professor Rasheed said. "And the resistance has worked just as the government has been trying to, to curtail the influence of the foreigners."

Routine violence continues at high levels across much of Iraq, and many civilians and American soldiers continue to die. The big attacks have not necessarily ended, experts are quick to acknowledge.

But this week, the split took a cinematic turn when masked men calling themselves the Salvation Movement released a videotape containing threats to kill Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian militant  suspected in the deadliest attacks here. American military officials say the group, based in Falluja, is made up of secular former members of Saddam Hussein's Baath Party. Then on Friday, a second group of guerrillas released a similar message threatening Mr. Zarqawi.

The same day, a statement posted on an Islamist Web site, claiming to be signed by Mr. Zarqawi, lashed out against the Muslim Clerics Association, an influential Sunni group with strong ties to Iraqi insurgents. The statement accused the group of weakness for offering a ransom to prevent the beheading of Nicholas E. Berg, the American businessman killed in May.

"Some mediators tried to save this infidel and offered us as much money as we want," the statement said. "But we refused, although we need this money to keep the wheel of holy war rolling."

Opinions among resistance fighters vary, but it is not uncommon these days to hear comments disdainful of the foreign fighters, like those from a young fighter in Falluja, whose relatives hold high positions in the resistance.

"Iraqis do not need Zarqawi or Al Qaeda members to help them," he told an Iraqi reporter working for The New York Times.

Dividing the Rebels

The split would seem to be welcome news to the new government of Prime Minister Iyad Allawi. His strategy for combating violence is to divide the insurgency by appealing to the patriotism of Iraqi fighters to reject the presence of foreigners who he claims do not care about Iraq itself. He is promising amnesty for some Iraqis, but threatening to crack down on those who do not accept it.

To that end, Mr. Allawi and other government officials say, he has been meeting with former Baath Party members in the resistance and tribal leaders to convince them that their interests and those of foreign fighters are not the same.

"We're negotiating with what I call the noncriminals, those who never really were the hard core like Zarqawi and his aides and the Al Qaeda-style people," Mr. Allawi said in an interview.  "And on the other hand, be very firm with the criminals and the assassins and the killers and the terrorists."

But many with ties to the insurgency caution against drawing clear lessons from this split or expecting Mr. Allawi's strategy to succeed.

There is little evidence that the various parts of the resistance regard Mr. Allawi's government as the legitimate sovereign leadership of Iraq. There are still 160,000 foreign troops on Iraqi soil, and American officials continue to hold sway. Until the last American soldier is gone, there will be no end to the resistance, say many Iraqis sympathetic to the insurgency.

"We don't approve of Iyad Allawi's government because he is an American agent," said one 25-year-old Sunni insurgent in Baghdad.

American and Iraqi officials say they hope the Sunni resistance will eventually channel its disenfranchisement into political action and contest the general elections scheduled for January 2005 rather than continuing to take up arms. A move in this direction could further widen the rift with foreign fighters.

But the reality is that the Sunni Arabs are a minority in the country and will probably  be a small or nonexistent presence in the highest offices after general elections, even though they have governed the area known as Iraq since the days of the Ottoman Empire. The insurgency could then continue its struggle, this time against a popularly elected government dominated by Shiites, who make up at least 60 percent of the population.

"We must prevent it from taking root," a senior American military official said, referring to the possibility that the Sunni insurgents will totally turn their backs on the political order created by United States and the United Nations.

Intelligence Gaps

American officials admit they lack reliable intelligence about the resistance, even about its size.

For months, American officials have said in public that the resistance has attracted no more than 5,000 people. But officials say privately that the numbers are far higher, and a detailed report by The Associated Press this week quoted an anonymous military official as saying that the resistance can call on upward of 20,000 people.

But even without detailed intelligence, the outlines of the resistance have been clear since it began gaining strength last fall. At the most basic level, the insurgency has been divided into the three parts that sometimes overlap: Sunni Arabs, in many cases led by former Baath Party members and former soldiers; Shiite Arabs led by Moktada al-Sadr; and foreigners from other Arab and Muslim countries.

The Shiites operate largely separately from the Sunnis and most foreign fighters, experts conclude. Sunni insurgents do not act under a central command, but rather are made up of independent groups that coordinate loosely and that have attracted many volunteers, these sources say.

The heavy fighting in April and May appears to have changed the groups' relations and relative strength.

Mr. Sadr's poorly trained militia appears to have been weakened greatly as it has taken on American troops in Baghdad and cities across the southern Shiite heartland, even as Mr. Sadr's popularity has soared.

Meanwhile, the military position of the Sunnis and foreign fighters appears to have improved after American officials declined to mount a final military assault on Falluja, essentially allowing the creation of a haven for militants.

Some experts argue that the formation of the new government, even if it has not been accepted as legitimate, has still accentuated the difference in goals between the groups.

The Iraqi resistance seems to be fighting against the Americans largely in the names of Mr. Hussein and Iraqi patriotism or for the cause of getting Sunnis into positions of greater power.

The foreign fighters embrace a broader anti-American agenda, less specific to Iraq and concerned more with sowing destruction in the name of militant Islam.

But religious fervor does seem to bind some Iraqis and foreigners.

A Shift in Perceptions

The establishment of the sovereign government may have set in motion a subtle but real shift in perceptions among some Iraqi rebels. Some argue that Mr. Allawi's Baathist past -- he was a hard-liner before he ran afoul of Mr. Hussein -- is swaying some former Baathists toward loyalty to the new government.

Perhaps even more persuasive, American military officials say, is the new president, Sheik Ghazi Ajil al-Yawar, a Sunni who has spoken against the occupation. And even if Americans hold ultimate power, Iraqis head a government with broad authority, and the resistance is taking notice, several experts say.

"All these things taken together will pull in some Baathists, though not all of them," said Hamid al-Bayati, the deputy foreign minister. "We have to see how many of them will join in."

Though the Iraqi guerrillas have proved to be skilled warriors, it is the foreign fighters who are most often accused of plotting the larger attacks, which have hit Shiite mosques, crowded streets, political parties and foreign aid groups. In a single day of bombings, as many as 200 people have been killed.

Over time the deaths of innocent Iraqis, American and Iraqi officials say, have angered many Iraqi resisters, and that is evident in statements by groups involved with the resistance or close to it. There even seems to be specific opposition to the attacks on police stations, oil pipelines and electrical stations -- all basic structures of a functioning state.

Asked recently if he advocated continued struggle against the Americans, Sheik Abdul-Satar Sattar al-Samarrai, a leader of the Muslim Clerics Association, said: "Yes. Honest and true resistance -- that is away from chaos, killing innocents and policemen and sabotaging the infrastructure -- should go on to kick the occupation out of the country."

The mystery remains whether the transfer of sovereignty itself has truly deepened the divide between Iraqis and foreigners and has led to the lull in audacious terror attacks since June 24. On that day, four days before the transfer of formal sovereignty, coordinated bombings in several cities killed more than 100 people. After that, American officials braced for an increase in attacks to protest the new interim government, but that never materialized.

Since then, insurgents have struck on a much smaller scale and have mainly confined their targets to American soldiers, Iraqi police officers, government officials and infrastructure.

Professor Rasheed said such changes were deliberate, with the resistance essentially giving Mr. Allawi the chance to prove that he is working in Iraqis' interests and will try to decrease the visibility of American soldiers.

Other officials do not go that far. The senior American military official would not rule out the possibility that Iraqi insurgents were reining in the foreigners. But it is also possible, he said, that altogether the insurgents are adapting to circumstances and are focusing less on the immediate and more on the longer term.

"Maybe this is just a tactical pause," he said. "What is the next big event? The elections."