

FM 33-5

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES

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PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS—TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES

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* This manual supersedes FM 33-5, 16 January 1962.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1. Purpose and Scope

a. This manual provides detailed psychological operations techniques for psychological operations commanders and staff officers. It discusses relationships, capabilities, tactics, and techniques of psychological operations during general, limited, and cold war operations.

b. Users of this manual are encouraged to submit comments or recommendations for changes to improve the manual. Comments will be keyed to the specific page, paragraph, and line of the text in which the change is recommended. Reasons will be provided for each comment to ensure understanding and complete evaluation. Comments will be forwarded directly to Commandant, U.S. Army Special Warfare School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307, ATTN: Director of Instruction.

2. Relationship with Other Training Literature

The techniques and procedures discussed in this manual augment doctrine published in FM 33-1. By integrating the tactics and techniques described in this manual with those concerned with general and limited war, *counterinsurgent operations*, and *guerrilla warfare*, the commander and the staff officer will gain maximum benefit from psychological operations as a weapons system.

3. Sources of Policy

The military commander uses psychological operations in conjunction with military operations to further national policies and objectives. Policies are considered to be the guidelines by which we achieve specific political, economic, military, or psychological objectives. National objectives and policies are usually determined at the highest levels of government and are

shaped largely by the nation's ethical and moral beliefs. Military psychological operations are a means to an end established by policy; therefore, they must be in accord with both the broad guidelines enunciated by the President and with the implementation plans of appropriate and interested agencies of government. Because of the psychological implications of all national policies and actions, military psychological operations must be coordinated with all government departments and agencies participating in information and psychological operations programs. The United States Information Agency (USIA), in conjunction with the Department of State and responsible civilian advisory groups and with congressional supervision and controls, is responsive to the President's established psychological objectives. USIA has primary responsibility for these programs in cold war situations.

4. Interagency Relationships

a. The roles and missions which are normally assigned to U.S. Government agencies operating in foreign countries is supervised and coordinated by the U.S. Ambassador. He may create a "country team" to assist him in this task, but he is not required to do so. The country team is headed by the Ambassador and is composed of those members of the diplomatic mission he considers appropriate. Usually the principal representatives of important U.S. agencies such as the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), the United States Agency for International Development (AID) mission, and the United States Information Service (USIS) are chosen as team members. A typical country team functions within the country to which it is accredited and focuses its attention on furthering the aims of U.S. policy and providing the country with requested advice and assistance. The Ambassador may use

his country team to coordinate such U.S. activities as the AID program, the Military Assistance Program, and the U.S. Information program.

b. *The U.S. Overseas Internal Defense Policy*, National Security Action Memorandum Number 182, 24 August 1962, sets forth policy for determining requirements and responsibilities for implementation of *counterinsurgency plans and programs*. The paper, with subsequent changes and modification, also sets forth agency functions and relationships as pertains to U.S. overseas information activities and psychological operations. One of the functions of the Department of Defense is to support the psychological operation of USIA in preinsurgent or counterinsurgent situations. The Department of Defense, in coordination with USIA and AID, also assists the host country in developing, equipping, and conducting psychological operations aimed at preventing or defeating subversive insurgency. In the event of hostilities in the host country, one of two things may happen: (1) The Ambassador and the country team may remain in the host country and coordinate advisory and assistance operations; or (2) The theater commander and his staff may supersede the Ambassador and the country team with the Ambassador becoming the political advisor to the commander and elements of the team being absorbed into the military organization in accordance with existing intra-governmental agreements governing U.S. national assistance programs.

c. The informational objectives and national policies generated by the President are programmed and planned by USIA, under advisement and control from the illustrated external agencies and groups. The broad policies and guidance supporting the desired programs control the production of the media services as well as the six USIS geographic offices. Each geographic office is assigned a specific area or region of responsibility. This office then supervises all programs which go to the worldwide audiences reflecting the United States image and views. There is a USIS post within most countries of the world. The public affairs officer (PAO) is responsible for the in-country USIS program under the supervision of the regional offices, but he is directly responsive to the

country's Ambassador. The major worldwide operations (such as Voice of America, movies, press and publications, and cultural efforts) fall under the purview of the media services, but these operations are conducted only after detailed coordination throughout the organization. Interagency responsiveness is greatly assisted by the centralized policy flow, while permitting great latitude in decentralized execution within policy. A simplified functional diagram of the USIA operations is shown below, illustrating current interagency operations and controls.


5. Roles of Army Psychological Operations

The roles of Army psychological operations are outlined in FM 33-1; but generally, psychological operations are a combat support weapon that the commander should employ habitually to assist in the accomplishment of his mission. Psychological operations can be used effectively in any type of operation from employment as a strategic weapon in a general war to a tactical unconventional warfare.

6. Capabilities

By following cohesive national policy psychological operations, integrated with the other instruments of national power, will make significant contributions to the achievement of national objectives through overt and covert means by effecting desired changes in selected audience attitudes, emotions, opinions, and behavior. There are, however, limitations to the success psychological operations can achieve. If a national government is one in which the people are not participating and its presence is not being realized at all levels, positive results from psychological operations cannot be realized without employing strong control measures over media and the population such as are practiced in most totalitarian countries. Furthermore, in military situations, psychological operations cannot make up for ineffective tactical operations in the field.

a. Although military psychological operations may be used to induce any response that the target audience is capable of giving, in practice its use is restricted to the political and military goals of the nation that uses it.



*Support from other agencies when required and authorized.

Figure 1. Simplified functional diagram of USIA operations.

b. Psychological operations may also support foreign policy by aiding diplomatic negotiations, gaining the support and cooperation of neutral countries, strengthening or weakening alliances, deterring a nation from aggression or clearing the way for aggression, and bringing about the final capitulation of an enemy nation.

c. Psychological operations can—

- (1) *Change morale.* Sustained psychological operations can produce a cumulative depressing effect upon the morale of enemy units and civilian populations by pointing up unfair treatment of ethnic groups, or by stressing the rapid development of new and powerful weapons being used against the enemy. Similarly, friendly morale may be improved by news of victories, news from home, and other reinforcements to group participation and commonality of goals and experiences.
- (2) *Reduce or improve combat efficiency.* Consistent psychological attacks upon morale, when integrated with other military operations, can lower the combat efficiency of enemy soldiers. The growing power of the Allied forces, the low civilian morale in the enemy country, and the destruction of enemy industrial capacity are themes that can lower morale. Positive programs for friendly forces can improve combat effectiveness, but the propaganda must be credible and emphasize positive values.
- (3) *Encourage defection.* Enemy soldiers subjected to psychological operations over extended periods can be induced to malingering, surrender, desert, or refrain from last ditch resistance.
- (4) *Deceive.* Psychological operations can be used by the commander to convey deceptive information.
- (5) *Create national unity.* Where a newly established nation includes largely divergent societies whose members hold no allegiance to groups larger than family, clan, or tribe, psychological operations can and should be used to assist in creating cohesive national

pride and a sense of belonging if the nation is to remain politically viable.

- (6) *Keep the public informed.* The population of a country can be made aware of governmental objectives, goals, and aspirations. They can be given a knowledge of on-going government programs which are serving the best interests of the nation as a whole. During time of crisis psychological operations can be conducted to calm the nation and bolster support for programs directed toward accomplishing national objectives.
- (7) *Re-direct interests.* A psychological operations campaign can open new informational channels or create interest in new subjects by saturating mass media with strong appeals. Such appeals can be strengthened by getting leading citizens and specialists in the particular subjects to comment favorably, since their roles as opinion formers is already established.
- (8) *Create or destroy images.* Moral or physical images may be created or destroyed through properly planned campaigns such as the "Why we fight" series stressing desirable American ethics to American soldiers. The image of an opposing military or political leader may be reduced to manageable proportions by exploiting his known personal weaknesses, his policies, or his motives.
- (9) *Establish an audience.* A high degree of credibility can be developed by presenting reliable information. The Voice of America (VOA) and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) are examples.

7. Measuring Success in Psychological Operations

a. An essential part of psychological operations is determining the degree of success that has been achieved. A detailed discussion on propaganda effect may be found in chapter 9

CHAPTER 2

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS INTELLIGENCE

Section I. INTRODUCTION

8. General

One of the critical elements of a psychological operations campaign is to identify effective, susceptible target groups and develop detailed intelligence about them. This chapter will explain intelligence requirements, procedures, and techniques for psychological operations.

9. Purpose

The guidance provided in this chapter is offered as a general statement of principles related to the requirements, procedures, and techniques of psychological operations intelligence. The specific requirements, procedures, and techniques employed in any given situation will depend, in great part, upon the mission assigned and the actual circumstances influencing the situation.

Section II. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

10. Area Analysis

In the search for effective and susceptible target groups as well as for an understanding of the conditions and attitudes which pertain to these groups, psychological operations personnel must develop their knowledge of the area in which they are operating. The first requirement is to identify the various societies within the operational area. Within a single nation, there may be several distinct societies even though they are intermixed. Identification may be a difficult task, but it must be accomplished.

11. Identification and Location of Targets

Another critical aspect of a psychological operation is the selection and exploitation of significant target groups. Groups must be found that are susceptible and effective. They must possess attitudes that lend themselves to themes that will influence the target group to adopt the desired behavior. One of the functions of psychological operations intelligence is to locate, identify, and analyze such groups. This process goes beyond the mere geograph-

ical location and identification of potentially exploitable target groups. The target groups will have to be identified and located in terms of social position and political alignment with the various factions in the operational area. This identification and location of target groups is essential in determining the target group's attitudes, its susceptibility, and its effectiveness (see app VI and VII).

12. Determination of Target Susceptibility

a. Influence of Attitudes, Frames of Reference, and Value Systems. Attitudes, frames of reference, and value systems of a potential target group are the chief factors in determining susceptibility or vulnerability to various themes or lines of persuasion. Psychological operations intelligence teams assist in providing this information.

b. Receptivity to Communications. Psychological operations intelligence must also explore the area of communications most acceptable to the target group. This exploitation would determine acceptable forms of communication and their content such as specific types of radio

programs. For example, a particular target group might prefer persuasive communication to be in the form of informal group discussion while radio is suitable only for entertainment and news.

13. Determination of Target Effectiveness

a. To determine which of several potential target groups will be selected for exploitation, an important factor is each group's effectiveness or its relative power. Again psychological operations intelligence can provide the basis for defining the group's effectiveness. Intelligence should be developed that provides a clear indication of the group's influence on other potential target groups.

b. If the group relationships mentioned above are not constant in all situations, it is necessary that the deviations be outlined along with the circumstances that prevail when such deviations occur. An examination of pertinent group attitudes, frames of reference, and value systems will offer an explanation for these de-

viations as well as the normal responsive relationship.

14. Information Categories

A detailed listing of psychological operations intelligence categories is contained in FM 33-1. Specific categories of information for psychological operations intelligence activities, however, will vary with the mission assigned and the society in which psychological operations is to be conducted. Generally, it would be desirable to examine an area such as policies in terms of the universal societal behavior areas outlined in the paragraph on area studies above. Hence, there should be a description and explanation of the political, economic, sociological, religious, educational, transportation, communication, and armed forces behavioral aspects of the society along with a statement of the influence of climatic, geographic, scientific, biographic, and historic factors. With this information, psychological operations intelligence personnel will be better equipped to determine the susceptibility, effectiveness, and behavioral responses of potential target groups to certain situations.

Section III. RESEARCH, ANALYSIS, AND INTELLIGENCE TECHNIQUES

15. Determining Mission Requirements

All psychological operations intelligence activities are focused on furnishing the required intelligence to accomplish the assigned psychological operations mission. The mission must be studied in detail to determine the precise intelligence requirements. Normally, the mission will either directly or by implication limit activities to a particular area and, by extension, to the social groups residing in that area. Furthermore, the mission will normally state the desired response from the inhabitants of that area. Psychological operations intelligence activities, then, should explore group susceptibilities in terms of the desired response. Similarly, intelligence should be developed that will identify groups that can be expected to effectively influence other groups to adopt the desired behavior.

16. Research Methods

Because psychological operations intelli-

gence explores many intangible areas, correct, scientific research methods must be used to avoid drawing wrong conclusions. Basically, research methods involve forming tentative hypotheses about the area of interest based on information already available. The next step is to test these tentative hypotheses on the basis of data obtained from the society and the potential target groups. This data is then analyzed in terms of the hypotheses. The tentative hypotheses are next accepted, rejected, or modified as a result of the data analysis. If the hypotheses are modified, additional testing is required to confirm the modification indicates that such action is required.

17. Evaluation and Analysis Techniques

a. *Evaluation.* When information is received it must be evaluated. A detailed explanation of the evaluation process is contained in FM 30-5, COMBAT INTELLIGENCE. Generally, however, the following should be determined:

- (1) *Pertinence.* The information should pertain to the enemy or the area of operations and be of immediate or future value to the psychological operations mission.
- (2) *Reliability.* The information should come from a reliable source through a reliable agency or individual.
- (3) *Accuracy.* The information should be corroborated or verified by other sources and be consistent with the entire related intelligence picture.

b. Analysis Techniques. Once information has been evaluated and accepted it must be analyzed so that its full import can be recognized. This information must be examined in detail and compared with information already established in order to place it in the proper area and determine its significance. The information must additionally be related to the major areas of interest from the point of view of its impact on the hypotheses that have been formed.

18. Correlation and Integration of Information

After a body of information has been developed, it must be organized according to the specific areas of interest derived from the assigned psychological operations mission. Conclusions must be made regarding the susceptibility effectiveness, and behavioral responses of potential target groups in terms relating to the psychological operations mission.

19. Specific Techniques and Considerations

a. Identification and Selection of Target Groups.

- (1) *Identification of target groups.* As outlined in chapter 3, Psychological Operations Planning, the most desirable target groups are functional social groups. From the point of view of psychological operations intelligence activities, the consequence of this desired quality of a target group means that an effort must be made to find groups possessing the following characteristics:

- (a) The group must be able to exert social pressure on its members to enforce its accepted pattern of behavior.
- (b) The group must be involved in the activities of the society in some positive fashion in the political, social, economic, or armed forces aspects of the society. In some cases, groups will be found that are active in several aspects of the society.

- (2) *Selection of target groups.* Target groups to be exploited should be both susceptible and effective. Consequently, psychological operations intelligence must develop information and analyze it in terms of whether or not the particular, potential target group is susceptible and effective, detailing the precise manner of susceptibility and effectiveness.

b. Attitude Assessment and Analysis. An important part of the development of successful lines of persuasion involves the assessment and analysis of existing attitudes within the potential target group.

c. Evaluation of Psychological Accessibility.

- (1) *Media, themes, and symbols.* While analyzing a potential target group, acceptable themes and symbols and the acceptable media by which these themes and symbols may be communicated to the target group must be determined. This can be learned by studying the themes and symbols that are currently being communicated to the target group by existing media.
- (2) *Technical accessibility.* To determine the best means of communicating with the target group, study the media that the groups are presently receiving. Determine the patterns and characteristics of these media. Geographic location must be studied to determine if any new mediums could be used successfully.

Section IV. RESEARCH INFORMATION ACQUISITION

20. General

Much information is required for psychological operations, and a problem arises in acquiring this information. Generally, much information can be derived from basic intelligence documents; however, these documents will not provide all the information required to support a psychological operations campaign. Information gaps will appear, and psychological operations intelligence personnel will have to fill in these gaps by using available intelligence resources.

21. Reference Materials and Basic Intelligence Documents

Normally, psychological operations intelligence personnel can be expected to have a variety of reference and basic intelligence material available to them. Specific requirements in this area would depend upon the situation and the assigned mission. It is well to note that in addition to documents prepared by agencies of the Armed Forces, other government civilian agencies and some private institutions prepare documents of this nature. An informal check with military intelligence units in the area will reveal what specific documents are available and the nature of their contents.

22. Exploitation of Human Resources

Because psychological operations is concerned with the persuasion of individuals to adopt certain forms of behavior, one of the chief sources to be exploited is the human being.

a. Interrogation of Prisoners. A valuable source of information for psychological operations intelligence purposes, especially with regard to hostile groups, is the prisoner of war. He can be questioned, observed, or used in actual operations to assist psychological operations personnel in the accomplishment of their mission. Prisoners of war, however, cannot be truly representative of the hostile elements in the area: these personnel are prisoners; the others are not. Depending upon how much time has passed since they were captured, there is a chance that they may not see things in the same way as the people who are still a part

of the hostile force. While psychological operations personnel may provide guidance to the interrogation specialist concerning areas of interest, the interrogator should not be disturbed while he is conducting an interrogation.

b. Target Population. Especially in counter-insurgent situations, psychological operations intelligence personnel may find that they have direct access to the potential target groups themselves. In such circumstances, the following devices may be used:

- (1) *Surveys.* A representative portion, or sample, of the target group is queried regarding its views on a particular matter or activity. A carefully drawn up questionnaire may be used in which the respondent answers simply by stating "yes" or "no." The form may be more complicated in that the respondent indicates his view in terms of a graduated scale. In other instances, the respondent will reply orally or in writing, detailing his views. The form the survey takes depends upon the sophistication of the target group and the information desired. After the data is collected, it is summarized and statistically analyzed. Based on the analysis, the hypotheses underlying the survey is accepted, rejected, or modified (and if so modified, then retested).
- (2) *Panels.* Representatives of the target group may be brought together to form discussion panels. Normally, such panels would be connected with the pretesting of specific items of propaganda for determining the probable effect before it is actually disseminated. In the case of post-testing, the panel would be used to determine why a particular effect was achieved. The discussion must be carefully planned and executed to ensure that valid results are obtained, that the panel does not consider areas outside of its competence, and that the results represent the real views of the panel rather than views which reflect what

the panel believes the psychological operations intelligence personnel would like to obtain.

c. Observers. Another major source of information concerning potential target groups are individuals, not members of the group, who have had some contact with the group and can answer questions based upon their observations. It is important to determine the relationships of these individuals with the group in order to determine the extent of their knowledge. By making this determination, psychological operations intelligence personnel can more accurately judge the validity of the information received from these individuals about the group.

23. Communication Media

a. Printed Materials. In addition to determining the technical capabilities and limitations of

existing printing facilities in the area, a study of the content of the printed material will provide insights into the communications habits of the society: specifically, aesthetic standards, expressive conventions, linguistics peculiarities, and acceptable formats. This information will provide guidance to the producers of psychological operations material ensuring that their material conforms to the communications habits of the society.

b. Interpersonal Communication. Information should be obtained concerning the nature and the forms of interpersonal communications within the society, such as group discussions, rallies, dramas, and individual persuasion. The intent is to determine the communication habits of the society in these areas to insure that any use of these devices by psychological operations personnel will conform to the standards and habits of the society.

CHAPTER 3

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS PLANNING

Section I. INTRODUCTION

24. General

a. The prerequisites for successful military operations are:

- (1) Complete, accurate, and timely planning.
- (2) Optimum employment of all available time, space, manpower, funding, and material.
- (3) Appropriate direction, control, training, intelligence, coordination, cooperation, and motivation to insure attainment of assigned objectives and accomplishment of the mission as a whole. These prerequisites become especially important when applied to the broad field of psychological operations. It is this function that the application of exceptional skills, timely and accurate intelligence, logistical planning for nonstandard supplies, and maintenance are so extremely important. Psychological operations planning is a continuous, long-range process requiring imagination, determination and detailed implementation at all levels.

b. Throughout all military planning, commanders and staff officers must consider the psychological aspects of their missions and selected courses of action. During the analysis of missions, commanders should determine what objectives are to be accomplished by psychological operations. The commander's initial planning guidance to the staff should include enough information to enable the staff to consider and evaluate psychological operations during the preparation of its estimates. As part of his decision, the commander may state

his concept for the psychological operations portion of the overall operation. He also may state any specific psychological operations objectives he desires accomplished.

25. Planning Techniques

a. The employment of psychological operations in support of military or paramilitary operations requires planning techniques sufficiently flexible to adjust rapidly to unexpected developments. Targets of psychological opportunity can often be exploited as they arise. The most careful contingency planning cannot anticipate all opportunities. Opportunities to exploit unexpected target vulnerabilities must not be lost by inflexible insistence upon implementation of original plans.

b. Planning for psychological operations is a continuous process. Vulnerabilities, target audiences, objectives, and appropriate themes often change swiftly with shifts in policies or in the balances of political or military power. Changes in a target nation's economy, weapons development, transportation or communications and war-induced changes in culture and sociological factors all tend to have an impact upon psychological concepts and operational planning considerations. Psychological operations staff officers and advisors must continually analyze the effects of current military and psychological operations, update present plans, anticipate future developments, and plan for the future.

c. Planning for psychological operations may precede the decision to carry out a particular propaganda campaign, with the decision coming only after a study of the proposed psychological operations annex to the plan (see app X). Whether the plan precedes or follows the

decision, the ingredients are essentially the same for all psychological operations and activities.

d. Contingency plans, which expound upon events reasonably expected to occur, follow the same pattern. They must be prepared, approved, and held ready pending the occurrence of anticipated events. Such plans must be implemented immediately when the anticipated event occurs. Contingency psychological operations plans cover a variety of situations, such as the end of hostilities, third country intervention, or the use of new weapons.

e. Plan ingredients—

- (1) Realistic objectives that can be achieved within prescribed policy limitations.
- (2) Brief analysis of the situation.
- (3) Sources of information.
- (4) Delineation of the target and its relative accessibility.
- (5) Themes to be used to achieve objectives.
- (6) Media to be employed.

26. The Psychological Operations Staff Officer

a. Advises the commander, staff, and subordinate units on psychological activities and psychological operations programs.

b. Coordinates psychological operations.

c. Prepares the psychological operations portion of training programs.

d. Exercises special staff supervision over psychological operations training throughout the command.

e. Plans and supervises psychological operations, including:

- (1) Preparation, supervision, and dissemination of psychological operations plans, directives, orders, and requests in support of conventional consolidation, and counterinsurgent psychological operations; and coordination with unconventional warfare psychological operations plans when required.
- (2) Dissemination of psychological operations studies, research reports, and

other pertinent information to interested action agencies.

- (3) Formulation of research and intelligence requirements and the submission of such requirements to appropriate staff agencies.
- (4) Further evaluation of intelligence and the preparation of the psychological operations estimate.
- (5) Coordinate the dissemination of psychological operations materials among psychological operations units and the disseminating units (Army aviation, artillery, Air Force, or patrols).
- (6) Establish staff coordination to ensure adequate storage of shells, bombs, etc., for delivering psychological operations materials.
- (7) Coordinate with the supported unit to ensure adequate logistical support and close-in defense for the supporting psychological operations unit.

f. Provides advice to the command information officer on the effect of hostile psychological operations for use in troop information and command information programs.

g. Advises on requirements of the command for trained psychological operations personnel units, equipment, supplies, and research.

h. Coordinates psychological operations in support of unconventional warfare with other psychological operations.

i. Provides technical advice and assistance in the reorientation of defectors and prisoners of war.

j. Assists in foreign military psychological operations training and in coordinating allied psychological operations.

- (1) Performs formal staffing and coordination duties necessary for implementation of the plan.
- (2) Determines whether or not the plan is in keeping with long-range national and/or host country aims and objectives.
- (3) Determines whether the plan is keyed

for strategic or tactical operations, or both.

- (4) Approves, validates, and issues the plan for implementation.

k. Theater headquarters establishes policy consonant with national policy governing psychological operations in the theater and issues directives concerning theater policy to subordinate commanders. The theater psychological operations staff officer formulates and develops theater psychological operations policy for the theater commander's approval and exercises the necessary staff supervision to insure that the directives, intentions, and the orders of the theater commander are properly executed.

l. The psychological operations staff officer in the theater is also responsible for long-range planning for psychological operations in support of military missions within the theater.

m. Commanders at all levels are responsible for planning psychological operations affecting their missions.

27. The Psychological Annex to Operation Plans and Orders

a. General. The psychological operation plan or order will appear as an annex to the overall operation plan or order. The form prescribed by the Department of the Army will apply to all psychological operations plans and orders and will be circulated to the several staff sections outside the psychological operations staff planning structure. It will be returned with appropriate comments and when completed, be submitted to the commander for approval.

b. Purpose of the Psychological Operations Annex. After the commander has approved the psychological operations plan, it becomes the basis for the psychological operations annex to the operation order. It is fitted into an annex so that the overall operation order will not become unduly cumbersome.

c. Content of the Plan and Annex. The basic planning elements of psychological operations are reflected throughout the annex. It will include policies, intelligence, reference to the overall military operation, and unit capabilities. The plan should contain enough detail to

delineate the responsibilities of subordinate commanders, and yet not be so detailed as to prohibit locally responsive planning at the "grass roots" level.

28. Psychological Operations Planning Procedures and Techniques

Tactical employment of psychological operations units assigned to field armies is a responsibility of the army commander. Psychological operations planning, advisory, and supervisory functions at field army, corps, and division headquarters are a staff responsibility of G3, and must fall within the framework of plans and directives laid down by the theater commander. The essential elements of planning which should be observed in all emergency operations are:

a. Minimum Necessary Intelligence. Obtain the minimum necessary intelligence upon which to act. Tactical psychological operations frequently call for quick action in order to exploit a fleeting target or situation.

b. Determine the Psychological Operations Themes. The themes selected for the mission should be simple and easy to develop. Because of the need for speed, theme selection may be restricted somewhat by the intelligence available, the unit's capabilities, and the amount of time available for planning before the operation must begin. Care must be taken not to contradict basic policy or earlier messages.

c. Select the Best Available Medium. Selection of the medium should be guided by intelligence on the following five major items: the kind of target, the time available to plan and act, the weather and the terrain, the time of day, and the duration of the operation. These items of intelligence cannot be treated separately. Each must be considered in conjunction with the others.

- (1) *Target audience.* Unless we know the target audience confronting us, we will not know its vulnerabilities. We should know, as an absolute minimum its nationality and language. Everything else we can learn about the target ethnic background will determine the direction of our psychological operations campaign.

- (2) *Time available.* The speed which may be required in mounting a particular operation may dictate the selection of media. Loudspeaker broadcasts can generally be made more quickly in a tactical situation than the preparation and dissemination of leaflets. If no loudspeaker team is available and an appropriate prestocked leaflet is on hand, it may be disseminated by munition or air-dropped before a loudspeaker could be employed. The locations of psychological operations units in a tactical area of operations must be carefully determined to enable commanders to engage alternate or more lucrative targets as required.
- (3) *Weather and terrain.* Information concerning the weather and terrain in the target area is essential. Weather conditions may dictate that a leaflet air-drop will be impossible when it is most desired. Wind, rain, snow, and sleet can often restrict the dissemination of media. Flat, open terrain facilitates loudspeaker operations. The amount of terrain to be covered is also an important consideration. A loudspeaker unit, able to maneuver for broadcasting from several locations, may cover an extensive area that otherwise would require an excessive amount of leaflet shells. The capabilities and limitations of each particular medium will have to be carefully weighed, considering both the weather and the terrain before a selection is made.
- (4) *Time of day.* The time of day at which an operation must be performed will influence the choice of medium. The necessity for immediate reaction for psychological operations at night usually, but not always, nullifies the value of a leaflet mission because the leaflet may go unseen. A night leaflet drop may be appropriate if immediate target reaction is not anticipated or desired. However, night operations favor the use of loud-

speakers in open terrain more than daytime operations do.

- (5) *Duration of the operation.* If an operation is to continue for a considerable time, it may be feasible to plan an extensive campaign using all available media. Several different methods of dissemination may be used. The duration should influence the theme to be used, the media to be employed, and the amount of intelligence required.

d. Coordination. Close and continuous coordination with all staff sections, and higher, subordinate, and adjacent headquarters is mandatory in order to eliminate duplication of, or interference with, the psychological operations of other organizations; to exchange information on intelligence and successfully employed techniques; and to mutually reinforce operations wherever possible. Coordination with other U.S. agencies is of special importance, particularly with those discussed in chapter 1.

e. Insure Friendly Troop Orientation. In any military operation, specific plans must be made to orient friendly troops in psychological operations being conducted. This orientation must never be taken for granted, especially in tactical situations where troops might be unaware that enemy soldiers and civilians are actually endeavoring to rally for amnesty, defect, or surrender. The purpose of psychological operations should be explained to *all* personnel assisting in the mission. Their interest and cooperation will be more genuine if they are given an English translation of the message to be disseminated. If the mission is to promote defection, friendly troops must know how, when, and where the enemy may come over, so that they will recognize the defectors as such. Failure to orient troops beforehand could lead to the killing of enemy troops who actually wish to defect or surrender, thus destroying credibility and adversely affecting future psychological operations.

f. Evaluation. Psychological operations must be properly and accurately evaluated. Such evaluation will indicate improved methods to be used in subsequent operations. This is a difficult task for two reasons. First, it is often impossible to distinguish between the effect

produced on enemy morale and attitudes by fire and shock action and that produced by friendly psychological operations. Secondly, the effects of psychological operations are cumulative and feedback is usually slow in coming. Because of these limitations, it is important to examine all possible information for the effects of friendly psychological operations (see ch 9).

g. Control. Control of the release of propaganda is a part of the planning phase of the operation. If regular distribution channels are used, the plan should indicate to whom the material is to be released. Care must be taken not to release material for use prematurely. Close coordination of psychological operations in support of civic action operations and military operations will assure proper timing and delivery of propaganda releases.

29. Planning Considerations in Special Situations

There are no essential differences in the procedures and techniques of planning whether the planner is involved in a general war or counterinsurgency. There are, however, certain considerations peculiar to counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare, and consolidation psychological operations. While each of these special situations is described elsewhere in this manual and the considerations referred to above are either stated or implied, a few of the specific differences are:

a. Counterinsurgency. All propaganda must appear to emanate from host country sources. An exception to this is propaganda disseminated in support of the military operations of U.S. combat forces; but even here care must be exercised to avoid undercutting the host nation or implying that the United States is acting because its beleaguered ally is unable or unwilling to accomplish what U.S. forces accomplish.

b. Unconventional Warfare. Because of difficulties in communication between the Special Forces team and the support element outside the Guerrilla Warfare Operational Area (GWOA), the psychological operations planner

must consider the geographical separation and use more imagination and initiative than under more normal conditions.

c. Consolidation Operations. Psychological operations personnel form a part of the civil affairs (CA) unit and are responsive, therefore, to the needs of the CA organization and its commander. CA personnel trained in the operation of public communications media will be present and will play an important role in formulating psychological operation plans. Initially, during the establishment of control, the psychological operations unit or units attached to the CA organization may find themselves communicating directives to the civilian populace rather than persuading the population to accept U.S. policy.

d. Counterpropaganda in Psychological Operations. The psychological operations officer will play an important role in the country team effort to counterpropaganda from hostile or critical neutral countries or coalitions. Counterpropaganda efforts fall into two main categories: denial operations and counteraction.

- (1) Denial operations include prohibition or liquidation of hostile propaganda organizations and media, jamming of hostile broadcasts, and censorship of hostile information outlets.
- (2) Counteraction answers hostile activity, attacking hostile propaganda to discredit the enemy's statements and destroy confidence in them. Conventional methods include forestalling, direct counterpropaganda, indirect counterpropaganda, and diversionary counterpropaganda.
- (3) Support in counterpropaganda activity should be sought from the government, acceptable political parties, influential professional people and organizations, religious groups, information media, and others. Close attention should be paid to hostile propaganda among students, youth, the unemployed, disaffected, and minority groups.

Section II. DEVELOPMENT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS CAMPAIGN

30. General

a. While the specific aspects of any particular campaign will vary in accordance with the situation, the steps for planning a psychological operations campaign are applicable to any situation.

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b. A psychological operations campaign consists of two fundamental phases: the selection of the psychological objectives and the accomplishment of those objectives. In the first phase of the campaign the condition and attitudes within the area of operations are analyzed in terms of potential target groups; their susceptibility and effectiveness. From this analysis, meaningful psychological objectives are developed which, if achieved, will result in the accomplishment of the assigned, psychological operations mission. The second phase of the campaign involves the creation of meaningful themes which will be employed by appropriate media, stressed as the situation demands, scheduled in accordance with the concept of the campaign, and disseminated accordingly. These themes must be directed at the achievement of the psychological objectives.

31. Psychological Operations Mission and Selection of Psychological Objectives

a. A fundamental consideration in selecting psychological objectives is (in addition to being responsive to the actual realities of the situation) that the objectives support the accomplishment of the psychological operations mission assigned by higher headquarters. While it is always essential to analyze the situation accurately in order to develop psychological objectives as well as to achieve these objectives, psychological operations personnel must also insure that the campaign supports the overall assigned mission.

b. A psychological objective is a statement indicating what behavioral responses are desired of a particular target group. The objective for any particular target group should be realistic in terms of the susceptibility and effectiveness of the target. Further, the psychological objectives should be such that its attainment will contribute significantly to ac-

complishing the psychological operations mission. As an example, if the mission involves obtaining the willing and active cooperation of the people in an area with the military forces in the area, a suitable psychological objective for the target group could be, "to convince the target group to report to friendly military forces, on a timely basis, any information concerning the activities of hostile forces."

c. When a target group has been selected for exploitation primarily on the basis of its capability to influence other groups, the psychological objective should reflect this intended use. For example, "To influence target group A to persuade group B to take a particular action." If such an approach is used, the susceptibility of both groups must support the approach and the desired response.

d. Accomplishment of psychological objectives—

- (1) The considerations that led to the development of psychological objectives are also pertinent to the accomplishment of those objectives. In this phase of the development of a psychological operations campaign ideas and plans are transformed into disseminated media designed to accomplish the assigned mission.
- (2) The conditions, attitudes, susceptibility, and effectiveness which resulted in the development of psychological objectives for certain target groups are also pertinent and determine how a psychological objective will be achieved.

32. Condition of Targets

a. Initially, before making a detailed study of the potential targets of a psychological operations campaign, psychological operations personnel should arrive at an assessment of the conditions and attitudes that exist within the area of operations. A number of potentially valuable target groups will appear as a result of this assessment.

b. A condition is an external element of the environment of the target. Thus, facts relating

to the political structure in which the target finds itself, the economic system in which the target is involved, the religious system to which the target adheres, and other areas of activity of the target are all conditions. From another point of view, conditions are all those things existing outside of the target which influence the target to some degree.

33. Definition of the Target

a. A most critical area in a psychological operations campaign is the definition of specific targets that will be exploited. A target group may be stated in terms of its function; that is, a functional description of the target such as "the village council of village X." A target may also be stated in terms of a classification; that is, a classification of a target such as "the people of nation X."

b. Generally, it is preferred that a functional target group be exploited for psychological operations. Usually, more valid and definitive statements can be made concerning the conditions and attitudes which pertain to a functional group (a social unit where there is interaction based on a common function among its members). A nonfunctional group (a simple gathering of people) is normally much more difficult to assess validly in terms of conditions and attitudes. Consequently, a psychological operations effort directed at such a group will probably fail to achieve a psychological objectives. Furthermore, assuming a constructive line of persuasion has been developed, more personal interaction is present among functional groups tending to reinforce the formation of the desired attitude.

c. Once potentially valuable target groups have been identified from background area studies and from considering the assigned mission, psychological objectives will be developed for each selected target group. In developing these objectives, it may be discovered that the potential target is neither susceptible nor effective. If this occurs, another target group should be selected. It is possible, however, that in some situations an objective will be forced upon the planner. Remember that conditions and attitudes prevailing within a particular target group are not necessarily static. Consequently,

conclusions relating to their susceptibility and effectiveness are not final. Furthermore, there may be a number of groups in the area that are critical to the accomplishment of the assigned mission. It may then become necessary to create the conditions and attitudes among these critical groups which will make them susceptible and effective targets.

34. Target Attitudes

In addition to describing the various *external* factors which affect the target, an analysis of *internal* factors affecting the target (the target's core values) is required for an appreciation of the most profitable means of persuading the target.

35. Target Susceptibility

a. The susceptibility of a particular target audience refers to the extent to which that target can be persuaded and along which specific lines. The analysis of the conditions and attitudes pertaining to the target should suggest the more profitable lines of persuasion to use on the target.

b. Significant attitudes and conditions affecting the target's susceptibility should be analyzed to determine what behavior patterns the target can be persuaded to adopt, any resistance that must be overcome, best means of communication with the target audience, and an overall assessment of the possibilities of successful target persuasion.

c. Certain potential target groups may not be susceptible to any line of persuasion. It would seem that if a certain group could not be successfully persuaded then it would be pointless to spend much effort on them; however, it is possible that at a later point in the psychological operations campaign the unfavorable conditions and attitudes might be modified to such an extent that this particular group would become susceptible to persuasion. Consequently, it might be wise at the outset to establish and maintain communication links with this group with the intention of exploiting the group later in the campaign. The mission and the situation would determine the course of action to adopt with this target group.

36. Target Effectiveness

a. To determine potential target effectiveness, assess the relative power of the group in relation to other groups in the area. To assess target effectiveness, study the power structure in the area of operations and assign potential target groups to relative positions within this structure.

b. In determining the effectiveness of a particular target group, examine the group's relationship to other groups. Give particular attention to what groups the potential target group responds and under what circumstances. Conversely, note the other groups in the area that respond to the dictates and desires of the potential target group and the circumstances existing when this behavior pattern takes place. It is important to distinguish any circumstances under which the standard relationship between the potential target group and other groups in the area may be altered.

c. It may be that a potential target group may not be effective in the psychological operations campaign. Similar to target susceptibility, a group's effectiveness might change as the campaign develops; thus, the best course of action would be to maintain a communication link with the group under consideration.

37. Development of Themes

a. A theme is a topic, subject, or line of persuasion through which a psychological objective is achieved. Themes developed in support of psychological objective serve as the basis for the content of the message which reaches the target group to whom the psychological objective pertains.

b. Themes are derived from an examination of the target's susceptibility, taking into account the conditions and attitudes which relate to the target's susceptibility as well as the psychological objective itself. As many variations of the basic themes as possible should be developed and used to accomplish the psychological objective. Themes must be developed carefully to insure that they contribute to the accomplishment of the psychological objective. Further, themes must have a foundation in the

susceptibility of the selected target group. Finally, themes should be—

- (1) *Timely*. The theme should be relevant to the situation. Normally, if the theme has been derived from a study of the susceptibility of the target group, this requirement will almost automatically be met.
- (2) *Credible*. The theme should appear truthful to the target group. In some cases, the theme may not be *absolutely* true because the target group is not prepared to believe the absolute truth. The critical factor is the target group's assessment of the truth or falsehood of the particular theme.
- (3) *Consistent*. The theme must correspond to other themes used in the campaign. It must not contradict other themes. This requirement must be met because output designed for one group may reach other groups in addition to the intended one. If the themes are inconsistent, the impact may be counterproductive and weaken credibility. Review themes used in the campaign to assure consistency.

c. Because a theme may often be relatively abstract, symbols should be developed which relate to the theme. A symbol is something that represents something else by reason of association, relationship, convention, idea, quality, or condition. It is an understandable sign of something invisible or abstract. It is well to note that the same *idea* may be conventionally represented by different symbols in different societies, or that the same *symbol* may represent different ideas in different societies. In addition to symbols being timely, credible, and consistent, as themes must be, there are three other essential characteristics:

- (1) *Suggestive*. A symbol must accurately transmit the idea it represents and the emotional basis upon which it depends.
- (2) *Simple*. Effective symbols are simple and easily reproduced by the amateur

or illiterate. Simple symbols have the advantage of being immediately recognizable and not subject to misrepresentation.

(3) *Acceptable*. A symbol must fit the

local culture so well that it does not contradict a similar symbol.

d. Appendix VI can be used as a planning guide for development of psychological objectives.

CHAPTER 4

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN COUNTERING INSURGENCY

Section I. CHARACTERISTICS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN AN INSURGENT ENVIRONMENT

38. General

Counterinsurgent operations consist of military, political, social, economic, and psychological actions undertaken by the local government to modify and ultimately eliminate the root causes of insurgency; accomplished through the development and modernization of the country as well as the development of a participant society.

39. Supplementary Instrument of National Power

In an insurgent environment, the elements of national power are normally fully committed. It is natural, therefore, to find operations being conducted to change the attitudes, emotions, opinions, and behavior of the population, the government establishment, and the insurgents. Specific psychological operations are conducted to cause the planned changes desired by the government. These operations do not replace current political, economic, and military operations but are blended into them to optimize the likelihood of government success. An example of such an operation is the amnesty program which encourages defection. Military intelligence gains cooperative sources of information; the military doesn't have to kill or rout out these individuals; the police can register and maintain surveillance over defectors; and the government has an opportunity to show its friendship and sincerity to

everyone in the nation through its treatment of these persons. The amnesty program relies heavily on the contrast between a secure life and the shadowy, hunted life of an insurgent facing a continuous threat on his life. The program would not work without such contrast.

40. Insurgency and Unconventional Warfare

Although psychological operations may be effectively integrated to support military actions in limited and general warfare, it is essential to success in both counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare. An insurgency, whether or not it is subversive and externally directed and assisted, occurs only where there are economic, social, and political environments which breed discontent. It is apparent, then, that any long-lasting solution will require more than tacit approval of government policies. This environment of discontent is sought by subversive agencies; and they base their attempts to establish broad, mass, organizational support for insurgency upon these seed-beds of incipient or latent insurgency. Not only must appropriate and sincere governmental actions be taken to eliminate such sources of discontent, but appropriate psychological campaigns must be energetically pursued to deny the insurgent his base of support, to give the nation a sense of unity of purpose, and to justify restrictive and repressive control measures taken during counter guerrilla operations.

Section II. SUPPORT OF NATIONAL INTERNAL DEFENSE AND NATION-BUILDING PROGRAMS

41. General

No tactical counterinsurgent program can be effective for long without major, nation-build-

ing programs. To build support for a legal, nontotalitarian government, the government must be worthy of that support. Thus, any

solution to the insurgency must satisfy the political demands of the insurgency. For this reason, military actions and psychological operations must be subordinate to the political sphere and its short- and long-range demands. The nation undergoing the stresses of a subversive insurgency must develop a plan which will include security as well as development, for there must be environmental improvement along with the measures for population and resources control and counterguerrilla operations.

42. The Nation-Building Programs

a. *General.* Nation-building programs take a variety of forms; and psychological operations play a vital role in every aspect of all the programs by building morale, engendering cohesive group feelings, assisting civic action, and creating and disseminating informational programs; in short, selling the programs by word and deed to the local population.

b. *Support.* All persons associated with the government establishment are, in effect, propagandists and good-will ambassadors for the national program. They must be made to accept this responsibility or the programs will be futile. After all, insurgency is a negative reaction to government, and governmental employees and representatives must help prove the government's honorable intentions through their own conduct. The people must be convinced that the government is not just to be tolerated, but that it is to be desired and is worth supporting with labor, intelligence, taxes, and the many other forms of cooperation which create stability.

c. *Need for Developing National Unity.* Nationalism, even if developed before national independence is gained does not automatically guarantee the degree of national unity essential to the functioning of a modern nation-state. The spirit of nationalism and the struggle for independence often creates an illusory sense of national unity. Once independence is achieved, however, the old ethnic, linguistic, religious, tribal, clan, and regional loyalties reassert themselves. The most disruptive divisions appear wherever large racial minorities perform key economic roles. Additionally,

these developing societies may have highly trained cosmopolitan intellectuals at one extreme and peasants and tribal members at the other end of the value systems. Under these straining social and economic conditions, the role of individuals and groups, as participants in these societies, is often under-valued and misunderstood. Strong and effective states are important; but to defeat an insurgency, power should be widely shared among groups throughout the society. Governments which cannot gain and maintain the support of major groups within their country and cannot satisfy physical and psychological needs by putting these groups to work on constructive tasks will, in the long-run be insecure and vulnerable to violent overthrow. Thus, nation-building is not only a matter of economic development, but a bond of unity must be developed between the people and the government. National unity may be developed by the programs suggested below. National ethos and pride must also be developed. Deep-rooted, spontaneous patriotism comes only after generations of interaction and with the development of a commonality of interests and values.

d. *Psychological Objectives Which Develop National Unity.* Any strong, united group has a quality which we call spirit, esprit de corps, élan, or morale. This feeling about the group is shared by the group's members. It is an intangible, a pride, a camaraderie, and an emotional attachment or cohesion which gives strength and meaning to the group and its members. By establishing programs which emphasize the psychological objectives, by stressing group participation activities, one can develop national unity.

(1) *Realistic, worthwhile goals.* Groups must satisfy some of man's wants. Group membership must reap rewards for efforts expended, and these goals must be of graduated importance based upon the effort required to achieve the reward. To illustrate, rewards may be graduated from "thanks" to a Medal of Honor. For the majority of persons, rewards should be frequently and easily achieved. Long-range, economic goals are desirable; however, a wage increase for

governmental employees or a needed bridge over a river is more readily translated into a positive reaction than would a hydroelectric power project which would take 15 years to complete. This long-range project would have to be broken down into numerous stages or hurdles to achieve the desired sense of accomplishment necessary in developing national unity.

(2) *Sense of prestige.* Man wants recognition of his merit and acknowledgement of his efforts in the group's behalf. The desired sense of prestige is derived from those members of the group that the individual most wants to impress. An individual does not necessarily want to impress a nation, but he does want to impress people within that nation who are important to him. In a developing nation, this is often limited to the family, the extended family, the clan, or the tribe. Even though the local leader or the man's family were the primary source of prestige, one would strive to integrate national and local programs so that slowly, over the course of time, the national government will become a source of prestige similar to that in most modern, nation-states. To illustrate further, an individual might not give his life for a government; but he would give it for his wife or family because of his close and continual interaction with all the members of this primary, functional group. Failure or lack of willingness to commit himself would destroy his sense of prestige and would likely result in his elimination from the group.

(3) *Sense of belonging.* Membership in a group must provide emotional rewards. Men gain a sense of satisfaction and security from belonging to strong, cohesive groups. Entertainers, religious leaders, and politicians all recognize the value and emotional response associated with collective activity. Group singing, football rallies,

and political gatherings are often so emotionally stimulating that the persons in attendance attempt over and over again to relive the experience. This can be seen in the alumni attending football games and then going down into the locker room "just to talk to the boys," or in the proliferation of veterans organizations after every war where the members can talk about old times and be with "old friends." To develop national unity, an individual must feel this sense of belonging to something to which he can contribute and in which he can participate. The individual must be able to see that his union, or unit, or group, with his consent, knowledge or participation, worked with other groups to achieve national goals, and that these goals are his goals and that he will be rewarded for his part in the effort.

(4) *Equity.* Perhaps nothing is more destructive of group morale than inequity in the treatment within the group. A man could get a reward and still resent it unless he feels that he has his fair share of the privileges and responsibilities, he will resent it. The reward must be a proper reflection on the contribution of the individual, no more and no less. In education, medical care, community affairs, etc., there must be agreement on the reasons for the differences in treatment. It is recognized that there will be differences; however, the differences should be justifiable.

(5) *Understanding the situation.* A key psychological objective in an insurgency is to keep everyone informed of what the government programs are and how all of the parts of the society fit into the national plans. The unknown can create fear and anxiety. In response to these feelings, people search for "explanations" for their situation in terms of their wants. This

often leads to over-simplification which places the government in a bad light and destroys unity; therefore, it is essential that a thorough informational program be instituted with timeliness, honesty, and sincerity as cornerstones. This interest in keeping the people informed will generate faith and respect as well as contribute to the sense of belonging.

(6) *Trend towards success.* A group which has worked together successfully in the past is led to expect success in the future. Thus, realistic emphasis on national successes will enhance national unity through the people's desire to be on a "winning team." In a political world, no one wants to associate with a loser, thus the long-range plans and programs must reflect positive attitudes and goals. In this program it is essential to assure that the current government will be in office long after the subversive insurgent efforts are defeated and the disillusioned are brought back into the nation as participant members.

(7) *Sense of purpose.* A high purpose, such as supporting the national government through the trials and tribulations of everyday life, is important in developing national unity. Groups under pressure need a cause to justify and inspire their efforts and sacrifices during an insurgency. The cause or purpose must have an emotional appeal because most people under pressure tend to follow their emotions. To achieve an appropriate sense of purpose which will appeal to men with differing interests, the constitution, charter, or laws must be broad enough to permit local and regional leaders to live within its bounds, yet still to its sense of purpose. A nation's policies and long-range objectives should be stated so that the people will know why it would be desirable to live with this governing body rather than with the subversive

"government" which is also attempting to win the allegiance of the people.

43. Psychological Operations Support of Environmental Improvement Programs

a. Purpose. An environmental improvement program is designed to develop faith and confidence in the legally constituted government of the country where counterinsurgent operations are taking place. This program must stimulate cooperation and support among appropriate segments of the population. The degree of cooperation and support from the civil population will reflect their attitudes toward the government. Environmental improvements should involve constructive programs designed to restore or give the civil community a condition of normalcy and a manner of daily living which will eradicate, or at least diminish, the causes for disaffection and insurgency. Unfortunately, these programs must be justified as well as implemented to insure popular support, for improvement does not mean the same thing to all peoples. To illustrate, a hydroelectric power plant is recognized as being nationally desirable when it will provide jobs and services for thousands. However, when a dam must be built upstream, flooding the river banks which have been tribal homes for centuries, these people will not necessarily see the hydroelectric plant as desirable. To retain these people as willing participants in the society, the desirable and necessary features of both the project and the displacement must be thoroughly and convincingly sold to the leaders and opinion formers of the affected tribes. Similarly, a new, straight, hard-surfaced road may be desired to decrease motor maintenance and improve speed and efficiency of transportation in an area; but merchants and towns to be by-passed must be convinced of the necessity and desirability of this new road which will decrease their businesses. Inequities and injustices must be recompensed or they will show the government's lack of sincere interest in the welfare of the people.

b. Planning. During the incipient or latent stages of an insurgency, the majority of the country's psychological operations efforts should be directed towards the support of environmental improvement programs. Such programs as military civic action, economic de-

velopmental programs, and political and social improvement programs should receive the majority of the propaganda efforts. Population and resources control and counter guerrilla operations programs should receive subdued propaganda programs, with emphasis on planning and training requirements. At the national level, the programs are prepared and designed primarily to nullify the basic causes of disaffection among segments of the civil population. These programs will normally include political, economic, social, military, and psychological actions in an operational area. Plans and programs in each area must be constantly reviewed and evaluated. These programs take a variety of forms. They may include governmental and legal reform, community relations activities to stimulate exchange of ideas, civic action, development of local resources, improvement of agricultural and manufacturing techniques, improving health conditions, expansion of educational facilities, and troop information to instill a social conscience.

c. Method. Psychological operations should be used in environmental improvement progress by—

- (1) Disseminating information concerning the proposed plans for economic, political, and social improvement.
- (2) Re-educating the population through mass media, as well as by rendering a community service by publishing and broadcasting news and directives.
- (3) Exposing the causes of disaffection which are manufactured and fallacious; in short, counterpropaganda. (Insurgent groups may have conducted such an active propaganda campaign that the people can no longer recognize and distinguish between real and imagined needs.)
- (4) Building and reinforcing morale of the population, military as well as civilian.
- (5) Pointing out to the civil sector the efforts of the military in assisting them in building needed schools, community projects, and the like. (This action underscores the cooperation of the military and civilians in working toward common goals.)

d. Need. Psychological operations is the instrument through which national and community goals and their interrelationships are explained. Without an extensive psychological operations program necessary cooperation for the total counterinsurgent program cannot be obtained.

e. Reinforcement. The government and its supporting agencies are critical determinants of the government's "image" in the minds of the people. The armed forces are particularly important because of their close contact with the people; consequently, they can help create a favorable image of the government. The favorable impact of civic action must be reinforced and spread by the psychological operations explanation of what the army, as a part of the government, is doing. Without this propaganda reinforcement, the value and contribution of military civic action may remain localized and not be widely understood in its role of developing national unity and actively showing the national government's genuine interest in the people and in the solution of their problems.

44. Psychological Operations Support of Population and Resources Control Programs

The guerrilla must be separated from his source of support; this support lies within the local population. Thus, a primary target for psychological operations is this local, civilian population. Direct appeal to the guerrilla, who may be a fanatic during this accelerating phase of insurgency, may net little result; but he may be affected as he sees his sources of food, medicine, and morale being turned away from him. Another primary target is found in the government itself. All government officials must be convinced of their own value and purpose. Their humanitarian activities in the name of the government, such as civic actions, should actually serve to create and sustain a sense of national service, devotion to duty and country, and the sense of responsibility for others.

As an insurgency escalates and the subversive movement gains sufficient local or external support to initiate organized guerrilla warfare or other forms of violence against the established authority and its peoples, the psychologi-

cal operations effort should shift its emphasis from environmental improvement to population and resources control. Long-range improvement plans must not be discarded, but the value of short-range, high-impact improvement programs will be more readily identified with the governmental interest in the people's problems than will projects taking years to complete. Civic action projects are well suited to this high psychological impact. Where the community has a need, this need should be met quickly by a cooperative effort between the local population and the military or paramilitary forces representing the government.

a. Population and Resources Control Programs. Control measures imposed in counterinsurgency curtail legitimate as well as subversive activities. The population must be forewarned of impending restrictions and the justification for them. They should be informed of benefits which will accrue from obedience and the hazards and penalties that will apply for violations of the regulations. Programs which often effectively isolate the guerrilla from his base of material and informational support include curfews; roadblocks and check points; control of food supplies; control of medical supplies; registration of all personnel, firearms, transportation, and fuels; establishment of "new life" hamlets for persons displaced by "clear and hold" operations; spot checks of cargoes in transit; and the isolation of key installations and areas. Each of these efforts will require a thorough study of the functional target groups and their key communicators. The target effectiveness and its susceptibility must be studied in light of the specific culture and the needs of that environment and the legitimate government. For this reason, vast and detailed amounts of sociological and anthropological information is required to develop a meaningful psychological operations campaign to change the attitudes and behavior of a specific group to favor governmental programs. The needs of the people must be matched and blended with the needs of the government. If people are convinced that it is in their best interest to support the government rather than the insurgents, then the controls and barriers may be removed. The people them-

selves will then willingly and actively assist the government in controlling the area.

b. Psychological Operations Programs Supporting Specific Population and Resources Control Programs. Specific programs which might be encountered during population and resources control operations are clear and hold operations and relocation operations. Clear and hold operations are concentrated in a specific, high priority area experiencing overt insurgency. Clear and hold operations are intended to create a secure physical and psychological environment and establish governmental control of the area. Psychological support of the clear and hold operations will assist in gaining the willing support of the population to obtain their participation in the governmental programs for counterinsurgency.

- (1) *General considerations in clear and hold operations.* Since clear and hold operations expand outward from a secure base, programs should be conducted within the secure base to insure a high degree of support as well as to maintain unit and population morale. Psychological operations personnel must encourage host country agencies to stress proper conduct and behavior in dealings with the population. The military, paramilitary, and police often establish reputations of being oppressive, harsh, unsympathetic, and corrupt. Such reputations can be eliminated by proper conduct and through supporting propaganda campaigns which illuminate the positive actions and values of the forces. A few rash, undisciplined acts will jeopardize popular support and the entire operation. In an area to be cleared, initial psychological operations programs implemented should seek to make the population neutral. Clearly written and easily understood themes and directives should be used to encourage cooperation. Compensation should be made for damages if the operation occurs during the early phases of insurgency. The emphasis should be on equitable, rapid settlement of claims. At the same time, mili-

tary civic actions, such as medical assistance to injured civilians (consistent with the military situation and not detracting from the operational requirements of the mission) will reduce the hostility of the uprooted and injured people and will, with proper propaganda support, put the blame for the entire situation on the shoulders of the insurgents. The following are examples of propaganda announcements which might be appropriate: "Military operations and restrictions will be removed when support to the guerrillas ceases." "The bandits, supported by _____*, have destroyed the pleasant, good old days." "We must govern ourselves." "As long as the guerrilla is here, you will remain in the combat zone." If government forces are fresh and ready for action, psychological operations should encourage, even provoke, the guerrillas into standing and fighting. If they run, it will show their weakness and "cowardly" ways. In Asia, the insurgent's fear of fighting may be related to losing face, thus forcing him into a fight. Once engaged in battle, he may be fixed and destroyed.

- (2) *Operational phases.* Once the area is cleared, the best psychological operations consist of informing the populace that the area is secure. To effect this, police or paramilitary forces should be recruited locally; and a sound training program should be initiated so that regular forces can be released for other missions. Psychological operations programs are designed to establish and maintain confidence among the newly created forces. Increased motivation of these forces can be achieved by such activities as parades and award ceremonies which recognizes desirable behavior such as bravery, community service, diplomacy, sacrifice, or honesty. Equitable treatment of popular forces, paramilitary forces, and regular military

or police units is essential to maintain esprit de corps and attain a sense of national unity. Host country dignitaries should be encouraged to visit and inspect the paramilitary forces. On such visits, the local leaders—political, military, religious, educational—should be recognized for their contributions and participation in community stability and development. This will contribute to a better understanding and communication between the national government and the local area and will commit the local leaders to the government.

- (3) *Terminal phases.* Because tactical units are gradually withdrawn, consistent with the ability of paramilitary forces to assume responsibility for the area, psychological operations programs will come under more control of territorial or political subdivisions. Themes stressing the ultimate defeat of the guerrillas should be used. Items of local interest, even the establishment of a local newsheet, and local psychological operations teams are suitable for blending local with national goals and objectives. Such specific matters as governmental intentions for future, local, political organization and elections should be aired to give the population a sense of participation in their own affairs as well as the affairs of state.
- (4) *General considerations in relocation operations.* Leaflets and loudspeaker messages should provide instructions about the impending move and should tell the people how to find transportation, if practical (promise of helicopter evacuation from guerrilla-dominated areas may increase the number of refugees). During the movement, special attention must be given to troop behavior because this may be the first impression of the recognized government. Instructions to the military units should include keeping families together, providing limited medical attention, assisting the refugees in a

* Third country involved in the subversive insurgency.

warm and friendly manner, giving special attention to the aged and infirm. The initial impression received at the relocation center is important. It should be in advanced stages of construction, if possible, and include welcoming committees. Psychological operations should inform and entertain with subtle propaganda; explain ultimate plans for housing, medical assistance, and land distribution as appropriate; encourage covert exposure of guerrilla infiltrators and terrorists; and provide follow-up programs for continuity in the resettlement effort.

c. Illustrative Propaganda Themes. Leaflets, loudspeakers, radio, films, newspapers, and face-to-face persuasion can be used to disseminate symbolic propaganda designed to:

- (1) Advertise the existence and accomplishments of the nation's programs.
- (2) Persuade the local people, including guerrilla auxiliaries and underground elements, that their objectives can be obtained through specific, peaceful negotiation rather than through guerrilla warfare activities.
- (3) Illustrate the futility and terrible cost of guerrilla warfare and its total effect upon the future of the nation.
- (4) Show that the guerrilla movement has come under the control of a third power which is using the conflict to further its own ends in the area.
- (5) Emphasize the fact that certain insurgent leaders are, in reality, bandits who seek the continuance of the war for their own personal gain.
- (6) Bring the weight of international public opinion to bear upon third party nations actively supporting the guerrilla force in its attempts to overthrow the legitimate government.
- (7) Explain the necessity for population control and guerrilla movement control operations.
- (8) Expose the fallacies of the insurgent ideology.

d. Population and Resources Control Objectives. Under appropriate circumstances, these themes, and others dictated by the local environment, can be used in a counterinsurgent operation to create a favorable image of the legitimate government and to destroy the emotional attachment of the local people to the insurgent cause. The total defeat of the insurgent force occurs only when the real subversive causes of the insurgency have been uncovered and eliminated and when the minds of the population have been conditioned to support government programs and policies. Psychologically, the objective we seek is the cohesive support of all elements of the population for the legal government and its programs. To accomplish this, themes and programs should divide the major elements of the population from dissident elements seeking violent and terroristic change.

45. Psychological Operations Support of Counter guerrilla Operations

The military commander must be aware of not only the economic, sociological, and military issues, but also he must be aware of the psychological impact of each of these elements upon the population, his own troops, and the insurgents in each military operation conducted against the guerrillas. Having this awareness, it does not necessarily follow that a formalized psychological operations campaign would be included in every operation; but psychological values and problems would be considered. Ultimate success depends upon the leader's awareness of the perceptions of both the combatants and the non-combatants. Experience has shown that many commanders give too little emphasis to the psychological aspects of military operations. Too often, long-range political objectives are sacrificed for temporary tactical gains. Policy statements and guidance, properly written and enforced, would eliminate this problem.

a. In tactical situations, the psychological operations plan should include activities directed toward the insurgents, the civilian population in the immediate vicinity, and the troop command information program. For example, before or during an attack on a hamlet, civilians in the area should receive timely information concerning their role in the opera-

tion, possible benefits, or potential dangers. This information should be written in the local dialect to avoid any misunderstanding.

b. Maintaining the fighting spirit of the armed military and paramilitary forces is a top priority job. Higher pay, awards, promotions, and other prestige-related actions may be used to promote and sustain devotion and dedication to the nation in the face of what is obviously a dangerous job in an insurgency. Of utmost importance is the need for the government to present a picture of calm assurance of ultimate victory.

c. Divisive themes should be used towards the insurgents. There may be numerous well-intentioned insurgents. These people, whose sense of nationalism or frustration motivates them, should be separated from the subversive insurgents or Communist cadre. Proof of external support of the insurgents, personal intrigue, character traits contrary to the local culture, and divergent motivations are some examples of divisive themes which may be appropriate.

d. A nationally recognized amnesty program for the reintegration of insurgents who are captured or who surrender should be carefully planned and conducted. Amnesty rallies should be carefully segregated from captured, hardcore, Communist cadre. The judicious use of propaganda throughout the retraining cycle would inform the amnesty rallies of the governmental aid programs, and objectives and would contrast these against the subversive insurgent's methods, goals, and ambitions. Once the amnesty program is successfully implemented, every effort must be made to inform guerrillas of how and why they should rally under the provisions of the program. It is imperative that psychological operations supporting this program be centrally controlled, but the messages and themes should be primarily responsive to local needs and local insurgents. Aerial loudspeakers are ideally suited to this program and can get the message out to recently isolated guerrillas. Programs can be tailored to the motivations and susceptibilities of specific insurgent organizations which have just been beaten in battle, which are homesick, which recently have been filled with new recruits, or which have other known or suspected

vulnerabilities. By appealing to existing subconscious attitudes, the propagandist can direct these tendencies towards action and cause the individual to take the next opportunity to rally. It should be recognized that the situation must reinforce the tendency to defect before rallying will take place. To illustrate this, an insurgent may hate his leader whose harsh treatment of the platoon has made the recently drafted individual want to get out of such an irritating environment. A loudspeaker announcement telling how and where to rally would be prepared but it would not be used until it was safe to defect. Such an appeal could be used when others had been known to have successfully rallied; when men have been separated from their control element by combat action; or when other similar conditions exist. The psychological operations program must convey the invitation to the insurgent when circumstances appear to reinforce his action tendencies.

e. Whatever the specific program to be implemented, the message must be designed and delivered so that it gains the attention of the insurgent. Common references and experiences must be stressed to insure meaningful communications. The message must arouse the insurgent's needs and suggest ways of meeting these needs. The suggestion must be appropriate to the group and must relate to a situation affecting the insurgent at the time that the message is conveyed. All groups have established rules of behavior or roles that are played by the members based upon relationships or relative status. If group values are firmly held, it is highly unlikely that individuals would violate such group attitudes to achieve individual needs of a lower order of preference. A devout Jew will not eat ham. A normal American mother will not kill or harm her child. An Asian will not lose face. The psychological operations officer must have close relations with the intelligence community to determine these deeply held values and thus to optimize program acceptance in susceptible and effective target audiences. Similarly, an insurgent cadre will play his organizational role based upon his self-image and group expectations unless he is removed from that role by a change in situational factors: a demotion, a denunciation, etc.

A direct surrender appeal, therefore would be unlikely to succeed since the cadreman would feel responsible for others and his self-image would cause him to enforce group standards of behavior.

46. Audience Consideration in an Insurgency

General. Since an insurgency is basically backed by numerous individuals who are opposed to all or part of the legally constituted governmental programs, ways and means must be devised to persuade a majority of these people that the government is not only serving their best interest but is the best qualified source of leadership for them. The vast majority of these people will be reached by mass media. Face-to-face persuasion and properly understood civic action programs are also extremely effective in appealing to the targets discussed below. Face-to-face communications have been found to be the most effective means of changing or forming attitudes because the man in the audience feels that he is then capable of judging credibility, sincerity, and the "real" interests and meaning of the speaker. Not only is face-to-face persuasion the most effective, but the propagandist may also take advantage of immediate feedback and modify the message to better suit the needs of the specific audience. Questions can be heard and answered. Wherever possible the propagandist must identify and appeal to "key communicators" and "opinion formers" within the selected target group(s) for they are the most influential in their field and scope. In spite of the need to appeal to functional groups, the following discussion is limited to the three principal groups within the insurgent nation: the government establishment, the civilian population, and the insurgents, for there are many generalizations which are of value.

The Target. The Government Establishment. The military, paramilitary, civil service, and numerous other elements of the government establishment make an excellent target audience for several reasons. First, they should have a vested interest in seeing the government remain in control, ensuring their retention. Second, the chain-of-command or organizational structure is already established, mak-

ing communications a natural and accepted thing. Third, these government representatives collectively and individually give the government its image. What they do or fail to do reflects the policy of the government either directly or indirectly, whether they recognize it or not.

- (1) *Programs.* Specific programs should be initiated to promote respected behavior patterns; eliminate corruption, graft, and greed; promote sacrifice for the national good and service; promote a sense of responsibility to self, community, and government; encourage greater response to the needs and desires of the civil population; provide for local participation by the civilians in their own local government; eliminate the image of ruthlessness; inform the government establishment of governmental programs which are serving the developmental aims of the people; reward faithful governmental employees as a step in the long-range goals of eliminating subversive insurgency.
- (2) *Actions.* Civic action programs, emphasizing self-help and cooperative efforts, are an example of the efforts which will perform two extremely important functions. Such programs will help convince the local citizens that the government is sincerely on their side. The governmental employees in their new role of benefactor, will begin assuming these responsibilities and become "the government with a conscience." This change from enforcer to helper is an overt commitment which will irrevocably change the personality and attitude of individuals and groups if properly conducted and supervised. Those involved will be participants in the development of their country, hopefully committed to the service of the people and the government.
- (3) *Initiative.* Seizing the economic, political, social, and military initiative is important in achieving a complete vic-

tory over the subversive insurgents. When on the defensive, only temporary and short-range victories can be achieved. The majority of countries beset with insurgency are predominantly agrarian, therefore, the governments which remain within the urban areas, either physically or psychologically, will remain defensive and will lose. The government should adopt themes which might be used by the insurgents, depriving them of the psychological advantage. Insurgents must be kept on the defensive while the government remains on the attack and retains the initiative.

- (4) *Advantages.* The image of a people's government, regardless of its exact form, will create a cooperative attitude within the population. Rapport will permit the government access to information and support and will accelerate the elimination of the insurgency.

c. Target. The Civilian Population. In addition to the psychological objectives mentioned under developing national unity, there are other important factors to consider when addressing the civilian population; but the need to stress ultimate victory is paramount. The people will remain either apathetic or hostile if there is doubt about the government's ability to win and retain control; because Communists, when taking over an area, normally liquidate, through "popular trials," those who have supported the government. Supporters of the former, recognized, legal government who are not liquidated are usually sent to schools where their self-guilt is built up and they develop symptoms of withdrawal as the Communist thought-reform web of vertical and horizontal controls slowly enmeshes and strangles them in the name of the state. One can understand, in this light, the reluctance to support the legal government until it is relatively clear that the government shall win.

- (1) *Programs.* Informational programs and services are required at several levels. At the national level, common governmental aspirations, goals, and

programs should be publicized. These national programs should be benevolent and beneficial. They should be couched in terms that permit the local political, economic, and social leaders to interpret and adopt them to meet local needs. At the local level, the population should be able to see readily an image of good government, working with and for the people. These programs aimed at the civilian population must be coordinated at a national level so that they will not be opposed, nor do they productive to military and paramilitary psychological operations programs. An image of strength, wisdom, and unity of effort and purpose will give the national programs their maximum, positive impact. Social programs should be designed to motivate the people to support the government against a politically motivated, subversive insurgent threat which is externally controlled and supported. National unity programs which reinforce governmental programs should be implemented and popular support of such programs should be encouraged. National unity objectives must be stressed to pre-school, primary school, secondary school, university students, and all other youth activity functional groups in order to foster the development of national pride and a sense of national responsibility. All other organizations throughout the country should be encouraged to demonstrate their support on a voluntary basis; and rewards and considerations can be developed to reinforce desirable, cooperative behavior. Although outward manifestation of governmental support does not always mean active physical and moral support, such a show will tend to undermine the insurgent's morale and create an illusion of isolation. The many who are uncommitted will also get the impression that the population offers mas-

sive, unanimous support of the government.

- (2) *Advantages.* Since the popular support of the insurgents is essential to the victory or even the continued existence of a significant subversive insurgency, the population is one of the major psychological targets of the insurgents. It must also be a key target of the legitimate government's psychological operations program. The government has access to the target audience during the incipient stages of insurgency and in the phases of insurgency before complete loss of control within an area. The audience can be readily studied and reached until the threat becomes so severe that the population is afraid to support the government. The people who are frustrated within the developing nation will respond favorably to the first propagandist who offers a reasonable solution to their frustrations. The threatened government has to recognize the problems and point the people towards the governmental solutions of these problems, thereby forcing the insurgent to react to the government's effort instead of taking the initiative. The insurgent must be compelled to assume the defensive. The insurgents must not be permitted to sow their seeds in an environment of unmitigated frustrations and anxieties. The government must recognize the political nature of the subversive threat and must plan and execute an effective counter program. The burden is upon the government and its advisors to recognize the problem and to correct it. Society, with its inertia and desire to remain in a reasonably stable condition, with reasonable rules of law, and with known interrelationships, is more receptive to developmental propaganda than to revolutionary promises and blandishments. Adverse conditions must be sought and corrected early in order to benefit the government. Once the issues

have been aired by both sides, the rule of law is in dispute, and active guerrilla and terrorist activities are being conducted, the psychological operations initiative may still be regained by properly planning a campaign supporting the internal defense plans.

d. Target. The Insurgent. Since a determined insurgency gathers momentum in direct proportion to the attractiveness of the ideology upon which the movement is based, the highly motivated insurgent may not be vulnerable to propaganda. Below them, however, within both the vertical political organization and the horizontal functional group organizations, there are a number of vulnerable individuals and groups. These susceptible individuals and groups can be propagandized effectively to benefit the government and to achieve national objectives.

- (1) *Programs.* Programs which may be successful against insurgents would include the following themes: divisive themes, working on differences between cadre, recruits, supporters, and the local population; anti-morale themes such as defeats, lack of support, isolation, homesickness, hardships, shortages, etc., illegal and terroristic actions (being careful not to create an image which will cause the civilians to cower before the insurgent) may be used to focus civilian hostility against the insurgent; amnesty themes may be used to exploit any tendency towards action which may develop as a result of attitude changes; and rewards may be offered for select insurgent leaders for various crimes. Leniency should be reflected by the government and all of its agencies rather than the pursuit of dogmatic standards of innocence versus guilt. All such programs should recognize the differences in status and origin of the insurgents. Specific, very localized messages, resulting from current, accurate intelligence, will yield maximum return on the propaganda aimed towards the insurgents and their local supporters.

(2) *Actions.* All media may be used against insurgents; however, since they are normally closely controlled and guarded against host government propaganda, they are often inaccessible to television, movies, radio, and printed media. Nevertheless, many ingenious methods may be devised to overcome these handicaps and increase communication with the insurgents. Safe conduct and

amnesty leaflets have been found effective when readily available and easily secreted by the insurgent. Every effort should be made to take advantage of any fears which the insurgents develop or hold with respect to the government forces, their weapons or any assistance the host country might be getting. Additional programs are discussed in Chapter 4, FM 38-1.

Section III. SUBVERSIVE PROPAGANDA OBJECTIVES AND ORGANIZATION

47. General

In an insurgency the enemy is difficult to identify, since he cannot be readily engaged in combat nor does he display consistencies and patterns. Consistencies are found, however, in externally controlled or sponsored subversive insurgencies. These consistencies, once recognized, enable the propagandist to better combat the threat. The insurgency will have certain recognizable objectives, methods, and organizations which make its appeals and false blandishments readily accepted and difficult to eliminate.

48. Subversive Insurgent Psychological Objectives

a. One psychological objective of the insurgent is to convince the local populace that local goals and aspirations are identical to those of the insurgent. In its formative stages, an insurgency is weak and needs to identify itself with the goals and aspirations of the local population. Typical themes which have enabled insurgencies to achieve the image of popular heroes are anti-colonialism, nationalism, and land reform. By aligning themselves with popular aspirations, the insurgents gain a number of positive reactions from attitudes which are formed about their activities while they are ostensibly serving the best interests of the people. Local insurgent leaders normally will not admit external controls and relations but will hold up their liberation mission for the ultimate freedom and independence of the people. By proving external sponsorship, the

image of "national hero" can often be destroyed.

b. A second insurgent objective is to convince significant portions of the population that their interests are not best served by the government due to recognized, psychological weaknesses. Developing nations whose international boundaries have been arbitrarily established often have engulfed powerful groups (tribes, clans, extended families, and religious sects) which have been controlled and separated by an alien party such as a colonial power. Once independence has been achieved and the former arbiter is removed from the scene, the power balance normally shifts rapidly. Groups which had been held in check become free to express their discontent with the new power structure. Subversive insurgents look for these psychological weaknesses and vulnerabilities to exploit. Timely use of forces thus created can facilitate the establishment of a new power balance and lead to ultimate seizure of power by the insurgents. Social, economic, political, ethnic, and religious minorities are typical groups which should be studied to determine the nature and extent of their frustrations and the degree of danger they represent to the legal government. There are also majority groups which must be studied in this same light, including peasants in an agricultural economy, workers in industrialized areas, and youths and women in a transitional society. These faceless masses can be organized and rallied to causes and ideologies which claim to give them immediate,

over-simplified answers or releases from their frustrations.

c. A third objective of the insurgent is to convince the country that the government and its leadership is unworthy of leading the people. The presence of graft, greed, corruption, nepotism, scandal, and infinite varieties of other faults make it very difficult, if not impossible, to hide from the insurgent propagandist's probes. The insurgent propagandist will question people and determine those areas where there are common complaints along economic, moral, or political grounds. He will then provide governmental scapegoats on which the people can vent their feelings. Even such problems as droughts, floods, and other natural calamities which create anxieties and frustrations will be used by the insurgents to "reveal" the government's incompetence.

d. Another psychological objective of the insurgent is to destroy national morale and confidence in the government. Once the insurgent cadre are trained and properly organized, they begin gnawing away at the governmental structure in outlying rural or mountainous areas. These areas are so remote that the incidents and terroristic activities destroy the fabric of law and order under the legal government (if it existed before), and the government can do little to provide necessary safety without an undue expenditure of its scarce power resources. Both the local inhabitants and the subversive insurgents recognize the government's helplessness once insurgent forces have been organized and established in these remote areas. It becomes then extremely difficult for the government to reestablish confidence in the legally constituted government, primarily because of sanctions and retribution which the insurgents exact from the local population the instant the government forces depart. Signs of cooperation with the government are sure to cause the individual to be punished after a self-criticism session. Through covert actions the guerrillas begin expanding from clandestine bases using selective terror tactics to create an environment of fear, while showing that the government cannot protect the people or properly administer the area. By illustrating the ineptitude of the government

and at the same time placing their own shadow government in every hamlet and village, they begin taking over the administrative functions of government. Ultimately, the government is left in its barracks and compounds and the insurgents and people are left to the rest of the country. National morale or a sense of unity as a nation-state is virtually nonexistent at the time of independence, and it is a simple matter for the insurgents to continuously force the government to show its brutal, harsh, and arbitrary nature through its counterinsurgent tactics. The insurgent encourages the government to create an image of ruthlessness by forcing it to carry out indiscriminate artillery and aircraft bombing of hamlets where insurgents have been supported or by any of the many other uses of force to destroy the insurgents and their bases.

e. Another psychological objective of the insurgent is to convince the world and the local population that the motives of nations assisting the threatened government are false. Through national and international media, the insurgent will attempt to malign the motives of all assistance to the local government. Economic exploitation, neo-colonialism, genocide, and capitalism seeking raw materials and markets are some of the numerous themes used to elicit sympathy and support.

f. Another objective of the insurgent is to convince the people that the insurgents will win the political struggle. Both the insurgent and the government will have this program in common. Popular support will be afforded to the side which is most likely to win. If the contest is in doubt, the people may be apathetic with willing, open support being difficult to gain for either side. Although the side with the greatest organizational and leadership capability will have a decided advantage. The insurgents have both vertical and horizontal organizations which provide administrative control. Their horizontal control organizations provide not only for participation, but for propaganda as well. Threatened governments, as currently constituted, seldom have organizations which could generate a voluntary sense of belonging to the nation, nor do they recognize the need for the populace to be able to

express itself. The government is compelled to use the older organizations, denying their use to the insurgent. This gives the insurgent a big opening with the restless youth, women, and farmers who cannot express themselves under the legal regime. Thus, many governments use traditional devices which keep feelings of frustration alive among the population, and reduce or slow down the rate at which modernization and development can be instituted. In addition to this organizational advantage, the insurgent is also able to lean upon the theories which have been propounded by Marx, Lenin, and Mao Tse-tung to illustrate the inevitability of the downfall of capitalism and the victory of socialism, communism, peoples democracies, or anything else they may desire to prove through dialectic interpretation of these revolutionary leaders. Selectively exploiting surprise, ambushes, and traps, the insurgent leaders can tell their forces of great victories; and at the same time, since they control their media closely, they can minimize the effect of defeats. They emphasize their military, economic, social, and political accomplishments and either avoid or "interpret" negative issues.

g. Insurgent leaders also attempt to convince every guerrilla, supporter, and sympathizer that he or she should be a propagandist. Schools, propagandist speeches, cultural shows, books, and radio programs are used to give the people in insurgent controlled areas a controlled understanding of the situation. However, the real energy and force for the insurgency comes from the cadre training programs where a fanatic zeal is developed. The cadre are highly motivated through a series of traumatic training sessions. Once trained, these cadre go out to establish and organize their home-town regions. Through the selective use of terror and the threat of violence, the non-believer, isolated from all group supports which would oppose the insurgent cause, is forced into compliance with insurgent aims and objectives. Even nonbelievers comply with instructions to strike, tarry, and assist through unspoken or implied threats. Through proper control of media, messages, and situational environment, numerous willing supporters can be and are elicited. These misguided people are

not easily reconverted to the government side, but must be differentiated from the insurgent cadre.

49. Subversive Insurgent Propaganda Organization

a. Targets. Subversive insurgents avoid disseminating propaganda in a vacuum. They act on the premise that the most effective propaganda is aimed at an audience which is already partly committed to their cause. The emergence of an audience so psychologically captured depends upon the prior creation of an elaborate system of controls. This is not to infer that the government establishment and the general population at large does not receive subversive propaganda, but rather that the greatest effort is expended against those over whom the insurgents have control (whether total or just during the hours of darkness).

b. Controls. The system of controls established is of both a physical and a psychological nature. The controls allow for the subtle blending of both positive appeals (such as promises of an actual redistribution of land in a village) and negative sanctions for nonconformity. The sanctions run the gamut of emotional appeals from isolation and rejection from certain group activities to self-criticism, group accusation, and group criticism; to 6-week visits to remote training camps, to death. Unrepentant landlords and usurers are often given the harshest sentences to prove the sincerity of the insurgent government in dealing harshly with those who do not hold the best interest of the people foremost. The local population is often required to sit in judgment in such cases. When the verdict of guilty is announced, the people are asked if the individual should be granted leniency, thereby showing the lenient, benevolent nature of this "people's government." Such controls on individuals are maintained and intensified in a consistent fashion by the political organization of the target area. Insurgent leaders insist on strict organizational discipline among their cadre. Once this discipline is established, they demand discipline among the target group.

This vertical organization is one key to effective control and dissemination of propaganda. It characteristically takes months or even years to establish the shadow political organization. At the same time, certain horizontal organizations are formed which act as propaganda transmission belts. Both of these two basic organizations are responsive to a unified, central, political command at any given level of administration (village, district, regional, etc.).

c. Vertical Organization. The primary function of the vertical-political organization is to administer both the command system and the training of new administrative cadres. In an insurgent-controlled, "liberated" area, the organizational structure at the village level would be headed by the village party secretary, assisted by a deputy secretary. Responsible to them would be various subsections or committees (economic and finance, security, education, culture, etc.). Cadre would fill these political posts. They would listen to radio broadcasts from Hanoi, Peking, or other Communist sources and adapt the issues discussed by these sources directly to the local issues. One week the international stress may be on anti-Americanism; another it may be anti-colonialism. In this way, the local insurgent jumps on the band-wagon and benefits from news around the world as well as from locally generated illustrations and propaganda.

d. Horizontal Organizations. The horizontal organizations are designed to satisfy the human need to participate. These mass organizations are organized and controlled by the subversive insurgent cadre. Occasionally a recognized local leader will become titular head of these front organizations to provide an image of popular support and participation. The mass associations are designed to encompass everyone in the community and are given names which imply broad participation such as: *Liberation Women, Liberation Youth, Liberation Farmers, and Liberation Workers.* In a controlled area, initially, everyone must belong to at least one such organization; the individual is then given certain tasks and responsibilities which he must accomplish in the name of the "people's" organization. If he shirks these tasks, he must confess or have

people single him out as a malingerer. The cadres encourages each individual to extend his affiliations with other "liberation" groups, thereby increasing his responsibilities to the point of total absorption of his time in the cause of insurgency, while the cause is never committed to the individual. The individual is closely supervised and criticized to the point that he develops a sense of pseudo-paranoia. He feels that everyone is watching his every move and that he is slowly, but surely, being isolated and insulated from the functional groups to which he formerly belonged. While this process is going on, the organization continuously makes him commit himself to the "people's" cause and persuades him to participate in communal activities. Gradually, these organizations take over all social, political, economic, cultural, and military controls. The isolation and fear generated in the individual makes it all but impossible to collectively fight the system.

e. Purpose of the Organization. The individual is encouraged to participate, always in an atmosphere controlled by the skilled agitation and propaganda cadres. Such participation is the real meaning of "people's democracy" in a "liberated area." Once the vertical and horizontal organizations have been carefully established, a potent and controlled arena for incessant subversive propaganda exists. The vertical organization replaces the legally constituted government. The horizontal organizations give the necessary facade of democracy, for these mass propaganda organizations permit the people "to express and discuss their problems," even solve their problems, so long as there is no conflict with the insurgent, vertical organizations and the party cadre. Therefore, these closely knit, intertwined control organizations must be unravelled and disentangled before psychological operations personnel can reach effective and susceptible target audiences within "liberated areas." The best solution is to foresee the political nature of the problem and forewarn the legal government and as many of the people as possible so that the people will know what the real nature of the choice is. Whether the "liberated areas" are lost by political naivete or conquered by default, the patterns and consistencies are available for study.

CHAPTER 5

CONSOLIDATION OPERATIONS

Section I. INTRODUCTION

50. Concept of Consolidation Operations

Consolidation psychological operations (or consolidation operations) are directed towards the population in liberated or occupied areas to facilitate military operations and promote maximum cooperation with the occupying power. The major tool for consolidation operations is propaganda just as in other psychological operations. Consolidation operations are designed and committed to assist in "winning" the peace and sealing the victory.

a. In modern warfare the arduous task of repairing war damage has fallen to the victor. He must be prepared to build a new political, social, and economical entity; providing the material, spiritual, and psychological rehabilitation of the people. Consolidation operations are conducted to support these ends.

b. This chapter is devoted to consolidation psychological operations occurring during and after a general or limited war. The crossing of borders to liberate or occupy areas with the use of military force is presupposed. The chapter briefly explains the concept of consolidation operations and its role in support of civil affairs activities. Within this context situations and objectives for consolidation operations, the type of propaganda appeals employed, planning considerations, and the use of media and facilities are discussed.

51. Relationship of Civil Affairs to Consolidation Operations

The task of administering and rehabilitating occupied or liberated territory is assigned to the theater army civil affairs command. This unit is a military organization capable of dealing with local governments at all levels and

serves as a focal point for contacts between the military forces and the civilian population. Consolidation psychological operations units are normally attached to the civil affairs unit for operational control. Civil affairs also involves the relationship derived from implied or explicit agreement between the United States and the government of the country in which our Armed Forces are employed. Conditions requiring civil affairs considerations may exist before, during, or after military action.

a. The role and mission of civil affairs is contained in chapter 21, FM 100-10.

b. It is necessary for other arms and agencies to support civil affairs activities, and among the primary supplementary arms and agencies are psychological operations units. Consolidation psychological operations are aimed at influencing the opinions, emotions, and attitudes of the civilian population in areas placed under the control of the United States or its allies.

(1) The primary objective of consolidation units is to inform the population of what is required of them, or what is being done for them, in line with U.S. national objectives.

(2) Consolidation operations in civil affairs can be divided into two broad areas: tactical support and area support.

(a) *Tactical support.* In a tactical support role, consolidation operations units must be able to provide immediate, on-the-spot, mass communications media to assist the combat commander in securing the combat

area from interference by the civil populace through the establishment of law and order, protection of individuals and property, civil defense, health and sanitation, and area damage control measures.

(b) *Area support.* Consolidation operations normally provide support, supervision, and control of the information media, thereby promoting maximum support and cooperation of the civil population.

Section II. CONSOLIDATION OPERATIONS OBJECTIVES

52. Situation and Objectives

The conditions dictating commitment of consolidation operations units are governed by such a variety of factors that no two consolidation situations may be exactly alike. There are, however, some objectives that apply to all situations which may be useful as guides in planning and conducting consolidation operations. In psychological operations consolidation activities there are two overall objectives: support of military operations, and the orientation and reeducation of the people.

53. Support of Military Operations

a. Initially, consolidation operations are conducted primarily to support military operations and to achieve objectives generally related to combat situations. Orientation and reeducation are attempted only when they further the basic support mission and only then if they form a basis for exploitation at some later date.

b. In liberated areas consolidation operations tend to be persuasive in nature; whereas, in occupied areas they may be arbitrary and directive. The demands of combat and the requirements for absolute control, however, may be so urgent that people in both occupied and liberated areas will have to be treated alike.

c. Consolidation operations assist the combat commander in—

- (1) *Establishing law, order, and discipline.* Consolidation units help to organize the rear area by conducting operations involving the judicious use of propaganda designed to calm fears of the populace, prevent their aimless movement in the area, and direct their activities into useful and orderly channels. Psychological operations units help create a state of mind

wherein the community accepts the authoritative controls imposed; likewise, these units assist in carrying out United States and allied policies applying to the area. An atmosphere of law and order enables tactical operations to proceed unhampered and with maximum strength since fewer troops are required for control in rear areas.

- (2) *Securing lines of communication.* The concept of modern warfare implies extreme mobility; hence, it is essential to keep channels of communication open to prevent the interruption of the flow of personnel and materiel. Refugees, evacuees, and displaced persons frequently clog highways and other routes of supply. By issuing directives and instructions relevant to these matters to the appropriate audience, consolidation units assist other agencies in their attempt to keep lines of communication open and intact.

- (3) *Marshaling labor.* Requirements are great for civilian laborers to assist organic service troops in unloading supplies, establishing and maintaining equipment centers, repairing roads, and restoring public utilities. Consolidation units, under CA direction are responsible for publicizing these labor requirements among the civil population and direct potential laborers to appropriate labor offices.

- (4) *Intelligence.* Through close contact with hostile and friendly persons, psychological operations personnel often gain information of value to the command's intelligence effort. An impor-

tant function of psychological operations personnel is to insure that this information is placed in proper intelligence channels.

- (5) *Controlling rumor.* The psychological state of inhabitants of a combat zone makes them vulnerable to rumors. Rumors may stimulate actions (or lack of action) which may interfere or impede combat operations. Consolidation operations must continually counter dangerous rumors through a timely, accurate, and well-managed information program.
- (6) *Preventing diseases and epidemics.* Consolidation operations play an important role in controlling and preventing epidemics and diseases by publicizing public health activities, the presence and location of contaminated areas, and other necessary emergency precautionary measures, thereby protecting both friendly combat forces and the population from these elements.

54. Orientation and Reeducation

The second major objective for consolidation operations is the orientation and reeducation of the population.

a. Objectives. Under the policy guidance and direction from higher headquarters, psychological operations personnel must prepare plans, programs, and operations designed to indoctrinate and educate the local population in areas under United States and allied control, with the objective of developing understanding and favorable attitudes toward our military forces, support of the military effort, and accomplishment of allied aims and objectives.

b. Liberated Areas. Orientation and reeducation of the population in liberated areas begins as early as possible and often may run concurrently with the combat support mission. Consolidation units have the mission of creating good will for the United States and her allies. Progress in achieving this mission can be made through cooperation with officials and civilians in the area and by explaining the policies of the United States and Allied forces toward the population of the liberated area.

c. Occupied Areas. In occupied areas the mission of consolidation operations is to implement programs for the orientation and reeducation of the civilian populations. The process of eradicating unacceptable doctrine and practices and eliminating the influence of persons and groups identified with such doctrine continues throughout the occupation period. The framework for the orientation of the population toward the postwar aims and objectives of the United States and its allies is outlined at this time.

d. Use of Psychological Actions. An important aspect of the orientation and reeducation programs are psychological actions which can be employed in conjunction with propaganda appeals and information programs for maximum effectiveness. The planned action, for example, of rebuilding a school may do more toward gaining the support of the civilian population than publication of various and sundry proclamations.

e. Secondary Objectives in Orientation and Reeducation. Orientation and reeducation include many secondary objectives to those major ones noted above, not all of which involve the actual dissemination of propaganda:

- (1) *Search for media.* Consolidation operations personnel should locate all information media and accessory equipment in the area which are available for immediate or future use. Of equal importance is locating technical and professional communications personnel who may be used and identifying key communicators and elite influence groups within the society who may be employed to help achieve the mission.
- (2) *Dissemination of news.* The peoples of liberated or occupied areas must be kept informed; hence, the dissemination of news has great importance from the very beginning of consolidation operations. The experience of being served by an objective press is a natural and useful initiation of political indoctrination carried out under the orientation and reeducation program.
- (3) *Rumor control.* The orientation and

reeducation of civilians cannot proceed as long as their minds are at the mercy of disturbing and conflicting rumors. Control of rumors assumes importance in consolidation operations as a prerequisite to the establishment of sound education programs.

- (4) *Collection of information.* Just as certain information obtained from civilians by psychological operations personnel is valuable to the military intelligence officer, much of it is also valuable to consolidation personnel in evaluating the temper and attitude of the people. This information may largely determine the nature and content of educational propaganda employed.

55. Aids to the Accomplishment of Objectives

The various conditions prevailing in liberated or occupied territory may help or impede our psychological consolidation effort. The success of consolidation operations is influenced by:

a. Intimidation. Under normal circumstances, a civilian may be stubborn, proud, and unreceptive to the authority of military commanders; but intimidation stemming from the presence of strong military forces in the area may temper his hostility and make him more responsive to consolidation operations.

b. Feelings of Inferiority. In occupied or liberated areas feelings of inferiority will often be found among people who by reason or race, religion, or socio-economic status have humbled themselves for a long period of time. Thus, they tend to offer little resistance to propaganda. Such persons are much easier to lead and direct than others.

c. Battle Shock. In an area recently subjected to total war, surviving civilians frequently are in a state of shock and are weary and apathetic to the consequences of their obedience to direction. This often renders them incapable of any premeditated resistance to authority and facilitates their control through psychological operations activities.

d. Dependence Upon Occupying Power. Dependence upon the occupying power is an inevitable characteristic of civilians in a newly liberated or occupied area. The occupying force supplies vitally needed goods and services which may be withheld if civilians fail to comply with directives. Therefore, for reasons of self-interest, the audience may aid the propagandist in his task.

e. Knowledge of the Military Situation. Knowledge of the military situation, when it is favorable to the occupier, tends to make the civilian population more readily cooperative than otherwise with the occupation forces.

f. Credibility. As in every psychological operation, credibility plays an important role in consolidation operations. The civilian's confidence in the source and the factual basis for propaganda appeals aids immeasurably in consolidation. Credibility for messages should have already been established in the strategic and tactical operations which preceded the consolidation phase. It must be maintained, even after victory, otherwise consolidation efforts will not succeed in fulfilling their objectives.

g. Control of Familiar Media. Civilians are accustomed to receiving news and information through certain well-known and established media. They tend to believe and follow more readily dictates which they receive through these sources. The consolidation propagandist, by using these familiar and tested media, capitalizes on an existing habit and materially increases the likelihood of attaining his objectives.

56. Obstacles

Just as there are conditions favoring consolidation operations objectives, there are factors which tend to retard their accomplishment. Among these are:

a. Resentment Against Occupying Forces. Peoples in an area of occupation have a natural antipathy toward the forces occupying their land. Their patriotism may cause them to resist the occupation forces and make the occupation difficult through positive acts of disruptive behavior and even open rebellion.

b. Ideological Differences. Whether he comes as a conquerer or liberator, the consolidation propagandist may find himself dealing with staunch adherents to ideologies hostile to his own. In conquered territory these hostile ideologies may stimulate the formation of resistance groups; in liberated areas, dissident elements may sabotage the occupation for selfish and opportunistic reasons. In any case, followers of a hostile ideology will make the task of the consolidation propagandist more difficult and these difficulties cannot be overemphasized. To be effective, the propagandist must understand the ideological differences as the populace understands them. He must then develop his program accordingly, dealing with the realities of the situation and not in terms of what he believes the situation should be. If the population appears to hold illogical views, he must discover the reasons why and then organize his campaign in terms favorable to his goals and objectives.

c. Military Misconduct. Not all of the obstacles leading to the attainment of consolidation operations objectives originate among the local population. Often occupation forces lack dedication, do not understand their mission, or engage in acts of misconduct that discourage cooperation among the people. To eliminate

misconduct and improve understanding of the mission, the military should be taught its responsibilities in assisting the psychological program achieve its goals.

d. Devastation and Disruption of Communications. Consolidation operations depend upon communications. When communications are destroyed or impaired, the task of informing and controlling civilian populations is made more difficult. Not only are the mechanical forms of communications such as radio and newspaper affected, but the face-to-face communication network is also affected, mainly due to the lack of current information on the situation.

e. Disease and Injury. The devastation caused by combat operations, with the subsequent destruction of public health facilities, may lead to the outbreak of disease and sickness among personnel engaged in the rehabilitation effort, thereby delaying successful consolidation of the area.

f. Enemy Propaganda. Although forced from the area, an enemy will continue to direct propaganda efforts toward the population, holding some members and perhaps gaining new adherents to his cause. Enemy successes in this activity will hamper consolidation efforts.

Section III. PROPAGANDA IN CONSOLIDATION OPERATIONS

57. Conditions of Psychological Importance

The initial consolidation effort is perhaps the most difficult since the attitudes of the population may not be fully known. Consequently, propaganda themes are difficult to translate into propaganda messages. A thorough understanding of the popular attitudes helps shape the course of consolidation operations and increase its potential for effectiveness. Among those attitudes which should be examined are:

a. Attitudes Towards Occupying Forces. While it may be taken for granted that liberated populations normally have more friendly attitudes toward the liberating forces and occupied people have more hostile ones, the propagandist must know the intensity of these attitudes in order to deal effectively with them.

b. Attitudes Toward Accepting Discipline or Control. People react differently to discipline or attempts to control their behavior; those accustomed to totalitarian methods may respond favorably to authoritarian controls, while those familiar with a democratic way of life may require different methods altogether.

c. Attitudes Shaped by Proximity of the Enemy. When enemy forces are located relatively near occupied or liberated areas, the population will fear their possible return. Hence, individuals who want to cooperate do not for fear of enemy retaliation; and those persons even less inclined to cooperate will resist hoping for future rewards. If the enemy has been driven far and there is little likelihood of his return, both friendly and hostile

persons are more likely to cooperate in the consolidation effort.

d. Attitudes Based on Enemy Propaganda. In liberated and occupied areas, the enemy will surely seek to advance his own ideology through intensive propaganda. The consolidation propagandist must ascertain the residual strength of enemy propaganda so that he can make his own propaganda more effective.

e. Attitudes Created by Organized Resistance Groups. When organized resistance groups exist in liberated or occupied areas, they exert a powerful influence on the population by their mere presence and because they use active psychological attacks against the occupying forces. Failure to control these groups may suggest weakness on the part of the occupying force.

58. Development of Propaganda Messages in Consolidation

a. In all areas of military psychological operations, several basic rules apply: themes must be developed within the framework of national objectives and policies; the target audience's attitudes and conditions surrounding the target must be analyzed before a psychological program can begin; themes and accompanying messages must be understood by the target audience; and the target audience must be presented reasonable courses of action. Similarly, these rules apply to consolidation operations.

b. Many themes can be developed based on the situation at hand and designed to pursue specific objectives.

- (1) Among other things, the consolidation operation publicizes command directives and announcements through different media. At the outset, these announcements concern immediate needs: sanitation, evacuation of refugees, maintenance of law and order, curfews, etc. Subsequently, the directives stress propaganda items of long-range importance to the occupation: encouragement of sound government, ideological matters, discouraging support of insurgent groups, improved living standards, freedom, in short,

themes designed to make a country economically, politically, and sociologically viable.

- (2) Dissemination of news is a valuable tool in the consolidation operations psychological campaign and can be used to support propaganda objectives. Local news of the military occupation; the progress of the war; and world news on political, scientific, religious, and education matters become of increasing interest to the population. Accurate news reporting, through consolidation psychological media, encourages a return to normal life, with the population better able to see its place in the larger scheme.
- (3) In liberated areas, consolidation units use themes concerning United States aims and emphasizing allied unity. Such efforts to build good will for the United States among the people and the leaders of a liberated nation begin to bear fruit as consolidation progresses.
- (4) In occupied areas, consolidation operations may stress the themes that the old order has been replaced and that the people must cooperate with the occupying forces for their own welfare. At the same time, enemy rumors and propaganda must be countered in a practical way.
- (5) Propaganda helps bring to the people's attention those military actions which are tangible evidence of our policy toward liberated or occupied areas: school rebuilding, improved public health facilities, etc.
- (6) In a liberated or occupied area, consolidation units can provide certain entertainment facilities, such as motion pictures, to people lacking such diversion from the devastation of war. Whether pure entertainment is presented or mixed with messages, any momentary relief from the realities of the situation will aid greatly in obtaining the cooperation of the people and in creating an atmosphere within which progress toward U.S. objectives can be achieved.

Section IV. PLANNING FOR CONSOLIDATION CONSIDERATIONS

59. Specific Planning Considerations

The following are specific planning considerations for consolidation operations which should be kept in mind throughout the consolidation program.

a. Continuity. Psychological operations in liberated and occupied areas are carried out as a single, continuous, and evolving operation from the time the area is occupied to the time when the military occupation ceases.

b. Consistency. Consolidation operations planning must be consistent with postwar aims. The psychological operations planner must avoid making commitments for short-term gains that may not fit long-range policies. Broken promises may compromise our foreign policy for years to come.

c. Interrelation to the United States National Program. Consolidation operations must be correlated with the United States Government's information program and must follow directives guiding that program. The credibility and perhaps the good will created by consolidation operations orientation and reeduca-

tion activities will influence the shaping of the United States information program in the area after hostilities cease.

d. Interrelation to Strategic and Tactical Operations. Consolidation operations cannot be divorced from strategic and tactical psychological operations. The relationship is one of reinforcement; the dissemination of propaganda emphasizing the same themes will render mutual support. Consolidation operations differ from the others only because the audience is restricted to an area held by friendly forces. Consolidation propaganda, however, will reach persons in areas not yet liberated or occupied; hence, care must be taken to insure that contradictions do not occur which might result in generating stronger resistance on the part of those still fighting.

e. Interrelation to Friendly Underground. Every effort should be made to obtain the cooperation of friendly governments-in-exile and friendly guerrilla and resistance organizations in order to coordinate all of the psychological operations programs and point them toward common objectives.

SPECIAL PROPAGANDA OPERATIONS

Section I. COVERT OPERATIONS

60. General

Covert psychological operations are those which do not disclose their source of origin. The operations are planned and conducted so that the government responsible for them is not evident and if uncovered, the sponsor can plausibly disclaim any involvement. Black and gray propaganda are classified as covert efforts.

61. Black Propaganda

Black propaganda purports to emanate from a source other than the true one. It pretends to originate (and sometimes does originate) within or near enemy or enemy-occupied territory. When ostensibly emanating from within an enemy country, it lends credibility to the idea that clandestine operations are being conducted by subversive elements within enemy territory. From the enemy point of view, it is an illegal and unlawful activity and, therefore, punishable under domestic law. This kind of operation requires great skill, knowledge, and an ability to work anonymously. It relies heavily on accurate intelligence. Black propaganda is best used as an element in strategic operations. Although its objective usually transcends immediate tactical situations, it is not excluded from tactical situations deemed sufficiently vital to be worth the risks inherent in its employment. To achieve maximum impact and to preclude a loss of integrity of the overt effort, covert and overt operations should be kept separate and personnel engaged in one should not engage in the other.

a. Capabilities and Advantages.

- (1) Operating under cover, black propaganda can originate within the enemy

homeland and provide immediate, on-the-spot, propaganda messages of relevance to specific audiences.

- (2) Since it emanates from an unknown source, it can help demoralize the enemy by suggesting to him that there are dissident and disloyal elements within his ranks.
- (3) By the skillful use of terminology, format, and appropriate media, the propaganda message can be made to appear as a part of the enemy's own propaganda effort, making the enemy seem to contradict himself; the result would be a proportionate loss of effectiveness in the enemy's overt effort.
- (4) Because it appears to be completely divorced from official or white propaganda, it can employ themes and techniques not appropriate for that kind.
- (5) Because of its covert nature and the difficulty in identifying the source, enemy counterpropaganda is less effective against it.

b. Limitations and Disadvantages.

- (1) Black propaganda requires an unusual amount of care to avoid identification with overt efforts and the subsequent loss of credibility.
- (2) It is difficult to coordinate with overt efforts.
- (3) It seldom uses regular channels of communication.
- (4) It may be difficult to control because operating agencies are decentralized.
- (5) It is limited by stringent security re-

quirements which, in turn, may limit its flexibility.

- (6) It is more vulnerable to discovery and destruction when operating in enemy territory.

c. Examples of Black Propaganda.

- (1) Gossip or rumor.
- (2) Pornography.
- (3) Witticism or jokes.
- (4) Slogans.
- (5) Counterfeit currency, ration, and identification cards.
- (6) Poison pen letters.
- (7) Representing the voice of the enemy.

62. Gray Propaganda

Gray propaganda does not specifically identify any source of origin.

a. Capabilities.

- (1) Skillfully used, gray propaganda can gain acceptance by avoiding the stigma of being "enemy propaganda."
- (2) It can use sensational themes without reflecting on the prestige of the originator.
- (3) It may be used to introduce new themes based on assumed vulnerabilities without identifying the real source; hence, being used for "trial balloon" purposes.

b. Limitations.

- (1) Gray propaganda is limited by the difficulty of keeping its origin mysterious, yet authoritative.
- (2) It may be vulnerable to searching analysis of its content and intent, thereby losing effectiveness and making it more susceptible to counter-propaganda.

Section II. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

63. The Hostilities Phase

a. General.

- (1) Unconventional warfare is defined as "a term which includes the three interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, and subversion against hostile states. Unconventional warfare operations are conducted within enemy or enemy-controlled territory by predominantly indigenous personnel usually supported and directed in varying degrees by an external source."
- (2) Guerrilla warfare is the responsibility of the United States Army. Within guerrilla warfare operational areas (GWOA), the United States Army is responsible for all three interrelated fields of activity as they affect guerrilla warfare operations.
- (3) In periods of war, Special Forces operational detachments are infiltrated into enemy controlled areas for the purpose of organizing and conducting

guerrilla warfare. In cold war situations, Special Forces personnel are invited by legitimate, foreign governments to train and develop indigenous forces in the doctrine, methods, and techniques of guerrilla warfare. A twofold purpose underlies this cold war training: one, to enable the allied force to oppose an invader successfully; and two, to counter and nullify organized subversive armed forces within the country. Manifestly, unconventional warfare personnel require a knowledge of the social and cultural environment of the operational area. This is necessary to facilitate mutual understanding, thereby easing the task of forming the guerrilla force. In peacetime or wartime, unconventional warfare units, by their very presence in a particular country, have a psychological impact among select military or paramilitary elements and among informed elements of the population. The image created by Special

Forces personnel is molded by a multitude of factors which bear heavily on the successful outcome of the operation. These factors include tangible evidence of United States interest in and support of the people by the presence of Special Forces personnel; the results of day-to-day, face-to-face meetings; and an intelligent understanding of the objectives and problems of the indigenous guerrilla force. But the image is more favorable if psychological operations techniques are used at all stages in the organization of the guerrilla units, especially in the initial stage to prepare the potential guerrilla force and auxiliary forces for the arrival of the United States personnel. Psychological operations are similarly important later in pointing up mutual efforts to achieve common political and military objectives. This new focus imposes additional burdens on the detachment commander, requiring him to have a detailed knowledge of psychological operations capabilities and the imagination to use them within his peculiar operational environment. The psychological implications of unconventional warfare makes a knowledge of psychological operations important. It is particularly important when a Special Forces operation is predominantly psychological in nature, in the initial phases of forming the guerrilla units, and in winning the help of supporting elements and the civilian population.

- (4) This section outlines how psychological operations can assist Special Forces in carrying out their missions, help to maximize the chances for success, and contribute to a shortening of the conflict. Additionally, it underscores the need for the military commander to recognize and appreciate the cultural differences separating him from the indigenous population. He must make known his respect for the traditions and way of life of those with whom he must labor to achieve

the mutual objective. And he must ascertain that his subordinates reflect that same respect and appreciation.

- (5) Members of resistance movements are active propagandists who exploit the ideological and political implications associated with resistance activity. Paralleling the guerrilla military effort is a propaganda effort conducted by all resistance elements that seek to gain support for their movement. The relative isolation and clandestine atmosphere associated with resistance activities creates a continuing need for propaganda to support the effort.

b. Concept and Organization.

- (1) Planning for Special Forces operations must include the use of psychological operations in all phases of the unconventional operation. Special Forces operations include a preparatory phase during which large areas fall under control of guerrilla forces or friendly military forces overrun the unconventional warfare area. Planned psychological operations can assist unconventional warfare operations both before and during hostilities and through those cold war activities in which United States Army units may be engaged. These psychological operations are designed to create, reinforce, or sustain those attitudes held by the population which will cause them to act in a manner beneficial to themselves and to United States objectives.
- (2) Strategic psychological operations have the broad objective of generally defining American principles and objectives and interpreting America and its people to other peoples. Radio program facilities can be used to prepare potential or determined Special Forces operational areas for the psychological acceptance of American unconventional warfare personnel.
- (3) Army psychological operations units are available within the overseas theater or command to assist in amplifying

ing the broad policies and goals in the particular area in which unconventional warfare units are committed. During hostilities a psychological operations staff officer will coordinate with the Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force (JUWTF) to assist Special Forces detachments in their respective areas of operations. All planning for Special Forces operations must include the use of psychological operations in all phases of the unconventional warfare operations, from the psychological preparation stage through the link-up stage, when conventional operations will govern.

c. Special Forces Area of Operations—Target Audiences. The enemy target audience may consist of several elements:

(1) *Enemy military forces.*

(a) Enemy military forces may be of the same nationality as the population, or they may represent an occupying foreign power. In either case the guerrilla force and the auxiliary personnel supporting them will attempt to make enemy soldiers feel isolated and undersupported by higher echelons by pointing up their inadequate supplies, poor equipment, and the perennial danger of death. By focusing on the enemy soldier's frustrations, psychological operations can lower his morale and reduce his effectiveness, particularly in conjunction with the powerful pressures generated by continuous combat action. Ambushing supply units, sniping, small-scale raids against isolated units, cutting enemy communication lines, and seizing vital objectives at night will induce a feeling of inadequacy, insecurity, and fear in the enemy soldier. The feeling of inadequacy and fear permit easy access to the mind with the several psychological operations tools, making the enemy soldier vulnerable to appeals urging surrender, malingering, or desertion. The enemy soldier's feeling of

isolation and his receptivity to our appeals are further aided through leaflets and broadcasts which stress the popular support of the aims of the guerrilla.

(b) The psychological "isolation" campaign must be supplemented by a more positive technique designed to elicit more readily observable reactions. If the Special Forces commander expects to have enemy soldiers defect or desert, satisfying and realistic goals must be introduced to attract the target audience. The enemy soldier should be told why and how he should defect and given assurances concerning his welcome and safety by the guerrilla force. When enemy soldiers are taken by the guerrillas, promises of safety and good treatment must be kept. Proof of good treatment must be passed on to enemy units by photographing some of the prisoners, having them sign leaflets, or even having them make loudspeaker appeals to their former comrades in arms. If these techniques are not feasible, auxiliary personnel should immediately inform enemy units by word of mouth of the well-being of defected or captured personnel. Obviously, the defection of an enemy soldier is important news to his former colleagues since it indicates to those remaining that the soldier's safety is assured. This fact alone can have a great psychological impact on the enemy and on the guerrillas themselves: the enemy is made to feel that his own comrades are wavering and do not support enemy goals, while the guerrillas learn that the enemy is weakening and his own chances for success increasing.

(2) *Enemy civilians.*

(a) Civilians in the operational area may be supporting their own government or collaborating with an enemy occupation force. Themes

and appeals disseminated to this group will vary accordingly, but the psychological objectives will be the same as those for the enemy military. An isolation program designed to instill doubt and fear may be carried out; and a positive, political action program designed to elicit active support of the guerrillas also may be effected. If these programs fail it may become necessary to take more aggressive action in the form of harsh treatment or even abductions. The abduction and harsh treatment of key enemy civilians can weaken the collaborators' belief in the strength and power of their military forces. This approach, fraught with propaganda and political dangers, should be used only after all other appeals have failed. When forced to use such tactics, the guerrilla must clearly assume responsibility in order to protect the population from enemy reprisal.

- (b) The main objective of psychological operations in guerrilla warfare operations will be to persuade the target group that the guerrillas are fighting for the welfare and goals of the population; that these goals are attainable; and that the United States, in supporting the guerrilla force, is pressing for the same political and social goals. Psychological programs aimed at this target audience stress appeals designed to induce the population to support and obey the guerrillas in achieving recognized common objectives.
- (c) By their presence in the operational area, Special Forces personnel are able to gather exploitable information on the immediate conflict, the attitudes, and the behavior of the local population. The guerrilla force and its supporting elements are a valuable storehouse of information which can be used to strengthen psychological operations plans directed at civilian and enemy target

audiences. Armed with this information, the Special Forces commander can then request support from the theater psychological operations officer to assist in carrying out a coordinated psychological program previously drawn up at least in tentative form. This support may take the form of dropping newspapers and other semi-official media to the population supplying the guerrillas with material to produce printed matter, and providing the Special Forces commander with additional advice and techniques on conducting a detailed and integrated psychological program.

- (3) *The guerrillas and the auxiliaries.* The third major target audience to be considered by the Special Forces commander comprises the guerrillas, the auxiliaries, and those underground elements assisting the guerrillas. The guerrilla force has been given proof that the United States supports the general objectives of the guerrilla movement by the infiltration of Special Forces personnel; but as the representative of the United States theater commander, the Special Forces detachment commander must insure that specific goals for the guerrillas and its support elements are reinterpreted and reemphasized continually during the hostilities phase.

d. Types of Psychological Operations in a Guerrilla Warfare Area.

- (1) *Action programs.* Action programs are those operations undertaken by the Special Forces commander which are designed to have a psychological effect on any of the three major target audiences. As indicated above, some combat actions may be initiated by the Special Forces commander purely for psychological purposes, especially those related to raising the morale of the guerrilla fighter or demonstrating guerrilla support of the people. The purpose of these actions is to rein-

force belief in the strength of the guerrilla force and in the rightness of their goals. When held by the population, these beliefs open up sources of food and needed information required for guerrilla survival. Enemy belief in the strength of the guerrilla force will tend to lower the enemy's morale and weaken his operations. Examples of actions that can be taken by the Special Forces commander and initiated primarily for psychological reasons are:

- (a) Assisting the civilian population by distributing and administering medical supplies.
 - (b) Rescuing and evacuating key civilians supporting the guerrilla cause.
 - (c) Warning the civilian population of impending aircraft or missile operations in the local area (these warnings imply guerrilla control over the operation and further increases the belief in the strength of the guerrilla force).
 - (d) Encouraging and assisting the civilian population to resume their normal activities (this may involve using the guerrillas or auxiliary units in assisting the local population to repair buildings, build needed rural structures, harvest crops, reopen schools and churches or organize social activity groups).
 - (e) Promoting honest and effective government in the area.
- (2) The psychological programs must carry the full weight of the prestige and legality of the United States and its allies. This can be demonstrated by having appropriate directives emanate from United States authorities at theater level or higher. Joint directives issued by United States and indigenous guerrilla leaders or the government-in-exile will give added force to the action programs.
 - (3) Successful military achievements and fair and prompt payment for supplies requisitioned from the civilian popu-

lation can have a beneficial psychological effect when intelligently and truthfully exploited. Emphasis on the legitimacy of guerrilla objectives and their capacity to win will help them in their military mission. Exploitable political aspects of the total situation should be used in the propaganda program.

e. Media.

- (1) *Face-to-face meetings.* During operations and before the Special Forces commander can help the civilian population resume a relatively normal life, he should reinforce written appeals by holding meetings and discussions with local civilians. These meetings provide additional, tangible evidence that the guerrillas are supported by the United States and that both are working in the interests of the population. Members of the Special Forces detachments must participate in such meetings to establish full rapport with the population and diminish the "foreignness" of the Special Forces personnel. These meetings help identify the guerrillas and the Special Forces personnel with the population.

(2) *Printed media.*

- (a) The leaflet, poster, or bulletin will be the most common and effective printed material used by the Special Forces commander and the guerrillas in the operational area. Small printing presses and other simple, reproducing machines can be used to print leaflets and news communiques. The technical problems associated with printing may be considerable, and dissemination of the leaflets will be difficult in those areas where the enemy maintains firm control. In the initial stages of hostilities, when psychological operations are most vital, guerrilla forces may not have the facilities to produce large amounts of printed material. Special Forces units, however, may be supplied

with lightweight, portable, printing equipment and may devise field expedients which will produce a limited number of leaflets or posters.

(b) The techniques of leaflet writing for unconventional operations are the same as those for conventional programs. Guerrillas, aided by the Special Forces commander, can usually select themes which are more timely, more credible, and more consistent than those which emanate from sources outside the operational area. The Special Forces commander can augment the locally produced program by having small newspapers dropped into the area to supplement bulletins issued through auxiliary units. Printed material should be used to emphasize favorable aspects of civic action programs already undertaken. War aims should be publicized as aspects of permanent national aims and policies and disseminated as official-looking leaflets. Leaflets carrying the official text of joint communiqués signed by the theater commander and the guerrilla leaders or Special Forces commanders should be official and formal in appearance when issued to the target audience.

(3) *Rumor.* Rumor can be an effective propaganda device especially when employed in black propaganda. The Special Forces commander, using guerrillas and auxiliary information channels, can initiate rumors in the operational area, if the situation calls for them. Themes that the Special Forces commander would be reluctant to sanction as official can be spread by rumor. Although rumors are difficult to control and the target audience can never be specifically isolated, the medium has the advantage of being virtually impossible to trace. Since this device is also exploitable by the enemy, rumors which are detrimental to the guerrilla effort should be

countered by leaflets or face-to-face meetings with selected members of the civilian population.

64. Psychological Operations in Demobilization

a. General.

- (1) Psychological operations are employed to assist the demobilization phase of a guerrilla force. Demobilization is the transfer of guerrilla forces and their associated elements to the control of the recognized national government or a partial or complete disbanding of forces. Psychological programs using all media must be planned to explain the demobilization process to the guerrilla. In addition, rehabilitation programs for the guerrilla are effected, and the guerrillas' role in relation to the future plans for their country is discussed. In general, psychological operations aid in the orderly transition of the guerrilla force to more normal pursuits and in preparing the civilian population for the return of guerrilla elements. (Wherever guerrilla forces are sponsored by United States Special Forces, demobilization plans are included in the civil affairs annex of the operations or administration order.)
- (2) When friendly conventional troops and unconventional warfare forces join, the ability of guerrilla forces to support military operations tends to diminish. Units retained beyond their period of usefulness become a liability and a potential source of trouble. Consideration must then be given to the demobilization of contingents in sectors occupied by United States troops. The decision regarding the transfer of guerrilla forces and auxiliary elements to the national government concerned must be resolved at the theater level. The political, economic, and social implications of such transfers must be weighed because they affect international relations and internal affairs, especially when guerrilla

forces are foreign to the area. When no recognized national government exists, the decision to disband the forces, partially or wholly, also requires careful consideration. In any case, Special Forces units may be involved in demobilization procedures. Therefore, coordination between Special Forces, civil affairs, and other appropriate military and political authorities must be effected to insure a disposition of guerrilla forces in harmony with the long-range political objectives of the United States in the area.

b. Role of Sponsoring Powers.

- (1) When combat operations of a guerrilla force are completed in a theater, the theater commander may release that force to the provisional government recognized by the United States.
- (2) Final responsibility for demobilization and use of guerrilla forces belongs to the provisional government. However, the United States may be obliged to restore and maintain public order in the area, until an effective political administration is established.

c. Exploitable Psychological Aspects of Demobilization.

- (1) Demobilization by United States forces may take any one or a combination of the following courses:
 - (a) The guerrilla force, with all arms and equipment, may be released to the recognized government.
 - (b) The guerrilla force may be demobilized and relocated by the United States.
 - (c) The guerrilla force, minus United States-supplied arms and equipment, may be returned to the recognized government.
- (2) Demobilization is planned and conducted to include the following:

- (a) Assembly of the guerrilla force.
- (b) Completion of administrative records.
- (c) Settlement of pay, allowances, and benefits.
- (d) Settlement of claims.
- (e) Awarding of decorations.
- (f) Collection of arms and equipment.
- (g) Care of sick and wounded.
- (h) Discharge.
- (i) Provision for the rehabilitation and employment of discharged guerrillas.
- (j) Prevention of bandit or other dissident groups forming from guerrilla elements.

d. Area for Psychological Operations Emphasis. Perhaps the greatest danger in any demobilization program is the possibility that former guerrillas will slide into dissidence, factional quarrels, or even banditry. Others may take advantage of unstable conditions to organize quasi-military or political groups which will conflict with policies of the provisional government or United States authorities. It is vital, therefore, that demobilization procedures be executed expeditiously and with foresight. Instituted procedures will be an outgrowth of high level deliberations by military and political authorities. In implementing directives, maximum coordination between Special Forces, civil affairs, and other appropriate elements is necessary. To avoid troublesome situations, tight control measures should be instituted and persons suspected of favoring action hostile to established authority kept under surveillance. Every effort should be made to bring about peaceful acceptance of the new political administration and to ease adjustment to those social changes consequent to the cessation of hostilities. A strong program of psychological operations is of great importance during this critical time of demobilization. It should be planned and executed with much care in close coordination with agencies of the recognized government and the United States.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS UNITS

65. General

Psychological operations units are employed in a strategic role, behind the immediate combat zone, to further long-range or broad national objectives or in a tactical role, to further short-term aims in the forward combat areas. The strategic unit (battalion size) is organized into cellular teams with the operational capability of propaganda development, radio broadcasting, and fixed (but movable) printing production and dissemination. The tactical unit, normally a separate company or battalion in support of a field army is similarly organized with cellular teams with the operational capability of propaganda development, loud-speaker broadcasting, and light and heavy mobile printing production and dissemination. Further doctrinal aspects of psychological operations, organization and employment, including those in counterinsurgent environments, may be found in FM 33-1.

66. Consideration in Psychological Operations Task Organization

a. The Cellular Concept. The underlying theory of a cellular TOE permits the activities of balanced organizations by economically tailoring them for specific reasons. Obviously, the organizations required for the support of a field army, for a corps, for a division, or for a joint unconventional warfare task force will differ by size, function, and composition. The cellular structure of the psychological operations organization effects savings in men and equipment not possible under fixed structure platoons, companies, and battalions.

b. Structuring the Force. Basically, three elements normally will be required to structure a force. They are command and control elements, supply and maintenance elements, and operational teams.

(1) There are three command and control elements. The smallest of the three command and control elements, the Team AA (company), is suited for support of a corps, separate division, or other command. It may also be assigned or attached in an advisory role to a Military Assistance Advisory Group Mission (MAAG/MISSION), United States Information Service (USIS), Special Action Force (SAF), or Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force (JUWTF), as required. The next larger command and control element is the Team AB (battalion). This team can be used to support a field army or a civil affairs command in a communication zone. The largest of the command and control elements, the Team AC (group) is designed to provide psychological operations support to a theater army. The team AC can plan, manage, and supervise a strategic psychological operations program. It can provide administrative command for all of the Army psychological operations organizations allocated to a theater of operations. One or more AC team (group) may be used to form the nucleus of a joint headquarters for all theater psychological operations organizations being structured. The number and composition of command and control elements will depend on the overall mission, the unified commander's desires, the geographical area, and the number and composition of operational teams provided as subordinate elements.

(2) Supply and maintenance teams are

capable of providing certain supply and maintenance functions not provided in the command and control elements discussed above.

- (3) In structuring a given force, one must consider the required operational teams to fill out the overall unit.

(a) There are seven major groupings of operational teams. The "F" series (propaganda) teams develop propaganda themes and tasks as directed by higher authority. The "G" series teams provide heavy mobile printing capabilities; the "H" series teams provide a light mobile configuration for the entire spectrum of psychological operations except radio broadcasting and are designed for combat, counterinsurgency, or unconventional warfare support operations. The "I" series teams provide for mobile radio operations; the "J" series teams provide a fixed printing capability; the "K" series teams provide a consolidation capability, primarily designed for support of the civil affairs and military police commands. There is an additional single operational cell not related to any major grouping, the "LA" or Ideographic Composing Machine Operations Team.

(b) From these operational cells or teams, the force planner selects the required number of teams to accomplish the overall mission. In determining the specific numbers of operational teams in each category, the planner should first consider the "F" series teams. Generally speaking, propaganda efforts being conducted against specific ethnic groups will require one "FA" cell for each ethnic group involved in order to develop the specialized propaganda required by psychological operations directives. For example, if a major force being supported is confronted with hostile forces speaking three foreign lan-

guages, three "FA" teams, each containing area and foreign language oriented propagandists, will be required in force. In addition, as support for the intelligence, research and analysis, audio and graphic efforts, the force planner must consider representation from other teams of the "F" series such as "FB" (Audio), "FC" (Current Intelligence), "FD" (Research and Analysis), and "FE" (Graphic).

(c) In determining the operational teams required for printing, for radio operations, or for the diverse activities represented by the "H" series, Light Mobile, the planner must be aware of the mass communications media appropriate for use in a specific area of operations. For example, in an underdeveloped area where the illiteracy rate is extremely high, the propagandist is forced to use media other than the printed word to get his propaganda message over. Therefore, face-to-face communications, mobile radio broadcasts, mobile loudspeakers, or other audio and visual means may be the principal devices for communicating with the target group. In more sophisticated environments, the requirement for printing presses may outweigh requirements for radio broadcast and reception capabilities. In such areas, all the printing teams available in the "G" series should be used to support a field army and its subordinate components. The full "J" series (printing) is designed to support the Army component of a unified command. Any consideration of incorporating printing facilities into the psychological operations organization support unit should be considered in the light of existing indigenous printing capabilities in a theater of operations.

(d) Some of the more specialized psychological operations support forces

that will require the planner's attention are those designed to support unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency, and consolidation operations in rear areas under the civil affairs command. Depending upon the activity to be supported, teams may be required to be airborne qualified. Examples are units designated to support conventional airborne corps and divisions, joint unconventional warfare task forces, and U.S. or indigenous counterinsurgent forces with air assault missions. The "H" series, light mobile operations teams, are designed to support counterinsurgent operations, but they may also be employed in other operations. They provide not only propaganda teams but the necessary loudspeaker, printing and processing, and audiovisual cells necessary in counterinsurgency. Psychological operations teams for wartime consolidation operations are designed primarily as advisory and supervisory elements available to the civil affairs command to assist in civilian control problems and in the management of prisoners of war and civilian internees in the rear area.

- (e) After arriving at the number and composition of operational teams, the planner should examine any specialized supply and maintenance requirements and, if necessary, provide one or more "BA" teams as required. Finally, he should analyze the geographic area of operations and the span of control that has been imposed upon the command and control elements. There may be requirements to augment the organization with cellular teams from the TOE 11-500 series (Signal Service Organization) or from TOE 29-500 (General Service Organization) for administration, mess, signal, or maintenance.

67. Roles and Missions of Psychological Operations Teams

a. Command and Control AA, AB, and AC Teams.

- (1) The Team AA is capable of exercising command and control of from 3 to 7 operational teams. The team leader is expected to keep himself advised of the status of supply, to perform normal personnel administrative matters, and to act as the point of contact between the supported unit and the operational teams he commands or supervises. Although he is limited in his ability to provide logistical support, maintenance, or messing for his subordinate elements, he can and should ensure that his subordinate elements are properly supported and cared for. He accomplishes this function by close daily contact with the psychological operations officer on the staff of the supported unit.
- (2) Team AB has capabilities greater than those of Team AA, for it is capable of exercising command and control of 5 Teams AA. Both teams AA and AB may be designated as airborne units. Team AB has the capability of supervising supply and personnel administration for itself and the subordinate AA teams. It has the capability for liaison with supported units and a limited capability to function in an advisory role to the psychological operations staff section of the supported unit. Team AB is responsible for its own supply and administration and that of its subordinate AA teams. Its limitations are no messing or maintenance capabilities, a communications restriction to Army common user circuits, and support requirements from the 11-500 and 29-500 series TOE. Consideration should be given to augmenting this team with selected indigenous personnel.
- (3) The AC team is the largest command and control team and is primarily designed as a theater army component psychological operations organiza-

tion. It has the capability of providing centralized operational command over the U.S. Army psychological operations elements allocated to a theater of operations. It has organic capabilities for administration, mess, supply, planning, and training for all assigned or attached teams and provides liaison to the unified or Army component commander to assist him in planning and conducting strategic, tactical, consolidation, and special psychological operations. It can also be deployed within the theater to provide direct control of committed psychological operations units; however, its strongest capability lies in the handling of administrative and support matters for all deployed psychological operations organizations. The liaison personnel in this team are airborne qualified, hence they may be assigned duties with airborne units in a theater of operations. The principal limitation of the AC team is its limited communications facilities. This may be overcome by selective augmentation or by satelliting it on other commands with common user facilities.

b. Team BA (Supply and Maintenance). This team has the principal function of providing direct support repair of signal and reproduction equipment. It stocks critical spare parts of standard radio equipment, printing presses, and any nonstandard spare parts peculiar to equipment used in the theater of operations. This team can provide supply and maintenance support for deployed psychological operations elements not having this capability. This is particularly important for units having nonstandard equipment requiring maintenance and running spares. An example would be indigenous presses and transmitters used by elements of the psychological operations organization deployed over a wide geographical area. The off-shore procurement and stockage of newsprint and inks and their subsequent distribution to printing presses within a theater of operations may require that this team be augmented, for short periods of time, with truck

transportation and indigenous labor units. Additionally, the team must be attached for unit administration, messing, maintenance, and supply to the unit being supported. Although the BA team is designed to support an entire theater of operations, this might not always hold true. In large theaters with subordinate unified commands, requirements may exist to provide a BA team in support of a deployed Team AB, as well as having one in support of the theater army component, Team AC.

c. Operational Teams. There are 29 types of operational teams. These in turn are broken down into seven functional series. Accordingly, the force planner should first study the capabilities and basis of allocation of both functional series and individual teams as reflected in part 4, section I of TOE 33-500. Each mix of operational teams requires a command and control element to provide minimal administration and support. Teams from a given functional series may or may not require the services of all other teams in the same series. The printing teams in the "G" series and "J" series and the radio teams in the "I" series generally require one complete set of a given functional series at least, in order to function effectively.

(1) *Team FA, Propaganda (Operations).*

This team has the capability of functioning alone or of supervising and working with selective mixes of Teams FB, FC, FD, or FE. Normally, the Team FA will be oriented toward one particular geographic area and have assigned one foreign language propagandist qualified in the language of that area. This team makes an excellent survey team and is appropriate for supporting an advance party in an area threatened with insurgency. It is well-suited to work with other services and agencies of the United States Government and can assist planning staffs in arriving at propaganda programs. In order to exercise its full capabilities, it may require attachment of FB, FC, FD, and FE teams and augmentation with selected indigenous personnel. The main point to remember about this team is that it is designed to develop

propaganda themes and psychological objectives. For every ethnic group that can be considered as a principal target audience, one area-qualified Team FA will be required. The team may be designated airborne and employed in support of airborne units.

(2) *Team FB, Propaganda (Audio)*. This team, with an aggregate of 17 men, develops themes and psychological objectives by preparing sound tape propaganda messages under the direct supervision of the Team FA. The tapes are disseminated by loudspeakers, radio, and other audio devices. It is particularly advantageous for this team to be augmented, with selected indigenous personnel if possible. The U.S. personnel, as sound technicians rather than propagandists, produce and record the scripts by foreign linguists. They monitor the technical quality of the tapes to be disseminated by the various media. A principal guideline for assignment of the Team FB is the requirement for propaganda to be cut on sound tapes for use in radio broadcasting or with loudspeakers.

(3) *Team FC, Propaganda (Current Intelligence)*. This team provides intelligence support to the foreign area propagandist and keeps the FA team informed about intelligence obtained through the intelligence sections of the supported units. It can extract from intelligence that information important to psychological operations. To accomplish the above, the Team FC has a foreign language propaganda officer and intelligence personnel whose specialists includes interrogation and translation of documents in designated languages. The intelligence editor extracts intelligence in proper form for the use of the FA team. Selected prisoners of war, civilian internees, and other knowledgeable persons may be made available, through intelligence channels, for interrogation by members of the team

in order to develop exploitable psychological operations tasks and themes.

An FA cell would be limited in effectiveness without assistance of the Team FC. The FC team may be designated airborne and introduced into an operational area in support of airborne units. Team FC supplements rather than duplicates combat intelligence efforts. The requirements for intelligence support for psychological operations indicate the need for a specialized intelligence function within the psychological organization.

(4) *Team FD, Propaganda (Research and Analysis)*. There may be circumstances when planning and implementing a psychological operations program requires research and analysis beyond the capability of the FA team propagandist. Team FD is capable of producing detailed studies of target audiences through research, the collation of intelligence provided by the FC team, and an analysis of enemy propaganda. The team is primarily designed for use in the planning phase, when liaison with other services and agencies is essential. The function of the FD team should not be confused with that of the FC team which is that of producing psychological intelligence. The FD Team is used for intensive and detailed research, using current intelligence as well as basic intelligence on the area and peoples concerned.

(5) *Team FE, Propaganda (Graphic)*. This team has the writers and illustrators who can take a propaganda theme and develop the propaganda leaflets, newsheets, proclamations, and posters in final form. Here again, the relationship between the Team FE and the Team FA is such that with the support of a graphic team, the psychological objectives and themes produced by the FA team are assured of reproduction in appropriate form and quantity. At least one team FE is necessary to support an

FA team. In order to realize its maximum capability, Team FE should be augmented, when possible, by selected indigenous personnel skilled in the preparation of copy and illustrations common to the target area and its people.

(6) *Team GA, Publication (Operations)*. This team supervises the operations of one GB, GC, and GD team and is responsible for coordinating the activities of these teams.

(7) *Team GB, Publication (Processing)*. This team trims, cuts, rolls, packages, and otherwise prepares printed propaganda material for dissemination by aircraft, tube artillery, or other means. This team, particularly, can profit by augmentation of local indigenous labor.

(8) *Team GC, Publication (Camera and Plate)*. This team produces the photolithographic plates used by the offset presses of the GD team. Under normal conditions the camera and plate team is necessary to the printing process. On this basis, therefore, Teams GC and GD should be collocated.

(9) *Team GD, Publication Press*. On receipt of the photolithographic plates prepared by Team GC, this team prints propaganda leaflets and other printed media to specification. The "G" series team is suitable for employment in the field army; it is mobile and, with the exception of the Team HC, is the most directly responsive printing facility for psychological operations support to the field army commander.

(10) *The "H" series light mobile teams*. These teams were initially designed for the support of indigenous, counterinsurgent operations and for the support of the wartime JUWTF. They were also designed to provide more immediate reaction to corps or division leaflet requirements than might be possible from Army level. They can be used in air assault and airborne

operations. Organized on a light, streamlined basis, all the skills and equipment necessary to conduct tactical psychological operations and support counterinsurgency (except mobile radio broadcasting capabilities) are contained in the light mobile teams described below.

(a) *Team HA, Light Mobile (Operations)*, is primarily designed to provide operational supervision over the "H" series teams. It also has the capability of planning and producing propaganda. Administrative and logistical support for the subordinate teams must be provided by the supported unit.

(b) *Team HB, Light Mobile (Loudspeaker Operations)*, is the loudspeaker team for use in man-portable or vehicular-mounted tactical loudspeaker operations in support of combat units. It can disseminate live or taped audio propaganda messages to enemy troops in contact and to selected target audiences. It is equipped with remote control equipment so that the operator can remain some distance away from the loudspeaker in a defilade position.

(c) *Team HC, Light Mobile (Printing and Processing)*, provides a highly mobile printing and processing capability for the production of propaganda leaflets and newsheets. This team is ideally suited for operations in support of counterinsurgency and the JUWTF or in direct support of a corps, division, or separate brigade. Generally, it should be collocated with a Team HD, Propaganda (Light Mobile Operations). It has an organic, cross-country mobility and can operate in fairly rugged terrain. It is not able to produce such amounts of sophisticated printed material.

(d) *Team HD, Propaganda (Light Mobile Operations)*, provides the principal capability for quickly preparing and disseminating leaflets,

and newssheets. It can also prepare scripts for use by tactical loud-speaker teams and airborne loud-speakers. A foreign language propaganda officer is in charge of the team. The team has the necessary illustrators, copywriters, and photographers to produce the final propaganda message. It can be structured as an airborne unit and employed in general or limited war, in support of counterinsurgency, and in unconventional warfare. Its principal limitation is its small size. It is capable of turning out finished propaganda in limited quantities. In essence, it reflects the same basic capability of an entire set of "F" series teams, but is concentrated in one team for quick application.

(e) Team HE. Propaganda (Audio-Visual) has the capability of conducting sound and film operations. It is equipped with a public address system for addressing rallies and crowds and also can show film or film strips. It is ideal for presenting propaganda on a person-to-person basis in consolidation operations. Teams organized such as this one are very effective in counterinsurgent situations. The team can also be used to distribute leaflets, posters, and other items prepared by other teams of the light mobile series. The team can conduct local surveys, opinion polls, and report on local attitudes and opinions.

(11) Team IA, Mobile Radio (Operations). This team is designed to supervise the other teams in the "I" series. The team IA can control or supervise the efforts of one or more IB, IC, and ID teams. It has the capability of supervising teams which may not be collocated, although the capability decreases sharply if great distances are involved. To conduct a radio propaganda operation, the planner must provide at least one IA, IB, IC and

ID team. The principal capability is to conduct medium- and short-wave radio broadcasting operations when properly equipped. These teams have a technical capability for setting up the radio transmitter, receivers, and antennas for broadcasting propaganda.

(12) Team IB, Mobile Radio (Radio News). This team provides a capability for monitoring hostile or enemy propaganda radio programs for psychological operations intelligence purposes and assists in analyzing the effects of our own propaganda.

(13) Team IC, Mobile Radio (Engineering). This team provides technical and audio specialists, as well as the actual equipment to broadcast propaganda programs over medium- and short-wave bands. The "I" series teams provide skill levels necessary to operate currently authorized radio stations. At least one IC team is needed to erect, operate, and maintain one transmitter. When larger and more sophisticated transmitters are available, additional IC teams may be necessary to carry out the increased operational and maintenance tasks. It is feasible for one IA mobile radio operations call to control two, three or even as many as five IC teams.

(14) Production ID, Mobile Radio (Production). This team provides a limited capability for producing original radio programs in support of psychological operations or broadcasting programs that have been taped. It provides the same capability that the broadcasting studio personnel of a commercial radio station would provide. The team prepares programs under the supervision of the IA team leader.

(15) Team JA, Printing (Operations). This team provides direct supervision of fixed printing operations. Normally, a Team JA supervises the efforts of one JB, JC, and JD team when grouped together. There may be several fixed press teams (JC) under the

direct supervision of one Team JA. Each "J" series team can provide a printing capability of some 2-million leaflets a day. The skill levels and the equipment provided are used in a theater army component support role. They are essentially fixed and constitute a semi-permanent installation when established. One complete set of the "J" series should be sufficient to support the theater army component of a unified command. In recommending the assignment of a "J" series group of teams, consider the fact that in many parts of the world complete printing installations, similar to that provided in this series are available through civilian printing concerns. In the event of mobilization, it would be possible to assemble the military members of the teams, less their equipment, and proceed to an oversea area where civilian facilities are available. The teams could begin operations pending the arrival of their own equipment at a later time. The skill levels in this series of teams are about the same as those of a small city newspaper printing establishment.

(16) *Team JB, Printing (Camera and Plate)*. This team conducts process photography and platemaking in support of the heavy offset press in Team JC. This team provides the process with photography and platemaking for several heavy presses.

(17) *Team JC, Printing (Heavy Press)*. This team has the necessary skill levels and reproduction equipment to produce 60-million leaflets per month. This press can produce various types of printed matter including small newspapers. Team JC cannot function without the support of a Team JB, or its equivalent, and should be placed under the supervision of Team JA. The Team JC establishes a semi-permanent installation, is not mobile, and must be provided a suitable, covered, working area with proper electrical power and a water supply. Sufficient space to

store large amounts of newsprint is also required. The team should not be required to function under canvas, tentage, or in makeshift facilities since the presses require a poured concrete or other heavy foundation. Direct support maintenance for this press is provided from the TEAM BA, Supply and Maintenance. When the "J" series teams are employed, there should be a BA team in support.

(18) *Team JD, Printing (Processing)*. This team prepares printed material for shipment to the disseminating agency. When the printed material comes off the presses, it has to be properly packaged, addressed, and transported to a shipping area. For example, whenever a JC team is in operation, the JD team should be used to prepare the printed material for its final dissemination. This team can make use of indigenous labor to assist them in their work, particularly when automatic leaflet rolling devices are not available.

(19) *The "K" series consolidation teams*. These teams are designed primarily for wartime support of the civil affairs and military police prisoner of war commands of a theater army component. After combat operations have been concluded in an area of the theater of operations, the control and livelihood of the civilian population becomes a problem to rear commanders. It is necessary to control and reestablish order among these civilians. U.S. Army psychological operations teams can assist civil affairs commanders by providing motion picture facilities, producing printed media (proclamations and letters of instruction), and by operating radio broadcasting stations and various other communications media.

(a) *Team KA, Consolidation (Operations)*. This team is made up of supervising the operations of two or more of the consolidation teams. The team is advisory in nature and is heavily equipped, and is primarily designed

to use indigenous personnel and material resources. They could be used in liberated or occupied areas to reconstitute mass media capabilities, under the supervision of the civil affairs commander; for as soon as communications media can be restored or replaced, the control of the populace is easier. The "K" series teams have an added capability, because selected teams can support counterinsurgent operations. As presently structured, the KA, KC, and KD teams may be provided with an airborne capability. "K" series elements comprise part of the psychological operations augmentation detachments to the Special Action Force (SAF).

- (b) Team KB, Consolidation (Motion Picture), has the capability to operate a motion picture installations operated by indigenous personnel. The team is particularly suited for supervision or advisory functions. When augmented by selected indigenous personnel, its capabilities are greatly enhanced. In planning the use of this particular team in its consolidation role, an estimate should be made of the number of motion picture installations that remain operational in a given area. If the team must operate the motion picture installation then one team per installation is required.
- (c) Team KC, Consolidation (Printed Media), has the basic capability to supervise the operations of a newspaper or other publications plant in a specific geographical area. The team is limited by not having organic printing equipment, and its deployment should be considered only when a printing installation needs an operational cadre. Augmentation of this particular team from selected indigenous personnel is almost mandatory.
- (d) Team KD, Consolidation (Radio), has the capability of operating a single, fixed, radio broadcast sta-

tion. In planning for the employment of a Team KD, consideration must be given to the number of fixed radio broadcasting stations it is desired to man in a consolidation operation. The team has the capability of making minor repairs and supervising the repair and installation of antenna systems, transmitters, receivers, and power sources. This is a limited capability and the team cannot go into a completely wrecked station and restore it.

- (e) Team KE, Consolidation (Distribution), performs the same functions as the shipping department of a modern newspaper plant. It handles the distribution of printed media. The team, augmented by indigenous personnel, would work in conjunction with a Team KC to insure proper distribution of newspapers, periodicals, and other printed media. Two of the limiting factors are the geographical area involved and the quantity (bulk) of printed material to be distributed. One Team KE normally would be required to serve a fully operational KC team.
- (f) Team KF, Consolidation (Display), by using indigenous personnel to actually place pictorial displays, can supervise the posting of proclamations, banners, signboards, window displays, bulletin boards, and other means to bring printed and graphic material to the attention of the public. The principal limitation of the team is the size of the geographical area in which it is required to operate.

(20) *Team LA, Ideographic Composing Machine.* This team is designed to operate and maintain an Ideographic Composing Machine; a device developed by the Army for reproducing in mass quantities materials printed in Chinese.

68. Indigenous Augmentation

a. Indigenous Personnel. One of the problems in developing propaganda is that of communicating with the target audience. There are many

languages and socio-ethnic groups in the world today that it would be patently impossible to provide skilled linguists for every possible contingency. One of the more obvious solutions to the problem is to employ the services of carefully supervised, indigenous personnel able to convert U.S.-developed tasks and themes to indigenous conditions. The product, unmistakably supporting U.S. objectives, would also be acceptable or credible to foreign target audiences. There are varied tasks in which personnel indigenous to the operational area can be used. Some of the more obvious positions are interpreters and translators, advisors on local customs and traditions; and as scriptwriters, artists, illustrators, and announcers. In rare instances indigenous personnel may be used as propagandists. In the ranks of skilled and semi-skilled indigenous personnel, we may find maintenance men, powermen, and electricians. From the ranks of unskilled labor, indigenous personnel can be recruited to assist in packaging, rolling, cutting, and transporting finished propaganda materials to distribution points. The psychological operations staff officer, in planning for the use of indigenous personnel, can usually obtain lists of personnel available for employment. Authority to hire indigenous personnel is normally prescribed in directives from the unified commander or his designated representative. The skillful integration of indigenous personnel into the psychological operations organization will help to overcome the difficulty of trying to cope with language barriers, particularly in developing countries of the world, where tribal languages differ even from one district to another. Indigenous personnel who have been previously employed in newspaper, radio, and television industries can be particularly useful.

b. Indigenous Material Resources. Psychological operations organizations, functioning in an overseas theater, should make use of material resources available in the area consistent with off-shore procurement policies. These resources can range from existing, operating radio stations and printing facilities to newsprints, inks, spare parts peculiar to foreign equipment, and materials for posters and simple graphic displays. The logistics problem is eased by taking advantage of locally available

materials. Materials common to the area tend to lend credibility to the propaganda that is being produced. This is particularly true of papers and inks. The history of U.S. Army psychological operations during World War II and the Korean war reflects a continuing logistics problem, particularly on obtaining sufficient newsprint or paper suitable for printing propaganda leaflets. Psychological operations printing plants often used papers and inks locally obtained and even then did not have enough for their needs. It is important to determine where indigenous material may be located and the amounts that are normally stocked when planning psychological operations in various theaters. This survey may include newsprint, the location of transmitter stations, printing plants, TV stations, and other facilities and supplies related to psychological operations. Conducting such surveys of available indigenous information media is normally a function of civil affairs civil information teams. Psychological operations personnel should be aware of the source if it is available.

69. Training of Psychological Operations Units

Psychological operations require a specialized, well-trained individual. This specialization covers an area that extends from a variety of mechanical communications equipment techniques to the more sophisticated subject of area studies. The background in journalism, anthropology, sociology, science, history, psychology, international relations, or economics is a useful background and prior training should be considered a determinant in the selection of personnel for work in psychological operations. The training and training tests, as defined in AR 350-1, apply to psychological operations and are as follows:

a. Biological/Physiological/Behavioral Phase. This initial phase is completed in basic combat training and is in accordance with AR 350-1, 1-1. The focus of this training is to produce a physically conditioned, motivated and indoctrinated soldier, a graduate of the course, commencing with basic infantry training. The emphasis is placed on

teaching the soldier to survive on the battlefield. Individuals must complete basic combat training prior to commencement of advanced individual training.

- (2) *Advanced individual training phase.* The objectives of advanced individual training is to qualify the individual to carry out his TOE assignment in his unit. For psychological operations units, this phase includes general training, specialist training, and language training.
- (3) *Unit training phase.* The objective of unit training is to produce units qualified to perform missions prescribed by applicable TOE. For psychological operations units, the unit training phase is divided into team training, training of functional groupings of teams or team elements, and unit (company, battalion, or group) training.
- (4) *Field exercises.* Field exercises provide an excellent opportunity for combined arms training. Psychological operations unit commanders are encouraged to seek opportunities for combined arms training for teams and elements of their command in field exercises and field problems conducted by units in their vicinity. Guidance for field exercises may be found in ATP 20-5: Army Training Program for Field Exercises and Maneuvers.

b. Army Training Test. Army training tests (ATT) are administered to units at appropriate times during the formal phases of training. The principal objectives of the ATT are to determine the effectiveness of the unit's training program and to determine the degree of combat readiness of the unit. This test is a factor in the determination made by higher headquarters to pass a unit from the formal training phase into operational readiness training. Psychological operations units are tested under ATT 33-series.

c. The Operational Readiness Phase of Training. Objectives of operational readiness training are (1) to correct shortcomings in training

status and (2) to develop and maintain a satisfactory state of readiness for operational missions. This advanced stage of training is conducted by units which have satisfactorily completed the formal phases of training and are assigned responsibility for continuous readiness in support of operational plans and missions. Operational readiness training programs (ORT) are generally planned on an annual cycle. There are no formal phases in operational readiness training; however the training effort should parallel ATP training on an expanded or reduced time scale for any formal phase of training. Decentralization is the key note. Decisions on training are the option and the responsibility of the unit commander based on his estimate of the unit training situation and subject to approval by supervising headquarters. Required general training is published by higher headquarters. A unit remains in readiness training as long as it maintains a satisfactory degree of combat readiness. An unsatisfactory state of readiness may result in a unit's being directed to return to the formal phases of training. An unsatisfactory state of combat readiness may be revealed by an operational readiness test or by readiness reports.

d. Operational Readiness Tests. As with the ATT, operational readiness tests are administered to units at appropriate times during operational readiness training when deemed necessary by appropriate commanders. An operational readiness test may be based on operational missions, may include selected portions of ATT, and may be conducted as part of a field exercise.

e. Reserve Units.

- (1) *Training objectives.* The training objective for a unit in Reserve status is to be trained so that mobilization deployment schedules can be met. If deployments have not been scheduled, the training objective for psychological operations units in a Reserve status is to be capable of completing the prescribed training program without delay after mobilization. As a minimum, units should be capable of taking advanced unit training upon mobilization.

(2) *Basic combat training phase.* For the purpose of orientation and indoctrination, personnel without prior military experience, before assignment to a TOE position and integration into the training program of the unit, should be grouped separately for approximately 16 hours of training. This period should include basic military orientation to include military courtesy and customs, military justice, supply economy, drills and ceremonies, field sanitation, personal hygiene, first aid, individual protective measures against CBA attack, nuclear warfare indoctrination, and guard duty. The remaining subjects or portions of subjects listed in ATP 21-114 will be presented during the 6 months' active duty training period.

(3) *Advanced individual training phase.* The training necessary for MOS qualification will be essentially accomplished during 6 months active duty training, attendance at Army service schools, and in some cases, attendance at civilian schools and organizations

when MOS training is not offered at Army service schools, e.g., Varitype machine operation and maintenance training. Continuous on-the-job training concurrent with the unit training cycle is necessary to achieve and maintain proficiency.

(4) *Training of officer personnel.* At the discretion of the unit commander, officers not required in conducting training or operations of the unit may be provided with officer-level instruction, either by training under the provision of ATP 21-160 or by appropriate staff and command training programs within the unit.

(5) *Training of cadre personnel.* At the discretion of the unit commander, NCO's not required in conducting the training of the unit or selected personnel in need of training above the level of the training conducted for the unit should be provided advanced level instruction by substituting the training shown in ATP 21-160 (cadre training) or other applicable training.

CHAPTER 8

MEDIA

Section I. DISSEMINATION

70. General

Psychological operations media will be employed by U. S. Army psychological operations units and other Army psychological operations staffs and agencies within the limitations of the principles stated below.

a. Massed Media. To the maximum extent possible, all media will be massed during each operation specifically affecting psychological operations production and dissemination.

- (1) Radio dissemination will augment leaflet distribution; face-to-face communication will support newspaper circulation; loudspeaker broadcasts will complement tactical leaflet drops; puppet shows will supplement rumor; and so on, with multiple variations in a similar massing of friendly psychological operations strengths.
- (2) Psychological operations massed media attack on a single enemy-held attitude or opinion will be *implemented by adapting the material disseminated by each medium to its most appropriate style or format.* Copy and scripts, layouts and formats, and art and sound effects will exploit identical themes *but will be tailored to fit the most suitable medium.*

b. Media Objectives. Each medium will contribute to the *overall* impact of current psychological operations campaigns (subject to the requirements of politico-tactical situations) by seeking identical objectives with identical theme exploitation. This, however, will require using the format and style peculiar to a specific medium based upon that medium's capabilities and credibility factor *in* reaching a particular target audience.

c. Media Repetition. Repetition of a given theme or themes will normally be accomplished by using all media available which are considered appropriate to the psychological objective.

71. Media Intensity

The degree of saturation (total coverage) of a given target to be reached by a single medium may be increased by exerting pressures from other media against lesser elements or members of that target. For instance, additional media can be directed against lesser priority or subordinate targets among a main target which is being exposed to the primary medium.

a. A critical factor to be considered is that dissemination of propaganda via mass media may result in over-saturation. Too frequent radio or loudspeaker broadcasts or leaflet drops may tend to achieve target reactions ranging from boredom to annoyance. Assuming that wars last for appreciable periods of time and that by the time they terminate, most members of all target audiences will have been subjected to the output of each medium numberless times, media dissemination should be held to a minimum.

b. A further consideration is the principle that leaflets will be disseminated and loudspeakers and radios will broadcast only when there is an important message to be sent to enemy targets. The risk of enemy action against friendly troops disseminating the message should be commensurate with the importance of the communication.

c. Finally, it is important to recognize that mass media are a part of existing social systems within a society and are affected by a target group's values and standards. The propagandist

must therefore, know about the social structure of the target audience before he can select media for disseminating propaganda within the target area. A lack of this understanding may create a series of problems. For example: in a rural, traditional society, a movie showing scenes of modern cities, modern transportation, clothing, and other forms of modern "Western" living, may serve to produce wants and desires among the traditional society which cannot be met by existing resources. The result would be a decrease in morale within the society. The same film may also damage the existing values and social structure within the society without adequately replacing them. This could become a significant contributing factor in undermining

the position of many of the leaders within the traditional society. The use of mass media in psychological operations may inadvertently contribute to the disruption of a society. The propagandist must understand that mass media cannot indoctrinate, "brainwash," or govern individuals who have been exposed to a particular series of political propaganda messages. Mass media, while possessing a tremendous potential for influencing a target group, cannot be effectively used if it disseminates material in direct opposition to a social group's values. To be effective in propaganda application, mass media must be applied and used to coincide with the accepted, existing values within the target group's social system.

Section II. LOUDSPEAKERS

72. Introduction to Loudspeakers

a. The use of microphones and sound amplifying equipment for transmitting messages over distances from a few meters to several thousand has become a standard part of the activities of civilian and military propaganda agencies.

b. Generally, in a civilian setting loudspeakers are used to communicate with assembled groups and in local street-by-street broadcasting; in a military setting, loudspeaker broadcasts are directed to by-passed troops urging them to surrender or cease resistance and to issue ultimatums and instructions to towns and fortified locations holding up the advance of friendly forces.

73. Loudspeaker Application

a. The loudspeaker can be used as a psychological operations weapon to exploit opportunities in cold war activities; in counter guerrilla operations; and in offensive, defensive, and consolidation phases of wartime operations.

b. The mobility of the loudspeaker enables psychological operations personnel to move wherever a potential target audience may be found.

(1) Loudspeakers can be mounted on jeeps for great mobility, even though it presents a vulnerable target to the enemy. Loudspeaker jeeps are es-

pecially useful in counter guerrilla operations where high mobility is necessary to counter "hit and run" guerrilla tactics.

- (2) Loudspeakers can be mounted on trucks where terrain features require a heavier vehicle or greater distances to be covered.
- (3) The tank-mounted loudspeaker is particularly useful in more dangerous situations. The tank gives better protection to mounted loudspeaker systems and personnel than most other vehicles.
- (4) Airborne loudspeaker systems have been developed by the United States Army. Loudspeaker equipped, fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft are especially useful today. These aircraft broaden the areas of loudspeaker accessibility and increase mobility. Both types of aircraft must operate low enough (depending upon terrain features, weather, and especially wind velocity) to make the announcer's message audible to the intended audience, but low altitude brings both the men and the aircraft within range of small-arms fire.
- (5) Small, portable, loudspeaker systems are available and may be hand carried.

These are helpful in guerrilla or counter-guerrilla operations and are useful in local police or constabulary activities. Ordinarily denied or restricted areas become accessible when the speakers are hand carried within hearing range of the target.

c. Loudspeakers are an extension of face-to-face communication. In conflict situations, personal or near face-to-face communication is essential to win popular confidence and support; and loudspeakers resemble face-to-face confrontations, although the speaker is not always visible.

d. Loudspeakers enable the operator to pinpoint his target to a greater degree than does other media. Messages can, therefore, be personalized; and the literacy of the target audience is not a significant factor.

e. Loudspeakers may also be used to aid—

(1) In an encircling movement when surrender messages or ultimatums are issued, when a unit leader or representative is called to a parley, or when members of a unit are being urged to quit fighting or cease resistance.

(2) In a combined harassment and searching maneuver, the loudspeaker's mission normally will be to create dissension and to undermine the enemy's morale and will to resist. Tactical, economic, political, and other weaknesses are emphasized to aggravate tensions and arouse fears. News can become an important part of the messages delivered under these circumstances, with airborne loudspeakers especially useful in dissemination. Engaging in harassment may damage the long-term psychological operations efforts and should not be attempted in every situation. Often, the loudspeaker may be used to offer an alternative to harassment, miserable conditions, or death.

74. Loudspeakers in Support of Civil Affairs/Civic Action

a. In a newly conquered or liberated territory, the loudspeaker can be used effectively to

broadcast instructions and proclamations to civilians and to assist civil affairs in controlling the territory and population.

b. Personalized messages may be directed to villages or other targets with tailored messages fitting the immediate situation. Regularly scheduled loudspeaker broadcasts in villages will attract audiences and may, with appropriate programming, aid in establishing amicable civil-military relations. Entertainment in the particular culture may be used to gain attention or to help alleviate stress on an already emotionally burdened population. The civil population can be informed by publicizing the progress of reconstruction plans and the role of the military in that progress.

c. Loudspeakers may augment radio by establishing a community listening station using loudspeakers to "boost" radio broadcasts and increasing the radio audience in areas where individual radios are scarce.

d. Loudspeakers can help in any health program devised for the country by informing the population of the schedules and locations of fixed and mobile health clinics, the location of good water supplies, etc. Broadcasts relating to health procedures to be followed in stamping out endemic diseases and pestilence where it exists are vital to the achievement of desired health goals.

e. Loudspeakers can be used to inform the populace of changes in national laws and local ordinances through community listening facilities and mobile sets mounted on available vehicles. Local national and village leaders may participate in loudspeaker team operations, giving them a part in the reconstruction programs and lending prestige and authority to the broadcasts.

f. Mobile loudspeakers may be used to inform the population of forthcoming elections, voting requirements, and polling sites.

75. Limitations

Wind, technical limitations, vulnerability to small arms fire, and terrain-induced acoustical effects, limit the use of the loudspeaker in certain military operations.

76. Intelligence

Detailed intelligence of the target is essential because a loudspeaker broadcast in a combat situation is a local and immediate operation. If a soldier hears his unit identified, his platoon officer named, and his platoon or company casualty figures given accurately, he will most likely listen to a loudspeaker message, but that message must be made meaningful for him. This detailed information may be obtained from prisoners of war, defectors, and enemy documents. Loudspeaker personnel operating with lower echelons must, therefore, maintain intimate contacts with intelligence officers and the interrogation and documents translation detachments to obtain useful information in time to make maximum use of it.

77. Planning and Coordination

a. Perhaps more than other media, loudspeakers depend upon agencies outside the regular psychological operations units for successful performance. Psychological operations personnel will need the help of the unit to which they are attached. One of the principal tasks of the loudspeaker unit leader is to acquaint military leaders with the variety of missions that loudspeakers can undertake.

b. Ideally, combat loudspeaker missions should be carried out only after discussion of military objectives, enemy capabilities, and available friendly resources. The participants in the discussion should include, at least, the unit operations officer (G-3 or S-3), the psychological operations officer (loudspeaker section) or team leader, and an intelligence officer. If the mission involves the coordinated use of artillery, armor, or air, representatives of those arms should take part in the planning at an early stage.

c. Because the combat loudspeaker message often depends on shock effect for maximum results, no single combat broadcast should be more than a few minutes in length. Furthermore, prolonged broadcasting from a stationary position may draw enemy mortar and artillery fire, thus unnecessarily endangering the lives and equipment of PSYOPS personnel.

d. Whatever the length of the broadcast message, the key sentence in broadcasts should be short and should be repeated for emphasis and clarity. If the broadcast is made from mobile equipment, the message must be carefully prepared, so that each sentence constitutes a complete thought in itself, and one that is not likely to be misunderstood or misinterpreted.

78. Target Accessibility

a. Physical factors affecting the clarity of loudspeaker reception include the terrain across which the broadcasts are made; climatic conditions (for example, humidity, the direction and intensity of the wind); the compactness of the target audience; and the character and loudness of competing sounds, especially those of battle zones.

b. In hilly or mountainous terrain, echoes may interfere with clear reception. Jungle terrain tends to absorb sound, while sound projected over water or low-lying coastal plains will carry long distances.

c. Sound travels better at night under conditions of low temperature and low humidity.

79. Announcer Qualifications

The interpreter is the authorized, loudspeaker team announcer (para 11, TOE 33-500F); although the actual announcer is more frequently a "local hire," indigenous to the operational area, who has the idiomatic, unaccented language fluency required for loudspeaker operations. In usual practice, the Army interpreter does not announce; is not present at the broadcast site, and is authorized only at full TOE strength. The announcer is supervised and monitored by the loudspeaker team leader who, under present tables of organization, is referred to as an intelligence analyst. Qualifications for the announcer are:

a. A good command of the language of the target group.

b. An intimate and detailed knowledge of the customs, folklore, and manner of speech habits of the target group; and the ability to adapt his script and presentation to conform to their

idiosyncrasies and concepts. (Prisoners of war clearly inclined toward the United States may be used. Having recently come from the enemy camp, they will know the current slang, current topics of interest, and the expressed and unexpressed grievances of the ordinary enemy soldier. Where security restrictions preclude using prisoners of war in live broadcasts, their messages may be prerecorded, monitored, and broadcast.)

c. Vigorous but unemotional speech delivery without displaying hatred.

d. An alert and imaginative mind capable of meeting any contingency.

e. An understanding of the military situation, especially its implication for enemy.

f. Ability to command the respect and cooperation of the combat troops with whom he works.

Section III. PRINTED MATTER

80. General

a. Printed material provides one of the chief methods for disseminating the propaganda message to a target audience. Printed materials as a psychological operations medium include all messages disseminated in printed form: leaflets; news leaflets; posters; magazines; pamphlets; books; and such items as novelties, trinkets, and gifts with printed messages on them.

b. Printed matter, in contrast with other media, can transmit messages of any length or complexity. Audio or visual media may be effective for short messages; but for a well-reasoned analysis of a situation, there is no substitute for the newspaper, pamphlet, or book. Printed material can be passed from person to person without distortion, a factor important to propaganda effectiveness and credibility.

81. Considerations in Use of Printed Matter

a. *Form.* Printed matter is a medium of communication using visual means to impart a message to a specific target. With this in mind, both advantages and disadvantages of printed matter as a psychological operations medium can be examined.

b. *Permanency.* A propaganda message, printed on substantial material, will be a relatively permanent document. Once printed and delivered it may be retained indefinitely.

c. *Illustration.* Printed matter generally uses illustrations and photographs to supplement the text of the message. For an audience with a low literacy level, an entire cartoon-type message, requiring little or no reading ability, can be printed.

d. *Color.* By using certain colors significant to the target, we may multiply the impact and meaning of the printed text. Color alone may have meaning. For instance, to an American, red signifies danger, and yellow signifies caution.

e. *Shape.* Shape may convey a message to the target. An octagonally shaped road sign in the United States may call to a driver's mind the word "stop" and prompt him to take the action necessary to do so. A leaflet in the shape of a leaf may signify approaching death in some societies. Obviously, the propagandist needs an intimate knowledge of the symbols relevant in a particular society to exploit this device.

f. *Format.* All of the preceding visual characteristics go together to make up the format of the printed message. Consequently, the proper choice of format is essential for a successful presentation of the message.

82. Leaflet Operation

For the purpose of military psychological operations, a leaflet is a written or pictorial message directed to the soldier or civilian of another nation for a specific propaganda purpose. The leaflet differs from other printed matter (such as a pamphlet or book) in that its message is contained on one or both sides of a single sheet of paper. There is no standard size, shape, weight, or format for a propaganda leaflet. Primary consideration in selecting the size, shape, and paper weight of a leaflet should be to accommodate the psychological message and facilitate dissemination. Understanding the printing capability is desirable since the size and shape of a leaflet may frequently depend upon the working dimensions of the offset

printing plate. The 13.3 cm by 20.3 cm (5¼ inch by 8 inch) leaflet is the most economical to produce using U.S. Army TOE printing facilities.

83. Leaflet Categories by Content and Purpose

Military psychological operations leaflets may be categorized as persuasive, informative, and directive.

a. Persuasive Leaflet. The persuasive leaflet attempts to attain its objectives through the processes of reason. Facts are arranged and presented in such a way that the target audience is convinced that conclusions reached by the propagandist are valid. The reader is given the impression that he is thinking the problem through for himself.

b. Informative Leaflet. The informative leaflet is used in all phases of a propaganda campaign. It allows facts to speak for themselves and attracts a reading public within the target audience. It helps to establish high credibility upon which all propaganda activities depend.

c. Directive Leaflet. The directive leaflet is fundamentally a special purpose leaflet. In tactical situations the propagandist normally does not direct the enemy soldier to take action unless available intelligence clearly indicates that the enemy is psychologically prepared for directive communication. The directive leaflet is employed, strategically, during wartime to direct and control activities of underground forces in enemy or enemy-occupied territory. It also may be used to disrupt enemy production by giving advance warning of bombing attacks and suggesting enemy workers protect themselves by staying away from their work areas. During consolidation operations and counter guerrilla operations, directive leaflets are used to support civil affairs units and legally constituted governments in maintaining law and order and to support local, positive, political action programs.

84. Leaflet Categories by Use

Leaflets can further be categorized according to specific uses, such as standard leaflets, special situation leaflets, safe conduct leaflets, and news leaflets.

a. Standard Leaflets.

(1) *Definition.* A standard leaflet contains a general propaganda message intended for repeated use within an operations sector or a theater of operations. Standard leaflets are used in all psychological operations and against all targets. It is planned, approved, and reproduced for *anticipated* requirements in advance of a particular operation. Standard leaflets constitute a stockpile of printed material to be used by psychological operations in contingencies or in other clearly defined situations.

(2) *Tactical operations.* Standard leaflets are particularly valuable in fast-moving, tactical situations when operating units are unable to prepare leaflets to fit rapidly changing situations. Standard leaflets provide for a continuation of the psychological operations support effort. Equipment failures are more likely to occur in tactical situations; therefore, standard leaflets permit a continuation of leaflet operations over periods when equipment is deadlined for repair.

(3) *Strategic operations.* Most propaganda leaflets disseminated in strategic psychological operations are standard messages. They are used because many of the leaflets for strategic situations contain political messages requiring approval and coordination with other propaganda agencies and, in some cases, friendly foreign governments. Because there is usually no urgency in the dissemination of standard leaflets and because they have a long-range, cumulative effect, standard leaflets permit pretesting of content, form, and style of communication, thereby increasing the psychological impact of the action and creating the understanding desired by the propagandist. Standard leaflets are used to supplement other mass communication media.

(4) *Consolidation operations.* Standard

leaflets (particularly directives, instructions, and proclamations) are effectively employed during the early stages of consolidation psychological operations. Their use in such situations frees reproduction equipment for the support of the immediate, tactical mission.

(5) *Advantages of standard leaflets.*

(a) Standard leaflets permit psychological operations to rapidly disseminate a great variety of propaganda messages. Leaflets are prepared in advance; loaded in shells, bombs, and other leaflet discharging devices; and are then stored, ready for immediate delivery. This provides flexibility for the use of propaganda at all levels of command.

(b) The use of standard leaflets permits complete standardization of selected propaganda themes or messages within the army, fleet, air division, or theater of operations. This ensures continuity of propaganda content for selected propaganda campaigns.

(c) Samples of standard leaflets, with an explanation of their use, can be cataloged and distributed to appropriate units. To the combat commander the availability of psychological operations support simplifies the task of integrating selected leaflets into tactical operations.

(d) Standard leaflets permit the most efficient use of the large, high speed presses at theater army level, and the maximum use of commercial facilities. In this regard, standard leaflets facilitate the establishment of a joint production agency for the control and printing of propaganda materials.

(e) Standard leaflets permit the establishment of procedures to pretest propaganda for format and style in advance of dissemination, and to anticipate the probable degree of effectiveness or the reaction to a given message.

(f) Standard leaflets insure continuation of the psychological effort along front lines even though reproduction equipment may be destroyed or put out of action temporarily.

(6) *Disadvantages of standard leaflets.*

(a) They are usually less effective than a leaflet designed and tailored to a specific action.

(b) If stored for a considerable period of time, they are subject to deterioration by moisture.

(c) At field army the stockpiling of leaflets may become a logistical burden to the psychological operations company (AA).

b. Contingency Leaflets.

(1) The contingency leaflet contains a "standardized" propaganda message prepared in advance to cover commonly recurring situations. Large numbers of such leaflets are held in readiness to be used immediately whenever one of the contingent situations occur. They permit the dissemination of a "special situation" leaflet in a short time. Contingency leaflets can be prepared in expectation of formal entry of a third major power into an existing conflict or where reliable intelligence gives positive evidence of covert military aid to a belligerent by an ostensible nonparticipant.

(2) Providing the contingent message can be readily accommodated, the leaflet size should be 15.24 cm x 7.62 cm (6 inch by 3 inch) on 7.25 kg or 9.06 kg (16 lb or 20 lb) paper. This leaflet size and these paper weights have very favorable serial dissemination characteristics and can be more effectively disseminated by inexperienced personnel than any other known leaflet. An additional advantage is that it requires far less storage space when holding large numbers of such leaflets in readiness.

c. Special Situation Leaflets.

- (1) *General.* When the standard or stock leaflet message is inadequate to exploit a particular propaganda opportunity or situation, leaflets are requested for special situations arising during the propaganda campaign.
- (2) *Definition.* Special situation leaflets are planned, created, reproduced, and disseminated to accomplish a particular psychological task. They are developed on the basis of intelligence which indicates the existence of specifically exploitable but transient and presumably nonrecurring psychological opportunities within the target audience. They are intended for use only once because the circumstances which govern their preparation are rarely duplicated.
- (3) *Tactical operations.* Special situation leaflets are used in many situations and against many targets. Tactical psychological operations achieve maximum results when soldiers and civilians in the combat area receive leaflets which have specific relevance at the moment of receipt, when the psychological pressures are greatest, and when a reasonable course of action is presented to them. For example, surrender becomes a reasonable course of action only when no other alternative action seems plausible under current circumstances. Therefore, most leaflets intended for enemy troops in a particular or special tactical situation are written at field army where local intelligence information is readily available in time to be useful, and when particular battle situations may be immediately exploited for propaganda purposes.
- (4) *Strategic operations.* Strategic psychological operations are made more effective by the use of special situation leaflets that deal with specific problems and discuss them in terms of current facts and within the appropriate cultural content. The impact is not usually immediate; rather, a cu-

mulative effect running over weeks, months, and years is planned. These leaflets are used most to communicate with special targets such as foreign workers in enemy or occupied countries, particular ethnic or religious groups, members of a particular industrial facility or industry, and friendly partisan groups located in denied areas. In composing leaflets addressed to special targets, the propagandist must fit the messages into the target group's frame of reference. He must also know the correct moment for saying something (or saying nothing) with optimum impact. As with tactical targets, special targets must be directed to take only those actions of which they are capable and willing. If rewards are promised for specific actions, those promises must be kept; otherwise they should not be made at all.

- (5) *Consolidation and counterinsurgent operations.* Consolidation psychological operations and counterinsurgent operations employ special leaflets for maximum results. Special leaflets enable the propagandist to transmit the decisions and directives of civil affairs or the national government to an individual community or to special targets.
- (6) *Operational considerations.* The following operational considerations should determine the use of special situation leaflets.
 - (a) Special situation leaflets provide the means for the timely exploitation of psychological opportunities as they develop. (If time becomes a critical factor, other media must be used.) Rarely, however, in their planning will they be out of harmony with the tactical plan. They too, must contribute to the total impression.
 - (b) Special situation leaflets often impart a sense of familiarity with the enemy situation. This provides the propagandist the opportunity to

communicate more intimately and knowledgeably with his audience and permits more effective slanting of the message to the audience's particular needs.

- (c) The enemy may take self-protective actions when irritated by a particular message to a special target. A leaflet or oral message to a particular target may cause the enemy to take measures to preclude desertion, prevent acts of sabotage, or to tighten food rationing within the target audience.

85. Physical Characteristics of Leaflets

a. Leaflet production is affected by physical characteristics of size, shape, weight, texture, and quality of paper. There are many factors that enter into the selection of leaflet sizes and paper weights such as message length, artwork, delivery system, press capability, and leaflet mission. Knowing all the factors surrounding the situation, it is a simple matter for PSYOP personnel to select a leaflet size and paper weight to suit the mission. Figure 20, lists leaflets sizes with accompanying data that have been selected as having characteristics that favor accomplishing the mission and at the same time provides a variety of leaflet sizes from which to choose. The 16 leaflets indicated in figure 20 were selected from over 100 leaflet drift and dispersion characteristics in 7.25, 9.06, and 27.18 kg (16, 20, and 60 pound) weights.

b. The most important phase of leaflet operations is the development and preparation of the message. If the message is not effective, all the other efforts from printing to dissemination are wasted. Similarly, it is a waste of effort to print an effective message on a leaflet whose aerodynamic characteristics are sufficiently unfavorable to preclude its being dropped on the target. Column 6, figure 20, reflects the patterns made by various leaflets listed in column 1, figure 20 as these patterns relate to each other. The lines reflecting the major axis of the leaflet pattern on the ground have no scale, but simply reflect the length of the leaflet pattern in relation to all other patterns when the leaflets are dropped

under the same wind conditions and from the same altitude.

c. Legibility is noticeably affected by quality and texture of paper. Full color reproduction demands a high grade of paper. All of this affects the drift characteristics of the leaflet when delivered by air drop. The quality of paper is also important to durability. Safe conduct leaflets, for instance, should be printed on durable high quality paper. The commander must determine whether the advantages in printing greater quantities on poorer, but acceptable paper, outweighs reduced quantities of leaflets on a better grade of paper.

86. Leaflet Dissemination

Printed matter is the one medium of psychological operations that must be physically delivered to a target audience. In consolidation situations this is not difficult when friendly forces control the establishment communication network. On the other hand, the distribution of printed propaganda in enemy or denied areas involves many difficult problems. The established methods for disseminating printed propaganda in denied areas are infiltration of agents or military patrols, use of international mail, artillery shells, or aerial delivery (bomb container and free fall). The method or technique selected depends upon a variety of operational factors such as political considerations, target density and population patterns, number and size of leaflets to be delivered, enemy anti-aircraft and other countermeasures, availability of ordnance and devices, allocation of air sorties for leaflet missions, air turbulence, and weather. The following information concerns methods, devices, and techniques generally available throughout the military for the dissemination of printed propaganda.

a. Surface Delivery.

- (1) The ground patrol has been a useful, if limited, method for disseminating small amounts of printed matter behind enemy lines. Posters, leaflets, pamphlets, gifts, and gimmicks may be placed or scattered by patrols and reconnaissance elements, usually in conjunction with regular missions.

- (2) Leaflets, posters, and other propaganda gimmicks can be left behind during retrograde movements. They may be placed on trees, posted on buildings, put in bunkers, and distributed on the ground.
- (3) Infiltrators, line-crossers, partisans, and special agents can be used to disseminate printed propaganda behind enemy lines. This method is frequently used in the distribution of gray and black propaganda. Line-crossers and agents can also be used to mail propaganda to selected individuals or organizations. The enemy postal system or neutral mail drops are used for this purpose.
- (4) In counterinsurgent situations all agencies of the supported government should be used to disseminate printed propaganda messages. In addition, civilian public service organizations (to include the religious community) should be used as outlets and distribution points where feasible.

b. Ground-to-Ground Delivery.

- (1) *Artillery.* The weapon chiefly used by United States artillery units to fire propaganda shells is the 105-mm howitzer. The principal carrier of propaganda leaflets is the base ejection, smoke shell, M84, used with the 105-howitzer. This method of leaflet dissemination is not wholly satisfactory because the weight of the leaflet-filled round is so light that standard firing tables do not match its ballistics. Many of the unprotected leaflets are crushed during setback, burned by the ejection charge, or torn during emission.

(a) *Artillery shell, M-118, 155-mm (BE, Smoke).* This a secondary device for leaflet dissemination by artillery. It is a base ejection, smoke round fired from the 155-mm howitzer. A time fuse ignites a charge which ejects the baseplate and leaflet load. The capacity of the round is approximately 900, 13 cm x 20 cm

(5 inch by 8 inch) leaflets. The M-118 will accept any roll or combination of rolls which do not exceed 38 cm (15 inches) in length and 10 cm (4 inches) in diameter. One trained, 2-man team using improvised rolling devices to expedite the loading process can load approximately 25 of these shells per hour. This round should be used only where the M-84 is not available or when the range of the target exceeds the capability of the 105-mm howitzer. The M-118 shell dispersion pattern on the ground is influenced by leaflet descent characteristics, height of burst, terrain, and prevailing winds.

- (b) *Propaganda cartridge.* A propaganda cartridge, T107E2, 105-mm has been tested for psychological operations to overcome the ballistic problem. This shell has been classified as Standard "B" to be produced as the need arises.
- (c) *Conversion.* Army ordnance has the responsibility of converting the base ejection smoke shell into a propaganda projectile under the supervision of psychological operations personnel. If available, indigenous personnel are trained to process and load leaflet projectiles.
- (d) *Marking.* To avoid confusion with normal smoke shells, all old markings are obliterated from the shell cases and projectiles. A large "P," designating "propaganda," is stenciled on the shell; and if a number of different leaflets are used or if the loaded shells are to be stored for future use, the serial number of the leaflet should be stenciled on both the shell and the cardboard case. It is helpful to insert one copy of the leaflet and its English translation in the cardboard case.
- (e) *Storage and delivery.* All leaflet loaded ammunition is delivered in printed. As stated previously, the




Figure 2. Leaflet sizes that can be inserted in the BE M-84 smoke shell for the 105-mm howitzer.

fiber cases which protect the projectiles from moisture and inclement weather. Special situation leaflet requests at field army demand swift delivery to the using unit, which may require deliveries to be made directly to the field artillery battalions. Psychological operations units are responsible for processing, loading, and delivering to the appropriate artillery unit propaganda ammunition.

(f) *Leaflet rolling.* Normally leaflets can be rolled where they are

base ejection, 105-mm shell will hold any roll or combination of rolls which do not exceed approximately 16.6 cm (10½-inches) in length, the roll must have a diameter of approximately 7.62 cm (3 inches) to fit snugly into the shell. The number of leaflets inserted depends on the weight of the paper and the size of the leaflet.

(g) *Weather.* The factor which governs the accurate distribution of leaflets over a given area is not only an

accurate setting of the firing weapon, but the existing wind and its direction. The ballistic change between the standard smoke shell with canisters and smoke shell with leaflets causes a maximum difference in range of approximately 183 meters (200 yards); the leaflet shell is approximately 2.72 kg to 3.63 kg (6 to 8 pounds) lighter than the standard smoke shell, thus the range is reduced. On the other hand, a wind velocity 16 to 25 kilometers (10 to 15 miles) per hour may cause leaflets to drift downwind as much as 457 to 548 meters (500 to 600 yards) if ejected at a point 91 to 137 meters (100 to 150 yards) in the air. At this height, the area

covered is approximately 137 meters (150 yards) in diameter. The leaflet pattern assumes an oval shape which is slightly more elongated by a stronger wind. As a general rule of thumb, one leaflet shell from the 105-mm howitzer, detonated approximately 91 meters (110 yards) above the ground, will cover an area 69 meters (75 yards) by 46 meters (50 yards). The 155-mm round will cover an area of approximately 137 meters (150 yards) by 91 meters (100 yards).

(h) *Fuze action.* The time fuze in the nose of the projectile is set at the required range. On reaching this range, the fuze ignites the ejection charge and the thrust from the ex-

LEAFLET DRIFT _____ (LOW ALTITUDE)	
SPEED OF WIND	
K P H _____ M P H	METERS _____ YDS
8.3 _____ 5	196.5 _____ 215
16.6 _____ 10	393 _____ 430
24.9 _____ 15	484.4 _____ 530
33.2 _____ 20	557.5 _____ 610
41.5 _____ 25	621.5 _____ 680
49.8 _____ 30	676.4 _____ 640

Figure 3. Leaflet Drift Table (Low Altitude).

plusive forces out the base plate which is held by only three to four screw threads. The leaflets follow the base plate and scatter. Use of smaller propelling charges is desirable because of the increased tearing of leaflets at higher velocities.

- (i) *Drift tables and leaflet dispersion.* The fuze should be cut to cause the point of burst between 27 and 46 meters (30 and 50 yards) above and upwind of the area to be covered. Since the leaflets are carried along by the wind, it is necessary to select the point of burst some distance to the windward, based on wind velocity at the target at the time of the mission. The following table shows the approximate drift of average size (13.3 cm x 20.3 cm) and weight leaflets, assuming the height of burst is 91 meters.

(2) *Mortar.*

- (a) An 81-mm mortar projectile has been developed by U.S. Navy for use as a leaflet round. The round is the Projectile, Leaflet, 81-Mortar, EX 4-0, and is available from the Naval Ammunition Depot, Crane, Indiana.
- (b) The projectile consists of the body tube and tail cone of the 81-mm illuminating cartridge M301A2, the M84 time fuze, M4 fin assembly with ignition cartridge, and propellant charges. A three-piece break-away canister, pressure plate, and shear plate are assembled into the body tube.
- (c) Advantages. It is readily available to support ground forces; it can be used from light naval craft; it can pinpoint targets; and it is not affected by weather and terrain.
- (d) Disadvantages. It has a small carrying capacity; and the lethality of the case and other metal parts may cause undesirable effects.

(3) *Static-fired leaflet mortar (leaflet bomb).*

- (a) The static-fired leaflet mortar is a mortar in principle in that the canister remains in position while the projectile is thrust into the air. It is primarily designed for use in covert operations or in denied areas. The leaflet mortar lifts a payload of 400 grams to a height of approximately 40 meters. The canister can be reused, but each assembly comes complete.

- (b) The length of the assembly is 31.7 cm (12½ inches) and is cylindrical with a diameter of 12.7 cm (5 inches). The empty weight is .675 kg. At the bottom of the tube is a wooden, machine-tooled block that provides the shaped effect and directs the force of the explosion upward. There are two explosions to this device; the first propels the canister to a height of approximately 40 meters where the second charge ignites, breaking the cardboard cover and releasing the leaflets.

- (c) This device has proved to be effective in selective, covert operations; and its use can be expanded by employing trip wires, time delay fuzes, etc. The Federal stock number on this device is: LEAFLET BOMB, 1 lb, 8 oz, 1325-H00-0047.

(4) *The leaflet landmine.*

- (a) The leaflet landmine is similar to the static-fired leaflet mortar except that the leaflets are put directly into the canister above the propellant charge. A divider between the propellant charge and the leaflets is necessary in order to push the leaflets out of the canister without damage to the content.

- (b) The propelling charge consists of 10 to 20, 56.7 gram bags of black powder such as used in practice hand grenades. The charge, when detonated, propels the leaflets 3 to 4½ meters (10 to 15 feet) into the air. The size of the leaflet pattern and distance from the mine depends to a large extent on the wind. Only




Figure 4. Static-Fired Leaflet Mortar.




Figure 5. The Leaflet Landmine.

a limited number of leaflets are required in view of the very small, intended target audience. In addition to being placed on the ground, the leaflet mine can be rigged in trees or in and around buildings. It can be fired by electrical means, trip wire, or time delay fuzes.

- (c) Tests have been conducted to determine the feasibility of locally fabricating a workable leaflet landmine. Even untrained personnel, using readily procured materials, can fabricate one mine in 20 to 30 minutes. This mode of leaflet dissemination is intended primarily for covert operations.

- (5) *Sea floats.* Seaworthy containers have been used throughout history to transmit messages. This technique is relatively simple and inexpensive. Propaganda material is placed in a waterproof container and dropped at predetermined locations at sea or in rivers and streams. Prevailing winds, tide, and currents transport the containers to the target area. Containers can be made of wood, bamboo, glass, plastic, or similar materials. Inexpensive plastic or cellophane envelopes can be profitably used for large-scale, float operations. This method requires large volume dissemination because a great number of the containers will




Figure 6. Floats employed for dissemination of printed matter.



Figure 7. M129 Leaflet Bomb being prepared for employment.

never reach the target audience. Access to reliable hydrographic data is necessary to plot projected courses.

c. Air-to-Ground.

(1) *General.* The first military use of the air-to-ground dissemination of propaganda was during the Franco-Prussian War when the Germans dropped leaflets from observation balloons. During World War I leaflets were disseminated by hand using slow, low-flying aircraft. Despite the fact that slow, low-flying aircraft present an easy target for ground fire, this method is currently used in selected operations. Many methods and techniques have been developed and tested for sowing propaganda leaflets. The selection of the most profitable method for air dissemination of leaflets in support of an operation should be based on a thorough analysis of the situation. Close coordination with the U.S. Air Force is essential. The following factors should be considered:

- (a) Target area to be covered and number of leaflets required to saturate each target.
- (b) Probable ground fire.
- (c) Availability of ordnance.
- (d) Allocation of sorties.
- (e) Weather, to include direction and velocity of wind.
- (f) Political considerations.

(2) *M129E1 Leaflet Bomb.*

- (a) The M129E1 leaflet bomb was developed to fill Air Force requirements for an efficient propaganda leaflet bomb for use with high performance aircraft. The bomb is designed for external and internal carriage on fighter-bomber and bomber aircraft. It is an Air Force item obtained through Air Force ordnance.
- (b) The leaflet bomb is made of fiber glass and consists of a body, M129E1, and a tail section, M148. It is split longitudinally into two sections which are held together by four

latches on each side. The bomb has three, inline recesses to receive lugs for suspension. The two outer recesses have a 35.3 cm spacing and are used for double-hook suspension. The center recess is used for single lug suspension. The M129 is the same as the M129E1 except that it does not have the large reinforcing plate between the lugs for ejection release. The M129 can be used only on aircraft not requiring forced ejection for release from the bomb shackle.

- (c) Its empty weight is 52.57 kg (115 lbs) and approximately 101.37 kg when loaded with leaflets. It can carry approximately 30-thousand 13.3 x 20.3 cm (5¼ x 8 inch, 16 lb., machine rolled) leaflets. The maximum inside diameter of the bomb is 39.3 cm (15½ inch), the minimum is 34.2 cm (13½ inch). Because of the internal configuration, the method for loading 13.3 cm x 20.3 cm (5¼ inch x 8 inch) leaflets is to use six 36.1 cm (14¼ inch) diameter rolls and one 31.7 cm (12½ inch) diameter roll. Before the leaflets are placed in the bomb the detonating cord is placed in the seam between the two halves.
- (d) The bomb is fuzed and armed at the launch base by Air Force or Navy personnel. A fuze with tetryl booster or tetryl lead should be used to increase reliable functioning of the primer cord release mechanism. The M147 fuze is preferred. When the bomb is released the fuze functions at a predetermined time, detonating the primer cord separating the two body sections, detaching the fins, and releasing the leaflets.
- (e) Leaflet dispersion patterns depend upon the weight and shape of paper, amount of moisture absorbed, how long the leaflets have been rolled, the velocity and direction of wind from the surface to the functioning altitude, and temperature gradient

LEAFLET DRIFT _____ (MID ALTITUDE)

SPEED OF WIND		METERS _____ YDS	
K P H _____	M P H _____		
8.3 _____	5 _____	658 _____	720 _____
16.6 _____	10 _____	1316 _____	1440 _____
24.9 _____	15 _____	1608 _____	1760 _____
33.2 _____	20 _____	1853 _____	2028 _____
41.5 _____	25 _____	2804 _____	2280 _____

Figure 8. Leaflet Drift Table (Mid Altitude).



(normal lapse rate or inversion). Due to the wide tolerance of fuze functioning, the minimum safe altitude is 2,000 feet above ground. A fuze lot should be pretested to determine tolerance of the particular lot. It is necessary to select the point of burst upwind of the target area based upon wind velocity at the time of mission; for upon dispersing, the leaflets will be carried along by the wind. The following table gives an indication of approximate drift for 13.3 cm x 20.3 cm leaflets, assuming 1,000 feet to be height of burst:

(3) *Air-drop fuze package.*


(a) The air-drop fuze package was developed and used extensively in Korea. Its preparation is simple. Approximately 5-thousand, 13.3 cm by

20.3 cm (5¼ inch x 8 inch), leaflets are wrapped and tied much like a gift package. Heavy paper is used, and the string should be of sufficient strength to secure the package.


(b) After the package is wrapped and tied, a fuze is assembled. The fuze assembly consists of an all-weather time delay fuze igniter, a predetermined length of time fuze, and a blasting cap. Once the length of the time fuze is determined, the fuze is assembled by crimping a blasting cap to one end and the fuze igniter to the other. The blasting cap is placed directly under the knot of the tied package and the entire mechanism is tied or taped into place. A heavy piece of cardboard or metal should be placed inside the wrapping paper to add a degree




LEAFLETS BEFORE WRAPPING



LEAFLETS WRAPPED WITH BLASTING CAP ATTACHED



CAP EXPLODES AND BUNDLE BREAKS



LEAFLETS FALLING FROM BUNDLE IN FUNNEL-SHAPED EXPLOSION




Figure 9. Air-Dropped Leaflet Package.


BUNDLE TYPE	NO OF STACKS	LEAFLET SIZE		BUNDLE SIZE		NO LEAFLETS PER BUNDLE	BUNDLE WEIGHT	
		CM	INCHES	CM	INCHES		Kg	LBS
	2	21×26	8½×10½	28×42×11	11¼×16½×4½	2,500	8.55	19.0
	4	14×19	5½×7½	28×39×11	11¼×15¼×4¼	5,000	8,325	18.5
	3	13×25	5×10	25×26×11	10×10½×4½	3,600	8,325	18.5
	8	10×13	4×5	28×42×11	11¼×16½×4½	10,000	8.55	19.0

Figure 10. Ties used with the plastic release device.

of rigidity to the package and to protect the leaflets from the blast of the detonating cord.

- (c) Another method for preparing a fuzed package is for the leaflets to be stacked between two, flat, cardboard covers, cut to appropriate size so that its edges are flush with the edges of the stacked leaflets. Since bundles are made up of standard size leaflets in uniform stacks, only two to four basic cardboard sizes are required. If tied tightly, the cardboards provide a rigid backing for the stacked leaflets. With the rupture of the cord, the cardboard supports fall away almost instantly, freeing all the leaflets at once. Different tie combinations are required according to the number of leaflet stacks in the bundle. Different combinations of bundle ties can be made by using a plastic tie device. One continuous strand of cord attached to the device by means of spaced "pips" provides a secure tie

that holds the leaflets in the bundle under moderate tension. The detonation of the blasting cap shatters the entire plastic device, instantly snapping the cord tie and removing all tension. The cardboard backing falls away, and the leaflets are set free.

- (4) *Air drop by hand (low altitude)*. By this method, which has been used since World War I, leaflets are merely dropped through aircraft doors or ports, or into specially fabricated chutes or hoppers, as the delivery aircraft passes or circles the target area. This technique is inexpensive and efficient providing low-level, aerial delivery is feasible. Leaflets should be dropped in small quantities at very close intervals; this results in an almost continuous release of leaflets which are evenly distributed downwind and parallel to the aircraft flight pattern. Two men can dispense thousands of leaflets per minute using this technique. Experience has shown that




Figure 11. Use of Chutes in Low Altitude Air-Drops.

leaflets printed in areas of high humidity tend to stick together. Ruffling one or both ends of the leaflet stack insures complete dispersion.

(5) *High altitude volume free fall.*

(a) This process uses the prevailing and seasonal winds to carry leaflets in volume to targets many kilometers from the drop point. The leaflets, dispensed from aircraft flying prescribed routes at altitudes up to 50,000 feet are carried to their target by prevailing winds. Penetration distances and area coverage will vary with leaflet size, paper weight, and direction and force of

prevailing winds. Although leaflet density on the ground will generally be light, coverage of several thousand square kilometers is possible. A more favorable density can be attained by increasing the quantity of leaflets dispensed or reducing the target area. This technique is well suited for strategic leaflet operations directed at large, general target areas; however, it requires long-range planning and preparation to ensure prompt reaction to favorable wind conditions. The advice of skilled, meteorological personnel and experts in leaflet descent principles is essential throughout




Figure 12. Method of fabricating boxes for high altitude static line dissemination.

the planning and execution of this operation.

- (b) At higher altitudes the use of leaflet bundles or boxes opened by a static line has proven effective. Through use of rollers on the deck of the aircraft, boxes weighing up to 49.90 kg can be ejected with minimum exertion. The following is an outline of the steps required to prepare boxes for high altitude, static line dissemination.

Step 1. Using a punch, cut four holes approximately 6 cm by 2 cm ($2\frac{1}{2}$ inches x $\frac{3}{4}$ inches) as indicated in figure 12. If a punch is not available, a knife can be used. In using a punch, the box must first be placed upon an object slightly deeper and smaller than the box

so that a hard surface is provided when striking the punch.

Step 2. Cut through the box from one hole to another as illustrated.

Step 3. Place a 5 cm (2 inch) wide length of webbing through the holes. The length of webbing depends upon the size of the box, but must be long enough to tie after the box has been filled with leaflets.

Step 4. Place a 10 cm (3 or 4 inch) strip of masking tape over the 5.08 cm of webbing.

Step 5. Cut all four corners of the box from the top to about three-fourths of the way down (or less).

Step 6. Again using masking tape, tape one strip up the cut portion and two across, as illustrated.

Step 7. After filling the box with leaflets, tie the two strips of webbing.

Step 8. Attach one end of the static line to the webbing ties. The length of the static line depends upon the type of aircraft, but it is normally about 4½ meters (15 ft.) long. The box is rolled out of the aircraft and as the container comes to the end of the static line, the sides of the box split. In effect, it is turned inside out. The leaflets fall away followed by the empty box.

(c) Knowledge of flight characteristics of different size leaflets is necessary to ensure that the proper "mix" of leaflets is used so that dissemination takes place deep and throughout the target area. Millions of strategic leaflets can be sowed to denied areas by taking advantage of the seasonal winds, coordination is required between the meteorological data center, the Air Force elements responsible for the mission, and the psychological operations unit responsible for loading and disseminating psychological operations leaflets.

(6) *M12 (MOD 0) Navy smoke tank.*

(a) The M12 smoke tank can readily be converted into a leaflet carrier for use by either USN or USAF aircraft. This tank is a standard Navy item which is 274 cm (108 inches) long and 35.5 cm (14 inches) in diameter. It weighs 158.76 kg empty and can be carried by operational aircraft at speeds up to 400 knots. It has standard 35.5 cm (14 inch) and 76 cm (30 inch) lugs.

(b) As a leaflet carrier, the Navy smoke tank operates in the following manner. When reaching the desired target area, the pilot activates an explosive bolt which releases the rear door. When the rear door is fully opened a switch is automatically triggered that opens a cavity located in the nose of the tank. Air

pressure forces the leaflets from the tank. To insure an even exit, it is recommended that a plug be placed inside the front end of the smoke tank.

(c) This device can hold approximately 50-thousand, 13 cm x 20 cm (5¼ inch x 8 inch) leaflets; however, the number, weight, and size should be determined by an analysis of mission requirements. Generally, the leaflets should be rolled rather than loosely stacked. Gift kits, gimmicks, and other small items can be placed in rear of the tank if desired.

(7) *Balloon operations.*

(a) Leaflet dissemination to long- and short-range targets located in denied areas can be accomplished by using balloons. Detailed meteorological data is necessary to insure drop reliability of long-range targets. The amount of technical data needed depends upon the distance to the target area. Target ranges are as follows: short-range leaflet operations are under 402 km (250 miles); mid-range leaflet operations are between 402 and 966 km (250 and 600 miles); and long-range leaflet operations are from 966 to 2,415 km (600 to 1,500 miles).

(b) For short-range targets a less comprehensive survey of meteorological data is adequate; however, as range to the target increases, more research is required to obtain exacting data concerning optimum leaflet load, optimum aerodynamic properties of leaflets, best release altitudes, and meteorological data for proposed routes to the target area.

(c) As a rule, the actual impact may vary from the desired impact area by as much as 10 percent of the distance that the balloon travels. By applying this factor to a short-range target of 241 km (150 miles), the leaflet release point could be 24 km (15 miles) off target. The target can still be reached if proper study




Figure 13. J-100 meteorological balloon.

is made of the leaflet release altitude, wind direction and speed, and the aerodynamic properties of the leaflets. For long-range targets the displacement error is so great that it is only possible to reach a very general area.

(d) A variety of standard balloons are available for use by U.S. forces. Se-

lection should be based on meteorological and load considerations as calculated by trained leaflet personnel. The following are characteristics of standard balloons: The J-100 is a neoprene meteorological balloon capable of ranges up to 402 km (250 miles) with payloads up to 2.72 kg; the R-250 and R-400





Figure 14. R-250 pillow balloon.

are plastic (polyethylene) "pillow" balloons with a range up to 966 km

(600 miles) depending on wind velocity. The payload of the R-250 is



Figure 15. Cluster of toy balloons carrying a propaganda message.

3.63 kg and the R-400 is .91 kg. Other balloons capable of mid-range delivery are the J-9, J-10, J-300, and R-250. The 170 F is designed for long-range delivery. It can transport 39.92 kg of leaflets up to 2,415 km (1,500 miles). This balloon has a ballast system which permits it to be airborne for a period up to 3 days.

Section IV. RADIO BROADCASTING

87. General

Radio broadcasting as a medium for propaganda dissemination provides broad coverage and the speed to capitalize on fleeting opportunities. It reaches out rapidly beyond borders, enemy lines, and hostile aircraft. It shapes attitudes, opinions, beliefs, and behavior of neutral, friendly, and enemy peoples.

a. Capabilities.

- (1) *Speed.* Radio is timely and capitalizes upon the speed with which the latest information may be processed and disseminated to the target group.
- (2) *Wide Coverage.* Radio can provide wide coverage of the geographic area in which the target group resides.
- (3) *Ease of perception.* Radio-listening requires little or no effort on the part of the target group and illiteracy does not prevent the listener from forming his own individual image as he listens.
- (4) *Versatility.* Radio is a versatile medium. It is easily adaptable to

drama, music, news, and other types of programs, and can transmit a message in a less obvious manner than other media.

- (5) *Familiarity.* Listening to radio is a habit where possession of radio receivers is common.
- (6) *Emotional power.* Radio has the ability to elicit many emotions. A skilled radio announcer can exert tremendous influence on the emotions of the listener simply by pitch, resonance, inflection, or timing.

b. Limitations.

- (1) *Jamming.* Jamming may prevent the target group from receiving radio broadcasts.
- (2) *Enemy restrictions.* The target group may be subjected to severe anti-listening laws, thereby reducing effectiveness of radio broadcasts.
- (3) *Technical.* Radio signals may be rendered inaudible by fading or static due

to unfavorable atmospheric conditions. Buildings and mountainous or mineral-laden terrain often limits the range of the transmitter.

- (4) *Lack of receivers.* In some areas, so few receivers are available that radio is not an effective medium. In addition, the target group may not possess receivers capable of receiving foreign broadcasts.
- (5) *Power shortage.* Bombing or other military action may destroy power plants, rendering inoperative all receivers depending upon an external source.
- (6) *Fleeting impression.* Oral media do not possess the permanency of written media. The oral message may be forgotten or distorted with the passage of time.

88. Strategic Radio

a. The content and purpose of a radio broadcast determines the type: strategic or tactical. Strategic radio broadcasts are designed to effect long-range objectives. They are normally directed at a mass target audience and call for a gradual change in the attitudes of many and varied targets. Closest coordination is required to insure that broadcasts are agreeable to the differing thoughts and tastes of the target audience.

b. The primary mission of strategic radio broadcasting is to support national, long-range policies of the friendly country or countries sponsoring or originating the broadcasts. This may be accomplished in many ways, such as sustaining morale of resistance elements, and undermining the confidence of target groups toward the enemy government.

c. Another mission may be to support underground elements by transmitting instructions and information to agents in enemy-held territory. The information may be overt or coded. Overt messages can be designed to confuse or mislead enemy forces, whereas coded messages are more reliable for actual underground operations. This mission may become tactical if in a combat situation.

89. Tactical Radio

a. Tactical radio stations are usually located in the forward area, within reach of enemy lines, and are used in conjunction with combat operations by mobile units of a radio broadcasting organization. It is advisable to coordinate tactical broadcasting objectives with loudspeaker, leaflet, and other psychological operations.

b. Tactical radio stations normally are mobile and may be deployed where they are most needed. They can be moved as the friendly forces move—forward or rear—and they can be used in connection with tactical intelligence information. Tactical stations can react with speed to any situation and tactical broadcasts can cater to the tastes of provincial audiences.

c. Long-range, fixed stations may also be considered tactical if they are used in direct conjunction with combat operations. Definitions of strategic and tactical radio are not based upon their distance from the enemy, but mainly on the purpose of the broadcast.

90. Programing

a. *Definition.* Radio programing consists of planning the schedule, content, and production of radio programs during a given period.

b. *Objectives.* The objective of radio programing in psychological operations is to gain and hold the audience when the propagandist wishes to influence, thus aiding in accomplishing psychological objectives. Truthful, credible, fast, and accurate news reporting is one of the better ways to gain and hold this audience.

c. *Content.* Words, music, and sound effects are put together in various ways to produce programs of several kinds. The different types of radio programing are—

- (1) Straight news reporting (without commentary).
- (2) Commentary (an analysis of the news in which opinions are expressed).
- (3) Music programs (instrumental or song).
- (4) Dramatic programs.
- (5) Speeches and talks.
- (6) Discussions and roundtables.

- (7) Sports (reports or play-by-play).
- (8) Interviews.
- (9) Special events (i.e., on-the-spot coverage of an election or arrival of an important visitor).
- (10) Religious programs.
- (11) Variety programs (a combination including music, dramatic skits, comedy, etc.).
- (12) Announcements.

d. Principles.

- (1) *Regularity.* The radio propagandist must create habitual listening patterns in order to build a regular audience. Thus, regularity is an essential element of programing. The broadcast day, once established, remains relatively unchanged. Specific programs are transmitted at the same hour each day. Content, style, and format of programs should follow an established pattern.
- (2) *Repetition.* Repetition is essential for oral learning. Hence, key themes, phrases, or slogans must be repeated to insure a large segment of a target audience has the opportunity to receive them on many occasions.
- (3) *Suitability for target audience.* The radio propagandist prepares programs to suit the tastes and needs of his intended audience. Program content and style of presentation, as far as policy objectives permit, should follow the patterns to which the intended audience is accustomed. Programs must be better than those offered by the enemy if a large audience is to be won.
- (4) *Credibility.* Factual, credible, and accurate material is presented.
- (5) *Exploitation of censorship.* Discussion or presentation of banned books, plays, music, and political topics often finds a ready reception by the target audience; the same holds true of news withheld by censors.

e. *The Voice.* Selection and training of an-

nouncers with proper voice qualities is essential to successful PSYOP radio.

- (1) The emotional tone conveyed by the voice often influences the listener more than the logic of arguments presented.
- (2) Announcers whose accents are similar to those of unpopular groups within the target audience should not be used.
- (3) Female voices are used in propaganda to exploit nostalgia, sex frustration, or to attract female audiences. In many parts of the world women's voices may be resented because of the peculiar status of women in these societies.

91. Program Classification

Radio programs may be classified by three different methods.

a. *Content.* The most common and useful method of program classification is contents. News reporting, commentaries, announcements, educational or informative documentaries, music, interviews, discussions, religious programs, drama, and woman's programs are examples of content classification.

b. *Intent.* Classification by this method is useful for the propagandist in planning the response he wishes to obtain from his broadcasting. Programs are produced to induce such emotional reactions as hate, fear, nostalgia, and frustration.

c. *Origin.* Classification by this method pertains to the source of the broadcast: official, unofficial, authoritative, etc.

92. Some Principles of Radio Scriptwriting

Some basic factors that must be considered when writing radio scripts are—

a. *Conversational Style.* News should be written in a popular, informal, relaxed style, but avoiding superficiality. The listener should not be conscious of the fact that the news is being read to him.

b. *Simplicity.* The writer uses simple, everyday words and simple sentence structure. He

avoids modifying clauses. He may make two short sentences out of one long sentence; but to avoid "sing-song" effect, he does not make every sentence the same length.

c. Initial Attention. The listener may be running the risk of reprisal for tuning into a forbidden broadcast, so the announcer must gain instant and meaningful attention. The initial part of the script must convince the listener that the program will be of interest to him. The essential facts must be contained in the first few sentences to gain initial interest and to insure that if the script has to be cut, nothing of major importance will be lost from the content.

d. Speech Speed. The normal rate of speech will vary among different announcers. The scriptwriter should time the rate of speech of each announcer in the language used and tailor the script for him to gain maximum impact in the time allotted.

e. Tongue Twisters and Alliteration. Avoid words that successively begin with the same sounds such as: "In providing proper provisional procedures . . ." Also avoid as much as possible the words ending in ch, sh, th. Depending on the speaker's ability, these sounds, coming at the end of words, often produce a hissing noise through the microphone.

f. Numbers. Round numbers are substitutes for exact figures unless the precise number is important. For example, "20 thousand" may be used in place of "20,158." Numbers should be written in the same manner easiest to read, such as "one-billion-200-million-50-thousand," in place of "1,200,050,000."

g. Unfamiliar Names. Avoid beginning a news item with an unfamiliar name. Do not say, "John Jones announced this morning that . . ." Rather, introduce the names as "The Australian Minister of Education, John Jones, announced this morning that . . ."

h. Quotation Marks. The listener cannot see quotation marks. By voice inflection the announcer can make it clear when a quotation begins and ends. Other methods may be used to indicate a quotation:

- (1) In Smith's own words . . . The council is sure to reject the proposal.

- (2) To quote Smith . . . The council is sure to reject the proposal.

- (3) As Smith states . . . The council is sure to reject the proposal.

i. Punctuation Marks. Ordinary marks of punctuation are ignored in scriptwriting. They may be used, however, as a guide for the announcer. For example, parentheses () may be used to set off a phrase. Key words may be capitalized for emphasis. Phonetic spelling may be used to help the announcer with the pronunciation of difficult words.

j. Profanity and Horror. The propagandist, speaking as a representative of his government, and in keeping with the image of the serious, sincere spokesman, will not use profanity in his broadcasts; nor will he use horrible descriptions of battles, bombings, ship sinkings, and human suffering, although objective reports on these subjects have a legitimate place in radio and loudspeaker operations.

k. Abbreviations. Conventional abbreviations are seldom used. For example, "Mister" is used in place of "Mr." and "Doctor" in place of "Dr." "C.I.O." and "F.B.I." are familiar to American audiences but have little or no meaning elsewhere. U.N. has meaning for many peoples, but it must not be assumed that it is understood by everyone and in the way it needs to be understood.

93. Radio Program Format

A fundamental principle in writing scripts for psychological operations broadcasting is to standardize as much as possible without losing the desired flexibility. Format refers to the content of a program. Through a familiar manner of presentation, the originating station tries to establish the identity of its programs in the minds of its listeners with the aim of building a regular audience. The format for a series of programs is usually established before the first program is broadcast. Radio station personnel, when establishing the format for a series of programs, should bear in mind that they must adhere to the highest standards of radio scriptwriting if they are to be successful in meeting their objectives. Of great importance is the uniformity of the script. Just as uniformity in a military organization makes

things easier for everybody concerned, uniformity in radio scriptwriting makes the job easier for radio broadcasting personnel.

94. Radio Scriptwriting Techniques

The following techniques may be used to gain and hold the attention of the audience:

a. The Aural Sense. The special character of radio stems from the fact that it is entirely an aural medium. Since radio depends entirely on the ear, it must work completely on the listener's image inspired by the sound waves coming from the loudspeaker. The sound of a man's voice in a radio play raises a particular image in the listener's mind of what he says. Radio writing must make the scene, idea, or thought clear to the listener as soon as it is heard.

b. The Rapid Getaway. Radio programs must capture an audience within the first few moments of presentation or it will lose them. Programs must present a challenge, a promise, or a conflict to arouse attention within the first few moments of their start. Valuable time cannot be wasted on elaborate introductions.

c. Power of Suggestion. A vast storehouse of scenery is in the listener's mind. The radio writer, through use of speech, sounds, or music suggests to the audience what the scene should be; and in their mind's eye, they see anything from a post hole to the Grand Canyon.

d. Pacing and Timing. The radio writer controls pacing in the program. This is the change in quality, emotion, thought, or feeling written into the program. Timing is controlled by the director and is represented by a shift of speed in delivery.

e. Freedom of Movement. The radio writer can change scenes as frequently as desired. He can take his listeners from one point on earth to another, or even into outer space with words, sound effects, or appropriate music.

f. Conflict. Radio writers call conflict the backbone of interest in a radio script. It is used to increase the interest and retain the attention of the radio audience. Conflict is the ageless formula of hero against villain, good versus evil, the fight for survival, and the solution of difficult problems.

g. Imagination and Application. It is one thing to know technique and another to apply it. Application is where the imagination comes in. The imaginative application of technique is the radio writer's success formula. The radio writer should be constantly alert for new ideas and techniques and should not be afraid to experiment with variations on old "established" techniques.

95. Radio Program-Building

When the radio script writer is familiar with the principles, mechanics, elements, and techniques already discussed, he must then turn his attention to program-building. To plan, organize, and coordinate the building of a radio program the following construction steps are suggested:

a. Purpose. The first concern of the writer is purpose. What is he trying to do? Careful thought in the statement of purpose will help listener's recognize the value of the program and will, perhaps, induce them to listen again.

b. Research. Informational material may frequently be buried and can be brought to surface only through research. Hidden color and details are often revealed through research; and to round out a subject or a personality, the research must be more than superficial. Finally, research gives a note of authority to the voice which the listener hears.

c. Writing. Writing techniques can be learned. The ability to write well is not an inborn gift reserved for a select few. Certainly, a good journeyman writer with an interest in his business will more than make up his lack. A writing assignment is not something to be feared. As previously stated, the techniques can be learned and the art can be practiced—herein lies success. When you have turned out the last page of a script, do not put it under the glass as a rare gem. Put it aside for awhile, then read it again. Without doubt there will be some rewriting necessary and this is a construction step that cannot be skipped. Finally, when all the bugs are ironed out, read it aloud. The only true test of a radio script is how it sounds, not how it looks on paper.

96. Black Radio

A black radio broadcast appears to originate from sources other than the actual one. It is designed to give the impression that it comes from dissident elements in the target area and will normally involve utterances or acts which are unlawful under the domestic law of the target nation.

a. Advantages.

- (1) Black radio permits use of themes and tactics not otherwise permitted in white propaganda.
- (2) It can operate on either side of the battleline. When operated by agents within the enemy country, it can broadcast knowledgeable accounts of events embarrassing to the enemy.
- (3) It can operate with a minimum of personnel and equipment.
- (4) It can worry the populace about enemies within the country, causing them to be suspicious of their neighbors.

b. Disadvantages.

- (1) If operating behind the enemy lines, black radio stations are easily located and must be moved constantly.
- (2) Programing must be of high quality and credibility to avoid unmasking the station as a covert operation.
- (3) Black radio is difficult to coordinate with overt operations.

97. Gray Radio

In a gray radio broadcast, the propagandist avoids identifying himself as either friendly or enemy.

a. Advantages.

- (1) Gray radio can be more forceful and aggressive than black radio in its programing because it does not attempt to falsify the source.
- (2) Gray radio operations permit more direct coordination with military action than black radio.
- (3) When the identity of a gray station is discovered and made public, underground groups are not necessarily discredited.

b. Disadvantages. Gray radio has no recognized voice of authority.

98. Monitoring

Radio monitoring is done to intercept enemy, friendly, and neutral radio broadcasting which, when analyzed, provide valuable information to psychological operations. Primary responsibility for monitoring in foreign areas is assigned to Foreign Broadcasting Information Service (FBIS). Monitoring has these specific aims:

a. To provide information of the enemy's domestic or foreign propaganda programs and the propaganda line directed to his own military forces in the field.

b. To provide information for evaluating the effectiveness of United States and allied psychological operations.

c. To augment regular news sources.

99. Monitoring Operations

a. Strategic and tactical monitoring facilities are not sufficient for monitoring all enemy, friendly, and neutral radio broadcasts. Hence, on a planned basis, selected monitoring is done.

b. Broadcasts may be monitored by means of recording equipment; this insures accuracy and allows maximum use of the available personnel. Recorded broadcasts must be edited by personnel capable of recognizing material of propaganda import.

c. Scanning the dial for other broadcasts of significant interest to United States and allied forces is also done.

d. Operational rules require monitoring personnel to—

- (1) Be objective when giving their monitoring reports.
- (2) Be familiar with names of persons and places likely to appear in monitored broadcasts.
- (3) Monitor only the station to which assigned, unless specifically directed to scan for other broadcasts.

- (4) Record the identity of the monitored station, the date and hour, and other relevant information pertaining to the monitored broadcasts.

- (5) Notify superiors of significant monitoring information.
- (6) Write phonetically when doubtful of the spelling of strange names.

Section V. AUDIO-VISUAL MEDIA

100. Motion Pictures

If their employment is feasible, motion pictures constitute one of the most effective media available.

a. Capabilities of Motion Pictures.

- (1) *Credible.* There is a tendency for most children and a high percentage of adults to accept without question all presumably factual information presented in films. Even obviously inaccurate statements or pictures are apparently accepted as "truth."
- (2) *Audience illiteracy.* Illiteracy is no barrier to the application of motion pictures in military psychological operations, although it is a critical factor in terms of the effect a particular motion picture may produce on illiterate or semi-illiterate groups within a given society.
- (3) *Dramatic.* Motion pictures are dramatic. Themes are indirectly presented in a variety of ways.
- (4) *Recall.* Motion pictures have generally been found to elicit a high degree of recall in both adults and children due to the dimensions of sight and sound reinforced by moving images.
- (5) *Universal.* The motion picture is a universal communications medium due to its combined audio-visual dimensions, mass distribution, and relative ease of presentation.

b. Limitations of Motion Pictures.

- (1) *Preparation.* Much time and effort are required to properly produce a film.
- (2) *Audience restrictions.* There may be restrictions placed on local populations prohibiting them from gathering in sufficient numbers to make a showing worthwhile.

- (3) *Content.* The content of the film may not be applicable to the existing situation. Film content may become dated an untimely.

101. Television

Television stands ready to create the most exciting future in the field of mass communications. The important concept to be considered by the military propagandist lies in the fact that television has become and will continue to become commonplace nearly everywhere in the world. Television is the medium which will take its place in millions of homes with unrelenting impact; it belongs to the people, wherever they exist. The impact of television has carried over to military, and its application has already begun to bring about significant changes, by internal use of the medium. The development of mobile television cameras mounted on tanks, vehicles, aircraft, and even hand-carried by combat soldiers has brought the immediacy of the tactical battlefield to the command post. Mobile television may now be considered an important element in battlefield surveillance. The Armed Forces Radio and Television Service operates television stations abroad for troop information and education; in many areas, whetting the appetites of local civilian populations for more television. Closed-circuit television is being used by many military installations and service schools in the United States for instructional purposes. It becomes apparent that television is being applied within the military to accomplish a number of diverse and important missions. With this communications medium available for use by military psychological operations units and other governmental and civilian agencies, television's characteristics, effectiveness, and limitations should be considered and understood.

a. Characteristics.

- (1) Like radio, television makes use of an individual's sense of hearing to con-

vey an idea. Like printed media, television also makes use of the sense of sight, and adds the element of sight-motion. The viewer's attention is further held by moving images on the screen. Like the motion picture, television combines these elements: sight, sound, and motion. Unlike motion pictures, however, it is the additional sense of immediacy that television can so effectively create; that quality of "happening now," at a distant point, placing the viewer in two places at the same time. He is able to "extend" his image from the security of his own home to a projected point in time and distance where the televised event is happening.

- (2) Since television is capable of reaching thousands or even millions of people with these combined elements of sight, sound, motion, and immediacy, it becomes not only an effective mass communications medium, but for many, a rather personalized form of communicating. Since television is frequently watched by people in small groups amid familiar surroundings, it may serve to create a high degree of social interaction among various interest groups. Since television is the closest method yet devised to face-to-face contact from one person(s) to another, it may be considered as the most effective means of communication yet devised. As such, it becomes a powerful communications weapon for psychological operations.

b. Capabilities.

- (1) *Speed.* Like radio, television can produce programs capable of reaching large segments of the target very rapidly.
- (2) *Illiteracy barrier.* Television leaps the barrier of illiteracy. Television can by-pass an audience's unfamiliarity with a written language.
- (3) *Unifier.* Television brings people closer together in many separated lo-

cations by making them familiar with the same ideas and concepts.

c. Limitations.

- (1) *Range.* Unlike radio frequencies, television's very-high and ultra-high frequencies do not travel far. Rough terrain, uneven atmospheric elements and geography affect the range and strength of a television signal. Television signals must be boosted with relay stations, airborne transmitters, or relay satellites in order to reach long distances.
- (2) *Reception.* The distribution of television sets currently is scattered and uneven throughout the world.
- (3) *Power source.* Most television receivers require an outside source of electrical power. Many areas of the world lack such power, although transistorized sets with built-in power sources will help overcome this limitation.
- (4) *Program requirements.* A television station, even operating on a limited schedule creates a tremendous demand for program material. Each day's operation requires a large amount of film, videotape, and live programming to sustain a program schedule.
- (5) *Vulnerability.* Television equipment and parts are delicate and extremely vulnerable to damage, either accidental or intended. Television stations are easily identified and make excellent military targets. At the receiving level, television sets are difficult to hide, particularly if an antenna is required. They are fragile and easily destroyed or put out of action.
- (6) *Expensive.* Television is expensive. Stations are expensive to construct, operate, and maintain.
- (7) *Personnel.* Television is a complicated communications medium and requires specialized personnel with a wider range of skills than those required to operate a radio station.

Section VI. FACE-TO-FACE COMMUNICATION

102. Introduction

a. While mass media are vital to military psychological operations, face-to-face communication is, in many instances, the most effective method for appeal to a target audience. In its simplest form it is a confrontation of two individuals in informal conversation for a particular purpose.

b. Face-to-face communication, as a medium for psychological operations, includes rallies, speeches, door-to-door "salesmanship," or agitation: in short, the range of activities in which people communicate verbally in direct, face-to-face situations. Conversations, arguments, and commands are day-to-day experiences and are not in themselves a medium for propaganda dissemination. Control is the lacking factor. Thus, control is the key to face-to-face communication as a medium for psychological operations.

c. In conventional war, it is obvious that face-to-face situations are lacking and that psychological operations must depend upon other media. Face-to-face communication is largely limited to rumor; however, in cold war situations, counter guerrilla and certain unconventional warfare operations, controlled face-to-face communication can be a useful medium for propaganda. In actuality it may be the only medium which can be effectively employed. In situations where other media can be used, they may be used to support face-to-face communications.

103. Factors of Controlled Face-to-Face Communication

a. *General.* To be effective the propagandist must know in specific terms what he desires to say, how it should be said, to whom it should be directed, and where and when to say it. These principles are essentially those which apply to all types of propaganda and their dissemination.

b. *The Message.* Specifically, the propagandist must be certain of the message he wishes to convey. That message may be an ideology, cooperation with the military, or developing interest in a positive national and community

program. In most situations, themes for face-to-face communication seek to engender cohesive behavior. (The notable exception is rumor, which generally is employed for divisive purposes.) While actual phraseology should not be so planned that the advantages of apparent spontaneity are lost, the theme or line of persuasion can be purposefully preplanned and questions anticipated. The requirements are not unlike the preparation of a teacher before a class noted for its inquisitiveness.

c. *Presenting the Message.* The manner of presentation is of paramount importance. As in any method for propaganda dissemination, the message must be understood. Explanation of propaganda themes must be in terms which the target individual understands; he must be able to relate what is said to him in terms of his own experience, not the propagandist's. To present the message effectively, the propagandist must understand his audience thoroughly. He must have empathy—thoroughly be the other person. Certain "rules" assist the propagandist in achieving this sense of identification:

- (1) Carefully avoid an appearance of dogmatism when dealing with a hostile target.
- (2) Stress the areas of agreement that exist between himself and the audience.
- (3) Strive to keep the attention of the audience away from minor points of difference.
- (4) Work toward a predetermined conclusion but by means of the audience's method of reasoning.

d. *Selecting the Audience.* In any propaganda campaign the right message is required for the right audience. In face-to-face communication special care must be taken in selecting the target. The most useful targets are elite groups (opinion formers) who tend to form the attitudes of the rest of the larger target audience.

e. *Time and Location for the Message.* Efforts to disseminate propaganda by face-to-face communication are dependent upon correct lo-

CHAPTER 12

POST COMBAT SUPPORT OF ALLIES

Section I. INTRODUCTION

180. General

a. When the territory of a friendly country has been ravaged by war, has been exploited economically beyond a point where self recovery can be expected, or has been so suppressed politically that its citizens lack the essential fundamentals of self government, the United States may assume responsibility for supporting that country. The assumption may be one of total responsibility or it may be shared with other nations. Support may be direct, or through an international body such as the Organization of American States or the United Nations.

b. The U.S. Army is charged with being prepared for service as may be required to support the U.S. national interest. Although the role of support of allies is not always assigned to the Army, or to other military services, responsibility for preparedness for such duty continues. This involves planning, training of personnel, structuring of units, and possible prestockage of supplies.

c. The recipient of this support may be a traditional ally or a state that has only recently become associated with the United States. It may be located anywhere in the world and be at any stage of economic or cultural evolution. There should be an agreement between the United States and the ally to define relationships between U.S. forces and the local population, and including such matters as the authority and conditions under which U.S. forces may be employed in the area, the facilities and services which each country may provide to the other, and the degree of authority which the military commander may assume regarding normal functions of civil government. See FM 41-5 and chapter 1 for discussion of civil affairs agreements.

181. Relationships

a. Contacts with indigenous citizens, officials, and unofficial leaders are an essential part of these support operations. Number, frequency, and character of such contacts vary widely and merely making contact does not alone guarantee success. Failure to establish appropriate contact does, however, assure failure of mission. These contacts must become working collaborations. Individuals in the U.S. Army and individuals in the indigenous military and civilian environment must think of themselves as working partners in an interrelated process, each knowing the contribution he should make and the contribution expected of the other, and neither impinging on responsibilities of the other.

b. Since the Department of State is charged with primary responsibility for foreign policy, major commands may have political advisors (POLADS), who represent the Department of State, especially if no ambassador is accredited to the country. Department of State counsel is of great importance in routine matters as well as in the crucial policy decisions made by military commanders. The role of the POLAD in such missions is of greater operational significance than it would be under combat conditions, since this type of mission is basically political.

c. U.S., international, or third country civilian organizations will probably be active in the country. These agencies may be public or private. The host country will have granted authorizations, which normally specify their areas of interest. The projects of these international bodies should, and often do, complement U.S. sponsored programs. Although their resources are often from U.S. origins, the Army has little or no authority over their

activities while they act within their agreements with local authorities. U.S. Army personnel must cooperate with, and gain cooperation from, their representatives.

d. If military units of another foreign country are operational in the same area, their status, mis-

sion, and responsibilities should be clearly explained in appropriate directives disseminated to U.S. Army personnel. All military units usually will be part of a combined command that includes U.S. forces, but each national force may have assigned functions or geographical areas.

Section II. PLANS

182. Initial Planning

a. Operations are governed by national level decisions. Directives must be communicated as soon as published to all advisor, program, and project personnel. Usually implementing instructions by intermediate headquarters are needed for application of policy in specific situations. Under no circumstance should such instructions replace or delay distribution of policy guidance publications.

b. If encouraging change is part of the U.S. objective, the feelings of local people must be judged carefully and recommended changes be presented as advantageous and consistent with local social evolution. It is futile to attempt to make basic social changes quickly. Forms of government, occupational methods, marketing customs, family and tribal controls, and religious standards are some of the many fields in which people may be reluctant to deviate from established practices. To be worthwhile, a reform effort must be one that will last. Short-range projects must fit into long-range programs and long-range programs must not ignore the present or the near future.

183. Personnel Qualifications

Personnel for such operations must be competent soldiers, qualified in the skills in which they are to specialize, and temperamentally equipped to

work effectively with people of other nationalities. People in this assignment must have, or be willing to acquire, some knowledge of at least one language used by the people in the area of operations. Grammatical excellence and fluency are desirable although not necessary. Some knowledge is essential, if only to be able to communicate intelligently through an interpreter.

184. Background Influences

Policy directives should state clearly what ends are to be attained. However, local conditions, many of which are not subject to U.S. influence, determine choice of methods. Among these factors are—

- a.* Effects of hostile military occupation.
- b.* Political, legal, and social heritage.
- c.* Population composition and attitudes.
- d.* Current development status of the economy.
- e.* War damage.

CA staff sections of headquarters of U.S. Army units committed to such a program, and commanders of CA units must take all of these background influences into account in making their CA estimates of the situation. (See FM 101-5 and app. E.) While there is usually no hostile force involved, the other factors which must be considered for estimates and plans are all equally applicable to this mission.

Section III. OPERATIONS

185. Civil Affairs Aspects of the Operation

For the U.S. Army, a commitment to this type operation is a commitment to what is primarily a civil affairs mission. The priority civil affairs activity normally is the support of the functions of government. Other major civil affairs activities which may be involved in support of the priority activity will usually include—

- a.* Participation in populace and resources control.
- b.* Participation in military civic action.
- c.* Community relations.

- d.* Military support of civil defense.
- e.* Consolidation of psychological operations.

186. Priority Activity

a. Support of the host country government is the fundamental activity, for unless this government can be made viable and exercise its authority effectively throughout the national territory, little will have been gained in the long run. All other activities are pointed toward support of this major activity. The U.S. effort will include coordination with host country agencies at all levels in the plan-

ning and execution of all parts of the program, and demonstration to the people of the respect in which that government is held by the representatives of the United States.

b. Actual assistance in public administration may be desired, particularly in developing nations or in nations which have been so badly damaged that they must reconstitute an administration utilizing relatively untrained or inexperienced personnel. The problem probably will be acute at intermediate and local levels. In this situation CA Public Administration and all the other functional teams can be used to provide operational support and formal or on-the-job training for host country personnel. These teams may actually perform governmental functions on a temporary basis in the immediate postconflict period.

c. Examples of such assistance by functional teams could include—

- (1) Public Finance Team—Drafting of local budgetary procedures and assistance in drafting a basic budget.
- (2) Public Welfare Team—Assistance in the creation or reconstitution of institutions such as orphanages and old people's homes.
- (3) Public Education Team—Demonstration of teaching techniques at all school levels and introduction of audiovisual means for adult education programs for illiterates.

187. Other CA Activities

a. In war ravaged countries, and in many developing nations, people have become accustomed to the use (or misuse) of resources without regard for the common welfare. In any event, such nations are apt to experience a prolonged period of severe shortages of items necessary for the proper creation or reconstitution of an economy. Shortages may make laborers unwilling to work, or unwilling to do the kinds of tasks which are required. These conditions, and others which might include a flourishing black market, may necessitate a populace and resources control program. While the nation may not at the time be faced with an insurgency, the allocation and control problems will be very similar to those of a nation engaged in internal defense operations. Techniques as described in chapter 6, may be used to remedy the situation. U.S. CA personnel, and other military personnel acting under CA staff guidance and supervision,

may be used to plan, advise, train, and assist in a populace and resources control program. They are most likely to be required in the detailed planning phase; and here the Public Safety, Tribunals, and all of the Economics functions teams will have a part to play. Preferably U.S. military personnel should not be used in the actual enforcement processes as this would give the operation the appearance of a foreign occupation and might well do more harm than good. Accordingly, a decision to use U.S. units for such purpose should be made only by the senior U.S. commander in the country.

b. All of the environmental improvement measures which a host country may undertake (ch 5) and the military civic action outlined for U.S. and host country forces (ch 6 and 7) will be applicable in the postcombat situation. A major contribution of U.S. forces will be the stimulation, training, and equipping of host country military and paramilitary forces to undertake military civic action projects which fit the overall program and which complement the work of other agencies. U.S. units will normally also participate in military civic actions directly, but should present them as having been planned and accomplished under the aegis of the appropriate host country governmental agency.

c. U.S. units will place emphasis upon their community relations (ch 2) and train and advise host country military forces to do likewise. U.S. Army community relations activities, if they are to succeed in their purpose, should be clearly labeled as activities of U.S. military forces. While some community relations projects may resemble military civic action, the primary distinction is that military civic action is intended to help the host country in its nationbuilding program, while community relations are matters directly between the U.S. forces and the general populace.

d. Military support of civil defense will play a smaller but important part in the overall effort even if there is no threat of further armed conflict. The same or similar organizational techniques and programs are useful to prepare for and to meet natural disaster situations which may arise. The host country military forces should be encouraged to assist the civilian populace in organizing and preparing for disaster situations and for providing prompt relief, rescue, and rehabilitation work if disaster should strike. Here, too, U.S. forces should participate and may do so in the name

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of the United States as well as providing support to host country efforts (ch 9 and 11).

e. Consolidation psychological operations are essential to build or restore a sense of nationhood and responsible citizenship, particularly where the populace is war weary. Psychological operations are a vital instrument in explaining the need for programs which may be unpopular, such as populace and resources control, and for the hard work and sacrifices required from the people to improve the environment. These operations should not gloss over difficulties and errors, but present the problems and the solutions proposed and instituted by local government in the most favorable light possible, consistent with the facts of the case. CA civil information personnel should provide overall policy direction and train and assist host country governmental agencies and information media in the accomplishment of this program. As in internal defense, no other civil affairs major activity can be performed with optimum results without

appropriate and effective civil information and psychological operations support.

188. Transition to Civil Authority

The object of these operations is to provide for termination of military responsibility and transfer of all functions to host country civil authority, or to civilian agencies of the U.S. Government, or international bodies. This may involve a fairly short period or these operations may extend for years. In any event, planning for termination of U.S. Army operations and for smooth turnover of functions to civilian agencies must be an integral part of every phase of the operation. Turnover will be expedited and eased if those who are to assume responsibility can be encouraged to come in while U.S. Army personnel are still on the job, observe the operation, and gradually assume the mission. This will provide maximum continuity and minimum disruption for the people who are affected by the particular operation.

MILITARY GOVERNMENT

Section I. INTRODUCTION

189. The Nature of Military Government

a. Military government is the form of administration by which an occupying power exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority over occupied territory. It is established and maintained for governing—

- (1) Occupied enemy territory.
- (2) Domestic territory recovered from rebels treated as belligerents.
- (3) Allied or other territory recovered from an enemy (including neutral territory and areas unlawfully incorporated by the enemy into its own territory) unless or until these territories are the subject of a civil affairs agreement.

b. The authority of the occupant is supreme over the occupied territory and population. Within limits of international law, the occupant may exercise the functions of government itself and exclude the local authorities. The intensity and extent of controls will vary with circumstances and policy. Performance of some governmental functions by authorities of the previous government is not inconsistent with a military occupation, so long as the power and purpose to exercise supreme authority in the territory are maintained by the occupant. In other words, the conclusion of an agreement between the occupant and the previous civil government concerning the authority to be exercised by each does not necessarily bring military government of the area to an end.

c. Military government depends on skills and training not customarily expected to be part of the attributes of military officers. The problems involved are not the same kind of military problems encountered in the strategy of a campaign or in the tactics of a battle. Nevertheless, it is quite clearly a military responsibility in the sense that once a commander has occupied territory he must

assume the obligation for the government of the civil population. In at least the first phase of his occupation, he will carry out his obligations with soldiers. But their duties will not be those of war; they will be administrative in nature and political and economic in character. Only the authority will be military.

d. This does not mean that military government is exercised without legal responsibility. A commander acting as a military governor, or his deputy delegated to act as governor is granted sweeping powers but at the same time is closely bound both by international law and the law of his own country. This requires him to have at his disposal expert legal counsel and advice. Under the laws of war, a commander may suspend or alter national laws for demonstrable cause, but his powers over property in enemy territory have been carefully circumscribed.

190. Basic Principles

There are five basic principles which are applicable to the establishment of military government in the postcombat period.

a. International law requires the occupant, so far as he is able, to maintain an orderly government in the occupied territory.

b. No nation may expect to gain a lasting victory from modern warfare without taking into account the future activities and orientation of the enemy civil government and population.

c. An organization must be planned; it cannot be improvised.

d. To be effective, military government must act as both the instrument and, in the absence of adequate guidance, the creator of foreign policy.

e. Military government is not a permanent regime, and from the outset plans must be made for the transfer of power to civil authority.

191. Rationale for the Creation of a Military Government

Since Army forces have the unique capability of providing control of the enemy's land areas and the population therein, and enforcing surrender terms after victory has been assured, the implementation of the military government portions of the national plan for occupied territory is normally an Army responsibility. The Army, in effect, is required to replace civil authority in territory it has conquered or occupied, with military rule until civil authority is either restored by treaty or inaugurated with U.S. consent.

192. The Responsibility and Authority of the Military Governor

The military governor is the military commander or other designated person who, in an occupied territory, exercises supreme authority over the civil population subject to the laws and usages of war and to any directive received from his government or from his superior.

193. Occupied Territory

Occupied territory is territory under the authority and effective control of a belligerent armed force. Territory is considered occupied by the United States when U.S. forces have taken firm possession of such territory for the purpose of holding it. The number of troops necessary to maintain the authority of the occupant will depend on the density of the population, its degree of subservience to the occupant, the nature of the terrain, and similar considerations. It is not necessary that troops be physically present in all quarters of the occupied territory; it is sufficient that the occupying forces can, within a reasonable time, send detachments of troops to make the occupant's authority felt within any district. However, a mere proclamation that certain areas are occupied (a so-called "paper-occupation") is not sufficient to establish occupation. Similarly, the occupant may need to assume only a minimum of military government functions if the local government is effective and not hostile to the occupant.

194. Limitations Imposed by International Law and Agreement

a. General Principles. The general principles of customary international law and applicable international agreements will be faithfully observed in

the conduct of military government (FM 27-10). The most important treaty provisions on the conduct of belligerent occupation are to be found in The Hague Regulations Respecting the Law and Customs of War on Land of 1907 and the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the Geneva Civilian Convention of 1949). It is particularly important that CA personnel have a thorough understanding of this latter agreement since it is one of the primary legal sources governing the conduct of relations with the populations of belligerent and occupied territories.

b. Respect for Existing Law. The occupant must respect the existing law "unless absolutely prevented" from doing so (Art 43, The Hague Regulations of 1907). Penal laws may be repealed or suspended only in cases where they constitute a threat to the occupant's security or an obstacle to the application of the Geneva Civilian Convention of 1949 (Art 64); e.g., those penal laws which are in conflict with the humanitarian principles of the convention. The extent to which laws are to be suspended or abrogated by the United States in occupied territory is a matter to be determined at governmental level and will be prescribed in directives to the senior U.S. commander. Detailed doctrine on the limitations imposed by international law on the administration of punitive justice in occupied territory is contained in paragraphs 211 through 214.

c. Treatment of Population.

- (1) Under the Geneva Civilian Convention of 1949, fair, just, and reasonable treatment of inhabitants of occupied areas is required. It is an essential basis of military policy, if political-military-economic objectives are to be achieved and the occupation is to be successful, that the inhabitants do not become either future enemies or permanent liabilities. Further, just treatment encourages the support and cooperation of the inhabitants and thereby reduces the effort of the occupant. This policy does not prohibit necessary punitive and disciplinary measures essential to good order but does forbid recourse to capricious or unnecessarily harsh treatment.
- (2) The term "protected persons" may be generally defined as nationals of a Party

to the Geneva Civilian Convention of 1949 who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves in the hands of a party to a conflict or occupying power of which they are not nationals (Art 4, Geneva Civilian Convention of 1949). No protected person may be punished for an offense he or she has not personally committed. Collective penalties and all measures of intimidation or terrorism are prohibited. Pillage is prohibited. Reprisals against protected persons and their property are prohibited. The taking of hostages is prohibited.

- (3) The importance of the recognition of human rights such as respect for personal and property rights, the sanctity of marriage, the inviolability of the home, and freedom of religious worship cannot be overemphasized.

d. Protection of Cultural Property.

- (1) Cultural property is defined as any property of great importance to the cultural heritage of a people, such as monuments of architecture, art or history; archaeological sites; buildings which are of historical or artistic interest; works of art, manuscripts, books, and other objects of artistic, historical or archaeological interest; scientific collections and important collections of books or archives; or reproductions of the property

defined above. Buildings used for cultural or religious purposes are included in the definition of cultural property.

- (2) Armed forces are bound to refrain from any use of cultural property and its immediate surroundings for purposes which are likely to expose it to destruction or damage, and to refrain from any act of hostility directed against such property. These obligations may be waived only in cases where military necessity imperatively requires such a waiver. Armed forces must also undertake to prohibit, prevent, and if necessary, put a stop to any form of theft, pillage, or misappropriation of, and any acts of vandalism directed against cultural property and religious edifices (FM 27-10).

e. Publication of Regulations. Article 65 of the Geneva Civilian Convention of 1949 provides—

The penal provisions enacted by the Occupying Power shall not come into force before they have been published and brought to the knowledge of the inhabitants in their own language. The effect of these penal provisions shall not be retroactive.

Accordingly, proclamations, ordinances, orders, and instructions intended to be binding upon the inhabitants will be published in written form, both in English and in the language(s) of the inhabitants and dated. All such regulations addressed to the inhabitants are given the widest feasible publicity within their area of application.

Section II. PLANNING

195. Planning Factors

a. The status of the nation to be governed is one of the factors that has to be taken into consideration. Is it a highly sophisticated, industrialized, and modern complex? Is it primarily an agricultural society? Is it an underdeveloped area? Different numbers of men with different kinds of skills will be called for depending on the answers to such questions.

b. The size of the population to be governed is another factor.

c. The objectives of an occupying power with regard to the state of the local economy have a bearing. Is the economy to be maintained or is it to be placed on a higher level?

d. Fewer occupation personnel are required if the people of the area are given the responsibility

for local government with the occupying power maintaining directive and controlling jurisdiction to insure that the authority of the occupation is complied with.

196. Armistice Planning

Hostilities are often terminated by the conclusion of an armistice. Although armistice agreements normally are signed by military officers, their political importance is such that the Department of State and other nonmilitary departments of the U.S. Government have a significant interest in their terms. When an occupation is to follow an armistice, the agreement will contain provisions as to the powers of the occupant and the obligations of the government submitting. It is important that these provisions be chosen

with foresight and drafted with skill, and that consideration be given to economic and political matters as well as those which are of a strictly military character. Inadvertence may result in hindering the occupation authorities; ambiguity may embarrass them; needless severity may produce a reaction against the government that dictated the terms.

197. Planning Procedures

a. Since detailed prior planning is essential at all echelons of command within the area of operations, the area or senior U.S. commander must provide an overall civil affairs plan for the guidance of his subordinate commanders in order to prescribe the objectives of civil affairs operations and insure continuity of policies and uniformity of their application.

b. The military force serves primarily as an instrument of national policy in the attainment of political objectives. Accordingly, the area or senior U.S. commander insures that primary attention is given in the preparation of his plan to the political-military-economic objectives received from the appropriate Department of Defense authority and to limitations which may be imposed by the rules of customary international law, or terms of treaties or agreements. Consideration is given to the mission of the command; policy guidance received from higher authority on political, economic, and sociological matters; and the degree of control or influence to be exerted over local agencies of government. A detailed prior study must be made of area intelligence to include geographical and economic features; the density and composition of the population; forms and levels of government; and attitudes, customs and traditions of the people. Information on sources of area intelligence is contained in chapter 4.

c. The overall area civil affairs plan prescribes the objectives of operations, specifies the depth and extent of the area to be covered by projected operations, provides information on the anticipated phasing of the operation, furnishes guidance on the delegation of civil affairs authority to the commanders of major tactical and administrative commands, establishes the CA organization and requirements for units, and includes direction on the deployment of command and area support units. The overall plan furnishes general instructions on the conduct of relationships with national or local civilian authorities and the degree of control, in-

fluence, or supervision to be utilized. Policies are set forth pertaining to the conduct of the various CA functional specialties and the levels of government at which they will be conducted. Guidance is also included on the extent of procurement of local supplies, equipment, real estate and services for military use; the furnishing of civilian relief; economic and military aid from U.S. resources; off-shore procurement; and on other matters essential to the conduct of civil affairs operations. When projected operations are to extend into the territory of two or more nations, variations of objectives and policies with respect to each nation necessitate clear differentiation in plans. Planning for the deployment of units should stress simplicity and flexibility so that unforeseen requirements can be met readily with minimum disruption of the planned organization.

198. Planning for the Transfer of Authority

a. Military government authority should be transferred to a U.S. or allied civilian authority when the political situation allows. This may occur shortly, or many years, after the termination of hostilities. Planning for this transfer should actually begin prior to the start of military government operations and should be continuous. Normally some considerable period of advance warning will be given prior to the date of actual transfer, but this may not provide sufficient time for planning for the turn-over to civil authority.

b. Preferably, the civilian officials who are to take over from the military government should come in well in advance of the take-over date and gradually be integrated into the control structure to provide for continuity of policy and effectiveness of operations.

c. This planning should be accomplished jointly, at least in the latter phases, by the military governor's staff and the incoming civilian agency.

199. Chain of Command

A civil affairs chain of command is used in areas where subordinate tactical and administrative commanders are not authorized to conduct military government operations. In such a situation the senior U.S. commander controls operations through a unit, or staff section, which supervises and directs the activities of the CA units within its area of concern. It is normally desirable that military government operations be centralized in the CA organization when the military situation

is no longer critical, and prior to the transfer of the operation to a civil agency of government. The factor determining the type of command channel employed is the tactical or occupational nature of the military mission. The CA chain of command provides the desirable uniformity and continuity of operations not always possible when military government is directed by a number of subordinate tactical or administrative commanders. Close command and staff liaison between the commanders of CA units and commanders of tactical or administrative units should be maintained when the CA chain of command is employed in order to produce coordinated action. The employment of the CA chain of command does not deprive tactical and administrative commanders of their organic CA staff sections, nor does it relieve them of obligations imposed by treaties, agreements or customary international law to insure that humanitarian or other principles are observed by their troops.

200. Allied Military Government Organization

a. If the U.S. forces which are operating in conjunction with troops of other countries occupy enemy territory, the military government of the area concerned may become an international responsibility. In an international command, military government planning and supervision may be carried out through an integrated military government staff. Integration of personnel may be

accomplished at all command levels but should not extend to the command of CA units of one nation by officers of another.

b. Directives covering broad aims and policies for the initiation or conduct of military government operations by a combined or allied command are promulgated preferably by a higher international policy-forming body such as the United Nations, or the Organization of American States. If such an organization is not in existence or if international representation is not to be supplied at the headquarters of a combined or allied command, an advisory or consultative body may be established for the purpose of furnishing policy guidance and effecting coordination with the governments concerned. The composition of this body is not limited to representatives of allied nations responsible for the conduct of the operation; it may include representatives of other nations not participating in, but concerned with, the operation.

c. The division of occupied territory into zones to be administered by separate states is to be avoided. Disparity in policy and practice is inevitable in zonal administrations. The resulting lack of uniformity will be severely damaging to the success of the occupation. Zonal boundaries tend to harden into international boundaries, and establishment of zones may eventually lead to the dismemberment of an occupied country. Occupied countries thus divided into zones eventually may become international sore spots.

Section III. CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

201. General

a. Military government operations are circumscribed by both legal and policy considerations. They are directed towards the control of the government, the economy, and the populace of the area. For that control to be ultimately effective it must be based upon standards of conduct which impress upon the populace the fairness, decency, and justice of the occupant.

b. The occupying force cannot expect the populace to act in the desired manner unless that populace is properly informed. The populace is officially informed of the lawful orders of the occupying force by the publication of regulatory matter. Mere compliance with the legal requirements for the dissemination of this regulatory matter is insufficient in most cases; and it is a func-

tion of CA civil information activities, assisted by consolidation psychological operations, to actually spread the orders and directives effectively to the people. (See FM 33-1 and FM 33-5 for doctrine and techniques pertaining to consolidation psychological operations.)

c. Military government operations call for the utilization of all the varied skills available in CA units, since those operations cover the gamut of the activities of a society. The organization, capabilities, and functions of CA units and the functional teams available in the CA organizational structure are described in chapter 3 and in appendixes B and C.

d. Controls are established at those levels of government where the conduct of governmental activities can be directed or supervised with the greatest efficiency, uniformity, and consistency

with established policies. Certain functional specialties, such as public communications and public finance, normally are most effectively controlled or supervised at a high level of government; but other functional specialties, such as public health and public welfare, are best controlled or supervised at each level of government. In any case, the military government organization should parallel the structure of indigenous government at each control level.

e. Military government operations require resourcesfulness and adaptability in coping with the variety of situations that may be encountered. Efficiency of operations depends upon the establishment and maintenance of consistent policies. Consistency is attained, however, not by rigid patterns of operations, but by rigorous analysis followed by discriminating response to the essential elements of each situation.

f. The commander of the area of operations or senior U.S. commander insures that subordinate commanders can implement the military government portions of the operations plan by insuring that qualified personnel are provided for the CA staffs of subordinate commands, providing CA command and area support units for deployment at the required time and place in accordance with the overall area of operations plan, and insuring the timely issuance of the area of operations plan.

g. Although the claims service is not a CA responsibility, every effort should be made to see that lawful claims against the United States are promptly settled. With claims, as with requisitions, failure to pay the inhabitants promptly may cause hardship and leave a resentful feeling which works against U.S. interests.

h. In order to safeguard the health of the U.S. forces stationed in the country and to minimize the amount and cost of required relief measures, military government public health activities will receive a high order of priority.

i. Archives and records, both current and historical, of all branches of government of the area are of immediate and continuing interest to the local government and to the military. It is essential to locate and protect them.

202. Civil Affairs Enactments

a. Published regulatory matter such as proclamations, ordinances, laws, instructions and the like, which are intended to be binding upon the

populace, are known collectively as civil affairs enactments.

b. Unless otherwise stated, civil affairs enactments issued prior to occupation are effective and binding within the occupied territory upon occupation. However, penal provisions of such legislation shall not be retroactive and shall not come into force before they have been published and brought to the knowledge of the inhabitants in their own language. It may often prove difficult to reach a satisfactorily clear and idiomatic translation. The matter is important, however, and great pains should be taken to provide such a translation. The inhabitants cannot be expected to comply unless they understand, and it is the translation, not the original English, that informs them. However, in areas of U.S. responsibility, the English version prevails in the event of disagreement in meaning. English is the authentic version for both penal and civil type enactments.

c. Provisions concerning proclamations and ordinances have been standardized by agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada under the Standardization Program (SOLOG), and identical provisions are included in a Standardization Agreement among NATO Armed Forces (STANAG). For such provisions, see SOLOG Agreement 39 (app L).

d. Subordinate commanders report to the higher commander the issuance of any enactments within their respective areas of authority to include the date, place of issuance, and area of application. Higher commanders may require the submission of copies of all regulations published by subordinate commanders.

203. Proclamations

a. In advance of an actual occupation, the theater commander prepares documents necessary to conduct civil affairs operations in conformance with the policies of higher authority. In preparing his initial proclamation, he considers such factors as U.S. national objectives, requirements of international law, and measures required for the security of his forces. The initial proclamation should be stated in brief, simple terms; and it should contain initial instructions to the population of an occupied territory. The points outlined in (1) through (6) below, which apply primarily to civil affairs administration of occupied territory, are appropriately modified by the terms of a civil af-

fairs or other agreement to show relationships in liberated territory between the military and local civil authorities when civil affairs activities are to be conducted pursuant to such agreement.

(1) *Declaration of the fact of occupation.*

The declaration is a formal notice of the fact of occupation. In the declaration, the extent of area and the people covered by the occupation are defined.

(2) *Purpose and policy of the occupation.* A general statement of the purpose and policy of the occupying force as designated by higher authority is included in the proclamation.

(3) *Supremacy of the military commander of the occupying force.* A declaration of the supremacy of the military commander is essential if the fact of military control is to be made known to the inhabitants and compliance with military directives assured. Announcement is made of the commander's authority and of the suspension of local political ties with, and obligations to, the enemy national government. In addition, the inhabitants are informed that they will be required to obey the orders of the military commander and his subordinates and to abstain from all acts or words of hostility or disrespect to the occupying force.

(4) *Obligations, duties, and rights of the inhabitants.* Confirmation is given that, unless the military authority directs otherwise, local laws and customs will continue in force, local officials will continue in office, and officials and employees of all transportation and communications systems and of public utilities and other essential services will carry on with their regular tasks. Assurance is also given that persons who obey the instructions of the military commander will be protected in their persons, property, religion, and domestic rights and will be allowed to carry on their usual occupations.

(5) *Statement of additional proclamations and ordinances.* Advance notice is given of subsequent proclamations and accompanying ordinances which will specify in detail what will be required of the inhabitants.

(6) *Miscellaneous matters.* The proclamation includes the place and date of signing, the signature and title of the issuing authority, and such other matters as the commander considers appropriate.

c. The tone and character of the proclamation may be affected by the—

(1) Political-military objectives to be attained.

(2) The degree of the precariousness of the occupation.

(3) Requirements to be placed on governmental agencies and civil population.

(4) Traditions, customs, and desires of the local population.

(5) Treaties, agreements, or the rules of customary international law affecting the occupation.

d. Subsequent proclamations, numbered in sequence, and supplemented by ordinances, are prepared as necessary to set forth detailed rules governing the conduct of the population.

204. Ordinances

a. An ordinance is an enactment issued under the authority of the commander of the area of operations or military governor promulgating detailed rules of law or procedures for the administration of his zone of responsibility as a whole. Necessary ordinances will be prepared in advance of the operation. Among other matters, ordinances should deal with offenses against the occupant or liberator, establishment of courts, currency and exchange regulations, rationing, and price control.

b. The format of ordinances should be standardized to the following extent: (See app K for sample ordinance.)

(1) Ordinances should be numbered in sequence.

(2) They should consist of a series of main subdivisions called articles.

(3) They should contain definitions of any terms used in them which are ambiguous or unfamiliar to the persons to whom they are addressed.

(4) The final article in each ordinance should specify the effective date of the ordinance.

(5) Ordinances should be signed by the military governor or by some authorized subordinate.

205. Notices and Directives

a. Notices (orders and instructions) differ from other legal documents such as proclamations and ordinances. They are local in scope and are issued to control or direct the civil population and governmental authorities. The purpose of notices is to prevent civilian interference with military operations or to provide detailed information as to the method of complying with the provisions of previously issued documents. Examples of subject matter contained in notices are—hours of curfew; travel restrictions; and limitations on the operations of agencies of government. Authority to issue notices should be delegated to those subordinate commanders having area authority.

b. Directives are issued to specified persons such as civil officials and are distinguished from those notices, orders, and instructions which are published for the information and compliance of the general public. Directives may be issued under the authority of the theater commander, and this authority should also be delegated to those subordinate commanders having civil affairs area responsibilities.

206. Gazettes

a. It may be desirable to establish an official gazette for publication of enactments binding upon the inhabitants, as well as for other purposes.

b. Instructions pertaining to the operations or internal administration of civil affairs units are transmitted through command channels and are not published in a gazette.

207. Techniques of Control

a. Administrative controls over a population may be coercive, in the case of measures which can be enforced, or noncoercive, with respect to measures which offer incentives. Whenever and wherever possible, noncoercive controls are employed. The strongest measure available may be withholding some desired assistance. Measures intended to cause every member of the population to cooperate should not involve the use of force. The people as individuals must be induced to recognize their interest in the common good. They may be offered an otherwise unobtainable incentive, or it may be made more convenient for them to cooperate. The best medium for exercise of control over the masses is through public officials and leaders. This lends emphasis to the importance of selecting and supporting civilian administrative machinery

whose members not only are capable and cooperative but who possess prestige and popularity with the remainder of the population.

b. Among noncoercive administrative measures which may be adopted to secure goodwill and acceptance of an announced policy or desired course of action are—

(1) *Declaration of policy.* A declaration of policy is an overall statement of U.S. objectives, aims, and policies with respect to the area in which operations are conducted. Although a statement of policy is one of the least onerous of noncoercive administrative devices, it may be accompanied by announcement of penalties for the recalcitrant.

(2) *Declaration of legal obligations.* A declaration of legal obligations clarifies for the government and inhabitants of the area those relationships with the military force which are prescribed by international law. A declaration of legal obligations may be included in initial or subsequent proclamations. Awareness of prescribed obligations and relationships tends to promote integrity of action and increases mutual respect.

(3) *Establishment of standards.* Published standards guides may provide an effective means for spotchecking and improving local procedures. Standards guides may be of particular value in the conduct of such functional specialties as public health, public transportation, public utilities, and public communications.

(4) *Setting of examples.* Elements of the U.S. military force should stress correct conduct of troops in public places and among the local inhabitants. CA personnel should strive to be prompt in making replies to inquiries, punctual in keeping appointments, and accessible to local officials. Emphasis should be given to the promotion of respect for local laws, customs, and traditions. Another means of setting an example is through demonstration; that is, by exhibition of a preferred method or device. The expectation is that the superiority of the demonstrated method or device will encourage voluntary acceptance. Demonstrations may be particularly suited to such matters as

child care and public health and sanitation through the use of mobile clinics, soil testing, deinfestation of grain, care of poultry, and operations of communications equipment. Agencies of civil government are encouraged to make maximum use of improved techniques.

(5) *Educational campaigns.* Educational campaigns are useful to familiarize the inhabitants with an idea, action, or policy in order to secure cooperation, increase the scope of local interest, and raise standards. Educational campaigns may be prepared by the various CA functional specialists in coordination with the civil information officer to furnish information on such matters as sanitation, food and agriculture, and the source and amounts of imported civilian supplies. Within the various functional specialties such as public health, public works and utilities, public communications, and public transportation, technical periodicals and other publications may be prepared and furnished to the respective local agencies of government.

(6) *Conferences.* Conferences with local officials constitute the most frequently used method of clarifying and interpreting laws, policies, or procedures which are of mutual interest. Discussions in conferences not only serve to show an interest on the part of CA personnel in local activities or projects but also provide a most effective method of obtaining the acceptance of advice. When questions arise on especially complex problems, effective action may be obtained by discussing the subject in gradual stages until a time is reached at which the entire matter can be summarized. It may be desirable to conduct daily informal conferences with the chiefs of the various agencies of government.

(7) *Conciliation, mediation, and arbitration.* In both conciliation and mediation, a third party helps to resolve a dispute between two other parties. In arbitration, an arbitrator is given the power of making a final binding decision. Conciliation and mediation differ from arbitration in that there is no prior agree-

ment to abide by the decision of a third party. Conciliation and mediation may be advantageously employed in lieu of arbitration to reconcile divergent groups of leaders in following a common policy since the voluntary nature of such agreement tends to provide more active support of the agreed decision.

(8) *Submission of reports and review of records.* The submission of reports and review of records provide a valuable method of obtaining information, controlling operations, observing efficiency, verifying conditions, and checking the accuracy of actions taken. Since this method extends the effectiveness of CA personnel beyond that of most other control processes, it should be used to the maximum practicable extent.

(9) *Compliance through publicity.* Compliance through publicity may be used to obtain a desired result through the use of favorable or adverse publicity or comment with respect to a specific activity or selected civilians. There is no resort to legal means of compulsion. Since people as a whole usually respond to publicity concerning themselves, publicity may in appropriate circumstances be used to influence the entire population.

(10) *Miscellaneous.* There are other non-coercive measures which may be used. Among these are subsidies and the granting of other tangible and intangible benefits. The payment of a subsidy which grants a material or financial reward for following a desired policy or plan, or other payments by the United States, such as those for local procurement of supplies and services, are examples of this type of measure.

c. Coercive controls apply restraint in requiring the inhabitants of the area to follow an announced policy. In the case of certain violations, administrative penalties may be applied, while in others the violator may be referred for appropriate judicial action. Among coercive controls which may be considered are—

(1) *Licensing.* A license is a permit or privilege to engage in some activity otherwise prohibited, but the purpose is regulation or revenue, not prohibition.

Licensing must be preceded by a law or directive making it illegal for a person or organization to engage in a specified activity without a license. The advantages of licensing as a control device are—the burden of proof placed upon the licensee; the self-discipline generally resulting from the fear of loss of special privilege; and the considerable assistance to law enforcement in difficult technical areas of administration. The effectiveness of a licensing system depends on inspections to insure compliance, and this might require a large staff.

- (2) *Investigation.* An investigation is the act of searching for facts and often concerns an alleged error, deficiency, or incident of misconduct. The person or agency being investigated may be required to justify the conditions which have been uncovered or to show cause for the deficiencies observed.
- (3) *Inspection.* Inspection may be used for the physical surveillance of the operations of civil government or the performance of activities involved in the production or transportation of products. It may be employed to disclose instances of active sabotage or to uncover violations of directives. A few competent inspectors may extend their influence over a large part of the population. When an inspector is technically qualified, he may also furnish valuable instruction to the persons whose activities are inspected. If continuous operation is essential, as in the case of such vital activities as the production of food, practice of medicine, operation of water systems, communication lines, and transportation systems, inspections provide a particularly valuable method of control. Inspection permits the continued operation of important activities, enables small numbers of competent personnel to be widely effective, promotes constructive policy, and provides a strong disciplinary influence.
- (4) *Apprehension of violators.* Apprehension of violators includes actions taken in searching for, finding, and detaining persons who violate enactments. The successful conduct of military government

operations necessitates that violations be detected and violators identified and punished. Since compliance with the intent of directives may be obtained from most local civilians, the latter may develop a vested interest in the enforcement of such directives. As a result, when others violate directives, those who comply often furnish information on which the apprehension of violators may be based.

- (5) *Taxation.* Taxation is the raising of revenues by the requirement of compulsory payments. Taxation may be used as a charge for a specific act and, under appropriate conditions, as a means of control of the local economy. Taxation has the same weakness as other methods of control, i.e., to be effective each violation must be identified and proved. In addition, the incentive is to violate rather than comply with the law.
- (6) *Summary action.* A summary action is an immediate action taken to correct or improve a specific activity or situation. Summary decision by an investigating officer, inspector, reviewer, or supervisor may be justified when it is essential to prevent further violations or to remove a potentially dangerous person from a position of responsibility. Summary actions may be judicial or administrative and may include removal from office; denial, suspension, or revocation of license; and denial of withdrawal of benefits.

208. Enforcement

a. In the initial stages of an occupation, the enforcement of enactments is accomplished, under the staff supervision of the responsible commander's G5 staff sections, and by civil affairs units assisted by civilian police. When civil police and other civil agencies lack sufficient enforcement capabilities, military police or other military units may be required, although, if possible, troop enforcement is limited to such matters as emergency measures, crimes against the military, and traffic control.

b. Violators of regulations are brought for prosecution before civil affairs tribunals or, if authorized by the theater commander, before the civil courts of the occupied territory. Military tribunals

with jurisdiction over the local population normally are not established in friendly territory except when authorized by the terms of agreements or other consensual arrangement.

209. Military Government Courts

a. During an occupation the occupant may, under international law, establish military government courts. These courts are established primarily for the purpose of providing a forum in which violations of the occupant's legislation may be adjudicated. In exceptional circumstances, when the established local courts of the occupied area are unable to function, or when such action becomes necessary to insure the effective administration of justice, military government courts may be granted jurisdiction to administer the ordinary criminal and/or civil law of the occupied area. This jurisdiction should be returned to the local courts of the occupied area as soon as possible.

b. The commander normally delegates authority to appoint military government courts to those subordinate commanders having area responsibility for the conduct of military government. For reasons of practicality this authorization normally does not go below the level of division commanders in tactical organizations and comparable logistical units. Authorization extended to civil affairs commands depends not on size or level of the units but on their missions.

210. Types of Tribunals

a. Criteria as to composition and jurisdictional limitations of military government courts are set forth by the theater commander. Usually there are three categories of courts, patterned as to size, qualifications of members, jurisdiction, and limitations on maximum punishments somewhat like courts-martial. In any circumstances, a superior court in the system should be designated to conduct legal proceedings involving protected persons, as defined in the Geneva Conventions of 1949, when the death sentence or imprisonment in excess of 2 years is authorized for the offense charged (FM 27-10). Courts must adhere to every pertinent provision of the Geneva Conventions and should conduct their operations procedurally, so far as practicable, in a manner which will be understood by local populations.

b. In addition, commissions may be appointed by an authorized commander to hear special cases not normally within the jurisdiction of established

courts such as accusations of espionage against nonlocal civilians. Commissions try cases involving unusual circumstances or exceptional seriousness. Membership, procedures, and jurisdiction are prescribed by the appointing authority. Military commissions which constitute judicial bodies should not be confused with commissions created to administer specific projects or other operational programs.

c. Boards are established to process certain quasi-judicial issues. The appointing authority may specify procedural rules or instruct the board to set its own rules, but the appointing authority must define the board's jurisdiction. A board may consist of one officer but often numbers two or three. Boards pass on requisition demands; property control orders; labor issues; valuations of utilities, real property, and services; and like administrative matters.

211. Jurisdiction

a. *As to Territory.* Jurisdiction extends to the whole of the occupied territory. When only a portion of a political subdivision is occupied, jurisdiction is assumed over each part as occupation becomes an actual or constructive fact.

b. *As to Persons.* Jurisdiction extends to all persons in the occupied territory other than prisoners of war, members of the occupying forces, or members of armed forces of states allied with the occupant. Persons serving with, employed by, or accompanying the armed forces are sometimes made subject to the jurisdiction of such tribunals. Persons subject to United States military law (see Uniform Code of Military Justice, Art. 2) do not fall under the jurisdiction of local courts of an occupied area unless expressly made subject thereto by a directive of occupation authorities.

c. *As to Offenses.* Jurisdiction extends to violations of a proclamation, ordinance, or order issued by occupation authority, violations of the law of war (if other tribunals are not established for the adjudication of such cases), and violations of indigenous criminal or civil laws which continue in force after the area has been occupied.

212. Procedures

a. Care is taken in preparing the judicial organization, procedures, and rules of trial to make sure that every pertinent requirement of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 has been met. The system must have rational simplicity. While this may

sometimes entail radical departures from formal U.S. judicial practices and rules of evidence, the basic guide remains the United States Manual for Courts Martial. (See para 2, MCM, 1951.) All courts shall give consideration to provisions of the law of the country in which they sit, so far as those laws have not been suspended by United States or allied authority. In particular they shall give effect to procedural safeguards and substantive rights, the recognition of which is compatible with international law and American standards of justice. In adjudging any sentence, particularly one including confinement, consideration should be given not only to the crime committed but also to the availability of facilities and officials necessary to the prompt execution of the sentence. Under no condition may one assume that American practices are common, or even comprehended, in other lands. For example, the common American practice of suspending execution of part or all of an imposed sentence would be considered in many parts of the world as a reprimand for the police, the prosecutor, or the court of original jurisdiction. In the disrupted circumstances inherent in military occupation, suspension of a sentence does not possess the probational and rehabilitational characteristics found in a settled society.

b. Care should be taken, in appointing military government courts, to select officers of sound judgment and judicial temperament. These courts should be manned by legally trained persons to the maximum extent possible. It is mandatory that officers appointed to military government courts have a good understanding of the policies and objectives of the occupation. Such an understanding tends to promote rational and consistent action. Considerable continuity in the membership of the courts is also advantageous, since it tends to result in like penalties for like offenses.

c. Harsh or erratic punishments generate resentment and undermine respect for the courts by the inhabitants. In establishing, for example, the extent of the fines that a military government court is to be empowered to impose, the effect that the fine in the foreign currency will have upon the inhabitants of the occupied territory, not the significance to an American of any suggested sum in dollars, should be given consideration.

d. Every essential of justice should be safeguarded. The accused should be assured a fair hearing; receive adequate notice of the charges in

advance of trial; be given adequate opportunity to prepare his defense; enjoy the right to counsel; be enabled to present evidence necessary to his defense; call witnesses in his defense; cross-examine witnesses presented by the prosecution; and, unless he freely waives such assistance, be aided by an interpreter. Adequate provision should be made for review of administrative examination of cases by the military government legal staff. The right to petition for review shall be provided. (See para 2, MCM, United States, 1951 and Article 73 of the Geneva Civilian Convention of 1949.)

213. Limitations in Penal Laws

The Geneva Civilian Convention of 1949 imposes important limitations on the administration of punitive justice in occupied territory. The Convention establishes the following guiding principles:

a. The penal laws of the occupied territory remain in force, except that they may be repealed or suspended by the occupying power where they constitute a threat to its security or an obstacle to the application of the Convention. Those laws relating to recruitment and bearing of arms, laws dealing with political processes, such as the rights of assembly and suffrage, and laws establishing racial discrimination may, for example, well be deprived of effect. The tribunals of the occupied territory normally continue to function in respect to offenses covered by those laws which are continued in effect (Art. 64).

b. The occupying power may promulgate penal provisions essential to maintain orderly government of the territory; to insure the security of the occupying power; or to enable the occupying power to fulfill its obligations under the Convention (Art. 64). Alleged violations are triable before properly constituted nonpolitical military courts sitting in the occupied country (Art. 66).

c. As to the penal provisions mentioned above, if an offense was solely intended to harm the occupying power, and did not constitute an attempt on life or limb of a member of the occupying forces or administration, nor a grave collective danger, nor seriously damage the property of the occupying forces or administration or the installations used by them, it shall be punished by internment or simple imprisonment, the duration of which is proportionate to the offense (Art. 68). It may not be punished by a deprivation of liberty more serious than simple imprisonment, such as imprison-

ment at hard labor or solitary confinement. The limitation in Article 68 does not preclude the imposition of other penalties, such as fines, in addition to simple imprisonment or internment, so long as the additional penalty is not a further deprivation of liberty, and so long as the total punishment is proportionate to the offense.

d. The penal provisions promulgated by the occupying power may provide for the imposition of the death penalty only in case of espionage, or of serious acts of sabotage against the military installations of the occupying power, or of intentional offenses that cause death (para 2, Art. 68). (Although this Article also provides that the named offenses must have been punishable by death under the law of the occupied territory at the time the occupation began, the United States, and certain other governments, have reserved the right to impose the death penalty without regard to this particular limitation.)

e. The Protecting Power, as defined in the Convention, shall be notified of all proceedings involving the death penalty or possible imprisonment for 2 years or more. Not until 3 weeks after this notification reaches the Protecting Power may the trial begin (Art. 71).

214. Drafting of Penal Ordinances

In the drafting of penal ordinances, account must be taken of the following matters:

a. Care must be taken to insure that, in any enumeration of offenses punishable by death, the requirements of the second paragraph of Article 68 of Geneva Civilian Convention of 1949 are met.

b. The requirements of notice and of 3 weeks delay in those cases in which the death penalty or imprisonment for 2 years or more is "involved" present difficult problems, to which the following considerations are pertinent:

- (1) From the point of view of the occupying power, violations of the occupant's directives vary greatly in their seriousness according to the circumstances of the case. Entering a forbidden area, for example, might constitute either a technical violation or, under other circumstances, a very serious offense meriting imprisonment for 2 years or more.
- (2) It would be a serious impediment to the administration of justice, if, as to all

violations of the occupant's legislation, notice and 3 weeks' delay were unavoidable. Many small cases, deserving some very moderate punishment, would be needlessly magnified and the value of prompt correction as a deterrent would be lost. Delay also increases the difficulty of producing witnesses.

c. For the foregoing reasons, it is desirable that the procedure of military government courts should be so contrived as to make possible an early separation between those cases which do or do not require notification to the Protecting Power. When a preliminary investigation of charges is made, this procedure may serve as an appropriate instrument for determining whether the individual should be tried for such an offense as might permit imprisonment of 2 years or more and would accordingly require notification to the Protecting Power.

215. Local Courts

a. Article 64 of the Geneva Civilian Convention of 1949 provides that "the tribunals of the occupied territory shall continue to function in respect of all offenses" covered by the penal laws of the occupied territory, subject, however, to two exceptions—

- (1) The consideration that any obstacle to the carrying out of the Convention should be removed.
- (2) The necessity for insuring the effective administration of justice.

b. It is the duty of the occupant to insure the effective administration of justice. Normally, this is to be accomplished through the continued functioning of the local courts. If by reason of being corrupt or unfairly constituted, these courts do not insure justice, then the military governor should take appropriate measures to cause that end to be attained. He might remove certain judges and appoint others in their stead. He might allow the old judges to carry out only certain duties, e.g., to hand over records and do other things necessary to enable the administration of justice to go forward. He might even use courts of his own creation to administer the penal law. In short, the occupant is to see to it that the law is properly administered, by the existing judges if possible. He must, in any event, insure that there is a fair and effective administration of justice.

Section IV. RESTORATION OF GOVERNMENT

216. Political Objective

a. Normally it will be the ultimate objective of U.S. occupation to leave behind a government oriented in democratic principles and which will not be a threat to future peace and world stability. This may best be accomplished through the establishment of an efficient and popularly accepted government, stable economic and financial conditions, and respect for law and order. Normally it will be the policy of a U.S. military government to allow the maximum political freedom consistent with military security and public order.

b. After active combat has ceased, requirements of the military situation are greatly diminished and considerations of long-range policy become dominant. Plans for reformation or restoration of the institutions of the occupied country can now be put into full effect. It becomes possible to adopt a policy of greater liberality toward the inhabitants. Consistent with established policy for the occupation, a sound indigenous administration is developed and confirmed in the exercise of responsibility, always subject to the paramount authority of the occupier. An informed populace capable of self-government is fostered by means of newspapers representing various opinions, by permitting public discussion and the formation of acceptable political parties as rapidly as is practicable, and in due course by the holding of free elections. Measures will be shaped toward the transfer of authority to a local civil agency according to directive.

c. Paragraphs 207 and 208 describe the political contingencies and methods which affect the achievement of these objectives.

217. Treatment of Hostile Governments

a. No assumption can be made as to whether the national government of the enemy will come under the control of the occupant at the conclusion of active combat. A submission of the government might not have occurred; the enemy government might have yielded only a portion of its territory to the occupant; or, although the entire country is occupied, the enemy government itself might have withdrawn into exile. Each of these situations must be treated on its particular facts within the framework of overall U.S. objectives.

b. Where the national government of the enemy has come within the power of the occupant, the

question arises as to how to treat the resulting situation. Broadly, three possibilities are conceivable as indicated in (1) through (3) below. Various courses may be devised within each of these broad possibilities; however, the choice to be followed is a matter for highest policy decision. Personnel coming into contact with this situation should avoid any unwarranted action or statement that might prejudice this freedom of choice. The training of personnel should prepare them to execute any course that may be adopted.

(1) *Replacing the defeated government and building a new structure.* This course should be adopted only as a last resort. It should be necessary only if the old regime has completely collapsed, or if it is so hostile or such a threat to the peace that it cannot be allowed to exist. This extreme treatment would necessitate a protracted occupation and a deep commitment by the occupying power. The obstacles to success are obvious and grave. In any case where so fundamental a reconstruction is contemplated, the military government personnel for this purpose require very special preparation.

(2) *Proceeding with the defeated government.* The government that has submitted may be accepted tentatively as the basis for further development, under the control of the occupying power. Individuals whose past gives no promise of useful service will be excluded from office. A program may be inaugurated looking toward the strengthening of the administration, the reform of political institutions, and the development of responsible self-government. It does not follow, from the fact that a submitted government may have become a cobelligerent, that the occupant is bound to give it unqualified support. This sort of acceptance does not necessarily imply approval or condonation. Its significance may be simply that in working toward ultimate objectives, the government already in being has been found to be the most convenient base from which to start.

(3) *Installing new personnel within the existing framework of government.* By this

approach, the members of the defeated government would forthwith be turned out and a new group acceptable to the occupant would be installed in the offices of government. This course might be adopted in favor of the leaders of an underground movement or a committee of national liberation. A major concern, in considering such a course, must be the question of whether a group thus installed would command the support of the country and give the best promise of achieving permanently satisfactory conditions.

218. Retention or Removal of Government Personnel

a. Military government personnel should avoid acting as operating officials of the civil government, but should rely, to the maximum extent possible, on the services of personnel of the occupied territory. Persons thus employed should be reliable, qualified, and respected by the community and should be willing to comply with directives. They should be protected from hostile elements in the population.

b. Immediate convenience ordinarily points to the retention of administrative personnel. Presumably they will know their jobs and can carry on essential activities. It may be, however, that vir-

tually every officeholder and employee in the existing government is either overtly hostile to the occupying forces or is so intimately associated with an organization opposed to the occupation that his removal is indicated. It is recognized that the occupant may lawfully remove public officials from their posts. However, the occupant may not in any way apply sanctions to, or take any measures of, coercion or discrimination against them should they abstain from fulfilling their functions for reasons of conscience (Art. 54, Geneva Civilian Convention of 1949). The policy regarding removal should be prescribed in a directive to the senior U.S. commander. Where officeholders are automatically retained, it ordinarily will be desirable to make clear to the community that this is only a provisional arrangement for immediate administrative convenience and implies no approval or condonation of such persons.

c. The occupying power may compel persons, including public officials, to perform work which is necessary either for the needs of the army of occupation, or for the populace, such as burying military and civilian dead, or feeding, sheltering, clothing, transporting, or caring for the health of the population of the occupied country. The limitations on such work prescribed in Article 51, Geneva Civilian Convention of 1949 will be observed.

Section V. RESTORATION OF THE ECONOMY

219. Economic Policies

a. Both self-interest and concern for the welfare of the occupied country can be expected to lead the United States, as occupant, to adopt a comprehensive economic policy. The outlines of this policy normally will be set forth in the directive to the senior U.S. commander. Government departments in addition to the Department of Defense and the Department of State will have an important concern in these matters. For example, so far as such a highly technical matter as the control of currency is concerned, it is to be expected that the Treasury Department will share in framing the directive and will maintain a continuing interest in its execution. It should be remembered that fiscal and various other economic measures of an occupation have significant consequences in the home country of the occupying force.

b. The revival of the domestic economy of the occupied territory will, according to the limitations set out in the theater military government directive, be an objective of the occupation. The effort has several ends such as the well-being of the local population, the provision of supplies for the armed forces, and the reduction of the burden on U.S. and allied shipping. The directive to the senior U.S. commander should specify the level at which the local economy should be assisted, maintained, rehabilitated or restored. The restoration of a war shattered economy, even to the modest extent attainable during an occupation, runs into numerous elements, such as the repair of factories and the salvaging of equipment; the provision of credit; and the restoration of channels of distribution. Comparable measures must be taken to restore agricultural production.

c. The maintenance of as sound a currency as the circumstances permit will be one of the tasks

of the occupant. The occupying power may be able to count upon a national bank of issue to provide the requisite currency, or may find it necessary to provide a financial agency and to issue occupation currency. The occupant should insure the stability of any currency that it may issue and should take other measures to prevent inflation. A military government, like other governments, may be called upon to devise and administer policies for managing the currency, and must prepare plans to that end.

d. Taxes must be collected for the support of the government of the area concerned. In the conditions to be expected in the wake of combat, this task calls for resourcefulness. Military government personnel should be prepared to give direction to this effort. Military procurement activities in an occupied area must be closely coordinated with civil affairs activities. Procedures must be prescribed for the procurement of facilities, utilities, services, including direct hire labor, and supplies. Wherever practicable, procurement and payment should be accomplished through the action of the local government. It is the practice of the United States to refrain from the local procurement of supplies and facilities unless they are surplus to minimum local needs. International law likewise imposes certain restrictions both on the type and quantity of property which may be requisitioned. For example, the occupant may not requisition foodstuffs, medical supplies, or other necessary articles for use by the occupation forces

and administrative personnel without taking into account the requirements of the civilian population (Art. 55, Geneva Civilian Convention of 1949). Requisitioning of supplies and facilities in occupied territory is governed by Article 52 of the Hague Regulations of 1907 and by Articles 55 and 57 of the Geneva Civilian Convention of 1949.

220. Military Civic Action

As soon as security conditions permit, U.S. military units stationed in the occupied area should begin military civic action to assist in achieving U.S. political and economic objectives. Military civic action programs to be conducted with U.S. troop support should be planned and supervised by the CA organization charged with military government responsibilities to insure conformance with U.S. policy and national objectives. Military civic action with U.S. units participating can reduce the costs of economic rehabilitation and improve conditions of life for the populace, thus helping to achieve political objectives. Such action by U.S. troops will also help reduce the likelihood of popular support for dissident elements against the occupation forces. The nature of the military civic action program will be governed by the extent of war damage, the state of development of the occupied nation, and resources available to support this program. The general principles of military civic action as an element in a program of Internal Development which are discussed in chapter 6, are applicable and should be used as guides.

APPENDIX A

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Clothing, Toxicological Agents Protective
Clothing, Vesicant Gas Protective Clothing,
Explosive Handlers' Clothing.

TOE 3-500—Chemical Service Organization.

TOE 29-500—Composite Service Organization.

TOE 41-500—Civil Affairs Organization.

NATO Status of Forces Agreement (4 UST 1974;
TIAS 2846).

Manual for Courts Martial United States—1951,
USMJ, Art. 2.

APPENDIX B

CA UNIT ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND STAFF FUNCTIONS

1. Types of CA Units

a. CA units of varying sizes and capabilities are provided to conduct civil affairs operations with a maximum economy of U.S. personnel, maximum flexibility of employment, and a minimum practical ratio of command, administrative, and overhead personnel to operational personnel.

b. CA personnel may be categorized as generalists or functional specialists. The former are used for command and control purposes in CA units and the latter as members of appropriate functional teams and to fill certain unit staff positions.

c. There are both fixed TOE and cellular TOE CA headquarters units. CA functional teams may be attached to either type.

(1) *Fixed TOE units.*

(a) CA Area A Headquarters (TOE 41-2).

(b) CA Area B Headquarters (TOE 41-2).

(c) CA Brigade Headquarters (TOE 41-201).

(2) *Cellular TOE units (TOE 41-500).*

(a) CA Group Headquarters.

(b) CA Battalion Headquarters.

(c) CA Company Headquarters.

(d) CA Platoon Headquarters.

2. Employment of CA Units

The smallest size CA headquarters unit capable of performing the particular civil affairs mission involved is used to support a military command or to provide any other civil affairs operational capability. Criteria for tailoring CA units is provided in chapter 3. The nature of the mission and the characteristics of the area of operations, rather than the size of the supported force, determine which CA unit or units will be employed for any particular operation. Paragraphs 3 through 8 below, outline the general capabilities of each type unit listed in 1 above.

3. The CA Brigade

The CA brigade is the senior unit in the CA organizational structure. It has both an organic command and control, and a functional capability. It may be employed without augmentation to—

a. Exercise command, or command less operational command, over attached civil affairs units in all intensities of warfare.

b. Conduct civil affairs activities with the national government of a major nation in all intensities of warfare.

c. Form the basis of a theater or theater army civil affairs staff agency.

d. Provide military support to a regional civil defense organization in the United States in the event of enemy attack, natural disaster or other emergency.

4. The CA Group

The CA group is a command and control headquarters with no organic civil affairs functional capability. Although it may be tailored to perform civil affairs operations by the attachment of appropriate CA functional teams, it normally is not used for this purpose. The CA group normally is employed only in the communications zone as a command and control headquarters subordinate to the CA brigade. Its mission is to alleviate span of control problems in the event that the geographical area is too large, or the number of CA units too great, for direct control by the CA brigade.

5. The CA Battalion

The CA battalion is a command and control headquarters with no organic civil affairs functional capability. It is normally tailored, however, by attachment of appropriate functional teams to perform a functional as well as a command and




Figure 5. Civil affairs brigade.

control mission. The CA battalion may be employed to—

a. Exercise command, or command less operational command, over attached CA companies in all intensities of warfare.

b. Conduct civil affairs activities with the national government of a small nation, or with a large political subdivision of a major nation, in all intensities of warfare.

c. Form the basis of a civil affairs staff agency for a large independent task force.

d. Provide military support to a state civil defense organization in the United States in the event of enemy attack, natural disaster, or other emergency.

6. The CA Company

The CA company is a command and control headquarters with no organic civil affairs functional capability. It is normally tailored, however, by attachment of appropriate functional teams to

perform a functional as well as a command and control mission. The CA company may be employed to—

a. Exercise command, or command less operational command, over attached CA platoons in all intensities of warfare.

b. Conduct civil affairs activities with the smaller political subdivisions of a nation in all intensities of warfare.

c. Form the basis of a civil affairs staff agency for a medium-sized independent task force.

7. The CA Platoon

The CA platoon is the basic civil affairs operational element. It exercises command and control over attached CA teams in the performance of civil affairs operations. It may be employed to—

a. Exercise command over attached CA teams in all intensities of warfare.

b. Form the basis of a civil affairs staff agency for a small independent task force.




Figure 6. Type organization civil affairs group.

8. The CA Area Headquarters Units

The CA area headquarters are specialized units normally not employed except in high intensity warfare or military government situations. Although they have both an organic command and control and a functional capability, they normally are employed only in the functional role during conflict, and in the command and control role in the military government environment.

a. The CA Area A headquarters may be employed to—

- (1) Exercise command over an integrated civil affairs structure in a military government situation, or in a national reconstruction effort in a posthostility environment.
- (2) Conduct civil affairs activities in high intensity warfare with the national government of a major nation.

- (3) Form the basis of a theater or theater army civil affairs staff agency in high intensity conflict.

b. The CA Area B headquarters may be employed in the same roles as the CA Area A headquarters, except that neither the command and control nor the functional capabilities of this headquarters are as extensive as those of the Area A headquarters. It should, therefore, be employed in correspondingly lesser roles.

9. CA Unit Commander

Commanders of CA units perform all of the normal administrative and operational duties of unit commanders of any type military organization. The commander uses his executive officer or deputy to assist him in the performance of these and other duties. Both of these officers must be competent CA generalists as well as capable mili-




Figure 7. Type organization civil affairs battalion.

tary leaders. In addition to the normal functions of command, CA unit commanders also perform specific CA functions as required by the unit mission. These may include—

a. Planning for, assigning missions to, deploying, and supervising the activities of CA functional specialist personnel and teams.

b. Acting as a point of contact with the civil authorities of a specified area.

c. Coordinating activities of his own unit and those of non-CA units to include such matters as—

- (1) Military civic action.
- (2) Populace and resources control.
- (3) Psychological operations.
- (4) Military support of civil defense.

d. Providing civil affairs support on a command or area basis to designated units.

e. Providing CA generalist and functional specialist training to non-CA U.S. personnel and to allied military and civilian personnel.

f. Acting as a military governor or his representative for occupied enemy territory.

g. Providing governmental services to a civilian population in a civil defense or martial law emergency situation.

h. Commanding attached non-CA units and personnel when required for the performance of a civil affairs operation.

10. CA Unit Staff Officers

The staffs of CA units are organized on general staff principles in accordance with FM 101-5. The four principal staff assistants are the assistant chief of staff, personnel and administration (G1; S1); the assistant chief of staff, security, plans and operations (G2/3; S2/3); the assistant chief of staff, logistics (G4; S4); and the assistant chief of staff, civil affairs (G5; S5). As indicated, the staff organization of CA units normally contains a combined G2/3 staff section. In addition, some of the duties normally found in other general staff sections in non-CA units are under the G5 in CA units. These duties consist, in general, of those supervisory and coordination functions di-




Figure 8. Type organization civil affairs company.

rectly bearing on civil affairs operations, as opposed to normal military operations of the CA unit. Specific statements of the duties and functions of CA unit staffs are contained in paragraphs 11 through 16 below.

11. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Personnel and Administration (G1; S1)

The ACofS, Personnel and Administration is the principal staff assistant on personnel matters including maintenance of unit strengths, personnel management, morale and welfare, headquarters management, and discipline, law, and order.

12. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Security, Plans and Operations (G2/3; S2/3)

The ACofS, Security, Plans, and Operations, is the principal staff assistant for intelligence matters, for training, and for all plans and operations other than plans and operations involving the performance of civil affairs functions. He is responsible for—

a. Developing plans, policies, programs, and procedures pertaining to the operations of the CA unit, other than civil affairs operations. This would include plans for unit movement, unit deployment, rear area security, damage control and

CBR attack. The ACofS, Security, Plans and Operations insures that the plans are compatible with operation plans of supported tactical units; secures the approval of the commander on the plans; and supervises their execution.

b. Reviewing and coordinating plans of attached CA units in the areas indicated above.

c. Selecting and allocating CA units and teams needed to support the civil affairs mission based on recommendations and requirements as determined by the ACofS, Civil Affairs.

d. Recommending priorities to govern the allocation of equipment to attached CA units and teams, based on the advice of the ACofS, Civil Affairs.

e. Planning and supervising training of attached CA units and teams.

f. Recommending and requesting attachment of additional or replacement CA units and teams, as required and based on the advice of the ACofS, Civil Affairs.

g. Developing and supervising execution of the intelligence collection plan.

h. Collecting, evaluating, and interpreting information on the effect of weather, terrain, the enemy, and the civilian population on the civil affairs mission.




Figure 9. Type organization civil affairs platoon.




Figure 10. Type organization civil affairs Area A or B headquarters.

i. Providing intelligence and counterintelligence information to the staff.

j. Providing intelligence estimates, as required.

13. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Logistics (G4; S4)

The ACofS, Logistics, is the principal staff assistant for matters pertaining to materiel and services. He is responsible for—

a. Providing information to the ACofS, Security, Plans and Operations, and to the ACofS, Civil Affairs, for development of plans, programs, policies, and procedures for logistic support of unit operations and civil affairs operations.

b. Determining logistic support requirements for attached CA units and teams.

c. Planning and supervising supply, services, maintenance, and medical support for attached CA units and teams.

d. Coordinating requirements furnished by the ACofS, Civil Affairs, for military supplies for use by the indigenous populace, and requisitioning such supplies.

e. Requisitioning, receiving, storing, distributing, and documenting military supplies and equipment.

f. Allocating equipment to attached CA units and teams in accordance with priorities established by the ACofS, Security, Plans and Operations.

14. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs (G5; S5)

The ACofS, Civil Affairs, is the principal staff assistant for matters pertaining to civil affairs operations. He is responsible for—

a. Developing plans, policies, programs, and procedures for civil affairs operations of attached CA units and teams.

b. Determining priorities for the allocation and deployment of attached CA units and teams and furnishing recommendations to the ACofS, Security, Plans and Operations.

c. Determining priorities for the allocation of equipment to attached CA units and teams and furnishing recommendations to the ACofS, Security, Plans and Operations.

d. Determining requirements for additional CA units and teams and furnishing recommendations to the ACofS, Security, Plans and Operations.

e. Reviewing and coordinating civil affairs operational plans of attached CA units and teams.

f. Coordinating and supervising the civil affairs operations of attached CA units and teams.

g. Acting as point of contact for the unit with the civilian populace in the area.

h. Determining requirements for military supplies for the use of the indigenous populace and furnishing recommendations to the ACofS/Logistics.

15. CA Functions

CA functions are considered under four broad categories—Governmental; Economic; Public Facilities; and Special. The 20 functions may be grouped under these categories for operational control and, as required, by the scope of the civil affairs mission. Every function is in some degree related to every other function and therefore coordination must be continuous. The areas of specialization are—

a. *Governmental* functions are those dealing with matters involving governmental activity or control, political activities, review and correction of actions of civil officials in accordance with competent directives, and implementation of policy decisions with respect to control or relationship of the people to the government in the area of operation. These functions are—

- (1) Civil Defense.
- (2) Labor.
- (3) Civil Administration.
- (4) Public Education.
- (5) Public Finance.
- (6) Public Health.
- (7) Public Safety.
- (8) Public Welfare.
- (9) Tribunals.

b. *Economic* functions are those concerned with the economic structure of an area as a whole, and the coordination of the more specialized economic aspects and efforts in developing direct support for the military effort from local resources and discharging the command's economic responsibility to the civil population and its government. These functions are—

- (1) Civilian Supply.
- (2) Economics and Commerce.
- (3) Food and Agriculture.
- (4) Property Control.

c. *Public Facilities* functions are concerned with the supervision, control, and operation, where required, of facilities such as water, gas, waste disposal, electrical and other power systems,

communications, transportation, and restoration or introduction of such facilities. These functions are—

- (1) Public Communications.
- (2) Public Transportation.
- (3) Public Works and Utilities.

d. Special functions are those concerned with people; their rights as individuals; their culture, care, religion, protection and control. Planned direction and constant supervision are essential for uniformity of operations and to the successful accomplishment of activities within this category. These functions are—

- (1) Arts, Monuments, and Archives.
- (2) Civil Information.
- (3) Displaced Persons, Refugees, and Evacuees.
- (4) Religious Relations.

16. Utilization of Functional Teams and Specialists for Operations

Normally, functional teams are attached to, and operate with, a CA headquarters unit. However, individuals with special qualifications may be integrated into the unit headquarters, operate sepa-

ately, or be consolidated to form appropriate teams as required in the operational area. Also, individual teams may be attached to augment related portions of staff sections for designated periods of time. To meet unusual situations, teams with related interests may be combined to provide functional capabilities not preplanned or which may not be available from other sources. For example, if a situation called for two civilian supply teams and only one each civilian supply and public welfare team were available, these teams could be temporarily combined to meet the requirement. Again, a public safety team and a displaced persons team could be combined to provide two displaced persons teams or two public safety teams. Also, a number of identical type teams of different sizes may be combined to provide a larger team of sufficient stature and manpower to accomplish a given task. CA functional teams can also be attached to non-CA units for the performance of specific duties such as planning and supervision of military civic action. CA composite teams made up of personnel from various CA functional teams may also be created, although normally CA teams can perform with more efficiency as constituted and under the control of a CA headquarters unit.

APPENDIX C

CA FUNCTIONAL TEAM TASKS

1. General

a. The tasks within the capability and scope of responsibility of each of the CA functional teams are enumerated in succeeding paragraphs, arranged alphabetically for ease of reference. Some of these tasks are applicable under any circumstances, i.e., peacetime, cold, limited, or general war, regardless of the degree of civil affairs authority vested in the military commander. Others are performed only when the military commander has been authorized to assume full executive, legislative, and judicial authority over a specific area and its population. The determination of those tasks to be performed in a given political or environmental situation is the responsibility of the commanders on the advice of their CA staff officers. A checklist of commonly occurring tasks, as related to the various intensities of warfare, is contained in appendix M.

b. These tasks normally are performed by CA functional teams. In the event that appropriate CA teams are not available, the responsible commander may be required to utilize non-CA units and personnel in order to accomplish his civil affairs mission. Such personnel or units should be selected on the basis of training and experience most comparable to that of CA units and personnel.

c. It will be noted that some of the tasks specified as being in the areas of competence of a given functional team will appear to overlap with those of other teams. This overlap is particularly noticeable in the civilian supply function. Clear lines of demarcation between team functions cannot, in many cases, be delineated until the civil affairs operations have commenced, because of the impact of yet unknown situational factors. It is the responsibility of CA unit commanders to establish these lines of demarcation and to coordinate all operational efforts as expeditiously as possible to avoid duplication of effort (app B).

2. Arts, Monuments, and Archives

This function, in its broad aspects, seeks to protect the traditional culture, customs, and arts of an area. Specifically it is concerned with maintenance or establishment of protective measures for cultural property such as important religious edifices, monuments, and movable objects including archeological, historic, scientific and artistic objects, and collections (FM 27-10 and DA Pam 27-1). This function also includes duties and tasks concerned with safeguarding and accounting for archives and official public records. The function may include concern with cultural patterns and respect for local customs and traditions. Specific tasks include—

a. Surveying and preparing lists of—

- (1) Individual objects of fine arts and monuments known or believed to be in the territory, showing their location and the names of persons or organizations having custody thereof.
- (2) Repositories of archives, museums of art, libraries, and collections of archives and objects of fine art showing their locations and caretakers.
- (3) Names of known authorities on fine art and archives without the country.

b. Advising commanders and other staff sections concerning fine arts, monuments, libraries, archives, and records that are or will be uncovered.

c. Preparing and publishing directives and instructions concerning the care and protection of fine art, monuments, libraries, archives, and other objects of historical and cultural value.

d. Locating, identifying, ascertaining ownership, and safeguarding objects of fine art, monuments, libraries, archives, and records.

e. Recommending return of property to rightful owners.

f. Marking protected property with such identifying symbols as may be designated by appropriate authority or international agreement.

g. Establishing a procedure for the processing of enemy archives.

h. Seizing historical records of all branches of the local government.

3. Civil Defense

The civil defense function involves all aspects of supervision, negotiation, direction, advice, liaison, and staff services in establishing or re-establishing and operating civil defense programs in the event of enemy attack or natural disaster in a host country or a U.S. military area of assignment. This function is based on the policies and directives of the host country or the objectives of the United States. The statutes and regulations governing civil defense in the United States provide for—(1) unanticipated or emergency needs for the protection of the safety and health of the people of the area in the event of attack or natural disaster; and (2) for the mobilization and efficient utilization of the resources and facilities in the area to assist and aid the civil defense effort. Specific tasks may include—

a. Study of the organization, capabilities, equipment, and functioning of the existing civil defense agency.

b. Preparation of plans and procedures for military support to the civil defense agency.

c. Maintaining liaison with the civilian government to advise and assist in carrying out civil defense programs.

d. Coordination and integration of civil defense measures with rear area security and damage control plans and supervision over civilian activities in integrated plans.

e. Strengthening the local civil defense capability by assisting or supervising in its establishment or reorganization in order to provide for natural disaster relief, air raid warning, emergency shelter, firefighting, evacuation, demolition and related activity. These measures include—

(1) *Preparatory to attack*—

(a) Establishment of appropriate organizations and operations plans.

(b) Recruitment and training of personnel.

(c) Conduct of research.

(d) Procurement and stockpiling of necessary material.

tems.

(f) Construction or preparation of shelters.

(g) Evacuation of population.

(2) *During attack*—

(a) Enforcement of passive defense regulations.

(b) Evacuation of personnel to shelter areas.

(c) Control of traffic and panic.

(d) Control of electrical communications media.

(3) *Following attack*—

(a) Activities for volunteer agencies such as fire, rescue and emergency squads.

(b) Monitoring for specific hazards of special weapons.

(c) Unexploded bomb reconnaissance.

(d) Essential debris clearance.

(e) Emergency welfare measures.

(f) Immediate essential repair of vital facilities.

4. Civil Information

This function is concerned with the facilities employed to disseminate information to the people; coordinating the operation of public and private communication media; and assisting, aiding, directing or supervising the preparation, distribution and dissemination of necessary information through private and public agencies within the assigned area. To assist in this function, psychological operations personnel may be attached to civil affairs units to support civil affairs operations (FM 33-5). Specific tasks may include—

a. Survey and analysis of available information media.

b. Studies of the facilities employed to disseminate information to the people, the type and extent of the information disseminated, and the degree of its acceptance by the people.

c. Preparation, distribution, and dissemination of information through armed forces radio stations and civilian information media.

d. Coordination of civil information activities.

e. Recommendation of procedures for and supervision of civilian information media, including review and censorship of material to be disseminated.

f. Removal of those civilian personnel engaged in the operation of information media who are

(e) Provisions for adequate warning sys-

inimical to the United States, or not in sympathy with its policies and objectives.

g. Recommendations regarding measures for protection of physical facilities of information media; e.g., newspaper plants and radio stations.

h. Requisition, protection, and issuance of supplies including newsprint, ink, and radio parts.

i. Utilization of key civilians as soon as possible, after screening and authorization by host government or U.S. authorities.

j. Impounding all documents, supplies, manuscripts, films, radio recordings, reference libraries, and similar stocks of raw or processed material pertaining to the operation of the information media.

k. Conducting, with assistance of attached PSYOP personnel, analysis and research in psychological activities and submitting reports of findings on public opinion and morale in the area of operation.

5. Civilian Supply

Civilian supply involves the mobilization and use of resources of the civilian economy, within the bounds of national policy, international agreements and international law, in support of U.S. military forces; the satisfaction of essential civilian needs from civilian sources, and the supplementing of civilian needs from military supply sources, as required. This function includes the acts and processes needed to determine requirements and arrange for procurement and distribution of supplies to the civilian economy. It also includes responsibility for providing and distributing food and supplies for disaster relief, and for the administration of food and supplies made available from local resources, the armed forces of the host country or the United States. The team will analyze and compute the needs for supplies and equipment of all types, including those essential to maintain the civilian economy in a state of productive efficiency. The principal sources of civilian supplies are—reallocation of supplies from the local economy; captured enemy stocks; contributions from national and international welfare and charitable organizations; and contributions from local, allied or U.S. military stocks or resources in the area. Types of supplies that may be approved for issue from U.S. military stocks consist principally of food, tentage, clothing, engineer equipment (to insure operation of essential utilities), communications

equipment, medical supplies, transportation equipment, fuel and lubricants. Specific tasks may include—

a. Planning activities on the basis of strategic-logistic studies.

b. Planning for distribution of supplies based on surveys of standards of living, including health and dietary factors.

c. Reviewing agricultural and industrial patterns of the area to determine the effects of administrative policies on civilian supplies.

d. Estimating adequacy of available civilian supplies.

e. Making recommendations as to movements of essential civilian supplies, particularly food and fuel, from surplus to deficit areas.

f. Recommending supplies which should be made available from military sources and allocations to be made of such supplies.

g. Making recommendations as to supplies available for military use from civilian sources in accordance with international law.

h. Negotiating with civilians to obtain support for military units.

i. Purchasing, requisitioning, or otherwise acquiring, warehousing, and accomplishing distribution of civilian supplies in accordance with established policies and applicable requirements of law.

j. Analyzing the organization of collecting and distributing agencies handling essential supplies.

k. Establishing and maintaining civilian supply records.

l. Insuring coordination of transportation facilities for the distribution of civilian supplies.

m. Conducting liaison with supply agencies to insure that military supplies are provided for civilian use as approved by the commander.

n. Insuring adequate safeguarding of essential civilian supplies.

o. Preparing procedures and programs for the transition from military civil affairs to civilian operation of civilian supply in the area.

p. Insuring that necessary organic military transportation for movement of supplies is made available when local transportation is inadequate.

q. Planning and supervision of food rationing or controlled distribution.

6. Displaced Persons

This function involves the processing and control of displaced persons, refugees, and evacuees. The functional team assists or supervises the establishment, administration and operation of camps; and assists in or directs the repatriation, resettlement, or movement of these people within the assigned area. Consideration must be given during the course of military operations to the deliberate movement by the enemy of refugees, evacuees, and displaced persons into friendly areas of operations. Failure to control the movement of such persons may seriously interfere with the accomplishment of the tactical mission. Specific tasks include—

a. Survey and analysis to determine—

- (1) Estimated numbers of displaced persons, refugees, and evacuees together with routes of movement to selected assembly points.
- (2) Languages, customs, and attitudes of the people concerned.
- (3) Adequacy of facilities and local supplies in the area in which such persons will be found.
- (4) Attitudes and policies of the governments of the native countries toward such persons.
- (5) Acceptability of such persons as immigrants to other nations.

b. Preparation of plans for control and supervision of the welfare of refugees, displaced persons, and evacuees (movement, housing, feeding, medical service, and administrative processing).

c. Maintenance of liaison with appropriate agencies regarding plans to repatriate, resettle, or move displaced persons and refugees.

d. Planning for the orderly and secure withdrawal to places of safety of leaders and certain key personnel in the event of a retrograde movement.

e. Operation and administration of camps and planning for required construction.

f. Requisition and issuance of supplies for support of camps.

7. Economics and Commerce

This function is concerned with aiding, assisting and coordinating economic agencies, both public and private. It will include determining the location, type and availability of natural resources; developing plans for preservation, rehabilitation,

or restoration of the local economy; supervising or assisting in the operation of commercial and industrial activities; establishing or reestablishing foreign trade to bolster civilian production and the economy; and recommending or directing the rationing and control of prices of critical commodities that are essential to the people within the area. Specific tasks include—

a. Survey of commercial and industrial activity to determine the availability of local resources for military use; means for the development and use of natural resources to include location, type, and availability; means of production and distribution considered essential for military or civilian use in accordance with policy directives; requirements for machinery, raw materials, and supplies from other than local sources; and legal provisions applicable to economic matters, and to public and private agencies and institutions concerned with economic activities.

b. Preparation of recommendations and initiation actions based on these surveys.

c. Compilation and analysis of statistics on domestic and foreign trade.

d. Recommendations for safeguarding materials, equipment, and facilities.

e. Information and advice to local business and commercial institutions concerning policies of the military commander.

f. Examination of price control and rationing measures instituted by the existing government to determine their extent and effectiveness, and the necessity for additional measures.

g. Development of economic measures to include—

- (1) Preparation of requirements for materials to be diverted to military use in accordance with policy and guidance published by higher headquarters and applicable requirements of law (FM 27-10 and DA Pam 27-1).
- (2) Determination of specific types of business enterprises including brokerage houses, exchanges, and banks to be opened or closed, taking into account policies of higher headquarters and applicable provisions of law.
- (3) Recommendations on allocation of resources between military and civilian needs and between areas, industries, and plants.

h. Implementation of economic measures to include—

- (1) Provisions of bonuses, subsidies, and price adjustments to encourage production and movement of required goods and materials.
- (2) Economic stabilization measures to include measures to insure production of desired products.
- (3) Restrictions on exports and imports to include measures to prevent exportation of supplies needed in the area, and procedures to control and allocate imported supplies to uses which will further U.S. objectives.
- (4) Supervision of commercial and industrial activities including foreign trade.
- (5) Supervision of natural resources extraction.
- (6) Planning the importation of supplies which will decrease dependency on U.S. military resources.
- (7) Supervision of policies and officials in price control and rationing to include prohibition of the purchase of controlled items from troops by civilians, and determination and enforcement of measures for the control of rent and rationing of dwelling space and other scarce real estate.
- (8) Recommending or supervising the preparation of plans for the establishment or reestablishment and rehabilitation of local commercial activity and industrial production.

8. Food and Agriculture

This function applies to civilian production, processing, storage and distribution of foods to reduce the importation of food for military and civilian consumption. It includes estimating requirements, stimulating production and processing of needed foods; improving or directing farming methods; and recommending plans for utilization and conservation of land, forests, and marine food resources within the area of operation. Specific tasks include—

a. Surveys of agricultural production, farming methods, conservation of lands and forests, food storage, marine food resources, and food processing.

b. Surveys to determine the location of food surplus and deficit areas.

c. Estimate of food requirements, agricultural production, and probable deficit during the period of operations.

d. Estimate of requirements for food, fertilizer, and farm machinery from other areas of military sources.

e. Recommendations for safeguarding supplies and equipment.

f. Recommendations on degree of control of all governmental food and agriculture offices.

g. Measures to encourage earliest possible resumption of agricultural production.

h. Recommendations as to restrictions on circulation and transportation of nonessential supplies to permit distribution and movement of required agricultural supplies and equipment.

i. Recommendations as to measures to avoid repositioning the labor of farmers during critical periods, e.g., seeding and harvesting times.

j. Recommendations for obtaining capacity production.

9. Labor

This function is concerned with assistance to, liaison and coordination with and, in appropriate cases, supervision, control, or operation of governmental and private agencies and institutions concerned with labor. In addition to activities in the labor field directed primarily to the local economy, this function includes arrangements to provide labor needs of the military forces in accordance with policies established by higher authorities and applicable provisions of law. Procurement of labor, training, relocation, housing, safety standards, policies respecting wages and hours, unemployment subsidies, compensation for injuries and the like, may be governed by an applicable civil affairs agreement. Civil affairs operations in the labor field are subject to the provisions of the Hague Regulations and the 1949 Geneva Conventions, particularly the Civilian and POW Conventions. This will pose special problems for civil affairs officers (FM 27-10). Also provisions of U.S. law and of local law relating to labor may be applicable. Specific tasks include—

a. Plans for use of labor.

b. Determination of labor availability and procedures for procurement of labor for authorized types of work.

c. Review of applicable laws and policies respecting labor and review of status, operation, and effectiveness of local agencies, institutions, and organizations concerned with labor matters.

d. Analysis of labor relations including studies of labor organizations and labor relations between employers and employees.

e. Coordination with governmental labor procurement agencies.

f. Recommendations as to priority of utilization of labor in rehabilitation of the economy.

g. Recommendations concerning utilization of civilian labor to include—

(1) Wage controls, pay scales, and schedules of hours of work.

(2) Labor relations including medical care and compensation.

(3) Payment of wages.

h. Recommendations as to changes in pertinent labor laws, regulations, policies, and practices.

i. Recommendations as to procedures to be followed, if there is evidence of enemy infiltration in the labor market, unions or governmental organizations or agencies.

10. Property Control

This function serves to protect property within established limits and to preserve negotiable assets and resources. It is based on a uniform and orderly system for the custody and control of property. Specific tasks include—

a. Maintenance of registers for supplies and property transferred from civilian sources to military units.

b. Formulation of policy guidance for the utilization and safeguarding of property.

c. Review of types or classes of property to be taken into custody and analysis of civil laws pertaining to such property.

d. Preparation of schedules of property to be placed under military controls as determined by policy directives, including—

(1) Property owned by enemy governments or nationals of those governments.

(2) Property of allied governments over which temporary control will be assumed.

(3) Private property susceptible to military use.

e. Protection of all records of title, transfers, and other property transactions.

f. Review of evidence available to determine ownership.

11. Public Administration

This function is concerned with the structure and conduct of government. It encompasses methods of establishing or assisting legislative and executive agencies from national to local levels and the processes of these agencies in the administration of civil government. Included are such considerations as political parties, eligibility for franchise, elections, tenure, and all other aspects of the development and operation of the apparatus of government. Specific duties include—

a. Surveying governmental organization at all levels.

b. Surveying lines of authority and influence having impact on political matters.

c. Analyzing effectiveness of existing agencies of government or social control.

d. Analyzing effectiveness of governmental officials and employees and of other community leaders.

e. Negotiating to gain support or cooperation for U.S. forces.

f. Participating in joint commissions, committees, or councils concerned with governmental affairs.

g. Removing persons who are inimical to the United States or who are not in sympathy with its policies and objectives, and securing the appointment of leaders who will further desired programs.

h. Recommending organization, functioning, staffing, and authority of agencies of government or social control.

i. Advising, conducting liaison with, supervising, controlling, or replacing organs of government.

j. Advising on legislation or recommending policy changes based on the analysis of the society and the economy of the area.

12. Public Communications

This function is concerned with the supervision of the postal services and of those civil communication facilities not under the direct military control of the signal officer. It is also concerned with the regulatory organizations, civilian technical specialists, communication parts and materials and all international and civil affairs agreements

and directives relative to communications. Specific tasks include—

a. Analysis of the location, functions, means, and techniques of communication facilities and postal services existing in the territory.

b. Study of the organization and administration of civilian communications. For example, postal services are often organized and administered in conjunction with telephone and telegraph services.

c. Review of existing international agreements relative to communications.

d. Analysis of requirements for communication parts and material and determination as to whether such requirements can be supplied locally or whether other sources must be utilized.

e. Study of requirements for and availability of civilian technical specialists.

f. Recommendations as to measures for protection of essential communication facilities.

g. Recommendations as to the extent communication facilities should be controlled, supervised, or operated by the technical services, the CA organization, or other units.

h. Recommendations, in accordance with policy directives, as to the allocation of communication facilities between military and civilian use and determination of alternate means of communications available to support the local administration in the event facilities are required for military use.

i. Assistance, control, supervision, or operation in accordance with established policies of civil communications facilities and postal services.

j. Requisitions, in accordance with policy directives, of military supplies and equipment for rehabilitation and operation of communications facilities.

k. Supervision of return to civilian control of facilities no longer required for military use.

13. Public Education

This function is concerned with the supervision of or assistance to educational programs and institutions and public libraries. Specific tasks include—

a. Survey and analysis of school facilities, applicable laws, courses of study, procedures for training and selection of teachers, and textbooks.

b. Recommendations for changes necessary to comply with U.S. national policy, e.g., screening teachers or changing textbooks.

c. Determination and enforcement of restrictions on the utilization of school facilities, e.g. prohibition of billeting in school buildings when other facilities are available.

d. Supervision of administration, safeguarding of records, and conduct of inspections of schools.

e. Requisition and issue of materials and supplies for use in schools.

f. Removal of civilian personnel engaged in public education who are inimical to the United States or are not in sympathy with its policies and objectives.

g. Preparation of plans and procedures for the repair of damaged school facilities on a priority basis.

h. Assistance to, or supervision of, any new or revised educational programs.

14. Public Finance

This function includes control, supervision, and audit of fiscal resources; budget practices, taxation, expenditures of public funds, currency issues, and the banking agencies and affiliates. It is essential that the function be performed in an integrated and uniform manner within each national area. Specific tasks include—

a. Analysis of taxation systems and other sources of revenue, governmental expenditures, and estimates of adequacy of public funds for performance of governmental functions.

b. Review of public laws and agencies regulating banking and financing.

c. Analysis of financial structures including types and conditions of financial institutions.

d. Analysis of types and amounts of circulating currencies, acceptance by population of such currencies, and current foreign exchange rates.

e. Recommendations as to provisions for military currency.

f. Recommendations as to establishment of currency exchange rates.

g. Establishment and enforcement of restrictions on exportation of U.S. currency.

h. Recommendations for advances of funds to governmental or private financial institutions.

i. Recommendations for protection of public and private financial institutions and safeguarding funds, securities, and financial records.

j. Recommendations as to designation of type of circulating local currency.

k. Recommendations for control of foreign exchange.

- l. Establishment of controls over budget, taxation, expenditures, and public funds and determination of appropriate fiscal accounting procedures.
- m. Reestablishment or revision of taxation systems in accordance with policy directives.
- n. Liquidation, reorganization, opening, or closing of banks.
- o. Supervision over credit and provisions for credit needs.
- p. Regulation or supervision of governmental fiscal agencies, banks, credit cooperatives, and other financial institutions.
- q. Recommendations as to emergency declaration of debt suspensions for specific types of debts.

15. Public Health

This function is concerned with measures to preserve or restore the state of public health and to protect the health of military forces. The Geneva Civilian Convention of 1949 provides that belligerents must protect the wounded, sick, aged, children, and expectant mothers from the effects of war. This Convention also provides that civilian hospitals and medical transportation facilities are entitled to the same protection from attack as is provided for military medical units and facilities. Specific tasks include—

- a. Analysis of organization and functions of public health and sanitation agencies.
- b. Survey of adequacy of medical, paramedical, and auxiliary personnel; and medical, and sanitation facilities.
- c. Preparation of estimates of requirements for additional medical personnel, medical supplies, and materials required to maintain facilities.
- d. Provisions for the prevention, control, and treatment of endemic and epidemic diseases.
- e. Recommendations for safeguarding supplies and facilities.
- f. Arrangements for the treatment of sick and wounded civilians, including provisions for medical assistance by military units when required.
- g. Plans and recommendations for rehabilitation or reconstruction of hospitals and other civilian medical facilities.
- h. Plans for and conducts nutritional surveys to assure the proper feeding of the civilian populace, including determination of caloric requirements for specific categories of the population such as heavy workers, children, and nursing mothers.
- i. Plans for and establishes sanitary regulations pertaining to food and food handling, including

regular inspections by veterinarians of sources of food supplies.

- j. Measures for the restoration and protection of food and water supplies.
- k. Measures for the disposal of sewage and waste.
- l. Promulgation of local orders directing that civilians observe medical and sanitary measures.
- m. Supervision of civilian public health officials in the enforcement of public health laws and the performance of public health services.
- n. Retention, removal, or appointment of public health officials.
- o. Requisitions pursuant to established policy and issuance to civilian medical facilities and sanitation agencies of military medical and sanitary supplies.
- p. Collection and burial of civilian and animal dead and maintenance of necessary records.
- q. Supervision, restoration, and maintenance of public health facilities and records.
- r. Rehabilitation or establishment, if practicable, of industries concerned with the production of antibiotics, immunization agents and medical supplies and equipment.

16. Public Safety

This function includes advising and assisting, or controlling and supervising, the local civilian officials in the creation, maintenance, or reestablishment of public order and safety in the area. It involves the police, firefighting and correctional institutions. Specific tasks include—

- a. Examination of the customary method of announcing regulations to the people; and of those law enforcement methods having traditional respect among the civilian population.
- b. Study of the organization, capabilities, equipment, functioning and political orientation of existing law and order agencies, confinement facilities, and firefighting agencies.
- c. Analysis of the character of the population with respect to orderliness and obedience to law.
- d. Coordination with counterintelligence elements in the prevention and detection of espionage, sabotage, subversion, and civilian aid to guerrilla activities.
- e. Preparation of plans, procedures, and recommendations for maintaining or restoring law and order.
- f. Supervision of those civilian agencies which enforce law and maintain order with particular

attention to looting; rioting; control of liquor and narcotics; collection and disposition of weapons, explosives, and implements of war in the hands of civilians; and the enforcement of regulatory and other measures of the occupant.

g. Assurance of proper notification to the populace of proclamations and notices.

h. Enforcement of orders relating to security control of the civil population, including, as necessary, establishment and operation of a pass system; registration of individuals; checkpoints; curfews; communications; control of assembly; and arrest of wanted persons.

i. Supervision of administration of jails and prisons.

j. Requisition and issuance of required police and fire department equipment in accordance with approved policies.

k. Activities regarding impounding or safeguarding supplies, materials, equipment, buildings, or areas as may be required for any civil affairs function or activity.

l. Determination in coordination with intelligence agencies of suitability of government employees and public officials.

m. Advising or supervising the establishment or reorganization of the local police, firefighting, penal and similar institutions.

17. Public Transportation

This function is concerned with supervising those transportation facilities which remain under, or are transferred to, the civil government or private operators. The railways, highways, airways, and waterways form the system of public transportation, and this system must serve the armed forces as well as the civilian economy of a country. Specific tasks include—

a. Survey of the organization, routes, and capacities of the transportation system including extent of damage and requirements for restoration.

b. Analysis of the organization, powers, and functions of regulatory agencies.

c. Recommendations as to the desirable extent of operation of the civilian transportation system by the military agencies.

d. Determination of requirements of civilian transportation system for labor, technical, engineer or other assistance, replacement parts, and fuel.

e. Recommendations as to the allocation of transportation facilities for civilian or military

use and coordination of such recommendations with the appropriate military agencies.

f. Arrangements for police protection of essential transportation facilities and installations.

g. Requisitions, in accordance with policy directives, of military supplies, fuel, and materials for use in rehabilitating and operating transportation facilities.

h. Supervision over facilities released from military to civilian control.

i. Insuring that all important records and files belonging to public transport organizations, agencies and officials are safeguarded until adequate examination and disposition of such can be made.

18. Public Welfare

This function is concerned with emergency and continuing relief measures essential to public order and welfare. It includes assistance or control and supervision and coordination of relief activities and welfare measures; and assistance to or supervision and control of public and private welfare institutions. Included are public and private institutions for the care of children, the aged and handicapped, and miscellaneous charitable and relief organizations. Specific tasks include—

a. Analysis of public and private welfare institutions and applicable public law.

b. Estimate of requirements for public welfare activities.

c. Recommendations for military assistance in public welfare activities.

d. Recommendations for safeguarding appropriate establishments.

e. Estimation of requirements, requisitions according to established policy, and supervision of distribution of relief supplies from military sources.

f. Supervision of administration of public welfare laws and the regulation of public and private charitable institutions.

g. Supervision over voluntary agencies and contributions from such sources.

h. Supervision of emergency shelter and feeding centers for indigenous civilians.

19. Public Works and Utilities

This function is concerned with supervision and operation, where required, of such facilities as buildings and dams; water, gas, waste disposal, electrical, and other similar systems; and restoration or introduction of such services. Specific tasks include—

a. Survey of the organization and capabilities of key installations including extent of damage.

b. Analysis of the organization, functions, and authority of regulatory agencies.

c. Recommendations as to the desired extent of operation of civilian facilities by military agencies.

d. Recommendations regarding police protection of essential facilities.

e. Determination of requirements of public utilities for labor, technical assistance, replacement parts, and fuel.

f. Recommendations as to the allocation of public utilities for civilian and military use.

g. Requisitions of military supplies and materials to aid in rehabilitating public works and utilities.

h. Supervision of civilian public utilities.

i. Acquisition of essential public utilities services from military sources.

20. Religious Relations

This functional team assesses the civil affairs significance of the religions and cultures of the assigned area and analyzes religious and cultural factors affecting social-religious problems bearing on the various functional areas of operation of the civil affairs mission. Specific tasks include—

a. Conducting studies on religious practices, structures, physical symbols and devices, hierarchies, and major personalities.

b. Developing codes of behavior and educating troops to reduce possibilities of offensive acts contrary to local religious customs and practices.

c. Analyzing, evaluating, and recommending solutions to potential religious-cultural problem areas.

d. Maintaining liaison with missionaries and local clergy in the area of operations.

e. Maintaining liaison with leaders of civilian religious groups to include, where appropriate, assistance to and participation in charitable endeavors.

f. Encouraging religious freedom except where the beliefs or practices pose a security threat to U.S. forces or endanger the lives of participants.

g. Developing areas of compromise and arbitration to lessen friction and hostility between opposing religious groups.

h. Determining restrictions on the use of religious facilities. Military utilization of religious

buildings, shrines, and consecrated places for purposes other than religious is limited to use as emergency aid stations or medical installations; or for the housing of wounded personnel awaiting evacuation.

i. Seeking methods of effecting compromise between dietary habits, based on religious beliefs, and the production and distribution of foodstuffs.

21. Tribunals

This function is concerned with the legal system of the area and the application of international law in civil affairs operations. Specific tasks include—

a. Supporting the work of the unit judge advocate and in his absence performing his assigned duties.

b. Reviewing the local organization of the bar and determining the reliability of its members.

c. Establishing necessary civil affairs tribunals and other judicial and administrative agencies, including determination of their number, types, jurisdiction, procedures, and delegation of appointing authority.

d. The closing or reopening of local tribunals, including courts, boards, and commissions; determining their jurisdiction, organization, and procedure.

e. Recommending the suspension or abrogation of laws and procedural rules applicable to local courts.

f. Making recommendations concerning the alteration, suspension, or promulgation of laws to include civil legislation. (It may be necessary to deny enforcement effect to local legislation or to adopt new laws essential to the control of the area in question and the protection of U.S. forces. Such legislation must conform to applicable provisions of U.S. law and international law as, for example, the 1949 Geneva Conventions.)

g. Supervising the administration of civil and criminal laws by local officials.

h. Providing members for military government courts.

i. Reviewing or administratively examining cases tried in military government courts before referral to higher headquarters for final review.

j. Establishing a system of regular review of the legal aspects of the administration of prison institutions and the procedures for commitment.

APPENDIX D

G5 COORDINATION WITH OTHER STAFF MEMBERS

1. General

FM 101-5 sets forth the general doctrine of internal staff coordination. This appendix lists those matters of particular importance to the civil affairs staff officer in non-CA units which, in some units, are performed by other staff sections but which are of mutual concern. For the purposes of this appendix a support command staff organization is used but the doctrinal principles set forth are equally applicable to any coordinating staff organization.

2. Assistant Chief of Staff, Personnel

a. Personnel strengths in planning requirements for civil affairs operations.

b. Replacements for CA staff personnel.

c. Availability of indigenous supplies for feeding and clothing civilian internees, and the availability of facilities or materials for use in construction of cages and camps.

d. Availability of civilian labor within the local economy, including skills, categories, and numbers of civilian personnel and payment scales in line with the local economy, and employment agreements.

e. Information relative to the availability of suitable indigenous facilities for rest and leave centers.

f. Plans for military assistance to the civilian populace on graves registration matters, for use of civilian labor in U.S. graves registration activities, and the availability of land for use as cemeteries.

g. Reports from local authorities concerning the conduct of military personnel in the civilian communities.

h. Removal and relocation of civilians from selected command post areas, and the use of civilian facilities for headquarters.

i. Recommendations for command directives concerning the conduct of military personnel in relations with the civilian populace.

j. Safety management planning, safety matters pertaining to CA units, and the civilian population.

k. Information and assistance in the control and movement of displaced persons and refugees and maintenance of law and order in local communities.

l. Business establishments to be placed off limits to military personnel.

m. Liaison for procurement of civilian medical facilities for military use.

n. Requirements for military assistance for evacuation and/or hospitalization of civilians.

3. Assistant Chief of Staff, Security, Plans and Operations

a. Assistance, such as guides, from local population for reconnaissance units.

b. Intelligence information collected from the local population to include line crossers, refugees, and displaced persons.

c. Evaluation of civil aspects of potential targets.

d. The use of local agencies for guarding acquired technical enemy material for intelligence purposes.

e. Plans for technical intelligence targets.

f. Intelligence information pertaining to the population, its government, economy, and institutions.

g. Counterintelligence activities of civil affairs elements including civil security, censorship, control of travel, and location of collaborators.

h. Advice and assistance on military training required by STANAG 2057 (app L).

i. Advice on the impact of plans on civil affairs activities, as well as effect of the civilian situation on plans, and of restrictions or limitations imposed by agreements or law.

j. The availability and capability of CA units to support plans.

k. The priority of movement of CA units.

l. Civil Affairs Annex to Operations Plan.

4. Assistant Chief of Staff, Services

a. Liaison with civil procurement agencies, locating equipment and labor required for military use, and reporting the availability based on a determination of civilian needs.

b. Advice and assistance to purchasing and contracting officers in making arrangements for local procurement.

c. Requirements for military transportation for civilian needs.

d. Information on availability of civilian transportation for military use.

e. Estimated impact of civilian traffic on highway regulation and traffic control and of military traffic on civilian usage.

f. Measures to control civilian traffic, including use of vehicles, routes to be used, and issuance of permits.

g. Dissemination and enforcement of those portions of the highway regulation and traffic control plans which are applicable to civilian traffic.

h. Liaison with civil agencies to insure coordination of military and civilian highway regulation and traffic control.

i. Requirements for special type service units for civilian support.

j. Capability and availability of civil agencies to provide construction equipment, materiel, and/or personnel.

k. Availability of indigenous utilities for military use.

l. Liaison with civil agencies for procurement for utilities.

m. Information on the availability of real estate, assistance in locating desired real estate, and liaison with civil agencies for procurement of real estate.

n. Information on availability of indigenous communications, equipment, and facilities for military use.

5. Assistant Chief of Staff, Supply

a. Consolidated requirements for civilian sup-

plies to be furnished from military stocks or requisitioned from U.S. stocks.

b. Location of civilian supplies required for military use and reporting of availability based on a determination of civilian needs.

c. Plans for the distribution of supplies to civilians.

d. Requirements for food and medical supplies for emergency civilian support.

e. Requirements for insecticides, repellents, and rodenticides for protection of the health of the civil population.

f. Disposition of captured enemy supplies which are adaptable to civilian use.

g. Availability of salvage clothing and other supplies for civilian use.

h. Civil affairs paragraph and annexes for administrative orders.

6. Assistant Chief of Staff, Maintenance

a. Information on the capability and availability of the local economy to provide maintenance facilities, equipment, and personnel for military use.

b. Liaison with civil agencies on maintenance support for military units.

7. Surgeon

a. Information on the availability of civilian facilities for evacuation and hospitalization of military personnel.

b. Information on the availability of civilian medical supplies for military use.

c. Requirements for military medical support for the civil populace.

8. Chaplain

a. Religious support to the civil populace.

b. Information on the availability of civilian religious edifices and consecrated areas for military religious services.

9. Staff Judge Advocate

a. Policies relating to liaison with civilian law enforcement and judicial agencies.

b. Provision of claims services for civilian claimants.

c. International law matters, both customary and conventional; e.g., The Hague Regulations, The Geneva Conventions of 1949, Status of Forces Agreements, and the applicability of U.S. laws in foreign countries.

- d. Procurement law matters.
- e. Disposition of offenses against the civil populace.
- f. Establishment of civil affairs tribunals and other judicial and administrative agencies. The closure or reopening of local tribunals, including courts, boards, and commissions; their jurisdiction, organization and procedure; and the classes of cases triable by them.

10. Provost Marshal/Military Police

- a. Enforcement of laws, orders, and regulations.
- b. Control of vehicular traffic, to include measures which expedite priority movements, prevent

- interference, avoid congestion, and provide for maximum utilization of available road space.
- c. Control of circulation of individuals.
- d. Protection of personnel and property.
- e. Prevention and suppression of pilferage and looting.
- f. Security of, and escort for, designated individuals.
- g. Prevention and suppression of crime through investigative effort.
- h. Surveillance in support of anti-airborne and counter-guerrilla operation and other designated rear area security and area damage control support activities.
- i. Coordination and liaison with indigenous police.

APPENDIX E

CA COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

1. The commander's decision is influenced by the political, economic, and sociological characteristics of the area of operations in addition to other considerations. A civil affairs estimate, accordingly, assists the commander in reaching a decision by evaluating for him political, economic, and sociological conditions and weighing the effects of these conditions on differing courses of action.

2. FM 101-5 contains detailed information on preparation of estimates of the situation and a form and example of a CA staff estimate for use as guides. The form of CA estimate in FM 101-5 is particularly suited for use by the G5 or S5 staff officer of a tactical or administrative command. The form contained in this appendix is designed primarily for the CA unit commander. In the analysis and comparison of appropriate CA actions, the various functional specialties are grouped in such a manner as best to facilitate their considerations.

3. The remainder of this appendix shows a sample form or format for an estimate of the situation suitable for use by the commander of a CA area headquarters, brigade, group, battalion, or company. This guide for preparation of an estimate is a modification of the basic form contained in FM 101-5; and presents a logical and orderly method for examination of the factors affecting the accomplishment of the mission to determine the most suitable course of action for the unit as a whole. The basic form for the commander's estimate is arranged to insure investigation of all pertinent factors. When time permits, a complete written estimate may be made. When time does not permit, as is usual in smaller units, the form may be used as a checklist to insure consideration of all factors essential for a decision.

4. Form for CA Unit Commander's Estimate of the Situation

(CLASSIFICATION)

Unit or Area
Place
Date and Time

COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

Map or chart references: (As necessary for understanding of the estimate.)

1. Mission

A concise statement of the task and its purpose. The overall politico-military mission is the controlling factor of the estimate. If the civil affairs mission is multiple, determine priorities. If there are immediate tasks, prescribed or

(CLASSIFICATION)

(CLASSIFICATION)

deduced, necessary to the accomplishment of the mission, such tasks should be listed in this paragraph. Guidance from the G5 of the supported command or in the absence of such guidance the analysis of the CA unit commander, will determine which of the seven major civil affairs activities will have command priority of effort.

2. The Situation and Considerations

a. Determine and analyze those factors which will influence your choice of a course of action as well as those which affect the capabilities of the enemy to act adversely. Consider such of the following and other factors as are involved:

(1) Characteristics of the area of operations including its physical features, climate, and basic political, economic, and psychological factors. Consider also the following specific points:

(a) Attitudes of the population—whether cooperative or uncooperative.

(b) Availability of local material and personnel to support civil affairs operations.

(c) Number of refugees, evacuees, and displaced persons in the area.

(d) Amount and type of war damage suffered by the economy, particularly in the transportation, public utility, and communication fields.

(e) Status and character of civil government.

(f) State of health of the civilian populace.

(2) Enemy strength and disposition. Note all enemy capabilities which could possibly affect the accomplishment of your mission and estimate the relative probability of their adoption. These capabilities may include the following:

(a) Relative enemy strengths and combat capabilities, to include special attention to unconventional weapons and the possibility of their employment.

(b) Sabotage—include all capabilities for military, political, and economic sabotage possible of execution by agents, guerrillas, and partisans.

(c) Espionage—include all methods for which the enemy is known or estimated to be capable, together with the extent of such activity.

(d) Subversion—include all types of propaganda, treason, disaffection, sedition, and similar acts affecting friendly troops and local civilians.

(e) Movement by the enemy of refugees, evacuees, and displaced persons into the area.

(f) Passive resistance, such as refusal to serve in required capacities.

(3) Civil affairs situation and nature of operations to be supported. Review general policy guidance from higher headquarters and consider pertinent terms of relevant civil affairs agreement or rules and conventions of international law. Other factors to be considered include:

(a) Review of current problems faced by the supported command.

(b) Estimate the impact of future plans of the supported operation pertinent to your mission.

(CLASSIFICATION)

(CLASSIFICATION)

(c) Determine the availability of military or civilian relief supplies for diversion to the civilian populations.

b. Assumptions. Matters which are assumed, but not known, to be valid for the purpose of your estimate.

c. Special Factors. Items not covered by any of the above categories which require special recognition and treatment in your estimate, such as the possible employment of mass destruction weapons by the enemy and the effect of such employment on your mission.

d. Own courses of action.

(1) Note all practicable courses of action open to you which, if successful, will accomplish your mission.

(2) Priority will be given to that major civil affairs activity which most directly relates to your mission. One of the following major civil affairs activities will have that priority:

(a) Provision of civilian support for and prevention of civilian interference with tactical and logistical operations.

(b) Providing and supporting the functions of government for a civilian population.

(c) Community relations.

(d) Military civic action.

(e) Military participation in a population and resources control program.

(f) Military support of civil defense.

(g) Consolidation psychological operations. Normally, consolidation psychological operations will always be in support of the other six activities and it, too, will be geared to provide maximum support to the priority activity.

(3) The work of the functional teams assigned or attached to the unit will be designed to support command priority. The following checklist will serve as a reminder of the various specific activities for which you may be required to exercise control or supervision:

(a) Governmental

1. Civil Defense

2. Labor

3. Public Administration

4. Public Education

5. Public Finance

6. Public Health

7. Public Safety

8. Public Welfare

9. Tribunals

(b) Economic

1. Civilian Supply

2. Economics and Commerce

3. Food and Agriculture

4. Property Control

(CLASSIFICATION)

(CLASSIFICATION)

(c) Public Facilities

1. Public Communications
2. Public Transportation
3. Public Works and Utilities

(d) Special

1. Arts, Monuments, and Archives
2. Civil Information
3. DP's, Refugees, and Evacuees
4. Religious Relations

3. Analysis of Opposing Courses of Action

Determine the probable effect of each significant difficulty on the success of each of your own courses of action. At this stage of estimate, eliminate those difficulties which have little or no effect on your selection of a course of action. A difficulty will not influence your choice of a course of action if it affects all alternatives equally.

4. Comparison of Own Courses of Action

Weigh the advantages and disadvantages of each of your own courses of action (in the light of the governing factors of the situation) and decide which course of action promises to be the most successful in accomplishing your mission. In arriving at a decision, the commander may assign particular weight to one or more of the factors listed in paragraph 2 and may consider additional factors such as those policy decisions affecting the conduct of civil affairs under special political situations.

5. Decisions, Conclusion, or Recommendations.

Translate the course of action selected into a concise statement of what the unit as a whole is to do, and so much of the elements of who, when, where, how and why, as may be appropriate.

/s/ _____
COMMANDER

(CLASSIFICATION)

NOTES

1. The estimate may be a thorough, complete, written document or it may be a brief mental evaluation. In preparing his estimate the CA unit commander will normally rely on his staff for evaluation and recommendations pertaining to their principal fields of interest. (See FM 101-5.)

2. The commander's decision is not confined to the statement of decision made in paragraph 5 of the estimate but may include additional implementing instructions, supplementary decisions, admonitions, or warnings to clarify his intent or furnish guidance to his staff or subordinate commanders.

APPENDIX F

CA INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PLAN

1. General

a. Civil affairs intelligence requirements are discussed in detail in chapter 4 of this manual. This appendix is intended for guidance to and use by CA units in preparing their intelligence collection plan. Non-CA units may incorporate the matters listed herein in their overall unit intelligence collection plans, as required.

b. Civil Affairs Essential Elements of Information (EEI) might include, for example, the following items:

(1) What is the attitude of the populace toward its own government? the hostile force? civil affairs activities?

(2) Do migrating populations constitute a problem? What are the social and political effects of such movement?

(3) What is the influence of political parties upon the populace of the area? How is it exer-

cised? Relative strength of various parties? What is the platform? Who are the leaders? What social and economic groups support each party?

(4) What economic problems are serious in the area? What are their causes? What will be their estimated duration?

(5) What is the extent of crime and misdemeanors in the area?

(6) What are the attitudes of educators or leaders of schools and universities? What are they teaching? What are their qualifications, backgrounds, beliefs, and the strength of their followings?

2. Format

A suggested format for the Civil Affairs Intelligence Collection Plan is indicated below. For further details concerning use of a collection plan and worksheet, see FM 30-5.

Format for CA Intelligence Collection Plan

Essential elements of information (EEI)	Analysis of essential elements of information (indications)	Collecting agency or source*	Specific request or orders to agency	When and how to report
What is the extent of crime and misdemeanors in the area?	Number of arrests for commission of law violations over and above what is normal. Type of violation, frequency, against whom committed, and whether increasing or decreasing.	Public Safety Team, Tribunals Team.	Be alert to detect technical compliance with rules, regulations, laws, proclamations, and instructions while attempting to thwart the purpose of the law by evading its scope or retarding its implementation. Priority of collection effort will be given to violations of Populace and Resources Control laws, decrees, and regulations.	Render informal report by telephone or memorandum to designated headquarters when first detected or suspected. Include details in periodic report.

*The collecting agency or source listed in this column is exemplary in nature and indicates only those CA functional teams with the greatest collection capability in the area of interest expressed in the EEI. It is appropriate and will often be necessary to include functional teams with lesser capabilities or with coordinating interest.

APPENDIX G

CIVIC ACTION PROJECTS

→ The following is a list of suggested civic action programs and projects together with an indication of U.S. Army units and personnel having general capabilities to support them.

This list is particularly applicable to IDD situations, but may also be helpful in developing programs for stabilized rear areas and for post-hostility environments.

1. Agriculture and Natural Resources

a. Increase or improve production of animals, grain, or vegetable food products—individuals with farming experience; unit transportation; veterinary personnel.

b. Insect and rodent control—troops or units with land or aerial spraying devices; medical, veterinary, and certain chemical warfare personnel.

c. Transportation of agricultural produce, seeds and fertilizers—units with transport capabilities.

d. Construction of simple irrigation and drainage systems—units with equipment or tools; engineer units; or troop labor.

e. Clearing areas—units with equipment or tools; troop labor.

f. Grading operations—engineer units.

g. Forestry activities such as planting, thinning, and harvesting—individuals with forestry training or experience; troop labor.

h. Setting up and operating sawmills—engineer units.

i. Devising and constructing flood controls—engineer units and troop labor.

j. Reclamation of land and draining of swamps—engineer units and troop labor.

→ *k.* Harvesting of crops—all troop units.

2. Industry and Communication

a. Assessment and development of acceptable sand and gravel resources for road work and general construction—engineer units.

b. Installation, operation, and maintenance of telephone, telegraph, and radio systems—signal units.

c. Construction of housing and buildings—engineers for designing and supervising; troop units for construction.

d. Operating emergency communication centers to serve the civilian populace as well as the military, especially in times of disaster—signal units particularly, and any unit with communications equipment and personnel generally.

3. Transportation

a. Construct, repair, or improve roads and bridges—engineers and troop units with labor or trucks available.

b. Construct, repair or improve railway equipment—transportation, ordnance, and engineer units, and troop units with labor available.

c. Construct, repair, or improve inland waterways, wharves, and harbors—engineer, transportation, and Navy units.

d. Construct, repair, improve, or operate airfields—Air Force, transportation, engineer, army aviation, and troop units with labor available.

e. Removal of individuals from disaster areas—all units with land, sea, or air transportation facilities and a capability for controlling circulation of individuals.

4. Health and Sanitation

a. Improve sanitary standards—medical and engineer units.

b. Set up and operate dispensary units for outpatient treatment or to give first aid—medical units.

c. Devise acceptable methods of disposing of human waste—medical units and engineer units.

d. Provide safe water supply systems—engineer units, medical units, and troop labor.

e. Control malaria and other insect-transmitted diseases—medical units and troop labor.

f. Teach sanitation, personal hygiene, and first aid—medical units and any other military units that train and operate under field conditions.

5. Education

a. Give basic education training (i.e., reading and writing) to military personnel—selected personnel from all military units.

b. Provide technical training to military personnel which will be useful when individuals return to civilian status—all military units, especially technical service units.

c. Provide instructors for schools for basic education to youth and technical training for adults—all military units.

6. Public Administration

a. Provide guidance and assistance to public administrators in fields of organization, personnel selection, work procedures, etc.—civil affairs units and qualified personnel throughout military units.

b. Provide guidance and assistance to public safety administrators in their police, fire protection, and civil defense activities, including disaster relief—civil affairs, military police, and engineer units and personnel.

7. Community Development, Social Welfare, and Housing

a. Preparation of plans, surveying, and construction supervision and assistance for houses and

community buildings such as schools, civic centers, churches, orphanages, medical centers—engineer units, particularly, and all military units generally.

b. Sponsorship of worthy community projects such as orphanages, schools, and medical centers—all military units.

8. Mass Communication

Provide advice and assistance on best methods of informing the people through such devices as publications, films, or broadcasting—CA civil information teams, and public information, intelligence, and psychological operations units.

9. Mapping and Project Surveys

a. Preparation of necessary maps and charts for road and railroad projects, irrigation and land development, and political subdivisions and geographical features—engineer and individuals with the ability in the fields of surveying, geodetics, and charting.

b. Preparation of nautical charts and coastal surveys—Navy units.

10. Paramilitary Forces

Analysis of mission, structure, functioning, equipping, and training of any existing paramilitary organization to determine capability and suitability for civic action tasks—civil affairs units and personnel.

APPENDIX H

CIVILIAN SUPPLY

1. General

a. This appendix is prepared as a guide for personnel charged with responsibilities for the use of civilian resources for the support of military forces, and provision of military supply support for civilian populations and agencies. This information applies primarily to circumstances of limited or general war. In peacetime situations, U.S. military use of civilian resources will be limited in general to normal offshore procurement procedures, and U.S. military support of a civilian populace will be minimal and will conform to international agreement. Civilian supply in IDD situations is discussed in chapter 6.

b. Within an army force, the supply organization is the aggregate of the commands, staffs, units, operations, procedures, control, and management needed to plan and carry out the supply support of military operations and such other activities as may be directed.

c. The CA organization is the aggregate of the CA staffs, units, and activities that contribute to the military mission through support or control of local agencies to prevent civilian interference with military operations. It assists the military commander in the fulfillment of his obligations with respect to the inhabitants, government, and economy of the area, and is a contributive means for the attainment of national objectives beyond the war.

- (1) The CA organization, in support of military operations, distributes to civilian users supplies for the relief of disease, starvation, and alleviation of such unrest as may interfere with the military mission. It locates local supplies, equipment, and labor required for military use; reports their availability based on an assessment of civilian needs; and determines the effect of their use for military pur-

poses on the local economy. This function includes advice and assistance to purchasing and contracting officers and other personnel charged with the local procurement of supplies, real estate, facilities, labor, and services.

- (2) The CA organization maintains liaison with civil authorities; makes recommendations as to supplies which should be made available from military sources; and analyzes the need for supplies and equipment of all types, including essential factors of production necessary to maintain the civilian economy in a state of productive efficiency. It also recommends and provides guidance and advice on the general scope of military assistance with respect to rehabilitation or restoration of the economy, stabilization procedures, and the satisfaction of essential civilian needs through military supply sources. Unless otherwise directed, no economic rehabilitation is undertaken except that which can be accomplished from resources available in the command.

2. Planning

a. General or coordinating staff responsibilities for supply planning are vested, depending upon the type of command, in the section headed by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G4; Assistant Chief of Staff, Supply; Director of Supply and Maintenance; or Director of Supply. In each case, the CA organization provides recommendations and advice on pertinent civil affairs matters as identified in FM 101-5, particularly availability of indigenous resources for support of military operations, and requirements for military support of civilian populations and institutions.

b. Recommendations and advice at headquarters responsible for theater or force-level planning are

influenced by considerations of force mission, international agreements, involvement of other governmental agencies or bodies, policy on rehabilitative measures to be taken with respect to the local economy, and capabilities of allied nations with forces in the area to assist in support operations. It is the responsibility of commanders at all levels to provide information on resources which may be utilized for support of military operations and estimates of requirements for support of civilian populations.

a. Since specific policies vary for each country or area in which operations are conducted, only general factors and considerations can be listed.

(1) *Basic premises.*

- (a) Full use is made of the material resources, facilities, and services of the area for the purpose of supporting the military mission.
- (b) Except in IDD operations and when otherwise directed, provision of military supplies to civil populations is limited to that essential to prevent disease, starvation, or such other causes of unrest as might interfere with military operations.
- (c) In IDD operations, civic action programs normally will require provision of supplies to civilian agencies and the distribution of supplies through military channels.
- (d) The caloric value of rations for civilian consumption normally will be included as part of guidance concerning the extent to which U.S. forces may provide support to the population of a country.

(2) *Additional considerations.*

- (a) Urban areas are largely dependent on outside food sources. Rural areas normally are self-sustaining, and rural populations probably will require little or no emergency food allocations.
- (b) It can be estimated that 10 percent of the population in cities in excess of 100,000 people will require indefinite subsistence and medical supply support. This percentage can be scaled downward in smaller municipalities and may need to be increased in larger cities.

- (c) Requirements for medical supplies should be based on estimated civilian combat casualties and major endemic diseases in the area.
- (d) If harvests or stocks of local supplies are adequate to meet civilian supply needs as each military objective is reached, the clogging of military channels may be avoided by holding imports in storage areas and by utilizing local resources to the maximum.
- (e) Supplies intended for distribution to civilians in an area of active military operations should be rapidly distributed for immediate consumption or use. Major preparation, processing, or detailed handling should not be required. As the military situation becomes relatively stabilized, such bulk type supplies as unprocessed foodstuffs, cloth to be made into clothing, or lumber for the construction of shelter may then be suitable.
- (f) Establishment of priorities and phasing of deliveries must be compatible with the timing of supplies required for the support of military operations.
- (g) Fertilizers, seeds, tools, or repair parts, may serve to accelerate local production of needed supplies at low cost. This would also free valuable shipping space for other uses.
- (h) Requirements for support of civilians must be specific as to quantity and time, or as to needs for a specific project.

3. Military Supply Support

a. The principal sources of supplies for civilian support are reallocation of supplies from the local economy, captured enemy stocks, contributions from acceptable national and international welfare and charitable organizations, contributions from local or allied resources in the area, and U.S. military stocks.

b. Types of supplies that may be approved for issue from U.S. military stocks consist principally of food, tentage, clothing, engineer equipment to insure operation of essential utilities, medical supplies, transportation equipment, and fuel and lubricants. The supply organization establishes, controls, manages, and operates the facilities

through which such supplies are made available for civilian support in response to requisitions placed by units charged with the civilian supply function. These units are also responsible for the issue of supplies to authorized civilian agencies or groups, either by drawing directly from depots or supply points when they have adequate transportation, or by requesting delivery to specified points at which issue can be made to local governmental authorities.

c. Supply installations which receive, store, and issue supplies for civilian support are identified in supply and distribution plans. These plans assign specific missions and, as implemented by administrative orders and other instructions, prescribe requisitioning and supply procedures to be followed.

- (1) Under certain circumstances, and particularly upon the initiation of military operations in a theater, supplies for support of civil affairs operations may be provided on an automatic basis. As the operation progresses, CA staff officers are responsible for developing plans and programs for the coordination of requisitions from the units in whose areas ultimate distribution to civilian agencies will be made.
- (2) Requisitions for military supplies for civilian support are processed in the same manner as those for all other military supplies and afforded priorities consistent with support for the command mission. Depending upon the situation, supplies required for civilian support may be strictly controlled and require command approval for issue.

d. The CA organization normally requires civilian agencies receiving support to maintain records in such detail as is necessary for a full and proper accounting of supplies provided from military sources, as well as of contributions made by allied governments and nonmilitary agencies.

- (1) When supplies are transferred to the local government or civilian agencies for distribution or for reallocation, authorized signatures must be obtained on receipts.
- (2) Accountability for military stocks used for civilian support is maintained until the supplies are issued to appropriate civilian agencies. Further accountability, stor-

age, processing, and final distribution to end users is normally the responsibility of civil agencies operating under the supervision of CA personnel.

- (3) Central accounting controls are maintained to provide information on which to base continuing requirements for civilian supplies, and insure that supplies are not issued in excess of essential minimums. Statistical evaluations at local, regional, and national levels assist in determining the effectiveness with which civilian supply operations are being accomplished.

4. Support from Other Sources

a. As previously indicated, supplies for civilian relief or economic aid may be obtained from local resources, captured enemy stocks, and by contributions of national or international agencies.

b. Within the area of operations, the aggregate of supply requirements, military and civilian, is reviewed to determine those supplies which should be obtained through local procurement. Directives of the commander, based on applicable legal limitations, furnish guidance to subordinate commanders on available methods of procurement. Except in situations of grave emergency to the command, local procurement for military use which will result in subsequent importation of similar items for civilian use will not be permitted.

- (1) Procurement of supplies and equipment is done by purchasing and contracting officers appointed in accordance with policies and procedures established by the Department of the Army. Purchasing and contracting officers may also be designated agent finance officers for the purpose of making cash purchases.
- (2) CA units assist and advise purchasing and contracting officers in making arrangements for local procurement. Procedures for local procurement by CA units conform to those prescribed for all military units operating in the area.

c. Maximum efforts are made to exploit those captured enemy supplies which are suitable for civilian use. The military use of captured enemy supplies may be objectionable due to their dissimilar quality, packaging, marking, and the difficulty which may be encountered in repair and maintenance. The allocation of captured supplies to ci-

villian use in the area of their location reduces requirements for civilian supplies and the transportation necessary to move such supplies from rear areas. Intelligence requirements demand, however, that care be taken to safeguard or evacuate captured materiel in satisfaction of technical intelligence requirements.

- (1) As enemy food supplies are uncovered, adequate security measures are taken to protect them from destruction or looting. These supplies may be released for distribution through CA distribution channels for the feeding of refugees, displaced persons, and local inhabitants.
- (2) Captured enemy vehicles and fuel and lubricants may be issued for the movement of food from rural to urban areas and for other essential purposes.

5. Military Use of Resources

Consistent with the policy that maximum use be made of local resources in the support of military operations, logistical planning gives consideration to projects involving the reconstruction and rehabilitation of local facilities for military use. In such planning, both military and civilian requirements are considered in the light of the total mission of the command. Use of existing local facilities serves not only to reduce the need for military construction effort, but may promote desired economic development in the area. The CA organization provides the point of contact for military commands and other agencies requiring local supplies, services, and facilities. When procuring local property by requisition or seizure, a type receipt as shown in figure 11, Requisition/Seizure Receipt, should be used. Form may be reproduced locally.

6. Procurement of Real Estate

a. The acquisition and disposition of real estate are functions of the Engineer. These functions are performed in accordance with the terms of agreements, the law of land warfare, and applicable theater policies.

b. Adequate prior planning is essential to the effective determination of requirements and allocations of areas and facilities.

c. Although control over all activities concerned with real estate is centralized, the acquisition of real estate has a strong and direct impact on the economy of the area of operations. G5 accordingly determines the availability of real estate for mil-

itary use, any limitations that should be imposed on such use, and the effect of such utilization on the local economy. G4 develops policies on the requisitioning and administration of real estate and makes allocations of areas, billets, and facilities to users. G1 suballocates shelter and quarters for the use of staff sections and personnel within the headquarters.

d. CA units assist engineer real estate officers in locating desired properties and facilities. Engineer real estate officers insure that requests for utilization of real estate are within the allocations made by G4 and maintain, in coordination with CA units, inventories of available real estate.

e. Effective coordination of real estate requisitions may necessitate the establishment of area real estate allocation boards including CA and other representation from the various commands concerned.

7. Procurement of Labor

a. Maximum use is made of local sources of labor in support of military operations. Theater policies, based on legal or treaty requirements and U.S. policies with respect to local economic considerations, are promulgated on such matters as the procurement and distribution of labor, uniform wage scales, and conditions of employment. When the availability of local labor has been determined by G5 in accordance with theater policies, the report of availability is furnished to G1, the allocating staff agency.

b. Civilian labor procurement and administration is performed by unit labor officers, civilian personnel officers, or area labor officers in coordination with appropriate CA units. CA units locate local labor for using agencies and establish and maintain such minimum records as are necessary to insure adherence to prescribed policies and directives. CA units are not responsible for such matters of administration as hiring, payment for services, or maintenance of employment records.

c. Refugees are utilized to the maximum practicable extent as a source of local civilian labor.

8. Civilian Casualties

a. It may be necessary for military aid stations to administer emergency type treatment to civilians during active military operations and, when feasible, to evacuate seriously wounded or critically injured civilians. The extent of military treatment and evacuation of civilian casualties de-

Receipt is hereby acknowledged of the following property which has been requisitioned/seized by the undersigned, acting for and in behalf of the US armed forces:

Item or items: _____
(Describe fully, including quantity)

Location: _____
(Identify by address or otherwise where the property was when it was requisitioned/seized)

Owner: _____
(Name and address of owner, if known)

Custodian: _____
(Name and address of person in custody of property at time of requisition/seizure)

Value: _____
(Estimated)

Condition: _____
(Describe quality of property)

Date: _____
(Date property requisitioned/seized)

Purpose: _____
(Purpose for which property was requisitioned/seized)

Period of use: _____
(Temporary or permanent; if temporary, estimate duration)

Name of person making requisition/seizure

Grade and Identity No.

Unit designation (if applicable)

Date

Figure 11. Requisition/seizure receipt.

pend upon the requirements of the military situation and the availability of military medical facilities. Whenever possible, civilian casualties are evacuated to the nearest civilian medical installation. If civilian medical facilities are not available, the administrative order of the command concerned should outline evacuation procedures.

b. When civilian casualties are to be evacuated to military medical installations, evacuation is accomplished through the military evacuation system on a priority basis second to military casualties.

c. If civilian ambulances are not available for the transport of civilian casualties, trucks, private cars, or animal-drawn carts are utilized. When military transportation must be provided, available air, rail, or motor transportation, including empty vehicles moving to the rear, are employed. Provisions are made, where necessary, for the transportation of civilian casualties by litter or improvised means.

d. When sick and wounded civilians have been evacuated to military medical facilities, they are segregated from military personnel and transferred to civilian facilities as soon as their physical condition permits. Accordingly, measures are taken, whenever practicable, to rehabilitate civilian hospitals on a first priority basis.

9. Movement of Civilian Supplies

a. Transportation includes the utilization of civilian and military transportation for the movement of civilian supplies. Use of public transportation facilities not operated by the Transportation Corps for military purposes is coordinated through the G5 of the command charged with the control or supervision of such facilities.

b. When authorized by competent authority, civilian transportation may be requisitioned for military use. In the allocation of civilian transport between military and civilian use, careful consideration must be given to the terms of the civil affairs agreements for the movement of food,

clothing, medical, and other supplies. Except in emergency situations, civilian vehicles should not be used for military purposes. Civilian vehicles are returned to their proper owners as soon as effective control over their use can be exercised by civilian authorities.

c. Upon entry into an area previously under enemy control, all civilian vehicles, trucks, and animal-drawn carts required for the transportation of civilian supplies are organized into transportation pools for operation under the supervision of CA units in the area. The organization of vehicles into pools provides the most effective means for the movement of civilians and transportation of essential civilian supplies. To the maximum practicable extent, such vehicles are operated by their owners.

d. When local or captured enemy supplies and facilities are not available, minimum amounts of fuel, lubricants, tires, and spare parts from military stocks, and essential military maintenance facilities, are made available by the responsible military commander for utilization by civilian transportation pools under the supervision of CA units. Issues of supplies are made against approved trip tickets and are restricted to the controlled employment of the vehicles in meeting the approved transportation needs of the community involved. Commanders of CA units estimate future requirements for military stocks for fuels and lubricants in advance and submit the necessary requisitions through appropriate command or supply channels.

DISPLACED PERSONS, REFUGEES, AND EVACUEES

1. General

a. Application. The CA tasks discussed herein are applicable under circumstances of limited or general war with CA authority vested in the military commander. In certain circumstances during peace and cold war, where the military commander is not vested with CA authority, CA functional teams may assist, advise, and support allied civilians or indigenous military governmental authorities in the performance of these tasks.

b. Definitions.

- (1) A displaced person is a civilian who is outside the boundaries of his country in time of war, who may or may not be desirous of repatriation, and may require assistance in obtaining food, shelter, and clothing.
- (2) A refugee is a civilian who has left his home to seek safety elsewhere within his own country.
- (3) An evacuee is a civilian removed from his place of residence by military direction for reasons of his own security or the requirements of the military situation.

2. Control

a. During combat operations effective control of the movement of civilians is of primary importance. Disorganized masses seriously impair the movement of military units, endanger security, and threaten the health of the military force. Refugees and displaced persons also constitute a potent weapon which the enemy may use to disrupt friendly military operations. To prevent interference with military operations from the movement of the local populace, it is essential that civil administration be reconstituted at the earliest practicable time and that constructive direction be given through civil authorities to the local populace.

b. The theater commander plans and prepares directives covering policies and procedures for care, control, and disposition of refugees, evacuees, and displaced persons. All commanders are under the legal obligation imposed by the rules of international law, including the Geneva Convention of 1949, to provide a minimum standard of humane care and treatment, to establish law and order, and to protect private property. Additional humanitarian considerations are observed whenever possible, providing they do not result in interference with military operations.

c. Detailed planning for the care and control of refugees, evacuees, and displaced persons should include such matters as the authorized extent of migration and evacuation; location and establishment of camps; standards of care; status and ultimate disposition of refugees and displaced persons from allied, neutral, or enemy countries; extent of local governmental authority over nonnational civilians; and designation of routes for refugees movement, military and civilian police to provide traffic control, intelligence detachments to screen personnel, and CA units to supervise camp operations.

- (1) During a fluid situation, it is desirable to billet refugees with the local population in nearby communities to the greatest practicable extent rather than to move them to the rear through assembly areas to camps. When frontline tactical units have advanced sufficiently, it is advantageous to permit the early return of refugees to their homes. Logistical support requirements may, however, delay the return of refugees to centers of population. In a static or slow moving situation, it may be necessary to collect and move all refugees to the rear.
- (2) All movements of refugees, evacuees, and displaced persons to the rear are made on

designated secondary roads. Maximum utilization is made of local transportation and police.

- (3) The ultimate disposition of refugees is to allow them to return to their homes as quickly as tactical considerations permit in order to lessen the burden on the military force and the civilian economy for their support and to lessen the danger of disease which accompanies the grouping of peoples in confined areas. When refugees are returned to their homes, they can assist in the restoration of their towns and contribute to their own support.
- (4) The ultimate disposition of displaced persons is to resettle them, preferably in their own country or in any area of their choice consistent with U.S. policy and international agreements. The early resettlement of such displaced persons shortens the period of time during which they are a responsibility of the military commander. In either a fluid or a static situation, displaced persons are formed in groups and moved through assembly areas to displaced person camps as soon as the tactical situation permits.
- (5) The ultimate disposition of evacuees will vary with the reasons for evacuation, but generally they will be returned to their places of residence. However, circumstances may dictate their resettlement in other areas of their choice within the scope of U.S. policy and the terms of international agreements.

d. To prevent infiltration by guerrillas, enemy agents, and escaping members of the hostile armed forces, it is essential to establish control points; screen refugees, evacuees, and displaced persons; search suspected individuals; and impose restrictions on movement. Although screening activities may be performed initially by military police, intelligence, or other type units, they are most effectively conducted by using friendly and reliable local police or civilians under the supervision of CA units. Administrative controls must be conducted with care to prevent the alienation of people who are sympathetic to U.S. objectives.

3. Evacuation

a. Whenever possible, the rearward evacuation of communities in forward combat or other areas is

avoided. Evacuation removes civilians from areas where they can maintain themselves; provides material for enemy propaganda; arouses resentment; complicates the control of their movements; increases the difficulties of maintaining adequate security; necessitates the use of military transport and the expenditure of additional food, fuel, clothing, and medical supplies; and may create epidemic conditions and decrease availability of facilities to support military operations.

b. If tactical considerations require, civilians may be removed from forward areas and not be permitted to return to their homes until the advance of friendly elements has resulted in the establishment of a new forward zone. The removal of civilians may be partial or complete, as security considerations require. If practicable, livestock should be evacuated with the civilians. When civilians have been removed from an area, they are not permitted to return to their homes until authorized. However, when the military situation permits, civilians may be returned to their homes under escort in order to rescue livestock or minimize personnel losses which may impair the local economy.

- (1) The decision for this action must be made by the division or higher commander. A rearward evacuation beyond the division rear boundary is made only after coordination with corps or field army.
- (2) Civilians are evacuated to the rear only when necessary to—
 - (a) Remove them as a hindrance to military operations.
 - (b) Provide for increased security of troops and installations and to safeguard information.
 - (c) Provide for their safety and welfare by removing them from the frontlines.
- (3) Civilians may be evacuated when—
 - (a) There is time for the evacuation to be accomplished.
 - (b) Density, character, and composition of the population render such evacuation necessary.
 - (c) Means are available to accomplish the evacuation.
 - (d) Routes are available for the evacuation.
 - (e) Areas are available to absorb the evacuees.
 - (f) Distances involved are not prohibitive.

(g) Fallout from nuclear attack has not made movement impracticable.

c. Duties of a CA unit commander in an evacuation include—

- (1) Supervising the execution of plans for evacuation.
- (2) Arranging for the employment of civilian transportation to the fullest extent possible for the transport of civilians.
- (3) Arranging for the establishment and maintenance of feeding stations along routes.
- (4) Insuring that plans for reception have been made.
- (5) Arranging for establishment of civilian collecting points and civilian assembly areas.

d. When a decision is made to accomplish the mass evacuation of a community, detailed plans are made to prevent stragglers or uncontrolled groups from disrupting forward movement of military units and supplies. Mass evacuation planning includes—

- (1) *Transportation.* Maximum use will be made of civilian transportation. If this is not available, military vehicles should be requested for the old, the very young, and the sick.
- (2) *Distance.* The distance of the move from the point of departure should be no greater than is necessary to meet the minimum objective for which the movement is planned.
- (3) *Fallout.* Where radioactive fallout has occurred, or is anticipated, precautions are taken to avoid moving civilians downwind from the actual or anticipated nuclear attack.
- (4) *Screening.* Security screening and documentation of evacuees should be accomplished at the earliest possible moment.
- (5) *Identification.* If possible, every evacuee is provided with and required to wear visibly on his person a tag identifying him by name, or is provided an official identification card indicating the locality from which evacuated and bearing other pertinent information.
- (6) *Briefing of evacuees.* Briefing to explain the purpose of the move, restrictions on personal belongings, and the methods of passive air defense is accomplished by

leaflets, loudspeakers, posters, or other means available prior to beginning the movement.

- (7) *Impedimenta.* Each person is allowed to take a predetermined allowance of personal effects.
- (8) *Rations.* If the move will require not more than 2 days, rations may be issued at the time of departure to each person evacuated, or rations may be issued at designated points en route.
- (9) *Priority.* The mission will determine categories and timing of evacuations of specific groups.
- (10) *Assembly areas and camps.* Housing should be such that it will not endanger the health of the evacuees, nor unnecessarily increase the suffering caused by the evacuation. Issues of food fuel, clothing, and medical supplies are furnished in advance to the assembly area receiving the evacuee.
- (11) *Medical care.* The health and physical well-being of the evacuees are difficult problems. Use of civilian medical personnel is highly desirable. Civilian medical personnel are supplemented by military medical personnel, if necessary and available, to assure meeting standards of medical care required, to protect the health of military personnel, and to comply with international law. Appropriate health measures will be taken prior to movement to prevent spread of infectious diseases and development of epidemics.
- (12) *Religious needs.* When practicable, the religious needs of the evacuees are ascertained, and facilities are made available for worship, through the use of civilian religious personnel assisted by military chaplains, if available and required.
- (13) *Duration.* The duration of the evacuation should be no greater than that necessary to meet the objective for which the movement is planned.
- (14) *Return.* Plans for mass evacuation also include provision for the return of the evacuees as well as criteria for determining the duration of their absence. Areas subjected to CBR attack are carefully screened for safety of occupancy before return movement is accomplished.

e. Standfast orders normally are issued to civilians in order to prevent interference with military operations and to preclude disclosure of the plan of operation. In a retrograde movement, however, experience has shown that such orders are not obeyed if a population fears the enemy and civil police are ineffective. Therefore, the rearward evacuation of civilians in special categories and priorities may be authorized by policies of higher headquarters. Policies pertaining to evacuation are implemented by subordinate tactical commanders as the military situation permits. Evacuation priorities may include persons and resources according to the following priorities:

- (1) Persons subject to reprisals, such as civil officials and resistance leaders who have worked for the military forces of the United States and its allies and their immediate families.
- (2) Other civilians including scientific, medical, and religious personnel.
- (3) Civil police.
- (4) Materiel of immediate value to the enemy forces except such items as medical supplies and foodstuffs essential for civilian needs, personal property, or any other material covered by international law or humanitarian considerations. Equipment or materiel in certain categories, capable of immediate conversion to military use by hostile forces and not capable of evacuation, such as petroleum products, weapons, means of heavy transport, and public communications equipment may be destroyed.

4. Collecting Points

Civilian collecting points are temporary areas designated for the assembly of small numbers of refugees, evacuees, and displaced persons prior to their evacuation. At collecting points, only minimum emergency relief for limited periods is provided. Collecting points should be in defilade, accessible by road, and near water.

5. Assembly Areas and Camps

a. An assembly area provides a temporary assembling place for refugees, evacuees, and displaced persons in preparation for further movement to refugee camps or for resettlement in local communities. Assembly areas, which are generally designed to accommodate a larger number of per-

sons than a civilian collecting point, provide additional emergency relief to include food, clothing, medical supplies, medical treatment, and limited shelter. In assembly areas, the process of screening to segregate prisoners of war and civilian internees for separate handling by military police units is continued. In addition, action is commenced to segregate civilians by nationality or ethnic groups in preparation for movement to designated camps. A continuous effort must be made to identify and segregate individuals whose interests are inimical to those of the United States and its allies.

b. Assembly areas and camps serve as temporary or semipermanent places for the grouping of refugees, evacuees, and displaced persons prior to the return of such persons to their normal places of habitation, resettlement in local communities, repatriation to their own countries, or other designated disposition. Normally they are located in the field army rear area or in the communications zone. Camps may utilize available civilian accommodations or military construction.

- (1) In these camps, a further segregation of refugees and displaced persons takes place according to nationality or ethnic group. Continuing action is taken to detect enemy civilians who should be interned; examine civilians for communicable and other diseases; prepare individual identification records; reestablish family groups; provide food, clothing, and additional medical care; and prepare individuals for future disposition.
- (2) In the designation of locations, care is taken to avoid those which are in the vicinity of profitable targets, such as vital communications centers and large military installations. In the selection of local facilities, consideration is given to the temporary or semipermanent nature of the facilities to be established, and to such factors as weather proof roofing, solid floors, ventilation, provisions for water supply, sewage and waste disposal, and proximity to local sources of food supply. Another factor in camp location is whether inhabitants will be a source of indigenous labor.
- (3) The specific type of authorized construction, which is the minimum necessary to satisfy the requirements of the particular

situation, varies according to local climate, anticipated permanency of the particular camp, number of camps to be constructed, extent of local sources of labor and materials, and the availability from military resources of engineer materials and assistance. Whenever possible, construction is accomplished by the refugees, evacuees, or displaced persons, themselves, or by local agencies of government employing civilian labor. Local sources of materials are utilized to the maximum practicable extent in accordance with legal limitations.

- (4) The administration and operation usually is directed by a CA platoon under the supervision of its company headquarters. The parent CA company provides technical advice, support, and assistance, and may furnish additional platoons and functional teams or specialists, such as displaced persons, public health, public welfare, or public safety, at any particular camp according to the requirements of the particular situation. In the event that additional functional teams or specialists are required beyond the capabilities of the CA company, the company

commander requests necessary assistance from the CA battalion. Because of the large numbers of refugees, displaced persons and evacuees for whom control and care normally must be provided, maximum attention must be given to the use of local civilian personnel to provide the cadre for camp administration. This cadre should be organized and trained prior to the opening of the camp. Whenever practicable, civilian personnel should be obtained from public and private welfare organizations and employed under military supervision.

- (5) Inmates of camps should be required not only to establish and maintain the organization for internal camp administration but also to assist in maintaining the physical security of the installation. Within the limitations imposed by international law, camps should provide the necessary labor for their own operations and within applicable limitations should be considered as a source of labor. Allied liaison officers and representatives of international organizations and of local governments are conducted on visits to camps as required.

APPENDIX J

CIVIL DEFENSE, AREA DAMAGE CONTROL AND REAR AREA SECURITY

1. General

It will be noted that the civil affairs tasks discussed herein are applicable under circumstances of limited or general war with civil affairs authority vested in the military commander. In certain circumstances during peace and cold war, where the military commander is not vested with civil affairs authority, CA functional teams may assist, advise, and support allied military governmental or civilian authorities in the performance of these tasks.

2. Civil Defense and Area Damage Control

a. Civil defense includes the mobilization, organization, and direction of the civil population to minimize by passive measures the effects of enemy action on all aspects of civil life. Because of the extensive impact on civilian populations and economies that may result from use of mass destruction weapons, careful development and implementation of civil defense plans are essential to preserve the stability and security of civil government. In addition, civil defense contributes to the protection of military installations from damage; may minimize military casualties; permits the continuance of local support to military operations; and generally reduces the extent of disruption to military operations.

b. Area damage control in military operations consists of preventive and control measures taken before, during, and after an attack to minimize its effects on military operations. It serves to assist in the continuation or reestablishment of administrative support. Generally rear areas are divided into subareas for damage control purposes. A rear area security control center is established by the responsible commander to implement and coordinate rear area defense and damage control, and subordinate control centers are established in each

subarea. Area damage control planning is a general staff responsibility of G4, while rear area security plans are prepared under the supervision of G3. Civil defense is within the purview of G5.

c. Civil defense, area damage control, and rear area security planning and operations should be mutually supporting. Preattack planning will give consideration to such matters as camouflage, circulation of traffic, movement of individuals, blackouts, construction of shelters, warning systems, labor, firefighting and decontamination procedures, equipment, and personnel. In postattack recovery operations, radiological survey and decontamination processes will benefit both military personnel and civilians. Civilian and military firefighting equipment and labor potential can be coordinated or pooled, where advantageous, as can medical services. Any major movement of civilians as the result of an attack will have a direct bearing on the circulation of military traffic. In repair and reconstruction activities, equipment, technicians, labor, and materiel of troop units concerned and the capabilities of civilian population should be coordinated to the maximum advantage of both.

d. The G5 has general staff supervision over civil defense activities and may assign the responsibility for civil defense planning and measures for the control of the civilian populace to the CA unit commander. The CA unit commander is responsible for implementation of civil defense plans and for coordination of control measures with appropriate agencies of government. To the maximum extent practicable, local officials are held responsible for organization of local civil defense activities and effective conduct of civil defense measures.

e. Civil defense planning is not confined to protective measures against weapons in the mass destruction category, but must include protection against all types of warfare, and against all forms

of natural disaster such as floods, fires, and earthquakes. In the development of civil defense plans, consideration is given to—

- (1) Correlation with the area damage control plan.
- (2) Provisions for emergency repair of vital installations, fire prevention and protection, disposal of enemy explosive ordnance, and emergency hospitalization of civilian personnel.
- (3) Maximum utilization of existing local plans, organizations, and facilities.
- (4) Mutual support provisions to enable both military and civilian rescue and working parties and their equipment to be employed in the installations and facilities of either.
- (5) Establishment of civilian control centers in the vicinity of subarea control centers, whenever feasible, in order to receive air raid warnings, dispatch orders, direct emergency services, and coordinate measures between military and civil organizations and facilities.
- (6) Coordination of neighboring civil defense organizations particularly when the boundaries of military sectors cross political boundaries.
- (7) Establishment of civil defense organizations in towns and cities where they do not already exist.
- (8) Establishment of civil defense organizations at provincial and national levels as soon as the situation permits.
- (9) Organization and training of personnel of fixed support installations or facilities for provision of emergency hospitalization, housing, feeding, and mobile reserve teams capable of rapid movement for the performance of police, rescue, fire, medical, and engineering services.
- (10) Plans for the evacuation of cities and towns rendered unsafe as a result of nuclear attack or natural disasters, and necessary transportation and control.
- (11) Development of protective measures against guerrillas, infiltrators, and subversive elements during a period of disruption or disorganization.
- (12) Education of the local population in civil defense operations and provision for the dissemination of information, orders,

and instructions requiring group action, and assignment of individual responsibilities.

f. The CA unit commander coordinates the activities of the various functional specialists who supervise the local agencies of government and civil defense services most closely related to their respective specialties. Organization or augmentation of the following types of services is desirable in most situations.

- (1) Police services.
- (2) Fire services.
- (3) Warden services.
- (4) Public health services.
- (5) CBR defense services.
- (6) Rescue and engineering services.
- (7) Communications and transportation.
- (8) Public welfare services.
- (9) Local information bureaus.

g. Logistical planning should include provisions for anticipated requirements of civil defense equipment and supplies in order that unscheduled diversions from military stocks will be minimized. The stockpiling of selected salvage items such as material for shelter construction, clothing and blankets will assist in reducing the drain on military stocks. Civil defense equipment and supplies which should be available for issue to the local government may include firefighting and other heavy equipment, tools, and civilian relief supplies.

3. Rear Area Security

a. In rear areas, civil affairs operations increase in scope and complexity. Refugees, evacuees, and displaced persons moving back from combat areas must be fed, sheltered, and controlled. Civilian administration is reconstituted; and programs are instituted to support military operations, prevent disaffection, relieve distress, and initiate rehabilitative measures. Steps must be taken to alleviate disease, hardship, idleness, and inequities of an economic, political, or social nature.

b. In rear area security operations, a maximum effort should be made to use available loyal indigenous personnel to assist in security of the area. Civil affairs programs can play an important role in rear area security operations. Examples of civil affairs operations which can muster civil assistance are—

- (1) Increasing the efficiency of the local administration so that orders, intelligence,

requests, and information pass expeditiously in either direction between the military commander, the civil administration, and the populace.

- (2) Improving the efficiency of the civil police and its image with the populace in order to enhance its effectiveness in security, control, and intelligence.
- (3) Improving local health through public health measures to enhance the government image, increase civilian productivity, and eradicate contagious disease.
- (4) Initiating or improving public welfare activities, such as centers for the aged.
- (5) Locating and negotiating for civilian resources required for military use.
- (6) Organizing or modernizing public facilities such as water distribution, sewage disposal, power, communications, and transportation to increase the general efficiency and productivity of the area.
- (7) Preparing and disseminating information through military and civilian information and psychological operations media.

4. Counterguerrilla Operations

a. It is essential that initial civil affairs operations be directed primarily toward gaining control of the populace in land areas occupied or liberated by the military force. Guerrillas depend on the active support of the local inhabitants for food, medical supplies, shelter, intelligence, and personnel. No effective guerrilla movement can exist without the passive sympathy of the local population; therefore, a basic objective of counterguerrilla operations is to separate guerrilla forces from civilian support. Since guerrillas thrive on confusion and the disorganization of government, civil affairs operations are conducted to engender stable conditions through local relief, restoration of law and order, a resumption of agricultural production, reestablishment of local government, and measures to enlist the active support and sympathy of the local populace. Appropriate consideration is given to the use of rewards for friendly assistance, imposition of punishment for collaboration with guerrillas, employment of propaganda media, and imposition of necessary restrictive measures.

b. When the local populace collaborates with hostile guerrilla forces, rigid controls and restric-

tions are imposed. Such controls and restrictions may be relaxed subsequently according to the requirements of the situation. Punishment for violation of regulations and restrictions must be just and deserved to prevent exploitation by guerrillas. Maximum publicity is given to those offenses for which punishment is imposed. In order to reduce collaboration with guerrillas, it may be desirable to impose strict rationing controls on the production, distribution, and consumption of food, clothing, medical and other supplies.

c. Planning for rear area security is initiated without delay, is continuous, and includes plans to prevent, minimize, and combat enemy guerrilla activities. Planning for defense against guerrilla action requires a detailed analysis of intelligence of the area of operations including the enemy, weather, terrain, national characteristics, customs, beliefs, and desires of the people. Consideration is given to political and economic policies that are necessary to gain control of the area and its populace. Plans must be effectively coordinated with adjacent commands and vigorously implemented in all areas to prevent the movement of guerrillas.

d. Local and national police security detachments and other formations of local personnel and displaced persons are organized and utilized to guard critical installations against sabotage and to function as information collecting agencies. In rear areas, local civilians who are dependable and sympathetic are employed in security units and as agents and informers to infiltrate guerrilla units and report their movements and locations. Labor and service units may be utilized in the storage and distribution of supplies and the preparation of defensive works.

e. Screening of local civilian employees is essential to prevent information of military operations and troop movements from falling into the hands of guerrillas and infiltrators.

f. It may be necessary to provide essential items of supply to segments of the civilian populace, including victims of resistance force attacks, groups which have been relocated or concentrated for security reasons, and other civilians whose resistance to insurgent forces may be weakened by hunger and distress. These supplies initially will be limited to such survival items as food, medical supplies, clothing, fuel, and construction material. Emergency supplies must be safeguarded and controlled to insure equitable distribution and their denial to hostile elements.

g. No insurgent movement will achieve success without the willing or coerced support of a portion of the civilian populace. The following are suggested methods of control of civilians which may be adopted by CA units:

- (1) Confiscate weapons to reduce their availability to guerrilla seizure. Establish an accountability system for those weapons retained by civilians.
- (2) Register all civilians and set up an identity card system.
- (3) Establish a curfew with due consideration for civilian needs.
- (4) Set up circulation controls.
- (5) Suspend such personal rights as may be necessary to allow searches and arrest on suspicion.
- (6) Evacuate designated areas.
- (7) Provide security for friendly civilians and their families.
- (8) Establish a reporting system covering treatment of wounds and administration of medical aid.
- (9) Furnish relief supplies as required.
- (10) Conduct educational forums to counter insurgent propaganda and outline positive programs.
- (11) Secure reports on absentee employees.
- (12) Maintain control and accountability over foodstuffs, medicine, livestock, raw material, or other matter which may be of assistance to guerrillas.
- (13) Establish rationing systems for critical items.
- (14) Confiscate property of collaborators.

- (15) Censor media of public communication.
- (16) License all forms of transportation.
- (17) Establish an information program with the support of psychological warfare personnel to publicize measures taken, reasons therefor, and punishments for noncompliance.
- (18) Reward civilians who contribute actively to counterresistance programs.
- (19) Restore normal community processes of public health, safety, education, communications, transportation, waste disposal, water supply, legal processes, and other expressions of civil government and administration.
- (20) Introduce necessary governmental and legal reforms.
- (21) Stimulate production of agricultural products and other essential goods.
- (22) Increase development and utilization of local resources.
- (23) Improve community relations activities.
- (24) Encourage civic action programs.

h. Counterguerrilla operations present legal and political problems of great complexity and sensitivity. Guerrillas, depending upon their status under international law, may be equated to regular armed units of the enemy or be regarded simply as brigands and bandits. For information concerning legal rules applicable to guerrillas and the use of local inhabitants in counterguerrilla operations, see FM 27-10.

APPENDIX K

SAMPLE ORDINANCES AND NOTICES

1. The sample ordinances and notices contained in this appendix are models for preparation of similar documents in military government situations. They have no application in situations short of full assumption of executive, legislative, and judicial authority by the U.S. military commander.

2. This appendix does not include samples of proclamations, as such documents are usually statements of far-reaching policy determination prepared at the highest governmental and military command levels for the signature of a supreme commander or figure of similar stature. They are intended for dissemination throughout affected countries and areas and all available channels, including civil affairs channels, are employed. CA personnel normally will not be involved in the drafting of such proclamations.

EXAMPLE OF AN ORDINANCE PERTAINING TO THE CIRCULATION OF CURRENCY IN OCCUPIED TERRITORY

ORDINANCE NO. 51

CURRENCY

ARTICLE I

Allied Military Currency

1. Allied Military Currency Notes bearing local denominations and in readily distinguishable form shall be legal tender in the occupied territory for the payment of any debt expressed in terms of the local currency.

2. Allied Military Currency Notes will in all respects be equivalent to any other local currency which is legal tender and of equal value.

3. No person shall discriminate between Allied Military Currency Notes and any other local currency which is legal tender and of equal value.

ARTICLE II

Prohibited Transactions

4. Except as authorized by the Civil Affairs Administrator, no person shall make or enter, or offer to enter, into any arrangement or transaction providing for payment in or delivery of a currency other than Allied Military Currency or Notes or local currency which is legal tender and of equal value.

ARTICLE III

Penalties

5. Any person violating any provision of this Ordinance shall, upon conviction by a Civil Affairs Court, be liable to any lawful punishment, other than death, as the Court may determine.

ARTICLE IV

6. This Ordinance shall become effective upon the date of its first promulgation.

General, United States Army
Civil Affairs Administrator

EXAMPLE OF AN ORDINANCE PUBLISHED IN OCCUPIED TERRITORY SPECIFYING PENALTIES FOR CRIMES AND OFFENSES

ORDINANCE NO. 4

PROHIBITION OF WEARING OF _____ MILITARY UNIFORMS

ARTICLE I

1. No former member of the _____ armed forces and no other civilian shall at any time wear or display on his person or clothing any military decorations, medals, insignia, or badges or rank or any miniatures thereof.

ARTICLE II

2. From the effective date of this article, no former member of the _____ armed forces and no other civilian shall at any time wear a _____ military uniform, or any part thereof, in its regulation color and pattern.

3. The wearing of garments which have been produced by dyeing a uniform a color other than (indicated denied colors) or by remodeling it into a civilian pattern will be permitted, provided such dyed or remodeled garments may not be readily identified as a uniform. This provision does not apply to headgear of any _____ military uniform, which will in no event be worn.

ARTICLE III

4. The term "_____ military uniform" shall mean any uniform of—

(a) Any branch of the _____ armed forces, including any _____ armed forces prior to _____

(b) The _____ Party, its formations or affiliated or supervised organizations, and

(c) Any _____ para-military organization, and police uniforms similar thereto, and shall include all outer garments including shirts and headgear but not including boots, shoes, or socks.

ARTICLE IV

5. The term "insignia" shall include but shall not be limited to collar, sleeve or shoulder ornaments or devices, distinctive braid and distinctive buttons of any of the organizations listed in Article III.

6. The term "military decorations and medals" shall include but not be limited to decorations and medals awarded to military personnel or to civilians for services related to the organizations listed in Article III, or for any other services related to military operations, but will not include decorations or medals granted or authorized by the government of any of the United Nations.

7. The term "military insignia and badges of rank" means insignia and badges or rank of any of the organizations listed in Article III.

ARTICLE V

8. The senior _____ official at each level of government will initiate and carry out a program for the remodeling and dyeing of uniforms and for the collection and distribution of clothing to those without adequate clothing. He is responsible for the distribution of clothing between communities within the areas under his jurisdiction. For these purposes, mayors and county councillors shall have power to requisition surplus clothing. Without limiting individual responsibility hereunder, mayors and county councillors shall be responsible for insuring compliance within their areas of the terms of Articles I, II, and III hereto.

ARTICLE VI

9. Any person violating any of the provisions of this Ordinance shall upon conviction by a Civil Affairs Court be liable to any lawful punishment, other than death as the Court may determine.

ARTICLE VII

10. Articles II and III of this Ordinance shall become effective on _____
_____. Articles I, IV, V, and VI shall become effective on _____

General, United States Army
Civil Affairs Administrator

EXAMPLE OF A NOTICE SPECIFYING HOURS OF CURFEW IN OCCUPIED TERRITORY

NOTICE

CURFEW

Until further notice no person within _____ will be permitted to circulate on the streets or outside his own house without a permit of Civil Affairs authorities between the hours of _____ and _____

Any persons found in the streets without such permit between those hours will be severely punished.

All persons are further warned that military guards are instructed to shoot any person seen outside his house after hours attempting to hide or escape.

Major General, United States Army
Commanding General

APPENDIX I

APPLICABLE SOLOG'S AND STANAG'S

(NOTE: In some instances, STANAG's and SOLOG's are similar in their provisions. In this appendix, where such is the case, the number of the similar STANAG or SOLOG will appear in parentheses next to the number of the reproduced STANAG or SOLOG.)

SOLOG AGREEMENT 29
DETAILS OF AGREEMENT
CIVIL AFFAIRS/MILITARY GOVERNMENT
PRINCIPLES OF OPERATION

(Study All)

General Remarks

No standard terminology is essential to this study.

SOLOG Agreement

1. The following general principles apply to all Civil Affairs and Military Government Operations; they are the basis for initial planning purposes in the absence of specific guidance:

a. **Humanity.** The principle of humanity prohibits the use of any degree of violence not actually necessary for the purpose of the war. War is not an excuse for ignoring established humanitarian principles. To a large extent these principles have been given concrete form in the law of war; but because all of these principles have not become legal rules; a military commander should consider whether a proposed course of action would be humane even though not prohibited by international law.

b. **Benefit of the Governed.** Subject to the requirements of the military situation, the principle of governing for the benefit of the governed should be observed.

c. **Reciprocal Responsibilities.** The commander of an occupying force has the right, within the limits set by international law, to demand and enforce such obedience from the inhabitants of an occupied area as may be necessary for the accomplishment of his mission and the proper administration of the area. In return for such obedience, the inhabitants have a right to freedom from unnecessary interference with their individual liberty and property rights.

d. **Command Responsibility.** Responsibility and authority for the conduct of Civil Affairs/Military Government operations are vested in the senior

military commander, who is guided by directives from higher authority, national policies, applicable agreements and international law.

e. **Continuity of Policy.** Continuity and consistency in policy are essential to the success of Civil Affairs/Military Government operations. Therefore, it is fundamental that overall policy be developed at governmental or top command levels and transmitted through normal command channels.

f. **Inclusion of Civil Affairs/Military Government Aspects in Plans and Orders.** It is essential that military directives, plans and orders contain guidance to insure the accomplishment of the Civil Affairs/Military Government mission.

g. **Economy of Personnel.** The duties of Civil Affairs/Military Government personnel should be confined where possible to supervision over existing or reestablished civilian authorities.

h. **Integration in Combined Operations.** In combined operations integration is desirable. This is achieved by exercising Civil Affairs/Military Government control through a combined command as opposed to establishing separate areas of national responsibility. Such integration should be included at appropriate command levels but should not extend to the command of Civil Affairs/Military Government units of one nation by officers of another.

STANAG AGREEMENT 2055

CIVIL AFFAIRS/MILITARY GOVERNMENT

PRINCIPLES OF OPERATION

DETAILS OF AGREEMENT

GENERAL

1. It is agreed that the NATO Armed Forces will adopt the principles of operation for Civil Affairs/Military Government contained in the succeeding paragraphs.

SCOPE

2. The following general principles apply to all Civil Affairs and Military Government operations; they are the basis for initial planning purposes in the absence of specific guidance:

a. **Humanity.** The principle of humanity prohibits the use of any degree of violence not actually necessary for the purpose of the war. War is not an excuse for ignoring established humanitarian principles. To a large extent these principles have been given concrete form in the law of war; but because all of these principles have not become legal rules, a military commander should consider whether a proposed course of action would be humane even though not prohibited by international law.

b. **Benefit of the Governed.** Subject to the requirements of the military situation, the principle of governing for the benefit of the governed should be observed.

c. **Reciprocal Responsibilities.** The commander of an occupying force has the right, within the limits set by international law, to demand and enforce such obedience from the inhabitants of an occupied area as may be necessary for the accomplishment of his mission and the proper administration of the area. In return for such obedience, the inhabitants have a right to freedom

from unnecessary interference with their individual liberty and property rights.

d. **Command Responsibility.** Responsibility and authority for the conduct of Civil Affairs/Military Government operations are vested in the senior military commander, who is guided by directives from higher authority, national policies, applicable agreements and international law.

e. **Continuity of Policy.** Continuity and consistency in policy are essential to the success of Civil Affairs/Military Government operations. Therefore, it is fundamental that overall policy be developed at governmental or top command levels and transmitted through normal command channels.

f. **Inclusion of Civil Affairs/Military Government Aspects in Plans and Orders.** It is essential that military directives, plans and orders contain guidance to insure the accomplishment of the Civil Affairs/Military Government mission.

g. **Economy of Personnel.** The duties of Civil Affairs/Military Government personnel should be confined where possible to supervision over existing or reestablished civilian authorities.

h. **Integration in Combined Operations.** In Combined Operations, integration of Civil Affairs/Military Government may be preferable to establishing separate areas of national responsibility. The decision of the commander of the occupying forces in the matter will depend upon the circumstances confronting him. If integration is decided upon, this will be achieved by exercising Civil Affairs/Military Government control through a combined command. Such integration should be included at appropriate command levels, but should not extend to the command of Civil Affairs/Military Government units or detachments of one nation by officers of another.

STANAG 2056 (SOLOG 39)

STANDARD CIVIL AFFAIRS/MILITARY GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS (PROCLAMATIONS AND ORDINANCES)

DETAILS OF AGREEMENT

GENERAL

1. It is agreed that the NATO Armed Forces will follow the policies and procedures for Civil Affairs/Military Government documents such as proclamations and ordinances, indicated in the succeeding paragraphs.

SCOPE

2. All initial proclamations and appropriate ordinances should receive the approval of the governments concerned prior to promulgation.

3. Initial proclamations should contain, where appropriate, the following:

- a. Declaration of the occupation. This is formal notice of the fact of occupation and of the extent of the area over which the armed forces assume jurisdiction.

- b. A statement as to the purpose and policy of the occupation.

- c. A declaration of the supremacy of the theatre commander. This is an essential prerequisite to the administration of any Military Government. It should announce that a Military Governor has been appointed and that political ties with, and obligations to, the enemy government, if any, are suspended.

It should announce that inhabitants will be required to obey orders of the theatre commander and his subordinates and to abstain from all acts or words of hostility or disrespect to the occupying forces.

d. Confirmation that, unless the military authority directs otherwise, local laws and customs will continue in force, local officials will continue in office, and officials and employees of all transportation and communications systems and of public utilities and other essential services will carry on with their regular tasks.

e. Assurance that persons who obey the instructions of the military authority will be protected in their persons, property, religion, and domestic rights and will be allowed to carry on their usual occupations.

f. A statement that further proclamations or ordinances will accompany or follow the initial proclamation, specifying in detail what is required of the inhabitants.

g. Place and date document is signed, signature and military title of the issuing authority.

h. In the event the situation above is a Civil Affairs Administration of a liberated territory, rather than an occupation, the preceding paragraphs a to f should be appropriately modified.

4. Subsequent proclamations, numbered in sequence, contain detailed rules governing the conduct of the population. These rules of conduct may also be set forth in ordinances.

5. The format of Ordinances should be standardized to the following extent:

a. Ordinances should be numbered in sequence.

b. They should consist of a series of main subdivisions called Articles.

c. They should contain definitions of any terms used in them which are ambiguous or unfamiliar to the persons to whom they are addressed.

d. The final Article in each ordinance should specify the effective date of the ordinance.

e. Ordinances should be signed by the Military Governor or by some authorized subordinate.

6. Proclamations and ordinances will be published in all such languages as may be necessary to insure that they are understood by members of the occupying force and by the inhabitants of the occupied territory.

STANAG 2057 (SOLOG 40)
CIVIL AFFAIRS/MILITARY GOVERNMENT
SUBJECTS FOR INSTRUCTION
DETAILS OF AGREEMENT

GENERAL

1. It is agreed that the NATO Armed Forces will adopt the standard list of subjects for instruction of Civil Affairs/Military Government contained in the succeeding paragraphs.

SCOPE

2. The introduction of Civil Affairs and Military Government subjects for instruction, the method of providing the information and the amount of time to be devoted to each subject of instruction will be decided by the Service concerned.

3. Training will be conducted to familiarize all military personnel with Civil Affairs and Military Government operations. The following subjects will be included:

a. The purpose and necessity of Civil Affairs and Military Government in military operations.

b. Rules and conventions governing war, with emphasis on the enforcement of law, preservation of order, and the prevention of wanton destruction of civilian property, communications, records, etc.

c. Organization and functions of Civil Affairs and Military Government staffs and units.

d. The individual soldier's relation to Civil Affairs and Military Government operations.

4. Training in Civil Affairs and Military Government conducted in courses of command and staff schools or colleges will be preceded by training outlined in paragraph 3 above and will include the following subjects:

a. Comparison of systems of government.

b. Training and employment of Civil Affairs and Military Government units and personnel.

c. Civil Affairs and Military Government planning.

d. The combined or inter-allied aspects of Civil Affairs and Military Government operations.

e. The methods of including Civil Affairs and Military Government problems in instructional and training exercises.

5. Courses for Civil Affairs and Military Government personnel will include the following subjects:

a. History of Civil Affairs and Military Government.

b. Comparative government, national, state or provincial, and lower levels.

c. Organization of the Army.

d. National policy concerning Civil Affairs/Military Government operations.

e. Staff functions and procedures.

f. Rules of land warfare and appropriate maritime law.

g. Civil Affairs/Military Government organization.

h. Civil Affairs/Military Government functions including courts, public safety, public health and others.

i. Local procurement in support of military operations.

j. Logistical organization and procedures of the Armed Forces.

k. The nature of interallied Civil Affairs/Military Government operations.

l. On mobilization, regional and language training.

6. Courses conducted at combined training centres will be similar to the courses for Civil Affairs/Military Government personnel with additional emphasis on interallied operations.

STANAG 2058 (SOLOG 41)
CIVIL AFFAIRS/MILITARY GOVERNMENT
PRINCIPLES OF ORGANIZATION
DETAILS OF AGREEMENT

GENERAL

1. It is agreed that the NATO Armed Forces accept the principles of organization for Civil Affairs/Military Government as shown in the succeeding paragraphs.

SCOPE

2. Civil Affairs/Military Government is a command responsibility.
3. The function of Civil Affairs/Military Government is supervised and directed by the commander, assisted by an appropriate staff.
4. Civil Affairs/Military Government operations are performed executively by Civil Affairs/Military Government units or detachments insofar as practicable.
5. The organization for Civil Affairs/Military Government is flexible in order to function effectively under varying situations and contingencies.
6. Integration of Civil Affairs/Military Government personnel is desirable in combined operations. The decision of the Commander of the occupying forces in the matter will depend upon the circumstances confronting him. If integration is decided upon it should not normally extend to the command of Civil Affairs/Military Government units or detachments of one nation by officers of another.
7. The Armed Forces of the NATO countries will accept responsibility for appropriate administration and support required by attached Civil Affairs/Military Government personnel or units of any of the other Armed Forces.

SOLOG AGREEMENT 42 DETAILS OF AGREEMENT CIVIL AFFAIRS/MILITARY GOVERNMENT TRAINING PRINCIPLES

(Study D 3)

General Remarks

No standardized terminology is essential to this study.

SOLOG Agreement

1. The introduction of Civil Affairs/Military Government training, the method of providing the instruction and the amount of time devoted to training will be decided by the army concerned.
2. Basic orientation in Civil Affairs/Military Government will be provided for all Army personnel on active duty prior to or during movement overseas.
3. Additional general instruction will be given to all army officers on active duty to impart a knowledge, at least equivalent to that required in regard to organization and operation of administrative and technical services.
4. Advanced instruction will be given at high level military schools at which officers are trained for command and staff assignments.
5. Maneuvers and other training exercises will include problems requiring the participation of Civil Affairs/Military Government units and personnel.
6. Civil Affairs/Military Government personnel will receive military training.
7. The functional training provided for specialists will be designed to adapt their civilian specialties to military operations.
8. Civil Affairs/Military Government personnel will receive appropriate regional training in accordance with their planned assignment.
9. Civil Affairs/Military Government personnel assigned to a theater or area having an inter-allied command should normally receive additional training at a combined training center.

STANAG NO. 2065
DETAILS OF AGREEMENT
CIVIL AFFAIRS/MILITARY GOVERNMENT
TRAINING PRINCIPLES FOR NATO ARMED FORCES

GENERAL

1. It is agreed that the NATO Armed Forces accept the following principles for training in Civil Affairs/Military Government.

SCOPE

2. Introduction of Training

The introduction of Civil Affairs/Military Government training, the method of providing the instruction and the amount of time devoted to training will be decided by the Service concerned.

3. Basic Training

Basic orientation in Civil Affairs/Military Government will be provided for all Service personnel on active duty.

4. Further Training

a. Additional general instruction should be given to all officers on active duty to impart a knowledge at least equivalent to that required in regard to organization and operation of administrative and technical services.

b. Advanced instruction will be given at high level military schools at which officers are trained for command and staff assignments.

5. Maneuvers and Exercises

Maneuvers and other training exercises will when practicable include problems requiring the participation of Civil Affairs/Military Government units and personnel.

6. Training of Civil Affairs/Military Government Personnel

a. Civil Affairs/Military Government personnel will receive military training.

b. The functional training provided for specialist personnel will be designed to adapt their civilian specialties to military operations.

c. Civil Affairs/Military Government personnel will receive appropriate regional training in accordance with their planned assignment.

d. Civil Affairs/Military Government personnel assigned to a theater or area having an inter-allied command should normally receive additional training at a combined training center and/or school.

APPENDIX M

CA FUNCTIONAL CHECKLIST

1. This checklist of civil affairs functions is intended as a guide for non-CA units and personnel who may become involved in civil affairs activities, as well as for CA staff officers and units. Those items listed within each functional area indicate the activities generally to be performed under all situations, in addition to those particularly pertinent to the intensity of conflict concerned. Performance of these functions will be accomplished within the framework of applicable policy guidance and directives of higher headquarters.

2. It is recognized that a number of these listed activities will be beyond the capabilities of non-CA units and personnel. However, this checklist will at least assist the commander in identifying and isolating his civil affairs problems and, as appropriate, permit him to seek trained assistance.

3. This list is not exhaustive, but does contain those civil affairs tasks, the performance of which can be commonly anticipated at all levels of command in one form or another. A statement of all functional team capabilities is contained in appendix C.

(CA Functional Checklist located in back of manual)

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By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

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