After the Cataclysm:
Postwar Indochina and the Reconstruction of Imperial Ideology

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SOUTH END PRESS
BOSTON
CHAPTER 5

Laos

The U.S. war in Laos is typically called a “secret war,” and with reason. During the period of the most ferocious bombing of the civilian society of northern Laos, which even the U.S. government conceded was unrelated to military operations in Vietnam or Cambodia, the press consciously suppressed eyewitness testimony by well-known noncommunist Western reporters. Earlier, fabricated tales of “Communist aggression” in Laos had been widely circulated by a number of influential correspondents. In the elections of 1958, which the U.S. government vainly attempted to manipulate, the Pathet Lao emerged victorious, but U.S. subversion succeeded in undermining the political settlement. At one point the United States backed a right-wing Thai-based military attack against the government recognized by the United States. All of this barely entered public awareness. The same was true of the CIA-sponsored subversion that played a significant role in undermining the 1962 agreements, a settlement which, if allowed to prevail, might well have isolated Laos from the grim effects of the war in Southeast Asia.

The hill tribesmen recruited by the CIA (as they had been by the French) to hold back the social revolution in Laos, were decimated, then abandoned when their services were no longer needed. Again, the press was unconcerned. When John Everingham, a Lao-speaking Australian reporter, travelled in 1970 “through dying village after dying village” among the Meo who had been “naive enough to trust the CIA” and were now being
offered "a one-way 'copter ride to death'" in the CIA clandestine army, no U.S. journal (apart from the tiny pacifist press) was interested enough to cover the story, though by that time even the New York Times was permitting an occasional report on the incredible bombing that had "turned more than half the total area of Laos to a land of charred ruins where people fear the sky" so that "nothing be left standing or alive for the communists to inherit" (Everingham). The Meo tribesmen cannot flee to the Pathet Lao zones or they too will be subjected to the merciless bombardment, he wrote: "Like desperate dogs they are trapped, and the CIA holds the leash, and is not about to let it go as long as the Meo army can hold back the Pathet Lao a little longer, giving the Americans and their allies a little more security 100 miles south at the Thailand border."

It is only after the war's end, when the miserable remnants of the Meo can be put on display as "victims of Communism," that American sensibilities have been aroused, and the press features stories that bewail their plight.²

Extensive analysis of refugee reports was conducted at the time by a few young Americans associated with International Voluntary Services in Laos. In scale and care, these studies exceed by a considerable measure the subsequent studies of refugees from Cambodia that have received massive publicity in the West, and the story is every bit as gruesome. But the press was rarely interested and published materials, which appeared primarily outside the mainstream media, were virtually ignored and quickly forgotten.³ As in the case of Timor, the agency of terrorism made the facts incompatible with the purposes of the propaganda system. The press, and scholarship as well, much preferred government tales of "North Vietnamese aggression," and continued to engage in flights of fancy based on the flimsiest evidence while ignoring the substantial factual material that undermined these claims.⁴

With the expulsion of John Everingham of the Far Eastern Economic Review from Laos by the new regime, no full-time Western journalists remain in Laos so that direct reporting is sparse and most of what appears in the press derives from Bangkok. Such testimony must be regarded with even more than the usual care.⁵ Direct reporting by Westerners from Laos can still
be found, however, by those who have learned over the years not to rely on the established press for "news." For example, two representatives of the Mennonite Central Committee, Linda and Murray Hiebert, left Vientiane at the end of January, 1978, after five years of volunteer service in Laos and Vietnam, and wrote several articles "prepared on the basis of research in Laos, including visits to a wide variety of places and projects, interviews with government officials and ordinary people, and evaluation of data collected by United Nations and Lao government agencies." We will return later to their eyewitness accounts and those of others who also bring perspectives that render them unusable by the Free Press.

The media have often feigned a touching regard for "lovely little Laos" and its "gentle folk," even while they were suppressing the abundant evidence on the murderous U.S. attack on the land and its people. When the war ended, Harry Reasoner, the commentator for ABC News, offered a fairly typical reaction, which was considered sufficiently profound to merit reprinting in the press. He expressed his "guess" that the Laotians, with their "innate disbelief and disinterest in these bloody games" played "by more activist powers like Russia and China and the United States and North Vietnam"—these are the "activist powers" that share responsibility for the turmoil in Indochina—will show that "there is some alternative for small, old places to becoming either Chile or Albania." So Laos may preserve its "elephants, eroticism, and phallic symbols"—and presumably, though he does not mention it, its average life expectancy of 40 years, its infant mortality rate of over 120 per thousand births (one of the highest in the world) and the rate of child deaths which will kill 240,000 of 850,000 infants before their first birthday in the next five years.

Reasoner continues: "I hope the benign royalty which has presided over the clowning of the CIA and the vicious invasion of the North Vietnamese will be able to absorb and disregard a native communist hierarchy." The "invasion of the North Vietnamese" was largely a fabrication of U.S. propagandists duly transmitted by the press and scholarship and the "clowning of the CIA" included those merry games that virtually destroyed those Meo naive enough to trust them, while massacring defenseless peasant
communities and converting much of Laos to a moonscape, still littered with unexploded ordnance.

The New York Times presented a historical analysis of the war as it came to an end.\textsuperscript{10} "Some 350,000 men, women and children have been killed, it is estimated, and a tenth of the population of three million uprooted" in this "fratricidal strife that was increased to tragic proportions by warring outsiders." In actuality, as in the case of Vietnam, it appears unlikely that there would have been any extended "fratricidal strife" had it not been for outsiders, of whom the United States was decisively important. The "history" is very well-sanitized, as befits America's "newspaper of record." The U.S. role is completely ignored apart from a few marginal and misleading references.\textsuperscript{11} As late as 1975, the New York Times is still pretending that the U.S. bombers were striking only North Vietnamese supply trails—Saxon mentions no other bombing—although the ferocious aerial warfare waged against the civilian society of northern Laos was by then well-known, and had even been reported occasionally in the Times.\textsuperscript{12} Ideologically based misrepresentations of history pervade the article, e.g., in the reference to the 1954 Geneva conference which "left Laos with an ineffective International Control Commission and enough ambiguities for the Pathet Lao to retain its stronghold." The ICC was indeed ineffective in preventing U.S. subversion in subsequent years, as the United States attempted to exploit "ambiguities" it perceived or invented in international agreements that permitted Pathet Lao control of the areas in question and laid the basis for their integration into the national political system in 1958, with consequences already noted.

When the war ended in 1975, the victorious Pathet Lao appear to have made some efforts to achieve a reconciliation with the mountain tribesmen who had been organized in the CIA clandestine army. One of the leaders of the Hmong ("who are best known to the outside world by the pejorative name 'Meo'"), Lytek Lynhiavu, held the position of director of administration in the Ministry of the Interior in the coalition government. He was the leader of a small group of Hmong who had refused to join the CIA-Vang Pao operation. Lytek tried to stem the flight of Hmong tribesmen (who "had reason to be fearful because it was they who had done much of the hardest fighting against the Pathet Lao and
their North Vietnamese supporters) to Thailand, but in vain. Lyteck "alleged that the U.S. had flown leaflets to Long Cheng [the base of the CIA army] and that these caused the Hmong people there to fear for their lives." U.S. officials denied the charge; "other sources said that the leaflets were in circulation long before Gen. Vang Pao left Laos and that they had been produced for propaganda purposes by an officer who had worked for the general," who was commander of the CIA clandestine army.13

"Whatever their origin, the leaflets appeared to be a fabrication. They were written in a complicated style that would have been difficult for many of the Hmong to understand."14

Lewis M. Simons, another correspondent with a record of serious reporting, gave a detailed account of Pathet Lao "re-education" programs shortly after.15 He interviewed people who had participated in Pathet Lao-organized "seminars" where "to the surprise of even some of the more skeptical, a lot of what they are taught seems to make sense to them." One office clerk reported: "The Pathet Lao are genuine patriots. They want to teach us pride in ourselves and our country, something we never had under the old regime." A graduate student expressed admiration for what he called the "scientific" approach the Pathet Lao took at the seminars, which he said were "tailored to the educational level of the people attending" and included persuasive arguments, though the authoritarian character of the system that was being introduced was evident enough: "There's no doubt in my mind that they're sincerely interested in improving the lives of the common people. That's more than you could ever have said for the previous government."

How common such reactions may be is an open question. Norman Peagam, a Lao-speaking correspondent of demonstrated integrity, wrote a long and critical report from Vientiane in the New York Times a year and a half later.16 "Little of the surface of life seems to have changed in Vientiane two years after the Communists' gradual and bloodless seizure of power," though the economy is run down "partly as a result of the halt in United States aid in 1975 and the blockade imposed by neighboring Thailand," which controls Laos's access to the outside world. But there have been changes: "Crime, drug addiction and prostitution have been
largely suppressed” and “everyone is expected to work hard and take part in communal rice and vegetable projects in the evening and on weekends.” Most of the professional and commercial elite are among the 100,000 people who have fled (the great majority of whom, however, were hill tribesmen), and some farmers and urban workers have also escaped despite the border guards who often shoot at refugees. Many others “want to leave but lack the money, the connections or the courage,” while “there are many others who support the new Government or at least accept it despite all the difficulties,” and hundreds have returned from France and other Western countries. Outside of Vientiane, “it seems likely that the Communists have a solid political base in the two-thirds of Laos that they effectively controlled during the recurrent conflicts that began in the 1950s. In the fertile populated Mekong Valley, where they are still relative newcomers, their power is largely maintained through apathy and the threat of armed force.” Western diplomats estimate the number in reeducation centers at 30,000. “They are being kept in centers ranging from picturesque islands for juvenile delinquents, drug addicts and prostitutes to remote labor camps barred to outsiders from which only a handful of people have so far returned.” Western diplomats list firm political will, honesty, patriotism and discipline as the new rulers’ main strengths. But, they maintain, the priority of ideological over technical considerations, the Communists’ deep suspicion of Westerners and intolerance of dissent and their poor managerial skills seriously hamper efforts to develop the country.” Another “factor hampering development has been the activities of rebels”; “it seems apparent that Thai officials give them support.” Another problem is corruption and the “new elite” of government and party officials who “enjoy numerous privileges not available to others,” creating cynicism and leading to exploitation of peasants “partly to feed this unproductive class.”

As in the case of Vietnam, one can find little discussion in the U.S. press of the Lao programs of reconstruction and social and economic development, or the problems that confront them. Repression and resistance, in contrast, are major themes of the scanty reporting. A brief report from Thailand describes “harsh concentration camps and a network of labor farms holding tens of
Laos 125

thousands of political prisoners...Informed Western sources estimate that 60,000 persons, many with little hope of rehabilitation, are in about 50 camps."19 Henry Kamm cast his baleful eye on Laos in March, 1978,20 reporting the continued flow of "Meo hill tribesmen of Laos who fought for the United States in the Indochina war,"21 some still carrying "their American-issued rifles." The refugees report "a major military campaign by Laotian and Vietnamese forces"—U.S.-style, with "long-range artillery shelling, which was followed by aerial rocketing, bombing and strafing," burning villages and food supplies, driving villagers into the forests (March 28). And again on the following day: "The Communists are bombing and rocketing Meo villages, presumably causing civilian casualties." "Resistance groups of various sizes, operating independently and without central direction or foreign assistance, are active throughout Laos, according to self-described resistance fighters, other recent refugees and diplomatic sources."

That the resistance forces are operating without U.S. or Thai assistance seems dubious (cf. Peagam, above, and notes 17 and 24), in the light of the long history of U.S. intervention in Laos based in Thailand, always the "focal point" for U.S. terror and subversion in Southeast Asia.22 And the record of U.S. journalism with regard to Laos is in general so abysmal that even if there is an American hand, if a long tradition prevails, the reader of the New York Times will be unlikely to hear about it—though an expose may come years later when the dirty work is long finished and the CIA is once again being reformed, in keeping with traditional U.S. commitments to justice, democracy, and freedom.

The guerrilla groups, Kamm claims, are "led mainly by former officers of the Laotian regular and irregular armies"—the latter term being the euphemism for the forces organized and directed by the CIA—"and are said to include significant numbers of defectors from the Pathet Lao, the Communist guerrilla organization [who, incidentally, constitute the present government, recognized by the United States], who are unhappy about the growing Vietnamese influence in their country."23 Kamm's "picture of the Meo's situation is Laos" conveniently omits any discussion of the U.S. program to organize them to fight for the United States, trapping them like desperate dogs and throwing away the leash when they lost their usefulness. Other problems
and developments in Laos are not on the beat of the Times Pulitzer prize winner.24

The continued resistance of the Meo serves as an inspiration to the editors of the Christian Science Monitor, who write (5 April 1978) that "one can only marvel at the human spirit and the tenacious longing of men for independence," sentiments that they never expressed when Laotian peasants were struggling to survive in the face of a ferocious U.S. attack that vastly exceeds in scale anything that the Communists are capable of mounting. "The fighting serves to remind the world—a long five years after the Indo-China war—that the communists have not won the hearts and minds of the people. They have victimized them." Note that for these representatives of the Free Press, "the people"—a term that rarely appears in U.S. journalism—are the hill tribesmen, who, as Kamm correctly reports, "fought for the United States in the Indochina war."

The Monitor editorialists are as oblivious as Henry Kamm to the past record of U.S. involvement with the hill tribesmen (nor do they seem aware of their own news reports; see above, p. 122). But they do know that Laos was bombed, though they do not seem to recall by whom: "Mercilessly bombed during the war, today Laos is hounded with problems, including a terrible food shortage (it was once self-sufficient in food), a disrupted economy, an exodus of skilled technicians, and of course political domination by the Vietnamese"—of course. "Little Laos is in fact tragically caught between the anvil and the hammer: a pawn of the Vietnamese as the frontline of defense against Thailand and a client of the Soviet Union in its big-power competition with China."

In the light of the well-known historical facts, it is no less than amazing that a major U.S. newspaper, one of the few that attends seriously to international affairs, and one that exudes moralism in its editorial commentary, can fail to make any mention whatsoever of the U.S. role, past and present, in creating these "problems," presented as if they were entirely the fault of the Communists. Once again, we see the remarkable similarities between the Free Press and its counterparts in the totalitarian states.

But, the Monitor informs us, "some signs of hope for the long-suffering Laotian people are emerging." In particular, "if they [the Laotian Communists] were to resolve the issue of the MIAs, they
would also be able to improve relations with the United States.” At this point, words fail.

And then these final thoughts:

In the final analysis, it will all depend on Hanoi. The question is how soon the Vietnamese want to establish normal links with the West and derive the benefits that come from being responsible members of the international community. As the men in Hanoi ponder their strategy, the people of Laos go on enduring.

If only Hanoi would choose to become a “responsible member of the international community,” joining the country that pounded Laos to dust while the Monitor looked the other way, then the long-suffering people of Laos might see a ray of hope. Hanoi is responsible for their tragedy, not the murderers and their accomplices in the press.25

The New York Times did run an Op-Ed describing the scandalous refusal of the Carter Administration to respond to the appeal of the Laotian government for international assistance “to stave off the impending disaster” of starvation after a terrible drought.26 This Op-Ed cites the two Mennonite relief workers who had just returned from Laos who report “that irrigation networks have collapsed and that paddy fields are pockmarked with bomb craters.”28 Others have estimated that so many buffalo were killed during the war that farmers “have to harness themselves to plows to till fields” while “unexploded bombs buried in the ground hamper food production.” But the U.S. Administration, fearing “that it will appear to be pro-Communist, thereby jeopardizing the canal treaties,” has refused to send any of its rice surplus (the world’s largest) to Laos, despite impending starvation.29 The problem is compounded by the fact that “last year the Congress specifically forbade direct aid to Laos,” though the “Food for Peace law” permits an exception. “Any more delay in Washington would simply compound the barbarity that the United States has already brought to that region”—and specifically, to Laos, though one could hardly learn that fact from current reports in the Free Press.30 For an indication of the impact of this statement, see the Monitor editorial (just cited), three weeks later.
While in the United States, it is axiomatic that "of course" the Vietnamese dominate little Laos, caught between the Vietnamese hammer and the Russian anvil, others, who suffer the disadvantage of familiarity and concern with fact, express some doubts. Nayan Chanda writes from Vientiane that:

Diplomats here dismiss some of the sensational Bangkok press stories about ministries crawling with Vietnamese advisers, but they believe that a sizable number of Vietnamese—soldiers and engineers—are building roads and bridges in eastern and central Laos. Although old colonial routes 7, 8 and 9 are dirt tracks unusable during the monsoons, they helped bring essential supplies from Vietnam in the dark days of 1975 when Thailand closed its borders. The Vietnamese now working to repair these routes are thus helping to reduce Lao dependence on Thailand.\(^{31}\)

Lao dependence on U.S.-backed Thailand has been a crucial element in its postwar distress—a fact which escaped the attention of the Monitor in its ode to the human spirit—alongside of U.S. cruelty in withholding aid, which likewise escaped notice. "Both Lao and Vietnamese officials privately admit," Nayan Chanda reports, "that Thailand is going to be Vientiane's lifeline to the world for years to come."\(^{32}\) The heavily-bombed roads to Vietnam and Cambodia "need large-scale repairs before being put to commercial use" and problems in Vietnamese ports make it doubtful that this construction will be of much help to Laos in the short term. Meanwhile, Thailand is controlling the lifeline effectively: "A de facto blockade by Thailand has virtually halted the trickle of foreign aid and Laos' own drive to earn foreign currency through exports." The Lao government reported that the blockade "has been asphyxiating the economy," and foreign missions complain of "harassment by Thai customs."\(^{33}\)

Quite apart from food and supplies, Thailand had refused to ship medicines ordered and paid for by the International Red Cross. Meanwhile in Laos malaria has been raging since the United States cut off its malaria prevention program in 1975, "killing adults and children indiscriminately, infecting pregnant
women, and weakening many people so that they cannot work”—it is “having a ‘devastating effect’ on the Lao population,” according to foreign doctors, along with intestinal and respiratory illnesses, typhoid and malnutrition. When the oxygen-producing plant broke down and surgical operations had to be suspended, Thailand refused to allow emergency deliveries of oxygen, according to Laotian officials.34

Warnings of imminent starvation as a result of the recent severe drought and other causes have been repeatedly voiced by UN officials, foreign journalists, and others.35

In addition to the problems caused by the consequences of the U.S. air war, the drought, and the Thai blockade that had virtually halted the trickle of foreign aid as well as Lao exports, Laos faces structural problems that are a legacy of French and U.S. imperialism.36 The economy inherited by the Pathet Lao was “totally artificial,” with its “crippling dependence” on dollar aid, and “the nature of the outside influence brought serious distortion to a subsistence economy,” Chanda observes.37 He cites a confidential World Bank report of 1975 which pointed out that in the Vientiane zone industrial production (almost entirely comprising brewing and soft-drink manufacture), and the structure of urban services in general, were “heavily influenced by the demand of expatriates and a tiny, wealthy fraction of the Laotian population.” The main “production” of towns like Vientiane was administration, services for the administration and foreign personnel attached to it, and, of much less importance, production and services for the rest of the urban population—and, finally, for the country at large.

It is “the structural imbalance and artificial economy inherited from the old regime” that lie “at the root of the present crisis,” though “a series of blunders by the new Government worsened the situation.” The same World Bank report “warned that termination of the [foreign, largely U.S. aid] programme ‘would cause the collapse of organised administration, and much of urban life’.” The aid was terminated, even vital food, malaria control and medical supplies. Without large aid commitments from West or East, and lacking export earnings, “harsh economy measures are
inevitable" and "the exodus of refugees seeking a better life abroad continues," stirring the compassion of Westerners who deplore Communist depravity as Laos groans between the Vietnamese hammer and the Russian anvil.

Like other beneficiaries of Western tutelage and benevolence for many years, the Lao often do not find it easy to comprehend the profound humanitarian commitments of the West—recall their "deep suspicion of Westerners"—thus leading them to mistake as well the meaning of the noble Human Rights Crusade now being led, once again, by the United States:

Asked how he viewed the opposition of the American Congress to direct or indirect aid to the countries of Indo-china, [Lao Vice-Foreign Minister Khamphay Boupha] referred to his recent meeting with Frederick Brown (the officer in charge of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam affairs at the U.S. State Department) during the latter's visit to Vientiane. "I told him that the US talks a lot about human rights, but what would they do in the face of a situation like ours?

"The US has dropped 3 million tons of bombs—one ton per head—forced 700,000 peasants to abandon their fields; thousands of people were killed and maimed, and unexploded ordnance continues to take its toll. Surely the US does not show humanitarian concern by refusing to help heal the wounds of war." Khamphay revealed that Brown had asked them to wait for a period—and in the meanwhile, he wryly added, "they have forced Thailand to close the border." 38

Meanwhile the people of Laos die from malnutrition, disease, and unexploded ordnance, arousing no sympathy in the country that bears a substantial responsibility for their plight with its "clowning of the CIA," and now coldly withholds aid because, as the press sees it, Hanoi refuses to join the community of "responsible nations." The 240,000 of 850,000 infants who will die before their first birthday in the next five years, and the many others who will expire with them, may be added to the accounts of imperial savagery, quickly forgotten by Western humanitarians.
But the efforts to rebuild continue:

The problem is the shortage of essential tools, draught animals and the costly legacy of war—unexploded ammunition. One official of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees who recently visited newly-resettled areas on the Plain of Jars described efforts to grow food in small patches of land in a dusty bomb-cratered landscape.

The official gave the example of Muong Pek, with a population of 33,000, out of which 25,000 were displaced persons who returned to their villages after the war. Before the war, the population of the district owned 83,000 buffaloes to provide draught power and meat. When peace came there were only 250 buffaloes.

Although the number has since gone up to 2,000, it is still inadequate for ploughing the hardened soil abandoned for years. In some places, men have to strap themselves to a plough to turn the earth. Last year, not surprisingly, the peasants in the area produced only enough rice for between two and four months. In one commune in the district with a population of 3,500, 15 people were killed by ammunition left after the war.39

A few months later Chanda visited the Plain of Jars, “the scene of some of the heaviest bombing during the Indochina War,” where “people are making a start on reviving what was once a prosperous rural society.”40 From the air, the Plain of Jars resembles a lunar landscape, pockmarked as it is with bomb craters that are a stark testimony to the years of war that denuded the area of people and buildings,” a consequence of “six years of ‘secret’ bombing” by U.S. aircraft.41 “At ground level, the signs of death and destruction are even more ubiquitous.” The province capital was “completely razed.” “But the once-flourishing rural society of the plain is slowly coming back to life, raising bamboo- and-mud houses on the ruins of the old, reclaiming abandoned rice paddies, turning bomb craters into fish ponds, and weeding out the deadly debris of war that litters the area.” Thousands are now returning from refugee camps and “many have emerged from their forest shelters and caves in the surrounding mountains” to villages where sometimes “not even a broken wall is to be seen.” The
peasants of one village have to work in rice fields 15 kilometers away because “heavy bombing in the nearby mountains brought hundreds of tons of mud hurling down into the river that once irrigated” their paddy fields. A peasant who joined the Pathet Lao, recruited by U.S. bombs, recalls the day when a U.S. jet “scored a direct rocket hit on a cave in which 137 women and children of the village, including his own, were hiding. The cave was so hot from the explosion, he says, that for more than a day he could not go near it.” Today, “death still lurks in every corner of the plain” in the form of such “war debris” as “golf-ball size bombs containing explosives and steel bits released from a large canister” and other products of American ingenuity that killed thousands during the war, and continue to exact their deadly toll.42

There are Vietnamese present, Chanda observes; namely “Vietnamese workers and soldiers” who are “building schools and hospitals, improving the road network...repairing roads and bridges,” and “were never seen carrying guns.” “If any Soviet experts were in the area, they were well hidden,” and there were few “visible items of Soviet assistance.” There are slow efforts to introduce cooperative stores and cooperative farming, facilitated by “the economic dislocation caused by the US in its attempt to defeat communism” which makes it easy to persuade “villagers to pool their resources” in construction and farming. “Despite moves towards a Marxist-Leninist order, socialism in Laos remains a typically soft, Lao variety which does not conform to the rigid dialectical materialism of European Marxists.” Traditional ceremonies are preserved—at least that should please Harry Reasoner.

Louis and Eryl Kubicka visited the Plain of Jars on the same trip. They quote Chit Kham, whose wife and three daughters were among the 137 people killed when an F105 jet bomber “succeeded in hitting the cave entrance with three out of four rockets it fired, according to an eyewitness with whom we spoke...whose job it was to monitor the bombing from a tree-top perch.” Asked what the United States might do “to regain the respect of the people here,” Chit Kham answered: “Of course we want aid, but they have killed us, so many lives were lost...we want back those lives that were lost.”43 Kubicka also describes the vast destruction, the unexploded ordnance (his wife “found a CBU bomblet [by nearly stepping on it]”), the “billions of pieces of shrapnel scattered over” the
province, "the lack of pulling power" because of the killing of buffaloes. He left believing "that few Americans could personally visit here and see what we saw with the quiet amicable people who hosted us, without feeling a sense of basic human sympathy, or without being ready to lend a helping hand."

Earlier, Kubicka had published a report from Vientiane on the U.S. program of bombing the peasant society of northern Laos and the Lao efforts to reconstruct. He quotes a UN official who had returned from the Plain of Jars, where some refugees had already been resettled: "I've seen a lot of refugee situations in my time throughout the world, but this is the best organization I've ever seen. If this is what Laos is going to be like in the future, we're going to see some significant development here." But of course assistance will be needed: "Conspicuously absent from the list of those proffering assistance is the United States," Kubicka comments, adding that "every other major nation represented diplomatically in Vientiane is currently providing Laos with some aid."44

The November 1977 visit was the first by journalists to the Plain of Jars, an area which, for people who have freed themselves from the Western system of indoctrination, has come to symbolize the terror that can be visited by an advanced industrial society on defenseless peasants. To our knowledge, no word about it appeared in the mainstream media, which continue to guard their secrets.

The Hieberts described this visit to the Plain of Jars on their return to the United States from Vientiane in January, 1978 (see note 6). They too describe in detail the ravages of U.S. bombing and the efforts to reconstruct, with the assistance of Vietnamese workers who are, according to Vietnamese diplomats, "fulfilling their two years of national service by working in Laos." The Hieberts, who were engaged in relief work in Laos, also describe the attempts of the new regime to undertake rehabilitation of the human debris of war—orphans, drug addicts, and others—and to bring health services to the countryside, and the problems caused by severe drought, the withdrawal of U.S. aid from the artificial economy it had created, and the "on and off blockade by Thailand," which in September, 1977, blocked fuel imports from Singapore, Swedish road-building supplies, 2,000 tons of rice
donated by the UN for refugees, $100,000 worth of medicines, and drought-related equipment and supplies.

No U.S. government aid had to be obstructed.
CHAPTER 6

Cambodia

The third victim of U.S. aggression and savagery in Indochina, Cambodia, falls into a different category than postwar Vietnam and Laos. While the Western propaganda system has selected and modified information about Vietnam to convey the required image of a country suffering under Communist tyranny—the sole source of its current problems—it has been unable to conjure up the bloodbath that was confidently predicted (Laos, as usual, is rarely noticed at all). In fact, by historical standards, the treatment of collaborators in postwar Vietnam has been relatively mild, as the precedents reviewed indicate, though the provocation for merciless revenge was incomparably greater than in the instances we surveyed. But in the case of Cambodia, there is no difficulty in documenting major atrocities and oppression, primarily from the reports of refugees, since Cambodia has been almost entirely closed to the West since the war's end.

One might imagine that in the United States, which bears a major responsibility for what Francois Ponchaud calls "the calvary of a people," reporting and discussion would be tinged with guilt and regret. That has rarely been the case, however. The U.S. role and responsibility have been quickly forgotten or even explicitly denied as the mills of the propaganda machine grind away. From the spectrum of informed opinion, only the most extreme condemnations have been selected, magnified, distorted, and hammered into popular consciousness through endless rep-
etition. Questions that are obviously crucial even apart from the legacy of the war—for example, the sources of the policies of the postwar Cambodian regime in historical experience, traditional culture, Khmer nationalism, or internal social conflict—have been passed by in silence as the propaganda machine gravitates to the evils of a competitive socioeconomic system so as to establish its basic principle: that “liberation” by “Marxists” is the worst fate that can befall any people under Western dominance.

The record of atrocities in Cambodia is substantial and often gruesome, but it has by no means satisfied the requirements of Western propagandists, who must labor to shift the blame for the torment of Indochina to the victims of France and the United States. Consequently, there has been extensive fabrication of evidence, a tide that is not stemmed even by repeated exposure. Furthermore, more tempered and cautious assessments are given little notice, as is evidence that runs contrary to the chorus of denunciation that has dominated the Western media. The coverage of real and fabricated atrocities in Cambodia also stands in dramatic contrast to the silence with regard to atrocities comparable in scale within U.S. domains—Timor, for example. This coverage has conferred on that land of much suffering the distinction of being perhaps the most extensively reported Third World country in U.S. journalism. At the same time, propagandists in the press and elsewhere, recognizing a good thing when they see it, like to pretend that their lone and courageous voice of protest can barely be heard, or alternatively, that controversy is raging about events in postwar Cambodia.3

Critics of U.S. violence find themselves in a curious position in this connection. Generally ignored by the press, they find that in this case their comment is eagerly sought out in the hope that they will deny atrocity reports, so that this denial can be featured as “proof” that inveterate apologists for Communism will never learn and never cease their sleazy efforts, which create such problems for the honorable seekers after truth who must somehow penetrate the barriers erected by those who “defend Cambodia.”4 When no real examples can be found, the Free Press resorts to the familiar device of invention; the alleged views of critics of the propaganda barrage who do exist are known primarily through ritual denunciation rather than direct exposure. Or there are somber references
to unnamed people who "make use of the deaths of millions of Khmers to defend [their] own theories or projects for society."\(^5\)

Another common device is to thunder that the doves "had better explain" why there has been a bloodbath,\(^6\) or "concede" that their "support for the Communists"—the standard term for opposition to U.S. subversion and aggression—was wrong; it is the critics who must, it is claimed, shoulder the responsibility for the consequences of U.S. intervention, not those who organized and supported it or concealed the facts concerning it for many years, and still do.

It is, surely, not in doubt that it was U.S. intervention that inflamed a simmering civil struggle and brought the horrors of modern warfare to relatively peaceful Cambodia, at the same time arousing violent hatreds and a thirst for revenge in the demolished villages where the Khmer Rouge were recruited by the bombardment of the U.S. and its local clients. Matters have reached such a point that a social democratic journal can organize a symposium on the quite astounding question of whether opposition to the U.S. war in Indochina should be reassessed, given its consequences in Cambodia.\(^7\) Others claim that the scale of the atrocities in Cambodia or their nature—peasant revenge or systematic state-organized murder—does not really matter; it is enough that atrocities have occurred, a stance that would be rejected with amazement and contempt if adopted with regard to benign or constructive bloodbaths.

Predictably, the vast outcry against alleged genocide in Cambodia led to calls for military intervention in the U.S. Congress; we will comment no further on the fact that such a proposal can be voiced in the Congress of the United States or what the fact implies in the light of recent history. A look at some of these proposals reveals how effectively any concern for mere fact has been submerged in the tide of propaganda.

Representative Stephen J. Solarz raised the question "of some kind of international police action under the auspices of the United Nations."\(^8\) This proposal was advanced during the testimony of Gareth Porter, who had exposed earlier bloodbath lies and also raised doubts about the evidence offered in connection with Cambodia.\(^9\) As evidence for the genocidal nature of the Cambodian regime, Solarz cited "Khieu Samphan's interview with
Oriana Fallaci” in which he allegedly acknowledged “that somewhere in the vicinity of 1 million had been killed since the war.” As Porter commented in response, the interview was not with Oriana Fallaci, contained no such “acknowledgement,” and is at best of very dubious origin and authenticity, as we discuss below. Undeterred, Solarz raised the question of international intervention.

In congressional hearings a year later, Senator George McGovern gained wide—and unaccustomed—publicity when he suggested military intervention during the testimony of Douglas Pike, who is described in the press as a “State Department Indochina specialist.”10 According to an AP report, McGovern “called yesterday for international military intervention in Cambodia to stop what he called ‘a clear case of genocide,’” citing “estimates that as many as 2.5 million of Cambodia’s 7 million people have died of starvation, disease and execution since the Communist takeover three years ago.” He is quoted as follows:

This is the most extreme I’ve ever heard of...Based on the percentage of the population that appears to have died, this makes Hitler’s operation look tame...Is any thought being given...of sending in a force to knock this government out of power? I’m talking about an international peacekeeping force, not the United States going in with the Marine Corps.11

McGovern went on to speak of the “crime when an estimated two million innocent Cambodians are systematically slaughtered or starved by their own rulers,” a case of “genocidal conduct” that cannot be ignored by “the United States, as a leading proponent of human rights.”12 On CBS television the same day he said that “here you have a situation where in a country of seven million people, possibly as many as a third of them have been systematically slaughtered by their own government,” that is, “by a band of murderers that’s taken over that government.”13 He returned to the same theme a few days later, informing the Congress that “a band of murderous thugs has been systematically killing their fellow citizens. Two million Cambodians are said to have been destroyed.”14

If 2-2½ million people, about 1/3 of the population, have
been systematically slaughtered by a band of murderous thugs who have taken over the government, then McGovern is willing to consider international military intervention. We presume that he would not have made this proposal if the figure of those killed were, say, less by a factor of 100—that is 25,000 people—though this would be bad enough.\(^{15}\) Nor would he have been likely to propose this extreme measure if the deaths in Cambodia were not the result of systematic slaughter and starvation organized by the state but rather attributable in large measure to peasant revenge, undisciplined military units out of government control, starvation and disease that are direct consequences of the U.S. war, or other such factors. Nor has McGovern, or anyone else, called for military intervention to cut short the apparent massacre of something like one-sixth of the population of East Timor in the course of the Indonesian invasion, though in this case a mere show of displeasure by the government that provides the military equipment and the diplomatic and economic support for these atrocities might well suffice to bring the murderous attack to a halt.

Assuming then that facts do matter, we naturally ask what McGovern’s basis may have been for the specific allegations that he put forth. An inquiry to his office in Washington elicited no source for these charges or documentary evidence to substantiate them. It is interesting that McGovern’s call for intervention, widely discussed in the press (occasionally, with some derision because of his record as a dove), has not been criticized on grounds that he seems to have had no serious basis for his charges. Nor did any journalist, to our knowledge, report an inquiry to McGovern to determine what evidence, if any, lay behind the specific factual claims that he put forth in calling for military intervention. (At our urging, one TV newsman has made such an inquiry, and was informed by the staff that his source may have been Lon Nol! For the sake of McGovern’s reputation, we would prefer to believe that the numbers were invented).\(^{16}\)

On the assumption that facts do matter, we will inquire into the reporting of postwar Cambodia in the Western (primarily U.S.) media. We concede at once that for those who “know the truth” irrespective of the facts, this inquiry will appear to be of little moment. As in the other cases discussed, our primary concern
here is not to establish the facts with regard to postwar Indochina, but rather to investigate their refraction through the prism of Western ideology, a very different task. We will consider the kinds of evidence used by the media and those naive enough to place their faith in them, and the selection of evidence from what is available. We will see that the general theory of the Free Press, well-supported by what we have already reviewed, is once again dramatically confirmed: the more severe the allegations of crimes committed by an enemy, the greater (in general) the attention they receive. Exposure of falsehoods is considered largely irrelevant. The situation is rather different from the manufacture of Hun atrocities during World War I, to take an example already discussed, since at that time the falsehoods were exposed only years after—in this case, they continue to surface though refuted at once. The U.S. responsibility is largely ignored, though critics such as Jean Lacouture are not guilty of this incredible moral lapse, and virtually no effort is made to consider postwar Cambodia, or the credibility of evidence concerning it, in the light of historical experience such as that reviewed in chapter 2.

Ponchaud comments that there is a prima facie case in support of atrocity allegations: "the exodus of over one hundred thousand persons is a fact, and a bulky one, that raises enough questions in itself." We would add that by parity of argument, the same considerations apply elsewhere; the exodus of approximately one hundred thousand persons fleeing from the victors of the American revolution also raises questions, particularly when we recall that the white population was about 2½ million as compared with 7-8 million Cambodians and that this was after a war that was far less bitterly fought and lacked any comparable atrocities by foreign powers.

Most of the well-publicized information concerning postwar Cambodia derives from reports of refugees—or to be more precise, from accounts by journalists and others of what refugees are alleged to have said. On the basis of such reports, these observers draw conclusions about the scale and character of atrocities committed in Cambodia, conclusions which are then circulated (often modified) in the press or the halls of Congress. For example, Barron-Paul present some examples of what they claim to have heard from refugees and then conclude that the government of
Cambodia is bent on genocide, a conclusion which is then presented in various forms by commentators. Similarly Ponchaud cites examples of refugee reports and concludes that the government is engaged in “the assassination of a people,” giving estimates of the numbers executed or otherwise victims of centralized government policies. Reviewers and other commentators then inform the public that Ponchaud has shown that the Cambodian government, with its policies of autogenocide, is on a par with the Nazis, perhaps worse. With each link in the chain of transmission, the charges tend to escalate, as we shall see.

Evidently, a serious inquiry into the facts and the way they are depicted should deal with several issues: (1) the nature of the refugee testimony; (2) the media selection from the evidence available; (3) the credibility of those who transmit their version of refugee reports and draw conclusions from them; (4) the further interpretations offered by commentators on the basis of what evidence they select and present. We will concentrate on the third and fourth issues. But a few observations are in order about the first and second.

It is a truism, obvious to anyone who has ever dealt with refugees or considers the historical record or simply uses common sense, that “the accounts of refugees are indeed to be used with great care.”²⁰ It is a truism commonly ignored. For example, the New York Times Pulitzer prize-winning specialist on refugees from Communism interviewed Cambodian refugees in Thailand “in a cage 8 feet square and 10 feet high in the police station of this provincial capital,” where “9 men are huddled on the bare floor” rarely speaking and staring “into the narrow space before them with dulled eyes.”²¹ It does not occur to him, here or elsewhere, to treat the accounts offered under such circumstances with the “great care” that Ponchaud properly recommends. The media favorite, Barron-Paul, is based largely on visits to refugee camps arranged in part by a representative of the Thai Ministry of the Interior, whose “knowledge and advice additionally provided us with invaluable guidance.”²² In the camps to which they gained access with the help of this Thai official, who is responsible for internal security matters including anti-Communist police and propaganda operations, they “approached the camp leader elected by the Cambodians and from his knowledge of his people
compiled a list of refugees who seemed to be promising subjects"—one can easily imagine which "subjects" would seem "promising" to these earnest seekers after truth, to whom we return. Citing this comment, Porter points out that "the Khmer camp chief works closely with and in subordination to Thai officials who run the camps and with the Thai government-supported anti-Communist Cambodian organization carrying out harassment and intelligence operations in Cambodia." The camps and their leaders are effectively under Thai control and the refugees who eke out a miserable existence there are subject to the whims of the passionately anti-Communist Thai authorities, a point that should be obvious to journalists and should suggest some caution, but is entirely ignored by Barron-Paul, as well as by many others. The story is just too useful to be treated with the requisite care.

Ponchaud, who is more serious, describes the treatment of the refugees in Thailand: they spend a week or more in prison before being sent to camps where they are "fed increasingly short rations" and "have to offer some token of gratitude to the camp guards for letting them out to look for work." He continues:

There is little hope for them. They live with their memories, constantly reliving the horrors they have witnessed. Each one recounts what he saw or heard, his imagination and homesickness tending to exaggerate and distort the facts.

Essentially the same point is made by Charles Twining, whom the State Department regards as "really the best expert [on Cambodian refugees] ... that exists in the world today." Stating that executions continue, he says that "we hear about executions from refugees who have just come out. You must talk to a refugee as soon as he comes out or the story may become exaggerated." How exaggerated it may become by the time it reaches Barron-Paul or Kamm, the reader may try to estimate. The issue does not concern them, judging by their reports. Nor has it concerned those who rely on and draw firm conclusions from these reports.

Access to refugees is generally controlled by Thai authorities or their subordinates (to speak of "election," as Barron-Paul do without qualification, is odd indeed under these circumstances).
The translators also presumably fall in this category, or are believed to be by the refugees who depend for survival on the grace of their supervisors. Clearly, these are unpromising circumstances for obtaining a meaningful record—compare in contrast, the circumstances of the Bryce report with its record of apparent fabrications. Ponchaud is unusual in making the obvious point that great care must be exercised. Clearly, the reports of refugees should be carefully heeded, but the potential for abuse is great, and those who want to use them with propagandistic intent can do so without serious constraint.

Not surprisingly, there are many internal contradictions in refugee reports. In the *May Hearings* Porter cites the case of Chou Try, who told a CBS reporter that he had witnessed the beating to death of five students by Khmer Rouge soldiers. In October 1976, he told Patrice de Beer of *Le Monde* that he had witnessed no executions though he had heard rumors of them. Porter notes that he was “chosen to be the Khmer chief” of the refugee camp at Aranyaphrathet, where a great many of the interviews have taken place. There are many similar examples. As Porter and Retboel both insist, refugee reports should certainly not be disregarded, but some care is in order. Evidently, interviews arranged under the circumstances described by Kamm or Barron-Paul are of limited credibility.

One refugee who became both well-known and influential in the United States is Pin Yathai. At a press conference held under the auspices of the American Security Council, Yathai, described as “one of his country’s top civil engineers and a leading member of the government” who escaped to Thailand in June of 1977, testified that people were reduced to cannibalism under Khmer Rouge rule: “A teacher ate the flesh of her own sister” and was later caught and beaten to death as an example, he alleged, citing also another case of cannibalism in a hospital and other stories of starvation, brutality, and disease. He was interviewed by Jack Anderson on ABC television, and his stories were also featured in the mass circulation *TV Guide* in “an article on the paucity of media coverage of the Cambodian holocaust by Patrick Buchanan,” one of Nixon’s speechwriters. Later, they became the basis for a substantial right wing attack on the *Washington Post* for its failure to cover Pin Yathai’s news conference, and in general,
to give what these groups regard as adequate coverage to Cambodian atrocities. *Le Monde* also published two articles based on Pin Yathai's allegations as well as a letter from another Cambodian attacking his credibility and accusing him of having been a member of the "Special Committee" of the Lon Nol government that was engaged in counterespionage, assassinations, perhaps the drug traffic, and was believed to have been funded by the CIA.34

The right wing *Bangkok Post* did report the press conference in which Pin Yathai presented his account of cannibalism and other horrors.35 The *Bangkok Post* story observed that "Cambodian refugees in Thailand yesterday discounted reports that cannibalism is frequent in Cambodia and even doubted if it has occurred at all." It also quoted "another Cambodian civil engineer who had long talks with Pin Yathai while he was in Bangkok" and who told AFP: "No more than 40 per cent of the statement Pin Yathai made in the United States is true. He never went so far while talking to fellow refugees in his own language." This information was not circulated by Accuracy in Media in its attacks on the *Washington Post* nor has it been presented by others who gave wide publicity to Pin Yathai's accounts.

Not all refugees are welcomed so eagerly as Pin Yathai. Consider, for example, a story in the *London Times* on a Vietnamese refugee who escaped from Vietnam through Cambodia to Thailand, which he entered in April 1976.36 He walked 350 miles through Cambodia over a two-month period.37 A civil engineer "with high qualifications" who speaks French, Thai, Khmer and Lao in addition to English, this refugee with his unique experience in postwar Cambodia, where "because of his fluency in Khmer and local knowledge he was taken everywhere for a Cambodian," seems a prime candidate for interviews in the press. But, in fact, he never made it to the *New York Times, Time, TV Guide*, or other U.S. media. His lack of qualifications are revealed by his comments when he arrived in Thailand, where he heard stories of massacres in Cambodia:

I could not believe it. Walking across the country for two months I saw no sign of killing or mass extermination and nobody I spoke to told me of it. I still don't believe it happened.
Note that the observations of this man, a middle-class refugee from Vietnam with the appropriate anti-Communist credentials, do not contradict the stories of brutal atrocities told in profusion by refugees. Rather, they are consistent with the remarks by State Department Cambodia watchers and other specialists on the geographical limitations of the worst atrocity stories, and suggest that there may be a good deal of local variation rather than the coordinated campaign of state-directed genocide that the media and their main sources prefer. But this very fact suffices to consign this report to oblivion in the United States, despite its undoubted significance as a rare window on inner Cambodia from what appears to be a fairly credible source. We will return to other examples, merely noting here the striking contrast between the media exposure in this case and in the case of Pin Yathai.

In fact, even the witnesses who are specifically selected to recount atrocity stories often add significant qualifications. For example, one of the witnesses at the Oslo Hearings on Human Rights Violations in Cambodia held in April 1978, was Lim Pech Kuon, who said that he “well understood” the Khmer Rouge policy. He asserted, “that he had never heard the Khmer Rouge indicate that they intended to kill all classes except the workers and poor peasants.”

It was perhaps more correct to say that, in the Khmer Rouge interpretations, the relics of the classes would be abolished—not eradicated. He also said that he had never seen an execution with his own eyes. When he arrived in Phnom Penh after the Khmer Rouge victory he had seen a number of corpses in the streets, but the corpses were covered, and so he could not see whether they were soldiers or civilians. He made it clear that it was the lack of freedom which made him flee by helicopter.38

While the media give the impression that refugees have uniformly recounted stories of horrible atrocities, journalists have occasionally noticed that the reports are actually more varied. John Fraser of the Toronto Globe and Mail, whose reports from Vietnam we discussed briefly in chapter 4, also visited a Cambodian refugee camp in Vietnam, “fully prepared for a host of atrocity stories about mass executions, bloody beheadings and
savage Khmer Rouge brutality,” particularly since the camp was only 50 miles from the border where there had been “deadly combat”:

To my surprise I got lots of tales of hardship, but no atrocities save for a second-hand account of an execution of two men. The accounts of life in Cambodia were grim enough and the atrocity stories too well authenticated to doubt, but still no one at that camp was able to tell me one. I finally had to ask if there was anyone who knew of an execution and after some time I got the second-hand story. I offer no conclusions on this singular fact, except that it was strange with so many refugees not to be able to get more information, particularly since it would have been useful for Vietnamese propaganda.39

We know of only one Khmer-speaking Westerner who is an academic specialist on Cambodia and has visited refugee camps in Thailand without the supervision of authorities, namely, Michael Vickery, who reports as follows on his August 1976 visit:

Since I speak Khmer I was something of a curiosity for them and it was easy to gather a crowd around and listen to what they said whether in response to questions or to unorganized conversation. It was soon clear that there was much disagreement among the refugees about conditions in Cambodia. Some pushed the brutality line, others denied it, or emphasized that killings were rare and due to the cruelty of a few individual leaders. Thus many of the refugees admitted that they had left because they disliked the rigorous working life under the new regime, not because they were themselves threatened with death or brutality. So much, though, was already apparent from a close reading of newspaper accounts. What I found more intriguing was that once when alone with one of the men he called attention to the lack of agreement and added that it was never noticed by outsiders because they didn’t understand Khmer. According to him, camp authorities had organized French and English speaking refugees as informants to give the official line to journalists who came to visit.40
We return to Vickery’s published and private comments, which are valuable and very much to the point.

Not everyone who is interested in analyzing refugee accounts is permitted the kind of access offered by the Thai Ministry of Interior to Barron and Paul. Cornell University Cambodian specialist Stephen Heder, who was a journalist in Phnom Penh, speaks and reads Khmer, is the author of articles on contemporary Cambodia—and has been notably skeptical about the standard conclusions drawn by journalists after guided tours through refugee camps—received funding from the Social Science Research Council and the Fulbright-Hays Program to do a systematic study of postwar Cambodia based on refugee testimony and Phnom Penh Radio broadcasts. He was informed by the Secretary-General of the National Research Council of Thailand that “the present political situations [sic] in Thailand do not favour us to consider this type of research. Therefore, if you still have an intention to do a research works [sic] in Thailand, please be advised to change your topic.” One way to give the impression that refugee stories consistently and without exception report atrocities is to prevent competent researchers fluent in Khmer, who do not need the guidance of Thai ministers or “elected camp commanders,” from examining the evidence for themselves. We have no doubt that when Heder publishes on contemporary Cambodia, his work will be criticized by those who do not approve of his conclusions on the grounds that he “ignores refugee data.”

To summarize, several points are worth noting. Refugee reports are to be taken seriously, but with care. In their eagerness to obtain “evidence” that could be used to defame the regime in Cambodia, such reporters as Barron and Paul or Henry Kamm, as their own testimony indicates, failed to observe the most obvious and elementary cautions that should be second nature to any serious journalist and that are specifically emphasized by Ponchaud, Twining, and others. The media, furthermore, have their own criteria for deciding which reports to emphasize and which to ignore. To evaluate refugee reports it is necessary to take into account extreme bias both in selection of stories and treatment of them. The apparent uniformity of refugee testimony is in part at least an artifact reflecting media bias. In particular, it would be difficult to construct an argument in support of the thesis of
central direction and planning of atrocities on the basis of alleged uniformity of refugee reports, since in fact there appears to be considerable variety; to sustain such a thesis other evidence is required, for example, documentary evidence. The unwillingness of the Thai authorities to permit independent scholarly study also raises questions, given the obvious interest of the Thai—shared by Western media and governments—in presenting the worst possible picture of postwar Cambodia. We will consider these questions in more detail below, but even a brief look at the handling of refugee reports suggests that a degree of caution is in order.

Refugee reports constitute one essential category of information about a society as closed to the outside as postwar Cambodia has been. The second link in the chain of transmission of information, which in this case is subject to some independent check for credibility, is the reporters and others who transmit their stories. To inquire into their credibility is surely a crucial matter in evaluating the material that reaches the public. People who have expressed skepticism about the press barrage are commonly accused of refusing to believe the accounts of miserable refugees, a line that is much easier to peddle than the truth: that they are primarily raising questions about the credibility of those who report—and perhaps exploit—the suffering of the refugees and what they are alleged to have said. When refugee stories are transmitted by reporters of demonstrated integrity, they merit more serious attention than when the account is given by someone who is otherwise unknown or has an obvious axe to grind. When a reporter from Pravda describes the horrors of U.S. bombing in Northern Laos, a rational observer will be more skeptical than when similar eyewitness reports are provided by Jacques Decornoy of Le Monde. Similarly, when Leo Cherne, chairman of the International Rescue Committee, discusses the barbarism of the Khmer Rouge, a rational reader will recall the previous history of this longtime apologist for U.S. violence and oppression who attempts to disguise this miserable display under a humanitarian cloak—for example, his supremely cynical description of the victims of U.S. bombings in South Vietnam: “There are more than 700,000 additional refugees who have recently fled the countryside dominated by the Vietcong and with their act of flight have chosen
the meager sanctuary provided by the government of South Vietnam."\textsuperscript{45}

To determine the credibility of those who transmit reports is a critical matter for anyone concerned to discover the truth, either about Cambodia or about the current phase of imperial ideology. There is only one way to investigate this question: namely, to pay careful attention to the use of quotes and evidence. Such an inquiry may seem pointless or irrelevant, or even cruel, to people who are quite certain that they already know the truth. Lacouture expresses feelings that are not uncommon in his "Corrections":

Faced with an enterprise as monstrous as the new Cambodian government, should we see the main problem as one of deciding exactly which person uttered an inhuman phrase, and whether the regime has murdered thousands or hundreds of thousands of wretched people? Is it of crucial historical importance to know whether the victims of Dachau numbered 100,000 or 500,000. Or if Stalin had 1,000 or 10,000 Poles shot at Katyn?\textsuperscript{46} Or perhaps, we may add, whether the victims of My Lai numbered in the hundreds, as reported, or tens of thousands, or whether the civilians murdered in Operation SPEEDY EXPRESS numbered 5,000 or 500,000, if a factor of 100 is relatively insignificant?\textsuperscript{47} If facts are so unimportant, then why bother to present alleged facts at all?

If, indeed, the Cambodian regime was, as Lacouture believes, as monstrous as the Nazis at their worst, then his comment might be comprehensible, though it is worth noting that he has produced no evidence to support this judgment.\textsuperscript{48} But if a more appropriate comparison is, say, to France after liberation, where a minimum of 30-40,000 people were massacred within a few months with far less motive for revenge and under far less rigorous conditions than those left by the U.S. war in Cambodia, then perhaps a rather different judgment is in order.\textsuperscript{49} As we shall see, there is a considerable range of opinion on this score among qualified observers, though the press has favored Lacouture’s conclusion, generally ignoring mere questions of fact.

We disagree with Lacouture’s judgment on the importance of accuracy on this question, particularly in the present historical
context, when allegations of genocide are being used to whitewash Western imperialism, to distract attention from the "institutionalized violence" of the expanding system of subfascism and to lay the ideological basis for further intervention and oppression. We have seen how effectively the Western propaganda system creates, embroiders, plays up, distorts, and suppresses evidence according to imperial needs. Western domination of world communications adds to the importance of closely evaluating evidence that so conveniently meets pressing ideological requirements. In this context, it becomes a question of some interest whether in Cambodia, for example, a gang of Marxist murderers are systematically engaged in what Lacouture calls "autogenocide"—"the suicide of a people in the name of revolution; worse, in the name of socialism"\(^{50}\)—or whether the worst atrocities have taken place at the hands of a peasant army, recruited and driven out of their devastated villages by U.S. bombs and then taking revenge against the urban civilization that they regarded, not without reason, as a collaborator in their destruction and their long history of oppression. Future victims of imperial savagery will not thank us for assisting in the campaign to restore the public to apathy and conformism so that the subjugation of the weak can continue without annoying domestic impediments. Especially in such countries as France and the United States—to mention only two international gangsters whose post-World War II depredations are not dismissed so quickly by past and potential victims as they are at home—it is a crucially important matter to be quite scrupulous with regard to fact, to pay careful attention to past history and to subject to critical analysis whatever information is available about the current situation.\(^{51}\)

Attention to fact was a particularly significant matter under the conditions of 1975-78, when extreme and unsupported allegations could be used to support military intervention, not a small consideration as we see from McGovern's statements already discussed or—more significantly, as recent history shows—from the context of the Vietnamese invasion discussed in the preface to this volume.

Quite apart from these considerations, which seem to us rather important, it is surely worthwhile, if one is going to discuss Cambodia at all, to try to comprehend what has in fact taken place
there, which is quite impossible if critical standards are abandoned and "facts" are contrived even out of honest anger or distress.

The inquiry to which we now turn will appear to be a pointless exegetical exercise to people who share Lacouture's judgment or for whom facts are simply an irrelevant nuisance, like the editors of the *Wall Street Journal*. While the latter reaction merits no comment, Lacouture's is not so quickly dismissed, though we feel that it is deeply wrong in the case of an investigation of postwar Cambodia, and entirely untenable if one is concerned—as we are here—with the workings of the Western propaganda system.

There is a related methodological point that merits comment, if only because it is so commonly misunderstood. Plainly, we may divide the evidence available into two categories: (1) evidence subject to some independent verification; (2) evidence that must be taken on faith. A person who is at all serious will concentrate on category (1) in trying to determine how much trust to place in unverifiable reports of category (2). If it turns out that some source is quite untrustworthy when claims can be checked, then naturally one will view with corresponding skepticism reports from this source that are subject to no such check. But in the sources that raise the charge of genocide, the overwhelming bulk of the evidence is of category (2). Therefore it is easy to be misled into thinking that even if the evidence of category (1) does not withstand critical analysis, the matter is of no serious import since it is of such a minor nature as compared with the far more serious (and unverifiable) charges. A moment's thought should suffice to show that this conclusion is entirely untenable; nevertheless, as we shall see, it is not at all uncommon.

Let us return now to McGovern's call for intervention and the press reaction to it. McGovern provided no source for his estimate of 2-2½ million systematically killed by thugs who had taken over the government of Cambodia, though such charges have been bandied about widely in the press since immediately after the Khmer Rouge victory. Nor did McGovern attempt to sort out the relative proportions of those who were killed by government plan or edict or in random acts of violence (evidently, rather different categories) as compared with those who died from malnutrition and disease.

McGovern's remarks, as well as much of the press commen-
tary concerning them, amount to the claim that the population is suffering in misery under a savage oppressor bent on genocide. Mere common sense, even apart from special knowledge, should raise at least some doubts about this picture. In the first place, is it proper to attribute deaths from malnutrition and disease to the Cambodian authorities? Compare, for example, the case of Laos already discussed, where relief workers speak of hundreds of thousands of deaths from malnutrition and disease as a legacy of colonialism and more specifically, the U.S. attack on a defenseless society, while the United States withholds desperately needed aid. It surely should occur to a journalist or the reader to ask how many of the deaths in Cambodia fall to the U.S. account. There is evidence on this matter, but it is systematically excluded from the press. Or, one might wonder, how can it be that a population so oppressed by a handful of fanatics does not rise up to overthrow them? In fact, even in the hearings where McGovern reported the estimates of 2½ million deaths attributable to the Khmer Rouge and “called for international military intervention,” the State Department response should have aroused some questions in the mind of a moderately serious reporter. Douglas Pike, responding to McGovern, said that “the notion of a quick, surgical takeout of the government of Cambodia probably is not possible,”:

He pointed to Cambodia’s unique government consisting of a ruling group of nine men at the center and communal government “in the style of the 14th century” in the villages, with no regional or provincial governments in between...“To take over Cambodia you’re going to have to take over the villages—all of them,” he said.54

Evidently there must be at least some support for the group of nine men at the center if it will be necessary to take over every village to overthrow their rule. The quandary has been expressed by other State Department experts. Charles Twining, who says that he was “sent to Bangkok [by the State Department] as the Indochina watcher with responsibility primarily for finding out what is happening in Cambodia and Vietnam,” made the following remark in response to Rep. Solarz’s query as to “how people at the top manage to establish their authority over these young soldiers
out in the villages who are carrying out this policy of extermination”:

It is a difficult question. We know the levels of administration in Cambodia; it goes from the central to the region to the sector to the district to the commune to the village. Presumably, then, there are loyal people at all of these levels. What really binds together these largely Paris-educated fanatics at the top with almost purposefully ignorant farm boys at the bottom who are the ones with the guns carrying out their orders—I really don’t know what it is that keeps them together and I wonder in the future how long something like this can continue, how long that glue can hold.55

It is, indeed, “a difficult question.”

Similar doubts were raised by experts close to the U.S. government during the earlier May Hearings. In response to Rep. Solarz’s remarks about possible intervention, Peter A. Poole, formerly a Foreign Service Officer in Cambodia and now a professor of international relations at American University, said that “I think that an international police force would be one of the worst possible things we could do.” On the evacuation of Phnom Penh, he said: “They obviously overdid it. They obviously did it very badly. But the general thrust of moving people out of the city was something that practically any regime would have contemplated and done at some stage in that year, getting the people back on the land and producing rice.” The Khmer Rouge, he added, “took over at a time when society was in ruins, so that there were no normal means of government...in a state of social, political, and economic chaos” and ran the country with “an ignorant peasant teen-age army, a rather large, very obedient army, well-armed and totally flexible, totally obedient to orders” who might respond to a command to march the people down the road by shooting those who do not obey. As to how the Khmer Rouge were able “to establish that sense of total discipline in the ranks of the army,” Poole answered: “I don’t know the answer to that question.”56

Another former Foreign Service Officer in Phnom Penh, David P. Chandler, now a senior lecturer at Monash University in
Australia, added some further comments which had little impact on the subsequent proceedings:

What drove the Cambodians to kill? Paying off old scores or imaginary ones played a part, but, to a large extent, I think, American actions are to blame. From 1969 to 1973, after all, we dropped more than 500,000 tons of bombs on the Cambodian countryside. Nearly half of this tonnage fell in 1973...In those few months, we may have driven thousands of people out of their minds. We certainly accelerated the course of the revolution. According to several accounts, the leadership hardened its ideology and got rid of wavering factions during 1973 and 1974...We bombed Cambodia without knowing why, without taking note of the people we destroyed...it is ironic, to use a colorless word, for us to accuse the Cambodians of being indifferent to life when, for so many years, Cambodian lives made so little difference to us.57

Chandler's comment was rejected by Rep. William F. Goodling on the following grounds:

Our bombs didn't single out certain segments or certain peoples in Cambodia. Our bombs hit them all [sic]. And whether you thought it was right or I thought it was right, the military at that particular time thought it was right.58

The comment is a fitting one from a leading apologist for the U.S.-backed Indonesian atrocities in Timor.59

Twining's "difficult question" is addressed in an article by Kenneth Quinn of the National Security Council Staff,60 one of the three leading U.S. government experts on Cambodia.61 Basing himself primarily on refugees who fled Cambodia in 1973-1974, Quinn reviews Khmer Rouge programs in an effort to explain "how a small but dedicated force was able to impose a revolution on a society without widespread participation of the peasantry" and indeed in the face of strong peasant opposition. He does not remark that since his evidence derives primarily "from the in-depth interviewing of selected refugees," it will obviously be negative; those who might approve of these programs are excluded from his sample. But ignoring this trivial point, Quinn states that "the
evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that the peasantry was opposed to almost all of the [Khmer Rouge] programs." Quinn discusses programs which included land reform, establishment of cooperatives, ensuring "that all citizens have roughly the same degree of wealth," obliterating class lines by confiscating property from the wealthy and compelling university students to plant and harvest rice, distributing excess crops "to feed other groups whose harvest was insufficient," etc. He notes that "as a result [of collectivization], production has outstripped previous individual efforts" and that "political-psychological [Khmer Rouge] efforts" seem to "have achieved significant results...according to all accounts" among the youth, who "were passionate in their loyalty to the state and party," "rejected the mystical aspects of religion," and "stopped working on their family plot of land and instead worked directly for the youth association on its land." He also comments that the Khmer Rouge "success is all the more amazing when it is realized that they had few, if any, cadres at the village or hamlet level...In most cases, there was no separate party existence nor were there political cadres at the village level or at any level below," though there were small, apparently locally recruited military units (in the midst of the civil war), as well as "interfamily groups" of a sort that "have existed in other Southeast Asian countries for years" and were used by the Khmer Rouge "for forcing the population to carry out a whole series of radically new programs."

Quinn then asks the "difficult question": "How did such a small group of people carry out such a varied and all-encompassing effort?" His answer is that "they cowed people and suppressed dissent and opposition through harsh and brutal punishments; and they constructed a governmental apparatus at the village and hamlet level which allowed them to exercise tight control over every family in the area." The possibility that some of the programs he reviewed might appeal to poor peasants is nowhere considered; it is excluded on doctrinal grounds.

Quinn claims that in 1973 the Khmer Rouge programs became extremely harsh as new cadres took over, described as "fanatics," who were "austere" and "did not take anything for themselves and seemed willing to live a frugal life" but instituted
widespread terror. Other sources, as we have seen, confirm that the Khmer Rouge programs became harsh in 1973—as the United States stepped up its murderous program of saturation bombing, a possible causal factor that Quinn is careful never to mention.

There are other aspects to the “difficult question” that properly troubled government specialists. How indeed do the Khmer Rouge manage to maintain control? Here, the refugee reports evoke some questions. For example, R.-P. Paringaux reported interviews with two high functionaries of the Lon Nol regime who had escaped to Thailand. They report that armed surveillance was “almost nonexistent” in the village to which they were sent. “In case there are problems, the village chief can call upon a militia group of 12 Khmers Rouges who maintain order in the ten villages of the sector.” One of these functionaries comments that the “old people”—those who were with the Khmer Rouge during the war—offer more support to the new regime: “they are peasants, who have always been used to hard work and to be content with little." It would seem not unlikely that part of the answer to the difficult question, and a reason why a dozen militiamen can maintain order in ten villages, is that the regime has a modicum of support among the peasants.

Other questions arise. If 1/3 of the population has been killed by a murderous band that has taken over the government—which somehow manages to control every village—or have died as a result of their genocidal policies, then surely one would expect if not a rebellion then at least unwillingness to fight for the Paris-educated fanatics at the top. But the confused and obscure record of the border conflicts with Thailand and Vietnam would appear to indicate that there are a substantial number of “purposefully ignorant farm boys” who have not exactly been awaiting liberation from their oppressors. As Pike observed in response to McGovern’s call for intervention, the Vietnamese tried a “quick judo chop” against the Cambodian regime with 60,000 troops but “failed abysmally.” Basing herself on Pike’s testimony, Susan Spencer of CBS raised the question to McGovern in a TV interview. When McGovern referred to Cambodia as “an underdeveloped country that has gotten out of control and is systematically slaughtering its own citizens,” Spencer make the
following comment:

You mentioned that we should apply pressure. It seems, though, that the Vietnamese, who periodically are at war with Cambodia, have found that the Cambodian citizens, at least the villagers, seem to support the government. What lever do we have to break in—to break that?

Spencer's question is a bit odd to begin with. If the villagers of this largely peasant society support the government, as Spencer assumes, then exactly what right do we have to find a “lever” to “break that”? And how does that alleged support square with the charge of genocide? These questions did not arise, however. McGovern simply replied that “the evidence is that about nine men are controlling that government in Cambodia” without a “loyal infrastructure out across the country” and it is “hard to believe that there’s mass support for the Cambodian government.”

The problem is implicit, though rarely discussed in these terms, in other reports concerning Cambodia. Robert Shaplen, who has been the Far Eastern correspondent for The New Yorker for many years, observes that in the border war with Vietnam, “the Cambodians have proved to be tough, ruthless and relentless fighters.”67 The Southeast Asia correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor comments that “despite Vietnam’s superior size, economy, and military power, Cambodia appears to have emerged the technical ‘victor’ after the Vietnamese invasion that ended with a military withdrawal in January...In fact, Cambodian attacks across Vietnam’s borders currently are described by one analyst as ‘heavier than ever’...Vietnam appears to have underestimated the strength of Cambodian resistance, several analysts note.”68 The continuing conflict with Thailand brings out similar anomalies. Whatever the facts may be—and they are far from clear—it seems that Cambodian forces held their own, so much so that U.S. analysts “voice skepticism about Hanoi’s ability to crush Cambodia” despite its overwhelming military advantages, because of “factors such as the apparently excellent morale of Cambodia’s ground forces.”69

Various explanations have been offered for these facts, which at the very least raise questions about the allegations that the
population is groaning under the heels of the conquerer.\textsuperscript{70}

William Buckley explains the difficulty away with resort to the mysterious Asian mind: nationalism carried to such lengths "is utterly alien to the western experience."\textsuperscript{71} PonchAUD argues that "the old Hindu core, which regarded authority as a divine incarnation, was still strong in the Khmers...\textquoteleft\textquoteleft The Cambodian sticks to the rule\textquoteright\textquoteright; The Khmer people still respect authority with a respect that to us is tinged with fatalism, even passivity, but that emanates an underlying confidence in the abilities of those in power...The underlying ideology [of the revolution] may come from somewhere else, but the methods employed show every mark of the Cambodian character," and Khmer culture makes it possible for the authorities to rule "the countryside with terror and lies," though "under Marxist influence, perhaps the Khmer will suddenly open a critical eye." "Another cause of the radicality of the Khmer revolution lies in the Khmer way of reasoning, which is bewildering to Cartesian minds. The Khmer thinks by accretions or juxtapositions, but adheres strictly to the rules of his own internal logic," apparently incapable of "Cartesian" logic.\textsuperscript{72}

The non-specialist may wonder about the cogency of these explanations of the "difficult question" that government specialists rightly find troubling. It is noteworthy that in the varied attempts to find a solution to this most difficult question, one conceivable hypothesis does not seem to have been considered, even to be rejected: that there was a significant degree of peasant support for the Khmer Rouge and the measures that they had instituted in the countryside.

As we begin to inquire a little further, other difficult questions arise. Consider the numbers game. What is the source of the figures invoked by the press? We shall see that the sources are obscure or misrepresented, though when corrected, they continue to surface. Furthermore, there is considerably more controversy among knowledgeable observers than the standard line of the press would indicate. For example, Lewis M. Simons, the outstanding \textit{Washington Post} correspondent, reported from Bangkok that "disease and malnutrition combined with a dropping birthrate are taking a greater toll of Cambodia’s population than Communist executions, according to some of the latest analyses
made here.” There is a major reversal in Western judgments of what had gone on inside Democratic Kampuchea...Most Westerners who make an occupation of observing Cambodia from Thailand are talking in terms of several hundred thousand deaths from all causes. This is a marked shift from the estimates of just six months ago, when it was popular to say that anywhere between 800,000 and 1.4 million Cambodians had been executed by vengeful Communist rulers.73

He also noted that “few Cambodia-watchers believe that “The Organization” [Angkar, the governing group] is organized well enough to control much of the country. It is generally accepted that local military commanders, operating from jungle bases, conduct their own small-scale border rations [sic] and impose summary justice.

There are two noteworthy points in this report by Lewis Simons—which was accepted with one irrelevant qualification as “excellent” by the State Department’s leading Cambodia watcher. First, the number of deaths is estimated by “most Westerners” who are close observers as in the several hundred thousand range, most of them from disease and malnutrition. Second, most Cambodia watchers doubt that the “summary justice” is centrally organized, believing rather that it is the responsibility of local commanders. Again we are left with some doubts, to put it conservatively, as regards the standard media picture: a centrally-controlled genocidal policy of mass execution.

Note also that the numbers killed were estimated by the leading government expert as in the “thousands or hundreds of thousands.” (Twining, who adds that “very honestly, I think we can’t accurately estimate a figure.”) His superior, Richard Holbrooke offered an estimate of “tens if not hundreds of thousands” for “deaths” from all causes.74 He offered his “guess” that “for every person executed several people have died of disease, malnutrition, or other factors...” (which he claims were “avoidable,” though he does not indicate how).75 Twining’s colleague Timothy Carney—the second of the State Department’s leading
Cambodia watchers—estimated the number of deaths from "brutal, rapid change" (not "mass genocide") as in the hundreds of thousands.\textsuperscript{76} What about deaths from causes other than killing? A major source of death, Simons reports:

appears to be failure of the 1976 rice crop. The government averted famine in mid-1975 by evacuating Phnom Penh and other cities and forcing almost every ablebodied person to work the land. But food production fell badly last year.

If this "excellent" analysis is correct, as Twining indicates, the evacuation of Phnom Penh, widely denounced at the time and since for its undoubted brutality, may actually have saved many lives.\textsuperscript{77} It is striking that the crucial facts rarely appear in the chorus of condemnations. At the time of the evacuation, AFP reported from Bangkok that:

Recent aerial photographs by American reconnaissance planes are said to have shown that only 12 percent of the rice paddies have been planted. The monsoon, which marks the beginning of the planting season, came a month early this year. There was also the problem of the acute shortage of rice in the capital when the Communists took over on April 17. According to Long Boret, the old Government's last premier, Phnom Penh had only eight days' worth of rice on hand on the eve of the surrender.\textsuperscript{78}

In a \textit{New York Times} Op-Ed, William Goodfellow, who left Cambodia with the final U.S. evacuation in April, 1975 wrote that "A.I.D. officials reported that stockpiles of rice in Phnom Penh could last for six days."\textsuperscript{79} Commenting on the "death march" from Phnom Penh, he writes that "in fact, it was a journey \textit{away} from certain death by starvation...[which]...was already a reality in the urban centers." The director of the U.S. aid program "estimated that in Phnom Penh alone 1.2 million people were in 'desperate need' of United States food, although at the time only 640,000 people were actually receiving some form of United States food support" and "starvation was widely reported."\textsuperscript{80} Goodfellow also correctly assigns the responsibility for the impending famine: it was caused primarily by the U.S. bombing campaign which
“shattered” the agrarian economy—an unquestionable fact that has since been quietly forgotten.

The situation in Phnom Penh resulting from the U.S. war is graphically described in a carefully-documented study by Hildebrand and Porter that has been almost totally ignored by the press. By early 1974 the World Health Organization estimated that half the children of Phnom Penh, which was swollen to almost 5 times its normal size by the U.S. bombardment and the ravages of the war directly caused by U.S. intervention, were suffering from malnutrition. A Congressional study mission reported “severe nutritional damage.” Studies in late 1974 and early 1975 revealed “a disastrous decline in nutritional status,” indicating “a caloric intake during a year or longer of less than 60 percent of the minimum required to maintain body weight.” A Department of State study of February 1975 reported that these statistics confirmed the universal medical impression given us by those involved in Cambodia health and nutrition that children are starving to death.” Starvation also lowered resistance to infection and disease. There were reports that cholera was spreading rapidly in Phnom Penh. The medical director for Catholic Relief Services declared in March, 1975, that “hundreds are dying of malnutrition every day.” Red Cross and other observers reported thousands of small children dying from hunger and disease. Note that all of this refers to the period before the Khmer Rouge victory.

As Hildebrand and Porter remark, “those children who did not die from starvation will suffer permanent damage to their bodies and minds due to the severe malnutrition.” They quote Dr. Penelope Key of the World Vision Organization, working in Phnom Penh:

This generation is going to be a lost generation of children. Malnutrition is going to affect their numbers and their mental capacities. So, as well as knocking off a generation of young men, the war is knocking off a generation of children.

Porter added relevant information in his Congressional testimony:

It must be noted that the same official sources who were claiming [a postwar death toll of 800,000-1.4million] had
been saying in June 1975 that a million people were certain to die of starvation in the next year because there were simply no food stocks available in Cambodia to provide for them.  

Porter drew the conclusion that the postwar death tolls were exaggerated by officials who “had an obvious vested interest [in] not admitting their failure to understand the capacity of the new regime to feed its people.” Alternatively, suppose that their postwar estimates are correct. Since the situation at the war’s end is squarely the responsibility of the United States, so are the million or so deaths that were predicted as a direct result of that situation.

The horrendous situation in Phnom Penh (as elsewhere in Cambodia) as the war drew to an end was a direct and immediate consequence of the U.S. assault—prior to the U.S. actions that drew Cambodia into the Indochina war, the situation was far from ideal, contrary to colonialist myths about happy peasants, but it was nothing like the accounts just reviewed by Congressional study missions and health and relief workers. The same is true of the vast destruction of agricultural lands and draught animals, peasant villages and communications, not to speak of the legacy of hatred and revenge. The United States bears primary responsibility for these consequences of its intervention. All of this is forgotten when sole responsibility is assigned to the Khmer Rouge for deaths from malnutrition and disease. It is as if some Nazi apologist were to condemn the allies for postwar deaths from starvation and disease in DP camps, though the analogy is unfair to the Nazis, since the allies at least had the resources to try to deal with the Nazi legacy.

Consider again what lies behind the call for military intervention in Cambodia. The leading State Department specialist estimated killings in the “thousands or hundreds of thousands,” and attributed a still larger number of deaths to disease and malnutrition—in significant and perhaps overwhelming measure, a consequence of U.S. terror. Furthermore, a news report that the State Department specialist regards as “excellent” notes that “it is generally accepted” by Cambodia watchers that “summary justice” is not centrally-directed. Another government expert insists
that it would be necessary to conquer every village to subdue the Khmer Rouge. But when a leading senatorial dove calls for military intervention, the *Wall Street Journal*, which backed the U.S. aggression and massacre through the worst atrocities, has the gall to make the following editorial comment:

Now, having finished the task of destroying [the U.S. presence in Indochina, American liberals] are shocked and dismayed by the news of the grim and brutal world that resulted. One of the few good things to come out of the sordid end of our Indochina campaign was a period of relative silence from the people who took us through all its painful contortions. They should have the grace to maintain their quiet for at least a while longer.\(^84\)

About postwar Cambodia, they have only this to say: the “present Communist rulers have starved, worked, shot, beaten and hacked to death upwards of a million of the country’s citizens.” Not a word about the U.S. role or continuing responsibility for death and suffering, let alone an effort to evaluate the evidence or to face the “difficult questions” that arise.

It would take a volume to record the material of this sort that dominates the U.S., indeed the Western press. Before turning to the nature of the evidence adduced concerning the scale and character of postwar atrocities in Cambodia, we will cite only one more example selected out of the mass of comparable instances, along with an example of journalistic integrity that is another of the rare exceptions.

On July 31, 1978, *Time* magazine published a “Time Essay” entitled: “Cambodia: An Experiment in Genocide,” by David Aikman. The essay is short on documentation but not sparing in its outrage. The sole documentation offered is the “interview” with Khieu Samphan already cited—an example that was specifically pointed out in advance to a *Time* reporter preparing background for this article as a probable fabrication—and a statement on Radio Phnom Penh that “more than 2,000 years of Cambodian history have virtually ended,” which Aikman presents as a “boast of this atrocity,” though other interpretations easily come to mind.

According to *Time*, “the lowest estimate of the bloodbath to date—by execution, starvation, and disease—is in the hundreds of
thousands. The highest exceeds 1 million, and that in a country that once numbered no more than 7 million.” Figures apart, what is striking about this claim is that nowhere in the article is there any reference to any U.S. role or responsibility, no indication that deaths from starvation and disease may be something other than a “bloodbath” by the Khmer Rouge.

A major theme of the Time essay is that “somehow the enormity of the Cambodian tragedy—even leaving aside the grim question of how many or how few actually died in Angka Loeu’s experiment in genocide—has failed to evoke an appropriate response of outrage in the West,” and even worse, “some political theorists have defended it, as George Bernard Shaw and other Western intellectuals defended the brutal social engineering in the Soviet Union during the 1930s”; “there are intellectuals in the West so committed to the twin Molochs of our day—‘liberation’ and ‘revolution’—that they can actually defend what has happened in Cambodia.” In fact, the Western press since 1975 has poured forth reams of denunciations of Cambodia in the most strident tones, repeating the most extreme denunciations often on flimsy evidence, in striking contrast to its behavior in the case of massacres elsewhere, as in Timor; the U.S. press is particularly notable for a marked double standard in this regard, though it is hardly alone. And there is good reason why Aikman fails to mention the names of those “political theorists” who have defended “the Cambodian tragedy”—as this would require differentiating those who have exposed media distortions and tried to discover the facts, instead of joining the bandwagon of uncritical abuse, from those who say that no serious atrocities have occurred (a small or non-existent set that Time has searched for, apparently without success). Specificity also might require publicizing the views of critics of the current propaganda barrage, which would make it difficult to avoid discussion of the crucial U.S. role in postwar suffering and deaths in Cambodia or of the actual nature of what Time regards as “evidence.” For Time ideologists, a defender of the “Cambodian tragedy” is one who fails to place all the blame for postwar suffering on the Khmer Rouge and who otherwise contests the patriotic truths handed down by the Readers Digest and similar sources.

For the ideologists of Time, the Cambodian tragedy is the
"logical conclusion" of "bloodbath sociology" associated with socialism and Marxism. The "moral relativism" of the West makes it difficult to see that the Cambodian experience "is the deadly logical consequence of an atheistic, man-centered system of values, enforced by fallible human beings with total power, who believe, with Marx, that morality is whatever the powerful define it to be and, with Mao, that power grows from gun barrels." Unlike the more "humane Marxist societies in Europe today," the Cambodians do not "permit the dilution of their doctrine by what Solzhenitsyn has called 'the great reserves of mercy and sacrifice' from a Christian tradition." As for the significance of the Christian tradition for the Third World—not to speak of the European experience—*Time* has no more to say than it does about the great reserves of mercy and sacrifice shown by the U.S. leaders who sent their angels of mercy to flatten the villages of Indochina while the editors of *Time* lauded this noble enterprise. And it is fitting indeed that they should cite Solzhenitsyn, the profound thinker who denounced the West for failing to carry this enterprise to a successful conclusion, in the spirit of Christian humanism.

To show in contrast that honest journalism remains possible, consider a report by Richard Dudman just after the fall of Phnom Penh. Dudman was captured in Cambodia while serving as a U.S. war correspondent in Southeast Asia, and wrote an important book on his experiences with the Khmer Rouge. Dudman writes that "the constant indiscriminate bombing, an estimated 450,000 dead and wounded civilians to say nothing of military casualties, and the estimated 4,000,000 refugees were almost inevitable results of the short U.S. invasion of Cambodia and the subsequent proxy war that ended in defeat for the United States as well as for its client regime in Phnom Penh." Relying in part on his personal experience in captivity, he adds that "the U.S. invasion spread the Communist-led guerrillas through most of Cambodia" and drove the Vietnamese Communists and the Cambodian population "into an alliance as comrades in arms against a common enemy—American tanks and bombs," which were a "catalyst": "we [the Khmer Rouge prisoners] could see Cambodian peasants turning to a friend in need in the form of the military forces of the Vietnamese Communists."

To ignore these basic facts in reporting postwar Cambodia is
as disgraceful as to attribute the U.S. legacy of starvation, disease, and bitter hatreds simply to atheistic Communism carried to its "logical conclusion."

Let us now turn to an evaluation of the evidence that is used by the media as support for their denunciations. Simons examined this question in an analysis after his return from several years as Post correspondent in Bangkok. Accompanying the article is a photograph showing workers under military guard with the following caption: "Photo from smuggled film purports to show forced labor in Cambodian countryside." Simons comments that "a number of journals, including the Washington Post, Newsweek, Time and Paris Match, have published several photographs purporting to show atrocities in Cambodia." But he continues:

Several U.S. and other experts believe that these pictures were posed in Thailand. "They're fakes," commented a State Department officer who has followed Cambodian affairs closely since before the end of the war.

As we shall see there is more to the story: the photographs continued to be published long after they were exposed as frauds, and corrections were refused by the journals that published them.

Simons next turns to the interview in which Khieu Samphan is alleged to have conceded that the Khmer Rouge are responsible for a million deaths, which he writes, was "subsequently referred to in the New York Times Magazine." He adds that the very occurrence of that interview is denied by Francois Ponchaud. Again, as we shall see, there is more to the story.

Simons then makes the following interesting observation:

Oddly, those few Western governments which have diplomatic relations with Cambodia generally refuse to accept the genocide allegation. "We'd need a lot more evidence before we'd be ready to believe such a serious charge," said an ambassador from a Scandinavian country. Representatives of his government have visited Phnom Penh several times since the war ended.

This lead too deserves to be explored. It is indeed "odd" that Western visitors to Phnom Penh refused to join the chorus. At the very least, a rational person might well heed Simons' observation
that “reports about Cambodia should be treated with skepticism.”

Simons offers other reasons for skepticism. Noting that “just one member of the U.S. embassy staff in Thailand [presumably, Twining] is assigned to monitoring Cambodian affairs,” Simons comments:

Most information gathered by this official and by journalists in Southeast Asia comes from interviewing Cambodian refugees who have fled to Thailand. Almost all of these refugees come from the northwestern part of Cambodia, an area which was never well controlled by the Communists and where reprisals by long-embittered guerrillas were fierce in the months immediately following the Communist victory. From this bare-bones intelligence gathering, nationwide projections have been drawn. It is these projections that have led to the conclusion that Cambodian leaders are genocidal monsters and that the torment of this once-gentle land has no parallel in modern history.

Again, what Simons reports has been emphasized by specialists to whom we return.90 The State Department’s Cambodia watcher, Charles Twining, comments that “our information is just inadequate. Most of it is from northwestern Cambodia and we have virtually nothing from northeastern Cambodia, so it is awfully hard to put together a significant figure and I think none of us want to give an estimate [of deaths].”91

Simons cites Gareth Porter’s comment that the forced evacuation of urban centers “was well-advised, though ‘heavy-handed’.”92 He quotes Porter as follows:

The fact is that the evacuation and the regime’s concentration on rice production have averted mass starvation. If you look at the three Indochinese countries today, you’ll find that Cambodia undoubtedly is in the best food position.

Simons continues: “This claim is more or less supported by State Department officials,” who say “people are probably eating better” and note reports of rice exports. We will return to reports by visitors that confirm these conclusions, contrary to the
standard picture presented by the media of mass starvation or even systematic policies of starvation undertaken by the leadership, as Lacouture and others contend. It is particularly worthy of note that visitors in late 1978 found food supplies to be more than adequate. The severe floods of the preceding months had a devastating effect on agricultural production throughout the region, causing a very serious shortage of food in neighboring countries. Some reports indicate that Cambodia may have been the hardest hit of all the countries of the region, but it seems that the extensive development of dikes and dams in the postwar period, which has consistently impressed visitors, sufficed, despite some damage, to overcome the worst effects and to afford the population an ample supply of food, even including a surplus for export, according to the regime; an achievement that U.S. specialists describe as “spectacular” if true.

Simons takes note of the U.S. attack on Cambodia and gives an accurate account of doubts raised by critics of the Western propaganda system, whom he misleadingly describes as “supporters of the Cambodian regime” (or “defenders,” or “friends,” of the regime); concern for factual accuracy carries no such implication. He asks why the most extreme conclusions about Cambodia have been “widely accepted” despite their often flimsy basis, and suggests two reasons: “First, while figures may be subject to doubt, what’s the difference between whether tens of thousands or a million people have been killed?” Second, the refusal of the government to permit outside observers itself suggests that they are attempting “to hide some horrible secret.” Simons argues that these points “have acceptable moral bases” but “sidestep key issues.” Reprisals have been common after other wars, and while the Cambodian government’s policy towards foreigners “may be judged extreme xenophobia, it does not prove that genocide is being carried out behind the bamboo curtain.” We are more skeptical about the moral basis for these points, for reasons already discussed. We wonder, for example, whether the reaction would be the same if some critic of the United States were to charge that U.S. troops had killed 40,000 civilians at My Lai, then responding to a correction by asking what’s the difference—just a factor of a hundred. Recall further that it is the more sensational claims that have been endlessly repeated by the media and have led
to a call for military intervention in Cambodia. As for Cambodian "xenophobia," it is worth considering just what the experience of Cambodian peasants has been with the West, not only under French colonialism but also in the few years of the war.96 Does the term "xenophobia" accurately convey their reaction?

This report, by one of the few serious U.S. correspondents who have recently worked in Southeast Asia, stands alone in the U.S. mass media, to our knowledge, in its fairness and accuracy in presenting the views of critics of the media barrage and its concern for the quality of available evidence, though Simons's skepticism, like that of many other close observers, has been drowned in the deluge.

Let us now consider in detail the several points that Simons raised. To begin with, consider the photograph that appeared along with Simons's article. This is one of several that have, as he notes, been widely circulated in the press as sure proof of Communist barbarism.

On April 8, 1977, the Washington Post devoted half a page to "photographs believed to be the first of actual forced labor conditions in the countryside of Cambodia [to] have reached the West." The pictures show armed soldiers guarding people pulling plows, others working fields, and one bound man ("It is not known if this man was killed," the caption reads). Quite a sensational testimonial to Communist atrocities. But there is a slight problem. The Post account of how they were smuggled out by a relative of the photographer who died in the escape attempt is entirely fanciful. Furthermore, the photos had appeared a year earlier in France, Germany, and Australia, as well as in the Bangkok Post (19 April 1976), where they appeared under the caption "True or False?" This strongly anti-Communist journal turned down an attempt by a Thai trader to sell them the photos "because the origin and authenticity of the photos were in doubt." The photos appeared in a Thai-language newspaper two days before the April 4th election. The Bangkok Post then published them, explaining that "Khmer watchers were dubious about the clothes and manner of the people depicted, and quoting "other observers" who "pointed to the possibility that the series of pictures could have been taken in Thailand with the prime objective of destroying the image of the Socialist parties" before the election. This speculation
seems eminently reasonable. Westerners in Southeast Asia have reported that the Thai press, including the *Bangkok Post*, was exploiting “horror stories” from Cambodia to undermine the Socialist parties in Thailand.  

The facts were reported in the *U.S./Indochina Report* of the Washington-based Indochina Resource Center in July, 1976, along with the additional information that a Thai intelligence officer later admitted that the photos were indeed posed inside Thailand: “‘Only the photographer and I were supposed to know,’ he confided to a Thai journalist.” The full details were again given in the *International Bulletin* (circulation 6000). A letter of April 20 to the *Washington Post* correcting its story was not printed, though “the *Post* published a short item acknowledging the doubts, but pointing out that the pictures had been published elsewhere.” The “freedom of the press” assures that readers of the *International Bulletin* could learn the true facts of the matter concealed by the mass media.

We reviewed the story thus far shortly thereafter. But it continued to evolve. The major newsweeklies did not want to miss the opportunity to offer their readers visual evidence of Khmer Rouge tyranny, and could not be deterred merely because the evidence was faked—repeated exposure has rarely dimmed the lustre of other familiar propaganda tales, such as the North Vietnamese land reform bloodbath of the 1950s, discussed in Volume I. On November 21, 1977, *Time* magazine ran the photo of the bound man. While the *Washington Post* had withheld judgment on whether the victim was killed in the staged photo, doubts had now been eliminated and *Time* assured the reader that he was executed. Several letters were sent to *Time* reporting the facts just reviewed and also noting that their fakery went beyond that of the *Washington Post*. Those who had wasted their efforts alerting *Time* to the facts were rewarded by the following response:

TIME printed that photograph of a Khmer Rouge execution (if indeed that is what it is) in good faith. We were assured of its authenticity by the Sygma agency who provided us with it: they say they obtained it from a Cambodian refugee now living in Paris, whose name did
not appear in the credit for fear of endangering his family in Cambodia. We note that the authenticity of the photograph has been questioned, but it seems to us that there is no way of proving it one way or the other. However, we do thank you for alerting us to the problem.

Not to be outdone, *Newsweek* leaped into the fray in its issue of January 23, 1978. The executioner and his victim appear on the cover of the international edition, and two other faked photos appear within, one with the caption “The executioners: For the condemned, a swift, primitive and brutal death,” and the other, “Life under the Khmer Rouge: Armed guards supervise forced labor in the fields.”

In a February 16, 1978, story filed by the Pacific News Service, Douglas Foster added some further details. He cites a State Department intelligence source who labels the photos a fake and said in an interview that he was “appalled” and “shocked” to see the photographs in the press. Foster also interviewed the director of the Sygma agency which had been distributing these intelligence fabrications to eager customers. She claims to have alerted *Time* to the possibility that the photos were propaganda plants, but held that the photographs were useful anyway, regardless of their authenticity, on the following grounds: “...As the people at *Newsweek* told me, if the photograph hasn’t been absolutely proved false, (the questions) don’t matter. Besides that, the Khmer Rouge do these things, like blowing people’s heads off. So the photos are like drawings...”

Foster notes that the photos have appeared widely in the U.S. and Western Europe (also in Australia), and comments: “No Western publisher who has used the photos has yet alerted readers that the pictures may well be bogus.”\textsuperscript{101}

The reaction of the *Washington Post*, *Time*, *Newsweek*, the Sygma agency, and others who have been engaged in this little exercise of atrocity fabrication,\textsuperscript{102} recalls some of George Orwell’s remarks on the Stalinist press:

When one considers the elaborate forgeries that have been committed in order to show that Trotsky did not play a valuable part in the Russian civil war, it is difficult to feel that the people responsible are merely lying. More probably, they feel that their own version was what
happened in the sight of God, and that one is justified in rearranging the records accordingly.103

Putting aside the manifest dishonesty, suppose that the photographs had been authentic. We might then ask why people should be pulling plows in Cambodia, as one of the faked photographs claims to show. The reason is clear, though unmentioned in this propaganda exercise. The savage U.S. assault on Cambodia did not spare the animal population. The Cambodian government reports that the attack on rural Cambodia led to the destruction of 50-60% of livestock in some areas, 30-40% in others.104 One can learn from the reports of refugees that "they had to pull the plows themselves because there were no oxen."105 Some died from the exhausting work of pulling plows. Who is responsible for these deaths? The U.S. press did not have to resort to propaganda plants to depict the facts. A hundred-word item buried in the New York Times cites an official U.N. report that teams of "human buffaloes" pull plows in Laos in areas where the buffalo herds, along with everything else, were decimated (by the U.S. bombing, although this goes unmentioned in the Times in accordance with postwar taboo).106 Much the same is true in Vietnam, as already noted. Quite possibly the U.N. or the Laotian Government could supply photographic evidence, but this would not satisfy the needs of current propaganda.

Let us now turn to the second example that Simons cites, namely, the interview in which Cambodian premier Khieu Samphan is alleged to have conceded a million deaths at the hands of the Khmer Rouge. This is the most widely-circulated "crucial evidence" offered of the barbarity of the regime—we have already given several examples—and is regularly cited by academic specialists, intelligence analysts, and Cambodia watchers. Frank Snepp, one of the top CIA analysts for Indochina, writes the following, with regard to the atrocities of the Khmer Rouge—which typically, he claims have been ignored in the West:

Khieu Samphan himself has provided perhaps the most reliable estimate of the casualties. During a conference of nonaligned countries in Colombo in August 1976 he admitted to an Italian journalist that the population of Cambodia had dropped by a million since the end of the
war. When asked what had happened to all these people, he replied, "It's incredible how concerned you westerners are about war criminals."\(^{107}\)

Similarly, Timothy Carney, a State Department specialist on Cambodia,\(^ {108}\) testified before Congress, without qualifications, that "in a 1976 interview with an Italian magazine, Khieu Samphan said that there were 5 million people in Cambodia."\(^ {109}\) Given roughly 1 million killed or wounded during the war (a "close" estimate, according to Carney), and a prewar population on the order of 7-8 million, we have over a million postwar deaths (i.e., victims of the Khmer Rouge, with a little further sleight-of-hand). As Carney notes, the alleged estimate of 5 million by Khieu Samphan contradicts the estimate by the Cambodian government that the population is 7.7 million, but he offers no explanation for the discrepancy.

Simons reports that the alleged interview was "supposedly given by head of state Khieu Samphan to an obscure Italian Catholic journal, Famiglia Cristiana, in September, 1976, and subsequently referred to in the New York Times Magazine," though its authenticity is denied by Ponchaud, "a French Catholic priest who is a bitter opponent of the Cambodian Communists," who wrote in August, 1977 that he knows "for certain" that the interview never took place. These statements are correct, but are only part of the story. To add some further detail, in the New York Times Magazine,\(^ {110}\) Robert Moss (extreme right-wing editor of a dubious offshoot of Britain's Economist called "Foreign Report," which specializes in sensational rumors from the world's intelligence agencies) asserts that "Cambodia's pursuit of total revolution has resulted, by the official admission of its Head of State, Khieu Samphan, in the slaughter of a million people." Moss offered no source for this "official admission." We speculated that his source was probably the Readers Digest, that noteworthy journal of cool and dispassionate political analysis, and Moss informed us in a personal letter that that suspicion was correct. Turning back to Moss's source, we read in the Barron-Paul book, expanding their Readers Digest article:

Khieu Samphan, as Cambodian chief of state, attended the Colombo Conference of nonaligned nations in
August 1976 and while there was interviewed by the Italian weekly magazine *Famiglia Cristiana*. "Those traitors that remained have been executed," the magazine quoted him as saying. It further quoted him: "In five years of warfare, more than one million Cambodians died. The current population of Cambodia is five million. Before the war, the population numbered seven million."

Barron and Paul then write that in response to a query as to the fate of the missing one million people, Khieu Samphan replied: "It is incredible how concerned you Westerners are about war criminals." They conclude that "if quoted accurately, Khieu Samphan indicated that between April 17, 1975, and the time of the interview in August 1976 roughly a million Cambodians died."

Note that even if Khieu Samphan had "indicated" that a million Cambodians had died, that is not quite the same as an "official admission...[of]...the slaughter of a million people" as a "result" of Khmer Rouge policy, as in Moss's rendition, which he saw no need to correct when the discrepancy was pointed out to him.

Ponchaud's denial of the authenticity of the interview was in a letter of August, 1977. The denial is particularly pertinent because Ponchaud is cited as the sole independent (nongovernmental) expert source in Barron and Paul's book. Furthermore, both Barron and Paul refer to their close association with Ponchaud.

In the light of these facts, we have repeatedly asked Ponchaud in personal letters to present publicly the details of this matter, in view of his expressed devotion to the "search for truth about the events in Cambodia" and the fact that the alleged interview is not only widely circulated and used as a basis for conclusions about Cambodian atrocities, but had even been offered as grounds for military intervention. In response to these requests, Ponchaud sent a letter to John Barron stating what he knew of the facts. Unfortunately, he has refused permission to quote from this five-page French letter unless it is quoted in its entirety, a requirement that in effect keeps it from the public domain. We are therefore unable to offer his information about the alleged "interview" or other relevant matters.
The matter is taken up by William Shawcross in a review of Barron-Paul. He points out that journalists who were present at Colombo, the site of the alleged interview with Paola Brianti, "say that none of them was ever able to get anywhere near Khieu Samphan... Two reporters have asserted flatly that she could not have gotten the interview and that it is a fake," though "she sticks by her story."

Note that in their book Barron and Paul qualify their comment by saying "if quoted correctly..." The qualification is certainly in order, if only because they misquote the Famiglia Cristiano interview (it was the interviewer, not Khieu Samphan, who is alleged to have offered the 7 million figure). Furthermore, as they and others fail to note, Khieu Samphan explicitly denied the massacre reports in the "interview". There is every reason to be skeptical as to whether there was such an interview, or if there was, whether the "quotes" are anywhere near accurate.

It is doubtful that the journalists and others who have referred to Khieu Samphan's "admission" of a million deaths (or a million "slaughtered") have ever seen the original article in Famiglia Cristiano, which is hardly a well-known source on international affairs. In fact, not a single copy of this journal is to be found in a library in the United States. The journal is a weekly published by the Pauline sisters and is primarily found in churches. It has apparently not occurred to the journalists, scholars, Cambodia specialists, intelligence analysts and congressmen who have quoted or misquoted this "interview" to wonder why Khieu Samphan, at a time when the Cambodian government was not making extraordinary efforts to reach out to the Western World, should have chosen Paola Brianti and Famiglia Cristiano as the medium for approaching Western public opinion. Nor has it occurred to them to be skeptical about a chain of transmission that proceeds from Famiglia Cristiano to the Readers Digest and then to the international community, or to wonder why Khieu Samphan should have offered a figure of 5 million Cambodians when his government was estimating the population at about 7.7 million.

The Famiglia Cristiano "interview" has not only been picked up by the U.S. press, congressmen, and intelligence analysts, but also by the foreign press and the scholarly literature.
example, the *Economist* gives the following version:

When the Khmer Rouge leader, Khieu Samphan, was confronted by these stark statistics last summer—a 7m population in 1970, an estimated 1m killed during the war, a presumed 5m people left in 1976—he replied blandly, “It’s incredible how concerned you westerners are about war criminals.” What is incredible is how little foreign outrage these figures provoke.\textsuperscript{119}

What is perhaps incredible is that the *Economist* should place such reliance on this “interview”.

No less incredible is the review of the Barron-Paul book in the *Far Eastern Economic Review* by Donald Wise,\textsuperscript{120} which begins as follows:


Then comes the Barron-Paul mistranslation of the probably fabricated *Famiglia Cristiana* interview, plus the inevitable comment that the world “is not concerned about the genocide in Cambodia” (his emphasis).

Turning to the scholarly literature, Kenneth M. Quinn writes that the figure of 7.7 million offered by the Cambodian government “was revised downward to five million by Khieu Samphan in an interview he gave to the Italian magazine *Famiglia Cristiana* [sic].”\textsuperscript{121} Again, no qualifications and no question about the source. The Quinn account is perhaps independent of Barron-Paul, given the dates and the fact that it does not offer the standard mistranslation by Barron-Paul, contenting itself with misspelling and misrepresentation of the contents. Quinn, who is described in *Asian Survey* as a State Department representative on the National Security Council Staff, is one of the experts who Barron and Paul cite as having made data available to them and having “guided us to other sources,”\textsuperscript{122} including, perhaps, this one.

A year later, Professor Karl D. Jackson surveyed the situation in Cambodia once again for *Asian Survey*.\textsuperscript{123} Attempting to reconcile apparently conflicting claims about the grain problem, he suggests as one possibility that although food production has still not reached prewar levels, it may suffice “to feed a
substantially reduced population, i.e., the five million people cited by Khieu Samphan in 1976, rather than the eight million cited by various officials including Pol Pot.” His reference for Khieu Samphan’s “estimate” is Donald Wise’s review in the Far Eastern Economic Review which begins by citing the Barron-Paul mistranslation of the alleged Famiglia Cristiana interview, which, to compound the absurdity, had already been cited in Asian Survey a year earlier by a State Department analyst who may well have been the source for Barron-Paul. No doubt the next reference to Khieu Samphan’s “admission” will appear in an article by Quinn citing Jackson.

A few months after Khieu Samphan’s now famous “admission” that his regime was responsible for the deaths of about one-sixth of the population of Cambodia, Indonesian Prime Minister Adam Malik admitted that 50-80,000 people, close to the same percentage of the population, had been killed East Timor in the course of what the Indonesian propaganda ministry and the New York Times call the “civil war”—that is, the U.S.-backed Indonesian invasion and massacre—though one could not have discovered this fact from the U.S. media. While Khieu Samphan’s “admission” was concocted by the media and scholarship on the basis of a fanciful interpretation of remarks that quite possibly were never made, Malik’s admission, by contrast, was clear and explicit. A comparison of media reaction to the actual admission by Malik and the concocted “admission” by Khieu Samphan gives some insight into what lies behind the machinations of the Free Press.

These examples, far from exhaustive, reveal how desperate Western commentators have been to find “evidence” that could be used in the international propaganda campaign concerning Cambodia. The credible reports of atrocities—and there were many—did not suffice for these purposes, and it was necessary to seek out the most dubious evidence. It hardly needs emphasis that journals of the quality and renown of Famiglia Cristiana (or, for that matter, the Readers Digest) in the enemy camp would be regarded with the utmost skepticism, if not dismissed outright, were they to offer comparable “evidence” about Western atrocities.

In this case, the Famiglia Cristiana “interview” bears all the earmarks of an intelligence fabrication of the type that the CIA is
known to have indulged in repeatedly.\textsuperscript{126}

Before turning to the next example cited by Simons, let us consider further the Wise review of Barron-Paul in the \textit{Far Eastern Economic Review}, cited above. To conclude the review which began with the Barron-Paul mistranslation of the probably fabricated interview, Wise offers the following quote from a Cambodian official transmitted by Barron and Paul:

\begin{quote}
...to rebuild a new Cambodia, 1 million men is enough. \textit{Prisoners of war (people expelled from the cities and villages controlled by the Government on April 17) are no longer needed, and local chiefs are free to dispose of them as they please.}
\end{quote}

Surely this is a damning indictment of the Khmer Rouge, on a par with Khieu Samphan's "admission". So let us therefore examine it, to determine whether it has any more credibility than the "interview" that has been so widely exploited to prove Communist iniquity, by Wise among others. As we pursue the trail, we enter into a curious comedy of errors.

Wise's quote is from Barron-Paul:

Francois Ponchaud, the noted French authority on Cambodia, reports that on January 26 an \textit{Angka} official in the Mongkol Borei district declared: "To build a democratic Cambodia by renewing everything on a new basis; to do away with every reminder of colonial and imperialist culture, whether visible or tangible or in a person's mind; to rebuild our new Cambodia, one million men is enough. \textit{Prisoners of war [people expelled from the cities and villages controlled by the Government on April 17] are no longer needed, and local chiefs are free to dispose of them as they please.}"\textsuperscript{127}

Apart from an insignificant error, Wise reproduces Barron-Paul correctly. Barron-Paul give no source, but the source must be an article by Ponchaud in \textit{Le Monde}\textsuperscript{128} where he asserts that a Khmer Rouge military chief made this statement in a directive to local authorities of the district on January 26, 1976. The accuracy of the translation has been challenged, but we will ignore this matter, since far more serious doubts arise.\textsuperscript{129}
Before turning to these, let us look into the identification of "prisoners of war." Barron-Paul quote the interpolated remark accurately from Ponchaud. In an article in *Le Monde* on the preceding day Ponchaud makes the same point. He says that refugees distinguish two categories of people: "the 'old people' from the regions liberated before 1975, and the 'new people' liberated on April 17, 1975. These 'new people' are always considered as 'prisoners of war' and have no rights." The allegation appears in a somewhat different form in Ponchaud's subsequent book. Here he writes that Khmer Rouge soldiers had "more than enough to eat and refused themselves nothing; they had rice, meat, and fish in plenty," but they were withholding food from workers who "were literally dying of hunger"\(^{130}\). "Their reasoning was simple enough: 'You are prisoners of war. We went hungry for five years. Now it's your turn!'"\(^{131}\) No source is given for the latter quote, and no evidence is cited suggesting its general applicability. As we shall see, Ponchaud uses the device of quotation with considerable abandon, so that skepticism is in order about this particular case.

Turning now to the quote given by Wise from Barron-Paul, who cites Ponchaud, note that they say Ponchaud attributes it to "an Angka official" on January 26, 1976. In fact, he attributes it to a Khmer Rouge military chief who issued a directive to local authorities on January 26. In his subsequent book, which one would expect to be more careful and considered than a newspaper article, Ponchaud does not give the quote at all. The sentiment surfaces only in the following quote: "Il suffit de 1 ou 2 millions de jeunes pour faire le Kampuchea nouveau,"\(^{132}\)—literally: "One or two million young people are enough to build the new Cambodia." Not only have the numbers changed—from one million men to 1-2 million young people—but so has the source. The quote is now attributed not to a Khmer Rouge military commander on January 26, 1976, but is rather given (still in quotes) as "the formidable boast" of the Khmer Rouge. The full context is this: "The Khmers Rouges are coldly realizing their formidable boast: '...'" ("Les Khmers Rouges réalisent froidement leur redoutable boutade: '...'). This statement closes the chapter entitled "The Calvary of a People."

Ponchaud's statement in the book plainly implies that the Khmer Rouge are in the process of eliminating all but one or two
million young people—that is, a total of some 5-7 million people, including all who are not young, out of a population that he estimates at 8 million in 1970. A few lines earlier Ponchaud gives estimates of war deaths (600-800,000) and "peace deaths" (note: not killings but deaths) ranging from 800,000 to 1,400,000, the higher estimates allegedly from U.S. sources. The difference between approximately a million deaths and the elimination in process of some 5-7 million people a few lines later would seem significant. It is typical of the way that Ponchaud and others use numbers and their care with the distinction between killing and dying (e.g., from disease and malnutrition caused by the war); recall the prediction from U.S. government sources that the numbers who would die from such causes would be on the order of one million.\textsuperscript{133}

Elsewhere, Ponchaud gives the alleged quote as follows. After stating that the number of postwar dead "certainly exceeds a million," he writes: "In the view of the revolutionaries, such a slaughter is no catastrophe: 'one or two million resolute young people are enough to reconstruct Cambodia,' is a boast [bou tade] frequently used by cadres during meetings."\textsuperscript{134} Here again the implication is that the revolutionaries would not be overly concerned with the massacre of many millions of people, the overwhelming mass of the population. In another publication from the same period, Ponchaud gives still another version of what appears to be the same "quote". He writes: "A Khmer Rouge stated: 'If there should remain in Cambodia only 20,000 young people, we will build the new Cambodia with these 20,000.'\textsuperscript{135} The numbers have changed once again, this time substantially, and there is no specific source. In this case, Ponchaud does not imply that the revolutionaries are in the process of eliminating all but 20,000 young people.

We now have a number of versions of the alleged quote, which Ponchaud evidently regarded as of some significance, given its prominence in his writings in 1976-1977, and the conclusions he drew from it. In only one of these sources (\textit{Le Monde}) is the quote specifically attributed: to a Khmer Rouge military commander issuing a specific directive on a specific date, who says that "one million" are enough—the rest can be "disposed of" (the Barron-Paul translation, which Paul claims was approved by Ponchaud). Ponchaud gives the entire "quote" from this commander in italics
in a separate paragraph in this *Le Monde* article, emphasizing its significance. The context, as well as the Barron-Paul rendition, suggest that he must have had some text or other document. In other articles written at the same time and in Ponchaud's subsequent book, the context and the quote disappear. There is no reference to the alleged directive. Rather, a "formidable boast" of the Khmer Rouge is given without attribution but in quotes: "one or two million young people" will be enough to build the new society. Nothing is said about disposing of the remainder, but it is implied that the Khmer Rouge are eliminating them.

In his review of the book, Lacouture gives still a different version: "When men who talk of Marxism are able to say, as one quoted by Ponchaud does, that only 1.5 or 2 million young Cambodians, out of 6 million, will be enough to rebuild a pure society, one can no longer speak of barbarism" but only "madness".136

We mentioned the discrepancy between the *Le Monde* account and the book in the review-article cited in note 100, adding that "this is one of the rare examples of a quote that can be checked. The results are not impressive."

In his letter commenting on this article,137 Ponchaud explained that the original *Le Monde* reference was based not on any text but rather on a report by a refugee who said that he had heard this remark from the chief of the Northwest region of Cambodia at a meeting; in our view, it would have been a good idea to state the source accurately in the original article. Ponchaud writes that he subsequently heard similar reports from refugees with numbers ranging from 100,000 to 2 million, and "in a spirit of truth," gave a more qualified account in his book, without a specific source. Ponchaud interprets the alleged statements:

not as a firm wish to reduce...Cambodia to 1 million people, but as expressing a resolution to purify Cambodia without taking into account people's lives. It is therefore more a "redoubtable boutade" [a formidable boast] than an explicit affirmation of intention.

We wonder whether under this interpretation, it is still proper to imply, as Ponchaud clearly did in his book, that the Khmer Rouge are in the process of eliminating 5-7 million people in
accordance with this "formidable boast." We continue to be unimpressed. This seems to us a curious way to use the device of quotation. Recall that this is one of the very few cases where an alleged quote can be checked, because in this instance it was reported in at least two separate sources (we will see that other quotes that are subject to verification fare no better, on inquiry). To our minds, it raises serious questions about the authenticity of the quotations that are offered in what is, we again emphasize, the most serious of the critical work on postwar Cambodia. The reader will observe how this rather vague report of what someone is alleged to have said, subject to a qualified interpretation, has been transmuted into a firm declaration of genocidal policy in its long voyage from refugees, to Ponchaud, to Barron-Paul, Lacouture and Wise.

Apparently Ponchaud has since had still further thoughts about the reference. It is deleted entirely from the American edition of his book, the one from which we have been quoting. But the long and dubious chain of transmission has left it as part of "history".

We mention specifically here the "American translation" because, curiously, the quote remains intact in the simultaneous British translation, where the last paragraph of Chapter 4, "The Calvary of a People," reads as follows:

A large part of the deported population appears to have been sacrificed. Its role in the history of Democratic Kampuchea will thus have been to build up the country's economic infrastructure with its own flesh and blood. Now a country of the pure should arise. 'One or two million young people are enough to make the new Kampuchea!' was the blood-chilling boast of the Khmers Rouges, which they are now grimly turning into a reality.

The two sentences that we have italicized are omitted in the American edition. The British translation is, perhaps, a bit free, but both the French original and the British translation do clearly imply that the Khmer Rouge are in the process of cold-bloodedly eliminating something on the order of 5-7 million people.

In the British Penguin edition, a slightly different version of
Lacouture's misstatement of this "quote," or "boast," or whatever it may be, attributing it to "men who talk of Marxism" and concluding that it goes beyond barbarism, appears on the book's cover. In the American translation, it is entirely deleted from the book, along with the claim that some 5-7 million people (including all but the young) are being eliminated to build "a country of the pure." We leave it to the reader to decide what to make of all of this.\(^{141}\)

Some further skepticism about this "quote" or "boast" is aroused by the Congressional testimony of State Department expert Charles Twining:

> The Khmer Rouge sometimes on a local level will tell villagers that, "we can afford to lose 1 million or even 2 million people." You hear this story often enough from enough places to make you think it has been handed down from on high.

> We can lose 1 million or 2 million if we must to create the new Cambodia...\(^{142}\)

The reference is suspiciously familiar. In this case, the 1-2 million are not those who will be left (the others cold-bloodedly eliminated by the Khmer Rouge, according to Ponchaud's rather fanciful construction which he has withdrawn), but rather those who may be "lost". And the quote is not attributed; rather Twining surmises that it has been "handed down from on high." It is a reasonable suspicion that this is a residue of the same alleged "boast". At this point, one must really belong to the faithful to believe that there is anything at all to the whole story. And our trust in those who transmit it without qualification in various forms correspondingly diminishes.

Yet another source for this garbled report is suggested by a Phnom Penh radio broadcast on military problems in which it is explained how Cambodia can defeat the Vietnamese even though much outnumbered:

> Using these figures, 1 Kampuchean soldier is equal to 30 Vietnamese soldiers...If we have 2 million troops, there should be 60 million Vietnamese. For this reason, 2 million troops should be more than enough to fight the
Vietnamese, because Vietnam only has 50 million inhabitants. We do not need 8 million people. We need only 2 million troops to crush the 50 million Vietnamese; and we still would have 6 million people left.\textsuperscript{143}

Again the statement is suspiciously familiar. It may well be that if there is any source at all for these various accounts, it is some sort of patriotic slogan, formulated with various rhetorical flourishes.

Wise is clearly much enamoured of this “quote.” In the same issue of the \textit{Far Eastern Economic Review} in which he reviewed Barron-Paul,\textsuperscript{144} Wise has an article on Cambodia in which he explains that “the new regime is too harsh for the formerly fun-loving, easy-going Cambodians.”\textsuperscript{145} As evidence for the harshness, he writes that “a senior Khmer Rouge official was quoted as saying that Cambodia needs no more than 1 million people to get started on its new course and all prisoners—that is, people from zones unoccupied by the Khmer Rouge at the April 1975 ceasefire—are no longer required and may be disposed of as local commanders think fit.” In a review of the English (British) translation of Ponchaud’s book, he cites it once again, in the following context:

Nobody can suggest a reliable figure for the “peace-dead,” says Ponchaud, “but it certainly exceeds a million.” Yet the Khmers Rouges boasted: “One or two million young people are enough to make the new Kampuchea.”\textsuperscript{146}

The implication is that the “peace-dead” are victims of the Khmer Rouge who “boast” of this massacre because one or two million people are all that are needed. Notice again how the facts, if any, have been skillfully transmuted in their passage through the Western propaganda system. In the first place, there is a serious question as to how many of the “peace-dead” fall to the Western account, rather than that of the Khmer Rouge. There is the further question whether the victims for whom the West does not bear direct responsibility are the victims of peasant revenge or a coordinated policy of massacre. Finally what of the “boast” of the Khmer Rouge—which stands in dramatic contrast to their persistent denial of massacres and expressed commitment to building up the population to 15-20 million? This “boast” is Wise’s
version of Ponchaud's version of a variously-attributed remark that has dissolved upon inquiry. Note again that it is a central element of his review of both Barron-Paul and Ponchaud, and that he also cited it in a separate article. It apparently never occurred to him to wonder why the "quote" he repeats is given and attributed differently in these two sources, or to inquire further into its authenticity on these grounds. In such ways as these the Western system ofindoctrination spins its web of deceit. 147

Recall Lacouture's question whether it is important to decide "exactly which person uttered an inhuman phrase." The example just mentioned was one of the cases under consideration—in other cases to which we return the distortion was still more flagrant. It is also one of the examples that Lacouture did not rectify in his "Corrections," and that he continues to use long after Ponchaud had recognized that it had no basis. 148 Lacouture used the "quote" to show that men who talk of Marxism are going "beyond barbarism." In fact, it turns out that there was no quote but only a remembered "boast" of dubious import, variously presented by Ponchaud and sufficiently questionable to have been eliminated from the American (though not British) edition of his book after inquiry, and suspiciously similar to a remembered slogan of quite different import attributed to many refugees by the State Department's leading expert. The example is perhaps not particularly important in itself, but gains significance in the light of the publicity accorded it and the fact that it is one of the rare cases of a "quote" for which independent verification is even possible.

It is also worth mentioning that these "quotes," which have a curious habit of disappearing on analysis, form the most substantial part of the evidence behind one crucial element in the thesis to which the propaganda machine is committed: that the Khmer Rouge leadership was committed to systematic massacre and starvation of the population it held in its grip, that is, to "autogenocide." It would be of little use to contemporary Western ideology if were to be shown that peasant revenge, undisciplined troops and similar factors (still worse, the legacy of the U.S. attack) were responsible for deaths and killings in Cambodia. It is crucial to establish in the public consciousness, whatever the facts may be, that a centralized and carefully-planned program lay behind the atrocities. As we have seen, one cannot appeal to the
refugee reports for this purpose. Therefore "quotes," "boasts," "slogans," "interviews," and similar documentation are of vital significance, as demonstrations of intent and recognition. It is therefore interesting to see how flimsy is the basis on which such elaborate constructions are founded, again, a useful insight into the mechanism and goals of current Western propaganda.

The examples just discussed, which are among the most widely diffused in the Western media and the springboard for many impassioned accusations, are by no means atypical. Let us turn now to the next observation by Simons, namely, that Western governments that have maintained direct contacts with Cambodia and have sent visiting delegations "generally refuse to accept the genocide allegation." One would think that with the intense concern over the internal affairs of Cambodia, evident from the extensive press coverage and denunciations despite repeated laments to the contrary, and the difficulty of obtaining information from a country virtually closed to the outside world, the reports of Western visitors would have received considerable notice. Such visitors would have been interviewed in depth, one might suppose, and their writings eagerly perused and circulated. That has not quite been the case, however. Their trips were sometimes reported, though just barely, and there was little effort to follow up beyond the first news conference. And Simons's interesting observation, which should have immediately sparked some doubts among journalists with a modicum of skepticism, occasioned no further inquiry.

By late 1978, the regime was beginning to open its doors more widely to foreign visitors. UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim was invited in October,\(^{149}\) and two U.S. reporters—Richard Dudman and Elizabeth Becker—visited in December, along with the British specialist on Southeast Asia Malcolm Caldwell, who was assassinated on the final day of their visit. Another group of visitors from the United States (including one member, Stephen Heder, a specialist on Cambodia, who had lived in Phnom Penh and is fluent in Khmer) had reached Peking when the Vietnamese invasion closed off access to the country in January 1979, and other invitations had been issued. As we noted in the preface to this volume, some observers regard the improvement in the international image of the regime as perhaps the major factor in the
timing of the Vietnamese invasion. With large parts of the country under military occupation, there will be no further opportunity to observe at first-hand the social order that had been constructed or to evaluate the picture presented in the West on the basis of refugee reports, selected and transmitted in the manner we have been discussing. Therefore, it is a matter of some interest to review the material that could have been exploited, the leads that could have been followed up by journalists and others concerned to establish the truth about postwar Cambodia. It is obvious that visitors on guided tours, like refugees selected on guided tours to refugee camps, can only present a partial and perhaps misleading picture, but their reports certainly offer a view of the social reality that would have been carefully investigated by anyone seriously concerned with the truth. We will divide this review into two sections, considering first the visitors who preceded the two U.S. reporters, then turning to their reports.

The Swedish Ambassador to Peking, Kaj Bjork, led a delegation on a two-week visit to Cambodia in February-March, 1976. The visit was quite newsworthy, for one reason, because it coincided with an apparent bombing in Cambodia of disputed origin. (Cambodia claimed that the United States was responsible, a charge dismissed in the West but apparently not in the Third World).\textsuperscript{150} Ambassador Bjork was taken to the site of the bombing. His account of his trip received some notice, including a front-page story in the \textit{New York Times}.\textsuperscript{151} Ambassador Bjork, the \textit{Times} reported, "described Cambodia as a nation under tight military control and led by nationalistic Marxist intellectuals whose goals are more revolutionary than those of the leaders of China." He found no private ownership, no money or wages, no private shops. "Mr. Bjork said that he saw no signs of starvation\textsuperscript{152} and attributed this to the controversial decision of Cambodia’s leaders to force people out of the cities to work in the rice fields"—a conclusion that is, as we have seen, apparently consistent with the judgment of State Department experts and others. He was struck by the emptiness of Phnom Penh, where he was not permitted to walk freely, though he noticed more activity in the outskirts. In the countryside he saw "total mobilization" to construct water control and irrigation systems and develop agriculture, the basis for all other progress.
As for popular attitudes, Ambassador Bjork said that “around Phnom Penh you could see youngsters marching, all of them with a hoe and a spade, some of them also carrying a gun. I got the very strong impression that the regime has active support from this kind of young person.” The leadership are men who returned from study in Europe with “a great deal of knowledge, a good deal of Marxist theory, and came back to Cambodia and reacted very strongly to existing social conditions. They have very strong collectivist and egalitarian ideas with a very strong overtone of nationalism.” Khieu Samphan, in particular, “gives the impression of being an intellectual of quality”—compare the contemptuous and disparaging account in the best-seller on Cambodia by Barron and Paul of the Reader’s Digest.

It might have been interesting to hear more about the impressions of this Swedish delegation, but the press was not interested. Scholars and reporters so assiduous as to discover Famiglia Cristiana might have learned something more, with a little enterprise. The Swedish journal Vietnam Bulletinen carried an interview with Jan Lundvik, who accompanied the Swedish Ambassador.153 His eyewitness report is quite different in character from the picture that dominates the media. Lundvik described the massive efforts to reconstruct the agricultural and irrigation systems, all by hand because there is no equipment. He reports two “lasting impressions” from his visit. The first is “the very strong patriotism” in a population that had been colonized and had not enjoyed complete independence for centuries, patriotism that “expresses itself in a very strong drive for independence—in all domains.” The second lasting impression is the incredible destruction: “One can barely imagine how destroyed are the agricultural areas. Phnom Penh is like an island in a land destroyed by bombing.” Virtually everything seen on a trip from Phnom Penh to Kompong Tham was destroyed.154 In Phnom Penh there were 100-200,000 people, he reports.155 The evacuation of the cities in April 1975, he believes, was not “as noteworthy for the Kampuchean people as had been represented in the West,” because Cambodia is an agricultural country; he also cites historical precedents. The revolution represents “the victory of the countryside over the city,” in a country that is overwhelmingly
agrarian—or was, prior to the forced urbanization caused by the U.S. bombing.

Lundvik reports schooling until age 12—at which time children join in production—and severe shortages of medical supplies. He speaks of a great effort to increase the population from the present 8 million to 15 million. He then adds the following comment:

In this connection I want to point out that the articles that are being written about a “bloodbath” in Kampuchea rely on assumptions that have been misunderstood or falsely interpreted. When the Kampucheans say that they can make do with 1 million inhabitants, they mean that they can achieve every task no matter how few they are, not that one is about to liquidate the remainder. The lack of labor power is a problem, and on this account they are trying to achieve a high birthrate.

Quite possibly, Lundvik has in mind here the Ponchaud “quote” in Le Monde which we have just discussed. Lundvik’s comment supports Ponchaud’s more qualified observations in personal correspondence, cited above, though not the various and mutually inconsistent published accounts. It is evident not only from these comments but from his observations on what he saw that Lundvik gives little credence to the stories, then already circulating widely, on genocide.\textsuperscript{156}

In general, Lundvik’s description of popular commitment and patriotism in a land ravaged by war and passionately committed to independence and development is positive and strikingly different in tone from the reports that were designed for a mass audience in the West. It is relevant to the “difficult question” that troubled Twining and others. It is noteworthy that a Swedish visitor does not feel compelled to evade what seems to be a plausible answer to this question: that the regime had support among the peasants.

The Swedish ambassador to Thailand, Jean-Christopher Oberg, visited Cambodia in December, 1977. He said “that he saw no sign of oppression or cruelty...[and]...discounted refugee reports that about one million people had died or been killed since the takeover.” He also “said he saw very few armed Cambodians—in fact, he saw four, “including one girl”—and “saw nothing to
corroborate reports that the Cambodians were working under armed threats."\(^{157}\)

Ambassadors from Sweden, Finland, and Denmark visited Cambodia again in January, 1978. A Reuters report from Peking on their trip appeared in the *Washington Post* and in an abbreviated version in the *New York Times*,\(^{158}\) with a second-hand account of what they are said to have told "Nordic correspondents" on their return to Peking. There seems to have been no effort to pursue the matter further. This single second-hand report is uninformative. The Danish Ambassador is quoted as saying that Phnom Penh resembled a "ghost town" (a comment since widely circulated) and the Swedish Ambassador as having said that more land was under cultivation than in 1976 and that "traces of the 1970-1975 war were still considerable" though they have decreased. "There were no signs of starvation." Little else was reported.

Inquiries to the Swedish Embassy in Washington in an effort to obtain further information about the latest trip have been rebuffed on grounds that the ambassador's report is not available to the public. What the explanation for this curious response may be, we do not know, and apparently no journalist has been sufficiently intrigued to pursue the matter further.

The Foreign Minister of Thailand spent four days in Phnom Penh in early 1978. The fifth paragraph of Henry Kamm's story in the *New York Times*, which we quote in its entirety, gives this account of what he saw:

Reporters at the airport were struck by Mr. Uppadit's effort to say nothing unkind about Cambodia. He volunteered a comment that reports about conditions in Cambodia since the Communist victory might have been exaggerated. Asked about his impressions of life in Phnom Penh, Mr. Uppadit said it had seemed like a normal city. Scandinavian ambassadors who visited the Cambodian capital last month described it as a "ghost city."\(^{159}\)

The Thai government, of course, is extremely right-wing and passionately anti-Communist, but Uppadit's comments might be treated with skepticism on grounds that he had returned from an
attempt to improve relations with Cambodia.

In April 1976, a Japanese newsman, Naoki Mabuchi, who had remained in Phnom Penh until May 1975, reentered the country and was held in detention in the border town of Poipet for a week. “While in detention, he said, he was free to watch activities in Poipet from the balcony of his room and even to wander outside the building, although he did not stray far.” He “says he speaks the Khmer language well enough to carry on casual conversation.” Mabuchi said that “the people he saw all appeared to be well-fed and in good health. He said his observations convinced him that reports in the Western press ‘placed too much stress on the dark side’ of life in Cambodia under Khmer Rouge rule.” The Bangkok press reported that as he crossed into Cambodia he was beaten, later tortured, by Khmer Rouge soldiers. On his return to Thailand, he denied these reports: “I was not beaten or tortured. I was treated by the Cambodian officials very nicely. They gave me the same food they had, and I think I gained some weight.”

Michael Vickery adds an interesting personal observation based on the story of the Japanese newsman, which has some relevance to the kind of reporting offered concerning Cambodia. He visited the border in Aranyaprathet shortly after the Japanese reporter had crossed into Cambodia. During the next two days that he spent in that town, he heard repeated “eye-witness” reports that the newsman had been “beaten with rifle butts,” “probably killed,” and then “definitely killed,” the last being the accepted account when he left the town. A few months later, Vickery discussed the incident with a member of the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok, with a special interest in Cambodia, who claimed that the Japanese newsman had obviously lied and had indeed been badly beaten. Why did he lie? To protect future Khmer-Japanese relations or in hopes that he would be invited back, Vickery was informed. The evidence that he had lied was “eyewitness reports.” But what of the eyewitness reports of his death? “Shrug of shoulders.” The U.S. official further admitted that he had not tried to meet the reporter or to judge the credibility of his report. Vickery comments:

No, his possibly true story was of no interest, although, obviously, the rumours of his mistreatment or death were
highly interesting. I think this is characteristic of an irresponsible attitude among those who are directly concerned with the manufacture of many of the stories about Cambodia which have been circulated.  

Vickery emphasizes correctly that whatever the facts might have been about the experience of the Japanese newsman, they would tell us little about contemporary Cambodia. It is, nonetheless, interesting to trace the fate of the story.

Four Yugoslav journalists visited Cambodia in March 1978, and reported on their visit in the Belgrade press. U.S. readers could find a translation of excerpts in the radical-pacifist journal *Seven Days*. They estimated the population of Phnom Penh at no more than 20,000, contrary to official estimates of 200,000. Money had been eliminated and the basis of social life was a system of cooperatives, one of which they visited. There they were told that work-related payment had been abolished and “complete equality prevails.” “We didn’t get the impression that the Kampuchean countryside is suffering any food shortages.” They described newly constructed buildings, workers “bust[ling] past the wavy palms” in Phnom Penh, some “carelessly” carrying arms (the same was true throughout Cambodia, they report, “probably a carryover from the revolutionary days”); there were some armed supervisors of work groups, “although that was not a striking phenomenon”). They visited schools and “huge” construction projects which they found “impressive,” where construction crews work an 8½ hour day with three free days a month devoted to lectures and discussion of work problems. Among the workers, primarily young, were small children, former Buddhist monks and “students from the now-suspended high schools and universities who, carried away by enthusiasm for their work, were forgetting their French but acquiring other skills.” They report an interview with Prime Minister Pol Pot, who expressed the hope that the population (which they report to be 7-8 million) will quickly grow to 15-20 million. They were struck by the absence of civil government or other organizations (“with the exception of unions on the factory and enterprise level”) and “the absence, even in mild form, of political indoctrination.” The most striking features of the society were its “egalitarianism,” “fundamentalist radicalism in
interpreting the concept of relying on one’s own resources,” and “the very evident sense of national pride” which “is reminiscent of the behavior of a quiet and introverted person whose opinions were hardly ever taken into account earlier, but who now speaks out, unexpectedly, but invariably passionately.”

More extensive excerpts appear in the BBC summary of world broadcasts, from a six-part report by Slavko Stanic. The former residents of the cities, Stanic reports, are now “mainly members of mobile brigades, which go from one building site to another to build new earth dams or construct artificial lakes,” or they live in cooperatives. He reports a 9 hour work day and writes that “we had the opportunity to convince ourselves that there is definitely no longer any hunger in Cambodia.” He describes a school for skilled electricians in a Phnom Penh suburb where “the lecturers were former workers who had passed through the ‘school of the revolution’,” and an agricultural school where the lecturers “were skillfully applying science to the production of seeds for new varieties of rice.” “The hospitals seemed to be in the hands of the old renowned Phnom Penh doctors.” Stanic reports that there are great differences among the cooperatives. “In the rich Province of Battambang and wherever there were villages before, private plots around the houses are much bigger, the peasants have cows and pigs and other livestock in private ownership,” and “there are not many of the pre-fabricated barracks which serve as common canteens in which all members of the co-operatives and their families eat.” In the “newly established economic zones where the former inhabitants of the cities live” conditions are harsher, and “thousands of families live in dwellings on stilts or in improvised barracks,” while it is planned that by the end of 1979 every family should have a house. “The chief concern of the new authorities in Phnom Penh is the construction and rehabilitation of the villages, an increase in the standard of living of the peasants and the growth of the population.” The suburbs of Phnom Penh, he was told, have about 220,000 people. He believes the current “policy of empty towns is a part of the strategy of the country’s defence.” New economic installations (e.g., a shipyard) are being installed in the vicinity of towns and their workers housed in the towns, which Stanic assumed would be slowly resettled.

Stanic also comments on the attitude of the regime towards
Buddhism. He quotes Yun Yat, the Minister of Culture, Information, and Propaganda: "She told us that 'Buddhism is incompatible with the revolution,' because it was an instrument of exploitation...Buddhism was dead, and the ground had been cleared for the laying of the foundations of a new revolutionary culture." Stanic also reports that at Angkor Wat, "some of the members of our escort hurried as a sign of respect to touch images of Buddha carved in stone. Some high ranking Party cadres also greeted us in the Buddhist manner when they met us, and one of the Buddhist priests who has replaced the robe with the revolutionary uniform disagreed with Minister Yun Yat. He told us that Buddhism and communism had the same humane goals, and that there was no great antagonism between them."

Reports of the Yugoslav visit appeared in the U.S. press. Michael Dobbs, in a report from Belgrade, emphasized the abandonment of Phnom Penh and the "new order...based on the village..." and on the cooperative and mobile brigade. "The Yugoslavs do not appear to have raised the controversial question of the hundreds of thousands of people believed to have been killed by the Khmer Rouge shortly after their victory," Dobbs writes in a typical reference to what "is believed"; "The only allusion to such massacres was made by the Politika correspondent, Ranchic, who said: 'We were inclined to believe the statement of our guides that the class enemy has been relatively quickly eliminated in Cambodia.'" The more favorable impressions that appear in the actual report are ignored or underplayed.

Citing the Yugoslav visit, AP reported that "Cambodia is training boys and girls as young as 12 to replace the industrial working class that was swept away after the Communist takeover three years ago." The reference to the "industrial working class that was swept away" by the Communists and is now being "replaced" is an embellishment of the Yugoslav report by AP. In fact, the "industrial working class" was very small and there is no indication in the Yugoslav report that it was "swept away." Refugees from the Battambang area, for example, report that in general workers remained in their jobs in a jute processing plant outside Battambang after the war. Perhaps AP has confused its dates and the agent of destruction; it is true that some of the few Cambodian industrial installations, and presumably workers and
their families as well, were "swept away" by U.S. bombers, without noticeable indignation in the media. Programs of vocational training for 12-year-olds are, furthermore, not generally regarded as an atrocity in a poor peasant society. The anti-Communist Sihanouk regime, for example, took pride in its programs of technical and vocational training in "model primary schools" and featured pictures of young children working with industrial machinery in its information publications, noting that the youth must not "take refuge in administrative careers" but must "have the ideal of productive labor." We do not recall protests in the West over such savagery.

The AP report also describes work-study programs and a nine-hour work day with evenings "set aside for alternating classes of political indoctrination and technical education." Again, a nine-hour work day hardly seems a major atrocity in a country of the economic status of contemporary Cambodia, and the Yugoslav report actually noted "the absence, even in mild form, of political indoctrination," as we have seen.

The New York Times carried a report of the Yugoslav visit by David A. Andelman from Belgrade. He repeats Ranchic's comment, cited above, and the report of the abandonment of Phnom Penh (he reports the Yugoslav journalists as writing that the population was about 200,000, "though most seem to live in the surrounding area and only about 10,000 downtown"). He also reports their account of work brigades with the comment that "it was clear that they were impressed labor," without explaining how this was clear. He too downplays or ignores the more favorable impressions conveyed, for the most part. Henry Kamm cited the Yugoslav visit in a column devoted to refugee reports. He tells us that one of the Yugoslav journalists "reported that they were appalled by much of what they saw, although, restricted by the conventions of Communist fraternalism, they said so only implicitly in their dispatches." As evidence, he cites their report of "child labor in rigorous agricultural tasks" which the Cambodians urged them to film despite the alleged statement of a Yugoslav TV reporter that this "would make a bad impression on the outside world." Kamm claims that the Yugoslav reports bear out the refugee accounts of "continuing bloodletting, even among factions
of the ruling party, and starvation, nationwide forced labor and regimentation," with a work day beginning at 4 a.m. and lasting often until 10 p.m. How he derived these conclusions from published accounts or the reports concerning them in the U.S. press he does not say.

François Rigaux of the Center for International Law of the Catholic University of Louvain was a member of a delegation of the Association Belgique-Kampuchéa who spent two weeks in Cambodia in mid-1978, covering 2,000 km. in several regions of the country and engaging in discussion with representatives of regional and municipal administrations, cooperatives, factories, workers groups, schools, hospitals and government. He has written a very detailed factual and analytic report of his experiences, which presumably would be available to journalists and others interested in his impressions of what he found.173

Initially struck by the apparent emptiness of Phnom Penh, Rigaux discovered after a few days that quite a few sections were settled and that people appeared to be engaged in normal urban existence. The surrounding industrial sections were more densely settled, and again, life seemed quite normal. The most striking feature of the cities was the complete absence of commerce.

In the countryside, people appeared to be well-fed, quick to enter into conversation, jokes and laughter, and in general engaged in normal activities with good-will, as far as he could determine. Rigaux was struck by the extreme decentralization and the progress in agricultural development. Schools combined study with light work (raising animals, cultivating fruits and vegetables, etc.), and the same was true in a secondary school that he visited. In a Phnom Penh factory, too, he found that workers were raising their own pigs, poultry, and vegetables. Cadres and administrative personnel participated in productive labor as well as taking responsibility for cleaning offices and so on.

Like other visitors, Rigaux was taken to the Ang Tassom collective. He reports that the work force was divided into three categories: people under 35 were responsible for heavy work, and those who were unmarried were assigned work in more remote areas; those in the 35-55 age bracket and young mothers carried out lighter work near their homes; and such activities as weaving and basketwork were reserved for people over 55. The cooperative
had a medical center and primary school with four hours of instruction a day for children and some adult education. Each family had its own house with an adjoining area for raising tobacco, fruit, etc.

In the area of family life, his own professional specialty, Rigaux reports that he found a picture not unlike that of Western European villages before the industrial revolution, with a strong emphasis on family life. Children over a year of age had collective care during the work day, and he reports efforts to arrange for married couples and families to share related occupations where possible. With the extreme decentralization and local arrangements for personal affairs, bureaucracy appeared to be reduced to a minimum.

Rigaux takes the “political objective” to have been “to place the entire population under the conditions of life and work of the poorest, the peasants.” What there was, was shared equally. Children of 15 years of age were expected to devote themselves to productive labor, a situation that should, he writes, be “compared to the fate of a great number of children of third world countries of the same age who are beggars or prostitutes [or, we may add, the 52 million child laborers, including 29 million in South Asia, whose fate evokes no outrage], rather than to the privileged condition of well-educated adolescents of the industrialized societies.” Similarly, medical care is not concentrated in the cities and reserved for the elite but is distributed through the most backward regions with an emphasis on preventive medicine and hygiene.

“The best propaganda for the new regime,” Rigaux writes, was the attitudes and behavior of the older peasants whom he came upon by chance during his travels. To Rigaux, they appeared to have acquired dignity, serenity, and security after a lifetime of oppression and violence.

Rigaux also reports on the discussion meetings for arranging work schedules and other tasks at various levels and the methods for selecting administrative personnel. He believes that factories, schools, cooperatives, and other organizations permitted a substantial degree of free exchange of opinion and popular decision-making. He notes the absence of the rights taken for granted in Western industrial societies, but points out that not only is the level of economic development incomparable, but also there were,
he believes, elements of control over work and supervisors that are foreign to the industrial democracies.

Rigaux remains unconvinced by the explanations offered by the regime with regard to repressive policies after liberation, including severe punishment and execution. He notes, however, that the conditions described with horror by many of the refugees (which he believes have "considerably improved") are "those of the majority of the Khmer peasants, conditions of which [the refugees] were unaware during the period when their privilege permitted them to keep at a distance" from the lives of the poor.

Rigaux believes that "relative to what it was before liberation, or compared to that of the peasants of Bangladesh, India or Iran..., the condition of the Khmer peasant has improved notably." For urban or Western elites, the results are "shocking," in part because of the deliberate insistence on equality, which requires that all share in "the conditions of work to which the immense majority of the world's population have been subjected for millenia." Now everyone faces "the exalting task of cooperating in the progressive improvement of the conditions of life of the entire population." "Conceived in a very poor country ravaged by war, the economic and political system of Cambodia does not pretend to be a model for an advanced industrial society, but it would be foolish to judge it in accordance with the needs and experiences" of such societies.

No doubt Rigaux, like other visitors, was shown what the regime wanted him to see. The picture he presents in his detailed observations should be worth some attention, one might imagine, and in fact might help explain both the apparent commitment of significant parts of the population to the new regime and the horror and indignation of others at its practices. As he notes, he had no opportunity to assess the veracity of the many stories of massacre and cruel oppression, but again, we note that there is no direct inconsistency between these stories and the quite different impression obtained by visitors in a country that is, by all accounts, highly decentralized and perhaps quite varied from place to place.

There were many other visitors to Cambodia from the Scandinavian countries, some from Communist groups, some non-Communists from "friendship associations," some journalists. Their reports appeared in the mainstream press and journals
in Sweden and Denmark, but have yet to be mentioned in the United States, though the sources are hardly obscure and some of the visitors (e.g., Jan Myrdal) are quite well-known in the United States. We will not review their reports, which are in general quite favorable though often qualified by the observation that while they personally witnessed scenes throughout the country of people engaged in productive work with apparent contentment and enthusiasm (working a 9-hour day, but according to Gunnar Bergstrom, at a slower pace than is typical in Europe), they do not speak Khmer and cannot comment on what they were not shown. These visitors too report no indications of starvation or malnutrition.

A Japanese delegation from the Peking embassy visiting in the fall of 1978, reported that the regime was stable and “the people did not seem undernourished” (“there were plenty of vegetables and fruit, and the peasants’ diet could be supplemented by pork”). An economist who had been in Cambodia during the Lon Nol regime “observed that rice production and irrigation are now better organised.” Phnom Penh “is a desolate city by day” but “a delegation member said he saw large numbers of people returning to the city in the evening from small-scale industries located outside.”174 U.S. readers, deluged with reports about Cambodian horrors at exactly this period (as before), were thoughtfully spared any exposure to the reports of the Japanese embassy delegation.

To our knowledge, that exhausts the accounts on the part of visitors who might, conceivably, be taken seriously in the West, prior to the visit of the two U.S. reporters in December 1978.175 There were others. A visit by a group led by an “editor of a Chicago-based Marxist weekly” received a 38-line notice in the New York Times176 reporting only that they “painted a glowing picture of life under the Communists” and denied atrocity claims. Daniel Burstein, editor of the Communist Party Marxist-Leninist newspaper The Call (Chicago) was interviewed on the MacNeil/Lehrer report (see note 53), where, again, he denied these claims on the basis of interviews with “average people” in the cities and countryside. Their account will naturally be given little credence in the West, since it is taken for granted that this Maoist group, with their ideological preconceptions, will report favorably on their visit. Skepticism is no doubt in order, though for accuracy, we
should add that exactly the same is true in the case of reports by John Barron and Anthony Paul in the *Readers Digest* of stories allegedly told them by "promising subjects," to whom they were "guided" by Thai officials, or reports by Henry Kamm of what he claims to have heard from a Cambodian in a cage in a Thai police station. If refugee reports transmitted by these highly dubious sources are given any attention, there could be no good reason to ignore the eyewitness reports of the only U.S. citizens to have visited Cambodia prior to December 1978. It should come as no surprise, however, that the accounts of the U.S. Marxist-Leninists were ignored or ridiculed in the press, while journalists and scholars greeted Barron-Paul, Kamm, et al., as unbiased seekers after the truth.

There is more to the Burstein story. Given the uniqueness of his visit, major media enterprises had offered to publish photographs and text to be provided by Burstein. Specifically, he received payment for submitted material from *Time, Newsweek*, ABC television, and the *Washington Post*. Many months later, the first three stalwarts of the Free Press had definitely rejected the text and photographs (refusing suggestions to rewrite, etc.), while the fourth was still mulling the question over. It is noteworthy that *Time, Newsweek*, and the *Washington Post* all had featured the faked photographs discussed earlier long after the fabrication was exposed, refusing to publish letters stating the unquestioned facts or to print retractions.

Visitors and refugees transmit quite different pictures. Refugees were brutalized, oppressed or discontented; otherwise they would not be refugees. Visitors are offered only a partial view, and they were for the most part initially sympathetic. We should anticipate, then, that visitors' accounts will be more favorable than those of refugees—though, as we have noted, and will see again, refugee accounts are not so uniform as the media barrage depicts. Note again that when we correct for the factors mentioned, conflicts between the refugee and visitor accounts need not be taken as indicating that one or the other must be dismissed; all might be accurate, in a country that presents a mixed picture with considerable local variation. That, in fact, would appear to be a fair conclusion from the full range of evidence so far available.
The media, however, pursue a different course. A highly selected version of what refugees have reported under quite unfavorable conditions was transmitted by observers of evident bias and low credibility, and given massive publicity as unquestionable fact. Reports of visitors were ignored or distorted. This was not an absolutely uniform picture, but it was a fairly general one. We have given a number of examples in the course of the exposition. A look at the material featured in the press in the fall of 1978, at the end of the period under review, confirms this picture.

The *New York Times Magazine* carried a major story by Henry Kamm in November entitled “The Agony of Cambodia.”¹⁷⁸ We have already investigated examples of Kamm’s reporting on Timor and Vietnam, noting his extreme bias and unreliability.¹⁷⁹ We have also seen how he distorted the account by the Yugoslav reporters. In the case of Vietnam, as we saw in chapter 4, Kamm pretended for a long period that there was no source of information apart from refugee reports, an obvious falsehood. By November 1978, Kamm evidently recognized that the pretense must also be dropped in the case of Cambodia. By that time U.S. journalists and other non-Communist observers had received invitations, and there were many reports available (outside of the Free Press) such as those we have surveyed. Kamm therefore describes the sources available as follows:

> With the country almost hermetically sealed off from the world, except for rare and carefully guided tours for carefully selected visitors, refugees who cross the heavily mined and closely guarded borders to Thailand and Vietnam are the only reliable source of information about life in Cambodia since the Khmer Rouge troops strode into Phnom Penh on April 17, 1975.

In short, we can continue to dismiss the reports of visitors—as Kamm proceeds to do—and rely solely on what Kamm claims to have heard from the refugees he interviewed under the circumstances already described, or reports transmitted from Vietnam, which is at war with Cambodia. These reports are “reliable”; others are not.

Kamm then proceeds to outline what he says he heard from
refugees. Much of it is inconsistent with what visitors have reported, from their own direct experience. But this fact deserves no comment, since the visitors have already been dismissed as unreliable. Thus, Kamm says that the Phnom Penh radio "is not listened to by the people of Cambodia, who have no radios." In contrast, Gunnar Bergstrom of the Swedish-Kampuchea Friendship Association (non-Communist, but sympathetic to the regime) reports that peasants had radios in the cooperatives he visited and listened to the radio regularly.\(^{180}\) Kamm also claims that the refugee reports are "told with striking similarity of detail in hundreds of refugee interviews." As we have seen, and will again see below, the reports vary considerably, as attested by qualified and independent observers. Kamm does not comment on the conditions of his interviews—though once again he describes an interview in a Thai police station—or what these conditions imply. He describes a regular work day of 13 hours with a half-hour break, again without reference to reports of visitors that explicitly contradict this account. His major conclusion is that "Cambodia's people labor to exhaustion, but they do not eat the rice they grow."

"In a country once abundant with food, where hunger was the one human misery almost unknown, Cambodians go hungry all the time." This he describes as a "mystery". There seems to be adequate rice production, and little is exported, but the people are starving. He concludes that "rational explanations have perhaps never been the surest guide to understanding" Cambodia. Rational explanation is indeed difficult when dubious premises and preconceived conclusions must be reconciled with recalcitrant facts, a problem familiar to propagandists everywhere. Kamm does not tell us whether rational explanations are a surer guide to understanding the behavior of a superpower that pounded Cambodia to dust, or the practice of journalists who try to conceal the long-term impact of that not insignificant fact, perhaps because he knows that rational explanations do suffice in this case, unfortunately.

Kamm's belief that hunger was "almost unknown" in prewar Cambodia is in flat contradiction to analyses of the peasant society by specialists, who conclude that hunger and even starvation were common. His report that the people are now starving is in flat contradiction to the eyewitness testimony of non-Communist
visitors, including the Swedish and Japanese embassy delegations as well as others. A possible resolution of his “mystery” is that the accounts he claims to have gathered in Thai police stations or under similar conditions of surveillance and coercion are inaccurate, and that even accurate refugee accounts give only a partial indication of a more complex reality. Even if we grant that Kamm is transmitting accurately what he heard, that would seem a plausible solution, but it is one that he is incapable of considering on ideological grounds, leaving him no alternative but to conclude that “what happens to the rice of Cambodia is one of the many mysteries enveloping the country.”

Kamm’s account is presented in the New York Times as “fact,” not as the reactions of a highly biased observer of limited credibility. And it is taken as simple fact by others who have been trained to rely on the press without critical standards. Thus Mary McGrory, a liberal syndicated columnist who was strongly opposed to the U.S. war in Indochina, writes that “except for a Yugoslav television crew that was admitted by the government, the People’s Republic of Kampuchea, as it is now called, has been cut off from the outside world. The ghastly accounts of its existence come from refugees all of whom tell the story...,” one of unrelieved misery and massacre: “In a recent article in the New York Times, Henry Kamm pointed out that while rice production is up, the Cambodians are on near-starvation rations.”181

On the same day that the New York Times published Kamm’s article on Cambodia, the Boston Globe published a front page feature story with a headline running across the entire top of the front page: “Cambodia now a ‘slaughterhouse,’ say refugees.”182 The report, by Michael Parks, is reprinted from the Baltimore Sun, and was also given front page coverage elsewhere.183 It is unclear why this story, which repeats material that has been presented in abundance in the press, adding nothing new or particularly topical, merits a screaming front-page headline. Parks relies almost entirely on refugee accounts; he does not indicate whether he heard these accounts himself or is transmitting them from some other source. These accounts, he writes, “vary little” and provide a “uniform catalogue of horrors that verges on genocide.” He repeats examples of the sort that have been widely publicized in the West since mid-1975.
Parks also refers to Japanese visitors to Cambodia, whom he does not identify, including "a Japanese correspondent" and "sympathetic visitors." He states that their description of cooperatives was "almost as grim" as the refugee stories of virtual genocide. This description he presents as follows: "With 5,000 persons, it had just brought rice production up to 1975 levels. The first efforts were just being made to build simple houses; a reopened elementary school had 190 children." Since he does not identify his source, we cannot judge whether his reference to "1975 levels" is correct; "prewar levels" seems more likely, considering what is known of 1975 levels, and Parks is silent on why it was necessary to try to achieve earlier levels of rice production. It is, perhaps, less than obvious that the description just quoted is "almost as grim" as a story of virtual genocide. This comment gives some insight into the way he evaluates the data available to him, however.

Parks also quotes the unidentified Japanese correspondent who writes ("nonetheless"): "We received the impression that these people [in the cooperative] had adjusted well to their new environment. In many ways the leisurely relaxed atmosphere peculiar to rural areas in the tropics had survived the political changes" (perhaps it is this remark that is "almost as grim" as a description of virtual genocide). Parks notes that the Japanese visitors asserted "that the peasants were well fed," but claims that they calculated the average diet at the cooperative as only 7 or 8 ounces of rice a day, far below other estimates; lacking any reference, his claim cannot be checked.

Parks is outraged by the report he attributes to the Japanese visitors that "Khmer Rouge leaders in Phnom Penh were living in luxury." Henry Kamm, in his story on the same day, also observes scornfully that government leaders "look remarkably well-fed, in splendid health and at ease in comfortable surroundings," while the population, he claims, is starving. Note again that visitors have reported that the population seems well fed, while at least some refugees and the leading U.S. government specialists have denied that Khmer Rouge cadres receive privileged treatment. But let us suppose that Park and Kamm are correct. If so, then Cambodia is similar in this respect to the other countries on their regular beat, where a minority lives in fabulous luxury while the peasants and urban slum dwellers subsist in misery. This fact, however, elicits no
outrage beyond Indochina (the one region where there is reason to believe it is untrue).  

We mentioned earlier William Shawcross's lengthy article on Cambodia in *New Times*, in which he expresses great concern over child labor—in Cambodia. Shawcross observes that Cambodia has been visited by Yugoslav journalists, "delegates from friendly Maoist parties in the West and trade groups from various Southeast Asian countries." He too states that in Cambodia "before the war, there was (in Southeast Asian terms) little hunger and no famine" and "the way of life was indolent"; so it may have appeared from a visit to Phnom Penh. He gives what appears to be a paraphrase of the Yugoslav report, but with a marked difference in tone. The Cambodians, he writes, "have developed the concept of the mobile Gulag," referring to the fact reported by Stanic and others that work teams move to wherever their labor is required. Furthermore, "Quite apart from shortages of food, life in the new cooperatives is hard. Work begins at 5 A.M. and lasts for at least nine hours," and there is often another shift at night. He does not explain how he knows that the work teams are a "mobile Gulag" rather than an attempt to rebuild a country destroyed by war. Nor does he comment on the apparent success of these efforts in overcoming the devastating effects of the U.S. war, which he describes, including the destruction of the agricultural system. He also fails to explain why he is so offended by a 9 hour work day in an impoverished peasant country. If indeed the cooperatives have managed to reduce working hours to a 9 hour day with occasional extra shifts, that would seem to be a considerable accomplishment. Such a work schedule was not at all unusual, for example, in Israeli kibbutzim a few years ago, to take an example from a far richer country receiving enormous aid from abroad, where such efforts were not denounced as evidence of the extraordinary harshness of the regime. For some Western journalists, a 9 hour work day may seem a major atrocity. Peasants, or for that matter farmers and workers in advanced countries, might have a rather different view.

Shawcross also states that "an estimated two million people, nearly one quarter of the population, have been killed in war and in internal purges." Since less than a million were reportedly killed in the war, Shawcross is asserting that over a million have been killed "in internal purges" since, a figure about ten times as high as
the estimates by Barron-Paul or Ponchaud. He cites no source for this "estimate". But this is again typical of the numbers game in the case of Cambodia.

Shawcross observes that the numbers are less important than the question "whether or not the government has used murder and terror as deliberate acts of policy." He writes: "The evidence is overwhelming that it has done so. Madness of this nature defies rationalization." He does not, here or elsewhere, present evidence that the use of terror is systematic and deliberate policy, though he does relay reports of refugees who have recounted gruesome tales of terror. Presumably, he concludes from these reports that the policy of the regime was one of deliberate murder and terror. Perhaps his conclusion is correct, despite his failure to construct a case.\textsuperscript{187} Again, it is noteworthy that neither the quality of his evidence, its selection, the demonstrated lack of credibility of his major sources (of which he was by then aware, at least in part), or the vast gap between his evidence and his conclusions seems to him to require any discussion.

Here as elsewhere Shawcross is quite careful to discuss the effects of U.S. military and diplomatic intervention. Others are less scrupulous in this regard. Thus Jack Anderson, interviewing Lon Nol ("a sad symbol of the serene little country of Cambodia, which he once ruled") presents the pre-1975 history as follows:

The Cambodians are a gentle if emotional people. They wanted only to live in peace in their lush kingdom, with its rich alluvial soil, washed by the pelting rains. But with the collapse of U.S. power in Southeast Asia, Lon Nol gave way to a fanatic regime that has brutalized the populace. Hundreds of thousands have been murdered by their new rulers, and other thousands have fled in terror.\textsuperscript{188}

Anderson is one of the country's major liberal syndicated columnists, who has devoted many columns to Cambodian atrocities, beginning with a report on June 4, 1975, alleging that the Khmer Rouge "may be guilty of genocide against their own people."\textsuperscript{189} He has ample staff and resources, and surely knows that it was not simply "the collapse of U.S. power in Southeast Asia" that is responsible for starvation, disease, destruction, and revenge in Cambodia. But it is appropriate, in the current phase of
imperial ideology, to excise from history other major factors with which he is quite familiar (as well as others that he may know nothing of, such as the realities of peasant existence), and to speak of Cambodia as a "serene little country" of "gentle people" plunged into disaster and misery by the "collapse of U.S. power."

In discussing Sihanouk's characterization of Communist Cambodia in the preface to this volume, we pointed out that he presented a dual picture, with aspects that were, from his point of view, both positive and negative. The reports of visitors tend to substantiate the picture he presented on the basis of the very limited evidence available to him. But their reports were either ignored, or else generally reinterpreted in the Free Press to conform to the required negative image. The two U.S. reporters who visited in December 1978, Richard Dudman and Elizabeth Becker, were able to reach an unusually large audience with their own words.\textsuperscript{190}

The \textit{New York Times} dismissed their visit in a line. Bernard Weinraub, in the 11th paragraph of a 13 paragraph story on reported purges in Cambodia, remarked that their visit "produced no substantial surprises since the visitors saw only what the government wanted them to see."\textsuperscript{191} It is true enough that their visit produced no substantial surprises, at least for people who were not restricted to the Free Press for their information. In fact, what Dudman and Becker observed was not very different from what had been reported by earlier visitors. But it was markedly different from what the \textit{New York Times} and other journals had been offering as standard fare, as we see at once when we compare their eyewitness reports with the version of postwar Cambodia that had been offered by the \textit{Readers Digest}, the \textit{New York Times}, the \textit{New York Review of Books} and other mainstream Western sources.

Richard Dudman, an experienced foreign correspondent with excellent credentials, commented that although "the visit amounted to a conducted tour...there was plenty of opportunity for observation in tours of 11 of the 19 provinces." His conclusions conform to the dual picture that emerges from consideration of the range of evidence previously available:

It seemed evident throughout this reporter's visit to
Cambodia before the recent Vietnamese attack that the new Cambodia’s version of Communism had no place in it for anyone who wanted to read, write, or even think independently, or for anyone who wanted to own more than a bare minimum of personal property.

At the same time, the physical conditions of life may well have improved for many peasants and former urban dwellers—possibly for the vast majority of the population, as the regime claimed.

Apart from the “austere standard of hard manual labor” and restrictions on “the freedoms accepted or at least professed by most of the rest of the world” that Dudman observed, his inability to make contact with former urban residents tended to confirm the dark picture of repression and atrocities conveyed by the refugee accounts that have been publicized. “The new Communist Cambodia,” Dudman wrote, “became one huge work camp, but its people were clearly not being worked to death and starved to death as foreign critics often charged”:

What I have found in two weeks of touring Pol Pot’s Cambodia—under strict government supervision but with a good opportunity for observation—was a regimented life of hard work for most Cambodians, leavened, however, by much improved housing, regular issuance of clothing, and an assurance of apparently adequate food. I did not find the grim picture painted by the thousands of refugees who couldn’t take the new order and fled to Thailand or Vietnam. In this lull between wars, those who remain appeared to be reasonably relaxed at the height of the busy harvest season. They sometimes leaned on their hoes like farm workers everywhere. And they often stared and then smiled and waved at the rare sight of Western faces. Workers usually appeared to be operating under their own direction. There were no signs of government cadres giving orders or armed guards enforcing the working hours, although individuals seemed to know what was expected.

The work day, Dudman found, lasted from about 6 AM to
11 AM and again from 1 PM to 5 PM. Dudman found the housing program ("one of the world's great housing programs") particularly impressive, "a sudden mass upgrading of the individual family homes from the standard that has existed for centuries," which "probably meant better living, too, for the hundreds of thousands of country people who were driven into the cities by the five year war..." as well as for the peasants who remained on the land. Until the Vietnamese invasion, prospects for economic development "appeared bright." Cambodia was feeding itself and had resumed rice exports, and the crucial water-control programs of the postwar years appeared to have been generally a success. He saw no evidence of starvation, contrary to standard claims in the U.S. media, and found the country "to be flourishing and potentially prosperous—at least until the Vietnamese invaders moved in." U.S. specialists, Dudman wrote, "have acknowledged that the Cambodian claim of reviving rice production to the point of resuming exports would, if true, be a spectacular achievement." It may well have been true.

Dudman also describes "a wide range of industrial growth—concentrated more in tiny and primitive cottage industries such as brick-making, silk spinning, and local blacksmith shops, but including also a fairly sophisticated rubber factory..." Development was decentralized and aimed for a high degree of local self-sufficiency. He describes "a progressive industrial growth plan" that seemed not unrealistic, judging by the account that he and earlier visitors have given. He also gives a brief account of the organization of the cooperatives.

Recognizing that the peasant population probably did not regard the "austere standard of hard manual labor" (specifically, a nine-hour work day) as an onerous imposition of the regime, and may not have been overly concerned that privileged urban sectors were compelled to share the hard but improving life of the poorer peasants, one might reach the conclusion that much of the population may well have supported the regime, particularly if it is true, as Dudman was informed but could not establish, that "decisions were taken collectively" in the cooperatives and even the army.

Elizabeth Becker's six-part series in the Washington Post covers much the same ground in less depth, and is in some ways
more revealing about the character of U.S. journalism than it is about Cambodia. She found the development program generally incomprehensible: “no one seems able to offer a coherent philosophical basis for the extreme upheaval that has taken place.” She does not go into how this alleged failure compares, say, with the “philosophical basis” for the developments in far more favored Thailand discussed in the preface to this volume, or comparable phenomena in other regions where a dependency model has been imposed. She writes that she is “forced to conclude” that the economic system “seems to be working,” revealing plainly the initial bias that colored all of her observations. It is also remarkable to see how uncritically she accepted Cambodian charges which, she claims, supported U.S. positions during the Vietnam war. She writes that she was given “a remarkable new document”—namely the Cambodian government _Livre Noir_ of September 1978,¹⁹² which had in fact been on sale in New York well before she left for Cambodia—which “confirms” U.S. claims and “discloses” that there were 200,000 to 300,000 Vietcong in the northeast region of Cambodia, including the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Party (COSVN), when Nixon ordered the 1970 invasion. It estimates the total number of Vietcong in Cambodia in 1970 at 1.5–2 million.¹⁹³ The _Livre Noir_, which is a bitter attack on the Vietnamese Communists, is certainly worth reading, but surely no serious commentator would accept uncritically a propaganda document produced in the midst of an ongoing war. U.S. reporters have rarely paid attention to material from comparable sources “confirming” or “disclosing” alleged facts that contradict positions taken by the U.S. government.¹⁹⁴

We have already noted the _New York Times_ dismissal of the Dudman-Becker visit. _Newsweek_ ran an uninformative article by Becker¹⁹⁵ and _Time_ reviewed their visit in an article that simply repeated its familiar rhetoric about “the shroud of terror and darkness” of a regime that was attempting to “counteract its worldwide image as a merciless, anonymous and genocidal regime,” systematically avoiding the direct observations that Dudman (and, in part, Becker) had reported, in particular, those that were positive.¹⁹⁶

Malcolm Caldwell was assassinated on the final day of the visit, in Phnom Penh. According to Dudman, “Caldwell expressed
general sympathy with the Cambodian brand of Communism prior to the Vietnamese invasion” and “the report that he was experiencing a change in views was not true,” as Dudman knew from conversations throughout the two-week trip “up to a few hours of his death.” In these conversations, “Caldwell remained sympathetic to the Cambodian revolution, without blinding himself to its faults,” likening it to early stages of the industrial revolution in England. It “seems out of the question,” Dudman writes, that the Cambodian government, which “had everything to lose from the incident,” could have had anything to do with the assassination, contrary to speculations that have been rife. Dudman’s conclusion seems well-founded. The true story will probably never be known, but the consequences of the assassination are clear enough. It is most unlikely that Caldwell’s account of what he had seen would have reached any segment of international opinion apart from the left. And for the left, judging by what he had written in personal letters and articles before his trip and by the fact that “he remained fully sympathetic to the Cambodian revolution” (Dudman), his message would have tended to support the Pol Pot regime and to undermine the justification for the Vietnamese invasion that was being presented in the Western and Soviet bloc press.\(^{197}\)

As we have seen, refugee accounts are not as uniform as accounts in the press suggest. A further look bears out the conclusion. The most extensive published report of a refugee interview, to our knowledge, is a study based on conversations with Peang Sophi, who escaped from Cambodia in January, 1976, and arrived in Australia three months later.\(^{198}\) “His account of life under the revolutionary regime,” Chandler comments,

differs in two important ways from others readily available in the West. Firstly, he spent over six months working actively—and rather happily—under revolutionary guidance; unlike many refugees, he was not punished by the regime for having roots in the “old society.” Secondly, from about September onwards, he enjoyed considerable responsibility, as the “economic” foreman of an 800-man rural work team.

Chandler also observes that his experiences may not be typical. He
lived in a province with “a unique (but recent) revolutionary tradition” and unusual prosperity, where “revolutionary cadre ...may have been especially vengeful and undisciplined, too; certainly most tales of atrocities told by refugees refer to events in Battambang” [Sophi's province].199 Sophi reports that the Khmer Rouge cadre were “thin and pale,” mostly young peasants. They admitted that in the early stages of liberation “they were subject to ‘uncontrollable hatred,’” and that “in this mood” conducted executions of Lon Nol officials and destroyed military equipment. They were “real country people, from far away” (Sophi's emphasis), illiterate, unfamiliar with urban amenities and frightened even of tin cans. “One speaker allegedly said: ‘We were so angry when we came out of the forest that we didn’t want to spare even a baby in its cradle’.” But Sophi reports that the executions were ordered halted shortly after. The cadres had no special privileges and were friendly in their relations with villagers and workers. Their program was successful because it seemed attractive, with a special appeal to youth. “Although he remained unconvinced by the totality of Khmer Rouge teaching, Sophi was impressed by the integrity and morale of many cadre, and by the ideology embodied in official directives and revolutionary songs.” Their goals were a vast increase in the population, distribution of power and responsibility to people with poor peasant background,200 hard work (though working conditions, he says, were not particularly severe, hours were flexible, and rations usually sufficient), “the moral value of collective labour,” and true independence based on self-reliance. Differences in status were obliterated, along with “begging and arrogance,” and there was a consistent “puritanical strain” in regulations. Obviously unhappy with the new society, Sophi nevertheless offers an account that is not unsympathetic—and that has yet to be reported in the mass media, to our knowledge. His account also suggests an answer to the “difficult question,” though one too unwelcome to be reported.

Chandler elaborated on these observations in an article in Commonweal.201 Here he stressed again how one-sided is the information available from refugees—by definition, those disaffected with the regime. Again he points out that the worst reports are from the Northwest, “where radical politics before liberation were weak, rural class differences especially pronounced, and
agricultural production higher than elsewhere in the country. For these reasons the liberating forces there seem to have been especially vengeful and undisciplined.” He then adds the qualification already cited in note 199.

Chandler makes some important and generally forgotten historical observations. Peasants, he writes, “have been ‘outside history’ for many years”:

we know very little, in a quantitative or political terms, about the mass of Cambodian society, many of whom, for most of their history, appear to have been slaves of one sort or another. The frequency of locally-led rebellions in the nineteenth century—against the Thai, the Vietnamese, the French and local officials—suggests that Cambodian peasants were not as peaceable as their own mythology, reinforced by the French, would lead us to believe.

The French were not concerned with the peasantry, “preferring to reconstruct Cambodia’s ancient temples, nurture a small elite, and modernize the economy to provide surpluses of rice and rubber.” Little is known of what actually went on in earlier history, the colonial period, or the “early independence period” (1953-1970).202

Lack of familiarity with the historical experience of the Khmer peasants makes it difficult to comprehend what lies behind the violence of the post-revolutionary period, though the atrocities of the civil war were reported at the time,203 along with the impact of the U.S. war.204 Citing Sophi, Chandler speaks of the “uncontrollable hatred” that led to early postwar atrocities in Battambang. He discusses the revolutionary ideology in terms similar to those already outlined. Continuing, Chandler comments:

Collective self-reliance or autarky, as preached by the regime, contrasts sharply with what might be called the slave mentality that suffused pre-revolutionary Cambodia and made it so “peaceful” and “charming” to the elite and to most outsiders—for perhaps two thousand years...In the Cambodian case, in 1976, autarky makes sense, both in terms of recent experience—American intervention, and what is seen as the Western-induced
corruption of previous regimes—and in terms of Cambodia's long history of conflict with Vietnam...Self-reliance also explains turning away from Cambodia's past to make a society where there are "no rich and no poor, no exploiters and no exploited."\(^{205}\)

Chandler asks: "Is the price for liberation, in human terms, too high?" On this question, he says, "we Americans with our squalid record in Cambodia should be 'cautiously optimistic' about the new regime, 'or else shut up' " (citing a friend), though he adds that the closed character of the regime (not to speak of refugee reports) raises serious doubts about such cautious optimism.

It would be incorrect to say that such relatively positive, though tempered comments on the revolutionary regime do not appear in the critical literature concerning Cambodia. It would be correct to say, however, that where they did appear, they were ignored as the story filtered through to a mass audience. Ponchaud, for example, describes the brutality of the civil war and the destructiveness of the U.S. attack, and a major theme of his book—though one could hardly know this from reviews and press comment—is his discussion of the "genuine egalitarian revolution" in Cambodia, where there is a new "spirit of responsibility" and "inventiveness" that "represents a revolution in the traditional mentality": with their vast construction projects, "the people of Kampuchea are now making a thousand-year-old dream come true" and both men and women find new pride in driving trucks and other constructive work.\(^{206}\) Where this important theme of his book is mentioned at all, it is offered as evidence of "destruction of a culture." Ponchaud, clearly, feels that the price was far too high, and perhaps he is right; but it is important to stress that contrary to the second-hand impression of reviews and press commentary, he did focus attention on these aspects of the new regime, which were as little noted or understood in the media as the impact of the U.S war.\(^{207}\)

The real conditions of Cambodian peasant life are of little concern in the West. The brutality of the civil war and the U.S. attack, though dramatic and unquestionable facts of very recent history, are rapidly passing out of memory. Note that Ponchaud, while not guilty of the outrageous deception of Barron-Paul and
others like them who excise the Western role and responsibility from history, nevertheless downplays it; U.S. bombers did not merely strike rubber plantations, nor did the French simply bring “order and peace.”

When we move from the mainstream of commentary that reaches a mass audience to studies by people who know and care about Cambodia, the picture changes. Ponchaud’s book, as already noted, is quite different from most of the media comment it elicited. Chandler’s article is another case in point. One of the small group of scholars concerned with Cambodia, Michael Vickery, reviewed the course of recent Cambodian history in an effort to explain why the revolution evolved “in a manner so contrary to all predictions”:

For all wise old Indochina hands believed that after the war had been won by the revolutionary forces—and there was no doubt by 1972, at the latest, that they would win—it would be the Vietnamese who would engage in the most radical and brutal break with the past. In Cambodia it was expected that both sides, except for a few of the most notorious leaders, would be reconciled and some sort of mild, tolerant socialism would be instituted...Among the Indochina countries only Laos has come out of the war true to form, while Vietnam and Cambodia have behaved in ways nearly the opposite of what had been expected. What this means first of all, of course, is that the Vietnamese and Cambodians were misunderstood and that the facets of their culture and history which might have revealed an unexpected capacity for tolerance in the one and vindictiveness in the other were missed.

He examines what was missed; notably in Cambodia, “in spite of its heady atmosphere as the last exotic Asian paradise, it was rent by political, economic, and class conflicts.” The war that seemed to explode in 1970 “proceeded naturally from trends in the country’s political history over the preceding twenty-five years, a period characterized by intense efforts of the traditional elite to frustrate any moves toward political, economic or social modernization which would threaten its position.”
Vickery suggests a degree of caution in assessing the postwar situation: “A blackout on information has been imposed by the new government, what the refugees, the only first-hand source of news, say is contradictory, and contributions from other sources, principally the Cambodian community in Paris, alternate between the trivial and the absurd.”

Vickery gives a detailed account of how Sihanouk and his right wing supporters proceeded to “rule alone,” with ample resort to repression. Lon Nol, later premier after the March, 1970 coup, “established himself solidly as a power figure” in Battambang Province bordering Thailand, assuming command of the region with the rank of colonel after the withdrawal of French military forces in 1952: “During the next two years this area was the scene of operations by government forces against Issarak[s] and Viet Minh characterized by gratuitous brutality.” Recall that this is one of the areas where the worst atrocities were later recorded. Vickery continues:

As related to me by a participant, [government forces] would move into villages, kill the men and women who had not already fled and then engage in individual tests of strength which consisted of grasping infants by the legs and pulling them apart. These events had probably not been forgotten by the men of that area who survived to become the Khmer Rouge troops occupying Battambang in 1975 and whose reported actions have stirred up so much comment abroad

—where, we may add, they are attributed to “Marxism,” a much more convenient origin for the purposes of Western ideology, however dubious in the case of Cambodian peasants who had lived through such experiences in their “gentle land.”

The “conservative ideology” of Sihanouk’s Sangkum party, which effectively ruled after 1955, was clear at once, Vickery continues. In accordance with its “authoritarian philosophy,” “natural leaders should rule,” namely, “the rich and powerful who enjoyed such a situation in the present because of virtuous conduct in previous lives...The poor and unfortunate should accept their lot and try for an improved situation in the next life through virtuous conduct in the present.” As we have noted, a
major theme of Ponchaud's book, cited if at all with the implication that the beautiful traditional culture is being obliterated by savage monsters, is that these conceptions were being replaced by a new egalitarianism and emphasis on peasant self-reliance.

From the election of 1955, won by Sangkum by a resort to repression and deceit, power "remained solidly in the hands of the old right"; the elite wasted the country's wealth through "conspicuous consumption," "expensive foreign products," "frequent trips abroad, [and] hard currency bank accounts." Meanwhile foreigners were mesmerized by the famous Khmer smile. "Skeptics might wish to ask why the system didn't break down...In fact, it did break down, and that is why Cambodia passed through a war and revolution."

The Issaraks were the inheritors of the tradition of warfare of the colonial period, turning themselves into "fighters for independence against the French." "For all but a tiny minority who had truly absorbed European intellectual values, modernization meant the type of growth exemplified by Bangkok and Saigon—lots of chrome and concrete, streets clogged by cars, a plethora of luxurious bars, and everyone dressed in western clothes." It was this tiny minority who, together with the forgotten peasants of inner Cambodia, later brought the old era crashing to the ground with bitterness and violence. Meanwhile the United States, while remaining the chief supplier for the Cambodian army, often mistook Sihanouk for a "communist" in the grip of their "Dullesian hysteria."

The political and economic situation worsened through the 1960s as the right consolidated its power and repression and corruption increased, and with it, discontent among the peasants and some urban intellectuals:

The discontent was accompanied by repression, the secret police were omnipresent, people mysteriously disappeared, and by 1966 Cambodia, though still smiling and pleasant for the casual visitor, was a country in which everyone lived in fear.

"The first large peasant revolt broke out in western Battambang province in the spring of 1967 and was suppressed with
bloodshed which was reminiscent of the 1950s and prefigured that of 1975." There were further revolts and disappearances and by 1969 insurgency was widespread though scattered.212 The coup of 1970 that overthrew Sihanouk was led by men who "had always been among the big guns of the Cambodian right who had sabotaged democracy, opposed the Geneva Accords, organized the Sangkum, and helped maintain Sihanouk's absolute rule from 1955." In the subsequent war, they lost to a large extent "out of sheer greed and incompetence."

The outright U.S. intervention sharply intensified the conflict, particularly, with the escalation of U.S. bombardment of the countryside in 1973:

Particularly during the severe U.S. bombing which lasted throughout the first eight months of 1973, and which produced no reaction in Phnom Penh213 other than relief, it must have seemed to FUNK [the guerrillas] that their urban compatriots were quite willing to see the entire countryside destroyed and plastered over with concrete as long as they could enjoy a parasitical existence as U.S. clients. It is certain that FUNK policy became much harsher after the bombing. Whereas in 1971-1972 they showed considerable efforts at conciliation and in general Cambodian villagers did not fear them, from 1973-4, with all allowance for government propaganda there are authentic accounts of brutal imposition of new policies without ideological preparation of the population.214

Vickery points out that the Kissinger-Nixon policy during the last two years of the war was "a major mystery," for which he suggests an explanation that appears to us quite plausible. Referring to the "Sonnenfeldt Doctrine," which holds that "pluralistic and libertarian Communist regimes will breed leftist ferment in the West," he suggests that "when it became clear [to U.S. leaders] that they could not win in Cambodia, they preferred to do everything possible to insure that the post-war revolutionary government be extremely brutal, doctrinaire, and frightening to its neighbors, rather than a moderate socialism to which the Thai, for example, might look with envy." In short, though it was understood that the United States had lost the war in Cambodia (even
though it was, quite clearly, still trying to win it in Vietnam),

destruction of rural Cambodia, by imposing the harshest possible
conditions on the eventual victors, would serve the two classic
ends: retarding social and economic progress, and maximizing the
brutality of the eventual victors. Then the aggressors would at
least be able to reap a propaganda victory from the misery they
had sown. This explanation for the insistence on battering
Cambodia to dust after the war was lost seems particularly
reasonable against the background of the basic rationale for the
U.S. war in Indochina, namely, the rational variant of the
“domino theory” which held that social and economic successes in
countries that extricated themselves from the U.S.-dominated
global system might cause “the rot to spread” to other areas, with
severe long-term consequences for U.S. power and privilege.
Unable to retain control over Indochina, the United States could
at least reduce the terrifying prospects that viable societies might
emerge from the wreckage.

Vickery points out that “the success of this policy [in
Cambodia] may perhaps be seen in the [1976] Thai elections, in
which the defeat of the socialist parties has been attributed in large
measure to fear of a regime like that in Cambodia.”

Writing of the Nixon-Kissinger bombing policy of 1973 at the
time, Laura Summers pointed out that it followed the Nixon
administration’s refusal “to accept Prince Sihanouk’s invitation
for negotiations in January and February, 1973.” U.S. B-52s
“pounded Cambodia for 160 consecutive days, dropping more
than 240,000 short tons of bombs on rice fields, water buffalo,
villages (particularly along the Mekong river) and on such troop
positions as the guerrillas might maintain,” a tonnage that
“represents 50 per cent more than the conventional explosives
dropped on Japan during World War II.” In spite of the enormous
destruction, “the bombing had little effect on the military capacity
of the Cambodian guerrillas.” She concludes, surely accurately,
that “American policy and American bombing have placed a small
country’s physical and political survival in escrow for many years
to come, not for the benefit of the people who live there nor in
defense of any laudable ideal.”

The fact that the Khmer Rouge ideology and practice became
harsher in 1973 as a direct result of the intensified bombing was
also noted by David Chandler in his congressional testimony. The interpretation just suggested apparently seems credible to Cambodians. Summers remarks that "in 1973, Khmers loyal to the resistance believed the major purpose of Nixon's six-month bombing campaign was to destroy the emerging productive potential and the social security of the liberated zone..." We suspect that the goal of increasing the harshness of the Khmer Rouge, a predictable consequence, was also quite probably an intended one.

The study of the revolutionary movement in Cambodia from 1970-1974 by Kenneth Quinn of the National Security Council is quite revealing in this regard. Quinn was resident in a South Vietnamese province bordering Cambodia from 1972-1974 studying refugees arriving from Cambodia. He reports that from early 1973—that is, from the time that the extraordinarily heavy bombing attack began—

the Khmer Communists drastically accelerated and intensified their program to radically alter society. Included in this effort were mass relocations of the population, purges of lenient cadres, the use of terror, and extensive re-modeling of the economic system...events occurred within Cambodia which sent the first group of refugees fleeing into South Vietnam [beginning in 1973].

We have already discussed his comments on the measures undertaken by the Khmer Communists at that time. What is now relevant is the timing. Nowhere in his article does Quinn mention the bombing among the "events [that] occurred within Cambodia" from early 1973, or its possible significance for understanding the sharp modification of policy that he describes. The omission is as interesting as the timing he indicates, from his well-placed vantage point.

Stephen Heder has suggested (personal communication) that the radicalization of 1973 in response to the U.S. bombing might well have been motivated by a desire to win popular support and encourage willingness to sacrifice on the part of the poor majority of the population, who would bear the brunt of the attacks and would also stand to gain the most from these policies, as is
sufficiently clear even from the hostile account by Quinn cited above.\textsuperscript{222}

Whatever the explanation may be for the fierce bombing of 1973, the available facts lead to one clear conclusion: every bomb dropped added its contribution to the postwar record of revenge by the battered peasant society. Meanwhile the perpetrators—who remain beyond the reach of retribution—receive awards for their humanitarian contributions\textsuperscript{223} as they denounce the unaccountable savagery of the Khmer Rouge.

Turning to the policies of the new regime, Vickery remarks that

they may be usefully compared with the recommendations of a “Blueprint for the Future” prepared by an anonymous group of western and Thai social scientists and published in the conservative \textit{Bangkok Post} [in February 1976]. Their suggestions, in order for Thailand to avoid a breakdown of its society and a revolution, were that people should be taken out of the cities and put back on the land, decentralization should give more power to local authorities, much more investment should go into agriculture, and the old elite should lose some of its wealth and political power. Now this is precisely what Cambodia has done, though of course on a much more massive scale than envisioned by “Blueprint,” but it illustrates that the basic policies are considered by “bourgeois” economists and political scientists to be rational and practicable for a country with problems similar to those of Cambodia.

Of course, there is also a major dissimilarity: Cambodia had been savaged by U.S. terror, and faced imminent disaster with the termination of the U.S. dole for the millions of people who had been subjected, in their turn, to the “forced-draft urbanization and modernization” that so entranced U.S. ideologists of the period.

Vickery was cautious in assessing the current situation though relatively pessimistic, and was willing to hazard few predictions. The postwar Khmer Rouge regime, he observed, “will certainly have no trouble teaching their people that Cambodian suffering was mainly due to foreign intervention”—we may add, from our
different perspective, that the propaganda organs of the West have been busily at work convincing *their* people that any such charge is a "simple-minded myth" or a case of wallowing in "the politics of guilt." He concludes finally:

Although one may legitimately ask whether the new egalitarian society could not have been established with less deliberate destruction of the old, there are ample reasons why the new leadership might answer in the negative.

Vickery's analysis of the backgrounds of the war and the sources for the harshness of the new regime was as foreign to the media as was his skeptical caution with regard to the developing situation. But it has not been uncommon in commentary by people whose concern is with the facts rather than with fanning hysteria in the West about the dangers of "socialism" or "Marxism"—we stress again the absurdity of the major theme of press propaganda: that the atrocities committed by Khmer peasants simply flow from "Marxism" or "atheism," as dire consequences of liberation from the grip of Western benevolence.

A rather similar perception is expressed in the prepared remarks by Charles Meyer at the April, 1978 Hearings on Cambodia in Oslo. Meyer, conservative and anti-Communist, is the author of scholarly studies on Cambodian history and contemporary Cambodia. His writings, based on long residence in Cambodia and intimate knowledge, have been ignored in the United States. Discussing the evidence presented at the Hearings, Meyer concludes that it suffices to show that "Democratic Kampuchea has been the stage of hasty executions" and that its people live under a regime that violates the International Declaration of Human Rights. But he adds some significant words of caution:

One knows that the colonial powers have often used the argument of "wildness" in order to impose their domination and their "civilizing mission." They have today successors, who are pushed by the same ambitions. It is only the vocabulary that has changed.
As for the “wildness” of the Cambodian leaders, he has this to say:

Today, like yesterday, whether they are monarchists, republicans or revolutionaries, the Khmers have an extreme susceptibility, which makes relations with them often difficult. Our Cambodian friends who are present here will not contradict me. Those who at present govern Cambodia have not escaped from this national characteristic. But they are not mad people nor monsters demanding blood—I have known several among them. Most of them sons of peasants, more or less formed in the French Marxist school, rebelling against a system which has remained feudal, they have the sentiment among the people of the countryside to have received a veritable illumination and found the road to the new. Perhaps I will shock many among you. But I believe that these Red Khmer leaders incarnate really a part of the peasants, who recognize themselves in them.229

These leaders, Meyer argues, “maintain the tradition of their predecessors just before them” and in their “immoderation” reflect deep-seated currents in Cambodian history and culture, though again he urges caution: “In reality the records re Cambodia are not so simple and many pieces are missing.” As in his book, he observes that “it is important to destroy the picture in the West that the Cambodians are non-violent by nature and filled with Buddhistic benevolence.” On the contrary, “behind that smile violence is slumbering and...it is dangerous to wake it up,” as happened in 1967 with the “brutal repression of a rising of peasants in the region of Battambang and the revolt of the minorities in the region of Rattanakiri.” Furthermore:

The American airforce gave the [military regime calling itself republican] its support by destroying the Cambodian plains through heavy bombing without for this being accused of genocide. The following events should not let us forget this. [As] regards the fratricidal fights with ties from one side as well as from the other to Vietnam in periods, they were without mercy, [as] is usual in all civil wars.
Today, as previously, "one should be extremely careful in one's analysis of the politics" of the victors, considering "the weight of the past, the ideology of the leaders, the menaces from outside, and, naturally, the psychological factors as well as the economical, religious and other ones"—a perception foreign to the mass media.

The summary executions of officials of the old regime "is in reality the application of the Cambodian penal code of 1877," including the brutal means employed: "This punishment was used between 1965 and 1970 for 'Red Khmers' who were caught and would have been used still more systematically, if the government had won the victory." Furthermore, "it seems to me that we should accept with reservations the balance in figures of the victims...[and]...admit that any estimation at present is impossible." He insists that "there are no simple explanations or clear and evident ones and that peremptory affirmations should always be avoided." He sees the war as a rising of the peasants against the cities, the symbol of corruption and repression: "One must further know that Cambodian city-dwellers were in reality Western colonials and Chinese [traders]."

Meyer is highly critical of the "radicalism and the excesses" of the revolutionaries. His concern to explain the postwar events in terms of Cambodian history and tradition is, however, in striking contrast to Western fulminations, though not uncommon among specialists on Cambodia, as is his attention to the factors that "contributed to harden the [internal] politics of the revolutionary leaders."

We learn still more about these factors in a paper by Laura Summers cited earlier. She discusses the destructive impact of French colonialism, which violated the "corporate integrity" of the Khmer people: "its indigenous legal system, pattern of land possession and national administration were dismantled." During the national uprising of 1885-1886, "French authorities with the aid of Vietnamese infantrymen succeeded in reducing the Khmer population of the Protectorat du Cambodge by 195,000 (20% of the entire Khmer population)." The French displayed little remorse over the fate of this people whom they believed doomed to extinction," as they brought a form of what Ponchaud calls "order and peace" to the land in fulfillment of their "colonial mission."
The impact on the countryside was particularly destructive. While most peasants owned some land, vast numbers of family holdings were insufficient for subsistence requirements by the early 1950s. Yields were among the lowest in the world "and barely met the subsistence requirements of the rural population in 1965, 1966 and (especially) 1967." At that time, annual rates of interest for loans ranged from 100% to 200%; "the total effect of the credit structure in agrarian economy was to make the peasant worse than a tenant on his own property" while village and urban elites lived in luxury. Sihanouk's attempts at some social reform had little impact. Particularly scandalous was the lack of medical care and the practice of charging exorbitant fees to peasants or denying them services or hospital treatment. The judiciary was no less corrupt and urban-based civil servants with no interest in peasant affairs enjoyed the amenities offered the rich by the colonial system while the mass of peasants sank deeper into poverty and suffering. "It is...not surprising that the revolution was violent for in addition to the human destruction heaped upon the community by intensive American bombing, there were profound social grievances and scores to be settled." In an accompanying demographic analysis, Summers estimates the number of "postwar deaths from exhaustion, disease and execution in the range of two hundred thousand, an estimate which is based on an extremely difficult to determine status quo ante bellum."

It is quite evident that to understand the events in the aftermath of the war it is necessary to pay attention to the historical background of the peasant revolution, which was further inflamed and deeply embittered by the U.S. attack culminating in the bombing of 1973, that Meyer hints might be considered genocidal in character. The sensational press accounts of atrocities that entirely ignore that background, while at the same time relying on highly dubious or sometimes fabricated evidence, may be useful contributions to the revival of imperial ideology; but they are of little value in conveying any understanding of the postwar situation.

We have already mentioned the peasant rebellions in Battambang in the west and the tribal provinces of the northeast in the late 1960s. The sources of these revolts in peasant discontent resulting from penury, oppression and corruption under the
increasingly right wing central government have been explored by the Australian scholar Ben Kiernan. These revolts were no small affair; Sihanouk cited a figure of 10,000 deaths (a figure which he may well have exaggerated for rhetorical effect), and it is estimated that about 4,000 peasants fled their homes in June 1967 "in the wake of severe army repression of their protest against harsh local conditions," as "aircraft bombed and strafed villages and jungle hideouts" and villages were burned to the ground and surrounded by troops, their inhabitants massacred. By the time that Sihanouk was overthrown in the March 1970 coup, there was "a sophisticated, powerful and indigenous resistance movement well entrenched in many parts of Cambodia." After the coup, there were peasant uprisings interpreted in the West as indicating support for Sihanouk. In an analysis of the locale and character of these protests, which were brutally suppressed by military force (including Khmer troops trained by the CIA in South Vietnam), Kiernan concludes that they reflect in part the ongoing antigovernment rebellion, though loyalty to Sihanouk was no doubt a factor as well.

In several studies, Kiernan suggested a picture of early postwar events in Cambodia that is rather different from what has been featured by the press. Specifically, he took issue with horror stories published in *Time* (26 April, 1976), which alleged that 500-600,000 people had died under the rule of the Khmer Rouge, "one of the most brutally murderous regimes in the world" which rules Cambodia by "a chilling form of mindless terror." Like others, he notes that most of the atrocity stories come from areas of little Khmer Rouge strength, where orders to stop reprisals were disobeyed by soldiers wreaking vengeance, often drawn from the poorest sections of the peasantry. He discusses the fake photographs, and gives examples of fabrication of atrocity stories by refugees "in order to persuade the Thai border police to admit them." He also deals with other fabrications that have appeared in the Western press. He suggests that, "untrained and vengeful, and at times leaderless, some soldiers in the northwest of Cambodia have terrorized soldiers, city dwellers, and peasants. This has been aggravated by the threat of widespread starvation, and actual starvation in some parts." He questions the assumption that there was central direction for atrocities as well as the assumption that
the stories from specific areas where, in fact, the Khmer Rouge had little control, can be freely extrapolated to the country as a whole. His conclusions are based in part on interviews with refugees in Thai camps and in Bangkok, and like Vickery in Thailand and Fraser in Vietnam, he reports quite a range of refugee judgments on the nature of the regime. He also gives an analysis of the class background and region of the refugee flow, relating these factors to the social and economic situation that had prevailed.

Kiernan’s detailed conclusions suggest why attending to these questions might be useful, at least for those whose concern is truth. Consider his analysis of the composition of Cambodian refugees in Thailand in August 1976. Note that this date is well after what Ponchaud describes as the worst period of terror, and that these refugees form a substantial part of the population sampled by Barron-Paul and Ponchaud.²³⁷ Kiernan concludes:

There were 10,200 Cambodian refugees in Thailand in August 1976. A tiny handful of these belong to that category of over half the population who, at the end of the war, had lived in Khmer Rouge areas for several years. The great majority of the refugees can be divided into three groups: former Lon Nol soldiers, former urban dwellers, and farmers from Battambang and Siem reap provinces.²³⁸

Unsurprisingly, over a third of the 3,000 refugees in the Aranyaprathet camp in Thailand are former Lon Nol soldiers, and many of the refugees are former Khmer Serei, commandos trained and financed by the CIA.

In Battambang, Kiernan writes, the “thin and undernourished” Khmer Rouge troops headed directly to the airport and broke up four T-28 bombers into pieces,²³⁹ “remembering the agony in the trenches, the hunger in the countryside because the paddy fields were full of bomb craters, and their terrible fear of asphyxiation bombs.”²⁴⁰ “For many months after that,” he continues, “refugees reported that Lon Nol soldiers were hunted down, particularly in northwest Cambodia—a few refugees were eyewitnesses to executions.”

Kiernan believes there is little evidence that the government
planned and approved a systematic large-scale purge. The evidence indicates, he believes, that “apart from the execution of high-ranking army officers and officials, the killing reported by refugees from the northwest after April 1975 was instigated by untrained and vengeful local Khmer Rouge soldiers, despite orders to the contrary from Phnom Penh.” “Most of the brutality shown by local Khmer Rouge soldiers is attributable to lack of training and the difficulty of forging a disciplined organisation in the Cambodian countryside, especially after the bombing of 1973,” though “it is also quite probable that some Khmer Rouge local cadres harbour the ...conception of the priorities for Cambodia’s survival...[with]...the emphasis on hard work, sacrifice, and asceticism which this dynamic form of Khmer nationalism entails” and which “has dismayed some Cambodians,” among them some cadres “who ensure peasant co-operation with their policies through force.” The killings were concentrated in “exceptional” areas where living conditions were harshest (he cites concurring judgments by Patrice de Beer of Le Monde and Ponchaud), regions where the Khmer Rouge were “organisationally and numerically weak.” He feels that “it is little wonder that several thousand peasants have fled from northwest Cambodia” (his emphasis), whereas “very few peasants, if any, have fled to Thailand from other parts of Cambodia, while soldiers and former city dwellers have arrived in Thailand from eastern and central Cambodia as well as from the northwest.” The reason is that “at the end of the war, farmers in the northwest were in for a very difficult period” because of the drastic shortage of food, exacerbated by the flow of refugees to the towns. In contrast, in areas that had been administered by the Khmer Rouge, canals and dams had been built enabling two crops to be brought in, and some rice had been stockpiled, a subject analyzed by Hildebrand and Porter, to whom he refers. Furthermore, these regions were unique in the inequity and exploitation of the poor: “With class divisions as stark as this, and after a brutal war, equally brutal revenge was taken by poor peasants” many of whom had joined the Khmer Rouge (though many bandits “passed themselves off as Khmer Rouge” as well, not an unusual phenomenon in comparable situations). He quotes one Khmer refugee who said that in Battambang the rich were being “persecuted” while the poor were
better off than before, and adds that “where the Khmer Rouge were better organised, ‘persecution’ of the rich was much less violent.”

This analysis covers the period of the worst terror according to Ponchaud, the period that provides much of the basis for the best-publicized accounts (Barron-Paul, Ponchaud, and reviews and references to Ponchaud). Therefore the situation that Kiernan describes is crucially significant for an analysis of the response in the West to postwar events in Cambodia. We know of no comparable analysis from a later period, though this in any event would not be relevant to our major concern—the workings of the Western propaganda system.

The Southeast Asia correspondent of the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Nayan Chanda, presented his assessment of the situation at about the same time in several articles. In the *FEER*, he estimated that in the 18 months of postwar bloodletting, which according to refugee reports and “most observers” was largely over, “possibly thousands of people died,” including not only the top figures of the Lon Nol regime but also “large numbers of lower-strata civilian and military personnel of the former administration [who] have been executed in the Khmer Rouge’s cleansing process.” But the actual numbers are “impossible to calculate.” The estimate of “possibly thousands” presumably refers to those killed, not the victims of starvation or disease or unexploded ordnance. In his May, 1977 article, Chanda discussed the “human cost” of what the regime had so far accomplished in these terms:

One will probably never know exactly how many human lives have been cut down by political execution, starvation and disease. The tendency of refugees to exaggerate their troubles to attract sympathy, the active presence of the intelligence services in the refugee camps and the Bangkok press—the most important source of information about the massacres—and the contradictory testimony of the last foreigners present in liberated Phnom Penh make a precise evaluation impossible. But the consistency of refugee stories in Thailand and Vietnam and the testimony from socialist sources leaves no doubt: the number of deaths has been terribly high.
On the necessity for the evacuation of Phnom Penh and the question whether the executions were a result of deliberate policy or local initiative, Chanda comments that opinions vary and takes no explicit stand himself (*Le Monde diplomatique*), though he suggests a point of view not unlike Kiernan’s. Chanda quotes a diplomat who spent four years in Cambodia until the Khmer Rouge victory and who attributes the massacres in part to the bitterness of the war and in part to “the action of the have-nots against the haves.” Chanda adds that the 1970-1975 war “was probably the most savage in Indochina, with soldiers of both sides giving no quarter” (*FEER*):

To the thirst for vengeance must probably be added the relative numerical weakness, political inexperience, and lack of organization of the Khmer Rouge, who suddenly became the rulers of a land ravaged by the war. In the absence of political work and a clandestine organization among the population controlled by Lon Nol, force more than persuasion was naturally used as the method of government. Suspicion, indeed profound hatred on the part of the Khmer soldiers—young peasants many of whom had lost their homes and families under the bombs—towards an urban population that was richer and more numerous also seems to have played a role (*Le Monde Diplomatique*).

Fear of sabotage was also an element.246 “The elimination of the former regime’s officials and the dispersal into the countryside of the educated urban middle class has created a vertical power structure,” with a “tiny group of French-educated elite...at the top dictating policy, while young and often illiterate farm boys—the grassroots cadres—are expected to implement the decisions. It is hardly surprising that these cadres rely on disciplinary action rather than persuasion or ideological motivation.”247

As for the postwar dead, who are listed simply as Khmer Rouge victims in the mainstream Western media, Chanda comments that disease was an extremely serious problem during the war (including a million suffering from malaria in 1972) and that the massive U.S. rice shipments which were the sole sustenance of the cities swollen with refugees did not suffice even then for more
than a part of the population. He cites a source close to the U.S. government who predicted a million deaths from starvation in Cambodia in the event of a Khmer Rouge victory—approximately the number of deaths later reported by Ponchaud and many others on the basis of alleged estimates from U.S. government and other Western sources. Recall that these numbers, often inflated by imaginative reporters and congressmen, are consistently attributed to the barbarism of the Khmer Rouge, who allegedly "boast" about these deaths.

Chanda quotes one observer who says: "If you consider the sheer magnitude of the problem faced by the Khmer Rouge in April 1975 and the dire prediction from Washington that 1 million Cambodians could die of starvation, this is no mean achievement." He also describes the economic and development programs undertaken by the new regime and the beginnings of trade and foreign contacts, the obsessive self-reliance and the conversion of the country into a labor army. His own view is evidently along the lines indicated by an observer whom he quotes: "They might have read a lot of Marx, Lenin, and Mao, but the ideology of the present leadership is virulent Khmer nationalism" (FEER).

In commenting on the contradictory testimony of the last foreigners to leave Phnom Penh, Chanda cited a letter by W. J. Sampson, an economist and statistician in Phnom Penh who is the author of a number of technical reports on the Cambodian economy and who worked in close contact with the government's central statistics office until March 1975, and was thus well-placed to comment on events of the period. Both the contents and the subsequent history of this communication are interesting. Sampson cites a UN estimate that the population of Cambodia in mid-1974 was 7.89 million, which agrees with his independent estimate. He further believes that the figures offered of war casualties are much inflated, estimating civilian killings at "perhaps in tens of thousands." Turning to the postwar situation, Sampson finds the figure of 2.2 million dead mentioned in the press "questionable." After leaving Cambodia, he writes, he visited refugee camps and kept in touch with Khmers. "A European friend who cycled around Phnom Penh for many days after its fall saw and
heard of no other executions" beyond the shooting of some prominent politicians and "the lynching of hated bomber pilots in Phnom Penh." As far as he could determine, refugees offered no first-hand evidence of elimination of collaborators. He believes that "such executions could be numbered in the hundreds or thousands rather than in hundreds of thousands," though in addition there was "a big death toll from sickness" and there were food shortages.

This communication, from what seems a credible source, appeared just at the time that the Barron-Paul book and Lacouture's review of Ponchaud were causing a great sensation in the media about the murder of 1-2 million Cambodians by the Khmer Rouge. The letter was specifically brought to the attention of journalists who cited Lacouture's statement that the Khmer Rouge had "boasted" of having killed a quarter of the population: 2 million people.254 With one exception they were unwilling to cite it.255 Porter mentioned Sampson's letter in congressional testimony when challenged by Rep. Solarz on his skepticism about the Famiglia Cristiano "interview."256 Solarz dismissed this by saying: "So, for all you know, this fellow could be a psychotic, right?" No such question was raised about unknown priests or reporters who circulated faked photographs and interviews from such sources as Famiglia Cristiano, or who drew conclusions from interviews with prisoners in Thai police cages.

Solarz's question and Porter's correct response ("theoretically, yes") were cited by William Shawcross in a context that is even more remarkable than his willingness to cite this disreputable insinuation.257 Shawcross argues that both sides of the "propaganda battle" have failed to examine their evidence carefully. The two sides are Barron-Paul, condemning the new Cambodian regime, and Hildebrand-Porter, defending it (the latter book, he writes, is "in some ways...a mirror image" of Barron-Paul). In this context, he alleges that "Hildebrand and Porter's use of evidence can be seriously questioned." As his sole evidence to substantiate this charge he offers the fact that Porter cited the Sampson letter, with its estimate of casualties, as "documentation" in the Congressional hearings when asked why he was skeptical about charges leveled at postwar Cambodia. But, Shawcross continues, "Porter had to agree with Congressman
Solarz that Sampson could in theory be 'a psychotic.' Shawcross then reports that he spoke to Sampson by telephone to inquire into his views. He quotes Sampson as having "said that altogether 'deaths over and above the normal death rate would not be more than half a million.'" Shawcross interprets this as an estimate of victims of the Khmer Rouge, concluding: "Mr. Sampson thus seems an unconvincing and unconvincing witness on behalf of Khmer Rouge moderation. Neither side of the propaganda battle has carefully examined all of the sources that it wishes to exploit."

Note carefully the reasoning. First, whatever Porter might have said in the May 1977 Hearings, it can hardly be offered in support of the charge that "Hildebrand and Porter's use of evidence can be seriously questioned" in their 1976 book (worse still, as the sole support for this charge). Sampson's letter was published subsequent to the book and obviously not mentioned in it. Secondly, Sampson's letter is, most definitely, "documentation," however one chooses to evaluate it. Furthermore, Shawcross does not question that Porter quoted it quite accurately and appropriately. As for Porter's being compelled to agree that Sampson could in theory be a psychotic, Shawcross's willingness to cite Solarz's absurd question is remarkable; Porter would—or should—have responded in the same way if asked whether Ponchaud, or Shawcross, or the authors of this book, etc., might be psychotics: "Theoretically, yes." Furthermore, consider Shawcross's inquiry concerning Sampson's views. He argues that since Sampson has allegedly changed his mind in a telephone call subsequent to Porter's correct citation of his views, that shows that Hildebrand and Porter's book (which makes no mention of Sampson) is unscholarly and that their "use of evidence can be seriously questioned." The logic is mindboggling.

But putting logic to the side, did Sampson in fact change his views, thus showing himself to be an "unconvincing and unconvincing witness?" The answer to the question depends on how we interpret the telephone statement by Sampson that Shawcross quotes. Given Sampson's known views on the general tendency to inflate figures, it might be supposed that his figure of deaths altogether above the normal is a reference to the total number of deaths throughout the war and the postwar period. In fact, in response to a query, Sampson stated quite explicitly in a letter
dated March 6, 1978 that this was exactly his intent. This letter was immediately transmitted to Porter, Shawcross and the editor of the New York Review. Aware of these facts, Porter in response to Shawcross wrote correctly that Sampson had intended to refer to all deaths—wartime and afterwards—when citing the half-million figure. Equally aware of the facts, Shawcross responded by repeating his claim that Sampson had offered the figure for deaths “since the end of the war.” This is, surely, a rather curious “use of evidence.”

There is much more evidence from sources that seem to deserve a hearing but have been ignored by the media. We have noted the selectivity in choice of refugee reports. We will mention two additional examples of eyewitness reports that were available to the media, in addition to those already cited, but that they chose to disregard. Liberation News Service (New York) carried a dispatch from George Hildebrand (one of the co-authors of the Hildebrand-Porter study) reporting an interview with “one of the few people in the U.S. today who can speak from direct experience,” namely, a Cambodian refugee named Khoun Sakhon who “spent the better part of a year traveling through Cambodia’s populous central provinces and working in a number of rural areas in the developing western region of Cambodia,” after having lived both in Phnom Penh and in liberated zones in earlier years. He also witnessed the evacuation of Phnom Penh in April, 1975. Sakhon “saw no massacres or abandonment of sick and elderly people” during the evacuation of Phnom Penh and claims that what the Reader’s Digest described as “looting” was in fact “the soldiers’ opening luxury shops and rice stores to the people.” He states further that during the evacuation, “trucks distributed rice and medicine to the people and the people were free to join the cooperatives they passed or to move on.” He lived in a commune, with, he claims, an 8-hour work schedule, adequate food and medical services, and generally fair treatment. His account of the “revolutionary culture” and the conditions of life and work is generally favorable, and he expresses regret that he joined a group of urban young men who escaped, saying: “I don’t know what I’m doing here. I feel I belong back there.” A press concerned to determine the facts about postwar Cambodia might have chosen to explore this lead.
Another example that would appear to merit attention is a lengthy and detailed account of the evacuation of Phnom Penh by Chou Meng and Shane Tarr. The forced evacuation of Phnom Penh has served as proof of the near-genocidal intent and practice of the Khmer Rouge ever since it was graphically reported by journalists at the time. It is featured in the books by Barron-Paul and Ponchaud and by many others. According to these accounts, based on refugee reports and what journalists observed largely from their confinement in the French embassy in Phnom Penh, the evacuation was a hideous atrocity. Hildebrand and Porter cite eyewitness accounts by Westerners that paint a different picture, but their book has been ignored, along with the published sources they cite. The account by the Tarrs, which is the only published account by participants that provides substantial detail, to our knowledge, tends to corroborate the sources cited by Hildebrand-Porter. Shane Tarr is from New Zealand; his wife, Chou Meng, is Cambodian. Both joined the mass evacuation to the countryside on April 18, returned to Phnom Penh on April 21, and then travelled through the countryside with the convoy of journalists and others on their way to Thailand. They write that they attempted to contact the media on their return to New Zealand to present their story, “but generally speaking news editors were not interested in hearing what we had to say unless we denounced communism in general and ‘painted a picture’ of Khmer Rouge atrocities in particular.” Several articles of theirs nevertheless appeared, but apart from the left wing press, all were “heavily censored so as to make our articles unintelligible and contradictory,” they allege.

The Tarrs claim that people were told that they would have to leave Phnom Penh because there was insufficient food. “Refugees we talked to were happy at the prospect of returning to their homes” though “city-dwellers were far less enthusiastic,” at least those who had some food (the very poor were “quick to leave…”). The initial orders were polite; subsequently they “became more like demands than requests,” though they saw no sign of force. After comparing notes with other evacuees, they conclude “that force was used only on isolated occasions.” They report that prior to liberation, they had visited the hospitals and found that only
one (Calmette) was functioning properly, and that "the revolutionary forces continued to operate it after they took over" though most of the medical personnel had fled. They believe that patients were evacuated to "more hygienic surroundings," a belief that cannot be dismissed out of hand in the light of the eyewitness account by Swain and others. They continue with a virtually hour-by-hour account of their trip to the countryside with the evacuees, then back to Phnom Penh where they joined other foreigners at the French embassy. They report many friendly contacts with villagers, refugees, cadres, and soldiers and say that they "witnessed no executions or other atrocities, and saw no attempts to intimidate people with weapons."

On their return to the French embassy on April 21, the Tarrs report, they were questioned for several hours by journalists who had been there since the 17th of April. "But when it became clear that we had no sensational stories to tell of mass executions, rape, pillage and suicides many of these journalists became quite disappointed." Specifically, they contend that Sydney Schanberg of the New York Times (who later won the Pulitzer Prize for his report of these days) dismissed their positive account with sarcasm; it did not enter his subsequent reports, including a long story (9 May 1975) on foreigners at the French embassy. With a few exceptions, the Tarrs report, "for most of the time we spent in the French embassy we were the object of abuse and fear by those who had nothing but contempt for the Kampuchean people."

Although Schanberg does not mention the Tarrs or their experiences during their participation in the evacuation, Swain does refer to them. He writes that Shane Tarr is so contemptible that "we—who have abandoned our Cambodian friends—do not wish to pass the time of day" with him. "He is full of nauseating revolutionary rhetoric" and he and his wife "fraternise with the Khmer Rouge guards over the walls." Shane Tarr "has a low opinion of us members of the capitalist press, we of his hypocrisy. He is shunned." Swain also apparently has a low opinion of the experiences of the Tarrs during the evacuation; these are never mentioned. We will see in a moment how "scholarship" deals with the account by the Tarrs.

The Tarrs then describe their evacuation to Thailand. They describe the tremendous destruction in the countryside and
conversations with villagers. They claim to have seen no signs of coercion, but rather people working “according to their capabilities and the needs of the group.”

We quote their conclusions:

From our observations and understanding of the events of Kampuchea from 17th April, when we evacuated Phnom Penh, to our arrival in Poipet on 3rd of May, we can make the following points:

1. We saw no organised executions, massacres, or the results of such like. We saw about fifteen bodies in Phnom Penh, of soldiers killed in the fighting.
2. There was very little intimidation of Phnom Penh’s population by the revolutionary army. Many saw it not as an occupier but as a liberator.
3. We can refute the claims of the imperialist media that the liberation army indulged in a mass orgy of looting and destruction.
4. The march to the countryside was slow and well organised. People who had no relatives to stay with were put up by other villagers in the liberated areas, until they were assigned elsewhere. They were provided with food.
5. The aged and the ill were not expected to join in the march. We saw very few who were old or sick on the road; those that we met elsewhere told us that the revolutionary organisation catered for their needs.

We saw the destruction of five years of war and of intense U.S. bombing. But we also saw dams, irrigation canals, rice paddies, and people who, while having to struggle very hard, were proud to have liberated Kampuchea from imperialism and were now the masters of their destiny.

Again, we may ask why the eyewitness report of Chou Meng and Shane Tarr does not enter the record, as shaped by the selective hand of the media and mainstream scholarship?

The question deserves a closer look. The account by the Tarrs of their evacuation in the convoy from the French embassy to Thailand is not unique; many reporters were present and wrote extensively about this trip. But their account of their participation
in the earlier evacuation from Phnom Penh is indeed unusual. As we have seen, journalists simply ignored it, though at the time this was virtually the only direct evidence concerning what was happening beyond the view from the embassy. There is also apparently a conflict of opinion—represented by the Tarrs on the one hand and Swain and Schanberg on the other—about the situation inside the embassy where foreigners and some Cambodians were confined. The Tarrs are, incidentally, not alone in their view. Richard Boyle of Pacific News Service is a correspondent with considerable experience in Vietnam, and author of an important but unread book. On reaching Thailand he filed a report from Bangkok published in the New York Guardian that did not appear in the mainstream press in the United States, to our knowledge. Boyle reports that he was asked by AP to take over their bureau and file for them as well as PNS after the U.S. departure:

I reported what the Cambodian staff reported to me: that the “Khmer Rouge” troops told Phnom Penh government soldiers that they were “brothers” and that they did not want to kill them. There were eyewitness accounts by Cambodian AP staffers of “Khmer Rouge” and Phnom Penh troops embracing on the battlefield, yet when I filed this it was censored by AP. After that the story was killed. AP reported that the liberators burned down refugee huts two days before the fall of Phnom Penh, yet the Cambodian AP staffers who visited the front all day could not confirm the report.

Boyle states that “stories of a bloodbath, as reported by other news agencies, cannot be verified and there is every indication that the accounts are lies.” He cites as an example an AP report “that French women were raped and brutalized,” though he asserts that French doctors and nurses “never saw any rape victims.” He also says that French mercenaries and Americans with CIA and DIA connections were permitted to take refuge in the embassy and to leave in safety, though they were regarded by the Khmer Rouge as war criminals. One of them, Douglas Sapper, a former Green Beret, “publicly boasted he was planning to take a Swedish submachine gun...and raise the American flag at the U.S. embassy
killing as many ‘commies as I can’.” Yet he “was one of the first Americans to seek refuge in the embassy” and was permitted to leave, along with other journalists rumored to be working with intelligence, though the Khmer Rouge knew of these threats (Schanberg refers fondly to Sapper as one of those who “performed constructive roles” in the embassy; Barron and Paul cite him simply as an “American businessman”). Boyle questions the atrocity reports and gives a positive account of the occupation and evacuation, adding that the French prevented fraternization with Khmer Rouge troops who wanted to visit journalists. His account of the situation in Phnom Penh and within the embassy is similar to that of the Tarrs.

Returning to the theory of the Free Press, we see that there are conflicting reports of all these events. Swain and Schanberg present their view in the London *Sunday Times* and *New York Times*; the Tarrs and Boyle give their conflicting account in *News from Kampuchea* (international circulation 500) and the left wing *New York Guardian*, also with a tiny reading public. The detailed participant account by the Tarrs of the actual evacuation from Phnom Penh as they perceived it, which is quite unique, is not so much as mentioned in the mass media; their reports appeared without distortion, they claim, only in tiny left wing journals in New Zealand. Boyle reports that AP refused to publish his stories when he had taken over their bureau, choosing instead accounts of atrocities that neither he, nor French doctors or nurses, nor Cambodian AP staffers could verify. But there is no censorship in the Free Press, such as we find in totalitarian states.

We are aware of only one reference to the report by the Tarrs in the mainstream media in the West. It is worth reviewing as an indication of how academic scholarship deals with evidence that departs from the prevailing line. The well-known Cambodia specialist Michael Leifer reviewed Barron-Paul in the *Times Literary Supplement.* In a letter commenting on this review, Torben Retbøll noted that Leifer “seems to accept, somewhat uncritically, the charges put forward in the book” despite serious questions about its accuracy and selective treatment of available data—questions that are quite pertinent, as we shall see. Specifically, Retbøll cited eyewitness reports that question the Barron-Paul account of the evacuation of Phnom Penh, including that of
the Tarrs. Leifer responded rather haughtily that by “eyewitness” Retbøll “presumably...means foreigners who sheltered in the compound of the French embassy. He does not confirm whether any of these so-called eyewitnesses had actual experience of participation” in the evacuation.270 Evidently, Leifer was unaware of the fact that the account by the Tarrs—published six months earlier—made quite explicit that they were direct participants in the evacuation prior to being sheltered in the embassy on their return to Phnom Penh. Retbøll then reported the Tarrs’ account correctly, quoting the conclusions just given, in a letter which furthermore, gave the citation to their report in News from Kampuchea.271 In response, Leifer asks whether Retbøll “is aware of the fact that Tarr and his wife were among those confined to the compound of the French embassy in Phnom Penh”—which of course he was, though the relevant point is that prior to this they participated in the evacuation. Leifer then cites Swain’s account of how the Tarrs were evacuated from the embassy concluding that “on the basis of this experience, it would seem impossible for the Tarrs to have compiled a report at first hand.” He says that “at one stage, there was every prospect that Mrs Tarr would be separated from her husband because of her nationality and dispatched out of the capital on foot,” but “the weeping couple” were smuggled on board a convoy by a French diplomat (citing Swain).272 Nowhere does Leifer mention the fact that the Tarrs participated in the evacuation on foot before they returned to Phnom Penh and the French embassy from which they were evacuated, and had published a detailed report of this experience. Leifer’s first letter indicates that he was simply unaware of their account. His second letter cannot be explained on this basis; rather, it reveals that he was simply unwilling to look into it, preferring to insinuate that their detailed story must have been invented out of whole cloth, evidently in complete ignorance of what they had reported. At this point he knew exactly where their account appeared. A striking example of careful and dispassionate scholarship. Retbøll’s response correcting the factual record was not published.

In citing Swain’s contemptuous account of the Tarrs and the alleged circumstances of their evacuation, Leifer simply presents it as fact, never mentioning that their own account differs radically. Typically, an insulting account of the Tarrs reaches a mass
audience, while their own version of events in which they were involved—including their participation in the evacuation and their relations to journalists—is not permitted to enter the public record. In this case scholarship surpasses journalism in deceit. The journalists simply did not refer to the Tarra's experiences, while condemning them for their "nauseating revolutionary rhetoric" and contemptible efforts to fraternize with the Khmer Rouge. The Cambodia scholar goes a step further, pretending that their account does not exist even when he knows precisely where it is to be found. 273

To complete the story, we turn finally to the major sources of information that have reached the general public, the books by Barron-Paul and Ponchaud.

As already noted, the Barron-Paul book and their earlier Readers Digest article have reached tens of millions of readers in the United States and abroad and are undoubtedly the major source of information for the general public. They have also been widely and generally quite favorably reviewed and have been the subject of extensive comment apart from reviews, also to a mass audience, ranging from a front-page horror story in the Wall Street Journal to an article in TV Guide 274 (circulation more than 19 million) by Ernest Lefever, a foreign policy specialist who is otherwise known for his argument before congress that we should be more tolerant of the "mistakes" of the Chilean junta "in attempting to clear away the devastation of the Allende period" and his discovery of the "remarkable freedom of expression" enjoyed by critics of the military regime. 275 The book has been described as "impeccably-documented" 276; the authors "deserve substantial credit, however, for the exhaustiveness and meticulousness of their research." 277 The London Economist wrote that "the methods and documentation" of the authors "will convince any save the most dedicated sceptics that at least 1m people have died since the fall of Cambodia as a direct result of the excesses of the Angka Loeu"; "It may be the best book there ever will be" on this subject. 278 In the United States, the press response in editorials and commentary was also substantial and largely unquestioning. 279

Not all reviewers have been completely uncritical. 280 Martin Woollacott noted that the estimates of dead are "guesswork" and that their sample of refugees "is disproportionately drawn from
the middle-class and the north-west of the country.” William Shawcross commented that their figure of dead “is that of the Carter Administration.” Elizabeth Becker objects that they “pepper their book with facile polemics,” turning it “into a Cold War propaganda piece.” A number of reviewers have remarked on their infantile discussion of Khieu Samphan’s alleged impotence and its significance as well as their failure to refer to the U.S role; when they speak of “the murder of a gentle land,” they are not referring to B-52 attacks on villages or the systematic bombing and murderous ground sweeps by U.S. troops or forces organized and supplied by the United States, in a land that had been largely removed from the Indochina conflict prior to the U.S. attack. But in general, their conclusions have been taken as overwhelmingly persuasive, if not definitive.

To evaluate the Barron-Paul account in a serious way, one must first consider its credibility where verifiable. Their case is largely built, as it must be, on refugee accounts. How much faith we place in their rendition of these accounts and the conclusions they draw from the samples they present will be determined by their credibility where what they say is subject to check. We stress again the importance of avoiding a gross but common error of reasoning; since the refugee accounts far outweigh in significance the supporting documentation, one might erroneously conclude that even if the latter collapses the main charges remain intact. The error is transparent; it is only the independently verifiable material that gives some indication of the trustworthiness of their account of what they claim to have heard and found.

We have already seen several examples of their exhaustive, meticulous, and impeccable scholarship, including their reliance on the Famiglia Cristiana “interview” and their uncritical handling of the edict allegedly put forth by a Khmer Rouge commander; they are not, of course, to be faulted for the fact that their source, Ponchaud, has since modified and then silently withdrawn this “quote,” though for the reasons we reviewed, there was ample reason for skepticism about this and other sources that they cite—quite selectively, as we shall see, as fits their purposes. We have also mentioned their method of finding “promising” subjects under the “guidance” of Thai ministry officials and “elected” camp commanders, a critical admission as to methodology that should
have at once alerted reviewers and commentators that this study is hardly to be taken too seriously.

In fact, this reliance—whether naive or cynical—on the guidance of Thai authorities is typical of their research. In his preface, Barron reviews the “diverse sources” that “all” assured him that “the communist conquerors of Cambodia had...put virtually everybody to work tilling the soil under deathly conditions.” These “diverse sources” are, in toto: specialists at the State and Defense Departments, the National Security Council, and three unnamed foreign embassies in Washington. The Acknowledgements supplement these remarkably diverse sources as follows: a representative of the Thai Ministry of the Interior, whose “knowledge and advice additionally provided us with invaluable guidance”; Cambodian specialists in the U.S. Department of State, the National Security Council, and the U.S. Army General Staff, who “made available large quantities of their own data, guided us to other sources, answered innumerable questions and favored us with authoritative criticism”; and Ponchaud, who “put at our disposal his immense store of knowledge about Cambodia, generously shared with us the results of his own research, saved us from errors through scholarly criticism and on several occasions assisted Ursula Naccache as an interpreter in the conduct of important interviews.” Can one imagine a researcher limiting himself to comparable sources on the other side of the fence for a critical study of U.S. imperial violence, then to be lauded for his meticulous and exhaustive scholarship? The same concept of “diverse sources” also sets the limits of their “impeccable documentation,” to which we return.

No less remarkable than their search for “promising” interviewees and their concept of “diverse sources” is the short shrift they give to pre-1975 Cambodia. They explain that they “have referred to [events prior to April 17, 1975] only to the extent we thought such references were necessary to an understanding of what has transpired since then,” reasonable enough until we see what they omit as unnecessary to such understanding. The U.S. role, for example—surely known to them if they read the journalistic sources they cite and hardly a great secret to readers of the daily press—is off the agenda as irrelevant to subsequent events.
Also unnecessary to the understanding of postwar Cambodia in their view are such minor matters as the backgrounds of the revolutionary movement in peasant society and social conflict. That a study of postwar Cambodia resting on such a historical vacuum can be regarded as an outstanding work of scholarship or even a useful study of current Cambodia is remarkable indeed. The framework that they set reveals with crystal clarity that their story, where unverifiable, is to be taken about as seriously as an account of the U.S. war in Vietnam produced by the World Peace Council. Correspondingly, it is treated as seriously by the Free Press as WPC studies are on the other side of the Iron Curtain.

There is, of course, method in the Barron-Paul research methodology; it is not as stupid as it looks at first glance. If Cambodian history, internal social conflict, the nature of peasant society, French colonialism, and U.S. intervention are all excluded by fiat as unnecessary for the understanding of what has transpired since April 1975, then the stage is fully set to blame everything on the evil Communist leaders: revenge killings, disease, starvation, overwork, unexploded ordnance, the B-52 craters that have "churned up...the entire countryside" (Swain), everything. Given their framework, we hardly need inquire into the details to predict the conclusions that these scholars will reach. All deaths in Cambodia in the postwar period, all penury and suffering and strife, will necessarily be attributed to the sole factor that is not eliminated from consideration a priori: the Khmer Rouge leadership. And of course that is exactly what the authors conclude. The absurdity of this procedure apparently has not been perceived by the many commentators who take this transparent propaganda exercise seriously.

The methodology for estimating postwar deaths, which has so impressed the editors of the London Economist and other ideologists, is hardly more than a joke; one does not have to be a "dedicated sceptic" to question their basis for concluding that "at least 1m people have died since the fall of Cambodia as a direct result of the excesses of the Angka Loeu" (our emphasis); mere rationality suffices, since all other factors were eliminated as irrelevant. What of the numbers? These are determined on the basis of such notable sources as Khieu Samphan's alleged admission that "roughly a million Cambodians died,"289 and
beyond that, estimates offered with no stated basis by various named and unnamed "Western observers," various guesses based on no cited evidence about the proportion of "educated people" massacred, other guesses about deaths from starvation and disease, and so on.\textsuperscript{290}

By such routes Barron and Paul concoct their estimate that "at the very minimum, more than 1,200,000 men, women, and children died in Cambodia between April 17, 1975, and January 1, 1977, as a consequence of the actions of Angka Loeu."\textsuperscript{291} The breakdown of numbers includes "100,000 or more in massacres and by execution" and most of the rest—roughly a million—from disease and starvation.\textsuperscript{292}

The "dedicated sceptic" might, at this point, raise eyebrows over the fact that 1.2 million is the figure allegedly produced by the U.S. embassy in Bangkok, since repeated widely in the press.\textsuperscript{293} And the figure of a million deaths from disease and starvation happens to correspond to the prediction by U.S. government sources of the numbers who would starve to death after the Khmer Rouge victory, as we have seen \textsuperscript{294}—an estimate based on an assessment of the ravages of the war, specifically, the destruction of the economy by the United States.

Very little in the Barron-Paul book is subject to possible verification. Therefore an assessment of the credibility of their primary evidence (refugee reports) rests very largely on the accuracy of their brief historical remarks. Several reviewers have commented on the striking inadequacies of these remarks, failing to draw the obvious conclusion, however: if what can be checked turns out to be false or misleading, what are we to conclude about claims that are subject to no verification? Turning to their version of history, we find the standard cliches about this "once happy country" now devastated by Khmer Rouge atrocities, the "faithful, kindly believers in Theravada Buddhism" who produced annual rice surpluses in the plentiful land "without overly exerting themselves," the "Phnom Penh residents, who had been known for their spontaneity and gaiety, their uninhibited curiosity and friendliness," etc.\textsuperscript{295}; compare the accounts of peasant life, the exploitative existence of the Phnom Penh elite, and the history of violence in Cambodia mentioned earlier, which pass here without notice. Barron and Paul, unlike every serious commentator, make
no effort to find out what lies behind the "Khmer smile," and they
do not seem intrigued by the fact that the very reporters they cite
speak of the surprise of urban residents when dark-skinned
country boys in traditional garb looking like creatures from
another planet entered Phnom Penh in April, 1975.

Turning to the Khmer Rouge, Barron and Paul claim that
"there is no evidence that the communists ever enjoyed the
voluntary support of more than a small minority of Cambodians,
in either the countryside or the cities" (a standard propaganda
cliché of the Vietnam War applied to the NLF, although known to
be false by official experts). 296 Rather, the Khmer Rouge programs
"alienated the peasantry affected" so that families "fled to the
cities" in a "mass migration"—not from the U.S. bombing but
rather from Khmer Rouge cruelty. Their "mute and phlegmatic"
soldiers include children "impressed into the revolutionary army
at age ten or eleven when the communists had overrun their
villages." 297 On the assumption that these remarks accurately
characterize the Khmer Rouge relation to the peasantry, the
"difficult question" of how they now maintain control becomes an
imponderable mystery, not to speak of their rise from a tiny
movement to a substantial army under the most horrendous
conditions and their success in defeating the Lon Nol army
backed by massive U.S. force. But no such problems trouble these
thinkers. The Khmer Rouge succeeded by skillful propaganda,
exploiting the U.S. "limited incursion" and the B-52 raids directed
against the North Vietnamese and Vietcong sanctuaries. 298 The
Khmer Rouge, they explain,

had new opportunities. To escape the spreading fighting,
people started swarming from the countryside into the
cities, spawning economic and social problems for the
Lon Nol government. The American intervention and B-
52 raids (the latter continued until August 1973) enabled
the communists somewhat more convincingly to depict
the North Vietnamese as "our teachers," 299 the United
States as the "imperialist aggressor" and the Lon Nol
government as "a lackey of the imperialists." The Far
Eastern Economic Review observed: "From being widely
regarded as the dogmatic disciples of a Marxist ideology
alien to Khmer national traditions and culture, the Khmer
Rouge became patriots."³⁰⁰

After their "conjecture" that the awful fate visited upon postwar Cambodia results from the "chronic impotence" of Khieu Samphan, Barron and Paul add the following explanation of the success of the Khmer Rouge despite their terrorizing the countryside:

But what is in doubt is not so important as what is certain. Khieu Samphan and a few kindred people, who neither by achievements nor by ideas had ever attracted any substantial following, absconded into the jungles, assumed leadership of an insignificant, ineffectual little guerrilla force, captured control of a political coalition and through it absolute control of an entire society.³⁰¹

Sheer magic.³⁰²

The "impeccable documentation" in this major work omits the many published sources that explain how the Khmer Rouge were recruited by the U.S. bombardment of the civilian society, a factor that the authors would have us believe is as irrelevant to an understanding of postwar Cambodian history as the actual situation in the countryside or the history of internal conflict.³⁰³

Apart from their historical comments, there is a possibility of independent verification of Barron-Paul's evidence only in the case of the occupation of Phnom Penh, when many reporters were present at first in the city itself and later confined in the French embassy. We will therefore consider perhaps the most striking claim that they put forth from this period.

Barron and Paul claim that there was a major bloodbath. In Phnom Penh, they assert, some people saw "summary executions" and virtually everybody saw the consequences of them in the form of corpses of men, women and children rapidly bloating and rotting in the hot sun. The bodies, sometimes grotesquely contorted in agony, yielded a nauseating, pervasive stench, and they had a transfiguring effect on the hundreds of thousands of people being exiled...[turning them into]...a silent, cowed herd...³⁰⁴
Evidently, something so dramatic would be hard to miss, so one would indeed expect "virtually everybody" to have seen it.\textsuperscript{305}

Their supporting documentation falls into the two familiar categories: (1) a list of names of Cambodians; (2) verifiable documentation, namely: "\textit{Sunday Times} (London), May 8, 1975; \textit{Mirror} (London), May 9, 1975, AP dispatch from Bangkok, May 8, 1975."\textsuperscript{306} Turning to the verifiable documentation, consider first the \textit{Sunday Times}, May 8. There is no such document. Presumably, they are referring to Jon Swain's report in the \textit{Sunday Times}, May 11. Assuming so, we turn to Swain's account. There is no doubt of his fury over the "enormity and horror" of what he describes in gory detail, but he seems to have missed the consequences of summary executions described so eloquently by Barron and Paul as he was walking through Phnom Penh or observing from the embassy. He does not report having see any signs of summary executions. He does transmit stories he heard about killings by soldiers, but that is all.

One of these stories is cited by Barron-Paul, with a little embellishment, as an example of a "summary execution." Swain presents it as follows:

A newly-arrived French teacher says that at 8:30 this morning he was on his way to the embassy when a Khmer Rouge patrol ran out of an alley and cut a line of refugees in half, splitting a family. When the parents protested the leader raised his rifle and shot them in the chest.

This second-hand report, if correct,\textsuperscript{307} would serve as a second-hand example of a "summary execution" under a broad interpretation of this concept, but provides no support for the far more dramatic claim that virtually everybody saw the consequences that Barron and Paul so vividly describe. Furthermore, this example does not support the major thrust of their argument, that the "summary executions," here and elsewhere, were commanded from on high as part of a systematic policy of genocide, perhaps a consequence of Khieu Samphan's "chronic impotence." Rather, it appears to be a case of a murderous act by soldiers of a conquering army, horrifying no doubt, but unfortunately all too common—for example, the "robbery and murder" committed by U.S. troops
occupying Japan or their participation in mass murder of members of the anti-Japanese resistance in the Philippines, to take a case where the armed forces in question and the society from which they were recruited had not suffered anything remotely like the savagery that the Khmer Rouge had endured. 308

Actually, Swain does discuss the matter of bloodbaths, though Barron and Paul do not refer to these remarks. Commenting on the assurance by U.S. diplomats “that the revenge would be dreadful when the Khmer Rouge came,” he writes:

I can only say that what I have heard and seen provides no proof of a bloodbath (and I would question the reliability of reports of mass executions that almost from the start have circulated outside Cambodia)... What has taken place, though equally horrific, is something different in kind. My overriding impression—reinforced as we journeyed through the countryside en route to the Thai border—was that the Khmer Rouge military authorities had ordered this mass evacuation not to punish the people but to revolutionise their ways and thoughts. Many thousands will no doubt die. But whatever else, this does not constitute a deliberate campaign of terror, rather it points to poor organisation, lack of vision and the brutalisation of a people by a long and savage war.

In this connection, Swain has something to say about a bloodbath that escaped the attention of Barron and Paul completely:

The United States has much to answer for here, not only in terms of human lives and massive material destruction; the rigidity and nastiness of the un-Cambodian like fellows in black who run this country now, 309 or what is left of it, are as much a product of this wholesale American bombing which has hardened and honed their minds as they are a product of Marx and Mao... The war damage here, as everywhere else we saw, is total. Not a bridge is standing, hardly a house. I am told most villagers have spent the war years living semi-permanently underground in earth bunkers to escape the bombing. Little wonder that this peasant army is proud of its achievements... The
entire countryside has been churned up by American B-52 bomb craters, whole towns and villages razed. So far I have not seen one intact pagoda.\textsuperscript{310}

His final thoughts are also perhaps worth quoting:

In the last five years, Cambodia has lost upwards of half a million people, 10 per cent of its population, in a war fueled and waged on its soil by outside powers for their own selfish reasons. The people who run, live in and try to reconstruct the heap of ruins they have inherited in Cambodia today deserve the world’s compassion and understanding. It is their country and it was their sacrifices. They have earned themselves the right to organise their society their own way.

In brief, Barron and Paul are careful not to cite Swain for what he does actually say, though it is highly relevant to their alleged concerns.\textsuperscript{311} Furthermore, this source lends no support to their claim that “virtually everybody” saw the hideous consequences of summary executions, or that the “summary executions” were a matter of government policy.

Perhaps we will do better with Barron and Paul’s second source: “\textit{Mirror} (London), May 9, 1975, AP dispatch from Bangkok, May 8, 1975.” The \textit{Daily Mirror}, May 9, contains no AP dispatch (this journal contains little international news). There is, however, a report by an unidentified \textit{Mirror} reporter, nestled amidst such items as “My secret agony, by girl’s mum,” and “Men’s Lib at the Altar.” This story is based on reports by evacuees from the French embassy and refugees. The reporter does not seem to have been in Cambodia, so he could not have witnessed the scene described by Barron-Paul. Nor did the people he interviewed. But he does have this to say: “The refugees heard reports of wholesale executions of Cambodians. But they never saw any themselves.”

So much for the second bit of impeccable documentation. Perhaps Barron and Paul, in the somewhat misleading citation quoted above, had in mind an AP dispatch from another source. There is, in fact, an AP dispatch from Bangkok (May 8, 1975) filed by Jean-Jacques Cazaux and Claude Juvenal on their arrival after evacuation from Cambodia.\textsuperscript{312} They say nothing about executions in Phnom Penh and report that “not a single corpse was seen along our evacuation route, however.”\textsuperscript{313}
Perhaps there are other May 8 Bangkok AP reports relevant to the Barron-Paul claim quoted above,314 but the sources they cite plainly are not. Rather, these sources either say nothing about a bloodbath that should have been hard to miss on their account, or express skepticism about bloodbath reports. There is no shred of evidence from this documentation in support of their claim about what "virtually everybody saw" or even in support of their general claim that the government was responsible for "summary executions." We are left with the unverifiable documentation: alleged interviews with Cambodians.

Other sources that Barron-Paul cite in a related context also do not bear out their claims about the signs of a bloodbath that virtually everybody saw. They cite Cazaux (AFP, Hong Kong, May 8, 1975) under the related heading "Transformation of Phnom Penh into a wasteland." We have been unable to locate this report and doubt that it exists, but there is an AFP report filed by Cazaux on May 8 from Bangkok, where he actually was. Here he says that there were rumors that 200 heads were lying in the marketplace and thousands of bodies rotting along Highway 5 leading north, "but latecomers to the embassy said that nothing of the kind [i.e., massacres] had taken place."315 Similarly, Sydney Schanberg, whom they cite under "Evacuation of Phnom Penh," notes "unconfirmed reports of executions of senior military and civilian officials" and the prospect that many will die on the march to the countryside; "But none of this will apparently bear any resemblance to the mass executions that had been predicted by Westerners." He cites reports of executions, "but none were eye-witness accounts." He saw bodies on the road from Phnom Penh but says "it was difficult to tell if they were people who had succumbed to the hardships of the march or simply civilians and soldiers killed in the last battles."316

Still another lengthy account (which Barron-Paul do not cite) was given by Patrice de Beer of Le Monde.317 De Beer urges caution with refugee or secret service reports ("how badly mistaken they were is only too well known"). He is skeptical about the reports of executions. "One instance cited is that of Oudong, which we went through on April 30, and where we saw nothing of the sort." He is also skeptical of monitored radio messages, "when you recall that the day after Phnom Penh fell a clandestine
transmitter on the Thai border announced that a score of journalists had been killed by the Khmer Rouge, when in fact they were all alive.” He describes “an unknown world” in the countryside, peaceful despite the devastation, turning to the task of reconstruction.

We hardly find here an “impeccably documented” account of how “virtually everybody” saw the horrendous scenes that Barron-Paul describe. In fact, their documentation reduces to category (1): unverifiable reports of alleged interviews with refugees.318 The fact appears to be that virtually nobody whose reports can be checked, including sources that they are clearly aware of since they cite them in related contexts, saw the scenes that they describe.

The fact that their claim was undocumented was noted by Torben Retbøll in letters commenting on the reviews of the Barron-Paul book in the Economist and the Far Eastern Economic Review. Barron and Paul have each responded.319 Each produces the obligatory insults (“one of the world’s few remaining apologists for the Cambodian communists,” etc.), with a touch of hysteria that stands in marked contrast to Retbøll’s letters, which quietly point out errors in the book and express skepticism about its claims. We will not review their huffing-and-puffing in an effort to evade the issue, but the upshot is that the claim to which Retbøll referred, which we have just discussed, is not supported by the verifiable documentation that they cite. It is, furthermore, a fairly sensational claim, and one of the few that is subject to possible verification. Furthermore, even the second-hand story of an atrocity that they cite more or less accurately lends no support to their thesis about the “summary executions,” as we have seen.

Perhaps this is enough to indicate that Barron and Paul’s impeccable documentation and exhaustive and meticulous scholarship, which has so impressed reviewers, will not withstand scrutiny. The historical comments are worthless and their effort to document what might have been observed reduces to the testimony of refugees, that is, unverifiable testimony. They do offer what to the superficial reader may appear to be “documentation,” but we discover on analysis that it is irrelevant or contrary to their claims, where it exists. Recall that this is apparently the best that could be achieved with the ample resources of the Reader’s Digest. In the case of reporters of demonstrated integrity,
reports of what refugees are alleged to have said must surely be taken seriously. In the present case, the very framework of analysis makes it clear that this is not a serious piece of work. At any point where their contribution can be evaluated, it is found seriously wanting if not entirely absurd. People who are willing to place their trust in what Barron and Paul report where no supporting documentation is available (i.e., essentially all the crucial cases) merely reveal that their preconceived bias overwhelms any critical judgment. Nevertheless, their work, both in the Reader's Digest with its mass international circulation and in this widely-reviewed and much-praised book, remains the major source of evidence on which the Western media and the general public have relied, a remarkable bit of evidence in support of the theory of the Free Press that we have been elaborating here.

Ponchaud's book, the second major source for Western audiences on postwar Indochina, is a more serious work and deserves more careful study and critical analysis. Before discussing it, a word about its reception and impact is in order. In fact, it is not quite accurate to say that Ponchaud's book itself has been a major source despite the numerous references to it: rather, the impact of this book has been through the medium of reviews and derivative commentary, primarily, a very influential review by Jean Lacouture, who has compiled an outstanding record as a historian and analyst of contemporary affairs in Vietnam and the Middle East, apart from other important work. The English translation of Lacouture's French review appeared shortly after the Barron-Paul Reader's Digest article, followed within a few months by their book and his corrections.\textsuperscript{320} The already quite extensive press commentary on Cambodia, which had been denouncing the Cambodian horror chamber and Gulag since the war's end, reached a crescendo of outrage and indignation at this time—always coupled with an agonized plea to "break the silence" that could barely be heard above the din of protest. The congressional hearings of May and July followed immediately. This escalation of the already high level of protest was caused, no doubt, by this "one-two punch"; Barron-Paul for the masses in the Reader's Digest, and Lacouture for the intellectual elite in the New York Review of Books. To appreciate how unusual all this is, compare the reaction to benign and constructive bloodbaths, as in the case of Timor.
As we have already mentioned, it is rare—indeed, unprecedented—for a French book on Indochina to receive such rapid and wide notice in the English-speaking world. Lacouture’s book on postwar Vietnam was neither translated nor, to our knowledge, ever mentioned in the press, though it was an eyewitness account based on long-demonstrated expertise; in contrast his version of a report by a hitherto unknown French priest concerning a country with which Lacouture had considerably less familiarity became a major literary and political event. Similarly, earlier French studies that give much insight into the developments that have led to the present situation in Cambodia have never been translated and were only mentioned far from the mainstream. And postwar French publications that give a more positive view of the Khmer Rouge are unnoticed and untranslated.

It would be difficult to argue that Ponchaud’s book has been translated and so widely discussed because of its unique excellence as a work of scholarship or interpretation. Whatever its merits, one would hardly maintain that it is in a class by itself in this regard. Nor is the reason for its uncommon fame that it records horrible atrocities; the same was surely true of the work of Pomonti-Thion and Meyer, for example, who dealt with the U.S. war. Nor can the reason be humanitarian concern, since the latter books were far more relevant than Ponchaud’s (all questions of merit aside) on any moral scale, for reasons that are simple and obvious: the information that they conveyed could lead to direct action that would impede or halt ongoing atrocities, while it is difficult to see what Westerners could do to improve the lot of those who were subjected to repression or worse in Cambodia, as specialists have commonly observed. To “speak out” about Cambodian atrocities in the West, joining the chorus of protest, is easy enough—as easy as it would be for a Russian intellectual to condemn the atrocious acts of U.S. imperialism. It cannot be that some moral imperative affords Ponchaud’s book its unique fame.

In fact, it is clear enough why this study has been singled out for special attention: its message, accurate or not, happens to conform perfectly to the needs of current Western ideology. These comments are no criticism of the book, of course. Rather, they relate to its remarkable reception, and thus are
relevant to our primary concern: the workings of the Western propaganda system.


Our own interpretation of the impact would be a bit different. Most of those who reacted to Lacouture’s review in the media by lauding the contribution of the book that they had never seen had shown little concern for the future of socialism; or for Asia, except in the sense that a fox is concerned with a brood of chickens.

Others have also commented on the influence of Lacouture’s review, which has indeed been unprecedented. William Shawcross writes that it had “enormous impact particularly because it was written by a former supporter of the Khmer Rouge (he issued a *mea culpa*) for a paper which had consistently opposed the war. It was taken up by dozens of papers...” In its review, the London *Economist* wrote that Ponchaud’s book “gained considerable notoriety because of an extraordinary review in the *New York Times* [sic] *Review of Books* written by Jean Lacouture, a French journalist.” Lacouture’s corrections (a “bizarre episode”) “added—a bit illogically—to the controversy that was already well advanced over whether the book itself was adequately researched and the refugees’ evidence viewed with sufficient scepticism.”

These comments bring out several interesting themes which, as we have seen, crop up constantly in discussion about postwar Indochina. Consider the *Economist’s* reference to the “controversy that was already well advanced” over Ponchaud’s book. There was no controversy. It was quite impossible for there to have been a controversy at the time when Lacouture’s review appeared. The book itself had just appeared; for all we know there was not a single person in the English-speaking countries who had read the book, let alone engaged in controversy over it, at that time (and precious few afterwards, when the unread book was having its “enormous impact” on the press); nor was there any controversy “well advanced” in France a few weeks after publication. Further-
more, there has been very little controversy over the book since. Reviews have been consistently favorable, our own review in the *Nation* included, as Ponchaud remarks in the author’s note to the American translation, though we raised several questions about it. But it is, as we have seen, a staple of media coverage of postwar Cambodia to pretend that a major intellectual battle is in progress, comparable perhaps to the debate over Stalinist crimes years ago. Such pretense provides a useful backdrop to the incessant plea that the story is “untold,” everyone remains silent, etc., a performance that would have an air of low comedy were it not for the seriousness of the subject.

Shawcross’s observation that part of the impact of the review was due to Lacouture’s former support for the Khmer Rouge and the fact that the *New York Review* had consistently opposed the war is very much to the point. But the matter deserves a closer look. In fact, much has also been made of Ponchaud’s early sympathy for the Khmer Rouge as evidence that his criticism has unusual force. Lacouture does describe himself as someone “who supported the Khmer Rouge cause,” and “advocated the cause of the Khmer Rouge in their struggle against the corrupt Lon Nol regime.” His previous writings indicate, however, that he was a supporter of Sihanouk, who was a bitter enemy of the Khmer Rouge until they joined forces against Lon Nol in 1970 and whose subsequent relations with the Khmer Rouge are not at all clear. In fact, it is difficult to see how a Westerner could have supported the cause of the Khmer Rouge, since virtually nothing was known about it. One should beware of the “God that failed” technique. It is a common error, as we have pointed out several times, to interpret opposition to U.S. intervention and aggression as support for the programs of its victims, a useful device for state propagandists but one that often has no basis in fact. As for the *New York Review*, it is true enough that it consistently opposed the war and was at one time open to writers connected with the peace movement and the U.S. left (along with a wide range of others), but it rejoined the liberal consensus in these respects years ago. It may be that the impact of Lacouture’s review derived in part from the fact that it appeared in the issue immediately following the André Gelinas article on Vietnam that we discussed in Chapter 4. This too was influential, and its impact was
enhanced, as we have seen, by the pretense that the journal in which it appeared had been an “organ of celebration” for the Communists, a typical lie of the propaganda institutions.336

Finally, as concerns Ponchaud, it is quite true that he writes that he listened to Khmer Rouge proposals “with a sympathetic ear,” since “I come of peasant stock myself.”337 As far as we know, however, during the years Ponchaud lived in Cambodia he never publicly expressed this sympathy and also apparently felt that no purpose would be served by any public comment or protest over the war—specifically, the foreign attack—while it was in progress; we are aware of nothing that he wrote on the war apart from several articles and his book all after the war’s end. Furthermore, he describes nothing that he did that might have been to the benefit of the peasants of Cambodia.

It apparently has not been noticed by the many commentators who have cited Ponchaud’s alleged sympathy with the Khmer peasants and the revolutionary forces that if authentic, it is a remarkable self-condemnation. What are we to think of a person who is quite capable of reaching an international audience, at least with atrocity stories, and who could see with his own eyes what was happening to the Khmer peasants subjected to daily massacre as the war ground on, but kept totally silent at a time when a voice of protest might have helped to mitigate their torture? It would be more charitable to assume that Ponchaud is simply not telling the truth when he speaks of his sympathy for the Khmer peasants and for the revolution, having added these touches for the benefit of a gullible Western audience or for the benefit of apologists who can then write that the atrocity stories have “impressed even those such as Francois Ponchaud,...who was sympathetic to the Communists when they first took over.”338

In short, neither Lacouture, nor Ponchaud, nor the New York Review had ever, to our knowledge, identified with the Khmer Rouge or their “cause.” While it is true that the impact of Lacouture’s review of Ponchaud’s book in the New York Review derives in part from such loose associations as those just mentioned, that is more a commentary on the media than on the facts.

Lacouture’s review has indeed been extremely influential. The corrections, in significant contrast, have been little noted.339 Two samples from the national press illustrate the media response.
Basing themselves on a review of a book that they had never seen, by an unknown author, the editors of the Christian Science Monitor published an editorial stating that "the loss of life" had been reported to be "as high as 2 million people out of 7.8 million total." They quote Lacouture's rhetorical question: "What Oriental despots or medieval inquisitors ever boasted of having eliminated, in a single year, one quarter of their own population."340 Surely enough time had passed to enable the Monitor editors to do what several private individuals had done upon reading Lacouture's review: namely to check his source for this remark, and find that it did not exist. The Monitor also cites the faked photographs discussed above (the fakery had been publicly exposed a year earlier), noting merely that they "have not been positively verified." They quote Lacouture's conclusion that "Cambodia's leaders have been 'systematically massacring, isolating and starving city and village populations whose crime was to have been born when they were'," never troubling—here or elsewhere—to inquire into the evidence for this allegation, or to ask what curious aberration might impel Cambodia's leaders to systematically starve and massacre the population of the country, or how a small group of leaders might be able to achieve this strange purpose. They conclude that "for the outside world to countenance such barbarism and remain officially silent about it, in a sense diminishes respect for humanity and its rights everywhere." To fully appreciate their reaction one would have to review the shabby editorial record of this journal341 in countenancing the barbarism of the United States over many years.342

Lacouture, like Ponchaud, takes note of the brutality of the U.S. war, surely a major factor in what followed. These references disappear from the Monitor editorial, which like Barron-Paul pretends that the current suffering in Cambodia takes place in a historical vacuum, a mere result of Communist savagery. We have already quoted their earlier editorial based on Barron-Paul, which avoids any reference to U.S. responsibility, though there is much moralizing about those who are allegedly indifferent to Khmer Rouge terrorism against the "engaging people" of Cambodia.343

To mention a second example, the liberal columnist of the New York Times, Anthony Lewis, devoted a column to Lacouture's review.344 Lewis was an outspoken and effective critic of the U.S.
war from 1969 and has since explained that “by 1969 it was clear to most of the world—and most Americans—that the intervention had been a disastrous mistake”345—not a crime. He commented on the “painful honesty” of Lacouture’s article which “lends ghastly conviction to its terrible conclusions.” He then quotes Lacouture’s conclusions: the new rulers “have invented something original—auto-genocide,” a new and more horrible form of genocide: “After Auschwitz and the Gulag, we might have thought this century had produced the ultimate horror, but we are now seeing the suicide of a people in the name of revolution; worse: in the name of socialism.” Apparently a greater horror than Auschwitz or the Gulag, not to speak of the Indonesian massacre of 1965-1966 or the U.S. massacres in Indochina (but then, as Lewis has explained, these were only a “disastrous mistake”). Lewis also quotes approvingly Lacouture’s claim that the “group of modern intellectuals, formed by Western thought, primarily Marxist thought” are systematically massacring and starving the population, and his further claim that these monsters “boast” of having “eliminated” some 2 million people, along with other citations that happen to be inaccurate. As distinct from the Monitor, Lewis cites Lacouture’s reference to the U.S. role, and like his colleagues warns that “to remain silent in the face of barbarism as enormous as Cambodia’s would be to compromise our own humanity”—as if there had been silence, as if it is “our own humanity” that is at stake, as if we do not compromise our own humanity by describing “American decisions on Indochina” as “blundering efforts to do good” (see note 345) after having remained silent about them apart from timid queries during the period of the worst barbarism. “In today’s world,” he concludes, “we ignore mass murder anywhere at our own peril.”

The allegations that Lewis quotes are severe indeed. As a legal scholar, he might have troubled to inquire into the source of the allegations that he is reporting from a book he had never seen by an author of whom he knows nothing, before broadcasting them in such a manner to a mass audience. Had he done so, he would have quickly discovered that his specific citations had no basis in the text of the book, as we shall see. And for all his expressed concern about compromising our own humanity, it is only “our own peril” that concerns this moralist (who concedes “that there is not much
hope of affecting the Cambodian government"), not the con-
sequences for Third World peoples who are potential victims of
the hysteria that he is helping to inflame with his unexamined
charges based on misquotations and errors.

The Monitor was unwilling to print corrections of the false
statements in its editorial or the conclusions based on them,
despite evidence provided to them that established the falsity
beyond question. They did, however publish (prominently) a letter
correcting some of these errors; retraction would have been the
honorable step. After Lacouture's corrections had appeared,
Lewis (who had also had in hand for several weeks the document-
tory evidence showing that his quotes were baseless) noted them at
the end of a column. His corrections were only partial, and he
did not make clear that full corrections eliminate entirely the
evidentiary basis for the conclusions he proclaimed. Nor did he
indicate whether this fact bears on the "ghastly conviction" lent to
Lacouture's "terrible conclusions."

Since the media have relied heavily on the contents of
Lacouture's review, regardless of the corrections, it is important
to see exactly what kind of information they are offering to the
reading public. We are not concerned here with Lacouture's
interpretation of what he read, but rather with the evidence that
was available to the many journalists who made use of this
evidence without troubling to investigate its character and ac-
curacy. Such evidence, plainly, consists of Lacouture's more or
less explicit references to the book. These references turn out to be
false or highly misleading in every instance. Hence the journalists
were writing on the basis of no serious evidence whatsoever.
Furthermore, subsequent inquiry has revealed that some of the
material in the book that was the basis for Lacouture's distorted
account was quite dubious at best—again, a pattern that we have
noticed earlier; evidence about Cambodia has a way of crumbling
when one begins to look at it closely, a fact that should raise some
questions about the examples that have not been investigated
because of their lesser prominence in the international campaign.
What reached the public was a series of reports by journalists of
Lacouture's misreading of statements by Ponchaud that are
themselves questionable in some instances (even forgetting the
additional link in the chain of transmission, namely, the refugee
reports). It is therefore of some interest to review these cases one by one.

The review contains the following references that can be related to something that appears in the book itself:

(1) "What Oriental despot or medieval inquisitors ever boasted of having eliminated, in a single year, one quarter of their own population."

(2) Ponchaud "quotes from texts distributed in Phnom Penh itself inciting local officials to 'cut down,' to 'gash,' to 'suppress' the 'corrupt' elites and 'carriers of germs'—and not only the guilty but 'their offspring until the last one.' The strategy of Herod." [Lacouture's emphasis]

(3) Ponchaud "cites telling articles from the government newspaper, the Prachachat,...which denounced the 're-education' methods of the Vietnamese as 'too slow.' 'The Khmer method has no need of numerous personnel. We've overturned the basket, and with it all the fruit it contained. From now on we will choose only the fruit that suit us perfectly. The Vietnamese have removed only the rotten fruit, and this causes them to lose time.' [Lacouture's emphasis.]

Perhaps Beria would not have dared to say this openly; Himmler might have done so. It is in such company that one must place this 'revolution' as it imposes a return to the land, the land of the pre-Angkor period, by methods worthy of Nazi Gauleiters."

(4) "When men who talk of Marxism are able to say, as one quoted by Ponchaud does, that only 1.5 or 2 million young Cambodians, out of 6 million, will be enough to rebuild a pure society, one can no longer speak of barbarism [but only] madness."

These quotes exhaust the alleged evidence available to the journalists on whom this review had such a powerful impact, and provide the basis for their further commentary.

Let us now review the status of this evidence. We have already discussed case (4), noting that the source, if any, is so unreliable that Ponchaud deleted the reference from the American edition.
Case (1) is simply false, as Lacouture points out in his corrections.\textsuperscript{350} There was no Khmer Rouge boast reported, and no figure of one quarter of the population “eliminated” or even an allegation of that number of postwar deaths.

Turning to case (2), as Lacouture acknowledges in his corrections, the source is not texts distributed in Phnom Penh but something much more vague; this is true not only of the single case he discussed in the “Corrections,” namely, the injunction to suppress “their offspring until the last one,” but also of the others cited.\textsuperscript{351} The one case that Lacouture discusses in his corrections is presented, as he says, as a “leitmotif de justification” in the French text. The other examples we are unable to locate in Ponchaud’s French text, though similar quotes are offered as “slogans used, both on the radio and at meetings.” What their status may be is not made clear. The radio reports are not identified (others are elsewhere in the book), so they are perhaps refugee memories. Plainly this must be true of the slogans reported. Thus what we have is memories transmitted at second-hand by Ponchaud, modified by Lacouture, and presented as texts distributed in Phnom Penh.

What of the one example that Lacouture corrects, which expresses “the strategy of Herod”? Does this judgment still hold if it is a “leitmotif” without explicit source rather than an official text? Without pursuing that question, we note that the American translation of Ponchaud’s book softens the reference still further. There is no quote given at all; rather, the text reads: “the theme that the family line must be annihilated down to the last survivor is recurrent in such reports.” The relevant “reports” are identified only as “several accounts”—presumably, refugee memories. Ponchaud’s paraphrase of a theme that several refugees have allegedly reported does not seem to us to provide very powerful support for denunciation of a regime as employing “the strategy of Herod.”\textsuperscript{352}

We are left with one single bit of evidence, namely case (3). This case turns out to be rather interesting. In his “Corrections,” Lacouture acknowledges that Prachachat is not a Cambodian “government newspaper” but rather a Thai newspaper—a considerable difference, which suffices to undermine the comment that he appends to this quote. In the corrections he writes that this Thai paper, in its issue of June 10, 1976, “carried an interview with
a Khmer Rouge official who said, as Ponchaud writes, that he found the revolutionary method of the Vietnamese ‘very slow,’ requiring ‘a lot of time to separate the good people from the counter-revolutionaries.’ ” It was the Thai reporter, he adds, who drew the conclusion he quoted that the Khmers had “overturned the basket...”

This is a fair rendition of what Ponchaud reports. Ponchaud writes: “In an interview in the Thai newspaper Prachachat of 10 June 1976 a Khmer Rouge official said that the Vietnamese revolutionary method was ‘very slow’, and that ‘it took a great deal of time to sort out the good from the counter-revolutionaries.’” Ponchaud then cites the conclusion of the reporter of Prachachat, and adds this final comment as a separate paragraph, closing the chapter: “This is the ‘Great Leap Forward’ of the Khmer revolution.”

The American version is a bit different. The final ironic comment is deleted entirely. Furthermore, he says here that the interview with the Khmer Rouge official was “cited” in Prachachat; that is, there is still another link in the chain of transmission. Note that this interview and the Thai reporter’s comment are considered rather significant; the chapter heading is: “The Overturned Basket.”

When we first read Ponchaud’s original, we assumed that the Thai journal Prachachat must be a right wing journal giving a criticism of the Khmer Rouge. That is what Ponchaud’s account suggests, in particular his final ironic comment, now deleted in the American edition. We wrote in the Nation (25 June 1977) that the chain of transmission was too long to be taken very seriously and we raised the following question: “How seriously would we regard a critical account of the United States in a book by a hostile European leftist based on a report in Pravda of a statement allegedly made by an unnamed American official?” (Correspondingly, how seriously should we regard a critical account of Cambodia in a book by Ponchaud based on a report in Prachachat of a statement allegedly made by an unnamed Khmer Rouge official?) The answer is: not very seriously. Whatever one thinks of this, it is evident that the basis for the extreme criticisms that Lacouture appends to this “quote” disappears when it is properly attributed: to a Thai reporter, not a Cambodian government
newspaper.

Several people (Heder, Ponchaud, Vickery) have pointed out to us that we were mistaken in assuming that Prachachat was a right wing newspaper critical of the Khmer Rouge. The fact is that it was a left wing newspaper, and the actual text is not a criticism of the Khmer Rouge, but a defense of the Khmer Rouge against foreign criticism, something that could hardly be guessed from Ponchaud’s account and is certainly worth knowing, in this context. Furthermore, it turns out that there is indeed another link in the chain of transmission; Ponchaud’s revision of his French text in the American (but not British) translation is correct. Prachachat did not interview a Khmer Rouge official. Rather, it cites a report by a person described as “a neutral individual” in Paris who says that “a Khmer official of the new government, residing in Paris, said to me...” Here, then, is an improved version of our original analogy: How seriously would we regard a critical account of the United States in a book by a hostile European leftist based on a report in Encounter of comments by a “neutral person” who reports statements of an unnamed American official? Again, not very seriously.

Note that the unnamed Khmer Rouge official in Paris is quite possibly a member of the pro-revolutionary Cambodian community in Paris, whose information is itself second or third-hand (perhaps through Peking), as Heder points out. Furthermore, given the context it is not so clear what interpretation to give to the comment about the Vietnamese methods being “very slow.” Lacouture’s reference as well as Ponchaud’s text suggest that what is intended is that the methods are too slow in eliminating people (at least, that is how we read them). The full context of the original article in Prachachat, however, suggests that what is in fact meant is that the Vietnamese method is too slow in returning former collaborators (including professionals and even former military men) to normal lives to help build the new society; again, a vast difference. The gist of the article seems to be a call for rapid proletarianization of the urban bourgeoisie—who, as every rational observer agrees, had to be moved to productive work in a country that had no economy, and had no way of feeding millions of people who had been driven into the cities by U.S. “forced-draft urbanization.” No one could guess from Ponchaud’s
citation that this may well be the intended sense of these remarks.

Furthermore, the context and the proper wording suggest a rather different sense for the paragraph quoted from the Thai journal's conclusion; recall that the article was intended as a defense of the Khmer Rouge against criticism.\textsuperscript{360} As Lacouture gives the quote, following Ponchaud, the Thai journalist says that "the Khmer method has no need of numerous personnel." The implication is rather similar to that conveyed by the widely quoted remark about needing only 1-2 million people to build the new society (Lacouture's case (4), already discussed): namely, not many people are needed; the others can be eliminated. Evidently, Lacouture understood it this way (we did as well)—hence his comment about Beria, Himmler and Nazi Gauleiters. But the context omitted from Ponchaud's text makes it clear that this interpretation is entirely false. The immediately preceding paragraph and the one in question read as follows:

If we may make a comparison, we see that the Vietnamese method requires numerous personnel to supervise the population; it may even turn out that it will not succeed everywhere, and the authorities will thus be charged with a very heavy burden.\textsuperscript{361}

In contrast, the Khmer method does not need numerous personnel; there are no burdens; because they have removed all the burdens out of the city...

Then comes the comparison of overturning the basket.

Note two crucial points. Placed in context, it is obvious that the reference to the Khmer method not needing numerous personnel means that not many people are needed as supervisors, not that most of the population can be eliminated. Whatever one may think of this, it hardly justifies the remarks about Beria, Himmler and the Nazi Gauleiters. Ponchaud's citation, eliminating the relevant context, radically changes and severely harshens the sense. Secondly, note that the phrase "they have removed all the burdens out of the city," which plainly means that the burdens of the authorities have been removed from the city, is translated by Ponchaud as follows: "there are no heavy charges to bear because everyone is simply thrown out of town."\textsuperscript{362}—obviously, the connotations are quite different.
When the proper context is introduced and Ponchaud’s mistranslation is corrected, we find that the journalists of Prachachat are indeed giving what they take to be a defense of the Khmer revolution. We will not go into the question of whether this defense is adequate. Rather, our point is that what they are saying is radically different from the impression conveyed by Ponchaud—which explains why Lacouture, and we too, were so seriously misled as to the character of the Prachachat article. Thus this final item in the list of Lacouture’s references (number (3), goes the way of the others. It provides no basis whatsoever for his charges, but rather shows that Ponchaud has once again flagrantly misrepresented a quotation, the very one from which he took the chapter heading.

Two conclusions emerge from this discussion. First, journalists who have been relying on Lacouture’s review (with or without corrections) have built their case on sand. Furthermore, inquiry reveals that when we proceed beyond his published correction to a full list of corrections, and beyond that to correction of Ponchaud’s original text to which he referred, the sand turns to jelly.

The original French has been considerably modified in the American edition. Specifically, in the list just given, item (4) is dropped entirely; the central example of (2) is changed from a quote to a paraphrase; the final ironic comment based on the translation of Prachachat is deleted and it is correctly stated that the article did not contain an interview with a Khmer Rouge official but rather that such an interview was cited. Item (1) was simply an error based on a misreading of a false statement by Ponchaud. Item (2) was also a misreading of Ponchaud. As for item (3), not only was Lacouture’s reference to Ponchaud seriously in error, but Ponchaud’s original translation from Prachachat is in part extremely misleading and in part flat wrong.

All in all, not a very impressive performance, either at the source or in the review. But it is this material that has had such a major impact on Western journalists, perhaps second only to the Barron-Paul book that we have already discussed.

Returning now to Lacouture’s point that it is a matter of secondary importance to decide “which person uttered an inhuman phrase, and whether the regime has murdered thousands or
hundreds of thousands of wretched people,” we believe that this review of the facts strengthens our earlier argument that it does matter indeed. It appears that the “inhuman phrases” in question may not have been uttered at all, or when uttered, were hardly so inhuman as Lacouture and Ponchaud suggest. It remains an open question whether the “regime has murdered” those who died from disease, starvation or overwork—or whether we have murdered them, by our past acts. It is also unclear on Ponchaud’s evidence whether “the regime” has murdered the victims of “summary executions” (by government design? or peasant revenge? or soldiers out of control?).

We have now reviewed the two major sources of information for U.S. and indeed Western readers: Barron-Paul and Lacouture’s rendition of Ponchaud. We turn next to Ponchaud’s book itself. Again, we face the usual problem of logic: the trust we place in unverifiable material, which includes the essential and the most serious charges, depends on the trustworthiness of material that can be verified, here or elsewhere. In this case, we are restricted to the book itself, as the few articles we know of add little. As we have seen, Ponchaud plays fast and loose with numbers and is highly unreliable with quotations. This discovery naturally raises questions about sources that cannot be checked. As in the case of Barron-Paul, we can turn to his account of the history and background to assess the credibility of his reporting and conclusions. There is a vast difference between the two books in this regard. Ponchaud at least makes an effort to deal with these crucial matters. He offers virtually no documentation, which again reduces the possibility of assessment, but much that he recounts seems plausible both on grounds of inner consistency and what is known from other sources. We have mentioned a few cases where we find his historical account unsatisfying; namely, in reference to the colonial impact and the U.S. role, though these are at least mentioned. On his account of Khmer culture and the ideology of the post-revolutionary society, briefly mentioned above, we are not qualified to comment.

In his historical comments, Ponchaud tends to keep closely to the version of events offered by the U.S. propaganda system. Consider, for example, his discussion of the U.S. and Vietnamese involvement in Cambodia. Since he gives no sources, we do not know on what information he relies; plainly, not direct experience
in these cases. The major studies\textsuperscript{364} give a general picture of the following sort: Cambodia had been subjected to attempts at subversion and direct aggression by its U.S.-backed neighbors, Thailand and South Vietnam, from the 1950s. Diem’s troops had attacked border regions in 1957. A CIA-backed plot to dismember Cambodia in 1958-1960 was foiled. There were provocations from the Thai side of the border, but the Vietnamese frontier posed a much more serious threat. “From 1957, but particularly from 1964, American-South Vietnamese forces attacked posts and villages, bombed rice fields, machine-gunned trucks, napalmed or defoliated the Cambodian side of the frontier,” causing hundreds of casualties each year (Pomonti-Thion). Meyer reports that “at the end of 1963, the ‘Khmers Serei,’ equipped and trained by the CIA, made more frequent incursions into Cambodian territory from bases in South Vietnam and Thailand,” and a few years later “the American-South Vietnamese attacks, ever more murderous, multiplied against the frontier villages of Cambodia.” After the massive and destructive U.S. military operations in nearby areas of South Vietnam, particularly in January-February 1967, Vietnamese peasants and guerrillas took refuge in narrow border areas, leading to cynical charges from Washington about Communist encroachment into neutral Cambodia. According to Meyer, by March, 1970, when the coup that overthrew Sihanouk took place, they were scattered along border areas to a maximum depth of perhaps 25 kilometers in the extreme northeast provinces which were to a considerable extent under the control of indigenous guerrillas. Other sources concur. Relations between the Cambodians and the Vietnamese in the “sanctuaries” were generally friendly at that time, and there were few military conflicts. The first evidence of Vietnamese encampments on the Cambodian side of the border was discovered in late 1967, a few kilometers beyond an unmarked border. While hypocrites in Washington and the press fumed in public about “North Vietnamese aggression,” the internal view was different. From the Pentagon Papers we learn that as late as May 1967—i.e., well after the major U.S. military operations cited above—high officials believed that Cambodia was “becoming more and more important as a supply base—now of food and medicines, perhaps ammunition later” (John McNaughton). A year earlier a U.S. study team
discovered the results of a U.S. helicopter attack on a Cambodian village (first denied, later conceded when eyewitnesses including a CBS television team reported the facts), one of several such cases discovered accidentally. In March 1969 the massive “secret bombing” began.

It is intriguing to consider the reactions in the United States to the occasional revelations that Cambodia had been attacked by U.S. forces. Roger Hilsman, who was director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the State Department and later Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs in the Kennedy administration, describes an attack by U.S. bombers on a Cambodian village on January 21, 1962, with an unknown number of civilian casualties. He describes this as a “tragic error in map-reading”: the real intent was “to bomb and strafe the cluster of huts near the Cambodian border” where it had been reported that there were Viet Cong guerrillas. It would not have been a “tragic error” if a Vietnamese village had been bombed by U.S. planes in January, 1962, with an unknown number of civilian casualties. Hilsman’s sole criticism concerning this bombing attack against a defenseless village (apart from the tragic error in map reading, which led to the wrong peasants being killed) is that though “the plan was well and efficiently executed” it was not well-designed for guerrilla warfare: “The greatest problem is that bombing huts and villages will kill civilians and push the population still further toward active support for the Viet Cong.”\textsuperscript{365} Hilsman is widely regarded as a “dove.”

On 25 March 1964, the \textit{New York Times} published a report by Max Frankel, now an editor, with the interesting title: “Stomping on U.S. Toes: Cambodia Typical of Many Small Nations Putting Strain on a Policy of Patience.” What aroused Frankel’s ire was that Cambodia had “borrowed a leaf from Fidel Castro’s book and demanded tractors and bulldozers as compensation for the killing of Cambodians by South Vietnamese in a frontier attack.” He is referring to the Cambodian response to a Vietnamese ground and air attack on a Cambodian village in which they were accompanied by U.S. advisers. A U.S. Army pilot “was dragged from the wreckage” of an L-19 observer plane “shot down in the action,” and “diplomats who rushed to the scene confirmed Cambodian
reports that at least one troop-carrying helicopter had landed at Chantrea with three Americans on board.” The Cambodian village of Chantrea was bombed and attacked by 12 armored cars, according to Cambodian sources; seventeen persons were reported killed and 13 injured. It was not the attack, but Cambodia’s response that enraged Frankel, who explains as follows:

It is open season again for the weaker nations to stomp on the toes of big ones...Leading the pack in big-power baiting these days is one of the smallest of nations, the Southeast Asian kingdom of Cambodia...What Cambodia is up to seems to turn on what Cambodia’s young leader, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, is up to. Washington has always regarded the 41-year-old Premier-Prince as a clever, headstrong, erratic leader who wishes to serve his people, defend their independence and develop their resources. It has also found him lacking some of the talent and temperament for the job...For the most part, the Administration’s instinct has been to try to save a wayward young nation’s independence in spite of itself and, at times, despite its own leaders. Officials remark privately that Indonesia is more important than Sukarno, Ghana more important than Nkrumah, Cambodia more important than Sihanouk.

But now Washington is “not only alarmed and saddened, but confused.” Of course, “Cambodia’s current effort to force the United States into a major conference that would embarrass its Thai and Vietnamese friends will be resisted”; the reference is to a conference that would settle border questions and guarantee Cambodia’s neutrality and integrity in a period when the United States was desperately seeking to undermine international efforts to neutralize South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia so as to avert the major war towards which the United States was clearly driving. But what was most irritating was the Cambodian effort to “stomp on U.S. toes” by asking for reparations after a village was attacked by forces trained, supplied and advised by the United States, and accompanied by U.S military advisers and aircraft. It was this unmitigated gall that was trying the patience of the U.S. government while calling forth a reaction in the New York Times
that is remarkable as much for the paternalism and racism of its style, so typical of the annals of colonialism, as for the response to the actual events discussed.

In his rather sketchy historical review, Ponchaud passes over all of these events of the 1950’s and 1960’s in silence. His only comment is that the “Vietnamese revolutionaries were becoming a real menace to Cambodia,” hardly an adequate summary. He says that “in his desire to stop the infiltration along Cambodia’s borders, [Sihanouk] disclosed the location of Vietcong bases, which were then bombed by the American air force. He called it a scandal and a crime over Radio Phnom Penh, but nobody was deceived”; the reference is to the 1969 bombings. Actually, Ponchaud is deceived. Keeping strictly to the position of U.S. propaganda, he fails to indicate that Sihanouk vigorously and publicly denounced the bombing of Khmer peasants. Turning to the March 1970 coup, Ponchaud has little to say about the background. His few comments are, furthermore, inconsistent: the coup was “presumably backed by the Americans” and “the United States was not sure what attitude to adopt in the Cambodian crisis. Sihanouk’s downfall was bad news...” The first of these two contradictory claims seems to us the more likely correct, given what little evidence is available, but Ponchaud does not pursue the issue—a rather important one. He makes no mention of US-ARVN military intervention from two days after the coup of March 18. As for the “incursion” of April 30, he says only that the South Vietnamese took advantage of it to avenge the murder of Vietnamese by the Lon Nol government: “their savagery drove a number of Cambodian peasants over to the Khmer Rouge.” Not a word about the savagery of the U.S. attack, which was amply reported at the time. Ponchaud asserts that the North Vietnamese “[swept] up young Khmers to be trained in revolutionary warfare,” ignoring entirely the eyewitness reports by U.S. correspondents in captivity that the U.S. bombing was recruiting Khmers, both young and old, to the Khmer Rouge. Pomonti-Thion remark appropriately that “the mechanism by which American bombs create resistance is too well known for us to describe here.”

With regard to the war in Vietnam, Ponchaud also keeps closely to the U.S. government propaganda line in his scattered
remarks. Discussing the “North Vietnamese” withdrawal from Cambodia by 1971, he says that they “returned to their conquest of South Vietnam”\textsuperscript{374}—the sole reference to that struggle, astonishing in its misrepresentation of the background that is so well-documented and familiar that we need not elaborate here. Referring to Sihanouk’s attitude towards the struggle in Vietnam, he says that at the time of the Tet offensive, “when he saw how fiercely the population in the south defended itself he wavered, and began to think the north might be defeated.”\textsuperscript{375} Again, an amazing distortion of well-known facts that are easily documented from U.S. government sources. There is overwhelming evidence from these sources and elsewhere that the Tet offensive was primarily a struggle between the U.S. Army and South Vietnamese guerrillas—indeed, the fact is not seriously disputed. In the Mekong Delta, for example, where some of the fiercest battles were waged, there were no North Vietnamese regular forces, and in fact the total number of North Vietnamese who had been drawn into the war by the U.S. bombardment of North Vietnam (exactly as planners anticipated) was at approximately the level of the South Korean and Thai mercenaries at that point, vastly outnumbered (and even more vastly outgunned) by the U.S. Expeditionary Force that had for years been attempting to conquer South Vietnam and to destroy the society in which the indigenous revolt was rooted. Furthermore, during the Tet offensive, the U.S. military continually lamented their difficulties in encouraging ARVN to reenter the countryside, particularly in the Delta. To describe the Tet offensive in Ponchaud’s terms is a gross falsification and a remarkable capitulation to the U.S. propaganda machine.

Such examples as these do not increase one’s faith in the veracity of material that is not subject to independent confirmation, to say the least, and should alert any serious reviewer. We have seen no mention of any of this in a single review or comment.

 Turning to material that is closer to the focus of Ponchaud’s book, as in the case of Barron-Paul, the only section subject to independent verification is the one dealing with the evacuation of Phnom Penh. Here too serious questions arise. We have already noted how severely Ponchaud’s account was distorted by Donald Wise in a review.\textsuperscript{376} Turning to his own account, there are many dubious elements. Thus Ponchaud reports the explanation given
by the revolutionary government: that the evacuation was motivated in part by impending famine. He rejects this argument on the grounds that rice stocks in Phnom Penh would have sufficed for two months for a large part of the population with careful rationing. The book cites none of the evidence from Lon Nol and U.S. government sources that gives radically smaller estimates, namely 6-8 days supply, one of the many cases where the lack of documentation in the book conceals a rather casual attitude towards crucial facts. We questioned Ponchaud's two-month estimate in our review already cited. In a letter in response, Ponchaud informed us that his estimate included food illegally stored and "may be somewhat excessive"; he also suggests that the 8-day estimate of the Lon Nol government may have been exaggerated in an effort to obtain more aid, which is possible, though their demand at the time was primarily for arms rather than "humanitarian assistance," and in any event that still leaves the estimate of USAID officials that there was only a six-day supply of rice. Even if Ponchaud's possibly "excessive" two-month estimate were correct, it remains unclear how famine could have been averted after two months had the cities not been evacuated, though the methods were extremely brutal, judging by most of the eyewitness accounts. As we have already noted, sources in or close to the U.S. government concur.

On the question of whether the atrocities in Cambodia, which Ponchaud graphically records from the testimony of refugees, were the result of a centralized policy of massacre or were rather, as many close observers suspect, in significant measure the result of localized peasant revenge and the acts of undisciplined troops, Ponchaud comes down squarely on the side of systematic and centralized policy:

The liquidation of all town and former authorities was not improvised, nor was it a reprisal or expression of wanton cruelty on the part of local cadres. The scenario for every town and village in the country was the same and followed exact instructions issued by the highest authorities.

And elsewhere, after reporting a refugee account of the massacre of officers and sick or invalid soldiers, he writes: "So many accounts contain similar statements that it can safely be affirmed
that the revolutionaries had simply decided to kill off the bulk of the former civilian and military establishment in the hours following the capture of Phnom Penh.”

One may, perhaps, be skeptical that Ponchaud has reviewed the scenario “for every town and village in the country” as is claimed in the cited remark. As for the “exact instructions issued by the highest authorities,” this is presumably his reconstruction from the alleged similarity of refugee accounts—he offers no direct evidence—and is as trustworthy as these accounts, his report of them, his interpretations of what he reports, and his judgment about the similarity of accounts of which, naturally, he can offer only a sample. The cautious reader, bearing in mind the serious inaccuracies of his quotes and citations where they can be checked and his careless treatment of historical fact, may want to reserve judgment on the question at issue. Ponchaud’s own conclusions, it is by now clear, cannot be taken very seriously because he is simply too careless and untrustworthy. It is hardly in doubt that work of this calibre would be dismissed out of hand, if it were critical of the United States.

It is also worth recalling in this connection that according to published refugee testimony that Ponchaud does not cite, executions had been ordered halted by mid-1975, though we do not know how reliable this testimony is, or, if reliable, whether such orders were observed or changed. As for the similarity of refugee accounts, we have already noted reasons for skepticism. Other Cambodia watchers and scholars who have visited refugee camps and interviewed refugees have expressed different judgments, and we have cited a few examples that have been generally ignored by the media that also raise questions. Ponchaud himself naturally gives only a sample of the accounts he has assembled. Even the examples he cites do not substantiate his firm conviction that central direction rather than localized cruelty or revenge has been clearly established. To mention a few examples, he cites a Khmer pharmacist who escaped in June 1975—that is, well after “the revolutionaries had simply decided to kill off the bulk of the former civilian and military establishment in the hours following the capture of Phnom Penh”—who reports: “The attitudes of the Khmer Rouge varied enormously from one to the next, and we got the impression that their orders were not very specific.” Later he is
quoted as saying: “You had to understand [the villagers]; they had suffered a lot from the government air force. Several people in every family had been killed in the bombardments.”

Perhaps this observation, far from unique, accounts for some of the subsequent killing and oppression. The same pharmacist speaks of the unaccustomed hard work and lack of food, concluding: “The Khmer Rouge were decent enough but if anyone resisted them or didn’t obey at once, it meant death.”

In his *Le Monde* articles, Ponchaud was less certain about the alleged “central direction.” Here he writes of the Khmer Rouge cadres that “it is difficult to know whether they receive orders coming from the government or whether they act on their personal initiative.” In general these articles give the same account as the book, though obviously in less detail. What did Ponchaud learn in the interim that caused him to change his mind on this crucial point?

In other connections too Ponchaud refers to diversity of policy. On the matter of “marriage customs,” the subject of much denunciation in the Western press, Ponchaud writes that “refugees’ accounts differ widely on this point, presumably because of variations in regional practice.” And on revenge as a possible factor for killings, he observes that during the Samlaut *jacquerie* of the late 1960s the police and military

were heavy-handed, killing many villagers and burning their homes. The population fled into the forest, with intensified loathing for the unjust administration that was leaving a trail of death wherever it went...when the Samlaut peasants took to the mountains [in 1968], they were firmly resolved to pay back a hundredfold the evil that had been done to them.

Recall again that this was one of the areas where the worst atrocities were later reported, and where Khmer Rouge control is said to have been very limited.

Such examples as these, which can readily be supplemented from the literature, raise serious questions about Ponchaud’s certainty with regard to the central direction of the massacres. There seems ample evidence that other factors—peasant revenge, for one—were involved, and it seems to us far from clear, on the
evidence that he and others put forward, that practices were as uniform as he claims. We note once again that not one single reviewer or other commentator in the mainstream press, to our knowledge, has expressed any skepticism about these conclusions, and some have elaborated them considerably, e.g., Lacouture, who informs us that the group of intellectuals who proclaim their Marxist ideology as they lead the country to ruin are systematically massacring and starving the population and that the "auto-genocide" of the new rulers shows us that we were wrong when we thought that Auschwitz and the Gulag were "the ultimate in horror." Ponchaud's reference to Lacouture's review expresses no reservations on these or other conclusions, so we may perhaps assume that he regards them as justified. They go far beyond any evidence that he presents (and as noted, are in part inconsistent with this evidence) and are subject to serious question in the light of other evidence to which he does not refer.

In the author's note to the American translation, Ponchaud writes: "I am an exegete by training and profession; I have long been accustomed to applying the methods of source criticism to a body of reported events in order to elicit the historical truth from them."389 This self-characterization hardly seems appropriate to the work we have been discussing, with its carelessness with regard to quotes, numbers, and sources. We have ourselves been led to undertake some unexpected exegesis in comparing the various texts that Ponchaud has produced: the _Le Monde_ articles and the French book; the French original and the American and British translations; the _Prachachat_ article and Ponchaud's severely distorted version of its contents. The discrepancies between the British and American translations deserve a further look, as we try to assess the credibility of the unverifiable material that constitutes the bulk of Ponchaud's case.

We have noted several discrepancies between the British and the American translations. In each case, the British translation remains true to the French original whereas the American translation introduces changes that are not trivial, in the light of the way in which the material deleted or modified has been exploited in the international condemnation of the Khmer Rouge. It is a little strange, to begin with, that there should be these discrepancies. None are indicated. There is a single translator:
Nancy Amphoux. The author’s notes for the two translations are dated on the very same day: September 20, 1977, Paris. Presumably they were written at the same time. Why then should the two translations differ? The differences are systematic: where a question was raised about the French text in the course of the effort to trace Lacouture’s references, the American translation has been modified while the British translation has been left as in the original. We note, finally, that the queries were raised in the United States, and that by an international trade agreement the British translation cannot be purchased in the United States and will not be found in U.S. libraries; the British version is the world edition. Perhaps it is worthwhile to undertake a more systematic review of the discrepancies, in an effort to understand just what is going on.

To review so far, we have noted the following examples:

(1) The British translation includes (in the text, and as modified by Lacouture, on the cover) the alleged quote: “One or two million young people are enough to make the new Kampuchea” (Ponchaud’s revision of his Le Monde citation) and the appended statement that the Khmer Rouge are “now grimly turning” this “blood-chilling boast...into a reality.” All of this is eliminated from the American translation.

(2) The “quote” that is described as an official text by Lacouture, namely, that “their line must be annihilated down to the last survivor,” has been softened to a “recurrent theme” of refugee reports without quotes in the American translation, but left in quotes as a “leitmotiv of justification” in the British version, as in the French.

(3) With reference to the Thai journal Prachachat, the American translation indicates correctly that there was no interview in the paper with a Khmer Rouge official, as both the French and British versions assert, but rather that such an interview was “cited” in the journal, which gave a second-hand report. Furthermore, the American translation deletes the final ironic comment about the “Great Leap Forward,” again softening the impact, while the British version keeps it. We emphasize again that these discrepancies are insignificant in comparison to the
gross distortion of the Thai original and the crucial omission of relevant context that remains in the French original and both translations, and is further distorted in Lacouture’s review, where it reached a general audience.392

(4) There is a further striking case in which the American and British translations diverge, in perhaps a still more curious way. Recall that the author’s notes for the English and American translations are dated on the same day and are translated by the same person. They are also largely identical, but not entirely. The American version begins as follows:

On March 31, 1977, The New York Review of Books published an account of my book under the signature of Jean Lacouture, which provoked considerable reaction in all circles concerned about Asia and the future of socialism. With the responsible attitude and precision of thought that are so characteristic of him, Noam Chomsky then embarked on a polemical exchange with Robert Silvers, Editor of the NYR, and with Jean Lacouture, leading to the publication by the latter of a rectification of his initial account. Mr. Chomsky was of the opinion that Jean Lacouture had substantially distorted the evidence I had offered, and, considering my book to be “serious and worth reading, as distinct from much of the commentary it has elicited” [reference to the review cited in note 100], he wrote me a personal letter on October 19, 1977 in which he drew my attention to the way it was being misused by anti-revolutionary propagandists...

The British version, dated the same day, begins as follows:

Even before this book was translated it was sharply criticized by Mr Noam Chomsky [reference to correspondence with Silvers and the review cited in note 100] and Mr Gareth Porter [reference to May Hearings]. These two “experts” on Asia claim that I am mistakenly trying to convince people that Cambodia was drowned in a sea of blood after the departure of the last American diplomats. They say there have been no massacres, and they lay the blame for the tragedy of the Khmer people on the
American bombings. They accuse me of being insufficiently critical in my approach to the refugees’ accounts. For them, refugees are not a valid source...

The British version then includes the following passage:

After an investigation of this kind, it is surprising to see that “experts” who have spoken to few if any of the Khmer refugees should reject their very significant place in any study of modern Cambodia. These experts would rather base their arguments on reasoning: if something seems impossible to their personal logic, then it doesn’t exist. Their only sources for evaluation are deliberately chosen official statements. Where is that critical approach which they accuse others of not having?

None of this appears in the American version.

The contrast between these two texts, both dated September 20, 1977, is quite striking. Our favorable reference to Ponchaud’s book in the American version becomes a sharp attack in the British version. The “responsible attitude and precision of thought” that receive such fulsome praise in the American version become complete irrationality, refusal to consider evidence, blind dogmatism, lack of any critical approach, and faked “expertise” in the simultaneous British version.

The accusations in the British version are false, and Ponchaud knows very well that they are false, as is sufficiently clear from the American version penned—it appears—on the same day. Far from saying that “there have been no massacres,” we wrote in the article to which he refers that there undoubtedly had been massacres though their scope and character were subject to debate, which we briefly reviewed, including Ponchaud’s “grisly account of what refugees have reported to him about the barbarity of their treatment at the hands of the Khmer Rouge” in a book that we described as “serious and worth reading.” We concluded that “we do not pretend to know where the truth lies amidst these sharply conflicting assessments,” all of which, incidentally, assume substantial atrocities and thousands or more killed. As for Porter, in the reference that Ponchaud cites he begins by writing: “There were undoubtedly large numbers of killings in the newly-liberated
areas immediately after the war by soldiers of the victorious army..." and "it may well be true" that there were summary executions by local officials, though "an adequate picture" will be impossible to construct for many years. Ponchaud's statement that according to Chomsky and Porter "refugees are not a valid source" is also an outright falsehood, as he knows perfectly well. In the reference Ponchaud cites, we wrote: "While [refugee] reports must be considered seriously, care and caution are necessary"; exactly his own explicit conclusion in the book, as we have seen. Porter takes the same position: after giving examples to illustrate the care that must be taken with refugee reports, he writes, in the very reference that Ponchaud cites: "This does not mean that refugee accounts are always false or even grossly exaggerated. But in judging the credibility of assertion based on a refugee report, one should take into account..."—then follow considerations that would be second nature to any serious journalist or scholar. Ponchaud's final remarks merit no comment, though they give some further insight into his reliability and precision.393

This comparison, which strikes us as quite remarkable, explains why the editors of the Economist were misled into writing that Ponchaud "forthrightly included some of the main attacks as a footnote to the English-language preface,"394 referring to our review which described the book as "serious and worth reading," and thus hardly qualifies as an "attack"—recall Ponchaud's citation in the American edition. They were, of course, reviewing the British edition, and naively trusted the author, in this respect as in others. Further questions remain unexplained. Why the stream of falsehoods, surely known to the author to be false, in the British edition, replaced in the simultaneous American edition by a show of courtesy and praise? We note again that the British edition is not obtainable through commercial channels in the United States and is not to be found in American libraries, while conversely, readers of the British edition are unlikely to be familiar with the references to U.S. publications that Ponchaud cites in his series of false accusations.

This kind of petty deceit is unworthy of discussion except insofar as it provides some indication of the credibility of a person who is building a case on largely unverifiable evidence. That issue is important, given the enormous impact of his work and its effect,
as it has been amplified through the international propaganda system, in reconstructing attitudes and ideology in the West.

We gain some further insight into Ponchaud’s scholarly practice by looking at subsequent translations of his book. The Norwegian translation contains reference to events of May, 1978, and therefore evidently went to press long after the British and American translations were completed, indeed after they had appeared. The material deleted or modified in the American translation appears in the Norwegian translation, as it did in the French original and the British translation. Evidently, it is only the reader in the United States who is to be spared the material that has been questioned in the United States, and that Ponchaud knows to be indefensible.

In a review of Ponchaud’s book that is fairer than most, William Shawcross writes that “Chomsky has pointed out some inconsistencies and mistakes in Ponchaud’s book” (referring, presumably, to private correspondence and our published review), “but they are of a minor nature and do not in any way affect that judgment.” The judgment to which he refers is Ponchaud’s comment in the author’s note to the American translation, which reads: “I was compelled to conclude [in the book], against my will, that the Khmer revolution is irrefutably the bloodiest of our century. A year after the publication of my book I can unfortunately find no reason to alter my judgment.” The evil demon that bedevils quotations about Cambodia has been at work once again. We are, by now, perhaps not surprised to discover that Ponchaud has misrepresented himself. The conclusion stated in the book is not, as he alleges in the author’s note, that the Khmer revolution “is irrefutably the bloodiest of our century” but rather a distinctly different one: “the Khmer revolution is one of the bloodiest of the twentieth century.” Actually, we concur with the judgment expressed in the book itself (“one of the bloodiest”), although we feel that the context requires immediate complementary mention—lacking in Ponchaud’s book—of the no less bloody U.S.-sponsored counter-revolution and direct assault that precipitated the bloody revolution. Shawcross seems to be implying that we do not concur with the judgment in the book, why, we have no idea; certainly not on the basis of anything we have written.
As for the inconsistencies and mistakes in Ponchau d's book, how seriously one takes them is, of course, a matter of judgment. While we find the conclusion in the book itself valid enough—and are indeed unaware of any contrary view—we want to point out the fallacy of reasoning that leads Shawcross to accept Ponchau d's misrepresentation of the conclusion of his book. The fact is that Ponchau d's book is highly unreliable where an independent check is possible. It is also true that the errors are "of a minor nature" as compared with the bulk of the evidence he presents: unverifiable refugee reports. As we have further noted, even these reports, on which he relies, do not support his unqualified conclusions on the serious question of central direction and planning of atrocities,\(^399\) and the material that has proven unreliable plays a large role in his argument for central direction and intent. We stress again that it is the verifiable evidence, of however minor a nature it may be, that determines how much faith a rational person will place in material that is subject to no check. This point Shawcross seems to have missed.

In his author's note for the American translation, Ponchaud writes that although "we, the French and the Americans, bear part of the responsibility for the Cambodian drama," nevertheless "we cannot make use of the deaths of millions of Khmers to defend our own theories or projects for society," referring to unnamed "accusing foreigners."\(^400\) Shawcross ends his review with the second of these statements and then adds: "In fact, of course, it can be and is being done." Shawcross does not say who is "of course" making use of the deaths of millions of Khmers to defend their own theories or projects for society, nor does Ponchau d tell us who are those "accusing foreigners" to whom his injunction is directed. The lapse is not accidental.\(^401\) It would be difficult indeed to find anyone \textit{defending the Khmer Rouge} (as distinct from those who exploit and magnify Cambodian atrocities to demonstrate the evils of Communism or liberation) whom this description fits.

The logic should be carefully considered. Shawcross's statement is a plain falsehood and Ponchau d's comment on which it is based is at best seriously misleading, with a presupposition that is plainly false.\(^402\) There are, to be sure, people who are skeptical of the implicit claim that "millions of Khmers" have died as a result of
the policies of the regime—surely nothing that Ponchaud reports substantiates this estimate, which is in fact far higher even than his own assessment of casualties, as we have noted. There are other people, though they are few indeed, who have defended the Khmer revolution on the basis of their own "theories or projects for society." We know of few people, in fact, who have offered more positive comments than Ponchaud himself does, in his discussion of the emphasis on self-reliance, the dignity of labor, the "new mentality" with its "spirit of responsibility" and "inventiveness," etc. But to fall under Ponchaud's injunction or Shawcross's obviously false claim, a person would have to both agree that millions have died at the hands of the regime and justify this fact on the grounds of his social theories. We seriously doubt that any such person exists. All of this is simply another of the desperate efforts to create an opposition, which we have observed throughout this review.

In fact, there is a different interpretation of Ponchaud's comment and Shawcross's elaboration which can be justified, though one at variance with their intention. There are indeed people—a great many of them—who claim that millions have died (or have been killed) in Cambodia and who are making use of this alleged fact to defend their own theories and projects for society. It is, in fact, one of our main themes that the mass media of the West have discovered Cambodia's travail (previously ignored, understated or suppressed when the direct responsibility was incontestably Western) precisely because of its ideological serviceability. The populace of the West can be mobilized to fear the consequences of "radicalism," attention can be diverted from the proliferating terror within the U.S. sphere, and the case can be reaffirmed that the West must be prepared to intervene to prevent such awful events as the removal of some "gentle land" from the Free World.

Returning to Ponchaud's book, despite flaws that seem to us quite significant, we still believe, as we wrote in the earlier review cited, that it is "serious and worth reading, as distinct from much of the commentary it has elicited" and as distinct from propaganda tracts such as Barron-Paul which have aroused general enthusiasm in the West, for reasons that are all too obvious. A fair review of
informed opinion about postwar Cambodia would, in our opinion, include this book as a serious though also seriously flawed and obviously unreliable contribution, in some (but not all) respects, to be placed at the more extreme critical end of the spectrum of specialist judgment and analysis. Such a review would not, however, single this book out (still less, Barron-Paul) as the repository of unchallenged truth, as the media coverage generally suggests. In fact, as we have seen, insofar as its statements cannot be independently verified, they should be regarded with a degree of skepticism, given the fate of those examples that are subject to independent verification.

It is noteworthy that not only the media but also governments appear to have relied uncritically on Ponchaud, despite his evident unreliability. A British government report, released by the Foreign Office, stated that “many hundreds of thousands of people have perished in Cambodia directly or indirectly as a result of the policies of the Communist government,” according to the press summary. The Foreign Office report cited ‘reputable observers’ for this estimate.” Only one such observer is cited in the Post account: “Father Francois Ponchaud, a French authority on Cambodia.” A careful look at Ponchaud’s work—specifically, his way with figures (his estimates are cited by the Foreign Office)—shows that it must be regarded with considerable caution; it is at best suggestive, hardly authoritative. If the press account of the British government report is accurate, proper caution was not taken, though an analysis of Ponchaud’s work should not have been beyond the resources of the British Foreign Office, had it been concerned with finding the truth.

To complete the review of books about postwar Cambodia, we should mention briefly a third—actually the first to appear—namely the Hildebrand-Porter study to which we have referred several times. This book differs from the later studies by Ponchaud and Barron-Paul in a number of respects: (1) it is virtually unread (by mid-1977, when we discussed it in the cited review, it had sold about 1,000 copies); (2) it has been almost entirely ignored by reviewers and political commentators apart from occasional abuse; (3) it is carefully documented from Western and Cambodian sources. Factors (1) and (2) are explained by a fourth striking difference: this book gives a rather favorable account of Khmer Rouge programs and a detailed
picture of the impact of the U.S. war—a continuing impact, as the authors show. The fourth factor alone suffices to eliminate it from the record, whatever its merits or deficiencies. Published in 1976, the book was well received by the journal of the Asia Society.406 In Choice407 it is described, in a brief note, as “A rare combination of humanitarianism and scholarly research.” Apart from these notices, the book has to our knowledge been reviewed only in our 1977 Nation article (very briefly) and in the New York Review by Shawcross a year later,408 where its “use of evidence” was challenged in the manner we described. It has not been used as the basis for editorial comment, with one exception. The Wall Street Journal acknowledged its existence in an editorial entitled “Cambodian Good Guys,”409 which dismissed contemptuously the very idea that the Khmer Rouge could play a constructive role, as well as the notion that the United States had a major hand in the destruction, death, and turmoil of wartime and postwar Cambodia. In another editorial on the “Cambodian Horror,” the Journal editors speak of the attribution of postwar Cambodian difficulties to U.S. intervention as “the record extension to date of the politics of guilt.”410 On the subject of “unscrambling Chile,” however, the abuses of the “manfully rebuilding” Chilean police state are explained away as an unfortunate consequence of Allendista “wrecking” of the economy.411 In brief, Hildebrand and Porter attribute “wrecking” and “rebuilding” to the wrong parties in Cambodia.

In his foreword to the book, Asian scholar George Kahin of Cornell University observes that

in their documented and comprehensive account, George Hildebrand and Gareth Porter provide what is undoubtedly the best informed and clearest picture yet to emerge of the desperate economic problems brought about in Cambodia largely as a consequence of American intervention, and of the ways in which that country’s new leadership has undertaken to meet them...Anyone who is interested in understanding the situation obtaining in Phnom Penh before and after the Lon Nol government’s collapse and the character and programs of the Cambodian government that has replaced it will, I am sure, be grateful to the authors of this valuable study.
The Free Press, however, is not grateful for an account of the results of the U.S. intervention or the efforts to overcome them, and has shielded the general public from any perception of postwar Cambodia that focuses on these issues.

Since this book does not form part of the media barrage concerning what must be believed about postwar Cambodia, we will not subject it to any further analysis, given our specific concerns here.

It is difficult to convey properly the deep cynicism of the all-too-typical reporting that obscures or completely eliminates the U.S. role in turning Cambodia into a land of massacre, starvation, and disease. While journalists prate about morality, people are dying in Cambodia as a direct result of policies that many of them supported and concealed, and now eliminate from history. It is hardly in doubt that the malnutrition and disease caused by the U.S. war, not to speak of the legacy of hatred and revenge, will have lasting effects upon this “lovely land” with its “engaging people.”

It is difficult to conjure up in the imagination a statement from a Cambodian source that would not have served as proof of Communist iniquity as it entered the U.S. propaganda system. On the anniversary of the Khmer Rouge victory, Khieu Samphan gave a talk over Phnom Penh radio in which he said that agricultural production had improved and people now get enough to eat “to take care of their health and fatten them up.” How was this received and interpreted in the United States? An AP dispatch from Bangkok cites this comment, adding that he “made no reference to the starvation, disease and widespread executions reported by many Cambodian refugees. But he admitted that the country...had ‘suffered untold difficulties’ since the Communist victory.” The reader is presumably to conclude that this “admission” of untold difficulties such as starvation and disease supports the charges against the Communist regime. And just this conclusion is drawn by the Christian Science Monitor in the editorial on Cambodia already cited: “Reading between the lines is illuminating,” the editors inform us, repeating the wording of the AP dispatch and commenting: “All this calculated mistreatment of a people in order to make a nation self-sufficient ought not to go unnoticed...” Presumably, they prefer the situation in Laos
where the United States withholds all but a trickle of aid in the face of overwhelming disaster,⁴¹⁵ or Vietnam where the refusal is total and even initiatives to normalize relations have been rebuffed by the United States. Recall the widespread acknowledgement that the new regime had considerable, perhaps “spectacular” success in overcoming the food crisis caused by U.S. bombing, considerably more so than the other countries of Indochina. It was hardly irrational for the Cambodian regime to suppose that the United States would leave the country to starve after destroying its agricultural system. If the New York Times, the Christian Science Monitor, and the media in general were expressing any human concern, instead of simply grasping at any straw to find a way to denounce an official enemy, they would be in the forefront of the drive to bring the U.S. government to alter radically its inhuman policy of withholding sustenance from the countries it has destroyed, instead of gloating over the suffering of our victims in one of the most hypocritical displays in modern history.

Bertrand Russell was one of the early critics of Bolshevism after a visit to Russia in 1920. But he also had this to say:

Every failure of industry, every tyrannous regulation brought about by the desperate situation, is used by the Entente as a justification of its policy. If a man is deprived of food and drink, he will grow weak, lose his reason, and finally die. This is not usually considered a good reason for inflicting death by starvation. But where nations are concerned, the weakness and struggles are regarded as morally culpable and are held to justify further punishment...Is it surprising that professions of humanitarian feeling of the part of the English people are somewhat coldly received in Soviet Russia?⁴¹⁶

Similarly, when poor peasants are driven into the jungle from villages destroyed by bombing, they may seek revenge. How much more apt are Russell’s words when applied to the United States, which bears direct responsibility for bitter suffering throughout Indochina and now refuses to aid the victims because they do not meet its finely discriminating standards of human rights. It would require at least the talents of a Jonathan Swift to do justice to this scene.
To appreciate fully the cynicism of the press and editorial comments, it is necessary to recall the role of the U.S. mass media in supporting the “secret war” against Cambodia. Prior to the Nixon-Kissinger administration, Cambodia had been subjected to U.S. or U.S.-supported armed attack and subversion, but not on a regular and systematic basis. The massive assault against Cambodia began with the B-52 operations, initiated, according to the official record, on March 18, 1969. On March 26 the Cambodian government, recognized by the United States, issued statements condemning the bombing and strafing of “the Cambodian population living in the border regions...almost daily by U.S. aircraft,” with increasing numbers of people killed and material destroyed, alleging that these attacks were directed against “peaceful Cambodian farmers” and demanding that “these criminal attacks must immediately and definitively stop...”417 Prince Sihanouk called a press conference on March 28 in which he emphatically denied reports circulating in the United States that he “would not oppose U.S. bombings of communist targets within my frontiers.” He went on to say that Communists are not the only victims; “Unarmed and innocent people have been victims of U.S. bombs,” including “the latest bombing, the victims of which were Khmer peasants, women and children in particular.” He then issued an appeal to the press: “I appeal to you to publicize abroad this very clear stand of Cambodia—that is, I will in any case oppose all bombings on Cambodian territory under whatever pretext.”418

The “secret bombings” continued, along with defoliation attacks for which no agency of the U.S. government has as yet admitted responsibility. On January 3, 1970 the Cambodian government issued an official White Paper giving specific details of U.S. and U.S.-client attacks on Cambodia up to May, 1969 by air, sea and land, with dates, places, specific numbers of casualties, photographs, etc. Occasional cases of U.S. bombing of Cambodian villages (including destruction of well-marked hospitals, bombing of ambulances attempting to retrieve wounded, etc.) became public knowledge when discovered by Americans who happened to be on the scene; the usual technique was for the government to deny these reports, then concede them if American eyewitnesses were found to be present.419 Throughout this period, the press remained virtually silent. Neither Sihanouk’s appeal nor
the official White Paper which documented murderous U.S. government attacks on a "friendly" country were considered worthy of comment by the press; we know of no reference to the White Paper in the mainstream U.S. press, though it was hardly a secret.\textsuperscript{420} The "secret bombings" continued, concealed by the U.S. press which was later to claim that it was Richard Nixon who kept the bombings secret from the press and the U.S. public, thus undermining the foundations of our democracy.\textsuperscript{421}

There was one notable exception, namely, a \textit{New York Times} report by William Beecher which reported B-52 raids on "Vietcong and North Vietnamese supply dumps and base camps in Cambodia," citing U.S. sources and stating falsely that "Cambodia has not made any protest," disregarding Sihanouk's impassioned appeal and his protest against the murder of "Khmer peasants, women and children in particular."\textsuperscript{422} Beecher's report also said that "in the past, American and South Vietnamese forces had occasionally fired across the border and even called in fighters or helicopter gunships to counter fire they received from enemy units there"; not mentioned is the somewhat more important fact that U.S. aircraft attacked Cambodian villages and that according to the "friendly" government of Cambodia, there were such incidents as an attack by U.S., South Vietnamese, and Korean armed forces on a Cambodian village along with aircraft of the same armed forces, after which U.S. and South Vietnamese troops invaded and burnt the villages, among other examples.\textsuperscript{423}

Now the same media that helped conceal these and earlier U.S. attacks on Cambodia, as elsewhere in Indochina, are retrospectively eliminating the U.S. role from history and attributing the consequences of the U.S. attack to its surviving victims.

The peasant army that captured Phnom Penh did not conform to the colonialist cliche. They were not gentle folk with a delightful Khmer smile:

The troops that seized Phnom Penh were dark-skinned peasants. Their close-cropped hair was covered by the traditional checkered peasant headcloth, their uniforms the faded remnants of what had once been olive green fatigues...They neither talked nor smiled. Some appear to
be as old as 25 or 30, but a majority seem to be between 12 and 15 years old...Many had probably never seen a city street or a lawn before. Their appearance was equally shocking to many of the residents of Phnom Penh.424 They had suffered bitterly in a war that had been fought with no quarter. Their enemy was a foreign power that had come to destroy their villages and land, and an urban society, hardly less foreign in their eyes, a colonial implantation that they know only as a murderer and a remote oppressor. In the regions where there had been brutal suppression of peasant revolts, there were many scores to settle. In the dark recesses of peasant life and history, unstudied and unknown beyond, there no doubt lay the roots of many more. The latent conflict was churned to a tempest of violence by the armed might of the United States, striking its savage blows directly or by the hands of its local clients. In Vietnam and Laos, where the circumstances were different though comparable, there appears to have been little murderous vengeance—little, that is, by historical standards. In Cambodia, however, the dark-skinned peasants exacted a fearful toll. Of that, there is little doubt.

Beyond that, evidence is slight and unreliable, and informed opinion ranges over quite a wide spectrum. At one extreme, we find Ponchaud—or rather, several different Ponchauds. One of them estimates “peace deaths” at over a million (including more than 100,000 killed); a second alleges that the Khmer Rouge were making good their formidable boast to eliminate 5 - 7 million people; and a third speaks of “the deaths of millions of Khmers.” He regards it as established that a centralized plan dictated a systematic program of terror, massacre and oppression in every town and village, and apparently accepts Lacouture’s interpretation that a small group of men who proclaim their Marxist ideology were systematically massacring and starving the people of Cambodia.

Across the spectrum opinions vary. Many, including State Department experts, are quite skeptical of a toll of “millions of Khmers”—we wonder, frankly, whether Ponchaud really believes such figures—and offer estimates of killed ranging from “thousands” upwards, with many more deaths from starvation and
disease, though perhaps not the million such deaths predicted by U.S. government sources before the war's end. Many specialists suspect that executions were heavily concentrated in regions of little Khmer Rouge control and unusual peasant discontent and hatred, intensified by war and the U.S. bombings, particularly those of 1973.

There are also varying opinions on the character and effectiveness of Khmer Rouge social and economic programs and the roots of postwar Cambodian society in the traditional culture, Khmer nationalism, and the ideology of the leadership.

We suspect that the main body of informed opinion would accept the tempered comments of such critics of the Khmer Rouge as Charles Meyer that "one should be extremely careful in one's analysis of the politics" of the Khmer Rouge, whose leaders "incarnate really a part of the peasants, who recognized themselves in them," considering carefully such factors as "the weight of the past, the ideology of the leaders, the menaces from outside, and, naturally, the psychological factors as well as the economical, religious and other ones." Informal opinion would also not dispute the judgment of Laura Summers that "...the Khmer revolution is the expression of deep cultural and social malaise unleashed by a sudden and violent foreign assault on the nation's social structure."

If a serious study of the impact of Western imperialism on Cambodian peasant life is someday undertaken, it may well be discovered that the violence lurking behind the Khmer smile, on which Meyer and others have commented, is not a reflection of obscure traits in peasant culture and psychology, but is the direct and understandable response to the violence of the imperial system, and that its current manifestations are a no less direct and understandable response to the still more concentrated and extreme savagery of a U.S. assault that may in part have been designed to evoke this very response, as we have noted. Such a study may also show that the Khmer Rouge programs elicited a positive response from sectors of the Cambodian peasantry because they dealt with fundamental problems rooted in the feudal past and exacerbated by the imperial system with its final outburst of uncontrolled barbarism. Such a study, however, has yet to be undertaken. The West is much more concerned to excise from
history the imperial role and to pretend that the history of contemporary Cambodia begins in April 1975 in a manner that is disconnected from the imperial legacy and must be explained by the lunacy of "nine men at the center" who were systematically massacring and starving the population in a form of "autogenocide" that surpasses the horrors of Nazism.

While many questions remain open about Cambodia during the 1975-78 period that we have reviewed, on another question, the one that primarily concerns us, we feel that the facts are clear and overwhelming. The theory of the Free Press that we have been discussing throughout these two volumes is once again dramatically confirmed. The media, in this case as in others reviewed earlier, are serving in effect as a propaganda agency for the state. It is a fair generalization that the more extreme the condemnation of Cambodia, the more confident the claim that "Communism" lies at the roots of its present travail, the more diminished the U.S. share and responsibility — then the greater the exposure. The nature and quality of the evidence presented is of little moment. It is an astonishing fact that where evidence is subject to some independent check, it repeatedly and with remarkable consistency turns out to be fabricated, misleading, or dubious. Furthermore, exposure of falsehoods and fabrication is dismissed as insignificant and unimportant or is even condemned as apologetics for terror. Known fabrications and material of a most dubious nature continue to be exploited long after exposure. The extreme condemnations that constitute the standard fare in the media rest almost entirely on reports that cannot be checked, transmitted by sources that are revealed to be of extremely low credibility where they are subject to some verification.

Critics are not sent to concentration camps; Western societies are indeed free in this respect. Rather, they are permitted to speak to one another, within tiny circles. Meanwhile an image is concocted of a mighty force that must be vigorously combated by those courageous souls who try to stem the flood of apologetics; or it is claimed, with equal merit, that these lone voices must somehow find a way to penetrate the barriers of silence and unconcern. The propaganda system has been committed to eke what profit it could from the misery of Cambodia. Questions of truth are secondary. The serious moral issues that arise — the issues
of the real locus of responsibility, the obligations to the victims, and the probable human consequences of the media barrage—have been entirely beyond the comprehension or concern of those who preach in the most strident tones of moral obligations. What enters history in the United States (and, we believe, the West generally, though we have not examined the media systematically elsewhere) is a version of the facts that suits the ideological requirements of dominant social groups; other interpretations, whatever their merits, are simply swept aside. The central theme that liberation from Western domination is a fate to be avoided at all costs is constantly and persistently drilled into popular consciousness. So effective is the awesome system of indoctrination and thought control that even many people who have been critics or skeptics are caught up in the well-orchestrated hysteria.

When the facts are in, it may turn out that the more extreme condemnations were in fact correct. But even if that turns out to be the case, it will in no way alter the conclusions we have reached on the central question addressed here: how the available facts were selected, modified, or sometimes invented to create a certain image offered to the general population. The answer to this question seems clear, and it is unaffected by whatever may yet be discovered about Cambodia in the future.

We urge once again that the reader concerned with the workings of Western propaganda compare the treatment of Cambodia—and the other societies of Indochina as well—with the attention given to other cases where the evidence available, the scale and character of the atrocities alleged, and even the time frame is comparable: Timor, for example. We stress again that in the case of Cambodia, as all observers of even moderate seriousness agree, what happened in the 1975-78 period under review, whatever it may have been, lay beyond our control, whereas in the case of Timor and other ongoing benign and constructive bloodbaths, that is far from true. Perhaps evidence will be forthcoming to support the claim of the British Foreign Office that "many hundreds of thousands of people have perished in Cambodia directly or indirectly as a result of the policies of the Communist government," evidence more credible than the material on which they uncritically relied. There is no doubt that many hundreds of thousands, if not millions of people have perished in
other third world countries in the same period as a direct or indirect result of the policies of Western powers, victims of aggression, starvation, disease, hideous conditions of work, death squads, etc. Furthermore, this will continue, with continuing Western responsibility but without government protest or media exposure. The conclusions from such a comparison seem obvious.

Finally, perhaps we should stress some obvious points about what the future may reveal. We speculated in the preface that the Vietnamese invasion may prove disastrous for Cambodia. Any assessment of the resulting conditions should be carefully compared with what visitors observed just prior to the invasion—specifically, with their general assessment that food supplies appeared adequate and that there were certain constructive developments, whatever one may think of the regime. If there is a deterioration in the conditions of Cambodia, this is very likely a consequence of the invasion itself; and here again the Western contribution cannot be ignored, including the special role played by the propaganda hysteria and climate of opinion of 1975-78, discussed at length above. A no less obvious point is that for some time at least, the Vietnamese (like the Pol Pot regime) are likely to permit only a guided and selected view, so that interpretation of any evidence that may become available will necessarily have to be subjected to critical analysis. The media record hardly encourages optimism, in this regard.
CHAPTER 7

Final Comments

We have explored some of the ways in which the propaganda systems of the West, primarily that of the United States, have faced the major tasks noted in chapter 1 of this volume. Not surprisingly, inquiry reveals a highly selective culling of facts and much outright lying. Some areas of the world are almost entirely blacked out, where disclosure of major abuses would disturb both pliable clients and the U.S. economic, military and political interests that find this pliability advantageous. As we have described throughout the two volumes, the first principle of the Free Press is the averting of the eyes from benign or constructive terror, along with a general avoidance of invidious language and a sympathetic understanding for the difficult problems faced by the terrorizing elites backed by the United States. In sharp contrast, countries that ordinarily evoke minimal western interest are thrust into the limelight when "enemy" terror and the evils of Communism can be revealed, and other useful lessons drawn. Thus the second principle of the Free Press is the intense and dedicated search for nefarious terror, which can be brought into focus without giving offense to any important groups and which contributes to domestic ideological mobilization.

Further devices used in handling nefarious terror, as we have described, include the stripping away of historical context, fabrication, and myth creation. Useful myths, once successfully instituted, are virtually immune to correction. In focusing on
refugees fleeing from Indochina and the prevailing harsh conditions there, the western media employ a third principle of the Free Press, namely, "agent transference." That is, the critical role of the United States in maintaining internecine conflict from 1954, and its more direct shattering of the Indochinese societies and their economic foundations, is acknowledged only occasionally and as an afterthought. The only "agents" to whom responsibility is indignantly attributed for the suffering in Indochina are the new regimes that came into power in a presumably normal environment in 1975. Death and suffering from malnutrition and disease in societies brought to ruin by U.S. intervention are displayed as proof of the evil nature of Communism. Meanwhile, in the U.S. sphere of influence working conditions of extraordinary severity, massive dispossession of the peasantry, child labor, near slavery, starvation in the midst of rapid economic "growth," and similar concomitants of development in accord with the Free World model are, if noted at all, dismissed as an unfortunate element of the process of modernization. And the hundreds of thousands of refugees from Latin American subfascism, or the plight of the victims of Indonesian aggression in East Timor or other benign and constructive terror in Southeast Asia and elsewhere, and the causes of their plight, are studiously ignored, in recognition of the friendly client status of the official terrorists and the absence of any useful lessons to be drawn from their depredations.

There are further and more general aims to be served by the extensive effort to dispel what the *Wall Street Journal* calls the "simple-minded myth" that Indochina's suffering is somehow related to U.S. actions over the past thirty years. For the groups that dominate economic, social, political and intellectual life in the United States, it is a matter of urgency to ensure that no serious challenge is raised to their predominant role, either in ideology or in practice. While mild social reforms have been introduced in the United States, others now conventional in Western Europe (e.g., national health insurance, minimal "worker participation" in industry, etc.) have been effectively resisted here, and there has been remarkable success in designing policy so that state intervention in the economy and social life serves the needs of the wealthy and powerful. We have noted that the absence of an organized left opposition in the United States has facilitated the work of the
system of thought control and indoctrination. U.S. ideologists have been unusually successful in conducting "the engineering of consent," a technique of control that substitutes for the use of force in societies with democratic forms.¹ To serve this end, every effort must be made to discredit what is called "socialism" or "communism". In its more vulgar forms, the argument is that "socialism" or "Marxism" (which in practice means unwelcome social reform, since radical institutional change is hardly an immediate issue) leads inevitably to Gulag. The process of agent transference has made more plausible the doctrine that socialism must inevitably become tyranny. A recent media favorite is the group of Paris "new philosophers," whose congenial message that Marxism equals Gulag has assured them a ready and uncritical audience in the United States and Western Europe. In fact, their critique of authoritarian elements in Marxism-Leninism is remarkably shallow as compared with the long tradition of left-wing libertarian thought that has been virtually ignored in the West, and their enormous success in France reflects in part conditions specific to French intellectual life,² but U.S. media have little care or understanding for any of this. The access of this group to the media and the receptivity to their slogans is a perfect counterpart to the curtain of silence drawn over the proliferating Gulags in the U.S. sphere, as well as the agent transference in Indochina.

There is, to be sure, an element of absurdity in the constant refrain that socialism equals Gulag, as revealed by events in the underdeveloped societies. A comparison of the problems facing such societies as Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Cuba, Mozambique, etc., with the situation in the industrial West would simply be ridiculed in societies that were not subjected to such effective ideological control as ours. But despite the inherent absurdity of attributing, say, revenge killings by Cambodian peasants who were bombed out of their homes by Western force to "Marxism" or "atheism," the practice is common and quite successful as a tactic in engineering consent to the priorities and structures of contemporary state capitalism.

In the United States, this tactic has become a virtual reflex. Bolshevik and later Stalinist crimes have regularly been exploited as a weapon against movements seeking reform or revolutionary change. During the Red Scare after World War I, which was quite
effective in controlling labor militancy and eliminating radical intellectual currents, the *Wall Street Journal* wailed: “We talk of parlor Bolsheviks, but what of those other Bolsheviks, in the Cabinet, or at any rate near the throne?” Similar accusations, loosely associating reform Democrats with Stalinist crimes despite the eager and frightened collaboration of many liberals were common during the era mislabelled “McCarthyism”. Harry Truman even denounced the civil rights movement of the 1950s as a Communist plot—conceding, in response to inquiry, that he had no proof, but explaining: “I know that usually when trouble hits the country the Kremlin is behind it.” The 1970s campaign against “Big Government” (understood to cover health and welfare activities but not the police and military establishment) is likewise facilitated by a propaganda barrage carrying the implicit message that “socialism equals Gulag.” In this context, too, it is an effective tactic to focus attention on real or invented atrocities committed in underdeveloped ex-colonies that use the phrase “socialism” in reference to their programs of mass mobilization under authoritarian state control to carry out industrialization and modernization.

One final factor merits a few words of comment. So-called “North-South conflicts” do not necessarily take the form of imperial intervention. At various levels and in a multitude of interactions there is a continuing struggle over access to resources, terms of trade, opportunities for international capital and other problems. A general public mood of hostility to the Third World is useful to the managers of the industrial democracies as they attempt to manipulate these conflicts to their benefit. In contrast, the sympathy towards Third World independence movements that developed during the post-World War II struggles for national liberation, brutally repressed primarily by France and the United States, is an impediment to the imposition of measures that will meet the requirements of the world’s wealthy industrial powers. In this context, it is useful to engender hatred, contempt and moralistic outrage directed against the nationalist movements of the Third World, particularly those that have recently escaped from the domination of the United States. It should hardly come as a surprise, therefore, that a major effort should be directed towards reversing the worldwide currents of sympathy towards the
people of Indochina that were aroused by the assault of the U.S. war machine. That struggle came to be perceived as symbolic of the conflicts between the industrialized West and the former colonial domains, and it imposed barriers to the mobilization of public support for the traditional measures that may be required to preserve a favorable investment climate in the coming era.

These remarks bear directly on the framework of Western propaganda. They do not touch another and very different question: how should one evaluate the programs and character of the countries that have been liberated from Western domination, or respond to developments there? Our primary concern here has been U.S. global policy and propaganda, and the filtering and distorting effect of Western ideology, not the problems of reconstruction and modernization in societies that have been victimized by Western imperialism. Correspondingly, we have not developed or expressed our views here on the nature of the Indochinese regimes. To assess the contemporary situation in Indochina and the programs of the current ruling groups is a worthwhile endeavor, but it has not been our objective.

As for appropriate response, its central component in the current situation should be a committed and very substantial effort to help the victims, insofar as this is possible: those who are oppressed, those who have fled, those who are seeking to reconstruct some kind of viable existence from the wreckage. Such response is not to be discerned among the dominant classes and states of either East or West.

There is no single cause for the misery and oppression that we find in every part of the world. But there are some major causes, and some of these are close at hand and subject to our influence and, ultimately, our control. These factors and the social matrix in which they are embedded will engage the concern and efforts of people who are honestly committed to alleviate human suffering and to contribute to freedom and justice.

The success of the Free Press in reconstructing imperial ideology since the U.S. withdrawal from Indochina has been spectacular. The shift of the United States from causal agent to concerned bystander—and even to leader in the world struggle for human rights—in the face of its empire of client fascism and long, vicious assault on the peasant societies of Indochina, is a
remarkable achievement. The system of brainwashing under freedom, with mass media voluntary self-censorship in accord with the larger interests of the state, has worked brilliantly. The new propaganda line has been established by endless repetition of the Big Distortions and negligible grant of access to non-establishment points of view; all rendered more effective by the illusion of equal access and the free flow of ideas. U.S. dissenters can produce their Samizdats freely, and stay out of jail, but they do not reach the general public or the Free Press except on an episodic basis. This reflects the power and interests that benefit from the uncontrolled arms race, the status quo of domestic economic arrangements, and the external system of multinational expansion and collaboration with the Shahs, Suhartos, Marcos's in the contemporary "development" and sacking of the Third World. Change will come only when material facts arouse sufficient numbers to force a reassessment of policy. At the present time, the machine expands, the mass media adapt to the political economy, and human rights are set aside except in rhetorical flourishes useful for ideological reconstruction.
The editorial is about what one would expect in a journal that not long ago was featuring discussions by one of its saner commentators (Joseph Harsch) on the relative merits of bombing trucks and dams (the latter so much more satisfying to the pilots, who come home "with a feeling of accomplishment" when they see the waters "pour through the breach and drown out huge areas of farm land, and villages, in its path" and so much more effective in "hurt[ing] people"). For lengthy quotes, see *American Power and the New Mandarins*, p. 14; for analogies, see the Nazi archives.

119. It is less appropriate, however, to ignore the subsequent discussion in *Le Monde*, including the reply of the Vietnamese Ambassador to France, November 10. See the extensive discussion and analysis in *Vietnam South East Asia International*.


121. See chapter 5, note 12.


124. Cf. Chomsky, *American Power and the New Mandarins*, pp. 249, 285. Other comparable examples of effective press self-censorship are reported there. In most of the cases mentioned, including the ones we cite here, much effort was expended in trying to convince the media to publish the facts, with no success.

125. For a comparable example, see chapter 6, note 102.

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5 Laos

1. See Bernard Fall, *Anatomy of a Crisis: The Laotian Crisis of 1960-61*, Doubleday, 1969, for a detailed exposure of some of the more ludicrous incidents in the early phases of the U.S. war; this exposure, like others, had no detectable effect on subsequent reporting.

2. See the reports by Henry Kamm in the *New York Times*, cited below; or for example a Sunday feature story by Ogden Williams, "The Tragic Plight of our Abandoned Allies," *Washington Post* (24 September 1978). Williams is identified as a former CIA officer who also worked with USAID in Vietnam—quite possibly, a distinction without a difference in this case, since as was finally conceded in public, the aid program, in Laos at least, was providing a CIA cover from 1962. He claims that the Meo army organized by the CIA was tying up two divisions of North Vietnamese regulars in Laos. Comparable claims are common, but tend to evaporate on investigation; cf. the references of footnote 4 for detailed analyses. Sources close to the U.S. government estimate perhaps one combat regiment of North Vietnamese soldiers in northern Laos, where the CIA army was fighting, in 1968.

4. For a detailed analysis of the material just briefly reviewed, see N. Chomsky, *At War with Asia*, Pantheon, 1970, chapter 3; *For Reasons of State*, Pantheon, 1973, chapter 2; and references and documentary evidence cited there. The scholarly literature is useful but must be treated with care, since as demonstrated in the sources just cited the conclusions reached often derive from the most dubious evidence, sometimes sheer fabrication on the part of government officials who are taken quite seriously despite their long record of prevarication.

5. See John Everingham, “Press war creates problems for Laos,” *Far Eastern Economic Review*, writing from Vientiane before his expulsion on the “hostile and inaccurate Thai press coverage of Lao affairs” that “may convince those not on the spot,” and on the questionable “principle of reporting Laos from Thailand,” where one finds a “stream of anti-Lao hysteria and falsities.”

6. *Laos Recovers from America’s War, Southeast Asia Chronicle*, no. 61, March-April 1978, P.O. Box 4000D, Berkeley, California 94704. Most of the material in this issue is by the Hieberts. Other material is supplied by Mennonite missionaries still in Laos.


8. Hieberts, *op. cit.* These features of lovely little Laos, and of other “small old places,” have intrigued thoughtful U.S. observers like Reasoner much less than the eroticism, which, as visitors to Vientiane quickly learned, was a major preoccupation of the press corps, many of whose members seemed to divide their time between the U.S. Embassy (where they received “the news”), the hotel bars, and the local house of prostitution. As elsewhere in Indochina, there were noteworthy exceptions.

9. See footnotes 1 and 4.


11. E.g., Phoumi Nosavan’s “proclaimed anti-Communism won him military aid from the Eisenhower administration and the Thai government” in 1960. In fact, Phoumi was armed and backed by the United States in his successful effort to overthrow the government recognized by the United States, and thousands of Thai troops (virtually, U.S. mercenaries) were apparently fighting in Laos (see *At War with Asia*). The U.S. role in overthrowing the 1958 political settlement in which the Pathet Lao emerged as the dominant force is not so much as mentioned, though it is entirely beyond controversy. See, for example, Hugh Toye, *Laos: Buffer State or Battleground*, Oxford, 1968; Charles Stevenson, *The End of Nowhere: American Policy towards Laos Since 1964*, Beacon, 1972.

economy and social fabric” are now the main target of the U.S. bombardment, which is claimed to be a success: “The bombing, by creating refugees, deprives the Communists of their chief source of food and transport. The population of the Pathet Lao zone has been declining for several years and the Pathet Lao find it increasingly difficult to fight a ‘people’s war’ with fewer and fewer people.” On the same day Le Monde (weekly selection) reported that this “battering” of Laos had been going on for over five years and that “the United States Air Force carries out more than 12,500 raids a month.” As already noted, eyewitness reports of the U.S. attack on the rebel economy and social fabric had been reported by Jacques Decornoy of Le Monde in July 1968, and repeatedly brought to the attention of editors of the New York Times and other journals, to no effect. See p. 117, above.

See also the eyewitness report by T.D. Allman at just the time when Air Force Secretary Robert Seamans, visiting the same areas, reported that “I have seen no evidence of indiscriminate bombing.” Allman’s report of massive destruction from highly discriminate bombing aimed at civilian targets appeared in the Far Eastern Economic Review and the Manchester Guardian; Seamans’s failure to see anything was reported in the Washington Post. Direct reporting from the ground by Michael Morrow did not appear in the U.S. press at all, to our knowledge, as befits observations of U.S. atrocities by a Western reporter who concludes that “it is unlikely that Americans are or will ever be around to pick up the unexploded pieces of the most extensive bombing campaign in history,” a campaign that is now being expunged from the historical records. See At War with Asia, pp. 95f; For Reasons of State, pp. 173f. For the Decornoy report and much other valuable material that is conveniently ignored in the United States, see N.S. Adams and A.W. McCoy, eds., Laos: War and Revolution, Harper, 1970.

13. Given what is known about CIA control and activities, it seems likely that this was part of a U.S. intelligence campaign. This places the subsequent show of compassion for the refugees—see footnote 2—in a still more ugly light.

14. Daniel Southerland, “Lao tribesmen moving out,” Christian Science Monitor (30 May 1975). Southerland was one of the small group of correspondents in Indochina who maintained a high level of professional integrity throughout. We are indebted to Louis and Eryl Kubicka of the AFSC, who spent three years in Laos (including two and one-half years after the war), for additional information about Lyteck and for helpful comments and information about other matters. The Kubickas have made extensive efforts to bring information about postwar Laos to the U.S. press, to little effect. They inform us that their accounts were seriously distorted by New York Times reporters Paul Hoffman and David Andelman, “by the device of omission and by taking the negative side of balanced statements we made” and other standard Free Press techniques. An important analysis of Thai perception of U.S. moves to undermine Thai democracy prior to the October 1976 military coup (see Volume I, chapter 4, section 2) was submitted to the New York Times, Washington Post and other journals, but rejected. For their own account of the postwar situation in Laos, see Louis Kubicka, “Laos: Resettlement Begins on Bombed-Out Plain of Jars—Minus U.S. Aid,” Los Angeles Times (1 March 1976); “War Hangover in Laos,” Eastern Horizon, March 1978; “From the Plain of Jars,” Progressive, March 1978.


17. Interviews with two refugees who returned are reported by John and Beulah Yoder of the Mennonites, writing from Vientiane in February, 1978 in *Laos Recovers from America's War*. One, a Meo tribesman now in a teacher training college, recalls “the intense anti-Lao propaganda in the Thai camps” and the “many lies about Laos” spread in France. In the Thai camp, “we lived like pigs. No one had enough to eat” and the Thai military attempted to recruit refugees to fight communism, possibly in Laos, while camp guards beat or imprisoned anyone trying to escape. The second says that he fled to Thailand “because I didn’t understand the policies or goals of the new regime. In the old regime we were taught only to make ourselves rich. We were not taught love for our nation.” Living in France, he “learned about the goals of the new Lao regime” from the Lao student organization. “He realized they had a vision for Laos which he could share.” On the Thai camps, see footnote 24 below.

18. Since these important elements of the “prisoners” in “re-education camps” are a legacy of western imperialism, they are regularly disregarded in western commentary.


21. A phrase of rare accuracy from this pen, though one wonders whether the author comprehends its meaning.

22. See chapter 1, note 16. In the documents cited there, it is proposed that Thailand be developed “as the focal point of U.S. covert and psychological operations in Southeast Asia.” The proposal was implemented, and Thailand also became a major base for direct U.S. military operations against Laos and Vietnam, and for CIA-backed groups attempting to undermine the neutralist government of Cambodia. (See Volume I, chapter 4, section 2; chapter 6, below, and references cited there).

23. On the “growing Vietnamese influence,” always a staple of U.S. reporting—it has been “growing” in the U.S. press for some 25 years—see footnote 4, and also pp. 128, 132, 133, below, and note 31.

24. On the Thai refugee camps, see John Burgess, “City of broken lives,” *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 26 May 1978. According to refugees, some “use the camp as a base to support the guerrillas harassing the communist government in Laos” though most are more interested in finding another country, usually the United States, to take them in. “People leave Laos for varied reasons: some because they are threatened with reeducation, some because they have records as prostitutes or criminals, others because they cannot find jobs.” The underworld is thriving in the camp, where Thai police “claimed to have discovered a syndicate...that was producing Laotian women for the brothels of Bangkok,” and the drug trade flourishes. 41% of the people in the camp “claimed direct or indirect membership in U.S.-affiliated agencies, mostly the old Laotian armed forces.” A few of the camp’s people intend to join the anti-Communist resistance in Laos, and “one well-placed refugee” reports that small numbers “pass in and out of Laos with help and equipment from the Thai military.” A Meo veteran of the CIA army reports that “his village had been destroyed by artillery” while others claim that the Lao government used poison gas against them.

25. It is superfluous to note that Vietnam’s attempts “to establish normal links
with the West” have been blocked at every turn by the U.S. government, since Hanoi has not yet succeeded in meeting the exalted standards set by the United States, to the applause of the Free Press.


27. See footnote 6. This is the only press reference to the Heiberts that we have noted, though their eyewitness report from a country virtually closed to the West would have been featured in a country enjoying a free press.

28. The reference, presumably, is to the Plain of Jars, where the vast U.S.-inflicted war damage remains unrepaired (if indeed it can be repaired).

29. The impending starvation is a result of the U.S. attack and also the natural disasters that have afflicted Southeast Asia in the past several years.

30. In what it called “a humanitarian aid decision in keeping with the Administration’s policy of answering basic human needs,” the Carter Administration agreed to send 10,000 tons of rice in August and September of 1978; UPI, “U.S. giving $5m in rice to Laos,” Boston Globe (2 June 1978); Don Oberdorfer, “U.S. Will Give Laos $5 Million in Food Aid To Avert a ‘Disaster',' Washington Post (1 June 1978). The last U.S. aid was in 1974, when 24,000 tons of rice were sent. The 10,000 tons allegedly forthcoming would supplement the 80,000 tons pledged by other countries. Note that the fear of jeopardizing the canal treaties was past, at this time.

It appears, however, that even this tiny gesture towards “humanitarianism” was a fraud. When the State Department announced that a piddling 10,000 tons of food would be released for the starving Lao on May 31, it was assumed that this munificence would be in addition to the regular contribution of the United States to the World Food Program of the United Nations, which had pledged 30,000 tons of food to Laos. But it seems that the U.S. donation is to be “merely a part of its normal biannual contribution to WFP, and no more.” The estimated need in Laos to avoid disaster is at least 120,000 tons of emergency food. Roger Rumpf and Jacqui Chagnon, AFSC representatives in Laos, letter, Washington Post (14 October 1978). There appear to be no limits to the cynicism of the Human Rights Administration.

31. Nayan Chanda, “Laos keeps up a cold front,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 15 April 1977. Vietnamese influence in Laos has no doubt been growing, for several reasons, among them, punitive U.S. policies towards Laos and Vietnam and the Vietnam-China conflict. Occasionally, propaganda fabricated with no concern for fact may be accurate—in this case, in part as a consequence of the brutal policies supported or concealed by the media.


33. The situation may have somewhat improved in subsequent months, as the Thai government moved to a more “liberal” anti-Communist policy.

34. Norman Peagam, “Letter from Vientiane,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 6 May 1977. No aid donor countries offered to supply the DDT required for malaria control after the U.S. aid cut-off. Peagam adds that the health problem is exacerbated by efforts to encourage hill tribes to move down to the lowlands in order to conserve the forests and “sending civil servants into the countryside for political seminars and manual work.”

35. Among them, Thai journalists, accurately for once. Theh Chongkhadikij,
“Fears of Imminent Famine in Laos,” *Bangkok Post* (7 March 1977), reporting the fear of “ambassador-level sources in Vientiane” that Laos faces starvation within a few months, largely because of the drought. Similar fears have been repeatedly expressed in the *Far Eastern Economic Review*.

36. For a review of some of these, see *At War with Asia*, chapter 3.


41. Properly, Chanda places the word “secret” in quotes. As we have seen, the “secrecy” was a matter of decision by the Free Press.

42. Recall that the bombing in the Plain of Jars had nothing to do with North Vietnamese supply trails, as loyal correspondents for the *New York Times* and other specimens of the Free Press continue to pretend. Rather, its purpose was to destroy a civilian society that was undergoing a mild social revolution. See the references of notes 3 and 4.

43. “War Hangover in Laos.” (See footnote 14).


### 6 Cambodia

1. We would like to thank Stephen Heder, Ben Kiernan, Torben Retbøll, Laura Summers, Serge Thion and Michael Vickery for important information and very helpful comments on an earlier draft of this chapter.

   During the period of this review—mid-1975 to the end of 1978—the regime used the name “Democratic Kampuchea.” With some misgivings, we will continue to use the conventional English spelling, “Cambodia,” throughout. Again with misgivings, we will use the term “Khmer Rouge” to refer to the revolutionary movement of Cambodia and to the regime during the period of our review. See Volume I, chapter 1, note 56.

2. François Ponchaud, *Cambodia: Year Zero*, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1978; a revised and updated translation of his *Cambodge: année zéro*, Julliard, 1977, which became perhaps the most influential unread book in recent political history after a review by Jean Lacouture, to which we return. It is also unusual in that it is the only recent French book on Cambodia to have been not only widely quoted and misquoted, but also translated. In contrast, important French studies of the colonial period and the U.S. intervention have gone unreviewed, unnoticed and untranslated, as was the case with Lacouture's book on Vietnam, mentioned above: for example, Charles Meyer, *Derrière le sourire Khmer*, Plon, 1971; Jean-Claude Pomonti and Serge Thion, *Des courtisans aux partisans*, Gallimard, 1971 (for some discussion of these books, see Chomsky, *For Reasons of State*, chapter
2. Ponchaud, a French priest who lived in Cambodia for ten years, is the best-informed and most careful of those who have done extensive critical work on postwar Cambodia, though his study is not without serious flaws. For tens of millions of readers in the United States and throughout the world, the major source of information is no doubt John Barron and Anthony Paul, *Murder of a Gentle Land: the Untold Story of Communist Genocide in Cambodia*, Readers Digest Press, Crowell, 1977, expanded from an article in the *Readers Digest*, February 1977. Subsequent references to Ponchaud will be to the U.S. edition cited above, unless explicitly noted. We stress that references are to the U.S., not the British edition, which differs in crucial respects, as we shall see.

3. We will return to a few examples. As one indication of the power of the U.S. propaganda system, consider a study of the "Ten Best Censored Stories of 1977" described as "a nationwide media research project" with "a panel of ten nationally recognized individuals"; one of us (Chomsky) was among them, along with journalist Shana Alexander, Ben Bagdikian of the Graduate School of Journalism at Berkeley, Congresswoman Shirley Chisholm, Nicholas Johnson (chairman of the National Citizens Communications Lobby), Victor Marchetti (former CIA agent who has written important exposes of the intelligence system) and other well-known journalists, writers, and media specialists. The panel selected "Massacre in Cambodia and Vietnam" as one of the ten best censored stories (news release, Office of Public Affairs, Sonoma State College, 9 August 1978). Putting aside any question as to the facts of the matter, this story does not even merit consideration in a study of "censorship," given the actual media coverage.

4. We do not want to imply that this is the only reason why journalists sought out dissenting opinion. In the case of Cambodia, as in the other cases we have discussed, there remains a current of honest journalism though it is often buried under the avalanche of propaganda.


6. For example, Morton Kondracke, "How Much Blood Makes a Bloodbath?", *New Republic*, 1 October 1977: "Perhaps the United States does bear some responsibility [note the admirable caution], but the doves themselves had better explain why similar things haven't happened in Vietnam...." Why is it the responsibility of those who opposed the U.S. intervention that converted a civil struggle into a murderous war to "explain" the consequences that ensued?

7. *Dissent*, Fall 1978. Evidently, the question can be raised only if one accepts two assumptions: 1) the U.S. intervention in Indochina would have prevented a Cambodian bloodbath or was designed for this purpose; 2) the United States has the right to use force and violence to prevent potential crimes — and thus, *a fortiori*, to resort to force to prevent actual crimes by invading Indonesia, much of Latin America, etc. It is difficult to decide which of the two assumptions that are jointly required for the question even to be raised is the more absurd.


10. In fact, Pike is a State Department propagandist whose effusions are often simply embarrassing. For some examples, see Chomsky, *American Power and the New Mandarins*, pp. 365-66.


13. McGovern introduced the transcript into the *Congressional Record*, August 22, S 14020.


15. We choose a factor of a hundred for illustration because of Jean Lacouture’s observation, to which we return, that it is a question of secondary importance whether the number of people killed was in the thousands or hundreds of thousands.

16. See note 53, this chapter. Given the wording McGovern used, it is likely that his actual source was a widely quoted allegation by Jean Lacouture that the regime was “systematically massacring, isolating and starving” the population and had “boasted” of having killed some 2 million people. See the reference of note 17. As we shall see, even after Lacouture published a correction, stating that there was no basis for the latter charge, it continues to be reiterated by people who are aware of the correction, along with his more general claim, for which he also provided no evidence that withstands inquiry.


18. Ponchaud, *op. cit.*, p. xvi. His estimate of refugees is conservative as compared with some others. We noted earlier a recent estimate of 14,000 Cambodians in Thai refugee camps (others have already been resettled) in addition to an alleged 150,000 who have fled to Vietnam. According to Vietnamese sources, there have been 330,000 refugees and displaced persons from Cambodia since April 1975, including 170,000 of Vietnamese origin, almost all women, children and older people (UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Information Note, Hanoi, 31 July 1978). Based indirectly on this source, the U.S. press has given estimates of 500,000 refugees from Cambodia (Editorial, *Boston Globe*, 23 August 1978; the record will show that Hanoi sources have rarely been given such credence and publicity; in this case, the journal was unaware of the original source.) On the exodus of Vietnamese refugees from Cambodia, see Laura Summers, “Human Rights in Cambodia,” paper delivered at the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C., February 1978. She estimates that the Vietnamese population of Cambodia was about 450,000 before the war in 1970 and 310,000 were expelled or fled (along with 20,000 detained) during “the racialist campaign against Vietnamese Kampucheans by Lon Nol’s Khmer Republic” (her source is the well-known demographer Jacques Migozi, *Cambodge: faits et problemes de population*, CNRS, Paris, 1973). See T.D. Allman, cited in Volume I, chapter 3, note 20. Note that this exodus of over 300,000 people during the racialist campaign by the government backed by the
United States has been quietly absorbed by the propaganda system, and that Lon Nol is now apparently offered as a serious source for allegations backing a proposal for military intervention in Cambodia. We return to Lon Nol’s earlier exploits.

19. See chapter 2, section 2.
23. Ibid., p. xiii.
24. To be precise, Porter cites a similar comment from their Readers Digest article, where they write that the “promising subjects” were selected with the “guidance” of the campleader. May Hearings, p. 23.
26. Richard C. Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State, July Hearings, p. 23.
28. See the discussion in chapter 2, section 1.
30. 20 January 1978, in Washington. This is a private group supporting U.S. military build-up.
33. AIM Report, May 1978, Part II, reprinted as a full-page advertisement in the Washington Post (2 June 1978). Accuracy in Media, which publishes the AIM Report, is a well-financed right-wing group which is concerned that the media do not adhere to the doctrines of state propaganda with sufficient loyalty, and under the guise of defending “accuracy” exerts pressures of various kinds to overcome this unfortunate situation. The alleged failure of the media to give sufficient attention to “the Cambodian holocaust” is one of their staples.
34. Le Monde, 7,8 September 1977, 25 October 1977. There was, in fact, a CIA-run secret school in Laos for training Cambodian Army guerrillas that was closed down by the agency when a high-ranking officer who was an aide to the brother of Prime Minister Lon Nol was arrested by the Lao police for heroin smuggling. See Alan Dawson, Pacific Stars & Stripes, 12 October 1971.
37. Note that he should have witnessed or learned directly of the worst excesses. According to Ponchaud, “the early months were those of blackest terror.... The executions continued after the early months of the massive purge of the former regime’s civilian and military cadres and the many recalcitrant elements, but they became less frequent and less summary” (pp. 64, 69). Other sources agree, as we shall see below. Even people who should be ranked among outright propagandists agree that there must have been “some diminution of the killings” (Leo
Cherne, MacNeil/Lehrer report; see note 53). Cherne explains this on the grounds that the population had been reduced from 8 to 5 million, so that there were just fewer people left to kill. On his source for the 5 million figure, see note 118.


40. Michael Vickery, personal letter of September 24, 1977, which he has authorized us to cite. In this letter he expresses his pessimism about developments in Cambodia, along with a good deal of skepticism about finding out the truth.

41. See, for example, Wall Street Journal, editorial (18 July 1978), which offers “Prof. Chomsky’s heroic efforts to disprove the Cambodian bloodbath through textual criticism of witnesses’ statements” as an example of “intellectual levitation” on a par with apologetics for Mao, scholastic debate over the Shaba incursion, or the “passionate” argument of specialists on Africa that “Mau Mau outbreaks in Kenya were a spontaneous response to colonial oppression.” Putting aside these interesting examples, the fact is that apart from letters to journalists who have invented or spread known falsehoods, these “heroic efforts” reduce to the single article cited below (note 100), which notes that refugee reports “must be considered carefully” though “care and caution are necessary” for obvious reasons. No attempt whatsoever was made to “disprove the Cambodian bloodbath.” The article states that “we do not pretend to know where the truth lies amidst these sharply conflicting assessments” cited by experts, of which the more extreme are selected (and distorted) by the press. Furthermore, these perhaps less than heroic efforts contain no specific discussion of witnesses’ statements but rather document falsehoods and misrepresentations by those who have made use of these statements, as well as the continuing efforts by the Wall Street Journal and others to devise apologetics for atrocities within the U.S. sphere. Excerpts from a letter correcting these typical falsehoods appeared in the Wall Street Journal, 7 August.

42. See, for example, Norman Peagam, “Good crops and grim terror in Cambodia,” New Statesman, 4 August 1978, or his briefer report in the New York Times (19 July 1978). Peagam makes the important point that “refugees in Thailand and Vietnam give virtually identical accounts,” which he reports graphically—and in this case, credibly.

43. As noted above, p. 117, the Free Press preferred to ignore these reports too, though they were certainly known to editors of leading journals.


45. Leo Cherne, “Why we can’t withdraw,” Saturday Review, 18 December 1965. On a government-sponsored study of how U.S. air and artillery attacks by causing “damages and casualties to the villagers” impel them “to move where they will be safe from such attacks...regardless of their attitude to the GVN,” and the reaction by U.S. officials and apologists, see Chomsky, For Reasons of State, pp. 5, 142. In the same article, Cherne observes that “there should be no illusion about the consequences” of “an American withdrawal from Vietnam”: “There will be a bloody purge of the non-Communist leaders and intellectuals.”

46. “Cambodia: Corrections.” See note 17 of this chapter. The significance of his reference to “deciding exactly which person uttered an inhuman phrase” will be explained below.
47. On Operation SPEEDY EXPRESS, see Volume 1, chapter 5, section 1.3.
48. As we shall see, the evidence he reported was seriously in error throughout, and the sources on which he relied prove to be quite dubious on further inquiry. Lacouture's corrections, which were partial and somewhat misleading, were published in the United States when the errors were brought to his attention here, but never in France, where the article originally appeared.
49. See chapter 2, section 2. Recall the estimate by the "victim of the liberation," Pleyber-Grandjean, that the resistance had massacred 7 million people; quite evidently an exaggeration, though with some factual basis in tens of thousands of killings, but at least not widely disseminated as authoritative in the mass media of France and Germany, and not beyond correction.
50. This quote from Lacouture appears on the cover of the U.S. version of Ponchaud's Cambodia: Year Zero.
51. To illustrate the issues at stake, consider the following example of a very general phenomenon in the industrial West. A U.S. newspaper in 1978 ran a cartoon showing a picture of a confused Nicaraguan citizen with Somoza on one side and a guerrilla with a gun on the other. The caption defined the alternatives he faced: Somoza's corruption and oppression on the one hand, "liberation or worse" on the other. It is important in the current phase of the Western system of indoctrination to establish in the popular mind the principle that liberation is a terrible fate for subject peoples, a major reason for the current campaigns of abuse and deceit with regard to Indochina.
52. Or, where possible, on independent evidence as to the credibility of those who present reports and interpretations.
53. Here are some scattered examples. From the New York Times: (9 July 1975) editorial "scores genocidal policies of Cambodia's Khmer Rouge rulers," comparing them to "Soviet extermination of Kulaks or with Gulag Archipelago" and "says silence by US Cong[ress] members and UN must be broken" (quoted from index); (20 October 1975) editorial with similar content; (27 March 1976) editorial contends that Cambodia is a "vast slave labor camp" ruled by "fanatical Communist leaders"; (12 April 1976) article cites Time report that 500,000 Cambodians have perished since April 1975; (3 June 1976) citing a journalist of France Soir: "the figure of a million victims since April 17, 1975, the day of the 'liberation' of Phnom Penh, is plausible, if not certain"; David A. Andelman (2 May 1977) "The purges that took hundreds of thousands of lives in the aftermath of the Communist capture of Phnom Penh on April 17, 1975, have apparently ended, for the most part..." (27 July 1977) "Up to 1.2 million people may have been killed under the Communists in Cambodia, a high State Department official said today," citing Richard Holbrooke, who in fact testified that "Journalists and scholars...guess that between half a million and 1.2 million have died since 1975" (our emphasis, July Hearings, p. 2); C.L. Sulzberger (27 August 1977): "estimates of the number deliberately slaughtered by the Communist regime run from two hundred thousand to one million"; editorial (3 July 1978): "The estimates are that many hundreds of thousands, perhaps even 2 million Cambodians out of a population of 8 million, have been killed or allowed to die of disease and starvation." Christian Science Monitor: editorial (26 April 1977), "Reports put the loss of life as high as 2 million people out of 7.8 million total"; editorial (31 August 1978) citing State Department officials: "The U.S. government is confident that scores, probably hundreds of thousands of people have been killed." Washington Post, Don Oberdofer (20 April 1978) citing the former minister of Information of
the Lon Nol government: "1 million Cambodians have been 'slaughtered' and another million 'appear to have perished from disease and starvation'”; Jack Anderson (2 May 1978): “Competent sources have offered estimates ranging from 1.8 million to 2.5 million...who...have died from mistreatment and execution”; Jack Anderson (3 May 1978): “The death toll from beatings, shootings, starvation and forced labor may have reached 2.5 million victims...”

Smith Hempstone (7 May 1978): “It appears certain that between 500,000 and 2 million Cambodians...have been executed, starved or worked to death, died of disease or been killed while trying to flee...” Boston Globe: UPI (17 April 1977): “Most foreign experts on Cambodia and its refugees believe at least 1.2 million persons have been killed or have died as a result of the policies of the Communist regime...Some experts...believe as many as 3.5 million people—half of the total population—have been killed or have died in the past two years;” (12 September 1977): Lon Nol reports that “more than 2.5 million Cambodians have been killed since the Communist Khmer Rouge conquered his country.” Business Week, 23 January 1978: “As many as 2 million may have died out of a population of 5.5 million.” MacNeil/Lehrer report (TV, 6 June 1978): “In the worst accounts some two million people are said to have been killed by the new Communist regime” (the government specialist Timothy Carney estimated the number of deaths, not by “mass genocide” but by “brutal, rapid change” at “hundreds of thousands”).

Many similar examples can be given overseas; to select just two: Die Zeit. (23 April 1976): “500,000 to 1.5 million people have died, been executed or starved”; Izvestia, (9-10 December 1978) alleging 2 million “executions” in Cambodia (Le Monde, 12 December 1978).

We will return to a few other examples of the great many that might be cited from the fall of Phnom Penh to the present.

54. AP, 22 August 1978. See note 11 of this chapter.
56. May Hearings, pp. 40-41.
57. Ibid., p. 14.
58. Ibid., p. 17.
59. See Volume I, chapter 3, section 5.4, for discussion of his role.
61. See note 108, this chapter.
63. Compare the contemptuous remark of another refugee, who complained that “Now all village chiefs are selected from among the poorest and the most illiterate,” cited by Laura Summers, “Defining the Revolutionary State in Cambodia,” Current History, December 1976, from Le Monde, 18-19 April 1976. Such comments perhaps give some insight into Twining’s “difficult question.”
64. The same is true of the fierce resistance to the full-scale Vietnamese invasion of December 1978-January 1979. See the preface to this volume. We will keep here to the time frame preceding this invasion, as throughout this chapter. On the border conflicts, see Heder’s articles cited in note 19 of the preface.
66. See note 12 of this chapter.
69. David Binder, "Cambodia-Vietnam Battles Spur U.S. Concern over 'Proxy' War," New York Times (25 December 1978). Note that this analysis, which appeared on the day that Vietnam stepped up its dry season offensive to a full-scale attack with 100,000 troopers, appeared well after Vietnamese efforts to establish a Cambodian liberation front, with a program tailored to what are assumed outside of Cambodia to be the needs and concerns of the local population. See Nayan Chanda, "Pol Pot eyes the jungle again," Far Eastern Economic Review, 15 December 1978. Chanda points out that "None of the 14-member central committee of the KNUFNS [the Vietnamese-established front]...are nationally known figures." The one well-known Cambodian whom rumor had associated with KNUFNS, So Phim, "who was earlier reported to be leading anti-Pol Pot resistance, is dead." Chanda, FEER, 26 January 1979. As noted in the preface, the Vietnamese plainly do not believe that the KNUFNS can control the population without an army of occupation that far outnumbered the Pol Pot forces even before the massive Vietnamese assault that is reported to have destroyed a substantial part of the Cambodian army.
70. Recall the experience of Russia during World War I, or even World War II, when Hitler succeeded in raising a substantial army in support of the invasion of Russia and, according to some analysts, might have achieved his ends if Nazi atrocities had not helped organize the massive resistance that played the major role in the ultimate allied victory. Or recall even the experience of Western Europe, where Germany had little difficulty in organizing local support after its conquests.
71. Op. cit. (see note 11). He is referring to the unwillingness of a refugee who had allegedly seen nine members of his immediate family killed to support a foreign invasion.
72. Op. cit., pp. 139-143. Recall some of Henry Kissinger's thoughts on the inability of people of the Third World to comprehend "that the real world is external to the observer" because their "cultures...escaped the early impact of Newtonian thinking," leading to a "difference of philosophical perspective" that is "the deepest problem of the contemporary international order." For discussion of these and comparable profundities, see Chomsky, "Human Rights" and American Foreign Policy, Spokesman, 1978, chapter 1.
73. Lewis M. Simons, "Experts list disease as No. 1 killer in Cambodia today," Washingtton Post (24 July 1977). In congressional testimony, Twining questioned Simons's "source on this reevaluation" while agreeing with the contents of this "otherwise excellent article." Specifically, "I am convinced that the number of people who have died from disease and malnutrition has been even greater than those executed" (July Hearings, p. 8). On the number killed, he offers the estimate: "Certainly thousands or hundreds of thousands." Twining blames the government of Cambodia for the deaths from disease, claiming that they rejected drugs and medicines. Ponchaud reports that from August 1976, with the resumption of foreign trade, medicines have been imported, along with U.S.-produced DDT, including antimalaria drugs sent in 1976 from the AFSC (pp. 83-85, 102). See also the corrections to Twining's statement by Richard Holbrooke, July Hearings, p. 16; also the references of note 250, below.
74. July Hearings, p. 2.
76. MacNeil/Lehrer report; see note 53.
77. See Poole’s remarks on the evacuation, p. 153 above.
80. This is one of the arguments offered by Cambodian authorities for the forced evacuation of the urban centers. The second reason regularly advanced is the fear of CIA-backed subversion by groups left in Phnom Penh (cf. Ponchaud, *op. cit.*, p. 19, citing a statement of September, 1975). These reasons are continually rediscovered by the U.S. press: e.g., *New York Times* (29 July 1978), reporting that “for the first time” the government alleged that “the revolutionaries considered the city to be full of agents, ammunition dumps and conspiracies to undermine the new regime, and therefore felt total evacuation to be necessary for defense.” The second argument has more force than is commonly alleged. See Snepp, *Decent Interval*, pp. 339-40, who reports that the evacuation “left American espionage networks throughout the country broken and useless.” As for the first motive, Ponchaud disputes it. We return to his reasons below, p. 273.
81. See note 9 of this chapter. Quotes are from pp. 25-29. See pp. 30f. on the U.S. role in the politics of starvation for the mass of the population while the elite pursued the good life.
82. *May Hearings*, p. 30. Porter cites a U.S. intelligence study on Cambodia leaked to the press by Henry Kissinger, discussed in the *Washington Post* (23 June 1975) and *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 25 July 1975. A U.S. Aid report of April 1975 concluded that widespread starvation was imminent and “Slave labor and starvation rations for half the nation’s people...will be a cruel necessity for this year, and general deprivation and suffering will stretch over the next two or three years...” William Shawcross, *Sideshow*. Simon & Schuster, 1979, p. 375.
83. On this matter, Laura Summers comments (*op. cit.*, see note 63): “By all accounts, however, universal conscription for work prevented a postwar famine.” This appeared in December, 1976. Perhaps by now one should write “by all serious accounts,” or at least the vast majority of them. We have already cited Poole and Simons (with Twining’s concurrence). Comparable judgments from sources by no means sympathetic with the regime will be noted below.
84. “McGovern the Hawk,” *Wall Street Journal* (23 August 1978). Note that it is only the end of the Indochina campaign that was “sordid,” and that the *Journal* feels no need to observe the injunction of silence, after its disgraceful record of subservience to state power and apologetics for barbarism. Note also the suggestion of the editors that it was the *critics* who took us through the painful contortions of the Vietnam war, not the war managers. The Journal also pretends that the silence of the activists is of their own choice, rather than a case of simple refusal of access by the mass media.
85. One of us (Chomsky) was approached by *Time* in the preparation of this article in a transparent effort to elicit a favorable comment from a “supporter of the Khmer Rouge.” Instead, *Time* was offered a (very partial) record of fabrications with regard to Cambodia for which *Time* and other journals are responsible.
86. In his review of U.S. wartime journalism, Peter Braestrup comments that “In 1962-66..., *Time* policy on Vietnam was hawkish, even euphoric” (*Big Story* Volume I, Westview Press, 1977, p. 45). While this study contains so many errors that little in it can be assumed to be true, in this case Braestrup is correct. See the references of note 22, chapter 2 of this volume. Later, *Time* policy was no longer
euphoric, though it remained hawkish.


88. Richard Dudman, Forty Days with the Enemy, Liveright, 1971. He reported here that "the bombing and shooting was radicalizing the people of rural Cambodia and was turning the countryside into a massive, dedicated, and effective revolutionary base," p. 69, referring to the U.S. attack, an insight that has been rapidly forgotten and is in fact denied in some of the more disreputable literature on postwar Cambodia.


90. It is worth noting that the northwestern areas were then subject to Thai-supported anti-Communist guerrilla sabotage activities (see Stephen Heder, "Thailand's Relations with Kampuchea: Negotiation and Confrontation along the Prachinburi-Battambang Border," mimeographed, Cornell University, December 1977). An internal Amnesty International paper of 14 June 1976 notes that in that region "there are still many aspects of civil war." During the period 1972-75 parts of this region were under Thai military domination in part sanctioned by agreements with the Lon Nol government, and there were also instances of land grabbing. The Thai had also annexed and plundered the region in collaboration with Japanese fascists in 1941-45. We are indebted to Laura Summers for this information. The CIA-supported Khmer Serei also operated in this area from Thai bases for many years. As we shall see below, Lon Nol conducted brutal attacks on the peasants of the region in the early 1950s. Thus there is a long historical background that helps explain why this region should be the focus of violent revenge.

91. July Hearings, p. 22.


93. See the Economist (London) 21 October 1978, reviewing the effects of the floods in Southeast Asia: "As usual, there is no reliable information about what goes on inside Cambodia, but agricultural experts say it could be the worst hit of all. At one time, most of the country looked like a gigantic lake. Much of the vast Tonle Sap-Mekong basin is still under water. There seems little doubt that the waters have brought new hardships to this unhappy country." To the surprise of most observers, the grim prediction does not appear to have been realized, though we have yet to read a comment on this fact or its import in the major media.

94. See p. 209 below. Also, FEER Asia 1979 Yearbook.

95. Presumably, he has in mind Lacouture's remark on the relative insignificance of a factor of a hundred and his original allegation that the regime had "boasted" of having killed some 2 million people.

96. During the U.S. war in Vietnam, it was common for reporters and others to comment on the curious "xenophobia" of the Vietnamese, which makes it so hard to deal with them. Apparently it is a curious trait of peasant culture, as yet unexplained by contemporary scholarship, to react with a demonstration of xenophobia when foreign powers drop cluster bombs on villages after many years of colonial domination. Yet another aspect of the mysterious Asian mind.

97. See below, p. 219.


99. Douglas Z. Foster, "Photos of 'horror' in Cambodia: fake or real?" Columbia Journalism Review, March/April 1978. No date is given. Foster also reviewed the
basic facts briefly in *More* (February 1978).


101. We are concentrating on fabrications and distortions in the U.S. press, but it should be noted that the phenomenon is worldwide. For some documentation on fabrications in the French press and television, which elicited no comment or explanation when they were exposed, see Pierre Rousset, "Cambodia: Background to the Revolution," *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, vol.7, no.4, 1977. See also note 48.

Another example is a widely published photo taken by the West German journalist Christopher Maria Froder, showing a Khmer Rouge soldier brandishing a weapon, according to the photographer, to prevent looting of shops in Phnom Penh after its liberation on 17 April 1975. The picture appeared in the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 14 April 1978, with the caption "Khmer Rouge takeover: Savage Repression." The *Review* refused to publish a letter by Torben Retbøll noting that after the photo had appeared in *Die Welt* (West Germany, 9 May 1975) with the claim that the soldier was looting, and in *Der Stern* (29 April 1976) with the caption: "After the victory, there followed the revenge against the rich," the photographer protested the falsification on German TV (the facts were correctly reported in the West German *Befreiung*). But on 15 August 1976, the *Sunday Telegraph* (London) again published the photo as an illustration of Khmer Rouge brutality as did *Newsweek* in the issue just cited. Retbøll's letter appeared in *News from Kampuchea* (Australia), vol. 2, no. 2, November/December 1978, to an international audience of 500 people. The same picture appeared in the *Washington Post* (9 May 1975, with the caption: "Khmer Rouge soldier angrily orders Phnom Penh shopkeepers into streets"), and again in the *York Times Magazine* (Henry Kamm, "The Agony of Cambodia," 19 November 1978), this time with the caption: "Conquering Phnom [sic] Penh in 1975, a Khmer Rouge soldier rounds up merchants," illustrating that a good piece of propaganda never dies.

102. There are many others. For example, one of the fabricated photographs appears in the Soviet journal *Literaturnaja Gazeta*, 4 October 1978, in an article devoted to atrocities in Cambodia that quotes extensively from the U.S. press. Torben Retbøll has informed us of a number of Western European examples: *Der Spiegel*, 30 January 1978, who refused to print a letter of correction, like their U.S. counterparts; the Danish journal *Ekstra Bladet*, on three separate occasions (3 May 1976, 28 December 1977, and 4 January 1978); the *London Observer* (30 October 1977) on the front page.


104. Communiqué du Ministre de l'information et de la propagande (*Hu Nim*), 31 March 1976. Hildebrand and Porter (op. cit., p. 70) cite a government report of 15 April 1976 alleging that several hundred thousand draught animals were killed in rural areas. Whatever the actual numbers may be, they are surely not small. As we have seen, the same is true throughout Indochina.

105. Ponchaud, *op. cit.*, p.55. See also chapter 5, on similar conditions in Laos.


107. *Op. cit.*, p. 340n. As noted earlier, this is only one of several cases where
Snepp offers evidence based on what may very well be intelligence fabrications. 108. Richard Holbrooke informed the Congressional Committee in the July Hearings that Twining, Carney and Kenneth Quinn, “form to my mind, the American core of expertise on Cambodian affairs today in the U.S. Government” (p. 2). As we shall see, Quinn also refers to this alleged interview, and may well be the source of its wide dissemination. Twining, when asked what public statements the Cambodian government has made about executions, replied: “The little that has been said publicly, when Khieu Samphan was in Colombo, for example...” (p. 12). It is not clear whether he is referring to the “interview” or to Khieu Samphan’s statements at the Colombo meetings. Thus of the three specialists who form “the American core of expertise on Cambodian affairs today in the U.S. Government,” two cite this “interview” as genuine, perhaps three, depending on what Twining had in mind in this reference.

110. 1 May 1977.
111. Barron and Paul, op. cit., p. 202. In their article in the Readers Digest, February 1977, the story is reported slightly differently. For a full discussion of the various versions and their authenticity, see Torben Retbøll, “Cambodia—the Story of a False Interview,” unpublished ms., 1978. Retbøll, a Danish historian, is one of the small number of people in the West who care enough about the facts to pursue the details and write to journals that print false or dubious information, and like others, has been regularly subjected to vilification and abuse for this unwelcome commitment to the truth.
112. This was a personal letter to Chomsky commenting on the article cited in note 100.
113. Barron says: “Ponch [sic] assisted us extensively in our interviews in France. He compared data with us, criticized our work, and challenged in some cases our findings.” May Hearings, p. 48. Paul cites a letter from his research colleague on the book who claims to have been “in almost daily contact with Father Ponchaud.” (FEER, letter, 9 December 1977). We cannot comment on the authenticity of these remarks for reasons discussed below.
114. Cambodia: Year Zero, p. xvi. Ponchaud cites one of these letters in his note for the American translation, p. xiii. See below, p. 278.
115. See p. 138, above.
117. See among others, Ieng Sary (interviewed in Der Spiegel, 9 May 1977, by Tiziano Terzani), who estimated the population at 7,760,000 and explicitly denied the reports by Barron-Paul and others of massacres (it is curious that one constantly reads that the Cambodian government had not denied these claims). In the May Hearings, after Porter had questioned the Famiglia Cristiana “interview” (noting that the Cambodian government has repeatedly estimated the population at 7.7 million), John Barron attempted to defend his use of the alleged interview, with the following claims: (1) “other Cambodian officials at approximately the same time had stated that there were 5 or 5.2 million inhabitants of Cambodia”; (2) “The figure of 7.7 million mentioned by Mr. Porter I have seen stated one time, and that was in a claim made shortly after the first anniversary of the revolution” denying massacre claims; (3) “I don’t know of anybody in the world who has ever contended that the population of Cambodia ever was that large.” As for (1), Barron cites no examples and we know of none. As for (2), he
was probably referring to the Ministry of Information communique cited in note 104, which estimated the population at 7.7 million, a figure that has been repeated often. But the most surprising claim is (3). Ponchaud, Barron’s major nongovernmental source, writes that “in 1970 the population of Cambodia was usually estimated at 8 million” (including 400,000 Vietnamese); op.cit., p.70. The UN estimated the population in mid-1974 at 7.89 million (see below, p. 231) and in mid-1976 at 8.35 million (cf. UN Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, February 1978). Swedish visitors to postwar Cambodia have reported that the population is 8 million and that efforts are being made to increase it to 15 million. Estimates in the 7-8 million range are standard. In their book, Barron and Paul write that “no one heretofore had contended that the prewar population of Cambodia was more than seven million...” (p. 202n.)

118. It has also been cited on television, e.g., by Leo Cherne of the International Rescue Committee, on the MacNeil/Lehrer report (see note 53). He claims that when Khieu Samphan “was asked what is the population of Cambodia, he said five million. The population of Cambodia used to be 8 million.” Cherne notes that this estimate of five million is inconsistent with a population estimate offered by Pol Pot in “Peiping” (the name used for Peking by Dean Rusk, Leo Cherne and others of their political persuasion). This “disparity in the population of Cambodia” is offered as the sole example of “the most remarkable revelations” by Pol Pot. It is, of course, only a “remarkable revelation” to someone who relies on such sources as Famiglia Cristiano for his knowledge of international affairs. Recall that it is this “remarkable revelation” that Cherne relied upon to explain why executions have diminished (see note 37, this chapter). The above appears to be the intended sense of some rather confused remarks by Cherne. We rely on the written transcript, Library no. 702, Show no. 3242, 6 June 1978.


120. FEER, 23 September 1977.

121. Kenneth M. Quinn, “Cambodia 1976: Internal Consolidation and External Expansion,” Asian Survey, January 1977. Torben Retbøll has brought to our attention that in this article, Quinn claims that Khieu Samphan “offered a partial explanation” for the reduction in population on grounds of war dead and the return of “600,000 ethnic Vietnamese” to Vietnam. But in fact nothing of the sort appears in the cited “interview”. If this “interview” is indeed an intelligence fabrication, as appears not unlikely, it may be that it went through several versions before being placed in Famiglia Cristiano, to be picked up by the world press.


124. See Volume I, chapter 3, section 5.4.

125. To add an unnecessary little extra, the same issue of Famiglia Cristiano contains an insert on Sihanouk, referring to “a suspicion, expressed in Le Monde August 8, that the entire family of the Prince has been exterminated.” Retbøll (op. cit.) points out that the reference is to a fabricated “appeal” published in good faith by Le Monde with the signatures of well-known French leftists. Two days later, Le Monde published an apology when it discovered that the signatures were forged—a fact not mentioned in the Famiglia Cristiano report. This fact alone might have suggested that this journal is hardly a trustworthy source, had the question been of any concern.

126. See chapter 2 of this volume, p. 27, for one of many examples. It is difficult
to imagine that the CIA, with its long history of deception in Indochina, has suddenly ceased its disinformation campaigns. Ed Bradley of CBS news, asked on the MacNeil/Lehrer report to comment on the “allegation that there is a disinformation network at work spreading these allegations” of Cambodian atrocities, responded: “I don’t have any doubts that there is some element of truth in it...,” a plausible surmise. The alleged “interview” is not found in the regular FBIS translations though it does appear in a special “For Official Use Only” supplement to the Daily Report for Asia and Pacific. Thus it is not available to regular library subscribers, but presumably is available to selected individuals to whom it can be “leaked”. We are indebted to Stephen Heder for this information.

128. 18 February 1976.
129. Paul defends the translation in a letter to the Far Eastern Economic Review, 9 December 1977, citing the research colleague who claims to have been in almost daily contact with Ponchaud (see note 113, this chapter). He ignores the question of the actual source of this alleged quote, to which we turn directly—something that should have been known to a person in almost daily contact with Ponchaud, who allegedly approved this specific translation.

130. Such claims, for which no specific evidence is offered, are emphatically denied by at least some refugees. See below, p. 212. They are also denied by the State Department’s leading specialist, Charles Twining. See July Hearings, p. 21. See also Quinn’s comment on the austerity of the cadres, above, p. 155.
133. See the references in note 82, this chapter, and the text at note 82.
136. See note 17, this chapter. In Nouvel Observateur, 2 October 1978, Lacouture gave the same wording as a quote, attributed to Khmer Rouge cadres: the new generation charged with the building of Cambodia “needs only a million and a half to two million Cambodians to construct the country,” (his emphasis). This article is an excerpt from Lacouture’s October 1978 book Survive le peuple cambodgien!, Seuil, 1978. As we shall see directly, this reference appears in print over a year after Ponchaud, a close associate of Lacouture’s, had withdrawn the quote and its interpretation of it as apparently without credible source.

Quite apart from the discrepancy of source and the changes in numbers and text (not to speak of the dubious source, to which we return), it is hardly clear that Khmer Rouge military commanders or whoever might have been the source for this remark, if anyone, “talk of Marxism.” Specialists have noted that the Khmer Rouge leadership tended to stress independence, nationalism, manual labor, equality, etc., but not Marxism. According to Carney, Marxism-Leninism made its appearance in domestic radio broadcasts only in 1976. Timothy M. Carney, “Continuity in Cambodian Communism,” in Carney, ed., Communist Party Power in Kampuchea (Cambodia), Data Paper number 106, Southeast Asia Program, Department of Asian Studies, Cornell University, January 1977, p. 23.
137. See note 112, this chapter.
138. See note 2, this chapter.
139. Something unknown in the history of industrialization in the West or elsewhere in the "developing world," of course.
141. The subsequent (1978) Norwegian translation (Kambodsja Ar Null, Tiden Norsk Forlag, p. 84), retains the quote and the implication that the "formidable boast" is being put into execution. This translation was evidently supervised by Ponchaud, since there are some revisions of the French original as well as new material. See note 395, this chapter.

Skepticism about the source of this alleged quote had already been expressed by Gareth Porter (May Hearings, pp. 51-52), properly, it is now clear. Ponchaud's qualifications in his letter regarding the quote are noted by Malcolm Caldwell (Manchester Guardian, 8 May 1978). He comments: "Yet, without a move on Ponchaud's part to correct the misuse, the construction of threatening a systematic massacre is the one still put on it by authors determined to slander Kampuchea at any cost to honesty and integrity." This comment takes on added weight now that Ponchaud has deleted from the American edition both the "quote" and the inference drawn from it.
142. This passage is given separately in small print, apparently indicating that it is a quote, or standard report of refugees, or something of the sort. July Hearings, p.12.
144. 23 September 1977.
145. This egregious comment is typical of the colonialist mentality. While the friends and associates of Westerners in Phnom Penh may have been "fun-loving" and "easy-going" as they enjoyed themselves at the expense of the peasant population, the latter appear to have endured a rather different existence, a matter to which we return.
147. In the same review, Wise claims that Ponchaud dismisses the excuse that Phnom Penh was emptied to avoid famine as "rubbish" because "there was enough stocked rice to feed between 2.5 million and three million people..." Compare what Ponchaud actually wrote: This explanation for the evacuation, "given as the essential one, is not fully convincing." The "more than 1.5 million peasants" who had been driven into Phnom Penh "were all eager to return to their homes without being forced to go" and as for the rest of the population, stocks of rice on hand "might have fed it for two months, with careful rationing" (at which point, presumably, they would have starved to death). Op. cit., pp. 20-21. Note further that on inquiry Ponchaud concedes that his estimate may have been exaggerated. See below, p. 273. But for Wise, Ponchaud has shown the explanation to be "rubbish". This explanation was, as Ponchaud states, commonly given as the essential one. See the comments by Ieng Sary, reported from Tokyo, AP, Washington Post (14 June 1978) for one example.

Wise also makes the following curious remark: Ponchaud "eloquently smother the naive theories of alleged experts who—even before Ponchaud's book appeared—had decided there were no massacres after the communists took Phnom Penh in 1975..." (his emphasis). He cites no such "experts". Note also Wise's curious implication that prior to the appearance of Ponchaud's book in January 1977 it was somehow illegitimate to draw conclusions—at least, the unauthorized ones—about Cambodia.
148. See note 136, this chapter.
149. AP, "UN chief invited to Cambodia," *Christian Science Monitor.* (14 October 1978). See also Frederic A. Moritz, "Critics crack Cambodia's closed door," *ibid.*, 16 October 1978, noting also the visit of a "left-wing China-oriented Hong Kong" newspaper reporter in September, one of the many whose reports received no coverage in the Western media.

150. See *New York Times*, 7 March 1976, and for a review, Laura Summers, "Defining the Revolutionary State in Cambodia." Cambodia circulated photographs of the incident, but they do not seem to have been published in the U.S. press, which much prefers faked photos produced by Thai intelligence to illustrate alleged Khmer Rouge atrocities. See Heder, "Thailand's Relations with Kampuchea," pp. 27-28, 77-79 (cited in note 90, above).


152. Elsewhere, he is quoted more positively as saying that he had seen "enormous numbers of children who looked quite healthy and quite lively." *Toronto Globe and Mail*, (8 March 1976), cited by Porter in the *May Hearings*, p. 28. In the *Times* account he is quoted as saying, in response to a query about starvation: "How can I judge? I saw no signs of starvation."


154. Similar impressions can be derived from a reading of Ponchaud's book, though rarely from the secondary references.

155. The official Cambodian government estimate was 200,000. See Ieng Sary's interview in *Spiegel* (cited in note 117.) It is probable that this estimate was intended to include the suburbs, which according to visitors were more populated than the city itself.

156. Recall that according to Ponchaud's 1978 book, the worst terror was over by the time of Lundvik's trip; see note 37.

157. *Sydney Morning Herald* (Australia, 30 December 1977); cited in *News from Kampuchea*, Vol. 1, no. 5, December 1977. The Committee of Patriotic Kampuchans, which published the journal, at that time included Ben Kiernan, an Australian specialist on Cambodia; Shane Tarr, a New Zealander who lived in Cambodia until April 1975; and a group of Cambodians in Australia, three of whom lived in areas under Khmer Rouge administration in 1970 and 1975. In keeping with the theory of the Free Press, it was not subject to censorship and the information it presented about Cambodia was available to the Western reader, journalists included. In further confirmation of the same theory, its documentation and positive accounts of postwar Cambodia reached an audience of about 500 people throughout the world.


161. See note 40 of this chapter.

162. 19 May 1978.

163. The text appears in *News From Kampuchea*, vol. 2, no. 1, May 1978.


165. Michael Dobbs, "The New Cambodia: Phones, TV, Cars on Rubble
167. See the reference in note 198 below and Ponchaud, *op. cit.,* p. 113.
170. Henry Kamm, "Cambodian Refugees Depict Growing Fear and Hunger," *New York Times,* 13 May 1978. As both the *Post* and *Times* correctly reported, the Yugoslav journalists said they saw no signs of food shortages. Once again Kamm notes that some of the refugees he interviewed were in a "small cage" in a police station, others in a "disused prison" and refugee camps, where "their bearing and comportment recall concentration camp survivors in the Europe of 1945" —a fact that conceivably relates to the conditions of their detention. See p. 141 above.
171. The same "implicit restrictions" prevented them from raising questions about atrocities, he explains. Kamm's remarks on "communist fraternalism" are no doubt appropriate, though Yugoslavia has been known on occasion to exhibit some slight degree of independence, one recalls. But more to the point, Kamm neglects to mention the "implicit restrictions" imposed by "capitalist fraternalism." For example, those that enable a Pulitzer-Prize winning specialist on the misery of refugees to inform his reading public that refugees in Timor are fleeing from the mountains where they have been "forced to live" by FRETIILIN guerrillas; this apparently on the authority of a kindly Indonesian general, not—perish the thought—interviews with refugees. Unlike Cambodian refugees in Thai prisons, these unlucky souls are not proper subjects for a reporter of such independence of mind. See Volume 1, chapter 3, section 5.4.
172. William Shawcross also reports that "The Yugoslav journalists were shocked by the extent of child labor," and reports the same account of the filming. "Cambodia Today: a Land of Blood and Tears," *New Times,* 13 November 1978. The subheading of this story (which is featured on the front cover) includes the statement that "Cambodia today is a 'hell on earth.'" As the story itself indicates, this is a quote from Hanoi radio, which has rarely been regarded as a reliable source in Western journalism, but is taken quite seriously when it provides negative information about Cambodia in the midst of a bitter war. See note 18, above.

The concern of Western journalists over child labor is rather selective. A rare report on the topic filed from Thailand received little publicity in the United States and aroused no noticeable outrage: Amport Tantuvanich, AP, "Slavery the fate of these children," *Boston Globe* (24 September 1978). The report describes children working in Thai factories "hour after hour without a break around furnaces that generate 1450-degree heat. Their arms and hands bear scars from burns and cuts..." There are tens of thousands of illegally employed children, some "sold by their parents to factory owners" and working as "virtual slaves." "A recent survey by the International Labor Organization in Geneva showed that of 52 million children under age 15 at work around the world, 29 million are working in South Asia." Many of the Thai laborers are under 10. "Labor specialists say that a combination of wide-open free enterprise and a lack of labor-union power contributes to the child labor problem. Under laws laid down by Thailand's military government, strikes and other labor union activities

...
are forbidden.” On the U.S. role in creating this situation, see Volume 1, chapter 4, section 2. See also the preface to this volume.

Another example is the notable exploitation of child labor from the occupied territories in Israel. At the “Children’s Market at the Ashkelon junction” one finds children aged six or seven trucked in by labor contractors at 4 AM to work on the private or collective farms in the vicinity, helping to make the desert bloom for their prosperous employers who pay them “a meager subsistence wage” though “often they are cheated even on that.” Ian Black, “Peace or no peace, Israel will still need cheap Arab labor,” New Statesmen, 29 September 1978. The miserable conditions of child labor (and Arab labor from the occupied territories in general) have been discussed and deplored in Israel (see, for example, Amos Elon, “Children’s market at the Ashkelon junction,” Haaretz, 2 August 1978), with no effect on the practice, however. The matter has yet to be discussed in the mainstream U.S. press, to our knowledge, surely not by those who are so deeply offended by child labor in Cambodia, a major atrocity that evokes memories of Hitler and Stalin.

Visiting Cambodia in the summer of 1978, Gunnar Bergstrom reports that he saw children working in the fields, mixing work with play in a manner not unfamiliar in peasant societies. See note 180, below. See also the reports cited in note 190, below.


175. There were Third World visitors, but their reports are unknown or discounted. Several reports can be found in News from Kampuchea. See also Summers, “Defining the Revolutionary State in Cambodia.” See also note 149 of this chapter.

176. “US Leftist Editor Says Cambodians Are Thriving,” New York Times (12 May 1978). Six months later, a column by Burstein appeared on the Op-Ed page of the Times (“On Cambodia: But, Yet,” 21 November 1978), two days after the New York Times Magazine published a major story by Henry Kamm, to which we return. Burstein’s brief statement based on what he says he saw is “opinion”; Kamm’s lengthy account of what he says he heard from refugees is “fact.” Professor David Sidersky of Columbia University denounced the Times for printing this “propagandistic opinion on questions of fact,” (letter, 5 December). He did not criticize the Times for publishing Kamm’s article with its faked photos, allegations about starvation taking no account of direct testimony to the contrary by visitors, etc. Nor did he criticize the Times for withholding evidence provided by visitors. Rather, his criticism was limited to the Burstein Op-Ed statement for not presenting factual evidence, as was obviously impossible in the space provided him.

In contrast to the coverage in the United States, visits by Danish Communists received substantial publicity in the Danish press, we are informed by Torben Retbøll. (Note that some of the visitors whose reports were suppressed in the Free Press were non-Communists, and there is little doubt that they would have been treated rather differently had their reports conformed to the propaganda line.) A detailed report by these visitors appears in The Call (P.O. Box 5597, Chicago Ill. 60680), May 15, 22, 29, June 5, 12, 1978; The Young
Communist, June/July 1978; Class Struggle, Summer 1978. There was also a report in the Guardian (New York, 7 June 1978). See also Kampuchea Today, Call Pamphlets, December 1978, and a “photo-record” of their visit by David Kline and Robert Brown, The New Face of Kampuchea, Liberator Press, 1979. They say their trip covered 700 miles with frequent stops and discussions with government leaders and others.

177. We regret that we cannot comment here on television news, since we have no records. We have cited the MacNeil/Lehrer report on Cambodia on the basis of a transcript. Burstein informs us privately that lower-echelon reporters and editors were helpful and sympathetic, but that the idea was apparently killed at a higher level, a process not exactly unfamiliar to us personally. See the prefatory note to Volume 1.


179. See Volume 1, chapter 3, section 5.4; this volume, chapter 4. Note that his distortions are systematic; his extreme bias is consistently towards service to the U.S. government propaganda system, whether he is dismissing the testimony of refugees and other victims in Timor and relying on Indonesian generals, or dismissing the testimony of visitors to Cambodia and relying on what he claims to hear from refugees in Thai police cages, or grossly misrepresenting the available evidence from Vietnam.

180. We rely on an hour-long taped interview in English, readily available to enterprise reporters, no doubt. Bergstrom has a number of interesting things to say, and seems careful and qualified in his account. For example, he visited areas where there was alleged to be insurrection, but saw no signs of disturbance and no security presence. Reports by U.S. journalists to the same effect many months later were front page news. As already noted, the work pace seemed to him moderate by European standards. He gives many details of the life he observed, and in general, reports a peasant society rebuilding with some success from the ruins, noting, however, that his access was limited.

181. Mary McGrory, “Slow reaction to Cambodia bloodbath,” Boston Globe, 27 November 1978. As the title indicates, the central point is that “for a while, Cambodia was hardly discussed,” though finally, by mid-1978, it is receiving some attention. The statement is totally false, but, as we have seen, in keeping with the constant pretense of writers who send this message to their mass audience in the Reader’s Digest, TV Guide, and the major journals, or in the more select periodicals.

182. Boston Globe, 19 November 1978. On the same day, the Globe reports that “the Inter-American Human Rights Commission yesterday accused the Nicaraguan National Guard of murdering scores of unarmed civilians” in September, charging that “entire families were machine-gunned to death in their homes,” that unarmed youths “were allegedly forced to dig their own graves before they were executed,” along with other atrocities. This story made page 78. The preceding day a brief AP report noted that “despite pleas from the Nicaraguan opposition the Carter Administration has decided against trying to prevent Israel from supplying light arms to the regime of Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle, Administration sources said yesterday.” None of this is major news, however and it elicited no editorial or other comment. On November 18 the New York Times reported (also not prominently, and in this case with no descriptive detail at all) that the Commission had accused the Nicaraguan
Government "of flagrant, persistent abuses of human rights, including summary executions, torture, arbitrary detention, indiscriminate bombing of unarmed civilians and obstructing the humanitarian efforts of the Red Cross"; the government's "practices had victimized all sectors of the population but particularly the poor and people between the ages of 14 and 21." Nothing is said about the long-standing relation between the United States and Nicaragua. See Volume 1, chapter 4, section 5.2.


184. See note 130.

185. The New York Times is also not noted for outraged denunciations of gross differences in living standards in the United States. In New York City, for example, one can easily discover wealth that surpasses description only a short distance away from hovels where a grandmother stays awake through the night with a club to prevent rats from killing a child who will go to school the next day without breakfast.

186. See note 172, above.

187. It is not clear that he understands what is required to establish his case. See the serious error in logic discussed below, p. 282.

188. Jack Anderson, "Lon Nol in Exile: Sad Symbol of Cambodia," Washington Post (1 October 1978). Some of Lon Nol's exploits in this "serene little country" in the 1970s are well-known. See, for example, Volume I, chapter 3, section 2. Anderson's mythical picture of prewar Cambodia is a very common one. Among many examples, an advertisement for a CBS news special on Cambodia reads: "Once, Cambodia was a very special place. Lively, Happy, Peaceful." New York Times (7 June 1978). The myth provides a useful backdrop for the picture of merciless horror and madness. See note 232, below.


190. Richard Dudman published an edited version of his series in a special supplement to the St. Louis Post-Dispatch (15 January 1979): "Cambodia: A land in turmoil." Elizabeth Becker's series appeared in the Washington Post, December 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 1978 (along with a December 24 story on Malcolm Caldwell's assassination in Phnom Penh). These accounts were serialized in many journals in the United States and elsewhere as they appeared in late December. Our quotes from Dudman are from the edited version cited.

191. Bernard Weinraub, "High-Level Purge in Cambodian Regime Reported," New York Times (29 December 1978). Weinraub attributes this opinion to "American analysts." Times ideologists continued to disregard the reports by the U.S. journalists, just as they had dismissed earlier testimony from reputable non-Communist observers that was unacceptable on doctrinal grounds. Thus Dudman reports that "with good opportunity for observation" he found "an assurance of apparently adequate food" and no signs of malnutrition, confirming the reports of earlier visitors. But for Henry Kamm it is a matter of dogma that Communist policy has caused starvation ("Although the growing of rice was declared the supreme national objective and almost the entire nation was set to work at this task, the Cambodian people, for the first time in their history, learned hunger"—and contradicting himself in the very next sentence: "Until the war disrupted their lives, [hunger] was perhaps the one scourge of life that Cambodians had always been spared," which is false as well as inconsistent with what precedes). To maintain the dogma with its accompanying "mystery" already
noted, it is necessary to ignore the reported facts, as Kamm does, in this article written a month after the accounts by the visiting U.S. journalists were widely circulated. Henry Kamm, "The Cambodian Dilemma," *New York Times Magazine*, 4 February 1979, an "analysis" with accompanying moral lecture that merits no further comment.


193. Becker states that the information in the *Livre Noir" closely paralleled US intelligence estimates" of 1970. We know of no evidence that U.S. intelligence estimated in 1970 that there were 1.5-2 million "Vietcong" in Cambodia. Similarly, much of the other material in it does not parallel U.S. intelligence estimates, at least so far as the public record indicates. See Nayan Chanda, "The Black Book of Hatred," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 19 January 1979, for some discussion of the *Livre Noir* and also of conflicting Vietnamese claims in the two-volume *Kampuchea Dossier* published in Hanoi. See Heder's articles cited in note 19 of the preface to this volume for detailed discussion of the background, including the longstanding conflict between Vietnamese and Cambodian Communists.

194. They do, however, regularly accept documents and assessments produced in Hanoi and Phnom Penh prejudicial to the adversary, in the midst of a bitter conflict, on the principle that any negative information concerning a Communist regime, however questionable the source, must be accurate. See notes 18, 172 of this chapter.

195. Elizabeth Becker, "Inside Cambodia," *Newsweek*, 8 January 1979. Her story deals only with Caldwell's assassination, the border war, the alleged support of the *Livre Noir* for U.S. intelligence estimates, atrocity stories from refugees, and the condition of Angkor Wat. It studiously avoids any report on what she actually observed of life in Cambodia.


197. See the preface to this volume.


199. We have already commented on the localized nature of atrocity reports noted by a number of analysts, Twining included. Chandler observes that the reason may be that conditions elsewhere are better, or that it is more difficult to escape from other areas. Ponchaud (in his author's note for the English translation) states that most of his reports come from the provinces near the Thai border, though "quite a few came from further away" (p. xv.). In an article published in January 1976 (N.B. after the worst atrocities; see above, note 37), Ponchaud wrote that Battambang-Siem Reap (i.e. the Northwest) is a region of "bloody violence more than any other"; cited by Porter, *May Hearings*, p. 24.


201. David P. Chandler, "Transformation in Cambodia," Commonweal, 1 April 1977. See also his comments in the *May Hearings* (in part cited above, p. 154), where this article appears as a supplement.

202. The French also continually readjusted the border in a manner prejudicial to Cambodia. See the preface to this volume, note 20. On the vicious and barbaric French colonial impact on Vietnam, see the references cited in chapter 4, note 40;
also note 67. Matters were little different in Cambodia. Chandler’s comments on the mythic “happiness” of the Cambodian peasants as seen by imperial interpreters can be supplemented by the studies cited in notes 2, 18; also Malcolm Caldwell and Lek Hor Tan, *Cambodia*, Monthly Review Press, 1973, and sources cited there, particularly Milton E. Osborne, *The French Presence in Cochin-china and Cambodia*, Cornell, 1969. Ponchaud, in contrast, writes that “to any Western visitor Cambodia was a land of smiles” (the standard cliché; see Meyer, *op. cit.*): “There did not seem to be any major social or agrarian problems” and “French colonization brought order and peace” though there were injustices that could be “exploited” by “an intelligent propaganda campaign,” *Cambodia: Year Zero*, pp. 140f.

203. Ponchaud writes: “During the reign of Sihanouk and then under Lon Nol, methods used by the government forces in dealing with their Khmer Rouge enemies were no less savage than those subsequently employed by Democratic Kampuchea: between 1968 and 1970 prisoners from Samlaut or Dambar, the cradles of the Khmer revolution, were bound to trees with their stomachs cut open and left to die; others, hurled off the cliffs of Bokor, agonized for days: enemy villages were razed and the villagers clubbed to death by local peasants who had been set against them.” *Ibid.* 140. This account is corroborated from other sources. The events elicited no reaction in the West, and are now generally dismissed or ignored (by Ponchaud as well as others) as a possible reason for subsequent savagery.

204. See the references of notes 2, 45, 202. For a review of press reports, see Chomsky, *At War With Asia*, chapter 3.

205. Recall Elizabeth Becker’s puzzlement over the lack of any “philosophical basis” for the policies of autarky, self-reliance, egalitarianism and decentralization. On these matters, see Laura Summers, “Democratic Kampuchea,” in Bogdan Szajkowski, *Marxist Governments: A World Survey*, Macmillan, London, forthcoming. Also her introduction to her translation of Khieu Samphan, *Cambodia’s Economy and Industrial Development*, Cornell 1979, and the text itself, written in Paris in 1959 for a Doctorat in economics. See also Malcolm Caldwell, “Cambodia—Rationale for a Rural Policy,” a five-part study presented at the Seminar “Underdevelopment and Subsistence Reproduction in Southeast Asia,” University of Bielefeld, 21-23 April 1978. This is a preliminary draft, never completed, which we hope will be published with Caldwell’s papers. See also the report on Thailand cited by Michael Vickery, p. 221, below. Also Denzil Peiris, “The student principles,” *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 2 June 1978, explaining how the “economic restructuring” of Cambodia had been following Khieu Samphan’s ideas in his thesis, and also outlining these ideas.


207. On this matter, Ponchaud writes: “The economy inherited by Democratic Kampuchea had been totally devastated by the war.” The South Vietnamese “unhesitatingly demolished a large part of the economic infrastructure of the Cambodian territory,” and the United States bombed the rubber plantations, while the soldiers of the Lon Nol regime, “following their instructors’ example, buried their own country under their bombs and shells” and the Khmer Rouge “razed everything in their path that could in any way be connected with the West.” *ibid.*, p. 85.

208. See notes 202, 207, above. Ponchaud’s reference to “their instructors’ example” is more accurate.

210. Vickery’s observation on the contradictory character of refugee stories reflects his personal experience in refugee camps; see above, p. 146. The contradictory character will naturally not emerge from accounts by reporters who proceed in the manner we have described. Note that when Vickery wrote in August 1976, refugee stories were, as he says, “the only first-hand source of news,” though the situation was gradually to change, as we have seen. It should also be noted that the “blackout on information” followed years of censorship under the Lon Nol government.

211. “Anti-French maquis cum bandits, who controlled much of the countryside and in some cases probably had contact with the Viet Minh.”

The exact history and character of the Cambodian revolutionary movement and its antecedents is the subject of controversy that we will not attempt to review. Laura Summers informs us (personal communication) that the Issarak movement was supported by the Thai resistance opposing the Japanese in World War II (the allies refused assistance, fearing their reformist social programs). Based in the Thai-occupied provinces of the northwest, it was officially recognized by the Thai resistance government in 1944 and received support from both Siamese and Vietnamese. “Prior to joining the Independence movement most Khmer Issarak were peasants, monks or intellectuals (teachers).” Summers further comments that Lon Nol had been involved in Battambang politics in earlier years, having been appointed to reestablish the local Khmer administration in the region in 1946 and serving as Provincial Governor of Battambang from 1947 to 1949. As for the scale of the military activity of the 1953-54 period, Summers informs us that there were 10,000 armed guerrillas operating in Cambodia in January 1953, 8000 of them Issaraks divided into several tendencies, less than 2000 Viet Minh.

212. On political violence perpetrated by the Sihanouk regime, see Heder’s forthcoming article in the *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* (cited in the preface, note 19) where he describes, for example, a speech by Sihanouk in August 1968 “in which he claimed to have put to death over 1,500 communists since 1967 and stated that, if necessary, he would persist in such a policy of merciless extermination until the [Communist Party] submitted” (we quote from the manuscript). This statement, and others like it, aroused no more outcry in the West than the violent repression carried out by the regime.

213. The reference, clearly, is to the leadership in Phnom Penh and their supporters, not to the peasants driven into the city by the war. T.D. Allman had described Phnom Penh as a city “shared by two separate nations: the poor, the refugees, the ordinary people, their lives torn and complicated by the war beyond imagination; and the political elite for whom the war has meant promotions and a revived sense of their own importance...” (“Forever Khmer,” *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 4 September 1971).

214. Timothy Carney notes that “sometime in 1973 the party apparently decided to accelerate its program to alter Khmer society...” for no cited reason. Carney, ed., *op. cit.*, p. 21. The most interesting material in this collection is a translation of Ith Sarin, “Nine months with the maquis,” excerpted from a 1973 book written in an effort to rally opposition to the Khmer Rouge. It gives some insight, from a very hostile source, into the success of the Khmer Rouge in gaining popular support by conscientiously following the maxims of “serve the people,” “study from the people in order to be like the people,” etc. We have been informed that
the sections of Ith Sarin's book that do not appear in Carney's excerpts give a rather favorable description of Communist social and economic programs and that the book was banned by the Lon Nol government as being more harmful than beneficial to its cause.

215. Kissinger succeeded in duping the compliant media into believing that he was simply seeking a "decent interval" after the U.S. departure from Vietnam, but some attention to his actual statements as well as to the unfolding events reveals quite clearly that the aim was military victory in defiance of the Paris Agreements of January 1973, as was pointed out at once, though generally ignored by the press. See the references of chapter 1, note 1.

216. A secondary goal was no doubt to eliminate a rear base for the resistance in Vietnam. According to Snepp, intelligence gathered in 1970 revealed that nearly 80% of the supplies for Communist forces in the southern half of South Vietnam were sent through Cambodia. *Op. cit.*, p. 20.

217. See chapter 1, section 2.


221. See note 60 of this chapter.

222. Personal communication.

223. See p. 14, above.


225. On this matter, Vickery writes (personal communication): "I am convinced, however, that a good bit of Cambodian policy since the end of the war has been inspired by good old-fashioned vengeance and that the revolution could have been carried out more gently. This possibly gratuitous violence would have no connection with a 'Communist,' or 'Marxist,' or 'Maoist' orientation of the new leaders, but, I believe, would be well within the limits of traditional Cambodian personality and culture as I came to understand them during a residence of five years there." Cf. Meyer, *op. cit.*, (see note 2) for an analysis of Cambodia that lends support to this interpretation, which, however, is unhelpful for the needs of current propaganda.

226. We quote from the transcript, for which we are indebted to Torben Retboell, who is preparing a study of the Hearings. We have changed only spelling, punctuation and some obvious misprints and grammatical errors.

On Meyer's own reaction to the hearings, see *Dagens Nyheter* (Stockholm), 23 April 1978 (translated in FBIS, 27 April 1978, Cambodia, H2), where he is quoted as saying: "I know I have been lured into a trap here in Oslo. It has been a question of judging and condemning the new Cambodia and not of trying to understand what has happened there." Of the various participants, Meyer was undoubtedly the one most familiar with Cambodian history, society and culture, in fact the only one to have written on Cambodia apart from the war and postwar period, to our knowledge.
227. See note 2. In a review of Meyer's book in the *Journal of the Siam Society* (January 1973, volume 61, Part I, pp. 310-25), Laura Summers describes him as "one of Sihanouk's closest associates" and "without doubt the most prominent of [Sihanouk's large contingent of French advisors] because of his enormous influence in all areas of foreign and domestic policy making and notably in domestic economic planning...By 1961, it was widely acknowledged that he was almost as powerful as Sihanouk." Summers raises serious questions about Meyer's interpretation of the Khmer peasantry and in particular "his psychologizing of essentially social phenomena [which] prevents him from fully understanding the emergence of leftist movements..." She notes particularly his avoidance of "any implication of French colonialism" and the "colonial bias" of his account, and his implicit rejection of the possibility that the Khmer peasants might have been capable of making rational decisions for themselves on the basis of their perception of social reality. We need hardly add that it is not because of these characteristics of his writing that Meyer's book and the statement to which we turn have been ignored in the United States. In fact, like Sihanouk himself, Meyer was regarded as a dangerous radical by U.S. officials, we have been informed.

228. Context suggests that he has in mind the Vietnamese. He writes: "However, it must not be so that the accusations against the regime in Cambodia—even if they to a certain extent are justified—become the pretext of a Vietnamese intervention for a pretended liberation of the Khmer people." On this warning and the failure to heed it, see the preface to this volume.

229. Compare Ambassador Bjork's reactions, cited above, p. 188.


231. About this event, Ponchaud writes only that "until recently the general tone of relations between Khmers and French was one of mutual friendship. With one exception: the measures adopted by Charles Thomson in 1884, during the Jules Ferry government, which made the Khmers very angry. The effect of the measures was to deprive the sovereign of all but symbolic power, and this led to a full-scale rebellion." That seems a little thin for the massacre of 20% of the population. *Cambodia: Year Zero*, p. 145.

232. Elsewhere, she points out that yields were considerably lower than those of Cambodia's Southeast Asian neighbors before the war. "Consolidating the Cambodian Revolution."

See also Virginia Thompson, *French Indo-china* (Macmillan, 1942). She comments on the misery of the Khmers despite the country's potential and actual wealth, the decimation of the population by foreign and internal strife, the indebtedness and lack of credit facilities other than usury for the small proprietors, and the fact that "the population is ever on the edge of starvation" (pp. 338ff.). See also Ben Kiernan, "Peasant life and society in Kampuchea before 1970," mimeographed, Monash University (Australia), 1978. He reports that the official termination of slavery in 1897 had little impact in some districts and that even for peasants who were free, the majority throughout the period were at a subsistence level, with low yields, frequent hunger and even starvation, and a sharp decline in landholdings for about 80% of farmers from 1930 to 1950. In short, hardly a picture of "order and peace" in a land without "any major social or agrarian problems" (Ponchaud) for the "fun-loving, easy-going Cambodians" (Donald Wise), or a land that had never known hunger until it fell into the hands of the evil Communists (Henry Kamm), a "gentle land" of "happy smiles" as depicted by many Western journalists and casual visitors.


236. Note that this exposure of the fakery was long before the international publicity afforded these fabrications, which still continues unaffected by fact, as we have seen.

237. Barron and Paul visited refugee camps in October and November, and also interviewed refugees elsewhere. See above, p. 141, on their mode of access to refugees. Ponchau d’s interviews with refugees were also from the same period. Ponchau d based his book, he writes, on written accounts by 94 Khmer refugees, 77 in Thailand and 17 in Vietnam, and interviews with hundreds of illiterate refugees, mostly from the “laboring classes.” He identifies only the 94 literate refugees: all middle or upper class with the possible exception of “seven ordinary soldiers,” “four Khmer Rouge,” “three bonzes,” “two fishermen,” “a provincial guard,” “a truck driver,” “a warehouseman.” Cambodia: Year Zero, p.x.

238. He notes that Western and Thai journalists in Bangkok as well as U.S. officials in the refugee camps concur with this analysis.

239. Sophie’s account; see above, p. 212.

240. Ponchau d writes that in some areas agricultural work was dangerous after the war “because of the unexploded bombs and shells lurking in the grass or brush.” In one region northwest of Phnom Penh, “a day never went by without several villagers being injured or killed by explosions.” Cambodia: Year Zero, p. 56. These deaths and injuries, like those from starvation, disease, and overwork caused by the killing of draught animals, are included among “Khmer Rouge atrocities” in the fanciful tabulations offered by the Western media. When he was evacuated from Phnom Penh in May, 1975, Ponchau d passed through villages where he saw “vestiges of the dreadful American air warfare.” In conversation, villagers referred to T-28 bombing (including napalm) as the most terrible part of the war, worse than the B-52s. He also passed “a huge cemetery where thousands of revolutionary fighters were buried,” a testimony to the nature of the war. Ibid., pp. 37-38. Such observations rarely found their way to commentary on the book.

241. Recall that Ponchau d’s book is known primarily through second- or third-hand accounts. Much of Kiernan’s article in Australian Outlook is based on interviews with refugees in camps in Thailand and Bangkok from December 1975 to February 1976. As noted above, there were 10,200 Cambodian refugees in Thailand in August 1976; the January 1976 figure was about 9,300 (Kiernan, personal communication).

242. There is unlikely to be a serious and comprehensive study of refugees, in part because of Thai refusal to permit serious scholars to conduct research among refugees (see p. 147, above), in part because of the changed situation after the Vietnamese invasion.

We hope that further comment is unnecessary on the significance of
Kiernan's analysis for investigation of the workings of the Western propaganda system with regard to Cambodia. Later events and discoveries, whatever they may be, quite plainly—as a simple point of logic—have no bearing on an evaluation of what the media have been churning out on the basis of research in 1976.

Subsequent analysis of the later period, should it be undertaken, would have to consider the impact of a two-front war that was particularly violent on the Vietnamese side in 1977 and involved continued attacks by the CIA-trained Khmer Serei on the Thai side (cf. R.-P. Paringaux, Le Monde, 28-29 August 1977). For a skeptical view about events on the Thai border, see Norman Peagam, Far Eastern Economic Review, 11 February 1977; for an eyewitness account of Cambodian atrocities on the Vietnamese side of the border see Nayan Chanda, FEER, 31 March 1978, and for a prescient analysis of "the seriousness of Cambodia's predicament" in a highly unequal battle see Chanda, FEER, 11 August 1978. The border conflicts undoubtedly had a severe impact within Cambodia. It is quite senseless to exclude them from consideration in interpreting internal events in Cambodia in the postwar period, as is not uncommon. See Heder's papers cited earlier for extensive discussion.


244. Note that his estimate is at the lower end of Twining's estimated "thousands or hundreds of thousands." Recall also the estimates by Carney and Holbrooke cited above as well as those by Cambodia watchers cited by Simons (pp. 159).

245. Here there is a footnote reference to a communication by W.J. Sampson to which we return.

246. See note 80, this chapter.

247. FEER. Whether Chanda is correct in attributing the use of force to uneducated peasants, we are not qualified to say. We should remark, however, that modern history offers little basis for the belief that uneducated peasants are more given to savagery, violence or terror than sophisticated Western intellectuals. Quite the contrary. Similarly, we wonder whether there is any source of peasant origin that offers justification for massacre and annihilation in the manner, say, of Guenter Lewy's highly praised America in Vietnam, on which we have commented several times. For further discussion, see our review of this book in Inquiry, 19 March 1979.

248. See notes 82 and 293, this chapter.

249. For more on these matters see the ignored study by Hildebrand and Porter, cited in note 9, this chapter.

250. For more on these matters, briefly noted in the revised English translation of Ponchaud's book, see also Far Eastern Economic Review, December 1976, 7 October 1977, and 2 June 1977; and the articles by Summers in Current History cited above, notes 63, 220.


252. Recall Barron's attempt to defend his 5 million figure; note 117, above. In an unpublished paper, Sampson arrives at an estimate of about 8.4 million for the population at the end of 1978, noting many uncertainties. The FEER Asia 1979 Yearbook estimates the population at 8.2 million.
253. This figure presumably includes wartime deaths.
254. See his review of Ponchaud and the "corrections," where the charge is withdrawn. See notes 17, 48.
255. See note 348, below.
258. Note that this communication is subsequent to Shawcross's phone call.
260. George C. Hildebrand, "Kampuchean refugee challenges terror stories circulated in U.S.A.," *News from Kampuchea*, June 1977; also *Guardian* (New York), 30 March 1977. In the same report, Hildebrand states that he "spoke personally with Cambodians who were approached by U.S. agents seeking to recruit them into... armed bands [that "raided Cambodia from bases in neighboring Thailand"] during 1975."
261. Cf. the eyewitness account by Sydney H. Schanberg (New York Times, 9 May 1975): the Khmer Rouge were "peasant boys, pure and simple—one darker skinned than their city brethren, with gold in their front teeth. To them the city is a curiosity, an oddity, a carnival, where you visit but do not live...When they looted jewelry shops, they kept only one watch for themselves and gave the rest to their colleagues or passersby." On the peasant army, see also the comments by Peang Sophi and by Jean-Jacques Cazaux, cited below, p. 289. On how apparent efforts to prevent looting have been transmuted by the international press into looting, savage repression, brutality and revenge, see note 101, above.
263. Methods aside, most observers believe it to have been a necessity. See, e.g., the comments by Poole (p. 153) and many others. See also notes 273, 313, and p. 167.
264. Their observations are corroborated by other sources; see Hildebrand and Porter, *op. cit.*, pp. 50f. See also the eyewitness report of the situation in the hospitals at the time of the Khmer Rouge takeover by Jon Swain, *Sunday Times* (London), 11 May 1975: "Hundreds of people were being subjected to a hideous death" at a hospital where doctors "had not reported for work for two days, and there was no one to treat the two thousand wounded." People were bleeding to death in the corridors or in wards drenched with blood and thick with flies. A nurse explained that the doctors simply stayed away, while "the dead and dying lay in pools of their own blood," including a Khmer Rouge "who had somehow been brought there for treatment." In dismay, Swain and his journalist colleagues "sloshed our way through the blood to the exit." Reports by Swain and others indicate that the subsequent Khmer Rouge evacuation of the hospitals was a brutal affair, but perhaps the scene they observed is relevant to understanding the evacuation policy.

Swain's lengthy and horrifying account contrasts with the brief mention by his companion, Sydney Schanberg of the *New York Times*, who describes the evacuation vividly and notes that many of the miserable patients forcefully evacuated will have little chance of survival, but of the situation in Phnom Penh he says only that "many of the wounded were dying for lack of care" (New York
Times, 9 May 1975; in an accompanying dispatch headed “American’s Brief Brush With Arrest and Death,” he writes: “Doctors and surgeons, out of fear, had failed to come to work and the wounded were bleeding to death in the corridors”). He believes that the Khmer Rouge who threatened him and his companions as they left the hospital may have been angry because “they wanted no foreign witnesses” to the evacuation, though a reading of Swain’s account of the same visit raises questions about the alternatives.

265. Richard Boyle, Flower of the Dragon, Ramparts Press, 1972. Boyle filed a story on the exodus from Phnom Penh for Pacific News Service (30 June 1975). In it he reports having seen the Calmette hospital “now administered by the Khmer Rouge,” “relay station and rest stops along the road out of Phnom Penh, where Khmer Rouge troops—mostly women—and Buddhist monks supplied refugees with food and water” and “an orderly exodus, in which refugees moved at a leisurely pace on bicycles, ox-carts and on foot.” He states that “not one of the 1100 foreign nationals, including about 20 journalists, who left on the two convoys provided by the Khmer Rouge ever witnessed any bodies abandoned on the roadside,” contradicting a White House intelligence memo cited by Jack Anderson, Washington Post, 23 June 1975. He believes the evacuation to have been justified by horrendous conditions in Phnom Penh, which he describes: squalid refugee camps, severe malnutrition and disease, patients in hospitals dying from gangrene and suffering from lack of treatment unless they were wealthy, lack of doctors (who fled), destruction of water filtration plants and power lines by “secret police agents” (“By the evening of 17 April, there was no power in many parts of the city, and the water supply was running out”), “a dwindling food supply.” French medical doctors at Calmette, the only functioning hospital, told him that they “feared an epidemic of bubonic plague, or even worse, cholera or typhoid.” He claims further that the Khmer doctors who remained treated patients “too sick to make the journey into the countryside” and that the evacuation was “systematic and well-planned” so far as he could see. He questions the charge in Newsweek by its photographer Dennis Cameron that the Khmer Rouge mistreated civilians, noting that “the magazine failed to produce a single photo from Cameron to substantiate his charge.” Boyle’s account did not appear in the national media, or elsewhere in the press, to our knowledge. Other reports from European journalists giving a similar account of the evacuation are cited by Retboll (“Kampuchea and ‘the Reader’s Digest’”), who notes that given the resources of the Reader’s Digest, their omission of evidence inconsistent with the Barron-Paul report “is not a matter of inadvertence but rather a conscious attempt to suppress evidence which might disprove or modify their own conclusions.” Retboll also cites a statement by Lim Pech Kuon, one of the witnesses at the Oslo Hearings, who challenged Anthony Paul from the floor, saying “it is obvious that Paul does not know anything at all about Cambodia. Therefore it is not up to him to judge this country.”

266. Guardian (New York) (28 May 1975). Barron and Paul report the story that Boyle asserts was censored by AP, op. cit., p. 10.

267. Reporters quoted Dr. Bernard Piquart, chief surgeon at the Calmette Hospital, as having “seen hundreds of bodies with their throats cut in the central market” and having “affirmed that he had been forced to operate on wounded Communist soldiers at gunpoint and that he had cared for French women who had been raped.” When he crossed the Cambodian border to Thailand with the convoy from the French Embassy, however, Piquart “seemed embarrassed over
the wide publicity given to his reports” and “said he had talked too much and had never seen all of that.” AFP, New York Times (10 May 1978).

268. 7 October 1977.
269. TLS, 28 October 1977.
270. Ibid., 4 November 1974.
272. Ibid. 2 December 1977.

273. It is not easy to reconcile Leifer’s praise for the Barron-Paul book with his own observations and scholarly work. See, for example, his “Economic Survey” of Cambodia in The Far East and Australasia, Europa, 1976, pp. 431ff., in which he observes that “the onset of war in Cambodia completely disrupted the economy...By April 1975, there was not a Cambodian economy, only the importation of foodstuffs financed by the United States government.” Thus the “first priority” for the Khmer Rouge “was declared to be the restoration of the national economy. Partly to this end, the urban centres, including the capital, were cleared of their inhabitants who were driven into the rural areas to work on the land and in other tasks of economic reconstruction. The initial rigours of the collectivization of agriculture were sustained at human cost but a good first harvest and the virtual rehabilitation of Cambodia’s small industrial sector, with Chinese technical assistance, placed the economy in a viable condition.” Given these facts, how can one give a favorable review to a book that excises from history all that precedes April 1975 and attributes the Draconian measures then instituted solely to Communist villainy?

274. 30 April 1977.
275. Phil Gailey, “Don’t Withhold Aid from Chile Junta Because of ‘Mistakes,’ Panel Is Told,” Miami Herald (6 August 1974). His TV Guide article, based largely on Barron-Paul, is entitled “The Cambodian Blood Bath and The Great Silence.” The major theme is the “appalling” refusal of the media to take seriously “the murder of a million innocent people,” to be explained by the tendency of the media to overlook crimes that “are inflicted in the name of revolution.” Dr. Lefever “directs the Ethics and Public Policy Program of the Kennedy Institute of Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., and teaches international politics there,” TV Guide informs us. It should be borne in mind, difficult as it is to imagine, that material of this sort not only inundates a mass audience but is also taken seriously in allegedly “sophisticated” circles in the United States.

276. Donald Wise, Far Eastern Economic Review, 23 September 1977. This is the review already cited, which began with the probably fabricated Famiglia Cristiana interview and ended with the “quote” about one million people being enough to build the new Cambodia; each example forms part of the impeccable documentation in the Barron-Paul book. Wise also cites with approval Barron-Paul's explanation of the more extreme policies as a consequences of Khieu Samphan’s alleged “impotence,” and other deep remarks.


278. Economist, 10 September 1977.
279. For one of many examples, see Editorial, Christian Science Monitor, 26 January 1977, reporting the Barron-Paul conclusions with no question as to their authenticity, while deploiring the "indifference in America and elsewhere to the fate of freedom under what appears to be one of the most brutal and concentrated onslaughts in history...in the lovely land and among the engaging people of Cambodia." Like the authors of the book, the editors have conveniently forgotten an earlier onslaught on this lovely land. Their earlier concern for "the fate of freedom" for Cambodian peasants remains a closely-guarded secret.

280. In the Nation, 25 June 1977, we commented on some of the more obvious inadequacies of the book.


In conformity with the standard line, Woollacott alleges that Cambodian atrocities had previously been disregarded. "The American Right did not want to examine at all closely the kind of fate to which they had abandoned 'their' Cambodians. The whole array of Left-wing and liberal groups in the United States, France, and Britain, who had supported the Khmer Rouge cause, after some sophistry about the evacuation of the cities and some suggestions that the stories of executions were CIA 'plants,' more or less dropped Cambodia." He does not refer us to sources for "the whole array of Left-wing and liberal groups" who took this stand, or explain how the regular condemnations of Cambodian genocide from mid-1975 in the mainstream press (New York Times, Time, etc.) comport with this version of the facts. He also states that "only when a figure as impressive as Jean Lacouture spoke out, as he did earlier this year, did a few Left-wingers timidly follow," referring to the article by Lacouture that condemned Cambodian "autogenocide" on the basis of gross misrepresentation of Ponchaud. This paragraph was dropped by the Boston Globe, who were aware of the facts; see note 348, below. Woollacott also expresses his astonishment that the Cambodian revolutionaries had not "picked up...the essential humaneness of French life and thought," as exemplified in Indochina for so many years, or in Algeria at the time when they were studying in Paris.

282. New Statesman, 23 September 1977. Shawcross is impressed by the consistency of refugee reports, without, however, inquiring into the extent to which this is an artifact based on the selection process, not a small matter, as we have seen, particularly in the case of the book under review.


285. This scholarly criticism did not extend to the citations from his own work, as we have seen. Cf. pp. 178ff., above.


287. Ibid., p. xiv.

288. For example, John Swain's comments, cited below. Barron and Paul refer in passing to the "fratricidal war" in which civilians were "caught up in the crossfire between government and insurgent battalions or killed by bombings" (p. 6). Nowhere is there any indication that the United States had anything to do with the destruction of the countryside. Equally scandalous is the reference to the U.S. "limited incursion" and the "devastating B-52 raids" which they depict, in accordance with government propaganda, as directed against North Vietnamese and Vietcong sanctuaries (p. 54). Missing from their "impeccable documentation,
to cite only one relevant example, are the eyewitness reports by several U.S.
correspondents (e.g., Richard Dudman, then a Khmer Rouge captive) of the
impact of the U.S. "incursion" and aerial attack on Cambodian civilians. Nor do
they take note of the subsequent destruction caused by the United States, or of
course, the earlier U.S. interventions, military and otherwise, in Cambodia. See
the references cited in notes 2, 45, 202, 204, for ample detail.
The absurdity of their assumption about the irrelevance of history was noted
by William Shawcross (New York Review of Books, 4 March 1976), referring to
their book then under preparation, evidently, with little effect.
290. In striking contrast with their freewheeling estimates about deaths in the
postwar period (by definition, at the hands of Angka), they are properly skeptical
about the figures of wartime casualties, which, they sternly admonish, are offered
with no stated basis (p. 6n). To appreciate the humor of this remark, one must
read through the "methodology" they offer for counting postwar casualties on pp.
203f. Carney, for what it is worth, takes the figure of one million to be a "close"
estimate of wartime "killed or wounded." July Hearings, p. 22.
292. To be precise, their numbers are 430,000 or more from disease and
starvation in the latter half of 1975 and 250,000 or more in 1976, plus 400,000 or
more "during the first exodus," presumably from disease and starvation.
293. See Ponchaud, Cambodia: Year Zero, p. 71, citing "American Embassy
sources," which, he privately informs us, means the Bangkok Embassy. We write
"allegedly produced" because no qualified person at the U.S. Embassy ever
produced that figure, so we are informed. Charles Twining, who was the
Indochina watcher at the U.S. embassy in Bangkok from 1975 to 1977, writes that
there was never any "Embassy figure" of 1.2 million "or of any other dimension"
and that although people in Bangkok naturally tried to arrive at estimates in their
own minds as to the number of Cambodians who died from execution, or from
disease or malnutrition, "these were purely private, and mostly short-lived,
294. See note 82.
296. Perhaps the percentage of the population that voluntarily supported the
Communists was as small as the minority that supported the American rebels in
1776-1783; see chapter 2, section 2.
298. On this matter see note 418, below.
299. That the Communists depicted the North Vietnamese as "our teachers"
seems hardly likely, given their constant emphasis on independence and self-
reliance and the long history of conflict between Cambodian and Vietnamese
Communists. On the development of Cambodian Communist policy during this
period, see Heder's papers cited in the preface, note 19.
301. Ibid., p. 61.
302. For a serious account of how the Communist forces were built up from an
estimated 5-10,000 in the pre-coup period (January 1968 to March 1970), despite
opposition from the Vietnamese and Chinese, who opposed the armed struggle
line of the Khmer Communist Party, see Heder, op. cit.
303. Even the limited range of sources they cite in their "impeccable documentation" hardly supports their case. Thus under "paucity of popular support for the communists" (p. 214) we find the study edited by Carney, op. cit., which does indeed include the statement by a hostile critic who lived with the Khmer Rouge that the masses do not support them, though it also contains laments from the same source concerning their popularity and success. See note 214 above. Under the same heading they also cite Quinn's study (see note 60), which gives ample evidence suggesting the contrary conclusion, as we have noted.


305. Recall that the Tarrs report having seen dead bodies on the streets. As many journalists have noted, it was difficult to decide whether dead that were seen were victims of the last stages of the fighting or postwar executions. Barron and Paul are quite certain, however. Their primary source, Ponchaud, saw no dead bodies (Cambodia: Year Zero, p. 24). See also the report by Lim Pech Kuon cited above, p. 145.


307. Not surprisingly, reports transmitted under such circumstances have low reliability. For example, Swain also reports that surgeon Bernard Piquart reported several atrocious acts by Khmer Rouge in the Calmette Hospital, a report corroborated by "other witnesses." But Piquart seems to have had second thoughts. See note 267.

308. Cf. chapter 2, section 2.

309. Recall that people who have a considerable knowledge of Cambodia do not find these fellows so "un-Cambodian like"—cf., e.g. Meyer, p. 223, above; Vickery, note 225—though they are undoubtedly quite unlike those whom Meyer calls the "Western colonials" in Phnom Penh.

310. Compare Barron and Paul, who keep strictly to the government propaganda line: whatever the facts, the U.S. was simply striking "communist sanctuaries" (p. 54), i.e., Vietnamese Communists, as the context makes clear.

311. This is not the only example. To take another, while they quote Swain's horrified account of the evacuation of the hospitals, they omit his equally horrified account of what he saw in a hospital before evacuation. See above, note 264.


313. This is in response to a surmise by some foreigners that only the strong will survive, so that the forced march is "genocide by natural selection." Others, they say, "believe the depopulation of the cities was a necessary race against time to prepare the rice fields for a new planting. Food is very short now, and much farmland had been devastated by the war."

314. The Washington Post (9 May 1975) carries a story filed from Aranyaprathet (not Bangkok) compiled from unidentified news dispatches that contains reports that many refugees saw decomposing bodies or people who had been shot or apparently beaten to death, citing also Olle Tolgraven of Swedish Broadcasting who said "he did not believe there had been wholesale executions" though the Khmer Rouge may have shot people who refused to leave their homes when ordered to evacuate.

315. Washington Post (9 May 1975). Paul takes care of this annoying fact as follows, in a letter to the Far Eastern Economic Review (9 December 1977): "I'm afraid that the evidence is overwhelming that these people, whoever they were, were either the rare exceptions or were not telling the truth," appealing
to the testimony of "scores of Cambodian refugees" most of whom "witnessed summary executions" and all of whom, to his recollection, saw "corpses during the long exodus"—as did some foreigners, though the more scrupulous among them pointed out that it was impossible to know whether they were victims of the recent bloody fighting or of executions. Ponchaud writes that he saw no dead bodies in or near Phnom Penh (Op. cit., p. 24).


317. Le Monde (May 8-10). See the Manchester Guardian Weekly (17 May 1975) and a brief report in the Washington Post (8 May 1975), which notes correctly that his account "lent no substance to reports that a massive and bloody purge of anti-Communists is under way in Cambodia." He saw no bodies en route and found the streets of Phnom Penh empty on leaving the city. His report "was generally favorable to the Khmer Rouge," and thus not to be discussed further.

318. Recall that the second-hand report of the French teacher which they cite from Swain provides no evidence for the horrible consequences of summary executions that "virtually everybody" saw, but rather serves as an example of the "summary executions" themselves, furthermore, an example that does not support their conclusion, as noted.


320. See note 17, above.

321. See note 2, above. Even "scoops" have been avoided by the press when they convey an unwanted picture. For example, in 1972 Serge Thion was invited to visit the liberated zones in Cambodia, reporting on his experiences in Le Monde (26, 27, 28 April 1972). His reports provided a unique insight into the character of an unknown, though evidently very successful and significant movement. His story was offered to the Washington Post, but rejected. It appeared nowhere in the U.S. media, to our knowledge. For some excerpts, see For Reasons of State, pp. 190ff.

322. Several are cited in Hildebrandt and Porter, in their ignored study.

323. See, for example, the testimony of Peter Poole, May Hearings, pp. 18-19. He points out that "I don't think there is a great deal we can do" to improve the situation though we might easily worsen it, and that even speaking out will do little good in this case. The point was commonly emphasized by people who know and care about Cambodia, as was the fact that the kind of irresponsible and sometimes hysterical "speaking out" that was being done, with its falsifications and unsupported allegations, could cause serious harm. See note 228 of this chapter, and the preface to this volume.

324. Far easier, in fact. Throughout the protest against the U.S. war in Indochina, the Soviet Union was quite reluctant to back or tolerate strong condemnations of the United States, specifically of Nixon, a fact that led to continual controversy at international meetings.

325. Not really "perfectly" because of the condemnation of the United States and the major theme that Khmer Rouge policies have roots and reason in the domestic society. But few will actually read the book, discovering these elements, and the commentary that reaches a mass audience can be counted on, by and large, to keep to atrocity stories. Lacouture takes note of the Western responsibility but ignores the second major theme of the book, as do other reviewers.

326. Author's note for the American translation, p. xiii.


329. The *Economist* is correct, though not for the reasons it probably had in mind, in describing Lacouture's published corrections as "a bizarre episode." In what passes for intellectual discourse in the West, political discussion included, correction of errors is rare indeed, as a glance at review journals will indicate. Lacouture deserves credit for departing from the general norm. We think that his corrections are inadequate and disagree with some of the conclusions expressed in them, but we want to stress that it is no crime to misread—it is a rare review that avoids error—and it is only proper to issue corrections when errors are discovered. One of us (Chomsky) played a role in this, which though entirely a matter of private correspondence has for some reason been the subject of considerable discussion (and distortion) in the press. We see no point in commenting on any of this.

330. The *Economist* thinks otherwise, for interesting reasons to which we return directly.

331. See, e.g., Leo Cherne's comment on the MacNeil/Lehrer report, referring to Ponchaud as "very sympathetic to the Khmer Rouge." See note 53. Similarly, the review in *Foreign Affairs* stresses that Ponchaud "was initially sympathetic to the Khmer Rouge" (Winter, 1978-1979), as have many others who take this alleged fact to add to the credibility of his account (reasonably, if it is true). Shawcross also writes that Ponchaud "originally welcomed the prospect of a revolutionary change* (New York Review, 6 April 1978). See also note 338.

332. *New York Review*, 31 March 1977; thus he writes that he can read Ponchaud's book "only with shame."


334. For Sihanouk's own account, see the preface to this volume.

335. See chapter 2, p. 24.

336. See chapter 4, p. 112.

337. *Cambodia: Year Zero*, p. 22.


339. Lacouture's original charges, in fact, have continued to circulate widely even after they were withdrawn. To cite only one case, Homer Jack, Secretary-General of the World Conference on Religion and Peace, produced a *WCSCP Report* entitled "Can the United Nations stop human massacre in Democratic Kampuchea" (20 November 1978) which is full of fanciful charges, including Jean Lacouture's estimate "of the number of persons killed" as "one-quarter of the population," referring to Lacouture's *New York Review* article in which he stated that the regime "boasted" of this achievement, but not to his "Corrections" where he stated that the charge had no basis. It is striking that the credible evidence of substantial atrocities never seems to suffice for human rights activists of this type. Jack surely knew of Lacouture's corrections; indeed, in the course of a series of undocumented slanders directed at "the political right wing" and "the left wing," he denounced our review in which the facts were mentioned. Even when the falsehood was specifically called to his attention, among many others in the document, he felt no need to correct it (or others). Recall Orwell's statement on what is true "in the sight of God" in the Stalinist school of falsification; p. 171, above. The example is not untypical.
341. In contrast, its foreign correspondents have often been outstanding.
342. For a few examples of its countenancing certain acts of barbarism and remaining silent about others, see Chomsky, *American Power and the New Mandarins*, pp. 14f., 185, 244, 277.
343. See note 279.
344. 21 March 1977.
345. *New York Times* (21 April 1975). The preceding sentence tells us that “the early American decisions on Indochina can be regarded as blundering efforts to do good. But by 1969...” See p. 15, above. More recently Lewis has warned that “America should do nothing” regarding Rhodesia, because, “if we remember Vietnam, we know that intervention, however well-intended, may do terrible harm if it is uninformed.” (*New York Times*, 1 February 1979). The inability of the intelligentsia to inform themselves about what their government is up to truly defies comment.
348. We know of only one case of honest retraction: Matthew Storin, *Boston Globe* (13 May 1977), correcting a report of 7 April based on Lacouture. Storin was also unique in his willingness to at least mention contrary evidence that was privately provided to journalists who had relied on Lacouture, along with conclusive evidence that their references were without basis. Alexander Cockburn expressed the hope—in vain—that “such liberal journalists as Lewis” who had relied on Lacouture’s derivative account would see “that ‘details’ do indeed matter” (*Village Voice*, 16 May 1977). After Lacouture’s corrections appeared, a letter was sent to the *New York Review* by a well-known scientist (Nobel Laureate) commenting that in his field, when conclusions are published based on certain evidence and it then turns out that the cited evidence is incorrect, the scientist does not retract the evidence while reiterating the conclusions—but evidently matter are different in journalism. The letter was not published.
349. As we have mentioned (note 48), in the *Nouvel Observateur*, where Lacouture’s review was originally published, the corrections never appeared. But this fact, which we find rather surprising, is perhaps of little moment given that in the United States, where they did appear, they have been ignored and what remains in the media record are the original errors. A misstated reference by Lacouture to a quote that has been deleted from the American edition appears on the cover of the British edition of Ponchaud’s book. A different quote from Lacouture’s review appears on the cover of the American edition, with no concern over the fact that the conclusions expressed were based on no accurate citation. See note 339.
350. Somewhat misleadingly. He writes that “My reference to the death of ‘one quarter’ of the population in a single year must be corrected”—he had spoken of “boasts” and killing—citing Ponchaud’s text, which gives a Cambodian estimate of 800,000 dead during the war and a U.S. embassy (Bangkok) estimate of 1.2 million dead (not killed) since the war; adding the two, we obtain the two million figure, about one quarter of the population, that has since been used with abandon in the press and Congress, very likely with this source. See note 293, above, on Ponchaud’s 1.2 million estimate allegedly based on “American embassy sources,” though the embassy offered no such estimate. Thus Lacouture’s statement that the Khmer Rouge boast of having eliminated some 2
million people is based on a misreading of a claim by Ponchaud that is dubious to begin with. Ponchaud mentions other estimates attributed to various vaguely-identified sources, but there is little reason to suppose that these claims have any more validity than the single one which is subject to check, and which, as is the way with verifiable claims, turns out to be inaccurate. Lacouture continues to refer to the 2 million figure (dropping the "boast"); "...the hundreds of thousands, indeed 2 million victims..." of the Pol Pot Regime (Nouvel Observateur, 2 October 1978), an excerpt from his book Survivre le peuple cambodgien! He gives no source, and does not explain how such charges will help the Cambodian people to survive. 351. See pp. 72-73 of the French original, pp. 50-51 of the American translation.

352. We do not know why Ponchaud dropped the quotes in the translation in this case. Perhaps because of the focus on the question after Lacouture's review and corrections. Or perhaps the reason lies in a debate over translation from Khmer on which we are not competent to comment. In News from Kampuchea, August 1977, Stephen Heder challenged several of Ponchaud's translations, including this one. He asserts that in this case, the correct translation of the Khmer phrase (which he says is openly used) is something like "to have no more of this kind of person (e.g., imperialists, oppressors)." In a privately circulated document ("Vicissitudes de la linguistique au service de l'Ideologie abstraite," Ponchaud rejects these challenges to his translations. In this case he states that Heder's proposed translation is "false," but also says that his own translation was "hasty," and would require more time to justify and polish. His own account of the meaning seems to us to leave the correct interpretation rather ambiguous over a certain range, with his specific formulation at the harsher extreme. In any event, even if there is a quote, contrary to what the American edition suggests, it would seem that Lacouture's conclusions from a possible rhetorical flourish are distinctly questionable.

353. The quote as Lacouture gives it in his Nouvel Observateur review is inaccurate, and further errors are introduced in the English translation. We will drop this matter, keeping to Ponchaud's text.

354. P. 73 of the French original.

355. This translation, which is sufficiently accurate, is what appears in the British edition, p. 70.

356. Heder provided us with an English translation; Ponchaud with a French translation and the Thai original.

357. Our apologies to the editors of Prachachat for the comparison.


359. Cf. note 273, above. Also, note 82.

360. There is a problem in that the French translation given in Ponchaud's book differs from the French translation that he sent us, which includes the context omitted in the book. We will assume that the translation that he sent us is accurate. It corresponds closely to the English translation provided by Heder. We have not taken the trouble to verify the translations from the Thai original, since the main points emerge fairly clearly even without this further step.

361. The phrase reads: "il peut même arriver qu'on n'y arrive pas partout, et les autorités se trouvent alors chargées d'un fardeau très lourd."


363. This exercise in verification raises some further questions. It is striking that
those passages in the original French text that drew attention because of Lacouture's review have been softened, deleted, or changed in the American translation, or where they remain, are extremely misleading or outright misrepresentations. Note that this is true of each of the four cases just discussed, including the first, where a look at Ponchaud's text shows that estimates of roughly a million dead (the most crucial of which lacks any credible source) become, a few lines later, allegations that many millions are being eliminated, most of the population in fact. These passages were selected for investigation at random, in effect; that is, they were not selected on any basis other than the fact that they seemed to be the passages that Lacouture had in mind in his misrepresentations of (i.e., references to) the book. The facts suggest some obvious questions about the remainder. We have not carried out a thorough line-by-line comparison but a fairly careful reading has not brought to light any other changes from the French original to the American translation (apart from some new material and some rearrangement). If this impression is correct, it also suggests obvious questions.

Ponchaud's book is almost completely lacking in verifiable documentation. The Prachachat reference is one of a handful of examples. It is therefore of more than passing interest to see how it fares upon examination.

364. For a review, see Chomsky, For Reasons of State, chapter 2, where there are references for the citations here.


367. See chapter 1.

368. Cambodia: Year Zero, p. 164.

369. Ibid.

370. See below, p. 288. It has been alleged that Sihanouk was being hypocritical in his denunciation of the U.S. bombing and that he had in fact secretly authorized it. This has been occasionally argued in defense of the failure of the U.S. media, like Ponchaud, to make public Sihanouk's impassioned criticism of the bombing of the civilian society of Cambodia. Two points deserve notice. First, even if Sihanouk secretly authorized bombing of "Vietcong bases," he surely did not authorize bombing of Khmer peasants, and his protests were directed against the latter crime. Second, while commentators and media analysts may draw whatever conclusions they please from the conflicting evidence available, this does not entitle them to suppress what is, by any standards, crucial evidence, in this case, Sihanouk's attempt to arouse international protest over the U.S. bombing of the civilian society.


372. Ibid., p. 170.

373. Ibid., p. 167.

374. Ibid.

375. Ibid., p. 164.

376. See notes 146, 147 above.

377. Ibid., p. 21.

378. See above, p. 160.

379. See pp. 153 and 167 above.

380. Ibid., p. 50.

381. Ibid., p. 28.
382. See Peang Sophi’s testimony, p. 212 above. See also several reports cited by
Kiernan, “Social Cohesion,” from the Bangkok Post, reporting the statements of
refugees that an order to stop reprisals was announced at the end of May 1975.
383. See note 237, above, for a review of their scope and character.
384. Cambodia: Year Zero, pp. 16, 53. Ponchaud does not explicitly state that
this is the same man, but it appears so from his description.
386. Sometimes in more detail, as we have noted in the case of the alleged “quote”
about 1-2 million young Khmers being sufficient to build the new Cambodia.
388. Ibid., p. 162. See also notes 203 and 240, above.
389. Ibid., p. xiv.
390. But given Ponchaud’s carelessness with fact, already noted in several cases,
some caution is in order here as well. Thus, the author’s note to the American
translation, dated 20 September 1977, contains a reference to a letter dated 19
October 1977.
391. See note 352, above.
392. We omit reference to other slight discrepancies.
393. We have kept to published material, omitting discussion of personal
.correspondence mentioned by Ponchaud, who presumably obtained it from the
editor of the New York Review. His references to this personal correspondence,
 apart from being irrelevant, are incorrect. What he calls “a polemical exchange”
leading to Lacouture’s corrections consists of personal letters pointing out errors
 and urging correction; Lacouture’s published corrections reveal how little it was
 “polemical”. It is difficult to imagine a less polemical response to the discovery of
 serious errors, and it was so understood, as the correspondence clearly shows.
 Nor is there anything in this correspondence to support Ponchaud’s false
 statements, though even if there were, it would be irrelevant in this context, as
 should be obvious. We should perhaps mention that in his book cited above and
 in articles and interviews elsewhere, Lacouture has been presenting grossly false
 versions of Chomsky’s views, invariably without the slightest effort at documenta-
 tion, and indeed, quite inconsistent with what he knows to be true. This too
 deserves no further comment.
394. See note 329. Ponchaud’s fakery has also found its way into what purports to
 be “scholarship.” In a review of Ponchaud’s book in International Affairs,
journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (January 1979), Dennis
Duncanson writes that “The author reports, without rancour, that after the
French edition came out it was attacked by Professor Noam Chomsky and Mr.
Gareth Porter for relying on refugees’ stories, on the grounds that refugees can be
assumed to warp the truth, that we ought to give the Phnom Penh Politburo the
benefit of its secrecy, and that as a positive fact no massacres took place in
Cambodia.” This is an embellishment of Ponchaud’s false statements in the
British translation, presented here simply as fact—to this scholar, it is of no
concern that Ponchaud’s charges are presented not only “without rancour” but
also without a particle of evidence, and that, as can be easily verified, the charges
 are not only false but indeed were conscious falsehoods, as we have seen.
Duncanson proceeds with further falsehoods and undocumented slanders that
give some insight into what is regarded as “scholarship” in this domain but are
otherwise not worthy of comment.
395. Tiden Norsk Forlag, 1978, p. 210. See note 141, above. We are indebted to Torben Retbell for providing us with the relevant pages.
396. *Inquiry*, 16 October 1978. See note 327, above, and text.
399. Shawcross regards this question as not just serious, but the most crucial question, and he believes that the evidence has firmly established central direction and intent. See note 187, above, and text. In his published work, he appears to rely largely on Ponchaud, quite uncritically.
400. *Cambodia: Year Zero*, p. xvi.
401. The lapse on Ponchaud’s part is perhaps far from accidental. Thus in the British translation, the comparable passage in the author’s note (p. 16) clearly implies that the “accusing foreigners” are the ones to whom he has already referred: namely, Chomsky and Porter, who “say there have been no massacres” and regard refugees as “not a valid source,” an allegation that he knows perfectly well to be false, as we have seen.
Recall again that the British version is not available in the United States, where the merits of his allegations can readily be determined.
402. Much the same is true of Ponchaud’s rhetorical question: “How many of those who say they are unreservedly in support of the Khmer revolution would consent to endure one hundredth part of the present sufferings of the Cambodian people” (p. 193), immediately following the familiar accusation that few voices have been “raised in protest against the assassination of a people.” He fails to enumerate those who are unreservedly in support of the Khmer revolution, though the list would be small enough so that it could easily have been given at this point. Note also that another question might easily be raised: how many of those who virulently condemn the Khmer revolution would consent to endure one hundredth part of the suffering of the peasants of the traditional society of Cambodia?—a society that was hardly improving their lot in its latter days.
403: In fact, we know of no specialist who takes such an estimate seriously, including Ponchaud in his more sober moments.
405. See note 9. Ponchaud mentions it in the author’s note to the American translation without comment, postdating it by a year.
408. See notes 237, 259 above.
409. 22 November 1976.
410. 16 April 1976.
411. 20 September 1976.
412. Recall the predictions by U.S. government sources of impending starvation that will take a million lives, or by the Western doctors cited by Hildebrand and Porter(see p. 161, above) in a book which for this reason alone must be kept from public notice.
413. *New York Times* (19 April 1977), our emphasis.
414. 26 April 1977. The implication here, and explicit statement commonly, is that Cambodia did or would refuse any shipments of food. Is that correct? The crew of the Mayaguez saw two Chinese freighters unloading rice in the port of Kampong Som in May 1975. See Roy Rowan, *The Four Days of Mayaguez*.
415. See chapter 5, note 30.
417. The specific instances cited are not B-52 attacks.
420. Ibid., pp. 122-123.
421. In the Watergate hearings the alleged “secrecy” of the bombing became an issue but not the bombing itself. Nixon’s crime, we must assume, was not that he sent his bombers to destroy a relatively peaceful country with which the United States had “friendly” relations, but that he kept the matter from Congress. On the hypocrisy of the Watergate proceedings and the press reaction quite generally, see Chomsky, introduction to Blackstock, ed., Cointelpro.
422. William Beecher “Raid in Cambodia by U.S. unprotested,” New York Times (9 May 1969). Recall Ponchaud’s comment that Sihanouk’s protest against the bombing of North Vietnamese and Vietcong sanctuaries deceived no one. As we pointed out in note 370, Sihanouk’s protests were primarily against the bombing of Khmer civilians. In regard to the bombing of Vietnamese concentrations near the border, while there is conflicting evidence as to Sihanouk’s attitude, it is not up to the press or others to decide what it “really was” and then to withhold reference to his explicit appeal just cited on grounds that no one is deceived by it. What is more, recall that the bombings of the “Vietcong and North Vietnamese” sanctuaries were undoubtedly aimed at Vietnamese who had been driven across the border by murderous U.S. military operations in Vietnam, primarily since early 1967. And finally, recall that direct observation by Western reporters and others confirms that the B-52 raids were by no means aimed at the Vietnamese. See for example, Swain, op. cit.; p. 249, above. While the precise scale of these atrocities could not have been known in 1969, and is not known now in the West, a free press could have surmised and perhaps learned a great deal had it chosen to do so. It is remarkable that Beecher’s unique though quite inadequate account is now held up as evidence that the press maintained its honor throughout this period, despite the crimes of Richard Nixon.
423. See At War With Asia, pp. 121-22.
425. See above, p. 224.
426. “Defining the Revolutionary State in Cambodia.”
427. See the accounts surveyed above, as well as the assessment in the FEER Asia 1979 Yearbook.
7 Final Comments

1. On these matters, see Alex Carey, "Reshaping the Truth: Pragmatists and Propagandists in America," Meanjin Quarterly (Australia), vol. 35, no. 4, 1976; Carey and Truda Korber, Propaganda and Democracy in America, forthcoming.
2. In particular, the singular failure of significant segments of the French intelligentsia to come to terms with the true nature of Stalinism and its roots in Leninist ideology and practice.