About the Series

The *Foreign Relations of the United States* series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the U.S. Government. The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, under the direction of the General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.


The statute requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the U.S. Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the *Foreign Relations* series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded. The editors are convinced that this volume meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing.

*Sources for the Foreign Relations Series*

The *Foreign Relations* statute requires that the published record in the *Foreign Relations* series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government en-
gaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate
with the Department of State historians by providing full and complete
access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and
by providing copies of selected records. Most of the sources consulted
in the preparation of this volume have been declassified and are avail-
able for review at the National Archives and Records Administration
(Archives II) in College Park, Maryland.

The editors of the Foreign Relations series have complete access to
all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central
files of the Department; the special decentralized files (“lot files”) of the
Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the De-
partment’s Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of interna-
tional conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with
foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and the memo-
randa of conversations between the President and the Secretary of State
and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. All of
the Department’s central files for 1977–1981 are available in electronic
or microfilm formats at Archives II, and may be accessed using the
Access to Archival Databases (AAD) tool. Almost all of the Depart-
ment’s decentralized office files covering this period, which the Na-
tional Archives deems worthy of permanent retention, have been
transferred to or are in the process of being transferred from the De-
partment’s custody to Archives II.

Research for Foreign Relations volumes is undertaken through spe-
cial access to restricted documents at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Li-
brary and other agencies. While all the material printed in this volume
has been declassified, some of it is extracted from still-classified docu-
ments. The staff of the Carter Library is processing and declassifying
many of the documents used in this volume, but they may not be avail-
able in their entirety at the time of publication. Presidential papers
maintained and preserved at the Carter Library include some of the
most significant foreign-affairs related documentation from White
House offices, the Department of State, and other federal agencies in-
cluding the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency,
the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Some of the research for volumes in this subseries was done in
Carter Library record collections scanned for the Remote Archive Cap-
ture (RAC) project. This project, which is administered by the National
Archives and Records Administration’s Office of Presidential Libraries,
was designed to coordinate the declassification of still-classified
records held in various Presidential libraries. As a result of the way in
which records were scanned for the RAC, the editors of the Foreign Re-
lations series were not always able to determine whether attachments to
a given document were in fact attached to the paper copy of the docu-
ment in the Carter Library file. In such cases, some editors of the *Foreign Relations* series have indicated this ambiguity by stating that the attachments were “Not found attached.”

**Editorial Methodology**

Documents in this volume are presented chronologically according to time in Washington, DC. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the *Foreign Relations* series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the Chief of the Editing and Publishing Division. The original document is reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents within the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the documents are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words or phrases underlined in the original document are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the original text, and a list of abbreviations and terms is included in the front matter of each volume. In telegrams, the telegram number (including special designators such as Secto) is printed at the start of the text of the telegram.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount and, where possible, the nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld after declassification review have been accounted for and are listed in their chronological place with headings, source notes, and the number of pages not declassified.

All brackets that appear in the original document are so identified in the footnotes. All ellipses are in the original documents.

The first footnote to each document indicates the sources of the document and its original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document.
VI About the Series

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than to page numbers.

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the Foreign Relations statute, monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation of the series and declassification of records. The Advisory Committee does not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the series, but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and reviews volumes as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory obligations.

Declassification Review

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, conducted the declassification review for the Department of State of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 13526 on Classified National Security Information and applicable laws.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The declassification review of this volume, which began in 2014 and was completed in 2015, resulted in the decision to withhold 0 documents in full, excise a paragraph or more in 0 documents, and make minor excisions of less than a paragraph in 0 documents.

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process described above, that the documentation and edito-
rial notes presented here provide a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of the Carter administration’s policy toward public diplomacy.

Adam M. Howard, Ph.D.  Stephen P. Randolph, Ph.D.
General Editor  The Historian

Bureau of Public Affairs
June 2016
Preface

Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series

This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the Foreign Relations series that documents the most important issues in the foreign policy of the administration of President Jimmy Carter. This volume documents the public diplomacy efforts of the Carter administration from 1977 until 1980. Readers interested in a more detailed examination of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty should consult Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, volume XX, Eastern Europe. Additional documentation on the USIA reorganization effort, as well as documentation on efforts to reorganize other aspects of the conduct of U.S. foreign policy, is in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, volume XXVIII, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy. The political aspects of the Carter administration’s decision to boycott the 1980 Moscow Olympics and a broader treatment of information policy are in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, volume XXV, Global Issues; United Nations Issues.


This volume documents the Carter administration’s efforts to conduct public diplomacy. A primary emphasis of the volume is the fundamental role that the United States Information Agency (subsequently the United States International Communication Agency) played in the formulation and implementation of public diplomacy. The documentation focuses on the merger of the Department of State’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU) and the United States Information Agency in late 1977 and the establishment of the United States International Communication Agency in early 1978; the reports and recommendations of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information and the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs; the production and dissemination of USIA/ICA research reports, briefing papers, and surveys; the conceptualization and administration of broadly-based cultural initiatives such as ARTS AMERICA; the development of initiatives designed to celebrate the American Constitution bicentennial; foreign responses to exhibits, films, radio and television programs; a new emphasis on younger, foreign audiences; and USIA/ICA’s efforts to adapt to and utilize new forms of technology to refresh and enhance its programming.

The volume also draws attention to the Department of State’s public diplomacy efforts. The documentation focuses on people-to-
people, cultural, and educational exchanges, administered in the Department by CU. Following the integration of CU into USIA, senior officials worked to strengthen the institutional relationships between the two agencies. The volume also includes documentation on the Department’s initiative to inform the American public about U.S. foreign policy and the world.

Within the White House, the President and his primary advisers grappled with the organizational and intellectual challenges posed by the CU–USIA merger and establishment of ICA. Carter, in creating ICA, emphasized not only ICA’s charge to inform the world about American society but also ICA’s new role of informing the American public about the world, what ICA would term the “reverse” or “second mandate.” The documentation reveals the ways in which Carter, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski, and other advisers pushed USIA/ICA Director John Reinhardt and his agency to develop programming and initiatives to support foreign policy successes such as the Camp David Accords and respond to crises such as the taking of U.S. hostages in Iran, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the 1980 Olympic boycott, and Cuban refugees. In addition, the volume also highlights Carter’s appointments to the Board for International Broadcasting, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and the advisory commissions on information and cultural affairs.

Acknowledgments

The editor wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Ceri McCarron, Brittany Parris, Keith Shuler, and Charles Stokley of the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library; Seth Center and Martin Manning of the Department of State; and Elizabeth Gray, David Langbart, Tab Lewis, Alan Lipton, Don McIlwain, and Richard Peuser of the National Archives and Records Administration. The Historical Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency helped to arrange access to CIA files.

The editor conducted the research for this volume and selected and annotated the documentation under the supervision of Adam M. Howard, General Editor of the Foreign Relations series. Stephen P. Randolph, Director of the Office of the Historian, reviewed the volume. Chief of the Declassification Division Carl Ashley coordinated the declassification review. Stephanie Eckroth and Craig Daigle did the copy and technical editing under the supervision of Mandy A. Chalou, Chief of the Editing and Publishing Division. Do Mi Stauber Inc. prepared the index.

Kristin L. Ahlberg, Ph.D.
Historian
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Sources


The Presidential papers of Jimmy Carter are a key source of high-level decision making documentation on public diplomacy. A number of collections from the National Security Affairs (NSA) files are relevant to research in this area. Within the Brzezinski Material, the Agency File (particularly the files for USIA, USICA, Department of State, BIB/VOA/RFE/RL) contains the most relevant documentation, especially concerning the 1977 USIA reorganization proposal. Within the Staff Material, the Horn/Special File, containing the files of NSC staffer Paul Henze, prove the most significant, given Henze’s overall interest in international broadcasting. Also of interest in the Staff Material collection are the Putnam Subject File, located within the Europe, USSR, and East/West File, and the Country and Subject files in the North/South Pastor Files. Both Robert Putnam and Robert Pastor engaged in a series of public diplomacy initiatives related to Europe and Latin America, and their files contain valuable information on public diplomacy and disarmament and the creation of the Hubert H. Humphrey North-South Scholarships. Beyond the National Security Affairs files, the White House Central Files are also an excellent source of documentation on public diplomacy. The Subject Files yield substantial material on USIA, USICA, BIB, VOA, and RFE/RL, in addition to including information regarding the 1977 USIA reorganization proposal, fiscal matters, governmental and non-governmental educational and informational exchanges, and the President’s relationships with foreign press.

The National Archives and Records Administration also houses essential documentation on the conduct of public diplomacy during the Carter administration. Within the Department of State Record Group, RG 59, the records of Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher feature some high level documentation, as do the records of the Director of the Policy Planning Staff Anthony Lake. Of particular importance is Record Group 306, the records of the United States Information Agency/United States International Communication Agency. These collections are a rich source of information about USIA/USICA’s ever-evolving organizational structure and its various programs and products. The USIA Historical Collection includes Subject Files (containing records relating to USIA function, mission, organization, and programs compiled by former USIA archivist Martin Manning), Office
of the Director Files (containing biographical material on USIA senior personnel and major speeches), and Reports and Studies Files. The Records of the Associate Directorate for Programs contains the Subject Files of Basic Operating Documents, which yield some of the most important high-level USIA policy formulation documents. The Office of the Director Files is also an excellent source of high-level documentation; particularly useful files include the Executive Secretariat Correspondence Files and Subject Files. The Office of Research files contain a variety of USIA printed products, including the Foreign Opinion Notes, Briefing Papers, Special Reports, and Research Memoranda.

Records of the Department of State’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU) were transferred to the special collections of the University of Arkansas Libraries in 1983. The Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection includes, primarily, the records produced when CU was located within the Department of State, from 1938 until late 1977-early 1978. Of particular interest for this volume are the CU Organization and Administration Files (Group I). Group I contains 6 series. The General Program Policies, Procedures, and Plans; Country Program Plans; and CU Reorganization 1978 files yielded important documentation on the issues facing CU during the early months of the Carter administration, CU’s role in implementing the country program plans, and CU’s role following its integration within USIA.

In addition to the paper files cited below, a growing number of documents are available on the Internet. The Office of the Historian maintains a list of these Internet resources on its website and encourages readers to consult that site on a regular basis.

Unpublished Sources

Department of State, Washington, D.C.

Central Foreign Policy File. These files have been transferred or will be transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland.

P Reels
D Reels
N Reels

Lot Files. These files have been transferred or will be transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland

HA Files: Lot 82D180
Human Rights Subject Files, 1980
National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland

Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State

Lot Files
D Files: Lot 81D113 (Entry P–14)
  Records of Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, 1977–1980
S/P Files: Lot 82D298 (Entry P–9)
  Records of the Director of the Policy Planning Staff Anthony Lake, 1977–1981
C Files: Lot 87D241

Record Group 306, Records of the United States Information Agency/United States International Communication Agency

USIA Historical Collection
Subject Files, 1953–2000 (Entry A–1 1066)
Office of the Director, Biographic Files Relating to USIA Directors and Other Senior Officials, 1953–2000 (Entry A–1 1069)
Reports and Studies, 1953–1998 (Entry A–1 1070)

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Subject Files of Basic Operating Documents (Entry P–100)

Bureau of Information
Library, Program Division, Special Collections, Bureau of Historical Librarian, Records Relating to the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, 1980–1998 (Entry P–146)
Office of Information Resources, Library Programs Division, Special Collections Branch, Office of the Historical Librarian, Subject Files, 1953–1999 (Entry P–195)

Office of the Director
Executive Secretariat, Secretariat Staff, Correspondence Files, 1973–1980 (Entry P–104)
Executive Secretariat, Secretariat Staff, Subject Files, 1973–1978 (Entry P–116)

Office of Research
Briefing Papers, 1979–1999 (Entry P–49)
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Foreign Opinion Notes, 1973–1989 (Entry P–118)
Office of the Associate Director, Program Files, 1973–1978 (Entry P–119)
Special Reports, 1953–1997 (Entry P–160)

Jimmy Carter Library, Atlanta, Georgia

Brzezinski Material
Agency File
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Brzezinski Office File
  Subject Chron File
Country File
Name File
Staff Evening Reports File
Subject File

Donated Historical Material
  Brzezinski Donated Material
  Jagoda Donated Material

Office of the Staff Secretary
  Handwriting File
  Presidential File

Plains File
  Subject File

Presidential Materials
  President’s Daily Diary

Staff Material
  Europe, USSR, and East/West
    Putnam Subject File
  Horn/Special File
    Henze File
  North/South Pastor Files
    Country File
    Subject File
  North–South Thornton File
    Subject File

Office File
  Meetings File
  Outside the System File
  Presidential Advisory File

Staff Office Files
  Domestic Policy Staff
  Eizenstat Files

White House Central Files
  Subject Files
    FG 266: Includes information on the United States Information Agency
    FG 298: Includes information on the International Communication Agency
    FG 298–1: Includes information on the Voice of America
    FG 999–7: Includes information on the proposed Agency for International Communications (Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1977, 10/11/77)
    FI 4/FG–266: Includes information on financial matters related to the United States Information Agency
FO-5: Includes information on governmental and non-governmental information-exchange activities, including exchange programs, studies, proposals, and requests

FO 5–1: Includes information on governmental and non-governmental educational exchange activities, including exchange programs, proposals, and organizations

FO 5–3: Includes materials on the President’s relations with foreign press

Central Intelligence Agency

Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, Job 91M00696R: Subject Policy Files, Box 5, Folder 12: Human Rights.

University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, Arkansas

University Libraries, Special Collections

Manuscript Collection 468

Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection (CU)

Group I: CU Organization and Administration

Series 1: General Program Policies, Procedures and Plans

Series 2: Country Program Plans

Series 5: CU Reorganization 1978: CU–USIA Liaison

Published Sources


Chicago Tribune.


———. The United States and Latin America; Next Steps, a Second Report. New York: Center for Inter-American Relations, 1976


Foreign Affairs.

Foreign Policy.


XVIII  Sources


The Washington Post.
Abbreviations and Terms

AAI, Africa-America Institute
ABC, American Broadcasting Company
AC/D or AC&D, arms control and disarmament
ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
ACLU, American Civil Liberties Union
ACTION, federal agency created by the merger of VISTA and the Peace Corps
ACYPL, American Council of Young Political Leaders
admin., administrative
AF, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
AF or ICA/AF, Office of the Director for African Affairs, International Communication Agency
AFL–CIO, American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations
AGUSA, U.S. International Communication Agency’s “Agriculture USA” Exhibit
AHA, American Historical Association
AIC, Agency for International Communication (proposed name for the International Communication Agency)
AID, Agency for International Development
AIDSAT, international applications demonstration (demonstration of the capabilities of the ATS–6 satellite, undertaken by the Agency for International Development)
ALA, American Library Association
ALSC, Association for Library Service to Children (division of the American Library Association)
Amb., ambassador
AMIDEAST, American Friends of the Middle East (non-profit organization)
Amparts, American Participants (cultural exchanges)
ANPA, American Newspaper Publishers Association
AP, Associated Press
APSA, American Political Science Association
AR or ICA/AR, Office of the Director for American Republics Affairs, International Communication Agency
ARA or ARA/LA, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State/Bureau for Latin America, Agency for International Development
ARBA, American Revolution Bicentennial Administration
ARBC, American Revolution Bicentennial Commission
ARS, Africa Regional Services (source of French language programs for Public Affairs sections at U.S. embassies in Africa)
ASAP, as soon as possible
ASEAN, Association of South East Asian Nations
ASNE, American Society of Newspaper Editors
ATS–6, Applications Technology Satellite-6

B–1, American long-range bomber
BA, Bachelor of Arts
BBC, British Broadcasting Corporation
BFS, Board of Foreign Scholarships
BIB, Board for International Broadcasting
BJ, Barry Jagoda
XXII  Abbreviations and Terms

BNC, bi-national center (USIS)

CA, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Department of State; also circular airgram (USIA)
CACAR, Central America and the Caribbean
CAO, cultural affairs officer
CAT, Conventional Arms Transfer
CB, Charles Bray
CBS, Columbia Broadcasting System
Cc, carbon copy
CCD, Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
CD, Christine Dodson
CF, confidential file
CGIAR, Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
Ch, chair
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
CIEC, Conference on International Economic Cooperation
CIES, Council for International Exchange of Scholars
CINCPAC or USCINCPAC, Commander in Chief, Pacific Command
CITW/TWIC, Columbus in the World: The World in Columbus (Columbus, Ohio-based research study)
CM, Circular Message (USIA)
COB, close of business
COM, chief of mission
COMSAT, communication satellite
Cong. or Cong., Congress; also Congressman
CP, cultural presentation
CPP, Country Plan Program
CPR, Chinese People’s Republic (People’s Republic of China)
CSC, Committee on Scholarly Communication
CSCE, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CTB, Comprehensive Test Ban
CTW, Children’s Television Workshop
CU, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State
CU/EE, Office of Eastern European Programs, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State
CU/EX, Office of the Executive Director, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State
CU/OPP, Office of Policy and Plans, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State
CULCON, U.S.-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Exchange
CV, Cyrus Vance
Cy, copy
CYO, Committee of Youth Organizations

D, Office of the Deputy Secretary of State; also, Democrat
D or ICA/D, Office of the Director, International Communication Agency
D/CT, Office for Combating Terrorism, Office of the Deputy Secretary of State
D/HA, Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Office of the Deputy Secretary of State
D/S or ICA/D/S, Executive Secretariat, Office of the Director, International Communication Agency
D/SO or ICA/D/SO, Operations Center, Executive Secretariat, Office of the Director, International Communication Agency
DA, David Aaron
Abbreviations and Terms XXIII

DBS, direct broadcast satellite
DCM, deputy chief of mission
Dept., Department
Distrib., distribution
DOD, Department of Defense
DSCS II, Defense Communications Satellites
DFL, Minnesota Democratic-Farmer-Labor party
DM, Deutsche Mark

EA, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
EA or ICA/EA, Office of the Director for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, International Communication Agency
EB, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State
EC or USEC, European Community
ECA or ICA/ECA, Associate Directorate for Educational and Cultural Affairs, International Communication Agency
ECA/A or ICA/ECA/A, Academic Programs, Associate Directorate for Educational and Cultural Affairs, International Communication Agency
ECA/FL or ICA/ECA/FL, Libraries, Cultural Centers and Resources, Associate Directorate for Educational and Cultural Affairs, International Communication Agency
ECA/I or ICA/ECA/I, Office of Institutional Relations, Associate Directorate for Educational and Cultural Affairs, International Communication Agency
ECA/IC or ICA/ECA/IC, Cultural Presentations Division, Office of Institutional Relations, Associate Directorate for Educational and Cultural Affairs, International Communication Agency
ECA/IP or ICA/ECA/IP, Private Sectors Program Division, Office of Institutional Relations, Associate Directorate for Educational and Cultural Affairs, International Communication Agency
ECA/PPE or ICA/ECA/PPE, Policy, Planning and Evaluation staff, Associate Directorate for Educational and Cultural Affairs, International Communication Agency
ECON, economic section of an embassy
EDC, European Defense Community
ED.D., Doctorate of Education
EE, Eastern Europe
EPK, Eugene P. Kopp
ERDA, Energy Research and Development Administration
ERW, enhanced radiation warhead
EST, Eastern Standard Time
ETV, educational television
EU or ICA/EU, Office of the Director for European Affairs, International Communication Agency
EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EUR/CE, Office of Central European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EUR/EX, Executive Office, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EUR/SOV, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
Excom, Executive Committee (USIA)
EXDIS, exclusive distribution

4–H, youth organization administered by the National Institute of Food and Agriculture of the Department of Agriculture (the four H’s are head, heart, hands, health)
FAA, Foreign Assistance Act, also, Federal Aviation Administration
FAO, United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
XXIV Abbreviations and Terms

FBIS, Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FOAA, Foreign Relations Authorization Act
FCC, Federal Communications Commission
Fed., federal
FltSatCom, Fleet Satellite Communications System, U.S. Navy
ForMin, foreign minister
FRG, Federal Republic of Germany
FSIO, Foreign Service Information Officer
FSO, Foreign Service Officer
FY, fiscal year
FYI, for your information
G–7, Group of 7 (Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States)
G–77, Group of 77 (group of developing countries established at the conclusion of UNCTAD in 1964)
GA, United Nations General Assembly
GAO, General Accounting Office
GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP, gross domestic product
GMT, Greenwich Mean Time
GOM, Government of Mexico
GNP, gross national product
GS, Gary Sick
GSP, generalized system of preferences
H, Bureau of Congressional Relations, Department of State
HA, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State
HEW or DHEW, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
HFS or HS, Harold F. Schneidman
HHH, Hubert Horatio Humphrey
HIRC, House International Relations Committee
HRCG, Human Rights Coordinating Group (Department of State)
I or USIA/I, Office of the Director, United States Information Agency
I/R or USIA/I/R, Office of the Assistant Director, Public Information, United States Information Agency
I/ISO or USIA/I/ISO, Operations Center, Executive Secretariat, Office of the Director, United States Information Agency
I/SS or USIA/I/SS, Secretariat Staff, Executive Secretariat, Office of the Director, United States Information Agency
IAA or USIA/IAA, Office of the Assistant Director, Africa, United States Information Agency
IBS or USIA/IBS, Office of the Assistant Director, Broadcasting Service, United States Information Agency
ICA or USICA, United States International Communication Agency
ICBM, intercontinental ballistic missile
ICRC, International Committee of the Red Cross
ICS or USIA/ICS, Office of the Assistant Director, Information Center Service, United States Information Agency
IDA, International Development Association
IDCA, International Development Cooperation Agency
IEA or USIA/IEA, Office of the Assistant Director, East Asia and Pacific, United States Information Agency
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IEU</td>
<td>USIA/IEU</td>
<td>Office of the Assistant Director, Europe, United States Information Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFAD</td>
<td></td>
<td>International Fund for Agricultural Development</td>
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<td>IFC</td>
<td></td>
<td>International Finance Corporation</td>
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<td>IFI</td>
<td></td>
<td>international financial institution</td>
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<tr>
<td>IIE</td>
<td></td>
<td>Institute of International Education</td>
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<td>II SR</td>
<td></td>
<td>Institute for International Social Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILA</td>
<td>USIA/ILA</td>
<td>Office of the Assistant Director, Latin America, United States Information Agency</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td></td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IMV</td>
<td>USIA/IMV</td>
<td>Office of the Assistant Director, Motion Pictures and Television Service, United States Information Agency</td>
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<td>INA</td>
<td>USIA/INA</td>
<td>Office of the Assistant Director, North Africa, Near East, and South Asia, United States Information Agency</td>
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<td>INFCE</td>
<td></td>
<td>International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation</td>
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<td>INM</td>
<td></td>
<td>Bureau for International Narcotics Matters, Department of State</td>
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<td>INR</td>
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<td>Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State</td>
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<td>INSAT</td>
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<td>Government of India’s domestic communications satellite system</td>
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<td>Intelsat</td>
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<td>International Telecommunications Satellite Organization</td>
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<td>IO</td>
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<td>information officer, United States Information Agency; also, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State</td>
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<td>IOA</td>
<td>USIA/IOA</td>
<td>Office of the Assistant Director, Administration and Management, United States Information Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOC</td>
<td></td>
<td>International Olympic Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>USIA/IOM</td>
<td>Office of Management, United States Information Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOP</td>
<td>USIA/IOP</td>
<td>Office of Policy and Plans (changed to Planning and Program Direction in late 1977), United States Information Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOP/G</td>
<td>USIA/IOP/G</td>
<td>Policy Guidance Staff, Office of Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOP/M</td>
<td>USIA/IOP/M</td>
<td>Media Reaction Staff, Office of Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOP/P</td>
<td>USIA/IOP/P</td>
<td>Planning and Program Advisory Staff, Office of Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOP/R</td>
<td>USIA/IOP/R</td>
<td>Office of Research, Office of Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOR</td>
<td>USIA/IOR</td>
<td>Office of Research, United States Information Agency</td>
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<td>IOR/DIS</td>
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<td>Data Index System, Office of Research, United States Information Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPI</td>
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<td>International Press Institute</td>
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<td>IPS</td>
<td>USIA/IPS</td>
<td>Office of the Assistant Director, Press and Publications, United States Information Agency</td>
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<td>IPT</td>
<td>USIA/IPT</td>
<td>Office of the Assistant Director, Personnel and Training, United States Information Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>IREX</td>
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<td>International Research and Exchanges Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISRO</td>
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<td>Indian Space Research Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>ITU</td>
<td></td>
<td>International Telecommunication Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td></td>
<td>International Visitors (cultural exchanges)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IVS</td>
<td></td>
<td>International Visitors Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IYC</td>
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<td>UN International Year of the Child</td>
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<td>J or JC</td>
<td></td>
<td>Jimmy Carter</td>
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<tr>
<td>JER</td>
<td></td>
<td>John E. Reinhardt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUSPAO</td>
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<td>Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (South Vietnam)</td>
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<td>KGB</td>
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<td>Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti (State Security Committee)</td>
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XXVI Abbreviations and Terms

Komsomol, youth division, Communist Party of the Soviet Union
kw, kilowatt

LA, Latin America
LBJ, Lyndon Baines Johnson
LDC, lesser developed country
LIMDIS, limited distribution
LOS, Law of the Sea

M, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management
M/MO, Management Operations, Department of State
M–X, missile experimental; intercontinental ballistic missile
M.A., Master of Arts
Mags., magazines
MBFR, Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions
MECEA, Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (Fulbright–Hays Act)
MinEd., Ministry of Education
MIT, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
mm, millimeter
MOU, memorandum of understanding
Mtg., meeting

NAACP, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
NAC, North Atlantic Council
NASA, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC, National Broadcasting Company
NCIV, National Council for International Visitors
NDEA, National Defense Education Act of 1958
NEA, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State; also National Endowment for the Arts
NEH, National Endowment for the Humanities
NET, National Educational Television network
NGO, non-governmental organization
NIH, National Institutes of Health
NODIS, no distribution
NP, nuclear non-proliferation
NPT, nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSC, National Security Council
NSF, National Science Foundation
NSSM, National Security Study Memorandum

O/A, oversize attachment
OAS, Organization of American States
OAU, Organization of African Unity
OBE, overtaken by events
ODA, official development assistance
OE, Office of Education, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OES, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Department of State
OMB, Office of Management and Budget
OPEC, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries  
OTP, Office of Telecommunications Policy (White House)  

P, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; also, President  
P&C, press and culture (either refers to counselor for press and cultural affairs or section of embassy)  
PA, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State  
PA/M, Office of Plans and Management, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State  
PAA, Public Affairs Adviser, Department of State  
Pak, Pakistan  
PAO, public affairs officer  
Para, paragraph  
PARM, Policy Analysis Resource Memorandum  
PBS, Public Broadcasting Service  
PD, Presidential Determination or Directive  
PER, Bureau of Personnel, Department of State  
PGM or ICA/PGM, Associate Directorate for Programs, International Communication Agency  
PGM/D or ICA/PGM/D, Office of Program Coordination and Development, Associate Directorate for Programs, International Communication Agency  
PGM/E or ICA/PGM/E, Director, Exhibits Service, Associate Directorate for Programs, International Communication Agency  
PGM/G or ICA/PGM/G, Policy Staff, Associate Directorate for Programs, International Communication Agency  
PGM/P or ICA/PGM/P, Press and Publications Service, Associate Directorate for Programs, International Communication Agency  
PGM/R or ICA/PGM/R, Office of Research and Evaluation, Associate Directorate for Programs, International Communication Agency  
PGM/REU or ICA/PGM/REU, Europe Research, Office of Research and Evaluation, Associate Directorate for Programs, International Communication Agency  
PGM/RL or ICA/PGM/RL, Agency Library, Office of Research and Evaluation, Associate Directorate for Programs, International Communication Agency  
PGM/T or ICA/PGM/T, Television and Film Service, Associate Directorate for Programs, International Communication Agency  
PH, Paul Henze  
P.L., public law  
PLO, Palestine Liberation Organization  
PM, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State  
POC, Problems of Communism (USIA/USICA publication)  
POL, political section of an embassy  
PPP, post project proposal; also program priority paper  
PRC, People’s Republic of China  
PRCM, Office of People’s Republic of China and Mongolian Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State  
PRM, Presidential Review Memorandum  
PVO, private voluntary organization  

Q&A, question-and-answer  
R, Republican  
R&D, research and development  
RDP, Robert D. Putnam  
Ref, reference  
Reftel, reference telegram
XXVIII  Abbreviations and Terms

Reforger, return of forces to Germany
Rep., Representative
Res, resolution
RFE/RL, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
RG, Record Group
RH, Robert Hunter
RI, Frederick (Rick) Inderfurth
RL, Radio Liberty
RMS, Resource Management System (USIA)
ROK or ROKG, Republic of Korea/Republic of Korea Government
RP, Office of Refugee Programs, Department of State; also Robert Pastor
RSC, Rosalynn Smith Carter; also Regional Service Center (USIA)
S, Office of the Secretary of State; also, Senate
S/P, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
S/PRS, Office of Press Relations, Office of the Secretary, Department of State
S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
S/S–O, Operations Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
SACOHRD, South Asian Committee on Human Rights and Development
SALT, Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
SAT, satellite
SCA, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State
SCC, Special Coordination (or Coordinating) Committee
SCI, science attaché
SE, Southeast
Sec, Secretary
Sen, Senator
SFRC, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
SITE, Satellite Instructional Television Experiment (India)
SLBM, submarine-launched ballistic missile
SOP, standard operating procedure
SSOD, UN Special Session on Disarmament
STADIS, distribution within the Department of State only
Stat., statute
SX–70, type of Polaroid camera
TASS, Telegrafnoe Agenstvo Sovetskogo Soyuza (Telegram Agency of the Soviet Union)
TLC, Trilateral Commission
Telex, switched network of teleprinters
TL, Tony Lake
TNF, theater nuclear forces
TV, television

UAE, United Arab Emirates
UK, United Kingdom
UN, United Nations
UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP, United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
UNGA, United National General Assembly
UNICEF, United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund
UPI, United Press International
US, United States
USA, United States Army; also United States of America
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviations</th>
<th>Terms</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>USAC/IECA</strong>, United States Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs</td>
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<td><strong>USACI</strong> or <strong>IAI/S</strong>, United States Advisory Commission on Information</td>
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<td><strong>USEC</strong>, United States Mission to the European Community</td>
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<td><strong>USG</strong>, United States Government</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>USIA</strong>, United States Information Agency</td>
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<td><strong>USIS</strong>, United States Information Service</td>
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<td><strong>USLO</strong>, United States Liaison Office (Beijing)</td>
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<td><strong>USN</strong>, United States Navy</td>
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<td><strong>USOC</strong>, United States Olympic Committee</td>
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<td><strong>USSR</strong>, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>UTC</strong>, Temps Universel Coordonné (Coordinated Universal Time)</td>
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<td><strong>V–E</strong>, Victory in Europe Day</td>
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<td><strong>VIP</strong>, very important person</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>VISTA</strong>, Volunteers in Service to America</td>
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<td><strong>VOA</strong>, Voice of America</td>
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<td><strong>VPS</strong>, Visitor Program Service</td>
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<td><strong>VTR</strong>, video tape recording</td>
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<td><strong>WAC</strong>, World Affairs Council</td>
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<td><strong>WARC</strong>, World Administrative Radio Conference</td>
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<td><strong>WATCH</strong>, Washington Association for Children and Television</td>
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<td><strong>WC</strong>, Warren Christopher</td>
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<td><strong>WH</strong>, White House</td>
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<td><strong>Wireless File</strong>, daily news service supplied to the field by USIA/USICA</td>
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<td><strong>WR</strong>, Weekly Report</td>
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<td><strong>Z</strong>, Zulu (Greenwich Mean Time)</td>
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<td><strong>ZB</strong>, Zbigniew Brzezinski</td>
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<td><strong>ZBB</strong>, zero-based budgeting</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Persons

Aaron, David L., Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Abshire, David M., chairman, Board for International Broadcasting, from 1975 until 1977; member, Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy (Murphy Commission)

Alger, Chadwick, Professor of Political Science, The Ohio State University, associated with the Kettering Foundation’s “Columbus and the World” project

Ali, Muhammad, American boxer

Ailey, Alvin, dancer and choreographer; founder, Alvin Ailey American Dance Theater

Anderson, Mary Jane, Executive Secretary, Association for Library Service to Children and co-coordinator, USICA Books and Broadcasting for Children international symposium

Arbatov, Georgiy, Director, Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Science, Moscow

Armacost, Michael H., member, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, until 1977; member, National Security Council Staff for East Asia and China from January 1977 until July 1978; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia, Pacific, and Inter-American Affairs from July 1978 until January 1980; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from January 1980

Ashmore, Harry, Pulitzer-Prize winning American journalist

Atherton, Alfred L., Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs until April 13, 1978; U.S. Ambassador at Large from April 11, 1978, until May 22, 1979; U.S. Ambassador to Egypt from July 2, 1979

Baker, Howard, Senator (R-Tennessee)

Bandler, Donald K., Office of African Programs, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State; later, Congressional Relations Officer, Office of Inter-African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State

Barnes, Martha, Children’s Services Consultant, Westchester County Library System, New York; U.S. participant, USICA Books and Broadcasting for Children international symposium

Barrett, Edward W., Dean, Graduate School of Journalism, Columbia University

Bastian, Walter M., Jr., Staff Director, Senate Budget Committee, until 1977; Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Affairs from March 18, 1977, until August 2, 1979; thereafter Administrator of the Agency for International Development

Bennet, William Tapley Jr., former U.S. Ambassador to the Dominican Republic during the Johnson administration and former U.S. Ambassador to Portugal during the Johnson and Nixon administrations; U.S. Ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, from April 26, 1977

XXXII Persons

Berger, Samuel R. (Sandy), member, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, from 1977 until 1979; thereafter Deputy Director, Policy Planning Staff

Bernays, Edward L., President, Edward L. Bernays Foundation

Bernstein, Leonard, American composer and conductor of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra

Biddle, Livingston L., Jr., Chair, National Endowment for the Arts

Bieste, Edward G., Jr., member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-Pennsylvania), until January 3, 1977

Biden, Joseph R., Jr., Senator (D-Delaware)

Blackburn, Paul P., III, Inspector, Office of Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency; Senior Planning Officer, Issues and Plans Staff, Office of Policy and Plans; Senior Planning Officer, Issues and Plans Staff, Associate Directorate for Programs, U.S. International Communication Agency, from 1978; Chief, Fast Policy Guidance Staff, Policy Staffs, Associate Directorate for Programs, from 1979

Blair, William D., Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs

Blosch, Julia Chang, chief minority counsel, Senate Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs until 1977; Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Assistant Director, Africa, United States Information Agency; Deputy Director, Office of the Director for African Affairs, U.S. International Communication Agency, from 1978

Bloquent, Wilbur, Educational Programs Officer, Office of Assistant Director, Motion Pictures and Television Service, United States Information Agency; thereafter Communication and Media Program Officer, Private Sector Programs Division, Associate Directorate for Educational and Cultural Affairs, U.S. International Communication Agency

Blumenthal, W. Michael, Secretary of the Treasury from January 23, 1977, until August 4, 1979

Boorstin, Daniel J., historian; Librarian of Congress

Bradshaw, James, Press and Cultural counselor, U.S. Embassy in Warsaw

Brann, Eva T.H., tutor, St. John’s College; member, U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs

Bray, Charles W., III, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs until 1977; Deputy Director, United States Information Agency and U.S. International Communication Agency; Chairman, Interagency Committee on Public Diplomacy and Disarmament


Bremer, L. Paul, III (Jerry), Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Oslo until 1979; thereafter Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State

Brewster, Kingman, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to the United Kingdom from June 3, 1977

Brezhnev, Leonid I., General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

Brooks, Jack B., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Texas)

Brown, Carroll, Chargé d’Affaires, U.S. Embassy in Warsaw

Brown, Harold, Secretary of Defense

Brzezinski, Zbigniew, adviser to Jimmy Carter during the 1976 campaign; thereafter Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Buchanan, John Hall, Jr., member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-Alabama) until January 3, 1981

Burger, Warren E., Chief Justice of the United States

Burke, J. Herbert, member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-Florida) until January 3, 1979

Burns, James MacGregor, Professor of Government, Williams College and biographer of Franklin D. Roosevelt; later President of the American Political Science Association

Burress, Richard T., lawyer; member, U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs

Butler, Landon, Deputy Assistant to the President

Byrd, Robert C., Senator (D-West Virginia); Senate Majority Leader

Caddell, Patrick H. (Pat), public opinion pollster

Cage, John, American composer, music theorist, and performer

Callaghan, Lord James, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom until May 4, 1979

Cannon, Mark, Special Assistant to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court

Capra, Frank, American film director, producer and writer

Carter, Alan, Assistant Director, Public Information, United States Information Agency until 1977; Associate Director, Office of Policy and Plans (title changed to Deputy Associate Director in late 1977 or early 1978); Acting Deputy Associate Director, Associate Directorate for Programs, U.S. International Communication Agency, from spring 1978; Deputy Associate Director, Associate Directorate for Programs, from mid-1978 until 1979; thereafter, Director for East Asian and Pacific Affairs; member, Interagency Committee on Public Diplomacy and Disarmament

Carter, James Earl, Jr. (Jimmy), President of the United States from January 20, 1977, until January 20, 1981

Carter, Rosalynn, First Lady from January 20, 1977, until January 20, 1981

Carter, W. Hodding, III, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and Department Spokesman from March 25, 1977, until June 30, 1980

Case, Clifford P., Senator (R-New Jersey) until January 3, 1979

Castro Ruz, Fidel, President of the Council of State and President of the Council of Ministers of Cuba

Chatten, Robert L., Assistant Director, Latin America, United States Information Agency from 1977 until 1978; Director for American Republics Affairs, U.S. International Communication Agency from 1978 until 1979

Chapman, Christian A., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State, until 1978; thereafter, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Paris

Christopher, Warren M., Deputy Secretary of State from February 26, 1977, until January 16, 1981

Church, Frank F., Senator (D-Idaho); Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee from January 3, 1979

Clark, Richard C. (Dick), Senator (D-Iowa) until January 3, 1979; Ambassador at Large and U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs from May 1 until November 1, 1979

Cohen, Richard L., Executive Assistant, Office of the Director, United States Information Agency and U.S. International Communication Agency

Conover, Willis C., Jr., host, Voice of America Jazz Hour

Costanza, Margaret (Midge), Assistant to the President for Public Liaison until September 1, 1978

Crespi, Leo P., Deputy Chief for Planning, Attitude and Audience Research Division, Office of Research, United States Information Agency; Deputy Chief for Planning, Attitude and Audience Research Division, Office of Policy and Plans, spring 1978; Deputy Chief, Planning, Office of Research and Evaluation (changed to Office of Research in 1979), Associate Directorate for Programs, U.S. International Communication Agency, from mid-1978 until 1979; Senior Research Adviser, Office of Research, Associate Directorate for Programs, from 1979
XXXIV  Persons

Critchlow, James, Planning and Research Officer, Board for International Broadcasting


Cutler, Lloyd N., White House Counsel from 1979 until 1981

Day, Arthur R., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Dalsimer, Anthony S., Office of African Programs, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State

Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsiao-p’ing), PRC Deputy Premier from 1952 until 1967; Vice Premier of State Council from 1973 until 1974; thereafter, Vice Premier

Derian, Patricia Murphy (Patt), Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Office of the Deputy Secretary of State, from June 10, 1977, until August 17, 1977; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs until January 19, 1981

Diggs, Charles C. Jr., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Michigan), until June 3, 1980

Dizard, Wilson P., Jr., Chief, Planning and Program Advisory Staff, Office of Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency

Dobelle, Evan S., U.S. Chief of Protocol, from 1977 until 1978

Dodson, Christine, Deputy Staff Secretary, National Security Council, until May 1977; Staff Secretary, National Security Council, from May 1977

Donovan, John, Executive Secretary, Children’s Book Council

Duffey, Joseph D., member, Carter-Mondale transition team; Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs from April 8, 1977, until March 21, 1978; thereafter Chairman, National Endowment for the Humanities

Dulles, John Foster, Secretary of State from January 21, 1953, until April 22, 1959

Durham, Deborah, Executive Editor of “The New Voice,” produced by WGBH–TV; U.S. participant, USICA Books and Broadcasting for Children international symposium

Dussault, Phil, International Affairs Division, Office of Management and Budget

Eban, Abba, former Israeli Foreign Minister

Edwards, William Donlon (Don), member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-California); member, House Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights

Eisenhower, Dwight D., President of the United States, from January 20, 1953, until January 20, 1961

Eisenhower, Milton S., President Emeritus, Johns Hopkins University; member, Presidential Study Commission on International Radio Broadcasting (Eisenhower Commission)

Eisele, Albert A., Press Secretary to the Vice President

Eizenstat, Stuart E., President’s Assistant for Domestic Affairs and Policy and Executive Director of the Domestic Council
Engle, Harold E., Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Research, United States Information Agency and also acting Assistant Director for Research; Deputy Assistant Director, Research, Office of Policy and Plans, from early 1978; Acting Assistant Director, Office of Research and Evaluation (changed to Office of Research in 1979), Associate Directorate for Programs, U.S. International Communication Agency from 1978 until 1979

Erb, Guy F., member, National Security Council Staff for International Economics, from September 1977 until January 1980; thereafter, Deputy Director of the International Development Cooperation Agency

Ermarth, Fritz, member, National Security Council Staff for Defense Coordination, from September 1978 until November 1980

Evans, Rowland, syndicated columnist

Ewalt, Larry, Office of Assistant Director, Motion Pictures and Television Service, United States Information Agency

Fallows, James, White House Chief Speechwriter from 1977 until 1979; thereafter Washington Editor, The Atlantic Monthly

Fascell, Dante B., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Florida)

Fasick, J.K., Director, International Division, General Accounting Office

Ferre, Maurice, mayor of Miami

Finch Hoyt, Mary, Press Secretary to the First Lady and East Wing Coordinator

Ford, Gerald R., President of the United States from August 9, 1974, until January 20, 1977

Forster, Clifton B., Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Assistant Director, East Asia and Pacific, United States Information Agency, until 1977; thereafter Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy in Tokyo

Foster, William C., Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, from October 6, 1961, until December 31, 1969

Frankel, Charles, Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs from September 15, 1965, until December 31, 1967; Professor of Philosophy, Columbia University and Director, National Humanities Center, until 1979

Franklin, John Hope, Professor of History, University of Chicago; member, U.S. Advisory Commission on International Communication, Cultural and Educational Affairs from 1979

Fraser Miller, Cynthia J., Special Assistant to the Director, United States Information Agency and U.S. International Communication Agency until mid-1978

Fraser, J. Malcolm, Prime Minister of Australia

Free, Lloyd A., Director, Institute for International Social Research, Princeton University

Frelinghuysen, Peter H.B., member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-New Jersey)


Fulbright, J. William, former Senator (D-Arkansas) and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Fuller, Buckminster, American architect

Funk, Gerald (Jerry), member, National Security Council Staff for North/South Affairs, from December 1978 until January 1981

Gallup, George H. Chairman, American Institute of Public Opinion (The Gallup Poll); member, U.S. Advisory Commission on Information

Gallup, George H. Jr., President, American Institute of Public Opinion (The Gallup Poll)

Gardner, Richard N., adviser to Jimmy Carter during the 1976 presidential campaign; U.S. Ambassador to Italy from March 21, 1977
XXXVI Persons

Garrison, Mark J., Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, from 1974 to 1978; thereafter, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Moscow

Gates, Robert M., Special Assistant to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs from April until December 1979

Giddens, Kenneth R., Assistant Director, Broadcasting Service (Voice of America), United States Information Agency from 1969 until 1977

Giscard d’Estaing, Valéry, President of France

Glass, Michael A., General Counsel, United States Information Agency and U.S. International Communication Agency from 1978

Glenn, John, Senator (D-Ohio)

Griffin, Robert P., Senator (R-Michigan) until January 2, 1979; also Republican Whip until 1977

Griffith, William E., Professor of Government, Tufts University and MIT; adviser to Zbigniew Brzezinski

Gromyko, Andrei A., Soviet Foreign Minister and Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

Gronouski, John A., Postmaster General of the United States, from 1963 until 1965; U.S. Ambassador to Poland from 1965 until 1968; founding Dean, LBJ School of Public Affairs, University of Texas, from 1969 until 1974; Professor of economics and public affairs, LBJ School of Public Affairs, University of Texas, from 1969; member, Presidential Study Commission on International Radio Broadcasting (Eisenhower Commission), from 1972 until 1973; member and chairman, Board for International Broadcasting, from 1977 until 1981

Guillion, Edmund A., Dean, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University; member, Presidential Study Commission on International Radio Broadcasting (Eisenhower Commission); member, Panel on International Information, Education, and Cultural Relations (Stanton Panel)

Habib, Philip C., Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from September 27, 1974, until June 30, 1976; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from June 30, 1976, until April 1, 1978; thereafter Senior Adviser to the Secretary of State on Caribbean Issues; also acting Secretary of State, January 1977

Hackley, Anthony, Planning and Program Advisory Staff, Office of Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency; later, program development officer, Office of Program Coordination and Development, Associate Directorate for Programs, U.S. International Communication Agency

Halsema, James J., Chief, Research Review Staff, Office of Research, United States Information Agency; Technology Planning Staff, Office of Management; Technology Adviser, Management Staffs, Associate Directorate of Management, U.S. International Communication Agency until 1979

Halstead, Thomas A., public affairs adviser, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; member, Interagency Committee on Public Diplomacy and Disarmament

Hanks, Nancy, Chair, National Endowment for the Arts until 1977

Hanson, Joseph O., Advisor for National Security, Planning and Program Advisory Staff, Office of Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency

Harley, William G., former President, National Association of Educational Broadcasters; former Director, Joint Council on Educational Telecommunications; former Chairman, Mass Communications Commission; member, U.S. Delegation to the 19th UNESCO General Conference, 1976

Harrop, William C., U.S. Ambassador to Guinea until July 15, 1977; Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from July 1977 until May 1980; U.S. Ambassador to Kenya from July 10, 1980
Hartman, Arthur A., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from January 8, 1974, until June 8, 1977; U.S. Ambassador to France from July 7, 1977; also acting Secretary of State, February 1977

Hatch, Orrin, Senator (R-Utah)

Hauser, Rita E., lawyer; member, Panel on International Information, Education, and Cultural Relations (Stanton Panel); member and Vice Chair, U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, until 1977; member, Board for International Broadcasting

Haviland, Virginia, Director, Children’s Literature Center, Library of Congress

Hays, John S., Chairman, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and ex officio member, Board for International Broadcasting


Hei, Alan L., Jr., Chief, News and Current Affairs, Office of Assistant Director, Broadcasting Service, United States Information Agency; Chief, News and Current Affairs, Office of Programs, Associate Directorate for Broadcasting, U.S. International Communication Agency from 1978

Henz, Paul B., member, Intelligence Coordination Cluster, National Security Council Staff


Hinton, Deane R., Representative to the European Communities until December 3, 1979; Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs from January 4, 1980

Hirschhorn, Eric L., acting director, International Affairs, Office of Management and Budget; member, President’s Reorganization Project staff

Hitchcock, William K., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs until 1978; also Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs during part of 1977 and 1978

Hite, Richard R., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Interior for Planning, Budget, and Evaluation until 1979; Deputy Associate Director for Intergovernmental Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, from 1979 until 1981

Holbrook, Hal, American actor known for his portrayal of Mark Twain


Hopper, Pauline, Chief, Program Resources Division, Office of International Visitors Programs, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State, until March 1978; Chief, Community Relations Branch, Office of Institutional Relations, Associate Directorate for Educational and Cultural Affairs, U.S. International Communication Agency from March 1978

Hormats, Robert D., member, National Security Council Staff for International Economics until 1977; Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs from 1977 until 1979; Deputy Special Representative for Trade Negotiations from October 1979

Horton, Frank J., member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-New York)

Huang Chen (Huang Zhen), Chief of the PRC Liaison Office in the United States until November 1977; thereafter, Minister of Culture

Huang Hua, PRC Foreign Minister

Humphrey, Hubert H., Jr., Vice President of the United States from January 20, 1965, until January 20, 1969; Senator (DFL-Minnesota) from January 1971 until his death on January 13, 1978

Humphrey, Muriel B., Senator (DFL-Minnesota) from January 25 until November 7, 1978
XXXVIII  Persons

Hunter, Robert E., member, National Security Council Staff for West Europe Affairs, from January 1977 until August 1979; member, Middle East/North Africa Cluster, from September 1979 until January 1981

Huntington, Samuel P., member, National Security Council Staff for National Security Planning, from February 1977 until August 1978; thereafter, Director, Harvard University Center for International Affairs

Huntoon, Elizabeth, Children's Services Specialist, Chicago Public Library; U.S. participant, USICA Books and Broadcasting for Children international symposium

Hutcheson, Richard G. III, White House Staff Secretary

Inderfurth, Karl F. (Rick), Special Assistant to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs from January 1977 until April 1979; Deputy Staff Director, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, from 1979 until 1981

Ilchman, Alice S., Dean of the College, Wellesley College, until March 1978; Associate Director for Educational and Cultural Affairs, U.S. International Communication Agency, from March 1978

Inman, Jerry, Chief, Private Sector Programs Division, Office of Institutional Relations, Associate Directorate for Educational and Cultural Affairs, U.S. International Communication Agency, from late 1978 until 1980; thereafter, Director, Office of Private Sector Programs, Associate Directorate for Educational and Cultural Affairs

Inouye, Daniel K., Senator (D-Hawaii)

Jamieson, Donald, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs until 1979

Jagoda, Barry, media adviser, Carter-Mondale campaign, 1976; thereafter Special Assistant to the President for Media and Public Affairs

Javits, Jacob K., Senator (R-New York) until January 3, 1981

Jenkins, Kempton B., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations and Legislative Officer for Nuclear Non-Proliferation until 1978; staff member, Foreign Service Institute, from 1978 until 1980; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for East-West Trade from 1980; also Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations from 1976 until 1977

John Paul II (Karol Wojtyla), Supreme Pontiff of the Catholic Church and Sovereign of Vatican City from October 16, 1978

Johnson, Lyndon Baines, President of the United States from November 22, 1963, until January 20, 1969

Jones, William M., General Counsel, U.S. House Committee on Government Operations

Jordan, Hamilton, Chair, Carter-Mondale campaign 1976; Assistant to the President from 1977 until July 1979; White House Chief of Staff from July 1979 until June 1980

Kahan, Jerome, Deputy Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State; member, Interagency Committee on Public Diplomacy and Disarmament


Kane, Robert, Director of Athletics, Cornell University, until 1976; President, U.S. Olympic Committee from 1977 until 1981

Katzip, Ephraim, President of Israel until 1978

Kennedy, John F., President of the United States from January 20, 1961, until November 22, 1963


Kissinger, Henry A., former Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs during the Nixon and Ford administrations

Kohler, Foy D., former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union during the Kennedy administration; member, Board for International Broadcasting
Kopp, Eugene P., Deputy Director, United States Information Agency until 1976; acting Director, from 1976 until 1977
Kraft, Timothy E., Special Assistant to the President for Appointments until May 1978; thereafter, Assistant to the President for Political Affairs and Personnel until August 1979

Lake, W. Anthony (Tony), Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
Lance, Thomas Bertram, Director of the Office of Management and Budget from January 24, 1977, until September 24, 1977
Larrabee, F. Stephen, member, National Security Council Staff for USSR/East Europe Affairs, from September 1978 until January 1981
Leach, James A. S., member, U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs; member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-Iowa) from January 3, 1977
Lederer, Leon, Staff Director, Office of Assistant Director, Europe, United States Information Agency
Lewinsohn, Jodie, Assistant Director, Europe, United States Information Agency; Director of European Affairs, U.S. International Communication Agency until 1979
Lewis, Flora, foreign and diplomatic correspondent, The New York Times
Lewis, Hobart, Reader’s Digest Chairman and Editor-in-Chief; member, Executive Committee, Panel on International Information, Education, and Cultural Relations (Stanton Panel); Chair, U. S. Advisory Commission on Information, from 1977 until 1978
Linowitz, Sol M., Ambassador-at-Large and Co-Negotiator, Panama Canal Treaties; Chairman, Presidential Commission on World Hunger; Personal Representative of the President from 1980
Lipshutz, Robert J., White House Counsel from 1977 until 1979
Liu, Theodore, Special Assistant to the Deputy Director, United States Information Agency and U.S. International Communication Agency until late 1979
Long, Loretta, American educator and actor, Sesame Street
Lopez Portillo, Jose, President of Mexico
Lowenstein, Allard K., former member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-New York) and head of Americans for Democratic Action; consultant to the Department of state; head of the U.S. Delegation to the 32nd United Nations Human Rights Commission meeting, from February until March 1977; alternate U.S. Representative to the United Nations for Special Political Affairs from 1977 until 1978
Luers, William H., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs until 1977; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from 1977 until 1978; U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela from October 9, 1978

MacGregor, Clark, former member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-Minnesota)
Mamet, David, American playwright, screenwriter, and director
Manilow, Lewis, lawyer; President, Museum of Contemporary Art of Chicago; member, U.S. Advisory Commission on International Communication, Cultural and Educational Affairs from 1979
Mann, Janenan L., aide to Representative John Buchanan; congressional staff adviser to U.S. delegation to the UN World Conference of the UN Decade for Women
Marcy, Mildred K., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, until March 1978; Director, Office of Institutional Relations, Associate Director for Educational and Cultural Affairs, U.S. International Communication Agency, from March 1978

Marshall, George C., Secretary of State from January 21, 1947, until January 20, 1949; Secretary of Defense from 1950 until 1951

Martin, Louis E., adviser to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson; Special Assistant to the President during the Carter administration

Mason, Dwight N., Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Management until 1980; thereafter Political Counselor, U.S. Embassy in Ottawa

Mathias, Charles M., Jr., Senator (R-Maryland)

Matlock, Jack F., Jr., Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Moscow

McCall, Richard L., Jr., legislative aide to Senator Hubert Humphrey and Senator Muriel Humphrey from 1977 until 1978; professional staff member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, from 1978 until 1979; Deputy Staff Director, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, from 1979 until 1980; Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs from June 10, 1980, until January 21, 1981

McCloy, John J., President, World Bank and International Monetary Fund from 1947 until 1949; U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, from 1949 until 1952; Chair, Chase Manhattan Bank from 1953 until 1960; Chair, Ford Foundation from 1958 until 1965; adviser to numerous presidents

McGee, Gale W., U.S. Ambassador to the Organization of American States

McGovern, George S., Senator (D-South Dakota) until January 3, 1981

McGurn, Barrett, Office of Public Information, United States Supreme Court

McIntyre, James T., Jr., Director, Georgia Office of Planning and Budget until February 1977; Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget, from February until September 1977; acting Director from September 1977 until March 24, 1978; thereafter Director

McKee, Jean, member, U.S. Advisory Commission on International Communication, Cultural and Educational Affairs, from 1979

Mead, Margaret, American cultural anthropologist

Meany, George, President of the AFL–CIO until 1979

Menoz Ledo, Porfirio, Mexican Minister of Education

Meyer, Cord, Jr., Special Assistant to the Deputy Director for Central Intelligence

Meynner, Helen S., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-New Jersey) until January 3, 1979

Michelson, Sig, former Director, CBS Evening News; President, Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty and ex officio member, Board for International Broadcasting, until 1978

Milburn, Beryl B., member, U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, from 1976 until 1977

Mink, Patsy T., member, U.S. House of Representatives until January 3, 1977; Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs from March 28, 1977, until May 1, 1978

Modic, Paul A., Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Assistant Director, Press and Publications Service, United States Information Agency; Deputy for Programs, Office of Assistant Director, Broadcasting Service; Director of Programs, Associate Directorate for Broadcasting, U.S. International Communication Agency, from 1978 until 1980

Mondale, Joan, Second Lady of the United States
Mondale, Walter F. (Fritz), Senator (DFL-Minnesota) until December 30, 1976; Vice President of the United States

Monsen, G., Richard, Assistant Director for Research, United States Information Agency

Morison, Samuel Eliot, Professor of History, Harvard University

Morris, Richard, Professor of History, Columbia University; President of the American Historical Association in 1976

Moore, Frank, Assistant to the President for Congressional Liaison

Moose, Richard M., Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management from March 18 until August 15, 1977; Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from July 6, 1977, until January 16, 1981

Moyers, Bill, White House Press Secretary during the Johnson administration; host, Bill Moyers' Journal (Public Broadcasting Service); editor and chief correspondent, CBS Reports

Murphy, John T., President, AVCO Broadcasting; member, Board for International Broadcasting

Murrow, Edward R., Director of the United States Information Agency, from March 15, 1961 until January 20, 1964

Muskie, Edmund S., Senator (D-Maine) until May 1980; Democratic nominee for Vice President, 1968; Secretary of State from May 8, 1980, until January 18, 1981


Nasser, Gamal Abdel, President of Egypt from June 23, 1956, to September 28, 1970

Nevelson, Louise, American sculptor


Nichols, Robert L., Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Assistant Director, East Asia and Pacific, United States Information Agency; Deputy Director (Southeast Asia and Oceania), Office of the Director for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. International Communication Agency from 1978 until 1979

Nielsen, Arthur C., Jr., President, AC Nielsen Co.; member, U.S. Advisory Commission on Information

Nixon, Richard M., President of the United States from January 20, 1969, until August 9, 1974

Novak, Robert, syndicated columnist

Nowak, Jan, former Director of Polish Broadcasting, Radio Free Europe

Nye, Joseph S., Jr., Deputy Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology until 1979

Nyerere, Julius, President of Tanganyika until country renamed in October 1964; thereafter President of Tanzania

Odom, William E., Lieutenant General, USA; Military Assistant to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs from 1977 until 1981

Oksenberg, Michel (Mike), member, National Security Council Staff for East Asia and China from January 1977 until February 1980

Olason, Victor B., Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Assistant Director, Latin America, United States Information Agency; Deputy Director, Office of the Director for American Republics Affairs, U.S. International Communication Agency, from 1978; Director for American Republics Affairs, from 1979
OLDHAM, Dortch, member, U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, until 1978

OLOM, Louis T., Staff Director, U.S. Advisory Commission on Information until 1978; Staff Director, U.S. Advisory Commission on International Communication, Cultural and Educational Affairs, from 1978 until 1979; Staff Director, U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, from 1979

O’NEILL, Thomas P. (Tip), Jr., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Massachusetts) and Speaker of the House of Representatives

Owen, Lord David, British Foreign Secretary from February 21, 1977, until May 4, 1979


PAHLAVI, Mohammed Reza, Shah of Iran

PASTOR, Robert A., member, National Security Council Staff for North/South Affairs

PASTORE, John O., Senator (D-Rhode Island) until December 28, 1976

PEARSON, James B., Senator (R-Kansas) until December 23, 1978

PELL, Claiborne, Senator (D-Rhode Island)

PERCY, Charles H., Senator (R-Illinois)

PERKINS, James A., former President, Cornell University; Chairman, Presidential Commission on Foreign Language and International Study, from 1978

PEREZ, Carlos Andres, President of Venezuela until March 1979

PETTIGREW, Richard A., Assistant to the President for Reorganization; member, Executive Committee on Reorganization

PEZZULO, Lawrence A., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Affairs, until mid-1977; U.S. Ambassador to Uruguay, from August 10, 1977, until May 29, 1979; U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua from July 31, 1979

PIES, Richard E., Professor of History, Harvard University and Director, Harvard University Russian Research Center

PISANO, Jane, Congressional Liaison Assistant (White House Fellow), National Security Council Staff, from January until August 1977

PISTOR, Michael T.F., Assistant Director, Public Information, United States Information Agency; Director, Congressional and Public Liaison, U.S. International Communication Agency, from 1978 until 1980; thereafter Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy in New Delhi

POWELL, Joseph L., Jr. (Jody), White House Press Secretary

POVICH, Shirley, sports columnist and reporter, The Washington Post

PRESS, Frank, Professor, MIT until June 1, 1977; thereafter, Special Adviser to the President for Science and Technology and Director, White House Office of Science and Technology Policy

PUTNAM, Robert D., Professor, University of Michigan; member, National Security Council Staff, 1978

QUANDT, William B., member, National Security Council Staff for the Middle East and North Africa from January 1977 until August 1979

QUINN, Kenneth A., Special Assistant, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State

QUINN, Thomas Henry, Washington lawyer; member, Board for International Broadcasting

RABIN, Yitzhak, Israeli Prime Minister from 1974 until 1977
Read, Benjamin M., Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management from August 1977 until January 1981 (title changed to Under Secretary of State for Management in October 1978)

Reddy, Leo, Chief, Europe Research, Office of Research, Associate Directorate for Programs, U.S. International Communication Agency


Rentschler, James, member, National Security Council Staff for West Europe Affairs, from October 1978 until January 1981


Richardson, Elliot L., Secretary of Commerce until 1977; Ambassador at Large and head of the U.S. Delegation to the Third Law of the Sea Conference

Richardson, Henry, member, Sub-Saharan Africa, North/South Cluster, National Security Council staff, from February 1977 until November 1978

Richardson, John, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs until March 7, 1977; thereafter President, Freedom House

Richmond, Yale W., Director, Office of Eastern European Programs, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State, until 1978; Deputy (Exchanges), Office of the Director for European Affairs, U.S. International Communication Agency, from 1978

Roberts, John, Secretary of State for Canada until 1979

Roberts, Walter R., Executive Director, Board for International Broadcasting; member, Executive Committee, Panel on International Information, Education, and Cultural Relations (Stanton Panel)

Robison, Olin C., President, Middlebury College; chair, U.S. Advisory Commission on International Communication, Cultural and Educational Affairs, from 1979

Rockefeller, David, banker and philanthropist; founder of the Trilateral Commission

Roche, John P., former special adviser to President Johnson; Professor of Political Science, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University; member, Presidential Study Commission on International Radio Broadcasting (Eisenhower Commission)

Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, President of the United States from March 4, 1933, until April 12, 1945

Roth, Richard L., Director, Office of Policy and Plans, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State, until 1978; Chief, Policy Staff, Associate Directorate for Programs, U.S. International Communication Agency, from 1978

Roy, J. Stapleton, Deputy Director, Office of People’s Republic of China and Mongolia Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State; Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing; Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Beijing

Rusk, Dean, Secretary of State from January 21, 1961, until January 20, 1969; Professor, University of Georgia School of Law from 1970

Russell, McKinney H., Deputy Assistant Director, Office of the Assistant Director, Motion Pictures and Television Service, United States Information Agency until spring 1977; Assistant Director, Motion Pictures and Television Service, from mid-1977 until 1978; Director, Television and Film Service, Associate Directorate for Programs, U.S. International Communication Agency from 1978 until 1979; thereafter Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy in Brasilia

Ryan, Leo J., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-California) until his death on November 18, 1978

al-Sadat, Anwar, President of Egypt
Sakharov, Andrei Dmitrievich, physicist and Soviet dissident; recipient, 1975 Nobel Peace Prize
Sarbanes, Paul S., Senator (D-Maryland)
Saunders, Harold H., Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, until April 10, 1978; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Sayre, Robert M., Inspector General of the Department of State and the Foreign Service until May 1, 1978; U.S. Ambassador to Brazil from June 8, 1978
Schechter, Jerrold, member, Press and Congressional Liaison Office, National Security Council Staff; Press Officer and Associate Press Secretary from January 1977 until February 1980
Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., historian and former Special Assistant to President Kennedy
Schlesinger, James R., Secretary of Defense until November 19, 1975; Secretary of Energy from August 5, 1977, until July 20, 1979
Schmidt, Helmut, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany
Schneiders, Greg, Director, White House Projects
Schneidman, Harold F., Assistant Director, Information Center Service, United States Information Agency until mid-1977; Deputy Director for Policy and Plans, from mid-1977; Acting Associate Director, Planning and Program Direction, spring 1978; Acting Associate Director for Programs, U.S. International Communication Agency, from spring 1978; Associate Director for Programs from mid-1978
Schultze, Charles L., Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
Scott, Robert S., Assistant Director, Motion Pictures and Television Service, United States Information Agency until mid-1977
Shakespeare, Frank J., Director of the United States Information Agency, from February 14, 1969, until February 7, 1973
Sherburne, Neil C., former secretary-treasurer, AFL–CIO Minnesota Federation of Labor; member, Board of Regents, University of Minnesota; member, U.S. Advisory Commission on International Communication, Cultural and Educational Affairs from 1979
Shirley, John William (Jock), Assistant Director, Europe, United States Information Agency until early 1977
Sick, Gary, member, National Security Council Staff for the Middle East and North Africa
Silverman, Stanley M., Agency Budget Officer and Deputy (Budget), Office of Assistant Director, Administration and Management, United States Information Agency; Assistant Director, Budget and Fiscal Services, from 1977 until 1978; Director, Office of Comptroller Services, Associate Directorate for Management, U.S. International Communication Agency, from 1978
Silverstein, Leonard L., attorney; Vice President and Director of the National Symphony; member, U. S. Advisory Commission on International Communication, Cultural and Educational Affairs
Simon, Paul M., Member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Illinois)
Siracusa, Ernest V., U.S. Ambassador to Uruguay until April 22, 1977
Sisco, Joseph J., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs until February 18, 1974; thereafter Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs until June 30, 1976
Slack, John M., Jr., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D–West Virginia) until March 17, 1980; chairman, House Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on State, Justice, Commerce, and the Judiciary

Smith, David, Office of African Programs, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State

Smith, Howard K., co-anchor, ABC Evening News, until 1975; thereafter political analyst and commentator, ABC News


Smith, Paul, Chief, Problems of Communism Branch, Publications Division, Office of Assistant Director, Press and Publications Service, United States Information Agency, until 1978; Chief, Problems of Communism Branch, Publications Division, Press and Publications Service, Associate Directorate for Programs, from 1978

Smith, Red, freelance sports writer

Smith, Wayne S., Principal Officer, U.S. Interests Section at the Swiss Embassy in Havana, Cuba

Smith, William French, member, Panel on International Information, Education, and Cultural Relations (Stanton Panel); member, U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs

Soares, Mario, Prime Minister of Portugal until August 1978

Solmsen, Peter, Advisor on the Arts, Office of International Arts Affairs, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State; Advisor on the Arts, Associate Directorate for Educational and Cultural Affairs, U.S. International Communication Agency

Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr I., Soviet novelist and historian forced into exile

Sonnenfeldt, Helmut, Counselor of the Department of State until February 21, 1977

Sparkman, John J., Senator (D-Alabama); Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, until January 3, 1979

Spielberg, Steven, American film director, screenwriter, and producer

Spevacek, David, budget examiner, State/ICA Branch, International Division, Office of Management and Budget; member, Interagency Committee on Public Diplomacy and Disarmament

Staats, Elmer R., Comptroller General of the United States and Director, General Accounting Office

Stanton, Frank, former President and Vice Chairman of the Columbia Broadcasting System; former chair, U.S. Advisory Commission on Information; chair, Panel on International Information, Education, and Cultural Relations (Stanton Panel)

Stern, Al, member, Domestic Policy Staff

Stoessel, Walter J. Jr., U.S. Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany

Stone, Richard B., (Dick), Senator (D-Florida) until December 31, 1980

Straus, R. Peter, Assistant Director, Broadcasting Service, United States Information Agency in early 1978; Associate Director (VOA), U.S. International Communication Agency until 1979

Straus, Richard, Director, Office of Western European and Canadian Programs, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State, until 1978; Director, Office of Academic Programs, Associate Directorate for Educational and Cultural Affairs, U.S. International Communication Agency, from 1978; Senior Advisor, Associate Directorate for Educational and Cultural Affairs, U.S. International Communication Agency, from 1979

Streibert, Theodore C., Director of the United States Information Agency, from August 5, 1953, until November 15, 1956

Sutton, Francis X., Deputy Vice President, International Division, Ford Foundation
XLVI Persons

Szanton, Peter L., Associate Director for Organization Studies, Office of Management and Budget

Talley, Mae Sue, former publisher, The Arizonan; member, U.S. Advisory Commission on International Communication, Cultural and Educational Affairs, from 1979

Tarnoff, Peter R., Director, Office of Research and Analysis for Western Europe, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, until 1977; Special Assistant to the Secretary and Executive Secretary, Department of State, from April 4, 1977, until February 8, 1981

Tharp, Twyla, American dancer and choreographer; founder, Twyla Tharp Dance troupe

Thayer, Harry E.T., Director, Office of People’s Republic of China and Mongolia Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State, until 1980; Ambassador to Singapore from December 13, 1980

Thompson, James M., Brigadier General, USA, Director, Office of Policy and Plans, International Security Affairs, Department of Defense; member, Interagency Committee on Public Diplomacy and Disarmament

Thornton, Thomas P., member, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, until 1977; thereafter member, National Security Council Staff for North/South Affairs

Thurber, James P., Chief, Policy Guidance Staff, Office of Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency until 1978; Chief, Fast Policy Guidance Staff, Associate Directorate for Programs, U.S. International Communication Agency from March 1978 until mid-1978; thereafter Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy in Islamabad


Toon, Malcom, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union until October 16, 1979

Torrijos Herrera, Omar, Brigadier General, Commander of the Panamanian National Guard from October 11, 1968 until August 1, 1981; Chief of Government of Panama from October 11, 1972 until October 11, 1978

Tower, John, Senator (R-Texas)

Trattner, John H., Director, Office of Press Relations, Department of State, until 1978; Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State, from 1978 until 1979; Executive Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State from 1979 until 1980; thereafter Department Spokesman

Trudeau, Pierre Elliot, Canadian Prime Minister until June 3, 1979, and from March 3, 1980

Truman, Harry S, President of the United States from April 12, 1945, until January 20, 1953

Truett, Cecily, television producer and co-coordinator, USICA Books and Broadcasting for Children international symposium

Tuch, Hans N. (Tom), Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Assistant Director, Broadcasting Service, United States Information Agency until 1978; Deputy Associate Director, Associate Directorate for Broadcasting, U.S. International Communication Agency, from 1978; acting Associate Director (VOA), from 1980

Tuchman Mathews, Jessica, member, National Security Council Staff for Global Issues from January 1977 until June 1979

Vance, Cyrus R., Secretary of State from January 23, 1977, until April 28, 1980

Van Allen, Dirk, Commander, USN; Maritime/UN Negotiations Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff; member, Interagency Committee on Public Diplomacy and Disarmament

Vest, George S., Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, until March 27, 1977; Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from June 16, 1977

Videla, Jorge Rafael, President of Argentina


Villarreal, Marti, Associate Directorate for Educational and Cultural Affairs, U.S. International Communication Agency

Villimarescu, Serban, Associate Director for Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency, 1976

Vogel, Ralph H., Director, Operations Staff, Board of Foreign Scholarships, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State, until 1978; Chief, Board of Foreign Scholarships Staff, Office of Academic Programs, Associate Directorate for Educational and Cultural Affairs, U.S. International Communication Agency, from 1978 until 1979; Chief, Board of Foreign Scholarships Staff, Office of Cultural Centers and Resources, Associate Directorate for Educational and Cultural Affairs, from 1979

Voorde, Frances M. (Fran), White House Director of Scheduling until 1978; thereafter Deputy Appointments Secretary

Walker, Lannon, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs

Warnke, Paul C., Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, from March 14, 1977, until October 31, 1978

Washburn, Abbott M., former Deputy Director, United States Information Agency, from 1954 until 1961; member, Federal Communications Commission, from 1974 until 1982

Wellford, W. Harrison, member, Carter-Mondale Transition team, 1976; Executive Associate Director for Reorganization and Management, Office of Management and Budget, from 1977 until 1981


White, Theodore, journalist and author, *The Making of the President* series

Whitfield, Mal, former Olympic track and field athlete; Regional Sports Officer, United States Information Agency and U.S. International Communication Agency

Wilkinson, Sharon, Office of African Programs, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State

Will, George F., syndicated political columnist

Winkler, Gordon, Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Assistant Director, Press and Publications Service, United States Information Agency until 1978; Director, Press and Publications Service, Associate Directorate for Programs, U.S. International Communication Agency, from 1978 until 1979; Deputy Associate Director, Associate Directorate for Programs from 1979

Winks, Robin W., Professor of History, Yale University

Wisner, Frank G., Deputy Executive Secretary, Department of State


Wolper, David, U.S. television and film producer

Woodcock, Leonard, President, United Auto Workers, until 1977; Chief, U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing, from July 1977 until March 1979; U.S. Ambassador to the People’s Republic of China from March 1979

Wyatt, Lawrence, Special Assistant for International Affairs, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

Young, Andrew J., Jr., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Georgia) until January 29, 1977; U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations from January 30, 1977, until September 23, 1979

Zablocki, Clement J., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Wisconsin); Chairman, House Committee on International Relations
Public Diplomacy

1. Petition Prepared by Employees of the United States Information Agency

Washington, November 3, 1976

Introduction

Those of us who have endorsed this statement speak only for ourselves. We believe our views are shared by many of our colleagues in the Washington elements of USIA and in the 110 countries around the world in which our programs operate. Moreover, we believe this statement represents a positive and reasoned approach to the conduct of American public diplomacy.

We are convinced that the overseas information and cultural programs of our government can be made more responsive and more effective. To that end, we propose redefining the function of USIA, and reorganizing it to support that function.

Much of what we propose is not new. We believe that a realistic and workable public diplomacy can be conducted within the framework of the original mandate set out for the country’s information and cultural programs in the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948:

"... to promote a better understanding of the United States in other countries and to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries." ²

USIA has been largely ignored by the Executive Branch and threatened by the Congress over the past decade. Our accomplishments

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² Reference is to the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (P.L. 80–402), which Truman signed into law on January 27, 1948. The Act, commonly known as the Smith-Mundt Act after Senator H. Alexander Smith (R-New Jersey) and Representative Karl Mundt (R-South Dakota), established guidelines by which the United States conducted public diplomacy overseas.
have come in spite of, rather than because of, those to whom we are accountable. Not surprisingly, our achievements have fallen short of our potential. We believe the time has come to establish realistic goals and to seek the active support of the Administration in providing the leadership and resource stability needed to achieve those goals.

Our statement includes three major recommendations:

- government-wide agreement that the mission of USIA is not to manipulate foreign attitudes, but to seek understanding of American policy as well as the society and values from which it flows;
- acceptance of an operating style characterized by open, frank discussion of issues (including responsible non-government opinion) and the depiction of American society and culture in all its diverse aspects;
- integration of the Department of State’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs into a revitalized, independent USIA.

The Role of USIA

Our Agency was formed in an age when the media were regarded as powerful weapons in the battle for men’s minds. If propaganda could be directed against the enemy in wartime, it was argued, why not use the same means in peacetime to win friends? USIA has long since outgrown that simplistic view. We know that manipulation through international communication fails on two counts: its pursuit represents a naive conception of human nature and a self-defeating contradiction of the values we seek to represent in the world.

We also know that USIA is a comparatively small voice in an increasingly sophisticated and noisy communications environment. Our role must be carefully defined, lest our message be lost in the babble of competing voices.

The basic task of USIA has always been to support American foreign policy. From this mission devolves a responsibility not only for the careful representation of government policies, but also for the candid depiction of American society and values.

In the long run, the response of foreign nations to our policies will be motivated first by their own self-interest, and second by their perception of ours. USIA can sharpen these perceptions and can seek understanding. But we cannot change deep-seated attitudes. Rather than trying to make policy more palatable, we must strive to make it more understandable. And rather than trying to make America more lovable, we must strive to make it more comprehensible.

If this definition of our role as one of representing foreign policy and depicting American society is more modest than the rhetoric of past years, we believe it will lead to a program that is more fruitful.

Although what we say is necessarily limited by our resources, our message must encompass the diversity of our pluralistic society. We
must not fear portraying America as it is. USIA should be expected to present persuasively the Administration’s policies along with responsible non-government opinion, even though such opinion may at times be critical of those policies. Presenting the diversity of American opinion produces long-term benefits which far exceed the occasional short-term risks.

To represent our society and its values with candor and to enunciate the policies of the government with precision, we believe the proper mode of discourse is the dialogue, in the sense suggested by Harry Ashmore: “As opposed to argument or debate, dialogue is not intended to resolve issues, but to clarify and illuminate them. It is essentially a rational exercise by which differences may be narrowed and perception improved.”

We recommend dialogue not because American views will necessarily prevail, but because rational discussion will best ensure their fair exposure in the world marketplace of ideas.

Dialogue involves listening as well as speaking. USIA has traditionally reported on foreign public opinion. We urge that this role continue. Otherwise the dialogue we advocate becomes a monologue—we speak and they listen. Even if government action is infrequently influenced by foreign public opinion, it should at least be heard before policy is formed.

In summary, we urge the promotion of responsible discussion abroad of American policies and purposes, and the repudiation of the sometimes captivating but superficial notion that USIA’s goal should be simply to win friends and influence people. There is, we submit, a considerable difference between responsible and representative public diplomacy (which we advocate) and public relations (which we reject).

**Audiences**

USIA has long been plagued by arguments over whether we should address mass audiences or opinion leaders. We dispute those who would exclude either; the relationship is clearly complementary. Moreover, a nation which represents the Jeffersonian principle of full public participation in decision-making can hardly disavow this ideal abroad by channeling its efforts only to elites. In fact, it is because of our concern with publics outside government that the mission of USIA is fundamentally different from that of the Department of State. However, our interest in communicating with the broadest possible audience must be tempered by budgetary pragmatism and by an awareness of inter-cultural sensitivities.

As a practical matter, mass audiences are accessible, if at all, only through the Voice of America or through materials placed in the indigenous media. With the press, television, and other media in most coun-
tries subject to government control or sanction, placement of all but the least controversial materials is frequently limited. Access to the media in democratic societies is less a question of ideology than of willingness to accept materials from a foreign government, even a friendly one. In each case, access is at the pleasure of the media gatekeepers (e.g., editors, producers, and commentators), with whom we must unquestionably seek to develop a relationship of mutual trust. For unless we first establish a dialogue with those who control the foreign media, we will fail in the broader dialogue between America and the people of other nations.

There are other publics whom we must continue to address because of their pre-eminent role in the development of ideas: scholars, artists, writers, and government officials concerned with education, information, and cultural affairs. We look upon them as essential interpreters in the process of cross-cultural communications.

U.S. officials must also maintain close personal contact with administrators, foreign affairs officials, military officers, and business leaders. However, it is clear that other elements of the American mission abroad—particularly State, Defense, and Commerce—must bear primary responsibility for these relationships. We can often support these contacts with media skills and resources, but our primary concern should remain those audiences with whom we uniquely share a community of interest.

In this information-rich age, we must carefully shape our programs in each country to complement the existing patterns of influence, culture, and communication. This strategy requires both mass communication and personal contact.

Organization and Leadership

USIA has been the subject of a number of studies. The most recent of these is the Stanton Panel Report. While we endorse the Stanton Panel comments on the essentiality of public diplomacy, we disagree with its proposals for reorganization. They would compound the fragmentation that already exists in Washington—the separation of USIA and CU (the State Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs)—and would create fragmentation overseas where none exists.

The purposes of public diplomacy are best served, we believe, by an independent organization combining USIA and CU. USIA already

administers the State Department’s educational and cultural exchange program overseas. Our programming experience has shown that the present distinction between information and cultural programs is arbitrary and awkward. Both relate to policy; both relate to the society we represent.

By bringing USIA and CU together, we can ensure that the dialogue we seek involves the flow of ideas and people to, as well as from, the United States. We are confident that this can be accomplished without violating the Congressional stricture that USIA not be used by any Administration to pursue domestic political goals, nor to mobilize American public opinion in support of Administration objectives.

The Stanton Panel would have USIA join the State Department, with the Voice of America remaining outside as an independent agency. In support of this proposal, the Stanton Panel argued that the differences between association with State and continued independence “are more cosmetic than substantive.” We wish to argue that the differences are substantive indeed, and must follow logically from the definition of USIA’s role. If that role is primarily advocacy of State Department policy, we rightly belong in the Department of State. If, on the other hand, it is the representation of U.S. Government policies and the depiction of American society, it follows that our continued independence must be assured. But neither role is enhanced by the creation of new and overlapping bureaucracies.

We advocate the full integration of CU within a revitalized and rechartered USIA committed to the support of American policy through the exchange of persons and ideas.

There is a second option which we believe is far less desirable, but still preferable to the fragmented organization proposed by the Stanton Panel—combining USIA with all educational and cultural exchange activities in a single inter-cultural communications agency within the Department of State. This position was taken by the State Department which, like USIA, has opposed the Stanton Panel reorganizational recommendations.

Even if the second option is chosen, we believe that VOA should remain closely associated with USIA. But we fear that the State Department, whose primary responsibility is the formulation and execution of American foreign policy, will find itself particularly uncomfortable with an independent news gathering and reporting organization to which the Congress recently granted a charter for news integrity. If USIA becomes an element of the State Department, VOA’s special responsibilities must be protected. And if the redefined role we seek for USIA is accepted, it, too, will need special guarantees.

As representatives of the U.S. Government serving abroad, we do not seek or expect to be exempted from official accountability for our
actions. Since we are part of the American diplomatic mission, our activities may understandably be regarded by others as indicative of the direction of U.S. policy. Where we present, as we must, dissenting voices, they must be identified clearly as such. And we accept the necessity, in sensitive circumstances, to avoid the creation of dangerous confusion over U.S. policy directions.

For this reason, the desire of some employees of the Voice of America for complete and unfettered freedom of action could only be realized were the Voice cut loose from all organizational ties to State or USIA—including access to classified information, the protection and advantages afforded by official status for its employees overseas, and the negotiation for and protection of its overseas transmitters by our embassies.

We think this extreme course inadvisable. VOA is an integral part of our information program. We believe that its employees can perform with journalistic integrity alongside their USIA colleagues, and that the requirement for VOA news to be reliable and authoritative can be further protected if our redefined goals are accepted.

Whatever structure is chosen, we support the goals proposed by the Department of State for strengthening a reorganized international communications organization:

“Encourage respect for America and American policies in our interdependent world. This requires coherent articulation, honest explanation and fidelity to our commitment to individual liberty and cultural diversity.

“Promote interactions which deepen mutual understanding, encourage rationality, and strengthen cooperation among Americans and other peoples.”

We recognize and strongly support the need for organizational change. And we believe that one organization, not two, should be responsible for international communication. Hence, we reject the Stanton Panel proposals to divide the functions of USIA. We endorse the consolidation of public diplomacy within a restructured, independent USIA.

Finally, there is the question of leadership. If caution is the preserve of the State Department, boldness must be that of USIA. The necessary catalyst for successful public diplomacy is leadership which is politically sophisticated, culturally sensitive, experienced in international communications, and dedicated to the pursuit of ideas and the promotion of understanding.

We believe the national interest is best served by a public diplomacy based on dialogue. And we believe the considerable energy and talent of the Agency’s personnel should be directed toward this end.
Kenneth Adler
Juliet C. Antunes
Sheila Austrian
George E. Beams
Jon Beard
Robin A.
Berrington
Paul P. Blackburn
Wilbur T. Blume
Peter F. Brescia
Jerome R. Broadus
Ray H. Burson
Alan Carter
Robert Cattell
Frances Cook
Robin Cook
Robert Conrod
Roger B. Cooper
Charles E.
Courtney
Donald Creager
Dean Curry
Richard H. Curtiss
Judith B. Degnan
John H. De-Viney
Mary Lou
Edmondson
Margaret Eubank
Dean H. Finney
Joel A. Fischman
Richard B. Fitz
Maynard H.
Fourt
Cynthia Fraser
Ethel Freid
Eugene J.
Friedmann
Barry Fulton
Angie Garcia
John D. Garner
Robert R.
Gaudian
James Gavigan
Michael A.
Giuffrida
Carl Hoffman
John H. Hudson
Ronald L.
Humphrey
George Jacobs
John Jacobs
Deanna I.
Johnson
Jack W. Juergens
Lorin A. Jurvis
David K. Krecke
Nancy E. Kincaid
Bonnie L. Kicsic
Robert Knopes
L. Robert Kohls
Ray Komai
Alan Kotok
Alice Lage
Charles J. Lahey
Frank Lattanzi
Pilar Laugel
Leon Lederer
Leslie Lisle
Jeffrey H. Lite
Thomas E.
Mahoney
Sigrid Maitrejean
Jean E. Mammen
Bernie T.
Marquis, Jr.
Louise H. Massoud
B. Ellen Mathews
Elaine M.
McDevitt
Donald E. McNeil
Donald E.
McNertney
June Miller
Paul A. Miller
William J. Miller
Robert P. Milton
Paul Modic
Richard D. Moore
Herwald H.
Morton
Robert Petersen
Wilbert C. Petty
James C. Pollock
Phillip O. Powell
Kenneth G.
Prillaman
Paul J. Rappaport
Roger C. Rasco
Leonard Robock
Harlan F.
Rosacker
Sanders
Rosenblum
Clathan Ross
William B. Royer
Robert R. Ruggiero
Howard H. Russell
John Russell, Jr.
McKinney H. Russell
Arthur F. Salvaterra
Sol Schindler
Alvin Schlossman
Michael Schneider
Seymour L.
Schreiter
Robert S. Scott
E. David Seal
Dennis R. Shaw
Neila Sheahan
Stanley M.
Silverman
Edward A. Silvis
Christopher Snow
Charles S.
Spencer, Jr.
Craig Springer
Diane Stanley
Steven B. Steiner
Frank Strovas
G. Scott Sugden
Richard Suib
Marshall W.S. Swan
John A. Swenson
A. Stephen Telkins
Margaret H. Thome
2. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Director, East Asia and Pacific, United States Information Agency (Forster) to the Acting Director (Kopp)\(^1\)

Washington, January 6, 1977

SUBJECT

United States—EC—Japan Exchanges

In recent months the President and Secretary of State\(^2\) have made specific reference in policy statements to the increasing importance of maintaining effective communication between “the industrialized democracies” on issues of common concern. These issues have fallen primarily in the political-military and economic fields but also cover environmental concerns, energy problems and conceptual differences on arms control and disarmament policies.

President-elect Carter has also repeatedly expressed his interest in such effective communication and has participated actively since 1973 in the “Trilateral” efforts at exchange\(^3\) initiated by Zbigniew Brzezinski. Vance and Blumenthal have also been active participants in these meetings designed to bring ourselves, the EC countries and the Japanese

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of the Director, Executive Secretariat, Secretariat Staff, Correspondence Files, 1973–1980, Entry P–104, Box 109, 7700010–7700019. No classification marking. Copies were sent to IOP and IEU.

\(^2\) Reference is to Ford and Kissinger.

\(^3\) Established in 1973, the Trilateral Commission comprises leaders from the private sector in Japan, Europe, and North America.
closer together on major issues of concern. The objective of the Trilateral Commission (TLC) from the outset has basically been a communication objective and this is why some of us have felt that USIA could play a useful role in contributing to the efforts of this and similar organizations.

In underscoring the need for greater communication on the issues, President Ford and President-elect Carter have referred to the importance of continuing exchanges between North America, Western Europe (EC/OECD) and Japan in Asia in view of their similar interests and concerns, particularly in the security and economic areas. The assumption here is that any breakdown in this communication could have serious consequences in terms of our own policy interests and also from the standpoint of international stability since it would provide potential adversaries with opportunities to exploit differences in advancing their objectives.

The communication problem is now very acute in the case of Japan and the EC over the current trade imbalance problem and a reading of the press in Western Europe and Japan will indicate a certain paranoia on both sides. In a recent statement in Antwerp (November 23) Ambassador Deane Hinton referred to the possibility of a new wave of restrictionism which would not be an answer to concerns over Japanese-European trade imbalances: “What is called for is a balanced recognition by all parties that a problem may exist and a need to be sensitive to the concern of others.”

This brings me to the purpose of this message which is to inform you of current initiatives by USIS in Brussels and Tokyo designed to facilitate more effective communication between ourselves, the EC and Japan on the economic issues of common concern. Our intended audience is the media (economic editors and commentators) and also includes those economic specialists from the academic and other fields who contribute to the media.

Largely as the result of Art Hoffman’s active interest and cooperation in Brussels and good spadework by USIS Tokyo, we now have European and Japanese media leaders interested in a special exchange effort to improve public understanding of the major economic issues with which we are all confronted. Hoffman worked with us to facilitate the recent visit to Brussels of Yasuo Takeyama, influential editor of Nihon Keizai, Japan’s Wall Street Journal. Takeyama was very impressed by the briefings arranged by Hoffman which gave him an entirely new perspective on the gravity of the situation in Europe in relation to Japan’s image in Europe and he returned to Tokyo determined to do something about it.

Good follow-up work by Hoffman and Miller and his staff in Tokyo have now produced these results:
1. The Japan Newspaper Publishers and Editors Association headed by our friend Masaaki Kasagi of CULCON is now proposing a major symposium in Tokyo next fall bringing economic editors and commentators together representing the EC, US and Japan. Kasagi, working closely with Takeyama, will use the new Press Center forum in Tokyo for this symposium.

2. Considering the immediacy of the problems, Kasagi further proposed a preliminary meeting of US, Japanese and European correspondents stationed in Japan late this month which their Foreign Press Center will organize. Hoffman has been invited to attend this meeting which will provide him with an exceptional opportunity to meet Japanese journalists concerned with EC problems.

3. Takeyama, concerned by his findings in Brussels, now plans a series of three seminars sponsored by his paper in Europe working with European editors in a special attempt to communicate more effectively on the current trade issues. The first of these will be on February 10 in Brussels.

4. The EC Information Offices in Brussels and Tokyo and the IPI in London have all expressed keen interest in the exchange proposals and believe they will do much to clear the air on some of the fundamental misunderstandings. Peter Galliner, Director of the IPI, will visit with Hoffman in Brussels this month to discuss European input on the exchanges and Art indicates that the Financial Times may play a role similar to Nihon Keizai’s on symposium sponsorship on the European end.

The above will give you some idea of how fast things are now moving as the result of these USIS initiatives. It may also provide useful background for the upcoming US-Japan Friendship Commission Meeting on January 10, since I believe it is the type of project in which our more pragmatic media, business and Congressional representatives should have a very keen interest. We are dealing here with gut issues rather than some of the frothier aspects of cultural exchange.

3. Editorial Note

In a January 14, 1977, memorandum to Acting Director of the United States Information Agency (USIA) Eugene Kopp, Associate Director for Policy and Plans Walter Bastian indicated that the incoming Carter administration had asked the United States Information Agency “to handle completely the drafting, recording and transmitting to as
many countries as possible, of an approximate three-minute television statement to the world by the President-elect.” Bastian also explained that the videotaping of President-elect Jimmy Carter’s message would take place at Blair House on January 19. “Transmission of the message by satellite,” Bastian continued, “would go out over the next 18 hours so that it would be in the hands of foreign television stations for release at noon on January 20. We have the capability, through satellite transmission, of reaching 79 countries but the final count will depend on how many actually want it.” (National Archives, RG 306, Office of the Director, Executive Secretariat, Secretariat Staff, Correspondence Files, 1973–1980, Entry P–104, Box 113, 7700590–7700599)

In the address taped on January 19, President-elect Carter reinforced the themes he planned to emphasize during his January 20 inaugural address:

“I have chosen the occasion of my inauguration as President to speak not only to my own countrymen—which is traditional—but also to you, citizens of the world who did not participate in our election but who will nevertheless be affected by my decisions.

“I also believe that as friends you are entitled to know how the power and influence of the United States will be exercised by its new Government.

“I want to assure you that the relations of the United States with the other countries and peoples of the world will be guided during my own administration by our desire to shape a world order that is more responsive to human aspirations. The United States will meet its obligation to help create a stable, just, and peaceful world order.

“We will not seek to dominate nor dictate to others. As we Americans have concluded one chapter in our Nation’s history and are beginning to work on another, we have, I believe, acquired a more mature perspective on the problems of the world. It is a perspective which recognizes the fact that we alone do not have all the answers to the world’s problems.

“The United States alone cannot lift from the world the terrifying specter of nuclear destruction. We can and will work with others to do so.

“The United States alone cannot guarantee the basic right of every human being to be free of poverty and hunger and disease and political repression. We can and will cooperate with others in combating these enemies of mankind.

“The United States alone cannot ensure an equitable development of the world resources or the proper safeguarding of the world’s environment. But we can and will join with others in this work.

“The United States can and will take the lead in such efforts.
“In these endeavors we need your help, and we offer ours. We need your experience; we need your wisdom.

“We need your active participation in a joint effort to move the reality of the world closer to the ideals of human freedom and dignity.

“As friends, you can depend on the United States to be in the forefront of the search for world peace. You can depend on the United States to remain steadfast in its commitment to human freedom and liberty. And you can also depend on the United States to be sensitive to your own concerns and aspirations, to welcome your advice, to do its utmost to resolve international differences in a spirit of cooperation.

“The problems of the world will not be easily resolved. Yet the well-being of each and every one of us—indeed our mutual survival—depends on their resolution. As President of the United States I can assure you that we intend to do our part. I ask you to join us in a common effort based on mutual trust and mutual respect.

“Thank you.”

The United States Information Agency distributed the address to 26 countries on January 20. (Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book I, pages 4–5)

The United States Information Agency also planned to distribute other media products designed to educate foreign audiences about the new presidential administration. In telegram 17356 to multiple diplomatic and consular posts, January 26, the Department of State described USIA’s Transition ‘77 film program:

“1. The first installment of Transition ‘77, USIA’s four-part film/VTR series which will introduce the new administration will be ready for shipment early in February. It will describe the role of the Carter White House in formulating and coordinating policies of the U.S. Government and introduce members of the White House staff who will figure prominently in international policy matters.

“2. On January 27, an IMV team is scheduled to tape interviews conducted in the White House by noted commentator Edward P. Morgan with Zbigniew Brzezinski, Hamilton Jordan, Bert Lance, Robert Lipshutz, Jody Powell and Charles Schultze. The first program will consist of excerpts from these interviews, filmed segments of the White House working environment, and commentary by Mr. Morgan.

“3. Subsequent programs in this series will focus on the Cabinet, White House/congressional relations, and on foreign policy. Our aim is to complete the series by April.”

(National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770028–0194)

For additional information about the Transition ‘77 program, see Document 20.
Washington, January 24, 1977

SUBJECT
Periodic Public Opinion Surveys

To gauge the climate of public opinion abroad in which the Agency will try to promote understanding of the new administration’s policies and objectives, IOR—in conjunction with IOP and IEU—proposes to carry out a multi-country European survey shortly after the President’s inaugural address. Since the Agency has a continuing need as well as responsibility to follow trends in foreign public opinion, on issues of importance to the United States, we propose to follow up this survey with brief opinion polls conducted on a regular semi-annual schedule in Western Europe and Japan and, from time to time, in Canada and selected Latin American countries.2

Such studies have been conducted irregularly in recent years, with the result that there are gaps in our knowledge of foreign opinion trends. We have also found, when opinion polls are not conducted regularly, that the Agency is vulnerable to charges of political motivation in the scheduling of a survey at a particular time. The use of regular periodic surveys will avoid these problems and will serve basic Agency needs in providing useful insights into foreign opinion on current issues.3

The research tool employed in such studies is the so-called “rider” survey. It comprises roughly a dozen questions piggy-backed on ongoing national polls taken by leading commercial contractors. These riders are an integral and established part of the Agency’s research program and supplement rather than replace more comprehensive attitude surveys tailored for a special audience and special needs. Of course, the

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of the Director, Executive Secretariat, Secretariat Staff, Correspondence Files, 1973–1980, Entry P–104, Box 109, 7700140–7700149. No classification marking. A copy was sent to Kopp. Concurred in by Vallimarescu and Shirley, who did not initial the memorandum.

2 Kopp underlined the portion of the sentence beginning with “we” and placed an asterisk in the left-hand margin next to it. At the end of the first page of the memorandum, corresponding to the asterisk, Kopp wrote: “See Reinhardt note—no follow-up polls w/o clearing w him. epk.”

3 Kopp underlined “The use of regular periodic surveys will avoid these problems,” wrote “doubtful” in the left-hand margin next to it, drew a line from “doubtful,” and added: “the leakers will still leak!” in the margin below the paragraph.
prior approval of the State Department and the Embassies must be obtained for each survey.

The proposed February survey is tentatively planned for the four major West European countries, augmented by the Netherlands and Norway as representative of smaller NATO member states. The thrust of the inquiry will be to identify those perceptions and expectations of the incoming U.S. administration that are overriding in European public opinion, as distinguished from leadership and media opinion. Within that compass, the focus will be on Atlantic security and international economic concerns to coincide with the administration’s priority issues. In this sense, and indeed in its broad perspective as well, the survey results should provide unique information useful beyond purely Agency interests.\(^4\)

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\(^4\) In the margin below this paragraph, Reinhardt wrote: “no objections to the survey part, but Mr. Kopp should make the decision. Request that you not make long-range commitments for polls without further [unclear].” Kopp underlined the portion of Reinhardt’s comments beginning with “Request.” He also wrote “epk 1/26/77” on the approval line and added “with noted limitation” above it. Reinhardt’s secretary Patricia Siemien wrote below Reinhardt’s comments: “1/26/77 Called to Aseneth [Blackwell] in Monsen’s office. P.S.”

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5. **Report Prepared in the Office of Research, United States Information Agency\(^1\)**

S–1–77 Washington, January 28, 1977

*Introduction*

The present paper is one of two embodying a review of indications from surveys abroad from 1955 to 1976 that bear upon foreign perceptions of U.S. military strength and foreign opinion on issues relating to arms control.

The objectives of these papers are to contribute guidance for Agency programming to the degree that available information is still

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applicable, and guidance to Agency research as to where more current measurements are desirable.

Brief comments on some of the major indications are included below, not as in any sense firm conclusions, but in the interest of stimulating thought on the meaning of the data and their program implications.

Some Comments and Program Implications

The available indications from surveys taken abroad in recent years would seem to point to a declining trend in the U.S. strength image compared to that of the U.S.S.R. But it is important to appreciate that most of the evidence is in the form of anticipations expressed in the past about the state of affairs in the future. Needless to say, perceptions of actual U.S. strength at the present time may differ from past anticipations. Accordingly, updated measurements of current perceptions are pressingly needed before coming to any hard and fast conclusions about how opinion on U.S. strength compares with that of the Soviet Union.

Perhaps the primary program suggestion that emerges from the present review of foreign perceptions of U.S. strength is that in any efforts to enhance an image of preeminence the emphasis in program output should be less on nuclear strength or even military strength, and more on overall power. It is in this most generalized view that the U.S. apparently stands best vis-a-vis its principal adversaries. With such factors as economic strength, technological strength and political influence in the balance U.S. might looms larger in foreign perceptions than in a narrower focus upon military or strategic capabilities.

In regard to preferences expressed abroad for U.S. vs. Soviet superiority in strength it would seem at first blush that it can only be considered an adverse reflection on the U.S. to find that even among its closest allies the predominant preference is not for U.S. superiority but rather for equality with the U.S.S.R. Such judgments would seem to suggest a lack of trust in the U.S. to use a preponderance of power in ways that serve the best interests of its allies. But while there is some evidence for such negative sentiments it is far from the whole story. Exploration of the reasons voiced in the present connection suggest that in the minds of many security is best assured by parity. The superiority of one side means the inferiority of the other, and efforts to catch up tend to perpetuate an arms race. Parity means greater stability and can be the basis of arms control and disarmament.

In any case, whatever the adverse connotations in some respects, preference for U.S.–U.S.S.R. equivalence in strength would seem to have its advantageous side at the present time. It suggests that foreign public opinion is not only predominantly prepared to accept but indeed
to applaud equality in U.S. and Soviet strength. If parity is the state of affairs to which the U.S. must reconcile itself, it is reassuring to know that such a position is not likely to result in widespread concern and trepidation among the peoples of the Free World.

There is a further thought here in regard to Agency programming. If the U.S. must settle for parity with the U.S.S.R. in strength it obviously best serves U.S. interests to represent such a situation as less a course that the U.S. has had thrust upon it and more a course that it has chosen. The U.S. could thus represent the decision as reflecting the arguments already described that appeal to many abroad—that parity means greater stability and is a better basis for negotiations in arms control and disarmament.

But whatever the advantages of parity there is the disturbing possibility brought to light in the survey data that perceptions of less than U.S. preeminence in strength in the future may be approved, but at the same time be accompanied by lesser respect for the U.S. and lesser confidence in its leadership in foreign affairs. This is a serious finding if true. But before such a bleak conclusion is accepted much more confirmation is needed. The strength question upon which this analysis was based was of the “who’s strongest” variety and did not explicitly deal with the position of U.S.–U.S.S.R. equivalence. Thus further exploration is needed to see whether those who specifically affirm an equivalence of U.S. and Soviet strength have any less respect for and confidence in the U.S. than those who envision continued U.S. superiority in the future.

The effects of Sputnik I\(^2\) and subsequent U.S.S.R. space achievements in elevating perceptions of Soviet strength, nuclear and otherwise, is clearly a thing of the past. It is fair to presume since the moon landing that any spinoff from space spectacles works more to U.S. advantage. On the other hand the explosion of the Soviet superbomb in 1961,\(^3\) if less than its initial impact, has no doubt contributed to some enduring beliefs in larger Soviet weapons. How important a 100 megaton bomb may appear, however, when lesser bombs are already so overwhelming may be questioned. So possibly U.S. emphasis on numbers and accuracy is probably well advised in enhancing appreciation of U.S. capabilities.

All in all, it should not be presumed that the U.S.S.R. is perceived as ahead of the U.S. at the present time in nuclear strength. While the largest proportion of the public abroad is likely to perceive an

\(^2\) Reference is to the first artificial Earth satellite, launched into orbit by the Soviet Union on October 4, 1957.

\(^3\) Reference is presumably to Soviet detonation of a 50 megaton nuclear device on October 30, 1961.
approximate standoff, especially in view of repeated American statements affirming equivalence, it well may be that among those believing otherwise the U.S. continues to hold the edge it manifested when last measured in mid-1972.

Finally, not the least food for thought in the survey indications are Lloyd Free’s findings in the IISR surveys of 1968 and 1974 that all the great powers have sagged somewhat in perceptions of strength in absolute terms. This does not necessarily affect perceptions of relative or comparative strength. But it can suggest a diminished importance in public opinion of the question of who’s ahead in a world where lesser countries are having a progressively larger influence in world affairs.

[Omitted here are sections I: Perceptions of Comparative Strength; II: Some Possible Consequences of Perceptions of Declining Superiority in U.S. Strength; III: Long Term Trends in Perceptions of Comparative Strength; and Annex: The Image of America’s Future in Foreign Public Opinion: II. America’s Future Standing As the World’s Strongest Power (USIA Report, July 1973).]

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4 Free and Princeton University psychology professor Hadley Cantril established the Institute for International Social Research at Princeton; Free served as its director.

6. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Director, Motion Pictures and Television Service, United States Information Agency (Scott) to the Acting Director (Kopp)1

Washington, February 3, 1977

SUBJECT
Prestige Film Showing in Warsaw

American Embassy Warsaw Press and Cultural Counselor James Bradshaw reported January 26 (Warsaw 0617–C)2 on the highly successful and effective showing of the feature film ONE FLEW OVER THE

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2 Attached but not printed.
CUCKOO’S NEST³ (United Artists) January 25 in Warsaw. The host was Charge d’Affairs Carroll Brown. The audience of “more than 500 invited guests . . . included many distinguished representatives of government, media, and the arts. Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Romauld Spasowski, Chief of the Foreign Minister’s cabinet Alojusz Bartoskek and many foreign ambassadors were present”.

The Embassy reports it was flooded with calls for invitations to the screening and “many who had been unsuccessful showed up at the theater anyhow, and after everyone else was seated, those at the door were allowed to stand at the rear of the theater or sit in the aisles”. The Polish and diplomatic audience heaped “superlatives” on the film, not only for its artistic merit (“This film should get all the Oscars in the world”), but (in the Embassy’s judgment) for “. . . its deeper philosophical implications,” which were readily grasped by the audience and characterized by an important Polish film director who said, “This is a film about us. You have to be from this part of the world (referring to film director Milos Forman) to make such a film—in America”.

Aside from the impressive effect of CUCKOO’S NEST on the audience as a cinematic tour de force, the Embassy foresees a “multiplier effect” in pressure on the Polish authorities to obtain the film for public showing. The anticipated refusal of Polish authorities to import it for public release would “demonstrate another dimension to the Polish (government) claims about importing so many Western films: that such acquisition is selective and politically regulated and not determined by any artistic merit”.

The Embassy has followed this message with a new request, to show the film at a second invited program for Polish psychiatrists. Permission has been requested from United Artists.⁴

CUCKOO’S NEST was obtained by IMV as part of a continuing program in cooperation with the motion picture industry and the Motion Picture Association of America to provide important feature films for ambassadorial screenings, principally in East Europe and Peking.

³ Reference is to the Oscar-award winning 1975 film, starring Jack Nicholson and Louise Fletcher, based on the 1962 novel written by Ken Kesey.

⁴ In telegram 660 from Warsaw, January 27, Bradshaw stated that Brown had proposed an additional screening of the film to accommodate members of the Polish Psychiatric Association and others unable to attend the first screening of the film. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770029–1171)
7. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter

Washington, February 10, 1977

SUBJECT

International Exchange of Persons

When we met on January 27, you recalled your visit to Latin America in 1972 and you expressed your high regard for programs which give individual Americans an opportunity to become acquainted with other cultures and societies.

We understand that your visit to Latin America was arranged by Partners of the Americas, an organization which has been highly successful in promoting exchanges with Latin America. Currently, 30 state Governors serve as honorary chairmen of “partnerships” between their states and countries of Latin America. The Governors are asked to promote new ties and strengthen existing linkages, and their visits

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1 Source: Carter Library, Office of the Staff Secretary, Handwriting File, Presidential File, Box 9, 2/24/77. No classification marking. Under an undated covering memorandum, which Aaron initialed, Brzezinski sent the President a copy of Vance’s memorandum. (Ibid.) The President wrote: “cc Rosalynn” in the top right-hand corner of Brzezinski’s memorandum. Attached to these memoranda are a February 24 note from Hutcheson to Brzezinski indicating that the copies of both memoranda were forwarded to Brzezinski for his information and a handwritten note by Inderfurth: “cc Brz also RSC—if we haven’t already sent her one—I believe we have.” (Ibid.) Copies of both Brzezinski’s and Vance’s memoranda are also in the Carter Library, White House Central Files, Subject File, Foreign Affairs, Information-Exchange Activities, Executive, Box FO–35, FO–5 1/20/77–9/30/77. A notation on the copy of Brzezinski’s memorandum in this file indicates that the Vance memorandum and the Brzezinski covering memorandum were sent to Carter on February 22.

2 The President met with Vance, Christopher, Benson, and Habib in the Oval Office from 2 until 2:30 p.m. on January 27. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary) No record of this conversation has been found.

3 Carter recalled his 1972 trip in his 1975 book entitled Why Not the Best?: “We have a sister state in Brazil named Pernambuco. After Rosalynn and I visited its capital city of Recife in 1972, we helped to arrange for an annual exchange of private citizens between the two states. Each year a planeload of about 200 Georgians fly to Pernambuco and a similar number of Pernambucans come to visit us. All of these visitors live for a couple of weeks in private homes and participate in a series of special events designed to teach them about the character and customs of their hosts. This has been an exciting experience for hundreds of our people and has reminded us anew that we share one world where peace and friendship can be a natural part of international life.” (Carter, Why Not the Best?, pp. 124–125)

4 Established within the Agency for International Development (AID) in 1964 as Partners of the Alliance, the organization coordinated “people-to-people” exchanges as part of the larger Alliance for Progress. During the Nixon administration, Partners of the Alliance became a private sector organization and assumed the name Partners of the Americas.
to the Partner country are a key element in this program. With the assistance of the Governors, the Partners help encourage mutual trade and investment, educational exchanges, involvement by other private U.S. organizations, developmental programs in agriculture, nutrition and health, and assistance in international disaster relief emergencies. As part of this comprehensive program, six other state Governors also visited Latin America during the past seven years.

The Partners is one of many such programs to which the Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs provides funds and assistance, pursuant to the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchanges Act of 1961 (Fulbright-Hays). Under the Act the Department seeks to strengthen patterns of two-way communication in order to increase mutual understanding and sense of community between the people of the United States and other countries throughout the world.

Listed below are some examples of similar programs funded partially or wholly by the Department. The FY 1978 budget request to Congress provides $70.5 million for continuation and slight expansion of these cultural exchange activities.

—The National Governors’ Conference conducts annual exchanges of State Governors with the Soviet Union and Japan. U.S. Governors travel to these countries in one year, and Soviet and Japanese delegations visit here the following year. In the latest round of these exchanges, we are extending an invitation to a group of eight Soviet Republic officials to visit here in July. The Governors’ Conference has also arranged occasional visits to other countries, including the People’s Republic of China in 1974.

—The U.S. Conference of Mayors and the League of Cities similarly exchange visits with mayors of the Soviet Union and Poland. In the most recent exchange the mayors of Dayton, Denver, Lincoln (Nebraska), and Spokane spent two weeks in the Soviet Union last November meeting with local government officials in that country.

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5 Kennedy signed into law P.L. 87–256 (75 Stat. 527), the Fulbright–Hays Act, on September 21, 1961. The Act consolidated earlier legislation on cultural and educational exchanges.

6 In April 1974, the White House announced that six governors—Marvin Mandel (D-Maryland), Calvin Rampton (D-Utah), Philip W. Noel (D-Rhode Island), Daniel J. Evans (R-Washington), Arch A. Moore, Jr., (R-West Virginia), and Robert D. Ray (R-Iowa)—had been invited to tour China that May. The National Governors Association had selected the six governors after consulting with White House and Department of State officials. (Karlyn Barker, “Mandel Invited for 10-Day China Tour,” The Washington Post, April 27, 1974, p. A3)

7 James H. McGee, William H. McNichols, Jr., Helen Boosalis, and David H. Rodgers, respectively.
—The Town Affiliation Association arranges direct exchanges between U.S. and foreign cities. Currently 610 U.S. cities and 800 cities in 76 countries have “sister city” relationships which organize a broad range of programs between the people and institutions of the participating cities.

—The American Council of Young Political Leaders conducts exchanges of young political leaders with the Soviet Union, Western and Eastern Europe, East Asia and Latin America. Two delegations of 12 Americans—6 Democrats and 6 Republicans, all under age 40—visit the Soviet Union each year for 18 days, five of which are spent in a seminar with young Soviet political leaders. In exchange, two groups of Soviets also visit the U.S. for a similar program. The participants on the U.S. side are active in politics on the federal, state and local levels. Since its inception in 1972, more than 150 persons have participated on each side. The U.S. Youth Council conducts similar exchanges with Western Europe, the Middle East and Africa.

—In the Middle East and South Asia the National 4-H Foundation and the Farmers and World Affairs have arranged exchanges of farm youth and farm families during the past ten years. Americans and foreign participants live with farm families, travel widely and exchange experiences with large numbers of people. In 1976, 4-H established a young farmers exchange with the Soviet Union.

—The Department partially supports three private programs which each year send American high school students abroad for a year and receive foreign students in the United States. Participants live with host families and attend local schools. More than 6,000 foreign and 3,000 U.S. students participate each year under programs conducted by the American Field Service, Youth for Understanding, and the Experiment in International Living.

—The African-American Institute, a Washington-based organization under contract to the Department, is planning to send 20 U.S. elected state and local government officials to Africa this summer for 30-day visits.

—The Department of State’s International Visitor Program is a central aspect of our people-to-people activity. Under it, each year we bring more than 2,000 foreign leaders to the United States for visits of approximately 30 days. The International Visitors spend several days in Washington and visit other cities in the United States according to their professional interests, meeting and exchanging views with U.S. counterparts.

—Home hospitality is provided these officially invited visitors by such organizations as the Atlanta Council for International Visitors, one of 90 local organizations throughout the United States which cooperate with the Department. More than 100,000 volunteers in these organiza-
tions help arrange programs in their communities, provide local transportation, and receive the visitors in their homes. Most International Visitors welcome the opportunity to see how Americans live in their homes, and they describe home hospitality as the high point of their visits.

—The Department also promotes improved two-way links with foreign countries through the Fulbright academic exchange program which it administers. Each year approximately 3,000 U.S. and foreign students, research scholars, teachers and lecturers are exchanged with over 100 countries. In Western Europe, our Allies consider these programs of great importance and share their funding with us on an approximately equal basis. Through these programs we are able to take cognizance of the long-range needs of the industrial democracies in the sciences, arts and humanities, and to help establish permanent linkages between centers of higher learning. Academic exchanges are also conducted with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. As a result, there is a new generation of scholars who have lived and studied here and abroad, and thereby have a better understanding of other countries, and their own.

I will ask Joe Duffey to review these programs to see whether there is more that we can and should be doing in the areas described above. Joe will also be seeing Reverend Wayne Smith of Atlanta here in Washington on Friday, February 11, to discuss the “Friendship Force” concept.¹

¹ The President announced the establishment of the Friendship Force program during a March 1 White House dinner, honoring governors attending the National Governors’ Conference winter session. Referencing his 1972 trip, Carter stated: “It was a tremendous exhibition of the yearning of people in another country who spoke Portuguese—one of the Georgians spoke Portuguese—to learn about us and for us to learn about them. So we’re going to try to do this on a nationwide basis and ask those of you who are interested, either the Governors or their spouses, to be thinking about it, and later on you’ll get a letter concerning it. And perhaps your own State this first year would like to just take one airplane, and we’ve asked the State Department to give us advice. And we would like to have somebody go, maybe a couple of hundred folks go from, say, Idaho, to perhaps Morocco, and let 200 Moroccans come back.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book I, p. 270) Carter also explained that Smith “was the one who had the idea for our first exchange. And he’s going to just volunteer to kind of coordinate the whole effort.” (Ibid.)
8. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the United States Information Agency and the Department of State

Moscow, February 14, 1977, 1710Z

2122. Subject: TASS Continues Attack on VOA and USIA. Ref: (A) Moscow 2004, (B) Moscow 2042, (C) Moscow 2043, Exdis.

1. Hard on the heels of Goncharov’s attack on VOA carried by TASS February 10 and reported ref tel A, there appeared February 11 another (unsigned) commentary on the TASS wire datelined Washington and again singling out VOA, and this time USIA as well, for particular vilification.

2. Entitled “Confrontation in the USA”, the February 11 item ostensibly concerns itself with “a sharp confrontation” in the United States between “the forces of reaction and militarism” on one side and “broad public forces which realize how senseless and dangerous is the arms race” on the side of the angels. As such, this would be just another piece of TASS boilerplate on the “myth of the Soviet threat” were it not for its particular focus on USIA and VOA.

3. In setting the stage for its eventual presentation of the view of participants in a Washington seminar sponsored by a so-called “Coalition for a New Foreign Policy,” the TASS piece claims that enemies of detente in the West have been and still are carrying on “a fierce political and ideological struggle against the basic propositions and

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770052–0417. Limited Official Use; Priority. Sent for information to Leningrad.

2 In telegram 2004 from Moscow, February 11, the Embassy reported on Vladimir Goncharov’s analysis, noting that it contained the “strongest and most pointed criticism of Voice of America broadcasts in recent memory.” The Embassy concluded, “TASS and by direct implication those who set TASS policy clearly upset over very thorough Western treatment of human rights situation in USSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, et. al. By jumping on VOA, however, rather than usual bêtes noire RL and RFE (no other station is mentioned by name in piece) Soviets seem to be saying they particularly irked by emphasis given this subject on VOA Russian service.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770049–1149)

3 In telegram 2042 from Moscow, February 12, the Embassy summarized an article appearing in the February 12 issue of Pravda, entitled “What is Concealed Behind the Clamor About ‘Human Rights’.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770051–0436)

4 In telegram 2043 from Moscow, February 13, the Embassy provided an assessment of human rights in the Soviet Union. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770051–0508)

5 Reference is presumably to the Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy, a lobbying organization for peace and social justice issues.
the fundamentals of the (Helsinki) Final Act.\footnote{Reference is to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Final Act, or Helsinki Accords, comprised of four “baskets” or categories. For the text of the Final Act, signed on August 1, 1975, see Department of State Bulletin, September 1, 1975, pp. 323–350.} Not only for export, this campaign is allegedly also directed against Americans themselves, “poisoning their minds from year to year with anti-Soviet propaganda.”

4. To carry this “rabid anti-Soviet and anti-Communist campaign abroad,” these enemies of detente make use of “state bodies, such as the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), acting as a coordinating center of anti-Soviet propaganda, and the Agency-directed ‘Voice of America’,” as well as the expected Pentagon and CIA “misinformation services” and professional anti-Sovietists.”

5. With that off its chest, TASS devotes much of the remainder of the story to the Coalition for a New Foreign Policy” conference, citing “Professor J. Stone, the Director of the American Scientists Federation” (sic), Dr. A.M. Cox of the Brookings Institution, and Professor E. Revenal of Johns Hopkins University. All, of course, are quoted in pithy statements about the non-existence of any Soviet threat and needless American defense expenditures. Finally, the piece refers to a “peoples action group” petition against funding the B–1 bomber.

6. Comment: Coupled with the February 10 TASS commentary, this latest criticism of USIA-cum-VOA provides supporting fire for the main attack launched in the February 12 issue of Pravda (reported refs B and C). Although human rights are not mentioned in the February 11 TASS piece, the familiar charges of anti-Sovietism and “anti-Helsinki-ism” are. VOA, which on February 10 was “hostile” and “interfering in the internal affairs” of the USSR, by February 11 had become an arm of the “coordinating center of anti-Soviet propaganda.” That “center”, USIA, was singled out for the first direct attack in the past several years—VOA occasionally coming in for criticism but not as a component of USIA. The Agency, after recent favorable mention in Soviet press treatment of exhibits and other cultural exchanges, has at least temporarily slipped back into the TASS “bad guy” column. As with the February 10 TASS article, singling out of VOA and USIA this time around can only be seen as an expression of particular Soviet displeasure over Voice and USIA (and overall USG) treatment of current issues in the U.S.-Soviet bilateral context.

Toon
9. Information Memorandum from the Associate Director for Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency (Bastian) to the Director-designate (Reinhardt)

Washington, February 17, 1977

SUBJECT

Agency Contacts with New Administration

In light of our conversation yesterday, I thought it might be useful to provide you with a summary of USIA contacts with the Carter Administration. Early contacts date back to the Democratic Convention (we were not trying to pick the winner—we did the same thing at the Republican Convention) when we set up a press center to assist foreign journalists. I visited the Carter headquarters in the Americana Hotel and talked with the Carter people concerned with foreign press liaison.

A partial list of the Agency’s contacts with the new Administration includes:

—IMV is producing a four-part series on the new Administration to introduce the Administration to the world. Hosted by Edward P. Morgan, the first part has been completed and shipped overseas. Included in the first part were interviews with Messrs. Brzezinski, Jordan, Lance, Lipshutz and Powell.

—Reports on foreign media reaction to President Carter’s election, to his message to the world, to his inauguration and to his “fireside chat” were hand delivered to the White House press office immediately following production of the reports. Jody Powell acknowledged the value of these reports in a letter to IOP/M.

—The President’s message to the world was an unprecedented action which brought the image of the President before one of the

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of the Director, Executive Secretariat, Secretariat Staff, Correspondence Files, 1973–1980, Entry P–104, Box 128, 7702560–7702569. No classification marking. Fraser initialed the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum.

2 The Democratic National Convention took place at Madison Square Garden in New York, July 12–15, 1976; the Republican National Convention took place at Kemper Arena in Kansas City, August 16–19.

3 See Documents 3 and 20.

4 See Document 3.

5 Reference is to the President’s February 2 fireside chat, broadcast live over television and radio. For the text, see Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book I, pp. 69–77. For additional information about the address, see footnote 2, Document 33.

6 Not found.

7 See Document 3.
largest audiences ever to see a political message. IOP discussed the message with the White House press office before it was taped, IMV handled transmission of the televised message by satellite, and the VOA broadcast the message in 36 languages.

—IOP invited Albert Eisele, Vice President Mondale’s press secretary, to a briefing in which policy and area officers discussed with him the public relations aspects of the Vice President’s trip to Europe and Japan.\(^8\) Suggestions on ways in which USIS posts could contribute to the trip were offered to Mr. Eisele. As a result of this briefing, Rome PAO Robert Amerson traveled with the Vice President’s party to handle contacts with the foreign press and to advise USIS posts what would be required of them. After the trip Mr. Eisele returned to USIA to brief area and policy officers on the results of the trip and on USIA and USIS posts’ contributions to the mission.

—Robert Hormats, senior staff member for international economic affairs in the NSC gave a briefing to Agency officers on the economic plans of the Carter Administration. IPS based an article on the briefing, and after obtaining clearance from Mr. Hormats, distributed it worldwide.

—Joe Hanson and I met with NSC press adviser Jerrold Schecter on February 15 to discuss policy guidance and to outline what USIA could contribute to the NSC. IOP/M’s media reaction reports were of particular interest. They will be delivered regularly to the NSC and a special weekly report on worldwide media reaction to the Carter Administration’s foreign policy\(^9\) will be prepared specifically for the NSC.

—The policy guidance staff (IOP/G) maintains regular contact with the White House press office and serves as liaison with the White House for other Agency elements.

—The White House press office has designated Anne Edwards to act as liaison with USIA. She is currently on a 90-day contract, after which the White House would like her to become a USIA employee (Schedule “C”) and continue in the same capacity.

—We are studying the possibility of employing David Colton, who worked in the Carter campaign and in the transition, in the media


\(^9\) See Document 12.
reaction unit. He has worked for *Der Spiegel*, which would be ideal background from which to handle West European media reaction.

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10. **Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs (Hitchcock) to all Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Office and Staff Directors**

Washington, February 17, 1977

**SUBJECT**

CU Program Objectives

Attached is the final list of CU Program Objectives that was compiled by Working Group II, with input from all offices. The list represents the majority view of the members of Working Group II and those of other officers providing comments during the drafting and review process. Although everyone participating does not agree with all items, they do represent a broad consensus of bureau thinking. In my review of them I made a few changes which have not been seen before by the offices. They are now ready for the next step in our planning and management system scenario: the preparation of regional and functional aims. Both the objectives and the aims will be communicated to the field and used in the FY–78 office and post project planning and resource allocations, and in tentative FY–79 projections.

These objectives relate to the broad, long term foreign policy emphases which have been articulated by both the previous administration and Secretary Vance in his confirmation hearings before the Senate. The objectives represent CU’s perspective on how best to focus its limited resources on the more significant activities that can make a contribution to better mutual understanding and favorably influence the international climate. Ongoing and proposed programs implemented by CU and the posts overseas in support of these objectives

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1 Source: University of Arkansas Libraries, Special Collections Division, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection (CU), MC 468, Group I, CU Organization and Administration, Series I: General Program Policies, Procedures, and Plans, Box 4, CU Policy Papers, 1970s, folder 18. No classification marking. Copies were sent to members of all working groups.

must be consistent with the principles outlined in the CU Concept Paper. Their ultimate purposes are an enhanced level of mutual understanding and cooperative relations between the U.S. and other societies. These objectives will provide a coherent framework for describing the focus and content of our various activities.

The next step in our scenario is for each area and functional office (with program funds) to define specific (one or more as appropriate) aims which will contribute to the furtherance of those objectives appropriate to the mission of each office. In preparation for this next phase offices should select those CU program objectives which are relevant to their respective regions or functions. It is anticipated that no office will pursue all objectives.

Although each office will prepare its own unique aims, it is desirable that a common approach be used. In order to start from the same basic perception each office preparing aims should designate one officer to be the focal point for their preparation. This officer’s name should be provided OPP by COB February 18. OPP and EX discussions of the goal preparation process will be held on Tuesday the 22nd.

Each area’s aims will become a part of the CPP guidance sent to the field with the annual instructions.

This effort has been a long and arduous one, but the patience and contributions of all those who have participated is very much appreciated. Now let’s continue to flesh out the system and make it work.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs³

Washington, February 1977

CU Program Objectives

Activities of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs seek to foster mutual understanding between Americans and people of other countries as a means of promoting more peaceful and harmonious international relations. The Bureau encourages the formation of linkages between individuals and institutions across political boundaries and the development of effective communication spanning cultural

³ No classification marking.
gaps. Thus it strives to affect in a constructive manner the human environment in which the nation’s foreign policy is conceived and conducted.

To carry out this general concept, and taking account of broad, long-term U.S. foreign policy emphases, the following program objectives determine the specific content and focus of the CU input into the binational process of designing and implementing mutual exchange programs.

1. To maintain and reinforce effective ties between the U.S. and the industrialized democracies.
2. To increase the number and areas of constructive relationships between the U.S. and closed societies.
3. To establish or improve two-way communication between the U.S. and developing countries.
4. To strengthen individual and institutional capacities to deal with economic interdependence and limited natural resources.
5. To strengthen the capacity of developing countries to understand, select, and adapt science and technology to their own needs.
6. To increase attention to and support for human rights.
7. To strengthen international commitment to protection of the global environment and to improvement of the quality of life.
8. To foster the learning of English and other languages, within their cultural contexts.
9. To promote the development of new concepts of education and intercultural communication.
10. To support the media, communication, and publishing sectors’ efforts to play a constructive role in intercultural communication.
11. To strengthen educational institutions of other countries in specific areas of mutual interest to the United States and the host country.
12. To increase the business sector’s sensitivity to its role in international relations and its impact on U.S. global interests.
13. To strengthen the international component of U.S. educational programs.
14. To increase and diversify the participation of community organizations in international affairs.\(^4\)
15. To improve the formal study abroad of American society and culture.

\(^4\) An unknown hand changed “14” to “15” in this point, changed “15” to “14” in the next point, and drew an arrow from one to the other signifying that their order should be reversed.
In implementing all of these objectives CU programs are designed to reflect the rich diversity of American society, representing all significant groups of our citizenry.

11. Memorandum From Paul Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, February 17, 1977

SUBJECT
Gronouski as BIB Board Chairman?—II

This is in response to your questions on my first memorandum on this subject.2

The way a Chairman of the BIB allocates his time and goes about exercising his responsibilities depends in large part on how he wants to do it and how he manages his team—i.e. both the other Board members and the Board staff. Abshire has been a very activist, interventionist Board Chairman and, being here in Washington, has made it much more of a job than it needs to be. (There is an advantage in having a Board Chairman who is not resident in the Washington area.) The Board probably needs to meet about four times per year for a day or two, maybe longer for the budget meeting, and Board members should (as a group or individually) probably make one visit a year to Munich and some of the radio sites in Europe.

PL 93–129, The Board for International Broadcasting Act of 1973,3 is very specific about certain things:
• Board members are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special (Henze), Box 1, Chron File: 2/77. Confidential; Outside System.
2 Reference is presumably to Henze’s February 15 memorandum to Brzezinski, in which he indicated that Aaron had “checked on how we approach Gronouski” to serve as BIB Chairman. Henze wrote, “Word is that we are free to go ahead and ask him whether he would like to be considered for the appointment. No commitment of any kind is implied in this action, of course.” (Ibid.)
3 The Board for International Broadcasting Act (P.L. 93–129), which Nixon signed into law on October 19, 1973, created the Board as an independent federal agency to fund and oversee Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.
• Only three may be of the same political party.
• For each day of service they are compensated at the E–V daily rate ($182.00 under the new pay raise), and when traveling they are allowed travel money and per diem. There is no upper limit on compensation for travel or allowances permitted by the law.

The law does not specify how often the Board shall meet or how it goes about its business except that it is permitted to establish a staff hired under standard civil service procedures. The division of labor between the Board and its staff is up to it.

The law authorizes the Board to make grants to RFE/RL (including monies received from other governments and private individuals), to review and evaluate the mission of RFE/RL, to see that broadcasting is kept within the broad foreign policy objectives of the U.S., to encourage efficiency and economy, to make audits, prescribe regulations and report annually to the President and the Congress. The law does not specify how the Board is to exercise these functions. This concluding general provision of the law is interesting:

"In carrying out the foregoing functions, the Board shall bear in mind the necessity of maintaining the professional independence and integrity of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty."

The Secretary of State is charged in the law with responsibility for providing the Board "with such information regarding the foreign policy of the United States as the Secretary may deem appropriate."

VOA and other broadcasting operations are not mentioned in the law.

CONCLUSION

In sum, the job of Chairman can be accommodated to the schedule and wishes of the man who takes the job, subject to the desires of the other members of the Board. He could, theoretically, make it practically a full-time job, but the assumption underlying the law is clearly that he would not and that the function, and that of the other members of the Board, is clearly a part-time one.

I find a broad degree of consensus that Gronouski would, if he wants the job, be a good man for it. If you prefer not to contact him directly, perhaps I could do so saying that I have been asked to sound him out in your behalf.
12. Memorandum From the Director-designate of the United States Information Agency (Reinhardt) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\(^1\)

Washington, February 18, 1977

Attached is the first, hastily prepared weekly foreign media reaction report which you requested yesterday.

The material for this paper was compiled from the regular reporting which the Agency receives from overseas and represents only readily available sources on hand. For future reports we will, of course, specify the subjects our posts should monitor and thereby gain a wider coverage.

Normally you will receive this report on Thursdays, as you requested. However, since many publications appear on Fridays (e.g., The Economist, The Spectator, The New Statesman), we will either need to prepare a Friday supplement or choose a different day for sending the weekly report.

In the course of writing this paper, questions arose regarding both its style and content, and we will resolve them in early discussions with Jerry Schecter.

Finally, because of the press of time we have relied heavily on direct quotations to indicate the substance of articles. Henceforth we will prepare substantive summaries and use only the most striking, revealing quotations.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the United States Information Agency\(^2\)

Foreign Media Reaction: Selected Foreign Affairs Issues

SALT OUTLOOK

“President Carter has begun to discover what a thicket he has to plunge through in his search for a nuclear arms deal with Russia. He is shoving gallantly forward. . . . It is increasingly difficult to go on

\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 9, International Communication Agency: 2–7/77. No classification marking.

\(^2\) No classification marking.
believing that the negotiations about nuclear weapons can be kept in
two different compartments, one for ‘strategic’ weapons to be discussed
between America and Russia alone, the other for ‘tactical’ ones which
also involve their European allies. Some people argue that it may be
necessary, before long, to reorganize the negotiations to recognize that
fact. Any such all-in nuclear negotiations would be a hideous tangle.
But it seems increasingly likely that any SALT II deal Mr. Carter may
pull off this year will have to be a fairly short-lived one—with a much
more complicated SALT III haggle pretty soon.” (Economist, independ-
et, London, 2/11/77)

“Mr. Carter is determined to get relations with Russia on a better,
safer and more promising footing, to take initiatives, and to show a
willingness to come at least half way. . . . Inevitably to some extent
Mr. Carter is feeling his way, as his predecessors did—each, however,
with a decreasing margin of safety in case things went wrong. His
margin is now either nonexistent or at best wafer-thin. For this reason
he cannot afford to dispense with ‘linkage,’ ‘reciprocity,’ or whatever
term is in vogue to describe getting a good, tough over-all bargain.”
(London Daily Telegraph, conservative, 2/10/77)

“If the Soviets know that the Americans do not attach any impor-
tance to the details of the (SALT) agreement, they will easily get the
upper hand in the bargaining. . . . According to the American press,
the man whom President Carter has chosen as head of the arms control
agency, the man who will conduct the team of negotiators, Paul War-
cke, professes in an extreme form the doctrine that in nuclear matters
superiority does not exist or does not matter. . . . If the former adviser
to McGovern really professes the ideas credited to him, the choice of
Paul Warnke by President Carter would constitute a further step in
the weakening, or rather the surrender of the U.S. It would increase
the anxiety that certain initiatives of the new President in diplomatic
and especially in strategic matters rightly cause in Europe.” (Figaro,
moderately conservative, Raymond Aron, 2/15/77)

“President Carter has roughly outlined his SALT offer to the Sovi-
ets. Details remain unclear. It is reassuring that the U.S. apparently is
not ready to shackle its cruise missile. There is reason to take a skeptical
view of the possibility of eventual U.S.-Soviet agreement on cruise
missiles and Backfire bombers. It would not be wise to pursue a policy
of gentlemen’s agreements with Moscow or even a policy of good
examples, because such a policy might lead to a dangerous shift of
the nuclear balance. American advance concessions have never been
honored by the Soviets.” (Die Welt, right-center, byliner, 2/10/77)\(^3\)

\(^3\) Brzezinski bracketed this paragraph.
“President Carter seems to have learned the lessons of SALT I and Vladivostok, and is prepared to negotiate with the Russians more realistically, taking firmer positions than Kissinger, the advocate of detente at any price. . . . This, by the way, is the course recommended by Carter’s closest advisers, Vance and Brzezinski. . . . Everything shows that Carter’s nuclear policy is as prudent as it is skillful . . .”

(O Estado de Sao Paulo, 2/11/77)

**EUROCOMMUNISM**

“American policy towards European Communism is relatively low in the priority list for the overall review of foreign policy which is now under way in the National Security Council,” official sources in Washington say. “When the review is completed there will be no dramatic announcement, but some changes are expected. There will not be a 180-degree turn from Dr. Kissinger’s position,” one senior official said, ‘but probably about 30 or 40 degrees.’ . . .” (Guardian, liberal, Washington correspondent Jonathan Steele, 2/17/77)

**TRILATERALISM AND EUROPE**

“Will Carter choose Europe or Germany? . . . The global policy of the U.S. must find its new orientations within the next three months as required by the Western summit in May, during which Carter will disclose them. . . . Won’t the White House tend to translate the trilogy, ‘America, Europe, Japan,’ proposed by international business diplomacy with the trilateral commission, into ‘U.S., Germany and Japan’? . . . To avoid such a danger one must be aware of it and make Washington understand how indispensable it is to strengthen the cohesion of the European Community and its awareness of its role and of its future. . . . The Community must begin to speak with one voice on a minimum number of major themes, especially if trilateralism becomes the password of the new U.S. Administration. . . . There remain a few months to persuade the U.S. that the particular nature of Europe, whatever Britain may say, must be reaffirmed. If the French President and the West German Chancellor can persuade Jimmy Carter of its importance, they will find the American partner they seek.” (Figaro, page one article by Alain Vernay, 2/10/77)

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VANCE MIDDLE EAST MISSION

“The switches are being set for peace in the Middle East. . . . On the eve of Secretary Vance’s visit,6 Syrian troops were withdrawn from southern Lebanon in compliance with Israeli requests. . . . In a letter to Chancellor Kreisky, the PLO signaled readiness for a settlement providing for establishment of a Palestinian mini-state. . . . That the Carter Administration intends to keep the reins of mediation in its hands was demonstrated by Washington’s energetic objection to the European Community’s intention to pass another Middle East resolution.” (Die Zeit, Hamburg, 2/17/77)

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

“. . . American motives for a strict policy of nonproliferation are respectable and based upon responsibility. They cannot be simply reduced to considerations of competition, especially since they affect American industry. However, respectable motives should not lead to neglecting rationality, nor should moral pathos disregard logic. The Germans are not furnishing Brazil with the A-bomb nor the materials to build it as long as the agreements . . . are not circumvented . . .” (Frankfurter Allgemeine, right-center, 2/15/77)7

“President Carter remains adamant . . . As far as (he) is concerned, economic considerations play no role in the matter at all. He never has indicated that the Germans should abandon their deal with Brazil. . . . The U.S. takes the view that nuclear reprocessing installations should be placed under international supervision (and) the FRG would follow this American line if Bonn could save face vis-a-vis Brasilia. Therefore, American pressure is now directed at Brasilia rather than Bonn.” (Washington correspondent Emil Boelte in several papers including General-Anzeiger, independent, Bonn, 2/17/77)

The U.S. and the USSR are exerting “colonialist pressures against the Brazil-West German nuclear agreement . . . Why this orchestrated

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action? The nations now pressuring (us) not to carry out the nuclear agreement—arrogating to themselves the role of defenders of world integrity—did they employ this same reasoning 32 years ago when they began the arms race?" (Jornal de Brasilia, independent, 2/13/77)

(During the week, Japanese media reported on Tokyo’s request for a reprocessing plant from the U.S. Prognostications were that the plant would be provided, and that Japan and the U.S. would also agree to adopting new safeguards as a result of the deal.)

THE THIRD WORLD

“. . . Carter has been making a carefully measured entrance on the world stage. . . . American policy will remain attached to its sheet anchors of support for NATO and the Western Alliance and the search for stabilization of the nuclear balance with Russia. . . . It is in the handling of the third world that the most significant change is likely in American policy. Mr. Carter may be expected to show more awareness of the nations of the third world as people with enormous problems of poverty and backwardness, rather than as simply pawns in the cold war.” (London Observer, independent, 2/14/77)

HUMAN RIGHTS

“President Carter’s adviser on national security . . . Dr. Brzezinski, has reaffirmed in clearest terms America’s interest in maintaining the independence of Yugoslavia and Rumania . . . in an article in the latest . . . issue of Survey . . . His views differ substantially from those of . . . Kissinger and his . . . assistant Sonnenfeldt. In contrast to (a closer “organic” union)9 Mr. Brzezinski wants to see a ‘polycentric’ Communist world and the ‘gradual evolution of (those) regimes into more cooperative members of the international community.’” (Communist Affairs correspondent David Floyd in The Daily Telegraph, 2/11/77)

“Fears are rising among Soviet dissidents that the authorities are planning a major operation against them . . . (The Pravda statement)

8 Brzezinski bracketed this paragraph.
appears to be an official rebuff for President Carter’s call for greater respect for human rights in the Soviet Union.” (Correspondent Andrew Wilson in The Observer, 2/14/77)

CUBA-U.S. “THAW”?

“The arrival in the White House of Mr. Carter—a man obviously more anxious than Mr. Ford to deal with Latin American problems earnestly and with generosity—at last permits a glimpse of a real opening of the ‘new dialogue’ often promised by Mr. Kissinger and regularly forgotten by a man primarily concerned with ratios of forces on a world scale. Mr. Carter, who seems to be making a correct appraisal of the strategic, political and economic importance of the countries located at the U.S.’ very door, stigmatized the Latin American dictatorships. . . . The warning has been understood in Chile. . . . Mr. Carter moreover seems determined to step up negotiations . . . to conclude a new Panama Canal treaty. . . . But it is with the Cuban regime that the signs of a thaw are the most numerous. . . . The new crew has thrown the ball to the Cuban side.” (Le Monde, left of center, 2/11/77)

(If President Carter’s February 16 remarks at the Agriculture Department came too late for comment or news treatment.)

10 The President offered remarks and took part in a question-and-answer session at the Department of Agriculture beginning at 11:40 a.m. For the text of the President’s remarks and responses to questions posed by Department of Agriculture employees, see Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book I, pp. 167–175.
13. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency (Bastian) to Jessica Tuchman of the National Security Council Staff

Washington, February 28, 1977

SUBJECT

PRM Human Rights Draft

The following is provided in response to subject PRM:

1. Define, from the moral viewpoint, what the United States should set as its goals in greater upholding of human rights around the world.

2. Analyze the probable short and long term positive and negative effects of a series of alternative human rights policies for the United States.

Examine the following options:

a. Vigorous unilateral statements by the U.S. naming the nations involved;

b. Milder or intermittent unilateral statements and actions, naming the nations involved;

c. A multilateral policy, going in step with the United Nations, which sometimes names the nations involved;

d. A general declaratory policy, naming no names (the mildest course).

3. Analyze the probable result of the suggested analysis which would be a selective policy of promoting human rights, pushing harder on Country A and less on Country B. A very important—perhaps overriding—question is whether consistency is more important than making progress where we can with a selective approach.

4. Declare that “the human rights policy of the US is the reflection of deeply felt concerns for human rights by the American people, the President and the Congress.”

5. In paragraph 6c of subject PRM, include USIA cultural and informational programming.

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6. Monitor and provide regular assessments on the most prominent foreign media coverage of U.S. human rights policy and related initiatives.

7. Propose that we use the CSCE Belgrade June 15th meeting as a forum to (a) reinforce our position on the CSCE Final Act’s human rights and freedoms provisions—the so-called “Third Basket”, and (b) express concern about allegations that human rights and freedoms incorporated in the Final Act have been denied in several Final Act signatory countries.

8. Propose a program to promote positive efforts to encourage favorable human rights trends and to help foster the growth of free political and social institutions.

Walter M. Bastian, Jr.
Deputy Director (Policy and Plans)

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2 A preparatory meeting for the October 1977 Belgrade CSCE Review Conference was scheduled to take place in Belgrade in June. The “third basket” of the Final Act (see footnote 6, Document 8) emphasized humanitarian cooperation, human contacts, freedom of information, and educational and cultural exchanges.

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14. Memorandum From Paul Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, March 2, 1977

SUBJECT

Recommendations to President on New Appointments to Board of International Broadcasting and Transmittal to Congress of Report on International Broadcasting

As you requested earlier this week, our recommendations for actions in connection with the Board of International Broadcasting have

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special (Henze), Box 1, Chron File: 3/77. No classification marking. Sent for action.
been put together in a single package and are ready for you to lay before the President.

You may find useful a few additional items of information which, because of the need for brevity in your memo to the President, we could not include:

Present membership of the BIB:
David M. Abshire, Chairman
Foy D. Kohler
John T. Murphy
Thomas H. Quinn
John P. Roche
Sig Michelson (ex officio)

Board members are not classified as U.S. Government employees. They are paid at the E–V rate ($182) per day when serving (maximum necessary about 20 days per year), plus per diem and travel expenses. Employees of the BIB staff are civil service employees.

The President’s Report to Congress recommends approval of 16 additional transmitters over the next 3–5 years for broadcasts by RFE/RL and VOA to Eastern Europe and the USSR and 12 additional transmitters for VOA broadcasts to Asia and Africa. No money figures for these transmitters are included but costs for the first 16 could be in the range of $30–$35,000,000 and the second 12 $25–$30,000,000. These will all be requested in BIB and USIS budget requests to Congress for the next several years for the money would be expended over a period of at least three to four fiscal years.

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2 Reference is to an attached, undated memorandum from Brzezinski to the President, in which Brzezinski recommended that Carter accept Abshire’s resignation as BIB Chairman, appoint Gronouski as Chairman, and fill Roche’s expired term with Griffith. (Ibid.) There is no indication that this memorandum was sent to Carter.

3 Section 403 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1977 (S. 3168; P.L. 94–350; 90 Stat. 823–850) required the President to submit to Congress by January 31, 1977, a report on international broadcasting. National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 245, August 3, 1976, directed the preparation of a study outlining measures designed to improve the effectiveness of U.S.-funded international broadcasting. NSSM 245 is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXVIII, part 2, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy, 1973–1976, Document 111. The Ford administration produced a 51-page report entitled “U.S. International Broadcasting Requirements” but did not forward the report to Congress; see Document 113, ibid. In a March 22 message to Congress transmitting the copy of the report, Carter indicated that his advisers had been in the process of reviewing the Ford administration report and had concluded that review. Carter noted that his review of these efforts had led him to conclude that current efforts were “inadequate” and that VOA and RFE/RL required 16 additional 250 KW transmitters for broadcast to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, in addition to 12 VOA transmitters for broadcast to Asia and Africa. (Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book I, p. 478)
Memorandum From the Assistant Director, North Africa, Near East, and South Asia, United States Information Agency (Nalle) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Atherton)

Washington, March 3, 1977

SUBJECT
USIA Support for Current U.S. Diplomatic Initiatives in Middle East

I would like to provide a USIA reaction to your observations that Secretary Vance’s just-completed Near East visits are the beginning of what is likely to be an extremely active period of diplomacy for the U.S. in the Middle East, and that the parties to the Arab-Israeli dispute desire the U.S. to remain in its middle-man role. We wish USIA to be as active and useful as possible in supporting U.S.-Middle East initiatives, and have devoted a great deal of effort and thought toward accomplishing this.

We now are in the final phases of significantly strengthening our programming capabilities at all the Middle Eastern posts. We are providing Wireless File reception equipment to all U.S. diplomatic establishments in the area, and installing an Arabic-language Wireless File reception network in these same diplomatic establishments to enable us to get Arabic-language versions of texts and other key Wireless File materials rapidly into the hands of Middle Eastern leaders. We are reissuing our Arabic-language magazine from Tunis, after the shutdown of our printing plant in Beirut, and in the process are revising the format and treatment to provide more policy-oriented material to audiences at the policy-making level. We are similarly upgrading the capability of our libraries in the Middle East to bring policy-related materials to governmental, media and academic leaders; reorganizing our entire post audience record systems; planning some increases in U.S. and local personnel at newly-opened or re-opened posts in Arab countries.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of the Director, Executive Secretariat, Secretariat Staff, Correspondence Files, 1973–1980, Entry P–104, Box 113, 7700540–7700549. Limited Official Use. Copies were sent to Quandt and Day. Blind copied to Reinhardt, Kopp, Bastian, and Scott. Reinhardt’s handwritten notations on the memorandum are illegible.

2 See footnote 6, Document 12.

3 Reference is to the news file transmitted from Washington to post, via shortwave wireless transmitters, which included official statements of U.S. policy, in addition to news articles, and press summaries prepared by the Department of State. The Wireless File also sent five regional transmissions of policy statements and news background materials to post 5 days a week.
(as proposed in my memo of February 24\textsuperscript{4} to NEA); and sending knowledgeable U.S. speakers from outside government to meet with Arab and Israeli audiences (recent successful examples have been William Quandt, Malcolm Kerr, William Griffith and J.C. Hurewitz).

We will continue our concentration on these activities, making available to leaders on both sides of the Arab-Israeli confrontation lines the ideas and opinions of responsible American governmental and non-governmental leaders. We would even suggest an increase in this activity, perhaps through regular preparation of video-taped interviews or question-and-answer sessions with State Department officials on subjects of intense area interest such as Secretary Vance’s recent trip and for use with Arab or Israeli government, media and academic leaders rather than with the general public. (See also my memo of February 22\textsuperscript{5} proposing your involvement in a VTR dialogue.)

But at the same time we wish to consider ways to take these activities one step further, making available to the Israeli leadership and public opinion the viewpoints of moderate Arabs, and to the Arab leaders the opinions of moderate Israelis.

The first 30 years of the Arab-Israeli dispute have been characterized by extremist rhetoric emanating from both sides, and amplified by both indigenous and foreign media. Now, with moderates playing significant public roles on both sides of the lines, we would like to assist in amplifying their efforts. For example, a video-tape of an address by an Israeli moderate to an American audience, and his handling of the questions asked by Americans, might encourage moderates among Arab viewers, and conversely.\textsuperscript{6} We already are in the business of showing interviews prepared for American TV by Prime Minister Rabin or President Sadat to audiences across the lines. We propose taking the process one step further, showing similar interviews by moderate, non-governmental personalities.

To a very limited extent we have already done this, exposing selected Arab and Israeli leaders, usually in the living room of an American diplomat rather than in a USIS Center, to video-taped expressions of private individuals from the other side. Examples are the televised series entitled “The Arabs and the Israelis” in which Israelis heard the widow of an Egyptian fighter pilot say she bore no ill-will toward Israel but only longed for peace, and in which Arab audiences listened to the father of a dead Israeli infantry officer describe his vision of a peaceful Middle East in which Israelis and Arabs could prosper.

\textsuperscript{4} Not found.
\textsuperscript{5} Not found.
\textsuperscript{6} Reinhardt placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.
together. Another U.S.-made television series shown to selected audi-
ences on both sides of the lines was the dialogue between Israeli author
Amos Elon and Samia Hassan, daughter of an Egyptian diplomat, who
discussed the entire spectrum of Arab-Israeli differences.

What we are proposing now is not only to continue taking advantage of
such materials as they become available from other sources, but also to adopt
a more positive role in stimulating their making, attempting to direct them
toward instead of away from the hard political questions, and seeing that they
are circulated where they can make a wider impression in both Israel and the
Arab states.7

For example, we would like to obtain video tapes or transcripts of
talks and question-and-answer sessions of Israeli “doves” visiting the
U.S. These could range from fringe figures such as Matti Peled to
politically significant moderates such as former General Yigael Yadin
or former Foreign Minister Abba Eban. Similarly, moderate figures
from the Arab world, particularly the new breed of polished, American-
educated lobbyists, lecturers and academics could be video-taped
addressing the questions of American audiences, which presumably
would reflect the misgivings or insecurities of subsequent Israeli
viewers.

We are considering another approach in conjunction with USIA-
sponsored American speakers on the Middle East problem. Whether
in Israel or the Arab countries, such speakers normally field a series
of concerned and suspicious questions which reflect the deep distrust
of the ultimate intentions of the other side. We would like to have a
speaker such as Malcolm Kerr, for example, meet and talk with a group
of Israeli leaders and then, after a time, show them a video-tape of the
questions asked him during an earlier, similar session in Syria, Jordan
or Egypt.8 Conversely, we would show Arab audiences a tape of Israelis
questioning Dr. Kerr. We think the questions, illustrating feelings of
insecurity rather than desires for expansion, might be mutually
enlightening.

Looking back over the U.S.-Middle Eastern role of the past four
years, we see that the first stage in our information effort was to explain
the U.S. “honest broker” role, dictated by the fact that U.S. interest in
a permanent settlement is as great as the interests of the direct parties
to the dispute. This stage apparently has been successfully completed
in view of the manifest desire of both Arabs and Israelis that the U.S.
continue its middle-man role.

7 Reinhardt placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph.
8 Reinhardt placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.
The second and ongoing stage of the information effort has been to focus the attention of all parties to the dispute on initiatives to clear away procedural impediments to negotiation and on examining and defining the major problems to be solved.

What we now are proposing is a cautious forward step into encouraging both private Americans and area moderates to define the compromises necessary to reach solutions.

Such indirect dialogues between Arabs and Israelis, conducted via American intermediaries or partisans, will not by themselves remove the accumulations of distrust and suspicion that make political compromise so difficult. However, they may speed the day when delegations of Israelis and Arabs are willing to begin direct dialogues on neutral territory, or even to venture across the lines to enter into the kind of direct communications that must accompany final stages of a peace settlement. For this reason we see such efforts, sensitively produced by USIA and sensitively presented at our posts, as a positive means of supporting the intensive U.S. diplomatic efforts concomitant to 1977 peace negotiations. We will welcome your comments, cautions, and guidance in this regard.

16. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Ghana, Nigeria, Zambia, Kenya, Cameroon, and France

Washington, March 5, 1977, 0216Z

49454. Paris for ARS. Subject: American Specialist Program: Dr. Loretta Long.

1. Dept. delighted to announce availability for post programming of Dr. Loretta Long, better known as Susan, one of the human hosts, on “Sesame Street”. Dr. Long, an Afro-American, is a singer, actress, TV personality, teacher and educator and an effective communicator with her audiences.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770077–0226. Unclassified. Drafted by Wilkinson; cleared by Smith; approved by Dalsimer. On March 17, the Department repeated telegram 49454 to Kinshasa. (Ibid.)

2 Reference is to the children’s educational television program produced by the Children’s Television Workshop (CTW), which debuted on the National Educational Television (NET) network (later PBS) in November 1969.
2. Dr. Long was born in Michigan. B.A. Western Michigan U., M.A. City College of New York, EdD U. of Mass. She has taught in New York City public schools and given numerous lectures, workshops, panels, etc., relating to the media and education. She has appeared on musical plays and revues in the U.S. and Australia and in numerous movies and TV shows in the U.S.

3. Dr. Long can speak on: “the media and the classroom teacher”, “cultural clash: racial sensitivity training”, “values in education”, the impact of the media on young minds” and related topics. She wishes to hold discussions with media professionals and trainees, educators and student teachers, Min. Ed. officials and TV and radio programmers. She will gladly give interviews, but is not interested in performing, except to recreate a “Sesame Street” segment with local “characters” for Nigeria TV where she understands the show has appeared. She will bring “Sesame Street” segments to illustrate talks. Advise whether “Sesame Street” familiar to local audiences.

4. Dr. Long available June–early August for 4–6 weeks. Please express soonest interest time frame and programming plans.

5. Interested post should advise dates schools and universities close for summer and re-open in fall.

Christopher
17. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Director, Broadcasting Service, United States Information Agency (Tuch) to the Acting Director (Kopp)\(^1\)

Washington, March 8, 1977

SUBJECT

Treatment of Human Rights Issue in Output to the USSR and E.E.

The Soviet Government when propagating their version of “peaceful coexistence” has always insisted that this concept did not include “ideological warfare” which the Soviets felt free to pursue militantly: as long as it does not include armed conflict it is perfectly all right to use any other method to promote the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, including subversion and black propaganda. Thus, press, radio and TV attacks on individuals and groups in the West and propaganda blasts against democratic institutions in the Free World are, by Soviet standards, within the ground rules of “peaceful coexistence” or “detente” since their supposed intent is merely to advocate the blessings of communist ideology.

I submit that the advocacy of human rights is part of our ideology. When President Carter or VOA support the activities of Mr. Sakharov\(^2\) and other human rights advocates abroad, these activities should be explained and defended in terms of our ideology. Thus, we do not interfere in the “internal affairs” or disturb the sovereignty of the communist nations when we advocate the protection of human rights in their countries anymore than they consider it interference in our internal affairs when they propagandize for justice for Angela Davis, give an award to Gus Hall, or make appeals on behalf of the “Wilmington 10.”\(^3\)

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of the Director, Executive Secretariat, Secretariat Staff, Correspondence Files, 1973–1980, Entry P–104, Box 113, 7700580–7700589. No classification marking. Copies were sent to Bastian, Shirley, and Reinhardt. Reinhardt and Fraser both initialed the memorandum, indicating that they saw it.

\(^2\) Reference is to Soviet physicist and dissident Andrei Sakharov, who, in early 1977, engaged in an exchange of letters with Carter. For additional information, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Documents 2, 5, 8, 9, and 11.

\(^3\) Reference is to 10 individuals arrested, tried, and convicted on arson and conspiracy charges in Wilmington, North Carolina, in February 1971. At the time, African-American students in Wilmington had instituted a boycott against the city’s schools in response to attacks on African-American students prompted by desegregation of the school system. The boycott precipitated various acts of violence, culminating in the firing of shots at firefighters attempting to extinguish an arson fire. The “Wilmington 10” were implicated in this action, despite lack of evidence regarding involvement, and, as a result, were perceived as political prisoners and thus deprived of their human rights. The federal appeals court, in 1980, overturned the convictions on grounds that the defendants’ constitutional rights had been violated by both the prosecutor and the trial judge.
I suggest that we consider—in our private and public diplomacy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union—telling the Soviets forcefully that ideological conflict cuts both ways: our human rights advocacy is as vital to our ideology as Soviet advocacy of communist ideas is to their ideology. We should remind them that we make no linkage between our ideology and practical steps toward improving our bi-lateral relationship just as they do not link “peaceful co-existence” and ideological conflict.

18. Memorandum From Paul Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, March 10, 1977

SUBJECT

International Broadcasting Issues—Comments, Questions and Answers

The following may be useful to you in discussing these matters with the President:

1. The BIB, by law, is charged only with sponsorship of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. The ambitions of certain BIB board and staff members notwithstanding, it could not extend its responsibilities—to take over VOA, e.g.—without new legislation.

2. The first priority with the BIB is to get a new chairman for it and to appoint new members replacing those whose terms are running out. David Abshire has already resigned as Chairman and two members’ terms, those of Foy Kohler and John P. Roche, run out on 30 April.

3. An important criterion for selecting a new chairman for BIB is to get a man who will work flexibly and openly with the Carter Administration and who will be dedicated to strengthening the effectiveness of RFE/RL. John Gronouski appears to us to have these qualities. Frank Stanton, whose appointment is being advocated by Senators Percy and McGovern and certain BIB staff members (e.g., Walter Roberts) is the principal advocate of a scheme for putting RFE/RL and VOA under BIB control and for expanding the BIB as a semi-autonomous entity for controlling all U.S. international radio broadcasting.

These are very controversial proposals which no department or agency endorses.

4. The BIB has been successfully established over the past three years and is a good formula for sponsorship of RFE/RL (replacing CIA funding and control) but it has developed a tendency to become an extra layer of management with its own continually increasing staff. The radios feel that it interferes too much in day-to-day operations and tends to pre-empt decisions that are more properly left to the RFE/RL board of directors (chaired by John Hayes, of the Washington Post-Newsweek radio/TV empire).

5. The BIB has an important but limited role to play. It should not become involved in management of the radios. It should not get into jurisdictional disputes with other U.S. Government elements, trying to take over VOA, e.g. Its staff should be kept lean and confine its efforts to true oversight/review functions, as required by law, and to representing RFE/RL with the Congress.

6. In the form in which it has existed up until now, the BIB has been dominated by David Abshire, a Nixon appointee, who also heads a research center at Georgetown University. Foy Kohler has played a positive role in the BIB, but he has pressured to have too many positions in the radios filled by retired FSO’s and USIS people. We need younger, more vigorous people for these demanding jobs. John P. Roche has been disappointing as a BIB member. The two other BIB members, John T. Murphy, President of AVCO Broadcasting in Cincinnati, and Thomas H. Quinn, a young Washington lawyer with no visible qualifications for the job, were originally appointed for two years and (unfortunately) reappointed for three more last year. The prime reason for appointment of Murphy was that he was proposed by Senator Taft, while Quinn was a protege of Senator Pastore. (Congress simply played favorites here, but there was apparently no effort by the Executive Branch to propose more effective people.) We could certainly find better people than these two to serve on this Board, but for the time being emphasis must be on filling the two vacancies that occur as of 30 April when Kohler’s and Roche’s terms run out.

7. Griffith, whom we are proposing to replace Kohler, is an ideal choice from the viewpoint of both knowledge of the radios, in depth, and knowledge of Eastern Europe and the USSR.

8. Since one of the most important functions of the Board is to serve as the radios’ interface with Congress, we feel a former Congress-man would be useful on the Board—preferably one with an interest in

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2 Reference is to the Georgetown Center or Center for Strategic and International Studies, which was affiliated with Georgetown University until the late 1980s.
international affairs. Also, since only three BIB members can belong to one political party, the Congressman should be Republican. We now have clearance from Frank Moore’s office to offer the other BIB vacancy to Peter H.B. Frelinghuysen, former Congressman from the 5th District of New Jersey, who decided not to run at the end of the 94th Congress and has retired to private life. (If he turns out not to be interested we have two other possibilities, both former House members: Clark MacGregor of Minnesota and Edward Biester of Pennsylvania.)

9. There is considerable Congressional interest in BIB. In the House, Dante Fascell, who controls their appropriations, tends to take the deepest interest. In the Senate, Senators Humphrey, Percy and McGovern, among others, have been strong supporters. Though Senators Percy and McGovern have written the President advocating appointment of Frank Stanton as BIB Chairman, there is not much reason to believe that any Congressional group would want to challenge (or could effectively challenge) strong Presidential leadership in matters relating to the BIB or international broadcasting in general.

10. There is also not much reason to expect any serious challenge in Congress to Executive proposals for increased funds for new transmitters for all the radios (including VOA) and for more modest sums to permit RFE/RL to hire younger editors from among recent emigres and to expand broadcasting in Soviet minority languages—aims which are very much in accord with basic Administration foreign policy objectives and our championing of human rights.

11. Over the years, the costs of these radios have increased at a far slower rate than costs of weaponry or costs of intelligence-collecting. It can be argued that they are, nevertheless, of major significance for achieving our national security objectives even though they cost—all together—only a minute fraction of what we spend on a single weapons system. As we try to bring our national security expenditures into better balance, we should consider investing more in international broadcasting. If the Administration makes a strong case, Congress is likely to support it.

12. You are quite right in feeling that matters relating to the BIB and to RFE/RL should not be permitted to get mixed up with broader questions relating to VOA. It may be useful, nevertheless, to review some background on the VOA “problem” and to brief the President on this subject when you have the opportunity.

13. Over the past year or so a good deal of agitation, both within and outside of VOA, has developed for “independence” or “autonomy”. Some people advocate setting up the VOA on the same basis as the BBC. Others want to put it under the BIB. Some apparently envision melding RFE/RL and VOA into a single international broadcasting service. Much of the thinking behind these proposals is fuzzy and the implications have not been well thought through.
14. It is alleged that VOA’s broadcasts have suffered from governmental interference which has both (a) kept it from broadcasting completely on certain delicate topics and (b) forced it to take particular lines on subjects the State Department or the White House felt strongly about at particular times. The arguments tend to be over very fine points and tend to cancel each other out. Considering the challenges VOA has had to face over recent years—coping with the Vietnam withdrawal, Watergate, problems of domestic dissidence—a strong case can be made that it has carried out its mission extremely well. (During the past 7½ years it has been headed by Ken Giddens, an Alabama Republican broadcasting executive who has set an all-time record for tenure in his job and seems to have performed very well.)

15. In any event, there are strong arguments against reaching conclusions on the basis of the unusual circumstances which have existed during the past few years. A case could be made also that the strongest proponents of “autonomy” for the VOA and of placing VOA under BIB along with RFE/RL, tend to make “best case” assumptions about the way the world is going to develop during the next decade or two and “worst case” assumptions about the way the U.S. Government is going to operate. According to their contentions, the VOA is always in danger of being misused by the White House, the State Department or some other element of the U.S. Government for short-term, tendentious, partisan or other narrow purposes. Only an “independent” VOA can allegedly broadcast objectively (whatever that is supposed to mean). This is very specious argumentation. If VOA could broadcast with objectivity during the difficult Watergate period (I listened to it continually during this time; its performance was outstanding), the greatest period of strain the U.S. Government has experienced since the Civil War, why shouldn’t we expect it to operate effectively in the future when we have no reason to expect such strains again soon?

16. The 35-year history of the VOA provides very little evidence of tendentious broadcasting or misuse by particular Administrations. It may have been overly polemic in the 1950’s (more so than RFE at times) and slow to report news of major interest to its listeners; more often it was accused of being dull. But critics of radio stations usually run the full gamut of possible accusations and extreme criticisms are seldom a very good standard for judging impact. During the past 10–15 years, VOA has settled into a pattern of very competent broadcasting of news, entertainment and features about American life that clearly appeal to listeners and keep them well informed. (I have listened to VOA steadily during my time abroad over the past eight years and consider that it is doing an excellent job of what can reasonably be expected of it.)

17. Why shouldn’t the VOA be under direct U.S. Government management and present itself as the Voice of the U.S. Government and, ipso facto,
the American people? Whom, really, would an “independent” or “autonomous” VOA represent? Why shouldn’t the VOA reflect American policies and explain American government positions? Obviously, it should not be narrowly propagandistic, but why assume that a properly led U.S. Government is going to want it to be? Why should the U.S. Government abdicate responsibility for managing a major information instrument in a world that wishes to have American positions and American values explained to it and wishes to be informed on what is happening in the United States?

18. An Administration which divested itself of control over VOA might well find that it had created more problems for itself than it had eliminated. There is the danger that VOA could drift into an adversary position against the government; this is probably less serious danger than decline in effectiveness and relevance.

19. None of this is to say that VOA could not benefit from some improvements. Tight budgets and strict adherence to civil service requirements have resulted in broadcast staffs that tend toward the elderly and unimaginative. There is a case to be made for broadcasting in more languages, for there is now hardly any corner of the world where cheap radio receivers are not within reach of practically everyone. There is, also a case for reviewing VOA’s position in our governmental structure and for taking a fresh look at the way in which it is given policy and administrative guidance. But this should be done objectively and by persons free of the partisan views that have grown up around some of these questions in the past few years.

20. All of the U.S. Government’s international broadcasting instruments have been essentially marking time during recent years. Technically, they are all behind their competitors. A program for strengthening them needs to be put into effect immediately. They have all been kept under such tight budgetary restrictions that they have not been able to experiment with more creative programming approaches or more appealing ways of delivering news and information. They need to be given the means of doing so. Both technically and substantively, they need to be infused with new dynamism. Technical developments which are now on the horizon—direct satellite broadcasting, e.g.—may provide the means of greatly increasing the impact of our international broadcasting instruments a few years from now. We should rejuvenate them so that they can take full advantage of what technological breakthroughs may offer.
19. Memorandum From the Chief of Staff (Jordan) to President Carter

Washington, March 14, 1977

SUBJECT

CHAIRMAN OF THE INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING BOARD

As you requested, I checked with Secretary Vance on the proposed appointment of John Gronouski as Chairman of the Board for International Broadcasting. Cy has no objection to Gronouski, but indicated his preference was for Frank Stanton, former President of CBS. McGovern and Percy have also recommended Stanton, but there is no record of their objection to Gronouski. The basic controversy is over William E. Griffith, and we can postpone any action on that nomination until a later date.

Arguments in favor of Gronouski: He was Postmaster General in the Johnson Administration and then served as Ambassador to Poland, where it is generally agreed he performed well. He is a prominent ethnic and not an “establishment” type. He has apparently already been contacted by Brzezinski and is reported to be enthusiastic about taking the job. It is doubtful that even McGovern and Percy would object to his appointment. He would bring a new perspective to the Board.

Arguments in favor of Stanton: As Chairman of a Panel which studied the international broadcasting situation, Mr. Stanton has had experience in the area, although to some the recommendations of the Panel he chaired have been controversial. As a former President of CBS he would bring a good deal of experience in all forms of broadcasting to the Board. He has the support of Vance, Sen. McGovern and Sen. Percy.

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 9, Board for International Broadcasting (RFE, RL, VOA): 2–12/77. No classification marking. A stamped notation indicates that the President saw it. In the top right-hand corner of the memorandum, Carter wrote: “cc: Ham Zbig. What are key elements of the Stanton report? J.” An attached March 15 note from Hutchenson indicates that the copy was returned in the President’s outbox and forwarded to Brzezinski and Jordan “for appropriate handling.” (Ibid.)


3 See footnote 3, Document 1.
20. Memorandum From Larry Ewalt of the Office of Assistant Director, Motion Pictures and Television Service, United States Information Agency, to the Deputy Assistant Director, Motion Pictures and Television Service (Russell)\(^1\)

Washington, March 14, 1977

SUBJECT
Field Reaction to TRANSITION ’77 Series

Ninety-five posts have ordered TRANSITION ’77.\(^2\) Forty-seven have responded, so far, to IMV’s request for comment and guidance on the series. General reaction has been very favorable, with the initial program being enthusiastically received as a useful and timely product that is excellent in both substance and production technique. It was viewed as a means to help the interested viewer understand the transition process and give him a sense of having obtained an inside glimpse at the character, style and mood of the key personalities in the new administration. A sampling of these reactions:

USIS Amman—“Joint Mission review indicates first program timely and useful. Casual atmosphere reflects style of President and his administration.”

USIS Belgrade—“Yugoslav newsman who has seen first program in the TRANSITION ’77 series (interviews with Brzezinski, Powell, Lance, et. al.) was delighted with content (especially Powell’s comments on government-media relationships) and would like to publish excerpts in bi-weekly magazine.”

USIS Bern—“First program was enthusiastically received at two showings for Ambassador and staff within the Embassy. Format and questions were successful in presenting little if not unknown personalities to curious audience.”

USIS Bonn—“Post thought first VTR in TRANSITION ’77 series very good and would hope that second program would maintain same format, quality and tone . . . Morgan’s technique gives the viewer the sense of having obtained an ‘inside’ view and this view, we think, is a very positive one.”

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of the Director, Executive Secretariat, Secretariat Staff, Correspondence Files, 1973–1980, Entry P–104, Box 114, 7700690–7700699. No classification marking. Sent through Marquis, who initialed the memorandum. Russell sent a copy of the memorandum to Jagoda under a March 15 memorandum, stating: “We have a good feeling about the project and its value and were grateful for your office’s fine cooperation on it.” (Ibid.)

\(^2\) See Document 3.
USIS Brasilia—“Post sees format and length of first program as good; interviewer and questions excellent; questions to Brzezinski and Jordan (particularly question on Vietnam experience) outstanding. Post foresees usefulness of programming primarily with small groups of government and press contacts.”

USIS Brussels—“. . . showed first part TRANSITION ‘77 at luncheon/screening program today before a gilt-edge audience, including wide selection of top electronic and print journalists and prominent academics. Response was very favorable about content, as we expected. For audience, this was the first time most had opportunity to see new personalities on-screen and to learn something of their attitudes.”

USIS Canberra—“Response to first TRANSITION ’77 VTR program has been excellent. This VTR has been applauded by both media and political leader audiences in Australia. Edward P. Morgan’s informative but low-key approach is just right for this kind of subject.”

USIS Dakar—“Program promises to be useful for Government of Senegal, media officials . . . Third program should emphasize delineation between Executive-Legislative for those audiences who do not understand why Presidential word is not law.”

USIS London—“USIS London congratulates IMV on initial TRANSITION ’77 program, which would be hard to beat on substance and style. Post has scheduled select invitational Embassy showings for key audience members beginning next week. Our only recommendation is not to tamper with whatever it was that went into first program to make it so effective.”

USIS Mexico—“Format interesting and varied, resembling network special report program, and of comparable quality . . . VTR shown to Presidential Advisory Staff, Mexico City leadership, students at Iberoamerican University, with highly favorable responses.”

USIS Taipei—“First program useful in introducing White House personalities in relaxed format which contributed to general impression of forthrightness, open-minded approach to problems, opportunities facing Carter administration . . . Interviewer’s penetrating questions gave overall feeling of new style in White House.”

USIS Tehran—“Post pleased with first in series. Sees real potential for VTRs in introducing major administration personalities to top level Iranians.”

USIS Tokyo—“First program excellent, no major adjustments needed in format, time, etc. President Carter and members of his administration are objects of considerable interest on part of media representatives, policy planners, members of counterpart (Government) Ministries, etc. There is much interest in learning more about the individuals, their philosophies, ideas, attitudes toward government and use of power.”
Many posts indicated they already had begun, or were making preparations, to program the series, primarily in direct invitational screenings for primary target audiences of government officials, political leaders, media representatives, academics, students, business and labor leaders, etc. These would take place at Agency residences, libraries, cultural centers or wherever most convenient for the particular individual or group.

Many posts indicated they were attempting to place the program with television stations. The most probable television use would appear to be adaptation and segmentary use in the form of single interviews or excerpted statements, rather than placement in its entirety.

Though most posts expressed general satisfaction with the content and format of the series, there were some which were not entirely pleased with the first program. Some dissatisfaction was expressed. The single element most often mentioned was program length. Many felt it should have been kept to 30 minutes. Others felt the program’s introduction was too long and that the program should move into the interviews faster. Proving again you can’t satisfy everyone, some posts said the interviews were too short, some said they were too long.

Posts with sharp-eyed viewers noted that the opening montage of stills showed all post World War II Presidents except Johnson and Nixon (and felt that the omission of Nixon was too obvious) and that interviewer Edward P. Morgan wore two different neckties during the program.

Most of this “critical” comment was constructive and in the form of suggestions on how future programs could be more targeted to audiences in each post’s particular area.
21. Memorandum From Paul Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, March 18, 1977

SUBJECT
BIB, VOA & Related Issues

The Gronouski-Stanton argument symptomizes a much broader issue which is going to come to a head during the next 2–3 months and which, whether people want it to or not, is going to require White House intervention. This is the question of where VOA ends up in the government. At his testimony this past week,² John Reinhardt refused to commit himself to Senator Percy on Stanton Report.³ Senator Humphrey, on the other hand, told Reinhardt that he had grave reservations about Stanton recommendations on VOA and wanted to have assurance that he was not going to support them. It is interesting that Humphrey has got into this (you might consider talking to him on Gronouski, Griffith, etc.). Reinhardt is reliably reported to favor keeping VOA just where it is, but State does not share this view. There are some people in State who favor turning the whole field of international broadcasting and information programs, in effect, over to Stanton.—Whatever some people in WH Staff think they know about this, it would not be in the interest of the President to let this happen.

The President’s speech last night⁴ points up the need for a strong U.S. ability to communicate to the world through instruments such as VOA as well as RFE/RL. We should probably be considering expanding our capacity to communicate through other means as well. In its way, the capacity of the U.S. Government to project its ideas throughout the world through instruments it manages is as important as its capacity to defend itself with weaponry . . . This requires, I believe, that we

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special (Henze), Box 1, Chron File: 3/77. No classification marking.
take a very specific interest in questions of U.S. information policy from NSC vantage point and assert ourselves on key issues.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to public diplomacy.]

22. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter

Washington, March 18, 1977

SUBJECT
Stanton Report, Board for International Broadcasting and Related Issues

Stanton’s Report advocates a fragmenting of U.S. information effort:
• abolishing USIA and setting up an Information and Cultural Affairs Agency (ICA) under State which would have some of its functions while
  • a new Deputy Undersecretary of State for Policy Information would have others.
  • Abroad, PAOs would be abolished and USIS functions spread around embassies, while
  • VOA would be set up under a separate Board, like the BIB, with eventual merger with the BIB foreseen.

The total effect would be to make U.S. information programs harder for the Government to manage and less amenable to White House influence. Eventual merger of VOA and RFE/RL would deprive RFE/RL of their distinctive character and role. Opposition to Stanton’s ideas has been widespread and includes most Ambassadors, USIA and VOA officers and the Board and Staff of RFE/RL. John Hays (Post/Newsweek), Chairman of the RFE/RL Board, is strongly opposed to Stanton and could be expected to resign if Stanton were appointed BIB Chairman.

The Stanton Report was done at the Georgetown Center where Kissinger is now located. The Center is headed by David Abshire, who

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 9, Board for International Broadcasting (RFE, RL, VOA): 2–12/77. Confidential; Outside System. Sent for information. A stamped notation indicates the President saw it. Another copy is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 47, Chron: 3/77.

2 See footnote 2, Document 18.
has just resigned as Chairman of the BIB, with the aid of Walter Roberts, who has played a very partisan role in the BIB Staff. These people have been lobbying with members of Congress, pushing Stanton’s (and their) partisan views and denouncing people who disagree with them.

Stanton as BIB Chairman would be caught up in controversy from the start and his ideas would make it very difficult for us to get real improvements in U.S. broadcasting and other information efforts.

23. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Washington, March 19, 1977, 0225Z

61257. Subject: VOA Broadcasts to the USSR. Ref: Moscow 3341–C. 1

1. USIA and Department are concerned that Embassy finds that VOA’s approach has “changed noticeably in recent weeks.”

2. If Embassy’s conclusion is based solely on fact that there has been substantially heavier coverage of human rights stories, the explanation is straightforward: heavier coverage reflects both the administration’s and U.S. public’s focus on the issue. As you are aware, the new human rights emphasis, especially as it affects U.S.-Soviet relations has generated lively and vocal debate. Media coverage, both in the United States and abroad, has been extraordinarily heavy. VOA has, of course, reported the statements that have emanated from official sources and the subsequent debate in the press. This the VOA has a clear mandate...
to do; it reports the news as it occurs and tells its listeners how public opinion reacts to it, largely as reflected in domestic US and foreign media.

3. If, on other hand, Embassy believes that, apart from increased volume of coverage, tone and approach have changed and that guidelines are being ignored, we need examples of materials Embassy finds objectionable and/or inappropriate. Since ref tel suggests that part of problem may be manner in which some programs are voiced, it would be helpful to have your specific comments on that aspect of situation as well.

4. In the meantime, Embassy should know that broadcasts to the Soviet Union have been under particularly close scrutiny in recent weeks. Indeed, every effort will continue to be made to handle human rights and other sensitive stories in accurate and balanced fashion. In this regard, ref tel, as well as Embassy’s earlier communications, are greatly appreciated.

Vance

24. Memorandum From Paul Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the Associate Press Secretary (Schecter)

Washington, March 22, 1977

SUBJECT

President’s Report to Congress on International Broadcasting

The following is for use in briefing the press or responding to questions on this report.

The report is not an annual requirement. It was asked for last year by the Congress because a number of questions had arisen about implications of longer-range developments in the international broadcasting field. The report was prepared during the final weeks of the Ford Administration but not transmitted because it was felt that the Carter Administration should have the opportunity to review its recom-

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special (Henze), Box 1, Chron File: 3/77. No classification marking.

mendations independently. This has been done during recent weeks with participation of the State Department, OMB, USIA and the Board for International Broadcasting. All of these agencies were essentially in agreement on the questions dealt with in the report.

The report concerns the operations of the Voice of America and the two separate radios that broadcast to Eastern Europe and the USSR: Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. (Though these radios retain their separate identity, they have been merged in corporate structure and many aspects of their operations are carried out jointly.)

VOA is operated by USIA with policy guidance from the State Department. RFE/RL operates under the sponsorship of the Board for International Broadcasting, which was set up by PL 93–129, enacted on 19 October 1973. The Board is a U.S. Government entity, consisting of a Chairman and five members and a staff who are full-time civil servants.

RFE/RL, in turn, is managed by a Board of Directors. Chairman of this Board is John Hayes, of the Washington Post-Newsweek group (other members on attached list at Tab A).  

The President’s Report to Congress concludes that VOA and RFE/RL are making optimum use of their present facilities but that they need more transmitter power to do their job effectively over the next few years. The report recommends a program for building new transmitters which will entail modest increases in financial outlays over the next three years. The exact sums which will be requested are not yet known; needs will probably be in the range of $30,000,000. The radios and OMB will be studying this question. Since funds will be needed over at least the next three years, they will probably not all be requested in this year’s supplemental budget request. The OMB is working on this supplemental budget request now.

Considering the rate at which most other categories of U.S. Government expenditures have been rising, these radios have been operating very economically. Even with expansion and modernization, they will be costing only a tiny fraction of the sums we spent on defense and military and economic aid abroad.

The President strongly supports the radios and considers them important instruments through which the U.S. Government and the American people assert their strong interest in human rights and the free flow of information.

While expansion of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty’s transmitters will affect only broadcasting to Eastern Europe and the USSR,

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3 See footnote 3, Document 11.
4 Not found attached.
expansion of VOA’s transmitter power will enable it to reach listeners in many other parts of the world, particularly the lesser developed countries, where expansion of broadcasting by Communist-dominated countries has given them considerable lead over the Free World in recent years.

The report does not deal with the location of VOA within the U.S. Government. The White House is aware that there has been debate on this subject and considers debate and discussion healthy. For the time being there is no plan to shift VOA from the control of USIA.

The report also does not deal with personnel questions on which there has been some recent press speculation. The President is considering nominees for the Chairmanship of the Board for International Broadcasting. David Abshire, who has been chairman for the past three years, has resigned. The President’s choice for this position will be announced shortly. (NOTE: Actually the President has decided to nominate John A. Gronouski, but the nomination has not yet been publicly announced, though it is now in process—it is conceivable that this announcement could be made now but it should be checked out with Hamilton Jordan’s office.)

At least two vacancies on the Board for International Broadcasting are anticipated; nominees for these are under consideration. Many names have been suggested, but choices have not yet been made. Professor William Griffith of MIT (who was attacked in the press last week) is still under consideration for membership on the Board, for he has excellent qualifications for this kind of appointment.

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5 On June 8, the White House released a statement indicating that the President would nominate Gronouski to be a member and chair of the Board of International Broadcasting for a term expiring on April 28, 1980. (Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book I, pp. 1073–1074)
SUBJECT
Leonard Marks on Cultural Exchange, Human Rights and Related Issues

Following up on your instruction of last week, I had lunch with Leonard Marks today. I found him bouncy, voluble and feisty. He had a lot to say about cultural exchange in general, about Turkey (where he visited in November) and about contacts with Arbatov and other Soviets. His main messages which he wanted passed to you are these:

- He gave me a letter (Tab A) in which he advocates four positive moves in respect to the Soviets:
  1—Increase in the Sister City program
  2—a dramatic increase in professors and researchers invited to U.S. from USSR and Eastern Europe
  3—a Presidential appeal on jamming, and
  4—U.S. offer to operate bookstores in USSR & Eastern Europe

He believes these initiatives will keep the Soviets on the defensive and counter the maneuvers they are going to make against us at Belgrade.4

- He reported that all living former directors of USIA had met with John Reinhardt a couple of evenings ago to discuss issues that had been raised in Stanton Report. Advice was unanimous that VOA should remain in USIA and that State CU should be amalgamated with USIA which should oversee all cultural and information programs. He says there is strong Congressional sentiment for this viewpoint. He hopes White House will support Reinhardt.

- He says seven vacancies are coming up on U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs (USAC/IECA) which he heads. He would like to have our help in getting good people appointed to it. All are Presidential appointees. He would also like to be reappointed to head it—says he is in complete harmony with

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special (Henze), Box 1, Chron File: 3/77. Confidential. Sent for information.
3 See footnote 8, Document 7.
4 Reference is to the CSCE Review Conference, scheduled to take place in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, in October 1977.
this Administration and is eager to push information and exchange programs energetically.

- He had very positive things to say about RFE/RL and President’s Report on International Broadcasting.\(^5\) He is eager to help in Congress if we need it. I told him Gronouski being appointed.\(^6\) He said he considered him a very good choice.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

1) Leonard Marks’ verve and energy are impressive. Unless someone has a much better candidate, I recommend he be continued as Chairman of USAC/IECA. I suggest we give some thought to new members of this group too; I will develop a list if you wish.

2) There is a good case to be made for a friendly, aggressive approach to cultural and information exchange as Marks suggests in his letter. Suggest you send the letter to Reinhardt and Vance for their comments. With some refinements, these initiatives are worth pursuing at the right time, I believe.

3) Suggest you may wish to get together with John Reinhardt because I think he feels the need for support and help in carrying out his responsibilities. If we accept the idea that information programs are part of our national security effort, just as our military and intelligence programs are, there is a good case for your asserting yourself a bit in this field and not leaving it only to State, which always tends to give it short shrift.

\(^6\) See footnote 5, Document 24.
26. Letter From the Chair of the United States Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs (Marks) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, March 24, 1977

Dear Zbig

Secretary Brezhnev’s recent statement² in response to President Carter’s declaration on human rights³ may be a prelude to a decision by the USSR not to participate in the Belgrade conference.⁴ As you know from personal experience during the Vietnam negotiations, the representatives of the Soviet Union are skilled at discussing “the shape of the table.” In fact, Georgi Arbatov last December made such a reference in a personal conversation with me.

To foreclose this possibility a face-saving device is needed—some indication from President Carter that the door has not been slammed in the face of Eastern Europe and the USSR. In my opinion the solution may very well lie in an expanded program of people-to-people relationships.

Recently the President referred to experiences he had had during his term as Governor of Georgia with a Sister City program which had had remarkable success.⁵ Programs of this nature exist throughout the country and have generally met with considerable enthusiasm by those who participate in the United States and in foreign lands. Accordingly, I would urge the following as a substantive program and as a means of showing Brezhnev and others that we want to improve relationships between our respective countries rather than return to a cold war atmosphere:

1. An increase in the number of Sister City relationships between the United States, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union. This activity should be left to private initiative, but as an inducement I would urge

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 1, Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs: 3–12/77. No classification marking. An attached NSC Correspondence Profile indicates that Brzezinski “noted” the letter on March 24. (Ibid.)


⁴ See footnote 4, Document 25.

⁵ See footnote 8, Document 7.
that a credit of $100 be given to each foreign visitor from the Eastern European area coming to the United States to help defray the cost of their travel. Reciprocally, the USSR and the Eastern European countries should make a similar advance to Americans visiting those countries.

In typical advertising fashion, I would introduce this program for “a limited time only,” and publicize it as an effort to carry out the spirit of Helsinki.

In my opinion a program of this nature should be acceptable to the Eastern Europeans and to the USSR at this time without sacrificing their stand on human rights or our alleged interference in the internal affairs of their countries.

2. A dramatic increase in the number of professors and research scholars invited to the United States to study in American institutions under the Fulbright-Hays program.\(^6\)

A reciprocal invitation from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe for Americans to study in their countries.

In this connection Rector Khokhlov of Moscow State University came to the United States last year to make arrangements for such an expanded program. To his dismay he found that our leading universities did not have the funds to undertake the exchange. Accordingly, I would recommend that financial assistance be extended for this program through the Department of State.

3. I would urge the President to make a plea that there be no jamming of the channel of communication, pointing out that Article 19 of the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights\(^7\) specifically provides, “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”

4. In the same spirit, I would advocate a formal request for permission to open and operate book stores in the USSR and Eastern Europe where American text books, literature, and cultural material can be purchased. This will be characterized as an attempt to “propagandize,” but should nevertheless be proposed since Basket III of the Helsinki declaration specifically contemplates this type of exchange of information.\(^8\)

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\(^6\) See footnote 5, Document 7.

\(^7\) Adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 10, 1948.

\(^8\) See footnote 2, Document 13.
I hope that these ideas will receive your serious consideration. If they appeal to you, I would be eager to help carry them out.

Sincerely

Leonard H. Marks

27. Paper Prepared in the Policy Planning Staff

Washington, undated

CU Action Program on Human Rights

According to a preliminary paper prepared by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, CU has both the opportunity and capacity to contribute to a greater awareness of human rights. It—together with USIA, AID, and PA and with overall coordination from D/HA—should be encouraged to expand its role in the human rights sphere.

CU's general approach should:

—Proceed on the basis of two assumptions: that there is substantial diversity among individual societies and cultures and that we can all learn something from each other in human rights matters.

—Be low-key and indirect, as opposed to confrontational and sharply visible.

—Proceed, as much as possible, in cooperation with non-governmental organizations, with grant support from CU where necessary.

CAUTION: We should avoid covert financing since it could well prove counterproductive for the promotion of human rights.

—Stress the longer-term approach of promoting pluralism within various societies through programs with academics, journalists, lawyers, labor and political leaders, etc.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P77018-2014. Secret. Attached as Tab 5 to an undated action memorandum from Lake and Derian to Vance, sent through Habib and Christopher, regarding a general approach and a specific action program concerning the administration’s human rights policy. The final version of the S/P and D/HA action memorandum, March 25, is printed as an attachment to a March 25 memorandum from Lake to Christopher. See Foreign Relations, 1977-1980, vol. II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Document 29. Christopher subsequently directed the Policy Planning Staff to redraft the March 25 memorandum as a memorandum from Christopher to Vance. For additional information, see Foreign Relations, 1977-1980, vol. II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Document 34.

2 Not found and not further identified.
Programs might be developed around three basic themes:

1. **Law and Society:** There is timeless conflict between order and freedom which shapes the legal system of every society. CU, together with USIA and AID, can use seminars, exchange programs and media products to address such topics as: the law vis-à-vis property, privacy, minorities; protection of civil rights and liberties; equity among citizens of all classes; the idea of a politically-independent judiciary; the rule of law.

2. **Comparative values:** Diversity in perceptions on human rights derives largely from differences in value systems. A comparative study of changing value systems affecting society, customs, and political institutions could help broaden understanding of these perceptions. Among possible themes for discussion: cultural values and comparative legal systems, individual rights versus the “greater welfare,” women in society, concepts of loyalty and obligation, individual rights versus family obligations, conflict-solving through compromise versus “right-or-wrong” adjudication, distributive justice, the generation gap, values rooted in religion, and the role of economic enterprise and “the public good.”

3. **Civic Institutional Response to Social Needs:** Programs of the State Department, USIA, and AID have already tried to build on the work of such US organizations as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the League of Women Voters, Common Cause, the NAACP, Sierra Club, etc., to promote a greater sense of community action abroad. More activities in this area might include: economic enterprise and social change, the cooperative movement, religious organizations and social progress, community action for social betterment, leadership training for social improvement, pressure groups and public policy, the environmental movement, and the status of the volunteer.

The next steps for implementation of a concrete CU action program for human rights should include:

—**Compilation of an inventory** of organizations and individuals with which to work on human rights-related programs.

—**Organization of one or more seminars** (perhaps both a multi-regional and several regional symposia) with a strong human rights orientation.

—**Inclusion of program activity related to human rights on the agenda of exchange programs**—both American Specialists going abroad and International Visitors coming to the United States and the Fulbright Program.

—**Increase in support for organizations dedicated to fostering human rights** (comparable to those programs already in train with the American Association of the International Commission of Jurists, the Center for World Peace through Law, and the American Bar Association’s
Program for International Legal Exchange. AID could augment efforts in this area, if the appropriate adjustments were made in existing legislation. (Senator Humphrey reportedly picked up on this idea at recent hearings.3)

—Elaboration on how CU intends to fulfill the objective (“to increase attention to and support for human rights”), specified in the regional goals for that bureau’s FY ’79 and ’80 budgets.

USIA Action Program on Human Rights

Although we have not yet solicited a specific action program from the Information Agency, our discussion with officials there and elsewhere suggests the following:

—USIA has already taken significant steps to emphasize US commitment to human rights abroad.

• VOA (Voice of America) stresses the theme in its broadcasts (so much so that there is increased fear of jamming by the USSR) and has a Human Rights Projects Officer working on a series on this subject.

• IPS (Press Service) has reflected this high priority policy with the drafting and dispatch of over 60 articles to USIS posts around the world.

• Policy Guidance. Working together with D/HA, USIA has cabled4 (March 1977) guidance on treatment of human rights to all USIS posts.

• Information Kit. An “FYI Kit on Human Rights as a US and International Issue,” with a collection of background material on this topic, has been prepared and will be sent to all USIS field offices by March 31, 1977.

• Active Coordination with D/HA. The Human Rights Officer on the Agency’s Policy and Planning Advisory Staff attends weekly meetings held by D/HA in the Department and is in regular contact with the D/HA staff.

• Media Feedback. USIA provides interested Agency and Department officers with worldwide media reaction on US statements and actions on human rights.

Next Steps

—Substantive: USIA claims that its machinery is ready to roll. What’s needed is a clearer idea of the policy we want to project.

—Procedural: The Agency is considering the establishment of a more formalized structure to deal with human rights and should be

3 Reference is presumably to the March 7 Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance hearings. Humphrey chaired the Subcommittee.

4 Not found.
encouraged to do so, with the most appropriate position for coordination within IOP (the Office of Policy and Plans) and with the stipulation that that office report directly and frequently on human rights to the Director.

—Development of Interagency Action Plan. In addition to increasing coordination within the Agency on human rights and continuing its active cooperation with D/HA, the Agency should work together with AID and the Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU) and Public Affairs (PA) to draw up a detailed and coordinated action plan for bringing the US Government’s informational and cultural resources to bear most effectively on promotion of human rights.\(^5\)

\(^5\) In a May 3 memorandum to Vance, Christopher stated, “I have called for the preparation of human rights action plans by USIA, CU, and PA for review by our Coordinating Committee; the PA Plan will include, *inter alia*, proposals to help senior-level officials of the Administration explain US policy on human rights, and the preparation of materials for mailing to opinion leaders and groups and for use by State Department employees speaking throughout the United States.” (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 19, Human Rights—Tasking Memos) Christopher’s memorandum is attached to a May 23 memorandum from Vance to Carter; it is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Document 48. For the final version of the USIA action plan, see Document 60.
28. Memorandum From the Senior Program Adviser, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (Espinosa) to the Director, Office of Policy and Plans, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (Roth)¹

Washington, March 25, 1977

SUBJECT

Comments on the Winks Report²

Although somewhat superficial, this is a thoughtful and very timely and useful report.

The report as presented is, as it purports to be, an outline of specific problems and recommendations directed to “possible improvements” (p.2) in the conduct of academic exchanges under the binational commission programs under the Fulbright-Hays Act, those administered under the terms of that Act and the specific executive agreements with each of the 44 countries where such executive agreements are operative.

The author states: “I also take it as reasonable to assume that, after nearly thirty years, this specific program in educational exchange needs modification.” It would be erroneous for the reader of the report to assume that it is a matter of bringing up-to-date policies and techniques initiated 30 years ago that have jelled without change since that time. I think that most of the managers of CU recognize that the world has changed considerably in the last 30 years.

Many of the problems raised are continuing ones, and a number of these have from time to time been thoroughly analyzed and improvements have been made. But while we talk of the country approach, which is basic, we neglect disparate country-by-country requests, especially in cost factors. Thus, unfortunately, special studies have been followed by later studies, and the correct points are made, but then the issue is often neglected until it again becomes a problem.

Therefore, I believe it would be premature at this stage to seek a substantial grant from a private foundation “the better to engage the private sector in support of the public . . . exchange program, using the grant to implement the more significant of the recommendations


² Reference is to a February 15, 1977, report drafted by Winks, entitled “A Report on Some Aspects of the Fulbright-Hays Program.” A copy of the report is in the National Archives, RG 306, Associate Directorate for Programs, Subject Files of Basic Operating Documents, Entry P–100, Statement of Mission & Concepts CU.
that follow elsewhere in this report.” (p.10) What is needed first is some continuing CU homework on the subject, starting with a systematic analysis of the specific recommendations in the Winks report vis-a-vis today’s country-by-country requests versus old policies universally applied.

1. p.10: The “records, as now kept and dispersed, make it difficult to provide answers to the many questions that rightly arise about future government programs.”

The first step, I believe, as the CU History Office has suggested with regard to the CU History records, is to hire a first-rate professional archivist and a human census and statistics expert (of the type that can be found in the Census Bureau) as consultants to give us expert advice. These are matters that require professional advice.

2. p.11: “Responsibility is now divided, perhaps too extensively and certainly without full clarity, between too many bodies. CU, BFS, CIES, the Advisory Commission, USIA through the CAOs and their country plans, binational commissions, IIE, and other contract agencies . . . the Fulbright program would appear to be excessively expensive to administer.” The report suggests that a private foundation be asked, through its own funds, to study this whole problem. Before such action would merit any attention, the recommendation requires careful analysis by CU itself, based on the reasons for and realities of the Department’s role in CU/private, CU/legislative, and CU/BFS/binational commission relationship, in the dynamics of the program.

3. pp.13–15: The discussion on these pages repeats what was written some 20 years ago, as the records will amply demonstrate, without indicating what has been done about these matters in the intervening years and specifically where improvements are needed and why. Inhibitions on progress should be fully analyzed. However, if the situation appears to others the way it appears to Winks, CU should certainly clarify the picture. CU has ample factual information and experience to make a careful analysis of Winks’ comments, and to state clearly what has been done about these matters over the years and what specifically needs new thinking now, clearly thinking through the restraints that seem to dominate our thinking.

4. pp.15–17: Recommendations 9, 10, 11, and 12 are those which Winks considers most innovative and important among his recommendations. “I therefore see the recommendations with respect to regional programming as one of the most important of those offered here.” (pp.28–29) He then hastens to point out that the initiative for this type of activity should come from the binational commissions (p.29). Again on page 31, he remarks that CU and the BFS take the “risk” of pushing the idea anyhow. Then on pages 32 and 33 cautions on the delicacy of taking unilateral action, while recognizing that the program’s whole
strength is its binational character (p.29). The binational character of the program, a jointly administered program between the U.S. and another country, the source of its binational character and commitment by each of the matching countries, the U.S. and another country and their educational communities, should be stated. Any regional or multilateral approach should be a topic for joint binational consideration unless the whole concept is in question. This point needs much deeper and fully documented analysis.

5. The other recommendations, most of which touch on improving existing techniques, or such matters as the adequacy of the level of grantee stipends, which obviously are not the same as they were 30 years ago, should each be fully reviewed and analyzed by CU, in relation to the above, before seeking outside advice. What are the restraints? What are the limits, and when is outside cooperation essential? There is no evidence that Winks has read the many CU reports and recommendations by CU to the BFS on this subject, and the actions taken. In any case, the question of desired or possible improvements should be based on where we are now in relation to country-to-country requirements, the steps taken over the years, and the fact that, with regard to techniques and administrative details, country-to-country requirements are more important than regional or worldwide concepts of uniformity.

6. With regard to academic exchanges, Winks states: “Bi-National Commissions continue, to my mind, to be the most effective means of administration abroad . . .” (p.29). If so, a question that BFS might discuss at a future date, but which CU ought seriously to study first, is why there have been no new Executive Agreements since 1964, and what in today’s world is the meaning of “binational” in the context of what we mean when we are talking specifically of the binational commission programs.
29. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Reinhardt) to all USIA Employees

Washington, March 25, 1977

TO MY USIA COLLEAGUES

It is with a great sense of humility, honor and dedication that I accept President Carter’s nomination and now assume the position of Director of the U.S. Information Agency.

During the months ahead, as we discuss and determine the future course of USIA, I shall count on your support. I come to my new position with a knowledge and understanding of the importance of our work and of the professionalism which characterizes our career service. Each of us is convinced that public diplomacy is an integral part of the foreign policy process and that its practitioners must be dedicated, imaginative, and untiring.

It is an honor for me to join with you once again and to have the opportunity to participate in the further development and refinement of our programs.

John E. Reinhardt
Director
30. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Reinhardt) to all USIA Heads of Offices and Services

Washington, March 31, 1977

I know that most of you will have heard reports on Wednesday's staff meeting from representatives from your element who were present. In my remarks I gave my views on the important issues now confronting USIA and outlined how I hope to deal with them. Since not all of you could be present, I thought you might like to read the attached informal record of that meeting. I should appreciate your calling the text to the attention of your staff and placing it in an appropriate place where all those interested may also read it.

Attachment

Notes Prepared in the United States Information Agency

Washington, March 30, 1977

NOTES FROM DIRECTOR’S STAFF MEETING
March 30, 1977

I am delighted to be here for the first time. This time three months ago I didn’t have the slightest idea that I would be here. Thus I have had no long preparation for assuming my duties here and don’t come this morning with any long list of things to be achieved. In the little over two months that I have known this day was coming I obviously have been doing a good deal of conferring with many of you here, with people outside the building, in the public sector and the private sector. I’ve been doing a good deal of reflecting on the general programs of the Agency but with at least one handicap—that much of my reflection has been based on an organization that I knew more closely 6–8

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2 March 30.

3 No classification marking.
years ago when I was working directly in it. I’m not sure that is a sound basis for proceeding. On the other hand, I fear that there is a looking back on those days and as I have conferred with you in the last 2½ months, many of the things that existed then are still with us, for better or worse. Actually, I think to some extent, for worse. This is one of the reasons that the general question of reorganization, which is uppermost in everyone’s mind, is on us. I think that if there had not been a Stanton Panel report there would have been an “X” or “Y” or “Z” report. And one of the several reasons that we are confronted with the question of reorganization, which incidentally I welcome, is that the Agency in its general organization, general structure, seems to me has not changed essentially since its birth. And therefore the question of mandate, of mission, of organization is a completely legitimate one and one that I think we should welcome. I am aware that those of you who have been in the Agency in Washington or overseas since the appearance of the Stanton report in the spring of ’75 have had your morale affected. You have been anxious, to say the least. Indeed there may have been some element of fear. And I think that this is natural enough. Where does the Agency go when this question is with us for a two-year period and is not settled—it would do something to any organization. Thus I am determined if at all possible that we put this question behind us. I told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee it would take 60–90 days. I was not authorized to say 60–90 days. I was authorized to say quickly, whatever that means. It seems to me if we go along much longer with this question, it is simply never settled. If a new organization cannot deal with it within a year, it will tend to slide. If it slides any further, it would not be to anyone’s advantage, including taxpayers. Until we know the direction in which we are going, the redirection of the existing Agency will be more difficult. I do not think that we should undertake any massive changes until we get some better feel of the reorganization question. I personally think that we do have an antiquated structure. In sheer managerial terms it would seem to me there is something wrong with an organization that has 17 coequal Assistant Directors or their equivalents all reporting to the same place. From a sheer managerial point of view this simply does not make any sense. This has nothing to do with the Stanton Panel or with the other 32 studies of this Agency since its beginning. I cite this as just one overall structural problem that we have as an

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4 During the Nixon administration, Reinhardt served as USIA’s Assistant Director for Africa (1969–1970) and Assistant Director for East Asia and Pacific (1970) prior to his 1971 appointment as U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria.

5 Reference is to Reinhardt’s March 15 confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; see footnote 2, Document 21.
organization and that in my judgment makes reorganization a fair question. I think there has been a tendency over the years for us to deal with one another incestuously, to satisfy ourselves whatever the outside world thinks about us, whatever the other elements of the foreign affairs community may think about us. It is because of this internal relationship with one another that the question of the overall reorganization of the Agency has been put in abeyance, has not been faced up to. We have assured ourselves that we are good enough, that, e.g., when we open up a post overseas, we need a PAO, CAO, IO and other positions, regardless of whether there are indigenous information channels. This kind of thinking has led to the overall question of reorganization. Whether I’m right or wrong, it is on us. I think we should welcome the opportunity. Once and for all, I hope to settle the question of mandate, of structure of the organization, of our relationship with other elements of the government and especially with other elements of the foreign affairs community.

The general outline of my personal thinking on this question was contained in my response to Senators at the time of my confirmation hearings. I made it clear I was speaking personally. I believe Senator Javits made it crystal clear.

In the time frame of the next 60–90 days, what is going to happen is that in the next 2, 3 or 4 weeks at the most, I hope, the Executive will come to some conclusions about what it thinks concerning reorganization. There is at this time no definitive Executive position on the reorganization of USIA. There are a lot of thoughts, a lot of lobbying is going on. But no one, so far as I can find out, including the President, has made up his mind. No one has had argumentation on all sides of this question presented. I want to tell you as much about it as I know—there are no secrets.

We know the proposals on the table—I mention the Stanton Panel report simply because that is the latest report. That report is reinforced by the Murphy Commission report. You know what’s in it. I’m sure each of you here has read it. There is no question that we have to deal with each question in it. Personally I believe public diplomacy or whatever we call it is important. I think that in the general foreign affairs community this proposition is more or less accepted. All of us connected with the Agency over the years have experienced that we were tolerated, not welcomed overseas. Many foreign affairs colleagues have said, “Perhaps what you’re doing is alright, but it really doesn’t have much to do with what I’m doing.” I have no exact survey data,

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but it seems to me that in my general experience we have overcome this. There is an acceptance now for many of the things we do. I don’t think anyone questions the exchange of persons program, for example, since we operate overseas and we’re in touch with people in the foreign affairs community about this. I don’t think anyone would question the existence of the VOA. Many people are nettled about the broadcasts, particularly when they think those broadcasts encroach on their territory. Everybody recognizes the need for our better print media products. My experience is that *Dialogue*[^7] for example, is acceptable. Once a product is presented abroad, Ambassadors, Political Officers, Administrative Officers feel this is good. So public diplomacy has come to be accepted. I believe the Stanton Panel did the nation a service by pointing up the need. Speaking personally, I believe there should be an overall body, called the Agency or whatever, that is concerned with public diplomacy, meaning education, culture, etc. Fragmentation seems to be the great enemy of public diplomacy. If we have a series of bureaucracies around Washington each in charge of its small domain of public diplomacy, this is the road to chaos. If we go that road in 5, 6, 8 weeks, we’ll face another move for amalgamation. This is the most important part of the overall reorganization plan. Technically and organizationally I don’t think it makes much difference where we end up, on Pennsylvania Avenue or in the suburbs of Washington or in the Department of State building. The important thing is to be a central organization concerned with all of the elements of public diplomacy. After all, when done well, it is an integrated effort. If the Voice is broadcasting without any regard to the other elements of the public diplomacy structure, if the print media or motion pictures do this, it will be less good than it would be otherwise.

On this question, though, it is the uppermost thing we’re going to tackle first. We’re going to try to get rid of it within 60–90 days. I cannot be sure how this will be approached with Congress. Whether it is presented to Congress with one or many Carter reorganization plans or whether we will go before appropriate committees and discuss it at length, which is what I would gather, I don’t know.

One personnel matter: Mike Pistor is back from London to work exclusively on this question. He has no other function in the front office than to address the question of reorganization. Many people in this Agency have had their say on this subject. We have the documents, oral statements too. I am perfectly willing to accept others. We think we know where you stand insofar as you have written or spoken on

[^7]: Published quarterly and contained reprints of articles from U.S. periodicals, in addition to photographs and other images and articles written specifically for the publication.
this question. Once Mike has completed his work, largely a drafting job, discussions within the Executive will begin, going as high as necessary in an effort to put together a definitive view of the Administration. We hope to prevail in our thinking. I think I sense not indifference but lack of knowledge of this subject within the foreign affairs community. Then the question is, what do we do pending reorganization. Sixty to 90 days may not work. How do we function? How do we bring new direction, new life, new leadership in the existing structure pending reorganization? It will be difficult because we do not know what we would be breathing new life into, restructuring, until the question of reorganization is finally settled. With that in mind, there are two or three things I would like to emphasize.

First is the question of preeminence of the field. I have heard that Washington exists to support the field. I don’t know anyone who particularly challenges this. To the extent that it has not worked, we want to make it work. This has got to be the dominant emphasis, whether we are reorganized or not. I would say that for an FSIO who wants to get ahead in the public diplomacy agencies as now organized, the place to get ahead is somewhere overseas, not in Washington. Literally we should consider ourselves a support element. There will be an increasing need for first-class, unerring support. We all accept the principle of Washington support for the overseas agency. It would seem to me in my own experience that despite acceptance of that principle, some of our support has been lacking. I had evidence of this in the past week when going through budget preparation hearings. There were hard questions and sometimes less than useful answers. It would seem to me that if an element of Washington bureaucracy were in charge of Africa, Personnel, whatever, that element at least should know more than me about the problems and know the answers. Otherwise there’s not much need for experts. I mention this only as an example of what I think you will need in terms of professional, expert support for the field if the field is to become or remain eminent. In order to look into this question more closely, I hope to work with each element here, certainly with element heads and their chief subordinates. I don’t want to do this six in a day in order to get rid of it. I want a briefing session from each of you from your points of view but without charts, without prepared statements, but largely in terms of answering questions, focusing attention on what it is that concerns you in order to make your operation the most efficient. We will get started in the next day or two. The main reason is not simply for my education—I have some because of my long association with the Agency—but to see where we are, where we stand.

I support intellectually and emotionally the general principle of openness. I do not think we can make basic decisions about the Agency
without considerable input from various sectors of the Agency. How we structure ourselves to take advantage of the climate of openness, frankly I don’t know. I am acquainted with the Excom group\(^8\) as it exists. I assume one reason for the establishment of this committee was to enlarge the participation in the decision-making process. Insofar as I know about this committee, I don’t like what I see. I don’t like the composition of it. But if one tries to redesign it, I run into the problem of getting an unwieldy committee. In general, the size seems satisfactory as it is. But many important elements are out of it. There will be some such instrument, but I do not like what we now have. I don’t promise a new instrument next week, but there will be one. Pending the establishment of a new one, for questions and decisions that won’t wait each element should send your papers to me. If a decision has to be made immediately, we will make it. This is less than open, but it seems to me all we could do until we have restructured the committee. I would welcome counsel on this. I don’t know whether you’re happy or unhappy with this. As we try to restructure, I would welcome the counsel of each of you here and of your colleagues who are not here.

A word about the organization of the front office: At the beginning, at least hopefully we’ll have a Deputy\(^9\) someday, and the Deputy’s primary role as I conceive of it will be in program direction involving Area offices, involving Media offices as they support programs overseas. I would hope that the new Deputy, whenever he or she arrives, will focus 90 percent of that person’s attention on: What are we doing overseas, what should we be doing, and how well are we doing it? Clearly these are questions that concern the Areas primarily. They are questions that concern the Media insofar as they support the Media overseas. If they don’t support overseas, there is no reason for them to exist. As concerns budget and administration, the only reason we budget and administer is for whatever we do overseas. I hope that in the early days, at least, the new Deputy will have far more business with the Areas and the Media than with any other elements in the

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Agency. This may or may not work. It is presumed the new Deputy will need staff assistants, largely for the purpose of smooth liaison with the elements. Cynthia Fraser is already a Special Assistant and will continue in that role and will be primarily concerned with the smooth functioning of the office in its relationship with the other elements of the Agency and to a certain extent with other elements of the government. There is almost certain to be another Special Assistant who will not be Mike Pistor. The other person is not there, but when we are functioning there will be another Special Assistant to be carefully differentiated from the work Cynthia Fraser does. The second Special Assistant will be far more concerned with ad hoc work: Where are the problems? Where are the opportunities? This person is going to have lots of problems with the bureaucracy. He/she will also concentrate on the areas of opportunities: Are we missing a few bets? There will be a special project nature to the function, special concentration. This person will look for the special problems and opportunities.

Finally I would like to deal with an area I would call “needs,” whether we’re reorganized or not. This grows out of my reflections on the general operation of the Agency over the years. One of the great needs, if not the greatest, hopefully can be dealt with in terms of the reorganization. The need is for a meaningful, useful mandate, or mission. I am well aware of the fact that many people have tried to state this, and I think many are very good. I’m not sure we can improve on some of the statements. Any statement of mission or mandate goes right back to the Smith-Mundt Act.\(^\text{10}\) We have an obligation to explain foreign policy, to bring the people of America together with peoples abroad in an effort to gain mutual understanding. There is not much question that this is the essence of the mandate. The real problem is that thus far this kind of statement of the mandate has also been taken as a license, much less in recent years than before. A general statement allows one to do anything without any necessary priorities. I am aware of Thematic Programs. I should think that these do establish priorities. I think we still need a clear statement of mission and of mandate that will guide us in all of our work at home or abroad and that will make clear to other elements of the foreign affairs community what we are up to—how public diplomacy becomes an integral part of the foreign affairs structure. This should be agreed to in the Congress, the foreign affairs community and in the Agency. I hope to deal with this in the reorganization.

Secondly, I go back again to unwieldy structure. I bring it up again only because I think this is one of the needs which over all the years

\(^{10}\) See footnote 2, Document 1.
has cried out for some kind of solution, which we still don’t have. I don’t think I can get much done if 17 Assistant Directors are coming at me. There must be some more efficient mechanism, whether there’s a reorganization or not.

The third need is more difficult to describe. We can write a mandate, a mission, and hope for general understanding, we could reorganize the structure this afternoon. But there is a need for an intellectual center for the Agency in the broadest sense of the term. What have we done? What has been the degree of success or failure of what we have done, and what should we be doing? This center would affect the old planning, guiding and evaluation problem. It has always been with us and I assume it always will be with us. I don’t think I should call it a problem. It is pretty easy to go our separate ways, to do our thing pretty well in one area, less well in another, but without any core concern about what we do as an overall Agency. This is what we need in terms of an intellectual heart. Whether one person or six, this center would be exclusively concerned with more imaginative, more adventurous programming that is obviously in the national interest. I hope that you sense the need and I’m not quite sure how we fulfill this need.

Fourthly, I think there is a crying need and always has been for a closer relationship and hence greater interest in the overall foreign policy process as it affects this Agency. This calls for a closer personal relationship with counterparts, with other foreign affairs agencies, not just the Department of State but perhaps AID, to a limited extent CIA, to a more limited extent NSC. What we have is concerned with the overall foreign policy process. I don’t think we win our spurs unless we make ourselves indispensable. There has got to be a sense of our need in the foreign policy process. It has been my experience that when we go to our colleagues, whatever we are proposing is generally acceptable. When you’re talking about culture, education, our programs, nobody is against us. But what our programs do to advance foreign affairs objectives is less clear. I should think that in the Area offices, for example, you should be bothered by calls from the Department of State saying in effect, Can you do the following things to help the general cause? Whatever we’re trying to do in a country, you’ve got a role. They should be calling on you as much as you call on them. I am aware that personalities play a great role, perhaps preeminent role in this. I am aware of the shaky relationships each of us has had with our counterparts in the foreign affairs community. There has to be some close relationship stemming first from personal contact but more important from programs we are trying to advance. On VOA and Eastern Europe, they’ve got something at stake and they protect their interests. They deal closely with Shirley and his predecessors, Tuch and his predecessors because they are interested in what comes
out at the other end that affects what they’re intending to achieve. Frequently there are public conflicts. I have seen cables from Moscow about the Voice broadcasts.\(^{11}\) Perfectly legitimate cables. Some wrong, some dead right. What we are doing so far as an Agency, the Voice in this instance, is important in the foreign affairs community. I have attended some NSC meetings on some dominant problems. There was not much question that I was there because of the Voice. There was some fear that you would say something wrong. But the point is that I was there largely because we had a program of interest to someone, some groups outside the Agency. I can’t stress this need too much.

One final illustration: Before confirmation I attended a briefing session by one element of the Agency trying to bring up to date its counterpart element in the Department. I thought overall it was a good briefing session, not so much for what we were saying as for what they were asking and for the manner in which they were trying to bring some harmony between our activities and theirs. The bottom line is indispensability. As long as we distribute pamphlets, process leader grantees, show films in a country without any general interest being aroused in our colleagues, I don’t think we are making public diplomacy work, not establishing a firm basis for public diplomacy.

Finally, the question of the VOA problem. This is at the heart of the Stanton Panel proposal and there is no question that there are thorough-going, hard, tough proponents on both sides of this general issue. I have given my personal opinion before the Senate and the VOA hierarchy. I don’t know how it will turn out. As long as it is a part of the Agency, as it is now, it isn’t a coequal and I don’t think it should be regarded as a coequal. Some 2,500 employees and one-fourth of the Agency’s budget and the ability to program overseas without going through any filtration process mean that it is somewhat more important than some of the other things that we do. I believe that one of the real reasons for the question of the Voice as it now confronts us in the reorganization problem is that over the years we have dealt with it as a coequal. Frankly, this is one of the problems that we have with the Excom. How we overcome this quickly I leave to you. In some of the meetings with some of the elements I have asked pretty pointed questions regarding relationships with the Voice. I have not been always happy with the answers. It would seem to me that radio, if it can be heard in a country where we have an on-the-ground operation, becomes a very important part of that operation. It needs support on the ground overseas and it needs support and guidance back here. The guidance question is a bothersome one and is at the heart of the

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\(^{11}\) For a representative example, see Document 8.
organization problem. On that question it would seem to me we are much better off in our relations up here if we not do much before the fact, before the broadcast, about the news. Good journalists must know a good story when they see it, must broadcast it whatever it is. I hope with our relations with our colleagues downtown that when the question of broadcasts comes up, after the fact, there may very well be much discussion of what you did last week. If we have this discussion about what we have done, we ought to leave news alone and trust to the journalists. If we have poor journalists, we ought to get good ones. There is no overall statement on this but there will be one if VOA remains with us. On the question of news analyses, commentaries, we have an obligation as an Agency, the Voice has a mandate, a Congressionally-approved mandate, to explain foreign policy. That explanation cannot be made efficiently and well unless you are in contact with the policy makers. We must do something to strengthen your relationship with the policy makers. It is not enough each morning to have filtering down to you the policy of the day. It will never be enough until there are closer relations with the policy makers somehow, some way. For example, if SALT is the dominant question on a given day, you clearly are going to know a great deal about this to the extent that the appropriate people are able to sit down with the appropriate policy makers. Policy makers have an obligation to sit down and tell us. This is a key to the commentary/news analysis question. The Voice is also under a mandate to reflect the diversity of opinion on these questions including the subject of foreign policy. There is much debate in the United States, and it is much to our advantage to reveal this. To my knowledge this is generally done well. But it is a part of the uptown operation to assist in the guidance toward diversity. What are the suggestions? What does the research reveal on certain subjects that may be of interest to the Voice as they attempt to fulfill this part of their mandate?

There is a third part of the mandate, one which I call Americana. I am sure there is a greater need for uptown input. I have listened to some programs under this general rubric overseas that don’t seem to me to have high priority, but I understood why they were there. I don’t think there was any element back here focusing on what’s happening in this vast and rich society of ours that may be of interest to Latins and Africans and Asians. I am aware you do this down at the Voice but in a structure as large as ours uptown, you ought to get better guidance on this. There is a crying need for a closer relationship. The physical separation does not help much. We must overcome the more important intellectual separation.

On personnel assignments made en masse previously, I’m not sure we can do much about them. All of them may not hold as we attempt to position ourselves from a personnel point of view to achieve maximum results. But probably 95 percent will remain as announced.
31. Letter From the Chair of the United States Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs (Marks) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\(^1\)

Washington, March 31, 1977

Dear Zbig

In view of recent developments on the SALT talks,\(^2\) I would like to supplement my letter of March 24, 1977,\(^3\) particularly since you have asked me to expand on the concept.

I believe that it is important that President Carter at an early date make a public statement referring to “the spirit of Helsinki” and stressing the willingness of the United States to cooperate in programs which will bring the peoples of countries closer together. This statement must be “more than words” and should call for an affirmative program with suggestions for translating the Basket III proposals\(^4\) into action.

Let me be specific.

An Increase in Sister City Exchange Visits

I am attaching a schedule (Enclosure One) describing the current Sister City relationships that now exist with the USSR, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia.\(^5\) You will note that there are only a limited number

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\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 1, Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs: 3–12/77. No classification marking. Under an April 2 covering memorandum to Brzezinski, Henze sent Brzezinski a copy of Marks’s letter, stating: “It would be good if everyone came up with ideas as fast and energetically as Leonard Marks does. He has written you a somewhat more refined version of the proposals he originally made in his letter of 24 March 1977 [see Document 26]. While these proposals are not sensational, I think there is a case for our making them when good opportunities arise over the next few weeks and months. At any rate I would like to be sure that State and USIA are thinking constructively along these lines. One way of finding out is to send them Leonard’s letter and see how they respond.” Henze also recommended that Brzezinski sign an attached letter to Marks, thanking him for the proposal. (Ibid.) Brzezinski responded to Marks’s proposals in an April 6 letter, asserting: “These are worthwhile objectives and, while I am not optimistic that the Soviets and some of the East European countries will respond favorably to them immediately, I see advantages in advancing them ‘in the spirit of Helsinki’ when good opportunities present themselves over the next months.” Brzezinski also indicated that he planned to send Marks’ letter to both the Department of State and USIA, “asking for their ideas on implementing your suggestions.” (Ibid.) For Reinhardt’s response to the letter, see Document 34.

\(^2\) Reference is presumably to Soviet rejection of the U.S. SALT proposals raised during Vance’s March 27–30 meetings with Brezhnev and Gromyko. For the memoranda of conversation of these meetings, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Documents 17–23.

\(^3\) See Document 26.

\(^4\) See footnote 2, Document 13.

\(^5\) Attached but not printed is the undated enclosure entitled “Current (and Active) Sister City Relationships.”
of US cities involved and that there are many opportunities for expansion particularly in those communities which have substantial population from the Eastern European area.

To expand this program, I would suggest that the President turn to the League of Cities and the Conference of Mayors, urging them to check out opportunities for inaugurating the Sister City arrangement. I have little doubt that they would respond with enthusiasm.

In the past arrangements for these visits were normally made by the private group involved who paid their own expenses. On occasion, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU) has provided limited funds to encourage newly created efforts. In my opinion an expansion of this program should be carried out essentially through private organizations. If government plays a large role, the program loses its basic appeal. Accordingly, CU should have only a limited role to perform. It may be necessary to provide some funds for organizational arrangements, but this would be a small amount compared to the total effort.

I have recommended that a credit of $100 be given to each foreign visitor from the Eastern European area coming to the United States. The mechanisms for distributing these funds would not be complicated and can be arranged so that the funds could be used for hotel, restaurant and other tourist purposes. Most likely the Soviets would reject such assistance, but if offered it can be an inducement for Eastern European groups and would make the program much more attractive. However, if the $100 credit is eliminated, the expanded program can still be carried out.

Increase in the Fulbright-Hays Program

An educational exchange program on a governmental level has been in effect for some time with the USSR, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia. I am attaching as Enclosure Two a description of the current Fulbright program with these countries. At the present time, the Department of State is negotiating similar agreements with Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria.

Although these governmental arrangements can be expanded, the most promising area for expansion will be direct private exchanges between US universities and those in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

To expand this program, I would suggest that the Department of State turn to organizations such as the Association of American

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6 Attached but not printed is the undated enclosure entitled “Fulbright Programs With USSR and Eastern Europe.”
Universities, the International Institute of Education, and similar groups which have had considerable experience in handling academic exchanges. They know the rectors of universities in Eastern Europe, the ministers of education, and others whose participation would be required to translate this idea into a reality.

Let me point out that in the past it has been difficult to recruit qualified Americans with the required language capability, and that we have not been able to respond to the invitations for exchanges from important academic institutions in the Eastern European area. However, I believe that this problem can be overcome if we really make the effort.

Opening of Book Stores

The United States Information Agency operates libraries and book stores throughout the world. If permission should be granted by the USSR and Eastern European countries for similar operations, USIA is prepared to handle it. The same people who regularly provide books and services for our USIA libraries abroad can undertake this assignment.

All of the proposals described above can be put into effect without authorizing legislation, and without creating new agencies of the government.

I have tried to give you a brief outline of the steps that will be required to get the program started. Of course, there will be many details that will require careful attention before the arrangements can be concluded. However, it is important to note that none of these ideas are untried—essentially I am recommending an expansion of existing programs.

The responsibility for putting these ideas into effect would be the CU Bureau at the Department of State for the Sister City programs and the Fulbright-Hays exchanges; and the responsibility for the book stores would be in the USIA.

The important feature of this proposal would be the accent on people-to-people relationships which President Carter has previously announced in discussing the Friendship Force exchange. This program is directly related to that effort and would be consistent with “the spirit of Helsinki.”

Let me know if I can help.

Sincerely

Leonard H. Marks

7 See Document 7.
32. **Memorandum From Paul Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)**

Washington, April 4, 1977

**SUBJECT**
Status Report—BIB and Related Matters

_ I talked with Gronouski at noon today._ He feels he had a very successful Washington visit and accomplished just what he intended—laying the groundwork for good relations with Congress:

- He had an excellent meeting with McGovern on the afternoon of 31 March. McGovern told him Stanton had come to ask for his support, and he had told him his position would depend on man President chose. McGovern said he delighted at Gronouski’s selection, thought he extremely well qualified for job and that he would support him in every way. (Gronouski commented that he had supported McGovern in 1972.)

- He saw Percy briefly; Percy told him he had favored Stanton but was delighted with his selection and would support him in every respect.
  - He stopped at Humphrey’s office, though Humphrey was not in; said he knew Humphrey would support him.
  - He saw Sparkman, who congratulated him warmly and assured him of support of his committee; he feels confident, therefore, that confirmation itself is no problem.
  - He had good luncheon meeting with John Hayes and Leonard Marks on 31 March and got extensive advice from them on BIB Staff members. They told him Jim Critchlow would be best choice as staff chief. (He would be.)
  - He stopped by Abshire’s office to leave greetings and let Abshire know he would like to talk to him in future (a true political operator, Gronouski!).

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 9, Board for International Broadcasting (RFE, RL, VOA); 2–12/77. Confidential. Sent for information. An unknown hand drew a downward pointing arrow at Henze’s name in the “from” line. Dodson initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. According to an attached NSC Correspondence Profile, Brzezinski “noted” the memorandum on April 6. (Ibid.)

2 McGovern was the Democratic Party nominee for President in 1972.
Gronouski says he does not want to come back to Washington until his confirmation hearings but if trouble develops with one of these Congressional committees he will call and let his views be known. He wants no new legislation and wants to get feel of job during first year before suggesting any changes in organizational structure; he does plan to change BIB staff.

Congressional Subcommittee hearings last week are felt by radios to have gone badly. There is talk, primarily by Senator Pell, of need for new legislation putting BIB and RFE/RL boards together and making other changes to “increase the authority” of the BIB. This has radios quite worked up and I have been on phone twice today with John Hayes about it. He and I agree that radios are a little too neurotic about this because it is not at all clear that legislation could pass and it certainly will not pass quickly. Hayes and Marks are mobilizing various people with influence on the Hill to make point that it is unfair when BIB is getting new chairman and two new members to rush to legislate changes. Gronouski should be given chance to work with system and then see whether he thinks he needs adjustments.

RECOMMENDATION: As occasion arises over next couple of weeks, it would be useful if you could make this point to some Senators and Congressmen: to Pell, e.g., to Humphrey and Percy and to people such as Zablocki and Fascell in House.

A rather frank conversation with Jim Critchlow gave me some new insight into what has actually been going on in conjunction with these Congressional subcommittee hearings. It seems that within BIB Tony Shub is monopolizing congressional matters and has been working very closely with the staff members of the various committees, especially John Ritch, who works for the SFRC and who has been in the forefront of the pro-Stanton anti-Griffith lobby. Shub has been providing much of the questioning that has been put to BIB and radio representatives at the hearings . . . Shub has also been briefing journalists such as David Binder (who was present at the SFRC subcommittee meeting on Friday, April 1, and Curtis Wilke, the Boston Globe reporter who attacked Griffith on 26 March. It’s all pretty incestuous, with BIB Staffer Shub (encouraged by Walter Roberts) mounting, jointly with Congressional staff people, an attack on the BIB and the radios . . . Somewhat of a covert action operation in its own right . . .

Question of appointing Griffith remains exactly where it was when I reported to you last, and we still have no final word on Frelinghuysen.

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3 This subcommittee consists of Senators McGovern (Ch), Percy, Pell, Biden and Baker. [Footnote is in the original.]
4 April 1.
I am keeping pressure on Landon Butler’s office. As soon as we find we can move ahead on these appointments, I recommend you consider desirability of 2-3 very selected calling efforts: to Humphrey, Percy and, perhaps Sparkman. Meanwhile, we can generate some other positive contacts with Congress. Gronouski stated to me today that he hoped Griffith appointment could go through. Said no one he talked to in Congress raised it with him as an issue.

Meanwhile, State/INR has done very interesting short paper on Communist attacks on western radios⁵ and finds that all the major ones—VOA, BBC, Deutsche Welle as well as RFE/RL—have been under stepped-up attack for several weeks. Attacks began when they realized President Carter was going to push human rights and long before program for expansion of transmitter strength of the American radios was announced.⁶ In early February, e.g., TASS lambasted VOA as “one of the most powerful mouthpieces of American imperialism.” Attacks on RFE/RL intensified in mid-February and seem to have been initially centered on these radios’ support of dissenters.⁷ Moscow and Eastern Europeans have been stressing notion of “illegality” of RFE/RL activities and their alleged inappropriateness in light of Helsinki accord. In short, this study discredits the notion that the radios have been attacked because the President announced the expansion program and that this shocked the Russians into all sorts of other negative activity. They didn’t have to wait for that announcement to reveal their uneasiness and strike back.

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⁵ Not found and not further identified.
⁷ See Document 8.
33. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Reinhardt) to the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance (Benson)

Washington, April 8, 1977

SUBJECT

USIA Support for U.S. Nonproliferation and Nuclear Export Policy

When the President submits the Administration’s comprehensive energy program to the Congress on April 20 we understand that it will contain the draft legislation on nonproliferation and nuclear export which Secretary Vance promised in his testimony before the House International Relations Committee on March 1. Indications are that advancing these policies will make considerable demands on many of the resources of American diplomacy. Public affairs, I believe, will be prominent among the resources required, since a good deal of our effort will involve explaining our positions in the face of hostile or indifferent receptions.

To provide proper public affairs support for U.S. nonproliferation and nuclear export policies abroad, I believe that USIA needs to work closely with State and the other substantive agencies involved in devel-

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770068-0165. No classification marking. Mink sent a copy of Reinhardt’s memorandum to Nye under an April 19 action memorandum, requesting that Nye sign a proposed response to Reinhardt. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P77068-0167) Nye’s April 20 response to Reinhardt is printed as Document 40.

2 During his February 2 “fireside” chat, broadcast live on nationwide television and radio networks, the President stated that one of the administration’s “most urgent projects” was the development of a national energy policy. He indicated that Schlesinger had the responsibility for directing this effort: “On April 20, we will have completed the planning for our energy program and will immediately then ask the Congress for its help in enacting comprehensive legislation.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book I, p. 70) For the text of Carter’s April 20 address on a national energy plan, delivered before a joint session of Congress, see Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book I, pp. 663–672.

3 The full text of Vance’s March 1 statement is printed in the Department of State Bulletin, March 21, 1977, pp. 267–271. Vance indicated that the administration favored renewal of the Export Administration Act of 1969 in order to retain the Secretary of Commerce’s control of exports for reasons of national security, foreign policy, and short supply. He stated that the administration would, as a result of the comprehensive review of U.S. nuclear export and non-proliferation policies, “develop legislative recommendations” by the end of March, regarding the bills designed to renew the Act. He continued: “We believe this approach would have significant advantages. It would clarify U.S. nonproliferation policy and provide a sound basis from which to assure U.S. leadership in this field. Meanwhile, we suggest that the concerned congressional committees not enact legislation in the non-proliferation area before giving full consideration to the executive branch’s recommendations.” (Ibid., pp. 270–271)
oping guidance and support materials and that this cooperation should begin as soon as possible.

In general terms, we envisage two sorts of support approaches. The first includes materials providing guidance as well as historical and technical background for use before the President’s April 20 announcement. The second includes the preparation of supplementary guidance and programs for follow-on support in the near and long term. We would expect to use the full range of Agency resources as appropriate. These would include international broadcasts over the Voice of America, speakers, printed matter, press placement materials, video tape recordings and motion pictures. Specific materials would be differentiated for use by general or highly specialized audiences as needs require.

If you agree that this sort of cooperation could usefully contribute to the support of the U.S. nonproliferation and nuclear export policies, I suggest that your staff and mine get together as soon as possible to plan and develop a systematic program of public affairs support.

Since time is of the essence, I look forward to your early response to this proposal.

34. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Reinhardt) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, April 14, 1977

SUBJECT

Letter of March 31, 1977, from Leonard Marks to Dr. Brzezinski

We have read with interest Leonard Marks’ letter of March 31, 1977, and share his view that we should continue to look for ways to expand contacts with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. We agree that it would be useful for the United States to spell

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of the Director, Executive Secretariat, Secretariat Staff, Correspondence Files, 1973–1980, Entry P–104, Box 116, 7701020–7701029. Confidential. Drafted by Lederer; edited by Shirley; cleared in I/SS; approved by Reinhardt. A copy was sent to Vance. According to a notation in an unidentified hand, the copy was hand-carried to the Department of State on April 15.

2 See Document 31.
out ideas on this subject at a suitable level and at the right political moment.

Of the three specific suggestions in the letter, two relate to State/CU; however, USIA would be responsible for implementing all three in the field.

—Sister City exchanges are useful, but we do not ascribe to them a particularly high priority. We agree that they are best handled through private channels with appropriate government consultation and facilitative assistance.

—We concur that direct private exchanges should be encouraged. To a considerable extent, our officers in Eastern Europe already play an active catalytic role in bringing local and American institutions together. Since private exchanges in Communist countries go through government channels, USG assistance is not only helpful, it is essential. The immense value of exchanges argues for an increase in government funded programs as well. USIA would welcome and strongly support an increase in this area.

—USIA does not directly operate book stores. In some cases, we have indirectly been involved in book sales, particularly through binational centers in Latin America. There exist legal and other impediments to government operation of book stores, but such obstacles could probably be overcome if the opportunities offered merited the effort. We understand that the Department, after exploratory talks with our NATO allies, has decided not to raise the subject of book stores at the forthcoming CSCE preparatory conference, although we gather that progress on implementation of the section of the final CSCE accord relating to the availability of books will be reviewed. Assuming that we keep to this scenario, it might be useful to reexamine the book store question following the June conference in Belgrade.

\footnote{See footnote 2, Document 13.}
35. Memorandum From Paul Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\(^1\)

Washington, April 15, 1977

SUBJECT

USIA—Memorandum from John Reinhardt

John Reinhardt has written you a friendly, positive memorandum proposing that he meet with you to discuss ways in which USIA can assist in promoting the foreign policy interests of the United States. He emphasizes three points: USIA’s access to foreign leaders and foreign audiences, through VOA, PAOs, etc.; USIA’s ability to analyze foreign attitudes and trends; and USIA’s ability to report on the impact of the Administration’s initiatives abroad.

If you can find the time in the near future I recommend you invite Reinhardt to come over for a talk.\(^2\) It would be good for his morale and you could give him encouragement to take a firm hold on his agency and put more efficiency and dynamism into it. You could also offer him support in keeping VOA operating essentially as it does now, rather than being “Stantonized.”

I believe it would be useful for you to make direct use of USIA’s facilities, including VOA, by giving occasional interviews and statements for broadcast and by making videotapes on subjects of interest to elite foreign audiences—journalists, professors, intellectuals, etc.

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\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, White House Central Files, Subject File, Federal Government, United States Information Agency, Executive, Box FG–210, FG 266 1/20/77–1/21/81. No classification marking. Sent for action. Inderfurth initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. Brzezinski wrote Inderfurth’s initials below this and drew an arrow from the initials to Henze’s initials in the “from” line of the memorandum. Another copy of the memorandum is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special (Henze), Box 1, Chron File: 4–5/77.

\(^2\) Inderfurth underlined the portion of this sentence beginning with “recommend” and ending with “talk.” In the left-hand margin next to the sentence, Inderfurth added, “I agree. USIA & Reinhardt have been very helpful to us so far. RL” Brzezinski placed a vertical line in the right-hand margin next to this paragraph and wrote “do” in reference to the recommendation that he invite Reinhardt to the White House for a talk. According to an April 27 memorandum from Henze to Brzezinski, Reinhardt and Brzezinski were scheduled to meet on April 28. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special (Henze), Box 1, Chron File: 4–5/77) In an April 29 Evening Report to Brzezinski, Henze stated: “Sat in on your meeting with John Reinhardt morning 28 April and had useful and rather extensive talk with him both before and after your meeting.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special (Henze), Box 5, Evening Reports File: 2–6/77)
Embassies can make very good use of this kind of thing to cultivate and inform selected opinion-leaders.

Alternatively, if you cannot find time for Reinhardt, I will be happy to go and talk to him on your behalf.³

Tab A

Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Reinhardt) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)⁴

Washington, April 11, 1977

Now that the hurdle of my confirmation has been cleared,⁵ I would like to meet with you soon to discuss ways in which the United States Information Agency can assist you in promoting the foreign policy interests of the United States. As the government’s principal instrument for directly reaching foreign publics, the USIA, with a budget of over $260 million, has impressive resources and unique capabilities. It is a flexible, versatile tool which can respond quickly to your needs in pursuing foreign policy goals.

I know you are familiar with some of our operations, but let me mention three areas in which this Agency can be of unique service to you. USIA can provide 1) direct access to foreign publics and opinion leaders; 2) insight into foreign public attitudes and likely public reaction to contemplated U.S. actions; and 3) systematic feedback on the effects of our actions or policies on foreign opinion.

1. Access and Reach. We have many ways to convey messages to foreign audiences. The Voice of America, reaching perhaps 74 million regular listeners, provides instant access to people throughout the world without passing through any censors or intermediaries. Our 650 Foreign Service Information Officers, serving at 188 posts in 114 countries, constitute a skilled corps of professionals closely attuned to the political and psychological environment of the countries in which they operate and experienced in the art of getting our message to opinion leaders, educators and intellectuals. They deliver that message in the languages of and in forms adapted to their audiences. They

³ In the margin below this paragraph, Brzezinski wrote: “1—invite 2—get me feedback on item p. 2 [of Reinhardt’s memorandum].” Below it, Henze wrote, “Done. PH 18 Apr 77.”

⁴ No classification marking.

⁵ See footnote 2, Document 21 and Document 29.
know and understand the people with whom they are dealing and are trained to respond quickly to events or to Administration instructions.

When the Cairo press reacted unfavorably to the incomplete commercial wire service summaries of the President's March 9 press conference, our post sent the complete version of his statements, which it had received by radio teletype ("Wireless File"), to Egyptian officials and the media, with the result that the semi-official Al Ahram not only printed the full text but also carried a helpful commentary. Subsequent discussion of the issues was somewhat more balanced and informed. In the same week our people in Manila had similar results with texts supplied by the Wireless File when the Philippine press criticized testimony given by Assistant Secretary Holbrooke which originally had been reported out of context. This effectiveness is a product of intimate knowledge of the beliefs, attitudes and information gaps of our audiences.

Last Friday we sent both a thousand-word lead story and the full 5,500-word transcript of your news conference by radio teletype to posts throughout the world. Not only was this material distributed by our posts, but we have evidence that these press transmissions—like the Voice—are regularly monitored and used by high-level officials in the PRC, Egypt and Yugoslavia (and undoubtedly the Soviet Union), adding to their use as communication channels which can be of great value in ensuring that what we have to say reaches other governments instantly in unadulterated and unfiltered form.

In the longer range we can provide to elites abroad, through the wide array of Agency publications and other media at your disposal, the context in which foreign policies are made and the purposes they serve of mutual interest to other countries. As you know from your own experience, American experts are sent by the Department of State and ourselves through our posts to talk directly with their foreign colleagues. Where U.S. officials are not able to travel abroad for this

7 See footnote 3, Document 15.
9 April 8.
10 Reference is presumably to Brzezinski’s April 1 news conference, during which he discussed the U.S. SALT proposals made during Vance’s meetings in Moscow. For the transcript of the news conference, see Department of State Bulletin, April 25, 1977, pp. 414–421. In the left-hand margin next to this sentence, Brzezinski drew a vertical line with an arrow pointing to the sentence.
purpose, we can arrange a special “electronic dialogue” with key foreign audiences through an advance videotaped statement by the official followed by a radio-telephonic Q and A discussion. For example, Elliot Richardson will participate in such a dialogue with Japanese leaders on Law of the Sea issues in the near future. In any case, we regularly videotape discussions and interviews with government officials or experts on timely subjects for showing to strategically placed invited audiences or for placement on the local television stations. When Jimmy Carter became President, the leadership in many countries already was familiar with his philosophy of government through his interview with Bill Moyers which our posts had shown, often in collaboration with our ambassadors.

2. Insight. As a result of their knowledge of and rapport with foreign audiences our people not only have established their credibility but have gained insights into what shapes attitudes toward the United States so that our public affairs officers often are invaluable advisors to our embassies on public opinion factors. In addition, in many countries we are able to contract for public opinion polls on current issues of concern to the U.S., enabling us to provide the Executive Branch with unique information which may vary significantly from what we hear from official sources and editorialists. For instance, before the Vice President went to Japan we were able to provide him with evidence that the Korean troop withdrawal issue was not a major concern of the Japanese public, although it certainly is to the Japanese Government.

3. Feedback. As you know, USIA reports extensively on foreign media reaction. A number of these reports are already going to members of your NSC staff. These include the summary of significant “think pieces” which you requested and wrap-ups on foreign reaction to specific subjects. A digest of foreign media comment is delivered daily to Jerry Schecter. Our public opinion polls and the assessments of our officers overseas can provide additional light and perspective on foreign public reaction to U.S. policy initiatives.

These examples indicate our capabilities in broad scope. But these services can be tuned to very specific needs if prepared in consultation with your staff and in anticipation of Administration moves. It is my hope that USIA’s capabilities to inform influential foreign audiences and to understand their attitudes and behavior can be of direct assist-

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11 According to the December 26, 1976, issue of *Chicago Tribune*, Moyers planned to interview Carter for an hour-long *CBS Reports* program, to be aired prior to the inauguration. (Maggie Daly, “Jimmy Carter to ‘star’ in Moyers documentary,” p. 42)

12 See footnote 8, Document 9.
ance to you. I will seek an early appointment with you to discuss how we might do this.

36. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance and the Director of the United States Information Agency (Reinhardt)¹

Washington, April 16, 1977

SUBJECT

U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs

Leonard Marks, who has served as Chairman of the United States Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs (USAC/IECA) for the past four years, tells me that he would like to be reappointed to this position. I am impressed with the energy he has devoted to this part-time job. His experience in it and his service as Director of USIA during the Johnson Administration give him good credentials. He is enthusiastic about the President’s approach to human rights and freedom of information issues. Unless there is an equally good or better candidate who should be considered for this position, I am inclined to propose to the President that Leonard Marks be reappointed. I would like to have your views.

The Commission which Marks chairs has seven other vacancies to which we have the opportunity to appoint a spectrum of able people

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special (Henze), Box 1, Chron File: 4–5/77. Confidential. Henze sent a copy of the letter to Brzezinski for his signature under an April 13 covering memorandum, in which Henze stated: “I recommend we suggest to the President that Leonard be reappointed, but we should first see how State and USIA feel about it and whether they might have other candidates to suggest. Unless they can make a good case for someone else, I doubt whether we could do better than Leonard Marks because he combines an aggressive approach with an enormous range of contacts.” (Ibid.) According to a NSC Correspondence Profile, attached to another copy of Henze’s April 13 covering memorandum, Brzezinski, on April 16, signed the copy of the memorandum addressed to Vance and Reinhardt. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Agency File, Box 9, International Communication Agency: 2–7/77) In his June 10 Evening Report to Brzezinski, Henze reported that he had engaged in several long telephone conversations with Marks: “Among other things he [Marks] reported conversation with Vance in which latter assured him he supported him for reappointment as Chairman of USAC/IECA.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special (Henze), Box 5, Evening Reports File: 2–6/77)
who can devote a small but meaningful share of their time to its work. Marks has suggested that new appointees be from the following categories:

- a college president with an interest in international affairs or experience in exchange programs with universities abroad
- a representative of organized labor
- a figure with experience as an impresario or producer in the performing arts
- a performer in the field of ballet, classical music or modern dance
- a Pulitzer Prize author or poet
- a representative of the motion picture or television industry with awareness of the impact of U.S. films shown abroad
- a business leader with extensive international experience

He has proposed some names in these categories, but before we begin compiling a list for the President to consider for appointment, I would like to have your suggestions also.

I would like to move ahead rapidly to have USAC/IECA fully rejuvenated by the time we become involved in the Belgrade meeting in June, so I would appreciate your response to this memorandum by 22 April 1977.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

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37. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Director,
Information Center Service, United States Information
Agency (Schneidman) to the Director (Reinhardt)

Washington, April 18, 1977

SUBJECT

Propaganda in the United States

The continuing question is, “should any part of the dialogue being
conducted abroad be made available to the American people?”

DISCUSSION:

1. Materials, in whatever format, developed by personnel of the
U.S. Information Agency or its successor, or conceived and com-
misioned by the Agency, are not and should not be available within the
United States now or in the future.

2. It may be cruel to say so, but the material referred to in (1) above
is not the most important part of the Agency’s efforts and in my view
we would not be terminally disadvantaged were we to be denied this
source of materials.

3. The fruits of American society which are identified, acquired,
and disseminated abroad by the Agency, after they have been conceived
and produced here, are routinely available to the American people.

4. Why then can we not gain approval, both political and legal, for
making available to the American people, materials conceived and
produced by foreign individuals and institutions as part of this dialogue
and where Agency personnel and funding come in to play only after
the fact of creation?

5. A case in point is a collection of papers by U.S. and foreign
Americanists resulting from the Bicentennial series of regional confer-

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of the Director, Executive Secretariat,
Secretariat Staff, Correspondence Files, 1973–1980, Entry P–104, Box 117, 7701170–
7701179. No classification marking. Reinhardt and Fraser initialed the memorandum,
indicating that they had seen it. A stamped notation on the reverse of the first page of
the memorandum indicates that it was received in I/SS at 9:27 p.m. on April 19.

2 Reinhardt placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this point and
wrote: “The Kennedy film?” Reference is presumably to John F. Kennedy: Years of Lightning,
Day of Drums, a 1964 film produced by the United States Information Agency as a
memorial to Kennedy. Although USIA films could not be shown domestically, in 1966,
a special act of Congress allowed for the film to be shown in commercial theaters in the
United States. Documentation on the film and its U.S. screening is scheduled for publica-

3 Reinhardt placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this point and
wrote “can’t we?”
ences on American Studies that we sponsored. If we now publish the collection for our foreign audiences, this not insignificant body of work will be forever denied to Americans.

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38. **Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter**

Washington, April 18, 1977

**SUBJECT**

Public Understanding of your Foreign Policy

I had a useful session today with Pat Caddell, who shared with me some very interesting findings regarding the public perception of your foreign policy. While that perception is generally very good, and on some issues excellent, there are also hints of latent concerns and the absence of understanding of your broader purposes.

Accordingly, you might want to consider, and later discuss with Pat, a two-pronged strategy:

1. A conceptual speech deliberately designed for an elite audience, and leading to serious discussion by commentators; such a speech would be designed to pull together the various strands of your foreign policy and also to share your historical vision. It would be a formal statement, integrating in a single comprehensive speech some of the

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 47, Chron: 4/77. No classification marking. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that Carter saw it. Carter wrote in the top right hand corner: Zbig Good idea to explore. I." Hutchenson sent a copy of the memorandum to Mondale, Brzezinski, Costanza, Eizenstat, Jordan, Powell, Fallows, and Schneiders under an April 19 typewritten note, indicating that Brzezinski’s memorandum was returned in Carter’s outbox. (Carter Library, Staff Office Files, Domestic Policy Staff, Eizenstat Files, Box 208, Foreign Affairs—(General), [CF, O/A 47] [1])
themes developed earlier in your OAS speech, the UN speech, and the campaign speech in New York before the Foreign Policy Association.

2. Roughly two days later—so that the initial impact of the formal speech is not dissipated—a town hall meeting on foreign affairs, deliberately designed to appeal to the common man and held in a setting where the audience is likely to be sympathetic to your foreign policy approach. Televised, such a meeting could be very helpful in translating to the broader public what you are trying to do and it would build on the previous formal presentation.

The two together would pack potentially a powerful wallop and could have an important effect not only domestically but also abroad.

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3 See footnote 4, Document 21.


39. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Director, Motion Pictures and Television Service, United States Information Agency (Scott) to the Director (Reinhardt)

Washington, April 19, 1977

SUBJECT

IMV and USIA—A Response to Your Invitation For Comment and Observations

During the staff meeting of March 30th, you invited element heads to contribute information not previously submitted that relates to the

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of the Director, Executive Secretariat, Secretariat Staff, Subject Files, 1973–1978, Entry P–116, 1977: Reorganization Folder 3. No classification marking. In an April 22 note, Reinhardt thanked Scott for his “thoughtful memo” and added: “I share your view that the visual media—films, VTRs, television—can make a significant impact on our audiences and that they are an essential part of our overall USIA efforts.” (Ibid.)

2 See Document 30.
drafting of a reorganization plan or responds to other concerns and
issues presented. The paper presented herewith provides commentary
and supporting information on IMV’s usefulness to more effective
implementation of public diplomacy.

I would like to take advantage of your invitation to suggest ways
in which our activities might relate more effectively to those of other
elements within USIA, to new developments within IMV that have
changed its operating style significantly, and some suggestions for
other innovations within USIA structures that could be useful to IMV
and, we believe, to other Agency elements as well.

I. THE ROLE OF IMV

It need hardly be argued that the channel of communication repre-
sented by films, broadcast and closed circuit television represents one
of our most significant means of approaching foreign audiences. No
one can seriously argue that we can do an effective job as an Agency
without well-developed capabilities in these media. No one would
seriously argue that our media can do the job alone.

As will be described below, IMV activities have become increas-
ingly drawn into close conformity with those of other elements, particu-
larly with those of the field posts. That this has been realized has
resulted from the efforts of many individuals, most of them within
IMV itself. By stating this fact so bluntly, we do not wish to claim any
undue credit for ourselves or to overlook the contributions of others.
We mean only to dramatize a condition that you have already recog-
nized and commented upon: that the Agency lacks a vital intellectual
center, a program heart in which the activities of its various elements
are fully orchestrated. IOP has made a laudable effort to collect informa-
tion on field program plans and to bring elements together to coordinate
responses to these requests. But in practice these meetings have pro-
vided only the most general guidance for IMV, and real production
planning has been the result of bilateral contacts between IMV and the
posts rather than the multilateral orchestration that is still lacking.

If, as you indicated on March 30, we are headed toward a more
centralized effort at coordinating program planning, IMV can be
counted on to support those efforts fully. We hope, however, that
any such effort will distinguish carefully between the requirements of
program direction and program implementation. Neither IMV nor any
other supporting service of the Agency should claim a right to deter-
mine its own program goals. Those should be set at the highest level
of the Agency. We do, however, want to continue to be able to make
available to the Agency and to the achievement of its objectives our
own collective professional experience with our medium—to be able
to have a leading voice in determining when a film is needed or when
our contribution is better made by a VTR; when a project calls for cooperation with a foreign TV station rather than be undertaken by the Agency alone; when a subject is fit for audio-visual treatment, or when it is best left to the print or other media. And we want to continue to be a source of ideas for programming innovation.

These are not minor questions. In fact, they are the source of much of the continuing and, perhaps, unavoidable friction between the consuming and producing elements of the Agency—the friction that arises when those who are specialists in a program area suspect that “technicians” are attempting to frustrate their program purposes and when those who are specialists in a creative medium fear that “dilettantes” are trying to impose their personal tastes and judgment on production decisions.

In our view, the greatest single need faced by this Agency is breaking down this mutual suspicion. We have had the stimulating experience of working closely with individual posts, Areas and other elements on tangible cooperative undertakings where each recognized and welcomed the contribution of the other. If the Agency is to function as a unified, effective whole, these experiences must be made general. They must become the rule, rather than the exception.

II. RECENT DIRECTIONS IN IMV OPERATIONS

A number of significant changes have affected IMV operations in recent years which, we believe, should be kept in mind when and if a changed relationship of this element to the rest of the Agency is considered.

A. Recognition of Field Pre-eminence

During recent years, IMV has made a concerted effort to improve performance in support of field activities. We have recognized that USIA/USIS represents a global communication system and that all team members must be mutually supportive toward the accomplishment of perceived Agency objectives. IMV recently designed, coordinated and implemented a very substantial reorganization of personnel and functional alignments specifically to enhance the quality and delivery of services to the field, to provide better liaison with areas and to infuse professional foreign service experience and guidance throughout key areas of IMV affecting responsiveness to field requirements.

We have sought to draw all of our activities more closely into the framework of post programs and into the interest range of post audiences. The efforts include:

1. Preserving, against a growing tide of production requests coming from other elements of the Agency and from other governmental departments, a capacity to respond to direct post requests for VTRs,
news coverage support and, more recently, even one-country films. We have done this by setting aside a quota of VTRs that will be reserved for the posts, so that our work in support of ICS, IPT, the Department of Commerce and others does not crowd out our first objective—providing audio-visual support for post programs as expressed in direct requests from the posts themselves.

2. Pioneering, with IOA, an effort to obtain, in manageable form, regular reports of usage and assessment of IMV products, in an effort to judge our output by its utility to the field. We will seek the endorsement of the Director, in a separate paper, of this program, so that these purposes may be achieved.

3. We have held program review meetings with all individual areas, involving Area Directors, their deputies and staffs, with our own senior and operating staff, to discuss and refine our support for Area and post programs. These meetings have been mutually enlightening.

4. We have invited visiting PAO’s to IMV to discuss our programs and their problems, and have exposed members of our staff who had rarely had the opportunity in the past to the presentation by a PAO of his problems, media evaluation, and other operating realities.

5. We have undertaken a new effort to work very closely with the Inspection Staff, alerting them to current projects at posts on the inspection schedule, and giving them questions we want answered about our effectiveness and usefulness to the post. We meet following each inspection as well, and have found these procedures particularly useful in promoting interchange between ourselves and the posts.

6. We have sent IMV representatives to help the posts in both technical and programming projects, and have tried to ensure that any overseas travel by members of the IMV staff is planned on a project basis, so that it yields concrete program development information.

B. Support of Foreign Policy Objectives

The recent increase in the value of audio-visual products in policy support derives from the observation that a lop-sided amount of past film and VTR production had been addressed to other than the political-security themes. To enable us to address this shortfall, we have developed several new program mechanisms:

1. Press Conference, USA. This program has been operated effectively by VOA for years, and permits a Meet The Press format to be adapted to foreign policy needs by inviting guests and panelists who have our overseas audiences primarily in mind. We have worked out an

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3 Not found and not further identified.
4 Reference is to the NBC News political affairs program.
arrangement with VOA to conduct Press Conference, USA in our television studios up to 15 times each year. This arrangement provides a vehicle for major governmental policy spokesmen to reach overseas audiences by radio and television, both broadcast and closed circuit, in a highly persuasive way. Undersecretary Habib (then Assistant Secretary for East Asia), faced an outstanding panel just before the fall of Saigon\(^5\) to explain, in a VTR widely circulated and discussed, the consequences for U.S. policy in Asia. Ambassador Elliot Richardson has been scheduled to appear on the program just before the resumption of Law of the Sea talks in May of 1977.

2. In a related effort, we have developed, with IOP, a category of Critical Policy VTRs which permits Washington to override the RMS system on carefully selected occasions—when an immediate foreign policy objective must be served by rapid dispatch of a product to the field without first exchanging cables requesting and receiving confirmation of post orders. This power is used sparingly, only four times since its development, but permitted Undersecretary Sisco to come into our studios on short notice and communicate world-wide details of Secretary Kissinger’s Middle East disengagement program in 1975,\(^6\) and permitted then Assistant Secretary Habib to discuss publicly details of the U.S. position on the UN vote on Korea which was the subject of a separate cabled instruction to all Embassies.\(^7\)

3. Potentially our most far-reaching effort has been the establishment of a category of films called Special Report, in which we are attempting to involve policy directors in related agencies to join with us in defining, on film, the essential ingredients in a current U.S. policy objective. Our first attempt in this format has just been completed. The film Toward A Law of the Sea was developed, scripted, and reviewed by a joint team of IMV and LOS Task Force officers. It received a final review at a special screening held in Geneva for Ambassador Richardson, who appears in the film which is now on its way to posts in English, Spanish, French, Arabic and Portuguese. Production time from contract to shipment was approximately nine weeks. Using the Law of the Sea film as a working example of what can be done in this regard, we have held a screening at the State Department for representatives from the Department, ACDA and ERDA who are work-

\(^5\) April 1975.


\(^7\) Reference is presumably to telegram 220773 to all diplomatic posts, September 6, 1976. In it, the Department provided guidance for consultations on upcoming issues likely to be discussed at the 31st UN General Assembly, including “forthcoming debate on Korea.” The telegram is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–14, Part I, Documents on the United Nations, 1973–1976, Document 49.
ing on nuclear non-proliferation policy. We have proposed to them a
formation of a working group to develop a concept paper for a Special
Report on non-proliferation, and will work closely with this group on
the successful completion of the product once the concept has been
approved by the agencies concerned. We have in mind the develop-
ment, in this mode, of greater appreciation on the part of policy shapers
of the role that a carefully crafted film may play in the overall orchestra-
tion of efforts to explain and gain support for current U.S. policy
objectives.

C. Specialized Audience Requirements

A further significant characteristic of current IMV output deserves
special mention—the extent to which the collection now includes mate-
rial suitable for presentation to carefully selected professional and intel-
lectual audiences. Although IMV still considers television and theatrical
exposure of our products to mass audiences an important and useful
part of its function, it also gives high priority to provide posts material
suitable for exposure to primary audiences.

The new emphasis on VTR has, to a great extent, fulfilled this need
with its versatility, comparatively low cost, and suitability for a precise
matching of participants to audiences. The “expert to expert” mode is
used often and well by posts in all areas.

But there is no avoiding the realization that film is of great interest
to even the most elite of audiences, and the Agency will deprive itself
of important access to these groups if it cannot develop material on
film worthy of their attention. We have sought to do so in a variety
of ways.

Probably our most conscious effort to reach elite audiences is in
Reflections, a new series of hour-long films in which Americans of
eminence and achievement are asked to sum up their lives and works
through the device of an illustrated monologue. Two productions have
been completed in this series, Margaret Mead, and Samuel Eliot Morison,
the latter completed just before the great historian’s death. Three others
are in the early stages of production, Leonard Bernstein, Buckminster
Fuller, and George Meany. Once a number of these films has been com-
pleted on a representative collection of outstanding American scholars,
writers, humanists and statesmen, we foresee that they may form the
basis of an American studies program at a Center or a University. To
insure maximum usefulness, we also plan to produce half-hour ver-
sions of these films to enhance their use with a broader range of audi-
ences and, in some countries, on television. We have supplied small

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8 Morison died in 1976.
brochures, including selected bibliographies with the Mead and Morison films, and intend to continue the practice.

Our Century 3 series, although addressed to a broader audience than Reflections, also reflects our determination to supply posts with films they can present not only to television stations, but in direct projection to invited primary audiences. It is a thoughtful examination of the ways in which science and technology are likely to affect our lives over the next century—our food supply, our cities, even our concepts of life and death. Our productions in the arts—Nik: An Experience in Sight and Sound, with the Nikolais Dance Group, Jose Limon, and our two-part examination of the accomplishment of black artists in America for use in Afro-American history programs—The Legacy and The Inheritors—also demonstrate a conscious effort to reach our key audiences on the terms of their special interests.

Finally, we have greatly expanded and improved our acquired film program in recent years and, through its activities, have been able to bring into the program some of the finest documentary and dramatic works being produced in America today. We expect David Wolper’s six-part dramatization of Sandburg’s Lincoln, starring Hal Holbrook, to be of virtually permanent significance for the field and there is no finer example of the achievements of the American theater available on film than the American Film Theater’s production of The Iceman Cometh. Acquired documentaries such as The Puritan Experience, U.S. Art: The Gift of Ourselves, The Right to Believe and The Will To Be Free played important roles in our effort to communicate the significance of the Bicentennial commemoration to the class, as well as to the mass.

D. Flexibility of Delivery Systems

Finally, the most significant and far-reaching of all recent developments in the Agency’s audio-visual operations is the use IMV has made of new opportunities afforded by technology to shape the means of delivery of our product to the nature of the intended program use.

It can no longer be said that the Voice of America differs from other elements of the Agency in that it alone can directly address foreign audiences through its own communications network. Although IMV-originated satellite telecasts use foreign networks for the last few kilometers in the delivery chain, many networks have carried our

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10 Reference is to the 1939 play by American playwright Eugene O’Neill.
material live and unedited, so as to make the recent experience of IMV comparable to that of VOA. Furthermore, although we intend no invidious comparisons, even our colleagues at the Voice may acknowledge that our exposure to a foreign national audience watching its own national network is far greater, when it occurs, than the exposure VOA anticipates in most parts of the world. Such was the case recently when six Latin American networks carried the entire 23-minutes of President Carter’s OAS address\(^{11}\) live, just as it was transmitted from IMV facilities. Such was also the case with many of the 17 networks which carried our special inaugural satellite feeds in January, or the Bicentennial feeds to 37 countries in July.\(^{12}\)

In addition to the phenomenon of satellite transmission, the revolution in programming wrought by videotapes is impressive. Perhaps the most ambitious use ever made of videotapes was the result of our decision to offer the presidential debates of the campaign of 1976\(^{13}\) to all posts, in English, Spanish and French, and to deliver them by the fastest means available. By commercial air, by pouch, in the luggage of traveling Ambassadors and airline vice-presidents, and by any other means developed by the ingenuity of the posts and our operations staff, more than 100 copies of each debate were sent out. Some arrived and were shown at European posts the morning after the debate occurred. Posts reported that the VTRs of the debates gave them access to the highest levels of government and media.

With the videotape added to our satellite and film capabilities, IMV is now able to address audiences ranging in size from the millions who see a prime-time satellite feed or major series like Vision and Science Report, to the handfuls who see VTRs produced for a single use at a single post to achieve a single objective.

III. AREAS OF INNOVATION

Clearly, many of the changes which could improve IMV operations will require Agency-wide, in some cases government-wide, decisions. Here are a few examples of what we have in mind:

A. Initiatives Toward Outreach

In his March 8th letter to you, Chairman Hobart Lewis of our Commission stresses the need for closer ties between USIA and other

\(^{11}\) See footnote 2, Document 38.

\(^{12}\) 1976.

\(^{13}\) The debates between Ford and Carter took place in Philadelphia on September 23, in San Francisco on October 6, and in Williamsburg, Virginia, on October 22.
appropriate offices and agencies of the government. IMV has recently explored and developed mutual opportunities with several other agencies and totally supports the need to formalize and regularize these and other similar relationships.

The U.S. Government does not have so many internationally trained multi-media communicators that it can afford to permit its operations to remain fragmented and non-coordinated, especially in program design and planning areas. Whatever goes to overseas audiences from any source affects the image of America in the public diplomacy environment. The government’s information outreach where it affects foreign policy, overseas attitudes or the elimination of distorted views of U.S. purposes should be brought into a cohesive, modernized and more effective system.

Our services and facilities have been made available to the State Department, A. I. D., The Office of Telecommunications Policy, Commerce, FAA, NASA, and many others. We have developed ties with industrial and academic groups and with professional organizations like the Motion Picture Association of America. The professional services provided to OTP alone in support of the critical World Administrative Radio Conference (WARC ’79) is representative of the need for USIA recognition as an indispensable national resource. All of these initiatives have had a direct relationship to the public diplomacy mission but usually the agency requesting assistance is not aware of how best to solve an important communication problem.

The most dramatic case in point was AID’s approach to us for assistance in carrying out a multi-million dollar effort to demonstrate the use of high-technology communications in development. During the period in which the ATS–6 satellite was being moved from its stationary orbit over India, where it had been used for the SITE experiment, to its new orbit over Latin America, AID proposed to transmit

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14 In a March 8 letter to Reinhardt, Lewis, reporting on the most recent U.S. Advisory Commission on Information meeting, stated: “We discovered once again as we discussed our upcoming Report to Congress that solutions to USIA’s problems must take into account the complexities of the atmosphere—domestic and international—in which USIA operates. This means that USIA must work in a larger context which includes close ties to the appropriate offices of the White House, including the President, especially the NSC and the State Department and the other major departments and agencies of Government, e.g. Treasury, Commerce, Defense, Agriculture, Labor, NASA, HEW and the new energy agency.” (National Archives, RG 306, USIA Historical Collection, Office of the Director, Biographic Files Relating to USIA Directors and Other Senior Officials, 1953–2000, Entry A–1 1069, Box 23, John E. Reinhardt, Speeches, 1977–1978)


16 Experimental satellite communications project in India, designed by NASA and the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO).
several hours of special programs to high level audiences in up to 70 countries via transportable ground stations leap-frogged to each participating country by NASA. We were of decisive assistance in shaping the content of these programs, but we had to stand off at some distance because of distinctions between our mission and AID’s.

One consequence of the experience was our own feeling that it might be time to re-think somewhat the absolute taboo on “nation-building” the Agency has lived with for some time. Our own operations are a powerful stimulus to technology transfer, with the AID demonstration the most dramatic such illustration. But even post VTR operations have stimulated host nations to begin their own. Is it taboo for us to encourage institutions we work with abroad, universities and governments, to develop closed-circuit operations compatible with our own so that we can lend them videotape software? Is it possible for us to be too squeamish in circumstances where helping a host government provides new opportunities for the use of new technology to encourage new forms of dialogue?

B. Management Information

If the Agency is to have a true “intellectual center,” it must also have a more comprehensive system of reporting than has ever existed, and a more modern means of storing, analyzing and making that information available to all who need it. We have already made note of our own efforts in cooperation with IOA to develop usage reports on IMV products. Obviously, we will continue to fall short of true professionalism until we have a comprehensive picture of what happens in the field to the flow of products from Washington. We believe this can be done without increasing field paperwork. In fact, by using modern data reporting systems, paperwork can be simplified. Our own data cards have replaced a cumbersome and time-consuming film report.

Program usage, media data and other information relevant to intercultural communications should be managed in a central part of the Agency, staffed by career professionals, some of whom would provide critical continuity and serve as an information resource to those who direct programs.

C. Research and Development—USIA/IMV

There is not at present a formalized R & D program within USIA, at home or abroad. Each element is permitted to innovate or experiment with programming techniques and, to a degree, with its own related advancing technologies as they recognize an opportunity or are motivated to innovate. However, all elements could benefit from an exchange of information on experimental programming, and should
regularly be made aware of new technology or new applications of existing technologies.

In recent history some of the initial resistance, confusion or abuses of fielding the ½” VTR system and expensive hardware could have been avoided with a more orderly approach to testing various sub-systems, acquiring proto-type program feed-back and recommending a phased-in program as Agency capability to handle the new systems and to program new formats developed. The advent of industrial versions of video-disc equipment, and the current AID plans for developing regional satellite systems and software centers on three continents in the wake of the AIDSAT (ATS–6) demonstrations are only two of many state-of-the-art developments that indicate the Agency’s need for a focussed program on new technology applications.

IMV has recently initiated several exploratory test programs to develop new approaches to information delivery overseas. The Frank Capra multi-media cooperative program, coordinating USIA, area, post and host country governmental and industrial involvement as an audio visual form of technology transfer and the cooperative program with IEU, IMV and Athens to test what might be accomplished in a single country program, are but two examples.

The time may be near when a consortium of U.S. based agencies and private interests could share the support of a satellite-based information system capable of providing a “real-time pouch” service and other related applications. We were recently praised by the Egyptian government for delivering an “Issues and Answers” tape for their use in only ten days. It could have been there in ten minutes.

IV. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY—A DEFINITION

In presenting these thoughts, we have been aware of the widely felt need for agreement on a new statement of mission for the Agency that reflects current realities, and changing requirements. In the absence of a recently formalized mission statement, we have developed one of our own which seems to come close to reflecting the current operating assumptions of many dedicated Agency employees:

To encourage among the nations of the world, by overt means and in public forums, a better understanding of the policy goals of the United States Government, and of the social, intellectual and cultural forces contributing to the formation of those goals.

17 Reference is to the ABC News political affairs program.
40. Letter From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance (Nye) to the Director of the United States Information Agency (Reinhardt)\textsuperscript{1}

Washington, April 20, 1977

Dear Mr. Reinhardt:

This is in response to your April 8, 1977 memorandum\textsuperscript{2} to Under Secretary Benson on “USIA Support for U.S. Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Export Policy”.

I agree completely with your point on the need to provide proper public affairs support for U.S. non-proliferation and nuclear export policies abroad. To this end, I have asked my staff to work closely with yours to ensure that USIA has available all relevant background material as our policies evolve.

With regard to the President’s April 20 energy message,\textsuperscript{3} it is highly doubtful that it will contain a significant nuclear energy element. And I do not anticipate that it will be the vehicle utilized to transmit to the Congress the Administration’s legislative proposals on non-proliferation and nuclear exports. Rather, I expect that our legislative initiatives will be treated in a low-key manner consistent with the delicate “negotiations” that will ensue with concerned congressional committees which have introduced their own non-proliferation bills.

On the general subject of U.S. Nuclear Power Policy, you are, of course, aware of the President’s April 7 statement,\textsuperscript{4} which, for the most part, dealt with domestic issues. Additional Presidential decisions are pending on several international questions, but it is as yet unclear

\textsuperscript{1} Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770068–0163. Limited Official Use. Mink sent a copy of the letter and a copy of Reinhardt’s April 8 memorandum (see Document 33) to Nye under an April 19 action memorandum, recommending that Nye sign the letter to Reinhardt. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770068–0167)

\textsuperscript{2} See Document 33.

\textsuperscript{3} See footnote 2, Document 33.

\textsuperscript{4} On April 7, during a question and answer session held in the Briefing Room at the White House, the President announced that the administration had engaged in a review of issues related to the use of nuclear power; as a result of that review, the administration would pursue a major change in U.S. domestic nuclear energy policies, designed to limit the production of plutonium, encourage research into alternative nuclear fuel cycles, increase production capacity for enriched uranium, and continue discussions with a number of governments over the establishment of an international nuclear fuel cycle evaluation program. (Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book I, pp. 581–583)

The White House also released a statement on nuclear power policy, containing these and other objectives, on April 7. For the text of the statement, see ibid., pp. 587–588. See also Edward Walsh and J.P. Smith, “U.S. Acts to Curb Plutonium, Asks Allies to Assist,” The Washington Post, April 8, 1977, p. A1.

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precisely what form these will take, or even if they will be announced
publicly. To the extent that they are issued in public fora, we would
then have to decide on the desirability of using USIA resources in
support of the new policies. Obviously, this will require an evaluation
of the political risks of such a public affairs campaign in the context
of the sensitive consultations we will be conducting with our nuclear
trading partners—many of whom will not be enthusiastic with some
of our non-proliferation objectives.

We will monitor the situation closely over the weeks ahead and
keep your staff informed as Presidential decisions emerge and the
desirability of a public affairs program to support them becomes
clearer.

Sincerely,

Joseph S. Nye
Deputy to the Under Secretary

5 Nye signed “Joe Nye” above this typed signature.

41. Memorandum From the Chair of the United States Advisory
Commission on International Educational and Cultural
Affairs (Marks) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, April 26, 1977

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Section 106 (b)(1) of Public Law 87–256, the Mutual Educational and
Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, instructs this Advisory Commission
to “formulate and recommend to the President policies for exercising
his authority under this Act and (to) appraise the effectiveness of pro-

1 Source: Carter Library, White House Central Files, Subject File, Foreign Affairs,
Information-Exchange Activities, Executive, Box FO-35, FO-5 1/20/77–9/30/77. No
classification marking. Copies were sent to the President, Duffey, the U.S. Embassy in
Ottawa, the Canadian Embassy in Washington, Sparkman, and Zablocki. Marks sent a
copy of the memorandum printed here to the President under an April 26 covering
memorandum. (Ibid.)

2 See footnote 5, Document 7.
grams carried out pursuant to it.” Since the President has delegated to the Department of State primary responsibility for the conduct of this country’s exchange programs, I address to you this report on a meeting which the Commission held in Ottawa on February 18, 1977, with the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, Donald Jamieson, the Secretary of State of Canada, John Roberts and their colleagues who deal with international educational and cultural matters.

The purpose of our meeting was to examine ways in which educational and cultural exchange can better contribute to mutual understanding between our two countries, and to consider constructively any problems which may stand in the way of this goal. We reviewed existing programs for the exchange of students, professors and performing arts groups; Canadian and American patterns of education; cultural matters of mutual concern, such as the importation of books, magazines, films and television programs; and multilateral questions like the Helsinki agreement, the activities of UNESCO and the formation of a United Nations University, in which both countries have an interest. Our discussion touched specifically upon recent Canadian legislation affecting international exchange and on the relationship between both governmental and private groups engaged in the field. The Commission’s principal observations stemming from examination of these subjects are outlined in the following paragraphs.

1. Although close political, economic and social ties exist between Canada and the United States, there are nevertheless differences between Americans and Canadians. These stem largely from our differing historical, economic and social backgrounds; and they have led to contemporary differences in political structures and attitudes, in cultural aspirations and opportunities. Far from deploring their differences from Americans, Canadians cherish them and wish to maintain them, for they provide Canada with a specific Canadian identity, which it is eager to retain in the face of the enormous penetration of their country by ideas, attitudes and artifacts from the United States. Our Commission believes it is important to continued good relations, between our two countries that Americans understand this Canadian attitude.

2. Great care must be exercised on both sides of the border to make sure that the Canadian Government’s legitimate aspiration to provide “a Canadian choice” for its people in the selection of cultural products, and the American Government’s legitimate desire to provide the widest possible market for its cultural products, do not lead to recriminatory or discriminatory legislation which is damaging to Canadian-American relations.

Our Commission quite understands why the Canadian Government has taken steps to regulate the flow of cultural materials from
the United States and appreciates Canadian efforts to stimulate the creative energies of its own people. At the same time it questions whether these measures will produce the desired result. It is a fact of international life that competition exists in the distribution of cultural as well as other products; and experience has shown that the quality of the product rather than the nationality of the producer determines its acceptance in the foreign market. The success in the United States of such Canadian artists as Saul Bellow and Robert Goulet, and of such products as the film “The Apprenticeship of Duddy Kravitz,” are cases in point.

The Commission further believes that Canada profits from its close proximity to the United States, in that the United States pays developmental costs for encyclopedias, reference books, television programs, musical and dance productions and the like, and makes them available to Canadians at reasonable cost. The Commission believes it would be unfortunate for both sides if these transactions were inhibited.

Finally, the Commission favors unfettered international educational and cultural exchange, and is therefore opposed in principle to any measures, at home or abroad, which restrict it. Thus while it regrets Canadian legislation to limit in Canada the sale of American products, the performance of American artists, the viewing of U.S. television programs, or the advertising of American products in Canadian periodicals, it understands the philosophical principles behind the legislation and does not recommend that the United States adopt similar measures which would restrict the importation of Canadian cultural and educational materials.

What the Commission does recommend is a continuation of a calm, frank approach by both countries to a resolution of problems which arise. Neither side need abandon the philosophical, commercial or cultural principles which it espouses. Candid discussion and a spirited defense of each country’s perceived self-interest can, we believe, lead to a realistic settlement of these issues.

3. In spite of the large volume of private exchanges between Canada and the United States, an official U.S. program is desirable. In fact, given the importance of the U.S.-Canadian relationship, the Commission recommends that consideration be given to increasing the State Department’s budget for exchanges, particularly with a view to making possible more grants to Canadians under the Department’s International Visitor Program.

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3 Reference is to the 1974 film, directed by Ted Kotcheff, starring Richard Dreyfuss and Randy Quaid. The film is based on the 1959 novel, of the same name, written by Mordecai Richler.
4. Our final observation, though very general, is perhaps the most significant of all. It is that, in spite of the enormous possibilities for misunderstanding which exist between two such close—yet such different—neighbors, Canadians and Americans agree on basic principles and values and are striving intelligently to resolve their differences.

The Commission commends recent efforts of the Canadian Government to make its country better known in the United States. It is reassured by the statements of its leaders that their efforts to provide a “Canadian choice” for Canadians do not represent a denial of the principle of free flow of information nor any discrimination against the United States. It is encouraged by growing evidence that Americans are developing a sympathetic appreciation of Canada’s desire to retain its own national identity. It is convinced that the maintenance of good relations between Canada and the United States is a top priority for the Canadian Government, as it is for the American Government, and that educational and cultural exchange can promote the mutual understanding both countries desire.

The Commission hopes that its exchange of views with Canadian officials has made a contribution to this goal. Detailed Minutes of Commission’s meetings in Ottawa have been prepared and will be submitted to the Congress and the State Department in accordance with the provisions of Section 107 of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961.4

Respectfully yours,

Leonard H. Marks5

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5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Memorandum From Paul Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, April 27, 1977

SUBJECT
A PRM on Information Programs?

Rick Inderfurth has asked me to provide you with some pros and cons on a PRM on information programs directed abroad.

The basic argument for a PRM is that since the U.S. Government has many programs, it would be useful to assess how effective they are and how they complement each other, if they do.

Another argument for a PRM is to assess trends and requirements and see what we need to be prepared for in the future. This impinges upon PRM–10.

Another useful aspect of such an exercise would be to add up what responsible people think ought to be done and then see how much of it is actually being done and how well.

Finally, there is the question of method of implementation: are our methods and instruments effective? Are we spending our money in the most productive way? Are we taking account of likely future developments in technology? Are we encouraging research on impact of our programs and feeding the results back into our programs and plans?

Conclusion: A good case can be made for a PRM.

On the other hand, there are arguments against one. We have a great many PRMs under way now on broad issues. From the point of view of our own workload, it may be too soon to add another major exercise to the list.

The various agencies who would be involved have not yet staffed or reorganized themselves fully—USIA, State/CU, BIB. We should give them more time.

There are no pressing problems in this area that require urgent solution.

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special (Henze), Box 1, Chron File: 4–5/77. No classification marking. Sent for information. A notation in an unknown hand indicates that a copy was sent to Huntington. The Carter administration ultimately did not issue a Presidential Review Memorandum on information programs.

The government is responsible for only a small part of the impact which the United States makes on foreign audiences: the role of the press, radio and TV networks, the American book and magazine publishing industry and the enormous and varied information and public relations efforts, educational exchange programs and person-to-person arrangements sponsored by industry, foundations and universities are more important than governmental efforts.

Only certain aspects of the issue are amenable to PRM treatment.

**Conclusion:** A PRM could become an unwieldy, sprawling undertaking that might not be very helpful to anyone and would take up time and effort that operating agencies could more usefully be expending in other ways.

There are certain philosophical issues: To what extent should or can the U.S. Government attempt to coordinate and guide private effort? How comprehensive should U.S. Government programs aim to be? What is most important—mass impact or influencing of selected audiences? Is a worldwide information policy feasible or desirable? How important is it to have a consciously orchestrated U.S. Government information effort abroad when the day-by-day, routine impact of everything we do and say on much of the world is already so enormous?

**RECOMMENDATION**

If, in the near future, priority issues in this field emerge, I recommend we issue a PRM confined to a separate issue. I suggest we defer a general PRM until the end of summer, at the earliest, and then design one very carefully in light of NSC Staff experience with other broad PRMs currently in progress. Meanwhile, I suggest we take measures soon to ensure that U.S. Government positions and tactics for the forthcoming Belgrade meeting[3] and subsequent events are carefully worked out. We can expect a vigorous, polemic, aggressively defensive approach by the Soviets to Belgrade. More important, however, than elaborate policy papers, is selection of a good delegation that can stand on its own feet in Belgrade and meet Soviet initiatives with flexibility and imagination. The basic elements of the situation are all in our favor but we have to assert ourselves to take advantage of them.

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43. Telegram From the Department of State to all American Republic Diplomatic Posts and the U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Southern Command

Washington, April 29, 1977, 1620Z

96982. From Todman and Duffey. Subject: Cultural Initiatives.

1. The President said April 14 that we would develop new exchange programs, in consultation with other governments and with the OAS, to improve cultural relationships in the Americas.²

2. What scope do you believe we should give to these initiatives? What needs and opportunities could be met? How could we best engage your host government, institutions, and private sectors? Most importantly, how could we engage your society’s creative thinkers, writers and other talents?

3. We need your reply by COB Wednesday May 4.³

Vance

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770150–0691. Unclassified; Immediate. Drafted by Luers and Einaudi; cleared by Chapman; approved by Todman.

² See footnote 2, Document 38.

³ For the response from Mexico City, see Document 45.

44. Memorandum From the Chief of the Research Review Staff, Office of Research, United States Information Agency (Halsema) to the Director (Reinhardt)

Washington, May 2, 1977

SUBJECT

The Agency’s Electronic Future

In your staff meeting of April 12 you reiterated your interest in receiving directly the comments of Agency officers on USIA’s manage-
ment and asked for imaginative program ideas. At the same meeting you also warned that if we should decide not to do something it should be a conscious decision. I am therefore sending you this memorandum as a personal communication because of my concern for our organization’s future. Its opinions are my own.

In my opinion we may be in the process of allowing time to foreclose our options in the field that is our life blood: communications. After years of hearing Buck Rogers-like promises that may have lulled us into a false sense of complacency, communications technology applications are taking a quantum jump that can affect most of what we do.

The marriage of the speed and precision of the computer with the high capacity and quality of the communications satellite has made it possible for us to reach and to be reached by our establishments around the world instantly and accurately, freed from the vagaries of airplane schedules and ionospheric propagation conditions. Developments are taking place so rapidly that they have outrun the capacity of the regulators like the FCC to deal with them. Distinctions between modes of communication have been blurred by technological advances. The same broad band communications channel can be used alternatively or even simultaneously for the transmission in digital form of voice and music, photographs, television, teletype, computer data or facsimiles of letters and documents. The increasingly high power of communications satellites is making it possible to communicate directly via them to and from simple, low-cost ground stations which can be housed in an embassy communications room, eliminating ground links. The actual cost of communications should no longer be a function of distance.

Already the technology exists which would permit

—VOA to transmit its programs from Washington to its overseas relay stations without the use of costly U.S. transmitters and free from the vagaries of shortwave reception.

—VOA or IMV to transmit radio and color television programs directly to home or community receivers in any part of the world.

—IPS to transmit the Wireless File at 10 to 15 times its present rate, again without the errors or blackouts caused by dependence on shortwave transmission.

—IPS to edit its publications at the regional service centers from Washington without the weeks of delay caused by dependence on pouched galleys which limit the editorial content of our magazines.

2 Reference is to the fictional character, introduced during the 1920s, known for his space exploration exploits.
—IMV to provide television stations with live color coverage of events in the U.S. and instantly service all USIS posts with copies of its programs.

—ICS and CU to conduct face-to-face electronic conferences between specialists in the U.S. and their counterparts abroad at reasonable cost.

—ICS to provide USIS libraries with reference materials that are really current and on any subject desired, based directly and immediately on the vast resources available here, in place of fast outdated book collections.

—IOR to obtain public opinion polling and other data from overseas contractors in immediately processable form for quick service to the U.S. foreign affairs community.

—The Agency to send and receive letters and other communications in facsimile form instead of using slow and unreliable pouches.

This is not to imply that Agency elements are not already taking an interest in some of these developments. VOA has contracted for satellite circuits to service its stations in California and Greece. IPS and IEU have plans to test the applicability of a computerized Wireless File transmission to USIS London which would permit retrieval of any item by the post. IOP is looking into providing the Agency with the optical scanning of telegrams already used by State and is examining electronic means of copy preparation and printing. IMV makes occasional use of satellite feeds to provide foreign TV networks with coverage of such occasions as presidential elections and inaugurations and visits of foreign chiefs of state. ICS uses overseas telephone lines for its electronic dialogues, and it is collaborating with the Agency Library in studying various data retrieval systems. And there may be other plans of which I am not aware.

But these efforts are individual and uncoordinated. None of them is part of an overall Agency effort to explore how we could most reliably and most cheaply establish the basic circuits between Washington and our establishments overseas which could carry all these communications—and much more. No single office or individual in USIA has the responsibility for the major initiatives that will be required if we are to take maximum advantage of recent breakthroughs in communications technology and avoid being outmoded by it. Agency elements are proceeding independently to poke and prod at various parts of the communications elephant, and naturally drawing different conclusions.

If this new technology is to be practical for USIA use it must be cost-effective. We cannot save money by adding to existing systems. We must be able to give up the old in order to pay for the new. We
should not operate high power broadcast transmitter complexes in the U.S. to service overseas relay stations when their functions could be taken over by much smaller sideband transmitters or satellite circuits. We might reduce our great rental expense by reducing the size of USIS library reference sections in favor of servicing by data banks in Washington. Secure two-way conference calls could substitute for much of our present costly overseas travel. Air pouch costs could be slashed by providing posts and relay stations with high quality audio-visual materials and correspondence by videodisc and satellite instead of on film, tape and paper. I believe that we could make a convincing case to OMB and Congressional committees that judicious capital expenditures now would save funds later, or at least prevent costs from escalating at their present ruinous rate.

None of this is pie in the sky. The technology already exists and some of it already is being used. Last December a front page of the Washington Post was transmitted to Rome to demonstrate the feasibility of communications satellites for high-speed, overseas distribution of reproduction-quality proofs to printing plants far removed from the editorial office and composing room here. The Wall Street Journal has used such a system domestically for over a year to link two of its satellite printing plants to its editors and has two more going on stream. By 1980 Satellite Business Systems will be interconnecting customers from Alaska to Puerto Rico, using their own on-premises earth stations not only to replace existing voice and low-speed data circuits but also to provide intracompany mail services, extremely high speed data transfers, and teleconferences whose participants will see each other as they talk. Facsimile already is cutting so significantly into U.S. first class mail volumes that it is the subject of serious concern of the House postal operations and services subcommittee.

Time is an important element. Planning and policy decisions are being made which may foreclose some of our options. Over a year has passed since a task force recommended that the Agency immediately examine new possibilities for VOA transmissions, pointing to an increase in engineering costs which even then was threatening not only the Agency’s overall budget but the Voice’s own program resources. A USIA reorganization that separated VOA would remove the possibility of using the same technology to service both our radio and other Agency operations.

A variety of means exist or could be established to provide the circuits we would need. Commercial satellite circuits of course already

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3 One 12-inch videodisc costing under a dollar, weighing three ounces will carry the same information as 1,200 feet of 1/2" videotape, 675 80-slide carousel trays or 30 large textbooks—54,000 pages. [Footnote is in the original.]
exist and are used. These are relatively costly and their ground links in foreign countries are not under our control. It would be wise to at least attempt to negotiate for permission to operate our own receivers abroad. A major cost saving could come if the Agency were able to utilize completely U.S. Government-owned facilities. However, a major policy roadblock exists in the form of a group of rulings by the FCC, opinions of the OMB and Office of Telecommunications Policy which promote the use of commercial carriers. So far, only the military, and to some extent NASA, have succeeded in obtaining relief. However, these rulings are not immutable. Other agencies of the Federal Government with extensive overseas communications requirements have a stake in undertaking the determined and sustained effort that would be necessary to change the situation. There already are indications of a desire for modification. Abbott Washburn, for instance, has insisted that the FCC review its 1966 ruling on the subject.

Meanwhile the Agency seems to be doing nothing while the Department of Defense prepares to launch its second generation Defense Communications Satellites (DSCS.II) beginning in October and plans the configuration of its third series for use in the early 1980s. This year also will see the launch of the global Navy and Air Force FltSatCom system, which will further add to DOD capabilities. Two foreign affairs agencies have for some time been working out the policy problems of their Skylink system. The House Interstate Foreign Commerce subcommittee and its Senate counterpart are holding hearings which may lead to a complete revision of the Federal Communications Act.4 Howard Chernoff is advising the House subcommittee chairman but I have not heard of any USIA intention to ensure that our interests are protected and advanced in that forum. The U.S. position in the January 1979 World Administrative Radio Conference which may prove crucial to the future of international broadcasting is being established without top-level Agency attention.

You already are or soon will be receiving requests for new equipment from various parts of the Agency. These requests will be based on the parochial needs of the elements concerned. In many cases these needs will have been determined in purely technical terms, without regard to broad Agency requirements and in some instances without even a complete knowledge of the full range of technical developments either in being or imminent. I have a vivid memory of the strong assurances given to us by engineers only a little more than a year ago that the direct satellite broadcast of television to home receivers would be impossible for at least a decade. One of the speakers at the recent

4 Reference is presumably to the Communications Act of 1934 (P.L. 416), which replaced the Federal Radio Commission with the Federal Communications Commission.
Georgetown conference on DBS which you attended implied that the cost and complexity of receiving and conversion equipment would make DBS impractical. Yet even as you read this it is possible to see color TV transmitted from Cleveland, Ohio via satellite to the FCC headquarters on M Street, where it is received on an ordinary set fed by an antenna and converter which the Japanese and Canadians expect to be able to produce for $100 or less.

I urge that you factor into your examination of the most effective reorganization of USIA the problem of how best to get the informed, impartial advice that you and the Agency as a whole should have on its communications for the 1980s—which are only two and a half years away.

45. Telegram From the Embassy in Mexico to the Department of State

Mexico City, May 4, 1977, 2022Z

6697. Subject: Cultural Initiatives. Ref: State 096982.

1. Embassy strongly feels that scope of educational and cultural exchanges is limited only by funds and imagination. Relations with Lopez Portillo administration are excellent at this point, leaving opportunity for vastly expanded cooperation in exchanges with a country of great importance to U.S. Given economic and commercial ties, a common border and a growing Spanish-speaking population in the U.S. (largely of Mexican origin), areas of confluent interest abound and should be supported by increased official interaction through carefully planned exchange of persons. One example of GOM interest is acceptance of invitation to visit U.S. under Department auspices by Education Minister Porfirio Munoz Ledo in September. He wishes discuss mutual areas of interest and concern, thus giving USG unprecedented opportunity to enhance relations between us in educational and cultural fields. Another potential forum for improving relations will be bilateral cultural commission meeting scheduled for September in which Department and ForMin will discuss cooperative programs.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770156–1124. Limited Official Use; Immediate. Sent for information to USIA.
2 See Document 43.
2. We wish to stress fact that present high degree of cooperation between GOM and U.S. is dependent to some extent on the personal relationships between highest officials on both sides. GOM’s willingness to be very forthcoming in cooperation could lessen to a degree if it were to conclude that the present relationship is not producing the concrete results, political, economic and financial, for which Mexico is looking. Therefore, it is important to move quickly to take advantage of current favorable atmosphere.

3. Mexico’s needs and opportunities are numerous. Among most pressing are:

A. Education—Embassy could develop across-the-board plan, using exchanges, to have input at all levels Mexican educational system, from primary schools through university level. No formal U.S. studies program currently exists in Mexico, and new administration has placed priority in establishment of a U.S. studies center. Another GOM priority is establishing pedagogical university. Since large numbers of Mexican teachers would be trained at this university, impact throughout Mexican educational system would be enormous. Another area is curriculum, where much more emphasis could be put on study of U.S. education as low as primary school level. At university level, increased number of Fulbright professors could augment total input into education system, as could increased scholarships for graduate training in educational fields. From USG point of view, Mexico’s expertise in bilingual, bicultural education could be of great use to U.S. educators.

B. Demographic studies—given nature of problem of migration to U.S. by Mexicans, this another critical field in which GOM striving for solutions. New Ministry of Human Settlements extremely active and staffed by some of Mexico’s brightest, most energetic specialists. Here too benefits of such cooperation would benefit both countries.

C. Clearinghouse for educational opportunities—originally proposed by Embassy in 1975 Cultural Commission meeting, this center would inventory existing exchange programs (public and private) since an awareness of extent such activity is essential to coordination of efforts in education. GOM recognizes need for such an organization and would willingly cooperate with USG initiatives.

D. Economic areas—in interest of both countries is sophisticated treatment of principal areas: trade policy, fiscal policy and inflation.

E. Intellectual and artistic community—there are great opportunities for more exposure of intellectuals and artists of both countries to the culture of the other. This could be another useful function of a clearinghouse. The private sector—universities, municipalities, foundations—should be encouraged to participate more actively to promote such exchanges.
4. As indicated above, GOM is already actively engaged in providing exchanges and, through such things as the Munoz Ledo visit, has demonstrated its eagerness to collaborate at significant levels. What is required at this point is a commitment from USG to reciprocate.

Hayne

46. Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Information

Washington, May 1977

[Omitted here is an April 27 letter to the Congress from Lewis and the members of the Commission, the Table of Contents, and the Preface.]

SUMMARY

1. The mission of USIA was, and remains, relatively well articulated and defined. Its flexibility to respond to an ever-changing international situation requires a reaffirmation of purpose and intent in order to assure the relevance of the programs. The Congress is urged to examine both. Public diplomacy is defined and identified as crucial to the U.S. Government’s participation in the quest for international understanding. The Commission notes specific areas where the Agency has been under-utilized, and other significant areas where its role and participation have been indispensable.

2. The Commission believes that the time has come for the Congress itself to reexamine the basic statutes that created and contain the legislative authority for establishing foreign information and cultural programs. For much has changed. It should address and reconsider the relationship of USIA to the world of 1980 rather than the world of 1950. It should review the adequacy of past legislation and of USIA’s relationship not only to the present times but to the emerging future.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of Research, Special Reports, 1953–1997, Entry P–160, Box 37, 5–8–77. No classification marking. The report is the 28th annual report of the Commission. On May 10, 1977, Washington Post reporters Lee Lescace and Richard Weintraub wrote that the report, issued on May 9, “was rushed into print in order to reach Congress before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee today takes up Sen. Charles H. Percy’s (R-Ill.) amendment that would break up USIA.” (“3 Drop Recommendation To Break Up the USIA,” p. A12) As of 1977, members of the Advisory Commission were Lewis, George H. Gallup, Nielsen, Reinsch, and Shaheen.
More than 30 years after World War II, the extraordinary challenges and opportunities afforded by vast changes in communications technology should be exploited more effectively. For example, the potential inherent in the direct broadcast satellite indicates the far-reaching ramifications of USIA’s mission. It transcends government agencies. It involves the Congress. And it involves the American people, many of whom can be drawn into the task of improving the effectiveness with which the mission is implemented.

3. USIA has been a 24-year experiment in openness. The Voice of America, one of its major elements and engaged in international radio broadcasting to the world, has been in the forefront battles for openness. The result has been a continuing tension and frequent clash between journalism and diplomacy in a process that has expanded the dimensions of openness. The Commission commends those who have struggled with this issue, reiterates that it is a healthy process beneficial to both journalism and diplomacy and concludes that this will be, and indeed should be, an eternal process. The Commission also urges the reinstitution of a Broadcast Advisory Committee that would focus exclusively on the problems and opportunities of international broadcasting.

4. The Public Affairs Officer (PAO) abroad plays a distinctive if not unique role in representing the American citizens’ continuing interest in public affairs. In representing the U.S. abroad to the people of foreign countries, he or she exemplifies and reflects this democratic character of our people. The PAO’s practice and policy of cultivating associates and prodding Embassy personnel for openness in communications become apparent to all groups and levels of a foreign country with which the PAO is permitted to communicate. The PAO is a specialist in communications whose primary interest is public affairs.

5. This Commission, taking into account the impact of the visits to the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and the People’s Republic of China, by former Presidents Nixon and Ford, and reiterating the need to promote and sustain a relaxation-of-tensions atmosphere, calls for “patience and fortitude” in improving communications channels and contacts with the peoples of these countries. For the Commission contrasts the rate of change in communist countries with the U.S. and other Western countries. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Helsinki also opened new avenues of communication. Hopefully, the forthcoming conference in Belgrade will chart the achievements as well as retreats and then call for the continued lower-

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2 July 29–August 1, 1975.
3 See footnote 4, Document 25.
The cause of human rights is probably the most revolutionary principle in the world. The President’s sustained interest in espousing it represents a continuing, albeit complex, challenge to those who guide the affairs of USIA. An effective and prudent use of this principle will inspire hundreds of millions throughout the world.

7. “The Commission believes that larger goals and tasks should be set for USIA and that a gradually stepped-up campaign should be mapped to augment its audiences by giving the people of the world more information about the U.S.—not necessarily more news but more information.”

8. The Commission does “not believe that the USIA should be returned to the State Department, as that Department is currently organized and constituted.” We believe that the structure of USIA must include all elements of public diplomacy—fragmentation is not the answer. The Commission recommends that the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs be removed from the State Department and merged with USIA. It also recommends that the Voice of America remain a vital participant in the U.S. information program, but with the injunction that its Director “command an appropriate share of responsibility, resource and authority,” by elevating the rank and position to a Deputy Director of USIA.

9. The Agency should remain independent. The Commission appreciates the current efforts to consolidate government operations, but feels that reduction of the number of agencies cannot be viewed as an end in itself. If the goal sought is increased efficiency and effectiveness of operation, the members of this Commission have concluded that, under present conditions, USIA should retain its present autonomy.

10. USIA remains a seriously under-capitalized agency. Both the Congress and the Executive must address this issue carefully. The following letter from Dr. George Gallup to the Chairman of this Commission contains a seasoned observer’s perspective of this matter.

Specific Recommendations:

1. The power of communications should be acknowledged, and confidence in its ability to effect increased international and intercultural understanding substantially strengthened. USIA should consider

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4 Not printed. The letter follows the summary section of the report.
the effectively televised version of “Roots”\textsuperscript{5} as an example of how one mass media program provided new information and produced significant changes in attitude.

2. The assessment of foreign public opinion must be systematically and routinely undertaken, and the results made available to those engaged in foreign policy decisions within the Executive Branch as well as the Congress.

3. The Office of Congressional Relations must be strengthened and restructured.

4. The work of USIA is rarely appreciated, and the Commission invites the critical examination of Congress and the domestic media to substantiate Commission claims that recent USIA efforts in promoting worldwide celebration of the American Bicentennial have been outstanding.\textsuperscript{6}

5. The internal structure of USIA must be reviewed: personnel, administration and management, media services, all are in need of examination to assure continuing relevance and responding to demands for flexible change.

6. The news reported by the Voice must be freely disseminated, and remain both credible and competitive. There can be no distortion or prior restraint of news broadcasts. “VOA has demonstrated over the years that it is an alert, competitive, extremely capable and credible international broadcaster; VOA . . . ranks with BBC as the two most-listened-to international radio broadcasters.”

7. The physical presence of USIA’s top management at VOA must become more regular, and the personnel and operations of VOA should be consolidated into greatly improved facilities.

8. The whole of USIA should be housed in one building.

9. The Research element of USIA should be strengthened in terms of financial support, the acceptability of its function, and the professional character and capability of its personnel. For without an “Ear of America” there can be no effective “Voice of America.”

10. All USIA personnel in top management should “demonstrate an understanding of research as well as (its) application . . .” before assuming positions of leadership in covering USIA’s responsibility for vast geographic areas of the world, managing the Agency’s media or coordinating USIA’s policy mechanism.

\textsuperscript{5} Reference is to the television miniseries based on Pulitzer Prize-winning author Alex Haley’s 1976 novel \textit{Roots: The Saga of an American Family}. Broadcast on the ABC television network from January 23 through January 30, 1977, the miniseries attracted millions of viewers and received 9 Emmy awards.

\textsuperscript{6} See footnote 4, Document 37.
11. USIA should continue its efforts to communicate with the academic community. It should also develop a “closer relationship with the fifty states of the Union.”

12. The Public Affairs Officer should be granted the status and career objectives currently available to the State Department’s Foreign Service Officers by increasing in USIA the number of Career Ministers and by establishing a new top-title comparable to that of Career Ambassador.

13. The personnel systems within USIA should be thoroughly examined and remedied in order to provide real service to the Agency, rather than forcing unduly the Agency’s employees to conform to overly rigid requirements. To further this goal, the Commission urges the return of the Office of Personnel to the Office of Administration, a practice that prevails in most government agencies.

14. More attention must be given to the coordinated efforts of the media support available to the field.

15. There are too many rules and regulations—the bureaucratic machinery is once again in need of cleaning.

16. Labor Information Officers were eliminated due to budget cuts—the Commission recommends their contribution be made available once again.

17. The effective role and positive impact of special exhibits are appreciated, and it is recommended that there be more, in all geographic areas.

18. English teaching requires quantum expansion.

19. USIA should begin to plan now for commemorating the bicentennial of the ratification of the American Constitution and its Bill of Rights.7

[Omitted here is the body of the 122 page report and four appendices.]

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7 1987 and 1991, respectively. For additional information about USIA’s planning efforts to commemorate the bicentennials, see Document 92.
Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Reinhardt) to the Acting Assistant Director, Broadcasting Service (Tuch)\(^1\)

Washington, May 4, 1977

I attach the highest importance to the integrity of the Voice of America. It holds in trust—at all times, and in all circumstances—an important, continuing obligation to the national interests of the United States. I share that obligation.

I am herewith establishing the following guidelines to implement the principles established by Section 503 of Public Law 94–350\(^2\) governing the operations of the Voice of America.

1. VOA will be solely responsible for the content of news broadcasts. I expect VOA to continue to apply its double-source rule.

2. The Office of Policy and Plans (IOP) is responsible for providing guidance in regard to VOA’s obligation to “. . . present the policies of the United States clearly and effectively . . .” via commentaries and analyses. There will be no prior script clearance of VOA commentaries and analyses. Post-broadcast critiques will be regularly conducted. I expect VOA to inform IOP of projected commentaries and analyses and to seek IOP’s policy judgments in advance whenever time permits. VOA will continue to collaborate with IOP in the selection of topics for commentary/analysis on specific foreign policy issues.

3. Policy guidance from other USIA elements will be channelled to VOA exclusively through IOP; area offices will be guided accordingly.

4. Policy input to VOA from other Executive Branch elements will be passed exclusively through IOP. VOA will refer anyone seeking direct contact with its staff on policy matters to IOP as the only authorized intermediary. I expect these referrals will be firm but courteous.

5. I expect that VOA will look to IOP for guidance on the policy implications of foreign affairs issues, for suggestions of emphasis, and for specific caveats. VOA will seek advice, consult on issues and, whenever appropriate, raise individual policy problems which trouble VOA broadcasters. There must be a close, collegial operational relationship among VOA and other Agency elements, particularly Area Offices and field posts, in recognition that radio is a prime communications instrument for all of us.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, USIA Historical Collection, Subject Files, 1953–2000, Entry A–1 1066, Box 112, VOA, History, 1977. No classification marking.

6. Communications from Embassies and overseas USIS Posts should be welcomed by VOA and responded to on their merits. Policy issues raised in such communications should be considered jointly by IOP and VOA.

7. I expect VOA to take the initiative to seek background information necessary for the authoritativeness and accuracy of its broadcasts from sources within and without the Executive Branch.

John E. Reinhardt

48. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Reinhardt) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, May 4, 1977

SUBJECT
Public Opinion on the Human Rights Issue

You might be interested in the attached briefing note reporting on public opinion on the human rights issue, drawn from a recent USIA-commissioned poll in Great Britain, France, Germany, Canada and Japan.

I should note that to be suitable for a general opinion survey, the questions were kept simple, and did not explore the ramifications of the issue in relation to other foreign policy questions. Therefore it is not possible to interpret the results as a full endorsement, in public opinion, of the way President Carter has handled this issue. But we found strong support for the general principle of speaking out on human rights.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770087–1535. No classification marking. There is no indication that Vance saw the memorandum.
Attachment

Briefing Note Prepared in the Office of Research, United States Information Agency

Washington, April 29, 1977

FOREIGN PUBLIC OPINION ON U.S. ADVOCACY OF HUMAN RIGHTS

In mid-April, a majority in Germany (63%) and roughly half of the general public in four other major industrial democracies were aware of “statements by the U.S. in the past few months criticizing violations of human rights by the U.S.S.R. and other countries.”

Contrary to the misgivings expressed by some Western leaders and commentators about the risks of injecting a “moral challenge” into foreign policy, the President’s statements on human rights have struck a responsive chord among the more informed public. Among those aware of the U.S. position, majorities believed pronouncements on human rights to be “a good idea.”

Approval of U.S. Statements on Human Rights

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Only in Britain did an appreciable proportion (30%) disapprove. Similar large majorities of the more informed in the Western democracies—ranging from 61% in Canada to 78% in Germany—thought outspoken advocacy of human rights by “other Western leaders” would also be a good thing. In Japan, the level of those expressing an opinion was characteristically much lower, but the margin of approval for other leaders speaking out on the issue was better than two-to-one (36% vs. 15%).

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2 No classification marking.
SUBJECT

Adverse Congressional Developments re VOA and BIB

SUMMARY:

Moves are afoot in the McGovern subcommittee of the SFRC which could disadvantage present arrangements for operation of both VOA and RFE/RL. We need to take measures to have White House views transmitted clearly to key Senate (and perhaps House) leaders.

DISCUSSION:

Percy has introduced an amendment (publicized in the Post this morning) to have VOA set up autonomously and make other changes in the USIA/CU set up which represent implementation of the Stanton Report. According to Leonard Marks, Percy has agreed with McGovern and Pell that he will support their BIB amendment if they support this one. The Percy amendment has not yet been adopted.

Meanwhile a McGovern-Pell Amendment was adopted by the McGovern subcommittee which completely changes the BIB RFE/RL set up. It provides for expansion of the BIB to 10 members who would become the operating body for RFE/RL because the RFE/RL Board is forbidden by the same amendment from receiving any appropriated funds for the radios after 1 January 1977.

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special (Henze), Box 1, Chron File: 4–5/77. Confidential. Sent for action. A notation in an unknown hand indicates that a copy was sent to Schecter. In his May 4 Evening Report to Brzezinski, Henze summarized the “two bad amendments” to the Foreign Relations Authorization bill, adding: “If we don’t act to fend these [amendments] off, the whole radio broadcasting field could be badly screwed up by them.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special (Henze), Box 5, Evening Reports File: 2–6/77)

The whole SFRC is slated to vote on these amendments some time next week.

The two amendments actually serve contrary purposes—Percy’s takes the VOA out from under government control; McGovern-Pell’s puts RFE/RL under direct government control!

I have had calls from BIB, RFE/RL, Leonard Marks and John Hayes and have also talked to John Reinhardt, who is strongly opposed to Percy’s initiative and is attempting to enlist the support of State for his position. He asked that in any initiative taken from the White House level, his strong opposition to any legislation that changes the present USIA/VOA set-up at this time be cited. (I have not been able to get Gronouski on the phone, but have a call in to him; he can also be of some help, I believe; I am also going to talk to Tom Quinn, BIB Board member close to Senator Pell. Quinn, I am told, is not sympathetic with Pell’s initiative, which is actually the initiative of staff member John Ritch. I am also told that Quinn will be responsive to White House wishes.)

RECOMMENDATION

Neither of these amendments is in the interest of the Administration—but we must make the Administration’s views clear to the leadership in Congress or they may be adopted by the SFRC when it meets on Tuesday and sent on to the Senate. I suggest you arrange for me to work with someone on Frank Moore’s staff who can devote a fair measure of consistent energy to this issue. Senators Sparkman, Humphrey and Javits should be contacted and told that the Administration wants all new legislation dealing with the radios and USIA shelved. Senator Robert Byrd should be contacted and told of the Administration’s views, as should Speaker O’Neill and Dante Fascell. I am told that USIA has already had Abbott Washburn talk to Senators Tower and Baker who oppose these amendments.

3 In his May 4 Evening Report (see footnote 1, above), Henze wrote that he had spoken to Gronouski that evening about the two amendments: “He is still mediating a strike in Milwaukee but is very upset about them and plans to call McGovern and possibly others this evening or tomorrow.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special (Henze), Box 5, Evening Reports File: 2–6/77)

4 May 10.
United States “public diplomacy”—international information, education, and cultural relations—is being extensively reexamined in and out of Government. Various proposals call for redefining the mission of public diplomacy, changing or eliminating functions, and reorganizing the administering apparatus.

**STANTON PANEL REPORT**

The most prominent and comprehensive report suggesting changes in organizational arrangements to conduct U.S. public diplomacy is that of the Panel on International Information, Education, and Cultural Relations (Stanton Panel), a group of private citizens.

The report, published in March 1975, was endorsed 3 months later by the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy (Murphy Commission). A number of other qualified persons have strongly opposed several of the proposals. The State Department and the United States Information Agency are on record against all but one of them.

The report is being reviewed by the executive branch and is slated for consideration in the Congress.

GAO’s review is confined to the Stanton Panel recommendations. In the final chapter, however, GAO notes certain nonorganizational changes that merit attention in the ongoing effort to improve U.S. public diplomacy. (See pp. 34 to 36.)

One of the Panel’s proposals would improve present operations; two others seem promising but require further study; and the remainder—which contemplate a major reorganization—seem more likely to hinder than to advance the efficiency and effectiveness of U.S. public diplomacy. The latter proposals would achieve a certain tidiness on paper at the expense of arrangements that essentially have met the test of practicality and performance.

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2 See footnote 6, Document 30.
Policy information function

The Panel proposes to reassign to the State Department the U.S. Information Agency’s role in articulating and advocating U.S. foreign policy overseas. This is based on the Panel’s distinction between “policy” information—which covers the Government’s “stance on foreign policy questions of immediate concern”—and “general” information.

Like many other observers, GAO believes the two kinds of information are often mutually reinforcing and difficult in practice to separate. The primary responsibility for articulating and advocating as well as formulating U.S. foreign policy is vested in the President and the Secretary of State. A role of the U.S. Information Agency is to give resonance abroad to authoritative definitions and interpretations of that policy under State Department guidance. For the most part this work appears to be done professionally and to the State Department’s general satisfaction. GAO believes the U.S. Information Agency should retain its policy information role. (See pp. 9 to 13, 15, and 16.)

Policy advisory function

The Panel also proposes to transfer to the State Department the U.S. Information Agency’s function of advising U.S. policymakers on the policy implications of foreign public opinion. This function is in fact performed by several Federal agencies. The U.S. Information Agency’s cultural and media contacts abroad enable it to make a distinctive advisory contribution.

There have been complaints, echoed by the Panel, that this contribution has not been properly utilized. How adequately it is utilized, how much it differs from that of other agencies, and whether the “neglect” of U.S. Information Agency policy advice can be corrected by means other than transferring the advisory function are among the unanswered questions raised by this proposal. Pending further study of such questions, the present arrangement should be left intact. (See pp. 9, 10, 13, 14, and 16.)

Establishment of new Information and Cultural Affairs Agency

The Panel proposes to consolidate the cultural functions of the State Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs and those of the U.S. Information Agency. A single agency would be responsible for both the domestic and overseas aspects of U.S. general information, educational, and cultural programs. GAO believes, as do most persons consulted, that this proposal is constructive. It would lead to more efficient and consistent administration of U.S. cultural programs. (See pp. 17 to 24.)
Relationship of new Information and Cultural Affairs Agency to Department of State

The Panel proposes that the new information agency be placed “under—but not in—the Department” as an “autonomous” agency on the model of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Both independent status for the information agency and the Panel’s alternative have distinct advantages and shortcomings. Either could work well. The choice should be based on a careful study of the pros and cons.

If the agency were assigned to State, however, some safeguards and some vigilance would be advisable to protect the agency’s professional integrity and its ability to cover objectively not only the State Department but other agencies and branches of Government as well as the private sector. (See pp. 19 to 24.)

Field reorganization

The Panel proposes to reorganize U.S. overseas missions so that articulating “policy” information would be the exclusive responsibility of State Department officers while “general” information and cultural programs would be the province of Information and Cultural Affairs Agency officers. This would fragment what the Panel itself describes as “the unified organization which has worked so effectively in the field for over twenty years.” The present trend toward closer integration of those activities in the overseas missions should be encouraged. (See pp. 25 to 27.)

Voice of America

The Panel proposes to make the Voice of America an independent agency under its own board, asserting that this “would enable the Voice of America to function as a credible medium.”

The Panel offers no evidence that present Voice of America broadcasts lack credibility, credence, or listenership. Audience research by the U.S. Information Agency and others in recent years suggests otherwise. Similarly, the Panel implies without attempting to demonstrate that Voice of America does not satisfy the needs of the Department of State. The evidence again points in the other direction. Implementing this proposal would add considerably to costs of operation.

How U.S. foreign policy is reported and advocated, especially by fast media and especially in moments of international crisis, can greatly affect the national interest for good or ill. For an agency billed and perceived as “the” Voice of America, there can be circumstances in which diplomatic needs ought to prevail over journalistic concerns.

It should be emphasized, however, that circumstances justifying State Department or White House intervention in Voice of America...
broadcasting are highly unusual, and the prerogative should be exercised with restraint and in full awareness of the need to protect Voice of America’s professional integrity.

The present structural relationship between the Voice of America, the U.S. Information Agency, and the Department of State should be preserved, but efforts should be made to improve the working relationships. (See pp. 28 to 33.)

AGENCY COMMENTS

This report was submitted in draft to the interested agencies and advisory commissions, as well as the Chairman of the Stanton Panel, for their informal comments. All agreed that the cultural functions of the U.S. Information Agency and the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs should be consolidated. GAO’s conclusions concerning the other Panel proposals have elicited emphatic agreement and equally emphatic disagreement. All comments were carefully considered.

[Omitted here are Chapter 1: Introduction; Chapter 2: Transfer of USIA’s Policy Articulation and Advisory Functions to State Department; Chapter 3: Establishment of New Information and Cultural Affairs Agency; Chapter 4: Field Reorganization; Chapter 5: Voice of America; Chapter 6: A New Charter for U.S. Public Diplomacy; and Appendix I: Principal Officers Concerned With the Subject of This Report.]
Memorandum From Paul Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\(^1\)

Washington, undated

SUBJECT
Summary of Developments in Your Absence

Activities

**BIB, VOA, Congress:** A large proportion of my time was taken up working against the Pell amendment on BIB and the Percy amendment on VOA. Bob Thompson of Frank Moore’s staff was assigned to work with me on this and has put in a great deal of energy on it. The radios, Leonard Marks, John Hays and others have mounted a major effort to persuade key Senators to oppose these amendments. John Reinhardt of USIA has mounted a major effort re VOA and State has helped him on it. For the most part on BIB, however, State has not helped or has actually encouraged the people pushing the Pell (\& McGovern) amendment. The Pell/McGovern\(^2\) initiative abolishes the RFE/RL Board and expands the BIB to become the operating and controlling element for the radios. (I have it on very good authority that the Pell/McGovern amendment was actually written by BIB staff members Walter Roberts and Tony Shub with the help of McGovern Subcommittee staff chief, John Ritch.) The *Washington Post* had an excellent editorial on this subject Monday morning,\(^3\) pointing out that while the Percy amendment aims to take VOA out of government control, the Pell amendment aims to put RFE/RL under tighter control—an anomaly which fails to recognize the particular role each radio has to play. Frank Stanton has been in town, lobbying in Congress for the Percy amendment.

Our tactic has been to argue that neither amendment is fair to the new people who have just been appointed to head these radios; that there was no consultation with the Administration, and that the sensible thing for Congress to do would be to give the Administration a reasonable period of time to look over all these radio operations and decide rationally where changes, if any, are needed.\(^4\)

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\(^2\) Brzezinski underlined “Pell/McGovern.”


\(^4\) Brzezinski placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph and the one below it. He also wrote, “speak to me about this” in the margin.
One or both of the amendments may pass the SFRC this afternoon.\(^5\) Then they go to the full Senate. It will still be possible to mount an effort against them there (Humphrey has been eloquent in opposing them; others who have opposed them are Case, Stone, Javits, Baker, Griffin and Pearson; those on the side of Pell/Percy and McGovern are: Clark, Glenn, Sarbanes, Biden, Church. Sparkman was absent today, so is playing no role.) Finally the Senate version of the FOAA must be reconciled with the House version; Fascell is against these amendments, so they might be dropped in Conference. Rather than waiting for this, however, it might be advisable for the Administration to weigh in with Senator Byrd and ask him to help get them dropped in the full Senate . . .

**USIA Reorganization:** USIA and State are working together on a USIA reorganization plan. John Reinhardt had promised to send me a copy of what they have produced but has not done so; says he wants to meet with you again.\(^6\) Believe we should assert ourselves or we will find USIA getting itself more locked into State than is desirable. It is very much in interest of President to keep USIA in autonomous position under the White House.\(^7\)  

[Omitted here is material unrelated to public diplomacy.]

**Leonard Marks and USAC/IECA:** Leonard is very interested in getting issue of his continuation in this job settled and is eager to organize a new commission. At the rate White House appointments process moves insofar as these part-time boards are concerned, it will be next Christmas before we get this reorganized if we don’t make a real push. State told us last Friday\(^8\) they couldn’t answer your request for advice re Marks reappointment sent to Vance nearly a month ago because there is disagreement in the department about it.\(^9\) It seems to me that the potential of this job is too great to leave it untended for long and to let it be used to pay off some political debt. I recommend we have President announce interim (without term specified) reappointment of Leonard Marks and then proceed to get other members appointed to

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\(^5\) On May 10, the full Senate Foreign Relations Committee rejected Percy’s proposal and substituted a proposal that would require the administration to take into account information on recent studies, including the Stanton Report. The Committee, however, approved the Pell–McGovern Amendment concerning RFE/RL. (Lee Lescaze, “Senate Panel Votes to Relax Embargo Against Cuba,” *The Washington Post,* May 11, 1977, p. A1)

\(^6\) See footnote 2, Document 35.

\(^7\) Brzezinski placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph and wrote “speak to Frank Moore.”

\(^8\) May 6.

\(^9\) See Document 36.
the commission. Reappointment of Marks should enable us to avoid
the hassle we have been involved in in getting Gronouski cleared.10

[Omitted here is material unrelated to public diplomacy.]

10 Brzezinski placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to the first three
sentences of the paragraph and wrote “didn’t he [Marks] support Nixon?” Below this,
Henze wrote “no PH” and drew a line from it to Brzezinski’s question.

52. Memorandum From the Associate Press Secretary (Schecter)
and Paul Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the
President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Brzezinski)1

Washington, May 18, 1977

SUBJECT
First NSC–USIA Meeting, Tuesday, May 17, 3:00 p.m., Situation Room

The basic theme of the meeting was how to regard the USIA as
an opportunity and not a problem. Schecter, Henze and Pisano joined
forces with Deputy Director Charles Bray and Policy Guidance head
Jim Thurber. Three major areas were outlined:
1. Daily guidance.
2. Long-range guidance and planning.
3. USIA possibilities for assistance to the Administration.

Bray suggested that Thurber and USIA area experts have access
to their appropriate NSC counterparts. We agreed to meet again next
week with both sides presenting a list of major issues that are expected
to be of importance over the next six months to a year.

We also discussed the possibility of the USIA setting up a radio
or TV interview for Mrs. Carter before her Latin American trip2 to

1 Source: Carter Library, White House Central Files, Subject File, Federal Govern-
ment, United States Information Agency, Executive, Box FG–210, FG–266 1/20/77–
1/20/81. No classification marking. Sent for information. Inderfurth initialed the top
right-hand corner of the memorandum. A notation in an unknown hand in the lower-
right hand corner reads: “Second mtg scheduled 5/24/77 @ 430.”
2 Reference is to the First Lady’s goodwill trip to Jamaica, Costa Rica, Ecuador,
Peru, Colombia, and Venezuela May 30–June 8. Documentation on the trip is scheduled
for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXIII, Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean
outline exactly what she will be doing. Such an interview would help
to end speculation about her “substantive talks” with Latin American
leaders and place her visit in the proper perspective.

Bray and Thurber stressed the importance of the USIA receiving
as much advance notice as possible on the texts of Presidential speeches.
They seemed anxious to cooperate and to work more closely with the
NSC. However, Schecter explained that in the case of Presidential
speeches, it is often impossible to supply an early advance text. We
have to strike a balance between cooperation with USIA and their role
in not intruding on the policy process.

53. Memorandum From the Assistant Director, Latin America,
United States Information Agency (Chatten) to the First
Lady’s Press Secretary (Finch Hoyt)\(^1\)

Washington, May 19, 1977

SUBJECT

Maximizing Mrs. Carter’s Trip—Summary Points of our Previous Discussions

1. A basic problem up to now has been credibility in answering
the question, “why is she going?” when it is put by U.S. critics and
“why is she coming?” when raised by Latinos. It is necessary if at all
possible to push through the media and other filters the fact that Mrs.
Carter is one of the President’s closest advisers who can be expected
to give impressions and advice on her return from the area that will
indeed be heeded. This is a message that goes poorly through media
filters but one which her presence overseas should do much to drama-
tize. Trying to make this effect last is a function of USIS’ continuing
work with audiences on the ground overseas (short run) and of whether
the initiatives of the President’s OAS speech\(^2\) are realized (long run).
It is important to remember that the few doubts coming to us about
Mrs. Carter’s trip represent mostly official reaction to the question of
her ability to discuss substance. But there are other publics beside

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of the Director, Executive Secretariat,
Secretariat Staff, Correspondence Files, 1973–1980, Entry P–104, Box 121, 7701670–
7701679. No classification marking. Copies were sent to Einaudi, Pastor, Reinhardt, Bray,
and Fraser. Reinhardt and Fraser initialed the memorandum, indicating that they saw it.

\(^2\) See footnote 2, Document 38.
querulous government officials and I think the reaction among them has been and will be extremely positive.

2. The word “substantive” in connection with the discussions Mrs. Carter will hold with foreign leaders carries with it the seeds of some difficulties. “Substantive” implies a degree of focus on such issues as arms transfers, nuclear proliferation, amendment of the trade act, the specifics of how to deal with illegal immigrants, commodity arrangements and other things Mrs. Carter will be informed about, interested in and allude to but perhaps will not plumb to their substantive depths during brief meetings abroad. Use of the word without being specific about what you are implying raises a variety of expectations which can create some inevitable disappointments. The word also has the potential for implying a kind of instant expertise, a notion which I suspect you are eager to avoid. Her well-publicized study of Spanish and the issues is a big plus if Latins do not draw extravagant conclusions from this information. Some such conclusions already are being drawn. It might be useful to attempt to mitigate this by emphasizing less freighted words and phrases such as “talks,” “in-depth discussions,” “talks over a range of mutual interests” or “serious conversations”.

3. I believe there are two things that Mrs. Carter can talk quite profitably about and be accepted by all Latin listeners as an authoritative source:

(a) She has acknowledged mastery over “who am I, who are we, how we got to Washington, what we represent, what we are doing, what we are attempting to do.” When we look back on the trip in mid-June, I believe we are going to be happiest about the times we were able to provide Mrs. Carter an appropriate forum for that message.

(b) The one substantive issue on which she can and ought to attempt to be persuasive is the Administration’s approach to human rights. Feeling on this subject runs equally deep in the White House and abroad, but often for different reasons. While some foreign publics’ attitudes are closer to the U.S. Government position than to their own government’s, most commonly the U.S. approach is seen to emanate directly from the White House and there is much misunderstanding if not outright cynicism among foreigners about the subject. There is something to be gained by emphasizing that after the well-publicized foreign and domestic difficulties of the past decade, Americans are eager to stand for something they can be proud of. This kind of “domestic explanation” of what is perceived abroad only in its foreign affairs context would be most useful and received as an addition to foreign understanding of the issue. I think she could address it quite profitably both in private and, given the proper forum, in public. She could give an appreciation of the breadth and depth of the commitment to this subject within the United States, demonstrating that there is a much
greater constituency than is appreciated abroad and that it does not
spring from either naivete or religious zeal at the White House.

4. I encourage the avoidance at all costs of the phrase, “I came
to listen.” This phrase has been repeated by representatives of each
succeeding administration for as long as any of us can remember and
is the quickest way to have Latin American government and other
listeners hit the “off” switch for anybody who uses it. This is not to
say that the same thought cannot be advanced in a variety of ways,
since I understand that Mrs. Carter is indeed doing some listening on
behalf of the President. A reasonable substitute would be a presentation
incorporating the fact that Mrs. Carter has been to Latin America on
more than one previous occasion, that there are differences of approach
incorporated into the President’s OAS speech and that she is present
to bring people up to date on Carter Administration emphases and
would like to hear people’s firsthand reactions to them.

5. The word “new” as in “new frontier,” “new deal” and “new
dialogue” could be avoided at no cost to Mrs. Carter’s credibility. Many
Latin American listeners are fully inclined to give us a fair hearing
on how “new” things will manifest themselves. But many expressed
themselves quite lucidly in their “okay-up-to-now-but-let’s-wait-and-
see-what-happens” reaction to the OAS speech.

6. Mrs. Carter’s instincts are accurate in avoiding the “lady bounti-
ful” image by down playing emphasis on children’s hospitals and other
“women’s things”. The attempt to allow Mrs. Vance 3 to show the flag
in this fashion, so as not to offend the hosts, is a wise decision, we
believe, though too much should not be expected of it since Mrs. Vance
is not the star attraction.

7. We should not be deceived that there will be any reticence on
the part of reporters, either foreign or domestic, to try to nail Mrs.
Carter on just what sort of “substantive” things she is doing. I would
expect the Latinos to be slightly more gentle about it than the touring
Americans. The foreign press must be taken seriously. They are basi-
cally friendly and every attempt should be made to give them equitable
treatment and access. Though they will sometimes make demands or
requests which cannot be met, a special effort should be made to treat
them fairly—they will repay this effort many times over. Despite the
fact there are only 20 seats on Mrs. Carter’s plane, it must be realized
that there is not an infrastructure of mass communications existing in
Latin America except via the wire services for covering the trip. If there
is to be radio, TV and film coverage of Mrs. Carter’s trip as a whole,

3 Reference is to Grace Vance, who accompanied the First Lady on her trip.
rather than simply of the country being visited, USIA needs to be given an opportunity to provide it.

54. Briefing Memorandum From the Chief of the Policy Guidance Staff, Office of Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency (Thurber) to the Deputy Director (Bray)\(^1\)

Washington, May 23, 1977

SUBJECT

USIA Relations with the State Department

We discussed briefly last week the need for a new/expanded relationship with the Department of State.

The problem with State is roughly the same that exists with the White House—basically we do not have access to the intellectual process that goes into foreign policy decisions and events. If USIA is to support U.S. foreign policy, we need to know in advance what we are trying to accomplish, how we plan to get there, and the role USIA can play, including input and execution. I am thinking not only of major speeches but also foreign policy initiatives, trips, etc.

IOP/G does get guidance from State, usually from the PA’s in the various bureaus and we do attend most of the bureaus’ weekly meetings. I talk daily with Hodding Carter or one of his deputies. But most of this is along the lines of fire fighting. Our contacts are usually not plugged into the decision-making process and can only react to events.

I would suggest a schedule of meetings similar to those planned with the NSC.\(^2\) I would think this should be somewhere around the Deputy Secretary or S/P level—someone who has an overall handle on State’s thinking.

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of the Director, Executive Secretariat, Secretariat Staff, Correspondence Files, 1973–1980, Entry P–104, Box 130, 7702790–7702799. No classification marking. Sent through Bastian. In the top right-hand corner of the memorandum Bray wrote, “JER Did you say you were going to talk to Tony Lake? Could we discuss? CB.” Next to this, Reinhardt wrote, “CB I see Lake Thurs. [May 26].”

\(^2\) See Document 52.
55. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter

Washington, May 23, 1977

[Omitted here is material unrelated to public diplomacy.]

5. State-USIA Reorganization: I received a report on this matter which was unsatisfactory.2 I have since designated Warren Christopher to chair an inter-agency task force that will produce recommendations for this reorganization by next month. There is considerable Congressional and some press interest in this issue with several key Senators arguing for and against having the Voice of America remain under government control.

Frank Stanton headed a panel that issued a report two years ago recommending that USIA give up most of its news production operations to State, that a new Information and Cultural Agency be formed to handle cultural exchange and general information programs, and the VOA become independent.3 I have discussed this plan with Stanton and believe that he has come up with at least some elements of desirable reform.

Stanton’s conclusions have been challenged by a recent GAO report4 that recommends that USIA’s cultural exchange programs be handled by State. The GAO report has led some to advocate the creation of an ACDA-like agency to handle all the U.S. government’s cultural and information programs abroad.

I will have to wait until the report is finished before making my recommendations to you.5 I am convinced, however, that our management and approach to international public affairs has to be strengthened and streamlined. What I will aim for is a structure that gives our foreign information and cultural programs a new impetus. In this connection I will also make some suggestions regarding who should staff whatever new organization emerges. We have a wealth of talent in this country for such an operation, and we must get the very best to head it up.

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1 Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 37, State Department Evening Reports, 5/77. Secret. There is no indication that the President saw the memorandum.
2 Not found and not further identified.
3 See footnote 3, Document 1.
4 See Document 50.
5 See Document 64.
SUBJECT
Evening Report—24 May 1977

Daily Activities:

USIA–VOA: John Reinhardt called to give me rundown on developments re USIA/VOA on which he asked me to inform you. He said that Vance will shortly be sending to President a paper re reorganization of USIA and State CU structure.² It will apparently offer various options for President to choose from: Stanton recommendations; situation as is; or a reorganized, strengthened USIA, perhaps renamed something like Public Diplomacy Agency, which would combine present CU with all existing USIA functions.³ This latter option is one Reinhardt favors. This strengthened version of USIA could either remain completely autonomous as it now is, or it could be put in same relationship to State as AID or ACDA. It is not quite clear to me why proposals for reorganization should be submitted only at Vance’s initiative. In any event, I assume that you will want to have a look at them, and that President would want to have your views . . .⁴

Reinhardt tells me that Dante Fascell is going to hold hearings on US Government information organization and policies during second week of June.⁵ I will alert BIB/RFE/RL people to these. It happens that Gronouski will be in town that week, so it might be a useful time for him to get involved with Fascell.

Jerry Schecter, Jane Pisano and I, joined at end by Barry Jagoda, had useful meeting with Charlie Bray and Jim Thurber of USIA this afternoon and covered wide range of topics, most of which Jerry will be following up on.⁶

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special (Henze), Box 5, Evening Reports File: 2–6/77. Secret.
2 See Document 64.
3 Brzezinski underlined the portion of the sentence beginning with “or” and ending with “functions.” He also placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this and the previous sentence and wrote: “Pres. does not approve Stanton report.”
4 Brzezinski placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this and the previous sentence and wrote: “yes prepare.”
5 See Documents 58 and 63.
6 A record of this meeting has not been found.
I had lunch with VOA news chief, Alan Heil, and learned a good deal about how VOA is operating these days. He says that new guidelines which John Reinhardt issued few weeks ago have had very positive influence and have cut down most of the minor hassling about what VOA should and should not say.

John Reinhardt tells me that Peter Strauss has been selected as new head of VOA and is being cleared for job. Sounds good.

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7 See Document 47.
8 Brzezinski underlined the portion of the sentence beginning with “Peter” and ending with “job.” He also placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph and wrote: “I know him well.”

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57. Address by the Director of the United States Information Agency (Reinhardt)

Knoxville, Tennessee, May 28, 1977

Today’s commencement is a celebration of what you have achieved and the possibilities of your future in America and in the world. I am not flattering you when I say that this day at Knoxville College represents the best of what our country means to me and to many others.

What our view is of ourselves as Americans and the meaning of America to the world is what I should like to address today. I will do so in Socratic fashion, through questions. I have three:

—What does America mean to itself and to the world?
—Why is the world mindful of us?
—And, finally, how do we best communicate what we know of ourselves and our hopes for the world?

To the first question—what does America mean to itself and to the world?

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1 Source: Department of State Bulletin, July 4, 1977, pp. 5–8. Reinhardt delivered the commencement address at Knoxville College. His address is entitled “A Guiding Philosophy for American Informational and Cultural Programs Abroad.” A copy of Reinhardt’s speech is in the National Archives, RG 306, USIA Historical Collection, Office of the Director, Biographic Files Relating to USIA Directors and Other Senior Officials, 1953–2000, Entry A–1 1069, Box 24, John E. Reinhardt, Speeches, 1977.
At its best—at its very heart—America is an idea, or a collection of ideas. You may at times have heard the criticism that our reverence of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights is metaphysically centered on the documents themselves. That is, I suggest, a misreading of history and fact.

It is the idea and the ideals of America that command our loyalties and infuse our image of ourselves and our practices. The Constitution and the Bill of Rights, the Federalist Papers, the amply recorded history of our early days attest to the fact that what had been brought to this continent was not a new idea of representative government. The concept of self-government had deep roots in much of Europe, and Britain was the mother of parliaments.

What was new and central was the proclamation of the American Constitution, not on behalf of a divinity or a divinely appointed king but rather, and for the first time, in the name of “We, the People.” It is in these words that the American concept found its uniqueness. It is these words that are at the core of an American vision. It is from these words that flow our legal, social, and political principles and practices. It is from these words that we derive our extraordinary cultural vitality, the lifting force of our ideas, the progressive yeast of our society.

I would impose on you in an important way should I suggest that we have never violated our idea of ourselves. We can point to fixed times and fixed circumstances in our history when we faltered. In our most recent past, there was Watergate and there was Vietnam.

But none of these aberrations, I assert, could finally stand up to the force of “We, the People.” That force could be warped temporarily; it would not, in the longer run, yield.

We have, in fact, brought ourselves through these aberrations to today. We are able again to state that the American historical experience remains relevant to our lives. Once again we can attest to the validity of our view that man is individual, clothed in dignity and at the very center of the purposes of government. And once again, our institutions were tested and have proved to be resilient and responsive. We are, many of us, dreaming again.

I have commented briefly on the times we have faltered. But I should like to comment, again briefly, on what I regard as an extraordinarily revealing phenomenon. Perhaps you have noted it: However shrill the world’s accusations against us, however anguished the foreign note-taking of our failings, the standards used by others—in other lands—to judge us are our own. I know of no other country of which this is true. That fact, I suggest, affirms the power of our view of man.
Opportunities of Communications Technology

To my second question then—why is the world mindful of us?

Our ties to the world are unique. We are not, in the traditional sense, one people; we are many. We are not one culture; we are several. The mystique of the melting pot does not define the American experience.

Perhaps you recall what President Carter said at Notre Dame on May 22:

In ancestry, religion, color, place of origin, and cultural background, we Americans are as diverse a nation as the world has ever seen. No common mystique of blood or soil unites us. What draws us together, perhaps more than anything else, is a belief in human freedom.

This, it seems to me, explains—at least in part—why what we have tried to do at home has had such profound meaning for so many other nations and people—people to whom our common past continues to bind us—in Asia, in Africa, in Europe, in Latin America.

We are they. Many of them would be us. More of them would hope to hear the reverberations of our view of man in their societies. But something more must be said.

We cannot escape the fact that our great vitality—political and economic, cultural and military, intellectual and attitudinal—in and of itself commands international attention. Whether we will it or not, it is as much a fact as the attraction of the American ideal.

We cannot act without being seen; we cannot speak without being heard. We are seen; we are heard. Certainly the palpable international response to our view of human dignity—of human rights—is evidence of both the power and attraction of our aspirations.

In all of this, I suggest, one discerns the trails which have led us all to this moment, a special condition in the world which gives rise to a unique, perhaps historic, opportunity.

It is in part the fact that we have come through that recent domestic testing intact, even revitalized. It is in part the fact that the world is a quieter place these days. The decibel count is down. Stridency has subsided. The general climate—marred, it is true, by local thunderstorms—has undergone a subtle change.

\[2\] For the full text, see BULLETIN of June 13, 1977, p. 621. [Footnote is in the original. Carter’s speech is also printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 40.]
There is a disposition to listen—an expectancy, a hope for rational discourse, a recognition of the international character of many of our problems.

There is an acknowledgment of the need for dialogue. There is hope in the fact that the United States is once again ready to join in efforts, as President Carter said last week, “to inspire, to persuade, and to lead.”

There is, in short, a new opportunity at home and abroad. If we harness to that opportunity the wisest use of what is a communications revolution, then more of the promise can be fulfilled. That revolution in communications technology has, as never before in history, tied the world together. We interrelate more rapidly, more comprehensively, than ever before. And none of us will escape the consequences of that revolution.

You, for example, will know of events that affect your lives and your security almost instantaneously. You will have access to knowledge and background to enable you to understand and interpret those events. Each one of you will be increasingly a citizen of the world called upon to speak and act just as, in your role as citizen of community or State, you must speak and act or there can be no such thing as democracy, no such heroic figure as a free man.

There is a requirement to communicate, one which engages me professionally just as it engages you personally.

But the technology of communications carries with it a danger and a problem. The danger is that like all technologies, it is neutral—awaiting its utilization for better or worse. The problem, it seems to me, is inherent in the extraordinary volume and speed of communications which can now be generated.

In a very real sense, we live in a world of instant images. We are flooded by them. We see, but too often what we see is out of context. We read about or instantaneously view events, but they are often without perspective. They are instead the “happenings,” not what preceded them nor what is likely to follow.

In Knoxville, I would assume, you are accustomed to seeing Belgians and Japanese and Nigerians. There will be an occasional foreign movie; a newspaper headline about the Middle East; the story on the evening news about Brazil. There may be a Kabuki play from Japan; there is certainly access in your libraries to every foreign culture.

And yet how much time, how much thought can we give to any single event; how much can we immerse ourselves individually in any given international issue? Our schools, our families, our daily commitments and responsibilities, our jobs, our own personal enthusiastic all have claim to the larger part of our day and the larger part of our lives.
We cannot pretend that most of the images from around the world are more than images of the moment, no matter how they may come together over longer periods of time.

We are not alone. We share this overload of “instant image” with the entire world. If we are baffled by what we see or unclear about the meaning of what we see or simply staggered by the quantity of what we see, we are not alone.

You see the paradox. There is this moment when the world more than ever seeks dialogue. There is a technology which permits it on a scale as vast as the technology is dramatic. And yet we are, for the most part, drowning in the bits and pieces that are the instant images.

**America’s Public Diplomacy**

To recall my third question—how then do we best communicate what we know of ourselves and our hopes for the world? What can your society do to organize on your behalf a rational process of international communications?

There is a basis in our history and institutions for a process of international communications. The libertarian theory of the press, for example, was written into the Bill of Rights to guarantee a free marketplace of ideas and information. We have spoken since 1776 of “facts to a candid world” and of “a decent respect for the opinion of mankind.” Clearly, our society today must be in the *international* marketplace with the same vigor and candor and a decent respect.

Since I turn now to how our society can organize this effort, I shall speak again of “public diplomacy,” meaning those efforts through which your government enters the international market of ideas. I should like to put before you a series of principles and purposes which I think should govern such efforts.

First, we must undertake these efforts in a manner consistent with the ethics, ideals, and principles to which we ourselves aspire. We cannot be—we must not be—manipulative. To be so would, as it sometimes has in our past, prove corrosive of ourselves.

Second, in all that we project to the world we must reflect the fact that our words and actions are shaped by our view of ourselves—that is to say, shaped by the American ideal. It is the best way to bring clarity and coherence to the many and bewildering images others have of us. The American ideal forms a recognizable basis for the context of our actions.

Third, a decent respect for the opinion of mankind, today as in 1776, requires that we present our views and policies and aspirations forthrightly to the world. Not combatively, but forthrightly. Our interests require that others know where we stand. And our great presence
in the world leads others, quite spontaneously and in their own interests, to want to know.

Fourth, we should do what we can to encourage those individuals and institutions, those coalitions and “networks”—here and abroad—which are also engaged in the free flow and exchange of ideas and experiences. It is not the function of public diplomacy to compete; rather, to enhance and supplement existing efforts. They should be allowed the dignity of independence. But we can clearly help forge the institutional links—and the exchanges between them—that will contribute not only to the civility and the breadth of our mutual perceptions but to the common solutions of common problems.

Fifth, we must reach beyond ruling elites and seek out those who are the future contributors to thought and culture and leadership in their countries. Power is always transitory; sometimes it is oppressive. In any event, inherent in the nature of the communications process I am describing is the future as well as the present.

Finally, we must insist upon, we must insure, a dialogue. In so doing we strike a balance between our own most fundamental beliefs and needs and recognition of the needs, perceptions, and circumstances of others. We have been so greatly enriched by the gathering in of others—of European and Asian, African and Hispanic, Einstein and Dorati, apprentice and artist—that we are in fact ourselves a dialogue. We know it works. We know the power of listening. We should extend its realm.

From all of this, it should be eminently clear that propaganda has no place in our scheme of things, that there is nothing within us that enables us to be propagandists.

There is nothing in our history, nothing in our view of ourselves, no tradition, no value system that will permit it. To be propagandists, we would necessarily violate that which we most believe about ourselves.

If, instead, all our efforts are permeated by absolute fidelity to the American idea, then we will have joined the power of communication with the historic possibilities of the world as it is. We will have undertaken as well as we can, what must be done—to enter the open marketplace of ideas with the truth as best we can perceive it.

As Milton wrote in the Areopagitica: “Who ever knew Truth put to the worse in a free and open encounter.”

Your experiences here, which culminate in this moment of commencing, will have touched you with the power of ideas and reconfirmed the value of truth. I hope you share with me an attachment to the idea of America, a commitment to Libertarian principles, an affection for our cultural vitality. I hope some of you will join in the noble
effort to communicate to others, at home and abroad, a sense of what could be, if enough care to make it so.

58. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (Bennet) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, June 1, 1977

Hearings on USIA Reorganization

Issue for Decision

Congressman Dante Fascell’s Subcommittee on International Operations is planning a series of hearings on USIA reorganization before the July 4 recess. He has requested your appearance, preferably prior to June 15, to initiate the hearings. You would be followed by John Reinhardt and outside witnesses, to include those supporting and those opposing the Stanton and Murphy commissions’ recommendations on USIA reorganization.2 Fascell recalls having discussed this subject with you during the transition period.

Background

Because of his Subcommittee Chairmanship and personal interest in the subject, Fascell will play a leading role in Congressional considerations of any USIA reorganization plans we recommend. However, Fascell is impatient that the Administration seems not to be recognizing the importance of viewing international public diplomacy in a cohesive, coordinated fashion and addressing the possibility of reorganization on the basis of such a perception. He recognizes—in fact, he prefers—that you not appear before the Committee with a detailed reorganization plan proposal. Rather, what he hopes for is a general discussion which clearly demonstrates the concern of the Carter Administration for “public diplomacy in its full meaning”. He views USIA, including VOA, the exchange program and CU, the operations of Radio Free

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770102–1421. Confidential. Sent through Christopher and Moose; Christopher did not initial the memorandum. Drafted by Jenkins. Vance’s initials are in the lower right-hand corner of the first page of the memorandum. An unknown hand wrote “OBE 6/10/77” in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.

Europe and Radio Liberty, and our international communications policy (which is currently directed by EB and IO) as part of an overall package. Fascell would like you to appear personally to address these questions in general terms, reassuring the Committee that the Administration is taking a broad new look at the entire problem and stating some of the objectives you would like to see accomplished through this review and any subsequent reorganization proposals. These objectives in terms of Fascell’s expectations could include such things as a tightly-coordinated strategy for dealing with international communications policy questions such as satellite television transmissions, COMSAT receiver stations in underdeveloped countries, etc., a clear recognition of the distinction between international public diplomacy and domestic public diplomacy (Hodding Carter’s operation), the most rational use of our resources in cultural programming, etc. Fascell feels that the principal gap in the Administration’s present perception is in the U.S. international communications field where he believes policy is being mismanaged by the private sector and dealt with at the technical working level only in the Executive branch. He apparently also feels that the anachronism of the split between CU and USIA should be dealt with.

Joe Duffey, Dick Moose and Kempton Jenkins have all spoken with Fascell about these hearings, and he has emphasized to all that he has an open mind about the reorganization question and would not expect a detailed exposition at this appearance. This should simplify accepting his invitation prior to having a final White House-approved reorganization plan in hand before testifying.

In the Senate, you will recall Percy and McGovern sponsored a reorganization plan for State and USIA which was, in fact, a mirror image of the Stanton plan. This was adopted by McGovern’s Subcommittee but defeated in the full Committee. We, together with USIA, expressed our opposition to the McGovern/Percy proposal at that time. The Foreign Relations Committee instead adopted a general statement calling on the Administration to review existing proposals for reorganization and come up with its own recommendations by next September.

Recommendation

That you authorize us to inform Fascell that you welcome the opportunity to appear before the Committee and provide a broad policy statement of the Administration’s objectives in this field. We would work out a date with your office and Fascell’s.

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3 See footnote 2, Document 49 and footnote 5, Document 51.
4 Vance did not approve or disapprove the recommendation. Below it, Moose wrote: “Cy: I believe this is important—Dick.”
ALTERNATIVELY, that you authorize us to inform Fascell that, while you would like to make an appearance and provide a policy overview, the press of other business makes it impossible and that we would propose that Deputy Secretary Christopher appear in your stead.\(^5\)

\(^5\) Vance did not approve or disapprove the recommendation. Christopher testified before Fascell’s subcommittee on June 21; see Document 72.

59. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Reinhardt) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\(^1\)

Washington, June 1, 1977

As you and the President consider the future organization of “public diplomacy”—and as the Administration begins to prepare its FY 1979 budget proposals—I would like to raise for consideration the possibility that American public diplomacy is under-capitalized.

I do not, for the moment, have specific proposals to make. I hope the zero-base budgeting process may surface at least a few by August. On preliminary inspection, however, I am struck by the following kinds of phenomena:

—VOA must be the only serious radio in the United States which is still dependent on the vacuum tube. Solid-state technology is nowhere in evidence and the Voice must literally go to junk sales to find replacement tubes, since they are no longer being manufactured. This, of course, is quite apart from the question of signal strength, where we are clearly under-capitalized.

—I find it distressing—even given the strength of our private sector—that the richest country in the world has public funds to sponsor only 5,000 exchange and leader grantees annually. (This is, by the way, the two-way total.) The Soviets are miles ahead of us, even in some of our own “backyard” countries of Latin America. The program is clearly under-capitalized.

\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, White House Central Files, Subject File, Finance, Executive, Box FI–19, Fl 4/FG–266 1/20/77–1/20/81. No classification marking. For Brzezinski’s response, see Document 62.
—Politically and culturally, one of our strongest tools in the USSR and Eastern Europe is the splashy exhibit. We can barely afford one per year in the USSR, appear less frequently in other bloc countries and only rarely in the free world. We have the world’s most vital culture, but are not taking strategic advantage of it.

As we move to reorganize public diplomacy, and as you and the President consider resource allocation questions, these are issues I hope the Administration will have in mind. For a comparatively modest additional sum—say $50–100 million annually—we could be having a qualitatively different effect in the world. I do not see a need necessarily to broaden the spectrum of our efforts, but we could usefully intensify those programs which are agreed to be most successful.

I am sending a similar memorandum to Secretary of State Vance.2

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60. Airgram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State1

A–163

Moscow, June 7, 1977

SUBJECT
CU Country Plan

REF
(A) USIA CM 241, Attachment, Instructions for Country Plan,2 (B) Moscow 44433

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1 Source: University of Arkansas Libraries, Special Collections Division, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection (CU), MC 468, Group I: CU Organization and Administration, Series 2: Country Program Plans, Box 13, CU/EE FY 78 CPPs Unclassified, folder 22. Unclassified. Sent for information to the Consulate in Leningrad and USIA. Sent via pouch to CU/EE, EUR/SOV, Leningrad, and USIA/IEU. Drafted in P&C; cleared in P&C, ECON, SCI, and POL; approved by Matlock. A stamped notation on the airgram indicates that it was received in the Department on June 15 at 8:55 a.m.

2 Not found attached.

3 In telegram 4443 from Moscow, April 2, the Embassy transmitted part I of the 1977 Embassy PARM. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770114-0534)
PART 1. Rationale

The relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, the foremost military, political, and economic powers in the world, continues to be the top concern of U.S. foreign policy. Educational and cultural programs can contribute to reducing the potential for conflict by fostering a better comprehension on both sides. We do not as yet fully understand motives and patterns of Soviet actions such as sudden switches in domestic leadership and changes in foreign policies toward other countries. Soviet perceptions of American actions and their philosophical and pragmatic bases are likewise imperfect. The accuracy of such perceptions is a critical factor in our bilateral relations.¹

Educational and cultural contacts and exchanges can play a vital role in helping to insure that these perceptions are first-hand and from credible sources. Exchange activities offer opportunities for direct observation of the two societies and their institutions, and for direct dialogue between American and Soviet counterparts in opinion-molding circles. They also provide the framework within which in-depth studies of the culture within which domestic and foreign policies are made can be carried out. All these are consonant with the guiding principles of CU-sponsored programs (Reference A) and contribute to the environment necessary for achieving the goals expressed in the Embassy’s Assessment Report of April 2, 1977 (Reference B). During periods of correct but not cordial relations, such as have prevailed during much of the past year, the cultural channels have remained open and educational exchanges continue.

U.S.–U.S.S.R. academic exchanges *enlarge the circle of those able to serve as influential interpreters between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.* Exchanges of junior scholars for ten-month periods provide the basis for dialogue by developing a corps of highly-qualified scholars who go on to participate actively in other exchanges. They continue to conduct research, publish on the other country, and, most importantly, provide the subsequent generations of students in both countries with their basic knowledge of the other society. These exchanges, administered on the Soviet side by the Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education and on the U.S. side by the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), have come a long way in their twenty-year history. Nevertheless, there remains much to be done to assist scholars in their efforts to contribute to the important dialogue between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

¹ An unknown hand placed two vertical, parallel lines in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph.
These programs also stimulate institutional development in ways which favorably influence mutual comprehension and confidence in that past participants frequently play active and decisive roles in the establishment of new programs and contacts. For example, the Deputy Minister of Agriculture of the U.S.S.R., an early participant in the academic exchange program, was a prime moving force in the establishment last year of a Soviet-American exchange of young agricultural specialists.

Under the active leadership of its Rector who spent a year as an exchange scholar at Stanford University, Moscow State University has in the past year entered into two direct exchange agreements with American universities. Returned grantees established the American Studies Council at MGU and more recently the American Seminar which meets informally each month at Leningrad State University. Important research groups such as the USA Institute and the Institute of World Economics and International Relations also have former exchangees in key positions on their staffs.

Visits by exchange lecturers and American Specialists contribute to the exchange of information with such institutions and also open new doors, especially in Kiev, where the Advance Party for the Consulate-General has utilized them extensively to establish active contacts with local educational institutions and cultural organizations. Exchanges of such specialists have become more frequent during the past year and have moved into new areas with the strengthened link between the American Council of Learned Societies and the Academy of Sciences, which is administered by the International Research and Exchanges (IREX). The International Visitor, Multi-Regional and American Specialist programs extend into areas of bilateral interest beyond education and culture, and involve the Political, Economic and Science sections of the Embassy. Their integration into the nomination process for IV and Multi-Regional Programs and into the programming of American Specialists and Voluntary Speakers provides opportunities for strength-ening and expanding Embassy contacts in these fields while providing current information on U.S. institutions and policies to specialized Soviet participants. These activities are vital in helping to reduce impediments to intercultural exchanges of ideas and information.

It must be recognized that there are advantages for the Soviet Union in conducting mutual educational and cultural programs and exchanges. The Soviets can acquire scientific and technological knowledge in areas where they recognize weakness. They too can learn about U.S. society in order to better assess our positions and policies. By citing numbers of exchanges, they can show in the international propaganda arena how they contribute to “peaceful co-existence” and implementation of CSCE accords. They can also expand teaching of

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5 See footnote 6, Document 8.
the Russian language and Soviet culture and have stages for presenting performances by their best artists and companies.

The Soviets run certain risks as well, and these may be seen as impeding cooperation and full achievement of American goals. Through exchanges, young Soviets are exposed to influences other than those ideologically approved by the Soviet leadership. Officials are therefore reluctant to send qualified young participants—especially intellectuals, scientists, and artists—on exchanges and delegations and multi-regional programs. Instead they propose more mature, reliable scientists, scholars and artists, or none at all. This is most critical in the exchange with the Ministry of Culture of young graduate students in the performing arts. Qualified American participants have been accepted in Moscow and Leningrad conservatories but Soviet candidates to date have been in areas peripheral to the performing arts. The Embassy will continue to maintain its quota and urge the Ministry of Culture to take full advantage of its opportunity by proposing increased numbers of qualified candidates.

The ACYPL–CYO exchange of young political leaders differs somewhat from this same reluctance to send young people on exchanges. Nevertheless, this exchange is flourishing at a quickened pace. Potential leaders from each country have the opportunity to size each other up and exchange views during joint travel and seminar sessions, thus gaining valuable first-hand knowledge about the people, country and culture of the other side.

Exchanges of mayors and U.S. Governors with Soviet Republic Council Chairmen continues more haltingly. Progress on IV invitations for political leaders is so far limited to assurances that they are under consideration. New proposals such as that from the Council of State Legislatures will continue to be presented in the hope that improved bilateral relations will facilitate the travel of these influential leaders.

Cultural Presentations of music, drama, and dance continue to convey to broad Soviet audiences the message of diversity and dynamism in American culture. Increasingly they also provide additional avenues for contact through off-stage activities involving American artists and their Soviet counterparts. The recent visit to the Soviet Union by a group of American theater directors which resulted in concrete proposals for several co-productions grew out of the 1976 program of the American Conservatory Theater in the Soviet Union. Philosophical as well as esthetic values are transmitted in these activities which strengthen transnational linkages and networks of groups, communities and

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6 See Document 7.
organizations which are capable of affecting the quality and quantity of dialogue.

Difficulties with the Cultural Presentations Program stem from problems with Soviet handling of administrative arrangements and reluctance to program the more innovative American musical and dance groups and plays. Contracts are signed only after long negotiating sessions and logistical problems plague Embassy and escort officers. The Embassy is attempting, nevertheless, to meet the numerical exchange of ten groups from each side set for the 1977–79 program of the General Agreement and also to increase their impact by utilizing small groups which will perform and work with Soviet counterparts for periods of one to two months.

The special natures of conditions imposed on Embassy activities by the Soviet Government favors the use of CU resources to benefit all elements. Cultural Presentations allow other agencies to enhance relations with their Soviet professional counterparts. American Specialists and lecturers in the Educational Exchanges provide opportunities for dialogue in fields of interest to military, scientific, information, economic and political officers.

Private sector involvement is incorporated into some projects listed under CU/EE goals and the Embassy wholeheartedly endorses CU/EE’s continuing efforts to encourage private funding for direct institutional exchanges related to Embassy and CU objectives. Seed money and sustaining funds for maintaining the international aspect of objective-related exchanges are often the minor contributions essential for successful administration of these programs.

The Soviet Union, for reasons of its own, contributes the major financial portion of many programs by underwriting international travel for Soviet participants and in-country costs of American participants. The general rule of “sending side pays international travel”, established for exchanges under the General Agreement, also applies to International Visitor grantees and participants in Multi-Regional Projects.

PART II—Attached

Cost estimates for grants-in-aid are not included because such expenditures are well documented in CU/EE.

Matlock

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7 Reference is to the General Agreement on Contacts, Exchanges and Cooperation, signed on June 19, 1973, at the Washington Summit.
MEMORANDUM

FROM THE ASSOCIATE PRESS SECRETARY (SCHECTER) 
TO THE PRESIDENT'S ASSISTANT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS 
(BRZEZINSKI)

WASHINGTON, JUNE 7, 1977

SUBJECT
USIA/NSC COORDINATION

The USIA/NSC coordination meeting this morning included an agenda of the following items:

1. USIA's survey division is offering an analysis of our CSCE tactics and strategy as perceived in Europe over the summer. Such an analysis, to be available by late August, could help us in planning how to proceed at the Belgrade Conference in September. USIA would like to consult with Hunter and Tuchman on the kind of questions to be asked in the survey. They are also offering surveys on major upcoming issues if we provide two or three months lead time.

2. USIA is offering a briefing on the Voice of America (VOA); how it functions, how it can help, and what are off limits. Thomas Tuch, Acting Director of VOA, will provide a briefing of 10–15 minutes and then answer questions. I suggest you consider having him brief at an NSC staff meeting. We could do the whole thing in one-half hour at the most.

3. USIA is participating in the human rights PRM with special emphasis on its communications role and will have a copy of its study to the NSC by June 15.

4. NSC briefings for USIA policy guidance are continuing. Bob Hormats is scheduled on CIEC this week and we hope to get Mike Armacost on Asia, South Korea, and Vietnam next week.

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1 Source: Carter Library, White House Central Files, Subject File, Federal Government, United States Information Agency, Executive, Box FG–210, FG–266 1/20/77–1/20/81. No classification marking. Sent for action. Inderfurth initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.

2 The Belgrade Conference was scheduled to take place in October, rather than September.

3 See Document 67.

4 Under a June 12 memorandum to Bray, Schecter transmitted copies of the corrected transcripts for Hunter and Tuchman’s June 2 briefing on CSCE and human rights, Armacost’s June 16 briefing on East Asian affairs, and Pastor’s June 23 briefing on Latin American affairs. (National Archives, RG 306, Office of the Director, Executive Secretariat, Secretariat Staff, Correspondence Files, 1973–1980, Entry P–104, Box 129, 7702700–7702709)
RECOMMENDATION:

That you agree to a briefing for the NSC staff by Thomas Tuck on the VOA to be given at an NSC staff meeting.\(^5\)

\(^5\) Brzezinski underlined “Thomas Tuck [Tuch]” and “NSC staff meeting” and drew a line from Tuch’s name to the bottom margin and wrote “how many minutes? Is it worthwhile?” Brzezinski did not approve or disapprove the recommendation.

62. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to the Director of the United States Information Agency (Reinhardt)\(^1\)

Washington, June 9, 1977

SUBJECT

Higher Outlays for Information Programs

REFERENCE

Your Memorandum of 1 June 1977\(^2\)

You make some very good points about undercapitalization of VOA underspending on other aspects of our government information programs. These programs have all tended to mark time in recent years and now need new initiative.

I recommend you develop specific plans for full modernization of VOA, for expansion of exchange and leader programs, for exhibits in Communist countries and elsewhere and build them into the 1979 budget planning process as soon as possible. It will be easier to get approval for these expenditures in both the Executive Branch and from Congress if we put them in the framework of a new thrust in the field of public diplomacy which the President endorses.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, White House Central Files, Subject File, Finance, Executive, Box FI–19, FI 4/FG–266 1/20/77–1/20/81. No classification marking.

\(^2\) See Document 59.
63. **Statement by the Director of the United States Information Agency (Reinhardt) Before the Subcommittee on International Operations of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee**

Washington, June 9, 1977

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:

I am pleased to be here this morning at your invitation to participate in your discussions of international communications questions. For most of my career I have been personally interested in this field and officially involved in the practice and the theory of international communications.

In thinking about how to start my presentation I recalled a few sentences from the speech the Soviets did not allow Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn to deliver several years ago when he was awarded the Nobel Prize. He said: “Mankind has become one . . . not steadfastly one as communities or even nations used to be, not united through years of mutual experiences . . . not yet through a common native language—but surpassing all barriers, one nevertheless through international broadcasting and printing.” At the same time, he continued, we know that “suppression of information leads to atrophy and total destruction.”

I quote these few lines because to me they epitomize the challenge for the future and, at the same time, the threat facing us if we do not meet this challenge. Certainly we agree that the continuing free flow of information and the potential of today’s communication revolution to serve the needs of humanity is a matter of utmost urgency and importance. So I am extremely pleased at this Committee’s initiative, and I am pleased as Director of the Agency charged with explaining abroad the policies and culture of the United States, to participate in these discussions.

Since the very beginnings of our history as an independent nation we have had the strongest commitment to the maintenance of the right

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of free speech for all. And we continue to follow most fervently this
commitment to the fundamental right of every individual to seek,
receive, and impart information and ideas through any medium and
regardless of frontiers. Today more than ever before, this reaffirmation
is important because, on the one hand, the major developments in
communication technology have produced an information explosion
the potential of which is dazzling and, on the other hand, because we
are encountering unprecedented attacks on this basic philosophy.

Some of the dimensions of the revolution in technology are almost
beyond comprehension. Coaxial cables capable of 10,800 channels each
are soon to be replaced by millimeter waveguide systems of ultra-short
frequency which will carry up to 250,000 channels. Compounding the
increase in the number of channels with the increase in the capacity
each channel means that the capacity to transmit “bits” of informa-
tion per second per channel will jump from 648 million in a coaxial
cable to 15 billion in new systems. And when laser systems now on
the drawing board or already in preliminary testing come into opera-
tion, the figure may jump to 100 billion.

These technologies enable the mass of human knowledge to be
indexed, stored, retrieved, transmitted and shared by people all over
the world. Wisely used, such information systems can accelerate devel-
lopment in the poorest countries. Potentially, today’s technology can
afford new levels of educational and cultural enrichment to the earth’s
inhabitants. More profound and widespread understanding among
peoples must inevitably flow as another consequence of the fulfillment
of this communication revolution.

With this enormous potential so obvious to us, with our back-
ground, education and traditions of free speech going back to Thomas
Jefferson and the Bill of Rights, with the United Nations incorporating
commitments on the free and open exchange of ideas in its Universal
Declaration of Human Rights,\(^3\) it is difficult for Americans to compre-
prehend, let alone be concerned with the mounting criticisms of these
concepts in recent years. Yet these criticisms are coming from several
quarters and are based on different arguments.

From our ideological adversaries comes the argument that infor-
mation and communication are not only “sovereign rights,” but monop-
olies of the state. They hold this position, we believe, because they
recognize the power of information in maintaining control over their
populations, and contrariwise the power of outside, uncontrolled infor-
mation. From their beginnings, they have been aware of the importance
of mass media but most recently as they have promoted the idea of

\(^3\) See footnote 7, Document 26.
detente abroad, they have intensified their internal struggle against what they choose to label “reactionary bourgeois ideology” but which, in effect means the Western ideal of freedom of thought, freely expressed. This, despite the solemn pledge of all signatories to the Final Act at Helsinki, in 1975, to “facilitate the freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds.” As we believe that free speech is democracy’s chief weapon against tyranny, so do the leaders of these totalitarian states believe that control of free speech is a vital weapon in preserving their structure.

In promoting this objective the Soviets and their allies have taken full advantage of the recent flood of conferences dealing with international communications. In the past year or so there have been such meetings of the Non-Aligned countries in Tunis, in Mexico City, in New Delhi and in Colombo; there was a series of regional UNESCO meetings and the UNESCO General Conference at Nairobi; the meeting in Geneva of the World Administrative Radio Conference (WARC) of the International Telecommunications Union, and the continuing discussions of sub-groups of the United Nations Outer Space Committee. This rapid conjunction of meetings has brought into urgent focus the need for the United States to examine this issue carefully and comprehensively and to formulate a policy and an agenda for addressing it in the months ahead.

The Soviet concept of “sovereign rights” has been supported at some of these international meetings by non-communist states for non-ideological reasons. Thus, at last January’s WARC meeting, Western European, African and Asian nations voted with the Soviet bloc to allocate fixed frequency and orbital slots for each ITU member nation outside the Western Hemisphere. The United States argued unsuccessfully that satellite technology was new and that any proposal for developing firm allocations now would freeze technology too soon. The net effect of this action everywhere except in the Western Hemisphere will be to deny the use of satellites for international television transmissions.

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4 See footnote 6, Document 8.
5 References are to the Non-Aligned Symposium on Information, which took place in Tunis, March 26–30, 1976; a seminar sponsored by the Latin American Institute for Transnational Studies and the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation on The Role of Information in the New International Order, which took place in Mexico City, May 24–28, 1976; the Conference of Ministerial-level Government Representatives and Heads of News Agencies of the Non-Aligned Countries, which took place in New Delhi, July 8–13, 1976; and the Non-Aligned Movement summit, which took place in Colombo, August 16–19, 1976.
6 October 26–November 30, 1976.
7 Reference is to the World Administrative Radio Conference for the Planning of the Broadcasting Satellite Service (WARC SAT 77), which took place in Geneva, January 10–February 13.
unless prior consent is given by the intended recipient and by all other countries that may be affected technically.

The reason for the positive vote by the Soviet orbit countries was, without doubt, ideological; some other nations, particularly in Western Europe, simply needed right now a rational plan for the efficient use of frequencies because of the technical problems they were facing. And still other nations—those in the Third World—used this forum, as they have been using every other one, to battle against what they have begun to call the “cultural imperialism” of the developed world.

Leaders and intellectuals in these Third World countries have indicated they recognize the pitfalls of government control of information media, and that the Soviet Union may be exploiting the legitimate complaints of the Third World for its own ideological ends. These leaders are, nevertheless, disturbed by and angry at the near monopoly the developed world has in supplying the books they read, the TV and movie films they watch, the news stories they read, and even the foreign universities they must attend for much of their higher learning. In such a situation, according to the ministers of information of the non-aligned countries meeting in New Delhi last year, “freedom of information really comes to mean the freedom of these few to propagate information in the manner of their choosing.”

This imbalance exists and because we are concerned that all peoples should have the opportunity to share in the potential benefits of modern mass communication, we have pledged our determination to help develop and increase two-way communication among peoples. This must be done in a way that preserves the independence and fruitful diversity of sources of all information. Let us not fool ourselves, however, into thinking that we can ever completely effectuate a balance. But we can understand, we can sympathize and we can take action.

The most effective way to reduce this imbalance in the two-way communication flow is not to choke off with control the communications capacity of some, but to increase the communications capacity of all. I said this last year at the UNESCO Conference in Nairobi, Kenya, where I had the honor to head the American delegation. I was speaking to a resolution which would have had the effect of sharply curtailing the international flow of news. Eventually enough nations came to realize that passage of this resolution might not be in their long-term interest and so, instead, they voted to call for strengthening the information and communications systems of the developing world. The United

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States and other nations pledged assistance to help the developing world in this endeavor. These pledges helped gain passage of the resolution. Now we must make good on these pledges—because the ideological offensive has only been blunted, not broken, and other nations may look more favorably on these ideas unless they see real progress toward redressing the imbalance. More important, however, than simply winning a point ideologically is the need to keep faith with our own basic morality and principles. We must act if we are serious about the importance of utilizing communications resources to their potential, if we believe that what we are doing for mankind is the measure of our endeavor in human rights and the legacy we will enhance for future generations.

Actually the process of bridging the communications gap has already begun and in some areas is advancing at a rapid rate. For example, more than half the Non-Aligned countries have Intelsat earth stations. Many of them are connected by telex. India lists 71 non-aligned with which it can communicate and Kenya lists 67.

At the Nairobi UNESCO meeting, I repeated the willingness of the United States to continue to share its knowledge and expertise regarding communication facilities available for experimental undertakings. For example, as a result of our supplying India with the use of the U.S. ATS–6 (Applications Technology Satellite) communications system, India was able to conduct a year-long program on agricultural techniques, family planning and hygiene, instruction, and occupational skills.

India is now planning to build its own satellite. Indonesia plans to use satellites to connect its 50 major islands and 20 Arab nations hope to establish a satellite network. Brazil has plans to link 1,000 of its widely scattered communities by space satellites. But despite these developments, many nations are just entering the twentieth century in communications terms. At Nairobi, I further stated that the United States and other nations with highly developed mass media should endeavor to make available, through bilateral and multilateral channels, both governmental and private assistance to other states in helping to develop their mass media. We suggested that UNESCO itself should join in these efforts.

In fact, the United States Government and private groups in this country have been engaged in journalism training programs for some years. Between 1970 and 1974, some 1,137 media specialists from Africa, the Near East, East Asia and Latin America have come to America for training under grants provided by the State Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. The Department of Agriculture has sponsored an annual program to bring 40 specialized journalists to the United States for training which includes on-the-job experience on
newspapers in the mid-west. At Macalester College in St. Paul, Minnesota, the World Press Institute has trained over 200 foreign journalists and many Third World journalists have studied at Harvard University under the Nieman Fellowship program.\footnote{In the late 1930s, President of Harvard University James Bryant Conant used a $1 million bequest from Agnes Wahl Nieman to establish the Nieman Fellowship, a sabbatical program for journalists.} My own Agency, USIA, which administers the State Department Educational and Cultural programs abroad, maintains a press center in New York and another here in Washington to assist foreign newspeople, many of them from the developing area.

I am pleased to be able to report to you that just a few weeks ago America’s leading newspaper executives began translating the U.S. pledge of assistance to developing nations into action. At the April meeting of the American Newspaper Publishers Association, Mr. Clayton Kilpatrick, editor of the Chicago Tribune and a valued member of the American delegation to the Nairobi UNESCO meeting, announced formation of a World Press Freedom Development Committee to bring news media people from developing countries into closer contact with newsmen in developed countries.\footnote{During his April 25 address at the ANPA annual convention in San Francisco, Kirkpatrick stated: “The techniques tested at Nairobi should be employed in the coming struggle for free communication. We need a missionary effort. We need a sympathetic understanding of national aspirations. We need to be tough when we have to.” (“Editors’ group acts on world press curbs,” \textit{Chicago Tribune}, April 26, 1977, p. 2)} Among special goals of the new group is creation of a manpower pool of experts in all phases of publishing and broadcasting who would be available to assist press and electronic media in Third World countries. The Committee also plans to assess the technical needs of developing media and to channel to them available equipment.

And just two weeks ago the UPI Broadcasting Advisory Board resolved at its annual meeting to participate in any professional effort to insure the free flow of news, including technical and editorial assistance.

The effectiveness of this kind of action might be inferred from the sharp attack on the Press Freedom Committee just a few weeks ago by the official Soviet TASS news agency. In response, Mr. George Beebe, associate publisher of the Miami Herald said: “The Soviet Government has shown once more that it is fearful of any challenge between a free press and a controlled press such as exists in Russia.”

The formation of the World Press Freedom Development Committee is the kind of positive action we favor—a happy augury, I hope, of the balanced and principled approach that will be taken to address these problems. There are many other possibilities for helping redress...
the imbalance. My colleague at Nairobi and here today, William Harley, and one of my predecessors as head of the United States Information Agency, Leonard Marks, have proposed a number of exciting activities and projects in this context which I am sure you will want to hear about and discuss.

Suffice it to say, there is need for the United States to continue to enunciate its basic policy in favor of the free flow of information to people the world over, to illustrate the dangers of government control of information and to take positive action to help those with legitimate grievances. We cannot relax.

I was asked this morning specifically to address two subjects in my presentation—the Third World News Agency and international radio. At Colombo, Sri Lanka, last year some 85 nations formally agreed to a three-year-old proposal to form a News Agencies Pool wherein they would share selected news items from each other’s national news agencies. The objective, in their words, was to “achieve the broad and free circulation among themselves of news, information reports, features and photographs about each other, and also provide objective and authentic information relating to Non-Aligned countries to the rest of the world.” It is too early to evaluate where the Pool is going but if I may, I would like to summarize for you a few conclusions drawn from a survey of this subject just completed by a USIA officer at the Senior Officers Seminar.

The political declaration which led to formation of the News Agencies Pool referred to the fact that the majority of the Non-Aligned countries are now “passive recipients of biased, inadequate and distorted information.” The survey looked at the news distribution patterns of the three leading international news agencies. They show that some three-quarters of all the developing countries, rather than being passive recipients, are in a position to screen news items before relaying them to end-users. And even in some of the remaining countries, where news services are sold directly to the media, there are press controls of one kind or another. The survey also shows that while there may be an imbalance in the news flow, the charge that international news agencies are biased in favor of their home governments and serve their political and economic aims is debatable. In regard to the Pool itself, the survey found it to be operating reasonably well, although just seven nations were contributing most of the Pool’s content. The survey noted that almost half the Pool’s output had high or medium potential for placement in Western media and that the Pool’s contents contained “surprisingly little overt bias as far as the United States is concerned. Even more surprising is that of the nine percent of the stories found to have a bias, four percent were in favor of the United States.”

In addressing the subject of international radio broadcasting, may I start with a few statistics: Well over one hundred million people
around the world listen daily to broadcasts emanating from a foreign government radio station. Other statistics on international broadcasting are of similar breathtaking magnitude. Some 80 countries broadcast to the people of other countries daily and they transmit over 21,000 hours of broadcasting weekly. Some 17 nations each broadcast over 300 hours weekly.

The Soviet Union is the world’s most prolific international broadcaster. It transmits beyond its borders almost 2,000 hours of programs each week in 84 languages. The USSR is followed by the Peoples Republic of China, Egypt and then the Voice of America, which broadcasts 788 and a half hours of programming each week in 37 languages. (If one includes Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty this total is 1,809 hours weekly.) We are followed closely by the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of China, the BBC, North Korea and Albania. The six other Warsaw Pact nations are broadcasting almost 1,500 hours each week.

It can thus be seen that international broadcasting has become an important element in foreign policy implementation by many nations. The United States has long felt that it is of vital importance to our security and to the structure of peace to be able to continue communicating our policies, ideals and traditions of free information to the peoples of the world. The Voice of America, operating under a Congressionally approved mandate, broadcasts international news comprehensively and objectively, tells the story of American society and culture in all its diversity and explains U.S. foreign policy with a non-polemical approach. Particularly important is our broadcasting to the USSR and Eastern Europe where censorship and controlled media give the peoples of the area distorted or inadequate views of the United States, of crucial events within their own countries and in the world.

Whereas totalitarian leaders can in one way or another either stop at their borders, or selectively admit or control, other media of communication, international radio, unless it is jammed, goes directly into a listener’s home. There is heavy jamming in the USSR and in certain East European countries of Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe. Broadcasts by the Voice of America, however, seem at this time to be reluctantly accepted by these governments as an official activity of the American Government.

This does not prevent them from sharply attacking all three organizations. What has particularly irked the Soviet and East European leaders is coverage of news developments regarding human rights and dissident activities in their countries. They have construed this coverage—in which the United States has been joined by other Western radios—as an ideological attack on their system, interference in their internal affairs and an attempt to embarrass them at the upcoming
meetings in Belgrade dealing with implementation of the Final Act of the 1975 Helsinki meeting. In considering these charges, I would like to quote that section of the Final Act covering radio. It says: “The participating States note the expansion in the dissemination of information broadcast by radio and express the hope for the continuation of this process, so as to meet the interest of mutual understanding among peoples and the aims set forth by this conference.” We believe that our broadcasts have been and are fully consistent with the spirit and the letter of this statement.

As you know, President Carter recently publicly enunciated his support for the VOA, Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe by asking Congress to appropriate funds for increasing their transmitter capacity. At the time he made his request, the President said these stations have been for many years a vital part of the lives of the people of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. While no reliable figures are available—since no surveys in these communist countries can be taken—our estimate is that VOA listenership in this area is in the tens of millions daily. An interesting sidelight to this issue is the number of listeners in the United States to Radio Moscow broadcasts. An American social scientist estimated several years ago in the magazine Public Opinion Quarterly that despite an excellent signal throughout the evening hours, Radio Moscow has an audience of only two million listeners in the United States.

In terms of comparative worldwide listening, survey data in those areas where we have been able to take surveys, plus well-informed estimates, place total Soviet international radio listenership in the range of 15 to 24 million. Data and estimates put VOA’s weekly listenership at perhaps 70 million. RFE and RL listenership is estimated to be similarly impressive, perhaps as many as 50 million listeners weekly.

In terms of VOA’s impact there are many illustrations I might cite: Visitors to major USIA exhibits in the Soviet Union frequently report learning about them only through VOA promotional broadcasts, which often led them to travel thousands of miles to the exhibit site. Letters sent to Willis Conover who has been Master of Ceremonies for VOA’s “Jazz USA” program for many years indicate he is as well known in the USSR as any other single American. When VOA broadcast the
complete Charter 77 text, listeners in Czechoslovakia wrote to say that they had learned what the Charter contained only from hearing it on VOA.

The normal conduct of international affairs, President Carter told the Organization of American States last April, requires communication with all countries of the world.

Whether it is to these people in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, or the leaders of nations around the globe and their peoples, the VOA is a most effective element in America's public diplomacy, a channel through which we can not only tell our story but also can speak freely about human rights and American values directly to the people of the world. It is a vital instrument in the conduct of American foreign policy.

13 Reference is to a January 1977 document signed by about 300 Czechoslovakians, petitioning the Government of Czechoslovakia to guarantee the rights accorded to them by the Czechoslovak Constitution; international covenants on civil and political and economic, social, and cultural rights; and the Helsinki Final Act. On January 26, the Department of State’s Director of the Office of Press Relations Frederick Z. Brown read a statement to news correspondents, which stated, in part, "All signatories of the Helsinki Final Act are pledged to promote, respect, and observe human rights and fundamental freedoms for all. We must strongly deplore the violation of such rights and freedoms wherever they occur." (Department of State Bulletin, February 21, 1977, p. 154)

14 See footnote 2, Document 38.

64. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter

Washington, June 13, 1977

SUBJECT
Reorganization of State-USIA Relations

In the light of your commitment to government reorganization and of the continuing congressional interest in our information and cultural
programs, I have considered what, if any, organizational changes might be necessary to improve the conduct of the country’s public diplomacy. As you are aware, this issue has been the subject of studies by a number of groups over several years.

The studies have identified five principal functions within public diplomacy: (1) “Policy information” is disseminated by USIA to provide overseas missions with background and policy guidance on current issues. (2) “Policy advice” involves the analysis of foreign opinion with a view to its implications for US policies and programs. (3) “Cultural exchange” is managed by the State Department at home and by USIA overseas. (4) “General information” consists of media and other activities abroad to project American society. (5) The Voice of America provides the medium for broadcasting the news, depicting American culture and influencing foreign attitudes in directions favorable to US foreign policy goals.

The Department has concluded a study of the full range of organizational possibilities, including:

—maintaining the status quo;
—adopting the recommendations made by a 1975 panel headed by Frank Stanton which would abolish USIA, move that Agency’s policy information and advisory functions into the State Department, create a new Information and Cultural Agency to handle USIA’s general information and cultural programs, and give VOA independent status.2
—giving the Voice of America independent status while leaving USIA otherwise intact;
—shifting the State Department’s exchange of persons program to USIA, while giving that Agency a relationship to the Department comparable to that of either ACDA or AID.

After a detailed analysis of these various alternatives, I have concluded that the optimum solution would be to consolidate State Department exchange programs and USIA programs in a relationship to this Department similar to that of the Agency for International Development. I have come to this conclusion for the following reasons:

—To maintain the status quo would cause us to lose an opportunity to correct a long-standing organizational defect and to improve foreign policy guidance in our information programs;
—I concur with the findings of all of the studies of our public diplomacy that all cultural exchange activities should be consolidated in one agency. The combining of functions now carried out by the State Department at home and by USIA overseas would simplify communi-
cations and facilitate broad program operations involving both exchange of persons and media products. On balance, I believe the risks (such as a possible reduction in the Department’s influence over the exchange program and greater congressional resistance to funding exchanges) would be minimized if USIA programs were brought into a new relationship with the Department, comparable to that of AID, and if we maintain the exchange programs’ present organizational and budgetary autonomy;

—With regard to the locus of the policy information and policy advice functions, I see significant disadvantages in the Stanton Panel proposal that these programs be split out from general information activities. The various information activities complement one another, and to fragment them would result in weakened programs and less effective coordination;

—To establish an independent Voice of America would aggravate the present tendency of Voice of America to act outside established policy. An independent Voice of America would make difficult effective guidance by the Department. I am not persuaded that VOA would gain in credibility through organizational independence—a contention of the Stanton report and Senator Percy. VOA’s bureaucratic status in Washington would be meaningless to an overseas audience.

—As to the organizational relationship between the Department and the new USIA, we considered the models presented by ACDA—an independent agency under the direction of the Secretary of State—and AID—an agency within the Department of State. In my judgment, a relationship on the AID model is preferable. The present USIA, like AID, has a world-wide range of operational activities which are complementary to the basic mission of the Department of State. Under an AID-like relationship we will be better able to integrate the conduct of public diplomacy with traditional diplomacy, and to achieve greater efficiency in our international information and cultural operational activities.

In sum I propose that we move in the direction of consolidation, rather than fragmentation, in the organization of our public diplomacy resources. Clear policy guidance is essential, and the integrity of news and cultural programs must be protected.

Diagrams of present and proposed organizational relationships are attached.\(^3\)

\(^3\) Not found attached. The undated diagrams “Proposed Structure for the Reorganized Public Diplomacy Agency,” “Present Structure USIA,” and “Present Structure Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State” are all attached to an undated memorandum from Brzezinski to the President, transmitting a copy of Vance’s letter. (Carter Library, White House Central Files, Subject File, Federal Government, United States Information Agency, Executive, Box FG–210, FG 266 1/20/77–1/20/81)
During the course of the summer we will be examining each of the State and USIA activities involved in this reorganization. During that review we would consider the current mission of these programs, whether any present activities should be reduced, eliminated or expanded, and also whether there should be a change in the name of the agency through which our public diplomacy is conducted.

Important congressional issues remain, and before proceeding further on this question, I would like your approval on the course of action outlined above.

The Fascell Subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee has begun a series of hearings on public diplomacy and the State-USIA relationship. Deputy Secretary Christopher will testify June 21. Also, related hearings on international communications have been held by the McGovern Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee. A Senate sponsored amendment to the Department’s pending authorization bill would call for a report on these issues in October.

If you agree, I would propose that we outline in the forthcoming House hearings the issues discussed above, and the general direction of our thinking. We would describe the reasoning as our own, and make it clear that no final decisions or detailed plans have been made. We would then seek the Committee’s views and undertake on behalf of the Administration to give them appropriate consideration in the development of our reorganization program.

Recommendation:

That you approve the course of action described above.

4 See Document 72.
6 Ibid.
7 The President did not approve or disapprove the recommendation. Below it, he wrote: "Cy—This is a decision I would prefer to make—without having to contravene an interim ‘decision’ by the Congress—J."
65. Memorandum From Paul Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\(^1\)

Washington, June 15, 1977

SUBJECT
Reorganization of USIA, etc.

Secretary Vance has submitted his recommendations\(^2\) to the President on reorganization of USIA. They are good. State CU, according to this plan, will be amalgamated with a restructured USIA, but the whole entity (perhaps renamed) would be subordinated to State after the pattern of AID. VOA remains part of USIA as it is now, but would of course end up in a closer relationship to State. These recommendations represent a rejection of most of the Stanton Report\(^3\) and are welcome from this viewpoint. My only quarrel is with the subordination of the revised USIA to State.\(^4\) It is to the advantage of the White House to retain its present status as an independent agency, which it has been since 1953. No former USIA director has advocated its amalgamation into State and many Congressmen and Senators take a dim view of this proposition. I have summed up these views in the attached memorandum from you to the President (Tab I).\(^5\)

At lunch today I discussed all these matters in detail with John Reinhardt. The main advocate at State of subordination, he says, is Assistant Secretary for Cultural Affairs Duffy. Reinhardt prefers independent status, as now, but is prepared to compromise on a relationship with State like that of ACDA. He is very pleased, by the way, at the growing relationship between USIA and the NSC Staff and wishes to expand it.\(^6\)

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\(^2\) See Document 64.

\(^3\) See footnote 3, Document 1.

\(^4\) Aaron underlined the portion of this sentence beginning with “My” and ending with “quarrel.”

\(^5\) Attached but not printed is an undated memorandum from Brzezinski to the President. The memorandum includes handwritten corrections and additions made by both Brzezinski and Aaron.

\(^6\) In his June 15 Evening Report to Brzezinski, Henze elaborated on his luncheon meeting with Reinhardt: “He [Reinhardt] wants USIA to keep its independent status but will put up hard fight to do so only if he is sure of your backing. He says that Congressmen and Senators who are interested in USIA practically all favor amalgamation of State CU into it, as Vance memo proposes.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special (Henze), Box 5, Evening Reports File: 2–6/77)
RECOMMENDATION
That you send the attached memorandum at Tab I to the President.  

Brzezinski did not approve or disapprove the recommendation. Below it, Inderfurth wrote: “I’ve bracketed one sentence I would delete. RI. P.S. This is needed by June 20 at the latest.” Aaron wrote “Why? DA” in the right-hand margin and drew an arrow from it to Inderfurth’s initials.

66. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, June 16, 1977

Zbig,

This memo from Vance gives me real heartburn. It misses the entire point of the problem of USIA, which is that its information programs are totally out of date, obsolete and overstaffed.

On the cultural side, I disagree with Paul Henze. CU and Joe Duffey are going to be far more creative and far more aggressive in pursuing a cultural contact than USIA has ever been. In fact, the whole trend in USIA has been to throttle their more creative younger officers. One example of this is the fact that they have been shutting down cultural centers across Europe. Since Europe is the one area of the world undergoing the most important and fundamental political changes from the standpoint of our security, and since these cultural centers are our best source of access to the younger generation of intellectually alert people in Europe, USIA’s actions on this score are a typical example of what you will get if they continue to operate independently.

The Stanton report was based on the assumption that USIA’s information programs are largely obsolete. I happen to agree with that assumption. If USIA is supposed to continue these operations they should be required to justify them on a zero-based budget arrangement.

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 17, State: 6/77. Confidential. A notation in an unknown hand in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum reads: “Paul Henze—Staff D.A. comments as well (per D.A.) ZB has not yet seen.”

2 See Document 64.

3 See footnote 3, Document 1.
I believe the memorandum to the President should be rewritten so as to stress the inadequacies of the memo with the view towards having Vance’s reorganization study identify certain personnel reduction targets in streamlining. Unless we do that now, we are just going to recreate the old monster.

David Aaron

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4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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67. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Reinhardt) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)

Washington, June 16, 1977

SUBJECT

USIA Human Rights Action Proposals

In response to your memorandum of May 30,2 I am attaching USIA’s Human Rights Action Plan. Our objective is to insure that our programs fully support U.S. policy. We will refine our efforts as the Department develops its own regional and country-specific plans this summer.

Our Deputy Director, Charles Bray, will be the USIA representative on the Department’s Human Rights Coordinating Group, at least through the early stages of the effort and until the organization of public diplomacy is clearer.

While we advance a large number of programmatic ideas in the attached, we are sensitive to the need to assure that they are carefully attuned to the evolution of global policy and specific-country situations.

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I plan to send copies of the attached proposal to Public Affairs Officers in selected countries abroad where human rights is a sensitive issue. Not only do I want their comments on the proposal itself but I want them to begin thinking now about specific plans for USIS support of the Department’s human-rights plan for their country.

Attachment

Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the United States Information Agency (Bray) to all USIA Public Affairs Officers

Washington, June 17, 1977

Dear PAO:

I am enclosing, for your information and comments, the USIA Human Rights Action Proposals which we submitted to the State Department last week.

I do not, of course, have to tell you the salience of this subject in current and future Agency program efforts. The President has made clear, in both words and actions, the importance he has assigned to human rights as a continuing factor in our relations with other countries.

Thanks largely to your good efforts, USIA is already playing an important role in explicating the Administration’s policies and actions on human rights to overseas audiences. As you will see, we plan to broaden our activities considerably in the future, in coordination with the State Department and other agencies.

The enclosed document is, for the present, a proposal—not an action plan. However, I want to emphasize that it represents, in broad outline, both the objectives and the operating philosophy we want applied to the Agency’s approach to human rights activities. As the proposals make clear, human rights will be dealt with as an integral element in all Agency output. Our information and cultural programs should reflect U.S. commitment to the subject, whether or not “human rights” is the subject of the particular film, or seminar or press release you are dealing with. Human rights will be treated as a process whose objectives should be considered in terms of results over the next decade.

3 Confidential.
4 Reference is presumably to Carter’s March 17 UN address (see footnote 4, Document 21), and his speech to Notre Dame on May 22 (see footnote 2, Document 57).
This is the framework in which I want you to consider the enclosed proposals. In drafting the document, IOP had invaluable help from your area office as well as from the media elements. Now I want your candid comments on the plan as it relates to specific conditions at your post. In particular, I want you to address the following points:

1. Critique of the overall objectives, themes and treatment sections of the draft proposals. Is the overall balance within each of these sections right? What do they imply for programs at your post?

2. Usefulness of Washington-produced “global” products and projects mentioned in the plan to your specific country program. Do you have any further suggestions for products that would be useful to you?

3. What kinds of projects or processes are implied for your post (e.g., coalition-building efforts, seminars, exchanges, etc.)? The attached is product-oriented; we need to take the next step, and have a working group which would benefit by your thoughts.

4. Specific recommendations for programs that other agencies might undertake which would reinforce USIS public diplomacy efforts in this field. This involves actions both at the Washington level and at your Mission.

This last point relates to your relationship to other Mission elements in developing a coordinated human rights action plan for your country. The Department is currently in the process of developing country-by-country proposals for submission to each Ambassador in draft form. You will, I hope, be very much involved in the Country Team responses to the Department’s draft proposals once they are sent to the field. My main purpose in sending along the Agency’s proposals to you is to get you thinking about your contribution, at both the policy and operational level, in this Country Team effort. I suggest that you may want to share the Agency proposals with the Ambassador and/or other Mission officials with human rights responsibilities.

I look forward to receiving your comments on the attached paper. They should be sent directly to me. Unless there are strong mitigating circumstances—personnel transfers, for instance—I would like to get your initial comments by July 30.

Sincerely,

Charles W. Bray III
Deputy Director
Enclosure

Paper Prepared in the United States Information Agency\(^5\)

Washington, undated

USIA HUMAN RIGHTS ACTION PROPOSALS
—objectives, themes, treatment—

The purpose of the USIA plan of action is to organize Agency resources for a sustained effort in the human rights field. This plan will be coordinated with the Department’s human rights plans for individual countries as they are developed.

Salient features of the Agency proposals are:

A. Objectives

The basic objective of the plan is to advance human rights. Special attention will be given to:

—Increasing global understanding of, and support for, US policies relating to human rights;

—Strengthening understanding of the universality of basic human rights as defined in the UN Charter and the UN Declaration of Human Rights;

—Providing support and encouragement, where appropriate, to individuals and groups abroad who are actively involved in promoting human rights;

—Creating an international atmosphere more conducive to extending and promoting human rights;

—Describing challenges and responses to human rights issues in the United States.

B. Themes

The following broad thematic categories will be given major emphasis:

—The policies of the Administration reflect historic American concerns.

—The American record in strengthening human rights, while imperfect has relevance to similar efforts in other nations.

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\(^5\) Confidential.
—Human rights are a multilateral concern. Positive achievements within individual countries can reinforce each other in assuring a more humane world order.

—Human rights include economic and social as well as political rights.

C. Treatment

Human rights are an integral part of Agency information output, not the subject of a separate “public relations” campaign.

Programming will be reasoned rather than strident. It will emphasize human rights achievements but will not hesitate to address repressive practices by foreign governments.

In coverage of U.S. human rights developments, our case will benefit in the long run by balanced reporting of both achievements and continuing problems.

Posts will evaluate local perceptions of human rights and take these factors into consideration in their programs on this subject.

While bilateral efforts will be made to foster human rights in special cases, multilateral approaches may stand better chances for success.

In USIA programming, care will be taken to assure that human rights are considered in the overall context of U.S. political, economic and social goals.

USIA will be sensitive to the fact that, in some instances, human rights can be advanced more effectively through quiet diplomacy than through appeal to public opinion.

The following are specific responses to the subject raised in Deputy Secretary Christopher’s May 30 memorandum to Director Reinhardt: a.

a. Proposals for providing information and guidance on human rights to all USIS field offices.

We shall use a multi-media approach in explicating U.S. policy and promoting human rights. This includes a full range of print and audiovisual materials, together with speakers. Guidance will be tailored to statements and actions by U.S. or foreign officials, and to significant events (e.g. CSCE developments, UN Human Rights Commission meetings, etc.).

We shall periodically explore with field posts their perceptions of local human rights situations, and then develop supplemental programs which are responsive to these conditions.

b. Recommendations of specific steps USIA might take in particular countries to promote human rights.

6 See footnote 2, above.
The following specialized projects will be proposed to support USIS posts in individual countries on the human rights issue. These proposals are illustrative, not exhaustive, of the possibilities open to the Administration via USIA’s programming potential abroad.

1. USIA will provide a phased series of videotaped interviews or direct video statements by the President, Secretary of State, other cabinet-level officials, and Assistant Secretaries of State. These would provide an essential overview.

2. Agency elements and State/CU should cooperate in the conduct of at least one, and possibly more, International Visitor projects on an appropriate human rights topic. The projects and visitors would be selected on the basis of their potential for tangible follow-up programs (seminars, workshops, symposia, etc.) and other activities overseas.

3. The Agency will provide directories of major American and international human rights organizations to USIS posts and libraries for reference or for presentation to indigenous organizations.

4. We will continue Agency/CU efforts to foster inter-personal communication among officials, opinion leaders and professionals in the human rights field. Three major programs including speakers and media support will be conducted by USIS posts in the coming year:

   (a) Human Rights Aspects of U.S. Foreign Policy: e.g., the impact of human rights concerns on bilateral relations; the relation of human rights to arms sales, aid, technology transfer, etc.; origins of U.S. foreign policy emphasis on human rights (national beliefs, traditions, Congressional interest, public interests groups).

   (b) U.S. Challenges and Responses in the Human Rights Field, e.g.: civil rights—voting, political participation, the legitimacy of opposition, peaceful transfer of power, equal opportunity, minority rights, freedom of expression and movement; civil liberties—freedom of information, privacy, legal representation, habeus corpus; “human fulfillment”.

   (c) Human Rights Questions and Economic Development e.g.: the question of whether economic mobilization can occur without suppression of political freedoms and individual rights; North-South issues of distribution of wealth.

5. The Department and USIA should issue guidelines and provide whatever support necessary for Missions to encourage foreign leaders and internationally respected individuals to speak out in support of human rights.


7. An international conference on human rights should be proposed for September–October 1978 or in 1979. It would provide a focus for
strengthening international understanding of human rights questions, reinforcing commitments to human rights progress, and providing for followup programming overseas by US Missions with Agency and CU support.

The Conference should be structured to maximize constructive exchanges of experience and views in the human rights field, and to minimize polemical or political confrontations.

8. Establish a Human Rights Alert Service, which would use Agency radio and press facilities to call attention to human rights abuses and progress where and as they occur.

In order to ensure that the U.S. effort is fully implemented in the field, the Department should consider establishing a human rights coordinating committee at overseas missions. The committee would consist of representatives from the embassy’s substantive elements including USIS. Its purpose should be two-fold: (1) report on the status of human rights issues in the host country and (2) recommend programs designed to increase understanding of U.S. human rights policies (public affairs goal) and, equally important, encourage promotion of human rights in the host country (political goal). USIS posts would designate a human rights officer who would be a member of the mission’s human rights committee. This officer would help identify target audience members and organizations committed to strengthening human rights (e.g. religious groups, the bar, labor unions, political parties). The USIS human rights officer would also plan and implement public affairs efforts involving human rights.

To take advantage of audience data gained in this way, posts will be asked to broaden their audience lists to include human rights opinion leaders to be reached with program materials and through personal contact.

Specific Agency actions in particular countries will be determined by the political and other factors in the Department’s human rights plan of action for each country. Pending the issuance of these plans, the following approaches could be taken regionally:

LATIN AMERICA

In Latin America, the Agency will attempt to make our policies better understood, particularly in view of the bilateral disputes that have arisen over human rights between the United States and many governments in the hemisphere.

Because Latin American posts continue to have regular access to mass media outlets, the Agency will rely heavily on the press, radio and television to influence opinion leaders and the public at large. This is particularly useful in countries where the United States is engaged in human rights questions with authoritarian governments and where
we may not be able openly to sponsor lectures and seminar discussions on the subject. Paradoxically, the media in these countries are generally free to report and comment on human rights issues.

Despite potential local difficulties, posts in Central America, Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil have asked for speakers on human rights while USIS posts in Guatemala and Paraguay have asked for exhibits demonstrating the historic U.S. commitment to human rights. USIS Caracas proposes a television co-production with Venezuelan national television on the Administration’s human rights policy.

In addition to these field proposals, the Agency will: (1) produce a television and radio series dramatizing human rights causes out of Latin American and world history; (2) publish a 12-page insert on human rights in the regional edition of the Agency magazine *Horizons*; (3) publish human rights-oriented books for the Agency’s book translation program for general distribution and introduction into school curricula; (4) recommend that high-ranking USG officials who travel to Latin America be available as voluntary speakers for human rights programming; (5) produce a radio and press series to create greater recognition and prestige for international and private organizations devoted to human rights, with emphasis on the work of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission.

**AFRICA**

African nations tend to applaud human rights concepts in the abstract but many fail to put them into practice. Most African countries are quick to condemn human rights violations elsewhere but are reluctant to make a public denunciation of misdeeds in other OAU countries.

Given such sensitivities, USIS programming in Africa must be carefully handled in order to avoid the appearance of preaching and charges of interference in local affairs. One approach will be to call on State/CU resources to arrange two-way exchanges of persons in fields of key importance to human rights, particularly in law and jurisprudence. Amnesty International and the American Civil Liberties Union should be utilized, both as resources for these visitors and as sources of speakers for overseas programming.

A second approach will be to publicize, especially through the Voice of America and through post programming in individual countries, the efforts of African countries such as Botswana, Mauritius and Gambia which have good human rights records.

Finally, through consultation with field posts, other media products will be developed to further human rights goals. Exhibits, if discreetly done, are an indispensable tool in closed societies such as Guinea and Somalia, where they are often the post’s most effective information resource.
USIA’s approach to promoting human rights in Europe must take into account political realities on that continent.

In the communist states, we are obviously restricted in what we can do but not in what we say. Our most important medium is in VOA. We know, for example, that our international radio programs have been welcomed by human rights groups in communist societies. Indeed, our unjammed broadcasts often have had an immediate and direct effect on the governments of these countries. Western publicity about and support for these activities have reinforced the resolve of human rights leaders in the USSR and Eastern Europe. They also appear to have had some restraining effect on the authorities. We should continue to broadcast human rights and to reject charges that this is interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

In Western Europe, our objectives should be to 1) gain support for U.S. human rights policy, and 2) attempt to motivate the Europeans to become more involved in promoting human rights elsewhere. We can do so by strengthening and/or initiating ties with those European institutions and organizations which are concerned with human rights. This includes those European youth organizations whose views are similar to ours in the human rights field. Our aim should be to encourage the exchange of ideas and information between like-minded people and organizations so that we can support each other’s efforts. We should also strengthen U.S.—European parliamentary links where the subject of human rights could be discussed. This is of particular importance in view of the European Community’s plan to hold direct elections to the European Parliament in 1978. The CU exchange program should support this as one of its primary objectives.

It has been our experience that when we coordinate a particular policy with our European allies we not only get their support, but we are often able to project a common policy. For example, NATO is the forum where we have coordinated western CSCE strategy including Basket III initiatives.7 There is another forum where we could pursue a common human rights policy—the OECD. It is an organization comprising most of the western industrial world plus Japan where we now coordinate aid to LDCs and carry on the North-South dialogue. At a forthcoming OECD ministerial meeting, the U.S. will propose further cooperation on member-states’ unemployment policies—a subject which impacts on human rights.8

7 See footnote 2, Document 13.
8 The OECD Ministerial meeting took place in Paris June 23–24. For remarks made by Vance and Blumenthal at the meeting and during a joint press conference following the meeting, see Department of State Bulletin, July 25, 1977, pp. 105–117. The final communiqué, June 24, and a Declaration on Relations With Developing Countries, June 23, are ibid., pp. 118–120.
EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC

The following projects for East Asian countries merit special attention.

Philippines—The major human rights issue in the Philippines involves political detainees. The Mission’s basic tool so far has been quiet but firm diplomacy, avoiding high profile public dialogue in favor of subtle but unequivocal pressure. The post has a program scheduled on the legal aspects of human rights and will follow-up with speakers, films and press items. Here again the key to programming is to avoid preaching and to depict candidly both the successes and failures of the U.S. efforts to protect human rights.

Indonesia—As in the Philippines, the major concern is political detainees. The post will continue to follow a low profile approach while discussing the issues with influential contacts and disseminating the statements of U.S. officials. It will also organize meetings and seminars for American experts who can underscore the fundamental strength of our commitment to civil liberties.

The following specific USIS programs and supporting actions are planned:

—Preparation of background papers by Embassy and USIS officers for press and electronic media representatives on the future thrust of US foreign policy. These will emphasize human rights as a key element in our policy.

—Developing library collections for “outreach” programming, documenting the fundamental concern Americans have for human rights, as well as the successes and failures of our efforts.

Korea—One of this post’s major program objectives addresses the human rights issue. Seminars and discussion programs planned under this objective will seek understanding of how American values are formed and expressed and establish a dialogue with Koreans on common values. ROKG sensitivities and policy guidance by the Mission will be taken into account in program planning.

U.S. concerns and pronouncements on this issue will be fully reflected in VOA Korean language broadcasts. The post will publicize such programs with the primary audience in advance of the broadcasts. Similar programs will be made available for broadcast through the U.S. Armed Forces radio stations, which have a substantial Korean listenership.

Because there are definite limits within the ROK to a full discussion of U.S. concerns on this issue, consideration will be given to organizing special seminars or symposia in the United States to which key Koreans will be invited to participate. This approach will only be effective if the scope of discussion is not confined to the problems of one country.
Multi-country participation and a broad-gauged discussion of the issues are more likely to improve understanding of the U.S. position.

NORTH AFRICA, NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

Countries in this area have such varying perceptions of human rights that both the frequency and type of program approach must be tailored to each country. For example, a wide range of programs about human rights for diverse audiences would be fruitful in India, but only carefully chosen programs involving outstanding experts before small, selected audiences are acceptable in Iran. On the other hand, in Algeria, programming opportunities are rare, and even then limited to subjects related to economic or social rights.

In Iran the recent human rights dialogue between U.S. political analyst Ben J. Wattenberg and Iranian government officials apparently struck a positive chord. However, this type of programming may not be as well received by similar audiences in other NEA countries.

Examples of specific program proposals for this area are:

—expansion of USIA’s book programs to include outstanding works (foreign and domestic including translations) on human rights subjects;

—expansion of CU’s International Visitor program to involve more human rights activists; foreign journalists’ tours of the U.S. organized around human rights themes;

—more speaker and seminar programs focused on salient aspects of human rights that have relevance in specific countries or groups of countries in this geographic area.


c. Proposals for using the Voice of America, the Press Service (IPS) and other functional arms of the Agency to increase popular attention to human rights.

Agency print, radio and film/videotape will continue to report official policies, statements and other activities of Administration officials and members of Congress to overseas audiences. The Agency’s media services will also increase coverage of national and international human rights events such as the signing of the American Convention of Human Rights,9 U.N. Human Rights Day and the CSCE meetings in Belgrade.10

Agency media will also report on private domestic and international organizations which monitor and advocate human rights

9 The President signed the American Convention on Human Rights at OAS headquarters in Washington, D.C., on June 1. For his remarks at the signing ceremony, see Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book I, pp. 1050–1051.

10 See footnote 4, Document 25.
(Amnesty International, ACLU, NAACP, etc.), as well as statements and activities by prominent American scholars, writers and scientists. Examples of this are the recent protests by the National Academy of Science over the arrest and torture of a group of physicists in Uruguay,\(^{11}\) and protests by Saul Bellow and Arthur Miller concerning the harsh treatment of writers in many countries for their human rights stand.

The Voice of America will produce a series honoring human rights statesmen and stateswomen in American history. Included will be Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes; Charles Houston, the late black lawyer and leader in the civil rights struggle; Eleanor Roosevelt, Ralph Bunche and others. Such programs will illustrate the historical basis of human rights in the U.S. The Voice will produce a “VOA Forum Series” of twenty half-hour programs treating human rights. Examples of program themes will be important Supreme Court decisions dealing with human rights and the concept of due process in the 14th amendment. Prominent jurists and civil rights activists will be featured speakers for the Forum series. The Voice will also schedule prominent American and foreign speakers for interviews and panel programs.

The Press and Publications Service (IPS) will commission articles and acquire byliners by American and non-American scholars on the origins and record of human rights in the United States. IPS will produce an illustrated pamphlet on the origins and development of human rights in the U.S.

Special articles on human rights will be placed in Agency publications such as *Problems of Communism*, *Horizons*, *Dialogue*, *Economic Impact*, and *Economic Portfolio*.\(^{12}\) The March–April 1977 issue of *Problems of Communism* featured a review-essay of six books entitled “Detente and Soviet Dissidents” by Sovietologist Harvey Fireside.

*Problems of Communism* has developed a distinguished world-wide reputation. We will consider initiating a new publication, perhaps to be entitled *Problems of Democracy*, which could afford distinguished American—and foreign—political philosophers, politicians, humanitarians a forum in which to explore the ideas, values and processes which lie beneath both liberty and democracy.

For selected audiences, the Agency’s Film and Television Service (IMV) will continue videotape coverage of official statements. It will

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\(^{11}\) On April 27, the National Academy of Sciences announced that it would launch a “human rights drive” to compel the Governments of Argentina, the Soviet Union, and Uruguay to divulge the whereabouts of eight scientists imprisoned in those countries. (Thomas O’Toole, “Science Academy Sets Rights Drive on 8 in Prison,” *The Washington Post*, April 28, 1977, p. B17)

\(^{12}\) *Horizons* was published bi-monthly in English, Spanish, and in several other languages. *Economic Portfolio* was published quarterly in English and Spanish.
acquire commercial films and videotapes, feature films, network specials and documentaries. Examples of acquired commercial productions are the two recent NBC programs on human rights—the recent Soviet-American debate at Georgetown University and the documentary on the Belgrade CSCE meeting. For more general television audiences, the Agency will increase output on human rights subjects in its current newsclip service and in its regular TV series which are seen on several hundred foreign stations. The Agency will also cooperate with foreign television broadcast companies sending production teams to the U.S. to make programs about human rights.

In the exhibits field, the Agency will highlight salient passages of the Secretary of State’s April 30 speech, including human rights statements by prominent American and foreign advocates of human rights.

The Agency will support multi-regional International Visitor programs, bringing human rights advocates from a number of countries together with their American counterparts. The Agency will compile a directory of American and international human rights organizations for use by the posts in providing orientation to prospective international visitors. The concept of multi-regional international visitor programs might, as suggested earlier, be expanded to the level of an International Human Rights Conference to be held in late 1978 or 1979. Such a meeting would bring together some 200–300 human rights advocates from around the world and would provide a very visible focal point for the subject.

d. Proposals for coordinating the public diplomacy dimension of human rights issues with other relevant foreign affairs agencies, particularly, AID, D/HA and CLI.

We propose that the Agency’s Human Rights Advisor serve as our primary liaison with the Department’s Human Rights Coordinator’s

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(D/HA) staff. In this capacity he would be a participant in cooperative human rights public diplomacy efforts with members of the Department, AID and other agencies. Currently the Agency’s Human Rights Advisor is actively involved in cooperative projects resulting from attendance at weekly meetings of Department regional and functional bureau human rights officers.

e. Formal structure within USIA

The Deputy Director will be the interim USIA representative on the Department’s Human Rights Coordinating Group (HRCG). The Department may also wish to consider having Mr. Bray serve as the public affairs advisor to the HRCG. In this capacity he could suggest public affairs approaches as U.S. human rights policies and actions develop.

A USIA ad hoc Human Rights Coordinating Committee has been established to provide information policy guidance and review Agency human rights programming to ensure that the Agency’s effort is on target. The committee is a “working level” group which is chaired by the Human Rights Advisor who reports to the Deputy Director.

f. Steps USIA has already taken to achieve human rights objectives.

Human rights is a primary theme and prominent feature of Agency programs.

All Agency communications media are being used to present the Administration’s human rights policies to overseas audiences. Radio has been the primary direct channel to audiences, particularly in closed or authoritarian societies, where local media are controlled and where human rights problems are usually most acute.

In the early months of the new Administration, the Voice of America gave extensive coverage (news analyses, features and editorials) to statements by the President and other Administration officials which emphasized the heightened importance of human rights in U.S. foreign policy.

Congressman Dante Fascell, Chairman, Joint Legislative-Executive Commission on CSCE, was interviewed in December on VOA’s “Press Conference-USA.” Human rights provisions of the CSCE Helsinki Final Act\(^\text{16}\) was a primary subject of this interview.

In the field of television placement the Agency has provided extensive coverage of official USG statements, speeches and comments on human rights and its role in U.S. foreign policy. Since President Carter’s

\(^{16}\text{See footnote 6, Document 8.}\)
inauguration 18 different videotapes on human rights subjects have been made available to posts. Examples are:

—Secretary Vance’s April 30 human rights policy speech before the University of Georgia Law School;

—President Carter’s March 17 UN speech;¹⁷ his April 14 Organization of American States speech and the recent speech at the University of Notre Dame;¹⁸

—interview by U.S. and European journalists on April 30 with Congressman Fascell;

—US human rights policy interview with Ms. Patricia M. Derian, Coordinator, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (D/HA);

The Agency overseas speakers program incorporates U.S. and international human rights subjects by selected speakers. For example, Allard Lowenstein, head of the U.S. delegation to the recent UN Human Rights Commission, was programmed recently in five European cities where he discussed U.S. human rights policy before selected audiences. Mr. Lowenstein received extensive and favorable media coverage in each of the capitals he visited.

Special information kits and background papers have been provided to all posts. The kits highlight press treatment of the Administration’s emphasis on human rights and provide texts of the UN Charter relevant to human rights as well as copies of human rights covenants and conventions. The background papers presented information and guidance on human rights provisions of U.S. security assistance legislation and the role of human rights in U.S. foreign policy.

¹⁷ See footnote 4, Document 21.

68. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Reinhardt) to all USIS Principal and Branch Posts and Heads of Offices and Services

Washington, June 17, 1977

Dear Colleague:

We are all aware that some critical decisions will be made over the next several months about the basic thrust and organization of the United States’ entire public diplomacy effort. Regardless of the precise outcome of this process, we can be certain that public diplomacy will continue to be an active, vital element of the overall U.S. foreign policy effort. Indeed, there is good reason to believe that public diplomacy will assume an even greater importance than it has in the past.

It is with this in mind that I have initiated an effort to get USIA’s own house in order. I believe we must reexamine thoroughly everything we do, and why we do it, to insure that we are an Agency which is clear about its mission, realistic about its objectives, tough-minded about its programs and confident in its contribution to the overall foreign policy effort of the United States.

I believe we need a rigorous set of standards by which all elements of the Agency will operate. We need carefully defined guidelines to insure that our varied activities are carried out in a coherent fashion, toward the same end.

With a view toward developing a set of operative principles and guidelines, the Deputy Director and I have recently held a series of wide-ranging, highly informative discussions with all Area and Media Directors. A report on these discussions, together with the set of guidelines that has emerged from them, is enclosed. I urge you to study this report with great attention and care. It contains the guidelines on which we shall be building in the months ahead—the guidelines by which all Agency elements will be expected to operate—and some of the basic thinking which underlies these guidelines.

This report is only a beginning; but it is an important one. I intend for the dialogue we have now begun within the Agency to be ongoing. I view it as an entirely healthy process, one that can help us achieve a new level of vitality, a renewed sense of purpose and a coherent, unified direction for the Agency’s worldwide activities.

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I welcome the full participation of all personnel in this process.

Sincerely,

John E. Reinhardt
Director

Enclosure

Report Prepared in the United States Information Agency

Washington, undated

INTRODUCTION

The following is a report on a series of meetings that the Director and the Deputy Director held with all USIA element heads on June 2, June 8 and June 15. The purpose of the meetings was to lay out and discuss some fundamental principles by which the Agency should operate. The purpose of this report is to inform you of the key points of discussion and the results of the meetings.

Part I of the report is a transcript of the Director’s opening remarks at the June 8 meeting. These remarks have been included in their entirety so that you may have an accurate sense of the Director’s thinking.

Part II is a summary of the meetings’ key points of discussion. It is designed to draw your attention to some of the more important problems and opportunities characteristic of current Agency operations.

Part III is a summary review of the Agency’s basic operating guidelines under the new Director. These guidelines are a product of Director Reinhardt’s thinking, as refined by the recent discussions. Of necessity, the guidelines are general in nature. The Agency’s management, however, will be developing specific mechanisms to insure that all Agency operations properly adhere to these guidelines.

[Omitted here is a title page that reads: “USIA: OPERATING GUIDELINES FOR THE AGENCY, Report on a Series of Discussions among the Director, the Deputy Director and all USIA Element Heads.”]

I. The Director’s Opening Remarks, June 8 Meeting with all USIA Element Heads

This is a meeting that I came back to the Agency determined to hold rather early, because I thought it was at the core of what I hoped

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2 No classification marking.
to accomplish in the Agency. The idea of such a meeting goes further back than that. We have all second-guessed our superiors in the Agency. When I knew that I would have charge, I had hoped to hold this meeting the next day and get it out of the way so we could redirect the Agency as I have thought it should be directed since 1956.³

It soon became clear to me, however, that we couldn’t hold the meeting right away. I was not sure that my 1956 views were still entirely relevant. I was not sure who would constitute the intermediate-term managerial forces of the Agency. I was not sure of some other things. So the meeting is several weeks late. I regard it nonetheless as probably the most important in the series of meetings that I have had—primarily because it is all about program leadership.

Over the years the Agency has vacillated, temporized, changed courses with different Directors and different personalities. Each Director has had certain interests and some have accomplished worthy goals, but few have been strongly concerned with leadership of the field program, with being closely involved with USIA’s operations in Malawi or Germany. We would like to go in the direction of being intimately involved in the field program. We want to take some of the wear off this hackneyed statement and make it fully applicable today. We want to insure, in short, that the focus of USIA is constantly on the field.

This morning I would like to set forth and discuss some principles or guidelines to govern our operations overseas, principles which affect media and management elements in Washington as they serve the field. These principles will establish some parameters for our future operations.

I would first refer to Area Directors specifically, and everyone else by implication. Area Directors are in direct contact with the field and must conceive of themselves as part of management. As Area Directors, you are not a buffer or the PAO’s representative in Washington—you are part of the management of the Agency. The guidelines we eventually agree on about field operations are your guidelines. You will have a fair chance to debate and refine them, and then they will become yours. The PAO and his or her staff will act in accordance with the guidelines, and you will be the first line of appraisal, not defense. It will not be your job to represent PAOs but to represent the management of the Agency.

If Area Directors operate in this fashion, theoretically we do not need an inspection corps. Theoretically you, travelling regularly, should know all that goes on in our overseas posts. Practically, we do, of course, need the element of objectivity the inspection corps brings

³ Reinhardt served as a Foreign Service Officer in USIA at that time.
to the assessment of field programs. But there shouldn’t be many substantial discoveries of which you as Area Directors are not already aware.

What do we want to do in the field? The pending reorganization of the Agency will eventually produce a new statement of public mandate, or charter, enunciated by the President. But any enunciated charter is likely to go back to the bedrock of the Smith-Mundt Act, which sets forth two major objectives for us: 1) to explain American policy, and 2) to project American society—the most technically advanced, the most affluent, and in many ways the most interesting civilization in all of history. American life, thought, development—these are the things we project. There is no way around these two obligations. They can be expanded on or refined, but not avoided. A field post that is not meeting both of these obligations is not operating in the national interest or in accordance with our guidelines.

Look a little further. Every year the State Department orders a PARM exercise, setting out objectives of U.S. foreign policy in a given country. Our concern will be which of these USIS is contributing to. If there are eight PARM objectives, maybe it’s 3, 4, and 5 to which USIS is contributing. Theoretically a post could conclude there is nothing USIS can do about any one of the eight. We would be most interested in the rationale of the post which makes that statement; resources would be allocated accordingly. The question is, if you can’t contribute to PARM-stated objectives, what can you do? You have your own objectives presumably. These would be subsidiary objectives but not core objectives.

I like the term contract when we refer to the Country Program Memorandum—not a contract that’s unalterable for 12 months, but one that is valid the day it’s written and approved. The objectives should be set in concrete but not necessarily the proposals for implementation. The objectives are a part of the contract between Washington and the field. Obviously they can be changed in response to changing conditions in a country. But unless conditions do change, the management of the Agency—Area Directors being part of management—will be interested in the fulfillment of the contract, whether it’s in Upper Volta or Japan. Charlie Bray and I, when we travel, will be interested in briefings on the up-to-date objectives the posts are working towards, an updating of PARM and on the contract posts have with USIA. We will not let winning and dining get in the way of these discussions. We will ask the question “What have you done for us lately?” Other elements of management, we should hope, will proceed in like manner.

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4 See footnote 2, Document 1.
We would like to advocate in this time of zero-based budgeting, zero-based thinking. We are going through the ZBB exercise this summer. It looks like we are off to a good start. I think there should also be a zero-based philosophy in USIA. That which we have traditionally done is not what we will necessarily continue to do. An essential part of zero-based thinking will be what I would call a central perspective. All of us in this room are part of management, and we must begin from a shared perspective. For example, we should ask the question, “Do we need libraries at all?” From the standpoint of a central perspective we should be able to ask this question and come to some convincing conclusions. “Is a given activity in the national interest?” is another way to put the question. We have always asked that question. You know better than I that in the end we can justify almost anything with that question. Zero-based thinking demands that you ask it with conviction and answer it in a rigorous, convincing fashion.

We would like to repeat again that resource allocation will and should reflect the President’s foreign policy emphasis. If a post is making no contribution to the foreign policy objectives set forth in the PARM, then it should expect resources to be allocated accordingly.

The public diplomacy section of an embassy should be like any other section of an embassy. We ought to be an indispensable part of the country team, and our programs should reflect this. We should hopefully make as great a contribution as the political or economic sections. This relationship will have to be effected in Washington as well as abroad. The contract we have with our posts should reflect all of this.

In arriving at the central perspective I mentioned earlier, I would like to set out for discussion several ideas which form my thinking now. First, there is a strong presumption that a public diplomacy section should be a part of each diplomatic mission abroad. I state that deliberately. It does not mean that in every case it will be a reality. But I think that among the parts of any diplomatic mission there should be a public diplomacy section. The argument can be made that in some places, where our other interests are minimal, it should be the central part. I want to discuss this presumption further because some of you have thought through this question in preparing your papers evaluating one-person posts. Most of these posts are in Africa. One is in Latin America. Wherever they are, Area Directors, as part of management, must take into consideration, except for Africa, that resources to open new posts should come out of the area’s own hide. Latin America will not open in Surinam, which has a good case, unless it takes resources from something else.

For the media elements, with the exception of VOA, there is also a strong presumption in favor of acquiring rather than producing. This is not to say that we are out of the production business. It is only to say there...
is a strong presumption for acquiring. I gather from the last two or three months in the Agency we are headed in that direction anyway.

There is an understanding that the Washington organization exists for managing and assisting the field; our only interest is in the field operation. There will be several realigned organizational elements—not really new, but the organization chart will reflect some changes. The elements in Washington should be designed to reinforce the principles we are trying to formulate today. There will be a management section including the area offices. Management is understood in terms of managing programs, what we are doing overseas, how well or how poorly. Clearly the front office is part of this management; so are the areas and also IOP. There will be a new IOP, which I will discuss later. This element will ask the question, why this activity or that, how does this library or this seminar contribute to obtaining the objectives of the contract between a field post and USIA? There will also be a service element, and all of the media belong in it. Budget, administrative services, administrative control, resource allocation, people and money of all kinds should be brought more closely together.

Central to a great deal of this restructuring will be a reconstituted IOP. Of necessity it has to have a lot in it. It will include all those things it has had traditionally, but with a new focus. It will be the intellectual nerve center of the Agency. It will have policy, and it will be concerned with plans, today’s and next year’s plans. It will be concerned with evaluations, including inspection but also other aspects of evaluations, such as research—focused research, meaningful, useful research. It must be concerned with guidelines, particularly for the media. It will be concerned with programs in a broader sense. Its relations with our chief medium—VOA—have already been spelled out.

I want nothing I say here to be interpreted wrongly; the PAO still must be concerned with indigenous problems and opportunities. So long as the PAO can provide a convincing rationale for a post’s activities, the leeway he or she has always had over operations will be carefully preserved. As the Agency’s intellectual nerve center, IOP will have the dual role of monitoring or evaluating, and thinking creatively, seeing what the possibilities are. Our perspective here in Washington should be broader than that of the officer in Chad. We should see the overall picture of the Agency’s activities.

Our dominant medium is VOA. It has the means to reach people around the world without going through any filters, at least in areas accustomed to listening to shortwave broadcasts and areas where VOA has a strong signal. Part of the instrumentality for programming which PAOs have at their disposal is radio. There’s nothing a PAO can or should do about the news; but not all VOA broadcasts are news. PAOs can do much to help us with this medium, and as management leaders
PAOs should use it. The other media are still important. People still read, look at films, attend seminars and exhibits. The purpose of these activities is to help PAOs fulfill their terms of the contract. All of this has been pretty much generalities. Perhaps in discussion we can set forth some specifics.

I want this to be a discussion. Your focus shouldn’t be for me to answer questions. I am far more interested in what you think.

II. Summary of Key Discussion Points During Meetings of June 2, 8, and 15

Policy Explication

. . . If the Agency has an obligation to explain U.S. policies—and it clearly does—the question is how are we doing it; are we doing it? And the term “U.S. policies” should be understood to include both domestic and foreign policies, since the two are increasingly inter-twined in their impact abroad.

. . . There is a feeling that, at least unconsciously, the Agency, its management and executors in the field, may not have been sufficiently engaged in policy explication. Whether this feeling is correct or not, it is perceived in Washington and some areas abroad as correct. That poses both a problem and an opportunity for the Agency. To the extent that we do not explain U.S. policies, or are perceived as not doing so, we detract from our indispensability to the overall foreign policy process.

. . . People have been backing away from policy explication over the years. It was Vietnam, it was Watergate, the quality of the policies we were having to explicate.

. . . We have just emerged from a time when, in this Agency and elsewhere, policies were either not clear or not acceptable to many people within the bureaucracy. During that period, the bureaucratic beast turned away from that and did other things. The question now is whether our attention to a dual obligation has gotten out of balance, whether by calculation or by accident. If so, we must correct the balance.

. . . Going back to the premise that the minimum USIS post is the PAO and the Wireless File—that means that 80 percent of the effort and the time of that PAO should be devoted to policy explication. Everything built at the post around that adds dimension, additional ways in which the policy explication function can be carried out. We ought not to exist without policy explication at the beginning.

. . . I believe there are posts that have been and are doing a by-the-numbers job in setting forth policy. Everything they get is dutifully handled and they have done a first-class job in gaining recognition for our society. Where we have done a miserable job—the Agency and the Department in Washington and in the field—is helping front-line warriors, catching the attention of the audience we are dealing with. I’ve seen in inspections and personal experience that a number of our
officers are afraid to take on the explication job because the subjects are so complex. They look on themselves as technicians who merely provide a stage for the experts. If an issue is there, they are unwilling to take it on. Part of it is training, leadership, whatever. We will have to prepare our people and give them the confidence and the skills to do it.

. . . If you start with an officer, even minus the Wireless File, he is at least a reflection of the society. He is the contact point, the person the audience knows. He must be someone attractive enough to that audience, interesting to them, one who can develop a relationship with them to permit him to present a whole variety of wares. If he cannot do that, the game is lost. Because we have acquired of late a lot of very attractive wares—VTRs, magazines, etc.—we are becoming increasingly in this Agency impresarios, distributors of products. We are by default almost entirely that, or too much so. If a USIS officer repeatedly says to a foreigner, “I don’t know anything about that, but in two weeks I can get you the best speakers on the subject,” that officer after a while will not have the kind of relationship which will make him useful in that mission.

. . . First of all, you must be able to articulate, you must know the substance of issues and be able to address them. On top of that, as an FSIO, you are expected to have certain communications abilities which make you different from an FSO. I’ve found a large number of our officers who shy away from the explication role because they don’t feel this is part of their role. I think this is a serious problem, perhaps one that should be addressed at the beginning of the training cycle.

. . . I don’t see how the PAO can function unless he has at least a curbstone knowledge of economics, human rights, etc.

. . . If the PAO or press attache becomes known as the person best able to speak for the Ambassador, is known as an articulate person, reasonable and knowledgeable, I think experience shows that the press will turn to that person.

Indispensability

. . . In order to be an integral part of a diplomatic mission, a USIS post must have some appreciation of—and be appreciated by—the entire mission. Receptivity can vary widely from chief-of-mission to chief-of-mission. Obviously, a PAO must devote time, effort and ingenuity to insuring that his operation is indispensable to the mission. Ultimately, however, a well-run public diplomacy operation is the most persuasive demonstration of a USIS post’s worth to the over-all Mission.

. . . An educational function must also be carried out by USIA management with colleagues in the State Department, the White House, other Executive departments and agencies, and the Congress. This will help to integrate USIS posts abroad more fully into field missions.
Program Integrity

... Too often, we inherit setups, and we adapt to the whims of new chiefs of mission. I think it is a rare PAO who will come back to the Agency and say we have had a library for 20 years and now we don’t need it. We all fall into things that already exist and seem to work well for us—without examining whether they are the best ways of getting the job done or not.

Role of the Media

... The role of the media is in service of the field programs. Media products should not demand functions that people in the field can’t carry out.

Coherence

... Firm management from Washington should insure program coherence and continuity and preclude wild program gyrations resulting from changes in PAOs—while still allowing for the necessary, desirable degree of flexibility, initiative and creativity in the field. The supremacy of the PAO has to be exercised within certain parameters which allow for adaptation to local conditions.

Standards

... It is essential that management in Washington agree on a set of standards by which programs in the field can be justified and evaluated. What is a good library or a good information program? What commonalities exist among the areas? What constitutes a good program instrumentality? These are all key questions.

... The absence of parameters and standards has led, in the past, to a focus on differences rather than commonalities. If we are going to have a contract with the field, it must be based on consistent standards.

... Qualitative standards cannot be separated from cost effectiveness. The PAO, the Area Director, Media heads must always think of the two together.

Strategy

... A well-run post must have a communications strategy geared to its objectives. Uncoordinated, purposeless activities too often proliferate in the absence of such a strategy.

Agency-Wide Perspective

... It is a healthy process where the Area Director attempts to put on the Director’s hat, in confrontation with the less catholic perspective. Angels clearly will sit on the side of the more catholic view in such confrontations. It should not take more than two or three encounters before the word gets around that at each level of management we are
expected to approach problems and decisions from the perspective of central management, that empire-building is out.

... We are all guilty of parochialism. We must accept this fact and strive for a better perspective on our commonalities and global mission.

The Director: One of the Agency’s statutory obligations is to explain policy. I doubt that anybody rejects this. I have a feeling, however, that in our operations policy explication may too often be neglected, if not rejected. You can read inspection reports without gaining any real sense of our role as explicators. To put this in some perspective, the last thing I have in mind is that we should be running around the capitals of the world even pretending that we are setting foreign policy right. Indeed, I think it would be dangerous to head in that direction. As managers, I don’t want us to do anything to convey to the field the idea that every radio or TV editorial, or comment against U.S. foreign policy, could be fixed the next day. Nor do I want anyone to ignore the second part of our mandate, which is to project American society. But I think we need to look continually for evidence that we are taking the policy explication role seriously and that we are engaging local opinion molders in serious dialogue about policy issues.

I would think in terms of luncheon meetings or breakfast meetings or dinner meetings with key opinion molders, in which we are engaged in a dialogue about a central issue. The point isn’t to get an editorial or column the next day. If we get it, fine; but if we don’t, we have illustrated to the person that we are talking to aspects of American policy that before the meeting he may well not have taken into consideration. This effort involves setting the record straight where there are obvious errors. That’s what I mean by explication.

Our goal is to promote, through dialogue, a better understanding of U.S. policies and society. I don’t think, on the one hand, that we can be satisfied with the seminar that helps local journalists do a better job 25 years from now. That’s good but not sufficient. On the other hand, I don’t think we need to pretend we’re going to get different editorials. We need a logical rationale, a strategy for dealing with local opinion molders about American policies in the short term as well as the long term. That is the job of the PAO, what we as managers should be looking for.

The question of policy explication versus projection of American society is not an either/or question. It’s a matter of balance. We as managers, together with PAOs in the field, must be sure that the balance is appropriate at each post. This doesn’t mean that each PAO goes around asking: “What have I done for explication today; what do I plan to do for projection tomorrow?” Certainly there is a real sense in which the two objectives overlap and complement each other. But for each post there is nonetheless a proper balance between these two
functions, a balance which is determined largely by local issues and communications environments. We must be continually sensitive to the need to achieve and maintain this balance. To put it another way: the balance in effect at each post must be supported by a firm rationale. That is the heart of the contract that the post has with Washington.

Finally, there is a new foreign policy in the land. We, as a chief arm of the foreign affairs community, have to reflect it. We have to accept political realities. One of the great realities is the human rights issue. Another is the so-called Third World emphasis. A budget that allocates over $38 million to Europe and $14 million to Africa is not consistent with the realities of today. There are problems with this in the European budget every year. We should think that over as we look at ZBB. These realities must be taken into account.

III. Summary Review of Operating Guidelines

1. The Agency’s primary focus is on the field. Washington exists only for the purpose of guiding, servicing and assisting work that goes on in the field.

2. All Area and Media Directors should consider themselves integral parts of the Agency’s management team. Their perspectives should be Agency-wide, not parochial.

3. The Agency’s two fundamental objectives are to explain U.S. policy (foreign and domestic) and to project American society. Both of these objectives must be met. Any officer or post that backs away either from policy explication or societal projection is not operating according to the Agency’s guidelines. The balance of time and resources devoted to each of these objectives will of necessity vary from post to post. Because of differing local problems and communications environments, there can be no mandated explication/projection ratio worldwide. But the balance achieved at each post must be justified and evaluated in terms of a systematic clear-minded rationale.

4. Every USIS post should have clearly defined objectives which contribute to the achievement of mission-wide objectives, as defined by the Country Team. The post’s objectives should be viewed as a contract between the post and Washington. Resources will be allocated according to the quality of the post’s contribution to the achievement of mission objectives.

5. Every program and activity of the Agency must be rigorously examined in terms of its contribution to the foreign policy and national interest goals of the Administration. Just because we have done something in the past does not mean we should continue doing it.

6. Every USIS post should be an indispensable part of the Country Team, making a contribution to the overall mission effort comparable to that of the political and economic sections.
7. Except in the most unusual circumstances, every U.S. diplomatic mission abroad should have a public diplomacy section.

8. Among the USIA management, there is a strong bias in favor of acquiring rather than producing media materials of all kinds. Excluding only VOA, we should produce only what is essential and cannot be acquired elsewhere.

9. IOP will be reconstituted to serve as the intellectual nerve center of the Agency, responsible for policy, long- and short-term planning, evaluation and focused, meaningful research.

10. VOA is the dominant medium of the Agency. It should be viewed and utilized by PAOs as an integral element of programming, excepting only VOA’s independent news operation.

11. Proper management dictates that Agency programs and activities have a certain worldwide coherence, thrust and unity of purpose, while still encouraging an appropriate degree of local initiative and flexibility. We must recognize and accommodate local differences. But we must also operate from the premise that our activities have certain worldwide priorities and commonalities. We should think of ourselves as a unified communications system explicating the same foreign policy and the same society worldwide.

12. Proper management also dictates the development and application of a rigorous and consistent set of standards by which all programs and activities can be justified and evaluated.

13. An FSIO must be two things: a communicator as well as the manager of a communications process. This means that he or she must be thoroughly conversant with substantive foreign policy issues. In particular, a USIS officer must keep abreast of the major bilateral issues involving the U.S. and the country in which he or she is posted. An FSIO is not expected to be an expert in every policy issue; but in order to be an effective explicator of U.S. policy, he or she must be able to discuss major policy issues in an intelligent, well-informed manner. What distinguishes and defines an FSIO is that he or she is also expected to manifest an up-to-date, thorough grounding in communications theories, techniques and practices. The two elements—communications skills fused with substantive policy knowledge—go hand-in-hand for an FSIO.
69. Memorandum From Paul Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\(^1\)

Washington, June 17, 1977

**SUBJECT**

Evening Report—17 June 1977 (includes 16 June 1977)

**Daily Activities**

[Omitted here is material unrelated to public diplomacy.]

*BIB, RFE/RL, etc:* The FOAA and the McGovern-Pell amendment came up on 16 June, sooner than we expected and Humphrey was ready for a good fight.\(^2\) I talked with his assistant, Dick McCall, who called to ask whether we had any last minute ideas the Senator could use if necessary. I gave him a couple. As you know, *Humphrey succeeded in getting this amendment defeated at the end of the day by a vote of 77 to 13*. This victory will be an enormous morale boost for the radios and puts Gronouski in a very strong position as he takes over chairmanship of BIB after confirmation, we expect, before end of the month.

I had a *long phone conversation with Gronouski* this morning. He was elated at Humphrey’s success in getting McG-Pell Amendment defeated and feels confident that this puts him in very strong position for confirmation. His confirmation hearing is scheduled for 10:00 a.m. Tuesday, 21 June and, presumably, confirmation will follow soon after. He is giving a good deal of constructive thought to how he is going to handle the Board, the Staff and the Radios. He is eager to have Griffith and Hauser processed as soon as possible—but he understands this will inevitably still take a while. —In the longer run, Gronouski said to me today, he considers the main problem of the radios the fact that they are on much too tight a budgetary leash. He is eager to get everything tidied up and then wants to go to bat to get them an extra $20–$25 million per year. This is entirely justified and, in view of the basic strength they have in Congress, is probably do-able.

(In talking to McCall this morning about yesterday’s developments he said that Humphrey was itching for a fight and decided not to try for a compromise amendment—which Percy was trying to push—but

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\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special (Henze), Box 5, Evening Reports File: 2–6/77. Secret. Sent for information.

simply to get the McGovern-Pell one thoroughly defeated. Hubert was elated at the vote which confirmed his own judgment of the strength of sentiment on this subject when presented in the right way to the Senate. We had a number of other people working for us on this yesterday: John Hayes lined up Birch Bayh and Bruce van Viorst persuaded Senator Clark to change from his previous pro-McGovern-Pell position; Leonard Marks helped and RFE/RL Board members called other senators. But the key factor remains the fact that Humphrey’s instincts were right all along—and it demonstrates a lesson we might keep in mind for the future—it may be better to fight certain issues head-on than to water down our position by compromising too much. . .

Lunched with John Hayes to review radio matters. He is looking forward to close working relationship with Gronouski and is quite prepared to cooperate in strengthening administration of the radios in several areas where he feels that improvements (though not radical surgery or purge treatments) are justified. He also wants to sort out and strengthen the radios’ corporate board and hopes to have this accomplished by next winter. Then, with everything in good shape, he would like to step out of Chairmanship and be appointed to some other part-time governmental activity to which he could devote a fair share of his energies for the next 3–4 years. I told him we felt he had served well during a very difficult time for the radios and you were extremely appreciative of his service. We will want to keep him in mind for possible future appointments. Media/intelligence/foreign affairs in general are his main areas of interest.

**USIA Reorganization:** Conferred with various interested parties about Vance’s memo to President on reorganization of USIA, amalgamation of CU with it, etc. Have worked out procedures this morning for consolidating various inputs, including excellent memo from Barry Jagoda and Lance position (which we have not yet received), which Greg Treverton will do. David Aaron’s strong dissent from everyone else’s views (which you should read carefully) would necessitate stopping the whole reorganization process in its tracks and get us involved in a hassle in the information field akin to what we are going through in the intelligence field. I do not feel we need a PRM on the information/broadcasting/cultural exchange area to come up with sensible plans

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3 See Document 64.

4 Reference is to a June 16 memorandum from Jagoda to the President, sent through Brzezinski. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 17, State, 6/77)

5 See footnote 3, Document 70.

6 See Document 66.
for improving performance. USIA has not been doing badly, but it can do much better and the way to get it to perform better is to give it a consolidated mission and a real sense of status, reporting directly to the White House. Acting soon on Vance’s proposal is the best way to go. USIA (along with CU) will attract better people for all their activities if they know their mission is regarded as important by the White House.

70. Memorandum From Gregory Treverton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\(^1\)

Washington, June 18, 1977

SUBJECT

Reorganization of USIA and State Cultural Affairs

After Paul Henze left, Lance sent his comments on the original Vance proposal and David added a long dissent. The Vance memo is at Tab A,\(^2\) the Lance (and Jagoda) comments at Tab B,\(^3\) and David’s comments are at Tab II, along with Paul’s original memorandum.\(^4\) Here is the situation:

—Everyone agrees that consolidating USIA and State CU makes sense, except David. His comments are of a somewhat different order. He argues that USIA is bloated and uncreative, and so fears that if Duffey and CU were merged with USIA they would simply disappear in the mush. David also argues that USIA’s information programs are largely obsolete, and he would have any reorganization require that those programs be rigorously justified against a zero-based budgeting criterion.

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\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 17, State: 6/77, Confidential. Sent for action. There is no indication that Brzezinski saw the memorandum.

\(^2\) Not attached but printed as Document 64.

\(^3\) Neither are attached. For information about Jagoda’s memorandum, see footnote 4, Document 69. Lance’s undated memorandum to the President, which McIntyre and Wellford also signed, is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 17, State: 6/77.

\(^4\) Not attached. Aaron’s memorandum is printed as Document 66. Henze attached a copy of the “original memorandum” to his June 15 memorandum to Brzezinski, printed as Document 65.
—There is also general agreement that VOA should remain within an amalgamated “public diplomacy” agency, thus preserving a relationship akin to its current one in USIA, although Lance suggests further study of that issue.5

—There is disagreement on where to put the consolidated agency. Vance argues for an AID relationship to State; Henze and Jagoda6 (and Reinhardt) for continued independence, thus facilitating close links to the White House; and Lance again argues for further study.

The Vance memorandum asks for the President’s approval of the general approach he outlines. Christopher would then present it in testifying to the Fascell Subcommittee of the HIRC on Tuesday, June 21.

I have rewritten Paul’s suggested memorandum from you to the President (Tab I)8 to incorporate the Lance and Jagoda comments. It registers your agreement with consolidation but indicates your preference for sustaining the consolidated agency’s independence of State. It offers the President the choice of deciding that issue now or, as Lance suggests, deferring it for further study. It recommends the latter. If the President chooses that option, Christopher would be authorized to outline only the Administration’s general inclination to consolidate, and would solicit views on other issues.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

5 In his undated memorandum (see footnote 3, above), Lance stated: “We believe that further study is needed of such specifics as the relationship of the consolidated agency to the Department and how to assure the independence of the news gathering and reporting activities of the Voice of America (specifically, whether VOA needs to be reconstituted as an independent agency in order to achieve this end). We, therefore, propose that the various alternatives to these and other specifics be further explored before any Administration positions on them are presented.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 17, State: 6/77)

6 In his June 16 memorandum (see footnote 4, Document 69), Jagoda wrote: “I urge that the USIA structure be left independent (subject to informal State Department policy guidance) rather than be subordinated to State under the AID model as recommended by Secretary Vance. USIA will continue to report to the President through Dr. Brzezinski and would have a close working relationship with Powell, Schecter, and Jagoda—as is now the case. Putting this group under State might make it difficult to get fast-turnaround action. That is an obvious problem with other elements of the bureaucracy already. USIA needs to be mandated to work closely with the State Department on Cultural Exchange. As for the present personnel, I am confident that USIA Director John Reinhardt is the right man to take on these added responsibilities.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 17, State: 6/77)

7 An unknown hand underlined “HIRC on Tuesday, June 21.”

8 Not attached. Brzezinski’s memorandum to the President is printed as Document 71.
Attached are the outlines of Secretary Vance’s proposed reorganization plan for USIA (Tab A).\textsuperscript{2} He recommends that State should be allowed to begin briefing the Congress on the outlines of their recommendations to you. Warren Christopher goes before the Fascell Subcommittee today, June 21.\textsuperscript{3}

Bert Lance observes that more work is necessary before Administration positions are presented to the Congress. Therefore, he recommends any departmental testimony should simply discuss alternatives and issues and not indicate preferences at this time.

I agree with Bert’s recommendation (Tab B).\textsuperscript{4} You should be aware there are differences within the government and among your advisors on the degree of independence which is desirable for USIA, the relationship of USIA and Voice of America, and the relative autonomy of cultural exchange programs. Cy’s proposals deserve the most careful study for they will have a major impact on the US cultural programs and information efforts throughout the rest of your Administration.

**RECOMMENDATION:**

That guidance be given to State to focus on issues and alternatives in their testimony before Congress and that OMB work with State on refining their proposals for your decision.\textsuperscript{5}

\textsuperscript{1} Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 17, State: 6/77. Confidential.

\textsuperscript{2} Not attached. See Document 64.

\textsuperscript{3} See Document 72.

\textsuperscript{4} Not attached. See footnotes 3 and 5, Document 70.

\textsuperscript{5} Carter checked the approve option. Below it, he wrote: “Do not outline any organizational structure until I can study it & decide.”
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:

I welcome this opportunity to testify in the course of your hearings on “Public Diplomacy and the future.” The Secretary and I are encouraged by the careful attention you are giving to the inquiry, and by your interest in the larger issues of international communications. I would like to pledge our cooperation in working with the Congress in the review of policy in this area.

Let me begin by putting public diplomacy into the context of its purpose and place in the foreign policy structure of the United States. The purposes of public diplomacy are

1. To ensure that other nations more accurately understand this country, its values, institutions, and policies;
2. To ensure that our understanding of other nations and of our interrelationship with them is informed and accurate;
3. To ensure that this mutual understanding is bolstered by collaborative individual and institutional relationships across cultural lines; and
4. To ensure that, as the international policies of our government are formed, we take into account the values, interests, and priorities of publics abroad.

The audience for public diplomacy defines its vital place in the conduct of American foreign policy. Public diplomacy compliments and reinforces traditional government-to-government diplomacy by seeking to communicate with the people of other nations. In particular, it seeks to establish a dialogue with those who are importantly involved now or are likely to be involved in the formulation and discussion of attitudes and ideas which affect the United States. I speak here of people in other nations who are active in the academic world, the

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worlds of art and culture, in communications, or in government—those who are future leaders of their nations.

As you have emphasized, Mr. Chairman, the issues of public diplomacy are far broader than internal government organization. They also concern the wider span of international communications in this age of information. This wider span embraces such issues as satellite television transmissions, COMSAT receiver stations in underdeveloped countries and the free dissemination of news. As you know, we are preparing for international conferences which will consider some of these problems.

We must address these individual issues within the context of a comprehensive view by the United States. This comprehensive view is defined by three governing principles:

—*First*, we are committed to freedom of information and expression and the fundamental human right of every individual to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any medium, and regardless of frontiers;

—*Second*, we recognize the vital importance of communications in the development of peoples and nations and of friendly relations between them. All people should have a chance to share in the potential benefits of modern mass communications. Thus, we are determined to help develop and increase the means of communication among peoples. At the same time, we are determined to preserve the multiplicity and independence of sources of information;

—*Third*, the international flow of information and ideas must be two-way. There is a current imbalance—for example, much more information flows to the so-called Third World than flows from the Third World. One example of our willingness to help correct some of the imbalance is our long-standing offer to share our knowledge and expertise in the use of our ATS–6 communications satellite.

The specific and concrete steps we take on the whole spectrum of international communications will be consistent with these principles.

We reviewed public diplomacy from the perspective of its purposes as well as the principles outlined above. In this connection we have identified five specific functions of public diplomacy:

—“Cultural exchange,” which includes the exchange of people in both directions and the forging of institutional links. The Fulbright program, which sends scholars abroad and brings foreign scholars here to pursue their studies, is a major example of this function. It is managed by the State Department at home and by USIS overseas.

—“General information” consists of activities undertaken to project abroad important aspects of American society. These activities include exhibits, libraries, seminars, lectures and much of VOA’s programming. Most of these activities are managed abroad by USIA. Programs such
as tours of performing artists are managed at home by the State Department and overseas by USIA.

—“Policy information” is a combination of background and policy guidance on current and long-term issues for use in explaining our policies abroad. This information is obtained from State Department sources and statements and is disseminated by USIA to our posts overseas and to VOA. VOA draws upon this information for the policy commentary and analyses that it broadcasts. The subjects cover such issues as human rights, SALT and the Middle East. I will note in passing that I have differentiated between “general information” and “policy information” because others have done so, but I regard the dichotomy as somewhat artificial.

—“Public affairs advice” represents an attempt to assess and evaluate foreign public opinion and attitudes and thus to inform the U.S. agencies involved in foreign policy. For example, USIA was able to provide a survey on European attitudes toward the issue of human rights prior to President Carter’s trip to Europe.2

—“News reporting” is performed principally by VOA. Factual and unbiased reporting of all the news is the key to the integrity and credibility of the Voice. We must remain alert to ensure that the news function reflects the highest standards of American journalism.

It is through these five functions of public diplomacy that we are able, as a nation, to seek respect for our opinions and to pay respect to the opinions of others. We recognize that, in a world of information, it is no longer sufficient to reach only existing power structures of other nations. Their own policies are affected by the knowledge and attitudes of their citizens. It is especially important to recognize that younger generations in other countries will soon occupy positions of influence not only in government, but in the media, the academic community, the cultural world and other important segments of a society.

We are conducting a comprehensive review of our organization for public diplomacy. In this review, we have taken into account other studies, including, Mr. Chairman, your 1968 report on “The Future of

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2 See Document 48. The President departed Washington on May 5 in order to attend the G–7 Economic Summit in London May 7–8. He then attended a four-nation May 9 meeting on Berlin before departing for Geneva to meet with Syrian President Asad. He then returned to London for the May 10 North Atlantic Council meeting. The President’s remarks in Washington and London, the transcript of a news conference following the summit, and texts of the joint declaration of the international summit meeting, the declaration on Berlin, and the NAC communiqué are printed in Department of State Bulletin, June 6, 1977, pp. 581–607.
Through this process, we identified important shortcomings in the present organizations.

We have found that the components of public diplomacy have been fragmented. The responsibility for cultural exchanges and some of the general information activities are split between USIA overseas and the State Department at home.

We have also concluded that our international relations in the years ahead require more serious attention to public diplomacy than has been given in the past. Public diplomacy has been too distant from the processes by which our foreign policy is conducted—both for the contribution it should make when policies are decided and the support it can provide when those policies are in operation.

Specifically, the dissemination of accurate, ample, and timely policy guidance to our missions overseas and to VOA has been hampered by the lack of full communication between the State Department and USIA, despite the good intentions of all concerned. Similarly, the use of public affairs advice has been impaired by the lack of a close relationship between those who prepare this analysis and those who rely on it in the State Department.

Our review of the issues and questions involved has caused us to conclude that reorganization is required. The form of the reorganization has been under intensive study, but no final decision has been made by the President. The Administration is following your hearings with interest and care, as we proceed to shape our final recommendations and decisions.

Of course, Mr. Chairman, organizations are only as good as the people who staff and run them. In this respect we are indeed fortunate. At USIA, Director John Reinhardt and Deputy Director Charles Bray are already providing the kind of leadership that bodes well for public diplomacy. At State, Assistant Secretary Joseph Duffy’s deep commitment to educational and cultural exchange is already making itself felt. Equally important, USIA, VOA, and CU are staffed by competent professionals. The fact that present organizational arrangements work as well as they do is a tribute to their skill and dedication.

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In undertaking a reorganization of our public diplomacy program in the contemporary world, we will test all present activities for their relevance to current and future needs, and their effectiveness. We will identify new activities that need to be undertaken and establish principles for the management of these activities, to assure their efficiency and effectiveness in furthering our long-term national interest.

This is an important opportunity for the Congress, the Administration, and the American people. Therefore, I will be pleased to answer your questions, but I also wish to hear your advice and comments.

4 In his June 21 Evening Report to the President, Vance highlighted that day’s Subcommittee hearings: “The session was harmonious. Fascell and John Buchanan stressed that the Administration should act as quickly as possible on the reorganization question. Fascell expressed disagreement with the idea that exchange programs would be tainted by closer association with USIA; supported involving the USIA Director more closely in the foreign policy-making process; and plugged for more money for VOA modernization and cultural presentations abroad.” In the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, the President noted: “We should expedite.” (Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 37, State Department Evening Reports, 6/77)

73. Memorandum From the Advisor (National Security), Planning and Program Advisory Staff, Office of Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency (Hanson) to the Deputy Director for Policy and Plans (Schneidman)

Washington, June 27, 1977

REFERENCE

Notes on “The New IOP”

1. Relations with the NSC:

We’ve gotten off to a good start. I agree with the principle of showing them what we can do for them, then gradually ask for things from them, when a propitious time develops.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Associate Directorate for Programs, Subject Files of Basic Operating Documents, 1969–1982, Entry P–100, Basic Documents—1977 [A]. No classification marking. Sent through Dizard, who did not initial the memorandum. Hanson did not also initial the memorandum. An unknown hand wrote “Mr. [Alan] Carter” in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.
I propose two things:

A. More structured NSC briefings: These have been excellent as an indication of NSC goodwill and as (sometimes) providing useful news policy guidance on stories relating to the White House. But what one expects from the NSC is a sampling of policy thinking, an indication of future trends, a source for answers to the really hard questions.

I therefore suggest that, when the current cycle of get-acquainted briefing ends, we propose to the NSC that we shift to a system in which USIS gets briefings at our request (not too often, of course) and that we prepare for them in advance. The appropriate IOP/P specialist (Hill for economics, e.g.) would analyze what we really need to know that we can’t get from State, write a list of questions, then assemble the media-area group that will go to the NSC, pre-brief them, distribute the list of proposed questions and ask for comments or changes. Then when the group finally troops off to the White House, we will be ready to make the most of the time of our very top experts. This will avoid the somewhat unproductive use of time at some of the recent NSC briefings. This leads to a related subject. . .

B. USIA receipt of info copies of PRMs and PDs

Unless and until USIA actually again gets the right to take part in PRMs (NSC studies or Program Review Memoranda) there is no need to set up a special NSC staff such as existed from 1969–71 under Dick Monsen and me, when our workload of NSSMs from Kissinger’s NSC was heavy.

But there is a more basic need for IOP to have the PRMs and PDs (Presidential Directives)—the latter are the final decisions made by the President after the PRMs have been discussed in the NSC itself. This basic need is not for participation, but for information—to keep up with the new policy thinking. There is no way to do this that is half as efficient as reading the PRMs and PDs. Actually, in the case of the PDs, it is really important that we have them, at least all but the most sensitive, because we might violate policy through sheer ignorance of what the President has decided.

The PRMs and PDs would be an invaluable aid in our thinking and planning ahead. It is particularly important in the complex fields—such as national security, economics, and science—because these take the longest to think through and come up with accurate formulations which are as clear and simple and non-technical as possible. The regional PRMs are also important.

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2 See Document 56.

3 Reference is to Senior Economic Adviser Robert B. Hill. In the right-hand margin next to this sentence, an unknown hand wrote: “good theory.”
We are really in left field as far as PRMs are concerned. Out of some 25 which have been prepared, USIA has received exactly two—on Latin America and on human rights.\(^4\) I can testify that we need them badly. For example, my job of preparing to guide our program on nuclear non-proliferation would be much easier if I had access to the PRMs in this field.

If the NSC is nervous about leaks (as they may well be after the leak of PRM 24\(^5\) ) we might accept the privilege of reading the PRMs on NSC or State turf. This would be second best but, I think, better than nothing. Or we might borrow and return them to NSC.\(^6\)

I suggest that we ask for all the PRMs, strictly for information, both functional (security, economics) and regional. IOP should be the focal point, and we should see that areas got a chance to look at them. We might consider excluding some of the most sensitive subjects which we don’t really need, such as SALT.

A major use of the PRMs would be to better prepare for our contacts with NSC staff, as discussed under #1 above.\(^7\)

If necessary, we could mention in low key to the NSC that never in USIA’s history has the Agency been so uninformed on policy study documents as now.

2. “Help” function

The big functional gap in IOP is that no one is charged with generalist intellectual leadership of the slow media. IOP/G does this for fast media, but slow media do have a peculiar need for an intellectual nerve center, a spark or catalyst of ideas, and \textit{not only} in certain selected subject areas. So I propose the creation of a “generalist catalyst” staff within IOP. This should have enough people in it so that there would be at least one for each medium, preferably with some experience in that medium. The essential qualification would be a lively, wide-ranging mind exploring a variety of subjects and ideas. Beecham has a point: somebody should read their magazines. Not only that, but have discussions in the early planning stage, to explore this or that possibility.


\(^6\) An unknown hand underlined “borrow and return” and wrote in the margin below it “and promise not to use our Xerox machine?”

\(^7\) An unknown hand drew a rightward pointing arrow from “better” to “prepare.”
These bull sessions should often—perhaps always—include representatives from one or more areas as appropriate.

All this comprises a separate function, “help”, which is conceptually different from “planning, guidance, and evaluation”, the IOP functions as listed by John Reinhardt. It would not only do a lot of good, it would also help IOP’s image with the media. I know whereof I speak: I am a graduate of IPS.

3. **Content emphases**

   The country plan system and IOP’s role in it seems pretty good to me as is. But it seems to me we need more flexibility in themes and content emphases.

   The way we do this now is through the precepts and area program memoranda. It seems to me that setting these up for a whole year at a time is too rigid. Perhaps we should consider cutting the period to six months, or maybe a better way would be to set them for a year but with the understanding that one or more could be changed during the year as the need arises.

   Perhaps precepts are outdated and should be replaced by campaigns, much more specific and structured than the general language of policy themes. Finally, maybe the way to do it is to have one or two basic themes and one or two campaigns each year.

   This leads me to . . .

4. **Media coordination**

   Another obvious and long-standing hole in the USIA structure is operational coordination of the media. Some abortive attempts were made very early in the Agency’s history, but none recently. I do not have any strong feelings about whether this is sited in IOP or elsewhere, but it has been a crying need for many years. Frank Shakespeare carried media autonomy to a harmful extreme. It’s time to finally get ourselves organized.

5. **IOR**

   IOR is slow, over-bureacratic, and deficient in good analysis. It should be oriented again, as it once was, to policy and regional questions. Some good regional experts should be hired—maybe some of the same ones who were fired or left when Fredman radically reorganized IOR early in the Marks era.\(^8\) It is hard to get good analysis quickly, but that is what a communications agency needs.

\(^8\) Reference is to Marks’s tenure as Director of USIA during the Johnson administration.
Formation of Middle East Peace Effort Working Group

Acting on the conviction that public diplomacy can make a critical contribution to the U.S. effort to bring peace to the Middle East, INA has formed a “Middle East Working Group” to increase and focus Agency programming in support of this peace effort.

The principal function of the Working Group will be to stimulate development of programs and media materials for use by the concerned posts (and VOA) in communicating with appropriate audiences about U.S. policy in the Middle East. In this pre-negotiation stage of the peace effort, we see a basic imperative to “keep the record straight” on just where the U.S. Government stands. It is also important to inform area elites of U.S. public and media attitudes toward Middle East issues. The group will also explore ways to take advantage of the USG role as “honest broker” by making available to the Israeli leadership and public opinion the viewpoints of moderate Arabs, and to Arab leaders the opinions of moderate Israelis.

We foresee that we may have to ask for additional funding, beyond that granted in the Mid-year Program Review. We are particularly interested in expanding activity in the exchange of persons field, and we are working with CU on cost projections of several promising projects.

The Middle East Working Group will meet in INA every Monday at 12:30 pm for a brown-bag working session to consider new program ideas and to evaluate programs already underway. We are inviting attendance by representatives of concerned State and USIA offices. INA Desk Officer Bill Thompson will serve as coordinator of the Working Group.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of the Director, Executive Secretariat, Secretariat Staff, Correspondence Files, 1973–1980, Entry P–104, Box 127, 7702350–7702359. Unclassified. Copies were sent to Bray and Schneidman. Reinhardt and Fraser initialed the memorandum, indicating that they saw it.
75. Memorandum From Gregory Treverton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)\(^1\)

Washington, June 28, 1977

SUBJECT

Meeting on USIA and CU, Thursday, June 30, 11:30 a.m.

Wellford will chair the meeting. If things continue on their current track, there are really five issues to be discussed:

— **Timing of a decision.** Can the question of USIA/CU organization be put to the President soon, or should it be deferred for further study? Deferral is not taken to be a serious possibility, with Vance pressing his proposal\(^2\) and the Administration on record to Congress with the promise of a plan. If you want to try to put the horse before the cart, it will take a major effort, probably a memo to the President arguing that reorganization should not be pulled out of the air but rather follow a careful look at what the U.S. wants to do, and why.

— **Should USIA and CU be merged.** On that there is general agreement.

— **Can we build a searching review of programs into the reorganization.** Consolidation will not address your concerns about the quality and imaginativeness of USIA programs; indeed it might distract attention from them. If you choose not to hold up decisions on organization, at a minimum, I recommend that as part of any consolidation we secure agreement to an ongoing process of outside review, carried on by an NSC/State/OMB/USIA group.

— **How will a consolidated USIA/CU relate to the State Department.** Here the lines are clearly drawn: Vance would like an AID-relationship; most others prefer something akin to USIA’s current status—indepen-dence with special links to the White House; an ACDA-style relationship to State is another possibility.

— **How much independence for VOA.** There is general agreement that VOA should not—and probably cannot, due to Congress—be an independent agency. But people differ on other possibilities. Vance’s memo

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\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 9, International Communication Agency: 2–7/77. No classification marking. Sent for information. An unknown hand drew a downward pointing arrow at Treverton’s name in the “from” line. Aaron initialed the top-right hand corner of the memorandum, indicating that he had seen it. According to an attached NSC Correspondence Profile, a copy was sent to Gates, and Aaron noted the memorandum on June 30. (Ibid.) A record of the meeting has not been found.

\(^2\) See Document 64.
has hard words for VOA’s lack of responsiveness to policy guidelines, and by leaving VOA within USIA but bringing the latter into State, his proposal clearly intends to increase the control over VOA. Others argue that the current situation is about the best that can be done, that some tension between VOA’s desires and the comfort of State desk officers is inevitable and not all bad. Still others would like to go further in declaring VOA’s editorial independence.

(BIB and RFE/RL are issues with some relation to the USIA/CU question. But I strongly believe they should be kept apart; nothing is lost by considering BIB separately later on.)

**Vance Proposal**

Vance concludes that the “optimum solution” is to consolidate “our public diplomacy resources.” He would place the consolidated foreign information-cultural organization (including the VOA) in an AID-like relationship to the Department of State, on the following argument:

a) to maintain the status quo would cause us to lose an opportunity to correct a longstanding organizational defect and to improve foreign policy guidance in our information programs;

b) consolidation would simplify communication and facilitate broad program operations involving both exchange of persons and media products;

c) the various information activities complement one another, and to fragment them would result in weakened programs and less effective coordination;

d) an independent VOA would make difficult effective guidance by State and would “aggravate” the present tendency of VOA to act outside of established policy;

e) in an AID-like relationship it would be easier to integrate the conduct of public diplomacy with traditional diplomacy, and to achieve greater efficiency in our international information and cultural operational activities.

Vance argues that the risks (such as possible reduction in the Department’s influence over the exchange program and greater congressional resistance to funding exchanges) would be minimized if USIA programs were brought into a new relationship with the Department, comparable to that of AID. The exchange programs’ present organizational and budgetary autonomy to that extent would be maintained.

Vance’s is an argument for greater central direction and control of “public diplomacy” activities. It does not address directly the issues of what is done, where and how well.
II. Introduction

Regular readers of the annual reports of the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs will have detected over the years a similarity of theme in their introductions. In one way or another, with degrees of intensity ranging from mild observation to indignant accusation, they have pointed out that the importance of international educational and cultural exchange to our foreign policy has never been adequately recognized—particularly in terms of appropriations.

The successive Commissions have had their “up” moments and their “down” moments on this subject. Thus the Commission’s first report, issued in April 1963, was appropriately entitled *A Beacon of Hope*; its sixth report, however, issued in 1969, was plaintively titled *Is Anyone Listening*; and the title of its eleventh, *A Necessary and a Noble Task*, issued in 1975, managed to convey at one and the same time hope and despair.

Though the titles and the tones of the reports have changed, the underlying theme has almost always been that the beacon of hope represented by international exchange has not penetrated the surrounding darkness as deeply as it should have.

The three reports with which members of the present Commission have been associated reflect the up-and-down spirits of their predecessors. Our *Eleventh Report*, noting with satisfaction the steady rise in appropriations for the State Department’s programs (from $31,425,000 in 1969 to $54,300,000 in 1975) and the growing acceptance of the reality of an interdependent world, stated optimistically:

As acceptance of this reality has grown, so too has recognition of the role international educational and cultural exchange can play in

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2 Copies of the previous annual reports are ibid.
reconstituting the human community . . . The climate is more conducive than it has been for the development of effective exchange programs.

A year later we were less sanguine about the growing acceptance of the reality of an interdependent world; and we were downright concerned about the State Department’s exchange budget. On the first point, our Twelfth Report said:

There were during the year a good many developments in our relations with other countries to suggest that perhaps the growing interdependence of the world, on which we insisted so strongly in our Eleventh Report, had fallen victim to renascent nationalisms . . .

On the second point it noted with alarm that the 1976 appropriation for the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU) of the State Department of $55 million meant in practical terms, because of increasing costs, a substantial reduction in the size of the exchange program. We estimated that an appropriation of $90 million would be required to sustain a program at the 1966 level—and by implication recommended funding in at least that amount.

Now, one year later, we still feel that the CU budget is too small and have stated our belief that it should be increased. The Chairman spoke for the Commission when he testified as follows on February 28, 1977, before the House Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations:

My purpose in appearing here today is to support the appropriation request of the Department of State for the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs in the amount of $70,500,000 for the next fiscal year. It is my considered opinion that the work of this Bureau is of vital importance to the resolution of some of the complex political problems which the United States faces in its relations with other countries. My experience as Director of the United States Information Agency [1965–69], and my relations with the Department of State during the past several years as Chairman of the Advisory Commission have convinced me that cultural and educational exchange is an indispensable aid to the achievement of our foreign policy objectives.

Our first recommendation in this Thirteenth Report is that the Congress appropriate as a minimum for the exchange program the $70.5 million which the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has authorized the Department to request.

But once again we feel encouraged to believe that the importance of “public diplomacy,” of which international exchange is an important part, is gaining the recognition it deserves in our foreign policy. We do not believe that this is a partisan development attributable solely to a change in Administrations; and yet it is true that the new Administration appears ready to breathe new life into the exchange program. Here are the main reasons why we are once more optimistic.
• The appropriation situation is promising. The House has authorized an appropriation of $75.5 million, the Senate $80.5 million. The House Appropriations Committee has, disappointingly, reported out a recommendation for only $66.5 million; but the Senate Appropriations Committee has not yet been heard from. When these disparities are ironed out, we trust that the Department will receive, as we have recommended, all (or more than) it has requested.

• Organizational problems which have hampered the operation of our international cultural programs appear on the way to resolution. The Commission called attention to these in March 1975 in a report which it instigated, *International Information, Education and Cultural Relations: Recommendations for the Future*. Three months later, the Murphy Commission focused attention on them in its report, *Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Affairs,* noting:

> The ability of this country to make its views prevail and its policies succeed will derive less from its wealth and power, and more from such respect and support as the rest of the world accords to its values and purposes; however, neither foreign policy advocacy nor the building of long-range understanding between the United States and other nations is now being handled with full effectiveness.

Now the new Administration has made it clear that it intends to tackle the problem. The General Accounting Office has prepared for Congress a detailed analysis of the former report. The United States Information Agency (USIA) has defined its position on reorganization, and the State Department has done likewise. A proposed amendment by Senator Percy to the Department’s appropriation bill has precipitated action in the Senate; and in the House, hearings have begun on the various reorganization proposals. It is therefore reasonable to expect that by the end of this year our government will be better organized to exploit the possibilities of public diplomacy.

• Public awareness of, and support for, international exchange, have continued to mount. There is abundant evidence of this interest, none more striking than the media coverage accorded to the symposium held last May in Washington to commemorate the 30th anniversary of the “Fulbright Program.” News stories, editorials, and TV

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3 See footnote 6, Document 30.
4 See Document 50.
5 See footnote 2, Document 49; footnote 5, Document 51; Document 63; and Document 72.
commentary praised its past and pled for its future in terms like this from a *Newsweek* editorial:

Now, as the Fulbright-Hays program . . . observes its thirtieth anniversary . . . the need for such continuing educational exchange is unquestioned—and imperative. Unquestioned because of its consistent success over the years; imperative because the peace and progress of mankind are now, more than ever in the past, linked to the civilizing and humanizing of relations between nations.

- Most encouraging of all, President Carter himself has, in word and deed, demonstrated a commitment to the principle and the practice of international exchange which must set the tone for his Administration. It was characteristic of him that in his inaugural speech he addressed not only his fellow Americans but also “citizens of the world,” on the theme of shaping “a world order that is more responsive to human operations.”7 Subsequently he gave proof that these were not idle words by, for example: his vigorous personal participation in cultural events; his clear emphasis on the place human rights will play in the formation of U.S. foreign policy; his espousal of a “Friendship Force” which would extend to thousands of Americans the people-to-people experience he himself had found so useful.8 Above all the Commission is encouraged by his promise to the Organization of American States (OAS), quoted later in this report, that “we plan to explore with your governments new people-to-people programs, an increase in professional and scientific exchanges, and other ways of strengthening the ties that already link us.” It is again characteristic of the President that scarcely 6 weeks after making this promise he sent Mrs. Carter to Latin America to, as he put it, “elaborate some of the new directions contained in my OAS speech and to discuss with Latin American leaders ways in which we can cooperate most effectively to advance them.”9

The Commission naturally welcomes the Administration’s apparent intention to accord educational and cultural exchange a more prominent role in the conduct of foreign affairs and is eager to cooperate in the ways envisaged by its enabling legislation.

The Commission’s observations and recommendations on subjects which have concerned it during the past year—and for several previous years—are summarized in Chapter 1 (Summary and Recommendations) and Chapter III (Report on Activities) of this report. In Chapter

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8 See Document 7.
9 See footnote 2, Document 52, and Document 53.
V (The Future of the Commission), it has recommended a review of the Commission’s responsibilities and appointments consistent with them.

It is our hope that this Thirteenth Report of the Commission will do more than provide a record of a year’s activity. We hope, rather, that it will suggest to the Executive Branch and the Congress new ways in which the Commission can make a real contribution to an important aspect of U.S. foreign policy—one to which the new Administration has wisely decided to give a high priority.

[Omitted here are Section III: Report on Activities; Section IV: The Commission in 1976–77; Section V: The Future of the Commission; and five Appendices.]

77. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in West Berlin

Washington, July 6, 1977, 2102Z

156755. For P and C from the Deputy Director. Repeat USIA 18505–U.

This cable contains programs guidelines which have been issued by the Director and distributed here. They will guide your country plan program and project activities for the coming year. I hope you will see in them an important emphasis on (1) focus and (2) quality in our efforts to support U.S. policy objectives. They presume intellectual rigor applied to a commonly defined set of purposes.

These are the guidelines:

“As currently constituted, USIA has a two-fold legislative mandate: (1) to explain U.S. official policies and (2) to project American society. To ensure that this mandate is effectively interpreted and applied, the Director has established basic guidelines for Agency programming, both in the field and in Washington. He has directed that Agency managers—at all levels, in Washington and abroad—apply the guide-

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770240–0666. Unclassified. Sent for information. Drafted by Alan Carter; cleared by Bray and Schneidman, by telephone by Ward (EUR/CE), and for information by Fraser; approved for information by Baskey (EUR/EX).

2 Not found. The text of the guidelines, as sent in USIA 18505, is in an undated paper entitled “Guidelines for Agency Programming.” (National Archives, RG 306, Associate Directorate for Programs, Subject Files of Basic Operating Documents, 1969–1982, Entry P–100, Basic Documents—1977 [A]).
lines immediately to the current country plan and ZBB reviews. These guidelines are:

“1. The purpose of USIS country programs is to support U.S. policy objectives. These objectives will be based on only two sources: issues defined in the mission PARM and worldwide priority subjects specifically approved by the Director. No other policy objectives exist for the purposes of programming. PARM objectives to which a post addresses itself are to be reworded in the country plan as public affairs objectives.

“2. Programming not addressed specifically to policy issues (‘policy explication’) will be designed to strengthen audience perceptions of significant trends, enduring strengths and values in American society. This programming, too, must be demonstrably relevant to the stated objectives of each post.

“3. A country program, and each of its constituent parts, require a clear-cut rationale, articulated in terms of (1) PARM objectives, (2) global guidance from the director and (3) an analysis of the points of communications tension between the U.S. and host country. Program rationales are subject to constant challenge by management at all levels. The question is not ‘what are we doing,’ but ‘what are we attempting to accomplish and why?’

“4. Programs and projects must be clearly relevant to the promotion of PARM-identified U.S. interests in the host country or global guidelines from the Director. Programs and projects will not be undertaken simply because they are within our capability. A related question is whether we are trying to accomplish too much, and therefore accomplishing less than we might if our resources were more highly focused.

“5. All locally produced programming will meet all of the criteria stated herein. The totality of programs will be in a balance appropriate to public affairs priorities.

“6. Country plans should continue to be based on present audience definitions.

“7. The post’s rationale and post activities presuppose an understanding of the host country influence structure.

“8. The country plan, once approved, will govern program decisions and resource commitments throughout the year. It is a ‘living’ document, not a candidate for consignment to the files, and will be the basis for all judgments on a post’s program rationale and activities.

“Area offices will be responsible for drafting, in consultation with IOP, a response to each current country plan submission. The responses will convey judgments on each country plan submission in the light of these guidelines. The message will be reviewed and signed by the Deputy Director.

“Where, in the judgment of an area Assistant Director, the current country plan submission does not reflect these guidelines, posts will
be required to submit a new plan which will be due in Washington by cable not later than September 1.

“Allocations of FY 1978 funds in Washington and at overseas posts will be based on these submissions.” (End guidelines)

It is our intention, in the course of the next planning cycle, to meld our ZBB-country plan processes and to relate both more closely to the State Department’s PARM process. This will result in more productive programming while lightening the paper load on you and on us.

The area directors, working with IOP, are now using the guidelines as they review your country plan submission and project proposals. I shall communicate their comments and reviews to you by telegram early in August.³

In all cases, PAO’s will be asked to adjust their present country plan submission in the light of Washington comments. In some cases, PAO’s will be asked to submit a new plan, if the present submission does not adequately reflect the guidelines; the due date will be September 1.

You should read these guidelines in the context of the Director’s PAO letter of June 17⁴ which transmitted the transcript of meetings he and I conducted with senior agency officers.

If you have questions about the guidelines, please cable them. The Director and I trust you will interpret these guidelines rigorously and will regard it as a major personal responsibility to bring purpose, focus, indispensability and creativity to all that we do.

Vance

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³ Not found.
⁴ See Document 68.
WASHINGTON, July 19, 1977

SUBJECT
A Further Word—But Perhaps Not the Last Word

Yesterday afternoon you focussed on my comment about the political fluidity in Europe and questioned how the USIS presence could affect it. Our presence and activities probably cannot affect it materially. This instability is one of the more important elements of the environment in which we operate. The reason I stressed this point was to illustrate that even in this economically and socially advantaged region there is no guarantee of stability or even constancy of purpose. Therefore, one major USIS role is to constantly reinforce the U.S. interest and relationship to Europe. No matter what political developments ensue, a firm foundation for the U.S. connection is vital to our interests. The U.S. (and USIS) presence and activities with elites help to focus and confirm the broad political and strategic framework within which political events develop.

Concerning your other question, I’ve attached a spellout of the highlights of what USIS Europe would lose at 95% of current resources in this road of the ZBB exercise.
SUBJECT

U.S. Policy in East Asia

As a followup to our discussion of U.S. policy in East Asia at yesterday’s ZBB meeting, I am attaching a copy of Secretary Vance’s speech before the Asia Society on June 29. In it, particularly on pages 2, 3, 4, 9, 10 and 12, you will find explicit statements aimed at reassuring East Asians of our continuing significant involvement in the area.

In addition, following are some extracts from State’s East Asia Bureau’s ZBB submission touching on the same points:

“The United States must remain an Asian-Pacific power” (p. 1)

“The SEAsian countries are fearful that we may be turning our backs on them in the aftermath of Viet Nam...” (p. 1)

“. . . we should also be conscious of the political need to develop such non-military supports as economic ties, as our direct security role is perceived to decline” (p. 3)

“As our ground forces are withdrawn over the next few years, (Korea) we will want to maintain confidence through other means . . .” (p. 3)

These are but a few extracts which support this theme, but read together with the Vance speech and other policy statements, which can be supplied, I don’t think there should be any serious doubt that this Administration believes shoring up the confidence of East Asians in America’s long-term staying power and positive involvement in the area is real and necessary.

This is not to say that our continued involvement will be in the same form as it existed before Viet Nam fell. That, obviously, is not the case, but that also is another issue.

I trust you don’t mind this effort at policy explication.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of the Director, Executive Secretariat, Secretariat Staff, Correspondence Files, 1973–1980, Entry P–104, Box 130, 7702800–7702809. Confidential. Copies were sent to Reinhardt and IOP. Bray placed a check-mark on the memorandum, indicating that he had seen it; Liu also initialed the memorandum. A stamped notation on the reverse side of the first page of the memorandum indicates that it was received on July 19 at 4:42 p.m.

80. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Reinhardt) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, July 22, 1977

SUBJECT
PRC Jamming of VOA Chinese Broadcasts

During your conversations in Peking, you may wish to raise the subject of PRC jamming of Voice of America Chinese broadcasts.

Since 1973, we have hoped that improving U.S.-Chinese relations would lead to the end of PRC jamming of these broadcasts. To date, however, the jamming continues.

The point could be made that no other country now jams VOA broadcasts. The Soviets ceased doing so in 1973. The U.S. has always considered jamming an unfriendly act; its cessation would mark a significant improvement in our relationship with the PRC. Moreover, frequent Western press accounts cite the PRC as the only country which currently jams the Voice, a fact which damages the image that Peking seems to wish to cultivate internationally.

VOA Chinese language broadcasts—like those directed to other countries—consist of a comprehensive and authoritative report of international and U.S. news, of news analyses and other news-related materials (such as U.S. and international editorial round-ups) and Americana features, including English teaching and music.

Since the U.S. continually protests Soviet interference with the free flow of information, failure to raise this issue with the Chinese could leave the Administration vulnerable to charges of inconsistency, both from the Soviets and from the Congress, should the question be raised in connection with public debate on the conduct of our relations with China.

If you should need more information on this subject, I would be glad to provide it.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of the Director, Executive Secretariat, Secretariat Staff, Correspondence Files, 1973–1980, Entry P–104, Box 131, 7702930–7702939. Confidential. Drafted by Tuch on July 15 and redrafted by Fraser. Copies were sent to Bray, Tuch, Morton Smith, and IOR/DIS. A notation in an unknown hand indicates that the memorandum was hand-delivered to the Department of State on July 22.

2 Vance traveled to China August 20–26 to meet with Huang Hua, Huang Chen, and other Chinese officials. For the memoranda of conversation of these meetings, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XIII, China, Documents 47–54.
Washington, July 23, 1977, 0055Z


1. As you may already know, Mort Smith, formerly the Director of the East Asian Bureau Press Office, has assumed duties as Assistant Director of USIA for East Asia and the Pacific. I consider Mort’s appointment to be a unique opportunity to establish an especially close working relationship between State and USIA in developing a public posture for our diplomatic efforts.

2. Within the next few weeks USIA Area Directors will ask all PAOs to take a new, tough look at their country plans; particularly in light of the PARM process and USG objectives. They will need your help and the help of your Mission in making their programs address U.S. foreign policy goals more clearly and directly. Your personal attention and positive guidance will be a vital element in this process.

3. I would welcome any comments that you, in collaboration with your PAOs, might have on the future role of public diplomacy in support of our policies in Asia.  

Vance

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770263-1068. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Kenneth Quinn and Morton Smith; approved by Holbrooke.

2 For a response from the Embassy in Jakarta, see Document 83.
Washington, July 26, 1977

SUBJECT

President Carter’s Speech on US–USSR Relations

The President’s speech at Charleston\(^2\) provided an excellent opportunity to answer anti-U.S. comment appearing in Soviet and other media. Because of its importance, I thought you might be interested in a quick rundown of how it was handled and our plans for the future.

To obtain the quickest and widest distribution of the speech at the time of delivery, the Voice of America carried it live worldwide and then rebroadcast it in prime time to all areas of the world. The speech was also broadcast in full in Russian and major Soviet languages. Other language services broadcast extensive excerpts. Followups were provided with correspondent reports and an analysis of the key points in the speech.

Copies of the speech were sent by Wireless File to all posts and a VTR was produced of the entire speech, especially for USIS Moscow and Leningrad and also made available worldwide.

Copies were also given to resident foreign correspondents in Washington and New York who were invited to our press centers to hear the speech live.

Looking ahead, we have and will continue to urge all media to maximize the key points in the speech. We told the PAO’s of the importance of the speech, urged that they bring it to the attention of the Chiefs of Mission and insure maximum dissemination among key audiences.

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 9, International Communication Agency: 2–7/77. No classification marking. According to another copy of the memorandum, it was drafted by Thurber; cleared by Schneidman, Fraser, and in I/SS; and approved by Reinhardt. (National Archives, RG 306, Office of the Director, Executive Secretariat, Secretariat Staff, Correspondence Files, 1973–1980, Entry P–104, 7702920–7702929) In a July 28 memorandum, Brzezinski thanked Reinhardt for his July 26 memorandum, noting: “It was very helpful to learn how USIA handled the speech and your plans for the future.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 9, International Communication Agency: 2–7/77)

2 Reference is to the President’s July 21 address before members of the Southern Legislative Conference, attending their annual meeting in Charleston. For the text, see Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book II, pp. 1309–1315. The address is also printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 52.
To back up our posts, we will proceed along the following lines here during the next few weeks:

The Voice of America has asked its overseas correspondents to file reports from their vantage points on foreign reaction. U.S. and foreign media reaction will be used in opinion roundups. VOA is also considering a “Press Conference USA” program to discuss US–USSR relations using the speech as a reference point. A videotape of this program will be made for worldwide use.

Our press service is preparing an analytical article on the speech and will do a discussion piece interviewing Soviet experts. We are considering the possibility of using the speech as an insert in the next edition of America Illustrated, now coming off the presses. Plans are being made to reproduce the speech as a pamphlet in East European and major world languages.

In addition, we have asked our posts to send us foreign media reaction on the speech. Reports of early reactions have already been sent to your office.

83. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State

Jakarta, August 1, 1977, 0830Z


1. In general, public diplomacy of the new administration in this area has been effective. New policies have been enunciated clearly in statements by high level officials and such statements and backgrounds have been given timely dissemination through Wireless File and Departmental messages. This has been effectively supplemented by items available through alerts system, by VTR’s and by visiting speakers.

2. We still have two problems which require continuing attention in our public diplomacy: our posture in East Asia and human rights.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770274–0868. Limited Official Use. Sent for information to Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, Manila, Singapore, Medan, Surabaya, and CINCPAC.

2 See Document 81.
3. We still face deeply implanted and persistent feeling that new administration is “withdrawing” or, at least, “reducing priority” in East Asia. This remains conventional wisdom here in Indonesia despite visitors from new administration, significant statements such as Secretary’s Asia Society speech,³ agreement to US–ASEAN talks,⁴ and significant efforts by administration on behalf various forms of aid for Indonesia. I confess I am baffled by phenomenon. Fact is it exists and will continue to require, on our part, reiteration of our interest and maximum of attention to area through visits and concrete actions.

4. Full appreciation for President Carter’s broad and sympathetic interest in human dignity and basic rights is hampered by feeling that our approach to this issue: (1) is accusatory; (2) seeks to implant American models on other societies; and (3) fails to recognize special needs of developing societies. Clear presentation of administration views is complicated by fact clear distinction is not made in local public mind between official expressions, congressional views, and views of non-official human rights organizations. In order to put our intentions into clearer focus, we may need to consider somewhat greater emphasis on themes that: (1) we are not promoting a system; we are promoting an attitude which respects each human being and his needs and rights; and (2) we recognize that with basic rights go basic responsibilities of any individual toward others in his society and the welfare of that society.

5. In my absence, Charge Rives and Political Counselor Gardner will continue to work closely, as I have, with PAO Lavin in review and development of USIS country plan.

Newsom

³ See footnote 2, Document 79.
⁴ The first U.S.–ASEAN talks took place August 2–4, 1978. For the White House statement released at the conclusion of these talks, see Public Papers: Carter, 1978, Book II, pp. 1378–1379.
84. Memorandum for the President

Washington, August 3, 1977

From June 8 to June 24, 1977 the Subcommittee on International Operations of the House International Relations Committee heard testimony from 45 witnesses on issues related to reorganization of public diplomacy programs. A list of witnesses is attached. In addition, the Subcommittee received more than a score of additional unsolicited statements for inclusion in the hearing record.

Based on the hearing record, the Subcommittee has reached the following general conclusions.

1. The key to effective use of our public diplomacy resources is an awareness of the utility of these resources and a willingness to use them to further policy objectives. Reorganization is important, but only of marginal concern in dealing with this basic problem.

2. The head of the USIA (or successor agency) should be included in NSC and Cabinet meetings. Participation by the USIA Director will (a) substantially increase opportunities for maximum effective use of public diplomacy resources, and (b) allow the Agency to perform its responsibilities for explaining policy for the entire government.

3. USIA should not be merged into the Department of State. USIA must work closely with the Department of State. It is important that USIA or a successor bureau or agency have sufficient budgetary, personnel and administrative autonomy to ensure a corps of officers qualified and inspired to carry out the full range of public diplomacy in our national interests. The Director of USIA or his successor should be included in all major policy decisions within the Department of State. Similarly, lower level officials concerned with public diplomacy.
should be involved in all major policy formulation sessions at all appropriate lower and intermediate levels.\(^4\)

4. The programs administered by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs should be merged into the USIA.

5. The VOA should remain in the USIA.

6. The present authority and organization of the Board for Foreign Scholarships should be maintained.

7. The integrity of both our educational and cultural programs and of the programming of the Voice of America is of paramount concern.

Inevitably conflicts will arise over both programs in an attempt to resolve both (a) competitive short-term and long-term objectives, and (b) the distinctions between government policy and divergent opinions in the country as a whole.\(^5\)

No structural reorganization including the establishment of separate agencies for exchange activities or broadcasting will provide immunity from political pressures. Changes can be made, however, which will minimize the abuse of exchange programs or broadcasting activities.

8. The United States Advisory Commission on Information and the United States Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs can be restructured to more effectively safeguard the integrity of both exchange programs and of Voice of America programming. The following measures can ensure and safeguard the integrity and credibility vital to the success of our long-term public diplomacy programs: (a) higher caliber membership, (b) mandatory periodic reports, (c) independent staff to investigate alleged improper actions,\(^6\) (d) requirements for officials to notify the advisory group of pressures which would contravene the mandate of the programs, and (e) obligation of the Director to respond to the Administration and the Congress on advisory commission reports and staff investigation findings.

9. The USIA needs a fundamental internal reorganization. There are far too many officials at the assistant director level.\(^7\) It is important, however, that if either or both the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs or the Voice of America are within a reorganized USIA that

\(^4\) An unknown hand placed two parallel lines in the left-hand margin next to the last two sentences in this paragraph.

\(^5\) An unknown hand placed two parallel lines and an arrow in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph.

\(^6\) An unknown hand underlined this point.

\(^7\) An unknown hand placed two parallel lines in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.
the Directors of these programs be at the highest level beneath the Agency Director and that their independent access to Congress be assured. This would further ensure the integrity and credibility of these two programs.

10. Regardless of the future relationship of USIA and CU to the Department of State, clear responsibility should be assigned to a high official of the Department of State for (a) all issues relating to the freedom of communication, (b) technical matters which may impinge on freedom of communication, and (c) coordination of public diplomacy activities of Defense, Treasury, Commerce, HEW and other agencies.

11. The mandate governing USIA operations which was issued by President Kennedy should be reviewed and updated.

12. While it is important to resolve the long debate about possible merger of USIA and CU, it should be recognized that a further reorganization may be advisable once the President and Congress have more completely reviewed the entire structure of the Federal Government and especially its foreign policy agencies.

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8 An unknown hand underlined the portion of this sentence beginning with the word “independent.”

9 An unknown hand placed two parallel lines in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph.

10 Reference is presumably to a January 25, 1963, memorandum from Kennedy to Murrow, printed in Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters, Document 144. In it, the President stated: “The influencing of attitudes is to be carried out by overt use of the various techniques of communication—personal contact, radio broadcasting, libraries, book publication and distribution, press, motion pictures, television, exhibits, English-language instruction, and others.”

11 In a September 14 letter to Fascell, the President thanked him and his colleagues for their letter and memorandum, terming them “very useful” in assisting him in his decisions on reorganization. The President added, “I share your conviction that our information and cultural exchange efforts are one of the most important aspects of our foreign policy effort. I want to ensure that we have imaginative programs in this area which are energetically managed and led. For the money we spend, these are among the least costly operations of the government; nevertheless, the effect can continue for years after the money has been spent. When I ask for additional money for these fields, I want the Congress to be able to feel confident that we are making the best use of it we can. The reorganization we are now undertaking will put us in a better position to do that.” (Carter Library, White House Central Files, Subject File, Foreign Affairs, Information-Exchange Activities, Executive, Box FO–35, FO–5 1/20/77–9/30/77)
SUBJECT

Reorganization of State Department’s Exchange Program, the U.S. Information Agency, and Related Programs

In response to memos from Secretary Vance, Zbig Brzezinski, Barry Jagoda and me on the subject of reorganization of our “public diplomacy” programs, you stated that you desired to study the question prior to making decisions on the issue. Accordingly, Reorganization Project and other OMB staff, after extended consultation with Zbig, Barry, David Aaron, John Reinhardt of USIA, and Warren Christopher and Joe Duffey from State, have drafted this memorandum for your consideration.

Our public diplomacy consists of cultural exchanges, the dissemination of information and the rendering of policy advice to the President and other officials making foreign policy decisions (see Attachment 1, page 1). These functions are now carried on by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs in the State Department.

1 Source: Carter Library, White House Central Files, Subject File, Foreign Affairs, Information-Exchange Activities, Box FO-35, FO-5 1/20/77–9/30/77. No classification marking. Lance sent the memorandum to the President under an August 26 covering memorandum. (Ibid.) In his August 29 Evening Report to Brzezinski, Henze stated: “USIA’s reorganization plan was carried in directly to President and acted upon by him without any further NSC or other White House Staff coordination. President’s decisions were very much in line with what we expected and it is good that he acted fast. Manner in which this was handled has left a number of loose ends, however, which I have been discussing during day with David [Aaron], Bob Gates, and Christine [Dodson]. We will follow up on those which seem to be our particular responsibility or in which we have particular interest.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Staff Evening Reports File, Box 4, 8/25–31/77) Henze addressed these “loose ends” in his August 30 Evening Report: “Discussed President’s decisions with Charlie Bray, who had only rumors about it. OMB neglected to tell USIA (Reinhardt is off on leave, returning only in second week of September). Advised Bray to get together with USIA and work on follow-up actions re President’s decision (press announcement, contacts to reassure academic community re CU, briefing of interested Congressmen) which he did today.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special (Henze), Box 5, Evening Reports File: 7–10/77)

2 See Document 64; Document 71; footnote 5, Document 65; and footnote 3, Document 70.

3 Attached but not printed is an undated paper entitled “Background Information on Public Diplomacy Programs and Reorganization.”
(CU) and by the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) (see Attachment 1, page 2). Three issues are presented for decision:

1. Should CU and USIA be consolidated (page 2)?
2. If consolidation occurs, what should be the relationship of the new entity to the State Department (page 3)?
3. If consolidation occurs, what should be the relationship of the Voice of America to the new entity (page 5)?

1. SHOULD CU AND USIA BE CONSOLIDATED?

Discussion

There is a considerable body of opinion holding that a consolidation should be effected, on the rationale that locating complementary programs in a single location facilitates their orchestration toward like goals. CU carries on the cultural affairs function in Washington but cultural exchange is administered overseas by USIA personnel (as well as by 43 local Fulbright Commissions and by private U.S. organizations). It is this split in Washington leadership that is in large measure responsible for interest in reorganization. The single field organization attempting to orchestrate all of these programs must report to two separate leaderships, each of which maintains in Washington a separate set of regional bureaus and country desks.

A consolidation would produce a new organizational entity to which similar programs operated by other agencies and Departments might be added in the future.

Many academics, the Linowitz Commission,4 and the American Council on Education object to placing the educational and cultural exchange program in an agency whose functions they perceive as including the dissemination of “propaganda”, but any relocation of CU should include the Board of Foreign Scholarships (a Presidentially appointed Board created by the Fulbright-Hays Act5 to supervise the educational and exchange program and to select the program’s academic grantees). The Board should be able to continue to assure the non-political nature of the Fulbright Program. Further, the individual responsible for cultural and educational exchange in the new entity should have an appropriate rank—perhaps at the Deputy Director level—and consolidation should be accompanied by a new name that gives less prominence to the information function.

4 Reference is to the Commission on United States-Latin American Relations, chaired by Linowitz. The Linowitz Commission published two reports: The Americas in a Changing World and The United States and Latin America: Next Steps.

5 See footnote 5, Document 7.
There are several other factors related to a decision to consolidate USIA and CU: A consolidation should include also consolidation of the advisory committees to USIA and CU, the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information and the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs. Second, CU operates five reception centers for foreign visitors at major ports of entry into the U.S. Because these centers serve visitors under both AID and CU programs (about half from each), and because of their domestic location, the Chief of Protocol (Evan Dobelle) and Joe Duffey have suggested that they not be moved with CU but be placed in the Protocol Office.

Regardless of whether USIA is to be consolidated with CU, this is an appropriate time for a full review of USIA’s internal structure and personnel system, both of which appear to constrain rather than support the kind of creativity and venturesomeness that should characterize the agency. Director Reinhardt has begun such a review but would be greatly assisted in this task by a Presidential statement of support and encouragement. We urge that such a statement be made, either in your message transmitting the reorganization plan to Congress or in a separate memorandum to Director Reinhardt.

**Recommendation**

Consolidate the educational and cultural exchange activities of State and the information and cultural activities of USIA to produce a new organizational entity. A Presidential statement defining the mission of the new entity and assuring the continued integrity of educational and cultural exchange organization, activities and budget should accompany the consolidation.

This recommendation is supported by Zbig Brzezinski, Barry Jagoda, David Aaron, the Reorganization Project, OMB, State and USIA. No one in the Administration has expressed support for either retaining the status quo or following the Stanton Panel’s recommendation of placing “policy” information activities in State and “general” information activities in an independent agency (see Attachment 1, page 8).

**Decision**

Agree _____
Disagree _____

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7 Attached but not printed is an undated paper entitled “Background Information on Public Diplomacy Programs and Reorganization.” Another copy of the memorandum indicates that Carter approved the recommendation. (National Archives, RG 306, USIA Historical Collection, Subject Files, 1953–2000, Entry A–1 1066, Box 43, USICA, Reorganization, 1974–1978)
2. IN THE EVENT OF CONSOLIDATION, WHAT SHOULD BE THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE NEW ENTITY TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE?

The more that public diplomacy programs should concentrate on building overseas support for current American policies, the closer to State (in terms of both policy guidance and organizational location) any new entity should be. To the extent that public diplomacy should concentrate upon enhancing a broader mutual understanding, the more distance from State is appropriate.

So long as the budget and operations of the new entity are separate from those of State, its formal relationship to State is likely to matter less than the strength of its leadership and the degree of interest shown by the Secretary of State. Even so, the acceptability of consolidation to the Congress, the agencies, and the interested public will be affected by questions of form. Accordingly, there has been considerable discussion among the participants in developing this memorandum as to whether the relationship of a consolidated entity to State should approximate that of:

—AID, an agency within State whose Administrator reports to the Secretary,

—ACDA, an agency outside State whose Director reports directly to the President, but acts “under the direction of the Secretary of State”, or

—USIA, an independent agency whose Director reports to the President, but receives foreign policy “guidance” from the Secretary of State.

(The details of these relationships are set forth in Attachment 2.)

Recommendation

Secretary Vance prefers a relationship like that between AID and State, but has agreed to support an ACDA-like relationship as an acceptable compromise of the differing views on the subject. Zbig Brzezinski, Barry Jagoda, David Aaron, John Reinhardt, and the Reorganization Project, though inclined to a relationship like that between USIA and State, have agreed to concur in recommending an ACDA-like relationship. OMB’s International Affairs Division recommends maintaining the existing relationship between USIA and State.

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8 Attached but not printed is an undated paper entitled “Analysis of Alternative Organizational Arrangements for a Combined USIA/CU Agency in Relation to the President, NSC, and the Secretary of State.”
Decision

Relationship approximating that of AID and State ______
Relationship approximating that of ACDA and State ______
Maintain existing relationship between USIA and State ______

3. IN THE EVENT OF CONSOLIDATION OF USIA AND CU, WHAT SHOULD BE THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE VOICE OF AMERICA TO THE NEW AGENCY?

VOA is currently a component of USIA. It accounts for about one-quarter of USIA’s budget of $264 million. A decision as to the degree of VOA’s independence from the other aspects of public diplomacy depends upon the degree to which VOA’s news gathering and reporting should be independent of foreign policy guidance from State or other agencies.

The question of whether VOA’s news operations should enjoy the same independence as those of private broadcasting stations has long been argued among State, USIA, VOA, and interested outsiders. (There has been less controversy as to the propriety of State’s giving guidance where analysis and commentary are concerned.) Some have argued that as a U.S. Government radio station, VOA inevitably is taken by overseas listeners to represent official U.S. policy, and that therefore, its broadcasting activities (including news broadcasting) should not be inconsistent with official U.S. policy. Thus, in March 1975, State and USIA prevailed upon VOA not to carry the story of student demonstrations in Phnom Penh calling for Lon Nol’s removal because of the “possibility” that the broadcasting of such a news story “could be misconstrued as a signal that the U.S. Government was sympathetic to those demands.” Similarly, in October 1976, the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv forbade a VOA correspondent to check the veracity of a news story with a Palestine Liberation Organization spokesman because the U.S. does not officially recognize the PLO.

Those opposing this view take the position that we best demonstrate our strength as a nation by permitting VOA to broadcast the news without regard to official U.S. Government policy, while retaining for State the authority to provide guidance for analysis and commentary and to take VOA air time on its own to explain U.S. policy.

In a May 1977 memorandum, USIA Director Reinhardt stated that “VOA will be solely responsible for the content of news broadcasts.”

Nevertheless, there are those who believe that only structural independence will assure that freedom. Among these are the Stanton Panel

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9 The President did not approve or disapprove any of the recommendations.
10 See Document 47.
and Senator Percy, who have suggested that an independent VOA be headed by a board with both private members and one or more representatives of State and/or USIA. Others supporting news independence believe that it can be attained without structural independence if there is a strong Presidential statement guaranteeing the functional independence of VOA’s news gathering and reporting operations.

**Recommendation**

Retain VOA in a consolidated CU–USIA, with a strong Presidential guarantee of the independence of its news gathering and reporting operations. This is supported by Zbig Brzezinski, Barry Jagoda, David Aaron, the Reorganization Project, OMB, State, and USIA. No one in the Administration has expressed support for creation of a structurally independent VOA.\(^{11}\)

**Decision**

Agree ______

Disagree ______

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\(^{11}\) The President did not approve or disapprove any of the recommendations.
86. Letter From Frank Stanton to Secretary of State Vance

New York, August 29, 1977

Dear Cy:

I have awaited your return from China\(^2\) to express my deep disappointment at the way things have apparently developed, in your absence in connection with more important matters, in the area of international information, cultural and radio programs. Based on our conversations, it had been my impression that we were going to discuss the plans for USIA, CU and VOA before they were signed off.

Regrettably, with the exception of a preliminary conversation with Joe Duffey, it has been impossible for me to see any officer of the Department. Nothing ever came of my call or note to Warren Christopher, and when I succeeded in reaching Ben Read ten days ago, he informed me that the whole matter had left the Department and was pending in the White House.

Since I do not know what exactly is pending in the White House,\(^3\) I cannot comment except that I hear that our report,\(^4\) which has received the endorsement of the Murphy Commission,\(^5\) was shunted aside in favor of consolidating all information, cultural and radio activities under one roof. Not that it matters, perhaps, but if this is indeed the

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770154–1421. No classification marking. Under a September 12 covering action memorandum, Hitchcock sent Vance, through Read and Christopher, the copy of Stanton’s letter. In the covering memorandum, Hitchcock noted, “Between the time Mr. Stanton sent his letter and we received it, that decision by the President [to combine cultural and information programs in a single agency] was made and announced. Mr. Stanton was informed of the decision by Mr. Peter Szanton, Associate Director for Organization Studies of the President’s Reorganization Project.” Hitchcock also attached a copy of a suggested reply from Vance to Stanton. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770154–1422) For Vance’s response, see Document 89.

\(^2\) See footnote 2, Document 80.

\(^3\) On August 15, Stanton and Frankel sent a Western Union Mailgram to the President, requesting an appointment with him to discuss Carter’s impending “far-reaching decision regarding the future organization of our country’s international information, cultural, and radio activities.” (Carter Library, White House Central Files, Subject File, Federal Government, United States Information Agency, Box FG–210, FG 266 1/20/77–1/20/81) Kraft sent a copy of the Mailgram to Jagoda, under an August 22 covering memorandum. On an attached sheet, Jagoda noted that Carter “will almost certainly reject their point of view on this issue.” A handwritten postscript reads: “If you wait a couple of days—you can say something like—‘the President has already acted on these matters but he did so with full knowledge of your views and concerns as relayed to him by his advisors and through (their) own congressional testimony. BJ.” He then readdressed Kraft’s memorandum to proceed to Voorde. (Ibid.)

\(^4\) Reference is to the Stanton Panel report.

\(^5\) See footnote 6, Document 30.
proposal pending before the President, I will be unable to support it, wherever the consolidated program is organizationally anchored—outside or inside the Department.

I share the academic and cultural community’s concern, well expressed by former Assistant Secretary Charles Frankel in his statement to the Fascell Committee,\(^6\) that cultural relations and political information do not mix.\(^7\) At the same time, I am concerned that the Department failed to step up to the opportunity for the overseas spokesman role which both the Murphy Commission and our Panel proposed.\(^8\) I wish that I had been able to discuss this matter with Hodding Carter, but I was unable to engage his interest in our proposals.

Now that you are home again, perhaps the situation can be retrieved. I hope so.

With all good wishes.

Sincerely,

Frank

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\(^6\) Reference is presumably to Frankel’s June 30 letter to Fascell, containing a statement on the organization and international cultural and informational activities within the Federal Government. The text of the letter, printed on the letterhead of the National Humanities Center, on which Frankel served as President, is printed in *Public Diplomacy and the Future: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Operations & the Committee on International Relations, House Representatives, Ninety Fifth Congress, First Session, June 8, 13, 14, 15, 16, 21, 22, 23, and 24*, pp. 440–454.

\(^7\) An unknown hand underlined the portion of the sentence beginning with “cultural.”

\(^8\) An unknown hand underlined the portion of the sentence beginning with “failed” and ending with “role.”
87. Memorandum From Anthony Hackley of the Planning and Program Advisory Staff, Office of Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency to the Deputy Director (Bray)\(^1\)

Washington, August 31, 1977

SUBJECT

USIA Human Rights Action Proposals

Following is a report on the initial fifty PAO responses to “USIA Human Rights Action Proposals,” dated July 17, 1977.\(^2\) Major headings in this report identify subject areas which PAOs were specifically requested to address.

**SUMMARY**

The “USIA Human Rights Action Proposals” were extremely well received in the field. With few exceptions, PAOs assessed the objectives, themes and treatment sections of the proposals as well presented, balanced and realistic in the context of local program options and plans. While posts were generally receptive to and encouraged by the wide range of “global products” and projects mentioned in the proposals, their stated preferences for some products and projects over others were related to human rights sensitivities in the host countries and program options perceived by the posts.

The projects and processes suggested by PAOs indicate that they are attuned to the individual country human rights situation and the most logical and effective direction for policy explication and public diplomacy efforts in the human rights field.

The impressive list of PAO suggestions for media products, programs and Agency initiatives will be of significant value in developing plans and programs that are fully responsive to post requirements.

Recommendations for programs that other agencies might undertake include specific ideas for enhanced roles by State/CU, AID, DOD, Radio Free Europe, the International Visitors Program and the foreign correspondent tour program. The principal emphasis of those recommendations is involvement by other agencies in effective complementary programs.

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of the Director, Executive Secretariat, Secretariat Staff, Correspondence Files, 1973–1980, Entry P–104, Box 136, 7703620–7703629. Confidential. Sent through Schneidman, who initialed the memorandum. A copy was sent to Reinhardt. Reinhardt and Fraser initialed the memorandum, indicating that they saw it.

\(^2\) June 17. See the enclosure to Document 67.
This report does not include each post suggestion or comment, but is designed to be representative of the range and emphasis of PAO responses.

1. Critique of the overall objectives, themes, and treatment sections of the draft proposals. Is the overall balance within each of these sections right? What do they imply for programs at your post?

Overall, PAOs evaluate the objectives, themes and treatment sections as comprehensive, well balanced and realistic in approach. Recurring themes in PAO comments are (a) the USIA human rights proposals represent a new and positive direction for Agency programming; and (b) the proposals’ implications for a prominent USIS role in policy explication and public diplomacy are encouraging.

Objectives section

—Universality of human rights should be the “kingpin” of objectives.
—We should present the U.S. as dedicated to the fair application and observance of human rights globally, but within various national contexts.
—Problems may be experienced in implementing objective three—“Providing support and encouragement, where appropriate, to individuals and groups abroad who are actively involved in promoting human rights.” In selected countries human rights activists are regarded as being in opposition to government policies (a view held more by government leaders, but not as often by the populace.) In these countries USIS efforts to contact and offer encouragement to human rights activists could be exploited adversely by various factions within or outside the government, and thus prove counterproductive to our public diplomacy efforts.

This concern lends credence to the “where appropriate” caveat in objective three—which presupposes that initiatives to contact human rights activists may not be prudent in certain countries.

Themes and treatment section

—We should add a theme which directly associates the UN with human rights. Suggested wording is: “All UN members, by virtue of their membership in that body, have a moral obligation to provide and protect basic human rights of their citizens.” The purpose of this theme is to provide an international basis for promoting human rights.
—We should add another theme which is responsive to allegations that we are trying to force our traditions and values upon other nations and cultures. Suggested wording is: “The human rights policy of the Administration reflects a firm belief that the inherent dignity of man,
as outlined in the UN Charter, is a universal truth that transcends boundaries of nationality, race, culture, custom, creed and politics.”

—Recommend number 6 in the treatment section be revised to give greater emphasis to the relationship of economic rights and goals in the human rights equation and be supplemented to provide guidance as to the nature of this emphasis.

—Post human rights planning for programs should start with a clear understanding of local human rights perceptions.

2. Usefulness of Washington produced “global” products and projects mentioned in the plan to your specific country program. Do you have any further suggestions for products that would be useful to you?

While “global” products and projects are generally well received by PAOs their assessments of products and projects varied country by country. Variables influencing the degree of utility and value of products and projects are the prevailing local human rights situation, the sensitivities of the government to human rights and the PAOs’ perceived range of program options.

“Global Products” reported as useful in most countries include articles and VTRs on official human rights policy statements by the President, secretary of state and other administration officials. However, these same products were reported to have only limited value at other posts.

Overall, USIA proposed “projects” were assessed as realistic and generally representative of the kinds of proven techniques and processes—media materials, IV grants, speakers—which any serious international communications effort should include. Again, enthusiasm for individual projects varied country by country with preference for selected projects being made on the basis of past experience with similar projects or their perceived utility. For example, USIS Belgrade noted that only well-done commercial programs such as the recent NBC documentary and special on human rights have proved programmable.

The utility of “global products” and proposed projects varies with the medium. For example, USIS Tokyo reports that timely videotapes and full texts of speeches are always usable. However, background articles in English and VOA English broadcasts are somewhat less useful.

a. Response to specific Agency proposals

—International human rights conference in 1978 or 1979. Most PAOs thought such a conference could be useful. Those not in favor suggest

3 See footnote 14, Document 67.
that an international conference on human rights might be threatening to certain countries or it could turn into an anti-communist sounding board and thus lose all credibility. Also, it was suggested that it would be premature to hold such a conference pending the outcome of the CSCE follow-up meetings.

—Human rights alert service. A majority of posts are not in favor of this service. They regard it as too strident in approach and view it as keeping a “moral police effort” or “doomsday book” on countries around the world. It was suggested that this service might be provided more appropriately by an international human rights society.

—A new Agency publication titled: Problems of Democracy. PAOs generally applaud the idea of this new publication. It is seen as an innovative and potentially effective departure from traditional Agency media output. Foreign language editions are recommended.

b. Do you have any further suggestions for products that would be useful to you?

PAOs suggested:
—quality human rights-oriented books and media products translated in the host country language,
—human rights content in Dialogue and Problems of Communism,
—a study on the role of human rights in non-Western societies,
—information which points up instances (when it occurs) where the U.S. recognizes countries that take positive steps in the human rights field,
—a film/VTR series establishing America’s human rights heritage and tracing the history of civil rights developments in the U.S.,
—VTRs of distinguished non-government figures—both American and foreign—addressing the subject of human rights,
—large (suitable for framing) copies of the U.S. Bill of Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for display in libraries and information centers,
—and pamphlets dealing with human rights actions by the UN and other international bodies.

3. What kinds of projects and processes are implied for your post? (e.g., coalition-building efforts, seminars, exchanges)?

—The principle process should be dialogue from personal contacts and informal press lunches to panel discussions and an in-depth seminar for young leaders on East-West relations which will have an important human rights component.

—A presidential speech spelling out the objectives and agenda for expansion and improvement of human rights in the U.S. This would
demonstrate our good faith and add credibility to our statements about concern for human rights both at home and abroad.

—More stories on dissent in America and on the USG’s concern for the rights of the individual are needed on the VOA.

—We should identify public and private American leaders in the human rights field who would be available for exclusive interviews with foreign journalists. Such interviews could be conducted either by correspondents based in the U.S. or through telegraphic exchanges of questions and answers.

—Foreign correspondent press center activities are useful. They would be more so if posts were asked to include journalists other than the U.S.-based correspondents for some of the human rights programs that are initiated.

—Lectures are useful but PAOs would prefer that their main announced subject not be human rights. Human rights, however, could be included as part of any lecture.

—The U.S. record on humanitarianism is outstanding and lends itself to demonstrating our concern for fellow humans. Exhibits, magazine articles, IPS output and movies on our record in humanitarian causes would be useful to set the stages for lectures and seminars on human rights themes.

—Updated information is requested on what happened to the more prominent activists in the turbulent civil rights protest days of the 1960’s and early 1970’s.

—Where appropriate, we should develop programs which encourage freedom of speech and expression on the part of local artists and intellectuals. This does not mean we would encourage opposition to local governments, but rather we should play an active role as “patron of the arts” in encouraging young artists to use our facilities to express themselves through exhibits, concerts and seminars.

4. Specific recommendations for programs that other agencies might undertake which would reinforce USIS public diplomacy effort in this field. This involves actions both at the Washington level and at your mission.

—In countries where Radio Free Europe (RFE) is more popular than VOA, suggest more Agency and Department input to RFE on human rights.

—State/CU should develop more multi-regional projects to involve foreign intellectuals, writers, artists, and scientists in a human rights dialogue.

—Suggest to AID-Washington the possibility of their organizing, where appropriate, human rights seminars for selected audiences. Also,
AID should include a human rights component in its foreign national training programs and its output on assistance.

—Fellowships and seminars on the study of democratic institutions are suggested. It is in Western democracies where human rights flourish. The propagation of those democratic ideals should be pushed as if our survival depended upon them.

—CU should develop an IV grantee itinerary and program outline specifically tailored to human rights. Listing individuals, institutions, and places, the outline would be extremely valuable in helping field posts to prepare nominations and develop programs.

—Visits by articulate U.S. officials are one of the more effective means of supporting major foreign policies of the Administration. More are requested.

—Based on the model of the Department’s Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy, PAOs suggest a nine-month program for foreign scholars and educators in disciplines such as law, economics, and social sciences to examine and discuss the whole range of human rights issues and to meet U.S. officials and others involved in the human rights field.

—A special program should be established at the East-West Center Culture Learning Institute for Asian scholars and educators on educational aspects of the human rights concept.

—PAOs suggest congressional seminars conducted by the staff of congressional committees most involved in the question of human rights. Participants would be foreign parliamentarians, judges, law professors and leaders in the field of human rights.

It is clearly indicated above that involving PAOs in evaluation of Agency proposals and soliciting their ideas has resulted in the kind of specific information needed to upgrade the focus and responsiveness of Washington-developed human rights products and programs.

This is an interim report. A complete compilation will be made following receipt of the remaining PAO responses. We propose to provide a copy of the final report to area and media assistant directors and all posts.4

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4 Not found and not further identified.
88. Editorial Note

In a joint press statement issued on September 1, 1977, Director of the United States Information Agency John Reinhardt and Acting Secretary of State Warren Christopher announced the reorganization of U.S. public diplomacy activities, following President Jimmy Carter’s approval of consolidating the Department of State’s educational and cultural exchange activities and the United States Information Agency’s information and cultural activities in a “new organizational entity” (see Document 85). The statement outlined the procedures for establishing a new agency, discussed the process by which the President had reached his decision, and specified a time table for submitting the reorganization plan to Congress. It also specified the goals of the new agency:

“—Reflect accurately to other peoples and governments the values of our society;

“—Convey the diversity of thought and cultural vitality of the United States;

“—Insure that other countries know where this country stands and why;

“—Assist Americans to understand the intellectual and cultural wealth and diversity of other countries;

“—Forge relationships between Americans and others that can contribute to mutual understanding and the capacity to cooperate in solving common problems;

“—Provide the President and Secretary of State with accurate assessments of foreign opinion on important issues; and

“—Seek to reduce barriers to the international exchange of ideas and information.”

(Department of State Bulletin, October 24, 1977, page 572)

In USIA 24205 to all principal USIS posts, September 1, the United States Information Agency transmitted the text of the September 1 joint statement. The telegram also instructed posts to make the text of the joint statement available to the Executive Secretaries of the Fulbright Commission, within the respective countries, and “clarify that the President’s plan will guarantee the integrity of the functions of the Board of Foreign Scholarships and of our cultural and educational exchange programs with all countries.” (National Archives, RG 306, USIA Records, Historical Collection, Subject Files, 1953–2000, Entry A–1 1066, Box 43, USICA, Reorganization, 1974–1978)

In telegram 210289 to multiple diplomatic and consular posts, September 2, the Department transmitted excerpts from the September
1, 1977, Department of State daily briefing, during which Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and Department of State Spokesperson Hodding Carter III discussed the joint statement and indicated that he would answer any questions about the proposed reorganization. Carter stated he did not “think there are any great surprises” in the joint statement and then took questions:

“Q. As I understand it, at least technically the Secretary of State will be in charge of the Voice of America. However, you have formed VOA into a new agency and pulled that agency into the State Department.

“Q. And I wondered how that would guarantee independent news broadcasts, since VOA now, since I understand it, isn’t answerable to any policy-makers outside the VOA.

“Q. The State Department has always given advice?

“A. Yes.

“A. Well, the relationship, of course, has always been that we have given advice on policy matters.

“Q. The State Department has always given advice?

“A. Yes, the State Department gives advice on policy matters in any case to the VOA. I do not think that it substantially changes in its structural form that relationship.

“Q. Well, has that advice ever gone to the point of telling them what to broadcast and what not to broadcast?

“A. I don’t think that the question of prior censorship comes up.

“Q. What about post censorship? How about post recriminations?

“A. What am I going to tell you?

“Q. Garbled.

“A. What I am going to tell you is very obvious. There have been times where there have been questions raised in the past about VOA. I mean, that is a matter of record in fact.

“Q. But at least, if you will accept that there are murmurings within VOA that there will now be some interference from the State Department that didn’t exist in the past.

“A. I would find that to be not in keeping with what is intended in this, that there will be some new level of interference. In fact, it seems to me that Mr. Reinhardt has made it very clear that the VOA, within the general fact that it operates under USIA is going to be allowed to use independence, free from outside interference.

“Q. What makes it more independent?

“A. Wait a minute. I am not suggesting that it is more independent beyond what—by this reorganization—beyond what Mr. Reinhardt himself has already put out in the Agency.

“Let me say that insofar as the total details of this reorganization plan are concerned, that is going to be included in the broader reorgani-
zation proposal which the President is going to be forwarding, and I am just not prepared to go into great specificity on it because of that, but insofar as the major concern of the debate that I have seen in the past, i.e., the Stanton Report and others, clearly the VOA is not being spun out, it is being retained.

“Q. What I am asking you is somewhat different. If it is to have a relationship similar to ACDA’s relationship to the State Department, I am unaware that ACDA has an independent policy relationship to the State Department. Therefore I do not see how the Voice of America can have an independent policy relationship.

“A. Well, the budget and the personnel system are independent. The form of our participation is clearly going to be on the policy line in trying to make sure that policy is understood. It has nothing to do with those handling the news. It has to do however, with the accurate transmittal of U.S. policy. That has been the way it has been. I mean, that clear[ly] is an interest. It is a U.S. agency in that respect.”

After answering additional questions concerning the Voice of America, Carter responded to a question regarding the Stanton Report and support for its recommendations:

“I can’t speak officially as to how much support it had. It is not my understanding that it had a great deal of backing in the deliberations that went on in intergovernmental—it was certainly considered very carefully, however. It and the Murphy Report (see footnote 6, Document 30) and a number of others, GAO reports (see Document 50), and individual reports of agencies concerned.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770319-0362)
Letter From Secretary of State Vance to Frank Stanton

Washington, September 14, 1977

Dear Frank:

Just as your letter of August 29 reached me, the President announced his decision to combine the functions of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs and the US Information Agency into a new, single agency, which would also include the Voice of America. I understand Peter Szanton of the President’s Reorganization Project called you shortly thereafter to inform you of the President’s decision.

I believe the President’s decision provides a rational and workable approach to the management of our international information and cultural programs. I believe, too, that some of the important philosophical concerns raised by the Panel under your chairmanship will be met in the reorganization plan. For example, the plan will include measures to insure the independence of the news function of VOA. We also intend to make sure that the integrity of educational and cultural exchanges will be fully protected in the new agency.

I intend to do all that I can to help bring into being a new organization that has credibility in this country and abroad. I look forward to your help and advice in the crucial period ahead.

Sincerely,

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770154-1420. No classification marking.
2 See Document 86.
3 See Documents 85 and 88.
90. Memorandum From Paul Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)  

Washington, September 28, 1977

SUBJECT  
Evening Report—28 September 1977

Daily Activities:  

[Omitted here is information unrelated to public diplomacy.]  

Spent an hour with John Reinhardt at his request this morning so that he could bring me up to date on where reorganization planning stands. USIA and State have worked out a series of documents with OMB which are now nearing final form. The basic plan should be ready for presentation to Congress next month and will be accompanied by a carefully worked out Presidential message. There are a couple of issues yet to be resolved. I will discuss these with OMB and provide you with a report in a few days.

Also took advantage of meeting with Reinhardt to brief him on aspects of my recent visit to the Horn which are relevant to USIA and its mission. Will also give you some notes on this subject in the next few days, because the magnitude of pro-American sentiment and orientation which exists in “socialist” Ethiopia today is a tribute to 30 years of USIA work there and to various other aspects of U.S. public and private cultural exchange efforts. We get enormous mileage out of this sort of thing over time—and should therefore be giving it more emphasis—i.e. more money—than present programs provide for.

[Omitted here is information unrelated to public diplomacy.]

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special (Henze), Box 5, Evening Reports File: 7–10/77. Secret.  
2 See Document 93.  
3 See footnote 3, Document 91.  
MEMORANDUM FROM THE ASSOCIATE PRESS SECRETARY (SCHECTER) TO THE ACTING DIRECTOR FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET (HIRSCHHORN)¹

WASHINGTON, OCTOBER 3, 1977

SUBJECT

NSC COMMENTS ON USIA/CU REORGANIZATION PLAN

The NSC staff has reviewed the OMB-prepared text of the President’s plan to reorganize the international information, educational, cultural and broadcasting activities located within the United States Government. As written, the plan presents only two difficulties:

— The name proposed for the new agency is atrocious. We propose that it be called the United States Information and Cultural Agency or the United States Information and Cultural Exchange Agency. To call the new agency the International Communications and Exchange Agency makes it sound like a stock exchange. We prefer the name United States Information and Cultural Agency because it is more high sounding and less political and ideological in overtone. It is not a communications agency which refers to technical communications but rather it is an information agency to inform the world of U.S. policy


² The OMB-prepared text is ibid.

³ In an October 3 memorandum to Szanton, Jagoda expressed reservations over OMB’s use of the word “direction” to explain the relationship between the new agency head and the Secretary of State, asserting that the agency head would “consult” with the Secretary but would not be directed by him. Jagoda also stated that the proposed agency name “is horrible” and suggested that “culture” be added to the title. He concluded, “I must add that this name question is a matter of significant importance and serious concern to me. It might even be a good idea to meet on this subject.” (Ibid.) Henze, in an October 3 note to Schecter, characterized the OMB-proposed agency name “awkward and stiff” and suggested that the words “guidance” or “consultation” be substituted in the text for the word “direction.” (Ibid.) In his October 5 Evening Report to Brzezinski, Henze recounted his consultations with OMB staff regarding the reorganization plan, highlighting the problems associated with OMB’s name proposal and the subordination of authority. “[Agency for International Communication], which seems to be, would be acceptable, if it were prefaced with United States—making acronym ‘USAIC’ (U.S.-Ache). They are dealing with problem of subordination of the agency by language ‘under the direction of the Secretary of State and the President.’ I suggested President be mentioned first.” Henze commented that these changes had yet to be coordinated with the White House Staff due to the fact that both Brzezinski and Schecter were “away” that day and Jagoda had “some further objections.” Inderfurth, noting Jagoda’s reservations, wrote in the right-hand margin: “Barry would like to see USIA renamed ‘US Cultural Communications Agency.’ He wanted me to solicit your [Brzezinski’s] support for this idea. Rick.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special (Henze), Box 5, Evening Reports File: 7–10/77)
and goals. The agency should clearly be identified with the United States, as USIA has been for the past 25 years.

—The phrase in line 41, “Under the direction of the Secretary of State,” is too strong and is contrary to the sense of the President’s reorganization decision, i.e., that the new agency should have a relationship to State analogous to that of ACDA. “Under the direction” implies that the agency is subordinate to State, which the rest of the text does not bear out. For instance, the paragraph which begins at line 186 describes a cooperative relationship between State and the new agency which is not subordinate. A better phrase would be “under the guidance of the Secretary of State” or “in consultation with the Secretary of State.” This would better represent the White House position.

Jerrold L. Schecter
Director, Congressional Relations
National Security Council

92. Action Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency (Schneidman) to the Deputy Director (Bray)¹

Washington, October 5, 1977

SUBJECT
Organizing Principles for USIA During Bicentennial of the Constitution

REFERENCE
Your Memorandum of June 27, 1977²

This memorandum sets forth an action plan for the Agency’s participation in the Constitution Bicentennial. Part I sketches what preparations the U.S. and other governments as well as non-governmental

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of the Director, Executive Secretariat, Secretariat Staff, Correspondence Files, 1973–1980, Entry P–104, Box 141, 7701/40–7704/49. No classification marking. A copy was sent to Reinhardt. Bray and Liu initialed the memorandum, indicating that they saw it. Attached but not printed is an undated attachment entitled “Individuals Consulted in Preparing Recommendations.” In an October 14 memorandum to Schneidman, Bray stated: “I have read your memorandum of October 5 with interest. It represents a careful and thoughtful piece of research. Please proceed vigorously and in a catalytic manner.” (Ibid.)

² Not found.
organizations have made to date. Part II postulates five Constitution-related program goals for the Agency. Part III suggests an approach and schedule of activities for working toward those goals. Part IV specifies several initiatives which the Agency can take immediately at no additional cost to itself.

I—STATUS REPORT

Executive Branch: ARBA (American Revolution Bicentennial Administration) closes its doors on October 1, 1977. For its last year Congress voted ARBA only $65,000, correctly assuming that ARBA could operate till October on revenues generated by licensing and medal sales. The approximately half a million dollars in non-appropriated funds left over are being transferred to the Department of Interior (Park Service) for battle reenactments and other "pseudo-events" connected with the Revolution Bicentennial.

The National Endowment for the Humanities will probably allocate $200,000 to an inter-disciplinary multi-year study of the Constitution-making period co-chaired by Williams Political Scientist James McGregor Burns and Columbia Historian Richard Morris. “Project ’87” is expected to get more help from Mellon and Ford Foundations, aggregating $800,000.4

Judicial Branch: The Supreme Court, with Congressional appropriations, sponsored the production of five short documentaries on famous court cases and the Burr trial; IMV is acquiring prints for overseas distribution. The Office of the Chief Justice is anxious to be a prime mover in the early planning for the Constitutional Bicentennial. Special Assistant to the Chief Justice Mark Cannon is the responsible official. Former USIS Saigon Press Counselor Barrett McGurn now directs the Court’s Office of Public Information.

3 On July 8, 1966, Johnson signed into law legislation establishing the American Revolution Bicentennial Commission (P.L. 89–491; 80 Stat. 259), charged with planning the multi-year independence celebrations. In February 1973 Nixon proposed that an American Revolution Bicentennial Administration be created to carry forward the work of the ARBC. Public Law 93–179 (87 Stat. 697), which Nixon signed into law on December 11, 1973, established the ARBA as an independent entity to coordinate governmental and non-governmental projects and programs commemorating the bicentennial. The legislation directed that the ARBA submit a final report to Congress by June 30, 1977, and that the ARBA should terminate by June 30 or at the time the report was submitted.

4 A joint initiative of the American Historical Association and American Political Science Association, Project ’87 brought together leading U.S. historians and political scientists in order to promote public dialogue on the U.S. Constitution. In 1976, at the time that Project ’87 was proposed, Burns was serving as the President of APSA and Morris as President of AHA.

5 In 1807 former Vice President Aaron Burr was charged with treason and brought to trial before the U.S. Circuit Court. Burr was subsequently acquitted.
The Judicial Conference of the United States, the governing body for the administration of the Federal judicial system as a whole, has commissioned the writing of a pioneering popular study of the U.S. judicial system—national, state, and local—by Historian Sidney Hyman. The Conference’s International Committee Chairman, Chief Judge of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, is eager to use the Bicentennial to widen links between the American and overseas judicial systems. The book promises to be a good presentation item for expanding our contacts in this crucially important audience.

Legislative Branch: The 94th Congress failed to act on the bill co-sponsored by Senators Mathias, Javits, and Pell to create an American Constitution Bicentennial Foundation. According to the Assistant Librarian of Congress, Congress has provided no guidance on the Constitutional phase of the Bicentennial.

The Private Sector: The key player is the Bicentennial Council of the Thirteen Original States, a non-profit corporation registered in Virginia, which has embarked on an intensive citizen education program centered on high schools and civic groups. The Council has scheduled annual seminars until 1989, a Bicentennial Book Award and a periodical on constitutional issues. The Council is energetic and productive; its title, however, has made it somewhat objectionable to some organizations west of the Atlantic seaboard.

Other Governments: One hundred and one governments allocated more than 100 million dollars to commemorating the Revolution Bicentennial. International interest in the Constitution Bicentennial is understandably quiescent, although the French Bicentennial Committee plans to celebrate the Franco-American alliance and the Treaty of Paris. Spain, Poland, and the U.K. also have plans to observe anniversaries in the eighties of their respective roles in the U.S. revolution.

II—OBJECTIVES FOR USIA PARTICIPATION

The goals proposed below for Agency operations pertaining to the Constitution Bicentennial flow logically from our traditional mission and the pattern of commemorations for the Revolution Bicentennial; they also reflect CU mutuality themes. (In the Agency’s next annual Program Priority Paper a short paragraph focussed on the need for

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6 Reference is to S. 3100, the American Constitution Bicentennial Foundation Act, introduced by Mathias on March 9, 1976, and cosponsored by Javits and Pell. The bill proposed the establishment of a foundation consisting of 15 members, appointed by the President. The foundation would administer grants-in-aid to assist individuals and groups in carrying out projects related to the U.S. Constitution and democratic principles. The bill was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee but was not reported out of committee.

7 1783.
planning, but not mounting actual operations related to this event, could be included to sensitize posts to think ahead.)

1. To foster recognition of the historical and contemporary significance of the American Constitution, encouraging its study as part of the curricula of foreign universities, polytechnics, teacher training institutes and secondary schools, seeking to implant relevant knowledge of American constitutionalism into international social science curricula.

2. To strengthen understanding among appropriate foreign publics of the practical impacts of the American system of separate but shared powers upon American foreign policy and programs.

3. To initiate dialogue on the principles of constitutional democracy between Americans and foreign counterparts concerned with studying, commenting on, framing or performing official functions under, written constitutions.

4. To illuminate the achievements of constitutional democracy to nations under authoritarian systems, citing the American experience as a source of ideas.

5. To dramatize the interconnection between the U.S. Government’s current stress upon human rights and the original Bill of Rights of the American Constitution.

III—STRATEGY AND A POSSIBLE TIMETABLE

Retrospective analyses of the Revolution Bicentennial effort tend to share several common conclusions:

a. The syndrome of the “Revolution Bicentennial hangover” cannot be blinked away. After such a sustained period of fevered activism, one can expect neither Americans nor foreigners to maintain the same intense interest and energy level for the Constitutional observance—at least not without a pause.

b. The Constitutional commemoration will not lend itself to the mass hoopla of the Revolution Bicentennial but rather to the selective and focussed programming with which the Agency is doctrinally most comfortable.

c. Establishing a successor to ARBA\(^8\) should be preceded by a period of careful planning and idea generation.

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d. The new coordinating mechanism for the Constitution celebration should not be involved in operations but confined to planning and grant-administration.

e. Planning should not be over-centralized; inputs from a wide spectrum of institutions, public and private, are crucial to success.

f. Domestic and foreign dimensions of the Constitutional observances should not be overly compartmentalized. What ought to be sought, over the long run, is a broad interflow of ideas and inputs between USIA and other agencies and ultimately between Americans and foreigners.

The following timetable is offered only as a framework for discussion.

**November 1, 1977:** It is highly desirable that the White House, as the leadership center of the government, should call the first organizational meeting for intra-governmental cooperation on the Constitution Bicentennial. This act would reduce the vexing problem of territoriality which may arise if another Federal executive agency should be in the position of summoning its peers. All agencies with potential roles in the Constitutional Bicentennial would be included: HEW, Interior, Justice, State, the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Smithsonian, the National Archives, the Library of Congress, the Supreme Court, the Judicial Conference of the U.S.A., and the USIA. If the White House (possibly Al Stern of Stuart Eizenstat’s staff) could not be prevailed upon to call such a gathering, Richard Hite, the custodian of the Bicentennial’s remaining funds, could be persuaded to do so. USIA, of course, could not properly spearhead such a meeting but could play a catalytic part. Succeeding meetings could meet outside the White House orbit. Conferees might elect a chairman (rotating?) and then select three working committees to conduct liaison with three different sectors—the Federal establishment (including the Supreme Court and the Judicial Conference), private organizations, and overseas. As a probable member of the international committee, USIA would be prepared to invite the International Committee of the American Studies Association to circulate overseas Americanists (2,000 strong as of 1975) and seek their ideas and invite outlines of ideas for Bicentennial grants. USIA would coordinate also with Washington embassies such as the French and the Australian so as to avoid overlaps with their national celebrations coming at the end of the decade. Our posts would be encouraged to add their own constructive ideas on appropriate forms of celebrating the event.

**About October 1, 1978:** the intra-governmental committee should be ready to appoint a subcommittee to approach staff members of the Senate Judiciary Committee on the Constitution (Sen. Birch Bayh) and the House Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights (Rep. Don
Edwards) in order to sound out their willingness to sponsor bills to authorize an American Constitution Bicentennial Foundation. After almost a year of consultation and investigation, the intra-governmental committee should be well equipped to design a highly workable piece of legislation, avoiding the mixture of planning and event management which bedeviled ARBA. The new Congressional Act should also specify such points as the inclusive dates of the celebration, considering questions such as whether the commemoration should extend through the 200th anniversary of the Bill of Rights (1791).

January, 1979: or early in the first session of the 96th Congress the bill would be proposed in both houses. If and when the Act is passed, coordinating responsibility would be transferred to the staff and board of the new Foundation.

No firm plans should be made at this time beyond the creation of the Foundation. In the meanwhile, however, fruitful fermentation should be taking place as the result of the initiatives described above, within the government, with NGOs and abroad.

IV—IMMEDIATE OPTIONS

A number of steps can be taken at once without a specific allocation of resources.

1. Responsibility can be clarified for the early phase of the Constitution Bicentennial. An IOP Officer should be designated to chair a small Agency committee with representation from ICS or its successor organization, and IGC, with IMV, IPS, and IBS participation as needed. The ICS American Studies Staff should hold the files of all correspondence and otherwise backstop this planning unit. CU would also be invited.

2. The Office of Education International Division, HEW, is prepared to commission the compilation of a companion volume on the Constitution to its 1976 book: The American Revolution: Selections from Secondary School History Books of Other Nations (Argentina, Canada, the CPR, Egypt, France, Germany, Ghana, the U.K., India, Israel, Japan, Mexico, USSR) at no cost to USIA.9

3. Boston University’s Gaspar Bacon Fund for Constitutional Studies, which has sponsored lectures and books on the American Constitution since 1926, is seriously considering a suggestion to allocate funds for the preparation of a handbook on constitutionalism, an annotated bibliography of periodicals, publications and a roster of organizations on constitutional democracy. This suggestion, which now seems almost

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9 Published by the Government Printing Office as DHEW Publication (OE) 76–19124 and compiled by Robert D. Barendsen and others in the Bureau of Post-Secondary Education.
certain to be acted on, should produce a volume which the Agency would wish ultimately to buy in bulk orders for world-wide distribution to jurists, legislators, political activists as well as academicians as a program tool for spurring substantive discussion across national boundaries of constitutional issues. In any case, no advance order will be needed.

4. Deputy Assistant Secretary of CU, Mildred Marcy, who figured prominently in Revolutionary Bicentennial operations as a USIA employee, intends to broach to League of Women Voters President Ruth Clusen the idea of the League’s staging a multi-year, national forum on American Constitutional Democracy: A Self-Assessment. The seminar, as Ms. Marcy visualizes it, would explore how well America has fulfilled its ideals; in a sense, it would be a self-scoring exercise. This kind of public examination would of course become a media event. Ms. Marcy notes that the League’s charter authorizes it to “identify and seek solutions for” national problems. As a former officer of the national staff of the League Ms. Marcy is in a strong position to energize the League to undertake a major symposium in this vein.

Sub-themes for objectives should congeal in due course. Meanwhile, USIA can cross-pollinate the thinking of domestic agencies by distributing the International Directory of Specialists in American Studies, a most suggestive reminder of the depth and range of American scholarship on the U.S. and its potential engagement with what the ARBA Study on the Bicentennial of the Constitution called “our finest achievement as a civilization”. The Directory contains a total of 2,142 names from 71 countries around the world.
93. Message to the Congress

Agency for International Communication

Message to the Congress Transmitting Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1977.
October 11, 1977

To the Congress of the United States:

I transmit herewith Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1977 to consolidate certain international communication, educational and cultural, and broadcasting activities of the United States Government. I am acting under the authority vested in me by the Reorganization Act, chapter 9 of title 5 of the United States Code. I am also acting pursuant to section 501 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1978 (Public Law 95–105), which provides that my recommendations for reorganizing these activities be transmitted by October 31, 1977.

This reorganization will consolidate into a new agency, to be known as the Agency for International Communication, the functions now exercised by the State Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs and the United States Information Agency.

The principal aspects of this proposal are:

—The new agency will take over USIA’s international communications programs (including the Voice of America) and the international educational and cultural exchange activities now conducted by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs.

—The agency’s Director will be the principal advisor on international information and exchange activities to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of State. Under the direction of the Secretary of State, the Director will have primary responsibility within the Government for the conduct of such activities. The Director, the Deputy Director and the Associate Directors of the new agency will be confirmed by the Senate.

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2 Signed into law by the President on August 17, 1977.
—The two commissions that now advise USIA and the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs will be combined into a single seven-member commission. Members of this nonpartisan commission will be chosen from fields related to the agency’s mission. The commissioners will be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.

The purpose of this reorganization is to broaden our informational, educational and cultural intercourse with the world, since this is the major means by which our government can inform others about our country, and inform ourselves about the rest of the world.

The new Agency for International Communication will play a central role in building these two-way bridges of understanding between our people and the other peoples of the world. Only by knowing and understanding each other’s experiences can we find common ground on which we can examine and resolve our differences.

The new agency will have two distinct but related goals:

• To tell the world about our society and policies—in particular our commitment to cultural diversity and individual liberty.

• To tell ourselves about the world, so as to enrich our own culture as well as to give us the understanding to deal effectively with problems among nations.

As the world becomes more and more interdependent, such mutual understanding becomes increasingly vital. The aim of this reorganization, therefore, is a more effective dialogue among peoples of the earth. Americans—mostly immigrants or the descendants of immigrants—are particularly well suited to enter into such an undertaking. We have already learned much from those who have brought differing values, perspectives and experiences to our shores. And we must continue to learn.

Thus the new agency will lay heavy emphasis on listening to others, so as to learn something of their motivations and aspirations, their histories and cultures.

Several principles guided me in shaping this reorganization plan. Among the most important were:

—Maintaining the integrity of the educational and cultural exchange programs is imperative. To this end, the plan retains the Board of Foreign Scholarships, whose strong leadership has done so much to insure the high quality of the educational exchange program. In addition, I intend to nominate an Associate Director who will be

3 References are to the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information and the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs. The merger established the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Communications, Cultural, and Educational Affairs.
responsible for the administration and supervision of educational and cultural functions consolidated in the new Agency. The responsibilities presently exercised by the Department of State in relation to the Center for Technical and Cultural Interchange Between East and West, Inc., will be transferred to the new agency without alteration.

—Keeping the Voice of America’s news gathering and reporting functions independent and objective. The Voice’s charter, enacted into law in 1976, provides that “VOA news will be accurate, objective, and comprehensive”; that VOA will “present a balanced and comprehensive projection of significant American thought and institutions”; and that VOA will present U.S. policies “clearly and effectively, and will also present responsible discussion and opinion on these policies.”

Under this Administration, VOA will be solely responsible for the content of news broadcasts—for there is no more valued coin than candor in the international marketplace of ideas. I also plan to nominate an Associate Director who will be responsible for the administration and supervision of the Voice of America.

—The new agency’s activities must be straightforward, open, candid, balanced, and representative. They will not be given over to the advancement of the views of any one group, any one party or any one Administration. The agency must not operate in a covert, manipulative, or propagandistic way.

—Rights of U.S. Information Agency and State Department employees must be respected. In the new agency, their career achievements will be recognized and the best possible use made of their professional skills and abilities.

The Director of the new agency will assess and advise on the impact on worldwide public opinion of American foreign policy decisions. The Agency will coordinate the international information, educational, cultural and exchange programs conducted by the U.S. Government and will be a governmental focal point for private U.S. international exchange programs. It will also play a leading role within the U.S. Government in our efforts to remove barriers to the international exchange of ideas and information.

It is not practicable to specify all of the expenditure reductions and other economies that will result from the proposed reorganization, and therefore I do not do so. The reorganization will result in greater efficiency by unifying in Washington the management of programs which are already administered in a consolidated manner in the field. For example, field officers will no longer report to two separate sets of supervisors and headquarters at home.

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4 See footnote 2, Document 47.
This plan abolishes the functions of the Advisory Committee on the Arts authorized by section 106(c) of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2456(c)). Also abolished, as a result of the consolidation of certain functions of the United States Advisory Commission on Information and the United States Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs in the United States Advisory Commission on International Communication, Cultural and Educational Affairs, are the functions authorized by section 603 of the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, as amended (22 U.S.C. 1468) (requiring submission by the United States Advisory Commission on Information of a quarterly report to the Director of USIA and a semiannual report to the Congress). The new commission will report annually and at such other times as it deems appropriate (as does the existing Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs). Since appointments of all members of the new commission will be on a nonpartisan basis, as has been the case with the Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, the requirement of section 602(a) of the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act (22 U.S.C. 1467(a)) that not more than three members of the Advisory Commission on Information shall be of the same political party is abolished.

Various obsolete or superseded functions under Reorganization Plan No. 8 of 1953 (22 U.S.C. 1461 note), which created the USIA, are superseded by this plan. Finally, the Plan abolishes a provision authorizing the Secretary of State to pay the expenses of transporting the bodies of participants in exchange programs who die away from home, since State no longer will conduct such programs (22 U.S.C. 2670(e)). All functions abolished by the reorganization are done so in compliance with section 903(b) of title 5 of the United States Code.

After investigation, I have found that this reorganization is necessary to carry out the policy set forth in section 901(a) of title 5 of the United States Code. The provisions in this Plan for the appointment and pay of the Director, Deputy Director, and Associate Directors of the Agency have been found by me to be necessary by reason of the reorganization made by the plan and are at a rate applicable to comparable officers in the executive branch.

In presenting this plan, I ask the support of Congress to strengthen and simplify the machinery by which we carry out these important functions of the United States Government.

Such action will make us better able to project the great variety and vitality of American life to those abroad, and to enrich our own lives with a fuller knowledge of the vitality and variety of other societies.
The new Agency for International Communication will help us demonstrate “a decent respect for the opinions of mankind,” and to deal intelligently with a world awakening to a new spirit of freedom.

Jimmy Carter

[Omitted here is the text of Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1977.]

94. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Reinhardt) to all USIA Employees

Washington, October 11, 1977

President Carter today sent to the Congress Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1977. In essence, this Plan consolidates the functions now carried out by USIA and the State Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs into a new agency to be known as the Agency for International Communication. The Plan and the President’s accompanying Message are being sent to all posts via the Wireless File, together with a collection of questions and answers. I want to point out that the Congress has 60 legislative working days in which to consider the President’s Plan. If the Congress does not specifically vote the Plan down within this time period, the Plan automatically becomes law. Because of uncertainty as to when the current session of Congress will be adjourned, we cannot know at this time precisely when the 60 legislative working days will expire or, should the Plan become law, precisely when the new agency would be established. At best, the latter is several months into the future. We shall be calling on many of you to assist us in planning the details of the proposed new agency, should it come into being. In the meantime, I trust all of you will remember that there is a job to be done and that you will carry out your responsibilities with a renewed sense of purpose and dedication. I also encourage you to look upon the President’s proposal as a challenging opportunity for the future. We shall keep you as fully informed as possible over the next few months. We shall be delighted to answer inquiries to the best of our ability.


2 See Document 93.
95. Letter From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Reinhardt) to all USIA Public Affairs Officers

Washington, October 11, 1977

Dear PAO:

In July I issued by telegram program guidelines for Country Plan and project activities. Since then, it has become clear that the guidelines have at best resulted in some confusion. I regret that we were not more skillful drafters. Since the guidelines constitute one of the most basic building blocks that we intend to put in place, clarity at the outset is essential.

The misinterpretation which most concerns me accords a secondary place to our legislative mandate to project American society and a primary place to our mandate to explain U.S. official policies.

That is simply not the case, nor the intention. Our two legislative mandates are of equal importance. My initial emphasis (in meetings with colleagues in Washington) on explaining U.S. policies was meant to ensure equality of treatment to this function, which, I believe, has come to be taken for granted. Programs and projects in support of this purpose are sometimes difficult to design. That they may require more effort does not absolve us of our responsibility.

At the same time, programs to project American society are somewhat easier to design. It is for this reason that I chose to emphasize the foreign policy mandate. I did not and do not intend to accord the two mandates different priorities. To repeat—they are of equal importance.

The guidelines deliberately state that all programs must be demonstrably relevant to U.S. objectives under one mandate or the other; and also state that the country program is contingent on an analysis of the points of communication tension between the U.S. and the host country. Clearly, these tensions differ from country to country and thus our Country Plans will differ from country to country. Therefore, the balance between the programs under the two mandates will

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of the Director, Executive Secretariat, Secretariat Staff, Correspondence Files, 1973–1980, Entry P–104, Box 140, 7704100–7704109. No classification marking. Distributed to all heads of offices and services and overseas supervisory level employees. Alan Carter sent the letter to Reinhardt through Schneidman under an October 3 cover memorandum. In it, Carter explained that the letter "is the draft of the first of the two PAO letters for the Director’s signature” noting that it “is an attempt to clarify the intent of the Country Plan guidelines.” (Ibid.)

2 See Document 77.
also differ. It is the analysis of the tensions that will determine how much programming is done under each of the mandates.

But for the Agency as a whole, the two are equal in importance. Any other interpretation can only be misleading.

It is the PAO’s responsibility to determine what policies need explaining and which aspects of American society need projecting and where, in the context of the local communication environment, the balance lies. But to assume, at the beginning of the analytical process, a different priority for the two mandates would be erroneous.

I trust this clarifies our intent.

Sincerely,

John E. Reinhardt
Director

96. Paper Prepared in the Office of Research, United States Information Agency

Washington, October 12, 1977

Utilization of Opinion Research
by U.S. Foreign Affairs Agencies

Although American presidents beginning with Franklin Roosevelt have paid close attention to domestic public opinion only a few specific examples of the utilization of foreign opinions by the Federal government are available. For example, after Roosevelt found himself ahead of American opinion in his 1936 Chicago “Quarantine” speech he employed polls to be sure that his foreign policies were acceptable to the American public, yet there is little direct evidence of how he or

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of the Director, Executive Secretariat, Secretariat Staff, Correspondence Files, 1973–1980, Entry P–104, Box 141, 7704210–7704219. No classification marking. Engle sent a copy of the memorandum to Cohen under an October 12 memorandum. In it, Engle stated, “The attached paper summarizes what we have been able to pull together about government utilization of foreign affairs research. Leo Crespi has been a major source of information about past instances of utilization and Jim Halsema has done the basic work of pulling his and other information together in this paper.” (Ibid.)

his successors may have utilized foreign opinion data in foreign policy formulation.

One of the earliest examples of such utilization was the survey of 221 French military and civilian and native leaders in North Africa undertaken under the guidance of Hadley Cantril before the Allied landings there in 1942, which resulted in a decision to use primarily American rather than mixed British-American forces in the initial invasion, and to emphasize in broadcasts to the area that the United States had no plans to annex or control the area after the war. On the other hand, a subsequent attempt to send trained researchers to ask systematic questions in neutral European capitals was frustrated by bureaucratic in-fighting.

Lloyd Free states that “President Eisenhower was deeply interested in the opinions of people of other countries,” citing a rebuke Eisenhower gave to John Foster Dulles for ignoring public opinion as reported to the President by Free and Nelson Rockefeller, on the basis of USIA surveys. Free claims that one of his own surveys of Japanese attitudes “actually received consideration” at the NSC level. In 1956 Eisenhower sent USIA director Theodore C. Streibert a letter acknowledging receipt of USIA foreign public opinion roundups and asking that they be continued. In 1957 Rockefeller pleaded with Eisenhower to prevent discontinuation of such polls, threatened by budget cuts, citing “your previous expressions as to the value of these reports.”

A leaked classified report based on USIA polls became an important factor in the 1960 election when, after a Kennedy aide had provided a copy to the New York Times, it was then used by the candidate to accuse Nixon of misleading the American public as to the degree of erosion in American standing abroad.

Undoubtedly USIA and other reports on foreign public opinion have had some effect on the thinking of policymakers as part of their background information, but the fact is that there is little other specific

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4 Op. cit. [Footnote is in the original.]

5 Nelson A. Rockefeller to the President, letter dated June 13, 1957. USIA files contain other copies of letters of appreciation from senior personnel of foreign affairs agencies for such surveys, but again with no specific indication of how they were used. [Footnote is in the original.]

evidence of the use of such reports as actually influencing major U.S. policies. We must rely chiefly on the fact that senior officials concerned with foreign affairs have expressed interest in reports commissioned by USIA as evidence of their usefulness.

In general, the information generated by opinion polling—as with any other research—is merely one of the elements considered in the decision-making process. The decision-maker must inevitably balance all factors in each situation and may arrive at valid decisions based on non-empirical considerations. For this reason, it is difficult to determine the extent to which any policy decision is indebted to a single informational input. On the other hand, there have been several instances when the potential contribution of opinion polling among foreign populations was completely overlooked or ignored, with disastrous consequences.

One of the classic cases of missed opportunities to use a survey in foreign policy decision-making was that of a poll of Cuban public opinion by the Institute for International Social Research which showed that a little more than a year after Castro had come to power “the prevailing mood of the great majority of Cubans in April and May 1960 was one of hope and optimism,” with 86 percent of the sample expressing support for Castro.7 In the change of administrations the survey, which had been widely distributed by USIA, got lost in the shuffle. After the Bay of Pigs fiasco Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. wrote to Free, who headed the Institute, saying he wished “we had had it earlier.”8

Similarly, a report by Free on opinion in the Dominican Republic, taken in 1962 and widely distributed within the Federal government, showed “how extremely pro-United States, anti-Communist, and anti-Castro the Dominican people were at the time.” Yet when the Dominican crisis arose three years later and the U.S. intervened the report was not initially considered. Only after it had been republished and sent to the White House by Free and Cantril was its information taken into consideration.9

The Johnson administration apparently did heed a USIA survey of South Vietnamese attitudes taken in 1964, which showed popular attitudes toward the war were “largely apathetic,” interested in ending the conflict but not in which side won, although there was a “degree

7 Cantril, op. cit., p. 3. [Footnote is in the original.]
8 Cantril, op. cit., p. 5; Theodore C. Sorensen, The Murrow Years: Hot Words in the Cold War, New York, p. 141. [Footnote is in the original.]
9 Cantril, op. cit. p. 15. [Footnote is in the original.]
of approval for the insurgents on the part of many.”

This survey was influential in a decision taken a short time after its issuance to form a Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) an organization staffed by all U.S. agencies in Vietnam, and headed by a USIA officer, which greatly increased the American psychological effort in the area.

The Vietnam situation spawned other field research utilized in policy and program development. For example, a series of opinion surveys among villagers in South Vietnam, conducted during the period 1965–67 by Stanford Research Institute for the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Defense Department, is said to have directly influenced decisions on important military, security assistance, and civilian aid programs operated by the United States in the country.

U.S. domestic opinions are of increasing interest to the Department of State, which has a special unit (in the Office of Plans and Management of the Bureau of Public Affairs) to follow the results of polls dealing with foreign policy issues. Currently Public Affairs is monitoring editorial and other expressed opinion together with polls and thus assisting policy spokesmen to put forth the most persuasive presentation on such controversial issues as the Panama Canal treaty. We are told informally that PA input has been influential in the two Chinas issue by pointing to strong public opposition to ditching the Nationalist regime and in the Arab-Israeli dispute by noting the divergence between public opinion as reported by pollsters and that alleged by lobbyists on the Hill. PA has recently reported public wariness about too close U.S. involvement in African affairs, interest in human rights violations abroad and misunderstandings of the SALT issues in ways which some of its people believe have influenced what policy makers have said and done.

What Can Be Done by USIA?

Although the statement of USIA mission issued by President Kennedy in 1963 specifically calls for the Agency to advise “the President, his representatives abroad, and the various departments and agencies on the implications of foreign opinion for present and contemplated United States policies, programs and official statements,” this function has never been given an equal priority with the other part of that Mission statement calling for USIA to influence public attitudes in

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11 Reference is to the Public Opinion Analysis unit in PA/M, headed by Bernard Roscho.
other nations. An Arthur D. Little Inc. study of USIA management in 1970 made a strong recommendation that what it called the "sensing" function be greatly strengthened but no action was taken—rather, foreign public opinion research was reduced. The situation described by Free in 1965 that there was "not only no systematic feed-in of psychological data; but no systematic marshalling of such data and bringing them to the attention of top policy-makers when the hour of decision arrives," prevailed until very recently. Free noted that the instances of success he had cited came about because of the fortuitous existence of special channels to the top, not through the efforts of the bureaucracy, which he felt had little sense of significance of foreign public opinion. (Official and editorial opinion does get reported through channels by the Department of State, in USIA's foreign media reaction reports, and by other agencies concerned with foreign affairs.)

Although Free hoped that a new generation of Foreign Service Officers would have different attitudes than their predecessors, the continuing experience of the Office of Research in the development and clearance of new projects indicates that understanding of and support for opinion surveys is still relatively scattered within the corps.

Free felt that "for public opinion research to develop its full potential it must go into matters deeper than 'opinions.' It must investigate 'reality worlds' in general and the assumptions, often latent or implicit, upon which attitudes and opinions are based." And he felt that "for full meaningfulness, the findings must be interpreted against a broader background of social science data: studies of the power and influence structure in particular societies."\(^\text{15}\)

The only major change in the formal situation came about as a result of a provision of the 1975 Foreign Assistance Act requiring that "the President shall establish appropriate criteria to assess the commitment and progress of countries" toward foreign assistance objectives.\(^\text{16}\)


\(^{14}\) Lecture “The Role of Public Opinion in International Relations: the Contributions of Public Opinion Research,” prepared for delivery at the Edward R. Murrow Center of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Medford, Mass., November 1, 1965. [Footnote is in the original.]

\(^{15}\) Idem. [Footnote is in the original.]

\(^{16}\) The Foreign Assistance Act reference is in error; the International Development and Food Assistance Act (P.L. 94–161), which Ford signed into law on December 20, 1975, contained this provision.
This has caused AID to prepare a report to Congress which is essentially a blueprint for the application of various social science techniques to foreign aid policy development.\(^\text{17}\)

In 1977 the Office of Research was able, thanks to the representations of USIA’s new Director and Deputy Director, to obtain closer working relationships with the National Security Council staff. As a result, we have developed plans for a series of opinion surveys in which not only are the issues defined by members of the policy staff, but options for use of the results are tentatively laid out. The indications to date of high-level interest in the results of these polls—which we have attempted to report in the fuller kind of context suggested by Lloyd Free—have been gratifying.

If USIA were to be given a new mandate for sensing foreign opinions of interest to U.S. Government policymakers and given the staff ceiling and funding to accompany that requirement, it still would have to consider some of the existing practical limitations on increasing its activities abroad. Competent, reliable contractors who can conduct surveys of public opinion for us exist in only some of the 115 countries in which we have operations. We could not quickly alter this situation, or hope for others to do so. Clearances for undertaking such surveys would need to be obtained from the Department of State, chiefs of American diplomatic missions abroad and (in many cases) the host governments concerned. In many countries this last is impossible to get. Even in countries where attitude surveys are accepted in general, mission clearance is often a problem. Ever since the “Camelot” debacle in Chile in 1967, many if not most of our ambassadors have been queasy about the possible consequences of U.S. Government-funded public opinion inquiries in the countries to which they are accredited.\(^\text{18}\) Frequently unconvinced of the merits or need of surveys of public opinions, and perhaps unaware of their impersonal character and legitimate standing, they tend to err on the side of caution, an attitude which in some cases may be susceptible to change by firm indications from their superiors of the importance of the results of such surveys. In addition, while the interviewing of respondents would be done by local contractors, designing studies, awarding contracts, analyzing responses and preparing reports on the results requires staff work in Washington,

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\(^{18}\) Reference is presumably to Project Camelot, an Army-sponsored research project undertaken by the Special Operations Research Office, designed to analyze political and international problems outside of the United States. On July 8, 1965, the Department of Defense announced the cancellation of the project. For additional information, see *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, vol. XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico, Documents 279–280.
for which additional highly skilled professional personnel would be needed if present workloads were significantly increased.

Some of these obstacles to survey research can be overcome or circumvented. We have experimented with using small-group panel discussions or in-depth structured interviews of a relatively limited but carefully chosen group of informants to provide valuable insights related to USIA programming. In some cases these techniques could perhaps be used to get indirect evidence of views on major issues of foreign policy, even if they could not yield measures of public opinion. The example of the North African invasion survey is certainly worth repeating in other contexts.

We are also experimenting with getting views of people coming out of denied areas such as China and Eastern Europe, whether as emigres, refugees or temporary visitors, and with content analyses of published or broadcast materials to give us clues behind the superficial evidence of the words as they appear in newspapers or radio. And we draw upon scholars familiar with an area and the literature on it to pull together information not otherwise readily available. These techniques, too, are more successfully applied to the assessment or planning of USIA programming, but may prove worth pursuing for indications of foreign policy views as well.

Basically, however, the problem of organizing, staffing, and systematizing the Agency’s advisory function in response to a clearly articulated policy-making need is still to be worked out.
At lunch with George Vest this week, I asked him what— from his perspective—he thought our most important contribution in Western Europe might be.

After reflection, he responded in roughly the following way: influential Europeans, whatever their responsibilities in or out of government and including the intellectual community, confront a series of problems which are—to them at least—novel. Some of the problems are real; some imagined; but all form a “reality”. The menu of problems and their novelty are having a paralytic effect on Western European societies and governments. There is some danger, in these circumstances, that the Western European ship will founder with a flurry of impotent hand-wringing. The most useful thing USIS posts could do would be to bring together competent, imaginative, persuasive and inspirational American thinkers and problem-solvers with homogeneous or mixed groups of Western Europeans—in effect, to suggest that there are ways over or around some of their problems.  

An interesting echo of this theme is contained in Athens’ telegram 9269 reporting on a symposium on the future of democracy. A separate echo came to me this morning from Professor Friedmann of the American Institute at Munich. He said, again roughly, that West German society and government had lost élan, that there was little yeast (intellectual, moral or cultural), and therefore little sense of future prospects. And finally, of course, Jock Shirley went to Rome preoccupied by this kind of problem in the Italian context.

It can be argued that at least some of our Western European posts are already engaged in creating the kinds of problem-solving “net-

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1 Source: University of Arkansas Libraries, Special Collections Division, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection (CU), MC 468, Group I, CU Organization and Administration, Series 5: CU Reorganization 1978: CU-USIA Liaison, Box 27, USIA—General, 1976–1978 [1 of 2], folder 12. No classification marking. Copies were sent to Schneidman, Vest, and Hitchcock. Bray sent a copy of the memorandum to Hitchcock under an October 14 handwritten note. In it, Bray commented, “The attached is self-explanatory. It offers at least a potential for inter-institutional cooperation at a moment when friction abounds.” An additional notation in an unknown hand on Bray’s note, dated October 20, reads: “Mr. Roth—Mr. Hitchcock wants your attention called to point 1. of Mr. Bray’s note. MM.”

2 Hitchcock underlined the word “their” and placed a question mark in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.

3 Not found.
works” to which George Vest referred. I doubt, however, that we and the posts (not to say EUR and CU) share a self-conscious, articulated strategy.

We have emerged from the last decade with remarkable vitality and élan. We could share it more effectively with Western Europeans. USIA is a natural instrument. The task is important—perhaps more important than other things we do.

I suggest that IEU pick up this subject with George Vest and his deputies—that is to say, at an authoritative level in EUR—and decide whether the phenomenon does indeed deserve priority attention. If it does, clearly we will also need a strategy shared by USIA, EUR, CU and our posts. This phenomenon might, indeed, provide a basic rationale for a PAO Conference.

I would be happy to involve myself in any way you believe useful.

98. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, October 24, 1977

SUBJECT

North-South Scholarships

In my conversation with General Torrijos before his trip to Europe, he asked me why the United States had never established a scholarship program for bringing poor but talented Latin American students to the U.S. on full scholarships, as the Soviets did. I said that it was my

¹ Source: Carter Library, White House Central Files, Subject File, Foreign Affairs, Information-Exchange Activities-Educational, Executive, Box FO–35, FO 5–1 1/20/77–5/31/78. No classification marking. Sent for action. Copies were sent to Butler, Thornton, Erb, and Owen. Inderfurth and Dodson initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. Brzezinski drew an arrow on the first page of the memorandum pointing at Pastor's name in the “from” line. Also in the folder is an October 26 memorandum from Thornton to Brzezinski, in which Thornton endorsed Pastor’s proposal and referenced the CU study: “The critique from State/CU is correct in its own terms but those terms just are not relevant. This would be a political act, not primarily an attempt to make a major educational impact on a country. There would have to be special selection procedures and the like—and CU should have nothing to do with them. Probably the selection should be made with minimal US input (just enough to ensure that the recipients were not children of cabinet ministers!). The relevant model is the Rhodes scholarship—although we should avoid any attempt to duplicate that unique institution.” (Ibid.)
impression that the USG financed the study of many more developing 
country students than the Soviet Union did, but since he thought other-
wise, I said that I would look into the subject further.

I asked CU at State to do a study, and although they tried to dance 
around the question, it turns out that Torrijos is right. There are many 
more foreign students in the U.S. (203,000 in 1976) than in the Soviet 
Union (30,000 in 1973). But the USSR gives 13,000 full scholarships 
for undergraduate training, while only 10,000 students representing 
a relatively larger proportion of graduate students receive some U.S. 
government assistance. And few of these students, according to CU, 
are poor, and none are actively recruited, as is the case with the Soviet 
Union’s students.

Quite independently, Landon Butler called me and said he had 
spoken to David McCulloch (author of Path Between the Sea) who had 
suggested that one way to sell the Canal Treaty would be to link it 
to a program for bringing Panamanian and other developing world 
students to the U.S. for their education. His argument was that Ameri-
cans would feel more comfortable about giving away the Canal if they 
 knew the U.S. was training Panama’s next generation of technicians 
and leaders.

The President’s trip offers a great opportunity to launch such an 
idea. It is surprising to me that U.S. Embassies do not try to search 
for talented but poor secondary students to help them further their 
education in the U.S. If nothing else, the U.S. might want to consider 
a scholarship fund for the top fifty secondary students who can’t afford 
a college education in each developing country. This doesn’t have to 
be a response to the Soviets’ program, particularly since there is much 
evidence pointing to the counterproductive nature of study in the 
USSR—to study there is to learn to despise the Soviet communist 
system, not to love it. Nor should this detract from an important point 
CU made in their report: that we want to help build the universities 
of the developing countries rather than train their students here. CU’s 
argument (or rationalization) for not funding undergraduate education 
is that it will “Americanize” them and increase the chances that the 
nation’s most talented students would emigrate to the U.S., thus con-
tributing to the “brain drain.”

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2 Attached but not printed at Tab A is an October 13 covering memorandum from 
Hitchcock to Pastor, transmitting an undated study prepared in CU entitled “Foreign 
Students in the United States.”

3 Reference is to The Path Between the Seas: The Creation of the Panama Canal, 1870– 1914. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1977)

4 Inderfurth placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this sentence and 
wrote: “I doubt this! RI.”
Certainly, we don’t want to de-nationalize the next generation of a country’s leadership. But no one could argue that a four-year scholarship program for fifty students will de-nationalize a country. And incentives should be included to ensure that the students return to their country when their education is completed. In this regard, it would make sense to launch the initiative in Venezuela and to build on its experience, since it has recently established an unprecedented scholarship program to train about 5,000 students abroad now.

Venezuela and other middle-income countries are in a position to send their young abroad, but certainly not to help the poorer countries. The initiative would therefore have the advantage of using an idea and the experience of the middle-income countries, but be targeted at helping the poorer countries.

If you agree that this idea merits the President’s consideration, I will draft a short memo for you to send to him setting out the proposal.5

5 Brzezinski approved the recommendation and added: “First staff it out & check it out.” For Brzezinski’s letter to the President, see footnote 5, Document 119.
256666. For Ambassador or DCM. Subject: Reorganization Plan No. 2—Creation of Agency for International Communication. References: (A) State 244017; (B) State 244730.

1. In his testimony before Senate Governmental Affairs Committee Oct 25 former Senator J.W. Fulbright expressed some concern that consolidation of the educational exchange program with information program of USIA might be misunderstood in Commission countries. He said that the binational Commissions (particularly representatives of other nations who serve on them) might perceive the transfer of the program from the Department to the Agency for International Communication as a shift away from the mutuality emphasis of present educational exchanges to an approach more closely identified with the propagation of U.S. views.

2. Reftel (A) provides you with the text of the President’s message to the Congress outlining his purposes with regard to the reorganization, including his assurances that integrity of educational and cultural programs will be protected.

3. In order to enable the administration to respond to the Senate on the problem posed by Senator Fulbright, you are requested to have it presented to the executive directors of the Fulbright Commissions in your country, have them consult with key if not all commission

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770393-0913. Unclassified; Immediate. Sent immediate to all European diplomatic posts, Bangkok, Bogota, Brasilia, Buenos Aires, Canberra, Colombo, Islamabad, Kabul, Kathmandu, Kuala Lumpur, Lima, Manila, Monrovia, Montevideo, New Delhi, Quito, Santiago, Seoul, Tel Aviv, Tokyo, and Wellington. Also sent to Bern, Berlin, Bucharest, Budapest, Luxembourg, Moscow, Ottawa, Prague, Sofia, USNATO, the Mission in Berlin, Valletta, and Warsaw. Drafted by Straus; cleared by Hitchcock, Roth, Vogel, Cohen, Hirschhorn, and Mason; approved by Read.

2 In telegram 244017 to all diplomatic and consular posts, October 12, the Department transmitted the text of the President’s October 11 message to Congress on USIA-CU reorganization. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770371-0242) The text of Carter’s October 11 message to the Congress is printed as Document 93.

3 In telegram 244730 to multiple diplomatic and consular posts, October 12, the Department transmitted the text of a message from Donald Lowitz, the chair of the Board of Foreign Scholarships, for transmittal to bi-national commissions. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770373-0690)

members. They should be furnished with, and have an opportunity to reflect on, text of President’s message. Executive Secretaries should then obtain from them, particularly the national members, any views they may wish to convey.

4. Because of the time frame in which the hearings on the reorganization bill are proceeding you are requested to transmit the report of the executive directors on these discussions to the Department to be received in Washington by C.O.B. Tuesday Nov 1.

5. If you conclude that raising this subject presents problems we would appreciate knowing this ASAP.

Vance

100. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Office of Management and Budget (McIntyre) to President Carter

Washington, October 31, 1977

SUBJECT

Proposed Amendments to Reorganization Plan No. 2—Public Diplomacy

Proposed amendments to Reorganization Plan No. 2 (Public Diplomacy) are attached, together with a transmittal message. We had expected to have until November 11 to submit amendments, but because Congress is about to cease its regular sessions and go into pro forma meetings pending submission of the energy conference report, Chairman Brooks has decided to act on the plan this Wednesday, November 2. For this reason, any amendments must be transmitted to the Congress no later than Tuesday, November 1.

1 Source: Carter Library, White House Central Files, Subject File, Federal Government, Agency for International Communications (Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1977, 10/11/77), Box FG–236, FG 999–7 1/20/77–1/20/81. No classification marking. McIntyre sent the memorandum to the President under an October 31 covering memorandum on the President’s Reorganization Project letterhead, commenting that both Vance and Brzezinski had suggested alternative names for the new agency. McIntyre, noting that any proposed amendments had to be transmitted to the House by November 1, stated that “we must act quickly if you decide against our proposal of ‘Agency for International Understanding.’” (Ibid.) Hutcheson sent copies of both memoranda to Eizenstat, Brzezinski, and Pettigrew under an October 31 memorandum, requesting comments on McIntyre’s memoranda by 9 a.m. on November 1. (Ibid)

2 Attached but not printed.
The House and Senate hearings, as well as discussions with congressional staff, brought forth a number of congressional concerns with the plan as originally submitted. We have received a list of five proposed amendments (the “Joint Recommendations”) recommended by the Senate Government Affairs Committee, the Senate International Operations Subcommittee (McGovern), and the House International Operations Subcommittee (Fascell), and two amendments recommended by Senator Ribicoff alone. We also received one recommendation from Congressman Horton. We recommend the acceptance of four minor amendments that will in no way impair the effectiveness of the new agency:

1. Designate one of the four Associate Directors as the “Associate Director for Broadcasting” and one as the “Associate Director for Educational and Cultural Affairs”. This is one of the Joint Recommendations and Brooks apparently has no strong objections to it. Although the amendment would determine the titles of the two officials, it would not limit the functions that the Director could assign to them; at the same time, it would assuage congressional and public concerns about the status of the Voice of America and the educational and cultural activities in the new agency.

2. Change the name of the agency from the “Agency for International Communication” to the “Agency for International Understanding”. This is another of the Joint Recommendations, concurred in by Chairman Brooks. There has been general concern over the fact that the initials of the originally proposed name (AIC) spell “CIA” backwards and several Members of Congress and other interested parties have suggested “Agency for International Understanding” as a replacement. The NSC staff appears to be the lone objector to this name.\footnote{In his October 28 Evening Report, Henze reported on a conversation with Hirschhorn regarding the reorganization plan. Henze noted that the Office of Management and Budget had reservations concerning the proposed name of the new agency: “OMB feels President must request that this be changed and is going to recommend ‘Agency for International Understanding.’ I said we all thought this rather affected and could not honestly recommend it to President. Why not leave things as they are?” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special (Henze), Box 5, Evening Reports File: 7–10/77) In a November 1 memorandum to Brzezinski, Henze stated that McIntyre’s memorandum to the President on the reorganization plan “presents no problems for us” with the exception of the proposed agency name change. Henze commented, “I continue to regard ‘Agency for International Understanding’ as pompous, smacking of Newspeak, as I gather do you. I recommend we not endorse it to the President but instead propose we consider using the name already suggested (‘Agency for International Communication’) but with the words changed in order so that they do not spell CIA backward: i.e. International Communication Agency. This has the virtue of being simple and follows the analogy of the present name: U.S. Information Agency. It would abbreviate ICA, or USICA—a sensible acronym.” Dodson concurred, adding: “P.S. ‘Information’ translated into many languages has no meaning of ‘intelligence’ I still prefer above all ‘Information Agency.’” (Carter Library, White House Central Files, Subject File, Federal Government, Agency for International Communications, (Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1977, 10/11/77), Box FG 236, FG 999–7 1/20/77–1/20/81)
3. Provide that no more than four of the seven members of the advisory commission may be of the same political party. Brooks concurs in this Joint Recommendation, which also represents the only amendment requested by Congressman Horton. One of the existing commissions being consolidated uses this formula, while the other uses the “nonpartisan” formula that appears in the original version of the plan.

4. Add “labor” to the list of fields from which members of the advisory commission should be drawn. This is a Joint Recommendation, concurred in by Brooks. This will result in a total of eight occupational areas from which the seven commission members should come, but it was requested by the employee unions who testified and seems harmless.

One technical amendment relating to the Director’s membership on the board of the National Foundation for the Arts and Humanities is also included among the attached amendments.

We advise that one Joint Recommendation not be agreed to: the proposal is to move the new agency farther from the control of the State Department by changing the present language (providing that the Director acts “under the direction of the Secretary of State”) to something limiting the Secretary’s involvement to guidance or direction as to the foreign policy of the United States. We oppose this recommendation for three reasons:

- first this issue was the principal point in dispute in the preparation of the Presidential decision memo on public diplomacy, and you expressly decided on the “under the direction” formula;
- second, accepting this recommendation would arouse the academic community (who feel that some closeness to State helps protect the integrity of the cultural exchange programs); and
- third, Chairman Brooks opposes the recommendation.

It should be noted that the testimony of Administration witnesses before Congress has tended to tilt slightly in the direction of greater independence from State anyway, so that accepting the congressional recommendation would have little real effect operationally while causing us needless trouble with Brooks and the academic community.

Senator Ribicoff’s two personal recommendations were that the Fulbright program and the funding of the East-West Center not be transferred to the new agency, but remain in State. Chairman Brooks and all the other congressional participants oppose these recommendations, as do we. These programs are an integral part of the activities being moved from State into the new agency, and excluding them would continue in existence the fragmentation of related activities that is the principal reason for this reorganization. We think that Ribicoff is merely trying to respond to the individual concerns of former Senator Fulbright and Senator Inouye, and that there is no political support in the Senate as a whole for these two suggestions.
PERCEIVED OPINIONS ON NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES IN LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

Highlights

This preliminary report is based on questionnaires answered by USIS public affairs officers in 57 less developed countries during August and September 1977. In most cases, PAOs worked with economic and political officers in completing the forms. Their perceptions of the opinions of those in their country professionally concerned with North-South issues or personally interested in international affairs include the following:

—In most of the reporting countries, the involved and interested publics on North-South issues are believed to prefer seeing U.S. resources devoted primarily to projects fostering economic growth and national development, rather than to programs aimed at meeting basic human needs.

—Most posts perceive relatively little support for a policy of channeling officials development assistance primarily to the poorest of the LDCs.

—There appears to be no strong preference for multilateral over bilateral aid.

—The prominence of concern over issues of trade more than questions of aid suggests a view among most LDCs that if they could obtain more favorable terms in trading with the industrialized countries, other problems in North-South relations would be less troublesome.

—Whatever support the interested or involved groups in these countries may give to Third World rhetoric in other contexts, they do not appear to accept the clichés about the ineffective, self-serving, or misdirected character of past U.S. economic assistance.

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South Thornton Files, Subject Files, Box 101, North/South: Public Opinion in Less Developed Countries, 11/77. No classification marking. Bray sent a copy of the report to Thornton under a November 14 memorandum, noting that the report constituted the "first results" of USIA's efforts in "canvass[ing] our public affairs officers to get a reading on opinion in the less developed countries concerning North-South issues." (Ibid.) Another copy of the preliminary report, designated as USIA Research Memorandum M–7–77, and an unsigned and undated copy of Bray's memorandum are in the National Archives, RG 306, Office of Research and Media Reaction, Research Memoranda, 1963–1999, Entry P–64, Box 35, M–7–77.
—In less than half the countries is credence given to the official American position that the U.S. is committed to helping build a new international economic system or to the proposition that the U.S. is actively supporting the economic aims of the LDCs.

—Encouragement of private investment appears to be important to many more of these countries than does the nationalization of existing foreign-owned companies.

—The great majority of posts think that those interested in international affairs in the host country would view a visit by a top level U.S. official as important and desirable as a symbolic evidence of U.S. interest.

**Introduction**

The 57 posts covered in this preliminary report include 16 from Africa, 16 from the Near East and South Asia, 18 from Latin America and 7 from East Asia. About half of these countries can be considered very poor (per capita GNP under $300), the other half as better off among the LDCs.²

In most of these countries USIA is unable to conduct standard opinion surveys. PAOs were, therefore, asked to report their perception of local public opinion, especially of the opinions of two groups: those professionally concerned with North-South problems (referred to herein as Group A), and the larger group of individuals personally interested in international affairs (referred to as Group B).

Although completion of the questionnaire at each post was the responsibility of the Public Affairs Officer, he was asked to solicit and usually received assistance from Mission officers directly concerned with economic or political problems. These officers indicated, to the best of their joint ability, their perceptions of opinion in the host country on North-South issues.

This is, therefore, a study of opinions about opinions—a study not of what people think but of what our USIS and other overseas Mission officers think people think.³ In other words, this report is based on informed estimates rather than on actual measurements. Different officers at some posts perceived local opinion on certain issues very differ-
ently and said so. Those who have worked with the completed questionnaires have also been very conscious of the impressionistic character of the responses. Nonetheless, our Mission officers are often in a unique position to assess prevailing opinion on economic and political issues of interest to the U.S. Government.

A fuller report covering the entire questionnaire with an area-by-area breakdown is under preparation.

The Most Important North-South Issues

The burning issue is trade. In reply to a question on what are the most important North-South issues in the host country, posts in the great majority of reporting countries perceive that both Groups A and B consider trade with developed countries most important. Mentioned most often are improvements such as better access to markets in the developed countries, a broadening and liberalizing of the GSP (Generalized System of Preferences), increasing the prices paid to LDCs for raw materials, creation of a “Common Fund” to stabilize LDC commodity prices, and a revision of GATT to provide better terms for LDCs.

No other single issue is believed to be given as much emphasis as trade in the countries surveyed. Other issues mentioned by a varying number of posts as important to those professionally concerned in the host country are, in descending order of the number of mentions:

1. Transfer of Resources. (Including Official Development Assistance, private and multilateral financing).
2. Transfer of technology. (Concessionary terms for transfer of technology are perceived as being highly important in a majority of countries).
3. Energy problems. (Financial assistance from the developed countries to LDC oil-importing countries are perceived as highly important in a majority of countries. OPEC financial assistance, and minimizing further oil price increases, are seen as highly important in a majority of non-OPEC countries).
4. The New International Economic Order. (Belief that the developed countries should support this).
5. Stimulation of foreign investment. (Nationalization of foreign-owned companies is perceived as having low importance in a great majority of countries, while encouragement of private investment in LDCs by the developed countries is perceived as highly important in a near majority of countries).
6. Effects of economic problems in the developed countries on the LDCs.
7. Debt relief for host country.
The following issues are viewed as being accorded low importance by most of the surveyed countries: Law of the Sea issues, food supplies and population issues.

*Perceived U.S. Position on North-South Issues*

Our posts abroad believe that in a majority of LDCs the United States is viewed as supporting the economic aims of the LDCs but as not working for them actively. In a plurality of countries, those professionally involved are believed to view the U.S. as committed to helping build a new international system in which there is increased equity, growth and justice for the LDCs. The interested nonspecialist public, however, is perceived in a majority of countries as disagreeing strongly with this view and as feeling that the U.S. is not committed to helping build a new international system.\(^4\)

*Choosing Sides*

In most of the surveyed countries, large majorities of both involved and interested publics are believed to feel that their country’s interests are best served by siding in economic disputes with other less developed countries rather than with the developed countries. Further, in a majority of countries, posts perceive groups A and B as subscribing to the view that, to counter the divide and rule tactics of the industrialized nations, the “Group of 77” must negotiate as a solid front even when some of their economic interests differ.

*Reaction to American Economic Actions or Policies*

Various American trade policies—such as the generalized system of preferences (GSP), commodity agreements, and elimination of non-tariff barriers—are perceived as having most helped our image in less developed countries among both groups A and B. Conversely, perceived American inaction, intransigence or obstructionism on trade issues are perceived by posts to have done the greatest damage to the American image in the past two or three years.

When asked what changes or initiatives in American policies or actions in the economic field would, in their opinion, be most helpful to gain the support of those most interested in international affairs in host country, posts again talk primarily about: further trade concessions

\(^4\) Posts generally judged Group B less well informed on most issues, more hostile than Group A to the positions of the developed countries and the U.S., and more accepting of the extreme opinions and slogans expressed by some Third World spokesmen. Besides some government officials, military officers and businessmen, Group B usually includes also students, teachers, journalists, intellectuals, and others who in many countries are traditionally among the more leftist elements of the population. [Footnote is in the original.]
such as expansion of the GSP, or more commodity agreements favorable to the LDCs.

**View of American Foreign Aid Funds**

Contrary to the thrust of the Administration’s aid policy, which emphasizes meeting basic human needs, posts in large majority believe that the support of informed and involved groups in their country is more likely for a policy of devoting U.S. resources primarily to projects designed to foster economic growth and national development in the LDCs. Further, posts in a plurality of these countries perceive little support for giving official development assistance primarily to the poorest of the LDCs.

In a majority of countries that had been recipients of U.S. aid in the past, posts believe that at least those directly involved in international economic affairs perceive that this aid contributed materially to the development of the host country. Those more generally interested in international affairs are seen as more divided on the issue of American contribution to the country’s development.

Perceptions of the generally favorable image achieved by U.S. aid are supported by the belief that both groups A and B, in the majority of these countries, tend to disagree with the following three charges that have been made against the American aid program:

1. That U.S. economic assistance has so many strings attached that it has been ineffective;
2. That U.S. food aid has often been ineffective because it did not get into the hands of the needy; and
3. That U.S. food supplies given as foreign aid in the 60s and early 70s stifled expansion of local food production.

**Multilateral Versus Bilateral Financing**

International financial institutions like the World Bank, IDA, IFC, IMF, and the regional development banks are—in the opinion of posts—regarded favorably in the majority of the reporting LDC countries. They are generally not perceived as a means of control employed by the developed countries. Nonetheless, in a plurality of countries, posts perceive little support for the policy of channeling official development assistance primarily through multilateral rather than through bilateral institutions.

Our posts in a plurality of the 57 LDC countries responding perceive broad support for increasing the amount of official development assistance, for lowering interest rates, for providing a greater proportion of ODA in grants rather than loans, and for imposing fewer restrictions on how ODA funds are to be spent.
Perceived Opinions on Debt Relief

On a global basis, debt relief is not perceived as a particularly important issue. In a majority of these 57 countries, a moratorium or cancellation of debts owed to developed countries is believed to be given low importance. Rescheduling of debts to extend the payback period is, however, perceived to have high importance in about one-third of the countries studied.

Attitude Toward Multinational Corporations

Multinational corporations have, in the opinion of posts, a mixed image among groups A and B in the 57 countries. Only in a minority of countries is Group A—those professionally concerned with North-South issues—believed to accept the charge that multinationals exploit the natural resources of LDCs without providing commensurate benefits. In more than half the countries, however, group B—the attentive public—is believed to hold that view. The free-enterprise argument that multinationals are one of the best agents for helping LDCs achieve stable economic growth is thought by posts to be rejected by a majority of both groups A and B in these countries.

Further, in a majority of countries, those professionally concerned with international economic problems are believed to perceive “big foreign corporations” as “one of the dominant causes of the economic problems” in their country. The larger attentive public, on the other hand, is more often seen as blaming the present international economic order, their own government, or special vested interests for their country’s economic problems.

Perceived Reactions to American Political Actions or Policies

No single American political initiative undertaken during the past two or three years appears to stand out across regions as having particularly helped or harmed the U.S. image in less developed countries. Actions and policies believed by posts to have contributed most to a favorable image of the U.S. include, in descending order of frequency of mentions, the following:

1. U.S. foreign policy in general—such as paying more attention to a country or an area. (Mentioned in all areas)
3. U.S. Middle East involvement. (Especially important to countries in North Africa and the Middle East)
4. U.S. human rights policies. (Mainly in Latin America)
5. The Panama Canal Treaty. (Mainly in Latin America)

Actions or policies perceived as having done the greatest harm to the U.S. image are:
1. U.S. foreign policy in general—such as neglect of a country or an area. (Mentioned in all areas)

2. U.S. policy in Angola. (Mainly in African nations)

3. U.S. arms policies (sales, refusal to sell, nuclear policy; Mentioned in all areas)

4. U.S. support for Israel. (Criticism centered in North Africa and Middle East)

Perceived Importance of Various Political Developments

A visit to the host country by a top-level USG official, or some other symbolic evidence of U.S. interest, is believed by posts in a majority of the surveyed countries to be considered both very important and highly desirable by persons professionally involved or otherwise interested in international affairs. Other American initiatives which, in the opinion of the posts, would be most helpful to gain the support of host country target groups are (in descending order of frequency of mention) the following:

1. Settling the Middle East problem. (A high priority in Africa, the Middle East and East Asia)

2. Supporting majority rule in southern Africa. (Important mainly in African nations)

3. Continuing giving attention to host country or its region. (Mentioned mostly in Latin America)

4. Halting nuclear proliferation and the arms race, including demilitarizing of Indian Ocean. (Mainly in South Asia)

5. Halting international terrorism. (Mentioned in all areas)

Political developments which are widely perceived as being, in the eyes of interested host country publics, both unimportant and undesirable, include:


2. Reconciliation between the USSR and China.

Washington, November 8, 1977

SUBJECT
Meeting with Southern Cone PAOs on Human Rights Programming

I brought together the PAOs from the four countries of the Southern Cone—Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay—on my recent trip to the area in order to discuss programing relating to human rights themes. The following is a review of the highlights of that meeting divided into four sections: the situation as the PAOs perceive it, our consensus on thematic emphases for programs relating to their countries, the PAOs’ recommendations for support they could use from the media elements and their recommendations for support from non-media elements.

The Situation:

The width of the spectrum of definition of human rights frequently has proved to be an impediment to their search for increased understanding and support for United States positions. The conceptual framework set by the Secretary of State of there being three groups of human rights seemed to suggest a potentially productive approach. These groups have been called “clusters” by Assistant Secretary Todman. But during our meeting we used the Helsinki terminology and called them basket one (Integrity of the Person), basket two (Economic and Social Justice), and basket three (Civil and Political Liberties). There was consensus that for many purposes of policy explication it would be useful to confine the term “human rights” to references to basket

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of the Director, Executive Secretariat, Secretariat Staff, Correspondence Files, 1973–1980, Entry P–104, Box 146, 7704660–7704669. Limited Official Use. Copies were sent to Reinhardt and IOP. Bray and Liu initialed the memorandum, indicating that they saw it. In an undated note to Chatten, Bray commented, “Very interesting. Suggest distribution to other areas and D/HA, Derian. Will you be following thru on basic ideas? CB.” A notation in an unknown hand on the note reads, “11/14 Delivered orig. of note & memo to ILA.” (Ibid.)

2 In telegram 98034 to all diplomatic and consular posts, April 30, the Department referenced Vance’s April 30 address at the University of Georgia School of Law (see footnote 15, Document 67), and outlined the “high points” of the address, including the definition of human rights as: “1) The right to be free from governmental violation of the integrity of the person, such as torture, etc; 2) The right to the fulfillment of such vital needs as food, shelter, health care and education; and 3) The right to enjoy civil and political liberties, such as freedom of thought etc.” The telegram is printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Document 39.
one. This would not preclude extensive programing on human rights in the basket two and basket three areas, but it would dictate a more productive approach to policy explication. It also would prevent defenders of offensive foreign government policies from saying, as some are doing, “We have excellent programs and are making measurable progress in economic and social justice and, while we have for the moment non-democratic governments, there are numerous civil and political liberties to which we point with pride. Since that seems to make up the majority of what you Americans are talking about when you say human rights, our area of dispute is only a small one over on the ‘integrity of the person’ end of the scale.”

But problems of the basket one variety are everywhere. It is a revealing commentary that the phrase “to disappear someone” has entered the language down South.

The governments of all four countries are, to one degree or another, on the outs with the United States, perceiving our approach to be all stick and no carrot. Argentine Charge Max Chaplin, for example, was beset by the implications of the basic, pragmatic problem of how to move President Videla to action when much of the USG approach puts distance between us and him. The Uruguayan and Paraguayan governments are reluctant even to admit they have human rights problems. The Argentine and Chilean governments view threats to their institutions and general well-being as the motivation for their actions. There is a widespread official belief that foreign media distort situations in the Southern Cone. Any time a United States official can be quoted as saying the U.S. media do not give a balanced picture of the Hemisphere, governments (and others) leap upon the statement as support for their positions.

The one problem thread which ran consistently through discussions of the situation was the difficulty PAOs have in answering critics who claim the United States is following a double standard in its application of sanctions on human rights violators. There is considerable resentment, especially at government levels, about people’s perceptions that they are being singled out by the United States.

The cultural and historical context in which human rights are viewed is important in all countries. The context, in brief, has “rights” on a continuum with the institutional preservation of the state, church and family taking precedence over individual rights. Thus, when governments and others say they don’t understand what we are talking about, they are not always motivated by mere self-interest or intransigence, as they are sometimes accused of in Washington.

But while it is useful to remember that governments of Southern Cone countries are not the only audiences to have furrowed brows over just what is meant when U.S. Government spokesmen discuss
human rights, non-government audiences usually are more attuned to the positive implications of the U.S. Government policy in all three baskets. Media audiences are particularly important, since out-of-office and opposition politicians congregate there and the media form a traditional and usually not-yet-closed-off forum for debate and opposition to government policies. The academic world is another key sector in which there is considerable sympathy for and more constructive debate about United States human rights policies in all areas. Businessmen and church leaders are other audiences which offer not only promise but have been the locus of some progress in post program efforts. There was unanimity that military audiences should not be written off entirely as targets for USIS programing. The key to these seems to be military educational institutions, which have received, in general, less attention than their importance merits.

Receptivity for human rights related materials has increased everywhere, doubling in two months in Argentina alone, and posts now have developed lists of target audiences for these materials and programs.

In the program realm, all felt that official spokesmen have been particularly good, with Assistant Secretary Todman, Assistant Secretary Derian and Ambassador Lowenstein getting very good reviews as visitors. Some programs built around non-official visitors have been quite good, with Judge Christian and William Ascher topping the list. Others got more mixed reviews. Jack Hopkins did well in Chile and Central America but somewhat less well in Argentina and Uruguay.

Whatever USIA Washington’s approach may be, the overriding consideration for programing and focus is the perception of the American Ambassador, who sets the tone of the Mission in all cases. The most dramatic example of this has been in Uruguay, where Ambassador Siracusa’s approach to human rights programing was notably different from Ambassador Pezzullo’s.

USIS is uniquely fitted to approaching certain audiences on this subject and the situation, now that the United States Government’s interest in the subject seems to have been clearly established, brings

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the USG to a “point of dialogue” with various audiences. Both in policy and in societal projection, USIS now has space in which to grow.

Themes:

Because of the possible confusion between human rights “baskets” and Helsinki “baskets,” I recommend scrapping the terminology of our meeting and using at least a working title of groups 1, 2 and 3.

The following thematic areas have the endorsement of the group for USIA focus in response to the situation as they perceive it:

—The problem involved with human rights, their advocacy, their enforcement and our perceptions are universal, not bilateral. To help meet the double standard question, emphasis upon the universality of application of U.S. criteria would be very useful. Belgrade was cited as a possible example, recognizing the possible pitfalls if the United States were seen as equivocal there.

—“Human rights” per se should refer wherever possible to group one type cases. Groups two and three should be focused more in the area of “problems of democracy” or “problems of development” in order to keep the distinction clear but still leave us room to emphasize all. Thus human rights in the context of democratic traditions would be a valuable thematic area for group three emphasis.

—All felt that human rights materials related to the Soviets would be particularly useful. If we criticize the Soviets on human rights, it undercuts the notion that human rights violations are an unfortunate but necessary result of fighting communism, a position advanced universally by Southern Cone governments. Such materials also would help counter the feeling that the United States is singling them out.

—Governments and other audiences are quite sensitive to their image abroad and its decline as a result of human rights-related confrontations, a useful theme to pursue.

—Though there was general awareness that U.S. reporting on human rights developments elsewhere carries dangers of being counter-productive if people were to see us as taking credit for progress, all felt that such information should be made available to them for discreet use in policy explication. The basic logic was that it now is no secret that the United States is focusing many of its foreign policy concerns around human rights but that there remains a sometimes critical shortage of additional information, especially facts that would lend credence to our attempts to universalize the problem and our approach to it.

—There was consensus endorsement of all materials developing the concept of human rights over time and geography. E.g., there are historical roots within U.S. society that could be emphasized in countering the notion that the human rights policy is an aberration
which appeared on their doorsteps last January 20. The world context of all three groups likewise is a productive theme, the PAOs felt.

Media Guidance:

Aside from reference to the previous section on themes, the PAOs can use well:

—Soon-as-possible receipt of all human rights-related statements of the State Department spokesmen.

—All official human rights-related policy statements on videotape (16 mm film for Argentina).

—A compendium of basic human rights documents from RSC, leading with the Christopher statement,\(^4\) which all believed was the most useful single policy declaration made to date.

—All speech texts and transcripts of testimony.

—Interpretive materials on all human rights-related votes in IFIs.

—Copies of any VOA commentaries on the subject.

—A human rights focus in the magazines, but only if care is taken not to allow this focus to exclude other materials. The logic was that USIS and the United States have great credibility on a wide variety of other subjects ranging from science and technology to culture and education. This credibility should be used to associate with and enhance whatever we have to say about human rights.

—Uruguay can use tapes of testimony or speeches in order to make cassettes for use on a special human rights tape deck set up in the library. Uruguay also needs particular attention to radio materials since they are especially useful there.

Other Support:

The PAOs also suggested as useful:

—Q and A papers or background think pieces on subjects related to all three groups to send to their “human rights lists” or for use in preparing local talks (Chile and Paraguay).

—A continuing availability of official visitors who could serve as spokesmen, as long as peculiar local circumstances are taken fully into consideration, as was the case of Uruguay and Ambassador Lowenstein.

—IV grants from both media and military, for reasons outlined in “situation”.

—Full sets of the State Department reports to Congress for placement in the library reference sections, the reports which did so much set the human rights policy ball rolling.\(^5\)

—Books concentrating principally upon group three items—institutional problems of democracy. Presentation copies in English are the minimum they could use, but all hoped for program books in Spanish as well.

—Approximately four Washington-supplied speakers a year who need not bear any labels of being “human rights speakers”. These would concentrate primarily in the group two and three area. It was expected that official visitors should concentrate on group one, with some background discussion on groups two and three with the reverse being true for non-government spokesmen. Argentina and Uruguay were particularly insistent upon “high quality” speakers, with English speakers being acceptable if spokesmen are up to the standards of, say, Judge Winslow Christian.\(^6\) Programers should avoid the mid-December through February period in which programing of any sort is difficult. In Paraguay, that should be extended back to the end of November.

\(^5\) Reference is to the annual human rights country reports produced by the Department of State.

\(^6\) Christian was a justice on the California Court of Appeals and the first executive director of the National Center for State Courts.

103. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Reinhardt) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\(^1\)

Washington, November 10, 1977

Following our recent conversation, in which we discussed reporting on foreign media coverage of your activities and important U.S. foreign policy initiatives, I have instructed our posts once again to give careful attention to this reporting requirement. On reflection, and

\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 9, International Communication Agency: 8/77–2/78. No classification marking. Brzezinski wrote Schecter’s initials in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. Brzezinski sent a copy of the memorandum to Schecter under a November 10 note. (Ibid.)
following further discussions here in USIA, I believe we can, with assistance from your staff, do a more thorough reporting job and perhaps also increase foreign media coverage in these areas.

It would be most helpful if USIA could receive on a regular basis advance texts of your formal speeches. These can be distributed by our Wireless File, embargoed of course until actually delivered, and then made available in full text to foreign correspondents overseas. If necessary, a text could be held here for distribution at the time of delivery, though this procedure would cause some delay in getting the text to journalists. If no advance text is available, receipt of the text at the time of delivery would also serve a similar purpose. Transcripts of interviews or press conferences could also be disseminated through the Wireless File and quickly delivered to the proper people. USIA does not now receive such documents on a regular basis.²

Advance notice of your plans to hold interviews or press conferences or to make a major address would permit us to alert our posts to expect a significant event and enable our staff here to cover your activities more efficiently.

The timely availability of an accurate text will, one hopes, at least encourage more accurate reporting and commentary by responsible journalists, and may also increase coverage. Even a brief advance notice of a press conference or interview will enable our own staff to cover the event if possible, or to alert our post in the appropriate country to watch carefully for commentary resulting from an interview you have granted a foreign journalist.

I believe these suggestions will enable USIA to serve the National Security Council more effectively. If you agree, I will ask my staff to work out procedures in detail with Jerry Schecter.

² Brzezinski placed a vertical line in the right-hand margin next to this paragraph. He drew an arrow from Schecter’s initials in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum to the following handwritten notation: “give him [Reinhardt] a text for distrib. to foreign mags. & columnists.”
104. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Reinhardt) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)

Washington, November 18, 1977

I am aware that you have asked for your colleagues’ views on policy guidance relationships between the Department of State and USIA, with special reference to the Voice of America, and I want to take this opportunity to present our ideas. I will describe the present system, how it works and what we might do to improve procedures, not only as they relate to VOA but to all of our media.

Background

Reorganization Plan No. 8 provides that the Secretary of State shall provide to the Director (of USIA) on a current basis full guidance concerning the foreign policy of the United States. Coupled with this is the desire of the present Administration that USIA be the vehicle for the conduct of public diplomacy by the United States Government, with policy direction from the Secretary of State.

In discussing how this applies to VOA, I note the clear distinction between news and commentary stated in my memorandum to the Voice on May 4, 1977 (copy attached). VOA is solely responsible for the content of news broadcasts, which include correspondent reports and backgrounders. However, Department of State guidance on foreign policy issues is important, indeed indispensable, to VOA analyses and commentaries.

The Present System

Within USIA’s Office of Planning and Program Direction (IOP), we have three sections handling different aspects of policy matters:

—The Policy Guidance Office receives daily from Hodding Carter the briefing papers prepared by various Bureaus for his noon briefing of the press. It also is in frequent daily contact with S/PRS on specific subjects not covered by briefing papers. This Office is the sole unit

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2 Reference is to Reorganization Plan No. 8 of 1953 (67 Stat. 642) effective August 1, 1953, which established the United States Information Agency.

3 Attached but not printed is an undated document summarizing the principles governing VOA broadcasts, as Reinhardt outlined in his May 4 memorandum. See Document 48.
authorized to convey policy guidance to VOA and other Agency media. All other inputs must funnel through the Policy Guidance Office.

—Assistant Directors of USIA area offices maintain substantive relationships with their counterparts in the Department of State and convey appropriate regional guidance to the Policy Guidance Office for transmission to VOA.

—A newly established office of Issues and Plans is premised on substantive contacts with S/P and functional bureaus in the Department (e.g. EB, PM and IO). Essentially, Issues and Plans will work on mid-and long-term issues; inevitably, these relationships will provide insights into immediate concerns important to VOA—and these will be passed on to our Policy Guidance Office.

In our function of developing all of these guidance insights, we make the following distinctions:

News: We frequently ask S/PRS or Bureaus for information on handling fast-breaking news events. But we are only seeking clarification and information on whether a news story or report on foreign policy is accurate. We are not requesting guidance on the “handling” of the story.

Commentary: The Policy Guidance Office seeks State Department ideas and guidance on how VOA should treat an issue in its commentary, what the overall thrust of the commentary should be and what official statements are applicable.

Is The System Working?

News: Basically, yes. But there are four problem areas.

First, the Department is not fully cognizant of the special requirements of VOA; our requests are handled the same as requests from the commercial media. S/PRS’s work is geared basically to deadline requirements of the domestic print media and evening television news. VOA is on the air 24 hours a day and needs reactions and answers to meet broadcast requirements in a variety of time zones. We need a faster response mechanism when we are faced with commercial news stories which may be misleading or inaccurate, for we want to set the record straight as quickly as possible.

Second, we need advance notice of foreign policy announcements of any worldwide, regional or one-country significance. This means the active involvement of a significant number of Department elements. You will realize that no USIA officer is ever present when foreign policy is evolving or decided.

Third, advance notice of foreign policy announcements and, additionally, suggestions of foreign policy concerns that need clarification, can be extremely useful to VOA in the way it deploys its correspond-
ents. Clearly, these suggestions must be oriented to situations and events that command attention in the news; but, with that as a given, VOA’s correspondents can be tasked to provide the on-the-spot background and framework for these events.

Fourth, we need advance texts or, at a minimum, advance knowledge of major speeches by Senior State Department officials. The advance knowledge I speak of implies briefings on the major points we should cover. The more we know in advance, the more timely and accurate our news coverage will be.

Commentary: Here, we can do much better. USIA can play a significant role in furthering foreign policy objectives through VOA commentary. A foreign policy analysis or commentary by VOA is specifically designed to illuminate that policy, to explain and define it. I submit that the Department, excepting EUR, is generally passive as we develop commentaries: We get what we seek, but seldom is the initiative with the Department.

Too frequently, when we ask for suggested subjects for analytical treatment, we are asked, instead, not to comment. We understand this when we are in the midst of a delicate negotiation. Sometimes, however, our request involves subjects debated widely around the world and VOA has nothing to go with.

In general, then, we need more lead time in policy guidance from the Department, not only for VOA but all of our media. We need quicker responses on current, fast-breaking stories and we need earlier guidance on mid- and long-term issues.

Recommendations

Specifically, we recommend:

—more regularly scheduled briefings by Assistant Secretaries and others for USIA’s media, area and policy officers, VOA commentators, and others. We have no other authoritative way to learn of developing policy issues and policy objectives;

—briefings of State’s area and functional bureau officers by the senior leadership of USIA—on our role and our requirements;

—an insistence by State and USIA that relationships between our policy and area offices and the Department’s major bureaus focus on the substance of issues, the identification of longer-range concerns and the special needs of VOA.

If VOA in particular, but by no means exclusively, is regarded as another commercial medium, then its special competence and capability will not be utilized fully.

In fine, it seems to me that policy guidance initiatives far too often stem from the seeker rather than from the giver. With the notable and
most important exception of EUR, the VOA seems to be considered by the Department as one more problem that you do not need. Seldom, again with the exception of EUR, is the VOA regarded as the one USG instrument which offers an opportunity to communicate with peoples whose ideas and actions are important to advancing American interests.

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105. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Management (Read) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)\(^1\)

Washington, undated

**Policy Guidance for USIA**

This memorandum is in response to your request for a summary description of the way in which State guidance is conveyed to USIA.

**Secretary’s Responsibilities**

Reorganization Plan No. 8 of 1953, which established USIA, states that *The Secretary of State shall direct the policy and control the content of a program, for use abroad, on official United States positions, including interpretations of current events, identified as official positions by an exclusive descriptive label.*\(^2\) The Secretary of State shall continue to provide the Director on a current basis full guidance concerning the foreign policy of the United States."

Under the USIA/CU reorganization plan now on the Hill this language remains and is supplemented by statements that:

“‘The Director shall report to the President and the Secretary of State.”

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of the Director, Executive Secretariat, Secretariat Staff, Correspondence Files, 1973–1980, Entry P–104, Box 149, 7705080–7705089. No classification marking. Printed from an uninitialed copy. Drafted by M. Mercurio (M/MO) on November 18; cleared by Blair, Trattner, and R. Burns (M/MO). Read sent a copy of the memorandum, in addition to a copy of Reinhardt’s November 18 memorandum (see Document 104), to Reinhardt and Hodding Carter under a December 7 memorandum, indicating that Christopher had “asked that each of you designate members of a small working group to review the situation and to make recommendations about how to achieve more effective coordination.” (Ibid.) Miller sent copies of all three memoranda to Modic under a December 12 memorandum, characterizing the documents as “background papers on the working group on day-to-day policy coordination with the Department of State.” (Ibid.)

\(^2\) See footnote 2, Document 104.
“Under the direction of the Secretary of State the Director shall have primary responsibility within the government for the exercise of the functions vested in the Director.”

Although the legislative history of the reorganization tends to mitigate these statements by stressing the independence of the new agency, a basic responsibility clearly exists.

**Present Arrangements**

The process of providing policy guidance to USIA functions essentially as follows:

1. First thing in the morning, the Office of Press Relations (S/PRS) tasks bureau Public Affairs Advisers (PAAs) with preparation of written guidance on issues which S/PRS expects will be of interest to the media.

2. Papers are delivered to S/PRS by about 11 am in two copies. After conferring with the Secretary, the Spokesman makes the appropriate changes in the papers and passes one copy to a representative of USIA’s Office of Planning and Program Direction (IOP). If the USIA representative has additional questions he can discuss the matter further with the Spokesman or directly with the relevant bureau.

3. The daily noon press briefing is piped directly to USIA, and they receive transcripts of those sessions.

4. Immediately following this briefing, USIA/IOP representatives meet with regional and functional offices of USIA and VOA to disseminate the guidance received.

5. The Director of USIA attends the Secretary’s large Tuesday staff meeting, and as necessary seeks guidance from one of the principals when immediate high-level guidance is required.

Although informal, the system apparently works rather well. This is particularly true of USIA’s interactions with the Spokesman. In the judgment of S/PRS there have been no recent cases in which USIA was unaware of the Department’s policy or refused to follow it. USIA does occasionally encounter problems when they ask for policy guidance on a new issue which has not previously been staffed out. In their view there is at present no focal point to which they can look when they have this kind of problem.

The matter of USIA control over the personal and journalistic contacts of their employees is a separate and less tractable problem. There have been two or three cases since January of USIA employees making what they considered appropriate journalistic contacts with organizations or persons proscribed from contact by the Department. However, this is an internal USIA problem of control. No amount of guidance is apt to cover every single situation. This kind of guidance would also
enter the gray area between VOA’s straight news on which the Voice is independent and editorial content where they are to operate under State guidance.

In past administrations, a specific Seventh Floor principal was charged with providing overall policy guidance to USIA. At the moment no one is so charged. There is further no one at the working level charged with keeping himself informed on USIA programs and practices from the perspective of the Secretary’s responsibilities.

After policy guidance is provided, there is no feedback as to how our policy priorities are incorporated into USIA programs.

106. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the United States Information Agency (Bray) to the Associate Director for Planning and Program Direction (Schneidman) 1

Washington, November 23, 1977

To confirm our discussion: I would like delivered to me by December 15 an analysis of our known audiences—area by area—for magazines, films, broadcasting, speakers, etc. 2

What is known of their capacity to handle ideas? Interest in ideas? Comments—pro and con—on the quality of our products by audience members or recipients?

The research staff’s judgments as to whether we are overestimating or underestimating the intellectual capacities and interests of our principal interlocutors would also be welcome. This assessment should clearly be labeled as the judgment of the research staff and be independent of the analysis requested above.

I assume that three weeks should be sufficient. If that poses a serious problem or conflicts with urgent priorities, please let me know.

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2 An unknown hand underlined the portion of the sentence beginning with “I” and ending with “area.”
107. Memorandum From Jessica Tuchman of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, November 23, 1977

SUBJECT

USIA’s Suggestion for Human Rights Week—Your Query

Reinhardt suggests (Tab B) that the President’s greatest source of support on human rights comes from people rather than from their governments. Everyone I have talked to and everything I have read in the past months confirms this. Each of the President’s speeches and statements in this area has captured much attention and generated additional support, which eventually percolates back to governments. Thus I think that Reinhardt’s suggestion for a Human RightsWeek speech addressed to people all over the world is an excellent one.

You may remember that after the last UNGA speech, we got many reports of reactions expressing disappointment that the President had not once mentioned human rights. Some interpreted this as a backing off from the policy (this isn’t serious—it’s a press obsession that will be with us until the policy is no longer new). We even got some indications of disappointment from governments who were expecting some general words of praise for the positive steps that have been taken in many places. Thus there is substance that can usefully be said in such a speech, and I think we can be confident that the market has not been saturated with talk of human rights: I am a little leery of Reinhardt’s suggestion that the speech address “the place of the individual in society” which could easily get too philosophical and ethnocentric, but I believe that it would be well worthwhile to take a look at his draft.

Rick informed me yesterday that a proposal for a 3–4 minute Human Rights Week statement is already in the system. Obviously we would not want to do both. I would suggest that it be expanded into a 10–12 minute speech.

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2 Brzezinski placed two parallel lines in the left-hand margin next to the portion of the paragraph that begins with “eventually” and ends with “one.”

3 Reference is to the President’s October 4 address before the UN General Assembly, which is printed in Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book II, pp. 1715–1723. It is also printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 56.
I have no particular comments on Reinhardt’s proposals Two and Three other than that we should take a look at his material. I have drafted a note for a reply to Reinhardt’s memorandum along these lines—it is at Tab A.4

**RECOMMENDATION**

That you sign the memorandum at Tab A.

That you approve a 10–12 minute speech rather than a short statement for Human Rights Week.5

**Tab B**

**Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Reinhardt) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)**

Washington, November 16, 1977

As the end of the Carter Administration’s first year in office approaches, I have engaged in some preliminary New Year’s ruminations and reflections on the experiences of several months at USIA. The Agency’s Deputy Director, Charles Bray, has just returned from a two-week visit to the Federal Republic of Germany, Nigeria, Egypt, Jordan and Israel, and the impressions he gathered in discussions with intellectuals, academics, media, government and opposition leaders in these countries furnished more material for thought. Several common themes concerning the atmospherics within which we operate abroad emerged from our analysis.

—In much of the world, the intellectual discourse appears to proceed not from firmly held tenets about the future of a given society, but rather from questions about the direction in which societies are
headed, questions about the place of any society in the community of nations and about the place and role of individuals within societies. Perhaps it has always been thus, but questions surely outnumber answers in today’s world. In this psychological climate, the President’s emphasis on human rights has struck a responsive chord with peoples, if not always with governments. Their interest appears to lie less in the policy implications of the President’s views than in what is perceived as a powerful affirmation of basic human values.

To a remarkable extent, given the traumas of U.S. society in recent years, other societies continue to look to the U.S. as a model—not a perfect model, to be sure, but the most relevant model available in an imperfect world. Our ideas, techniques, values and institutions are perceived as workable. The substantial Nigerian investment in the American educational experience (anticipated to exceed $135 million annually by next year), the Egyptian reopening to the Western market economy, the overwhelming German celebration of our Bicentennial, are simply examples.

—The reverse side of the coin is the tendency on the part of many to dismiss the USSR as an irrelevant model, bankrupt of values, and essentially unworkable.

In light of the foregoing, I recommend to you and the President for consideration three specific proposals:

First. Human Rights Week (December 10–17) affords the President an opportunity to address domestic and foreign constituencies simultaneously, with a discussion of the place of the individual in society, his relationship to government and economy, the sources of our societal values, their relevance to others. I would like to submit a draft speech for consideration within a short time if you give preliminary endorsement to this recommendation. USIA could facilitate live international TV coverage by satellite; at a minimum we could place the text in the hands of a very large number of important foreigners. We assume, of course, that the President would deliver the speech before an appropriate specific audience or as an Oval Office address to the nation.

Second, assuming the President plans a year-end “State of the World” message to Congress, the content and tone could usefully reflect some of the foreign preoccupations which the foregoing suggests. I will forward, by November 28, some specific suggestions in this regard.7

Third, the foreign environment we think we perceive has important implications for the new International Communication Agency. We gather the President will be reviewing the FY 1979 budget on December

7 See Document 109.
6. I would like to send you background material and a few informal proposals before that meeting.

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8 According to the President’s Daily Diary, Carter met with McIntyre from 1:30 until 1:48 p.m. on December 6. He then took part in a budget review meeting for HEW and “related small agencies” from 2:01 until 3:40, 3:42 until 4:07, and 4:15 until 5:10 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials)

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108. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to the Director of the United States Information Agency (Reinhardt)¹

Washington, November 25, 1977

Thank you for your memorandum concerning our human rights policy and steps that might be taken during Human Rights Week.² I found both your analysis and proposals interesting. Regarding a “State of the World” message, and your thoughts on the FY ’79 budget for ICA, I hope you will forward the materials you mention to me. We are giving serious consideration to your proposal for a Human Rights Week speech—there are the inevitable schedule problems as you know. While I can make no commitment at this time that the speech will be given, I would like to see a draft of what you have in mind.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

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¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 94, Human Rights: 1977. No classification marking. A typewritten notation at the end of the memorandum indicates that it was dispatched on November 25.

² See Document 107.
109. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Reinhardt) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\(^1\)

Washington, November 29, 1977

SUBJECT
Themes for a Year-end Assessment of Foreign Policy

Public opinion research and a study of foreign media reaction, plus reports from our field posts, suggest consideration of the following themes for any year-end assessment of foreign policy the White House may be planning:

1. **Continue to Seek Solutions**: The Administration has gained international credit from its persistent efforts to find solutions to world problems. Criticism follows setbacks, of course, but reaction favors the determination to seek solutions even after one or more approaches fail. People want to believe that there is leadership and that it is both constructive and persistent. By and large the U.S. is seen in this light. The message should enhance this foreign perception. Express confidence and willingness to stay the course.

2. **Stress Human Rights**: Although public opinion polls abroad indicate some skepticism about U.S. motives, widespread support continues for the Administration’s human rights goals. Opinion research shows that individuals abroad and in the United States seek reassurance that human rights remains a major American policy objective. Borrow a line from the Notre Dame speech: “In the life of the human spirit, words [and, hence, ideas] are action.”\(^2\)

3. **Highlight American Experiences**: Not only in the field of human rights but in economic and social problem areas, foreigners are increasingly coming to regard American solutions as relevant to their own actions. As examples, U.S. experiences in race relations and the work of American consumer organizations.

4. **Note the De-emphasis on Ideologies**: Ineffective state-planning of the communist variety finds fewer adherents. Rigidly ideological solutions hold less attraction as models for developing countries. To repeat, the more pragmatic, productive and creative American model appears

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of the Director, Executive Secretariat, Secretariat Staff, Correspondence Files, 1973–1980, Entry P–104, Box 148, 7704910–7704919. No classification marking. All brackets are in the original. A notation in an unknown hand reads, “11/29 handcarried.”

\(^2\) See footnote 2, Document 57.
increasingly relevant. Borrow a line from the Charleston, South Carolina, speech: “And we can [now] see that, on balance, the trend in the last third of a century has been positive.”

5. *Emphasize What is Fair:* The concept of fairness is strongly American. It animates—or should animate—our foreign, as well as our domestic, affairs. The Panama Canal Treaty, the North-South dialogue, GSP. Just as we seek the fair solution, so we will require others to reciprocate: SALT, the GATT negotiations.

6. *Evoke Cooperation:* Americans now know that, despite our affluence, we can no longer overwhelm our problems—that we, too, must live by our wits, but have no monopoly of wisdom—that the central problems leap national boundaries. Evoke from Americans and foreign peoples a disposition to come together to seek solutions to common concerns.

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3 See Document 82.

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110. **Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the United States Information Agency (Bray) to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake)**

Washington, November 29, 1977

**SUBJECT**

USIA Relationship with S/P

Hal Schneidman has shared with me your informal memorandum on the “USIA Slot in S/P.”

It is at considerable variance from our institutional need, which I will now present.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of the Director, Executive Secretariat, Secretariat Staff, Correspondence Files, 1973–1980, Entry P–104, Box 149, 7705070–7705079. No classification marking. Another copy of the memorandum indicates that it was drafted by Alan Carter, edited by Bray, and cleared in draft by Schneidman. (Ibid.) According to Read’s December 28 memorandum to Christopher (see Document 118) S/P and USIA subsequently agreed that USIA would assign officers on non-reimbursable detail to S/P.
Our recent internal reorganization provided us with an Office of Planning and Program Direction. One of the most important functions of this office is to relate to the central elements of the U.S. foreign affairs agencies—NSC, S/P, Treasury, etc. The relations would allow us to identify the mid-and long-term policy issues that can and should be addressed by USIA’s programs of public diplomacy. We have gone to particular lengths to staff this office with some of our best people.

Each of them will have the responsibility of working with—not in—appropriate elements of the Department and other agencies so that major foreign policy issues can be “converted” into communications policy governing the programs we produce in Washington for the field, as well as those produced by our posts themselves.

Because this is a substantive function, none of these officers would be involved in the preparation of memos, speeches or press guidances for the Department’s units to which they relate (the thrust of your proposal). They will spend most of their time within USIA. They can—illustratively—assure that we initiate the kinds of research and media reaction projects that are relevant to your and our concerns. They can determine within USIA what public diplomacy programs ought to be considered to support foreign policies, as those policies are shaped.

In the case of S/P, we proposed to assign whichever of our officers you feel most comfortable with to S/P for a period of two to four weeks in order to establish the most basic knowledge of your office. Thereafter, that officer would call upon S/P as necessary and would participate in appropriate planning meetings and discussions with members of your staff. However, he would spend the vast majority of his time within USIA, as I indicated above.

I hope we can move to implement this as soon as possible. The functioning of the Office of Planning and Program Direction is vital to our mutual purposes.

If you need additional help on speeches, press guidance, memos, etc., we may be able to help with one or more officers on detail, but let’s consider that separate issue separately.
Attachment

Paper Prepared by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake)\(^2\)

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

USIA Slot on S/P

This position would provide S/P with the perspective of “public diplomacy” considerations, to be factored into the policy planning process. At the same time, it would give USIA an ongoing link to the thinking of the policy planning staff, to help in USIA advance planning.

Incumbent would be considered, and would be expected to act, as a full-time member of S/P, working under the supervision of the Director of the Staff on whatever projects seem appropriate to his particular abilities. This could include participation in the preparation of memos to the Secretary or other Department principals, speeches or press guidance papers, or any of the various other analytical studies in which S/P is involved.

He would also be expected to maintain close contact with the appropriate offices at USIA, providing them with feedback on policy trends and directions as required.

His main contribution to S/P papers would presumably be in the field of public affairs aspects of policy issues, how policies might be formulated to take better account of potential problems—or opportunities—in foreign countries. Toward this end, he would be expected to summon up whatever field reports or analysis is available to USIA that would relate to specific studies underway at S/P.

Depending on subject matter and Staff needs, the USIA incumbent would be expected to serve as co-drafter or principal drafter of papers, as well as participate in planning meetings and discussions with other members of the Staff.

\(^2\) No classification marking.
111. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State

Rome, December 2, 1977, 1240Z

19788. USEEC. Department pass White House. Embassies/Mission for Ambassador only. Subject: Joint Cable to President on ICA Budget.

1. Request Department pass immediately to the White House text of following joint cable from undersigned Ambassadors.

2. Begin text

Dear Mr. President:

The undersigned, your Ambassadors to France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, NATO and the European Communities met recently to discuss the present state of United States-European relations. While we discussed a number of issues, the purpose of this joint cable is to present a recommendation which has special urgency.

It is our understanding that you will be meeting on December 6 with the Acting Director of OMB to consider the FY 1979 budget level for the new International Communication Agency. It is our unanimous view, for the reasons suggested below, that the proposed budget for the new agency is much too low to permit the kind of information and cultural programs which are needed to support the U.S. national interest in Europe.

If we are to be successful in gaining support for your policies in Europe and other parts of the world, it is not enough merely to persuade the governments to which we are accredited that the courses of action we propose are wise and just. We must also engage the sympathies of young Europeans, particularly younger politicians, officials, teachers, writers and journalists who are moving into positions of influence and leadership. They have no firsthand knowledge of WWII. Moreover, many of them came of age during the Vietnam and Watergate eras and are burdened by a view of our country which bears little resemblance to the real America, and certainly not to the kind of society your administration is striving to build. Our European Embassies are making every effort to provide these young men and women the information and the cultural experiences which will enable them to form a more

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2 See footnote 8, Document 107.
accurate appreciation of our country, but the means at our disposal are inadequate.

It is ironic that for over two decades our European information and cultural efforts have been cut back while our political, military and economic interests should have dictated that they be strengthened. When one considers that during this same period the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe have greatly expanded their own Western European programs, the wisdom of these reductions becomes even more questionable, and the need to reverse the trend more urgent. An increase in the European programs would be consistent with the United States’ commitment to the defense of Western Europe and the administration’s view that that commitment is at the center of our foreign and security policies.

We thus conclude and strongly urge that our information and cultural programs, particularly those in Italy, France and the FRG, be sharply increased. While we cannot speak for your Ambassadors in other European countries, we believe they would also support this plea.

We believe that the creation of the International Communication Agency provides the administration an opportunity to appeal to the Congress for the increase in funding that is required to do the job as it should be done.

The Agency’s present budget in constant dollars is only slightly larger today than when USIA was founded in 1954, and substantially less than it was ten years ago. To do an effective, imaginative job of explaining American society and the administration’s policies will require considerably more. For Europe alone it would take something on the order of $20 million to bring the Agency up to the funding levels that are required to give us the programs we need today. The bulk of the additional money would be spent on programs, not on bureaucratic overhead. Some increase in the badly depleted USIA staffs would have to occur—hopefully through a shift of Washington-based officer personnel to the field. Most of the money, however, would go to fund greatly enhanced information efforts in the press and other media areas, as well as a more ambitious exchange of persons program and more intensive academic and student programs, including English teaching in areas where appropriate.

Kingman Brewster, who represents you in a country which shares our language and, to an appreciable degree, our culture as well, believes that his own present resources are more than adequate and could be reduced. He nevertheless shares our view that it is crucial that we improve our ability to communicate with the young men and women of continental Europe who are already moving into positions from
which they are able to influence the attitudes of peoples and governments towards us and our goals.

Respectfully,

W. Tapley Bennett, Jr
Kingman Brewster
Richard N. Gardner
Arthur A. Hartman
Deane R. Hinton
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.

End text.

Gardner

112. Memorandum Prepared in the United States Information Agency

Washington, undated

FY–1979 Funding For Educational and Other Exchanges

The Department of State’s FY–1979 budget request recommends program funds in the amount of $22.3 million for educational exchanges and $9.0 million for the program which brings carefully selected younger foreign leaders to the U.S. for 30–45 day familiarization visits.

Both programs have been strong successes. For example, Sadat, Giscard d’Estaing, Schmidt, Malcolm Fraser, Israeli President Katzir were picked by our embassies to participate in the leader program in the 1950’s and early ’60’s, long before their political emergence.

We propose to raise the funding for educational exchanges by 25% (to a new total of $27.9 million, vice $22.3 million) and to provide funds for an additional 750 participants in the leader program (to a new total

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Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special (Henze), Box 1, Chron File: 12/77. No classification indicated. Reinhardt sent a copy of the memorandum to Henze under a December 2 note. Henze sent both the memorandum and Reinhardt’s note to Aaron under a December 5 note, stating: “John Reinhardt has sent over a short piece explaining his request for more money for educational and leader-grant exchange, over and above what State originally included in the CU budget. I think it is well justified and suggest you support it if any questions arise during the President’s review today [December 6].” (Ibid.)
of $13.5 million, vice $9 million). Such funding levels would also require increased program support costs of approximately $3 million. Thus, the total dollar increase over the State Department request would be $13.1 million for FY–1979.

Rationale

1. Funds are needed; present levels provide for a total two-way flow of only 5,200 individuals, 1,000 less than when the Republicans took office.

2. It is a visible, concrete fulfillment of the commitment in the Helsinki Declaration “. . . to increase substantially cultural exchanges.”

3. This has been the most successful means ensuring that emerging foreign leaders are in contact with the U.S. and U.S. leadership at an early stage of their careers.

4. It is a relatively inexpensive way for the President to launch the new organization in a manner which will be well received, particularly in the academic community, and to demonstrate tangibly his commitment to the value of these programs.

113. Research Note Prepared in the United States Information Agency

N–11–77 Washington, December 9, 1977

PHOTOGRAPHY-USA EXHIBIT
(Moscow: Final Report)

Introduction

“Photography-USA,” an exhibit of technical and artistic achievements in American photography, concluded its six-city tour of the Soviet Union in Moscow, where it was viewed by 262,425 people. The exhibit included over four hundred photographs and equipment for

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2 The exhibit traveled to Kiev, Alma Ata, Tbilisi, Ufa, Novosibirsk, and Moscow.
amateur and professional photographers. Twenty one Russian-speaking American guides demonstrated equipment and answered visitors’ questions. This report is based on systematic debriefings of the guides by a research officer who was attached to the exhibit staff, as well as on his own observations.

Response to the Exhibit

Public reaction to “Photography-USA” in Moscow was positive and enthusiastic, as it had been in the five previous cities. The exhibit areas which received the most attention were those involving demonstrations of the Polaroid process—the portrait studio, the SX–70 stand, and the Polaroid close-up camera demonstration. The most popular of photographs, judging from remarks written by visitors in the exhibit comment book, were those of children and those taken in space—particularly during the Apollo moon missions. Individual photographers most often singled out for praise were Hiro, Jay Maisel, and Milton Green. As in previous cities, the main criticism of the exhibit was that the pictures did not depict life in America. (The “Reflections” photo exhibit, with pictures of the type many visitors expected to see at “Photography-USA,” had been in Moscow six months earlier as part of the “USA–200” exhibit.)

Some visitors commented that many of the photographs on display had been published previously in America Illustrated. A number of visitors felt the exhibit contained, in the words of one man, “too much technology and too little art and humanity.” Much, of course, depended on visitors’ expectations. Some thought “Photography-USA” would be an exhibit of American artistic photography, while others expected to see life in the United States depicted in pictures. Almost everyone, however, clearly enjoyed the exhibit. The comments regarding the selection of photographs concerned only one aspect of “Photography-USA,” and that not the most important one for most people.

The main attraction of the exhibit, as always, was the guides. They were able to answer visitors’ questions on a wide range of topics—from the equipment they were demonstrating to, more importantly, life in America and American attitudes toward a wide variety of subjects. Guides were not criticized in Moscow for not being specialists in photography, as had often been the case in other Soviet cities. Muscovites did not appear to expect technical expertise from the guides, perhaps because they have had the opportunity to visit more U.S. exhibits than residents of other cities of the Soviet Union. Most visitors were much

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3 The SX–70, an instant camera first produced by the Polaroid Corporation in 1972, automatically ejected photographs and developed the image.

4 The “USA–200” exhibit commemorated the American Revolution Bicentennial.
more interested in talking about America than about photographic technology. The exhibit’s three professional photographers, meanwhile, were kept very busy meeting with Soviet specialists.

Press Coverage

The opening of “Photography-USA” and a brief description of the exhibit were reported by several Moscow newspapers and TASS. Komsomol’skaya pravda, the official organ of the Soviet youth organization, Komsomol, carried a lengthy and very flattering article on the exhibit written by Vasilii Peskov, co-author of The Country Across the Ocean (1975), a very popular book about life in America as seen by two Soviet journalists who travelled across the U.S. by car.

Security

In Moscow there were fewer reports than in previous cities of visitors being picked up and questioned by the KGB for visiting the exhibit too often or for socializing with guides away from the pavilion. On the other hand, monitoring of visitors and their conversations with guides on the floor of the exhibit was much more obvious. The police in charge of crowd control around the pavilion were supplemented by a dozen members of the volunteer civilian militia, who occasionally removed their red armbands and wandered through the exhibit. In addition, the plainclothes security agents working within the pavilion on more than one occasion asked certain visitors to leave the exhibit. The “Photography-USA” staff, however, was not always unhappy to see the militia and crowd-controllers doing their job. The exhibit attracted its share of crackpots, including a self-proclaimed anarchist who wanted to “blow a hole in the Iron Curtain” and a Ukrainian religious fanatic who managed to alienate the guides by combining preaching with halitosis. Such individuals were banned from the exhibit by Soviet authorities, a move welcomed by all. But half a dozen militiamen were required to physically remove Karl, an aging and increasingly desperate Soviet of German origin, who reportedly has been trying for thirty-five years to leave the Soviet Union.

Visitor Questions

Questions posed by exhibit visitors in Moscow did not differ from those asked in other cities. They were primarily concerned with such U.S. domestic issues as education, unemployment, crime, pensions, and the cost of living. As a result, only about a quarter of the guides’ time was devoted to answering questions concerning photography. (This figure varied from stand to stand, with those demonstrating color printing and the Polaroid SX–70 speaking almost exclusively about the subject at hand.) In the area of international affairs, relations between the U.S. and the USSR were of most interest to visitors in Moscow.
President Carter’s attitude toward the Soviet Union was frequently cited, and usually criticized, by Muscovites.

Education was one of the American domestic issues discussed most intensely throughout the exhibit’s stay in Moscow. Visitors—almost forty per cent of whom were between fifteen and twenty-five years of age—were mainly concerned with the cost of and access to higher education in the U.S. They asked about college tuition and the availability of scholarships and other types of financial aid. Most visitors were unaware that a greater percentage of American high school graduates goes on to colleges and universities than is the case in the Soviet Union. Some asked about the cost of attending primary and secondary schools, and many were unaware that public schools are free in the United States. Others were interested in high school curricula, especially mandatory subjects and courses concerning the Soviet Union or Russian language and literature. Teachers asked about teachers’ salaries and work loads. Visitors frequently asked what American children are taught about the role of the Soviet Union in World War II, a subject dear to the hearts of Soviet citizens and one which they feel is neglected in American education. Racial issues in education were not a major topic of discussion at the exhibit in Moscow, although visitors often asked whether blacks and whites study together in American schools. Progress in the racial integration of American schools did not especially impress exhibit visitors, who as a general rule viewed unfavorably any contact with blacks.

Employment and unemployment were also major subjects of discussion in Moscow, as they have been in every city visited by this and previous American exhibits in the Soviet Union. Because, according to Marxist theory, unemployment is one of the inevitable contradictions of a capitalist society, it is the American “economic ill” most heavily stressed by the Soviet media. The specter of millions of jobless American workers haunts people who live in a country where college graduates are assigned jobs and where there is a constant labor shortage. Lectures on unemployment compensation did little to dispel this very negative image visitors had of the labor situation in the United States. Guides had the impression that most exhibit visitors would opt for job security, even though it would entail little or no choice in where they worked, over the American system—which, while offering the freedom of choice, also places on the worker the burden of finding employment in a market which Soviet citizens perceive to be already glutted with millions of jobless people. In this, as in other areas, visitors generally preferred security to freedom of choice with its responsibilities and risks. Exhibit visitors pictured labor-management relations as much more hostile than they are in reality, seeing employers as holding all the cards and workers virtually powerless.
Crime was the second most negative aspect of life in America in the minds of “Photography-USA” visitors in Moscow. Visitors generally asked guides to confirm the reports by Soviet media about the high incidence of violent crime in American cities and then asked them to explain the causes. The most commonly posed question on this subject—and the usual conversation opener—was: “Is it true that people are afraid to go outside at night in American cities?” The problems of crime and unemployment were not generally raised by visitors to embarrass guides or to gloat over the relative absence of these particular ills in their own country, but rather out of genuine curiosity and a desire to check the validity of their own sources of information. Specific incidents, such as the “Son of Sam” murders, although covered by Soviet newspapers, were hardly ever mentioned by exhibit visitors.\(^5\)

Conspicuous by their near absence were questions concerning current affairs, with the exception of those relating to the U.S. or U.S.-Soviet relations. Muscovites, like their compatriots in other cities, did not display the same interest in world events that most westerners do. One reason is that they cannot follow world events on a day-to-day basis in the Soviet media, which do not, for all practical purposes, report what is going on in the world. Newspapers and television provide only the scantiest coverage of international affairs, and that is so slanted and barren of detail as to make it of little interest to the average citizen. Visitors tended to ask about those things which they felt had a direct bearing on their own lives. This included, above all, questions on America and on U.S.-Soviet relations. Asian, African, South American, and Middle Eastern affairs were rarely brought up aside from an occasional “Why do you support the Israeli aggressors?” or “Why do you support the racist regime of South Africa?” Discussion of Soviet domestic issues, particularly Soviet leadership, was taboo at the exhibit. The new Soviet draft Constitution was felt to be either uninteresting or irrelevant. In private, however, Brezhnev jokes and talk of a new “personality cult” were common.

**Soviet-American Relations**

Most guide-visitor discussions of Soviet-American relations revolved around the person and politics of President Carter. Visitors made it very clear that they strongly desired friendlier relations with the United States. They saw in the policies of President Carter an obstacle to such relations and held him personally responsible for increased tension between the two countries. Some viewed as hypocritical the President’s criticism of the Soviet Union for human rights viola-

\(^5\) These murders and attempted murders took place in various New York City boroughs during 1976 and 1977.
tions while the United States continued giving aid to South Korea and Chile. He was criticized for not fulfilling his campaign promise to strive for arms limitations. His prestige with Soviets suffered another blow when it was announced that the United States was planning to develop a neutron bomb.

President Carter was not, however, completely without strong supporters among exhibit visitors in Moscow. They included dissidents, Baptists, Old Believers, would-be emigrants, and others who had run afoul of the Soviet security organs. Many of these people left at the exhibit letters and appeals addressed to President Carter or the U.S. Congress.

Some visitors complained that the United States seemed more eager to improve its relations with China than with the Soviet Union. This is a delicate issue with the Soviet people who appear to dislike and distrust their Chinese neighbors and who feel that Russians and Americans are natural allies. In spite of Richard Nixon’s initiatives to re-establish contacts with the People’s Republic of China, he is by far the most respected of recent American Presidents because of his policy of detente with the Soviet Union. President Carter, on the other hand, is seen as having undone much of the good work of Nixon in the area of Soviet-American relations.

**Voice of America**

The subject of VOA was raised in Moscow more frequently than in other cities where “Photography-USA” was shown. Visitors often referred to news items they had heard on VOA-Russian broadcasts in conversations with exhibit guides. This was often in connection with matters not covered by the Soviet mass media, such as criticism at the World Psychiatric Congress of Soviet use of psychiatry for punishing political dissidents. Only on a very few occasions did exhibit visitors accuse VOA of distortion or an anti-Soviet bias. Most often people simply asked guides if what VOA broadcasts is true. Many were impressed with the Voice’s coverage of Soviet internal affairs, clearly of very great interest to listeners. Visitors often asked how VOA obtains information about events in the Soviet Union and is able to air them so quickly.

People occasionally asked about individual VOA personalities, particularly those broadcasting in Russian. Several Muscovites brought gifts to be delivered to Voice of America announcers. Some expected to find VOA represented among the exhibit guides, as has been the case in several previous exhibits.

Exhibit visitors had numerous and often predictable suggestions for improving VOA broadcasts. Dissidents, for example, wanted more coverage of the dissident movement in the Soviet Union and a harder
line in the news. Several people suggested that VOA make more direct comparisons between life in the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Everyone, regardless of their political views, expressed interest in programs which present American views on the Soviet Union and its achievements. Also of interest to many listeners were VOA reports on Soviet emigrants living in the United States—how they adjust to life here, how they are treated, and, especially, how they have fared in finding jobs. Several exhibit visitors in Moscow suggested that VOA should offer to provide American pen-pals for its listeners. A young scientist said he very much regretted that VOA stopped giving English lessons in its Russian-language broadcast.

When young people mentioned VOA on the floor of the exhibit, it was most often in connection with music programs. Several recurring music-related themes were voiced by such visitors throughout “Photography-USA’s” stay in Moscow:

1) American country music is gaining popularity in the Soviet Union. Several country and western songs have been translated into Russian and are performed by Moscow groups.

2) Considerable interest exists in the fate of Soviet musicians who have migrated to the U.S. For example, a number of visitors inquired about the San Francisco group “Sasha and Yura.” One visitor suggested that an entire VOA program be devoted to this group, with interviews and details about their life and work in the U.S. People involved in the Soviet jazz world, such as jazz historian Alexei Batashev and lecturer Georgi Bakhchiev, expressed strong interest in the activities of such prominent ex-Soviet jazz musicians as Valeri Ponomarev, Vladimir Chizhik, and Vladimir Sermakashev, all of whom are now living in New York.

3) Visitors constantly stressed that they want to hear only the very newest and best of rock music with as little time as possible devoted to playing listeners’ requests.

4) Music fans and performers alike frequently suggested that the lyrics to popular songs be read by announcers, as foreign radio—especially VOA—is a primary source of new material for Soviet musical groups.

The most popular of VOA’s Russian-language music shows, judging from comments of exhibit visitors in Moscow, are Pop Concert I & II and the Saturday Dance Show. Several people said that they and their friends dance to the music of the Dance Show and would prefer that particular program to have more music and less talk. One young listener suggested that songs be introduced and dedications made over the music, as Radio Luxembourg does on its music programs. Judging from “Photography-USA” visitors’ remarks, VOA’s main competition in the area of popular music is Deutsche Welle.
Young Soviets are extremely serious about popular music. Moscow listeners were very eager to obtain more biographical information on their favorite performers, details of their private lives, their musical backgrounds, and their earnings. This is especially true of jazz and jazz/rock enthusiasts, who approach their music in an almost academic manner, attending lectures and circulating samizdat translations of articles from “Downbeat” and other western publications.

There was much more reaction to VOA English-language broadcasts in Moscow than in any other city visited by the “Photography-USA” exhibit. Most often mentioned was Willis Conover’s Jazz Hour, unquestionably the most popular program of its type on the air in any language. One young man said he had learned English by listening to Conover over the past ten years. To say that Conover is practically a household word in the Soviet Union is no exaggeration. A number of exhibit visitors in Moscow also mentioned VOA’s “Now Music-USA” and “Breakfast Show.” One man said he had been a fan of Phil Erwin\(^6\) for about thirteen years. Another listener suggested that the lyrics to selected popular songs be read on “Now Music-USA.” They need not be read at dictation speed, he said, since those interested record the programs and would not have any trouble understanding the words or, at least, having them translated. Another visitor said he had recorded all of the “Words and Their Stories” series. He noted with regret that some of the programs of the series are now being repeated after two years.

Comment Book

Between seventy-five and a hundred persons daily took advantage of the opportunity to write in the “Photography-USA” comment book, located at the exit from the pavilion. The book was constantly surrounded by a crowd of visitors—most of whom spent more time reading the remarks of those who had preceded them than writing their own comments. The comments as a whole reflected the same positive attitude toward the exhibit and America that guides detected in their conversations with Soviet visitors on the floor. Moreover, visitors’ comments in Moscow did not differ significantly from those registered in previous cities. The great bulk—approximately ninety per cent—were brief expressions of appreciation and approval of the “Photography-USA” exhibit and wishes for closer ties between the United States and the Soviet Union. Comment book writers were not, however, totally uncritical.

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\(^6\) Reference is to Phil Irwin, who co-hosted the Breakfast Show, a prerecorded program, with Pat Gates.
Regarding the exhibit itself, there were a number of complaints including among others, complaints that the pavilion was too small; the hours were not convenient for working people; not everyone was able to be photographed by the Polaroid SX–70; brochures on the equipment were not given to specialists; exhibit pictures were positioned too low for easy viewing in a crowded pavilion; many of the pictures had already appeared in America Illustrated; and there was too much technology and too little art. The most frequent criticism concerned the photography on display, on the grounds that they did not depict everyday life in America. Several felt the exhibit was too small. One wrote: “The kasha is good, but the portion is small.”

The comments of several visitors were directed against the neutron bomb and President Carter. “No! to the neutron bomb!” could be found on pages of the exhibit comment book. One comment was addressed to the President: “I hope that this exhibit is meant as a peaceful gesture toward the people of the Soviet Union.” Visitors occasionally engaged in arguments or dialogues in the comment book, responding to each other’s written remarks or writing over those with which they strongly disagreed. For example: “Too bad there were no biographies of Carter handed out today.” “When the neutron bomb goes off,” wrote another visitor, “the biography of Carter won’t help!”

Several visitors complained in the comment book that there were no signs in Luzhniki Park directing visitors to the pavilion, as is usually the case with special events. Others said there was no advertising or promotion of “Photography-USA” except on the Voice of America, even though the opening had in fact been reported by several local and central papers.

Positive comments far outnumbered complaints, and those who wrote in the comment book most frequently singled out for praise, the guides, the space pictures from NASA, pictures of children in the amateur area, the photographs by Hiro, Milton Green, and Jay Maisel, amateur equipment—especially the Polaroid cameras, but also slide projectors and Instamatics,7 and the exhibits exchange program in general. Many visitors used the comment book to express gratitude to the organizers of the exhibit and to invite more American exhibits to Moscow. That “direct people-to-people contact at an exhibit can only improve relations between the U.S. and the USSR” was a major theme of the entries in the comment book in Moscow, as it had been in all other cities visited by “Photography-USA.”

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7 Reference is to a series of easy to load cameras produced by the Eastman Kodak Company, beginning in the early 1960s.
114. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Reinhardt) to all USIA Domestic and Overseas Personnel

Washington, December 13, 1977

The 60-day period in which Congress could act on Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1977\(^2\) has now expired, without negative action. The House approved the Plan on November 29 by a vote of 357–34;\(^3\) the full Senate did not vote on it.\(^4\) The Plan, therefore, automatically becomes law. The new International Communication Agency will come into being on a date yet to be determined by the President, perhaps on April 1, but no later than July 1, 1978. A number of joint USIA/State/OMB working groups\(^5\) are hard at work developing options for dealing with the many issues which must be resolved in establishing the new Agency. We shall keep you informed of major progress as it occurs. In the meantime, we shall do our best to respond to your inquiries and we welcome your thoughts and suggestions with regard to the best means of organizing and operating the new Agency. We should all, of course, look upon this as an exciting challenge for the future, a rare opportunity to re-examine, improve and better coordinate the full range of activities to be undertaken by the new Agency. I trust


\(^2\) See Document 93.

\(^3\) On October 12, Brooks introduced H. Res. 827, a resolution to disapprove Reorganization Plan Number 2. On November 18, the Committee on Government Operations reported H. Res. 827 to the full House. The House rejected H. Res. 827 on November 29. (Congress and the Nation, 1977–1980, vol. V, p. 820)

\(^4\) On October 13, Ribicoff introduced S. Res. 293, the companion to H. Res. 827. On November 29, the Committee on Government Affairs reported S. Res. 293 to the full Senate. The Senate did not act on the resolution. (Ibid.)

\(^5\) A November 10 memorandum from Read and Curran to members of the Department of State and USIA working groups listed the eight working groups: “Organization of Educational and Cultural Activities;” “Organization of Policy, Planning, Coordination, and Program Development Functions;” “What Organizational Arrangements Should be Made for ‘Media’ other than those Provided for ‘VOA’ in Plan No. 2;” “Organization of Area Offices and Washington-Field Relationships to Facilitate Adoption of the New Mission of the ICA;” “Adoption of Personnel Systems and Practices that are Commensurate with and Provide an Orderly Transition Toward the Requirements of the ICA;” “Administration;” “Budget;” and “Legal.” (National Archives, RG 306, USIA Historical Collection, Subject Files, 1953–2000, Entry A–1 1066, Box 43, USICA, Reorganization, 1974–1978) Copies of the working groups’ final reports are in the National Archives, RG 306, Office of the Director, Executive Secretariat, Secretariat Staff, Subject Files, 1973–1978, Entry P–116, 1977: Reorganization Folder 2.
we shall all approach the task at hand in a spirit of enthusiasm and collegiality and with full commitment to the mission for which the new Agency will exist.

John E. Reinhardt
Director

115. Research Report Prepared in the Office of Research, Office of Planning and Program Direction, United States Information Agency


[Omitted here are the title page and the Table of Contents.]

THE AGENCY AND ITS AUDIENCES IN THE INTERNATIONAL MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS

A. The Assignment

On November 23, 1977, the Deputy Director asked the Associate Director for Planning and Program Direction for an analysis, by December 15, “of our known audiences—area by area—for magazines, films, broadcasting, speakers, etc.” More specifically, he asked: “What is known of their capacity to handle ideas? Interest in ideas? Comments—pro and con—on the quality of our products by audience members or recipients?” And he invited the judgment of the research staff—clearly labeled and distinct from the analysis—“as to whether we are overestimating or underestimating the intellectual capacities and interests of our principal interlocutors.”

This response to his request is in two parts. The first sums up what can be said by drawing together the results of studies irrespective of area or media lines, and concludes with judgments of the research staff.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of Research, Special Reports, 1953–1997, Entry P–160, Box 37, S–13–77. No classification marking. Engle sent a copy of the memorandum to Bray through Alan Carter under a December 19 covering action memorandum, in which he noted: “It will be apparent from our paper that we have had difficulty making a bridge from the observable things research has measured (demographics, attitudes, and behavior of audiences) to the intangible qualities of intellectual capacity, curiosity, and play of ideas which we were asked to address. I do not feel we have fully succeeded, but this product represents our best effort in the time available. I hope it is useful.” (Ibid.)

2 See Document 106.
concerning ways in which the Agency may not be properly estimating the capacities and interests of its audiences. The second consists of a series of appendices giving more detailed analyses, medium by medium, with special papers on certain geographic areas where carrying out traditional Agency programs is not possible.

Where comparisons by geographic area are possible (they are not always), we have more often included them in the detailed appendices. We omit information on the caliber of Agency speakers and its lecture and seminar programs for lack of systematic studies in this field.

B. Overview

Over recent years audience measurements for various Agency products confirm the clearly high intellectual capabilities of the Agency’s audiences and their high interest in ideas in most of the thematic areas covered by the Agency’s programming. Over most of the range of its media products, the Agency is doing a very good job in providing materials which meet these audiences at their intellectual level. Its record seems particularly good in the magazine field, and there is little sign of disaffection or dissatisfaction among radio listeners. The Agency-produced films of several years ago had a more variable record of communicating ideas to audiences at their levels. USIS centers and libraries, based on a limited number of studies, seem to attract Agency audience groups only selectively, but to be generally accepted by those attracted.

Nevertheless, within this general very good record of meeting audience levels of intellect and interest, there were also indications of some areas where improvement would be possible, through such measures as: establishing a better balance among thematic areas in Agency products; heightening their relevance to national development or other national priority needs of audiences; introducing (in films, for example) a greater degree of clarity of theme or purpose and a depth of treatment consistent with audience expectations; and seeking to counter, in VOA programming, a certain sense of institutional stodginess and introduce a greater sense of intellectual involvement with issues and events throughout its services. In addition, their intellect and interests suggest that a substantial proportion of the potential priority audience not now being reached through USIS Center programs might be reached through more active programming away from Center sites and in milieux to which persons of this type are more accustomed.

C. The intellectual level of Agency audiences

The Office of Research has not conducted a psychological testing program to measure the degree of sophistication and the ability to handle ideas among our audiences. Nevertheless we have established
measurements of a sufficient number of related qualities in our audi-
ences to permit us to draw inferences about aggregate levels of intel-
lectual capability.

Some years ago on the basis of cumulative studies up till that
time, the Office of Research posited the existence of an “international
informational elite,” an element of varying but generally small propor-
tion within each country which appeared to share intellectual and
educational characteristics and interests transcending cultural and
national boundaries. This elite, with similarities of educational back-
ground and experience, was manifest not only through its interest in
information from abroad but also through its higher level of exposure
to local media and opinion within the country.

The subsequent research in IOR in more recent years has tended
to confirm the existence of such an elite. Although we have not
attempted to measure directly the existence of an intellectual capacity
for handling ideas, the characteristics from which we might infer such
a capability, such as level of education, degree of exposure to the West
through study or travel, or the attainment of a senior level in one’s
chosen occupation, all seem to bear out the proposition that USIA
audiences do represent an exceptionally high level of such capability.

Our best evidence of the caliber of Agency audiences is drawn
from our studies of Agency magazines, whose readers for the most
part come from post priority audiences.

On the average, 88 per cent of the readers of the magazines studied
had at least some college education, and 42 per cent had studied at
the post-graduate level. While the coverage in some geographic areas
is not sufficiently representative to permit valid comparisons between
areas, the consistency of results is significant. About one in four readers
had studied in the United States, and at least half had visited the U.S.
at one time or another. About half the readers were at the upper level
of their occupational fields, although this fact is not necessarily related
to intellectual capacity.

The serious reading interests of most Agency magazine audiences
also appear to reflect a generally high intellectual capability. The survey
evidence suggests that our audiences are interested in a serious discus-
sion of international political and economic affairs and turn to Agency
publications in order to keep abreast of political events outside their
countries or regions.

Even the Agency’s self-selected audiences, when they can be suffi-
ciently measured, particularly those for VOA, prove to contain a sub-
stantial proportion who are of higher than average educational level
and, presumably, intellectual capacity.

More than half the listeners worldwide have at least some second-
ary education, and, among this group, about one fifth have experienced
university-level or higher training. These proportions among VOA's audience are considerably greater than for those corresponding levels of education among the populations at large in most countries studied.

Nevertheless, there are differences in this respect from one audience to another. An audience of specialists in a given field, as our study of Economic Portfolio shows, is much better able to deal with complex ideas in that field than a more general audience. Beyond this to-be-expected difference, however, other factors enter to produce differences, not so much from one geographic area to another as between one level of development and another. Audiences in less developed countries tend to find the quality of Agency publications somewhat higher and to find the ideas they present somewhat more stimulating and important than their counterparts in developed countries, though both give good marks.

Associated with level of national development, there is a similar contrast in the character of audiences in media-rich and open societies compared with those from media-poor or closed societies. The average educational level of VOA listeners in Africa, the USSR, and the Middle East is likely to be considerably higher than the national average; in Western Europe, Latin America, and Japan, on the other hand, the average educational level of VOA listeners is likely to be closer to the national average. We feel that these findings are related to the quality of the prevailing media environment, especially in Western Europe, where VOA competes for a potential audience with a large number of highly developed electronic media outlets often conveying highly sophisticated content. Moreover, listeners in media-poor societies (in some of which the media are also state-controlled) often report tuning to VOA for information not available in the local media. Soviet listeners to VOA are also thought to need a greater depth of background information on items carried by the Voice, not because of a lower intellectual capacity but for lack of access to sufficient information through other channels.

Language is also a factor associated with educational level in differentiating among audiences in intellectual capacities. Those who listen to VOA in English, although fewer in number, tend to be more sophisticated than those who listen in their vernacular language.

But the burden of the data we have indicates that despite these differences from one category to another, on most counts the Agency audiences are on the average far above the general population in those characteristics which would indicate a higher intellectual capacity.

D. Audience interests in ideas

The fact that these audiences participate in USIS programs, the purpose of which is primarily to communicate ideas, is itself an indica-
tion of interest in ideas. Their record of attendance or of acceptance of Agency products shows an interest in the thematic areas the Agency has selected for its program. Their interest varies, however, from one thematic area to another within those areas the Agency has selected for programming. Among magazine readers, for example, almost invariably, relatively few show much interest in subjects relating to American art and culture. Here again, there is a difference between less developed and developed countries. Audiences in the LDCs tend to show greatest interest in science and technology, and economics, and relatively little in U.S. political and social processes. On the other hand, audiences in developed countries show predominant interest in international political and security affairs and U.S. politics and society, and less interest in science and technology.

Audiences differ not only in thematic interests. Our study of the relevance of American experience to Kenyan audiences indicated that interest in ideas among Agency audiences is often geared to their perception of national priorities and concerns for their country. Irrespective of their particular occupational or disciplinary specializations, Kenyan elite audiences shared an interest in information from other countries in those areas perceived to have a bearing on internal economic and social development.

On the whole, however, USIA audiences seem characterized more by a common interest in world affairs and in their own regional affairs. A very high proportion of VOA listeners give listening to the news as their strongest reason for listening to radio. More often than among the general population, VOA listeners also regularly read a daily newspaper, including its editorial page, and tend to follow international affairs in news magazines.

E. Audience reactions to the intellectual level of Agency products and programs

On the whole, Agency products seem to be pitched at the right level for the sophistication of Agency audiences. This conclusion is most extensively demonstrated in the studies done of Agency magazines. For only one magazine (Trends) have readers been specifically asked whether they believe it should be at a higher or a lower level of sophistication or is about right. For others, readers have been asked other questions related to intellectual level. Most find the level about right. Agency magazines also rate pretty much on a par with comparable commercial magazines. As a specialized publication for a specialized audience, Economic Portfolio does especially well in satisfying its audience.

Audience comments on the quality of Agency publications do vary somewhat according to the locus of the reader. For example, data on
some relevant opinions about the intellectual level of *Horizons* indicate that Europeans are more likely to score the magazine lower than readers in the LDCs. The opposite is true of *Dialogue*. On the other hand, the Agency regional magazines, like *al-Majal*\(^3\) and *Topic*,\(^4\) could be regarded as competitive with similar magazines available to the readers on such criteria as being *serious* or *thought provoking.* *Economic Impact* was rated highly even in West Germany and Japan for providing “sophisticated discussion of economic subjects,” although the rating on that score was somewhat better in Colombia.

There is also ample evidence that VOA strikes a satisfactory level for most of its audience—though this may be a case of circular demonstration, since unsatisfied listeners would tend to tune out. Nevertheless, the high credibility VOA enjoys where tested, the high acceptance its programs have among listeners indicates that it is matching pretty well their intellectual standards. One must add, of course, that the VOA audience apparently covers a fairly broad range of intellectual types, from those with no schooling up to those with postgraduate degrees, and the reaction of the most sophisticated elements of its audience might well differ from that of the listenership in general.

One factor that appears to serve as an index of the intellectual capacity of the VOA audience is regular listenership to VOA news and analysis. A mail survey of known VOA listeners in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America showed that 50 to 60 per cent of those who responded listen to the entire VOA news program, which lasts about 30 minutes and includes 15–20 minutes of backgrounders, opinion roundups, and commentary. Fragmentary data—from field surveys—suggest that 5 to 15 per cent of the regular audience listen to VOA broadcast *primarily* to hear news analysis and commentary. These figures appear to confirm that although others also listen to these programs, a small segment of VOA listeners is particularly engaged by the ideas they present.

In the films and television domain, the evidence of acceptable sophistication is less strong, at least for Agency films dating from the 1974–75 period. Although audiences gave these films generally favorable ratings, some were clearly much less satisfactory than others in engaging the intellectual level of the audience—sometimes because they dealt with more difficult social problem themes rather than the more widely appreciated, less problematic, science and technology subjects.

\(^3\) Published monthly in Arabic for distribution in North Africa and the Middle East.

\(^4\) Published bi-monthly in French and English for distribution in sub-Saharan Africa.
USIS Centers and Libraries also received generally favorable ratings from the audiences they attracted (here again the circularity of the appraisal of self-selecting audiences is a factor). There is some indication that USIS priority audiences, while holding a favorable image of the centers, tended to feel that the local center was primarily for younger people and language students. Nevertheless, the available data on the program preferences of actual or potential patrons of our libraries and centers indicate considerable interest in ideas. For example, lectures, panel discussions and seminars held the greatest appeal for non-student visitors to libraries in Beirut and Tehran; in Brazil and francophone Africa, respondents (including non-patrons) also expressed great interest in lectures and seminars in their fields of interest.

Fragmentary evidence suggests that within the total audience universe, those who are reached by centers—a minority of the total—may not differ all that strongly from those who do not attend and are not reached. Where programming is principally in English, those with good English facility tend to be more prominent among those attending the center. Attending audience members also seem more accustomed than non-attendees to visiting foreign centers in general (American or other), perhaps because of having visited or studied abroad. But attendees and non-attendees alike seem to share many of the same interests—including interests in attending lectures in their professional fields, and sometimes in non-professional subjects as well. Those not reached, in other words, would seem in many ways equally susceptible to being involved in USIS programming.

F. Research staff assessment: Areas for improvement in Agency products and programs

Part of our assignment is to assess whether the Agency is over- or underestimating the level and interests of its audiences. The record we have indicates the Agency is doing well on the whole. Within the overall generally favorable picture of a good match between USIA products and USIA audiences, however, we believe there are a number of areas where improvements should be possible.

Frequently discussed by the Office of Research in the past has been the need for a shift in the balance of coverage given different thematic areas, cutting down on attention to cultural subjects and emphasizing more the political and economic themes. It will be some time before our research findings can reflect the results from any changes currently under way in this area in Agency planning and program direction.

Equally important, at least in the less developed countries, is the need for the Agency to assure the relevance of its products to the national concerns and priorities of these countries, not by adopting the
rhetoric of the Third World, but by presenting American experience, where appropriate, in the light of its significance for dealing with problems of development, and the efforts in management, planning, training and education that accompany this process.

The lesson of the film-testing experience indicates the need for having clearly in mind and communicating to audiences a definite purpose for a film production, while conveying the importance of the subject and offering an adequate depth of treatment about it. Particularly useful as a device for accomplishing this purpose seems to be the technique of presentation in the form of problem and solution.

The danger of underestimating the intellectual level and interests of the audiences, which characterized film production earlier, seems to us to remain strong in the area of center programs. There, so much effort seems to go into the presentation of cultural programs involving the audience only passively while not stressing programming devoted to the exchange of ideas on key international political and economic issues. The similarity of interests between audiences who attend and do not attend center programs suggests that USIS posts might do better to program more in vernacular languages and away from centers, within the academic, professional or trade association settings where the non-attending elites are apparently more accustomed to look for involvement with ideas.

A particular challenge to VOA, we feel, is the need to counter the impression (which comes up in some of our discussion panels) of being stodgy or rigid in the presentations of news and news analysis. Listener panelists sometimes commend other stations for an evocative kind of treatment, for being particularly adept at engaging their interests and seeming spontaneous.

On the whole, Agency audiences, we feel, are not looking for flashy or glossy products. Films and magazines generally get good marks for technical excellence, and majorities of our magazine readers are not in favor of greater use of illustrations or more extreme forms of layout. Rather, we get the impression that they look for importance in content. Perhaps the basic question, then, is whether the Agency is doing enough in its output to excite and stimulate the thinking of intellectually active people.

[Omitted here are the appendices: “Publications Recipients;” “VOA Broadcast Audiences;” “Film/TV Audiences;” “Center and Library Audiences;” “Audiences in the Soviet Union;” Audiences in Eastern Europe; and “Audiences in the People’s Republic of China.”]
116. Memorandum to the Files

Washington, December 17, 1977

SUBJECT

Meeting in Congressman Paul Simon’s Office to Discuss the Possible Use of Counterpart Funds for Educational Exchange Programs

PARTICIPANTS

Congressman Paul Simon; Leonard Marks; John Reinhardt; William M. Jones, General Counsel of the Committee on Government Operations; Keith Gartner, Congressional Fellow—Cong. Simon’s Office; Darrell Carter

Mr. Simon started the meeting by saying that it was instigated by Mr. Marks, who, he said, had good ideas and would work for them.

Mr. Marks then explained his interest, since 1966, in forming a Foundation(s) primarily to be funded from counterpart funds for educational exchange programs. He said that in 1966, when he was Director of USIA, the creation of a Foundation failed at the last minute because of domestic Indian politics. Nevertheless, he said he still believed in the idea and thought that the time might be right to try again. Mr. Marks thought that (1) a Foundation should function similarly to Binational (Fulbright) Commissions; (2) the U.S. Ambassador and the appropriate local Ministry should name a Foundation’s governing board to be made up of U.S. citizens and nationals of the host country; and (3) major funding for the programs should come from counterpart funds but appropriated money would be required.

Some of the problems of obtaining counterpart funds for exchanges were reviewed. It was noted, for instance, that the country of origin would have to agree to the expenditure of the funds and that Burma, for example, had never been willing to use funds for exchanges. The difficulties of obtaining U.S. Government concurrences for employing counterpart funds also were mentioned but not dwelt upon.

The group agreed that steps should be taken to see if the objective might be achieved. Congressman Simon suggested legislation. Instead of separate legislation, Janean Mann recommended that it be included in the Agency’s FY 1979 authorization bill. She thought that would be the fastest means to the end, and that support would at least come from Fascell, Buchanan, and Meyner of the authorizing subcommittee.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of the Director, Executive Secretariat, Secretariat Staff, Correspondence Files, 1973–1980, Entry P–104, Box 151, 7705210–7705219. No classification marking. Drafted by Darrell Carter (I/R) on December 20. Copies were sent to Reinhardt, Schneidman, Glass, Silverman, Nalle, and Morton Smith. Reinhardt and Miller initialed the memorandum, indicating that they saw it.
Rather than legislating for specific countries, basic legislation was recommended. However, since Egypt and India have counterpart funds, and are politically significant, they would be logical choices for programs.

Congressman Simon ended the meeting by asking Janean Mann and Keith Gartner to draft possible legislative language. He requested William Jones to inform Congressman Jack Brooks of what was being done and Janean Mann to pass the word in the International Operations Subcommittee. Future actions, he added, should be coordinated with Mr. Reinhardt.

No mention was made of the need or desirability to coordinate House plans with the Senate.

There was passing reference to getting the necessary appropriations if the programs were authorized. Mr. Marks said he thought he could get funding support from Cong. John Slack, Chairman of the Appropriations subcommittee, which deals with the Agency’s budget.

NOTE: Cong. Fascell approved the plan after discussing it with Mr. Marks.

117. Paper Prepared in the Office of Research, Office of Planning and Program Direction, United States Information Agency

Washington, December 27, 1977

FOREIGN ELITE PERCEPTIONS OF AMERICAN CULTURE

Between 1973 and 1976, the Agency conducted several studies among foreign elites which touched on the image of American culture abroad. They showed that European and Japanese elites see American culture in a modern, technological sense as opposed to the more narrowly traditional character they ascribe to their own. Though varying in emphasis from country to country, Europeans generally think of film, writing, science, technology and various forms of contemporary music (e.g., pop, jazz, musicals, and modern composition) as expressive of American culture. Japanese elites perceive it much the same way except that few think of American writing in this context.

In contrast with this contemporary image evoked by American culture, elites tend to view their own in light of past achievements in the arts and the humanities. Europeans most often cite literature, painting, classical music, theater, and historic architectural achievements as the defining characteristics of their culture. Japanese speak of traditional arts (e.g., noh\textsuperscript{2} and bunraku\textsuperscript{3}) crafts, aspects of Japanese religion and spirit, history, and their distinctive architecture.

The American Cultural Wasteland: A Myth Buried

Although elites see the essence of American culture to be very different from that of their older civilizations, they are not inclined to endorse the hoary stereotype of America as a cultural wasteland. Indeed, only small minorities subscribe to this once widespread myth. Far more have a fairly sophisticated view of the richness of contemporary American culture and readily acknowledge its contributions to the world.

Accordingly, in continental Europe, substantial majorities believe American motion pictures, writing and poetry, and architecture contributed importantly to Western culture since World War II. Moreover, they rate American achievements in these fields relatively higher than their own except for the Italians who express more esteem for their cinema and the French who consider their belles lettres superior.

Japanese elites also rank American achievements in these spheres above their own. However, while half of them grant significance to American contributions to world literature, nearly as many deprecate America’s literary accomplishments.

In Britain, American present-day achievements in writing and poetry, architecture, painting and sculpture, and serious music also drew generally positive ratings from elites who, at the same time, revealed considerable ignorance or uncertainty about American standing in the arts.

For that matter elite opinion everywhere is mixed about American contributions in painting and modern ballet, fields in which Americans have excelled since World War II. With the exception of the British, only minorities of European and Japanese elites rate American achievements in painting and sculpture important—appreciably fewer than judged their own in this way. This relatively low level of esteem for American painting in large part may reflect not so much informed critical judgment as ignorance about American movements grounded,

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\textsuperscript{2} Classical Japanese musical drama.

\textsuperscript{3} Japanese puppet theater.
as other research suggests, in an antipathy toward “modern art” in general.

Opinion is divided in evaluating American contributions to the modern theater. French and German elites rate their own relatively higher, but the Italian and Japanese accord greater importance to American achievements.

In sum, the stereotype of “uncultured America,” once thought to be pervasive, clearly does not exist among the elites of the major industrial democracies. In fact, they generally are aware of and credit America’s achievements in the contemporary arts.

Culture in the Overall U.S. Image: A Limited Role

The essentially positive American cultural image among European and Japanese elites appears to have little impact, however, on the total image the U.S. projects as a society.

Europeans who believe contemporary American artists have made significant contributions to Western culture are no more likely to hold an overall good opinion of the U.S. than elites who discount America’s cultural contributions. Similarly, perceptions of the contemporary arts in America are unrelated to interest in, or admiration for, America as a country. Nor are they apparently related to general perceptions of the dynamism of American society.

More specifically, only about one in 10 or even fewer in each of the nations studied spontaneously mentioned cultural themes as the “worst” or “best” aspects of American society. Far more in Europe and Japan associated these with U.S. foreign policy, political, economic and social conditions and the character of the American people.

Similarly, results of Agency magazine studies, mostly in developing countries, also point to the low salience of American culture with foreign audiences. These show that Agency audiences in many countries prefer information about the U.S. to be other than culture oriented. In fact, everywhere, the audience segment looking primarily for articles on art and popular culture represented only a small minority of readers.

Accordingly, foreign elite views on American culture, while generally favorable, do not carry with them implications enhancing America’s overall standing.

The Agency’s Office of Research carried out the elite surveys in Britain, Italy, West Germany, France and Japan. In the first three countries, we sampled USIS-defined priority audiences, including five comparable elites whose attitudes spanned the political spectrum: business executives, media leaders, government and political leaders, academicians and university students. In France, we sampled urban residents with at least a completed baccalauréat, the stratum from which French
elites are recruited. In Japan, we covered the graduates of the five most prestigious universities in the country, the source of much of Japan’s leadership in government and politics, business and industry, and media.

118. Action Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Management (Read) to Acting Secretary of State Christopher

Washington, December 28, 1977

SUBJECT
Your Role vis-a-vis USIA and then the ICA

ISSUE FOR DECISION

What steps should be taken, if any, to formalize your role vis-a-vis USIA and then the ICA?

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

Existing State-USIA links are many and complex. For example S/P and USIA have recently agreed that USIA will assign an officer to S/P on nonreimbursable detail to improve general policy coordination and formulation between the two organizations. PA and USIA have formed a working group to improve operational policy guidance procedures principally for the VOA. M/MO is working with USIA, S/P, the geographic bureaus and the field to integrate USIA and Departmental programs and resources toward agreed ends. A number of State-USIA working groups have recently completed work on options for implementing the reorganization of CU and USIA (see attachment).

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780040-2606. No classification marking. Drafted by Read and Mason. Printed from an uninitialed copy. A typed notation in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum reads: "PLEASE TREAT AS ORIGINAL OF MEMO."

2 See Document 106.

3 Attached but not printed is an undated paper entitled “Steps Toward Establishment of the International Communication Agency,” drafted in CU and M. The paper indicated that the Department of State-USIA working groups (see footnote 5, Document 114) had completed reports on several topics and that decisions related to broader options would rest with the appointment of the “top management” in the International Communications Agency.
And of course, there are many other State-USIA relationships involving the regional and functional bureaus in the Department.

It is important to note, however, that these linkages lack central coordination; although, M/MO has begun to move into that vacuum.

Such coordination will become more important when the ICA comes into being (probably on April 1, 1978) because we will have lost CU (a major present point of contact with USIA) and because the State-ICA relationship will be a new one based on reorganization plan language ("under the direction of SecState") and legislative history which is highly generalized and contains considerable potential for misunderstanding and disagreement.

While there was general acceptance in the House and Senate of the need for “policy guidance” from the Secretary to the new Agency, it was also emphasized by some Members, particularly on the House side, that State should not exert day-to-day control over the operations, budget, or personnel system of the new independent Agency and the separate reporting channel between the ICA Director and the President was stressed. Clearly this leaves a large gray in between area (particularly abroad where the Chief of Mission enjoys some operational control over the activities of other agencies) and it is important to create a sensible, cooperative relationship in practice while personalities are compatible on both sides. For example, jurisdiction-minded officials in both organizations, if left to their own devices, could create all sorts of difficulties which could have long lasting effects.

The situation demands sensitive, coordinated management of State’s relationships with USIA/ICA (particularly the early identification and resolution of issues before they become major problems) at an authoritative level in the Department, if State-ICA relations are to be close and useful. It offers the chance to get off to a good start.

In my opinion, you should assume the formal responsibility for the management of State’s relationship with USIA/ICA on behalf of the Secretary. Obviously only the Secretary and you have the appropriate rank to do this.

Designation of a Seventh Floor principal is not enough to provide substantive backup for State’s responsibilities vis-a-vis other organizations. I suggest that responsibility for backstopping you in this new role be centralized in M/MO. We have the experience and capabilities there to integrate and staff the various policy, resource and other issues which will need to be followed on a fairly regular basis. Tasking M/MO with this duty would also permit me to resolve many issues without taking them to you—the pattern which now exists and which has worked fairly well during the reorganization process, surely a baptism of fire.
RECOMMENDATIONS

1) That you assume the responsibility for managing State’s relationship with USIA/ICA.
2) That you assign the staffing responsibility to M/MO.

Christopher initialed his approval of both recommendations on January 17.

119. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, January 18, 1978

SUBJECT
North-South Scholarships: A Tribute to Senator Hubert Humphrey

In a memo to you in October, I sketched the idea for a North-South Scholarship, and you instructed me to staff it out and then write a memo from you to the President on it.

I have held a couple of meetings on the proposal with Tom Thornton, Guy Erb, Christian Chapman from State’s Cultural Affairs Bureau, John Richardson, former Assistant Secretary of State, and Phil Dussault from OMB. After reviewing suggestions, I revised the proposal, held another smaller meeting, re-wrote it again, and the product is attached at Tab A.

CU is not as enthusiastic as they might be, but Tom tells me that is to be expected. But NSC Staff—Tom, Guy, Henry, and I—are all very enthusiastic, and we believe that the idea should be seized this week because it really is a Hubert Humphrey Memorial.

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1 Source: Carter Library, White House Central Files, Subject File, Foreign Affairs, Information-Exchange Activities-Education, Executive, Box FO–35, FO 5–1 1/20/77–5/31/78. No classification marking. Sent for action. Pastor signed “Bob” next to his name in the “from” line. Inderfurth initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.

2 See Document 98.

3 Not printed is an undated paper entitled “North-South Scholarships: A Proposal.”

4 Humphrey died from cancer on January 13.
RECOMMENDATION

Therefore, we recommend that you forward the memo at Tab I\(^5\) and the proposal at Tab A to the President. Tom Thornton, Guy Erb, and Henry Richardson concur.\(^6\)

\(^{5}\) Not printed is a January 24 memorandum from Brzezinski to the President, transmitting the undated paper on the scholarship proposal (see footnote 3, above).

\(^{6}\) Bob Hunter concurs, and adds three suggestions: a) that, if the President approves, he call Muriel Humphrey at an appropriate point; b) that we consider using the new Humphrey Institute of Politics as the administering agency; and c) that we act quickly, before someone on the Hill introduces something like this. [Footnote is in the original. Thornton, Erb, and Richardson all initialed their concurrence. Next to the recommendation, Aaron wrote: “ZB—I think it is a great idea! DA.” An unknown hand also wrote below the recommendation: “ZB signed 1–24–78.”]

120. Address by the Director of the United States Information Agency (Reinhardt)\(^1\)

Washington, February 6, 1978

As this reorganization has been discussed over the past few months, almost a year now, I think I’ve made more speeches than I’ve ever made in my life, more than I ever hope to make in the rest of my life. For it seemed to me that there was room for a great deal of misunderstanding, but probably more accurately, there was a great deal of ignorance among the people about something called ICA.

There’s no question that in the past, only the most sophisticated people knew anything about something called CU or something called USIA. Everybody, of course, knew about the Department of State, and the sophisticated people knew that there were certain exchange programs operated out of the Department of State.

In an effort, perhaps a vain one, to overcome this problem, I set out a couple of months ago on a speaking tour on the West Coast. Some of you have heard me tell this story before, and I apologize for

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 306, USIA Historical Collection, Subject Files, 1953–2000, Entry A–1 1066, Box 43, United States International Communication Agency, Reorganization, 1977–1981. No classification marking. Reinhardt made these remarks before senior agency officials. The transcript was distributed to agency employees under an undated cover page entitled “Announcement of Structure of International Communication Agency.”
your having to listen again. But it illustrates, it seems to me, some of
the problems and opportunities.

Before I went to Los Angeles, I received a little brochure that the
head of the World Affairs Council had sent to me, announcing my
coming. Actually, it was a brochure designed to persuade the members
of the Council to attend a luncheon, at which I was to speak. It was a
very, very good job—good, slick paper, good printing, excellent repro-
duction of my photograph. It announced the subject, announced the
cost of your lunch—twelve dollars and a half. And I was very proud
of it, for them. It seemed to me that it was quite worthy of the best
reproduction facilities in USIA.

And I thought that I would make a little personal hay with this,
so I decided to send it to my father, who’s 87 years old, lives in
Tennessee. Nobody in Tennessee ever pays twelve dollars and a half
for lunch.

And I was sure I could make a few points. And I put it in an
envelope and wrote out the appropriate sentences that could be summa-
ized by saying, “look what I’m doing these days.” And I got a prompt
response. He said, “I don’t know a thing about this subject that you
propose to speak on, Public Diplomacy, Necessity or Luxury. But I do
know one thing: There is nothing that you could say on any subject
that’s worth twelve dollars and a half.”

I was properly chastened, but I still had to go on and make this
speech on public diplomacy, necessity or luxury. It started me to think-
ing about USIA activities in the past, and CU activities in the past.
Neither organization can be sure that we’ve been well known, that
we’ve even been understood. There are good historic reasons for this.
Over the years, Americans as a people have stayed away from these
kinds of bureaucracies that could be construed by someone, at least,
to be a kind of ministry of information.

And this has done something, I think, to both organizations, and
something that can be overcome to a great extent by ICA. In the first
place, it’s made us awfully defensive. We’ve spent a great deal of our
time as government servants simply defending our turf in an effort to
prove that what we were doing was worthwhile. We were always
convinced ourselves, but we were afraid that others in American society
may not be convinced.

I won’t try to illustrate this from CU’s point of view, where I’ve
never worked, but I think I can illustrate it perfectly from USIA’s point
of view.

One of our very important functions is libraries, 180-odd over the
world. And we as an agency have done a great deal of work trying to
justify libraries to ourselves, not realizing, it seems, that a library is a
library is a library wherever you find one, and the peoples around the world must know what a library is.

We’ve become defensive on this subject. We have tried to suggest that libraries are institutions that are designed to attract prime ministers and cabinet ministers and other members of what we’d call primary audiences. When they haven’t come in, we haven’t been quite sure what to do with the libraries. So the debate—the internal debate—goes on, rather than our accepting that this is a powerful instrument of communication, that it will naturally attract certain members of the society, and it won’t attract many others. We may take the contents of the library to other members of the society, but that’s all.

We’ve also put a great deal of emphasis on day-to-day communication problems, and indeed, this has become one of the real problems in reorganizing these activities, as some people have asserted. They say that one of the organizations that has been proposed as an entity in ICA, has been interested in the short-range, the day-to-day. The other one has been interested in the long-range. And the opponents of reorganization, at least, have said the two won’t mix.

Well, if you put it that way, probably they won’t. But it seems to me that one thing that we have learned over the years in USIA—you’ve always known it in CU—is that very little that we have done in the past 25 years has solved problems overnight. To the extent that we have been successful, we have been far more successful on long-range activities than we have on the short-range activities. It doesn’t mean that there aren’t short-range problems, or that some of the short-range problems don’t require attention.

When you look at any one of the great problems in the world, in the last 25 years, we would be bold indeed if we suggested that, as a result of what we’ve done on a short-range basis, we have turned these problems around or solved them.

So long-range activities, long-range results, almost by definition grow from the whole field of communication. There is a cumulative result over a period of time. The reorganization, I would hope, will help us to consider, to plan, to reflect on activities that we are agreed on, and to eliminate some of what I have perceived, at least, to be our overdefensiveness.

What I want to talk about mainly is the organizational structure of the new agency. We’ve had all kinds of input. We’ve had individual letter writers, we’ve had people who call us, we have had task forces which completed their work in the middle of December, as you will recall. And then it finally came to the point that we had to take all of

\footnote{2 See footnote 5, Document 114.}
these excellent suggestions and options and recommendations and put
together a structure which we hope will serve the new agency well.

We do not claim that we have organized for eternity. We think
that the structure is completely defensible. Six months after the agency
begins on April 1, if we’ve made a mistake or if it simply doesn’t work
as we have designed it, we won’t hesitate to change it. Obviously,
those who follow us won’t hesitate to change it.

What we have sought is a structure in accordance with some basic
principles that we think should govern the new agency. In the first
place, we have sought a structure that is consistent with the Presidential
principles announced in the President’s letter, and approved by the
Congress. If you go back and read the covering message that the Presi-
dent sent to the Hill with the reorganization plan, he made some
points. He made very clear what it is that the new agency should do,
not too specifically, but there’s no question about the general principles
he stated.

Thus, any organizational structure must take these principles into
consideration. Also, in the course of talking about the new structure,
the new ICA, I have likened it to a conglomerate, as some of you have
heard me say. It is not an exact analogy by a long shot, but it is
an instructive one, nevertheless. A business conglomerate has many
entities, some of them seemingly disparate entities. They make motion
pictures, they explore for oil, they make clothing, they engage in any
number of other activities.

Some of these activities may be dominant. If you’re exploring for
oil and you hit oil, you’re probably going to get more money. The
conglomerate is going to get more money from that entity than it can
possibly get from publishing books.

Still, businessmen in their wisdom have seen fit to bring together
these seeming disparate entities in an effort, obviously, to make a profit.
It is possible to look at all of the entities in the new ICA and say that
some of them are quite unlike others. Again, those who have not been
fond of the reorganization have pointed up this fact. An organizing
structure such as we have presented today, we hope, will help over-
come this seeming separateness of some of the entities.

We have been determined that there should be, perhaps as never
before, a core management in the new organization, not a core manage-
ment to be concerned with the tactical programs on a day-to-day basis.
We couldn’t follow these if we wanted to, because we’re too widely
dispersed as an organization.

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3 See Document 93.
On the other hand, there should be a management that is concerned with the general strategic purposes and objectives of the new organization, to set them without any hesitancy, and to make certain that they are carried out in some way, carried out efficiently.

This core management grows out of the reorganization plan sent to the Congress. It consists of a Director, a Deputy Director and four Associate Directors, who will meet frequently and who will be concerned with the overall strategic planning of the organization.

I have frequently used the words centrality of purpose and it’s a phrase that’s been misunderstood. I should at least tell you what I mean by it.

By centrality of purpose, I mean little more than that all our activities should have a purpose and should have some simple connection with the overall objectives of the ICA. I do not mean by this that around the world, in 184 places, we are going to have 184 posts doing exactly the same thing at the same time. I do not mean by this that there is a kind of lasso on entities of the organizations overseas and that they must do the same thing at the same time.

I mean only that whatever they’re doing should meet certain strategic standards that we will set, and that we can be knowledgeable about it.

Finally, in the course of these generalities, I’ve said that the organization must have two forces in it, two dominant forces, one centrifugal and one centripetal. The organization must have a clear-cut statement of purposes, objectives and strategies. These will flow out from core management. But there must also be flowing into core management, principally from the field, ideas, plans, purposes in the light of the communications problems and opportunities that exist overseas, whether it is a cultural exchange program, or a motion picture, or something going from the print media. Brazil is still different from Indonesia, and we can only know what the problems and opportunities are in each insofar as we have flowing into the organization the ideas as they are seen from the field.

Some of this will be a repetition of what I have said. But since these are the principles that have guided us, I thought that we should go through them, one at a time.

The new structure must provide—as I’ve just said—a core management group responsible for establishing broad agency policies and securing their effective execution. The agency must have a sense of strategic purpose consistent with overall U.S. policy goals—almost a repetition of what the President has already set for us.

The agency structure, as you will see shortly, should provide clear lines of authority and accountability at every level. Overlapping
Responsibilities and operations should be reduced to the absolute minimum. We hope that we have done this in setting up the structure. We of course cannot be sure until the agency begins its work.

Inflation of job titles should be reversed. There’s a long congressional history of questions on this subject which has helped us make up our minds on it.

The number of nonrelated staffs reporting to principal officers in core management should be reduced to the minimum.

The organizational structure itself must enhance the integrity of the academic exchange programs and the news operation of the Voice of America, mandated by the President and the Congress. In the case of the Voice of America, notice that it says the news operation of the Voice of America. A great deal of the Voice of America programming has little or nothing to do with news.

There should be a central point of reference for relations with field posts. By the same token, field perspectives must suffuse the entire agency, for still, a great deal of the work of ICA, as has been the case with both USIA and CU, is overseas. We all have gotten the message about the two-way dialogue, about the mutuality of activities, about intercultural relations, about the bringing of American people together with foreign people in various ways.

Nevertheless, a great part of the agency’s work will still be physically overseas.

The structure of the organization should call for new patterns of thought and afford opportunities for creative initiative.

These are principles that we thought about a great deal. We have recorded them because they have guided us in the designing of the structure.

[Omitted here is Reinhardt’s explanation of ICA’s organizational structure.]

QUESTION: John, how do you see the relationship of the ICA Director to the Secretary of State?

Mr. Reinhardt: The Secretary of State, under ICA, as under USIA, will be responsible for policy guidance, both tactical and strategic, to the Director of ICA. This will be the principal relationship. The other relationships between the two will be collegial and, depending on the issue at hand at any one time, close, we hope.

The two functions of public and traditional diplomacy are different functions, as agreed by all. The public diplomacy function supports, in its long-range effects, the efforts of traditional diplomacy. The two functions are both necessary to the national interest.
121. Memorandum From President Carter to the Director of the United States Information Agency (Reinhardt)

Washington, March 13, 1978

As you and the International Communication Agency embark upon your new mission, I want to outline my views of the purposes and functions of the Agency, and the manner in which it should conduct its affairs.

In transmitting Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1977 to the Congress, I said that the principal function of the Agency should be to reduce the degree to which misperceptions and misunderstandings complicate relations between the United States and other nations. In international affairs, as in our personal lives, the starting point for dealing effectively with others is the clearest possible understanding of differing points of view. The fundamental premise of the International Communication Agency is that it is in our national interest to encourage the sharing of ideas and cultural activities among the people of the United States and the people of other nations.

It is in the general interest of the community of nations, as well as in our own interest, that other nations and other peoples know where this great country stands, and why. We want them to understand our values, our institutions—the vitality of our culture—and how these relate to their own experience. We must share our successes, and look for help in learning from our failures. We must make available to people of other nations facts they would not otherwise learn about ourselves and our views.

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1 Source: Carter Library, White House Central Files, Subject File, Federal Government, International Communication Agency, Executive, Box FG–217, FG 298 1/20/77–12/31/78. No classification marking. Hutcheson sent a copy of the memorandum to Mondale under a March 13 note, in which Hutcheson indicated that the copy was returned in the President's outbox for forwarding to Mondale for “appropriate handling.” Hutcheson also stated, “Barry Jagoda has suggested that you present the attached to Reinhardt. This would ‘point to a successful, completed reorganization process, and also give needed prestige to the agency at its start.’ Please advise.” (Ibid.) Mondale presented the copy to Reinhardt during the ICA inauguration ceremony on April 3. The memorandum is also printed in American Foreign Policy, Basic Documents, 1977–1980, pp. 94–96. In telegram 84801 to all diplomatic and consular posts, April 2, the Department repeated the text of a message from Reinhardt to all ICA posts, in which Reinhardt transmitted the text of Carter’s March 13 memorandum and requested that posts share the text with the Ambassador or other principal officers. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780143–0173) Executive Order 12048, issued on March 27, 1978, and effective on April 1, formally established the International Communication Agency. For the text, see Public Papers: Carter, 1978, Book I, pp. 606–607.

2 See Document 93.
It is also in our interest—and in the interest of other nations—that Americans have the opportunity to understand the histories, cultures and problems of others, so that we can come to understand their hopes, perceptions and aspirations. In so doing, the Agency will contribute to our capacity as a people and as a government to manage our foreign affairs with sensitivity, in an effective and responsible way.

You and your colleagues have five main tasks:

1. To encourage, aid and sponsor the broadest possible exchange of people and ideas between our country and other nations. It will be your job to:
   — Continue successful government-sponsored exchange programs that now come under your Agency, and improve them wherever possible.
   — Encourage private institutions in this country to develop their own forms of exchange and aid those that are in the broadest national interest.
   — Provide counsel and information on our international exchange program as a whole, and assist in maintaining broad participation in the international exchange programs conducted by government departments and agencies, including those administered by the International Communication Agency.

2. To give foreign peoples the best possible understanding of our policies and our intentions, and sufficient information about American society and culture to comprehend why we have chosen certain policies over others. In so doing, you will wish to draw upon thoughtful and representative Americans, through the use of radio and television, magazines and other printed materials, and through seminars, personal contacts, the presentation of American art and culture, and the teaching of the English language where necessary and appropriate.

3. To help assure that our government adequately understands foreign public opinion and culture for policy-making purposes, and to assist individual Americans and institutions in learning about other nations and their cultures.

4. To assist in the development and execution of a comprehensive national policy on international communications, designed to allow and encourage the maximum flow of information and ideas among the peoples of the world. Such a policy must take into consideration the needs and sensitivities of others, as well as our own needs.

5. To prepare for and conduct negotiations on cultural exchanges with other governments, aware always that the most effective sharing of culture, ideas and information comes between individual people rather than through formal acts of governments.

In discharging these responsibilities, you must keep these goals in mind:
Since all the Agency’s activities bear a relationship to our foreign policies and interests, you will seek guidance on those policies and interests from the Secretary of State.

You will be responsible for maintaining the scholarly integrity and nonpolitical character of the exchange programs within your agency, and for maintaining the independence of the Voice of America news broadcasts. You will wish to assure that they reflect the broad interests of the United States and of the people served by these programs.

I look forward to your periodic accounting of your undertakings and your recommendations on the conduct of public diplomacy.

Finally, the Agency will undertake no activities which are covert, manipulative or propagandistic. The Agency can assume—as our founding fathers did—that a great and free society is its own best witness, and can put its faith in the power of ideas.

I’m sure the Congress and the American people join with me in wishing you every success in these important endeavors.3

Jimmy Carter

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3 In an April 3 memorandum, Reinhardt responded to Carter, commenting that the President’s statement of mission “will serve as an inspiration to all of us at ICA as we undertake the task of fulfilling the goals and purposes you have outlined. It will also be the standard against which we shall measure the success of our efforts.” (Carter Library, White House Central Files, Subject File, Federal Government, International Communication Agency, Executive, Box FG 217, FG 298 1/20/77–12/31/78)

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122. Circular Telegram From the United States Information Agency to all Principal USIS Posts1

Washington, March 16, 1978

USIA–7520. For PAOs from Director Reinhardt; Pass also all Branch Posts and Media Extension; CINCPAC for USIA Advisor.

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As we move toward establishment of the International Communication Agency on April 1, I am deeply grateful to those of you who, over the past several months, have given us the benefit of your ideas, thoughts and suggestions with regard to the new Agency. I have appreciated particularly your helpful comments on what the new Agency should be called abroad. Your perspectives have been considered at great length and with great seriousness.

Very shortly, I shall be forwarding substantive thoughts, views and guidelines which, I trust, will be of help to you as you set about your work in the new Agency. In the meantime, there are certain administrative and logistical matters which must be attended to immediately. I would, therefore, appreciate your prompt attention to the following:

1. Effective April 1, the International Communication Agency will be known abroad as “International Communication Agency, United States of America.” You should not, repeat not, use the terms “United States Information Service” or “USIS” to identify any part of your activities. These names will cease to exist on April 1, as USIA and the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs will cease to exist.

2. Any element of an overseas mission now called “United States Information Service” or “USIS” should be identified as “International Communication Agency, Embassy of the United States of America.”

3. Elements of your post which are institutional in nature (e.g., libraries, BNC’s, Centers, etc.) may continue with their current names, except in those cases where institutional names contain the terms “United States Information Service,” “USIS,” “U.S. Information Center” or any variation or translation of these terms. The latter names must be changed on April 1. Where name changes are required, you should select a preferred new name and forward it soonest by cable through your area director for approval. Names such as “American Cultural Center,” “Thomas Jefferson Library,” “Benjamin Franklin Center,” “American Center,” etc. are entirely acceptable.

4. Within a matter of weeks, you will be receiving information and guidance by pouch on new stationery and other printed materials. In the meantime, you are to make temporary, interim arrangements so that, effective April 1, your post activities are identified either as “International Communication Agency, Embassy of the United States of America” (non-institutional presence), or, for example, “Benjamin Franklin Center, International Communication Agency, United States of America” (institutional presence). In all instances, you are to spell out the words “International Communication Agency”; you are not to use the initials “ICA” or “USICA” in printed form. You should use no stationery or other printed materials on April 1 or thereafter which refer to the “United States Information Service” or “USIS”. Pending
further guidance, you should likewise make arrangements to remove, effective April 1, any signs bearing these terms and substitute interim signs identifying your post with the new Agency name.

5. There is a preference for using “International Communication Agency,” wherever possible, in English. However, where you feel it is essential or desirable to translate the name, your recommended translation should be forwarded immediately for approval through your area director. An official Agency translation in each language will then be decided upon for coordinated Agency-wide use.

6. All posts in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, excepting only those in Yugoslavia, are specifically excluded from the above decisions. These posts will be handled as a separate matter and should continue to operate for the time being under the “P&C” designation.

7. I trust you will do everything possible to insure that these and other changes in the weeks ahead cause minimal disruption to your programs and activities. In launching a new organization, we must all exert extra effort to maintain program continuity and effectiveness.

I appreciate fully the strong feelings many of you have expressed about retaining the “USIS” name used for many years overseas. I share a certain emotion that, for us and our colleagues in CU, must inevitably accompany the passing of two old and beloved organizations which have commanded so much of our professional lives and energies, and which, I am convinced, have contributed far beyond popular recognition to our interests and well-being as a nation. I realize, too, that this change may cause you some short-term difficulties in your work.

Nonetheless, the President has made it clear that the establishment of the International Communication Agency is an act of creation. I subscribe fully and enthusiastically to this view. As I have said repeatedly, I am firmly committed to the notion that the new Agency be more than the simple sum of its constituent parts, that it be a truly new Agency with new visions, new structures, new relationships, new thought patterns and new objectives, all pursued with renewed professional commitment.

Our name—at home and abroad—must reflect this transition, this act of creation. I warmly commend the dedication and the skills you have displayed in behalf of USIA, the American Government and the American people. I look forward to your even greater contribution, to your full cooperation and support, as a part of the International Communication Agency.

Any questions you may have about our name abroad or the logistics of carrying out the decisions outlined above should be directed to IOM through your area director.

Reinhardt
123. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, March 26, 1978

SUBJECT

The North-South Scholarship Proposal—Revised

At your instructions,² I have significantly revised the North-South scholarship proposal, shortening it from 4 pages to a little more than one page. I have also mentioned the idea of a poor but talented undergraduate program, but combined the NSC recommendation with that of the other agencies. As written, the recommendation is just for designating graduate students who already have scholarships. I think the President is likely to approve the idea for three simple reasons: all of the agencies are pretty much in agreement; it is a compelling symbol of US interest in the developing world, particularly with Humphrey’s name attached to it; and most importantly, it is not likely to cost very much.

You may want to hold on to the proposal and give it to the President on the plane,³ or send it forward today.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum attached at Tab I and send it forward.⁴

¹ Source: Carter Library, White House Central Files, Subject File, Foreign Affairs, Information-Exchange Activities-Educational, Executive, Box FO–35, FO 5–1 1/20/77–5/31/78. No classification marking.

² In a March 13 memorandum to Brzezinski, Pastor indicated that following Brzezinski’s transmittal of the January 24 memorandum to the President (see footnotes 3 and 5, Document 119) Hutcheson sent the memorandum to HEW, OMB, the Department of State, and USIA (USICA) for comment. After receiving the comments, Hutcheson asked Pastor to redraft the North-South proposal. Pastor transmitted the redraft to Brzezinski under the March 13 memorandum. Brzezinski wrote on the March 13 memorandum: “Bob—This verges on the ludicrous! A 4 p. memo to the P. of the USA asking 2 trivial questions. Prepare a decision memo for me. ZB.” (Ibid.)

³ Reference is to the President’s trip to Caracas, March 28–29. The President departed Washington, D.C. the morning of March 28. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary)

⁴ The President did not approve or disapprove the recommendation but added a comment to the first page of the undated memorandum attached at Tab I. See footnote 8, below.
North-South Scholars: A Tribute to Senator Humphrey

Several years ago, President Perez initiated a large-scale scholarship program, called the Ayacucho Program, with the purpose of trying to educate an entire new generation of Venezuelans. My staff has been working with people from other agencies on a proposal which is very similar to Perez' program, only it would finance the scholarships of students from all the developing countries to study in the U.S. Your stop in Caracas would provide a perfect opportunity to announce the program, making the point that we have profited from Venezuela's idea.

The program is quite simple. Its purpose would be to focus the attention of the American people on the importance of the developing world—a principal theme of your Caracas speech. The scholarship program could be named for Senator Humphrey, who was so identified with and so sympathetic to the North-South dialogue. Like the Rhodes scholarships, the Humphrey scholarship could provide education and a common experience for a new generation of leaders.

The program could be focused in one of two directions. We could select five poor but extremely talented undergraduates from all the developing countries (approximately 600 per year) and finance their undergraduate education. This program would cost about $30 million and for that reason many of the agencies believe that the direction of the program should be towards graduate students.

5 No classification marking. Sent for action.
6 Known as the Gran Mariscal de Ayacucho scholarship program.
7 Presumable reference to the President’s March 29 remarks made before the Venezuelan Congress. The text of the remarks is printed in Public Papers: Carter, 1978, Book I, pp. 619–623. During his toast made at a March 28 State dinner at La Casona in Caracas, Carter referenced the benefits of cultural exchange programs in establishing “bonds of understanding.” He continued, “Because of this visit and others on my journey, and in memory of your friend, our great American statesman, Hubert Humphrey, I would like to announce tonight my intention to establish a program of Humphrey scholarships which will bring poor but outstanding students from Latin America and throughout the world to study in the colleges of the United States.” (Ibid., p. 618) The full text of Carter’s remarks is ibid., pp. 617–619.
Of course, we have many scholarship programs for graduate students, and one idea would be merely to designate several graduate students who already have scholarships to the U.S., as Humphrey Scholars. The “Humphrey Scholarship” designation would be a prestigious one, and perhaps it could include a special one-month seminar each year where North-South problems could be addressed. Such a program would be very inexpensive, but might project the same symbol that we would like to project with a more extensive and expensive undergraduate program. State, USIA, HEW, and OMB all commented on the original NSC proposal for undergraduate scholarships by saying that they thought the idea was an excellent one, but too expensive. All those agencies preferred a graduate program instead. I have re-evaluated the original NSC proposal and now concur with the other agencies that a graduate program would be more desirable.

**RECOMMENDATION**

That you approve the idea of a Humphrey Scholarship program which would designate selected graduate students from developing countries who already have scholarships to attend U.S. universities. This could be announced in an appropriate way in Caracas.\(^8\)

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\(^8\) The President did not approve or disapprove the recommendation but wrote in the top right-hand corner of the first page of the memorandum: “Zbig—I like the HHH scholarship idea—We should leave the details until later. More staff work is needed. JC.”

Washington, March 31, 1978

[Omitted here are Marks' April 1, 1978, transmittal letter to Congress; the Table of Contents; and Section I: Summary and Recommendations.]

I. Introduction

This is the fourteenth regular report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs. It is also its last. President Carter's Reorganization Plan No. 2 proposed that the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs and the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information be replaced by one body, the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Communication, Cultural and Educational Affairs. The plan was approved by the Congress on December 11, 1977. It became effective on April 1, 1978, as a result of an Executive Order issued by the President. Hence April 1, 1978, marked the terminal date of the life of our Commission.

This situation has inevitably conditioned the form and substance of this final report. The Commission’s enabling legislation (P.L. 87–256, the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961) stipulates that the Commission submit to the Congress an annual report of its activities and recommendations. This document fulfills this requirement by outlining its work since July 1, 1977. But the Commission feels that, since this will be the final report of an organization which has had a productive life for almost 16 years, it has additional obligations to:

• Make some observations on the work of the Commission during its long life;
• Pass on to its successor suggestions for its operation which stem from the Commission’s long experience.

These two subjects are, therefore, dealt with in the pages that follow.

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2 See Document 93.

3 See Document 114.

4 See footnote 1, Document 121.
In one important respect, however, this report follows a well-established precedent. It has become a tradition for the Commission to comment in its annual accounting to the Congress on the general climate for this country’s international educational and cultural exchange programs and their place in the implementation of U.S. foreign policy. We do not believe this is the moment to depart from this salutary tradition.

Over the years this Commission has spoken frequently of the “growing interdependence” of the world and has insisted upon the importance of international exchange in the development of the “mutual understanding” so essential to such a world. But its voice is no longer, as we once felt it was, a voice crying in the wilderness. On the contrary, there has been in recent years so much talk about interdependence and mutual understanding, that these words risk becoming pious platitudes, about as likely to stir controversy—or action—as sin and motherhood.

For this reason, the Commission wishes in this final report to reiterate in the strongest possible terms its continuing conviction that now, more than ever before, this country must rely upon international educational and cultural exchange to provide foreign audiences with accurate perceptions of the United States, and to provide American audiences with accurate perceptions of other nations.

In the first years of the 20th century, “splendid isolationism” seemed to most Americans a sound basis for a viable foreign policy. World War II put a sudden and unhappy end to this illusion. In the years immediately following the war, America’s unprecedented military and economic power lulled many of us into the smug belief that we could create a pax Americana simply by “telling America’s story to the world.” That dream, too, was shattered by events. Other countries grew in power and influence and became disinclined to accept our bland assumption that the United States had all the answers. Gone now are the days of the Marshall Plan, when European newspapers readily accepted press handouts from American sources. Gone are the days of the Truman Doctrine, when a Greek radio or television station felt obliged to air canned programs on the United States. Gone are the days when citizens of developing countries avidly snapped up

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5 For the text of George Marshall’s June 5, 1947, Harvard University address, in which he proposed a comprehensive program to rebuild Europe, see Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. III, The British Commonwealth; Europe, pp. 237–239.

6 For the text of Truman’s March 12, 1947, address before a joint session of Congress, in which he pledged that the United States would provide political, military, and economic assistance to all democratic nations under threat by internal or external authoritarian forces, see Public Papers: Truman, 1947, pp. 176–180.
subsidized translations of American books, flocked into USIS libraries, or crowded into theatres as they once did. As the societies of the world have evolved, it has been made abundantly clear that this now is a genuinely interdependent world; that common problems call for joint solutions; and that the exchange of ideas cuts two ways—not one.

President Carter neatly summarized the altered circumstances of the world and their implications for U.S. foreign policy in his commencement address at Notre Dame University, May 22, 1977:

“It is a new world, but America should not fear it. It is a new world, and we should help shape it. It is a new world that calls for a new American foreign policy . . . We cannot make this kind of policy by manipulation. Our policy must be open; it must be candid; it must be one of constructive global involvement . . .”

The use of exchanges as a tool of foreign policy cannot be called “new.” It has been used by the United States to some extent for 40 years; and indeed previous Presidents have acknowledged its worth. In a letter addressed to the Chairman of the Commission on December 18, 1976, (Appendix D, the Thirteenth Report of the Advisory Commission), President Ford wrote, “International educational and cultural exchange programs have played an important role in our relations with other countries.” President Eisenhower, looking back on his presidency in an article in the Reader’s Digest, regretted that he had underestimated the value of exchange programs and noted the anomaly that the cost of one bomber exceeded the total appropriation for U.S. exchange programs. President Johnson assured the Chairman of our Commission, Leonard H. Marks, (then Director of USIA) that he shared these views and regretted that the Viet-Nam war prevented him from focusing on the problem.

What is different and significant in President Carter’s statement is the recognition of the importance of exchanges to foreign policy; for giving increased emphasis to international educational and cultural exchange is, we contend, one of the most obvious ways to achieve the open, candid, globally involved policy which the President advocates.

7 See footnote 2, Document 57.
The Commission therefore notes with satisfaction what appears to be a new awareness on the part of the Congress, the Administration, and the public that exchanges can help us to keep open channels of communication with other countries, enabling us to talk directly to other peoples, to state our views and listen to theirs, to avoid misunderstandings—in short, to serve our long-term interests.

Last June our Thirteenth Report noted that:

We feel encouraged to believe that the importance of “public diplomacy,” of which international exchange is an important part, is gaining the recognition it deserves in our foreign policy. We do not believe that this is a partisan development attributable solely to a change in Administrations; and yet it is true that the Administration appears ready to breathe new life into the exchange program . . .

Subsequent events have justified our cautious optimism. The number of foreign students coming to the United States has grown steadily. A consortium of leading associations in U.S. higher education has undertaken to identify positions which colleges and universities all over the world should be taking to meet the needs of an interdependent community of nations. A report of the American Association of State Colleges and Universities endorses “educating students for a highly multicultural and interdependent world as one of the top priorities of U.S. higher education.”

Our Government has reflected the attitude of the private sector. The first recommendation of the Commission’s previous report was that the Congress appropriate as a minimum for the exchange program the $70.5 million authorized by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), as opposed to the fiscal year 1977 appropriation of $59 million. Congress did appropriate the requested amount, thus encouraging the State Department to ask for $74,750,000 for fiscal year 1979.

The President’s personal support of the Friendship Force led to several massive, well-publicized, people-to-people exchanges. The House Subcommittee on International Operations wrote to the President after 10 days of hearings on Reorganization Plan No. 2, “The key to effective use of our public diplomacy resources is an awareness of the utility of these resources and a willingness to use them to further policy objectives.”

This statement confirms our belief that Reorganization Plan No. 2 is the most significant development since 1953 affecting our exchange programs. It therefore deserves special attention in this report. Although the plan dealt specifically only with the management of a certain segment of the Government’s exchange and information programs, the discussions which preceded and succeeded the President’s recommendation on the reorganization focused on the purposes and principles of educational and cultural exchange more public and private
attention than the subjects have probably ever before received in this country.

In the introduction to its Thirteenth Report, the Commission noted the impetus which its recommendation had given to a thorough study of our Government’s handling of its international information, educational and cultural programs, and summarized the actions which its initiatives had precipitated. This section of the report concluded: “It is therefore reasonable to expect that by the end of this year our Government will be better organized to exploit the possibilities of public diplomacy.”

That expectation came close to realization. On October 11, 1977, President Carter sent Reorganization Plan No. 2 to the Congress and released it to the public. Almost immediately committees of the House and Senate began hearings on it. The Chairman of the Commission contributed to these in a letter addressed to Senator Ribicoff, Chairman of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee. Simultaneously, many private organizations (principally from the academic community) made known their views. The hearings and the interventions of the academic community addressed basic questions of the role of international exchange in foreign affairs, as well as the structuring of Government to manage them. Paramount among these was one which particularly concerned this Commission: how to obtain genuine coordination of our information and cultural activities while at the same time retaining the integrity of the exchange programs.

As a result of these public and private observations, the President made several amendments to his proposal, and Reorganization Plan No. 2 was approved by the Congress on December 11, 1977. It established a new agency, the International Communication Agency (ICA), which “will have two distinct but related goals: to tell the world about our society and policies; . . . to tell ourselves about the world . . . The aim of this reorganization, therefore, is a more effective dialogue among peoples of the earth.”

An analysis of the plan is not pertinent to our interests here, and we have dwelt this long on it only to support our thesis that the time is ripe for the United States to, at long last, assure that international educational and cultural exchange is fully recognized as an essential element in the determination and implementation of U.S. foreign policy—and is utilized accordingly. Thanks largely to Reorganization Plan No. 2, influential members of Congress and the Executive Branch are alert as never before to the possibilities; and an agency has been established which has the potential to conduct exchange programs with maximum effectiveness.

In short, we tend to think that exchange programs between this and other countries of the world have come of age. What we now need
to do is to assure that the interchange of scholars and scholarly materials which takes place within our borders is carried out internationally. This would, we firmly believe, lead to a more mature relationship between the United States and other countries; one in which human rights and a greater awareness of the need for individuals to be genuinely free to move and speak as they wish would be generally accepted.

These thoughts lead us to the first and most significant, recommendation of this report. We recommend that the Congress and our successor Advisory Commission supervise closely over the next year the operations of the newly established International Communication Agency to make certain that the international educational and cultural programs for which it is responsible do indeed—as Reorganization Plan No. 2 projects—“play a central role in building two-way bridges of understanding between our people and other peoples of the world.”


125. Remarks by the Director of the International Communication Agency (Reinhardt)¹

Washington, April 3, 1978

Ladies and gentlemen, colleagues:

Welcome to the International Communication Agency.

Today is our first day of business. For me, it is a day of great excitement, brimming with a sense of challenge. For me, it is a rare day of renewed commitment to values and ideas and purposes with which many of us have been engaged for the better part of our professional lives.

I do not take this day lightly. I believe that we and others may later look back on this day as having been of historic significance.

It is because of this conviction that I want to talk to you at some length this morning—our first morning together—on three matters I judge to be of concern to us all.

_First_, I should like to present some of my own personal beliefs. I hope they will have an impact on the initial directions of the International Communication Agency.

_Secord_, I should like to outline what I see as the potential of ICA as an institution.

_And, third_, I should like to lay out what I view as some of the more important practical implications of this act of creation—the establishment of the International Communication Agency.

First, then, my beliefs:

I believe in the power of ideas. I believe that ideas are what the International Communication Agency is all about—the generation of ideas, the exchange of ideas, the refinement of ideas. In the ebbs and flows of history, there are those who place their trust in military might, those who lean to economic determinism, those whose ultimate regard is for scientific and technological innovation.

I turn to ideas. I believe, with Oliver Wendell Holmes, that “man’s mind, stretched to a new idea, never goes back to its original dimension.” I believe, with H.G. Wells, that, “Human history is in essence a history of ideas.” I believe, with President Carter, that “it is a mistake to undervalue the power of words and of the ideas that words embody.”

I also believe that the human personality, and human creativity, and human well-being flourish best where humane values and the rule of law—in their fullest sense—also flourish.

I believe it imperative—and in our highest national interest—to enhance the sensitivity, the insight and the understanding that Americans bring to their relations with other peoples. As President Carter has said, “only by knowing and understanding each other’s experiences can we find common ground on which we can examine and resolve our differences.”

I also believe it imperative that other societies know clearly where we stand and why—as a government and as a people—on issues of concern, just as I believe it inevitable that other societies, in their own interests, will want to know. An important part of our mandate continues to be the obligation to explain American policies as clearly and effectively as we can.

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2 The President made this statement during his May 22, 1977, commencement address to graduates of the University of Notre Dame. See footnote 2, Document 57.

3 The President made this statement in the message to Congress, transmitting the text of Reorganization Plan Number 2; see Document 93.
I believe that America has given birth to one of the most dynamic, most creative cultures since the Renaissance—but I also believe that no culture is so fully cultivated that it cannot be further enriched by the cultures of others.

I believe that, where they are properly rooted, cultural relations among peoples are more fundamental, more lasting than any other form of contact across national boundaries. Likewise, I believe that a people’s cultural achievements are both the most important statements they can make about themselves and the most meaningful statements that can be made about them by others.

I believe that the most effective means of communication is direct and personal. As Edward R. Murrow once said, in communicating across vast distances, the last three feet are the hardest and most important. A superb film or a superb magazine or a superb book—however valuable in its own right—is no substitute for a superb discussion among individuals. That is why our exchange of persons programs, and our colleagues in the field, and Americans voluntarily participating with us here at home are so central to our work.

I believe that the world has changed, and that Americans have changed with it. We now know that what we and others do as nations affects each other in historically unparalleled ways. We recognize that people—both at home and abroad—are demanding as never before to be involved in the overriding decisions that affect their lives. We appreciate—more fully than ever—that we cannot live free of foreign entanglements and, at the same time, that we cannot work our will unfettered on others.

I believe, above all, that the work we do can and does make a difference. Surely there will always be real conflicts of interest among peoples. But I believe that we can play a profound role in helping to reduce a multitude of conflicts that arise largely, if not entirely, from misunderstandings and misperceptions among people. And I believe we can make an essential contribution to the creation of an international environment in which real differences are worked out rationally, sensitively and peaceably.

Consider for a moment:
—Would the controversy over landing rights for the Concorde in New York City have raged quite so emotionally, or proved quite so intractable, if some representative sample of the citizens of Queens had visited for a period with their counterparts in Toulouse?
—Would the peace initiative undertaken by President Sadat have borne fruit more readily had the Arabs and the Israelis been more directly, more intimately in touch with each other over the last 30 years?

4 Reference is to Sadat’s November 19, 1977, trip to Jerusalem, making him the first Arab leader ever to officially visit the Jewish state. Documentation on this can be found in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978.
—Could the problems of the world economy be dealt with more sensitively and more successfully if economists and businessmen and workers from around the world were brought together more frequently and more purposefully to discuss issues of overriding common concern?

We can all pick our examples. But the conclusion, I believe, is inescapable: traditional, government-to-government diplomacy is no island unto itself. It does not operate in a vacuum. Indeed, its success or failure is shaped by the international environment in which it is conducted. The relations among peoples; the hopes, the aspirations and the perceptions of different societies; the extent to which people know and understand and have contact with each other—these provide the context within which traditional diplomacy operates, the fundamental building blocks of the international environment. This is our work, and in an important sense traditional diplomacy is our handmaiden, not the reverse. What could be more exciting or more challenging than to be mandated to shape the basic forces in our relations with other peoples?

This should give you some sense of my view of the potential of ICA as an institution—a potential, I believe, that is limited only by our answers to four questions:

- How imposing an institution do we wish to create?
- How central do we wish to be in determining relations between our society and others?
- How great a contribution is each of us prepared to make to the task?
- What kind of an institution, doing what kind of work, at what level of importance, do we want to look back upon in five or ten years?

As I see it, the President and others can look first to ICA for advice on the conduct of our overall cultural relations with other societies.

The President and others can look first to ICA for essential insights on foreign attitudes, aspirations and opinions.

The President and others can look first to ICA for sound counsel on the development and implementation of international communications policies.

The President and others should look routinely to ICA as a source of original thought on major international initiatives.

The President and others—including a wide array of people and institutions throughout our society—can look first to ICA as a principal vehicle for enhancing our knowledge and understanding of other peoples.

The President and others, in short, can view ICA as an Agency of singular importance in our dealings with other nations and other peoples.
Given its mission, given the activities in which it is engaged, given your talents and dedication and experience, ICA can and should be the single most exciting institution in government in which to work.

That is my vision of ICA’s potential. I believe it reasonable. I encourage you to share it, and I submit that, working together, we can convert this vision into reality.

Some thirty years ago, Senator J. William Fulbright also had a vision. Many of you have played a role in bringing that vision to life. Your work has left a unique mark on the world. I believe it to be among the most important contributions that we as a people have made to ourselves and to others since the end of World War II. And now, if our vision is as compelling as was Senator Fulbright’s, if we are as dedicated as he and others have been over more than three decades, then I believe we can and will succeed.

What, then, are the practical implications for our work? I do not pretend to have a definitive answer today. Surely, we all have much to learn. Some things we shall try, find them lacking and change. Other approaches will occur to us only with experience. Nonetheless, I believe there are some principles worth noting.

First, we must think and act from the beginning as a single, integrated organization. Reorganization is behind us. The United States Information Agency, the United States Information Service and the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs no longer exist. However fond we were of those institutions (and I was exceedingly fond of them), whatever value we placed on their work (and I placed a great deal), however much of our time and energy and emotion we devoted to them (and I devoted a healthy amount of all three), they are now history—proud history, to be sure, history on which we can build, but nonetheless history.

Today, we embark on an act of creation. We have a new Agency, a single Agency, an integrated Agency. This reality should govern our policies, our programs, our relationships with each other. We should no longer think of ourselves as engaged in information work or educational work or cultural work. We are engaged in communication with other peoples.

Second, we must be more disciplined than we have been in the past. We must examine, evaluate, critique what we are doing and why. We must ask ourselves how the American taxpayer will benefit from any particular proposal or program. We must be aware that the quantity of our activities does not necessarily reflect, indeed it may hinder, the quality of our activities.

It is for reasons of discipline that the International Communication Agency has been structured so as to reduce self-contained power cen-
ters. It is for reasons of discipline that posts abroad must proceed with their program planning in the first instance from Ambassadors’ goals and objectives. It is for reasons of discipline that effective influence structure analyses and audience record systems will be required. It is for reasons of discipline that the acquisition and production of media products in mutually re-inforcing ways are essential. It is for reasons of discipline that all of our activities must be linked to strategic policies derived from a thorough, research-based understanding of the common concerns and the communication tensions between our society and others.

Third, many of us must think and act differently than we have in the past. This necessity derives from the fact that we are a new, single, integrated organization mandated, as the President has made clear:

—“To tell the world about our society and policies—in particular our commitment to cultural diversity and individual liberty.

—“To tell ourselves about the world, so as to enrich our own culture as well as to give us the understanding to deal effectively with problems among nations.”

Neither USIA nor the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs was charged with this twin mandate. The International Communication Agency is.

Some will contend that USIS abroad had long been engaged in two-way communication. Undeniably, it was for many years the overseas executor of the CU program.

Nonetheless, USIA’s focus was always fundamentally one-way. Its mission was to tell others about our policies and our societies. To the extent that engaging others in a dialogue was seen as an essential tool for accomplishing this purpose, it was utilized and rightly so.

In contrast, the International Communication Agency has two-way communication as a fundamental principle of its mission and its activities. Speakers sent abroad, seminars held abroad, visitors brought to this country—our activities and programs as a whole should be designed to learn as well as to inform, and to inform as well as to learn.

The Voice of America, to give but one example, has always been—and no doubt will continue to be—primarily a one-way medium. It will not broadcast to the American people. Yet people at the Voice have been thinking creatively about the possibilities of using the Voice to involve foreigners in its programming in ways never before attempted.

What can the Television and Film Service do along these lines? What can the Press and Publications Service do? What can each of us do to promote more effective interaction with the peoples of other countries? That is a question that should suffuse the thinking of every-
one in the International Communication Agency—every post, every employee, every element.

I can think of no more inspiring or meaningful guideline for our work, nothing that is more consistent with the American character, American values, or American social and political processes, than the words of John Stuart Mill: “Not the violent conflict between parts of the truth,” Mill said, “but the quiet suppression of half of it, is the formidable evil; there is always hope when people are forced to listen to both sides; it is when they attend only to one that errors harden into prejudices, and truth itself ceases to have the effect of truth, by being exaggerated into falsehood.”

Let me now turn to specific guidelines for the new Agency. They can best be outlined in terms of each of its major elements.

*From the Associate Directorate for Programs,* we expect:

— the development of coordinated programs derived from the most accurate, comprehensive knowledge we can acquire of foreign attitudes, perceptions and opinions, and of the nature of foreign communications environments;

— assistance for our posts abroad in understanding and explaining American policies;

— close familiarity with the most dynamic and representative aspects of American social, political and cultural ideas; if we are to share with others an accurate, balanced understanding of American society, ICA must have an effective capability for assessing what it is we need to say about so rich and diverse and creative a society;

— a focussing of the extraordinary creativity of our media elements;

— a firm emphasis on acquiring from the vast storehouse of the American private sector, producing only what is essential to our programs and is unavailable elsewhere;

— more effective response to the program needs of our posts; Washington should not forget that it is largely in the field that ICA’s work will be done, that Washington exists primarily to provide strategic policy direction and support to field work;

— a capacity to assure that ICA makes its proper contribution to the development of government-wide international communications policies in such areas as the development of Third World media, the World Administrative Radio Conference, transborder data flows, the transfer of technology through educational and scientific exchange programs and the use of direct broadcast satellites; since we are the only government Agency exclusively mandated to focus on the process

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of international communication, we have a unique contribution to make;

—above all, the development of carefully refined, highly coordinated strategic policies for Agency programs as a whole.

What do we expect from the Associate Directorate for Educational and Cultural Affairs?

—a safeguarding of the integrity and the non-political character of our educational and cultural exchange programs;

—a thorough evaluation, refinement and possible expansion of our exchange programs and our assistance to Voluntary Visitors in this country;

—a significant upgrading of our work with private institutions in this country and abroad, helping where we can to forge enduring links across national boundaries;

—the careful, prudent selection of contract agencies to help us with our work and the continuous, effective monitoring of these agencies so as to insure that both we and the taxpayers are being properly served;

—the development and implementation of sound policies for our libraries, our book programs, our English-teaching and American Studies programs abroad;

—assistance in coordinating and setting policy standards for the exchange programs of all agencies of the government;

—close working relationships with others in the Agency, in particular the area offices and the Associate Directorate for Programs; ECA will be responsible for policy and budgetary decisions governing our educational and cultural exchange programs, and, in order to make sound decisions, it must rely heavily on the advice of the area offices and other elements of the Agency.

From the Associate Directorate for Broadcasting, we expect at least the following:

—a news service that is, in the words of the Congress reaffirmed by the President, “reliable, authoritative, accurate, objective, and comprehensive;” simply put: VOA should be the best news operation in the business;

—a significant improvement in non-news programs;

—prudent planning and management of technical facilities, including especially the construction of new transmitters, so as to assure the most efficient expenditure of the taxpayers’ money;

—awareness of advancements in communications technology in order to assure that our broadcast operation is maintained in the most up-to-date manner possible;

—creative thinking as to how the Voice of America might be utilized as a vehicle for international dialogue.
From the Associate Directorate for Management, we expect the following:

— a disciplined but fair personnel system, responsive both to the interests of the individual employee and to the interests of the Agency; our employees, including our foreign colleagues at posts abroad, are our most valuable resource; people must be recruited, assigned and promoted by a system that is understood, predictable, sensitive to individual skills and circumstances and as free as possible from tampering; above all, employees must perceive and believe that the system is fair and resistant to manipulation;

— a training program designed to supply the Agency with the employees and the skills needed to engage effectively in cross-cultural communication;

— technological and management information systems appropriate to our work, systems that are neither 20 years out of date nor more sophisticated than our tasks require, systems which facilitate our work rather than adding to it;

— a budget and resource allocation system that is responsible and responsive; I consider zero base budgeting to be one of the most effective disciplinary tools at our disposal; I intend that it should be utilized effectively;

— administrative procedures and systems supportive of the varied needs of an Agency with 10 separate locations in Washington and 189 posts in 120 countries around the world.

From our area offices, we expect:

— a focus on truly strategic communication problems;

— rapid assistance to posts on major policy issues;

— an effective contribution to the development of major initiatives to be considered by the President, the Secretary of State and others; if we as an Agency wish to play a prominent role in the government’s policy process, the precondition is our ability to generate policy ideas that command attention;

— effective management of resources, always linking our resources to strategic issues and problems, viewed and articulated whole;

— effective implementation of decisions made by management, together with advice, based on area and field perspectives, in the making of these decisions;

— fruitful relationships with domestic American organizations and individuals with an interest in particular areas of the world;

— effective working relationships with our counterparts at the Department of State and the National Security Council;

— clearly defined objectives based on a rigorous analysis of communication tensions between the United States and other societies and
geared to improving the quality of our communication with these societies.

Finally, and in the knowledge that no single asset is as precious as our presence abroad, what do we expect from our posts abroad?

— the effective conduct of daily business, while at the same time insuring that every decision is made, every activity is undertaken, in light of where we want to be in the longer term; we can all, certainly, find ways to keep busy; but we must recognize the need to free up more of our time for reflection on ultimate purpose; we must pay attention to the fact that communication is not a singular event, or even a series of singular events, but a continuing process requiring constant thought and constant refinement; the question is not how many people see a film or come into a library or attend a seminar; the question is one of purpose, consistency with our overall goals, meaningful accomplishment of our mission;

— a focus on communication issues and on personal contacts; a PAO and his colleagues must not allow themselves to get so caught up in the techniques of communication that they lose sight of the content and purpose of communication;

— the clearest possible explanation to foreigners of where this great country stands, and why;

— the development of fully integrated programs tied to U.S. policy objectives and to the national interest; our new mission demands that our activities be centered on learning as well as informing; post organization and programs must reflect this new mission;

— a more careful definition of those whom we want to engage in a dialogue, together with the operation of an effective audience record system and an effective outreach program; we simply do not have the resources—human or financial—to do our work successfully without such definitions and such systems;

— an effective contribution to our understanding of other peoples, based on wide-ranging personal contacts, systematic research and rigorous analytical thinking;

— an effective contribution to important policy initiatives at all levels; an ICA post should be perceived by all Ambassadors, as it already is by some, as the single most important element of the U.S. mission abroad.

I do not want to leave the impression that these expectations are entirely new, or that they have not necessarily been fulfilled in the past. In part, at least, they derive from exceptional work already carried out overseas.

— Posts like those in Yugoslavia, India, the United Arab Emirates and Trinidad have demonstrated just how invaluable an audience record system can be;
—Posts like those in Turkey and Singapore and Israel have shown how much can be accomplished through effective outreach programs;
—Posts like those in the Philippines and Gabon and Malta have illustrated the value of focusing on personal contacts.
—Posts like those in Bonn, Mexico, Japan and, again, India have excelled at integrated programs.
—Employees throughout USIA and CU, including many of our foreign colleagues at posts abroad, have demonstrated the skills and incorporated the approaches required in the International Communication Agency.

This list of achievements is by no means complete. It is meant simply to be illustrative. Nonetheless, our performance in Washington and in the field is far from uniform, either in quality or in focus. We have a new organization and a new mission. And I think it only fair that we all understand what is expected from the outset in the International Communication Agency.

I have talked at length with you this morning. Still it is only a beginning. You will all recognize that I have but skimmed the surface. There are details to be worked out, questions to be raised, answers to be found—many more than we can deal with today.

I trust, however, that I have given you a framework. I hope I have conveyed a sense of direction, a sense of potential.

Before concluding, there are several other points I would like to touch on very briefly.

First, I should like say a few words about our relationship to the Department of State. The International Communication Agency is an independent agency of the Federal Government. It is responsible for its own budget, its own personnel system, its own programs. Its Director reports both to the President and to the Secretary of State. It is from the Secretary of State that we shall seek and receive guidance on the foreign policies and interests of the United States.

I look forward to the closest, most collegial working relationship with the Department of State. I think it highly desirable that we have an equitable interchange of officers and employees with our sister institution. Our work, and our mission, are different from those of the Department. But they are closely related. We must work cooperatively with the Department of State at all times and at all levels.

Second, a personal confession: Over the past year, I have had to confine myself far more than I would have liked to Washington. We have had a new Administration, new policies emanating from that Administration, new leadership in both USIA and CU and, above all, a reorganization to work out. All of this hindered the kind of direct personal involvement I would have liked with our posts abroad. That
is a condition I plan to remedy shortly. I will be opening our exhibit in the Soviet Union, visiting several posts in Europe and joining our European colleagues at a PAO conference in Brussels later this month. The field can expect to see more of me in the year ahead.

Finally, I want to end where I began this morning—with ideas. They are the lifeblood of our Agency. They should be blossoming at all levels of our Agency. One of the great advantages of a new beginning like ours is that we can generate ideas together. We have a new mission and we must now, jointly, give this mission life and meaning. In so doing, we are limited only by our imaginations. New ideas may not always be adopted, but they will always be welcome. I encourage each of you to think imaginatively about what we can do differently, how we can do better.

We are confronted with a rare, open moment in history. That prospect is challenging. Whether and how we seize the moment is largely up to us. It will be a test of our beliefs, our vision, our will—and, surely, of our energies.

I am reminded, in closing, of a story I first heard some 20 years ago when I arrived in the Philippines as a new employee of the United States Government. Some of you may be familiar with it. The story is about the journey of a traveler across a vast and lonely plain. In his progress, the traveler comes across workers cutting stone. And of each he asks: “What are you doing?” Repeatedly, he is told: “Can’t you see? I am cutting stone.” Finally, he stops once again and asks: “What are you doing?” And this time the reply is different: “I,” says the worker, “am building a cathedral.”

Our choice is similar. We can see ourselves as stone-cutters; or we can be cathedral builders. I hope it will be said of all of us that we fashioned a cathedral.

We begin a new adventure today. We have a new Agency, at an inviting moment in history. President Carter has charged us with an exciting mission. He has wished us the best. I take great pride in working with you. Now let us be about our work.

Thank you.

References are to the “Agriculture-USA” exhibit in Kiev, scheduled to open on April 21, and the PAO Conference in Brussels, scheduled to take place April 28–30. The trip to Kiev marked Reinhardt’s first overseas trip as ICA Director. During 1978–1979, the “Agriculture-USA” exhibit also traveled to Tselinograd, Dushanbe, Kishinev, Moscow, and Rostov-on-Don.
Washington, April 14, 1978

SUBJECT

Provision of Policy Guidance to ICA Media

Some time ago I asked a State-USIA group to examine the adequacy of State policy guidance to USIA media, as an element of the Department’s obligation to provide policy guidance to ICA.

I have now received and reviewed the group’s report, and have consulted ICA on its suggestions. In general, the proposals would regularize and continue present mutually beneficial contacts between ICA and State.

As a result of this process of consultation, I am requesting appropriate elements of the Department to take the following actions:

—PA should continue to provide policy guidance to ICA media as it does now. Outside normal working hours, the PA press duty officer will be the source of guidance on breaking stories.

—If you are not already doing so, I request that all bureaus and independent offices, except INR, invite an ICA representative to attend regular general staff meetings in which representatives of other agencies outside State normally participate. (If you are not sure whom to invite, please consult Harold Schneidman, Acting Associate Director of ICA for Programs at 724–9349.)

—PA will advise ICA of upcoming events (speeches, interviews, etc.) involving senior departmental officials, and bureaus will also keep ICA informed of events and developments such as foreign policy announcements which are likely to generate press interest.

—S/P and the bureaus concerned will be responsible for providing ICA on a timely basis with appropriate briefing and background information on issues and events of consequence.

—Senior ICA officers have agreed to brief regional and functional bureaus on that Agency’s needs and the role its programs can play in

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, USIA Historical Collection, Subject Files, 1953–2000, Entry A–1 1066, Box 44, U.S. International Communication Agency, Reorganization, 1977. No classification marking. A notation in an unknown hand indicates that copies were sent to all ECA offices. Christopher served as Acting Secretary while Vance traveled to Sudan (April 13), Tanzania (April 13–16), South Africa (April 16–17), Zimbabwe (April 17), the United Kingdom (April 18–19), and the Soviet Union (April 19–23).

2 Not found and not further identified.
U.S. foreign policy. Please contact Mr. Schneidman’s office (ICA/PGM 724–9349) to arrange such briefings.

I have assigned M/MO the responsibility of supporting me in coordinating the overall State-ICA relationship. Please consult Mr. Ken Hill (Extension 21684) of that office on questions concerning this memorandum or relations with ICA.

I hope and expect that these steps will result in even closer and more effective State-ICA cooperation at all levels than has existed in the past between the Department and USIA.

Warren Christopher
Acting Secretary

127. Editorial Note

On April 4, 1978, National Security Council Staff member Robert Pastor sent Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski a memorandum referencing the Humphrey Scholarships proposal (see Document 119). Pastor indicated that he had received “an urgent phone call” from a member of Senator Muriel Humphrey’s (DFL-Minnesota) staff “asking what this Humphrey scholarship idea was all about.” He commented that he had provided additional information to Humphrey’s staffer, stating that the National Security Council Staff would follow up on the proposal once President Jimmy Carter returned to Washington, D.C., from Lagos and Monrovia. He reminded Brzezinski that Carter had mentioned to Pastor “on the plane” that the President wanted to call Humphrey “to brief her on the idea and to solicit her views.” Pastor recommended that Brzezinski sign an attached memorandum from Brzezinski to the President, dated April 4, which would remind the President both of the proposal and his remark regarding the telephone call. A notation in an unknown hand on Pastor’s memorandum indicates that Brzezinski signed the attached memorandum on April 4. On the attached April 4 memorandum, the President wrote: “Zbig Fritz will take care of this. He’s working w Bob Pastor & only informing Muriel now. I want to keep tight control until we define program clearly. JC.” The President also indicated that a copy of Brzezinski’s May 4 memorandum be sent to Vice President Walter Mondale. (Carter Library, White House Central Files, Subject File, Foreign Affairs, Information-Exchange Activities-Educational, Executive, Box FO–35, FO 5–1 1/20/77–5/31/78)
In an April 7 memorandum, Brzezinski instructed Pastor to “proceed as directed by the President, while keeping me fully informed.” (Ibid.) In response, Pastor indicated in an April 14 memorandum to Brzezinski that he had, based on the directions contained in Brzezinski’s April 7 memorandum, “drafted a short proposal which includes three options for the Humphrey Scholarship Program.” Pastor also stated that he had prepared an attached memorandum for Brzezinski to send to Mondale, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Director of the Office of Management and Budget James McIntyre, and Director of the International Communication Agency John Reinhardt regarding the Humphrey Scholarship Program. He explained, “I felt that a memo from you at this stage would be helpful in pushing the discussion forward and in attracting the attention of the heads of each of these agencies. I have been in touch informally with the staff people in each of these agencies, except OMB, and expect to be able to work from my proposal and prepare a paper for the President by May 1.” (Ibid.) Brzezinski’s signed letter to the agency heads is printed as Document 128.

128. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Vice President Mondale, Secretary of State Vance, Director of the Office of Management and Budget (McIntyre) and Director of the International Communication Agency (Reinhardt)\(^1\)

Washington, April 17, 1978

SUBJECT

Hubert Humphrey Scholarships

In remarks which he made in Caracas,\(^2\) the President announced his intention to establish a program of scholarships to bring students from the developing world to study in U.S. colleges. Since then, he has asked NSC to draw up a proposal and obtain your agency’s comments. I would appreciate it if you could designate someone in your agency to work with Bob Pastor of the NSC, who will be coordinating the staff

\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, White House Central Files, Subject File, Foreign Affairs, Information-Exchange Activities-Educational, Executive, Box FO-35, FO 5–1 1/20/77–5/31/78. No classification marking. The memorandum is attached to an April 22 memorandum from Bray to Brzezinski, printed as Document 129.

\(^2\) See footnote 3, Document 123.
work. He will be in touch with your office shortly to arrange a meeting to discuss the proposal at Tab A.\(^3\) We would appreciate if ICA and OMB could prepare some preliminary budgetary figures for each option in the proposal.

Our hope is to put together a proposal for the President by May 1, 1978.\(^4\)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

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\(^3\) Not found attached.

\(^4\) Under a May 17 covering memorandum addressed to Mondale, Vance, McIntyre, Eizenstat, and Reinhardt, Dodson circulated the “consensus proposal” that the NSC Staff planned to submit to the President. The undated proposal, entitled “Hubert H. Humphrey North-South Scholarship Program,” outlined the program’s purpose, number of participants, selection criteria, administration, and budget and authorization. (Carter Library, White House Central Files, Subject File, Foreign Affairs, Information-Exchange Activities-Educational, Executive, Box FO-35, FO 5–1 1/20/77–5/31/78)

129. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the International Communication Agency (Bray) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\(^1\)

Washington, April 22, 1978

SUBJECT

Humphrey Scholarships

The proposal to create an international memorial to Senator Humphrey is most appealing. We are looking forward to cooperating in the development of an implementing program.

We are preparing preliminary budget estimates and will be prepared to present them at the meeting on April 24.

We have given considerable thought to the three options offered in the attachment to your memorandum of April 17.\(^2\) We have developed

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\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, White House Central Files, Subject File, Foreign Affairs, Information-Exchange Activities-Educational, Box FO-35, FO 5–1 1/20/77–5/31/78. No classification marking.

\(^2\) See footnote 3, Document 128.
a fourth option which may also deserve consideration, since it too would address a real need and would relate directly to Senator Humphrey’s life-long interest in public service. This option offers one-year specialized training in disciplines directly related to public administration, development economics and similar skills to young men and women who have already committed themselves to a career in these fields in the underdeveloped world. We believe there would be merit in linking such a program, directly and in important part, to the Hubert H. Humphrey Institute in Public Administration now being founded. A somewhat more detailed development of this concept is attached.

I hope the enclosed paper can be circulated to the other participants before Monday afternoon’s meeting.4

Enclosure

Paper Prepared in the International Communication Agency5

Washington, undated

Option #4: Specialized Education for the Public Service

We take it as given that our purposes (as articulated in the April 17 memo) are to help educate a core group of a new generation of developing world leaders, to provide a compelling symbol of US interest in the developing world, to narrow the educational gap between industrialized and developing countries, and to provide an American education to the talented poor in these countries. These useful purposes could be served by a direct focus on those who by their own career choice have already indicated that they can respond to our objectives.

We can provide an opportunity to those who will be able to enhance their ability to contribute to public service in their own country, who will be able to provide mature and thoughtful perspectives to the Americans with whom they will come into contact in the course of the program, and who will constitute a growing infrastructure of human resources which could contribute to continuing cooperation among governments.

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3 Located on the campus of the University of Minnesota, the Humphrey Institute was established in 1977 as the successor to the University’s School of Public Affairs. Former Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Harland Cleveland served as the Institute’s first Dean, beginning in 1980. The Institute is now known as the Hubert Humphrey School of Public Affairs.

4 April 24.

5 No classification marking.
To meet this need we can look to those American educational institutions which offer appealing programs for young professionals, age 25–35, who have dedicated their careers to public service in government or quasi-governmental organizations. There is no reason why foreign professionals should not participate more fully—indeed, there is much to be gained by the institutions and the American participants, as well as the foreign students, from interaction with foreign grantees. The disciplines which such courses could cover include (but need not be limited to) public administration, development economics, public health administration, communication and journalism, social work and educational administration.

Participants in these programs would qualify as “poor”—they certainly could not afford this type of “topping-off” education on their own. It will not be difficult to select the outstanding among them since their decision to participate in public service will already have served to select them from the average.

A number of American universities and colleges now offer relevant programs and others could be included. Among those are: a course in development economics at Williams College; a course in management responsibility offered through the Sloan Fellows Program at MIT; the industrial development program at the Georgia Institute of Technology; the professional studies in international development at Cornell; the Nieman journalism courses at Harvard; and the courses in international economic development at North Carolina A and T at Greensboro. To the extent that we involve communication officials, some long-range contributions might be made toward solving the problems of North-South communications interaction which permeated the discussions at the UNESCO General Conference at Nairobi in 1976 and would improve our posture as we look to the next session this fall.6

This option has several advantages:

(a) The direct address to those already in public service honors the late Senator Humphrey’s lifelong interest and achievement in this field;

(b) It addresses the real, present need for skills in the public sector of developing countries, links the US to present and future “influentials”—and thus serves demonstrable mutual interests;

(c) The broad range of disciplines and subject matter can be tailored to meet the needs of a large number of developing countries;

(d) The course can be completed in one academic year thereby reducing both the cost and the likelihood of non-return;

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6 Scheduled to take place in Paris, beginning in November.
(e) The experience will give participants, educated in the US, a competitive—and welcome—advantage over peers in foreign governmental structures;

(f) There presently exist mechanisms in the US Government and associated entities (binational Commissions and experienced contract agencies) to administer this program.

130. Memorandum From the Director of the International Communication Agency (Reinhardt) to the Acting President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, May 19, 1978

SUBJECT
Proposed Presidential Initiative: The “Successor Generation” and the NATO Summit

Social, economic and political problems affect the current Atlantic relationship. Beyond that, there is a growing concern that younger Europeans and Americans—members of “the successor generation”—increasingly question the assumptions and values that have sustained that relationship and the effectiveness of at least some democratic institutions. Among younger Europeans, the U.S. is often viewed through the prisms of Vietnam, Watergate and anti-capitalist sentiment.

These problems could usefully be addressed at the highest levels of political leadership, perhaps in relation to the NATO and Economic Summits.

We recommend an initiative to mobilize creative and intellectual resources on both sides of the Atlantic in a kind of “Marshall Plan² for ideas.” While the initial thrust would come from the U.S., European commitment would—as in the 1940’s—be an essential element.

We propose that at the NATO Summit³ the President explore informally with Schmidt, Callaghan, Trudeau, Thorn and perhaps a few

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 9, International Communication Agency: 3–8/78. Confidential. A copy was sent to Vance. There is no indication that Aaron saw the memorandum. An attached NSC Correspondence Profile indicates the issue was OBE on July 27. (Ibid.)

² See footnote 5, Document 124.

others their reaction to a collective U.S.-European initiative which could:

—provide the basis for a more informed transatlantic dialogue;
—create new opportunities for younger Americans and Europeans to develop the kinds of relationships that benefitted their predecessors;
—reaffirm the validity and relevance of Western values;
—lend impetus to the vitality of democratic institutions.

If the reaction is favorable, the time between the NATO and Economic Summits could be used to develop joint, specific approaches.

Following the Economic Summit, the President could plan a speech at an appropriate European venue, such as a major university, to articulate the challenges facing modern societies, affirm the commitment of the West to its democratic institutions and reaffirm the enduring values on which they are based. Major European leaders should be primed to respond immediately and in kind (the Japanese could logically be included in any initiative, in which case commitments of the kind described below could even figure in the Summit itself and the communiqué).

In his speech the President could:

—Name several outstanding “successor generation” Americans to meet with European counterparts selected by their governments as a first step in a consultative process. The group would develop an agenda for future Atlantic (or OECD) cooperation in this area by the end of 1978. It would form the nucleus of a convocation of Americans and Europeans (hereafter in the memo, one could substitute OECD for “Europe” or “Europeans”) who would meet within 12 months—perhaps in conjunction with an Economic Summit in 1979—to evaluate work in progress and make further recommendations.

—Announce (contingent upon a like European commitment) U.S. support for an institute, possibly named for General Marshall, for promising young Europeans and Americans who are likely to play important roles in the political and intellectual life of their countries. The academy would be governed by a consortium of U.S.-European universities and housed at two universities, one in the United States and the other in Europe. In addition to providing appropriate interdisciplinary training, the academy would offer these future leaders a work experience at the local equivalent of state or federal levels in particip-

4 Reference is to the G–7 Economic Summit scheduled to take place in Bonn July 16–17. For the minutes of the summit meetings, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. III, Foreign Economic Policy, Documents 145–148. For the text of the declaration issued at the conclusion of the summit meeting and a joint statement on international terrorism, see Department of State Bulletin, September 1978, pp. 2–5.
ing countries to broaden both their experience and their understanding of foreign institutions and government processes.

—The President could announce a cooperative effort to bring more Europeans and Americans together through individual and institutional exchanges. Some specific U.S. initiatives in this area (again, to be matched by a like commitment) might be: (1) A 50% increase (to $6 million) in the funding of exchange programs designed to bring together outstanding younger Europeans and Americans active in political, intellectual and cultural life; (2) A program to enhance institutional responsiveness in Europe and the U.S. through (a) exchanges and internships in local and regional administration via grants to state and municipal governments and (b) international seminars to design enhanced service delivery systems from government; (3) Development of internships and seminar programs to assist younger media figures to understand, and ultimately reflect, the transatlantic reality; (4) Creation of grants providing outstanding young European public servants with one-year research fellowships in the U.S.; and (5) Programs to encourage European participation in ACTION volunteer programs, and reciprocal involvement by Americans in like European programs.

—Finally, the President could announce initiatives to enhance the study of U.S. and European languages and cultures. Specific initiatives on the U.S. side might be: (1) U.S. government support for the development of summer training institutes for European university faculty members involved in training teachers of English; (2) Increased HEW (or Department of Education) support of foreign language and area curricula in American universities.

Total additional USG “start-up” funding in FY 1979 is estimated conservatively to be $10 million. Since no one participating country’s contribution is likely to be large enough to capture attention—nor need it—our goal should be the announcement of a joint U.S.-European program totalling $100 million in the first year and announced as enduring over a period of 10 years.

All of the foregoing proposals could usefully be pursued without benefit of involvement by the President. In terms of the demands on his time and energy, however, the costs are low, the symbolic and political value relatively high, and the positive image of transatlantic cooperation presumably useful.
131. Memorandum From the Director of the International Communication Agency (Reinhardt) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, June 5, 1978

SUBJECT

Relations between ICA and the Department of State

Ben Read has suggested that it might be helpful if I provided you with a review and assessment of relations between ICA and the Department over the past two months. Attached for your information is a summary review.¹

Since our two organizations are in touch frequently, at multiple levels and on an hourly basis, this is hardly a comprehensive rundown of all contacts. It should, however, give you an accurate feel for the range and quality of the relationship.

While irritants and disagreements inevitably arise from time to time, I know of no current overriding problem hindering a mutually productive relationship between ICA and the Department. To my knowledge, this relationship has, on the whole, been remarkably smooth through a difficult transition period.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780125–0505. No classification marking. Read sent a copy of the memorandum to Vance under a June 14 action memorandum, to which he also attached a copy of a “brief note” for Vance’s signature, thanking Reinhardt for his report. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780125–0510) In the signed version of the note to Reinhardt, June 22, Vance characterized the report as “useful,” suggested that he would find it “useful” to receive “such reports regularly,” and concluded, “I agree with your assessment that State-ICA relationships have gotten off to a good start. If there is anything the Department can do further in this regard, please do not hesitate to let me know.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780125–0504)

² Attached but not printed is an undated paper entitled “Summary Review of State-ICA Contacts, April–May 1978.”
132. Memorandum From the Director of the International
Communication Agency (Reinhardt) to the President’s
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1

Washington, June 5, 1978

SUBJECT

President’s Speech on U.S.-Soviet Relations

We assume the President’s Wednesday speech on U.S.-Soviet
relations2 will go beyond a strict bilateral definition of that relationship.

Psychologically, and in terms of the reaction to the speech in the
Third World in particular, we hope it will appeal to a number of the
anxieties—in Africa and elsewhere—which have thus far been largely
latent but could usefully be surfaced.

Specifically, it would be useful if the President could constructively
outline a “code of conduct” for superpower behavior in the Third
World, perhaps using the 1972 summit declaration of principles3 as a
point of departure. We believe such a proposal would have wide reso-
nance in important Third World countries such as India and Yugo-
slavia, as well as in Africa.

We would hope that the speech would also touch on the following
points which, our analysis suggests, would elicit useful reaction:

— There is concern in a number of African countries, including the
anglophones, that lying behind the Soviet interest in at least limited
influence in Africa is a “grand design.” The speech could usefully raise
the question of the USSR’s hegemonial intentions.

— The President might note that external forces invited into a con-
flict situation for one purpose have been known to remain for other
purposes. Most African countries have their own splinter groups, ethnic
or political, and the President could usefully raise the question whether
any of the world’s countries wishes to have mercenary forces operating
“in the neighborhood.” This strikes us as a point on which to appeal
to Third World opinion—specifically including the Caribbean.

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File,
Box 63, Speeches: Annapolis, 5-6/78. Confidential; Sensitive. Bray initialed for Reinhardt.
A copy was sent to Vance. A notation in an unknown hand in the upper right-hand
corner of the memorandum indicates that Brzezinski saw it.

2 June 7. The President’s speech is printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. I,
Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 87.

3 Reference is to the “Basic Declaration of Principles of Relations Between the United
States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,” issued in Moscow on
—Given Soviet sponsorship of the Cuban presence in Africa, it may be worth calling into question Cuba’s “non-aligned” status. This point should be made in low key, but followed up with private discussion (and particularly with the Indians). Cuba attaches considerable importance to hosting the Non-Aligned Conference in 1979.4

—There appears to be—as yet unofficial—Eastern European concern with the future of detente. Recognizing the delicacy of the matter, there may be some utility in accentuating these concerns.

4 Scheduled to take place in Havana September 3–9, 1979.

133. Memorandum From Paul Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1

Washington, June 6, 1978

SUBJECT
New VOA Correspondents’ Guidelines

John Reinhardt has written you (TAB A) and enclosed draft guidelines (TAB B)2 for VOA correspondents abroad which he plans to issue shortly. He is not asking for your review or approval of them but in sending them to you in advance of issuance he is giving you the opportunity to object. There is nothing to object to and the letter does not require a formal answer. I recommend I mention it to him orally when I see him in a few days.

The guidelines go to great length to define the status and responsibilities of VOA correspondents overseas as exactly the same as all other journalists, including the principle that they are denied diplomatic or

1 Source: Carter Library, White House Central Files, Subject File, Federal Government, Voice of America, Executive, Box FG–218, FG 298–1 1/20/77–12/31/78. No classification marking. Sent for action. Dodson and Inderfuth initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. Notations in two unknown hands read: “Sent cy of Guidelines only to Newsom from DA” and “OBE discussed with Newsom.” An attached NSC Correspondence Profile indicates that the issue was termed OBE on July 10 per Aaron’s discussion with Newsom. (Ibid.)

2 Attached but not printed is a June 1 paper entitled “Guidelines and Operating Procedures for VOA’s Foreign Correspondents.”
special passports and use of facilities reserved for official Americans. Their activities are not to be under the control of chiefs of mission in any respect and they are to be controlled wholly from VOA/Washington. Arrangements reminiscent for those for resolving disputes between COSs and Ambassadors are provided in case of disputes—they are to be referred back to Washington. The guidelines are thus consistently idealistic and reflect the spirit of the times and the lofty principles which prevailed when the ICA in its present form was established, VOA correspondents are discouraged from indulging in sensation or irresponsible reporting, however, by the statement: “VOA correspondents are not investigative reporters . . .”

RECOMMENDATION—that you not respond formally to Reinhardt’s letter; I will mention these guidelines to him orally.  

AGREE _______  DISAGREE _______

Tab A

Memorandum From the Director of the International Communication Agency (Reinhardt) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)  

Washington, June 1, 1978

SUBJECT

New Guidelines for VOA Correspondents

Attached for your information is a copy of new guidelines, which I plan to issue shortly, governing the role, status and responsibilities of VOA correspondents overseas.

3 Aaron circled “I will mention,” drew a line from the phrase to the bottom margin, and wrote “What will you say? DA.”

4 Brzezinski did not approve or disapprove the recommendation. In the right-hand margin of the memorandum, he wrote: “DA You might check with Newsom whether this doesn’t go too far. State should control more. ZB.” Also attached to Reinhardt’s June 1 memorandum and the VOA Guidelines are a June 16 routing slip from Hill transmitting a draft memorandum from Christopher to Reinhardt concerning the Department of State’s “minor changes and revisions” to the guidelines and enclosing a revised draft. Hill indicated that the attached draft “incorporates the recommendations of the Under Secretary for Political Affairs and responds to his desire to make the minimum changes necessary to protect policy interests.” (Carter Library, White House Central Files, Subject File, Federal Government, Voice of America, Executive, Box FG–218, FG 298–1 1/20/77–12/31/78)

5 No classification marking.

The purpose of these guidelines is to provide a much-needed clarification of the position of VOA foreign correspondents, in order to insure fulfillment of the VOA’s legislated charter and the President’s mandate that VOA news gathering and reporting functions be kept “independent and objective.”

Essentially, the guidelines separate VOA correspondents from official U.S. Missions abroad. They make it clear that VOA foreign correspondents are government-employed journalists, not diplomats. They relieve the Ambassador and his Mission colleagues from even the appearance of responsibility for the content of VOA news broadcasts.

At the same time, the guidelines reemphasize the need for the correspondent to inform the Mission prior to undertaking any coverage which may be sensitive or controversial; they also reaffirm the right of the Ambassador, through appropriate channels, to comment on or question correspondent coverage.

I am convinced that the new guidelines, which have been worked on with care over many months, will help minimize, if not eliminate entirely, the various disputes that have arisen from time to time over correspondent activities. They will not, however, be universally applauded at our overseas Missions. With this in mind, I have forwarded a copy of the guidelines to Secretary Vance with the suggestion that their issuance be accompanied by a statement that the Department concurs in the guidelines and urges full cooperation from all Mission personnel overseas.

Since annual shifts in correspondent assignments begin early in July, I believe it would be helpful to have the guidelines issued, with Department support, by mid-June.
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134. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance, Secretary of Defense Brown, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (McIntyre), the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Warnke), and the Director of the International Communication Agency (Reinhardt)¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT
Interagency Committee on Public Diplomacy and Disarmament²

Whatever the specific accomplishments of the UN Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD),³ it has focused the attention of important publics throughout the world on disarmament issues. As we move beyond SSOD, it is desirable to foster a more informed and rational climate of opinion in other countries within which future official deliberations can take place. I am, therefore, establishing under the Special Coordination Committee an interagency committee to develop a year-long program in public diplomacy addressing the several issues of arms control and disarmament.⁴

Our goals are:

—to stimulate serious and constructive international discussion of important arms control and disarmament issues;

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980: Lot 81D113, Box 18, Memoranda to the Secretary–1978. No classification marking. A September 8 memorandum from Bray to Brzezinski (Document 149) indicates that the memo was dated June 8. Christopher sent a copy of the memorandum to Vance under a June 12 note, in which he commented: “Cy: This is a weird subject for the crisis management arm of the NSC.” Vance’s handwritten notation on the June 12 note reads: “I agree—talk to Z. about this it doesn’t make sense.” (Ibid.) Under a June 1 covering memorandum, Huntington and Putnam sent Brzezinski an unsigned copy of the memorandum, recommending that he sign it. Dodson added the following handwritten notation on the covering memorandum: ZB/Rick—You will remember this initiative—Reg [Bartholomew] cleared it with Reinhardt; Sam [Huntington] and Bob Putnam prepared attached. Note: CIA and JCS, our usual participants, are not represented. Ok?” Dodson also added two lines for Brzezinski to indicate whether or not he wanted JCS and CIA representation on the interagency committee. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and East/West, Putnam Subject File, Box 30, Disarmament: Public Diplomacy: 1–6/78)

² An unknown hand underlined the subject line.


⁴ An unknown hand underlined “Special Coordination Committee” and “arms control” in this sentence.
—to involve a wider spectrum of thoughtful and interested foreign individuals and institutions in a discussion involving clear statements of the U.S. positions and policies;

—to help develop a broader based consensus in other countries in support of U.S. positions; but at a minimum, to bring more serious and realistic public deliberations to bear on the several issues;

— to diminish the ability of the Soviet Union and others to command public attention in foreign countries on the basis of emotional rhetoric.

Among other means for achieving these goals, the committee should consider:

—regional seminars and conferences bringing together leading intellectuals for realistic discussions of arms control and disarmament issues;

—visits to the U.S. by foreign journalists and scholars to discuss arms control and disarmament issues with American counterparts;

—programs aimed at diffusing the results of these discussions to wider audiences abroad;

—intensified research designed to provide U.S. policymakers with a clearer understanding of the views of important foreign publics.

You should designate an appropriate member of this interagency committee with a rank equivalent to and not lower than that of Deputy Assistant Secretary. The committee will be chaired by the International Communication Agency. Final recommendations of the committee should be completed as soon as practicable and in any event no later than August 1, 1978. I would appreciate your communicating to the Director of the ICA the name of your representative to the interagency committee at your earliest convenience. The NSC staff representative will be Dr. Robert Putnam.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

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An unknown hand underlined “International Communication Agency” in this sentence.
135. Telegram From the International Communication Agency to all Principal Posts

Washington, undated

14211. Subject: Guidelines and Operating Procedures for VOA’s Foreign Correspondents.

1. Foreign correspondents of the Voice of America stand at the important and highly visible juncture of journalism and diplomacy.

2. While VOA journalists are government employees, subject to all the laws and regulations which apply to the conduct of everyone in the federal service, they are required at the same time to perform with a high degree of journalistic professionalism and integrity. The work and status of VOA overseas correspondents are identical to those of correspondents for other American press and broadcasting organizations except as specifically noted in this telegram.

3. The primary task of the VOA foreign correspondent, in fulfillment of the VOA Charter’s requirement that Voice of America news be accurate, objective, comprehensive, and consistently authoritative, is to give depth and perspective to the broadcast news file. Bearing in mind the special interests of audiences around the world, the correspondent transmits actualities, eyewitness reports, backgrounders, interviews and advisories designed to assist the foreign listener in understanding the news.

4. VOA correspondents are not investigative reporters. They broadcast the news; they do not present their opinions nor do they editorialize in their reporting.

5. VOA correspondents are supervised directly by the Chief of the VOA News Division in Washington and receive assignments exclusively from the Voice of America. All material submitted by correspondents is reviewed by VOA Washington before usage to ensure that it meets VOA charter standards.

6. VOA correspondents will travel with regular fee (not official or diplomatic) passports; they will enter a country with journalist visas; they will register and be accredited as journalists; they will be subject to local laws and regulations applicable to foreign journalists; they will

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Associate Directorate for Programs, Subject Files of Basic Operating Documents, 1969–1982, Entry P–300, Basic Documents—1978 [A]. Unclassified. All brackets are in the original. Sent to VOA correspondents in Abidjan, Athens, Bangkok, Brussels, Hong Kong, London, Munich, Nairobi, New Delhi, Panama City, Paris, Rome, Tokyo, and Vienna. Drafted by R. Peter Straus and Tuch on June 28; cleared in D/SO on June 29; approved by Reinhardt. The date and time of the transmission is unclear.
not have access to classified information; they will use post exchange or commissary facilities on the same basis as non-government American journalists are permitted to use these facilities; and they will not depend on U.S. Embassies or ICA posts for offices or residential space, secretarial services or other administrative support.

7. They will use commercial, not USG communications channels. (Embassy communications will be available only in cases were emergency conditions cause the establishment of “press pool” services available to other American journalists.) U.S. Embassies will be neither more nor less helpful to VOA correspondents than to other American journalists in giving or facilitating interviews, supplying information, aiding in travel. Making other arrangements, assisting with any difficulties.

8. Since the VOA is an official broadcasting service, it cannot, as a practical matter, divorce itself in the minds of many of its listeners from an identification with the U.S. Government. Therefore, a VOA correspondent will not seek an interview with a head of state or other politically prominent or controversial personality, either in or out of government, without the prior approval of the News Division in Washington, if the News Division agrees to the interview, the correspondent will inform the PAO or the Mission of the assignment as much in advance as possible. In the event that the Chief of Mission objects to the assignment, the correspondent will refer the matter to VOA Washington for resolution.

9. The same steps, i.e., prior approval from VOA Washington and prior notification of the PAO or Mission, will be followed in covering any story which can reasonably be deemed sensitive.

10. Similarly, should a story require travel in a war zone or other dangerous area, VOA correspondents will consult in advance with VOA Washington and will keep the Embassy informed of their plans.

11. The VOA correspondent has a general obligation to inform the PAO of his or her presence in the country, and of the general nature of his or her assignment(s). But PAOs will not supervise the work of a VOA correspondent, and the correspondent was no obligation to clear copy with anyone before transmitting it to VOA Washington. Missions, therefore, bear no responsibility for the content of material broadcast by the Voice of America.

12. If requested by the Chief of Mission, the correspondent will promptly provide a copy of the story after it has been filed.

13. Any comments, criticism or questions from the Chief of Mission regarding correspondent activities or copy should be directed to Washington through Department channels with an information copy to ICA.

14. The above guidelines are intended to define and clarify the status and responsibilities of VOA correspondents working abroad.
This telegram, therefore, replaces and supersedes CA–800 of April 20, 1972, effective immediately. The considerable task of implementing the administrative arrangements (e.g., office space and housing), and solving specific questions they relate to each correspondent and each locality, will inevitably take additional time. All such arrangements, however, should be effective by October 1, 1978.

136. Memorandum From the Associate Director for Programs, International Communication Agency (Schneidman) to the Executive Assistant to the Director (Cohen)\(^1\)

Washington, July 5, 1978

SUBJECT

International Arts Policy

The attached decision memo has for this year served as the framework for this institution’s approach to the arts. From several fragmentary comments I have heard, it is not wholly acceptable to ECA for reasons that are not wholly clear to me but which I believe have been communicated to persons outside of the Agency.

At the last full-scale meeting of the Interagency Art Group, held at Mrs. Mondale’s house, I set forth essentially the contents of the attached decision memo. In response to a question, I suggested that $10,000,000 was a good, round figure to pay for the overseas deployment of the products identified, developed and otherwise funded through the Endowments’ domestic infrastructure and that the money be placed in the Endowments’ budget as a separate line item.

The seminal attitudes that should be considered in following on that meeting are the following:

Paul Henze, NSC—“The two Endowments have a role to play in international relations but that role will be determined by ICA.”

Barry Jagoda—“The $10,000,000 should be placed in the ICA budget and not in the Endowments’.”

Liv Biddle, NEA—“Enthusiastic and unqualified support.”

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 306, Associate Directorate for Programs, Subject Files of Basic Operating Documents, 1969–1982, Entry P–100, Basic Documents—1978 [A]. No classification marking. Printed from an uninitialed copy.
Joe Duffey, NEH—“General support.”

Nancy Hanks, former Chairman of NEA, at a meeting with the Director—“The arts offer the greatest international impact for the least investment. The creation of the International Exhibitions Committee was the only real mistake in my tenure as chairman.”

Mrs. Mondale—“It is important that these activities be controlled by the creative personnel, in the case of the arts by the artist, rather than by administrators, bureaucrats or impresarios. I will lobby to get you the $10,000,000.”

The only way I know to make a collegial, non-redundant relationship work is to have our international infrastructure list the art and humanities people and products called for by our communication and cultural relations needs. The Endowments would then focus their domestic infrastructure on filling those needs in terms of both quality and Mrs. Mondale’s strongly held views. There may be other ways, better ways, that are not known to me. If so, the possessors of such ideas should come forward with them. What is not acceptable in my view is continuing in the same old comfortable way which adds up to an infinitesimal product in terms of the present and potential need.

Attachment

Decision Memorandum From the Associate Director for Planning and Program Direction, United States Information Agency (Schneidman) to the Director (Reinhardt)²

Washington, January 23, 1978

SUBJECT

International Arts Policy

The gathering, called by the attached invitation,³ will be the launching pad for this Administration’s international arts posture and policy.

It has been in gestation for close to half a year. The initiative came from the efforts of some in the arts community and within the government to have the government assume total responsibility for up-front, blank check funding of U.S. participation in the international

² No classification marking. A copy was sent to Bray. Reinhardt and Miller initialed the memorandum, indicating that they saw it.

³ Not attached and not further identified.
arts festivals such as Venice, Sao Paulo, Paris, etc.\textsuperscript{4} This proposal would delegate the entire mission to the International Exhibitions Committee, an offshoot of American Federation of Arts. The Committee has been almost entirely funded by grants from the National Endowment for the Arts and the National Endowment for the Humanities (more than $150,000, all of which goes for staffing and honoraria and travel expenses for the members—none for program). The Committee’s non-government fund raising efforts have brought in about $20,000 in two years.

Others believe that the international arts festivals represent an insignificant part of the need and opportunity to engage art and artists in the field of international cultural relations. The leaders of the two Endowments are strongly international minded and anxious to operate with high visibility in that sphere. From the interagency meeting I attended, it was clear that Paul Henze was favorably inclined and said that the Endowments should take their lead from ICA in this matter.

It would seem that a logical and effective division of effort is entirely possible. It could lead to a prompt and dramatic two-way flow of art and artists which would overwhelm the present puny efforts (CU’s cultural presentations to six countries in Eastern Europe, CU’s facilitation of two or three major U.S. museum shows per year, USIA’s present bag of 25 or 30 small exhibits in circulation, our joint funding of a few international arts festivals). The Endowments have the will and the funds. They have a domestic infrastructure; we have an international infrastructure. Linking them collegially would equal mutual self-interest (some say the funds now going to overhead support of the International Exhibitions Committee would be obviated by using the Endowments peer panels for that purpose and that those funds would more than cover the cost of participation in the festivals).

\textbf{DECISION}

1. No one should speak, even speculatively, of the philosophy of the new Agency.

2. CU’s representative (probably Peter Solmsen) should speak guardedly about the philosophy of the new Agency.

3. You (HFS) should speak guardedly about the philosophy of the new Agency.

4. (P Solmsen) or (H Schneidman) should speak positively for the new Agency in terms of the last paragraph above.\textsuperscript{5}

\textsuperscript{4} References are to the Venice Biennale, Sao Paulo Bienal, and Biennale de Paris.

\textsuperscript{5} An unknown hand, presumably Reinhardt’s, crossed out Solmsen’s name and placed a check mark next to this option.
137. Memorandum From the Acting Deputy Associate Director for Programs, International Communication Agency (Carter)\(^1\)

Washington, July 6, 1978

SUBJECT

Meeting of the Interagency Committee on Public Diplomacy—July 5\(^2\)

At the meeting we agreed that a major overall purpose of this public diplomacy effort will be to inject greater realism into the international discussion of arms control and disarmament issues. Following are some of the themes that were proposed for special emphasis. Assuming that the summary adequately reflects our discussion, I find it to be less satisfying than it sounded at the time. Several questions: (1) Are these truly the ideas on which we wish to have international consensus? If not, what’s missing? (2) What role should we give issues raised in the SSOD Program of Action\(^3\) or which relate to specific negotiations? (3) How would we open and sustain productive discussion on any given issue with any given group?

1. Arms control and national defense are two sides of the same coin, because both aim at reducing the threat of war by maintaining the security balance. We of course prefer to see the balance maintained at lower, less costly levels, and look to arms control as the major path to that end. Although some countries, particularly among the non-aligned, may not be impressed with the argument that a strong U.S. defense is essential for world peace, we should not be hesitant to make the point at appropriate times, or to be defensive about our necessary force modernization measures.

2. A good arms control agreement is one which contributes to stability. It should maintain, and hopefully improve, military stability in the sense that in a crisis neither party would be tempted to initiate—or threaten—a first strike. Likewise, it should enhance stability in the dynamics of the arms competition by ensuring that growth in arsenals stays within agreed limits. We should also emphasize that U.S. opposition to nuclear proliferation is based primarily on its destabilizing

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\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and East/West, Putnam Subject File, Box 30, Disarmament: Public Diplomacy: 7/78. No classification marking. Alan Carter addressed the memorandum to Putnam, Kahan, Thompson, Van Allen, Halsted, and Spevacek. A copy was sent to Bray.

\(^2\) A copy of the participant list and Putnam’s handwritten notes from the July 5 meeting are ibid.

\(^3\) The Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, June 30, 1978 (S–10/2) contains the SSOD Program of Action.
effects, and less on an assessment that it would be directly harmful to narrow U.S. interests.

3. In international arms control negotiations the U.S. seeks agreements that are equitable to all sides, and are readily perceived as such. Agreements which go against the interests of signatory nations will obviously not be viable over the long run.

4. Any arms control agreement must be adequately verifiable, so that the participating nations can have confidence that the terms of the agreement are being followed.

5. The successful completion of arms control agreements, particularly between the superpowers, forms an important part of the improvement in overall political relations. The converse is even more true: the failure of such negotiations is likely to have an additive detrimental effect.

6. Arms control is not a spectator sport. All nations should contribute to efforts to reduce tensions in areas where they are important actors. Conventional arms transfers and nuclear nonproliferation are two issues where the positive participation of other countries is essential to reaching viable solutions which meet legitimate security or energy concerns but are not destabilizing. In both instances we should be prepared to counter charges by supplier countries that the U.S. is infringing on their markets and by recipient countries that the U.S. is trying to perpetuate what they consider their second-class status.

At the meeting the following action assignments were agreed upon:

1. All members will review this paper and bring their comments to the next meeting. They will also offer suggestions on: countries to which priority should be given, possible governmental and nongovernmental program participants, and seminal literature on the major arms control and disarmament issues.

2. Dr. Putnam will solicit CIA assistance in pulling together information on arms control issues where the Soviet Union has found the most resonance among foreign publics and those where it is most on the defensive.4

3. Mr. Halsted will secure Larry Weiler’s views on the attitudes of non-American NGOs that participated in the SSOD.

4. I will develop a paper outlining some suggested ways that the ICA infrastructure could be used to support programmatic activity relating to this effort.5

4 Attached but not printed is a copy of Putnam’s undated comments on the proposal. Putnam noted, “Ask Bray if he’s willing to have ICA do the study=He thinks ICA probably less equipped than CIA, but he’ll check out possibility of: 1) joint ICA–CIA work or 2) Bray tasking memo to CIA. He’ll get back to me.”

5 See Document 139.
The next meeting of the committee is tentatively scheduled for the latter part of the week of July 10.

138. Telegram From the International Communication Agency to Multiple Diplomatic Posts

Washington, July 7, 1978, 1745Z

15297. Subject: Disarmament.
1. At NSC direction, ICA is chairing interagency committee which will plan multi-year public diplomacy initiative on major arms control and disarmament issues. Deadline for resulting report to NSC is tight.
2. Posts requested cable by July 21 information on interest in, and attitudes about, arms control/disarmament issues by concerned publics in host country. In preparing reply PAO should consult with other members of Mission. Insofar as possible, given host country political context, discreetly query local sources, particularly with respect to sections 1, 2, and 3 of response.
3. Response should consist of six parts:
4. First section should discuss size and character of publics concerned with arms control/disarmament issues. These publics defined as individuals and institutions professionally involved with such subjects who influence government policy or public opinion, whether inside or outside the government, as well as individuals who have a deep and continuing interest in such issues, even though they are not professional specialists in those areas. Given numbers of individuals, names of organizations, and any other basic information you believe would be useful.
5. Second section should describe in one or two paragraphs main arms control/disarmament issues of interest to these publics.
6. Third section should indicate degree of interest these publics have in specific topics. This section discusses interest only, not perceived importance of issues, or availability of possible remedies. For each topic select most appropriate term from following list: very high, high, medium, low, very low, insufficient information.

A. SALT II and III.
B. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
C. Theater nuclear or “grey area” issues.
D. Radiological and chemical weapons.
E. Anti-satellite systems.
F. Regional arms control arrangements (e.g., MBFR, Ayacucho, Indian Ocean, Sinai disengagement, regional confidence building measures).
G. Conventional arms transfers.
H. Nuclear nonproliferation and peaceful nuclear cooperation.
I. International disarmament machinery.
J. Linkage between disarmament and development.
K. Other arms control/disarmament issues (e.g., nuclear-weapons-free-zones, ERW) (specify).

7. In designing programmatic activities on arms control/disarmament, it highly useful have general idea where concerned publics stand now on key issues. For this purpose fourth section should contain post’s thoughtful response to brief questionnaire, completing it as you believe it would be completed by majority of members of concerned publics defined in section 1 of your reply. Washington will interpret responses to questionnaire with due caution, bearing in mind their necessarily impressionistic nature. Posts may, where appropriate, supply brief explanation of responses to individual statements, including an assessment of how opinions expressed may differ from official host country policies. Where there are marked differences of opinion within concerned public, indicate the differing views, the groups holding them, and their relative strengths. If post has insufficient information regarding certain statements, so indicate. For each of the following

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2 Reference is to the December 1974 Ayacucho Declaration, signed by officials from Peru, Chile, Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela, Argentina, Colombia, and Panama, which limited armaments and prevented the acquisition of offensive weapons. (David Binder, “8 Latin Nations Declare Intention to Limit Arms,” The New York Times, December 13, 1974, p. 1.)

3 Reference is to the 1971 UN General Assembly Resolution declaring the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. (A/RES/2832/XXVI)

4 Presumable references to the 1974 Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement, the 1974 Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement, and the 1975 Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement.
assertions, select a response from following list: strongly agree, agree with reservations, opinion about equally divided, disagree with reservations, strongly disagree, insufficient information.

A. The United States is genuinely interested in achieving meaningful arms control and disarmament.

B. The Soviet Union is genuinely interested in achieving meaningful arms control and disarmament.

C. The United States has more armaments than are necessary to meet its legitimate defense needs.

D. The Soviet Union has more armaments than are necessary to meet its legitimate defense needs.

E. The host country has more armaments than are necessary to meet its legitimate defense needs.

F. The United States is militarily superior to the Soviet Union.

G. The Soviet Union is militarily superior to the United States.

H. The U.S. is likely to sacrifice the interests of its friends and allies as it pushes for a SALT II agreement.

I. Completion of a SALT II agreement is of great importance for all countries.

J. Completion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is of great importance for all countries.

K. The enhanced radiation (neutron) warhead should be prohibited.

L. U.S. policies on conventional arms transfers are well-intentioned and constructive.

M. U.S. policies on nuclear nonproliferation are well-intentioned and constructive.

N. Regional agreements to limit conventional arms transfers are an impractical objective.

O. The host country should exercise greater restraint in international sales or purchases of conventional arms.

P. Arms suppliers should not transfer arms to countries guilty of gross and consistent violations of basic human rights.

Q. The U.S. has had a constructive approach to the MBFR negotiations.

R. The Soviet Union has had a constructive approach to the MBFR negotiations.

S. The United States should continue to pursue an agreement with the Soviet Union on arms restraint in the Indian Ocean.

T. Nuclear weapons free zones can contribute importantly to world peace.
U. U.S. policies on nuclear nonproliferation stem primarily from its desire to retain its dominant position in the nuclear fuel market.

V. The host country should exercise greater caution in developing plutonium or nuclear reprocessing capabilities.

W. The host country should take a more active role in international arms control and disarmament discussions.

X. There are significant unexploited opportunities for regional arms control in the region of host country.

Y. The current disarmament machinery (e.g., U.N. bodies, CCD) needs radical restructuring.

8. Fifth section should contain summary of results of any recent systematic in-country opinion surveys on these subjects, and any additional information post feels would be useful to Washington planners.

9. Sixth section should briefly indicate way you went about completing your response and your assessment of overall reliability of information provided.

10. In optional seventh section, include any innovative programmatic approaches (e.g., involving new institutional linkages) you wish suggest, recognizing that Washington already considering standard activities such as seminars and VTRs.

139. Memorandum From the Acting Deputy Associate Director for Programs, International Communication Agency (Carter) to the Deputy Director (Bray)¹

Washington, July 13, 1978

SUBJECT

Illustrative Programmatic Approaches to Arms Control/Disarmament Subjects

The following illustrative activities are listed separately to suggest the range of possibilities. In actual practice, they would be closely interrelated to reinforce ongoing communication with important publics.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and East/West, Putnam Subject File, Box 30, Disarmament: Public Diplomacy: 7/78. No classification marking.
1. Regional conferences. A typical regional conference would involve both official and unofficial Americans and foreigners. Participants from several countries could meet for two or three days to cover either a broad range of arms control questions or selected specific issues (e.g., SALT, conventional arms transfers, nonproliferation). The conference might be cosponsored by a prestigious local institution in the country where it is staged; that organization could also be given a grant to publish the proceedings. Activities in the period before the sessions could include: exchange grants to the U.S. for key participants, distribution of suitable background literature, media placement, and discussions with Mission officers. Post-conference activities might include: distribution of the proceedings, small-group seminars in the home countries of the participants, ICA library “outreach” programs, media interviews, and personal contact.

2. Special exchange projects. A group of arms control specialists (perhaps all of them journalists, or academics, or “think tank” researchers) might be brought to the U.S. for a “multi-regional project” involving meetings with USG and private arms control specialists, travel to military installations or commercial facilities, and a week-long seminar sponsored by an appropriate American institution. ICA media would give coverage to these activities. After their return, posts would maintain close contact with the participants and involve them in seminars and other programs.

3. Special briefings and tours. Handled under the aegis of ICA Foreign Press Centers in Washington and New York, these activities might involve foreign journalists resident in the U.S. and could focus on single-country or single-region concerns. Coverage generated could tie in directly with seminars and conferences being held overseas.

4. Grants to American institutions. Such grants could be made for a wide variety of purposes including: research on arms control organizations abroad, support to exchanges, subsidizing of conferences, and publication and distribution of materials.

5. Research and media reaction. ICA might commission opinion surveys to elicit information that would help keep American policymakers apprised of foreign attitudes regarding specific issues currently under negotiation. Media reaction reporting could help serve the same purpose, as well as convey any press comment emanating from our conferences or other activities.

6. Innovative program formats. In addition to seminars and exchanges, ICA resources might be used to support dialogue in a number of other formats. For example:

   A. VTRs. Videotaped interviews with U.S. arms control specialists could be used to stimulate small group discussions in the homes of Mission personnel.
B. “Electronic dialogues.” One part of a discussion on a particular arms control issue in a foreign country could be devoted to a telephone hook-up with an American specialist in the U.S.

C. VOA “town meeting.” A live VOA broadcast could feature a prominent American specialist who would give on-air responses to questions phoned in from selected countries. (Another VOA contribution might be to devote a series of programs, such as the prestigious VOA Forum, to arms control questions.)

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140. Memorandum From Paul Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, July 17, 1978

SUBJECT

Problems of Communism Still in Distress

Paul Smith asked to get together with me today and spent the greater part of a 1½ hour lunch and walk down Connecticut Avenue telling me about the troubles he is having keeping Problems of Communism (POC) going. It seems that the efforts we have been making to get across to John Reinhardt our concern that this publication receive the support it needs (I talked to him about it just two weeks ago) have been too subtle. POC is still operating with reduced staff (ICA is shifting slots to Third-World functions) and is being threatened with increasingly restrictive policy guidelines. ICA’s Plans Staff has now proposed that it be reduced from a bimonthly (it has always had six issues per year since its inception in the early 1950’s) to a quarterly. This is at a time when both the problems of the Communist world and our concern about them are increasing! And when the entire POC budget is under $300,000 per year!

Paul Smith, as you know, is an extremely knowledgeable, rational and motivated man who has maintained POC’s quality and kept a respected staff on even keel since he took over as editor in 1972. He fought a skillful battle to keep Congress from killing POC a few years ago when it was fashionable to dismantle “Cold War leftovers.” He is

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special (Henze), Box 2, 7/78. Confidential. Sent for action.
dismayed by the present climate in ICA which he says is compounded of excessive orientation toward the Third World, an aversion to East-West issues and general bureaucratic ineptitude and lack of dynamic leadership. Since John Reinhardt has apparently not grasped the message I have given him three times orally about POC, I have drafted a forceful letter (Tab B)\(^2\) from you to him which should have some impact.

Recent Moscow and Belgrade Embassy comments on POC provide a good measure of its impact in these important target countries. (Tab A)\(^3\)

**RECOMMENDATION**

That you sign the attached letter.

P. S. Paul Smith has a deep interest in Soviet minorities, a good many contacts with people working in this field and a wealth of ideas which can serve us well in our efforts to develop a more active program for work in this area. POC has its relevance for this effort, too.

\(^2\) Attached but not printed is an undated letter from Brzezinski to Reinhardt. For the signed version of the letter, see Document 144.

\(^3\) Attached but not printed are the undated Embassy comments.

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141. **Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the President for Media and Public Affairs (Jagoda) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)**\(^1\)

Washington, July 18, 1978

**SUBJECT**

*NSC’s role in International Communications and Culture*

A range of issues in international communications and cultural policy will be increasingly prominent over the next months. In particular, a potentially volatile UNESCO meeting scheduled for October and November bears careful monitoring by the White House.

As you know, there has been no comprehensive coordination by the NSC of communications policy and cultural affairs in the international

\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, Donated Historical Material, Barry Jagoda, Box 3, NSC. No classification marking. There is no indication that Brzezinski saw the memorandum.
arena. I would like to undertake, on a short-term basis, a review of these issues so that you might suggest more effective ways for the President to provide guidance to the bureaucracy. These matters are nominally handled by State and ICA, although the FCC, Commerce, the Cultural Endowments, and others have rapidly expanding involvement. Several Congressional committees have interests and concerns.

Briefly, here are the three main substantive areas:

1. **The role of the United States in communicating** its culture, ideas, and policy to others. ICA is beginning its newly mandated approach to “public diplomacy,” a result of last year’s reorganization. Frequently, Presidential policy could be more effectively implemented if there were a closer relationship between the White House and ICA. Questions of policy arise and guidance would be helpful and appreciated.

2. **The appetite of other countries** for bringing their culture and policy to our people. Increasingly, other governments (and their non-governmental institutions, including scholars, journalists, artists, cultural leaders, etc.) want to beam cultural and political product and policy toward our people. What should be our reaction? And what might be the role of the government in the decision-making process of our private sector?

3. **Conflict among the West, the Marxists, and the LDC’s about the free flow of ideas and information.** The Marxists and many one-party developing states have posed a considerable challenge to our approach to the free flow of information and culture. They want to mandate “state” responsibility for communications and ideas that are transmitted from within a nation. Our institutions are seriously concerned and are looking to the government for help and direction. A major fight over these problems will emerge at the previously mentioned late fall meeting of UNESCO, for which our government is currently unprepared. Obviously, at the heart of all this conflict is the question of human rights.

    My main interest, on your behalf, would be to determine how international communications and cultural matters can be better intertwined with the main thrust of our foreign policy. Jody Powell strongly supports this proposal and I would expect that the President would have no objection if the idea had your recommendation.

    May we explore this idea further at your earliest convenience?
Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the President for Media and Public Affairs (Jagoda) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\(^1\)

Washington, July 24, 1978

SUBJECT

My Proposed Job Description and Time Schedule

This memo elaborates on my proposal\(^2\) to provide short-term liaison between the White House and the International Communication Agency, while monitoring the attempt of the Soviet Union (and some Third World governments) to force UNESCO to mandate “state” control of media.

Previously, I had suggested:

1. ICA is struggling to get going with its new mandate.
2. More foreign culture and communication is being aimed at our citizens.
3. Conflict is intensifying among the West, the Marxists, and the LDC’s about the free flow of ideas and information. Apart from the international human rights issues in the daily headlines, UNESCO’s general assembly meeting this fall\(^3\) will be a battleground over the issue of “state” control of communication and ideas that are transmitted beyond national borders.

I propose to define areas where guidance for ICA could result in more effective implementation of Presidential foreign policy initiatives. In an effort to move deeply and immediately into the broad area of communication and culture (and to develop a clearer understanding of the bureaucratic dynamics), I would plan to initially focus on the “state control” issue (#3 above). This approach should not conflict with Henry Richardson’s work in overseeing activities of the U.S. in international organizations.

In short, here is my proposed job description for the next eight months: Liaison with John Reinhardt, and NSC staff member pursuing the human rights issues involved in our “first amendment” approach to the free flow of information and culture against our adversaries’ view of state control.

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\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, Donated Historical Material, Barry Jagoda, Box 3, NSC. No classification marking. Sent through Aaron. Printed from an uninitialed copy. There is no indication that either Aaron or Brzezinski saw the memorandum.

\(^2\) See Document 141.

\(^3\) See footnote 6, Document 129.
Assuming you agree with the previous paragraph as a rough job description, let me outline a time schedule of work over the next months:

Between now and October 1, when I would go on the NSC payroll, I would become more familiar with ICA and other participants in the international communication/cultural area. I have already accepted an invitation to represent the White House at an Aspen Institute seminar on “International Communications,” during the 3rd week in August.

During September, I would be in Washington participating in the preparation for the UNESCO meetings and developing closer relationships and understanding of ICA.

In early October, I would attend the annual four-day meeting of the International Institute of Communications, where Western and non-aligned (and some Marxist) broadcasters come together. Last year, I gave the welcoming address to this group on behalf of the President when they met in Washington. This organization is extremely concerned about the free flow of information (they see the issue in human rights terms) and appreciates the United States for “listening” to the non-aligned nations, while treating them each in a unique way.

In late October and November, the UNESCO general assembly will meet in Paris. I should attend some of those sessions concerned with the “state control” issue and with other international communications and cultural affairs questions.

During the remainder of this year, I will have been working closely with ICA, State, and the Cultural Endowments, as appropriate, to marshal their forces for the forward movement of our foreign policy. By early 1979, a plan of future action will have been developed.

My assignment, as a short-term staff member (Special Advisor to the NSC on international communications and cultural affairs??) would end April 1, 1979, six months after I have come onto the payroll—which is within the time allowable for these temporary arrangements.
Washington, July 31, 1978

SUBJECT

Focusing on the NSC/ICA Relationship

Two previous memoranda from me propose that NSC (1) carefully monitor the upcoming UNESCO meeting (particularly the “State control” of news media issue) and (2) consider ways of improving the relationship between ICA and the White House.

We seem to be in agreement about the importance of the UNESCO issue.

This memo is in response to your request that I develop more fully my thoughts about ICA. I followed your suggestion that I raise some of the questions that might be pursued over the next months. I think the focus of my review will result from answers to some of the following:

1. What is the internal hierarchical structure of ICA and how are executive policy decisions implemented?

2. What are the external influences on ICA decision-making (and policy implementation)—including both governmental and non-governmental sources?

3. What are the channels of communication between ICA and the White House? Between ICA and State? Are these sufficient and appropriate for all concerned?

4. What has been the experience of NSC staff members with ICA? What conclusion can be drawn that might lead to more fruitful relationships?

5. How can the NSC better tap ICA’s understanding of foreign attitudes and perceptions? (ICA overseas personnel deal with non-
governmental elites on a constant basis, while other U.S. overseas personnel (State) deal mostly with governments.)

6. How can NSC make better use of ICA to prepare foreign publics for impending policy decisions? (For example, could ICA have been helpful during the neutron bomb controversy?)

7. In what ways can Presidential decisions, once reached, be better implemented through the “action” orientation of ICA, bypassing further bureaucratic “consideration”?

8. Is there a useful way for ICA to stimulate NSC consideration of problems and opportunities in policy formulation and implementation?


144. Letter From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to the Director of the International Communication Agency (Reinhardt)

Washington, July 31, 1978

Dear John:

I keep hearing that Problems of Communism is losing staff, that it is falling behind in publication schedules and that there is now consideration of reducing it from a bimonthly to a quarterly. This publication represents a unique form of collaboration between the private academic

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special (Henze), Box 1, Chron File: 8/78. No classification marking. In an August 3 letter, Reinhardt responded to Brzezinski: “In the context of ZBB, consideration was given to publishing the magazine with less frequency, as consideration was given to many other undesirable, indeed, unpalatable, but possible alternative ways of operating. In this case, as in others, the decision was made not to alter the periodicity, in recognition of the value of the publication.” (Ibid.) Henze sent Brzezinski copies of both Brzezinski’s July 31 letter to Reinhardt and Reinhardt’s August 3 reply under an August 8 covering note, stating: “While he [Reinhardt] says he fears you have had faulty information about Problems of Communism’s situation, he goes on to insist that there are no real problems and that everything is fine with the magazine. This, of course, is not what we have been hearing from a variety of sources for a long time. But the basic thrust of his letter is positive—and he is very categoric about maintaining that he recognizes the importance of the publication and is giving it full support. This is what we wanted from your letter—a firm commitment to maintain the quality and frequency of this publication.” (Ibid.)
research community and the U.S. Government—something which your agency in its new incarnation is intended to encourage. Communist governments and movements all around the world are facing more, and more serious, problems than ever before. It is in our interest to encourage debate and discussion of these problems everywhere in the world, but especially in Communist-dominated countries and within Communist groups elsewhere. There is no better vehicle for doing this than Problems of Communism. It would be a bargain if it cost several times its current budget. It should continue to appear as a bimonthly and it should have the support it requires to be as lively and topical as its staff can make it. If you are encountering difficulty in providing needed support for this valuable publication on which I would be able to help, please let me know. I want to feel assured that it is not only going to continue its present level of excellence and timeliness, but becomes even better.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

2 Brzezinski wrote “Zbig” above his typed signature.

145. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron) to the Director of the International Communication Agency (Reinhardt)

Washington, July 31, 1978

SUBJECT
Humphrey Scholarships

As the attached indicates, the President has approved the proposal for a Hubert Humphrey North-South Scholarship program. Please
provide a brief report to the NSC on the implementation of this program, and specifically include the following:

1. Brief talking points for the President to use in the announcement of the program.

2. A plan for relating to the U.S. universities which will be involved in this program and include a list of those universities.

3. A draft set of instructions to our embassies and/or binational commissions on the method of selection of the scholars.

4. A suggested plan for relating to the Institute of International Education on the placement and supervision of these scholars.

5. A more detailed proposal for the summer workshop on North-South issues.

Please coordinate with the National Security Council and provide this report by August 10, 1978.³

David Aaron

³ In an August 10 memorandum to Aaron, Reinhardt responded to Aaron’s request. (Ibid.)

146. Paper Prepared in the Office of Research and Evaluation, Associate Directorate for Programs, International Communication Agency

Washington, August 1, 1978

[Omitted here are the title page and a page listing the attachments.]

OVERVIEW

The Concerned Publics

Except in Europe and South Asia, the publics who influence government policy or public opinion on arms control/disarmament issues,
or who have a deep and continuing interest in such issues, seem to number no more than 100 persons per country. In three of the four African countries included in this survey, posts believe that fewer than 20 persons constitute this public. Similarly small numbers are believed to be professionally involved or particularly concerned with these issues in the two Arab countries and in two of the four Latin American countries where posts participated in the ICA inquiry.

In most major European countries, in the East as well as in the West, the professionally involved or particularly concerned publics for arms control/disarmament issues are thought to range between 100 and 150 persons per country. Only in half a dozen countries out of the 30 surveyed, do the primary arms control/disarmament publics appear to be larger—between 150 and 600 persons.

**ESTIMATED SIZE OF ARMS CONTROL/DISARMAMENT PUBLICS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 20</td>
<td>Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania; Egypt, Saudi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arabia; Mexico, Venezuela.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20–50</td>
<td>Argentina; Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50–100</td>
<td>Nigeria; Indonesia, Japan, Korea (?); Brazil (?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100–150</td>
<td>Canada, France, Italy, Norway, Sweden; Hungary,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poland, Romania, USSR (?); Iran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150–300</td>
<td>Germany, Yugoslavia; Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300–600</td>
<td>Great Britain; India, Pakistan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In general, those with influence over policy or opinion concerning arms control/disarmament issues are most likely to be found in the country’s cabinet, in special elements of the foreign and defense ministries, in specialized government or private research institutes, on the political science, law and international relations faculties of major universities, in enterprises dealing with the production of energy or with the sale or purchase of arms, and in the press. Nearly every USICA post can name the concerned elements of the government, the relevant research centers, and the particular scholars, editors and columnists who work on arms control/disarmament issues.

In addition to these narrowly-defined influential publics, there exist in many countries larger publics deeply interested in some aspects of arms control/disarmament policies but with relatively little influence over them. While in Europe these larger publics may be concerned with SALT and MBFR, in most other countries their interest is more parochial. Of greatest concern are the issues believed to affect directly the country’s security and the balance of power within its region. These larger publics include environmentalists worried about the dangers of nuclear power production, the storage of nuclear waste or the fallout from nuclear testing; nationalists resentful of their country’s depend-
ence on foreign sources for nuclear fuel and subservience to foreign controls; those fearful that arms control agreements or human rights concerns might prevent their country from purchasing the arms needed for defense; and those concerned that controls will curtail their arms sales and thereby create unemployment and unfavorable trade balances. It also includes the many ordinary citizens genuinely concerned about the dangers of nuclear, or conventional, war. These larger publics may run into the thousands or—as in Japan, Germany and the U.K.—even millions.

**Interest in Arms Control/Disarmament Issues**

Interest in various arms control/disarmament issues differed considerably by region. It was strongly affected by the country’s perceived security needs and by present or anticipated requirements for nuclear energy. Both in Europe and elsewhere, however, interest is high in nuclear non-proliferation and regional arms control, low in radiological and chemical weapons, antisatellite systems and the linkage between disarmament and development. Conventional arms transfers, in Europe of high interest primarily to the major arms exporters, is of great interest to most non-European countries because they want to purchase the arms they feel they must have or deny them to potential enemies.

The concerned European publics generally oppose nuclear proliferation out of genuine fear that the spread of nuclear weapons will increase the danger of nuclear holocaust. Yet they want assured supplies of nuclear fuels with minimal restrictions, and in some cases the right to unhampered export of nuclear technology. Non-European publics, although for the most part officially committed to nuclear non-proliferation, want to retain their country’s option of joining the nuclear club, or at least of purchasing fissionable materials for the production of energy without burdensome foreign controls.

Interest in regional arms control arrangements is generally limited to the country’s immediate region: to MBFR in Europe, to Ayacucho and Tlatelolco in Latin America, to the Indian Ocean in the littoral states.

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2 See footnote 2, Document 138.

3 The 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco (Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean), which prohibited and prevented the development, testing, use, or manufacture of nuclear weapons, contained two protocols. Protocol I committed countries outside of the Treaty zone to undertake obligations of the Treaty with respect to their territories within the Zone. Protocol II called upon states possessing nuclear weapons that agree to respect the obligations in the Treaty to not use nuclear weapons against the parties to the Treaty. For additional information, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XI, Arms Control and Disarmament, Document 226. The United States signed Protocol II in 1968 and Protocol I in 1977.
SALT II and III is of great interest to most European countries, both East and West. The relatively low interest in SALT outside of Europe is in part attributable to the view that weaker countries cannot influence the negotiations between the superpowers and will not be strongly affected by their outcome. Interest in a comprehensive test ban treaty, on the other hand, is quite low in Europe, very high in Japan and high in several other non-European countries.

Theater nuclear or “grey area” issues, which in major European countries are followed with high interest, are of low salience in most non-European countries other than Japan, Australia, Korea and Pakistan. Among other AC/D issues of relatively high interest must be counted the enhanced radiation weapon (primarily in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and Japan) and nuclear-free zones (primarily in Scandinavia and Latin America.)

Finally, several countries—notably Egypt, Israel, S. Korea, S. Africa—are so preoccupied with more immediate problems that their concerned publics show little interest in AC/D issues unrelated to these problems.

Perceived Attitudes of Concerned Publics

ICA posts and EU’s policy office estimated the perceived agreement of “a majority of members of concerned publics” with a series of statements related to arms control or disarmament. They recorded their estimates on a five-point scale ranging from “agree strongly” to “disagree strongly.” Results are tabulated in appendix C and summarized below.

1. Opinions About U.S. Policies and U.S. Strength

Concerned publics in most countries appear to agree that the United States “is genuinely interested in achieving meaningful arms control and disarmament.” Even Romania and Yugoslavia, who identify with the nonaligned countries and generally see eye-to-eye on disarmament issues, grant that the U.S. really wants arms reductions. While concerned publics in other East European countries and the Soviet Union as well as Italy are divided on the question of American sincerity, those in India, South Africa and Tanzania and the general public in Japan doubt that America really means what it says about arms control.

On two subjects of great interest to specialists in most countries—conventional arms transfers and nuclear non-proliferation—opinion about U.S. policies is divided. Probably reflecting America’s role as

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4 Attached but not printed at Appendix C are the tabulates for all 30 countries involved in the survey.
the largest arms supplier, concerned publics in a majority of the 30
surveyed countries seem to disagree with the contention that American
policies in this area are well intentioned and constructive. NATO mem-
bers Italy and France along with such U.S. friends as Egypt, and Israel,
Iran, Japan and S. Korea share with the Soviet Union and East European
countries a jaundiced view of U.S. arms sales policy. And on non-
proliferation, German publics join the French, Soviets, and East Europeans,
among others, in disagreeing that “U.S. policies on nuclear non-
proliferation are well intentioned and constructive.” In fact, concerned
publics in many countries—including Germany, Italy, France and Sweden as well as the USSR and its satellites—tend to agree with the
cynical view that U.S. policies on nuclear non-proliferation “stem pri-
marily from its desire to retain its dominant position in the nuclear
fuel market.” On MBFR negotiations, on the other hand, which for most
non-European countries have low salience, publics with an identifiable
opinion on the subject (except in Hungary, Poland and the Soviet
Union) generally attribute a constructive role to the U.S.

In a majority of the survey countries, the concerned publics are
believed to agree, at least with reservation, that the United States is
militarily superior to the Soviet Union. Even in the Soviet Union, its
Warsaw Pact allies and in Yugoslavia they are believed to see the U.S.
as the stronger country, although public opinion in Western Europe
tends to view the USSR as militarily equal to or ahead of the United
States. In about half the countries—including India, Japan, Mexico and,
not surprisingly, the Soviet Union, Hungary, Romania and Yugo-
slavia—the United States is viewed as having more armaments than
necessary to meet its legitimate defense needs.

2. Opinions About Soviet Policies

Concerned publics in most countries other than the Soviet Union,
Eastern Europe, Great Britain and Australia do not perceive the Soviet
Union as being genuinely interested in achieving meaningful arms
control and disarmament. Further, except in the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe, these publics are thought to agree that the Soviet Union
has more arms than it needs. Several countries in addition to the USSR
and its satellites credit the Soviet Union with a constructive approach
to the MBFR negotiations.

3. Opinion About Host Country Policies

In almost none of the 30 countries do concerned publics feel that
their own country has more armaments than are necessary to meet
legitimate defense needs. The exceptions are Germany, Britain and
Italy, where opinions on this question is thought to be divided. And
only a few West European countries agree that their country “should
exercise greater restraint in international sales or purchase of conventional arms.” The notion that one’s own country “should exercise greater caution in developing plutonium or nuclear reprocessing capabilities” is also rejected in a majority of these countries. On the other hand, there is high agreement that one’s country should take an active, or more active, role in international arms control and disarmament discussions.

4. Opinions on Various Arms Control/Disarmament Issues

Several of the very important questions raised in this section turned out to be “motherhood” issues. Thus, there is near-universal agreement—even in countries with low interest in these issues—that nuclear-weapons free zones can contribute importantly to world peace, that completion of the SALT II agreement and of the comprehensive test ban treaty are of great importance for all countries and that the United States should continue to pursue an agreement with the Soviet Union on arms restraints in the Indian Ocean. At the same time, specialist publics in a number of important Western-oriented countries appear to agree that the U.S. “is likely to sacrifice the interests of its friends and allies as it pushes for a SALT II agreement.” And, in most non-European countries, these publics seem to have been swayed by the Soviet campaign against the “neutron” bomb, although in Western Europe only Norway and Sweden agree that ERW should be prohibited.

Opinion on regional agreements to limit conventional arms transfers is divided. Several Western allies join the Soviet Union and East European countries in disagreeing that such arrangements are impractical. In about the same group of countries, concerned publics believe that significant unexploited opportunities for regional arms control exist in their region.

Finally, there is a great divergence of opinion among concerned publics about the Carter Administration’s initiative in linking arms exports to human rights violations. Despite strong West European approval of American human rights initiatives on the part of the general public, the specialized AC&D publics in France, Great Britain and Italy are believed to agree with the Soviet Union, East European countries and others that arms suppliers should be at liberty to transfer arms to countries “guilty of gross and consistent violations of basic human rights.”
147. Memorandum From Robert Putnam of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\(^1\)

Washington, August 3, 1978

SUBJECT
ICA Initiative on Public Diplomacy and Disarmament

At John Reinhardt’s suggestion, you established an interagency committee to develop a public diplomacy program on arms control and disarmament.\(^2\) The committee has made reasonable progress, and its report will be ready by September 1st. The purpose of this memo is to provide you with an interim report\(^3\) on committee activity and to set before you one issue on which there are divergent views within the committee.

The committee has addressed four questions:
1. What specific US interests in the arms control field are likely to be affected by foreign opinion over the next year or two?

We have focussed on SALT, theater nuclear issues, MBFR, CTB, non-proliferation/nuclear energy, CAT, and regional arms control arrangements.

2. What are the present attitudes of key foreign publics on arms control issues?

Judging by reports from our posts in key countries, the most salient issues among European attentive publics are SALT, non-proliferation/nuclear energy, MBFR, theater nuclear issues, and CAT. Outside Europe, the only salient topics are CAT, regional arms control (e.g., Ayacucho), and non-proliferation/nuclear energy. Attentive publics everywhere are reported to be supportive of US policy on SALT, CTB, and MBFR, but suspicious on CAT and non-proliferation. On the latter two issues, relatively few foreign publics seem to support greater restraint on their own policies. In short, on CAT and non-proliferation we have a major selling job to do with attentive world publics.

3. What are the strengths and weaknesses of current Soviet propaganda efforts in the arms control field?

\(^{1}\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and East/West, Putnam Subject File, Box 30, Disarmament: Public Diplomacy: 8–10/78. Confidential. Sent for both information and action. Inderfurth initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.

\(^{2}\) See Document 134.

\(^{3}\) An unknown hand underlined “interim report.”
We have commissioned a CIA/FBIS study on this topic. It is already clear that the Soviets make a massive effort, but there is no systematic evidence of its effectiveness.

4. What specific programs should ICA conduct over the next year to foster understanding of arms control issues and US policy among attentive publics in key countries?4

The committee is considering three programmatic objectives:

(1) Sell SALT
We should convince foreign publics that SALT II will contribute to world peace and Western security, aiming for positive feedback into Senate opinion next spring.5

(2) Sell CAT and Non-proliferation
Since unilateral US policies won’t work forever, we should seek to build support for restraint among influential publics abroad.6

(3) Explore emerging issues
On issues such as MBFR, theater nuclear issues, and regional arms control, where our policies and those of other governments are still evolving, we should stimulate reasoned discussion of the alternatives, without aiming at persuasion in a specific direction.7

The committee has not yet assigned priorities to these objectives, but some participants strongly suggest something like a 60%–20%–20%8 division of energy, giving SALT clear predominance. In my view, objectives #2 and #3 are more important than that, particularly since this program’s effects will probably be more important in the long-term than in the short-term. In your view, should we:

_____ Devote most of our efforts under this program to selling SALT abroad
_____ Devote roughly equal attention to all three objectives9
_____ Other:

Apart from this question of priorities, no significant disagreements have yet emerged in the committee’s work. The final report will proba-

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4 Putnam wrote “DA” and drew a downward pointing arrow in the left-hand margin next to this point. Below this, Aaron wrote “[illegible] SALT with CAT & N.P.”
5 Aaron wrote “60%” in the left-hand margin next to this point.
6 Aaron wrote “30%” in the left-hand margin next to this point.
7 Aaron wrote “10%” in the left-hand margin next to this point.
8 Inderfurth underlined “60%–20%–20%.” He placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this sentence and wrote: “I think this is a good division. Rick.” Below this, Putnam wrote Inderfurth’s initials and drew an arrow from his initials to Inderfurth’s handwritten comment.
9 Brzezinski approved this option. Putnam wrote Brzezinski’s initials in the left-hand margin next to this option and drew an arrow from the initials to the option.
bly need formal SCC blessing, since it will serve as ICA’s marching order, but a meeting of principals may be unnecessary.

148. Memorandum From the Director of the International Communication Agency (Reinhardt) to the Associate Director, Voice of America (Straus)¹

Washington, August 14, 1978

SUBJECT

VOA Commentaries

In the wake of our recent discussion, and after a careful review of the relevant memoranda on the subject, I have reached the following conclusions with regard to the broadcasting of VOA Commentaries:

1. In partial fulfillment of the VOA Charter mandate to “present the policies of the United States clearly and effectively,” VOA should begin broadcasting policy Commentaries as soon as this is operationally feasible.

2. Commentaries are to be concise presentations of USG policies on issues of major concern and importance to the United States and to VOA listeners, the purpose of which is to give listeners as clear and accurate an understanding of USG policies as is possible through international radio broadcasting.

3. The production and airing of Commentaries will be handled in the following manner:

a. Though written by various persons in the VOA Current Affairs Division, Commentaries will be introduced on the air by a phrase such as “Here is a VOA Commentary read by (name of reader),” or “The following is a VOA Commentary,” with no mention of the author.

b. The individual reading a VOA Commentary on the air in English and on most of the other major language services will not be heard in any other broadcast capacity; in those few broadcast services where limited staff size will not permit such an absolute separation of functions, Commentary readers will not be heard at any other point in the

same broadcast (e.g., as a newscaster, a master of ceremonies, a feature narrator, etc.).

c. VOA’s Current Affairs Division will issue a minimum of three Commentaries weekly to be broadcast by the various language services, more if required and if relevant materials are available.

d. The present relationship between PGM/G and the VOA Policy Application Staff (as outlined in my memorandum of May 4, 1977) remains unchanged for the production of VOA Commentaries; VOA will continue to look to PGM/G (and, through that office, to the Department of State and other policy-making elements of the USG) for advice and guidance on subject matter for VOA Commentaries and on special aspects of a particular policy which should be emphasized and/or caveats which should be observed; there should be regular post-broadcast critiques of Commentaries, and, while prior script clearance is not required, it should be sought when thought advisable by VOA.

4. The broadcasting of VOA Commentaries in no way affects VOA’s Charter obligations to present the news in an “accurate, objective and comprehensive” manner, to “present a balanced and comprehensive projection of significant American thought and institutions,” and to “present responsible discussion and opinion” on U.S. policies. VOA Commentaries should complement, not supplant, these other Charter responsibilities. At the same time, the advent of VOA Commentaries should not lead to a decline in appropriate news reporting and analysis of USG policies. I assume that official USG policy statements and actions will continue to be reflected appropriately in the full range of VOA news broadcasts, news analyses, features programs, etc.

5. Finally, I assume that you will want to develop a suitable method for evaluating the nature and effectiveness of VOA Commentaries over a specified period of time.

I shall be delighted to discuss any questions you may have about these conclusions.
149. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Interagency Committee on Public Diplomacy and Disarmament (Bray) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, September 5, 1978

I. Background:

In your memorandum of June 8, 1978,² you tasked this Committee with developing a public diplomacy initiative focused on arms control and disarmament issues.

Our Committee included representatives of the National Security Council, Department of State, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Department of Defense, Office of Management and Budget, and International Communication Agency.

We agreed unanimously that a public diplomacy initiative could be extremely valuable at this time, and recommend that ICA be charged with coordinating appropriate activities along the lines outlined in the remainder of this paper.

II. Objectives:

We believe realistic objectives of the initiative are:

1. To lend clarity and precision to the foreign understanding of specific U.S. policies and broad purposes.

2. To increase the capacity of foreign individuals and institutions to engage in thoughtful, unemotional analysis of basic arms control issues.

3. To help create an international climate of opinion on these issues which is more congenial to the U.S. point of view.

The Committee considered a full range of arms control questions. However, to give greater focus to issues most important to U.S. interests and salient to publics abroad, and recognizing our resource limitations, we propose that preponderant attention be given to the following:

1. SALT and the East-West balance

2. Nonproliferation and the Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 9, International Communication Agency: 9–12/78. Confidential. Aaron, signing for Brzezinski, sent the memorandum to Vance, Brown, McIntyre, Warnke, and Reinhardt under a September 15 covering memorandum, indicating that the report constituted the final report of the Interagency Committee. Aaron requested the addressees to submit comments and approval of the report to the NSC no later than September 25. (Ibid.)

² See Document 134.
3. Conventional arms transfers (CAT) and regional arms control arrangements.

Specific programmatic goals will vary according to the immediacy and character of the issues involved in particular areas. The Committee devoted considerable time to discussing the relative attention that should be given to questions of obvious priority in the short run, such as SALT II and (to a somewhat lesser extent) CTB, as compared with longer term issues such as CAT and some aspects of nonproliferation. We agreed that considerable resources should be devoted during the next six to twelve months to making a strong presentation of U.S. policy on SALT, particularly to audiences in Western Europe and U.S.-based European correspondents. Simultaneously, we would expect to inaugurate various program activities supporting CAT, nonproliferation, and CTB, concentrating on areas other than Europe, but including that region as well.

Our goals will also be affected by the degree to which U.S. policies have been firmly settled or are still evolving. Where U.S. policies are well established, we must assure that they are understood abroad, if necessary through activities that are essentially consciousness raising exercises, and report back on areas of disagreement or misunderstanding. Where U.S. positions are in a formative stage (e.g., with respect to certain regional arms control proposals), this initiative can be useful for consensus building and providing early feedback on foreign opinions for the guidance of policy makers.

III. The Foreign Environment:

For this report ICA solicited Washington and field assessments of arms control-related attitudes of informed publics in 30 countries representing all major regions and various levels of development. Some of the more significant findings from this admittedly rough and second-hand survey are summarized below.

Within the larger publics concerned with foreign policy, national security, and energy, there exists in all the countries surveyed a much smaller group of knowledgeable individuals who influence government policy or public opinion on arms control and disarmament issues. Their numbers range from fewer than 100 in many of the developing
countries to several hundred in India and some of the industrialized democracies.

In addition to these narrowly-defined groups of influentials, larger publics in many of the countries have an interest in one or more aspects of arms control, though they exercise relatively little influence over public policy. Of greatest concern to these publics are specific issues believed to affect directly the country’s security, such as SALT and Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) in Europe.

Though interest in particular issues differs considerably by region, nearly everywhere it is thought to be high on nonproliferation and regional arms control arrangements, but low on radiological and chemical weapons, antishuttle systems, and the linkage between disarmament and development.

The concerned European publics generally oppose nuclear proliferation out of genuine fear that the spread of nuclear weapons will increase the danger of nuclear holocaust. Yet they want assured supplies of nuclear fuels without undue restrictions, as well as the right to export nuclear technology when it does not significantly increase the probability of proliferation. Although nominally committed to nuclear nonproliferation, many non-European publics wish to retain their countries’ option of joining the nuclear club, or at least of purchasing fissile materials for the production of energy without burdensome foreign controls.

Interest in regional arms control arrangements is generally limited to the country’s immediate region: to MBFR in Europe, to Ayacucho and Tlatelolco in Latin America, to the Indian Ocean in the littoral states.

SALT II and III are of great interest to most European countries, both East and West, but of medium interest in most other countries, with a few exceptions such as Japan. Interest in a comprehensive test ban treaty, on the other hand, is judged to be quite low in Europe, but high elsewhere (e.g., Japan, India).

Theater nuclear or “grey area” issues, which in major European countries are followed closely, are apparently of low salience in most non-European countries (Japan, Australia, South Korea, and Pakistan excepted). Among other issues of relatively high interest are the enhanced radiation warhead (ERW) and nuclear-free zones.

Finally, several countries—notably Egypt, Israel, South Korea, South Africa—are so preoccupied with their immediate problems that their publics show little interest in issues unrelated to these questions.

The concerned publics in most countries are judged to agree with the general proposition that the United States “is genuinely interested in achieving meaningful arms control and disarmament,” though in some (e.g., India, South Africa, and Tanzania) there is more outspoken skepticism that America really means what it says about arms control.
On two subjects of great interest to specialists in the 30 countries investigated—conventional arms transfers and nonproliferation—opinion about U.S. policies is divided, but tends to be critical. Probably reflecting either skepticism because of America’s role as the largest arms supplier, or dissatisfaction with U.S. decisions affecting them, concerned publics in most countries (ranging from NATO and East Asian allies such as France, Italy, Japan, and South Korea, to Warsaw Pact members, and including most of the non-aligned in between) are thought to disagree with American policies in these areas. The climate of opinion regarding nonproliferation is similarly inhospitable, with such countries as France, West Germany, India, Pakistan, Japan, South Korea, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union, among others, disagreeing that U.S. policies on this subject are “well intentioned and constructive.” In fact, concerned publics in many countries representing all regions are believed to accept the view that U.S. policies on nuclear nonproliferation “stem primarily from its desire to retain its dominant position in the nuclear fuel market.”

In a majority of the surveyed countries, the concerned publics are believed to agree, but not without some reservations, that the United States is militarily superior to the Soviet Union. Even the Soviet Union, its Warsaw Pact allies, and Yugoslavia see the U.S. as the stronger country, although directly measured public opinion in Western Europe tends to view the U.S.S.R. as militarily equal to or ahead of the United States. In about half the countries the United States is viewed as having more armaments than necessary to meet its legitimate defense needs. At the same time, concerned publics in about a third of the non-Communist countries are thought to agree with the statement that the U.S. “is likely to sacrifice the interests of its friends and allies as it pushes for a SALT II agreement.”

Outside of the Soviet bloc, concerned publics in most countries do not perceive the Soviet Union as being genuinely interested in achieving meaningful arms control and disarmament. Further, except in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, these publics are thought to agree that the Soviet Union has more arms than it needs. However, several countries in addition to the U.S.S.R. and its satellites credit the Soviet Union (as well as the U.S.) with a constructive approach to the MBFR negotiations.

There is near-universal agreement—even in countries with low interest in these issues—that nuclear-weapons free zones can contribute importantly to world peace, that completion of the SALT II agreement and of the comprehensive test ban treaty are of great importance for all countries, and that the United States should continue to pursue an agreement with the Soviet Union on arms restraints in the Indian Ocean. There is also believed to be strong opposition to the ERW in many countries, both in and outside of Europe.
Several Western and non-aligned nations, as well as the Soviet Union and the East European countries surveyed, believe that regional arrangements may be a practical, though as yet not fully exploited, way of limiting conventional arms transfers.

Finally, there is considerable divergence of opinion among concerned publics about linking arms exports to human rights violations. Despite strong approval of American human rights initiatives on the part of the general public in Western Europe, the specialized publics in France, Great Britain, and Italy are believed to agree with the Soviet Union, East European countries, and others that arms suppliers should not be constrained from making transfers to countries that are “guilty of gross and consistent violations of basic human rights.”

IV. Basic Approaches:

Relation to Soviet efforts: We regret that this Government has never before organized itself to conduct a “forward” public diplomacy strategy on these issues. The Soviet Union has—and with considerable effect, many believe (though some sources contacted by the Committee are skeptical about the degree of effectiveness).

In propagandizing extensively on disarmament, the U.S.S.R. has sought primarily to build support among certain less developed countries (LDCs) and to drive a wedge between the U.S. and its European allies. Without being defensive, our efforts must to a degree be directed toward setting the record straight on what we have already done in the arms control field and on the rationale for U.S. weapons modernization programs. At the same time, we will not assume that U.S. and Soviet broad security interests are universally incompatible.

Audiences: Our activities should be directed toward building constructive communication between Americans and influential publics abroad, in and outside of government, who significantly influence either the decision-making process or public opinion. While some of these may be “disarmament specialists,” others may approach arms control questions primarily from the perspective of national security policy.

We propose placing emphasis on countries for which the issues have high salience or which carry particular weight in international deliberations on these questions. The priorities listed in Section V reflect the Committee’s best judgment at this time, but are not meant to exclude other significant regional actors and will be reviewed in the light of increased information and experience.

The role of the People’s Republic of China is somewhat anomalous. While the PRC is clearly an extremely important part of the global arms control environment, it is nonetheless virtually inaccessible to this kind of USG-sponsored public diplomacy undertaking. We hope
that through private efforts, such as those initiated in earlier decades with the Soviet Union, the Chinese can increasingly join in the international public consideration of arms control issues.

Timing: The proposed activities will span at least the coming year and continue longer as appropriate, recognizing the long-term character of the central security and arms control issues involved.

Wherever possible we should take advantage of predictable “motor events” which focus the attention of influential foreign publics on specific issues. Such events will include the completion of SALT II, agreement on CTB and its submission to an international body as well as to the Senate, completion in late 1979 of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), the 1979 non-aligned summit in Havana,4 and the next United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD) in the early 1980s.5

Activities: We propose that ICA commission public opinion research, intensify its media reaction reporting, sponsor press briefings and seminars, conduct exchanges, and otherwise bring the full panoply of its informational and cultural resources to bear on these issues. It will draw on both government and non-government sources, for both participants and documentation, configuring the specifics of each activity to the particular audiences and issues at hand. In so doing ICA will depend on the agencies represented on this Committee for ongoing assistance in the form of policy guidances, speakers, and suggestions on program participants and media materials. Section VI contains two models which illustrate some of the specific programmatic possibilities that might be considered.

Basic messages: To counteract the widespread tendency toward simplistic and unrealistic approaches to arms control (as evidenced most recently by foreign nongovernmental organizations at the SSOD), we propose to emphasize two broad points:

1. Arms control is a matter of the head as well as of the heart. It is not enough simply to feel strongly about the arms race, and to deplore the danger, expense, and other burdens brought about by modern weapons. Rather, rational defense policy and arms control are two sides of the same coin, because both aim at reducing the threat of war by maintaining the security balance. Arms control issues cannot be resolved without tremendous patience as well as careful study of the technological, security, and institutional problems involved. (Some of the more down-to-earth American NGOs can be helpful in making

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4 See footnote 4, Document 132.
5 The second UN Special Session on Disarmament took place in 1982.
2. Lack of openness, or “transparency,” is a fundamental impediment to arms control. Without more widely shared, reliable information about other nations’ armaments, national leaders and private specialists on security questions quite naturally make conservative—perhaps unnecessarily conservative—assessments of their defense requirements and are forced to rely on national technical means for the verification of arms control agreements. Openness in defense planning is already a characteristic of Western nations, and it is in our interests, as well as in the interests of effective arms control, that the pressures of international opinion on this issue be brought to bear on more secretive nations such as the Soviet Union.

V. Specific Issues, Countries, and Approaches

(a) SALT and the East-West balance:

Country and regional priorities:
NATO members (with top priority to France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, United Kingdom)
Warsaw Pact members (with priority to the U.S.S.R.)
European neutrals (especially Sweden, Austria, Yugoslavia)
Major actors in Middle East and South Asia (e.g., Israel, Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, India)
U.S. allies in East Asia (e.g., Japan, South Korea, Australia)
Major actors in Latin America and Africa (e.g., Brazil, Argentina, Nigeria)

SALT and other questions directly affecting the East-West strategic balance will be of central concern to the United States for the indefinite future, and therefore should continue to receive heavy public affairs attention. Although our immediate efforts should focus on SALT II, we should also treat theater systems and MBFR, as well as CTB. SALT will naturally receive particular attention once a SALT II agreement is reached and the ratification debate intensifies. Theater systems will receive increasing interest over the next year or two. While Western positions on this issue and on MBFR are evolving, it will be particularly useful to engage in reasoned exploration of various options with interested publics.

With NATO country audiences it will be important to emphasize what SALT means for European security within the overall strategic balance, addressing concerns about limits on the transfer of cruise missile technology, about charges of U.S. “decoupling” of American and European security, and about allegations that the U.S. has given away too much by cancelling new weapons systems such as the B–1

bomber, and delaying decisions on ERW and the MX mobile missile. We should stress the importance of the SALT agreement and the CTB treaty to the long-term objectives of the Atlantic Alliance and its political significance to the detente process.

With our allies in Europe and Asia we should reiterate our view that strategic stability is the foundation stone of world peace. The U.S. has the strength and will to maintain the balance at whatever level necessary, but hopes that through arms control agreements, such as SALT, the balance can be held at lower, less costly, and less dangerous levels. Any agreement affecting the strategic balance must meet certain basic criteria: it must maintain, and if possible improve, the military security of the U.S. and its allies; it must be equitable, and readily perceived as such; and it must be adequately verifiable.

With audiences in the LDCs, our approach should be more general and more educative. We should emphasize that U.S. arms control efforts in SALT and other forums are achieving progress in the control of strategic armaments, and that these negotiations bring positive benefits to all nations without eroding the East-West balance upon which world peace depends. We should also stress that although the U.S. ultimately seeks substantial reductions in nuclear arsenals, the most immediate—and most difficult—goal is to stop or slow the increase in weapons. Once limits on expansion are reached, a foundation for significant mutual reductions will have been achieved. Success in SALT (and CTB) should be seen in part as responding to our obligations under the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and thus linked to the issues raised in the following section.

(b) Nonproliferation and CTB:

Country and regional priorities:

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6 During his June 30, 1977, news conference, the President announced that the United States “should not continue with deployment of the B-1, and I am directing that we discontinue plans for production of this weapons system.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book I, p. 1197)

7 See footnote 4, Document 143.

8 On June 8, 1979, White House Deputy Press Secretary Rex Granum announced that Carter “had decided that we will pursue a full-scale M-X.” (American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1977–1980, pp. 124–125)

9 Reference is to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), opened for signature in Washington, London, and Moscow in July 1968. On July 1, 1968, during a ceremony in the East Room of the White House, Johnson made a statement endorsing the treaty; Rusk and Foster signed the treaty on behalf of the United States. Johnson transmitted the treaty to the Senate on July 9, and the Senate gave its consent to the agreement on March 13, 1969. Following ratification by the United States, United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and 40 other states, the treaty entered into force on March 5, 1970.
Euratom members (especially France, F.R.G., Italy, U.K.)
Non-parties to NPT (e.g., South Africa, P.R.C., India, Pakistan, Brazil, Argentina, Israel, Egypt)
Other important suppliers or recipients (e.g., Canada, U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Iran, Nigeria, Mexico, Venezuela)

Although CTB relates to the East-West strategic balance over the long run, in terms of public diplomacy in India and other nuclear-conscious LDCs, it can also usefully be approached within the context of its possible contributions to nonproliferation. Universal adherence to the NPT or equivalent internationally-binding agreements would also be a major step toward the same end.

Two dates of special interest are: (1) November 1979, the conclusion of INFCE; and (2) March 1980, the end of the renegotiation period called for by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act. As the latter date approaches, there will be a growing interest in unresolved contentious questions, particularly in India, Western Europe, and other areas, if it is impossible to renegotiate all agreements for cooperation by then. CTB should receive ongoing treatment as the outline of a treaty becomes clear, with special attention when an agreement is reached between the U.S., the U.K., and the U.S.S.R., when it is sent to the Committee on Disarmament and the U.N. General Assembly, and when it is under consideration by the Senate. If it is signed before the 1979 non-aligned summit, CTB could be on the agenda there.

The major focus of activities on this subject should be to put across the point that nonproliferation is in the interest of all states, both nuclear and non-nuclear. Collectively we must focus on the long-term changes in the global ecosystem, and look seriously at where mankind is, or should be, heading in the coming decades.

In encouraging a more analytical approach to nonproliferation issues, we should stress (particularly to non-signatories of the NPT) the cost and danger of nuclear weapons, and the potential proliferation harm of premature movement to a plutonium-based fuel economy. Further nuclear proliferation could well upset existing regional stabilities, and would ultimately impair the national security of all nations both within the affected region and elsewhere in the world. We should articulate the U.S. view that in the coming few years priority should be given to developing proliferation-resistant and economically feasible fuel cycles. U.S. caution on this score is based on prudence and on the interests of the global community as reflected in the NPT and the International Atomic Energy Agency, not on a desire to maintain discriminatory hegemony or dominance of the nuclear fuel market.

Recognizing that U.S. policies in this area are frequently criticized as insensitive, hypocritical, and paternalistic, it is essential that we
demonstrate an awareness of legitimate energy needs and commercial interests of other nations and that our efforts to encourage sales restraint by supplier countries not be seen as a cartel strategy. We anticipate that the most responsive audiences to this subject, especially in the developed countries, are likely to be non-governmental groups, including some in the environmental field.

The best approach to publics in the non-NPT countries may be through regional activities which bring to bear the concerns of other nations in the same region.

(c) Conventional Arms Transfers (CAT) and Regional Arms Control:

Suppliers:
NATO members (especially Canada, France, F.R.G., Italy, U.K.)
Warsaw Pact members (especially the U.S.S.R.)
Neutrals (especially Sweden, Yugoslavia)

Recipients:
East Asia (especially Japan, South Korea, P.R.C.)
Middle East and South Asia (especially Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, India)
Latin America (especially Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Venezuela)
Africa (especially Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa)

Although CAT at present has appreciably less salience for other countries than for the U.S., the SSOD demonstrated a growing international concern with this issue. While some events in the U.S. (e.g., submission of particular arms transfers proposals to Congress) may arouse interest abroad, global consideration of this question is still so new that the contemplated public diplomacy activities should be primarily directed to consciousness raising. The major “motor event” that can be anticipated at present is the September 1979 nonaligned summit in Havana (or elsewhere), at which CAT could be an agenda item.

Public diplomacy treatment of this subject in supplier and recipient countries should stress the importance of supplier restraint in reducing flows of arms which exacerbate tensions in unstable regions and thus threaten the peace, and point out the heavy burdens which regional arms races and growing military expenditures may unnecessarily place on the LDCs as they go about providing for their legitimate defense needs.

Without overselling the Ayacucho agreement or suggesting that the U.S. is promoting particular and precise formulas, we should

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10 See footnote 2, Document 138.
emphasize U.S. support for regional arms control arrangements arrived at by the parties most directly concerned. These agreements offer the best hope for building intra-regional confidence and thus reducing the tensions that lie at the root of pressures for arms influxes. Latin America and Africa may be among the promising areas for regional discussions on this issue.

VI. Illustrative Program Models:

(a) Program Model #1:

A typical country receiving priority might be, for example, an upper tier LDC that is: (1) hoping to significantly increase its purchases of conventional arms to offset weapons buildups in neighboring countries; (2) marginally interested in East-West negotiations, which it views as essentially aimed at preserving superpower hegemony over the Third World; and (3) anxious not to foreclose its nuclear options by adhering to the NPT or otherwise accepting fullscope safeguards. In this typical country arms control decisions are made by a coterie of government officials, linked to an equally small number of private specialists in the universities, the print media, and a few research institutions. Public opinion is generally uninformed on the details of the issues, while NGOs which concern themselves with these questions are either Soviet-influenced mass organizations on the fringes of the political systems or are comprised of “defense intellectuals” who view arms control through a narrowly defined national security prism.

Our primary objective in this situation might be to involve knowledgeable individuals in and out of the government and opposite numbers in the U.S. to (1) exchange ideas and information, (2) clear up misapprehensions among those close to the decision-making process about where the U.S. stands on the issues, and (3) improve that country’s analytical capabilities.

On issues of regional significance to the country and its neighbors, such as CAT and nonproliferation, the main approach might be to expose the specialists to the views of U.S. official and non-official experts as well as to the attitudes of others in the region (who perhaps see the country’s interest in increased arms and nuclear capabilities as not necessarily benign). Illustratively, the following techniques might be used to achieve this aim: (1) exchange grants for specialists from several countries in the region to visit the U.S. as a group for discussions with U.S. officials and American specialists, ending in a series of structured meetings held under the auspices of a foreign policy organization; (2) a regional conference, cosponsored by a prestigious foreign policy institution of the country, to informally discuss alternative approaches to limiting arms influxes; (3) a grant to an American NGO to work with specialists from the region to explore prospects for a regional
clearing house to share information on arms control subjects; (4) speaking tours to the region for leading U.S. experts on these subjects; (5) fellowships for one or two nationals of the country to study arms control at a U.S. academic center for a year.

To allay misperceptions about the U.S. strategic military and arms control posture two main techniques could be used: (1) development of indigenous-language media materials which discuss the significance of SALT for East-West stability and its role in furthering global arms control objectives, and (2) exchange activities which bring defense specialists, journalists, and researchers to the U.S. to see at first hand how arms control and security interrelate in U.S. policy.

Instead of directly treating current policy disagreements over non-proliferation, a group of official and unofficial American specialists on this subject might meet with local counterparts in a three-day off-the-record session to discuss the implications of alternative proliferation scenarios over the coming decades.

For all of these activities ICA research and media reaction reporting would keep U.S. policy makers and program participants informed of local attitudes on the questions under discussion. At the same time ICA media (e.g., Voice of America programming, videotape recordings, magazines, presentation books, bibliographies) could be used effectively to supplement the interpersonal dialogue.

(b) Program Model #2:

In a typical developed country the issues might revolve around the U.S. reliability as an ally (in which SALT is feared by some as presaging a decoupling of American and regional defense), and a perception that the U.S. is attempting to retain its dominant position in both the conventional arms and nuclear markets. Governmental decisions and public pronouncements are affected by a sizable concerned public, affiliated with a wide variety of academic, research, and political institutions. Some anti-nuclear NGOs have political clout and support certain American arms control official positions, though they tend to oppose the U.S. military presence in the region. Writers on security questions are the most vocal and articulate opponents of the SALT II agreement, as well as other proposed regional arms control arrangements.

The major program strategy here might be to present the rationale for U.S. defense and arms control efforts through indigenous institutions which are already set up to explore these issues, and thus maximize the credibility of our presentations. Through participation in seminars and placement of articles in local publications we would seek an impact on both decision makers and public opinion. Although government officials would not be ignored, journalists, TV commentators,
defense specialists in parliament, and faculty members of international relations institutes might receive primary attention.

To get at the question of U.S. reliability and SALT, we might use the following techniques: (1) information packets on the U.S. strategic posture and arms control, with special emphasis on SALT; (2) special briefings on SALT for foreign journalists resident in Washington and New York; (3) tours of NATO facilities for parliamentarians and journalists from the country; (4) a high-visibility joint seminar on SALT and regional security held in conjunction with a major strategic studies think tank; (5) speaking tours for authoritative U.S. experts on these subjects; and (6) a U.S. visitation program in which specialists meet with U.S. officials and private arms control/security experts, travel to appropriate installations around the country, and participate in a wrap-up conference in Washington which focuses on arms control in the context of East-West security issues.

Suspicions about U.S. positions on CAT and nonproliferation might suggest an approach wherein we both explain U.S. policies and also stress the importance of sharing ideas and information as we collectively attempt to develop appropriate policies for the coming decade. This low key approach might envisage such goals as: (1) to encourage systematic research by local institutions on public attitudes on these arms control questions, (2) to stage a series of small seminars off of USG premises at which U.S. views can be discussed, (3) to develop a computerized arms control information base for sharing with experts in the country, (4) to publish and distribute a quarterly arms control “portfolio” containing copies of major policy statements and journal articles, and (5) to subsidize travel and participation by specialists from the country in arms control related seminars conducted by private organizations in the United States.

VII. Research:

One element in this program should be systematic and periodic surveys by ICA of opinion in key foreign countries on central issues of arms control, disarmament, and national security. Although soundings of mass opinion may be useful on certain broad topics, such as MBFR or SALT in Western Europe, the primary focus of the research effort should be informed elite opinion, for which more detailed or nuanced questioning should be possible. Evidence from such surveys of mass and elite opinion could be integrated with media reporting to provide current profiles of national and regional opinion. Periodic surveys, beginning early in the program, reflecting changes in attitudes would be useful both to U.S. policy makers and to those charged with implementing and adapting the ongoing public diplomacy initiative.
Dear PAO:

As dog days slowly fade from the Washington scene, and as our newly created Agency settles in following reorganization, I begin here-with a series of letters (of my own composition, for better or worse) designed to share directly with you and your staff what I have attempted to share with your colleagues here in Washington: that is, my views with respect to those concepts and philosophy which will guide our operations.

I have an uneasy feeling that the letters—this one in particular—are each likely to be a trifle long; I therefore urge you not even to take them up until you have an uninterrupted period to concentrate and reflect upon each of them, yourself, before making them the subject of discussion with your staff where that seems appropriate.

In the course of the series, I want to address such subjects as audience identification, the related distribution and records system, the “new” personnel system, mutuality, libraries, English teaching, genuine outreach programs and several other questions with which we have wrestled over the years. The subjects themselves are not new, but over the years they have never coalesced to form operational touch-stones. We have always had “good” activities, but precise shibboleths of professionalism have tended to elude us. I seek in this series to provide some bench marks for the Agency.

Discussions of most of these subjects have taken place in Washington (and with respect to some subjects, the discussions have been unduly protracted). Draft statements of policy have been prepared, and some tentative views have been conveyed to you. In a number of instances I personally have kept proposed policy statements from coming to you because I have not been entirely satisfied that our thinking—or our language—has been sufficiently refined. Now I believe we are ready to communicate effectively with you; I intend that within a relatively short time you will know where we stand on each of the above subjects.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, USIA Historical Collection, Office of the Director, Biographic Files Relating to USIA Directors and Other Senior Officials, 1953–2000, Entry A–I 1069, Box 23, John E. Reinhardt, Speeches, 1977–1978. No classification marking. Copies were sent to all country PAOs.
In this first letter, I want to address the question of field operations, generally and philosophically.

From the beginning I have said—and have meant—that roughly 80% of this Agency’s work should stand or fall on the basis of what happens in the field. Service in Washington should be regarded only as an apprenticeship leading to greater service in the field. We in Washington have an obligation not to erect complicated systems which become their own justification and which do not contribute to smooth, efficient and effective work at posts abroad. Over the years, for example, I have thought that we have made the Country Plan process, or audience records systems, so complex that we have forced attention on systems rather than on effective communication. Conceptual and operational simplicity must govern our instructions to you. I hope we can meet our own standard.

I want to acknowledge at the outset that much of what follows and will follow in succeeding letters is not new. Much of it will already animate your leadership and work. Much of it you will already have heard in various communications from Washington, including my own statements. It is my simple intent to summarize for ready reference as we begin the first full year of our work together. So I hope you will accept this series of letters in that spirit, amending course where amendment is directed by the thoughts in this and following letters.

To begin at the beginning: the bedrock purpose of ICA is to deal with what Walter Lippmann once called the “pictures in peoples heads.”² There is a tendency in a society as pragmatic as our own to deprecate the importance of the pictures in peoples heads. My own view is that it is important—fundamentally important—and sobering work, to be approached with tenacity and humility. I have quoted Oliver Wendell Holmes and H.G. Wells before. I accept, and hope that all of us accept, as literal truth the assertion that “man’s mind, stretched to a new idea, never goes back to its original dimension.” I accept as literal truth that “human history is in essence a history of ideas.” I continue to agree with President Carter’s assertion at Notre Dame that “it is a mistake to undervalue the power of words and of the ideas that words embody.”³

Against that philosophical background, how do we give operational expression to the idea that ideas are important?

A PAO arrives in Germany or in Rwanda, encounters an advanced communications network or a comparatively simple one, inherits more

² Reinhardt is referring, presumably, to Walter Lipmann’s 1922 work Public Opinion. Lipmann’s first chapter is entitled “The World Outside and The Pictures in Our Heads.”

³ See footnote 2, Document 57.
or less complicated bilateral problems and opportunities, engages an extensive and informed audience or one considerably less so. In either case, and in all cases in between, what should the Agency reasonably expect of its principal representative in the field? How do we translate Holmes and Wells and President Carter into effective operation?

In rather short order, we should expect from the PAO a thoughtful rationale for communicating in a single distinctive country, a rationale which will withstand challenge by Ambassadors, by the American public and its representatives, or by Agency management.

This rationale should bear some relationship to USG goals and objectives in the country. It can be expressed in terms of the tensions—the explicit or implicit communications tensions—between the host society and the United States. These tensions can be revealed by disdain for American cultural and aesthetic values; by ignorance of our efforts to erect a humane, libertarian society; by outright opposition to our nuclear non-proliferation policies; or in other, sometimes hidden, ways. The truly important problems and opportunities may not be easy to identify; they may shift from time to time (but not from day to day); they may exceed both our reach and our grasp—some so much so that they should simply be set aside, others so slightly that we should work at their resolution even though that resolution may never be fully accomplished.

Where problems or opportunities are not likely to be effectively addressed by anything ICA can do, where we can only nibble at the edges but not do anything to relieve a problem—a trade imbalance, for example—we (you) should boldly state that fact, make it a part of the rationale. You will have no opposition from us.

The corollary thought, however, is that if you can reduce no tensions, contribute to the advancement of no USG objectives—and one must allow for this possibility theoretically—then it is your obligation and ours to shift resources to environments more amenable to ICA approaches.

Articulating one’s rationale, we should acknowledge, ought to involve at least some intellectual agony. We are not looking for warmed-over political reporting. And, indeed, I must extend a general compliment on the quality of the bilateral communications essays this past spring. Whatever the defects of the Country Plan instructions, the resulting documents were measurably more thoughtful, profound and subtle than many of their predecessors.

The second general step in field operations, of course, is to identify those in the host society whom one wishes to engage. We will have in your hands within the next few weeks a revised and simplified set of guidelines for audience analysis. PAOs at posts where the earlier version was field-tested appear to have found the structured approach to
be of considerable assistance. I have personally delayed the sending of these guidelines as I have demanded greater simplicity. I will return to the question of “who” in a subsequent letter transmitting the guidelines. For the purposes of this letter, and as a general proposition, I do want to note my personal belief that our principal interlocutors should be those individuals and institutions in a society who create, communicate, debate ideas. For better or worse, it is the intellectuals—broadly defined—who set the agenda in virtually every society. Our purpose should be to stimulate their thought, refresh it where we can, understand the “pictures in their heads” and be certain that they understand our own. It is the “agenda setters” whom we are after. I must indicate one caveat: when we discuss libraries later, I shall indicate that the doors should be ajar for those who are not normally considered “agenda setters.”

In most societies, questions of access, time and limitations on our own resources will force hard choices upon us: we cannot hope to communicate effectively with all of the “agenda setters” on all of the issues we would like. Choice is forced upon us; the quality of our choices determines our effectiveness. Intellectual agony presents itself, again.

Finally, the heart of this letter: our concept of communication.

I believe it is essential to draw a distinction between “programming” and effective communication. The very word “program” has been much abused in the CU/USIS/ICA lexicon, and we paid a certain price.

Neither USIA nor CU was ever acknowledged as full partners in diplomacy, nor in some cases even as important contributors to national goals. One effect of our perceived lack of relevance in the past has been at least a mild case of institutional self-doubt. It is simply human nature in such circumstances to justify one’s existence by being active. My observations of the past year suggest that we may be too active: too many activities, too many programs, too many reports designed for voracious Washington machines and, most importantly, perhaps too many objectives—and too little time for reflection.

I do not believe that activities or “programs” necessarily sum to communication. From our perspective here in Washington we will not be insisting on quantity: a few well-chosen people in the audience, a few well-chosen opportunities for the exchange of ideas among important “agenda setters,” a few discernible changes in the pictures in people’s heads should be our goals. More than that we can probably not accomplish.

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4 See Document 154.
I am sensitive to the demands levied upon you by your working environment, and particularly by your mission colleagues. Some—perhaps most, but certainly not all—of those demands are inescapable and simply constitute the familiar cost of doing business. We make proper allowance for this cost. I am, rather, addressing myself to those activities and objectives which are generated within the ICA post.

I also acknowledge the dilemma faced by many posts at which the environment offers almost inexhaustible communication opportunities. We must regret forgoing some in order to focus our minds and efforts on a few. The choice cannot be easy. But I, for one, would vastly prefer a few demonstrable accomplishments in the realm of ideas than a plethora of merely good activities and programs.

Indeed, I am troubled by the verb “to program.” In many instances, it seems to me, effective and stylish “programming” has come to substitute for—and possibly to get in the way of—effective communication.

A program is an event; communication is a process. Effective communication entails the establishment of connections, their sustenance over time, the refreshing of intellectual wells, repetition for effect, the articulation and focussing of post resources for mutual reinforcement. The outcome—without which all else is delusion—should be a detectable increase in the intellectual or social momentum on any chosen subject as a result of our activities. It would, I submit, be worth asking yourselves how many of your post’s activities are in fact contributing to an increase in such momentum or whether your post is spread too thinly for effective accomplishment of the truly important.

To risk a generalization: it strikes me that it is at large posts in environments characterized by numerous policy and other communications tensions, and at small posts with restricted resources and relatively heavy extraneous demands on time, that the potential conflict between “programming” and effective communication is likely to be most acute; in the former case because the opportunity to do good work is so great across such a wide spectrum; in the latter case because it is the constant human temptation to respond to environmental demands—and to stay busy. In both cases, the challenge is to knit specific program events together to form a seamless web so that the IV grant, the lecture, the VTR showing, the Wireless File distribution, the outreach article passed to the Minister of State—in short, the “program” become a coherent process of communication on a few important subjects over an extended period of time. The specific “programs” or “events” are links which form a chain and the connector is the PAO and his staff.

The fact that audiences enjoy a “program,” ask for additional similar “programs,” and express admiration for the person or country producing such “programs” should not deflect us from our underlying
purposes. Such emotional bonuses from our audiences may be desirable but should not be equated with communicating. We are not impresarios—although thorough knowledge of stagecraft is important in our business. We are communicators.

Let me be more specific. At the Brussels PAO Conference, I listened with fascination as a PAO described how over a period of years rising journalists in his country had had little or no contact with the United States. Many of these men and women were assuming prominent positions in prominent media. The PAO was not certain why these men and women lacked an American connection, nor did he seek to assign blame. He did describe the manner in which he handled the problem, which incidentally seemed eminently satisfactory to me.

My point in this is that it is a prime example of a problem which ICA can attack—but not by way of a “program.” Our first thought, one which would occur to the most junior of us, is to arrange IV grants—and we probably should. But the grant is a single link. What are the other links, other “programs”? How do we employ other post resources, including staff and time, in this important communication nexus? Indeed, should we drop less important “programs,” though fully described in the Country Plan, as we concentrate our forces to close this gap?

And, finally, have we built in some way of evaluating results—the “momentum”—as we begin the protracted communication process with such a group? In short, are we managing “programs” or a communication process?

A final note, which may strike you as much as it has me: at current budget levels, total expenditures at posts average close to $1,000 per working day per American. However one caveats the figure, it remains—or ought to remain—a sobering statistic. The obligations of individual and collective accomplishment which flow from it—day in, day out and to the taxpayer—are substantial. Important subjects, institutions and individuals must be addressed thoughtfully and importantly. The bottom-line question remains: are we making a detectable difference in the momentum of at least a few ideas?

There is far more left unsaid herein than said. You have every justification, indeed, for asking what else is new; the answer, frankly, is that my purpose was to summarize for reference and, where circumstances suggest, to try to provoke new ways of looking at old business. Still, in terms of concepts, philosophy—choose your own guiding word—the Agency expects no more and no less of its principal field representatives than that they have a rationale, a thoughtfully identified

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5 See footnote 6, Document 125.
audience, a sense of communicating (as opposed to “programming”) and that they make a detectable difference. We have had too much theology, much of it esoteric, from Washington over the years. My intent in this letter has been simply to codify common sense, recognizing that it is one of our longest suits at field posts in particular.

I look forward to discussing this and other subjects of interest with those of you who will be at the PAO Conference in Jakarta this month and with others of you on subsequent occasions. With best wishes to all of you for a good year.

Sincerely,

John E. Reinhardt

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151. Telegram From the Department of State to Multiple Diplomatic and Consular Posts

Washington, September 26, 1978, 0048Z

244085. Exdis for Amb. and PAO from Saunders/NEA; Curran/ICA/NEA. Subject: U.S. Support for Camp David.

1. The purpose of this message is to elicit quickly your first views on the manner in which public diplomacy—broadly defined—can help develop support in the Middle East for the significant, tangible results

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780392–0473. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Manama, Sana, Tehran, Abu Dhabi, the Interests Section in Baghdad, Doha, Kuwait, Dharan, Tunis, Tripoli, Rabat, Algiers, Jerusalem, and Tel Aviv. Drafted in NEA/P; cleared in ICA/NEA and S/S–O and in ICA for information; approved by Saunders. On September 29, telegram 244085 to multiple posts was repeated to USUN, and, on October 3, it was repeated to the Joint Chiefs of Staff J–5 Directorate. (Ibid.) In his memoirs, Vance stated: “I had realized after my trip to Saudi Arabia and Jordan in September that we would have to conduct a major informational effort in the Arab countries to explain what Camp David really involved. I asked the International Communications Agency and Hal Saunders to propose ways of getting across the message that whatever Begin might now be saying, Camp David was a significant advance from the original self-rule proposal.” (Vance, Hard Choices, p. 237)
of the Camp David summit. Specifically, we feel we are not successfully communicating with the Arabs the importance of seizing the opportunity offered by the Camp David Agreements. The highest levels of the administration have made it clear to us that the task of winning support is of the utmost importance. We are developing a plan of action here and want to incorporate your suggestions at the outset.

2. We assume: (a) that the sense of central vision and purpose of the Camp David Framework will be difficult to maintain, at least in public mind, as negotiations unfold; (b) that news media will tend to highlight divisions and negative issues, thereby contributing to erosion of momentum; (c) that moderate individuals, institutions and governments will require continuing encouragement.

3. We also assume, given the extraordinary importance of the summit, that within very broad limits ICA and State will be able to draw on private individuals and institutions within the United States, including at least limited foundation resources, for speaking, seminar, conference, personal contact and encouragement purposes. Furthermore, we think that at least some institutions and individuals in Western Europe and elsewhere will be willing to assist where third-party or neutral-ground activities seem desirable. We have had indications from our allies (and a specific offer from the U.K.) that could result in participation by friendly news media (the BBC for example) in our support effort.

4. ICA resources are, of course, available as required.

5. With above assumptions in mind, we need your recommendations on:

(a) The manner in which we can, directly or indirectly, enhance the number and potency of host-country individuals and institutions supporting summit results;

(b) The possibilities over the next several months for enhancing useful contacts between Arabs and Israelis. Such contacts need not be in the context of direct peace negotiations. It seems to us that many private American (and European) institutions are planning, or could be interested in planning, conferences and seminars on a variety of “safe” topics (economics, public administration, technical management) to which appropriate Israelis and Arabs could be jointly attracted;

(c) The manner in which private American individuals and institutions, and USG resources as well, might be used to encourage moderate individuals and institutions in Middle East;

(d) What non-U.S. resources, public or private, could usefully be engaged.

6. We need your views as soon as possible. We realize this is a tight deadline but we would be greatly assisted if you could reply by your COB Sept. 27 and slug for reply “for ICA/NEA.”

7. We encourage you to make lateral distribution of your reply to all addresses of this message.

Christopher

152. Telegram From the Liaison Office in China to the International Communication Agency

Beijing, October 4, 1978, 0241Z

3168. ICA for Director Reinhardt only. State for EA Holbrooke/Thayer only. From Mort Smith. Subj: ICA Activities at USLO, Peking.

1. I understand there is a possibility that you will meet with Ambassador Woodcock during his Washington consultations next week. Given the changes which have taken place in the PRC since your last meeting, this should provide a vital opportunity to discuss the future of ICA-funded activities. Following are some suggestions and observations reflecting my detailed discussions here.

2. The enlarged scope for ICA-funded activities is real and important to the future of US–PRC relations and to perceptions of each other. While no one can say how long the present policies will last, no one doubts the commitment of the present leadership to building a modern state primarily through self-reliance but with substantial foreign technical help. Whether it is possible to send students to foreign countries, encourage the study of foreign languages in China, increase informa-

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780405–0724. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to the Department of State.

2 Woodcock met with the President and Brzezinski on October 11. For additional information, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XIII, China, footnote 2, Document 141.

3 There is no indication as to when an earlier meeting between Reinhardt and Woodcock took place.
tion input from outside sources, encourage listening to foreign broadcasts and do many of the other extraordinary things the current leadership has started doing without seriously affecting the non-technical aspects of Chinese society is a question only a Chinese fortune teller can predict. But the Chinese appear to be determined to go down this road, and until the line changes—which it can do although at considerable cost—we have an opportunity to enhance the communication process to a significant degree.

3. We have the start of a highly useful ICA program thanks to the excellent work done by a number of State Department officers who labored in the vineyard when conditions were less than ideal. John Thomson’s efforts since arriving a few months ago have been applauded by all of his colleagues, and he has been able to build quickly on the foundation established earlier. The major components in the ICA funded effort here are: exchanges of all types; providing English teaching materials to foreign experts and in all likelihood soon to Chinese teachers; a currently active film and VTR loan program now primarily with foreign teachers of the Chinese but with great potential for direct loans to Chinese; a book translation program which can be substantially expanded to take advantage of the current passion for foreign literature; the start of a small exhibit program whose efficacy will be tested before the end of the year. Publication program making available specialized printed materials about the U.S. including materials on US education; the start of a library which can be shaped to support our exchange programs; distributing Wireless File and other policy materials to Foreign Ministry officials.

4. It would be foolhardy for us to attempt to rush in now with programs beyond those enumerated above until we get a clearer indication of the permanency of the situation here and particularly our own ability to carry out current programs with an adequate measure of success. But to do even these minimal tasks requires considerably more in USG resources than currently assigned to the PRC. In manpower alone we cannot cope with these minimal requirements; in spite of the herculean efforts of an exceptionally able officer plus the considerable help of others in the Mission. In addition, the special organizational arrangement at the Mission obviously reflects a previous set of circumstances which are badly outdated.

5. To carry out these tasks I suggest the following:

A. The establishment of an ICA office within USLO—either as the cultural and press section or as ICA-Peking, whichever is most acceptable to USLO and the Department. The head of this office would report to the DCM and Ambassador and would have responsibility for carrying out the programs listed in para 3 above and for reporting to USLO on activities in these fields.
B. The office would be headed by a cultural counselor who would have prime responsibility for the exchange program in all of its manifestations. He would deal with American academicians and with the Chinese on exchange matters. He would also have supervisory responsibility for all ICA programs.

C. Assisting him would be a more junior officer who would be responsible primarily for the non-exchange elements of the program but would assist the cultural counselor as needed. He would share responsibility for dealing with the press with the cultural counselor.

D. An absolute necessity would also be a crackerjack admin secretary, one who could provide the office with the combined talents needed in the special circumstances of the PRC where many of the basic admin talents cannot be found in the local community.

E. Four local employees—a librarian (currently on the USLO staff); a Wireless File operator/audio visual assistant (tentatively approved by the Agency); a distribution clerk; an exchanges assistant. These would have to be supplied by the PRC, as are all local employees, but our experience with the current librarian indicates that training by ICA staff members from Hong Kong or other places can bring the level of local employee competence to better than acceptability.

6. Central to this plan is the course of the negotiations with the PRC on the exchange program. Obviously, if the exchange effort suffers a major setback or takes a form thus far unthought of, the needs outlined above will have to be reconsidered. However, given the current massive workload at USLO and the speed with which the exchange effort appears to be developing, plus the dramatic expansion of opportunities in other fields, we would do well to seriously discuss these proposals now so as to move quickly after the completion of these talks with the Chinese.

7. If the results of the Chou Pei-yuan visit warrant, I believe we should begin prompt discussions with State with a view to bringing our staffing arrangements in Peking into accord with the new realities that are emerging in our exchange relationship with the PRC. Our top priority should be providing John Thomson with a secretary/admin assistant, if possible by November when the first group of PRC English language trainees may be traveling to the US. Assuming that we can

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4 In an undated briefing memorandum to Vance, in preparation for his October 3 meeting with Huang Hua in New York, Holbrooke noted that a PRC delegation, headed by Chou Pei-yuan, was scheduled to arrive in the United States on October 7 to participate in talks with a U.S. group headed by NSF President Richard Atkinson and also tour several American universities. The briefing memorandum is printed Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XIII, China, Document 137; the memorandum of conversation of the Vance–Huang Hua meeting is ibid., Document 138.
secure state concurrence for the creation of two officer-level ICA positions at USLO, we should also move promptly to select a relatively junior officer who hopefully could be transferred here as early next year as feasible (obviously, I would suggest Thomson as our senior man here).

8. There will be some inconveniences for those who have to come out here quickly. Living conditions are not good and hotel living will, in all likelihood, be required at first. But the challenges and opportunities are so great that I am sure our agency can come up with appropriate people, as we did with Thomson.

9. These thoughts reflect my discussions with USLO, most importantly with the Charge, who as former Deputy Director of PRCM in the Department, is fully cognizant of the history of our activity in China. He has seen this message and concurs in principle that changes along the above lines may be desirable depending upon the concrete results of the exchange delegation. He naturally feels that the Mission should reserve its position until Ambassador Woodcock has returned to post and has had an opportunity to express his views. A more positive response cannot be hoped for.

10. There are some resource implications for us in this plan which EA can prepare for your consideration. While there is some additional money in our new budget for exchanges and other activities, there will not be enough to fund all of these costs. I can’t think of a higher priority need in the Agency, however, and trust that you will agree.

Roy

5 Reference is to Roy.
153. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to the Director of the International Communication Agency (Reinhardt), Secretary of State Vance, Secretary of Defense Brown, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (McIntyre), and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Warnke)\(^1\)

Washington, October 16, 1978

SUBJECT

Interagency Committee on Public Diplomacy and Disarmament

Having received the concurrence of all agencies that participated in the interagency committee on public diplomacy and disarmament,\(^2\) the International Communication Agency should implement the program outlined in the committee’s report of September 5, 1978.\(^3\) Given the complexity, sensitivity, and dynamics of the arms control issues to be addressed in this program, the implementation of this program shall be carried out with the assistance of, and in close and continuing consultation with, all agencies that were represented on the interagency committee.

Such coordination will be particularly important in the development of public statements addressing our SALT and CTB efforts.

Zbigniew Brzezinski\(^4\)

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\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 9, International Communication Agency: 9–12/78. Confidential. Putnam sent the memorandum to Brzezinski under an October 13 memorandum, requesting that he sign the directive. (Ibid.)

\(^2\) Agency responses to the final report are ibid.

\(^3\) See Document 149.

\(^4\) Aaron signed for Brzezinski above Brzezinski’s typed signature.
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154. Letter From the Director of the International Communication Agency (Reinhardt) to all ICA Public Affairs Officers

Washington, October 20, 1978

Dear PAO:

In my first letter of this series, I mentioned that I would be discussing with you the role of the library in the Agency’s overall operations. In this letter, I will indicate the importance, nature, and objectives of our libraries, as well as what we expect of you in their management. Some of you have libraries, some of you do not. The purpose of this letter is not to open or close libraries; rather it is to establish general principles governing their operation, wherever they exist, and unmistakably to point up their fundamental importance in the communication process.

Libraries will not run themselves while principal officials turn their attention to “more urgent” matters. Libraries are important; we will treat them as such. Libraries are expensive; they require prudent and direct management by PAOs.

The ICA library is an overt expression of the importance of free inquiry and of an informed citizenry. While the library can be a means of communicating specific ideas in the ICA programs overseas, it can also be, in itself, a powerful statement about American knowledge, culture and achievements. Our use of libraries must be consistent with the precepts of good communication, the precepts of contemporary American library practices, and the tradition of the American library.

Libraries are institutions with a long-term communication objective. The social and intellectual rate of return on libraries cannot be measured in months or even tours of duty.

In my first letter, I established the “increase in the intellectual or social momentum on any chosen subject” as our ultimate objective. We should admit, I think, that the stimulation of certain kinds of ideas—including those represented by our libraries—will take time. Indeed, one of the virtues of a library is to serve as a daily reminder—as we deal with the brush fires of the day—that serious communication on serious topics is a long-term proposition. We do need to focus on today’s problems, we will focus on these problems, but we also need to avoid the trap of being consumed by them. The task of integrating

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2 See Document 150.
a library into an effective communication strategy will force us to probe more deeply into the nature of our communication problems and opportunities. It will force us to keep our eyes on the long haul—as we must.

An ICA library must consist of a core collection containing those books, periodicals and other materials which embody the sustaining ideas of the American past as well as the generative energy of the present. It must center on American biography, history, philosophy, fiction, drama, and significant works in contemporary social science broadly defined. Every ICA library worthy of the name should offer the best—and only the best—books and journals in these fields; it follows that any foreigner using such a collection becomes important to us, even though we do no more than respond to her or his library needs. The library’s design, collection and evolution must attract segments of the broad student community. Indeed, few resources at the disposal of a PAO are more adaptable to the student population. When carefully selected students are attracted to and use the materials of your library, count your blessings. Conversely if they do not darken the library door, the burden of explanation is on you.

Special circumstances may justify the inclusion of other materials in the library, materials selected with student and non-student users in mind. The communications needs of your post might be served by the inclusion of materials on management techniques, for example, or American scholarly works about the host country. But such materials serve an objective different from the central objective which I assign to the library as an institution; you should be able to justify the ways in which these additional materials support important objectives. The core collection itself may change and grow, but by nature will be steady, dependable, relatively timeless.

Local institutions may serve the same needs as our core collection. In no case should we simply duplicate an existing, accessible collection—even for the purpose of “showing the flag” (except of course in certain closed societies like Eastern Europe). Where accessible collections exist, our own efforts should effectively be directed to their enhancement or the creation of special ICA collections or ICA reference centers, assuming of course indigenous cooperation and communication interest.

If we accept as our library objective a role in projecting this country’s intellectual resources, inquisitiveness, and openness, our task must be to make the core collection (as defined above) attractive, accessible, relevant and known to the society in which the library operates. The greatest scope for your talents and creative energy lies in making the library relevant and known in selected circles. While the library exists primarily for those who wish to use it, we should be engaged in raising
the consciousness of local institutions with respect to the intellectual potential which it represents. I depend on you to engage in the development of a close relationship between the library and local institutions. In X country this relationship may be with principal secondary schools, while in Y it may be the social science faculties of selected universities. In short, the determination must be the PAO’s, there being no precise Washington formula for worldwide application.

Do not confuse this point with “outreach” (on which I intend to send you a separate letter). The Agency’s outreach program has been and will continue to be an important vehicle for communicating certain ideas to a few individuals. The library, on the other hand, might be described as the focus of “inreach”—an intellectual resource available to those who wish to use the collection for their own reasons. Your objective should be insuring that the collection is known as an available and highly relevant resource. But we will not deform a library’s strength as a long-term communication instrument in an effort to reach those whom we have traditionally described as “primary audiences” for short-term purposes. If such individuals use the library, so much the better; but your basic purpose should be to link the library to its natural audiences, among which the selected student community should rank high.

I define a library’s natural audience in the following terms: In all societies, some individuals read; others do not. Libraries draw a natural audience from those who visit or otherwise use the institution. Many will be students, teachers, young functionaries; others will be important current mission contacts. If the latter visit and use the library, we shall be elated. But—and I repeat for emphasis—the library must not be deformed to serve only current leaders or the acknowledged elite. Bear in mind that cabinet members and university presidents are not frequent visitors in Bethesda or Boston free public libraries. Those in the natural audience who use the library and grow to understand the knowledge, achievements and values it represents may, indeed, be unidentified potential leaders in the context of the long-term communication objectives the library is designed to achieve.

One of your major management responsibilities with respect to the library is the support and development of the local national library staff. The significance of the ICA library will depend in part on the level of literacy and English competency in your host country, in part on alternate sources for books and ideas, but significantly on the quality and activity of the library staff. However extensive the library collection and its supporting facilities, the library’s reputation and effectiveness depend to a large extent on the ability of the staff to respond quickly, constructively and imaginatively. The foreign national librarian who can act as an “intellectual detective” to search out and share informa-
tion, to pursue leads, and to refer people to each other may be a library’s greatest resource.

Limitations of foreign staff may, in some cases, stop us short of achieving this goal. But the Agency’s professional librarians and training programs for foreign librarians (both of which we intend to enhance) are available to help create institutions where the expectation that “something may happen” is the intellectual stimulus drawing people to the library.

We have the resources to achieve our objectives; I expect you to tell us how to put them together. Your Washington colleagues have been very persuasive in arguing that we need from each of you a kind of library Country Plan. I have at least temporarily rejected their counsel because I do not believe that Washington knows exactly what it wants in such a Plan.

Hence, what I should like for you to do in the immediate future (say between now and December 15) is to sit down with your staff and work out a library rationale for your country. (This instruction applies to countries with libraries; at this point I am not taking “orders” for establishing libraries, though any proposals will be attentively studied.) Following the principles set forth in this letter, you should determine how the library advances your communication objective, what its natural audience is, what special audiences will be attracted and how. Then forward this Plan to your Area Director and ECA/FL no later than January 1. It will help them execute their managerial responsibilities. It goes without saying, I hope, that you will also seek the counsel of regional library consultants.

One caveat at the risk of sheer repetition: I have indicated that “selected students” are the principal component of the library’s natural audience. The key word, of course, is “selected.” I am very leery of restrictive attendance formulas; on the other hand, I realize full well that libraries must serve some purpose other than warming and cooling their clients. What I want to establish above all else is that the Agency no longer expects you to attract the prime ministers, cabinet members, and other high-level officials who simply do not have the time, nor probably the inclination, to visit your library very often. But there must be and can be visitors—users—and chief among these are selected students. Students have always challenged us as an Agency; let’s accept the challenge.

Sincerely,

John E. Reinhardt
Director

P.S. Remember once more that nothing in this letter addresses the subject of outreach and that in due course we will write about this
important communication instrumentality. A library by definition is a book place, people come in, use its collection, and go out. Theoretically outreach does not depend on a library; books could be stored in a warehouse or garage, each affording a non-public place from which we could reach out.

155. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter

Washington, October 24, 1978

SUBJECT
Report on ICA’s First Six Months

John Reinhardt has prepared a brief report (TAB A) for you on the first six months of the International Communication Agency, which came into being on April 1, 1978. He cites several examples of the effectiveness of this agency’s work, much of which results cumulatively from the efforts of the past, e.g. large VOA listenership in the Soviet Union, participation in past exchange programs by 38 current heads of government and emulation of our cultural exchange programs by many other countries. His agency, as he points out in respect to Camp David, has a capacity to communicate important information rapidly to all parts of the world.

What is disturbing in this report, however, is the information that our exchange programs have declined by 57% in constant dollars over

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 9, International Communication Agency: 9–12/78. No classification marking. Sent for action. Carter initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum, indicating that he saw it. Dodson sent a copy of the memorandum to Reinhardt under a November 2 memorandum, indicating that Carter had reviewed Reinhardt’s October 5 memorandum (attached and printed as Tab A) and “pronounced it ‘Good.’” She also noted that the President had approved Brzezinski’s recommendation in his October 24 memorandum that “steps be taken to reverse” the decline in funding for exchange programs. Dodson concluded, “The NSC Staff is ready to assist you in developing plans for expansion of exchange programs and in securing Congressional approval for them.” (Ibid.) An earlier draft of Brzezinski’s memorandum to the President, with Brzezinski’s handwritten notations, is ibid. An NSC Correspondence Profile, attached to the October 24 memorandum, indicates that the original copy of Reinhardt’s memorandum was sent directly to Henze, that Brzezinski transmitted a copy of Reinhardt’s memorandum and his memorandum to the President on October 24, and that Carter approved the recommendation on October 31. (Ibid.)
the past twelve years. This illustrates dramatically a point made in PRM–10:2 our expenditures on the competition for ideas have not kept pace with military outlays and we have a serious lag to make good. Unless we put more money and assign more talent to this area, our successors ten years hence will not have as much evidence of effectiveness to cite as John Reinhardt does in this report.

There are many more countries in the world now educating more people for accelerated political, economic and social development than there were even ten years ago. We should expose more of them to the United States so that they will understand us better when they take leadership positions. I would like to have your approval to take up with John Reinhardt the need for planning systematic expansion of ICA’s exchange programs.3

Tab A

Memorandum From the Director of the International Communication Agency (Reinhardt) to President Carter4

Washington, October 5, 1978

Since October 1 marked the end of the first six months of the International Communication Agency’s existence, this seems an appropriate time to give you the first of the periodic accountings called for in your March 13 memorandum5 to me.

Briefly, most of our reorganization work is now complete. Good working relationships have been established with the National Security Council and the Department of State (closer, more productive relationships than have existed in many years). We have been working intimately with the Department and the NSC on such issues as the Bonn Summit,6 follow-up on the Camp David agreements,7 arms control and disarmament, the “successor generation” in Europe,8 international communications policy, human rights and others.

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2 See footnote 2, Document 42.
3 The President approved this recommendation and initialed “J” below it.
4 No classification marking. A copy was sent to Vance. The President wrote “good J” in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.
5 See Document 121.
6 See footnote 4, Document 130.
7 See footnote 2, Document 151.
8 See Document 130.
We have focused heavily on refinements in our work, in an effort to achieve significant gains in operational efficiency and effect. A few indicators of where we stand:

—According to Soviet research statistics (which accord closely with our own estimates), 60%–75% of the urban intelligentsia in the Soviet Union listens regularly to the Voice of America.

—38 current heads of government participated during their formative years in our exchange programs (including, for example, Anwar Sadat, Mario Soares, Valery Giscard d’Estaing, Helmut Schmidt and Julius Nyerere).

—Our worldwide press service made it possible to put the complete texts of the Camp David Accords (which the commercial services were transmitting in abbreviated form) in the hands of influential Middle Easterners—in and out of government—overnight.

—Our Fulbright exchange program has been emulated repeatedly by other countries over the past thirty years—an irony, since, as a result of recurring budgetary restrictions, our exchange programs have declined by 57% in constant dollars in the past twelve years. We also have 29% fewer people on our rolls than in 1964 (and may be the only agency in your government which can make such a statement).

—France, West Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom each devoted a larger percentage of its 1977 national budget than did the United States to external cultural and information activities. According to CIA, the Soviet Union spends “at least $2 billion a year” on pro-Communist and anti-U.S. propaganda; this compares with our $361 million budget in fiscal 1978.

But perhaps the most important indicator of all is the frequency and intensity with which the creation of ICA has been attacked by the Soviets over the past year. These attacks, I believe, reflect both the Soviets’ underlying insecurity (recognition of their disadvantages vis-a-vis the United States in the long-term competition of ideas and value systems) and their appreciation of the power of communication and ideas. As Lenin put it in 1924, “ideas are more fatal than guns.”

Unlike the Soviets, we as a country and as a government tend to underestimate the centrality of our ideas and values to our position in the world and how attractive they remain to foreign peoples. It is, therefore, important to focus on the positive impact of your human rights policy at the popular level abroad. As a result of that impact, we appear to be reclaiming something the United States was in danger of forfeiting to Marxism-Leninism—an identification with the future.

I am convinced that our continued competition with the Soviets and their followers, as well as our relations with the developing nations, will be determined essentially by the force of our ideas and the effective-
ness with which we communicate them to the rest of the world. If I interpret your statements and actions correctly, this accords well with your own sense of priorities. It is ICA’s essential work. At the end of our first six months, I believe we can carry this work forward from a position of strength and confidence.

156. Telegram From the International Communication Agency to all ICA Principal Posts

Washington, undated

Subject: Humphrey Scholarships.

1. Following message being sent for Action to Ankara, Athens, Nicosia and Valletta. Other EU posts for info only.

2. Pretoria, Canberra, Tokyo, Wellington for info only.

3. On July 31, the President approved the establishment of a Hubert H. Humphrey North-South Scholarship program for outstanding young men and women of modest means from all of the developing countries to study for one year of specialized training in the U.S. The scholarships are to be offered to men and women engaged in public service for a one-year enrichment course in fields related directly to their work, not necessarily leading to a degree.

4. The program’s purpose is to help educate a core group of a new generation of developing world leaders. It is designed to provide education and a common experience for a group of future leaders and by so doing provide a compelling symbol of U.S. interest in the developing world. It will seek out talented youth who might otherwise not be able to afford education thereby demonstrating a special American concern for helping the poor and for promoting equality of people. The purpose of the studies will be to enhance the students’ capabilities for public service, in particular to help improve incomes, living standards and employment and enable them to contribute more effectively.

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South Pastor Files, Subject Files, Box 56, Humphrey Scholarship Program: 6–12/78. Unclassified. All brackets are in the original. Sent for information only to Geneva for USIO; sent to Brussels with a request to pass to USEC; sent for information only to USNATO. Drafted by Richard Straus on November 1; cleared in draft by Pastor, Bloch, Olason, Nichols, Richmond, Curtiss, and Schneidman; approved by Nalle. The telegram does not have a transmission time or a telegram number.

2 See footnote 2, Document 145.
to the equitable development of their country. The fields of study should include but not be limited to health, social work, rural or urban development.

5. The President has assigned the implementation of the program to the Agency under the authority of Section 102(A)(1) (I)(B) of the MECEA.

6. Scholarships will be made available to men and women from all developing countries with which we have diplomatic relations on a scale weighted by population (3 for countries over 10 million, 2 for those between 1 and 10 million, and 1 for countries with a population of less than 1 million). Placement and supervision in the U.S. will be handled by IIE. The first group of students is expected to come to the U.S. in time for the start of academic year 1979–80. Because funds for the program are being made available to the Agency beginning with fiscal year 1980 (i.e., beginning Oct. 1, 1979), the first group of students will have to have a sufficient knowledge of English not to require language training prior to the start-up of courses. In future years, we hope to be able to offer summer intensive English language courses so that students need not have the same level of English capability as we are asking for the first year. In countries with binational commissions, the opportunities for participation in the program should be publicized in the same way that opportunities are now offered for foreign students and the candidates should be selected in the same manner. In countries where there are no binational commissions, PAO’s should seek to establish jointly with the local government, preferably the Ministry of Education, an adequate screening mechanism. We would expect that such a screening mechanism would provide that in most countries initial screening will be done by local government agencies and a panel of three to five times the number of candidates would be submitted to the PAO for further selection and final approval of the winner(s) by the BFS. If this selection procedure poses problems for you, as it might in some countries, you should urgently advise us of the problems you see and we will seek to develop with you alternate methods of selection. All posts and binational commissions should bear in mind that we seek on an overall basis a roughly equal proportion of men and women and you are therefore encouraged to pay attention to worthy women candidates so that this overall proportion may be met.

7. Selection criteria: The program requires that candidates be outstanding young professionals, age 25–33, working in disciplines related to the public service for at least two and no more than five years, and unable to afford further education. They should be identifiable as potential future leaders; their education in the U.S. should be directly related to their future career development; they must be assured reem-
ployment in their chosen career on return to their home country; they should be of relatively modest family background by participating country standards, and essentially dependent on their own salary for meeting living costs; they should have completed the equivalent of undergraduate university training.

8. Summer workshop: at the end of the year-long course of formal study, the program will conclude with a summer workshop which will stress North-South development problems and hopefully also increase the participants’ understanding of the U.S. At least part of that workshop will take place at the Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs at the University of Minnesota. Details about the summer workshop will be supplied later.

9. In transmitting to you in this message the basic outline of the program and the administrative requirements placed on you, we recognize that we have undoubtedly not answered all of your questions. You are invited to forward these to the Agency as they develop. Slug telegrams for ECA/A.

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157. Telegram From the Department of State to all Diplomatic Posts

Washington, November 2, 1978, 0034Z

278318. For Chief of Mission. Subject: VOA Commentaries on the News.

1. The Voice of America has initiated in the last ten days a series of regular commentaries on current events. These commentaries are in principle to reflect USG policy closely and there will be monitoring of the commentaries within ICA. The new program has been called to the attention of all PAOs by ICA Director John Reinhardt.

2. As you know, VOA has been given wide-ranging autonomy and independence by Congress in carrying out its mission and this should be fully respected. Nevertheless, the policy content of VOA commentaries is of high importance to the Department and we believe it should be followed closely. Chiefs of Mission are requested, therefore, to call to the Department’s attention promptly any commentaries relating to US policies affecting your area which you believe do not accurately

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780451–0939. Confidential; Stadis. Drafted by Kreisberg; cleared by Trattner; approved by Christopher.
reflect US policy. As we will be working closely with ICA in order to ensure that US policy is fully reflected in the commentaries which will be written by the VOA your comments will be of assistance to us.

Vance

158. Statement by the Director of the International Communication Agency (Reinhardt) Before the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization

Paris, November 3, 1978

In his opening remarks at this general conference, the President of our 19th session reminded us that 2 years ago there had been a “spirit of Nairobi,” which helped us over difficult times to retain the atmosphere of accommodation that is essential to our activities; and he hoped that we might continue that spirit here in Paris, to aid us in our deliberations at this 20th general conference.

I join in that hope. I propose that we all once again set aside rhetorical politics and defensive expedients in favor of constructive action based on positive principles. With that recaptured spirit, I submit, we can achieve both unity and progress.

UNESCO has shown us the way over the past 2 years by its significant achievements in the field of human rights. It has adopted the strongest procedures of any U.N. agency for the handling of human

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1 Source: Department of State Bulletin, February 1979, pp. 50–54. All brackets are in the original. Reinhardt’s statement is entitled “UNITED NATIONS: The Challenge for Communications Development.” The 20th UNESCO General Conference took place from October 24 until November 28. The records of the 20th session—Records of the General Conference, Twentieth Session Paris, 24 October to 28 November 1978—are printed in three volumes: Resolutions, Reports, and Proceedings. (Paris: UNESCO, 1979) In telegram 35811 from Paris, October 30, the Embassy transmitted the full text of Reinhardt’s statement, requesting inter-agency comments and clearance. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])

2 Reference is to Deputy Head of the Canadian Delegation Napoleon Leblanc. In his October 25 address upon assuming the presidency of the 20th session of the UNESCO General Conference, Leblanc stated: “The name of my eminent predecessor [Taaitta Toweett] will always be linked with what has so rightly been called ‘the spirit of Nairobi’, that is: a firm resolve, whatever the difficulties we have to face and the diversity of our respective ideas, to arrive at a consensus that satisfies our fervent desire to achieve a universality based on respect for one another and on mutual understanding, in short—on dialogue.” (“Address by Mr. Napoleon Leblanc,” 20 C/INF.7 2 November 1978, p. 1)
rights complaints, thereby guaranteeing full and fair international review for the rights enshrined in the UNESCO Constitution. This represents an important landmark in UNESCO’s work in this, the 30th anniversary of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. We have also made a very important contribution to the international struggle to eliminate racism by adopting, through a consensus of the intergovernmental conference held last March, a draft declaration on race and racial prejudice. When confirmed by this general conference, that declaration will become a major weapon in the continuing struggle, to which we are all dedicated, against racism. This new instrument of our unity should command the fullest support and adherence of all governments devoted to human rights. It will contribute to our common endeavors not only at this conference but for generations to come. The United States urges unanimous support of the declaration.

UNESCO has also been making progress in other important areas. It has begun its own preparations for major participation in the U.N. Conference on Science and Technology for Development, a conference on which my government places great significance. During the past 2 years, UNESCO has sought to broaden and strengthen its programs to enhance the status of women and their role in our changing societies; its medium-plan statement on this subject is commendable.

On all those matters, and on numerous others in the fields of education, science, and culture—which UNESCO was created to promote—the United States has been pleased to take an active part. We hope that programs now moving in a promising direction will be carried through to successful culmination. For what we need to strengthen most of all is the sense of direction we recovered in Nairobi, and toward this end to join effective action with the spirit of cooperation.

This general theme—the move to a more effective program of action—will be developed by our delegation in each of the program commissions as we address ourselves to the proposed program and budget presented by the Director General [Amadou Mahtar M’Bow of Senegal]. In education, we look to increasing the links between schooling and the world of work, to the extension of educational opportunities

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3 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted December 10, 1948.
4 UNESCO subsequently adopted the Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice on November 27.
5 Scheduled to take place in Vienna, August 20–31, 1979.
to all segments of society, and to an expansion in the program for population education. In the natural sciences, we will call for a greater focus on priority projects and for the building of scientific capabilities in developing countries. In the social sciences, we will join with others to define major projects and to concentrate efforts on them. In culture, we want to participate in strengthening the sense of cultural identity of all peoples and to recognize, at the same time, the contributions of all cultures to the life of all humankind.

**Approach to Communications Development**

As I have said, the members of our delegation will develop our views on these matters in the various program commissions. It has always been the view of my government that it is on these matters—the E, the S, and the C of UNESCO—that our major emphasis should be placed. Today, however, I shall of necessity concentrate my attention on the questions that we face in the field of communications. For here we can see the clearest challenge to the continued “spirit of Nairobi.” What are the possibilities for effective action, and how do we find our way from the negative and divisive toward the positive and harmonious?

What we have before us first of all is the sound and generally agreed UNESCO medium-term objectives and the implementing plan of action proposed by the Director General. These give us the opportunity for much-needed research and study and calm reflection, as we seek to relate the extraordinary potential of communications to a human scale. The United States supports that program. But there are other documents on our desks, which aim to force decisions upon us that cannot, by their very nature, have been fully thought through. What are the most pressing communication needs of the various developing countries? How can they best be met—through restrictive declarations or positive cooperation? What are the best ways of addressing those troubling questions? I shall try in my statement to deal with each of these unresolved problems.

We have only just received the interim report of the International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems, and my government has not yet had an opportunity to formulate its reactions in full. Our comments will be provided, as requested, to the Commission.

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7 Following the 19th session of the UNESCO General Conference, M’Bow established a commission to undertake a review of communications in contemporary society. M’Bow appointed Seán MacBride (Ireland) to head the Commission; members included Elie Abel (United States), Hubert Beuve-Méry (France), Elebe Ma Ekonzo (Zaire), Gabriel García Márquez (Colombia), Sergi Losev (Soviet Union), Mochtar Lubis (Indonesia), Mustapha Masmondi (Tunisia), Michio Nagai (Japan), Fred Isaac Akporuaro Omu (Nigeria), Bogdan Osolnik (Yugoslavia), Gamal el Oteifi (Egypt), Johannes Pieter Pronk (Netherlands), Juan Somavia (Chile), Boobli George Verghese (India), and Betty Zimmerman (Canada). The Commission’s final report, entitled *Many Voices One World* was released by UNESCO in 1980.
I can say, however, that we find much to admire in the descriptive portions of the report, which comprise its principal part. The diagnosis is in large measure scholarly and balanced. Our own assessment of world communication importance and needs is—as you will hear shortly—closely congruent with that set forth in the interim report. To that extent we believe a good beginning has been made.

But when it comes to the report’s prescriptions, especially those that imply state controls on the operations of the mass media, we find ourselves unpersuaded. No adequate foundation in fact or in principle has been laid for such prescriptions, nor is there any acknowledgement of the losses—to national development, to peace, to international understanding—that they would entail. The closing few pages of the interim report contrast markedly in this respect with those that precede them. They are less balanced, less well grounded, and I trust will accordingly receive the personal attention of Commission members.

In his introductory remarks on the mass media declaration, the Director General called for a constructive dialogue that could lead to a consensus. Mr. M’Bow also made reference to the horrors of racism inflicted on the world through the state-controlled media of the Nazi regime; and he reminded us that UNESCO was created in part to prevent any repetition of such acts. This reflects my government’s position precisely—that it is state controls that have been primarily associated with the propagation of war and hostility and racialism, and that for UNESCO to sponsor a return to this stifling of human conscience would be to turn its back on its own charter.

Contemporary examples of this basic point are not difficult to find. The governments in southern Africa have reacted to demands for full enjoyment of political and economic rights by closing down newspapers owned by or sympathetic to black Africans. They have also moved to prohibit the circulation of information about the extent and effects of racism in that region. We have recently witnessed similar attempts by governments in other regions to suppress the circulation of documents that draw attention to the violation of human rights. It seems clear from these illustrations that it is freedom of information, and not its control by the state, that is best calculated to achieve the elimination of racism and to promote the attainment of economic and political rights.

Of course freedom must be coupled with justice. We have been learning that ourselves in the United States. America is not a single, monolithic society, and its diversity cannot be fully represented by the major newspapers or networks. And so we have been making major efforts in recent years to encourage ownership and operation of media outlets by blacks, women, Hispanics, and others to the end that the distinctive voice of each of these developing groups within our own
society can make itself heard in its own way. It is slow work sometimes, but it is development with and toward freedom.

Let me invite your attention at this point to two statements from the report of a task force on the international flow of news, issued just a few days ago.\(^8\) This group of distinguished communication practitioners and scholars, drawn I must emphasize from both the developed and developing worlds, had this to say.

It is our unanimous and deeply held belief that freedom of information and economic and political development are inextricably intertwined and mutually reinforcing.

And as the concluding words of the report:

We reject out of hand the view that freedom is something that only the developed nations of the West can afford—and that it is a superfluous luxury for the developing nations. The practices of a free press may be erratic, even in the West, but the aspirations of freedom should ultimately serve to unite the West and the Third World.

We ourselves would hope ultimately to persuade many other countries of the merits of this point of view. But we do not now seek to impose that view on other governments. We know how dynamically various are the relationships of these governments to their own mass media and how insusceptible they are to being captured within any single formula or code. If there is diversity, let it continue in the spirit voiced by John F. Kennedy 15 years ago, when he issued a call to make the world safe for diversity.\(^9\) UNESCO is *par excellence* a home for diversity, a shelter for many creeds. Let it so continue, and let us work constructively with each other to strengthen cultural pluralism and to enrich the variety of information and points of view that are exchanged.

*The Need for Cooperation*

This movement toward constructive and principled and unifying action is in the continuing spirit of Nairobi. So also is what I have to say today on the subject of practical cooperation.

Two years ago when I addressed this general conference in Nairobi, I acknowledged the existence of dependencies, disparities, and imbal-

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\(^9\) Reference is to Kennedy’s June 10, 1963, commencement address before the graduates of American University. In it, the President stated, “So, let us not be blind to our differences—but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved. And if we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity. For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small plant. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children’s future. And we are all mortal.” (Public Papers: Kennedy, 1963, p. 462) The President’s complete address is ibid., pp. 459–464.
ances in and among national communication capabilities. On that occasion I proposed that measures might be taken by the United States and other developed countries, together with their private sectors and the multilateral institutions, to help other states strengthen their information and communication systems in accordance with their needs. Today I want to describe what has been and is being done on our part, and then move beyond that to propose a system for improved cooperation among all the nations that can, I believe, move us purposefully and measurably toward the realization of our common goals.

Let me begin by recalling the scope and dimension of those goals. As I said in 1976, the central issue is to achieve growth with equity and to pay special attention to the poorest of the poor within the nations and among nations. Internal and international disparities often go hand in hand. Of the 400 million telephones in the world, for example, only 40 million—a bare 10%—are to be found in all of Africa, Asia, and Latin America combined. What does this imply for the scope of participation in the life of those societies or for two-way information flows within them?

A presently pending UNESCO report to the General Assembly devotes similar attention to the unevenness of communications development within societies, and also points up the existence of gross quantitative disparities among the nations of the world. It reveals that 30 developing countries still have no television service at all nor the technical skills to develop one; in about 40 developing countries, fewer than 5% of the people ever see a newspaper; and in more than 60 countries, where radio broadcasting may be the instrument chosen for nation-building, more than half the population has no radio sets. To this must be added a pervasive shortage of skilled technicians and teachers to build up and extend communication capacities.

It should be apparent from this brief recitation that the challenge of communications development is not one that can be met by simple or random infusions of assistance or by the immediate adoption of any formula for a new world order. If we are to have any serious impact, we must proceed in a far more systematic, long-range, and concerted fashion than any we have previously pursued. And we must attract cooperation from every quarter I mentioned 2 years ago—the more prosperous nations, the private sector in those nations, the multilateral institutions, and the disadvantaged countries themselves.

Why should we collectively take on this burden?

• Because information is increasingly recognized as a basic resource—intangible and inexhaustible but otherwise akin to energy

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10 See footnote 8, Document 63.
and materials—that is essential to full participation in the modern world.

- Because in the face of this recognition it would be unthinkable for us to allow our nations and our peoples to drift by neglect into two separate and distinct camps, the “information rich” versus the “information poor.”

- Because there are some common goals in which we do agree and around which we can construct an action agenda that draws us together and that emphasizes the value of our common institutions, like UNESCO. Those goals include the steady reduction of disparities and dependencies and imbalances in communication capacities and the progressive fostering of many-sided dialogues rather than monologues in internal as well as international communication structures.

**U.S. Efforts**

What can be done, then, to get things started? Two years ago I suggested a collegial effort. The responses we have been hearing at this conference thus far are heartening. More will no doubt be heard, and a great deal more is required if we are to move appreciably towards the attainment of our goal. Let me begin my own contribution by recounting what the U.S. Government has been doing in this field since Nairobi.

Our regular foreign assistance program has, in the course of the past 2 years, committed $18 million to the cooperative improvement of basic telecommunications infrastructures in developing countries. A further $19 million has been committed to the communications and information components of some 70 projects throughout Africa, Asia, the Near East, and Latin America in the fields of education, population, health care, nutrition, agriculture, and disaster relief.

We have expended another $4 million on two-way exchanges of communication students, teachers, and practitioners; on studies and conferences; and on media materials—all aimed at improving mutual understanding of communication perspectives. These efforts have directly engaged roughly 1,000 participants from 88 developing countries.

We have continued our technical assistance with communications satellites, of which the most prominent example remains the Indian site project I described to you 2 years ago. Its value has been underscored by the recent decision of the Indian Government to establish its own domestic communications satellite system INSAT, to be launched in 1981.

A number of U.S. Government agencies are engaged in sharing communication resources and information-system design capacity with their developing-country counterparts in specific fields of common
interest. These include scientific and technical information, weather and disaster warning, health and environmental data, and agricultural information. Other agencies have been working on a regional basis. We have, for example, assisted in the development of regional health information centers in Latin America and the Middle East, in cooperation with local governments and with the Pan American and World Health Organizations. We provide professional consultation by, and practical training in, U.S. communication institutions at the request of foreign government officials or under the auspices of the International Telecommunications Union.

Our private sector has also been helping. On the media side, there is one press group that was formed as a result of the Nairobi general conference, with broadly international participation, and that has now raised more than half of its projected million dollar treasury for a variety of projects to assist Third World media development. Our two major wire services have similarly volunteered their services to help in the establishment of national news agencies. On the very important telecommunications side, we have no comparably specific or coordinated data, but clearly the development potential of this industry’s export and investment transactions is very large.

We also need to recognize the contributions of the U.S. private, nonprofit sector, principally the charitable foundations and the universities. Some of them serve in a consulting capacity to UNESCO, others underwrite the work of such scholarly bodies as the International Institute of Communications and the International Association for Mass Communication Research, while still others actually produce the studies and conferences and reports that will help us gain a better understanding of the communication issues we are faced with. In my own country, there is an effort now underway for the first time to design a comprehensive and readily accessible clearinghouse of all communication policy research undertaken in the various relevant disciplines; upon eventual completion, this should be suitable for interconnection with national research centers in other countries through the UNESCO-affiliated network known as COMNET.

There are other institutional developments taking place at the government level in my country with definite implications for communications development. One of these is the creation last April of the International Communication Agency, which has been specifically charged by President Carter to promote two-way communication between our people and those of other lands. The new agency has been asked to engage in the development and execution of a comprehensive national

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policy on international communications. “Such a policy,” President Carter stated, “must take into consideration the needs and interests of others, as well as our own needs.”12 This represents, I submit, a significant evolution in the attitude of the United States toward communications development—and one that has taken place since we last met in Nairobi.

A second and equally important institutional development was, as many of you know, announced by President Carter in a speech to the Venezuelan Congress in Caracas last March.13 This involves the creation of a U.S. foundation for international technological cooperation. As its name suggests, the foundation will work on a cooperative basis to build technological self-reliance within developing countries. It will work to end dependencies at the same time as it lessens disparities. Since President Carter’s announcement, the process of creating the new foundation has moved forward steadily. We expect to be in operation within the coming year.14 I am pleased to tell you today that one of the key programs of the foundation will be devoted specifically to cooperation in the field of information and communications. I personally have high hopes that its efforts with other nations in this sector can make a substantial contribution to our common goals.

New U.S. Initiatives

These developments reflect a genuine commitment on the part of our new U.S. Administration. So do the two specific new projects, growing out of that commitment, that I wish to announce to this conference. The first will devote American assistance, both public and private, to suitably identified regional centers of professional education and training in broadcasting and journalism in the developing world, where such assistance could help the centers equip themselves to produce fully qualified practitioners for the media in the region. Our role will be to work with the faculties and the institutions on their premises. We will undertake to send a senior faculty member or dean of communications to each center for a year’s service as a faculty adviser on curriculum or resource development. Private U.S. news organizations will underwrite the visit to the centers of senior correspondents and

12 See Documents 93 and 121.
13 See footnotes 3 and 7, Document 123. In his remarks before the Venezuelan Congress, the President asserted, “For the rest of this century, the greatest potential for growth is in the developing world. To become more self-reliant, developing nations need to strengthen their technological capabilities. To assist them, I am proposing a new United States foundation for technological collaboration.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1978, Book I, p. 621)
14 Title IV of the International Development Cooperation Act of 1979 (P.L. 96–53), which the President signed into law on August 14, 1979, authorized the President to establish an Institute for Scientific and Technological Cooperation.
editors, on rotating 3-month assignments, to demonstrate professional skills.

As equipment needs are identified, efforts will be made to locate available consoles or studio facilities or printing presses that can be donated to the centers. Institutional funding needs, if any, will be reviewed and assistance offered in presenting them to suitable funding agencies. The visiting professors and journalists will stay no longer than requested; but so long as they are there, they themselves will be learning about Third World development needs and perspectives, in a way that will stay with them when they return to their regular jobs as teachers and gatekeepers of American journalism.

This should be a broadly cooperative undertaking. We have assurances of positive participation from media organizations. We solicit the advice and will welcome the participation of other experienced countries. It must of course be the developing countries themselves who identify the regional centers that seem best qualified to serve the joint purposes we would be pursuing. We are working actively with the UNESCO Secretariat to implement the necessary processes.

The second new U.S. project is a major effort to apply the benefits of advanced communications technology—specifically communications satellites—to economic and social needs in the rural areas of developing nations.

This program will be implemented with the funding of the U.S. Agency for International Development, using facilities of INTELSAT [International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium] or other appropriate satellite systems, and will enable nations in the developing world to disseminate valuable information to people in remote areas. My government—in cooperation with officials in developing areas—will work to design projects to promote basic literacy for children and adults and to share information on basic health care and other subjects vital to rural development. The basic result should be to take important information—much of which is already available in urban centers of developing nations—and distribute it to remote sections where people have little or no access to knowledge that can improve their way of life.

The project I am announcing today will build on the lessons—and the hopes—which have come out of the Indian satellite project and similar smaller experiments in recent years. A major part of the American contribution will be the provision of technical assistance, equipment, and training to promote fully informed use of satellite capacity in the developing nations.

We expect to learn much from this new project. But it is much more than a technological demonstration. It is a committed U.S. effort to build communication skills and experience which will enable developing countries to strengthen their own global, regional, and national
communications systems. The programming will be managed by the recipient countries themselves to help meet the basic human needs priorities which they identify. The project will be aimed at building permanent communication technology skills in these countries. At its conclusion, all aspects of management and control will be turned over to the recipient nations, and throughout all of this we hope that the project will develop expertise that will be transferable to other parts of the world.

We believe that this can mark an innovative, productive approach to urgent problems of rural development and communications, and we are pleased that this project will be moving forward in the months ahead.

Coordinating International Efforts

These are the major new initiatives that the United States is taking to help develop a better balance of communications capability throughout the world. But as I have stressed repeatedly, we need more. We need in particular to gather the strength and purpose that can come from the interchange of insights, experiences, and plans—whether bilateral, multilateral, public sector, or private—and from the systematized presentation of development objectives.

A large part of communications development is now accomplished through bilateral cooperation. It is in this sector that collaborative consultation could serve to detect gaps and overlaps, and to strengthen the presently fragmented process. The bilateral character of such activities need not be changed, but ways should be found to focus them on priority needs in a cooperative way with identifiable goals and measurements of progress. Our study has suggested to us that the international community may have already discovered at least a partial precedent for what is required, in the organization and work of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research.15

The applicability of this precedent to our purposes is not perfect. The agricultural research centers had been in existence for several years before their funding was coordinated; so that the sponsoring institutions took over a fully proven concept. We have nothing like that at present in the field of communications assistance. But is the

15 An initiative of the Rockefeller Foundation and supported by the World Bank, FAO, UNDP, and IFAD, the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), at the time of the Carter administration, was a confederation of autonomous research centers and donors who supported the transmission of global agricultural research. The four major research centers included the International Rice Research Institute (Philippines), the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (Mexico), the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (Nigeria), and the International Center for Tropical Agriculture (Colombia).
The present consultative group is jointly sponsored by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Bank, and the U.N. Development Program. We could substitute UNESCO for FAO as a sponsor. Like the existing group, we could establish an integrated and effective membership consisting of both developed and developing countries, the regional banks, concerned multilateral agencies, and non-profit foundations. Other appropriate international organizations could certainly be invited to participate. Out of the meetings and studies of a communication consultative group there should emerge a shared sense of development priorities and of the effectiveness of existing and proposed remedies. More than that, we would with the help of the sponsoring institutions—including UNESCO—engender cooperation on a scale that simply is not possible under presently existing arrangements. My government would invite our fellow members to consider this possibility with us.

The chief obstacle to this kind of constructive endeavor, as I see it, has been the introduction of extraneous political elements. I hope that will change. I hope we can discover and display the seriousness of purpose that alone will attract the sponsorship of serious international bodies. Therefore, I invite the Director General to convene a planning meeting within the next 6 months at which government delegations can seek to reach agreement on a specific proposal that can be presented on behalf of developing and developed countries alike to the institutions whose coordinating sponsorship we would seek. My government is prepared to take full part in these deliberations.

My concluding hope is that we will come to agreement—on the communication issues and on all the others we confront—so that together we can move toward making UNESCO a more effective instrument for meeting historic challenges. For it is through such strengthening of our common purposes that UNESCO makes its contribution to the cause of peace and international understanding. The minds of men and women are stirred by purposeful participation in programs of effective action—not by mere rhetoric or political posturing. This is UNESCO’s mission: to provide the means for enhancing practical cooperation in education, the sciences, culture, and communication. Let us get on with the job.
1978 469

159. Memorandum From the Director of the International Communication Agency (Reinhardt) to President Carter

Washington, November 30, 1978

The issue is whether, how, and in what time frame to expand our academic and other exchanges programs.

In his memorandum to you of October 24, Dr. Brzezinski noted: “our expenditures on the competition for ideas have not kept pace with military outlays and we have a serious lag to make good.” Some indicators of the decline are at Tab B.

The problem is easily identified: funds appropriated to these exchanges have not kept pace with inflation and the decline of the dollar (academic exchange funds have declined by 57% in constant dollars over the past decade). With the shift in emphasis in our foreign assistance programs, the focus has been on “basic human needs” at the expense of higher education or international exposure. Private foundations and academic institutions have curtailed their own efforts in recent years.

As a result:
—All of our Western European exchange programs are inadequately funded; 5–6 academic programs face the possibility of extinction in the next several years. Several European governments have indicated that, in the absence of significantly increased U.S. funding, they may begin to use their own contributions to these programs for exchange with other countries. (We currently fund only one full-year research grant for an American to all of Scandinavia; the number of French grantees has fallen in 10 years from 309 to 67. The FRG attaches such high political importance to these programs that it is now funding 80% of exchanges with the United States; the Bundestag appropriations committee, however, has sought out our Ambassador to express its growing unhappiness at the funding imbalance and to remind us that the USG in 1974 committed itself to parity funding.)

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980: Lot 81D113, Box 18, Memoranda to the Secretary–1978. No classification marking. The date on the memorandum is stamped. Christopher sent a copy of the memorandum to Vance under a December 13 memorandum, noting: “John Reinhardt wants you to be generally aware of his proposal to the President for an expanded ICA exchanges program, in case the President refers to it in conversation with you. You will recall that the President, at Zbig’s suggestion, endorsed the idea of such an expansion to recoup the decline in constant-dollar funding of these programs over the past decade. I attach John’s memo to the President on the subject.” (Ibid.)

2 See Document 155.

3 Not attached and not further identified.
We are forfeiting opportunities with emerging leadership groups and institutions in the “upper tier” LDC’s. Our programs funded only 16 American scholars to Brazil in 1977, only 7 American doctoral students in all of Africa, only 3 in Korea, none in Iran, none in Nigeria. Ten years ago we officially hosted 1,000 influential younger Latin Americans; last year the figure had dropped to 340.

The U.S. has been criticized by the USSR and Eastern European countries for not enlarging our exchanges in fulfillment of the Helsinki Accords. Both Dante Fascell of the CSCE Commission in Congress and Warren Christopher have asked ICA to enhance these programs. As a general proposition, the Department of State has authorized us to express its strong support for enhanced exchanges programs.

The foregoing quantitative measures do not reflect the qualitative decline. Influential foreigners, brought here to be impressed by the U.S., literally stay in third-rate hotels, travel in the company of inadequately trained escorts and interpreters, or with inadequate attention to their programs from overworked contract agencies. The average duration of academic sojourns has been reduced, typically, from an academic year to a semester or less; the value of stipends has eroded so dramatically as to make it difficult to attract truly authoritative scholars; the value of a grant for a doctoral scholar is now, typically, the cost of an airplane ticket.

For 1979–80 we have reprogrammed $2.3 million from other ICA activities into general exchanges; given that all of ICA’s activities are engaged in what Dr. Brzezinski calls “the competition for ideas” we are now robbing Peter to pay Paul. Reprogramming on a scale commensurate with the needs outlined in this memorandum would represent radical—and not necessarily corrective—surgery.

In our view, these exchanges programs should have three goals:

(a) To assure, now that it is clear the United States cannot overwhelm its foreign problems by throwing resources at them, that there is an adequate cadre of trained and sensitive Americans to assist this country to live by its international wits;

(b) To assure that over the next generation there are successors to the 38 heads of state or government who are currently alumni of these programs (or the 11 members of the current Indonesian cabinet, or the 10 of the current French cabinet);

(c) To assure that there are enduring personal or institutional links between influential Americans and foreigners of the kind and quality

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4 See footnote 6, Document 8.
5 An unknown hand underlined “As a general proposition,” and placed a vertical line in both the left-hand and right-hand margins next to this sentence.
which can facilitate cooperative address to major international problems and a reciprocal appreciation of values and ideas.

As a result of your reaction to Dr. Brzezinski’s memo, we have developed a possible “Program for the ‘80’s”. From the 1979 level, and at eventual full funding, the program would represent approximately a $44 million increase in our current exchanges budget of $32 million. The increase would be composed entirely of program funds; there would be no net addition to ICA staff. We would propose that the increase be phased in over a four-year period (doing so would respond to the congressional request in our 1979 Authorization Act that you submit a multi-year program to enhance exchanges).

We believe that any new funds should be apportioned according to the following priorities (the rationale for which is at Tab A).6

(a) The technologically advanced and/or democratic societies, in order to contribute to a solid “rear area” in the years ahead;

(b) Eastern Europe, the USSR and the PRC;7

(c) the “upper tier” LDC’s;

(d) Southern Africa and the Middle East;

(e) Special attention to Mexico (and, to a lesser degree, Canada).

We will continue to operate exchanges programs in the poorer LDC’s, which will also benefit by your recently proposed program of Humphrey Scholarships for younger public servants nominated for one-year “topping off” educational experiences in the United States. But the preponderance of incremental funds would be applied as outlined above, particularly in the field of academic exchanges.

In addition, we would propose a substantial expansion of an existing small program under which young American public officials (elected and appointed from local, state and federal levels) are exposed to selected foreign societies. The current program, administered by the bi-partisan American Council of Young Political Leaders, for example, has focused on the USSR and has created an impressive network of personal relationships among emerging figures in both countries. We would propose not only to increase the numbers of American and foreign public officials participating in this kind of program, but to enhance the learning experience by building short “bursts” of academic study into it.

The proposed “Program for the ‘80’s” is explained in greater detail at Tab A.

6 Attached at Tab A but not printed is an undated proposal entitled “International Exchange of Persons: A Program for the 1980s.”

7 An unknown hand underlined “and the PRC,”
Since ICA could not prudently administer the total sums required for these programs were the funds to become available in any given fiscal year, we recommend phasing them in over four years.

We recommend approval of the program at Tab A and that it form the basis for the required report to the Congress early next year. If you approve, we will draft the report for White House consideration.\textsuperscript{8}

We would recommend first-year attention to: (1) a partial restoration of the exchanges programs with the technologically advanced/democratic societies; (2) Eastern Europe and the USSR (so as to position ourselves for Madrid 1980);\textsuperscript{9} (3) a radically expanded program involving young American and foreign public leaders. We would also hold a small reserve fund so that we can take advantage of opportunities in the PRC.

First-year costs for these purposes would require $6.25 million.\textsuperscript{10}

The question then arises as to whether you wish to enhance these programs beginning in FY 1980 or defer until FY 1981.

Begin in FY 1980 \underline{\hspace{2cm}} Begin in FY 1981 \underline{\hspace{2cm}}\textsuperscript{11}

\begin{itemize}
  \item[8] The President did not approve or disapprove the recommendation.
  \item[9] Reference is to the CSCE Review Conference, scheduled to take place in Madrid in November 1980.
  \item[10] The President did not approve or disapprove the recommendation.
  \item[11] The President did not approve or disapprove the recommendation.
\end{itemize}

160. Memorandum From Paul Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\textsuperscript{1}

Washington, December 13, 1978

SUBJECT

Expanded ICA Exchange Program

John Reinhardt is eager to demonstrate that his agency is responsive to the President’s desire to see exchange programs expanded to make

\textsuperscript{1} Source: Carter Library, White House Central Files, Subject File, Foreign Affairs, Information-Exchange Activities, Executive, Box FO–35, FO 57/1/78–1/20/81. No classification marking. Sent for action. Aaron wrote “ok” and his initials on the memorandum.
up for the decline of the past decade. He has prepared a decision memorandum for the President which needs to go forward immediately if it is to be taken into account in the current budget review process. I have prepared a brief memorandum from you forwarding it to the President (TAB I) and recommending approval in principle, but without locking the President into decisions on specific budgetary allocations. If we are serious about expanding exchanges, we should begin immediately (not wait until FY 1980 or FY 1981) and the modest funds to do this can be found in the current ICA budget. What is needed during the first few months is not a lot of money, but careful developmental work, country-by-country, to work up good programs.

State has reviewed Reinhardt’s memorandum and endorsed the program in principle and wishes to work closely with ICA in developing the program before endorsing a specific set of priorities. State’s memorandum is attached.2

OMB has reviewed this program, in conjunction with its consideration of ICA’s appeal of OMB’s recommendations on its FY 1980 budget. OMB accepts the need for an expanded exchange program, notes that future-year funding for a program is partially provided for in budget projections for FY 1980 ($5 million which will fund the newly created Humphrey Scholarship Program) and beyond, but believes that ICA should plan its effort in greater detail before more specific budgeting can be done. OMB’s memorandum is the President.3

Both State and positions are consistent with the position I recommend you take: that you send Reinhardt’s memo (TAB I) to the President with the recommendation that he endorse the program in principle without reaction to the specific approval requests made in it.

To reduce the thickness of Reinhardt’s memo, I have removed TABs A and B but suggest they be readily available in case the President asks to see them (TAB II).4

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2 Attached but not printed is a December 6 memorandum from Tarnoff to Brzezinski. Wisner signed the memorandum on behalf of Tarnoff.

3 Attached but not printed is an undated memorandum from McIntyre to the President.

4 An unknown hand placed two parallel lines in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph. Attached but not printed at Tab A is the undated proposal entitled “International Exchange of Persons: A Program for the 1980’s,” a copy of which Reinhardt attached to his November 30 memorandum to the President (see footnote 3, Document 159). Attached but not printed at Tab B is an undated table entitled “A Program for the 1980s Distribution of Phased Additional Funding,” a copy of which Reinhardt also attached to his November 30 memorandum to the President.
Tab I

Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter

Washington, December 14, 1978

SUBJECT

Expansion of ICA Exchange Programs—Memorandum from John Reinhardt

You will recall that last October in reviewing John Reinhardt’s report of ICA’s first six months of operation, you approved my recommendation that we urge him to develop a plan for expanding exchange programs to rectify the 57% decline over the past twelve years. He has now responded with a memorandum (TAB 1) in which he provides further details on how exchange programs have declined and presents a set of priorities for expansion. He asks for your approval of a program for implementing these priorities (TAB A of his memorandum) with first-year costs of $6.25 million and requests that you decide whether the program should begin in FY 1980 or FY 1981. He attached a measuring table of decline at TAB B. TABs A and B have been removed because of thickness and are available if you wish to see them.

I have had Reinhardt’s memorandum reviewed by State and OMB, both of whom endorse it in principle. State wishes to work further with ICA on priorities for expansion. OMB believes the program needs to be worked out in greater detail before budgetary adjustments are made but notes that $5 million has been included in FY 1980 budget planning which will fund the newly created Humphrey Scholarship Program.

RECOMMENDATION

I suggest you approve this program in principle, for it represents a serious response to your original recommendation. I recommend that through modest reprogramming ICA begin implementation of the program immediately, working out priorities with State and NSC,

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5 No classification marking. Sent for action. Brzezinski sent a copy of the memorandum to Reinhardt under a December 15 memorandum in which he summarized the President’s comments. (Carter Library, White House Central Files, Subject File, Foreign Affairs, Information-Exchange Activities, Executive, Box FO-35, FO 5 7/1/78–1/20/81)

6 See Document 155.

7 See Document 159.

8 See footnote 4, above.

9 Ibid.
accelerating implementation in 1980 and, concurrently, working out longer-term funding requirements with OMB.\(^\text{10}\)

AGREE _______ DISAGREE _______

\(^{10}\) The President did not approve or disapprove the recommendation but wrote: “No recomm in FY 80—HHH Scholarships a good step. Ok to keep idea alive. J.”

161. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the President for Media and Public Affairs (Jagoda) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\(^1\)

Washington, January 20, 1979

SUBJECT
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS

I. Summary

My study of the International Communication Agency, from the NSC perspective, is complete, and I am pleased to submit this report.

The focus has not been on public relations or media relations, but on how our government relates to the global flow of ideas.

ICA does its overseas job well, but is only now beginning to develop communications (sophisticated computer/communications methods) skills and is insufficiently involved in helping our own people develop a global perspective. The NSC does an inadequate job of coordination of international communications potential and fails to take advantage of useful research capabilities at ICA. The recommendations of this study can be carried out largely by ICA, but support for Presidential foreign policy initiatives could be substantially enhanced by the addition of a full-time NSC staff member to work closely with ICA and other relevant agencies.

II. Global Perspective Needed by Our People

Measured by classic standards in the field of international public relations, ICA is a superb institution. It is not especially large: Its budget

\(^{1}\) Source: Carter Library, Donated Historical Material, Barry Jagoda, Box 3, NSC. No classification marking. A copy was sent to Aaron. There is no indication that Brzezinski saw the memorandum.
is little more than $400 million; and its employees number under 4500 Americans and 4500 foreign nationals. The bulk of these resources are devoted to telling the world about U.S. society and policy. This public relations and cultural relations effort aimed beyond our borders and directed with wisdom, care, and economy by John Reinhardt and his Deputy, Charles Bray, functions in a way that well suits the needs of a government proud of its policy and eager to share its ideas and values with the rest of the world.

As you will recall, the USIA was created in the midst of the cold war and was, in the phrase of the Agency motto, designed for “telling America’s story to the World.” With last year’s reorganization, including the addition of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs from State, the President directed that ICA move toward bringing foreign culture and perspectives to our own people, as well. This mandate seemed particularly timely since our foreign policy was likely to be understood only if our people became aware of the extensive global change and associated political and cultural activism of the previously passive world majority. It is clear, however, that this process of education and communication with our own people has barely begun at ICA. I start with this point because inadequate domestic understanding seems to be a weak link in our foreign policy chain. The Carter Administration must do a better job of helping the American people understand the world forces amid which Administration policy is shaped.

This matter of informing our people about the rest of the world is somewhat different than informing our people about our foreign policy. ICA is prohibited by law from making its materials intended for foreign distribution also available at home. This is justified as an effort to guard against the agency being used to boost the “political” fortunes of whichever Administration happens to be in power. This concern is understandable since the communications materials distributed abroad by the Agency tend to emphasize the positive themes of our society and the President is always cast in a favorable posture.

However, from the NSC perspective, ICA could become enormously more helpful if it could expand its role, recently mandated, to help inform and involve the American people in the larger world. To date, it appears that the changes have resulted in a better managed program of conveying abroad our policy and cultural messages, but the two-way, return effort has not been substantially increased, nor does there seem to be much specific planning in that direction.

RECOMMENDATION

Director Reinhardt should be encouraged to further develop a coordinated approach toward bringing an awareness home to our people of foreign attitudes about mutually significant international issues.
This would naturally include perspective on historical and cultural patterns, but to be most effective this effort would emphasize:

—Population shifts and the end of Western colonialism;
—Political awakening of the rest of the world resulting from literacy and new patterns of national and regional interaction;
—End of universally valid ideological models;
—Demand for more equal distribution of world wealth and power;
—Shared global problems like nuclear proliferation, economic dislocation, and human rights.

III. *International Educational and Cultural Programs are Inadequately Funded, Largely Ignored by NSC Staff, and Uncoordinated Government Wide*

As you will recall, interest was demonstrated by the President, and by you, in the overseas programs for educational and cultural exchange during the recent budget review. Increased funding levels were suggested, but an OMB recommendation to study the matter for another year was accepted by the President. My observation is that these programs receive inadequate attention from your staff and that there should be a closer liaison between ICA and NSC in the outline of these programs and in the process generally. But these intercultural communication efforts are never at the top of any one NSC staff member’s list of priorities. These programs could be much more closely interwoven into the main thrust of our foreign policy if they received more NSC attention, particularly with an eye to shaping our domestic consciousness.

Directly related is the need for better coordination of government-wide programs of an educational and cultural nature. NSC staff members should have an idea of who is being sent where by the federal government on programs in which contact abroad is with potentially important elites. Recent Congressional action mandated increased coordination and reporting on this matter by ICA, but that has not been activated.

**RECOMMENDATION**

At the President’s direction, a program for increasing educational and cultural exchange is to be developed. An NSC staff member should be assigned to give this priority, and ICA should be instructed to provide more guidance to NSC about these programs and how they can be of benefit to the implementation of the President’s foreign policy without compromising their intrinsic merit. ICA should be asked to present you with its plan for better coordination of government-wide foreign educational and cultural activity, including possible use of the NSC mechanism for implementation.
IV. Better Advisory Research for NSC Staff

In the original USIA, the Agency head was a member of the National Security Council, was to provide advice and guidance on foreign attitudes, and was to be a counselor on these matters to the President. To facilitate this role, the Agency had, as a key official, an Assistant Director for Research. A substantial budget and a large staff was devoted to the effort. Gradually, though, the White House came to pay increasingly less attention to the formal advisory role of the Director. The Research Directorate began to conduct research that tried to show that the Agency itself was a vital and useful organization. While polling data, attitudinal studies, and other reports were still available, these materials did not seem to be used by those concerned with the main direction of American policy.

This area was of particular interest because one of the main goals of this study has been to try to find ways to enhance the capacity of ICA to provide useful inputs into the NSC decision process. As part of the reorganization of ICA, Director Reinhardt has ordered his research department to become more relevant, to become more involved with the main thrust of our foreign policy. Specifically, under a plan adopted last month, the work of the new ICA research department would enable those concerned to:

—take foreign reactions and opinion shifts into account in carrying out current U.S. policies;
—assess the likely impact of foreign opinion on possible future policy directions;
—be conscious of elite and mass attitudes toward specific international issues of interest to the U.S.;
—understand the climate of opinion which defines the limits within which foreign leaders and negotiators operate;
—identify broad social, cultural, and value changes in foreign countries for the purposes of long and short-term policy planning.

Until now, ICA research has generally been of limited value to NSC staff members. With this new approach, the research department of ICA is becoming equipped to be directly responsive to the needs of the NSC staff. Although materials will continue to be made available on a timely basis from John Reinhardt to ranking members of the government foreign policy community, it should be possible to create a mechanism for briefing NSC staff members on an individual basis to find out what specific information is needed, for ICA to receive suggested areas of inquiry, and for work in progress to be made available on a regular basis.

RECOMMENDATION

To enhance the availability of useful information from ICA to NSC, ICA should be requested to establish a briefing program to keep NSC...
staff members up to date on research work in progress. ICA is willing to get this moving and is especially interested in trying to be responsive to suggestions from NSC staff members.

V. Global Information Flow Needs More Attention from NSC

With current staffing, NSC has limited ability to encourage and coordinate international communications and information flow. These matters are often thought of as policy problems, but I suggest that, from a Presidential perspective, they should be seen as operational opportunities.

I had hoped to crystalize thinking about how to get NSC more involved in thinking about communications and information policy issues. I began this study by concentrating on U.S. preparation for the recent UNESCO general conference. It was quickly apparent that although only limited attention had been devoted to the policy issues in international communications, a PRM\(^2\) had been developed and Henry Richardson was involved in the area sufficiently to provide a point of government-wide interaction. Preparations for the World Administrative Radio Conference seem to be moving ahead with NSC last-minute coordination. So, it can be said that this policy area is being handled satisfactorily in a routine way.

But, the area demands more. As you know, we have reached a time when the entire world political system is deeply influenced by the revolution in computer-controlled communications. In 1969, you wrote: “. . . to play an effective world role America needs foreign-relations machinery that exploits the latest communications techniques and uses a style and organization responsive to the more congested patterns of our global existence.”\(^3\)

Since then enhanced satellite capacity, microprocessors, and astonishing global networks of communications have arrived. Yet there is almost no operational thinking going on about these matters in the U.S. government. Since the effort would obviously be government-wide, this work could only be undertaken at the specific direction and with the full support of the President. This function would become the central activity of a new NSC staff member for Global Information. ICA is well suited to undertake the work under the NSC banner.

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3 Reference is to Zbigniew Brzezinski, Between Two Ages: America’s Role in the Technetronic Era. (New York: Viking, 1970)
RECOMMENDATION

There is much talk about the force of ideas and about rapid change in world affairs, but little planning for new organizational and bureaucratic arrangements to take advantage of the global flow of information and advanced communications technology. Although ICA could begin shaping a response to these possibilities, a Presidential mandate would have to be sought at the appropriate time. The research, development, and initial implementation would be expensive. Without full support from your office, the effort would not move. A staff person should be assigned to spend full time on global information resources and the other matters discussed in this report.

162. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Research and Evaluation, Directorate for Programs, International Communication Agency (Burnett) to the Director (Reinhardt)¹

Washington, January 25, 1979

FOREIGN AFFAIRS OPINION NOTE:
USICA Conducts Successful Magazine Opinion Survey in the Soviet Union

USICA has conducted the first successful survey of Soviet citizens undertaken by a Western governmental agency.

In the period October 1977 to June 1978, 1,921 readers of America Illustrated, USICA’s Russian language magazine, replied to questions on their reading habits and preferences. Earlier attempts at such a survey yielded replies of 100 or less.

The most significant fact about this survey was that it took place and produced substantial returns. This fact does not necessarily signal Soviet willingness to permit more extensive Western polling in the USSR or more sensitive topics for questioning. Evidence from other efforts to ask systematic questions of Soviet citizens indicates that the Soviets remain very sensitive to such efforts and are willing to halt them if they feel that acceptable norms are breached.

It should also be noted that readers for the first time were offered a premium (a set of American prints) for responding. Nonetheless, 1,921 readers did fill in the questionnaire with their names and addresses on it and sent it to the American Embassy.

The following are key findings from the magazine survey:

—Preference for cultural themes: The subjects of the articles found most interesting were predominantly cultural or scientific/technical rather than political or economic. In suggesting topics for future articles, respondents showed a marked preference for cultural themes, especially music.

—Accent on youth: The typical respondent was under 30, male, and had a secondary school education. One in three respondents was a student or pupil, one in seven an engineer, and one in nine a worker.

—Widespread distribution: Responses were received from 216 identifiable towns and cities, including 77 of the 85 cities where America Illustrated is supposed to be distributed by agreement with the Soviet government. Almost half of the responses were from Moscow, followed distantly by Leningrad, Kiev, and Tbilisi.

—Steady readership: The average respondent had been reading America Illustrated for slightly more than three years. Academics, artists, media workers, and scientists tended to be longer-term readers than respondents in other professions.

The Office of Research has circulated a full report on this subject.
163. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to the Director of the International Communication Agency (Reinhardt)¹

Washington, February 9, 1979

SUBJECT
The President’s Comments on Persian-language Broadcasting and Related Issues (U)

The President has recently expressed concern² that the Voice of America was not prepared to broadcast in Persian in Iran when trouble began developing there. I realize that commendable efforts are being made to inaugurate Persian-language broadcasts as soon as possible and the President is aware of these. We can all see, however, that Persian-language broadcasts over VOA would be much more effective if they had already been continuing for a long time, with an experienced staff, and had built up a dependable audience in Iran. We should draw a lesson from this experience and reexamine our priorities in international broadcasting to see whether we are likely to have the capability for communication with other key countries in the future. Please review present allocation of languages and transmitter time in light of both our current foreign policy priorities and with attention to areas where we might face a need for enhanced ability to communicate during the next few years and advise what adjustments and additions you believe should be made. I would like to have the results of this review no later than 7 March. (C)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 9, International Communication Agency: 1–5/79. Confidential. In a February 6 memorandum to Brzezinski, Henze noted that Vance had indicated, within his Evening Report to the President, that the International Communication Agency would begin Persian broadcasting “in about six weeks” and that the President had expressed “impatience” about the delay. Henze attached a draft memorandum addressed to both Vance and Reinhardt, tasking the Department and ICA “with a review of language-priorities and trouble-spots.” (Ibid.) Brzezinski wrote “redo” on the draft memorandum; it was retyped to address only Reinhardt. Henze’s memorandum is printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XX, Eastern Europe, Document 61.

² See footnote 1, above. According to a February 5 memorandum to Sick and Henze, Inderfurth stated that Vance had noted in his February 2 Evening Report to the President that Newsom had met with representatives from ICA and VOA regarding American broadcasting to Iran. He continued, “ICA will begin broadcasting in Persian in about six weeks. State will also ask the Chinese and Germans to take account of Soviet propaganda against us in their own Persian language broadcasting. In response to the above, the President said: ‘We should have prepared for this 3–4 months ago—make this SOP in the future.’” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 9, International Communication Agency: 1–5/79)
In addition, please undertake a review of transmitter needs during the coming decade in comparison with known and anticipated Soviet and other plans for expansion and develop recommendations for whatever additional investment it might be desirable for the United States to make to ensure our ability to compete in this area. This survey should be worldwide in scope, but I hear that Soviet transmitter power directed southward at the whole area from the Eastern Mediterranean over to the Indian subcontinent has given them advantage over all Western broadcasting, so the review should take an especially close look at the challenges we face in the Middle East and contiguous parts of Africa. This second survey should be ready no later than May 1, 1979.3 (C)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

3 In a February 16 memorandum to Brzezinski, Reinhardt indicated that ICA would respond to the two requirements “by the dates due.” (Ibid.)

164. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1

Washington, February 13, 1979

SUBJECT

Strengthening the American Image and Countering Soviet Propaganda in Iran

Under Secretary Newsom requested that an interagency State-ICA working group look at the themes and programs we might use in strengthening the US image in Iran over the coming months and in countering Soviet propaganda. The working group’s report, which the Department and ICA endorse, are summarized below.

There is no question that the Soviets have been attempting to exploit the situation in Iran by incorporating heavy doses of anti-US broadcasts into that country.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P790129–0993. Secret; Treat as Nodis.
In order to meet this problem, State and ICA during the past two weeks have taken or decided upon the following actions:

—A Persian-language shortwave service on ICA’s Voice of America (VOA) is scheduled to begin in mid-March.

—UK Foreign Secretary David Owen will review with the BBC our request that it allow VOA to use its transmitter on Masirah Island, off the coast of Oman.

—Over the next few months ICA and State will, within current budgetary limits, prepare to give increased stress to cultural exchange between Iran and the United States once the political environment in Iran permits.

Beyond these specific actions, we believe it would be unwise to launch a vigorous new program of comprehensive public diplomacy until it is clear that the Iranians have sorted themselves out politically. When the time seems appropriate and we are able to resume full-scale operation of our ICA resources in Iran, we plan to focus on the following themes:

—Both Iran and the US have strong spiritual heritages, and the people of both countries believe in the importance of a life that is guided by moral principles.

For example:

—Programs describing the place of religion in American life.
—Emphasis on social work in the US and abroad by humanitarian groups.
—Description of the role of prominent Moslems in American life and activities of Moslem centers in various cities.

—We also share a belief in the right of the Iranian people to express themselves politically through institutions constituted by them. We both believe that it is for the Iranian people to decide how they will govern themselves.

For example:

—Description of process of political change in US history, including specifically the resiliency of the US system in its ability to respond to crises like Watergate.
—Reports on the full range of activities of Iranian students in the US, including political activities and freedom to protest peacefully.
—Programs in which US experts on Iran comment on political developments there from their personal perspectives.

—Both of us believe in the development of our national wealth for the betterment of our people. The United States remains willing to cooperate with Iran for the benefit of the people and their country.

For example:

—Description of US achievements in sectors of interest to Iran, e.g., agriculture, housing financial management, medicine and other social services, and urban planning.
—Programs on contributions US has made in the past to Iranian development through both governmental assistance and private groups which have operated in Iran.
—Reports on successful US cooperation with other governments in developing their economies.
—Both Americans and Iranians want to see an Iran that is truly independent.

For example:
—Commentary on damage being done to Iranian political fabric by tendentious broadcasts from the Soviet Union.
—Reminders of historical occasions in the 19th and 20th Century when Russian forces occupied parts of Iran, as well as recollection of US efforts after World War II to promote Iranian independence and territorial integrity.
—Reporting on high-level statements from Administration and the Congress emphasizing importance of free, stable and independent Iran.

We also plan to utilize the following themes, both over VOA and in material distributed by ICA-Tehran, in order to counter more specifically the effects of Soviet propaganda.
—The harmful nature of the inflammatory broadcasts of Soviet-sponsored clandestine broadcasts for the peace and stability of the Iranian people.
—The possibility of civil war on the borders of the Soviet Union resulting from Iranian instability.

Finally, we will be consulting with our allies concerning how best to pursue our mutual interest in stemming the growth of anti-modern and anti-Western sentiment in Iran. These consultations will begin with and will focus on the UK, France, Germany, Turkey and Japan.

Peter Tarnoff
Executive Secretary
Memorandum From the Director of the International Communication Agency (Reinhardt) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\footnote{Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 9, International Communication Agency: 1–5/79. No classification marking.}

Washington, March 7, 1979

SUBJECT

VOA Language Priorities

In 1972 and again in 1976 the Agency completed definitive studies identifying VOA language priorities and technical facilities needed to transmit VOA programs to intended audiences abroad. The studies were done within the framework of the Agency’s overall mission to communicate with foreign audiences, taking into account the efficacy of other media and the activities of overseas posts as well as the effectiveness of the radio medium as a communications tool vis-a-vis a given audience. The time period of each of the two studies was five to seven years. Tab A\footnote{Attached but not printed is an undated paper entitled “A Quadrennial Study is Conducted by the Agency to Establish VOA Language Priorities. The Following ‘Language Categories’ Were Established by the 1976 Study Group.”} lists the languages by categories as determined in the 1976 study. (Some of the recommendations of that study have not yet been implemented since not all of the needed technical facilities have come on line.)

This review, in response to your memorandum,\footnote{See Document 163.} adds an important new dimension: it identifies those additional languages and areas where during the next few years we face or might face the necessity of enhancing our ability to communicate by radio, independent of, or in the absence of, other methods of communication. What languages to what areas should we be broadcasting in order to preserve for the United States the capability to communicate publicly, if other methods are not available to us?

Following consultation among Agency geographic area specialists, Department of State geographic bureaus and VOA broadcast specialists, we believe that, in addition to our current broadcast schedule (see Tab B):\footnote{Attached but not printed at Tab B are a March 1979 chart entitled “Voice of America Current Broadcast Times (GMT);” a undated chart entitled “Voice of America English Broadcasts;” and a March 1979 chart entitled “VOA Daily Output by Area.”}
a) we should begin broadcasting in three new languages—Azeri, Mongolian and Lingala;

b) we should increase English programs to East and South Asia, the Middle East, Europe, Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean to be more competitive with Radio Moscow’s expanded English-language World Service (235 hours per week vs. 223 hours by VOA at present) and with BBC’s extensive English programs;

c) we should increase Portuguese, Swahili and Hausa to Africa; Persian to Iran, Afghanistan and Tadzhikistan; Hindi, Bengali and Urdu to India, Bangladesh and Pakistan; French to North Africa; Indonesian and Thai to Southeast Asia; and Ukrainian to reach the Soviet Far East;

d) we should maintain the capability to start Italian and Spanish in Europe as well as to increase Greek and Turkish, as needed, within a three-month period;

e) we should replace a three-hour daily Russian program to the Soviet Far East, (now repeated from European transmissions) with a live program targeted for that area.

Details are listed in Tab C.

In view of the fact that the Soviets broadcast in several African languages, we carefully explored with the Department of State the question of broadcasting in additional African indigenous languages, particularly in the local languages of southern Africa. Our conclusion is that it would be politically inadvisable at this time, primarily because it would be widely perceived as favoring certain groups over others. English, furthermore, is widely used throughout the region, even among persons with only minimal education.

The above additions and modifications would increase VOA’s weekly schedule from the current 820 hours to 942½ hours. VOA would be broadcasting in 41 languages. Additional funds of $5.8 million and an additional personnel complement of 159 would be required. (Tab D compares VOA’s new schedule with the total languages and hours of other major international broadcasters, including the USSR and

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5 Radio Liberty broadcasts ½ hour daily with 2½ hour repeats in Azeri. [Footnote is in the original.]

6 We are convinced that audiences, wherever possible, should be able to hear VOA at least twice in a 24-hour period—i.e., morning and evening. [Footnote is in the original.]

7 Attached but not printed are an undated 6 page table, proposing increases in language broadcasting by language and geographical area, and an undated table entitled “Voice of America Broadcast Languages and Hours Weekly by World Area—Proposed.”

8 Attached but not printed is an undated chart entitled “Voice of America Ranking Among Major International Broadcasters.”

China. Tab E\(^9\) lists the individual languages and hours in which the USSR, China, Egypt, Great Britain and West Germany broadcast.)

Our current technical facilities can accommodate most of these additions, although VOA signals will continue to be hampered by the necessary use of less effective low-powered transmitters until the present construction program is completed in late 1982.

With these additions and modifications we believe that VOA will be broadcasting in vernacular languages—or have the capability to mount new programs within a short lead time—to all those areas where the United States might reasonably face a need for enhanced ability to communicate by radio during the next few years.

I should emphasize that the additional broadcast services recommended above, while not listed in priority order because of the unpredictability of crisis situations, are of lower priority than our current broadcasts.

The second study, dealing with VOA technical facilities, which will be delivered May 1, will go beyond this report in listing specific priorities in terms of individual languages and number of hours of broadcasts in each language (both existing and recommended) as related to current and future availability of transmitting facilities.\(^{10}\)

\(^9\) Attached but not printed are 5 individual, undated charts delineating the output by each of the five countries.

\(^{10}\) The VOA transmitter study, which Reinhardt transmitted to Brzezinski under a May 1 covering memorandum, is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 9, International Communication Agency: 1–5/79. For the National Security Council response to both reports, see Document 171.
Washington, March 8, 1979

SUBJECT

Implementation of Our Cultural Agreement with the PRC (U)

You will recall that during Deng Xiaoping’s visit to the U.S., we signed a broad Cultural Agreement with the PRC. We now face the task of giving that agreement specific meaning. The Agreement assigns responsibility on our side to ICA and on the Chinese side to the Ministry of Culture as the main implementing agency. (U)

We are fortunate that the Minister of Culture in China is the former head of the Liaison Office here, Huang Chen. I believe we should strike while the iron is hot, making use of Huang Chen and his knowledge of American society. (C)

I would also observe that our bilateral relations with China can now be divided into three categories: economic relations, where we are moving ahead under Mike Blumenthal’s leadership; science and technology, where we are moving ahead under Frank Press, and culture. Clearly, the latter, as far as governmental contacts are concerned, is the laggard among the three. (C)

I have been in contact with the working levels at ICA, where it is believed that the attached memorandum from you to John Reinhardt would be a helpful way of crystallizing program planning already underway at ICA. John Reinhardt, by the way, is very supportive of our new China relationship. He has already approved substantial funding by ICA for the Student Exchange Program, for current and

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2 Deng Xiaoping visited the United States January 29–February 25. For information about his meetings with U.S. officials, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XIII, China, Documents 201–209. At a January 31 White House ceremony, Deng and the President signed the cultural agreement and an agreement on cooperation in science and technology. At the same ceremony, Vance and Huang Hua also signed an agreement on the establishment of consular relations and opening of Consulates General. For the text of these agreements and the remarks made by Deng and Carter at the ceremony, see Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book I, pp. 200–211.

3 Attached and printed as Document 167.
expanded ICA activities in China, and for funding of major cultural exchanges. (C)

A report from ICA concerning their planning for cultural exchanges with the PRC would be useful so that we could see how it fits in with both the Frank Press and Mike Blumenthal efforts. That would give us a comprehensive view of our bilateral relations with China. I got the sense during the President’s meeting with Mike Blumenthal that the President would appreciate having such an overall view conveyed to him.4 (C)

RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum at Tab A to John Reinhardt.5 (U)

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4 Reference is presumably to Blumenthal’s March 6 meeting with the President, Aaron, Owen, and Oksenberg. During the course of the meeting, the participants discussed Blumenthal’s recent trip to China. For the memorandum of conversation, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XIII, China, Document 225.

5 Below this recommendation, Inderfurth added the following handwritten notation:
“David, I suggest you go ahead & sign this memo—as Mike say, the ‘iron is hot.’ Rick.”
For the signed version of the memorandum, see Document 167.

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167. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron) to the Director of the International Communication Agency (Reinhardt)1

Washington, March 14, 1979

SUBJECT
Cultural Activities with China (U)

Given your own personal interest in our cultural activities with the People’s Republic of China and your administrative responsibility for these activities (particularly to implement the recently concluded Cultural Exchange Agreement with the PRC),2 we would appreciate receiving from you proposals for U.S. Government-sponsored cultural activities with the PRC. (C)

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2 See footnote 2, Document 166.
These proposals should be contained in a plan for developing our cultural relations broadly defined with the PRC. This plan should involve the activities not only of ICA but other pertinent agencies as well, such as the National Endowment for the Humanities, the National Endowment for the Arts, the Smithsonian Institute, the Library of Congress, and the Office of Education. (C)

The plan should include:

—Consideration of the advisability of inviting a delegation of cultural affairs officials from the PRC, to be headed by Minister of Culture Huang Chen, for the purpose of reaching some specific agreements in the Cultural Exchange realm. (C)

—A listing of related activities which ICA believes its office in Beijing might conduct to enhance the activities of the Agreement. (C)

—As a result of inter-agency coordination, a listing of projects which other agencies in the government are prepared to undertake. (C)

Preparation of this report should be coordinated with OMB so that the budgetary implications of your proposals are understood. This report should also be coordinated with State for an assessment of its political feasibility. (C)

Please provide this report by April 1.3 (U)

David Aaron

3 There is no indication that Reinhardt prepared such a report. On May 2, an interagency ad hoc group met to discuss the cultural agreement. According to the summary of conclusions, ICA was to develop an inventory of exchange programs, a plan for soliciting private involvement, and proposals for funding the Huang Chen delegation’s proposed visit to the United States “within a month.” The summary is printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XIII, China, Document 240. In advance of his scheduled August trip to China, Mondale sent Carter a memorandum on July 11, in which he indicated that various U.S. agencies were “preparing proposals for an expanded cultural relationship.” Mondale also commented that Reinhardt had been invited to China “to present our proposals.” Mondale’s memorandum is printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XIII, China, Document 254.
168. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance, Secretary of Defense Brown, Director of Central Intelligence Turner, and the Director of the International Communication Agency (Reinhardt)¹

Washington, March 14, 1979

SUBJECT

Presidential Commission on Foreign Language and International Studies

As you may know, James Perkins is heading a Presidential Commission on Foreign Language and International Studies. Its mission is to study the state of international education in the U.S. and to report its findings to the President.²

The Commission is under-funded, and is in search of $100,000 to fund a landmark study on our national needs in this area.

We have not had a major assessment of our knowledge base concerning foreign languages and international studies in several decades. There is a general consensus both in and out of government that we are suffering an erosion in the manpower and institutional basis for understanding foreign areas.

I recommend, out of national security considerations, that your agency contact Jim Perkins to encourage him to undertake such a national assessment. In addition, I recommend that you tag $25,000


for his Commission. If DOD, State, CIA, and ICA each contribute $25,000, we will be able to have the needed study.\(^3\)

I know that the work of this Commission is of concern to the President. The work of the Commission grows out of the Helsinki Accords, by the way, in which the U.S. pledged itself to enhance our understanding of foreign cultures.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

\(^3\) In a March 26 memorandum to Brzezinski, Turner indicated that he endorsed the establishment of the Commission, adding that the Central Intelligence Agency had engaged in discussions with Perkins and the Commission members regarding CIA “interests and needs” relating to international education. Turner continued, “With respect to the funding problem you mentioned, the $25,000 contribution requested from CIA is a very modest amount indeed and, as such, would be no problem. I am more concerned, however, that in our enthusiasm to support this effort—by providing even a small amount of CIA funding—we might be making the Commission’s task more difficult. While I feel confident that CIA has a legitimate interest in such an assessment, others in the academic community, the media, or the general public might question the basis for CIA funding a study involving US educational institutions. There is in fact some question about CIA’s legal authority to transfer funds to a Commission such as this.” He suggested that in light of these concerns, Reinhardt would agree “that it is preferable to avoid the use of CIA funds for this purpose.” (Carter Library, White House Central Files, Subject File, Federal Government, International Communication Agency, Executive, Box FG–218, FG 298 1/1/79–5/31/80)

169. Memorandum From the Director of the International Communication Agency (Reinhardt) to Secretary of State Vance and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\(^1\)

Washington, March 22, 1979

I have just been alerted to an idea that David Rockefeller may want to raise with the President—if he has not already done so—and I want to be sure that you are aware of it as well. According to our Public Affairs Officer in Brazil, Mr. Rockefeller discussed the following with Ambassador Sayre during his just-concluded trip to Brazil:

1. On his recent, extensive travels around the world, Mr. Rockefeller has found many chiefs of state and heads of government in smaller countries openly questioning the steadfastness of American leadership.

2. He believes that many of these leaders’ doubts and uncertainties might be dispelled if they could meet personally, if only for an hour, with President Carter.

3. Since the likelihood of a series of state visits by such leaders is small, Mr. Rockefeller suggests a series of unofficial visits, with most or all of the funding coming from the interested private sector and a private meeting with the President assured.

4. While in Washington, the visiting leaders could also meet with key cabinet or sub-cabinet officials in departments and agencies of greatest interest to his country, as well as with prominent academic leaders, public affairs councils, journalists and so on.

I believe this idea has merit and is worthy of your, and the President’s, consideration. Should a decision be made to pursue it further, we are prepared to work with Mr. Rockefeller and others that may be involved in developing the details of the proposed visits.

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170. Memorandum From the Director for North African, Near East, and South Asian Affairs, International Communication Agency (Curran) to William Quandt of the National Security Council Staff

Washington, April 30, 1979

SUBJECT
ICA Activity on the Subject of the Islamic Revival

In response to your request to ICA/NEA, our media divisions have supplied listings of material prepared by USICA for use by overseas

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1 Source: Carter Library, White House Central Files, Subject File, Foreign Affairs, Publicity International, Box FO–38, FO 5–3 4/1/79–9/30/79. No classification marking. Curran wrote “Ted” next to his name in the “from” line. Quandt sent a copy of the memorandum to Aaron under a May 1 covering memorandum, in which he stated: “By pushing ICA periodically, we can expect to see them do more in the future.” Aaron’s handwritten notations on the covering memorandum read: “Very good. Keep it up.” According to a notation on the covering memorandum in an unknown hand, copies were also sent to Thornton and Henze. (Ibid.) An attached NSC Correspondence Profile indicates that Aaron noted the memorandum on May 3. (Ibid.)
posts or broadcast by the Voice of America thus far this year on the general subject of Islam. Attached are listings of the titles of articles (nearly all reprints from the press) distributed to our posts abroad via our daily Wireless File; articles (either reprints or original articles) published in USICA periodicals which are distributed by our posts; and titles of backgrounders or correspondent reports broadcast in English and by various language services of VOA. We have also listed two relevant projects currently being undertaken by our Office of Research, preliminary results of which are expected to be available by late summer or early fall.

As you can see, the Wireless File and VOA items have been fairly frequent, particularly in backgrounding events in Iran, and we are submitting listings only back to January 1 of this year. The Voice of America lists do not record which items were broadcast by each of the more than 30 foreign language services. In two cases the items were originated by a foreign language service, and these are specified. Others were broadcast in English and also made available to all of the language services.

USICA also brings leaders from Islamic countries to the U.S. under its International Visitors program, and our personnel in those countries maintain appropriate contacts with Islamic figures, particularly those in educational or media work. One Islamic leader expected to visit the U.S. later this year under our auspices is the Grand Mufti of Syria.

If you would like further information about any of these categories or items, please let me know.

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3 The “USICA Research Projects Presently in Progress” attachment (see footnote 2, above) listed two projects: “Study of Elites in Egypt, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia” and “The Role of Islam: Syntheses of Current Research.”

4 An unknown hand, presumably Quandt’s, placed a vertical line in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.

5 An unknown hand, presumably Quandt’s, placed a vertical line in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.

6 An unknown hand, presumably Quandt’s, underlined “Grand Mufti of Syria.”
Dear John,

Since the pressure of SALT and summits\(^2\) has prevented him from doing so, Zbig has asked me to give you our reactions to the two excellent studies you prepared in response to his request of February 9, 1979.\(^3\) We have reviewed them carefully and considered the choices they present. Let me sum up our conclusions. (U)

We find your recommendations for technical expansion of VOA during the 1980’s reasonable and justified in terms of basic foreign policy priorities. We endorse them fully. We would like to see you incorporate these plans in your budget projections for FY 1981 and beyond. The political issues involved in setting up new transmitters for broadcasting to south and central Asia should be systematically assessed as soon as possible so that negotiations can get under way and serious technical preparations can begin. Please assess these questions with the help of the Department of State and give us a status report by September 1, 1979. (C)

We find your conclusions in respect to expansion of broadcasting time and broadcasting staff realistic and recommend you also provide in current budget planning for the modest expenditures this expansion will entail over the next two or three years. (U)

On language priorities, we welcome your plans for further expansion of the Persian service which you have recently inaugurated. Atten-

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\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 9, International Communication Agency: 1–5/79. Confidential. Copies were sent to Vance and McIntyre. Also printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. XX, Eastern Europe, Document 63. Under cover of a June 1 memorandum to Brzezinski, Henze transmitted copies of the two ICA studies requested by Brzezinski in February. Within the memorandum, Henze summarized the studies and recommended that Brzezinski sign an attached letter to Reinhardt addressing several questions raised by the report. Also attached to the June 1 memorandum is a June 4 memorandum from Thornton to Brzezinski commenting on Henze’s memorandum and providing comments related to South Asian broadcasting. (Ibid.) Gates, in a June 5 memorandum to Henze, commented that Henze’s “package seems very detailed for Zbig to both read and act upon,” especially in the context of Brzezinski and Aaron preparing for the upcoming summit meetings. Gates wondered if it would be “bureaucratically feasible” for Henze to resolve any issues with Reinhardt directly rather than engaging Brzezinski. (Ibid.)

\(^2\) References are to the U.S.-Soviet summit in Vienna June 14–18 at which the President and Brezhnev signed the SALT II agreement, and the G–7 Economic Summit meeting in Tokyo June 25–29.

\(^3\) See Document 163.
tion should be given to the need to adjust broadcasting hours to improve prospects of attracting an optimum audience in Afghanistan and Soviet Central Asia as well as in Iran itself. (C)

In respect to new languages, we concur in the priority of Azeri, but as next priorities we propose Amharic, Pushtu and Tamil rather than Mongolian and Lingala. The potential audience for Mongolian seems too small. Broadcasts in Lingala would undoubtedly be useful but the need for better communication with Ethiopia, where Soviet influence is continually becoming more predominant, is greater. (C)

We have noted from your current broadcast schedule that VOA is still beaming 35 hours per week to the three countries of Indo-China, with 64 million people, while only 21 hours per week go to the whole Indian subcontinent, with a population between 800–900 million. I should think there would be a case for reducing broadcast time in Vietnamese, if necessary, to permit more broadcasting in the native languages of the Indian subcontinent. Exactly what mix of Indian languages would be best should separately be evaluated but we clearly ought to do more than we are now doing. (C)

I will be happy to meet with you and your staff to discuss any of these plans further.4 (U)

Very sincerely,

Paul B. Henze

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4 In a June 21 memorandum to Henze, Reinhardt thanked Henze for his “helpful comments and guidance” on the two VOA studies. Reinhardt stated, “Almost certainly we will want to have a session with you once our plans are further developed. I shall let you know when the time seems right.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 9, International Communication Agency: 1–5/79)
In the wake of our discussion yesterday morning, I have decided to task you—as the head of USICA’s central planning element—with the development of a specific plan for the projection of American culture overseas during fiscal year 1980. In carrying out this assignment, you should be guided by the following:

1. The plan should derive in the first instance from a careful analysis of the 1980 Country Plan submissions. It should specifically address itself to the cultural problems identified by the posts in these plans.

2. The plan should be detailed. It should specifically state what kind of cultural communication efforts we plan to undertake in which countries or areas of the world, within what time frame and at what cost. (It is not adequate merely to state that we will undertake one performing arts program and/or one plastic arts program in each country. Such an approach is far too simplistic, lacking the required level of judgment, discrimination, sophistication and sense of priorities.)

3. The plan should be built on the concept of sustained communication. It must not be scattershot, episodic or ad hoc. The point is that if there is a cultural tension to be addressed in a given country, this—as with all communication efforts—can only be done successfully over time and on a carefully planned, coordinated basis.

4. The plan should include a detailed concept for the coordinated application of all relevant elements of the Agency. If we are to address a cultural tension in a given country, how will we bring to bear—in coordinated, mutually reinforcing, cost-efficient manner—speakers, VTR’s and films, publications, the Voice of America, Cultural Presentations, the posts, etc.?

5. The plan must contain a specific menu of needs, criteria, timetables and available funding that can be presented immediately to the Endowments for the kind of input envisioned in our agreement with them.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Associate Directorate for Programs, Subject Files of Basic Operating Documents, 1969–1982, Entry P-100, Basic Documents—1979. No classification marking.

2 For the plan, see the attachment to Document 174.
6. The plan should contain detailed, justified budget figures for all proposed efforts.

7. The plan should include a detailed scenario which will enable us to maximize the support (including financial) of other institutions—other government agencies, private institutions, corporations and foundations. How should we proceed and with whom?

This plan should be presented to me for review no later than Friday, July 13. I realize that this is an unusually tight deadline, requiring extraordinary effort on your part. But I think it imperative that we have the proposed plan before basic budget decisions are made toward the end of July. The thought and work that you have already given to this subject, and the fact that your analysis of the Country Plans is nearing completion, should give you a head start. Finally, I emphasize that the quality and persuasiveness of the plan you present will be central to my determination of how we proceed in fiscal year 1980.

173. Action Memorandum From the Associate Director for Educational and Cultural Affairs, International Communication Agency (Ilchman) to the Director (Reinhardt)

Washington, July 9, 1979

SUBJECT

ECA and Second Mandate

We are anxious to move forward on designing programs in support of the second mandate. We have no problem with regard to assuring a strong “American learning” component in our programs involving physical exchange of persons. Well designed exchange programs have traditionally met this criterion and all new grants include, where appropriate, language identifying and assuring “American learning.”

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, USIA Historical Collection, Subject Files, 1953–2000, Entry A–1 1066, Box 52, Educational Exchanges, Educational and Cultural Affairs, 1978–1981. No classification marking. Drafted by Inman. The date on the memorandum is stamped. There is no indication that Reinhardt saw the memorandum. Nalle initialed the memorandum, indicating that he saw it.

2 ICA’s “second mandate” refers to the objective of educating and informing the American public about the world.
We have questions about our legal authority and the Agency’s intentions to address the mandate in the area of exchange of ideas. At the third grant review panel meeting on June 22, five pilot projects were presented that were designed to test the limits and to establish the beginnings of a framework within which we can work comfortably. All those proposals were deferred at the General Counsel’s request pending guidance from you on this question. We would like to discuss the policy implications of these grants at your earliest convenience. I will call Pat about an appointment.

3 Reference is to Siemien.

174. Memorandum From the Associate Director for Programs, International Communication Agency (Schneidman) to the Director (Reinhardt)

Washington, July 13, 1979

SUBJECT

Arts America

Attached is the plan requested in your memorandum of June 28. We consulted all Agency elements in its formulation; we did not, however, incorporate all of their suggestions, and changed many of them. I alone am responsible for the contents of this proposal.

We began this exercise with the assumption that each region or sub-region of the world would require a substantially different plan, based on different cultural concerns, differences in the extent of access to and appreciation of the American arts, and differences in the levels of “sophistication” of our audiences. In short, we believed that we would need to say different things to different peoples through different—and most “culturally acceptable”—art forms. We culled Country Plans and area offices alike to determine the different foci of each region.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Associate Directorate for Programs, Subject Files of Basic Operating Documents, 1969–1982, Entry P–100, Basic Documents—1979. No classification marking. Printed from an unsigned and uninitialed copy. Copies were sent to Bray and Cohen.

2 See Document 172.
We were wrong. There are, certainly, important cultural differences among nations. We no longer believe, however, that our starting assumption is essentially valid; within the rule of reason (we might send the most “avant” of the avant-garde to Paris but not Peking) the Agency needs to say essentially the same thing about the arts in America to everyone. This puts us into direct disagreement with AF, for example, who would have us emphasize black American art in Africa. (Though I believe that whatever we send to Africa should contain representative works by black artists, and that the didactic context that we provide through our other products should place their contributions in perspective.) It also rejects the collective wisdom of many that because country-western music is popular in a given country, our cultural presentations should emphasize it. We are therefore presenting a rationale, communication themes, and products we believe to be valid on a worldwide basis.

At the resource and logistics level for very expensive “one time” activities such as cultural presentations and fine arts exhibitions, regional groupings do make sense; these activities can only travel so far for the buck. Accordingly, the plans for CP and exhibitions are presented on a regional basis. Specifically regarding this part of our presentation, however, there are some underlying assumptions on my part that should be tabled here.

—The cost estimates are pretty shaky and could be well far off the mark at both ends of the range. They are based on our experience—and our experience is not very rich in trying to do anything other than “pick up” cultural presentations already traveling. I have provided you with essentially the list of cultural presentations that I was provided by ECA/IC—although I will admit to changing figures which I took to be extraordinarily high, and emphasizing soloists and duos over large groups. I have no way of knowing whether or not ECA/IC can deliver on an increase of this order of magnitude, although that order of magnitude is theirs.

—I believe you should read this section of the paper as suggestive only. In fact, I believe that a real partnership with the Endowments can reduce some significant overhead costs, as would inclusion under the Indemnification Act, and the very real possibility that our program will inspire increased private entrepreneurship in countries where none exists. Too, with a sufficiently diversified menu—in time, place, and cost, I believe we can really engage the private sector, along the lines outlined in Tab D.5

5 Attached but not printed at Tab D of the attached plan is an undated paper entitled “Proposal for Outside Support for the Agency’s Cultural Programs.”
—I am banking on your siding with me in the controversy over scale. The preponderant opinion in the Agency is to go with the “biggins”—large exhibits and large troupes that equate with an “event.” While I am not opposed to the occasional “event,” our multiple purposes—exchange, linkage, thrift of resources and staff time, are also well served by the deployment of solo or duo instrumentalists, vocalists or folk musicians to take on elite audiences in the Ambassador’s salon, our cultural center, the university auditorium.

On funding: Page 19 sets out the annualized costs for all proposals over FY–80 and 81, as against what we already have (or can reprogram internally, in the case of T and P) in our budgets for those activities. The order of “new” money for FY–80 is large. I recommend strongly that should you decide to augment the amount of resources we devote to the arts only incrementally, you give highest priority to the proposed magazine.4

And speaking of the magazine, it is truly the linchpin of “what’s new” in this proposal, and could be the most significant development in the Agency’s engagement with culture. T and the Voice will parallel and reinforce the magazine, and vice versa. Together they will form a kind of baseline context against which speakers, CPs, exhibits, films, and all the rest can play. The Arts Endowment has put together a working group of this country’s leading creative intellectuals to blaze a trail in the media arts. There is good reason to believe that the arts in America will, in the next decade, break out of their traditional museum and stage modes; the arts will belong to everyone through the media. In short order, the Endowment will provide us with a mother lode of people, materials, and ideas that will enable P, T, and VOA to be a part of this cultural breakthrough, and carry it to the rest of the world.

Finally, we are not including recommendations for the bureaucratic organization or reorganization of those parts of the Agency’s elements which deal with the arts in this paper. Such suggestions will derive from your content decisions.

4 Reference is to a proposed magazine entitled “ARTS AMERICA.”
Attachment

Proposal Prepared in the Associate Directorate for Programs, International Communication Agency

Washington, undated

[Omitted here is the Table of Contents.]

RATIONALE

The reasons for integrated and coordinated programming on the arts in America on a world-wide basis are compelling.

This year’s Country Plans suggest some very basic and deeply held foreign perceptions of our society and the forces that motivate it. Too many abroad see our strengths as limited to the technological, the scientific, the managerial. Too many see us as crass and consumately materialistic, out for the fast buck and little moved by humanist or spiritual values.

The natural concomitant of these perceptions (and perhaps the inevitable result of the sweep of our economic and political influence) is the accusation of cultural imperialism. We are too often seen as blind to the traditions and vigor of other cultures—a powerful member of the world community that lacks even the most rudimentary understanding of the needs and strengths of its neighbors. Ours is the newest culture, an “up-start” that lacks the civilizing values of history and tradition.

Whatever the reasons for these perceptions of American life and culture, the problem for us is fundamental: they form a canted and even dangerous context for international communication in a world of inevitable and increasingly intractable political and economic conflicts. A nation whose basic goals are peace and a fuller life for all must be perceived as having a human face, as understanding and appreciating the achievements of others, if it is to gain the participation of others in pursuit of its goals.

The arts speak to these perceptions directly, in a language which transcends cultural difference; just as “the Eroica” reaches the souls of Nigerians and Brazilians as well as Germans, the constructions of Louise Nevelson are as aesthetically moving to Filipinos and Greeks as they are to Americans. With the simplicity and integrity born of the

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5 No classification marking. An unknown hand wrote “Attached to July 13 memo” at the top of the plan.

6 Reference is to Beethoven’s Symphony No. 3 in E-flat major.
fact that the arts constitute our vision of ourselves for ourselves, they proclaim to the rest of the world that we are significantly more complex than popular stereotypes would have us:

— We value tradition but are not bound to it; we push the limits of the past to the future.

— We are materialistic and enchanted with technology; and we are consumed with questions of value, ethics, aesthetics;

— We are fiercely individual and competitive; and we value the group, the community, the collective good;

— We have the best of hopes and the worst of fears for the future of mankind;

— We are energetic and activist, as well as contemplative; elitist as well as populist; sacred as well as profane; and a thousand other things, all at once.

Thus are the arts more than the sum of their simple components. They are the “human face” of this nation. They are proof that we are a vital, individualist, free and questioning people engaged in the search for improvement in man’s nature as well as his condition. They are witness to the United States as a society deserving respect and, importantly, trust.

All of this does not imply that American arts themselves—or some parts of them—are not appreciated and admired by many overseas. To the contrary, studies reveal that those who have had access to the best of American arts (this usually means the most “sophisticated” of the urban populations of the “first world”), very much respect them. But there are two important points to be made in this context. The first is that the number of foreigners who have had access to our arts is very small. Most of the world (and even most of the much smaller world of USICA publics) has not had access to our very expensive best. Most of the world has been the “beneficiary”, through the revolution in mass communications, of American culture through our routine and often shoddy film and television products. They have been denied our best—both because of its prohibitive cost, and because they have permitted our worst to dominate their vision—not recognizing that their own impulses have attracted our Kojaks and Angels, even as they abhor them.

More importantly, whether or not our arts are admired as arts, their commercial distribution cannot exploit their larger dimension. It is not enough to simply display our arts, in the hope that they will

7 References are to the CBS television crime drama “Kojak” and the ABC television crime drama “Charlie’s Angels.”
somehow achieve the communication that they so powerfully portend. It is certainly not enough to continue in the ad hoc and episodic fashion that has heretofore characterized our activities in this area. Without in any way trying to mold or control what the arts say about the United States, we must utilize the full range of the Agency’s assets to provide a continuous and integrated explanation of them and of the society that gives them birth—a kind of sociological, almost scholarly backdrop against which the truths of Tharp and Cage and Spielberg and Price and Nevelson and Mamet and a thousand others can be seen abroad. And understood.


175. **Memorandum From the Associate Director for Educational and Cultural Affairs, International Communication Agency (Ilchman) to the Director (Reinhardt)**

Washington, July 20, 1979

**SUBJECT**

USICA Leadership in Federally Supported Exchanges

There have been in the past few days two occasions on which USICA was conspicuously active in carrying out the mandate that the Agency serve as the coordinator of U.S. Government exchanges policy.

Tuesday morning\(^2\) I met with the 60 American senior faculty and graduate students who will spend a year in the PRC. It was a stimulating session. The point is that through careful hard work, a clear eye,

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2 July 17.
and the appropriate expertise both in Washington and, increasingly, at the posts, USICA has emerged as the lead agency. It is true that the legislation fits well with us and that we have some of the most flexible money. Nonetheless, you will remember that six months ago the Federal agencies were in great disarray about both receiving scholars from China and sending Americans to work there. In this two-day orientation given by the executive agent, the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People’s Republic of China, most of the speakers were scholars or persons with intimate knowledge of the field conditions in the PRC. The representatives from the Federal Government were all from USICA: I gave the opening talk, Norris Smith handled the questions of assistance from the USICA posts and relations to the Embassy, as well as relations to the other Federal partners (NEH, OE, NSF, NIH), and they were to meet with Ted Liu who will, of course, be very important to them. I think at the moment USICA, as the convener of Federal agencies, and the CSC are an effective team. It will be important to preserve this leadership and expertise, to develop it in additional persons, and to try to have in key roles persons who can negotiate an orderly leadership status for USICA when that is important. I think it is important in the China field.

The second event was the U.S./Egyptian Joint Working Group talks, where the responsibility for leadership rests in USICA. David Nalle served as the American chairman, and other Federal partners at the table included OE, the Smithsonian, and the people who have such abundance of money that it skews what would ordinarily be an agenda for such an educational and cultural working group. This, of course, is AID. They have approximately $16 million to spend in this channel. It is a moment of particular opportunity, however, with the revival of the Fulbright Commission3 and a talented group of officers in Cairo. The team sent by Egypt was very high level and competent: two former members of Sadat’s cabinet and several university or research institute presidents. The big opportunity for new money in exchange is, of course, the Peace Scholarships, 500 a year to young Egyptians in development subjects, broadly construed. What is different about these fellowships, which are sponsored by AID, is that they will use selection criteria more nearly like those used in private academic exchange programs and that the arrangements will be made through the Fulbright Commission in Cairo. AMIDEAST is the placement agency on this side. Here is an opportunity to exercise leadership by using USICA’s rapport with some particularly imaginative and inventive AID staff to capture

3 For more on the Fulbright program, see Document 7.
significant amounts of money for mutual education and cultural understanding type exchange programs.

It is difficult for USICA to be a coordinator—except as a data collector—in a vacuum. But given particular opportunities, or seizing opportunities such as the above, coordination can be an effective way to lead.

176. Memorandum From the Associate Director for Programs (Schneidman) and the Director of the Press and Publications Service, Associate Directorate for Programs (Winkler), International Communication Agency to the Executive Assistant to the Director (Cohen)\(^1\)

Washington, July 23, 1979

SUBJECT

Director’s Decisions on Culture

Following are the items in our notes of the July 16 meeting.

—The Director said the rationale was fine.\(^2\) The first page was particularly well stated, especially paragraph four.

—He said the themes are all right.

—He said we need a new term for cultural presentations because this term is associated basically with what Paul Wheeler’s shop in ECA has been doing.

—He stated he would add $500,000 to the $250,000 now available for art exhibits. Augmentation of the performing arts budget will follow, pending consultation with Congressional elements; in the interim spot increases to take advantage of special opportunities as they arise are not precluded.

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 306, Associate Directorate for Programs, Subject Files of Basic Operating Documents, 1969–1982, Entry P–100, Basic Documents—1979. No classification marking. Attached to the memorandum is a July 26 note to Schneidman from Siemien, in which she wrote: “This accords with the Director’s understanding. Once outstanding decisions are made, you will want to incorporate all decisions in materials being prepared for Washington and overseas distribution.” (Ibid.)

\(^2\) Reference is presumably to the proposal attached to Schneidman’s July 13 memorandum to Reinhardt (see Document 174).
—Following the discussion on whether PGM/E or PGM/D handle the fine arts exhibits, there was no decision made.

—PGM is to immediately proceed to work out the necessary arrangements for fine and performing arts with the Endowments.

—It was determined that PGM/T has some $2.7 million “to play with.” This is in addition to funds for prints and language versions.

—Deputy Director Bray suggested that we do four issues of the magazine in FY 1980 and instead of deciding now to follow this with 12 in 1981 we test the water for PBS acquisitions in our 1980 efforts. At the end of that period we will decide whether to do the 12 magazine films in 1981 or switch to straight acquisitions. The Director approved this but only on a basis of one (production) to three (acquisitions) in these four films. The Director was very specific in placing responsibility for the concept for these films on Schneidman and Winkler and asked that he be kept apprised of these concepts.

—After being assured that the Ahora series was well placed in prime time, the Director ordered that we proceed with the series.

—The Director urged caution in proceeding with the Mideast and African series and said we will not go ahead without a “guarantee” of prime time placement. This means that we will produce a pilot for Africa to test the waters there. We are to call a hiatus on the Mideast series after completion of the third film (now in process) pending guarantees from that region regarding prime time placement.

—The contacts by the PGM front office with the two National Endowments re rights to films they support should be in consort with the legal counsel.

—We should attempt to acquire six to ten PBS programs on the arts in FY 1980. The Director specifically ordered the PGM front office personally to undertake these negotiations.

—The Director approved proceeding in FY 1981 with the expenditure of $125,000 to acquire direct showing rights for 25 feature films but only if these titles are selected by the National Endowment for the Arts. He was very specific that they should not be selected by Agency personnel.

—The Director approved the paper shows project as described in the report.

—As far as the presentation on the corporate connection is concerned, he specifically picked the option for individual corporate contacts and negotiation. He said that the PGM front office should be the implementers.

—The Director ordered completion of two papers which he wants by July 26.
1. A short paper for internal guidance of the Agency which rationalizes what we plan to do. It should say what we are now doing plus all the things that we plan to do. This covers the notion that the posts know the problems and opportunities but cannot know what is available in this rich and active segment of our society. We should state our position on reverse flow. We should also describe the powerful potential of a coordinated multi-media effort, in complementing the on the ground offerings of art and artists. The American Participants should be rationalized into this. In other words, he wants an explanation of how they will work in support of the overall arts effort. He also wants in this a rationalization of American cultural specialists similar to Amparts being placed under PGM. He also noted that one very carefully drafted section will have to describe how PGM will be responsible for planning of the total cultural presentations' efforts which will then be implemented by an office of ECA.

2. The Director asked for a PAO letter which will do much the same as the paper described above and will ask for PAO input. He feels there is a need for a rationalization of how this whole program fits as part of a Program Design and said the letter should note that the program is already justified in the Country Plans. Obviously a point to be handled here is the fact that not all Country Plans ask for high art.

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3 Not found.
4 The PAO letter is printed as Document 178.
5 Below this paragraph, Schneidman wrote: "P.S. We have omitted reference to the Arts America magazine since it was handled in a separate memo. HS."
177. Memorandum From the Director of the International Communication Agency (Reinhardt) to the Associate Director for Programs (Schneidman) and the Director of the Press and Publications Service, Associate Directorate for Programs (Winkler)¹

Washington, July 30, 1979

SUBJECT
Decisions on Cultural Initiative

Based on your July 13 memorandum² and our subsequent discussions, I have made the following decisions with regard to the proposed cultural initiative:

1. The rationale and communication themes presented in your July 13 memorandum are approved.

2. The general thrust of cultural presentations and fine arts exhibits presented in your July 13 memorandum is approved, with the following understandings:

   a. USICA cultural presentations and fine arts exhibits will be based on recommendations made by the two National Endowments, in keeping with our agreement of last October.³ PGM will be the Agency’s primary point of contact with the two Endowments. It will be responsible for securing the necessary recommendations, including supplying the Endowments with the information required.

   b. Subject to appropriate OMB and Congressional approvals, an additional $500,000 will be budgeted for cultural presentations in FY 1980 and FY 1981. These funds will be restricted to use on a matching basis of at least two to one with supporting private sector efforts. The additional funds required to implement the cultural presentations program you have proposed must be secured from the private sector.⁴


² See Document 174.

³ Presumable reference to an October 19, 1978, memorandum of understanding (MOU) undertaken with the National Endowment for the Arts and National Endowment for the Humanities. Bray sent a copy of the MOU to all element heads under a November 3 memorandum. (National Archives, RG 306, Office of Research and Evaluation, Office of the Associate Director, Program Files, 1973–1978, Entry P–119, INF 1)

⁴ In the left-hand margin, Schneidman placed a bracket around this paragraph.
c. Subject to appropriate OMB and Congressional approvals, an additional $500,000 will be allocated to fine arts exhibits. 

d. PGM will submit for my review and approval a more detailed schedule of FY 1980 cultural presentations and fine arts exhibits prior to the beginning of the new fiscal year on October 1. 

3. The decisions on the use of films and television are confirmed as stated in your July 23 memorandum to Mr. Cohen (copy attached)\(^5\) and our recent ZBB decisions. I reiterate that PGM leadership is directly responsible for undertaking negotiations to take maximum advantage of acquisitions in this area. You should keep me regularly informed of your efforts and progress. 

4. The paper shows project is approved as outlined in your July 13 memorandum. 

5. Your proposal for a new magazine as presented in your July 26 memorandum (copy attached)\(^6\) is approved, with the following understandings: 

   a. For obvious reasons, the manner in which this decision is communicated to the Agency and the field can impact heavily on its acceptance. I would, therefore, like for you to develop for my approval a recommended approach for making this decision known. I would like your recommendation no later than Thursday, August 2. No communication of this decision should be made until we have agreed on how it is to be handled. 

   b. There is a predisposition in this decision against permitting local inserts in the new magazine, for the quality reasons we have discussed. Our communication of the decision should make this known, but should also permit posts to state their case for a local insert, if they wish. Local inserts may be permitted where persuasive cases are made. 

   c. I would like to know as soon as possible, but no later than August 31, the detailed plan for phasing in the new magazine. 

   d. I will want to review and approve the design and format of the new magazine (or alternative designs and formats) as these are developed. 

6. PGM leadership is responsible for the Agency’s efforts to secure private-sector funds to support this initiative. I shall want to know specifically how and when you intend to proceed in this area and to be kept apprised of your progress. 

7. PGM leadership is responsible for planning and coordinating the cultural initiative Agency-wide. If and when irreconcilable differences

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\(^5\) Not attached but printed as Document 176. 
\(^6\) Not attached.
arise across Agency element lines, these should be surfaced to the Deputy Director or me for resolution.

8. This initiative should be undertaken immediately. Its impact must be felt in fiscal year 1980.

Finally, I want to compliment you on your highly professional work on this initiative over the past several weeks. Against an exceptionally tight deadline, you have done work that should serve as a model for you and other elements of the Agency. I appreciate your efforts, and I hope that you will convey my appreciation to all those who have been involved. I shall, of course, be delighted to answer any questions you may have.

178. Letter From the Director of the International Communication Agency (Reinhardt) to all ICA Public Affairs Officers

Washington, August 6, 1979

Dear PAO:

As you know, we have been wrestling for some time now with the question of how best to organize the Agency to take maximum advantage of the powerful communication potential of the arts.

Our point of departure has been a careful analysis of this year’s Country Plan submissions, so that we would know the communication needs and potential that you have identified in this area. We have had thorough, wide-ranging discussions with all elements of the Agency on this subject. And I have been persuaded, as a result of this process, that the justification for more systematic, better coordinated and better organized programs on the arts in America is indeed compelling.

Most of us have known, intuitively at least, that the arts are powerful communicators, that they effectively transcend their own content to interpret and enlighten the society that creates and nurtures them. The Bicentennial exhibit “200 Years of American Art,” the Bernstein

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, USIA Historical Collection, Office of the Director, Biographic Files Relating to USIA Directors and Other Senior Officials, 1953–2000, Entry A–1 1069, Box 25, John E. Reinhardt, Speeches, 1978–1980. No classification marking. Sent to all country and branch PAOs, Associate Directors, and heads of Offices and Services.
film, the performance of Alvin Ailey in a West African country, or of Romania’s Bulandra Theater in the United States, all contain this potential.

Yet as an Agency, we have not realized the full potential of the arts as a form of communication. We have tended to deal with the arts episodically. In an effort to organize ourselves to communicate more effectively through the arts, I am therefore designating “Arts America” as a major new multi-regional initiative for the Agency. (The term “arts” as I shall use it throughout this letter is broadly conceived; it denotes all forms of creative expression that mirror the significant threads of a culture and its values.)

The Rationale

A careful reading of the Country Plans indicates that too many influential people abroad are ignorant of—or indifferent to—the richness and diversity of the arts in America. Those of you who may have recently been in the United States have probably been discouraged by the same ignorance or indifference of Americans toward the artistic richness of the country where you serve.

The framework of communication between the United States and other societies is too often defined by a foreign perception of the United States as materialistic and technological and by an American perception of our interests in Eastern Europe, for example, as limited to the political, or our interests in the Third World as limited to the economic. To the extent that the fabric of communication between this society and others is defined by such perceptions, the problem for us is fundamental. We are faced with a distorted context for international communication in a world of inevitable and increasingly difficult political and economic conflicts. In the particular case of the United States, the national goals of peace and a fuller life for all must be perceived as having a human face, and the nation must be seen as capable of understanding and appreciating the cultures of others as it seeks in turn to gain their understanding and participation in pursuit of its goals. The arts offer proof that we are a vital, free, and questioning people engaged in the search for improvement in man’s nature as well as his condition. They are witness to the United States as a society deserving respect and, more importantly, trust.

The arts address directly the limited perceptions and misperceptions we and other societies have of each other. With the simplicity and integrity born of the fact that they constitute a society’s vision of itself for itself, they are a form of communication that arises from the

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2 Reference is to the 1978 documentary, “Leonard Bernstein: Reflections,” directed by Peter Rosen.
experience of a common humanity and identity of interests, which occurs in the sharing of an artistic experience. They are the “human face” of a nation. Whatever the specific bilateral political, military, or economic tensions and concerns between the United States and any other country, cultural communication among peoples is essential in achieving the goals of this nation and this Agency.

Therein lies the reason that I have decided to devote special attention to coordinated arts programs.

I continue to believe that the officer in the field—through the Country Plan process—is in the best position to describe issues and prescribe strategies for dealing with the bilateral tensions that motivate the major portion of USICA programs. He or she is also the most qualified to analyze the particular form that the misperceptions I have mentioned take in a society and to describe the nature of the constraints that they place upon the bilateral communication relationship.

We might well agree that the arts treat these underlying concerns very effectively. But the fact is that the field officer is not able to keep up with the vast and rapidly changing cornucopia of American artistic creativity. For this we will turn to the artists, performers, critics, and scholars of art and society themselves.

The Plan

“Arts America” is based on three key concepts:

1. Our approach will be two-tier: coordinated print, radio, and film products collectively will provide a basic context for on-the-ground performances, exhibitions and speakers. The essence of “what’s new” in the Agency’s engagement with culture is that for the first time all of the Agency’s media will be conceived and produced in parallel, to reinforce each other and the in-person events.

The importance of the in-person event is in no way lessened, but we obviously cannot send the New York City Ballet to very many countries. We can, through our media products, provide a continuous and integrated explanation of this ballet and all of the other arts events of this society.

2. We will not depend on the tastes and predilections of Agency employees, however well-informed, to determine which artists, performing groups, critics, specialists in the arts, or films we sponsor through our grants or our media products. Rather, the Agency will define the requirements and priorities of “Arts America.” We will work through the National Endowment for the Arts and the National Endowment for the Humanities to determine who or what best responds to those requirements. We will make final selections from the Endowments’ recommendations, basing our decisions on budgetary and scheduling considerations. This principle encompasses all forms of
programs—performing artists, feature films, VOA broadcasts, American Participants, Cultural Specialists, fine arts exhibitions, and so forth.

3. Finally, a word about the audience that we envision for “Arts America.” We are not limiting or even directing this effort primarily to the museum directors or cultural czars of the world, as we have done too often in the past. To the degree that we meet professional standards of excellence and innovation, arts professionals will certainly be interested and involved. But we are working on the assumption that the world’s busiest and most important people are increasingly turning to the arts for intellectual nourishment and for gaining a broader understanding of societies. Arts America is designed to engage those people—in government, the media, academe, the arts—whom you have identified as central to the bilateral communication relationship. We are not setting out to have artists talk about art with other artists, although that will surely happen. We are setting out to engage the most important people with whom we deal in a dialogue about the deepest values and hopes of our societies through the arts.

The major new resources to be made available for Arts America are three media products: (a) a quarterly publication; (b) a series of half-hour film documentaries for television placement as well as for direct projection; and (c) a series on the Voice of America.

Each of these products will have three principal functions, all related to how America sees itself through the arts: to serve as showcase and explicator of the arts in America, to mirror American society as seen through the arts, and to correct false stereotypes about American culture. Each one will be named “Arts America” to symbolize our determination that our products be carefully coordinated in the planning stages and mutually reinforcing when they reach you in the field. They will all be made available worldwide. Specific details about production schedules, language versions, and area-specific focusing will be the subject of future communications.

Arts America will be implemented at a second level through coordination and, in some cases, adaptation of existing products and programs. The Wireless File will carry a periodic column of cultural briefs, similar to its economic and energy briefs. The Article Alert Service and Availability List will significantly increase their “cultural” fare. PGM/T will greatly step up its acquisition efforts relating to feature films, videotapes and documentaries, including PBS documentaries for television rebroadcast, to support Arts America. All of these acquired films and videotapes will be made available to all posts. PGM/E will produce additional printed exhibits on art, with the intention of giving a sense of national style to our centers and offices.

PGM, in consultation with ECA and the Area offices, will draw up for the Endowments a worldwide schedule of Agency priorities for
fine arts exhibitions and performing artists. Subject to appropriate OMB and Congressional reviews, I am augmenting—through reprogramming—the amount that the Agency spends on fine arts exhibitions and the performing arts.

These initiatives will be designed and implemented in the context of existing programs that foster communication through the arts—including those that encourage communication on the arts of other societies. Foreign Press Center tours and briefings contribute significantly to an understanding of the role of the arts in American society. Multi-regional IV programs and Agency grants to private sector organizations have great potential for further expanding dialogue on the role of the arts in all societies. Educational exchange programs contribute to communication through the arts as an academic discipline. American Participants and Cultural Specialists will be an integral part of this initiative. For example, an artist, critic, or scholar will accompany or follow every exhibition that we send abroad to provide context, start the dialogue, plant the seed of institutional linkage.

In short, our long-term goal, through cooperation with the Endowments and the private sector, is to provide the opportunity for communication through and about the arts as a major element of the communication process between the United States and other countries. I repeat that the goal is communication. We intend to send performing artists and other leading American cultural figures to all parts of the world, and to allow you the scheduling flexibility to ensure that they are available when and where you want them, and that they can spend the time to meet the appropriate people and conduct the workshops that contribute importantly to the communication process. This will necessitate an attitudinal change for many in the Agency. I am not opposed to the “big event”; but exchange, linkage, and communication are also well served, often more economically, by individuals and small groups.

The Procedure

The process for implementing the arts initiative will parallel in many ways the Program Design process through which Washington organizes itself to respond to your Country Plan submissions. PGM, as the Agency’s central planning element, is responsible for the preparation of a Program Design to which all Agency elements and the Endowments can respond. PGM is also responsible for coordinating the implementation of this Design Agency-wide. The Design will be informed—as have all of our discussions and decisions up to this point—by the arts PPPs that you have submitted in your Country Plans. However, because of the field’s understandable handicap in knowing what is available that best communicates about and through the arts, and
because of the vital contribution to be made by the Endowments and
the private sector, the Program Design will not be limited to the specific
fulfillment of those PPPs.

Thus, by October 1 you will receive a Program Design, listing the
programs and products the Agency is committed to providing in FY–
80. You will be asked to order those that make the most sense in your
specific bilateral communication environment, in the context of your
communication objectives and plans. In upcoming years, we may find
it useful to request you to include more specific information about the
bilateral cultural relationship in the narrative analysis that is the key
to your Country Plan.

Private Sector Support for Arts America

This letter would not be complete without a very brief reference
to the discussions that are going on here to inform the private sector
about our plans for Arts America and to elicit its support. We clearly
have much to gain and much to give in this area. In fact, it is only
with private sector support that we can move much beyond our media
efforts to a truly comprehensive exchange of artists, performing arts
groups, and larger events. We are exploring such approaches as chal-
lenge grants for larger, more expensive performing arts groups,
expanded assistance to private organizations engaged in communicat-
ing on the arts of all societies, artist-in-residence programs sponsored
and funded by major corporations and administered by USICA, and
assistance programs in transportation, printing, or representation for
major events. We will keep you informed of our progress in this area.
We welcome your thoughts and suggestions on which corporations, if
any, in your country might profitably be approached and what kinds
of cultural activities they are most likely to be interested in supporting.

Reverse Flow

Finally, a word about our “other” Presidential mandate—to
enhance the access of Americans to the cultures of other peoples. This
is an area of concern to the Agency, particularly given the potential
demand on the Agency as we begin a more serious and concerted
effort to present American arts abroad.

I begin with two assumptions: (1) that the widest possible exchange
of art, artists and artifacts among nations is consistent with our mandate
and should be encouraged by this Agency in the most efficient way
possible; and (2) that this does not and cannot mean direct financial
support to foreign exhibitions and performances in the United States.
Our role in this area is analogous to our role in English teaching:
our scarce resources can best serve as catalyst, identifier, facilitator of
institutional linkages through programs alluded to elsewhere in this
letter; we simply cannot mount a major program to finance the “reverse
flow.” We can and will assist private organizations in attaining this worthy goal.

The best course, I believe, lies in working with the two organizations that have an existing relationship with the arts activities of private corporations, foundations, universities, state art councils, community organizations, museums, and the artists themselves—the Endowments. PGM has been charged with the responsibility of working out the details of a facilitative support arrangement with the Endowments and will let you know what is required of field posts.

Finally, I want to emphasize that everything I have outlined here relates solely to how we will communicate on and through the arts. This is one of our most significant responsibilities. It is not, however, our only responsibility. It should go without saying that you must continue to communicate fully about important American policies and bilateral concerns. Your obligation to fulfill your communication plans as outlined in your approved Country Plan remains undiluted.

I have come to the end of this admittedly lengthy letter. It is, however, only the beginning of what I believe may well become one of the most important contributions this Agency can make in the field of international communication—harnessing the potential of the arts for international understanding. I look forward to hearing your thoughts about what we should be doing in this most important field.

Sincerely,

John E. Reinhardt
Director
Washington, August 15, 1979

SUBJECT

VOA Expansion (U)

You will recall that we directed VOA to re-examine its language
priorities and readjust its output to support basic U.S. foreign policy
objectives a few months ago. Tom Tuch, deputy director of VOA, gave
me a brief rundown today of where things stand. Persian-language
broadcasts were resumed in April and now go out ½ hour of original
programming per day.² There is not much evidence of impact yet in
either Iran or Afghanistan. An additional hour of Persian will be added
this winter. In addition, additional resources are being allocated to
Chinese-language broadcasting and an hour of English to the Caribbean
is being added during FY 1980. (C)

Next priority is Azeri, but it is being put off until 1981 because of
budgetary stringency. Cost of adding Azeri (with impact in both Iran
and USSR) is $250,000 per year and 8 slots. ICA says it cannot reprog-
ram during FY 1980 to do this. (C)

In light of what we know the Soviets are doing in the area immedi-
ately to the south of their borders, we seem to be going at expanding
our own impact in a very leisurely way. If all we need is $250,000 to
start Azeri, it seems to me it would be very much in our national
interest to do it. We also need to push VOA into doing something
about building new and more powerful transmitters in the South Asian
area (approved in March 1977),³ for whatever they are programming,
their signal is weak and they are not competing with the vastly more
powerful broadcasts out of the USSR. (C)

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¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File,
Box 9, Board for International Broadcasting (RFE, RL, VOA); 5/79–1/80. Confidential.
Sent for action. Dodson initialed the memorandum. Also printed in Foreign Relations,
1977–1980, vol. XX, Eastern Europe, Document 64. An attached NSC Correspondence
Profile indicates that Aaron made the decision. August 21 and that a copy of the memoran-
dum was sent to Henze. (Ibid.)

² Aaron circled “½ hour.” He also wrote “ridiculous!” next to the subject line of
the memorandum.

At some point, it seems to me, we need to make the effort to get a little more zip and pep into this whole effort. But the present time may not be opportune. (U)

I stand ready to propose ways of raising these issues whenever you want them raised. What is your advice?—

LET IT RIDE

Generate a Proposal for finding MONEY for Azeri sooner

PUSH the transmitter problem

TELL VOA/ICA to be more adventuresome in seeking extra funds. (C)

4 Aaron did not place a check-mark next to this option.
5 Aaron placed a check-mark next to this option.
6 Aaron placed a check-mark next to this option.
7 Aaron placed a check-mark next to this option. Below it, he wrote “also push & above all Persian facts. DA.” In an August 22 memorandum to Reinhardt, Henze stated, “David Aaron recently reviewed the status of your initiatives, taken earlier this years, to heighten the VOA’s impact, especially in the Middle East. He has asked me to urge you to do everything possible to expand Persian broadcasts as rapidly as you can and to do whatever you need to do to ensure that they are listened to in both Iran and Afghanistan. He also urges that inauguration of Azeri broadcasts not be deferred until FY 1981, but be undertaken in FY 1980.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 9, Board for International Broadcasting (RFE, RL, VOA): 5/79–1/80)
180. Memorandum From Paul Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, August 17, 1979

SUBJECT
BIB and RFE/RL—Status Report (U)

I have attended meetings of both the BIB and the RFE/RL Corporate Board this week, talked to both about our priorities and policy goals as they relate to the radios, about some of the challenges we anticipate in the 1980’s and what we want to see the radios do to be in the best possible shape to meet them. I also answered questions of board members at some length. I have received warm thanks from everyone except the BIB Staff for coming and talking. (U)

The contrast between these two boards is striking when one experiences them in succession. The BIB and its staff leave one with the feeling that here is a randomly selected group of people who really have very little concept of what they are doing, preoccupied with trying to interfere in the management of the radios and magnifying petty problems into large issues. Only Gronouski has vision and a concept of what intelligent oversight is—and one feels sorry for him having to try to keep this motley crew in line. The RFE/RL Corporate Board, on the other hand, is a group of talented, serious first-rate men, experienced in business and public affairs, who know what the role of a supervisory body should be. They know and understand far more about radio operations than the BIB does and readily understand the goals and purposes of the radios as important foreign policy operational assets. (C)

It is more clear than ever that all of this hullabaloo about “relocation” of the radios to the U.S. is an issue that has been blown out of all proportion to its real importance by the BIB Staff in conjunction with a few congressional staffs. The Corporate Board members, to a man, understand this and are determined to keep the issue in perspective. I stressed to them that they all have an important role to play with Congress on this and other radio problems by helping build

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 9, Board for International Broadcasting (RFE, RL, VOA): 5/79–1/80. Confidential. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Brement and Larabee. An attached note in an unknown hand indicates that the copies were delivered on August 17. (Ibid.) An attached NSC Correspondence Profile indicates that Brzezinski “noted” the memorandum on August 20. (Ibid.)
understanding and support of RFE/RL. This advice was seconded by Gronouski. I hope that in this way we have permanently scotched BIB staff efforts to monopolize congressional relations and prevent radio management from participating in the process. (C)

All these people are well aware of the radios’ need for more money. They are already operating with such efficiency that modest increases in budget can buy heightened impact more cheaply than it could be obtained in any other way. They are mindful of the challenges they will face in a succession situation in the USSR and in Eastern Europe, when leaderships change in the 1980’s, and they would like to have their programming capabilities, their news-gathering and analytical staffs and their technical facilities in optimum condition to meet them. Gronouski has declared that the main inhibition to accomplishing this is OMB’s restrictive attitude. They are getting talk from OMB about cutting the radios’ budget for FY 1981 back below the FY 1980 level! This is idiotic. But it will be hard to deal with if the President endorses it. Gronouski and I both need some estimate from you on how far you are willing to go to oppose this. We can then devise a strategy for trying to cope with OMB.² (C)

Further talks with Ferguson, Walter, Hayes and Leonard Marks this week reinforce my feeling that a prime item on our agenda for the coming months must be reorganizing the supervisory structure—merging the BIB and the corporate board into a public corporation with half Presidential appointees, half public members representing a wide spectrum of interests and talents as the RFE/RL corporate board always has. (In the process the bothersome BIB Staff would disappear.) Leonard believes that he can get GAO to take the initiative in proposing the necessary legislation which the Administration could endorse and present to the next session of Congress. Alan Hovey, who spent eight years with RFE, is in a key position in GAO to help with this and Marks and Gronouski both know Elmer Staats (head of GAO) well. This has not been discussed with Gronouski yet, but there is increasing evidence that he would be ready to go along. You will be the best one to take it up with him, but it would be premature to do so yet. Do not say anything until you and I have had a chance to review all this further. (C)³

CONCLUSION:

This memorandum is for your information. As you will see, basically we have things going the way we want them to go. You need

² Brzezinski placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to the last two sentences in this paragraph. He also wrote “will help” in the margin.
³ Brzezinski placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to the last three sentences in this paragraph. He also wrote “ok” in the margin.
not get directly involved in anything relating to the radios for the time being. We will need your guidance and help on budget, however. I have the feeling we will need to make a real push on this no later than the end of September. If you wish to take it up directly with the President, I will prepare arguments for you. This may be better than taking it up with McIntyre—on the other hand, you may wish to raise it with him before or simultaneously with talking to the President.\(^4\) Anticipation of the Pope’s visit in early October can provide a good background against which to stress the radios’ role and capabilities. I am already working with Jan Nowak on this. (C)

\(^4\) Brzezinski underlined “with him” and placed a check-mark in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.

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### 181. Draft Staff Study Prepared in the General Accounting Office\(^1\)

**ID–79–54**

Washington, undated

[Omitted here are a September 11, 1979, letter from Fasick to Reinhardt (transmitting the draft staff study), the table of contents, and a list of abbreviations.]

**PREFACE**

**INTRODUCTION**

Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1977 created the U.S. International Communication Agency (USICA, or simply ICA) as of April 1, 1978. It combined the programs of the “old” U.S. Information Agency (USIA)

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 306, Bureau of Information, Office of Information Resources, Library Programs Division, Special Collections Branch, Office of the Historical Librarian, Subject Files, 1953–1999, Entry P–195, Box 2, USICA/Investigations and Studies, GAO Report—Some Issues Facing the ICA, Leslie Brady, Sept. 1979. No classification marking. In a November 23 letter to Reinhardt, Staats indicated that the General Accounting Office had been developing an “inventory of issues facing” ICA following its establishment and that GAO had planned to examine these “problems and issues.” “However,” Staats concluded, “after careful consideration of how to best do this, we have decided to wait until the Agency has had further time to solve some of these issues. We do not plan, therefore, to proceed further on the subject at this time.” (National Archives, RG 306, USIA Historical Collection, Reports and Studies, 1953–1998, Entry A–1 1070, Box 95, General Accounting Office Report, 1977)
and those of the “old” Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU) until then a part of the Department of State. The new Agency therefore embraced the full panoply of international education and cultural exchange, international broadcasting (Voice of America), and media programs (American publications, exhibits, films and television prepared especially for use in the Agency’s activities abroad) of those two former organizations.

Significantly, whereas the major mission of USIA had been to tell the outside world about America and its potential, the new Agency was now charged with a “second mandate”—to inform Americans also about other peoples and other cultures.

In view of the reorganization and this added dimension, it seemed worthwhile to take a broad look at USICA, as it completed its first year of operation, with the goal of identifying some of the significant issues confronting it. This study is a part of the continuing work of the General Accounting Office (GAO) in the field of public diplomacy.

**SCOPE OF WORK**

This study deals in some detail with seven issues on which we have developed sufficient information to sustain a significant presentation. These analyses include backgrounds, current problems, and occasional suggestions for improvements, as reflected in several scores of interviews with individuals and/or groups, inside and outside the Agency, who follow seriously its operations.

We recognize that important issues confronting the Agency are not limited to these seven. Others may merit equal attention. To that extent, choice of those to be discussed in this study might be said to be arbitrary.

Profiting by the presence of a GAO consultant with long experience in the programs in question, we held discussions with Agency personnel and, to a limited extent, with officers abroad. We also reviewed current public sources of information, such as the substantial record of Congressional hearings compiled during intensive study of the reorganization proposals; however, interviews were indeed the principal source of the information used in preparing this study.

**SUMMARY**

The study is divided into seven sections, the titles of which define pretty much the content; they might be delineated as follows:

1. *Search for Recognition*—For both foreign audiences and American public there is a vague uncertainty about who the ICA is (its identification) and where it fits (its identity).

2. *The Second Mandate*—For the first time in the history of public diplomacy, the Agency is being asked to assist the American people
in learning about foreign nations, as well as the contrary. This raises old questions and new, legal and otherwise.

3. Coordination—There is a double coordination problem for ICA—the effective organization and operation of the Agency itself, and the execution of the Presidential directive that ICA coordinate all programs conducted by the U.S. Government in the field of public diplomacy.

4. Washington vs. the Field—There is chronic rivalry between supporting elements in Washington and “front-line” elements in the field, and, in parallel fashion, between the Agency’s media services and the area offices—not entirely without benefit to the program as a whole.

5. New Problem in Overseas Assignments—A new problem that would seem to be important enough to justify that one sally into the personnel field: how does one direct a foreign service in which a growing number of career officers no longer wish to serve abroad?

6. New Programs at the Price of Old—Mining programs of proven worth to create or increase programs of hopeful worth needs careful assessment based on a long look back.

7. The Maintenance of Quality in Exchanges—Less intense as a problem for the new Agency than at first feared, maintaining the high calibre of official exchanges remain nonetheless a constant and justified preoccupation.

Appendix 1 contains charts indicating trends in appropriations for the programs covering the past twenty years.²

[Omitted here is an undated ICA organizational chart.]

CHAPTER 1
SEARCH FOR RECOGNITION

As the new executive body combining the U.S. Information Agency and the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs came into being, there was an unprecedented effort to convey through a carefully chosen title something of what the new organization was intended to be. This led to more attention, on the part of the Congress and the press, than a mere change of name would ordinarily have provoked. Along with it came a reassessment of the position in Government that the new agency should occupy—a much more profound question. This chapter will analyze the background to the discussion and the current standing of the new Agency as it tries to execute its mandate.

The connotations which usage lends to certain terms rub off on other terms around them. Thus “information”, a quite acceptable, respectable word if left alone, assumed a certain connotation because

² Attached but not printed.
it had appeared in the title of the two patently propaganda agencies at the very beginning of American public diplomacy—the Committee on Public Information, of World War I, and the Office of War Information, of World War II. No amount of subsequent defining has freed it entirely in the public mind from those initial associations, even though the names themselves are no longer a part of the public vocabulary. Further, the word “information”, as some foreigners use it, has overtones of intelligence-gathering—a fact they cannot always fully forget when they hear the term in connection with the American public diplomacy program. Yet of the dozen and a half titles applied to the successive main official overseas programs since the original “Creel Committee” (the Committee on Public Information cited above), ten have included this ambiguous word.³

Most experienced public diplomacy officers would probably agree that “information” has over the years complicated their information task, arousing at times vague suspicions and eroding in various degrees their credibility among those to whom they address their program. But most would no doubt also agree that foreign audiences, after hearing the term ever since Liberation, had largely made their peace with it—they came to know what it is by seeing what it does.

ANOTHER NEW NAME

Then came the reorganization of 1978, erasing USIA (the overall designation) and, generally, USIS⁴ (though long habit still keeps this latter acronym alive here and there), and creating the U.S. International Communication Agency. In the opinion of some senior officers and

³ A chronological listing will indicate to what extent organizers were brought back and back to a limited terminology to designate the offices carrying out American public diplomacy: Committee on Public Information (1917); Interdepartmental Committee on Cooperation with the American Republics (1938), soon to become the Interdepartmental Committee for Scientific and Cultural Cooperation, soon again to become the Office of Coordinator of Commercial and Cultural Relations Between the American Republics, soon still again to become the Office of the Coordinator on Inter-American Affairs (1938), and finally to become the Office of Inter-American Affairs; the Coordinator of Information (1941), including the Foreign Information Service, the parallel Office of Facts and Figures (also of 1941); the Voice of America (1942); the Office of War Information (1942); the Interim International Information Service (1945); the Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs (1946); the Office of International Information and Educational Exchange (1947); the Office of International Information and the Office of Educational Exchange, set up to operate abreast (1948); the U.S. International Information Administration (1952); the U.S. Information Agency (1953); and the International Communication Agency (1978). And this list does not include the parallel title, the U.S. Information Service (USIS), applied to the field (overseas) operations of the public diplomacy programs from the liberation of Europe until the abolishment of USIA. Thus the term of ambiguity over all those years has been in a sense the very term representing continuity. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁴ The elements of USIA operating overseas were designated USIS (United States Information Service). [Footnote is in the original.]
observers, the Agency found itself set back in its concern with identification, forced all over again to win confidence for its title. This time too the task is complicated by a slightly ambiguous term: “communication” (singular) tends in certain minds to have technical, rather than social, implications.

There has apparently been little controversy over the name in the history of ICA’s predecessors. USIS as a title had appeared out of World War II, adopted in country after country as liberation progressed. And successive titles for the Washington-based side of the organization were adopted mainly to indicate changes in structure, not to reflect any deep feeling about general connotations. Even the separation of information and exchange programs in 1953 passed without much discussion of name; each side simply designated in the title the part of the program that was largely left to it—the U.S. Information Agency on the one hand, and the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State, on the other.

Title was given greater consideration as Reorganization Plan No. 2 came up in 1977. Policy leaders in USIA hoped that a fresh name would reflect changes in emphasis in the new organization, and especially the accent on “mutuality” of which everyone at the time was talking. They came up with “Agency for International Communication,” a title that at least evoked purpose, even if it did not go far to define that purpose. Later compromises brought it to the present International Communication Agency, with the ambiguity cited above.

Five Public Affairs Officers (PAO) in Western Europe were consulted during the review concerning this matter of title and its effect on their work. They take it quite seriously, recognizing the validity of the statement in the January 1973 report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information:

“To foreigners abroad the USIS symbol means the information, cultural and education arms of the United States. Next to the American Embassy, USIS has become the best-known American public institution abroad.”

But these PAO’s do not agree in assessing the importance of the current change of name.

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5 The last report of the Commission (the 28th of May 1977, p. 5) carried this further telling paragraph on foreign identification of the “old Agency”: “The American experience of more than a quarter of a century with foreign information and cultural programs has earned the appreciation and plaudits of foreign governments as well as foreign populations. * * * If emulation is a factor in effectiveness, then USIA has been an effective operation in the minds of many host governments to which it has been accredited.” [Footnote is in the original. For additional information about the 1977 report, see Document 46.]
One of them regretted particularly that all the rhetoric expended in the discussion had created expectations of program and support that will be very difficult to realize. He echoed a senior officer in USICA Washington who speaks of the “over-selling of the ICA.” He believes that the change of name is indeed a complication, one that the communication effort could have done without, and therefore he is not insisting on its use among his clients; they come from a people conservative in such matters, and he believes they will continue for a long time to refer to the organization as “USIS”.

Two of his colleagues react similarly. “The name is a recognition problem,” said one. “USICA has not become an identifying term and will not do so.”

The other two PAO’s feel less strongly about the matter. One of them admitted that “the CIA connotation is there”; but he believed that time was already starting to take care of the initial confusion and doubt.

As for the fifth officer, he considered the question of title “not very important; the change represents only a temporary complication.”

In practical terms, the discussion is now moot—the Agency’s letterhead has been changed worldwide, and for the foreseeable future, USICA it is.

NEW STATEMENT OF MISSION

There is significant improvement, however, in one aspect of identification: the Presidential mandate of ICA is more specific than most of those preceding it, so that it serves, in some part at least, as guide to officers charged with carrying out programs and as definition to those interested in ICA programs. President Carter’s statement of March 13, 1978,\(^6\) called for “the broadest possible exchange of people and ideas”, the encouragement of private institutions “to develop their own forms of exchange,” “sufficient information * * * to give foreign peoples the best possible understanding of our policies and our intentions,” help “to insure that our government adequately understands foreign public opinion and culture” and assistance to individual Americans and institutions in “learning about other nations and their cultures,” “the maximum flow of information and ideas among the peoples of the world,” and “negotiations on cultural exchanges with other governments.” Foreign policy guidance is to come from the Secretary of State. Both the exchange program and the Voice of America are to be protected in the proper execution of their respective functions, and the Agency

\(^6\) See Document 121.
“will undertake no activities which are covert, manipulative or propagandistic.”

Whether the gist of this slightly repetitive list can be grasped and retained remains to be seen, since the text contains neither catchy phrase nor inspirational expression, and the Agency’s title evokes so small a part of it. “Communication” (singular) appears nowhere in the President’s March 13, 1978 memorandum to the Director of ICA, save in the Agency’s title. Reference to “international communications” (plural) in paragraph numbered 4 does not seem to carry quite the same connotation as the term in the title. Inside the Agency itself, the search for a satisfying identification, as one long-time officer points out, is shared by the players themselves: “When it comes to our own definition of the ICA, we don’t agree!”

This latter remark leads one to believe there is a question not only of identification—which may or may not turn out to be of much long-range importance—but one also of identity. What is ICA and where does it fit? What does it mean to those who work in it and for it?

ICA’S POSITION IN GOVERNMENT

For many, sense of identity is tied directly to the Agency’s relative position in the national government. Does the Agency “count” in international public affairs decisions of an Administration, or not? Here the Director’s standing with the President becomes extremely important—if he has direct access to the Chief Executive he can perform those aspects of his job which require such access, and he enjoys the kind of support that aids him in his leadership of the Agency. The last Advisory Commission for USIA, reporting just as reorganization was seriously getting underway, felt so strongly on this point that for the first time they recommended legislative steps that would “guarantee” high status to the Agency:

“USIA should be granted more legitimate authority within the foreign affairs community as the paramount agency for international communications. The Director of USIA should have direct access to the President, access guaranteed by law and not dependent upon the fluctuation of personal ties or whim * * * this Agency must have a direct relationship to the President.”

7 Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1977 states, “The Agency shall be headed by a Director * * *, who shall serve as the principal advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of State on the functions vested in the Director. The Director shall report to the President and the Secretary of State. Under the direction of the Secretary of State, the Director shall have primary responsibility within the Government for the exercise of the functions vested in the Director.” But these specifics indicate duties rather than position “guaranteed by law.” [Footnote is in the original.]
No such legislative prop has yet been furnished to the organization, and its leaders, rarely bolstered by the White House or the State Department to the degree they had dreamed in advance, have had to seek their own highest-possible level of participation.

The point at hand involves more than protocol and the company one keeps. An Agency Director who has a part in the development of the overall foreign policies he will be asked later to explain and defend obviously holds an enviable position. Besides, his contribution to policy decisions, on the basis of his knowledge of worldwide public opinion, can and should make for sounder U.S. international programs and relations as they are conceived. Public diplomacy probably will not come fully into its own until this kind of collaboration is recognized as part of desirable standard procedure.

The Agency’s present Director, addressing his first letter (September 6, 1978) to PAO’s\(^8\) recognizes this; he puts the perspective in two pointed sentences:

“Neither USIA nor CU was ever acknowledged as full partners in diplomacy, nor in some cases even as important contributors to national goals. One effect of our perceived lack of relevance in the past has been at least a mild case of institutional self-doubt.”

He could of course have cited like opinions expressed again and again in the Advisory Commission’s reports. Thus the 26th report (1973), carries this statement of position:

“* * * We reiterate our belief that the National Security Council structure developed in recent years should include representation from the government’s arm which specializes in foreign communication and in understanding foreign public opinion * * * “The importance of positioning the director of foreign communications at the strategic levels of the government * * * is that this enables him to be thoroughly familiar with Presidential initiatives and thinking in foreign affairs.”

The Commission’s 27th Report stated that

“* * * the Commission believes that it is more important than ever for the Agency to have greater access to the Secretary’s decision-making mechanism. If USIA is involved, it will be more thoroughly informed on policy decisions and can better present and interpret them to the world. Conversely, it can better perceive and report back the impact of these policies on foreign public opinion.”

And then comes the rather plaintive statement:

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\(^8\) See Document 150.
“But unfortunately the Agency continues to remain a neglected resource and only a potential contributor to the foreign and national decision-making process.”

The 28th and final Advisory Commission’s report picks up this regretful tone as it laments “** only a spotty record *** in providing our Presidents with information about foreign perceptions of the U.S.,” on the one side, and “** an almost total lack of appreciation of its [USIA’s]** potential power and influence abroad by Presidents in office and members of Congress,” on the other side. Then it makes its own recommendation on this point: “This Commission, as its predecessors, reiterates the need to have USIA representation at the highest levels of Government * * *.”

In his inaugural speech on April 3, 1978,10 the current Director expressed his determination to meet the “reiterated need”:

“** the President and others can look first to ICA for advice on the conduct of our overall cultural relations with other societies.
“** The President and others can look first to ICA for sound counsel on the development and implementation of international communications policies.
“** The President and others should look routinely to ICA as a source of original thought on major international initiatives.
“** The President and others * * * can look first to ICA as a principal vehicle for enhancing our knowledge and understanding of other peoples.
“** The President and others, in short, can view ICA as an Agency of singular importance in our dealings with other nations and other peoples.”

But do “the President and others” indeed look to ICA, “first” or even later than first? The Director implies the affirmative. At the time of the hearings for Foreign Relations Authorization for Fiscal Year 1979 (February 21, 1978), the following exchange took place between him and the Chairman of the Subcommittee on International Operations, House Committee on International Relations:

“Mr. Reinhardt: * * * We anticipate that the new Agency will be an integral part of the total process.
Mr. Fascell: Well, that remains to be seen yet. You are meeting more frequently with the Secretary of State?
Mr. Reinhardt: We meet frequently with the Secretary of State, with the head of the National Security Council, and we meet on substantive issues.
Mr. Fascell: You have not had an opportunity yet to sit in on what might be called a combined session, with the President chairing?

9 Brackets are in the original.
10 Reference is to Reinhardt’s speech at the April 3 inaugural ceremony. See Document 125.
Mr. Reinhardt: No; we are not members of the National Security Council.

Mr. Fascell: Well, I was thinking more of invitations. Of course, I would rather have you be a member of the National Security Council. * * * Well, we will be interested in watching very closely how the relationship develops between the Department and the White House with respect to the Director of this new Agency.

Mr. Reinhardt: We anticipate a harmonious relationship and one that will enable us to play a leading role.**

Most of that conversation might be said still to be . . . anticipatory. More than a year has passed since it took place, and one can find few initiated individuals, inside or outside the Agency, who believe that the Agency’s identity has been sharpened by either a contribution to the decisions of the Executive Branch or receipt of significant support from that Branch. Old hands at the information game are not prone to err on this score. Said one, an experienced officer, “The Agency cannot be truly effective unless it is a part of the NSC process. The fact remains that at present the White House ignores the Agency.”

**TARDY APPOINTMENTS**

One patent neglect by the White House is manifest in the tardiness of Presidential appointments to two important advisory panels of significance both for background counsel and for program guidance. One of these is the Board of Foreign Scholarships (BFS), existing through Presidential appointments since the early post-War, to direct the Fulbright academic exchange program, approve or reject its candidates, and maintain and protect the integrity of the program and its high standing in academe. It has represented one of the most solid links between Government and higher education and as such is one of the rare valid hopes for establishing a domestic constituency for ICA.

The new Agency was born April 1, 1978. Assuming that the BFS, traditionally a “working” group, would be promptly reconstituted for effective functioning, those responsible for the various aspects of the exchanges had a first surprise with the announcement that the Board would be named in September—five long months after ICA’s beginning. In reality, it was finally completed in December (8 months delay) and announced publicly only after the start of the new year.

The story of the other Presidential group, the new U.S. Advisory Commission on International Communication, Cultural and Educa-

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tional Affairs, is worse. Intended to replace both former Advisory
Commissions—one for USIA and one for CU—and to exercise a broad
responsible role in the new ICA arrangement, for nearly 18 months it
did not have a chance to do either, despite the specific role envisaged
in Section 8(b) of Reorganization Plan No. 2:

“The Commission shall formulate and recommend to the Director,
the Secretary of State, and the President policies and programs to
carry out the functions vested in the Director or the Agency, and shall
appraise the effectiveness of policies and programs of the Agency. The
Commission shall submit to the Congress, the President, the Secretary
of State and the Director annual reports on programs and activities
carried on by the Agency, including appraisals, where feasible, as to
the effectiveness of the several programs. The Commission shall also
include in such reports such recommendations as shall have been made
by the Commission to the Director for effectuating the purpose of the
Agency, and the action taken to carry out such recommendations. The
Commission may also submit such other reports to the Congress as it
deems appropriate, and shall make reports to the public in the United
States and abroad to develop a better understanding of and support
for the programs conducted by the Agency.”

On March 22, 1978, a few days before the ICA birth date, President
Carter nominated as first member of the Commission, for one year, the
President of an active, progressive American university. The nominee
was confirmed by the Senate on April 6. On April 7, President Carter
designated him as chairman of the Commission, and there was a White
House promise that the rest of the Commission would be nominated
within 60 days (by June 1). Just before Congress recessed in the late
fall a second nominee for the Commission was confirmed by the Sen-
ate. There followed a series of announced dates for the naming at last
of the remaining members. The Agency’s first anniversary apparently
jogged no appropriate memories to action; it passed without public
reference to the ill-fated Commission, and it was a full month later
(April 30, 1979, thirteen months after the Agency’s founding) that all
remaining members but one were finally designated. The last individ-

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12 Reference is to Robison. The White House announced on March 15, 1978, that the
President planned to nominate Robison to fill a 1-year term and serve as the Commission’s

13 Reference is to Manilow. The White House announced on October 6, 1978, that
the President planned to nominate Manilow to fill a 3-year term. (Public Papers: Carter,
1978, Book II, p. 1720)

14 On April 27, 1979, the White House announced that the President planned to
nominate six individuals to the Commission: Franklin, Sherburne, Silverstein, Talley,
Robison, and Manilow. The White House submitted the nominations to the Senate on
April 30. Silverstein would serve for 1 year, Franklin and Sherburne would serve for 2
years, Manilow and Talley would serve for 3 years, and Robison until 1982. (Public
Papers: Carter, 1979, Book I, pp. 729–730 and 787)
ual was nominated and confirmed June 28, 1979—fifteen months after the Agency might otherwise have begun to profit from his counsel.\footnote{Reference is to McKee. The White House announced on June 13, 1979, that the President planned to nominate McKee to fill a 3-year term. (Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book I, pp. 1037–1038)} The first formal meeting of the Commission took place August 16–17, 1979.

Meanwhile, help with all the aspects of the new Agency’s program with which the Commission in its advisory capacity might have concerned itself—relationship with the White House; role in “the NSC process”; liaison with the domestic public in explaining and/or demonstrating ICA’s mission; the christening of the new organization; the dissemination of the new “doctrine” of the Agency; the support of Agency morale; and (perhaps most important of all) the integration of USIA and CU forces to form a working and effective whole—help with all those aspects has been denied to ICA and to those who guide it, by the continuing procrastination in manning this key Commission.

ICA AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC

Finally, there is the ongoing problem of identity of the ICA in the eyes of the American public. At first glance, one wonders how this can be a problem at all. Has not the President, in his March 3, 1978 memorandum to the Director, reassured the American people by his directive that “* * * the Agency will undertake no activities which are covert, manipulative or propagandistic?”

One bears in mind, however, that, save for certain important parts of the exchange of persons program, all aspects of the Agency’s activities are addressed overseas. Indeed, by law\footnote{U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, as amended, Title V, Sec. 501. [Footnote is in the original.]} they may not be presented to the American public. There is therefore no very precise image conjured up among Americans when the Agency’s name is heard, despite the good media coverage at the time of the reorganization; for the average American, there is simply no experience to which to tie it. For although Americans know such terms as the Voice of America and the Fulbright exchange programs, they rarely associate these elements with the broader, overall organization.

One of ICA’s basic problems is therefore to maintain its credentials at home as a responsible, experienced, well-balanced agency with solid capabilities for doing overseas what it claims it can do. In the absence of a broad domestic constituency, “presenting its case” to the American public has not been easy. As a result, says one of its ranking officers, “the Agency suffers from vague identity.”
[Omitted here are Chapter 2: The Second Mandate; Chapter 3: Coordination; Chapter 4: Washington vs. the Field; Chapter 5: New Problems in Overseas Assignments; Chapter 6: New Programs at the Price of Old; and Chapter 7: Maintenance of Quality in Exchange.]

182. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Research, Directorate for Programs, International Communication Agency (Burnett) to the Associate Director for Programs (Schneidman) and the Deputy Associate Director for Programs (Winkler)

Washington, September 12, 1979

SUBJECT

A Critical Question for the Research Mandate: Why Study the General Public?

The current review of the Research mandate has raised the basic question of what “publics” should be studied. In view of the fundamental importance of this question to the Agency’s mission as well as to the research function, we have prepared a paper (attached) which details some of the theoretical, historical, methodological and policy justifications for including the general public in our examination of foreign attitudes.

With respect to countries where survey research is feasible, these arguments basically are that:

—while scholarly opinions differ on the degree and the appropriateness of general-public influence on policy, there is agreement that at a minimum the general public sets the outer limits of government action and the informed-attentive public (which we include under the rubric of general public for survey purposes) helps to set the inner limits;

—the postwar history of the interrelationship between public opinion and foreign policy indicates that leaders are increasingly attentive to general public sentiments on major foreign policy questions and that segments of the public have developed an impressive array of

instruments for pressuring governments, often invoking *vox populi* as justification for their actions.

—compared to those involving relatively small samples of the influential publics (125–150 interviews), surveys of the general public (about 1,000 interviews) are statistically more reliable, facilitate cross-tabular and multivariate analyses, and permit breakouts by sector (occupational, political, demographic, education level, etc.); and

— in addition to the fact that the President has specifically charged the Agency with assessing “public opinion abroad”, USICA is presently the only agency—government or private—to conduct such research on a systematic basis and is thus in a position to make a unique contribution to the foreign affairs community.

—research on the general public lies at the heart of the Agency’s “listening” function and enhances USICA’s capability for developing effective programs for two-way communication.

For these reasons, this office is firmly convinced that the Agency should conduct research on “general public” as well as “influential public” opinion abroad toward major foreign policy questions.

We are attempting to improve turnaround time for assessing the views of both the “influential public” and the “general public”. On August 24, we proposed a new approach to surveying the “influential public,” which the Acting Director approved. In a separate memorandum of today’s date, we will propose a new pre-set mechanism, initially in Western Europe and Japan, for surveying the general public.

Studying the general public, however, appears to be a more controversial concept with Agency management than studying the influential public. As we understand it, the principal arguments are that the general public has negligible influence on foreign policy decisions of governments abroad and that, in any case, Agency programming is directed toward influential elites.

As discussed at greater length in the attached paper, we believe there are very strong arguments for continuing research on the general public. This question is so fundamental to research—and has such strong implications for the Agency’s mission—that we believe it warrants the Director’s personal attention.

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2 An unknown hand inserted “or foreign policy issue” after the word “abroad” and circled the comma.

3 Not found.

4 Not found.
RECOMMENDATION

We strongly recommend that you forward this memorandum and the attached paper to the Director requesting that the mandate for this office specifically direct that general public samples be included in our surveys when appropriate.  

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Europe Research Division, Office of Research, Directorate for Programs, International Communication Agency

Washington, undated

Why Study the General Public?

The current discussion within USICA over the selection of foreign publics to be sampled in opinion surveys poses basic questions which require careful thought. Decisions related to the selection of samples for study should be based upon consideration of some of the theoretical, historical, methodological and policy justifications for covering the general public in such surveys.

In setting forth these justifications, this paper focuses on public opinion surveying in those countries where opinion polling is possible. This does not mean to imply that public opinion in authoritarian states cannot in some way affect government policies, nor that we should give up efforts to ascertain such opinion through available means.

Theoretical Justification

The whole question of the degree to which the average citizen in a democratic society can and should influence government policy decisions is, of course, a subject of timeless debate. An extensive literature argues for maximum public participation in order to check tyranny, inform leaders of the popular will and encourage individuals to exercise civic responsibility. Many other writers warn that extensive public participation is dangerous to rational, orderly, stable government.

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5 There is no indication that Schneidman and Winkler forwarded the memorandum and the attached paper to Reinhardt.
6 No classification marking. Drafted by Reddy.
Even those who are most concerned over populist excesses, however, concede that there is a relationship between government and the mass public which at least sets the “outer limits” of policy.  

Public sentiment can play a dynamic as well as a passive role. As Lord Bryce observed at the turn of the century in *The American Commonwealth*, “Nearly all great political and social causes have made their way first among the middle or humbler classes.”

This point is reinforced by political scientist Jack Walker, who argues that the primary agents of change in a democracy are movements emerging from the political mass as a whole. Walker argues that even when the mass public is unexpressive or apathetic, government officials, merely by anticipating public reaction, grant the citizenry a form of indirect access to public policymaking. Elites are forced to pay attention to public sympathies if for no other reason than that, if they fail to do so, their rivals will seize upon the resulting distrust to gain allegiance of the masses.

Within the mass public there is a significant sub-group identifiable as the “attentive public” which sets the “inner limits” of policy. Rosenau defines this group as “consisting of opinion holders who are inclined to participate but lack access or opportunity to do so.” Stated another way, those people who follow political and governmental affairs “are in some sense involved in the process by which decisions are made.”

The degree to which publics in different cultures follow public affairs varies dramatically. Almond and Verba demonstrated in the early 1960’s that publics in Germany, the UK and the US are far more attentive to public policy than those in Mexico and Italy. In overall terms Rosenau estimates this “attentive public” at no more than 10% of the population and probably smaller.

Our findings would suggest that this is an accurate general estimate of those who follow foreign affairs “very closely,” but an underestimation of those who follow foreign affairs “fairly closely.” In a July survey in three West European countries, we included the question, “How

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8 A three-volume set authored by James Bryce, 1st Viscount of Bryce, *The American Commonwealth* described various political and social institutions of the United States.


10 Rosenau, op. cit. [Footnote is in the original.]

closely do you follow news about relations between (our country) and other countries—very closely, fairly closely or not very closely?” The percentages were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>France</th>
<th>FRG</th>
<th>UK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very closely</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly closely</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very closely</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When knowledge questions were added to interest questions, we continued to find a substantial proportion (roughly 7–25%, depending on the issue) of the mass public in these countries who could fit the definition of that part of the public attentive to and reasonably informed about international questions.

For research purposes we are defining this group, a sub-sample of the general public, as the “foreign affairs public.” While the members of this group could not be classified as influential or elite, they do find intellectual stimulation and satisfaction in matters pertaining to foreign policy. As Rosenau points out, this group can be a critical audience for opinion molders and a critical link in the chain of communication to mass publics. Research on the general public is the only way to identify this group and its attitudes.

**Historical Justification**

Whatever one’s assessment of the proper role of public opinion in policymaking, there is no doubt that the general public has exerted increasing influence on foreign policy in the postwar period. As Lloyd Free states in his essay, “The Role of Public Opinion,” in our recent history the importance of public opinion has become more self-conscious than it used to be.” He explains,

“The assumption that public opinion, both at home and abroad, is somehow important is borne out by the efforts of political leaders to woo it and by the practices of governments. Every major government...

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12 It is not that this phenomenon began only in the postwar period. In the spring 1979 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, J. William Fulbright notes that “In the early years of this century, foreign policy professionals were confronted with the expansion of popular democracy beyond local and domestic matters to encompass foreign policy as well.” [Footnote is in the original. Reference is to J. William Fulbright, “The Legislator is Educator,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 57, number 4, Spring 1979.]

in the world today, and many of the minor ones, spend varying amounts of time, money, and attention on attempting to influence the opinions of their own citizens and the citizens of other countries as if those opinions really counted."

It might be added that a recurring theme in Theodore White’s thoughtful series on The Making of the President\textsuperscript{14} is that foreign policy issues, not domestic issues, have been the most critical factor in Presidential elections.

A brief list of just a few of the international developments in the postwar period in which public opinion played a notable role illustrates the impact of the general public on foreign policy:

- The French National Assembly’s rejection of a European Defense Force,\textsuperscript{15}
- Public opposition within the UK, France, and the US to the derailed Israeli-British-French invasion of Egypt;\textsuperscript{16}
- Public reaction to the first two Sputniks,\textsuperscript{17} resulting in revamped government programs toward education and scientific research policies;
- Hostility of British public opinion for so long toward Common Market membership;
- Restrictions against nuclear weapons placement and nuclear ship visits in numerous countries because of public sentiment;
- Cancellation of the Eisenhower visit to Japan\textsuperscript{18} and public demands for Okinawan reversion;
- The restraints which German aspirations for reunification placed on East-West negotiations and West European defense integration;
- Recurring tensions created between the US and its allies over European public opposition to increased defense spending and burden-sharing; and
- The impact of public opinion shifts in the US on Vietnam war policies and the fate of the Johnson Administration.

This list could obviously go on and on, and the precise degree of public opinion influence on any such complex developments is, of course, subject to debate. In more recent years, the impact of public


\textsuperscript{15} Proposed in 1950 by then-French Prime Minister René Pleven, the European Defence Community (EDC) called for a pan-European military. The French National Assembly rejected the plan in 1954.

\textsuperscript{16} Reference is to the 1956 Suez Crisis.

\textsuperscript{17} See footnote 2, Document 5. The Soviet Union launched Sputnik 2 on November 3, 1957.

\textsuperscript{18} In 1960, the United States and Japan revised the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. Domestic political opposition in Japan toward the treaty ultimately led to the cancellation of Eisenhower’s scheduled visit to Tokyo. For additional information, see Foreign Relations, 1958–1960, vol. XVIII, Japan; Korea.
opinion has perhaps become even more pronounced. Demonstrations and terrorism in the Middle East have made it more difficult for Arab governments to show moderation. Anti-US riots in Panama led the US to agree to revise the Canal Treaty, and anti-Treaty sentiment in the US later placed the President on the political defensive.\footnote{Presumable reference to the January 1964 Panama Canal Zone riots. For additional information, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico. Documentation on the Carter administration’s negotiation of the two Panama Canal treaties is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXIX, Panama.} Widespread religiosity and public opposition to the Shah led to revolution in Iran with all of its consequences for American foreign policy.\footnote{Documentation on the Iranian Revolution is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. X, Iran: Revolution, January 1977–November 1979.}

NATO’s ability to conduct large-scale maneuvers in Western Europe has been circumscribed by adverse public reactions. Recent improvements in Japan’s Self-Defense Forces have been greatly facilitated by increased public awareness and concern over Soviet military expansion in the Far East. Regardless of what Western leaders personally think about modernization of tactical nuclear forces in Europe, it is predictable that their decisions will be influenced by the views of the general public—just as public opinion affected their decisions on the neutron bomb. Economic pressures emanating from the public domain have just led Bonn to make the remarkable announcement that the FRG would be unable to meet its NATO commitment to a 3-percent real increase in its defense budget.

An argument which the Administration has made repeatedly in favor of SALT II is that surveys demonstrate clear domestic public support for the Treaty. But a crucial point in the debate has been the question of European support for the Treaty. The Administration claims that the Allies solidly back the agreement and points to the Guadeloupe Summit endorsement, while opponents rejoin that the government has been arm-twisting our Allies and that European officials concede in private their reservations.\footnote{Carter, Giscard, Schmidt, and Callaghan met for informal discussions at Guadeloupe, January 4–6, 1979. During a January 6 press conference, Giscard, Schmidt, and Callaghan all expressed support for SALT II. For the text of the press conference, see Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book I, pp. 17–20.} While there are currently no hard data available to Administration spokesmen on West European public attitudes, such information could possibly affect the posture of some Senators toward SALT II as well as official Allied attitudes toward the Treaty.

It seems evident, therefore, that the force of public opinion has affected foreign policy in democracies with increasing intensity and...
frequency. There are many reasons for this, not the least being the very existence of opinion polls themselves. Mass communication has played a critical role as well in focusing and informing public opinion.

In addition, practical experience and modern technology have given publics an impressive array of instruments for making their views felt beyond the traditional means of the ballot, lobbying, and political party, pressure group and trade union membership. The modern repertoire would have to include public interest pressure groups, computerized letter-writing, demonstrations, marches, whistleblowing, freedom of information legislation, and the use of powerful mass media.

Indeed, the current debate is not whether public opinion is affecting policy but whether it is affecting it too much. The Carter Administration has frequently been criticized for basing its policies too much on opinion poll results. But this criticism extends beyond the present government. In his recent Foreign Affairs article, former Senator Fulbright complained:

“Our elected representatives, and the ‘communications’ experts they employ, study and analyze public attitudes by sophisticated new techniques, but their purpose has little to do with leadership, still less with education. Their purpose, it seems, is to discover what people want and fear and dislike, and then to identify themselves with those sentiments.”

Most democratic governments abroad could be subject to similar criticism. Over and again, for example, in disputes between the US and Western Europe on matters involving trade, economics and defense, public pressures have exerted a strong influence over positions taken by those governments—and have often been cited by European officials as the reason for their inability to accommodate US objectives.

Methodological Justification

Methods for polling the general public are time-tested. Public opinion surveying procedures have been tested and refined through over fifty years of experience. They are widely used and accepted, and usually are cost-effective compared to other methods of gauging public sentiment.

In our separate memorandum on developing a more rapid and economical method for surveying the influential public, we propose samples of 125–150 drawn from a pre-selected list of 1,000.22 While we favor this approach for studying influential opinion, it has clear disadvantages when compared with the customary samples of 1,000

22 See footnote 3, above.
involved in general public surveying. In contrast to influential elite sampling, full sampling of the general public will enable us to:

—obtain statistically more accurate and reliable figures;
—distinguish between different publics, such as the “foreign affairs public” described above and the mass public;
—make distinctions between numerous other useful categories such as occupation, age, political affiliation, education;
—carry out with a higher degree of confidence more sophisticated forms of bivariate and multivariate analysis; and
—compare our findings with those generated by other researchers, the great majority of whom base their work on general public samples.

The most effective methodological approach, and the one we strongly prefer, is to sample both the influential public and the general public. This approach will give us a more complete measurement of the climate of opinion and enable us to compare general public and influential public views.

There is inevitably a certain arbitrariness about how one segments the full spectrum of opinion. For research purposes, one must also take into account the research tools available to sample different elements of this spectrum. In summary form, these are the categories and methods preferred by this office for survey research in those countries where opinion polling is possible:

**Foreign Policy Elite** (those political leaders, government officials, and specialists actually involved in foreign policy decision-making)—This group is the subject of regular mission reporting. For systematic surveys of this group, we thus prefer semi-structured mission reporting or use of qualified scholar-interviewers. In most cases, we would counsel against using private research organizations for interviewing this elite.

**Influential Public** (those persons who, by virtue of their occupation, position and access, could exert above-average influence on foreign policy decision-makers)—We have recommended samples of 120–150 respondents from a pre-selected list of 1,000 for most such surveys.

**Foreign Affairs Public** (those persons who have a relatively high level of interest in and knowledge of foreign affairs and who can serve as a link in the chain of communication to the general public, but who lack regular access to decision-makers)—We would use a sub-sample of general public surveys, most to be conducted through a pre-set rider mechanism.

**General Public**—We would use general public surveys, most to be conducted through a pre-set rider mechanism.

The combination of these methods will give this Agency an unusually effective capacity for assessing in a timely fashion the views of foreign publics in those countries where survey research can be conducted.
Policy Justification

As the Agency charged with assessing “the impact of actual and proposed United States foreign policy decisions on public opinion abroad,” we are, in any case, obliged to measure the opinions of foreign publics. President Carter, in launching ICA, announced that “the new Agency for International Communication will help us demonstrate a decent respect for the opinions of mankind. . . .”

In the absence of general public surveying by USICA, this information will not to our knowledge be produced systematically by any other US Government agency. This is an area where this Agency can make a valuable and unique contribution to policymakers’ understanding of the currents of foreign opinion.

This information is also unavailable with any consistency from data produced by others. In exercising their “watching brief,” Research analysts already are attentive to survey results produced by others which have a bearing on Agency concerns. Experience has demonstrated clearly, however, that such information is fragmentary, sporadic and often superficial. Only USICA research is focused specifically and in-depth on US policy and Agency programming concerns.

It also seems axiomatic that, in order to communicate effectively, the Agency must know the mindset of the general public on major issues of concern to the US. Although budgetary considerations have forced the Agency to direct its activities primarily to elite audience groups, several of these were selected because they can serve as channels to the wider public.

Even if the Agency can speak only to a few, it should listen to the many. It is only thereby that our program themes can properly relate to the concerns, values and aspirations of the general public. Despite the present emphasis on communicating with elites, many Agency programs (VOA, TV placement, films) are aimed at the general public. Research on general public attitudes is the backbone of the Agency’s listening function and can be an important aid to developing effective programs for two-way communication.
183. Memorandum From the Director of the International Communication Agency (Reinhardt) to the Associate Director for Programs (Schneidman)¹

Washington, September 13, 1979

SUBJECT

USICA Research Precepts

In response to your memorandum of July 30,² and in light of our previous discussions, the following are the approved Precepts for the Office of Research. They seek to make this activity indispensable to our overall efforts. As you know, my continuing, detailed attention to this subject is born strictly of my conviction as to the importance of research to this Agency and its responsibilities, and my desire to see research perform to its full potential.

I am especially concerned that we not devote our limited staff and financial resources to acquiring any but the most essential knowledge and information.

Ours is a government-financed, practical research need. We will not be satisfied with research results that are simply “interesting”; our research findings must be “indispensable” for specified purposes and end-users. All of our research effort must be geared to providing essential knowledge, otherwise unavailable, on issues of primary policy and/or Agency program concern.

GOALS AND RATIONALE

The objective of USICA research is to acquire essential, usable, reliable knowledge about other societies and the communication process that is otherwise not available, specifically knowledge of:

—The issues and concerns of greatest salience to influential publics in countries and areas of importance to the United States, as well as the attitudes, opinions, and perspectives of these publics on these issues;

—What these publics know—and do not know—about the United States’ perspective and policies on these issues; what aspects of American life, thought, and social and political processes are of interest to them; how accurate their perceptions of U.S. society and policies are; what the important gaps are in their knowledge of U.S. society and policies;

² Not found.
—The relevant communication habits of these publics, in particular what media and other sources they rely on for knowledge and information about issues of primary concern to them and about U.S. society and policies.

The body of knowledge resulting from this line of inquiry will allow us to perform our advisory function, as described in the Executive Order of March 27, 1978, establishing USICA:

“The Director of the International Communication Agency shall be the principal advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of State on international informational, educational, and cultural matters . . . the scope of the Director’s advice shall include assessments of the impact of actual and proposed United States foreign policy decisions on public opinion abroad.”

Of equal importance, it will inform this Agency’s communication efforts with other societies. It will provide valid, useful direction to field personnel and their support arms in Washington as to the important concerns, attitudes, aspirations, perceptions and misperceptions of those with whom we communicate overseas. This demands research activities which are pinpointed to provide essential information on clearly identified problems of overriding concern.

Special note should be taken of the Office of Research’s responsibility in meeting VOA research needs, which are clearly encompassed by the three above-outlined areas of inquiry. We are especially interested at this time in data which will aid VOA management in improving the quality of the Voice’s “Americana” broadcasts. Better information is sought on aspects of American life, thought and societal development that will both help foreigners to acquire a more accurate understanding of important aspects of American society and be of sufficient interest to them that they will listen. (I emphasize that I envision far more combing of existing literature and surveys in this effort than I do new work.)

OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES

Three basic operational guidelines apply to all Agency research activity:

1. Secondary sources will play a preeminent role in our efforts. They will be culled for relevant insights as the first and, hopefully, principal source in any project. I expect that a major portion of the kind of information we seek already exists in the literature and/or in projects in progress under non-USICA auspices, both here and abroad. Therefore, a major source for the “product” of the Office of Research will

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3 See footnote 1, Document 121.
be the analysis and interpretation of relevant, extant data and literature. We will purchase extant data, if necessary, rather than undertake to collect it ourselves. Surveys and other contracts will be initiated only after we are satisfied that data essential to our purposes do not already exist. Wherever possible in such instances I expect our research arm to seek opportunities for sharing survey costs with others. A major responsibility is to utilize resources prudently. We will not undertake surveys that are only vaguely “promising.” We must have maximum reasonable assurance of ultimate utility before surveys are undertaken.

2. Envisioned action implications will be clearly identified in each project proposal. These proposals must describe how reliable, useful, and essential information will be supplied on specific subjects or issues of primary concern to precisely defined research consumers within and/or outside of the Agency.

3. Ideally, we would have the capacity to collect and articulate the kind of knowledge described above about all societies. Limited resources, however, require that we focus our attention first on those societies which are both highly important to American interests and most likely to yield the kind of information we seek given the methodologies at our disposal. The following 14 nations will be considered countries of concentration for Agency research during FY 1980: United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Korea, India, Israel, Egypt, Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, China, and the Soviet Union. (The latter two countries are included because of their importance, but any research proposals regarding them must conform to the same operational guidelines as proposals for the other 12 countries.) As very important needs and opportunities are identified in countries outside this group, USICA management will entertain proposals for projects elsewhere.

ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENT

The Office of Research has a special responsibility to work with ECA in meeting its research needs. Important questions remain unresolved, however, as to ECA’s precise research needs and PGM/R’s proper role in helping to meet these needs. It is only because of this lack of adequate definition that I have not yet provided for ECA needs in the research goals specified above. The leadership of PGM and PGM/R should proceed immediately to consult with the leadership of ECA to determine what needs must be met, and who should properly meet them, in this area. The joint recommendations of ECA and PGM, together with any differences of view, should be submitted for my review and approval no later than October 15.

PROCEDURES FOR AUTHORIZATION AND IMPLEMENTATION

Because I feel that the work covered by these Precepts is so central to our responsibilities and because, in this initial phase, I want to give
direct attention to the proper deployment of our research efforts, all
research proposals must be provided by PGM to this office for approval
in detail before they are initiated. This includes obtaining prior D
approval of the specifics of all projects (questionnaires, methodology,
etc.), even when approval has tentatively been given to a research
concept.

184. Research Memorandum Prepared in the Office of Research,
Directorate for Programs, International Communication
Agency

M–35–79 Washington, September 19, 1979

SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S.:
A VIEW OF SOVIET PUBLIC ATTITUDES

Summary: The average Soviet citizen is inclined to hold positive
attitudes toward the American people, even to the point of feeling a
special sense of kinship with Americans. But at the same time, he is
likely to have predominantly unfavorable perceptions of American
society and the American system.

These were among the strongest impressions of Soviet attitudes
toward the U.S. received by Americans working at the USICA “Agriculture
USA” Exhibit in the Soviet Union. The majority of Soviet visitors
at the exhibit showings in six cities indicated by their questions and
comments to exhibit personnel that their perceptions of American
domestic conditions and foreign policy are shaped primarily by the
Soviet mass media and by foreign information sources which are
selected and channeled to the public by the Soviet government.

The picture of the U.S. presented by Soviet official sources is one-
sidedly negative, with emphasis placed upon the social, political, eco-
nomic, cultural and psychological ills of American society. Despite
fairly widespread skepticism about the accuracy and completeness of
the Soviet media’s picture of the U.S., Soviet citizens are indeed influ-
enced by it and have little choice but to base their perceptions upon the
information available to them. For the most part, they lack satisfactory

1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of Research and Media Reaction,
Research Memoranda, 1963–1999, Entry P–64, Box 36, M–53–79. No classification mark-
ing. Prepared by Jocelyn Greene (PGM/REU).
alternative sources of information and have no opportunity to obtain information firsthand. It is difficult for them even to recognize the gaps in their knowledge of the U.S. and their misperceptions, and still harder to fill in the gaps and correct erroneous beliefs.

Most members of the Soviet population—skeptics and true believers alike—are interested in the same questions regarding American society: the issues which are constantly discussed by the Soviet media, such as unemployment, high cost of living, expensive higher education and medical care, poverty, crime, violence and pornography. These problems are widely regarded as manifestations of the deeper flaws of American society, which, in the Soviet view, include lack of order; excessive complexity, individualism and competitiveness; unequal distribution of resources; and lack of concern for the needs of the citizenry, which forces the individual to face too many choices and take too many risks.

Many young people are much more open-minded and favorable toward American society than are their elders. It is also noteworthy that residents of the larger, more cosmopolitan cities are more knowledgeable about the U.S. and tend to be more positive in their attitudes than are citizens in provincial towns and rural regions.

The average Soviet citizen demonstrates considerable concern about the state of Soviet-American relations, although—at least publicly—he has little inclination to discuss specific bilateral issues. While he expresses a strong desire for peace, cooperation and increased contacts between the U.S. and USSR, he maintains an equally strong sense of competition with the U.S., this competitiveness manifesting itself in the incessant making of comparisons between the two countries.

End Summary.

Introduction

The USICA “Agriculture USA” (AGUSA) Exhibit visited six cities in the Soviet Union—Kiev, Tselinograd, Dushanbe, Kishinev, Moscow and Rostov-on-Don—between March 1978 and June 1979. Specific information on each of the city showings is contained in individual reports available from the Office of Research. This particular paper, however, focuses on insights derived from the overall exhibit experience about the nature of Soviet views of the United States. The substance and tone of exhibit visitors’ questions and comments to the Russian-speaking exhibit guides serve in part as the basis for some general conclusions about the concerns, perceptions and attitudes of average Soviet citizens in regard to the American people and American society.

Several caveats should be stated at the outset. First, there is always considerable danger in relying on firsthand observations, particularly when a cultural gap exists between observer and subject. Second, the
constraints of the exhibit setting, which sometimes result in Soviet visitors being less than candid, must be noted. Third, a high level of tension in the atmosphere at AGUSA, due largely to the particular sensitivity of the exhibit theme, was often not conducive to forthright and relaxed conversations between the Americans and the Soviet visitors. Fourth, exhibit audiences are not necessarily representative of the Soviet public at large, and it is often the more activist—rather than the typical—visitor who enters into conversation with the guides. Finally, it should be noted that this report is based on impressions derived from conversations held with a wide variety of Soviet citizens both within and outside the exhibit, and not on a structured interview methodology.

Despite these reservations, the information collected during the AGUSA tour is of considerable value. American researchers’ opportunities for extensive, informal, direct contacts with Soviet citizens are extremely scarce. This was an unusual chance for an American observer to spend fifteen months in the Soviet Union, in daily contact with Soviet people of varied backgrounds. Moreover, it was possible to record the impressions and observations of a diverse group of Americans, who were also directly and constantly interacting with Soviet citizens.

Soviet Perceptions of the American People

There is a widespread tendency among Soviet citizens from all strata of the population to draw a distinction between the American people and the American “system,” which includes, in the Soviet mind, government, big business, the military-industrial complex, and the values and beliefs underlying American political and social institutions as well as those institutions themselves. This distinction between people and system fits in with the official Soviet ideological model of capitalist countries: the masses are good, ordinary working folk who exist apart from and are oppressed by the small class of rich and powerful capitalists and the institutions which serve the latter’s interests. (Many Americans, of course, have a comparable outlook, separating the Russian people, who are perceived as essentially good, from the Soviet state—the regime, institutions and ideology—which is perceived as bad.)

Americans are granted high marks by Soviet people for their industriousness and energy, their efficiency, cleverness and innovativeness. Many Soviets also ascribe an adventurousness, a bold “pioneering spirit” to Americans, which they admire, although some feel this trait in our national character has its dangerous side. The tremendous respect for American technical genius leads sometimes to unrealistic expectations that every American possesses a degree of technical expertise and is fascinated by technology. This notion also sometimes devel-
ops into the conviction that “Americans can do anything,” and when faced with evidence that this is not the case, Soviets may react strongly, with bitter disappointment or with scathing contempt for the “fallen giant.”

Many Soviet citizens seem to feel a certain kinship with Americans that they do not feel with other peoples. They are often puzzled and disappointed to find that the average American does not reciprocate this feeling, and does not have the great curiosity about the USSR that his Soviet counterpart has about the U.S. Most Soviet citizens have heard, through the Soviet press, that there is widespread ignorance about the Soviet Union among Americans. This is difficult for most to accept, and if they accept it, even more difficult to explain; is it attributable, they wonder, to Americans’ lack of access to information (as the Soviet press claims), or can it really be that most Americans simply are not very interested in life in the Soviet Union? If they are not interested, why not? While this is viewed by some as distressing evidence of the low esteem in which Americans hold the Soviet people and their culture, others pass it off as an indication of Americans’ general intellectual apathy and self-centeredness.

In large measure, this sense of kinship with Americans felt by so many Soviets may be linked with the prevalent perception that as the citizens of the two “great powers” which dominate the world, we are in a special elite class. Visitors to AGUSA often described a bond between us in these terms. It seems that such comments frequently serve as self-reassuring assertions of Soviet national strength and power, efforts to underscore that the Soviet Union, which long lagged behind the U.S., has now, at least in some respects, achieved equality.

The sense of kinship, though, also appears to spring from the perception of a basic similarity between the American and the Russian character. The shared attributes most often cited by exhibit visitors were simplicity, unpretentiousness, gregariousness and hospitality.

Provincial Attitudes and Negative Stereotypes

A number of the least sophisticated exhibit visitors, generally peasants and workers from the more isolated provincial villages who have little or no contact with foreigners, did not appear to share this feeling of closeness to Americans. They tended to regard Americans as creatures unlike themselves. Many of these people, never having seen “real Americans” before the exhibit, had formed rather romanticized images of how they look and act. Expecting exotic and glamorous beings, some people were disappointed by the decidedly ordinary appearance of the guides and the Americans pictured in exhibit photographs, films and slides. Others, however, were gratified to find Americans much less imposing than they had anticipated.
Certain negative stereotypes of Americans were sometimes reflected in exhibitgoers’ remarks. Americans were seen as coldly calculating (“Americans marry for money, not love”), materialistic, superficial, and insincere (“Americans smile even when they don’t mean it”). A feeling shared by a not insignificant number of people—including both simple workers and sophisticated members of the intelligentsia—is that Americans are decent people, but, particularly in comparison with Russians, they are shallow and lacking in “soul.”

American Society and the American System

In contrast to the mainly positive feelings expressed about the American people, attitudes toward the society and system tend to be unfavorable, reflecting the influence of the heavily negative presentation of America in official Soviet information sources.

It is commonly felt that American society is immensely frightening in its complexity, disorder and competitiveness. The typical Soviet citizen has an exaggerated notion of the instability of American society and the insecurity of the average individual’s life in such a society. He imagines that there is constant crisis, uncertainty, pressure to take risks. Conditioned by the Soviet media to focus on the failures and drawbacks of Western capitalist society, he is apt to see every situation in the worst possible terms. Rather than looking at the challenge or potential gains which are part of risktaking, he concentrates on the psychological tensions and potential losses. He has a tendency to focus on the least fortunate members of American society, and to consider that they represent the norm, rather than an extreme end of the spectrum.

Many Soviets evidently believe that Americans can never truly relax. Life in the West is seen as a constant struggle; the ordinary American must always be on guard against financial ruin, loss of employment, criminal violence. Even if he is lucky enough to avoid disaster, he still must cope with the complicatedness of everyday life. The average Soviet citizen is aware that, compared with Soviet society, American society leaves far more choices to the individual—too many choices, in the Soviet view. While the Soviet citizen may be intrigued, even somewhat attracted by this notion of abundant choices, his overriding response is likely to be one of dismay and fear. Dealing with so many choices and decisions causes confusion, anxiety and fatigue, he feels; it makes life harder. Not only does it put undue strain on the individual, but it is a major factor in the general disorderliness of American society. Comments made by visitors to the exhibit would often reflect these attitudes; people would say that life in the Soviet Union is “simpler” and therefore better and more enjoyable than life in the United States.

To some people, the most threatening aspect of American society is its individualism and competitiveness. Most people tend to have an
exaggerated and distorted perception of the manifestations of these values in American life, based on the one-sided information provided by the Soviet media. To be sure, there are individuals who express approval of a system prizing private enterprise, the incentive value of competition, and personal independence in all spheres of life. But more commonly, Soviet people envision the U.S. as a nation of lonely, alienated individuals, unable to rely on any sort of supportive group and forced to compete rather than cooperate with their neighbors and colleagues. In the typical Soviet view, because of the structure of society and its prevailing values and mores, the American citizen is comparatively unprotected by either official collectives (trade unions, youth groups) or unofficial collectives (family, friends). Competition, almost always seen in negative terms, is associated with the obsessive pursuit of money and power widely regarded as characteristic of capitalist society. The conclusion reached by many people seems to be that while the collective ethos might have its drawbacks, the alternative is worse.

The average Soviet citizen is, of course, well aware of the problems in Soviet society, but his knowledge of American society is, at best, patchy and vague. Some people assume, in the absence of information to the contrary, that Americans must cope with the same problems Soviets face (deficits of consumer goods, housing shortages) as well as the problems peculiar to Western society: unemployment, expensive medical care, high rate of inflation. While other people realize that most of the major problems of Soviet society are not prevalent in the U.S., they still lack clear and convincing information about actual conditions outside the Soviet borders and are thus unable to develop a satisfactory understanding of American society. A very large portion of the information made available through official Soviet channels emphasizes the West’s negative features. The Soviet media set the agenda for people’s thinking about the U.S., influencing even those who are skeptical about the veracity of the information sources, and those who would like to view American society in a positive light.

Exposure to Western Information Sources

Direct, albeit limited, exposure to Western information sources often serves further to confuse and mislead Soviet citizens rather than clarify their perceptions of American society. American books, films, photographs and other items made accessible to the public are carefully selected to reinforce the unfavorable image of American society presented in official Soviet sources. The Soviet press, for example, frequently quotes statements from American sources which support whatever point is being made about Western society. These references carry considerable weight. In arguing various points with the guides, exhibit visitors would often exclaim, as if it were the final, irrefutable evidence in their favor, “But your own newspaper, The New York Times, says
...” It is difficult for individuals who doubt or reject the official Soviet version of a given aspect of American society to deal with foreign source material which supports the Soviet line.

A key problem is that the majority of Soviet citizens fail to grasp the fundamental differences between the Soviet and the American news media. They generally do not realize that in the U.S., “news” consists of information about unusual events, about disasters and problems, controversies and sensations. Many people automatically assume that the American media report on routine and normal occurrences, as the Soviet media purport to do. Curiously, even when individuals are aware of differences between the Soviet and American media, they do not necessarily interpret information from American sources in the light of that knowledge. They may have heard, for instance, that various opinions are expressed in different newspapers, or even within one newspaper, but it does not necessarily follow that when they read a quotation from *The New York Times* in *Pravda*, they will recognize that it represents one view, perhaps a minority opinion, and in any case not a universally accepted statement of fact.

As with the press, when Soviets view American films such as *White Line Fever* and *The Front*, they often assume that normal everyday American reality is being depicted. In fact, some people conclude that American society may actually be worse than these films dare show; they are extrapolating from their own experience with Soviet films, where some social problems may be treated, but not revealed to be as serious, profound or widespread as they are in reality.

Even American information sources designed for a Soviet audience may sometimes contribute to the confusion, due to the Soviet people’s unfamiliarity with American ways of presenting information and with the whole context of American society. For example, a journalist’s low-key, even-handed treatment of a controversial issue (an effective approach for an American audience) may be interpreted by Soviet readers as a sign of the weakness of the journalist’s actual position on the issue. A foreign radio broadcast on the current developments of a particular issue may be poorly understood by Soviet listeners because they lack the background information essential for comprehension.

*Subjects of Concern*

Most of the exhibit visitors’ questions and comments could be classified into three categories: ordinary daily life in America; American perceptions of and attitudes toward the Soviet Union; and problems in American society. The third category was the largest, and included questions on the social, political, economic, cultural and psychological ills of American society: the high cost of living, expensive medical care and education, unemployment, crime, violence, poverty, and so on.
These issues, constantly stressed by the Soviet media, were foremost in many people’s minds, as were the deeper, underlying problems manifested in these particular issues: exploitation of the weak, inequality, obsessive materialism, lack of national and individual goals, general malaise, self-centeredness. But by no means did everyone who asked about these problems believe they truly exist as described in Soviet sources. The attitudes held by questioners varied, and were often not even identifiable. Some people were simply curious to hear how an American would handle such questions. Others did appear to have a highly negative picture of America, and they asked their questions with the intent of exposing the evils of the West, and discomfiting and discrediting the guides. Still others wanted direct confirmation from the guides of information they had already obtained, perhaps from Voice of America, which contradicted the official Soviet version of one or another aspect of American reality. Whatever the individual’s attitude, however, it is noteworthy that the same issues—unemployment, unequal access to material goods, high cost and limited availability of medical care and education, etc.—were etched in people’s minds; that is what they first thought of in connection with the United States.

In view of the Soviet news media’s considerable attention to foreign affairs, including Soviet-American relations, it is interesting that exhibit visitors rarely initiated conversations on specific current international issues, such as SALT. Although one suspects that more candid and detailed discussion of such topics occurs in private, at the exhibit people usually confined themselves to expressing the familiar platitudes (which the guides heard dozens of times each day) about the need for peace, cooperation and increased contacts between our two countries. When foreign policy issues did come up, visitors seemed primarily interested in hearing the guides’ personal opinions or explanations of the official American government position. Visitors’ own comments, when expressed at all, tended to follow the official Soviet line. The American role in international affairs was criticized as “aggressive” and “imperialistic,” while the Soviet Union was seen as supporting peace-loving and progressive peoples everywhere. There seemed to be considerable feeling that the American people are “misled” on international issues by “certain circles” within the U.S., or by outside powers. Regarding American-Chinese relations and how they affect the Soviet Union—the issue of greatest concern to visitors—many expressed fears that the U.S. is lining up with China against the USSR; it was felt that Americans are naive to trust the Chinese, who, according to Soviet predictions, will betray America just as they betrayed their erstwhile friend, the Soviet Union.

Visitors were greatly concerned about American perceptions of a “Soviet military threat” and often repeated their hopes that “certain
circles” in the U.S. would not use the excuse of a “mythical Soviet threat” to justify an attack on the Soviet Union.

The Age Factor

There is naturally more variety in Soviet people’s views of the U.S. than any general summary of prevalent attitudes might suggest. A particularly noticeable difference in attitudes exists between members of the “younger generation” (born post-war), and their elders.

On the whole, young people take a more positive view of the U.S., are more accurately and broadly informed in some areas, and seem more open to information coming from American and other non-Soviet sources. Young Komsomol agitators were in evidence in each city visited by the exhibit, but they were far outnumbered by the friendly, fascinated young people who gathered around the guides and made repeated visits to the exhibit. American values and practices which are regarded with fear or disapproval by older Soviets are often embraced enthusiastically by members of the younger generation. The independence of American youth—living apart from parents after high school, making their own decisions on education, military service, work—appeals to many Soviet young people, who chafe against the physical and psychological constraints of Soviet society. Those under 35 tend to value security and stability less than do their elders, for whom the war and its accompanying dislocation are vivid memories.

Many Soviet young people have a distinct tendency to idealize American life, and in some cases their perceptions are as vague, one-sided and unrealistic in one direction as their parents’ ideas are in the other. It is the interpretation of information, rather than what and how much information they possess, that seems most to distinguish the generations.

Ethnic and Religious Factors

Predictably, certain ethnic and religious groups within the Soviet population are inclined to have highly positive feelings and perceptions about the U.S. In general, those groups which feel alienated from the Soviet regime and Soviet society are greatly attracted to the United States. Among exhibit visitors, the best represented of these groups were the Baptists (and believers from some other Christian sects), Jews, ethnic Germans, Balts, Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians from the Western Ukraine.

Members of such groups generally put more energy into obtaining information from outside sources, and often have more and better information about American life, although this is not necessarily the case. (Jewish citizens are frequently the most knowledgeable, thanks in part to information received from friends and relatives who have
emigrated.) Many of them think a good deal about life outside the Soviet Union and discuss it extensively among themselves. Nonetheless, they often have difficulty comprehending many of the same aspects of American life which pose difficulties for other Soviets.

Geographic and Socioeconomic Factors

The level of knowledge about America is, understandably, highest in large metropolitan cities such as Moscow and Kiev, where the population has the most contact with foreigners, access to a variety of Soviet and foreign information sources, and includes a concentration of highly educated, sophisticated individuals. The residents of the most isolated and undeveloped areas (Tselinograd, rural Moldavia) are much less well informed, but even these areas appear to have their local intelligentsia—a small community of people who are fairly knowledgeable about the West and astute in interpreting Soviet reportage of the outside world. (Many of these people were educated or spent time working in the major cities.)

Each geographic area visited by the exhibit had its own particular character, and observers noted the predominance of certain kinds of attitudes in each area. In Rostov, for example, people were inclined to be fiercely patriotic and thus critical of the U.S.; they often expressed strong views on issues but did not usually support those views with specific facts. Rostov struck the American exhibit staff as a typical blue collar, working class, rough and tumble town. Its character was formed by a number of factors, among them the Cossack historical and folk traditions of the region, Rostov’s role as an important river port, and the presence of the enormous Rostsel’mash farm machinery plant, which employs a huge number of people and wields considerable influence in many spheres of local life. Extent and type of education, profession, and income level do have an influence on individual perceptions and attitudes, but on the basis of observations in the exhibit setting, it would be impossible to venture any analysis of these factors. Most evident, rather, were the differences between, on the one hand, the urban, well-educated, professional people of the several more cosmopolitan cities, and, on the other, the residents of provincial cities and villages, be they peasants, workers, specialists or government officials. Provincial citizens were more accepting of official Soviet information sources, and less open to new and conflicting information. They were inclined to express less skepticism than their fellow citizens in Kiev and Moscow. They were also apt to have more trouble with concepts which are unfamiliar and confusing to any Soviet citizen, such as the interactions of the private and public sectors in American society or the nature of American individualism.

Conclusion

The average Soviet citizen bases most of his perceptions of the U.S. on the information presented by the official Soviet mass media and
the foreign materials (literary works, films, etc.) chosen by the regime for distribution within the country. Some information from outside sources is received through unofficial channels, but the large majority of citizens rely primarily or exclusively on Soviet or Soviet-approved sources.

Most citizens do not accept unquestioningly and wholeheartedly what the Soviet media tell them; with some exceptions, most realize that only selected information is made available, and therefore their perceptions of American society are likely to be somewhat off the mark. At the same time, they recognize that the information provided them is not sheer falsification and exaggeration. The question is: How much and exactly what can be believed? The average citizen, with little access to alternative information sources and no opportunity to make firsthand observations, has no satisfactory way to develop and evaluate his information. The best way, if one is interested, energetic and daring enough, is to seek out as many sources of information as possible and compare them all. A few people do precisely that.

Still, while information obtained from foreign sources such as VOA is carefully weighed and pondered, it is often neither fully accepted, nor well understood. In cases where information thus obtained conflicts with old familiar images, people often find it easier and more comfortable to retain the old images. Moreover, information from outside may not correct misperceptions or fill in blank spots because of the Soviet citizen’s inability to put the information in proper context or because of problems with the methods used in communicating. Reconciling conflicting information is, of course, a serious problem. Observers at AGUSA noted, as have others, that many Soviets often appear able to hold what to us seem glaringly conflicting perceptions and attitudes without feeling any apparent need to reconcile them.

Judging from visitors’ questions and comments at the exhibit, as well as other evidence, the average Soviet citizen has a picture of the United States which is incomplete, distorted and confused. While inclined to think favorably of the American people, he tends to view American society in a predominantly negative light, perceiving it as frighteningly disorderly, complex, unjust and unstable.

Although attitudes toward the U.S. vary considerably, depending in part upon the individual’s age, place of residence and background, most people—whatever their attitudes—are greatly curious about the problems of American society which are constantly spotlighted by the Soviet media. Soviet portrayals of the extremes of poverty and deprivation in America, on the one hand, and wealth and self-indulgence on the other, appear to make a particularly strong impression upon people.

The average Soviet citizen is, at least in public, critical of American foreign policy. Generally reluctant to discuss international issues in
concrete terms, he tends to follow the official line if pressed to express an opinion. He is not hesitant, however, to voice a strong desire for a peaceful and friendly relationship between the U.S. and USSR. This desire for peace and friendship coexists with a sharp sense of competition with the U.S., as exemplified in exhibit visitors’ ceaseless drawing of comparisons between the two societies in every area imaginable.

185. Letter From the Director of the International Communication Agency (Reinhardt) to all ICA Public Affairs Officers

Washington, September 26, 1979

Dear PAO:

Ever since USICA came into being, a good many questions have been asked about the meaning of the Agency’s so-called “second mandate.” You and your colleagues in the field, in particular, have wondered how this new “mandate” affects your work.

This is an important subject—both for you and for us in Washington. I would, therefore, like to offer some general guidelines for your use.

To begin, I should make clear my discomfort with terms like “the second mandate,” “mutuality,” “the American learning experience.” I find nothing inherently wrong with these terms. And I have no felicitous substitutes to offer. I fear, however, that the use of such shorthand tends to obscure rather than clarify. One danger is that such terms evoke a sense of mystery about something that is not at all mysterious. Another concern is that they may imply inflexible activities carried out only in certain ways and only by certain specified elements of the Agency—implications that are patently false.

What we are talking about is quite simple: it is the responsibility of this Agency to assist in enabling Americans to enhance their understanding of other societies—their histories, their cultures, their values and their aspirations, where they are coming from and why they behave as they do. It is not unlike our responsibility to increase foreign understanding of U.S. society and institutions.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, USIA Historical Collection, Subject Files, 1953–2000, Entry A–1 1066, Box 52, Educational Exchanges, Educational and Cultural Affairs, 1978–1985. No classification marking. Sent to all country and branch PAOs and Washington personnel at the supervisory level.
This responsibility derives directly from the President’s message to the Congress transmitting Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1977.\(^2\) In his message, the President explicitly set as a goal of the new Agency: “to tell ourselves about the world, so as to enrich our own culture as well as to give us the understanding to deal effectively with problems among nations.”

The President reiterated our responsibility in this area in his memorandum to me of March 13, 1978: “It is also in our interest—and in the interest of other nations—that Americans have the opportunity to understand the histories, cultures and problems of others so that we can come to understand their hopes, perceptions and aspirations. In so doing, the Agency will contribute to our capacity as a people and as a government to manage our foreign affairs with sensitivity, in an effective and responsible way.”\(^3\)

Recognition of our firm obligations in this area should not be taken to mean that USICA is to become the teacher and America the classroom. Indeed, our focus must be on stimulating, assisting and enhancing the work of non-governmental organizations and individuals in this area—work that in scale and potential impact far exceeds our own limited capacities.

I would stress the fact that we do not have any pat formulas. And, while I note that the mandate is new with the new Agency, I also appreciate that many of you have been doing good work in this area for some years. We will build on this previous work; and we will break new ground. All elements of the Agency can and should participate—thoughtfully, imaginatively and fully—in the generation of creative approaches to enhancing Americans’ understanding of others.

There are, however, some existing guidelines from which you should work. First and foremost, you should understand that different elements and activities of the Agency are involved in this effort in different ways:

(1) ECA’s Office of Private Sector Programs is the only element of the Agency which has as its fundamental purpose helping to enhance Americans’ understanding of others.

(2) Most elements and programs of the Agency, while having a different primary purpose and rationale, can and should make an important contribution to Americans’ understanding of others;

(3) Some efforts of the Agency—principally international broadcasting and materials produced for distribution abroad—are specifically precluded from involvement in this area.

\(^2\) See Document 93.

\(^3\) For the full text see Document 121.
ECA’s Office of Private Sector Programs is now working under a new statement of purpose and refined guidelines. It will carry out its purpose—to help enhance Americans’ understanding of others—through grants supporting non-profit projects conducted by American organizations outside the Federal government. It will focus on projects that involve American leaders or organizations most likely to stimulate the thinking, learning, and perceptions of broader groups of Americans.

Just as we do in our work overseas, it will support efforts which promise a sustained impact over time, with the maximum multiplier effect. Since Private Sector grants will be awarded only to projects originating with and submitted by organizations outside of the Federal government, this effort will operate largely outside of the Country Plan process. You, however, are in an excellent position to perceive the adequacy of American understanding of the society in which you are working. Your sharing of your knowledge and perceptions—through the Country Plan and other mechanisms—must therefore enhance our own understanding of where and how this effort can best be focused. (I am enclosing the Office of Private Sector Programs’ new guidelines so that you will have a detailed understanding of its purpose and operations.)

While the Office of Private Sector Programs is the only element of the Agency which has this work as its exclusive purpose, virtually all elements—specifically including you in the field—have a contribution to make and should be involved. There is no one program, no one activity, no single element of the Agency which has a corner on this market.

I point up the following merely to illustrate the range of our involvement in activities that make an important contribution to enhancing Americans’ understanding of other societies:

—The entire Fulbright academic exchange program, whether sending Americans overseas or bringing foreigners to this country.
—Our work in establishing linkages between universities in this country and those overseas.
—Our work with the U.S. Office of Education in secondary teacher exchanges.
—Our work with the National Endowments for the Arts and for the Humanities, with the Smithsonian and with the private sector, to enhance Americans’ awareness of other cultures and their arts.
—Our year-long involvement with the President’s Commission on Foreign Language and International Studies, which is soon to make

4 Attached but not printed is an undated enclosure entitled “Grants to Private Organizations in Support of International Educational and Cultural Activities.”
recommendations designed to help insure the competence of Americans to deal effectively with other societies.\(^5\)

—Our research activities, which have the specific goal of supplying us with essential information on the concerns and attitudes of other peoples.

Other activities involve you and your staff more directly:

—American Participants are sent abroad primarily to enhance foreigners’ understanding of some aspect of American society and/or policy. One of the criteria for their recruitment, however, is that they are influential Americans who have the capacities and the positions for sharing their understanding of foreign societies with other Americans upon their return to the United States. It is your responsibility to insure that Amparts have appropriate opportunities to learn the concerns and perspectives of their professional counterparts in the host country.

—Cultural Presentations and specialists afford similar opportunities for enhancing Americans’ understanding of others—if their programs overseas are properly arranged and conducted.

—And the same point can be made, in reverse, about IV grantees. The principal purpose of the IV program is to establish or enhance a productive relationship with influential foreigners by giving them a firsthand experience with the United States. At the same time, IV’s can also be an important means of increasing Americans’ understanding of other societies. The Agency’s Office of International Visitors will be working with programming agencies to insure that this is done whenever it is appropriate and in a manner that does not interfere with the main purpose of the IV program. You should sound out your grantees along these lines—offering them the opportunity to explain their own countries and areas of expertise but without either giving them the feeling that they are obligated to “pay” for their invitations or unduly raising their expectations about the opportunities that may be available to them.

The key point, again, is that not one but many areas of our work provide opportunities to enhance Americans’ understanding of other societies. Each of these should be utilized in every appropriate way. There is no single approach, no how-to-do-it kit. What is called for is your own thinking and imagination in a given situation, with a specific opportunity at hand.

There are, obviously, some exceptions. The Voice of America does not broadcast to the United States. The Wireless File, our magazines

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\(^5\) See footnote 2, Document 168.
(with the exception of Problems of Communism and English Teaching Forum), our television and film productions, other of our media products, are legally precluded from distribution within the United States. These are not vehicles available to us for enhancing Americans' understanding of others.

Two other points should be noted: (1) We are not in the business of assisting other governments to advocate their policies and points of view to the American people; and (2) as I explained in my recent letter on the Agency's cultural initiative, we may facilitate but will not fund foreign performing and plastic arts presentations in the United States.

In the weeks ahead, we will be working to refine our efforts in this area. Private Sector Programs, in particular, will be sharpening its approaches and exploring new possibilities.

I am prepared to consider making additional funds available for this work, should the need and the opportunities present themselves persuasively.

I encourage you to do all that you can—thinking and acting imaginatively—to help enhance the opportunities for Americans to enlarge their knowledge and understanding of others.

As always, I welcome your thoughts, suggestions and questions. Sincerely,

John E. Reinhardt

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6 Reference is presumably to Reinhardt’s August 6 memorandum on the “Arts America” program; see Document 178.
Memorandum From the Director of the International Communication Agency (Reinhardt) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\(^1\)

Washington, October 19, 1979

**SUBJECT**

Follow-up on Presidential Directive on Cuba/NSC PD 52\(^2\)

The International Communication Agency has two major cultural projects well under way. One is a visit of the Alvin Ailey dance troupe; the other is a showing in Cuba of an American art exhibit. While there has been a general policy against cultural exchanges with Cuba, members of our Agency in consultation with the NSC staff have agreed that these two projects are desirable exceptions.

According to the manager of the Ailey dance troupe, the Cuban Government has agreed to finance in-country housing and to take care of transportation—including material—to and from Cuba. The offer is being confirmed with the Cubans. USICA will pay performance fees unless private financing, such as foundation support, can be arranged. The company cannot make an April 1980 date proposed by the Cubans and is awaiting a Cuban reply to a counterproposal for the first week in September.

On October 26, a National Endowment for the Arts panel will identify existing art shows that respond to our criteria for an exhibit in Cuba. USICA funds have been earmarked. The Cubans have expressed an interest in having such an exhibit. The outlook for the project is good.

Should further opportunities to reach the Cuban people with U.S. cultural activities present themselves, we will discuss these with your staff.

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\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 40, Cuba: 9/1–12/79. Secret. A notation in an unknown hand at the top of the memorandum reads: “Staff—Pastor.” Pastor sent a copy of the memorandum to Brzezinski under a November 1 covering memorandum, commenting “I understand from ICA it is partially OBE’ed. With regard to the Alvin Ailey tour, ICA is still trying to determine whether the Cubans will accept our conditions. The Cubans had initially wanted to control the tour and use it for propaganda purposes, but we vetoed that. With regard to the art exhibit, we have agreement in principle with the Cubans.” (Ibid.)

187. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\(^1\)

Washington, October 31, 1979

SUBJECT

Extra-Governmental Efforts in Central America and the Caribbean

The preliminary inventories described below contain most of the factual material asked for in your request of October 24\(^2\) on the above subject.

An interagency task force is urgently considering the complex analytical and policy issues involved, and will submit the requested summary analysis and recommendations early next week in light of contributions from our missions in the field. State 284169 (Tab 1)\(^3\) describes the major issues being considered.

The importance and scope of the activities involved are documented in the following:

—*U.S. Private Organizations Active in the Caribbean and Central America* (Tab 2). This preliminary list of organizations, by country as requested, does not fully reflect the activities of universities or media organizations. But it already reveals an impressive network of several hundred U.S. citizen organizations. Although only a handful are active in some of the smaller Caribbean islands, as many as 100 or more are involved to some extent in the larger countries.

—*State and Local Government Efforts in Central America and the Caribbean* (Tab 3) focuses on the activities of two organizations under whose aegis 50 cities and several countries in the region are linked to U.S. cities and states: Sister Cities International and the Partners of the Americas. This analysis also reveals that federal government support, mainly through AID funding, is important to these citizen efforts.

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\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 46, Latin America: 10/15–31/79. Confidential. Tabs 1–5 are attached but not printed. A notation in an unknown hand at the bottom of the first page of the memorandum reads: “will send some analysis by Tues.”

\(^2\) In an October 24 memorandum, Dodson asked Tarnoff to prepare a report “describing activities undertaken by US non-governmental groups which contribute to the development (economic, political, or social) or democratization of Central America and the Caribbean.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 6, Central America: CACAR, 11/78–11/6/79)

\(^3\) An unknown hand placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph and wrote “Today, Monday.”
—The list of U.S. Private Voluntary Organizations Registered with the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid (Tab 4) contains the addresses, telephone numbers and names of executive officers and contact persons of 140 leading organizations. Although not all are active in Central America and the Caribbean, this list includes most organizations that might be involved in a comprehensive approach.

—The list of upcoming meetings (Tab 5) indicates some opportunities for consultation and if appropriate, initiatives. For example, the principal Administration speaker at the November 28–30 Miami Conference on the Caribbean could usefully formulate our major objectives in this area.4

Finally, a description of organization objectives and programs will be available in U.S. Non-Profit Organizations in Development Assistance Abroad, now in press.

Peter Tarnoff
Executive Secretary

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Washington, November 14, 1979

SUBJECT
VOA Persian Broadcasts

Since the curtailment of other direct channels of communication with the Iranian public has increased the importance of VOA Persian-language broadcasts during the present crisis, I thought you might like to know specifically what we have been broadcasting.

Our broadcasts currently consist of one-half hour per day, 10 to 10:30 p.m. Tehran time (1:30 to 2 p.m. EST). The first ten to twelve minutes of each program is devoted to the news, which is similar to the news broadcast in English and other languages but includes items thought to be of particular interest to Iranian listeners. (Monday, for example, even though we went off the air at 1:59 p.m. and the President’s announcement of the Iranian oil embargo wasn’t made until 2:01 p.m., we were able to get into the final minutes of our program the information the President was about to convey.)

Following the news we have had a backgrounder on “Iran and Diplomatic Immunity” (November 8), a correspondent’s report on “The U.S., the USSR and Iran” (November 10), and a feature entitled “Attack on the American Embassy” reflecting U.S. press treatment (November 5). We have also been able to obtain and broadcast a number of interviews with leading Muslims discussing U.S.-Iranian relations and their unfavorable reaction to the taking of hostages (November 12 and 13).

The remainder of our half-hour program has dealt with other topics of interest to the audience, such as “The Russians in Afghanistan” (a

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 10, International Communication Agency: 9–12/79. No classification marking. On November 4, the U.S. Embassy in Tehran was seized and Americans were taken hostage.

2 November 12.

3 On November 12, the President spoke to reporters in the Briefing Room at the White House and stated: “It is necessary to eliminate any suggestion that economic pressures can weaken our stand on basic issues of principle. Our position must be clear. I am ordering that we discontinue purchasing of any oil from Iran for delivery to this country.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book II, p. 2109)
series of three programs based on Christian Science Monitor reporting); the Kampuchean relief effort; and Mrs. Carter in Thailand.5

In our output we have emphasized three general themes: American concern for the safety of the hostages; the Administration’s efforts to alleviate the situation; and international support for the tenets of international law and behavior toward members of diplomatic missions.

VOA’s English-language broadcasts to the area—which, we understand, also are being listened to widely—have similarly concentrated on the Iran crisis with news analyses, a commentary and U.S. opinion roundups. The President’s statement Monday was carried live as an interruption of our news broadcasts to the Middle East.

We do not know precisely how many people and who in Iran are listening to VOA Persian or English. Before the current crisis we received numerous reports of listenership, including in the government and the press, the latter frequently replaying in the media what VOA had broadcast. At the present time there seems to be some evidence that the students and others are listening to VOA by the speed with which they react to what is said and done in Washington and elsewhere—information that they can only be getting so quickly by Western radio—VOA and BBC.

4 The Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea (Cambodia) in December 1978 decimated most of the rice crop, thus jeopardizing an already tenuous food supply. During 1979, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) began coordinating a large-scale humanitarian assistance program for Kampuchea on behalf of the United Nations and other concerned governments.

5 Reference is to the First Lady’s trip to Thailand, in early November, to observe famine conditions related to the influx of refugees from Kampuchea. Documentation on the trip is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXII, Southeast Asia and the Pacific.
189. Memorandum From the Director of the International Communication Agency (Reinhardt) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\(^1\)

Washington, November 15, 1979

SUBJECT

VOA Broadcasting

In response to your memorandum of November 8, 1979,\(^2\) the International Communication Agency is studying various\(^3\) approaches to augment present programming and broadcasting to Muslim countries with information concerning the treatment of that minority in the Soviet Union.

Over the past year, in addition to its news reporting, the Voice of America has broadcast several major programs which have addressed the treatment of Muslims in the Soviet Union. These have included:

—A three-part series in Bengali and Urdu on the state of Soviet Muslims and how these communities are used by the Soviet Union as part of the political appeal to Muslims in other parts of the world. These broadcasts were based on a series of feature articles on Soviet Islam by Moscow-based Washington Post correspondent Kevin Klose.\(^4\)

—A backgrounder on the Islamic revival which drew from the same Washington Post series.

—A major “Close-Up” documentary on Iran which included a discussion of Soviet concern over the religious revival in Iran and its impact on the Soviet Muslim population.

—A three-part series now being completed on the 1400th Anniversary of Islam in which our Middle East correspondent interviewed a number of leaders on the world-wide impact of the religion. The program includes attention to Soviet treatment of the Muslim minority.

Among the approaches to programming on this subject presently under study, the most appealing appears to be inclusion of the Soviet

\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 9, Board for International Broadcasting (RFE, RL, VOA); 5/79–1/80. Confidential.

\(^2\) In a November 8 memorandum, Brzezinski directed Reinhardt to include in VOA broadcasts to the Middle East information about the treatment of Moslems in the Soviet Union. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 112, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty/Voice of America: 10–12/79)

\(^3\) Brzezinski underlined “is studying various.”

treatment of this minority within the larger subject of Muslims throughout the world. More specifically, in addition to information broadcast on Soviet handling of Muslims, we would, through interviews and features, characterize the lives of Muslims in other parts of the world, including the United States. This comparative approach, combined with historical information on Muslim life, charting its development and contributions, would likely be the most credible and effective. It would, of course, specifically include the points you make about Soviet policies and actions.

Though your memorandum specifically addresses our broadcasting function, we will also consider all material on Soviet Muslims for use by other USICA elements. In cases where our access to a particular society is open, the printed media and our speaker program may be more useful, or at least can be an added complement to our broadcasts.5

I would like to note that some of our officers who are experienced in this area caution that Muslims, especially those who live in the countries adjacent to the Soviet Union, are already well aware of Soviet practices and policies in the Muslim sections of the Soviet Union and that it is not necessary and may well be counter-productive for USICA to do anything more than occasionally remind them of Soviet policies and actions.6

5 Brzezinski placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph.
6 Brzezinski placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph.
190. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter\(^1\)

Washington, November 15, 1979

**SUBJECT**


Because of your personal interest in helping the peoples of the Caribbean and Central America to cope with their economic and political problems, and your desire to engage the U.S. private sector in supporting economic development and democratic processes in the two regions, I have prepared a series of recommendations for your consideration. I believe that these recommendations, if implemented, will stimulate private organizations as well as state and local governments to intensify their activities in these two areas with little or no incremental cost to the United States Government.

There already exists an impressive number of U.S. citizen organizations active in Central America and the Caribbean. A number of others which command significant resources would, I believe, be responsive to an appeal from you to support programs in these countries. These include not only non-profit organizations, but also U.S. corporations with vested interests in the Caribbean and Central America.

Although only a handful of organizations are present in some of the smaller Caribbean islands, as many as 100 or more are involved to some extent in the larger countries. I have attached a list of active organizations at Tab 1.\(^2\) Further, under the aegis of Sister Cities International and the Partners of the Americas, 50 cities and several countries are linked to U.S. cities and states. An analysis of these programs is attached at Tab 2.\(^3\) According to our Ambassadors, many of these private organizations and state and local government programs have had a visible impact in the development and democratization processes of host countries.

In spite of the impressive work being done by these organizations, however, more can and should be done. I have prepared, by country,

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\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 46, Latin America: 10/15-31/79. Confidential. Printed from an unsigned copy. There is no indication that the President saw the version of the memorandum printed here.

\(^2\) Attached but not printed is an undated paper entitled “U.S. Private Organization in the Caribbean and Central America, by Country.”

\(^3\) Attached but not printed is an undated paper entitled “State and Local Government Efforts in Central America and the Caribbean.”
illustrative lists of urgent requirements in the Caribbean and Central America which are not now being fully met. These requirements were identified in consultation with AID, our Ambassadors and private sources. In every case I have suggested non-governmental organizations based in the United States which appear to have the resources and skills to address the identified need. The lists include both organizations already active in the country and those which would be becoming involved for the first time. Copies of the lists are attached at Tab 3.\(^4\) These lists should be considered as illustrative of the kinds of contributions private organizations could make rather than comprehensive lists of the needs of individual countries.

What is required is a catalyst of some sort to bring these organizations together, to coordinate their efforts, and to stimulate activity by organizations not now engaged in outreach programs in Central America and the Caribbean. I believe you can serve as that catalyst. I recommend that you convokce a meeting of representatives of non-governmental organizations and state and local government representatives at the White House in the near future. A suggested list of participants is attached at Tab 4\(^5\) which we consider broadly representative of the kinds of groups whose services are urgently needed in the Caribbean and Central America. The purpose of the meeting would be:

— to explain that you have assigned a high priority to the Caribbean and Central America, and to indicate your interest in private organization activities in the two regions;

— propose the establishment of a new private non-profit organization which would be charged with expanding the role of voluntary organizations in the Caribbean and Central America. Between 50 and 100 founding members would be desirable, drawn from a wide range of organizations representing business, churches, foundations, the universities, service clubs and others. It could be headed by a prominent citizen with an acknowledged interest in Central America and the Caribbean. In addition to a Board and executive steering group, the umbrella organization could organize subcommittees for each country. Each of these subcommittees would visit its country, determine key needs, and stimulate U.S. private sector activity to address the need. The U.S. Government would support the organization’s activities but not become directly involved;

— announce the establishment of an annual Presidential award for the organization judged to have made the greatest impact on the

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\(^4\) Attached but not printed is an undated paper entitled “List of Immediate Requirements.”

\(^5\) Attached but not printed is an undated paper entitled “Alphabetical Listing of Possible Participants at Core Group Meeting.”
processes of democratization and development in the Caribbean and Central America. The award would be a medal or cash grant, or both. Nominations would be made by our Ambassadors. This would serve to focus public attention on private sector activities in the two regions.

I believe these suggestions, if implemented, would help stimulate activity, avoid duplication and make non-government organization activity more supportive of broad policy objectives of the United States Government. If you decide to implement these recommendations, it must be made clear to all concerned that the Administration is not attempting to control or direct the activities of private agencies and that no additional federal funds will be available for expanded activities. Members of your staff should consult with a core group of 15–20 private organization leaders before you convocate the larger meeting to insure that there are no misunderstandings on these two issues. A suggested list of contacts is attached at Tab 5.6

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6 Attached but not printed is an undated paper entitled “List of Key Individuals for Preliminary Consultations.”
191. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

People-to-People Strategy for the Caribbean Basin

After our meeting on Central America and the Caribbean in mid-October, I asked State to prepare a country-by-country inventory of non-governmental activities in the Caribbean Basin. My idea was that a people-to-people strategy would be much more effective if it were based on mobilizing and expanding existing resources, rather than creating new ones. The package, which is attached, contains the following: an inventory of existing private organizations active in the area; a description of efforts by state and local government in the area; suggestions on specific needs of individual countries in the region and how these organizations could help meet these needs; and a list of key organizations and people who we can use as a core group for a broader effort.

Cy and I propose that you encourage the establishment of a new private non-profit “umbrella” commission to coordinate and expand the efforts of U.S. voluntary organizations in the Caribbean Basin. This group could be headed by a prominent person like Miami Mayor Ferre, who knows the region very well, and it should include leaders of these

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 6, Caribbean: People-to-People, 11/79. Unclassified with Confidential attachment. Although the memorandum is undated, Brzezinski wrote “Nov. 16 ’79” in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.

2 Presumably a reference to an October 19 presidential meeting on Latin America and the Caribbean. During the course of the meeting, the President highlighted the utility of people-to-people initiatives: “It is wrong to think that we can buy friends, and I think that is our major problem. I don’t think that people in the area think that the US really cares about them, that we are their friends. There are many ways we can demonstrate this interest. We have a thousand major universities in the US and I could call and ask them to participate in a program to help the area. If I called some business leaders and told them we have a problem, and divided up responsibilities, I am sure they would be glad to help. I believe we could really help if we did this. The American people would be happy to establish friendly relations directly with the people of the area. I don’t feel that the people in Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and perhaps even in Costa Rica feel that we care about them; perhaps they think that Cuba does.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory File, Box 83, Sensitive XX, 10/13/1979–10/31/1979) The summary of conclusions from the meeting is scheduled for publication in both Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XV, Central America and Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXIII, Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean.

3 Printed as Document 190.
organizations plus state and local leaders (Jack Watson agrees that Ferre would be a good chairman.)

The most important organizations working in the region, including the Committee on the Caribbean and the Council of the Americas, have organized an important conference on the Caribbean in Miami on November 28–30. If you approve of the proposal described above, then we ought to try to key our efforts to using that conference for launching this new initiative. Specifically, we could begin with the following steps:

1. Cy and I could meet informally with a core group of leaders of these organizations to seek their views and encourage them to organize such an effort.

2. We would draft messages for you to send to the Presidents of countries in the Caribbean Basin informing them of your idea for a people-to-people approach and asking their views on whether they would consider such an initiative helpful.

3. On the eve of the Conference in the Caribbean, we could invite this entire group to the White House for you to meet with them and launch the Commission. The group could then use the Miami Conference, which will be attended by a number of Heads of State and other leaders from the Caribbean, to begin discussions, which would hopefully lead towards an overall plan for helping the region.

4. Since you cannot attend the Miami Conference, perhaps you could tape a message which describes your policies and the people-to-people strategy, and that could be used as the keynote to the Conference. (As an alternative, the Vice President could speak on your behalf.)

5. Our Ambassadors from the Caribbean area will be attending a Chiefs of Mission Conference in Washington on December 3rd and 4th. Perhaps they could be invited to a brief reception at the White House, where you could underscore your interest in the area.

6. A Conference on Central America, which will be attended by leaders in the area, will be held in New Orleans on February 28, and we could use that event for the same purpose of mobilizing voluntary support.

These are some ideas for ways to get the people-to-people strategy moving. While this will be very important as a means to show the peoples of the area that the U.S. wants to help, we should not delude ourselves that more public resources will not be required. Almost all of the key non-governmental organizations, for example, the Partners

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4 Brzezinski placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph.

5 On November 28, in the Cabinet Room at the White House, the President recorded a video-taped message for delegates attending the Miami Conference on the Caribbean. For the text, see Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book II, pp. 2159–2161.
of the Americas, were started by the government with public aid, and while they have received an increasing amount of their funds from private sources, they still receive government money. We will make clear to them that little or no additional federal funds will be available for expanded activities, but we may need to be flexible on this point.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the proposal for a private, non-governmental organization to coordinate and expand activities in the Caribbean Basin, and the steps described above.⁶

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⁶ The President approved this recommendation.

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192. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to the Director of the International Communication Agency (Reinhardt)¹

Washington, November 28, 1979

SUBJECT

VOA Broadcasting on Islam (C)

Thank you for your memorandum of November 26, outlining your plans for additional broadcasting on the treatment of Muslims in the Soviet Union as part of a larger VOA series on the status of Islam beyond the Islamic heartland.² The program you set forth appears to have the potential for being quite effective. (C)

At the same time, I would like to emphasize again the importance of moving urgently to implement this programming as quickly as possible.³ (U)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

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³ Following this sentence, Brzezinski wrote: “I need periodic updates for the President.”
THE EXTENT OF ANTI-AMERICANISM ABROAD

In the absence of objective measurements there is a danger in the context of current Iranian developments of coming to exaggerated conclusions as to the extent of anti-Americanism abroad.

This is something that has been systematically monitored in the past, as may be noted in the illustrative chart attached summarizing findings from a worldwide survey conducted by the Agency some years ago in 22 countries and major cities.²

The chart documents a widespread predominance of pro-American orientations, even in Tehran. This is a pattern that has been repeatedly evidenced in Agency surveys in scores of countries over the past many years. In short, it is trite but true to say there has been a large reservoir of good will toward the US throughout the Free World.

While comparable trend measurements are lacking for recent years, the breadth of positive indications in the past and their persistence through prior periods of stress and strain in US relations establish a high probability that pro-American orientations for the most part continue to prevail.

Recent developments in Iran should not be permitted to obscure this likelihood and lead to inflated conceptions of the extent of basic anti-Americanism—even in Tehran itself. What may exist here is what is so often the case, shrill elements of the public representing themselves as vox populi.

It is important to distinguish anti-Americanism from criticism of US foreign policies. As may be noted from comparisons of Chart I to Chart II, there is considerably more of the latter than the former. So in general people can be critical of US policies without being basically unfavorable in their opinion of the US. More specifically in the current context, this means that Iranians can be critical of US policy relating to the Shah without being fundamentally anti-American.

² An unknown hand inserted “the” before “past” and “be” before “noted.” Attached but not printed are two charts entitled “General Feeling about the U.S.” and “Reactions to U.S. Foreign Policies in General.” A typed notation at the bottom of the first chart reads: “(from USIA Report R–176–65, ‘US Standing in Worldwide Public Opinion—1965’)."
Some of these points are obvious when spelled out but could easily be lost sight of in the heat of the present crisis. They are therefore possibly helpful reminders in any current efforts to assess the present extent of anti-Americanism throughout the Free World.

194. Memorandum From James Rentschler of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\(^1\)

Washington, December 3, 1979

SUBJECT
Moslem Emotions and Anti-American Sentiment: Back to Basics (U)

Far more qualified minds than mine are no doubt addressing this problem at the moment, but for what they may be worth, I share with you some thoughts/suggestions which grow out of recent events in Islam and the risks we now confront of a spillover effect throughout the lands of Islamic allegiance. I am less concerned with immediate security concerns than the longer-range problem of how our country will be perceived in that part of the world. (C)

Assuming that the wave of anti-American expression we are now experiencing in the Moslem community may not be short-lived—especially if the present crisis in Iran is prolonged—and assuming too that any measures we take to deal with the Iran situation will be exploited by our adversaries as anti-Islam, we need to consider some prophylactic moves designed not only to contain Pak/Libyan-type contamination but, in a more positive sense, to amplify the President’s press conference signal concerning our respect for Islamic religious teachings and tradition. This should be both a short- and longer-term effort. (C)

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\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 10, International Communication Agency: 9–12/79. Confidential. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Hunter, Sick, and Griffith. Rentschler wrote “Jim” next to his name in the “from” line. Gates initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. Brzezinski wrote in the top-right hand corner of the memorandum: “Develop with GS RH a memo to ICA from me along p. 2 ZB.” An unknown hand wrote “12/4/79” next to Brzezinski’s notation. According to an attached NSC Correspondence Profile, Brzezinski “noted” the memorandum on December 4. (Ibid.) The signed version of the memorandum Brzezinski requested is printed as Document 195.

\(^2\) See footnote 2, Document 195.
—Short-term: We could consider a variant of the VIP delegation idea we raised with you in connection with our proposals for the European Allies and Japan. Groups of respected private citizens, accompanied by appropriate USG officials and including, perhaps, some academic experts from universities with recognized departments in Middle East studies (Bill Quandt would probably have some ideas, and also Bill Griffith), could pay short visits to selected Moslem countries. Properly handled from a public affairs point of view (local press contacts, pre-departure publicity, etc.), these could help put the Iran crisis in perspective and, in a broader sense, associate the U.S. with an openness to the constructive aspects of the Islamic revival, a natural concomitant of a nation and people whose own society was founded on spiritual values (which retain vital relevance today). (C)

—Long-Term: ICA (including the VOA) should, on a priority basis, tailor its programs in Moslem countries to underscore American identification with or affinity for the things for which Islam stands. This can be done via seminar projects (focusing especially on the academic sector), speaker-bureau activity, circulation and placement of specialized publication material, cultural exchange efforts aimed at local scholars and journalists willing to examine America’s attitude on Islam and the world’s other major religions, etc.). It should not be too difficult for ICA people to devise a series of programs, valid over the next one to five years, which point up the commonality of values, spiritual and secular, that link our societies. (C)

In advancing the above thoughts I had in mind my own parochial concerns in North Africa—Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia—but clearly the focus of such an effort would ideally encompass many more Moslem countries or countries with important Moslem populations, including Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Mauritania, the UAE, Indonesia, possibly even Iraq, Somalia, and the Sudan. If any of this seems to you worth following up, I’d be glad to work on specifics. (C)

3 Brzezinski placed a vertical line in the right-hand margin next to this paragraph and added a checkmark, designed to highlight his comment written on the first page of the memorandum.
195. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to the Director of the International Communication Agency (Reinhardt)  

Washington, December 12, 1979

SUBJECT

Long-Term Cultural and Informational Effort in Islam (C)

To give effect to the President’s public statements concerning US respect for Islamic religious teachings and tradition, and to provide a long-term basis in the Moslem world from which US actions and the motives behind them will be more favorably perceived, ICA should now direct priority efforts toward developing information and cultural programs in Moslem countries (and those with significant Moslem populations) which will underscore American identification with the authentic values for which Islam stands. (C)

Cultural and educational exchange activity aimed at local scholars and journalists willing to examine, in an objective light, American attitudes on Islam and the world’s other great religions should be given special attention in this effort. At the same time, ICA should review all of its available assets—specialized publication material, speaker projects, library programs, and the Voice of America’s broadcast activity—with a view to adapting these to the objective of communicating the commonality of values, spiritual and secular, which link our society with those of the Moslem world. The promising initiatives which you outlined in your memorandum of November 26 in connection with a special VOA series on minority Islamic communities could possibly be expanded upon as part of this larger effort. (C)

As I have stressed in previous memoranda, your efforts should include information about Soviet treatment of Islam and the situation of Moslems in the Soviet Union. Crude comparisons between Soviet and American practices should, of course, be avoided, since the two

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 10, International Communication Agency: 9–12/79. Confidential. A copy was sent to Vance. The copy received in the Department of State is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800010–1755. Rentschler sent a copy of the memorandum to Brzezinski under a December 11 covering memorandum, indicating that the memorandum had been reviewed by both Hunter and Sick and included “pertinent language” proposed by Henze. A stamped notation indicates that Brzezinski signed the memorandum to Reinhardt on December 12. (Ibid.)

2 For a representative example, see the President’s news conference of November 28, the transcript of which is printed in Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book II, pp. 2167–2174.

3 See footnote 2, Document 192.
situations are not analogous. It is the fundamental approach and atti-
dute to Islamic values—as well as active Soviet oppression of them—
which need to be stressed. The totality of this effort will seek not only
to counter the attempts by our adversaries to portray the present crisis
in Iran as “anti-Islam” but, more positively, to foster better understand-
ing of this country’s true purposes in a world of increasing political,
economic, and social turbulence. (C)

ICA should develop a specific action program and submit it to the
NSC within three weeks. (U)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

196. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the
Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President’s Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\(^1\)

Washington, December 12, 1979

SUBJECT

Strengthening People-to-People Ties in the Caribbean and Central America

To help develop a program to strengthen private voluntary organi-
zation (PVO) activities in the Caribbean and Central America following
the President’s December 7 meeting,\(^2\) we offer the following comments
and recommendations on objectives, issues needing resolution and
specific courses of action.

I. U.S. Interests and Objectives

Widespread political instability, caused by rapid economic and
social change exacerbated by Cuban activism, make the Caribbean and
Central America of particular concern to the United States. Our basic
policy response is to help overcome the extensive socio-economic prob-
lems which are the root causes of political vulnerability and to

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\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country
File, Box 46, Latin America: 12/79–1/80. Confidential.

\(^2\) In a December 6 memorandum to the President, in advance of the December 7
meeting, Brzezinski stated that the meeting “will be small and informal to give you the
opportunity to further develop your idea for an enhanced people-to-people approach
to Central America and the Caribbean (CACAR).” (Ibid.) The meeting took place in the
Roosevelt Room at the White House, beginning at 1:42 p.m. The President left the meeting
at 2:33 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary)
strengthen democratic and pluralistic elements and institutions where possible.

Private people-to-people activities, and the unofficial and extra-governmental relationships they create, already contribute importantly to U.S. interests throughout the area. They can contribute even more through improved coordination, focus and heightened visibility.

Our objectives therefore are to stimulate and encourage PVOs to:
—complement national development efforts, and
—improve mutual understanding through increased people-to-people contacts.

II. Issues

How can these objectives best be achieved? The President’s December 7 meeting brought into clearer focus several important issues. Most of them should be reviewed at the next meeting with PVO representatives.

We are also asking our Embassies to provide suggestions (without going to host government officials) for increasing the acceptability and effectiveness of our proposals.

1. U.S. Government Role

Our role should be to help awaken PVOs to the challenges, and to facilitate their work without undermining their private character.

Official actions must be carefully managed to avoid raising either nationalist hackles in the region, or appearing to seek undue influence over the PVOs themselves. This issue, in turn, raises a number of operational questions:
—should there be a Presidential letter to Chiefs of State along the lines we recommended earlier (S/S #7902557 Tab 2)?
—should there be a White House announcement?
—should a USG aircraft ferry PVO leaders around the Caribbean and Central America?
—aside from such initial facilitating assistance, should there be some form of USG funding for this effort (and, if so, under which agency)?
—how should we handle liaison with voluntary groups; to what extent should we attempt to influence their policies?

3 Not found attached. Presumable reference to Vance’s November 15 memorandum to the President (see Document 190).
Recommendations:

A. That we explicitly seek an authoritative sounding of opinion on this issue at the next senior level meeting with PVO leaders.

B. That, unless PVO or Embassy soundings are negative, we provide initial encouragement to get the project off the ground (possibly including a Presidential letter and/or announcement, or even a government aircraft) but make clear to everyone concerned that subsequent activities will be purely private in nature, designed to assist in achieving shared host country objectives.

C. That we not provide funding to U.S. agencies or private organizations for this specific purpose. (Some individual PVO projects may, as now, qualify for U.S. support later.)

2. Structure.

It is important to avoid the creation of new bureaucracies or layering. We believe the most effective structure would be

— An umbrella group or “steering committee” made up of no more than 20 PVO leaders, to serve as a private coordinating body for the overall effort. A few selected USG officials might be ex-officio members.

— Sub-groups, organized by country, to identify particular needs and stimulate efforts to meet them. These U.S. PVO sub-groups might ultimately have local counterparts—but their chief function would be to multiply the effects and impact of the steering group by including knowledgeable individuals active in particular countries.

Depending on how the question of initial field consultations is resolved (issue 6 below), steering group members might focus on consultations with prospective “donors,” and subgroup members on those with “recipients.”

Recommendation: That this proposed structure be fully reviewed at the next meeting with PVO representatives, and that formal decisions be delayed until the consultation process has been completed.

3. Geographic Scope and Third Country Involvement.

Countries in both Central America and the Caribbean should be included.

It would also be desirable to explore increased PVO-to-PVO contacts from other major democratic countries of the Caribbean littoral—Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia—as “donors.” These nations are active in the area, share similar objectives with us and could contribute a multilateral dimension and closer regional identification with the program, minimizing the stigma of U.S. paternalism. We might also consider inclusion of Canada, which has strong traditional ties with the English-speaking Caribbean.
Costa Rica, the Central American country with the strongest democratic and local PVO tradition, could play a pivotal dual role as both “donor” and “recipient.”

We do not know which countries might be receptive, but presume Venezuela will be positive, that Colombia and Canada will be ambivalent while Mexico may be reluctant.

Recommendation: This approach should be discussed with PVO leaders. We are also seeking the views of our embassies.

4. Program Emphasis.

Attempting to target this new effort toward specific U.S. objectives raises several difficult questions:

—should priority attention be given to economic development, or to participatory people-to-people activities, or both?

—would specific policy objectives increase the risk of foreign criticism of U.S. paternalism or intervention so as to jeopardize program objectives?

—what range of activities would be easiest to stimulate and coordinate?

We anticipate that a broad, inclusive mandate would allow the greatest latitude for achieving our objectives.

Recommendation: We should spell out possible objectives at the next meeting with private leaders, but should allow the steering group to formulate its own program emphasis.

5. Early PVO Participation

The initial White House meeting was extremely useful, but had few direct representatives of PVO’s themselves. We should include more currently active PVO leaders in the early planning stages to ensure future cooperation.

Recommendation: That participation in future meetings be broadened to include more representation from the voluntary organizations which will carry out the program. A list of suggested invitees for the next meeting is attached at Tab 1.4

6. Initial Field Consultations.

A. Scope. Based on prior Embassy reporting on this subject, we believe six recipient countries are good candidates:

—Nicaragua

—Honduras

4 The undated list, entitled “List of Key Individuals for Preliminary Consultation,” was not found attached.
Should we decide to also consult with possible “donor” countries, an early sounding might enable us to include PVO representatives from third countries with U.S. PVO leaders on the initial survey.

As noted above (issue 3), Costa Rica could play a key dual role and should also be consulted.

Recommendation: Consultations should include official and private sector representatives in both “donor” and “recipient” countries.

B. Method. At the December 7 meeting, the possibility was raised that a group of U.S. PVO leaders might travel together to a series of countries one after the other, possibly by USG aircraft. As this method would have high visibility, limit length of visits, and possibly lack country expertise in the composition of the delegation, an alternative approach might be to have initial soundings undertaken by one or two selected PVO leaders for each country, travelling commercially and taking the time to talk things through with their counterparts. Subsequently, a consolidated report might be prepared for discussion with the President.

Recommendation: That we seek the views of PVO leaders at the next meeting, keeping in mind the need to balance getting started quickly against ensuring the best country impact. We are also asking our embassies for comment.

7. Continuing Liaison.

We should decide at an early point the nature of our arrangements for continuing liaison with the new PVO structure. Possibilities include: (1) detail of an FSO, AID or Peace Corps officer with Caribbean/Central American experience to serve as staff for the PVO umbrella groups; and/or (2) designation of an Embassy or AID officer in each country to serve as local liaison with counterpart country groups.

Recommendation: that this question be raised at the next meeting with PVO representatives.

8. Planning.

To make the implementation of this proposal most effective, we need to plan very carefully and resolve issues such as those outlined above. Because we are breaking new ground, it is important that we be well prepared, present a convincing case to PVO representatives at the next meeting, to build confidence that we have thought through the proposal and that our ideas are feasible. Otherwise skepticism and parochial concerns may reduce receptivity.
Just as important, the teams visiting individual countries must be fully prepared to answer difficult questions, avoid exacerbating sensitivities and engage in a concrete dialogue. We must be able to convince both host governments and PVOs that this is not simply an effort to meddle haphazardly in ways that could backlash against them.

Recommendation: In dealing with both private groups and governments, it is very important that we (1) emphasize that our consultation is genuine (e.g. that our ideas are not set in concrete and we are open to suggestions), but (2) that we have done our homework, that these proposals are well conceived, workable and worthy of their enthusiasm.

Peter Tarnoff
Executive Secretary

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5 Bremer signed for Tarnoff above Tarnoff’s typed signature.

197. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (McIntyre), Director of Central Intelligence Turner, the Director of the International Communication Agency (Reinhardt), and the Chair of the Board for International Broadcasting (Gronouski)

Washington, December 13, 1979

SUBJECT
Broadcasting to Muslim Audiences (U)

The President has approved the immediate actions to improve broadcasting to Muslim audiences endorsed by the SCC on December 11, 1979. These are listed at TAB A. Please take steps to implement these as rapidly as possible. (C)

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1 Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 31, [Meetings—SCC 225: 12/11/79]. Confidential.
3 Attached but not printed.
The President has reviewed the medium- and longer-term actions endorsed by the same SCC meeting and has asked that OMB assess funding requirements. Please do an assessment for each individual project as rapidly as possible so further plans can be developed. These actions are listed at TAB B. (C)

Mr. Paul Henze of my staff will be calling frequent meetings of the SCC Radio Working Group to assist you in implementing all of these efforts. (U)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

4 Attached but not printed.

198. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter

Washington, December 13, 1979

SUBJECT
People-to-People Strategy on Central America and the Caribbean

After you left the meeting on Friday, Cy Vance met with the group for another 20 minutes, and then Bob Pastor continued the dialogue for an additional hour. There is tremendous interest in the proposal, and all the participants promised that they would send us suggested candidates for an expanded group and some specific ideas on ways to structure the program. We hope to send you that information next week so that we can plan for an expanded meeting after the holidays.

There was some confusion as to whether the regional target for this effort is just the Caribbean, or also Central America. Andy Young

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 6, Caribbean: People-to-People, 12/79. No classification marking. Sent for information. The President wrote “Zbig J” in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. Pastor sent the December 13 memorandum to Brzezinski under a December 13 covering memorandum, requesting that he sign it. (Ibid.) In a handwritten note, December 13, the President instructed Pastor: “Give me a brief assessment of progress on our Caribbean project.” (Ibid.)

2 See footnote 2, Document 196.
argued strongly for the broader definition, and I agree with that. Unless you indicate otherwise, we will assume that you feel the effort should be directed at Central America and the Caribbean, and should to the extent possible, involve other basin countries like Venezuela, Colombia, and Mexico in the exchanges.³

The major issue discussed was the extent to which the US Government would be willing to financially support this program in the early stages. All of the group felt that an effective and well-coordinated effort would require US Government financial support at the beginning. This could be done by a grant from AID to a Commission Secretariat, which would be the coordinating hub of the organization. We stressed your interest in this being a private effort without government funding.⁴

Other comments made by the group:

1. *Airplane Trip.* On reflection, most of the members felt that it would be inappropriate to initiate such a program with a quick tour by a group through the area in a Presidential plane.⁵ I agree with that. It seems to me that there are three objectives such a tour would be designed to serve: (1) to establish if the host government is interested in such a program; (2) to make contact with local groups and people; and (3) to determine the kinds of needs which the program would aim to serve. We could do the first by a letter from you, and the second and third could be accomplished by either a low profile tour by a few members or by informal discussions and contacts with government officials and local leaders.⁶

2. *Objectives.* Fascell said that he still was not sure what we want to accomplish by this effort, and whether we are talking about only expanding existing organizations, or something more. His point is well taken, and I recommend that we convey to the members that you view this effort as serving three goals: (1) *attitude:* improve mutual understanding and appreciation through people-to-people exchanges; (2) *development:* help meet the developmental needs of the nations of the region through small-scale and personal assistance efforts; and (3) *democracy:* to encourage political and economic pluralism by working directly with private groups in the area in a way which will lead them toward playing important roles in their societies. To serve these goals, we hope to involve a wide range of groups and leaders.

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³ The President wrote “ok” in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph.
⁴ The President wrote “Let McIntyre advise—minimum fed $” in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph.
⁵ The President placed a bracket in the right-hand margin next to this sentence and added “not what I wanted.”
⁶ In the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, the President wrote: “I prefer the low profile tour.”
We have kept our Ambassadors informed of this idea and are seeking their views on how to proceed. In the light of your comments on the conclusion of the Caribbean Chiefs of Mission Conference, we will cable our Ambassadors and make three points: (1) We ought to be looking for creative ways to relate to Central America and the Caribbean, not just through traditional aid instruments. (2) In a time of budgetary stringency, it is especially important for us to look for ways to stretch our aid—make it more efficient and effective. (3) We are examining the idea of an important people-to-people program to the area. State is working hard on this idea.

If you approve this general approach, Bob Pastor will inform the members of the group and encourage them to relay their candidates and comments to us soonest. He will also make sure that a cable is sent to our Ambassadors in the Caribbean and Central America along the lines described above.7

7 Below this paragraph, the President wrote: “Zbig—Without further delay, let Bob Pastor set down in writing—in outline form—exactly what I have said in the Cabinet & Roosevelt Rooms. Add what he has received in advice from others plus his own ideas. Submit to me for comment and approval. Then we’ll move forward. I could do this personally, but don’t choose to do so. Ambassadors are probably not inclined to support what I want done—the major thrust of which will be non-governmental (federal). J.”
Memorandum From the Director of the International Communication Agency (Reinhardt) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, December 28, 1979

SUBJECT
VOA Coverage of the Afghanistan Coup and Iran

VOA newscasts December 27 in English and all language services led with the Afghanistan and Iran stories. The Afghanistan coup was a fast-breaking and continuously changing story, as reflected in Tab A (VOA News running file on Afghanistan) and Tab B (VOA Correspondents’ Reports). Tab C is yesterday’s news file on Iran, and Tab D contains VOA correspondents’ reports on the Iran crisis.

A VOA News analysis on the Soviet troop build-up in Afghanistan ran on the morning of the 27th, prior to reports of the coup. It was updated to reflect the new situation when reports of the coup were received, and was killed in the evening when it became dated (Tab E).

In VOA’s output on Iran—particularly to the Mideast and South Asian areas—we continue to stress 1) that the hostages are the real issue and must be released; 2) that the United States is pursuing all peaceful and legal means to resolve the crisis; 3) that the international community supports the United States; 4) that the American society stands united in support of the President’s handling of the crisis.

We are also trying to emphasize that 1) once the hostages are released, we are prepared to listen to Iran’s grievances and 2) the prolongation of the crisis is counter to Iran’s own interests and especially its revolutionary goals.

At the same time, VOA continues in its effort to “humanize” the hostages and evoke a response sympathetic to them as human beings by broadcasting profiles of individual hostages (with interviews and comments of family members and friends).

1 Source: Carter Library, White House Central Files, Subject File, Federal Government, Voice of America, Executive, Box FG–218, FG 298–1 1/1/79–12/31/79. No classification marking. Bray initialed for Reinhardt. A stamped notation reads: “ZB has seen.” None of the tabs referenced in the memorandum are attached. An attached NSC Correspondence Profile indicates that copies were sent for information to Hunter, Henze, and Thornton and that the “5 tabs of news reporting on file” were in the NSC Secretariat for review. (Ibid.) The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in late December 1979. In a December 28 note to Reinhardt, Brzezinski wrote: “I have reviewed your December 28 report of VOA coverage of the Afghanistan coup and Iran. Keep up the good work. However, as I am sure you agree, much more is needed.” (Ibid.)
200. Memorandum From the Director of the International Communication Agency (Reinhardt) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\(^1\)

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Communication with Muslim Countries

REFERENCE

NSC Memorandum of December 12, 1979

You asked us to develop a long-term plan for enhanced communication with Muslim countries.\(^2\)

We have reviewed the emerging public environment in the Islamic countries, set in train an assessment of our current communication efforts, and begun to evolve an enhanced strategy for the long term (the principal first elements of which are outlined at the conclusion of this memorandum). While our focus has been on the area from the eastern Mediterranean littoral to Bangladesh, much of the analysis and prescription holds for other Muslim societies.

We have identified two phenomena which require urgent address, one short-term and the other longer-term.

**Short-term.** Our posts have reported a nascent perception among influential members of the Islamic world that the U.S. is hostile to the whole of Islam, fails to distinguish adequately between various manifestations of Islam in different countries and appears to confuse the Ayatollah Khomeini and Shi’ism with Islam as a whole. The problem is compounded by the tendency of U.S. news media and private Americans to project this undifferentiated view of Islam. U.S. interests will be served by projecting our appreciation of the fact that Islam takes many forms, of which the Ayatollah is not a leading representative.

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\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 10, International Communication Agency: 1-4/80. Confidential. Brzezinski wrote Henze’s and Sick’s initials in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. An unknown hand wrote in the top right-hand corner: “1/5 ZB requests your immediate reaction.” Henze sent a copy of the memorandum to Brzezinski under a January 8 covering note, in which he assessed Reinhardt’s memorandum and expressed his own reservations about ICA efforts, suggesting that the NSC Staff might initiate an “independent evaluation” of ICA’s performance. Brzezinski approved this recommendation. Henze sent both the note and the memorandum to Dodson under a January 9 covering note, which reads: “Note ZB’s approval of the actions I suggested in the final paragraph of the attached memorandum on ICA, etc. This means that we have the go-ahead to organize a consultants’ survey of ICA. Who do we have on our list that we could use?” (Ibid.)

\(^2\) See Document 195.
USICA media output will be scrupulous in this regard; it will be reinforced by the degree to which official public statements can support the point.

Long-term. Our analysis, buttressed by external consultation and field reports (and mirrored by Flora Lewis’ series in “The New York Times”) suggests that the root phenomenon with which we are faced is a widespread “Third World” kind of hostility to the developed nations in general and the U.S. in particular. Islam complicates the problem, but is essentially an overlay taking different manifestations in different countries, and therefore requiring a differentiated response. Islam—as a religion—does not appear to us to be at the heart of the matter. Specific policy differences (e.g., support of the Shah or Israel) accentuate other sources of hostility to us.

The attached cable from USICA Cairo arrived as we were completing our own analysis; it parallels our conclusions and provides a view from the field.

For the longer term, therefore, we see a continuing need to engage with influential Muslims in a manner which simultaneously responds to both their general “Third World” identity and their role as representatives of a serious religion, many (but not all) of whose values we share; a principal purpose of this continuing discourse will be to expand awareness of commonalities where they exist. For both short and longer-term purposes, the invasion of Afghanistan provides an extraordinary opportunity (which we are seizing) to dramatize Soviet military and cultural imperialism, to enhance our own psychological posture in Muslim minds, and to erode Soviet identification with the non-aligned countries.

We are setting the following specific actions in train and will be developing others.

1) Our posts are being asked to take a hard look at the pattern of their contacts to assure that we are reaching the right institutions and individuals in the context of recent events. We have asked for a report by February 1.

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4 Attached but not printed is telegram 26305 from Cairo, December 26, 1979, in which the PAO assessed Egyptian public reaction to the Iranian hostage crisis.

5 Brzezinski placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph and placed a question mark next to it.

6 See footnote 1, Document 199.
2) We are developing, and hope to have in place shortly, variants on traditional exchanges activities which would involve religious/intellectual leaders from Muslim countries in much more directly value-centered discussions with American counterparts both in the U.S. and abroad. To the degree present funding is inadequate, we will reprogram internally.

3) We will be meeting this month with the Directors of the 11 NDEA language/area studies centers at American universities to explore the possibilities of mutual assistance in this current effort, to elicit their views as to new public diplomacy initiatives, to create joint research possibilities focused on the psychological environment in the Muslim world as it may affect our operations, and to encourage them to expand their own contacts. NSC participation in that meeting would be welcomed.

4) There are over 100,000 Muslim students in the U.S. We are exploring ways of enhancing the probability that their experiences here will contribute to the objectives outlined above in this memorandum.

5) We are reviewing our internal training/assignment procedures to enhance the language and area competence of our personnel overseas.

6) As our posts abroad head into the next planning cycle we are directing them to focus much more explicitly on both the long and short-term objectives outlined above, to redirect resources and activities where indicated and to make recommendations for enhanced or improved support from USICA Washington.

7) We have created an Agency task group, including VOA and other media, to assure continuing, policy-sensitive coverage responsive to our objectives.

8) We believe the national interest would be well served by a close review—perhaps to be conducted cooperatively by the Departments of State and Defense, and representatives of the private sector—of the private American presence in key countries such as Saudi Arabia. That presence was, in both quality and quantity, a liability in Iran and may prove to be elsewhere as well. We recommend the NSC initiate such an effort, in which we would be pleased to participate.

9) Finally, we recommend renewed consideration of the recommendations from the President’s Commission on Foreign Language and International Studies. Funds available to increase the competence of Americans to deal with international problems are grossly inadequate to the need; many of the report’s recommendations made good sense even before Iran and Afghanistan; they make better sense now.
SUBJECT
Olympic Games—Muhammed Ali Trip to Africa

We have been moving ahead with the practical measures necessary to implement the President’s decision to have Muhammed Ali travel to Africa to meet with key African leaders on the Olympics issue.\(^2\)

Louis Martin of the White House phoned Ali to present the President’s request that he visit five African posts. Ali was quite responsive to the idea of participating in the Presidential Mission. Acting on our understanding that an aircraft was being organized, we sent the attached cable and received a response (Tab A).\(^3\)

It is our assessment that the Ali Mission is exactly the kind of energetic public diplomacy we need to employ to have a fighting chance to bring the 40–50 African nations around to our point of view. A more detailed rationale for the Mission is attached (Tab B).\(^4\)

We expect this trip to generate a lot of publicity, and believe it will be very well received by American and African public opinion. It will be seen, *inter alia*, as a sign of the President’s commitment to his Olympic policy. Downplaying the Mission does not seem in accord with the spirit of the venture.\(^5\) Rather, we think the American public and the

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\(^2\) In telegram 25727 to Brazzaville, January 30, Harrop informed Walker that the White House had “agreed to our suggestion that Muhammed Ali tour several African posts to discuss Moscow Olympic Games.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800052-0380)

\(^3\) Not found attached. Reference is to telegram 26402 to Madras, January 30, 1980. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800053-0381) In telegram 189 from Madras, the consulate indicated that Ali stated that he would undertake the trip to the five African nations and would leave India, where he was on an exhibition tour, “on or before” February 2. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File D800054-0180)

\(^4\) Attached but not printed is an undated paper entitled “Ali Mission to Africa.”

\(^5\) On February 1, *The New York Times* reported that Cutler stated that Ali’s mission “was part of an effort to enlist ‘useful contacts, both public and private’ to win support for the American position.” (“State Dept. Confirms Request,” p. A8)
Congress will react positively to Muhammed Ali and the Administration working together in a large, important mission.

Rather than having an option of what type plane should be used, we are likely to have to accept whatever plane(s) we can get in order to accomplish the mission in a timely manner. If we can avoid a 707 equivalent, we will. But I am not sure that choice will be in our hand.

202. Memorandum From the Director of the International Communication Agency (Reinhardt) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, February 7, 1980

SUBJECT

USICA Activities Supporting U.S. Policy on 1980 Summer Olympics

The President’s decision to seek postponement, transfer or cancellation of the Moscow Olympic Games has received priority attention from International Communication Agency elements.

Besides participation in the Department of State’s Olympic Task Force, USICA has provided overseas posts with two major guidance papers:

—An issue analysis cable providing current U.S. policy and positions on the Moscow Olympics and relevant historical information was sent to all posts on January 14, 1980.¹

—On February 4, 1980, posts received additional public affairs talking points on non-participation in the Moscow Olympics and perti-
nent excerpts from the Soviet-produced “Little Handbook for Party Activists” on Moscow’s strategy for handling the Summer Games.¹

International media reaction is being provided daily for all interested U.S. Government agencies, and a special weekly summary of this media reaction is being sent to the White House.

VOA and the Wireless File are supporting USG efforts to build international support for the non-participation position. The comments of prominent Americans (e.g., Senator Bradley, Muhammad Ali, Al Orter, Professor Pipes and reporters/columnists from Robert Kaiser to Red Smith to George Will to Shirley Povich) have been used to convey the depth and extent of U.S. opinion regarding the games. Also worthy of note is a half-hour VOA documentary, “The Olympic Games—Sports or Politics?” which examined in depth the proposition that the two have become intertwined.

USICA Africa Area Director Art Lewis and Regional Sports Officer Mal Whitfield, plus a VOA Correspondent and a Wireless File reporter, are traveling with Muhammad Ali in Africa.²

Most of VOA’s coverage is being broadcast in our English and foreign language programs directed to the Soviet Union, the Islamic World, and the nations of the Nonaligned Movement. Most of the Wireless File output is being carried by all of its regional files.

¹ Not found.

203. **Address by the Director of the International Communication Agency (Reinhardt)¹**

Washington, February 7, 1980

It’s good to be among colleagues; the snatches of conversation and discussion I’ve heard here today are familiar—and heartening—

to someone who’s been engaged in this work at home and abroad for over twenty years. Your expertise and professionalism go without saying; it’s your continued enthusiasm that gives me a real lift. I’m grateful and impressed.

As you know, the convention at workshops like this is for the guest speaker to congratulate the participants and tell them that their hard work does not go unappreciated. I certainly don’t intend to break that convention. But I must, at the outset, make a further statement: without your efforts, my agency would simply fall down on the job. Our partnerships—the many partnerships represented here at this workshop—are essential to the U.S. International Communication Agency’s mission and to its institutional life. That’s a plain fact. And it’s as sound a foundation as I can think of for my brief remarks here today.

You’re all familiar with—and you share in carrying out—USICA’s mission, which in its simplest terms, is to encourage the sharing of ideas and experience between the people of the United States and the people of other nations, with the object of increasing mutual understanding. Our charter—drawn up by the President and sanctioned by the Congress—states explicitly that it is in the national interest to do this. Later in the month I will ask the Congress to appropriate almost 460 million dollars of the taxpayers’ money to carry out this charter.

Before USICA was created, most of you worked with the State Department on exchange-of-persons programs designed to increase mutual understanding among peoples, and you had at least some knowledge of the part played by U.S. Information Agency officers abroad in administering these same programs. So I won’t go into any organizational history except to make three points, which I believe are especially important today:

First, the importance of exchange programs—genuine two-way communication between Americans and people of other societies and cultures—was recognized from the beginning as too great to be entrusted solely to Government functionaries. Private-sector partnership remains a necessity to USICA;

Second, the old USIA and the Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs worked harmoniously and effectively together for many years on exchange matters in spite of enormous, and sometimes absurd, bureaucratic obstacles;

Third, for 30 years exchange programs existed together with other educational, cultural and information activities, often through periods of international stress, division and bloodshed, without external or internal compromise to their integrity.

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2 See Documents 93 and 121.
We’re looking at a very grim world today, but not an impossible one. I believe that the present international convulsions and confrontations underscore the need for these efforts at mutual understanding that we call public diplomacy, and with which you and I are intimately concerned. I’ve just come back this week from a trip to China and the Philippines. In Manila I met with our Public Affairs Officers from 14 countries in the Far East. Over the past critical weeks, these USICA officers have been engaged in explaining our country’s policies and clarifying America’s intentions and reactions in regard to Iran and Afghanistan, as completely and as thoughtfully as they could. At the same time, scholars, professional people, community leaders from those countries have been here, seeing for themselves the public mood, and the knowledge—or lack of it—of international issues reflected by their American hosts. These visitors have been explaining their own points of view and their judgments as interested members of other societies to whom the present international crises may have other implications.

I might add that what is most important in each of these efforts at communication is not just the assurance or warning of the moment, but the achievement of as accurate an understanding as possible of the social and cultural context in which the conversation takes place.

I have been thinking about my trip to the Far East, and about the tensions emanating from Southwest Asia, in connection with my appearance before the Senate Appropriations Committee on the 20th of this month.3 As Dr. Johnson said, “The prospect of being hanged concentrates the mind wonderfully.”

What have our efforts at cross-cultural communication done for us in Iran or Afghanistan? In other parts of the world, have our exchange-of-persons programs, our radio broadcasts on the Voice of America, our speakers and seminars on economic and social subjects, our exhibits of painting and sculpture, tempered the international climate to any appreciable degree?

After 40 years of official international visitor programs, do we—in government or politics or private institutions of influence—have a better understanding of others’ aspirations or fears or perspectives on the world—an understanding that moderates our national behavior or comprehension?

The answers to these questions are immensely more important than the 460 million dollars they’re associated with this year. And they’re questions which you, more than anybody, know must be

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answered—at least to a certain extent—on faith. We in America must believe in the possibility of rational discourse. We must believe that mutual understanding between peoples can actually be arrived at. The alternative is too terrible to contemplate.

But we can buttress our faith with intelligent and worthwhile programs, like the ones you work with every day.

—Influential international visitors from Yemen, Morocco and Oman, programmed by VPS, will take part in a seminar on Islam and the Modern World this weekend, jointly sponsored by American University and the Islamic Center. We can assume that they will make significant contributions to American understanding, and in the process, contribute to an actual lessening of political and social frictions among international opinion-makers.

—Last summer, nine young film-makers from five Arab countries toured the United States from coast to coast by van and station wagon, in a program arranged with the Academy for Educational Development. What they learned about the United States is bound to have an effect on their work and attitudes well beyond the techniques of documentary film-making. An ICA officer accompanying them saw—as you so often do with international visitors—a dramatic lessening of suspicion, an increasing warmth of response, as these intensely political, culturally defensive professional communicators saw that the trip was open, that they were not being guided toward conclusions or shielded from controversy.

—A glance at the arrival lists of international visitors shows economists, labor leaders, orchestra conductors, parliamentarians, university lecturers, business executives, playwrights, being given this same open experience—unique, I believe, to America—through the good offices and sure professional touch of AAI, IIE, VPS, The Labor Department, the Office of Education, Commerce, Defense, AID, our own voluntary visitor office and others represented in this room. And you know, despite the headaches and frustrations, the occasional impossible personality, that the programs work—they do achieve and increase mutual understanding.

If I have one policy point to make today, it is that our mutual endeavors to create understanding through international visitor programs, exchanges of scholars and artists, through discussions and seminars, through reasoned explication and sensitive listening, are most effective and meaningful when they are all actively engaged in multiple and continuous communication.

I have been worried about the tendency of people inside and outside USICA to see it as having a split personality, with one soft, rather slow-moving cultural side, and one brisk, somewhat argumentative information side. It just isn’t so. These facets of communication—some
more resonant than others—are all parts of a whole. To characterize them as long-range or short-range, one-way or two-way, as cultural or informational, is to stereotype and diminish them. What characterizes communication is the use to which it’s put, by both sender and receiver, not the means of communication itself. You could, if you chose, manipulate an exchange visit as easily as we could fashion a tendentious message for the Voice of America. None of us can, even if we choose, communicate only one message at a time.

At times of international crisis, people tend to simplify issues, and to split them into “either-or” alternatives, often along “hawk” and “dove” lines. A quick look at the papers these days will bear this out; either we take one of a series of actions in Iran or Afghanistan, or we take another series of actions.

The “either-or” approach to international relations may have its value—in clearing the ambiguities from proposed actions or in sharpening distinctions between policy options, for example—but one institution at least would be very badly served by “either-or” divisions, or ideological cleavages among its components or partners. That, of course, is USICA. This brings me to the policy point about public diplomacy and its future that I want to leave with you. If we are going to strengthen—truly strengthen—mutual understanding between peoples, and if we are truly going to strengthen rationality in international dialogue, we must use wisely all the means of communication at our disposal. Those of us who work in educational and cultural exchanges should see the VOA news and commentary as in a sense extensions of our own activities, with all the critical interest and concern that that implies. And the press officer in a post abroad who enunciates official U.S. policy, should understand that the Fulbright and international visitor programs provide increasing numbers of his audiences with background and experience of our culture which brings that policy into perspective. We must not only recognize the connections among the various channels of communication we use as practitioners of public diplomacy—official and unofficial—we must be aware that their complexities enrich the process, at the same time they defy manipulation.

Two years ago, when USICA was being organized and the international atmosphere was fairly calm, there were fears among people concerned with the State Department’s educational and cultural exchange programs that these activities might be politicized by any institutional links with the government’s overseas information and cultural programs. I think most now agree that these fears have not been realized. Now, with USICA established and the international atmosphere at the boiling point, I hear from some that the Agency’s information function—the clear enunciation and explanation to the world of American policy and opinion—might be dissipated by
USICA’s emphasis on educational and cultural-exchange matters. I think this, too, is an unnecessary fear.

“Either-or” just does not apply to our business. We are obligated to listen, to contribute to what is known in the exchanges community as the “American Learning Experience,” and we are bound, in our two-way communication, to reflect the plurality of American culture. But as the official component of this country’s public diplomacy, supported by tax dollars, we cannot cut ourselves loose from policy. Nor, in its day, could the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs.

Public diplomacy, skillfully and responsibly practiced, is necessary and beneficial to the conduct of our international affairs. It is a counter to the surges of irrationality and rage in the world which are activated by ignorance and misapprehension.

And the exchange programs are a primary ingredient of public diplomacy. In my view, they have never been more vital than now. I say this not out of any naive belief that exchanges are a panacea for the world’s problems; yet no foreign policy can be wholly realistic or complete which does not try to bring together, across frontiers, people who honestly want to learn from and about one another.

Many of you have heard what purports to be an ancient Chinese curse: “May you live in interesting times.” We are certainly so cursed, and so privileged.

As a remarkable blend of personal convictions and professional goals, this workshop represents an active partnership and a pledge for the future—in interesting times. I am proud to be a part of it.

Thank you.
Worldwide Optimism vs. Pessimism About the Prospects For 1980

Surveys taken in December 1979 by Gallup Institutes in 22 countries reveal a wide variation in the extent to which prospects for 1980 were viewed as likely to be better or worse than in 1979. The popular mood ranged from a 66 to 16 percent predominance of pessimistic over optimistic expectations among the British, to a 60 to 13 percent predominance of optimism among South Koreans (Table 1).

The US is among those countries with a marked predominance of pessimism, with a 56 percent majority who viewed prospects for 1980 as worse than 1979 compared to 31 percent who viewed them as better (13 percent said “the same” or gave no opinion). Other countries with a large margin of pessimism were Austria, India, Italy and Canada.

There was a notable concentration of Latin American nations among countries registering predominant optimism, with Uruguay, Mexico and Venezuela trailing only South Korea in the extent of optimistic sentiment. Chile was also predominantly optimistic, though by a lesser margin, and only Brazil fell short of clearly preponderant optimism.

Viewed as a group, the countries surveyed display a remarkably balanced distribution with the number of predominantly pessimistic countries equalling those predominantly optimistic. That the overall balance at the opening of the eighties is at an approximate standoff thus gives the advantage neither to prophets of doom who look for prevailing pessimism or to those of opposite persuasion.

While the study did not explore respondents’ reasons for expressing optimism vs. pessimism about 1980, questions were asked on economic expectations of prosperity and political expectations of a peaceful year. The findings shed considerable light on why Great Britain leads all the countries surveyed in pessimism, an historic high for Great Britain in annual surveys extending back to 1957. The fact is that both

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2 Attached but not printed is an undated table entitled “Table 1. Optimistic vs. Pessimistic Expectations for 1980.”
adverse economic and political expectations were also at or near historic highs in the current survey.

The results of the supplementary queries also suggest why South Koreans came out so high in optimism since they emerged as second highest among the nations surveyed in anticipations of economic prosperity.

In light of the British and Korean findings, a special analysis was pursued of the relationships between general optimism/pessimism and economic/international political expectations. The results showed that country variations in popular mood are closely associated with variations in economic expectations but have no discernable association with political expectations. More specifically, it was found that in countries where the population is less pessimistic about future economic prospects one finds people to be generally more optimistic.

Trend in Optimism vs. Pessimism

When the popular mood as measured in the latest Gallup surveys is compared to expressions of optimism and pessimism registered a year earlier in some 19 countries, a marked downward trend is found. There have been substantial declines in the margin of optimism over pessimism in 11 countries as against, at most, slight increases in only two. (Table 2)\(^3\)

This is a major shift downward in the course of a year. So while in the latest measurements neither optimism nor pessimism have won out in the overall balance among the countries represented, if present trends continue one must definitely expect an emerging tilt to the pessimistic side in worldwide expressions of popular mood.

It is interesting to note that there has been virtually no change in expressions of optimism versus pessimism among Americans in expectations for 1979 as compared for those in 1980. In both years there is a clear margin of pessimism with the majority expecting things to get worse. In contrast, among the British there has been a very large shift in viewpoint from what was a slight margin of pessimism in the prior survey to what is currently the largest margin for any of the countries surveyed. Similarly, in India there has been a very large shift toward pessimism in the current survey.

That the popular mood has been trending sharply downward over the past year and that pessimism already prevails by large margins in not a few countries would seem to have serious implications for political communication. Political leaders in spelling out the sacrifices that

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\(^3\) Attached but not printed is an undated table entitled “Table 2. Trend in Optimism-Pessimism About Prospects for 1979 and 1980.”
appear to be required to solve the monumental problems of the present
day must take care that this rhetoric achieves the objective of a construct-
tive realism rather than a destructive erosion of popular morale.

205. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the International
Communication Agency (Bray) to the President’s Assistant
for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\(^1\)

Washington, April 7, 1980

SUBJECT

Initiatives with Respect to European Opinion

You will have received our memorandum of April 4 on European
public opinion.\(^2\) At David Aaron’s suggestion, we have considered
what posture or initiatives might best respond to the post-Afghanistan
climate of opinion.

With that in mind, we propose below a strategy that focuses on
the Olympic boycott as the most urgent issue politically and diplomati-
cally.\(^3\) We should concentrate on appealing to the Europeans on two
issues of sensitivity to them—morality and Alliance unity. Simultane-
ously, we should highlight economic sanctions and security issues both
to reinforce our position on the Olympic boycott and as critical themes
themselves over the longer term. In discussing these issues we should
emphasize that (1) the U.S. is making hard economic choices and our
allies must do likewise; and (2) Soviet aggression in Afghanistan dem-
onstrates the need for both Atlantic unity and improved NATO defense
capabilities.

**Olympic Boycott.** Excepting only the Germans, Europeans are less
supportive of an Olympic boycott than their governments. Arguments
of national or international interest/security—“drawing the line” or
“teaching the Russians a lesson”—appear unlikely to be effective; they

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800065–2473. Confidential. A copy was sent to Vance.

\(^2\) Not found.

\(^3\) The White House, on February 20, released the text of a statement indicating that
the President had informed the United States Olympic Committee that the United States
should not send an Olympic team to Moscow. (*Public Papers: Carter, 1980–1981*, Book I,
p. 356)
may even be counterproductive given strong European public reluctance to derail detente.

The best approach appears to us to be the moral one: is it “right” to legitimate, even honor, Soviet aggression? What is “the right thing to do?” (Parenthetically, this approach may simultaneously also be more effective in the United States as well.)

We know that in mid-1977 European publics were much more supportive of the Administration’s address to human rights than their governments. We know there has been strongly negative reactions—particularly in France and the Low Countries—to the Sakharov exile and the impending pre-Olympic removal from Moscow of other dissidents. Both matters should be kept in the public mind by the President, Secretary of State, senior advisors and key members of Congress—particularly those well known in Europe.

We recommend:

— that details on dissident arrests and pre-Olympic round-ups be made public promptly as the facts are known, then periodically repeated;
— that the moral note, combined with references to Soviet offenses against Afghan human rights, be strongly stated in the President’s next press conference or ASNE appearance and become a staple of daily White House and State Department briefings;
— Western European governments (especially the West Germans) will be more susceptible, however, to the theme of Alliance unity. The President should use his next news conference, his appearance at the ASNE meeting this week, or a statement following this weekend’s USOC meeting to stress the importance of Alliance unity;
— that you make a mid-April appearance at our Foreign Press Center here before an invited list of (primarily European) journalists, and that the morality theme figure prominently;
— that American Ambassadors in Europe be urged to make repeated public speeches and TV appearances in the six weeks remain-

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4 See footnote 2, Document 17.
5 The President offered remarks and participated in a Question and Answer session at the ASNE annual convention, held at the Washington Hilton Hotel, on April 10. For a transcript, see Public Papers: Carter, 1980–1981, Book I, pp. 631–643.
6 The meeting took place at USOC headquarters in Colorado Springs, Colorado. On April 12, the United States Olympic Committee voted to support the President’s call for a boycott of the Moscow Games. (Steven R. Weisman, “U.S. Olympic Group Votes to Boycott the Moscow Games,” The New York Times, April 13, 1980, p. 1)
ing before May 24,\textsuperscript{7} drawing on your Foreign Press Center transcript and other sources;

—that American Ambassadors in Europe (and elsewhere) engage in systematic media backgrounding on the same themes;

—selected American Olympic athletes who support the boycott should visit Europe during the next three weeks to discuss with athletes and sports organization officials their conviction that the U.S. and its allies should not participate in the Moscow Olympics;

—that private American and European human rights organizations collaborate in a series of conferences in European capitals in early May to examine Soviet behavior in Afghanistan. Nobel laureates, particularly from the scientific communities which have spoken out on the Sakharov case, should be featured speakers;

—that an effort be made, preferably through third parties, to convene the UN Human Rights Commission to address (a) Soviet treatment of dissidents and (b) human rights—including refugees—in and resulting from Afghanistan;

—that the United States explore with third parties the possibility of bringing charges against the Soviet Union in the UN under Articles II and III of the International Genocide Convention.\textsuperscript{8}

\textit{Economic Sanctions.} The British public supports sanctions; the German public can be led in that direction; other European publics appear more reserved.

\textit{We recommend:}

—the morality theme (combined with non-aggressive accounts of USG actions and American business response) appears most likely to be effective. Again, American Ambassadors should support this effort in speeches and deliberate backgrounding of the financial-business media.

\textit{Constant supporting themes should include:}

—the details of accelerating energy conservation in the U.S., declining imports, decontrol, etc.;

—the details of the increase in defense spending despite budgetary cutbacks in domestic programs as supported by both Administration and Congress.

\textsuperscript{7} Reference is presumably to the May 24 deadline for registration for the Moscow Games.

[Both these points address the crucial question of American will (see next section) and should be designed to raise in comfortably affluent European minds the need for hard choices with respect to military security and East-West relations.]

Security Issues. European publics strongly support NATO, are increasingly concerned by a perceived Soviet threat, regard the USSR/Warsaw Pact as stronger than the US/NATO, appear disposed to support higher defense budgets.

We recommend:

— that the theme of Atlantic unity—not unanimity, but unity in the face of threat (particularly to oil suppliers)—be raised directly, even bluntly. The Rusks, McCloys, Kissingers, Trilateralists in the U.S. and Europe, could assist substantially if enlisted by the White House and Secretary of State.

We recommend:

— that a chorus of European and American voices be raised—particularly from those held in high regard in the FRG, which is most sensitive to the unity issue;

— that a DOD/State/NSC/USICA group be formed this week to consider the most effective observance of the 35th anniversary of V–E Day on May 9. There are indications that the USSR already has plans to use the observance for political purposes;

— that the possibility of an early “Reforger” type exercise, or other real (and visibly symbolic) steps, be undertaken to reinforce the fact of American commitment, perhaps in connection with V–E Day;

— that key Europeans (particularly the Germans, British and Dutch) be encouraged to make some V–E Day-related gesture to the United States in the United States, e.g. major speeches on Atlantic unity, visits to the headquarters of famous military units like the 82nd Airborne. Such gestures/speeches would be much more widely reported in Europe than here, but that is the purpose.

Indeed, that is the general purpose of this memorandum: to affect the climate of opinion by acts tangible and symbolic, and in a tone that is in the highest sense moral.

Handwritten brackets are in the original.

Reference is to an annual exercise, conducted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, to enable rapid deployment of troops to the Federal Republic of Germany in the event of a conflict with the Warsaw Pact.
206. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to the Director of the International Communication Agency (Reinhardt)¹


SUBJECT

Publicizing the Cuban Refugee Problem (S)

The President has directed the International Communication Agency to continue providing maximum publicity of the Cuban refugee issue through the Voice of America and other appropriate channels. ICA should use the themes developed by the Interagency Group on this subject and should develop new themes for consideration by the group. (S)

In developing these and other appropriate themes, ICA should continue and expand its interviews with arriving Cubans. ICA should also report on the progress it is making in developing a special one-hour program focused on Cuba, and the use of four 50-kw transmitters for initiating broadcasting to the English-speaking Caribbean. Please report on these various developments by June 6, 1980. (S)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

207. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the International Communication Agency (Bray) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, June 6, 1980

SUBJECT
Publicizing the Cuban Refugee Problem (C)

I am responding to your memo of May 30.²

We continue to play the Cuban refugee issue heavily in all our media and through our posts abroad. Since April 4 our press service has provided posts with over 200 texts of policy statements, stories, interviews with refugees, background on Cuba and the like. VOA remains heavily on the case, and all of its Cuban coverage has also been placed on its correspondent feed which services over 2,500 indigenous radio stations throughout Latin America.

We are using the themes developed by the inter-agency group and are actively working with other agencies to develop supporting factual material for our media.

To assist these efforts, and to capitalize on the refugees, we are now producing a film which will tell the story of life in Cuba as the refugees themselves experienced it. We have filmed interviews with Cubans in the Florida camps. I’m told it is powerful material. The film itself will be ready for distribution by mid-June.

We have given considerable thought to your staff’s proposal that VOA produce a daily one-hour program on Cuba for broadcast simultaneously to Cuba and other countries. The question of costs aside, we conclude: (1) Cubans know more than we can tell them about Cuba; (2) both commercial radios and VOA are already getting a heavy message into Cuba about refugee reception here and their views as to why they left; (3) audiences elsewhere will quickly conclude that a packaged program on Cuba is propaganda and tune it out; (4) that our best hope

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 16, Cuba: Broadcasting (Cuba and Caribbean), 12/79–12/80. Confidential. Cohen initialed for Bray. A copy was sent to Muskie. Gates initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. Brzezinski wrote “RF need your recomm. ZB.” Attached as Tab II to a June 13 memorandum from Pastor to Brzezinski, in which Pastor recommended that Brzezinski sign a memorandum to Bray regarding the recommendations made in Bray’s June 6 memorandum. The memorandum from Brzezinski to Bray is attached to Pastor’s June 13 memorandum as Tab I and is printed as Document 208. The memorandum printed here is also scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXIII, Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean.

² See Document 206.
of keeping Cuba in the minds of VOA audiences is to insert the story into programs to which they are drawn for other reasons.

VOA has been working with elements of the Department of Defense to assure that it is technically feasible to use DOD-furnished mediumwave transmitters to get an effective VOA signal into the eastern Caribbean. I am told that they have almost concluded their technical studies, which look like being positive. Cost estimates are being developed. If the project appears practicable (and we should know next week), the next step will be to survey the U.S. Navy base on Antigua which appears to be the only feasible site, then consult with the UK and the Antiguans.

Finally, I would like to flag one matter for NSC attention. Your staff will recall that well before the refugee issue arose, we were instructed by the NSC to develop a cultural exchange attraction to tour Cuba. Alvin Ailey’s dance troupe was selected and is currently scheduled to spend one week in Cuba in September. USICA and the Cuban Government are splitting the costs 50/50 (our share is approximately $130,000).\footnote{Brzezinski placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph and next to the sentence below it.}

We will need to know by approximately July 15 whether to proceed.\footnote{Brzezinski underlined “July 15 whether” and drew a right-pointing arrow in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.}
208. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to the Deputy Director of the International Communication Agency (Bray)

Washington, June 16, 1980

SUBJECT

Publicizing the Cuban Refugee Problem (C)

Thank you for your memorandum of June 6, 1980.\(^2\) We are pleased by ICA’s efforts to expand its capabilities to publicize the Cuban refugee problem. (C)

My staff has informed me several times of the cultural exchange tour of Alvin Ailey to Cuba in September. I see no reason for you to discontinue planning for the tour.\(^3\) (C)

Your arguments for not considering a daily one-hour program on Cuba are good ones, but frankly I am not persuaded. I do not agree, for example, that: (1) the information that we have available on Cuban activities abroad and on developments within Cuba is available to the Cuban population; (2) that this information is already being received in Cuba as a result of VOA and commercial radio broadcasting; (3) that audiences tune out propaganda or that accurate and credible information, which presumably would characterize the one-hour program, constitutes propaganda; and (4) if this were the case, then why

\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 16, Cuba: Broadcasting (Cuba and Caribbean), 12/79–12/80. Confidential. Attached as Tab I to Pastor’s June 13 memorandum to Brzezinski (see footnote 1, Document 207).

\(^2\) See Document 207.

\(^3\) In a July 24 memorandum to Reinhardt, Brzezinski stated: “In light of your comments on the state of US-Cuban relations and more importantly, in light of the expense to ICA of the Alvin Ailey program, I wonder whether it could be justified in the overall budgetary priorities of ICA. It would seem to me that in the context of reduced budgets that we should reserve such high priority cooperative programs for democratic countries with which we have good diplomatic relations.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 18, Cuba: Refugees, 7/22–31/80) In telegram 7237 from Havana, October 9, Wayne Smith referenced the cancellation of the tour and expressed his disappointment that neither the National Security Council nor ICA consulted with the U.S. Interests Section in Havana before reaching this decision. Smith indicated that he had seen copies of both the July 18 and 24 memoranda, asserting: “One could draw the conclusion from those memos that major cultural presentations are reserved for democratic countries with which we have excellent relations.” He commented that he never understood this to be the case, adding: “I had always thought we were interested in reaching out to communicate even with those whose views and values may not agree with our own. And where vocabularies may differ, what better way to communicate than through the performing arts.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800487–0143)
would Cuba and the Soviet Union spend so much money broadcasting throughout the area and the world? I do think it is useful to insert Cuban-related material in regular programs, and I believe that VOA is doing a good job at that, but I also think we would be better served by a daily one-hour program on the subject. (C)

Finally, with regard to a continued expansion of our public affairs effort in the Caribbean, I would strongly recommend that ICA move expeditiously to transfer a Public Affairs Officer to Nassau. (C)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

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209. Information Memorandum Prepared by the Associate Director for Educational and Cultural Affairs, International Communication Agency (Ilchman)¹

Washington, July 11, 1980

SUBJECT

Fall, 1979, “Books and Broadcasting for Children”—An International Symposium

The attached assessment (prepared by Marti Villarreal of the ECA staff) is an unusually balanced and readable report on a complex project. “Books and Broadcasting for Children” was USICA’s major contribution to the UN-designated International Year of the Child.

The project is worth reviewing for several reasons. Its genesis and funding required support and approval by the Director. It was exceedingly effective in building bridges to interested American private sectors (35 groups and private sector institutions were ultimately allied with USICA in the project). It proved to be the only really effective U.S. Government agency response to the IYC.

At the end of the report is an assessment of the opportunities seized (and missed) in implementing the project.

AN ASSESSMENT OF USICA’S ROLE IN “BOOKS AND BROADCASTING FOR CHILDREN”—AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM

What became USICA’s major program effort for the International Year of the Child (IYC) began with two separate grant proposals received by Private Sector Programs (then ECA/IP) in 1978. Both were concerned with media activities aimed at children. The first originated with Virginia Haviland, Director of the Library of Congress Children’s Literature Center, and Mr. John Donovan, Executive Secretary of the Children’s Book Council. They asked grant funding to bring international authors, librarians and books to the attention of American librarians and educators through regional workshops, media participation and public presentations. They were interested in both authors of printed works and in those involved in preserving the oral traditions in children’s literature prevalent in much of the developing world.

The second proposal came from Cecily Truett, a young TV producer who had just completed a successful public television series STUDIO SEE\(^3\) for the South Carolina Educational TV Network. Additionally, she had participated in the Munich PRIX JEUNESSE\(^4\) and had developed many international contacts in children’s television programming. She wished to establish a private international body to promote higher standards and international exchanges of children’s TV programs of an educational, cultural and entertainment character. The first step would be a “model” international conference on children’s TV programming. Ms. Truett also believed she could obtain financial support from other sectors. USICA staff members were intrigued with the proposal, feeling that the new Agency could play a role in such a pilot project which involved both education and international dialogue. However, they made three stipulations: (1) find a PBS station willing to collaborate; (2) get an international commitment; and (3) enlarge the project to include a children’s literature component.

\(^2\) No classification marking. Drafted by Villarreal.
\(^3\) Children’s magazine-style television program, produced by South Carolina Educational Television (ETV) that aired from 1977 until 1979.
\(^4\) Biennial international children’s television festival.
USICA was represented on the Interagency Council for the International Year of the Child by Anthony Hackley, Program Development Officer (PGM/D). The Agency had no plans at that time for formal programs in connection with the event, and IYC was not included in Agency Country Plans. However, Mildred Marcy, then Director of Institutional Relations (ECA/I) and Dr. Wilbur Blume, Program Officer, saw unique and innovative possibilities for USICA through some combination of the two projects, plus added possibilities in accomplishing it during IYC. Among those opportunities were the following:

1. It would be an excellent chance to work with the domestic constituency USICA had been mandated to develop.
2. Cooperation with the Interagency Committee on IYC would be good interagency politics and could contribute to the success of future programming.
3. A project combining media with education concepts was clearly suited to USICA.
4. If the applicants could obtain other funding, it would be an excellent test of joint funding concepts.

By December, 1978, Ms. Truett had managed to persuade WPBT-TV, Miami, South Florida’s Educational TV outlet, to co-sponsor her proposal. She also got a commitment from PRIX JEUNESSE of DM 10,000 (which was later withdrawn), plus commitments from the Boston Book Council and the Children’s Literature Section of the Library of Congress. Accordingly, she and Ms. Haviland met with USICA personnel to discuss a joint project. At this point Ms. Haviland withdrew, suggesting that the Association for Library Service to Children (ALSC), a division of the American Library Association (ALA) be invited to participate instead. ALSC Executive Secretary Mary Jane Anderson discussed the project with USICA and Ms. Truett in Washington in late 1978. The rough working draft of their two proposals became “BOOKS AND BROADCASTING FOR CHILDREN: An International Symposium.”

DESCRIPTION AND PURPOSE

The basic concept was that since books in translation, as well as radio and TV signals, transcend national boundaries, it was especially important and beneficial to bring together professionals in both fields from a variety of geographic and cultural backgrounds to let them discover and explore ways of contributing to the enrichment and improvement of each other’s work. Such a meeting could also focus on the need for a more universal interpretation of children’s media made inevitable by impending technological change. The Books and Broadcasting Symposium would assemble 30 professionals, equally divided between print and broadcast media, for a 36-day period to
identify and discuss their common problems with possible solutions, to prepare a workshop production demonstrating steps taken in translating print literature to the broadcast medium, and to share their knowledge and experiences with U.S. professionals. The dates were set—September 13–October 19, 1979. As it eventually developed, the Symposium was to begin with seminars for the entire group in Boston, New York and Washington, to take advantage of the number of experts present in those centers. The participants would then divide into small groups following USICA’s International Visitor format, and visit other areas of the United States, with itineraries suggested by their individual needs and suggestions made by members of ALSC and the educational broadcasters. The group would reassemble in Miami for the final workshop production and evaluation. The candidates selected were to be nationally recognized leaders concerned with these media and their implementation for children, or scholars with an interest in children’s growth and development.

The ALA Executive Board and the ALSC Board of Directors gave their approval to the project in January, 1979. Grants were then written by ECA/IP.

As the program evolved, financing problems grew in step. The USICA grants amounted to $33,120 to the ALA and $39,754 to WPBT-TV. ECA/IP had the promises of cooperative assistance from a number of other sources, both Government and private. WPBT-TV, for example, eventually contributed facilities and staff services amounting to $18,000 for the production workshop. The Children’s Book Council of New York promised to host some events, as did the Boston Public Library and the Library of Congress. However, there were no funds at all for the estimated $99,000 international travel costs for the 30 IV participants. Early in 1979 USICA Associate Director for Educational and Cultural Affairs Alice Ilchman asked Agency Director John Reinhardt to approve central funding in this amount, citing the project’s great opportunities. In her request, Mrs. Ilchman cited Salah Abdel Kader, Secretary General of the Arab States Broadcasting Union, in his article “TV Programmes for Children: The Arab Opportunity”:

“The attention given by each nation to its children has become the benchmark of its civilization. Countries that put children even second or third in their rank of interests cannot in any way keep pace with an age that is aspiring through its children to a better and yet more brilliant future.”

On March 8, the Director agreed to provide funds for the IV grantees’ travel, from central funding. Charles W. Bray III and Michael Pistor agreed to help mine private sources for additional money.

At this point there was intense activity in three areas: rounding up additional contributions from private or Government sources; screening prospective grantees; and planning the program logistics.
FUNDING:

Ms. Truett established headquarters in New York, while Ms. Anderson returned to the ALSC headquarters in Chicago. Ms. Truett was to prove an important catalyst in funds appeals. She was also able to entice graduate student Nancy Golden, who had formerly worked in publishing, as a volunteer aide.

While American participation was felt to be of utmost importance, there was no legitimate method of funding participation by U.S. citizens. Eventually, Lawrence Wyatt of HEW’s International Education Section, was able to scrape up grant funding for participation by three Americans. EXXON Corporation made a $5,000 general support grant. Numbers of other groups and associations agreed to provide tours, lunches or receptions, speakers or equipment loans. Ultimately, 35 organizations participated.

GRANTEE SELECTION:

Both the coordinators of the program (Ms. Anderson and Ms. Truett) were concerned that they have an important voice in the grantee selection. It was agreed that they would furnish USICA posts with suggestions but that, as is the general practice, the posts would have the right of final nomination.

USICA posts received the project announcement cable5 May 14; the first reply arrived May 16. Fairly predictably, immediate response was mixed, from enthusiasm through mild approval to strong disapproval. The deadline for nominations was July 1; afterwards both Ms. Truett and Ms. Anderson reviewed them. Some of the invitees originally suggested were unable to attend and counter-suggestions were made. The final list was approved at a meeting at USICA in Washington in August. Of the 30 nations represented, 4 were African, 7 Latin American, 4 Asian, 9 European, 7 from the Near East/South Asia, in addition to the U.S. citizens.

PROGRAM PLANNING/LOGISTICS:

Ms. Anderson and Ms. Truett began meetings in late March with representatives of the Visitor Program Service of Meridian House International, which was chosen to administer travel and lodging arrangements. At USICA, Mrs. Marcy directed the sometimes delicate negotiations between NCIV and the Agency IV Grants staff. ALSC/ALA and WPBT–TV planned all activities in all seminar cities and arranged for participants. Through their own professional networks, they tailored the grantees’ itineraries during the small group phase. They also called

5 Not found.
upon these professionals to act as volunteer hostesses in many cities, asking them to coordinate their activities with those of the IVS volunteer network. With so many people sharing the action, firm control and constant communication was necessary. All planners were involved in three Washington meetings in June, July and August.

The staff realized that the participants would not know each other at the start, nor would the broadcasters necessarily be knowledgeable about the book field (and vice versa). Neither were they likely to be aware of differences in development levels. Time must also be allowed for sharing the videotapes, books, and other materials the grantees had been urged to bring along. Sightseeing had to be arranged, plus “personal” and “rest” times. The programs had to be divided as equally as possible between print and broadcast media, and not all the time given to lectures.

PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION:

Both the ALSC and WPBT–TV issued final reports on the project which eloquently describe the 36-day program from its Boston beginning to the picnic in Miami which ended it. ALSC’s report is a 31-page booklet with 8 appendices and a financial report. It also contains excerpts from the evaluations submitted by the grantees, almost unanimously ecstatic. WPBT’s summary takes the form of a 30-minute video tape narrated by Cecily Truett. Among its highlights are the two workshop productions prepared by the Symposium participants in Miami. One translates a contemporary children’s book (Leo the Late-Bloomer) to TV; the second is a particularly arresting rendering of an oral-tradition Uncle Remus tale. Both should be seen to better weigh the Symposium’s effectiveness.

RESULTS AND OBSERVATIONS:

With so many opposites and experiments involved, the possibilities for misunderstandings were built in. For starters, there was the fact that it was the first time that two traditionally rival media had been asked to cooperate for a period of time on a single project. Certainly it was the first time such a linkage was established in the field of children’s literature. Adding an international element intensified problem areas. The children’s literature grantees were generally older and in some cases more mature than their broadcast colleagues. Furthermore, in dealing with their U.S. counterparts in the industry, many

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6 A copy of the report is in the National Archives, RG 306, USIA Historical Collection, Subject Files, 1953–2000, Entry A–1 1066, Box 178, Books, Children, Books and Broadcasting for Children, 1979.

7 Written and published in 1971 by children’s author Robert Kraus, the book features a tiger cub who is a “late bloomer” compared to his animal friends.
remarked that the children’s literature professionals were child-ori-
tented, while the broadcast professionals were largely working in an
adult-oriented world. There was almost universal complaint by the
literature professionals that more time was spent on broadcasting
activities. To some extent, the verdict is “guilty as charged,” but then
it simply takes more time to see a videotape or listen to a radio tape,
while a book may be satisfactorily skimmed by a rapid reader. And
some of the broadcast time included exploration into media interrela-
tion, such as trips to the Weston Woods Studios in Connecticut, and
the Miami WPBT–TV workshop itself.

The participants were asked to evaluate the conference and to list
the most positive experiences, the least positive, plus suggestions for
future conferences:

1. At the top of this list was the personal interaction across cultures
and disciplines, coupled with the opportunity to examine education
through mass media. The participants also enjoyed their visits to stu-
dios such as Weston Woods, WGBH–TV in Boston, and the Children’s
Television Workshop in New York. Successful small group visits were
tours of the Hanna-Barbera Studios in Los Angeles and to Mr. Rog-
ers in Pittsburgh. It appears that while there may have well been
some complaints about the division of time, the audio-visual events
were among the favorites.

2. There were complaints that the program was overcrowded, with
insufficient time for rest or sightseeing. Additionally, there were com-
ments that the symposium showed a lack of definition or focus.

3. The primary suggestion was that the “sharing” take place at the
beginning and not the end.

Participants had been asked to bring books, videotapes and other
examples of their work with them. These were not viewed until the
end of the conference. (One reason for the delay was that meeting
facilities in the Boston hotel were found to be inadequate.) Admittedly
there were technical problems connected with the projection of video-

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8 Established by Morton Schindel, Wilton Woods Studios produced short-films
based on children’s books such as Ezra Jack Keats’s *The Snowy Day* (1962).
9 Founded by Joan Ganz Cooney and Lloyd Morrisett, the Children’s Television
Workshop (CTW) oversaw the production of the educational television program ”Sesame
Street.” Throughout the 1970s, CTW would develop other educational programs such as
”The Electric Company” and ”3-2-1 Contact.”
10 Hanna-Barbera Studios, established by former Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer animation
directors William Hanna and Joseph Barbera, produced cartoon programs such as ”The
Flintstones,” ”The Jetsons,” and ”Yogi Bear.”
11 Reference is to Fred Rogers, creator and host of the educational television program
”Mr. Rogers’ Neighborhood,” which debuted on the NET network (later PBS) in February
1968. Rogers produced the program at the WQED public television station in Pittsburgh.
tapes; (i.e., different scanning systems had to be used for examplars from different nations). But, had the group been aware at the outset of general conditions in participating nations, discussions and indeed, the dynamics of the entire group, could have been different. Another suggestion was that the literature professionals be given more briefings on the technical problems of translating books to electronic media. Still another was that the schedule be less crowded, leaving time for more group interaction.

A particularly thoughtful critique came from participant Keith Tyler-Smith of South Pacific Television, Christchurch, New Zealand. He immediately commented that the time factor is particularly critical for such important professionals; he recommended a 14–21-day symposium for future projects. He also stressed that the factor most lacking “seemed to be a coherent overview of why the symposium was being organized and what were the objectives and how best could they be achieved.” He believed this fault lay in the dual responsibility and authority of the directors. (There will be further observations on this theme.)

Rukanuzzaman Khan, participant from Bangladesh wrote, “We have been especially moved to see the session on story telling for preschool children in the children’s section of the public libraries. On my return to Bangladesh, I have been trying to introduce the same system in the libraries run by the Central Kachi Manchar Mela.” He further commented on the initial lack of “sharing time.” Also, he remarked that except for an incident in Indianapolis, there had been no opportunity to meet with children on a personal level. He ended his evaluation with the statement that the authorities of Bangladesh television had “warmly welcomed” a proposal to exchange children’s programs with other nations, and the hope that such a project would be successful.

A November 15 post cable from Manila\textsuperscript{12} gives Antonio Padilla’s assessment of the Symposium. Padilla was also impressed with the use of a story-teller for TV and radio and he felt that using a story-teller in libraries US-style would encourage children to read. He also said he had made many useful contacts with Americans and his conference colleagues, which he planned to follow up at the 1980 World Conference of Librarians in Manila. He said that he “came away with the experience with the idea that broadcasting can complement reading activities to enhance learning and likewise books can provide a reiterative effect to broadcasting.” He described the whole program “as one of the bright pages of my life.”

\textsuperscript{12} Not found.
ASSESSMENTS BY ESCORT-INTERPRETERS

Several points in these reports were significant. The escort for participants from Bulgaria, Australia, Sweden noted, “The three were ideal grantees, competent, articulate, interested in everything. They related to each other exceptionally well....” The escort also noted that they would have preferred a TV project, and found some of the literature aspects “irrelevant.” This is further evidence of the occasional tensions between these traditionally-rival groups.

Another escort underlined their stay in Madison, Wisconsin, as particularly outstanding because of a visit with a producer of films based on traditional children’s stories from around the world, a tour of an “open” school, and exposure to the Children’s Television Channel, where children use the equipment. Each adult was then interviewed by a child reporter. The escort also remarked that the TV people acutely felt the lack of an international organization and strongly desired forming one.

A third escort raved, “These visitors were the most delightful persons I have escorted. All three felt honored to visit here. . . . There seemed to be no jealous feelings that the USA is far advanced—only admiration. Where they thought the US may have made a mistake in TV or media for children, they could profit by not doing the same.”

THE AMERICAN LEARNING EXPERIENCE:

The Symposium had a dual function in this area: 1) for the first time there were American participants; 2) the foreign participants were able to influence the attitudes of both private citizens and important organizations within the U.S., in several different ways.

1. The American Participants

As documented earlier, HEW grant funds were made available for the participation of three U.S. citizens in the Symposium. After the initial misunderstandings about their function, they took their places among the other international professionals. They were Martha Barnes, Children’s Services Consultant, Westchester County Library System, New York; Deborah Durham, Executive Editor, “The New Voice,” WGBH-TV, Boston; and Elizabeth Huntoon, Children’s Services Specialist, Chicago Public Library. In a letter to USICA Director Reinhardt, Ms. Huntoon said, “I would . . . like to thank you for the opportunity that made this Midwesterner an internationalist.” She also spoke elo-

13 Produced by WGBH, the weekly, scripted series depicted six high school journalism students writing about a variety of topical issues.
quently of her experiences in an interview published in the Chicago Tribune November 18.  

The American participants’ evaluations went into the same ballot box as those from other countries; therefore cannot be excerpted. However, the foreign participants were unanimously positive in their reactions to their U.S. colleagues, as giving them immediate access to professionals who could supply the “American” reaction to a certain experience, or to provide personalized explanations.

2. Effects on U.S. Citizens

An important sector of the U.S. was contacted during the Symposium, as members of ALSC were asked to serve as volunteer hostesses for the small group phase. They were given the names and telephone numbers of local IVS volunteers to contact and offer their assistance. IVS in Washington also received a list of ALSC names, and at ALSC’s request, they were sent a copy of the Symposium program. ALSC estimates that more than 300 of its members had contact with at least one of the Symposium participants. In many, but not all, cases, the ALSC hostesses were very enthusiastic and helpful.

In rural Arkansas, some of the Symposium participants rode a Bookmobile and were able to talk with Americans far off the usual IV circuit. The participants munched sandwiches from a country store and talked with children from a nearby school who had come to get books. The librarians involved asked, “Please let us know when you have more coming this way.” The Little Rock Council for International Visitors wrote to thank the ALSC members saying, “You were truly inspired to direct us toward Perry County . . . (it) was a roaring success. . . . I hope that we will all be able to cooperate on more foreign visitors in the future.”

From a librarian in California: “. . . when we reluctantly said goodbye to one another, I recognized that these women are my colleagues, my sisters, my other selves. They have made me feel that our conspiracy to bring books and children together is a global one, and that it is an awesome undertaking. . . .”

From a librarian in Cleveland: “. . . the program seems to all of us here who had a part in it to be a valid one, with great potential for more interchange between librarians and broadcasters, Americans and their foreign colleagues.”

There was extremely positive reaction from U.S. broadcasters who had come in contact with the Symposium. From Boston, the Executive Producer for Community Affairs at WGBH wrote to Director Reinhardt,

“On September 19th, WGBH hosted a day long conference for this impressive group of international visitors. The seminar was attended by many of our WGBH staff, as well as special guests from the Boston Community. We all welcomed the chance to be part of an international exchange of ideas between those who care deeply about children and the media designed for them. Indeed, it is clear that the more we can communicate ideas and values internationally, the stronger radio and television we will all be able to produce for children.”

A number of other U.S. broadcasters wrote to support Ms. Truett’s proposal that an international TV clearinghouse be formed, featuring a newsletter sent to all members. There was less documented reaction from U.S. broadcasters than from librarians, perhaps because they are not accustomed to writing, not because they are less articulate or less interested.

**ADMINISTRATIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE SYMPOSIUM**

These were also unique in tune with the project. The major problem seems to have been the lack of one person with overriding authority for the duration of the Symposium. Here, three high-powered women were in charge—Cecily Truett and Mary Jane Anderson, with Nancy Buttermark of VPS. Each was protecting her own interests as she saw them, which left ample space for battles over territory. Luckily, the most serious battle came quite early in the trip, involving the role of the American participants. Ms. Buttermark felt they should be additionally impressed into service as escort-interpreters, while the others believed their function was clearly that of “IV’s.” After some heated discussion, additional escort-interpreters were hired and the show went on with the Americans being treated as all the others. There was also tension among the three because both of the Program Directors’ pride in the uniqueness of the Symposium as opposed to the VPS attitude that the exercise was “just another IV program.” Certain oversights, such as VPS’s insistence on taxis over buses in New York because “it’s what we always do” resulted in wasted time and short tempers, until corrected. But on the whole, once committed, there was a genuine effort to make everything work. The fact that almost everything did function is a tribute to the triumvirate’s ultimate flexibility once the ship was in the water. However, someone to play the Solomon role is definitely indicated in the future.

There was also significant positive reaction from U.S. groups concerned with children’s TV programming, such as WATCH, which hosted a reception. And a letter from PBS revealed that international children’s programming exchanges were “high on the list” of projects.

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15 Not found.
seeking funding, PBS also urged the founding of an international children’s TV clearinghouse.

It appears that the Symposium had one major fault: the lack of sufficient follow-up, especially for the broadcasters. A great deal of energy, good will, and positive experiences were generated, and generally abandoned after the Symposium. Of course, there is the philosophical question of just how much should be furnished to funding recipients and where they should take up on their own. But in this case it does seem that we had a marvelous opportunity which was not advantageously used. Also, an international organization was in Cecily Truett’s original concept; it was also at least abstracted later.

**ASSESSMENT OF AGENCY ACTION AND REACTION:**

A number of “firsts” and departures from the norm were involved, as far as USICA was concerned. The following is a recap of these points, with results:

1. **It was the first time that USICA had sponsored a national (or international) rather than USICA-oriented project.** Additionally, it was the first Washington-originated program. At USICA’s inception, the rule had been established that no programs were to be imposed from headquarters.

   There were extremely mixed reactions all along. When the project was on the drawing board and reaction was tested, three area offices were mildly approving while two were violently opposed. Most of the opposition appears to have been because “Books and Broadcasting” was not connected with previously-approved Country Plans. Even when central funding was obtained, several PAO’s refused to consider it. Therefore, several important nations, such as Japan and Mexico, were not represented. On the other hand, the “Walt Disney of Brazil” was a participant.

   The problems did not end with central funding; tensions among USICA elements over the various “different” aspects of the project continued. This was especially obvious in the IV office. However, unlike the Symposium, there was one person with authority and, furthermore, approval from the Director’s office.

2. **It was the first time that any attention had been devoted to children’s programs.** Some USICA area opposition can doubtless be traced to the fact that children are not a target audience. However, in dealing as USICA did, with professionals active in literature and broadcasting for children, it reached a sector—one of its most important audiences, the world’s educators. And the evidence is overwhelming that it reached them successfully and touched them deeply.

3. **It was the first time that linkage was established between the electronic and print media in such an event.** As reported above, there were obvious
and continuing tensions here, but all participants seem to have been at least receptive to the link. For some, it marked an important change in attitude toward a traditional rival.

**USICA’S USE OF OPPORTUNITIES AFFORDED**

As recorded at the beginning of this report, the project was undertaken in large part to take advantage of the unique opportunities it afforded:

1. A good opportunity to work with the domestic constituency. All evidence suggests that the domestic constituency reached by the Project was impressed and enthusiastic. Eventually, more than 35 groups and organizations participated, some making quite significant contributions. For example, the Boston Public Library postponed its Spring Book Fair until October to enable it to highlight the presence of the Symposium. EXXON Corporation made a $5,000 grant. The Oregon Public Broadcasting Service made video playback machines available, free of charge. The Children’s Book Council provided discussion moderators during a two-day session in New York. Children’s Television Workshop (creators and producers of SESAME STREET) hosted a day at their facility, with the participation of top-level people. National Public Radio sponsored a panel discussion, as did the Public Broadcasting Service. CBS, ABC, and NBC each hosted a group for screening sessions and lunch. In all, 35 groups participated. However, concern remains that in some areas the opportunity was not fully utilized because of a lack of follow-up. Ms. Truett was invited to describe the project at the prestigious Aspen Institute, and later, at the National Association of Educational Broadcasters convention. And there have been other opportunities, though as mentioned before, no systematic follow-up.

   It should be noted again that the Symposium participants also influenced individuals and groups around the United States wherever they went.

2. It was good interagency politics. Follow-up meetings of the Interagency Committee on the International Year of the Child indicate that this opportunity was fully utilized. Books and Broadcasting for Children was hailed by the Committee as the only really effective effort by a government agency. At a meeting of the Committee February 27, 1980, the project’s particular significance was discussed. It was saluted as “one of the most outstanding examples of a project that happened only because of IYC; broke new ground by challenging agency policy on children; and shows evidence of having lasting effects on the international development and exchange of quality children’s media productions.”

3. The project, which melded media and education, was clearly suited to USICA. No argument on this point.
4. It would be a good test of the joint-funding concept. The test results are largely successful. There was, as previously noted, grant assistance from HEW. And other government entities participated, while not writing checks. The Agency for International Development provided facilities for a panel concerned with literacy programs. The Federal Communications Commission participated in a similar manner, and the Library of Congress hosted a tour and luncheon at which Librarian Daniel Boorstin was speaker.

**RIPPLE EFFECTS:**

Turkish book illustrator Ms. Can Goknil was highly successful in reaching high-level Turkish audiences to relate her experiences with the Symposium, in a January 23, 1980 discussion on children’s publications at the USICA Istanbul library. As a result Ms. Goknil was approached by every publishing house representative in the audience for additional information on U.S. publishing companies and upcoming international children’s book fairs. Ms. Goknil was also asked to be guest speaker at the Istanbul Fair later in 1980.

Ms. Loty Petrovits-Androutsoupolou made a presentation through USICA/Athens in March, which she described as “successful.” It included the 30-minute videotape produced by Ms. Truett. Ms. Petrovits-Androutsoupolou’s comment: “. . . Great was also the contribution of Brer-Snake, who fascinated my audience!”

Dr. Ingeborg Ramseger of West Germany documented her experiences in two articles which appeared in *Borsenblatt* (similar to *Publishers' Weekly*) and in *Buchmarkt*, a trade publication.


**OVERALL ASSESSMENT:**

“BOOKS AND BROADCASTING FOR CHILDREN: An International Symposium” was in almost all respects extremely effective and successful. Its two major drawbacks were the lack of complete focus during the Symposium (though not during the planning), mainly due to the dual nature of the project and the lack of one person with final authority; and the failure for whatever reason to follow-up with some proposal for an international clearinghouse, especially for educational broadcasters.

There is every reason to be optimistic that another project, similarly conceived and executed, could be even more successful with the basis of experience gained on this project.
210. Memorandum From Steven Larabee of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)\(^1\)

Washington, August 20, 1980

SUBJECT

Jamming of VOA (U)

As of 9:00 a.m. this morning the Soviets began jamming VOA (in Russian, Ukrainian and Armenian) as well as BBC and Deutsche Welle. This is the first time that the Soviets have jammed VOA since they ceased jamming it in August 1973. (Radio Liberty of course has continued to be jammed). As far as can be ascertained at the moment, RFE broadcasts to Eastern Europe not previously jammed—i.e., Poland, Rumania and Hungary—have experienced no increased interference or jamming. (C)

The last time that the Soviets resumed jamming of VOA was in August 1968 just after the invasion of Czechoslovakia. (Prior to that, VOA had not been jammed since 1963.) The Soviet action most likely reflects the Soviets’ fear of the impact on their own population of news about the unrest in Poland. The fact that Deutsche Welle is also being jammed reinforces the view that the Soviet action is primarily related to Poland (rather than Afghanistan or some other event). Moreover, given the Ukraine’s close historical ties and geographic proximity to Poland—as well as its strong indigenous nationalism—it is no accident that the Soviets have begun jamming VOA’s Ukrainian service as well. (C)

The Soviet action is an important development. It is a clear violation of the Helsinki Accords\(^2\) and attests to their intense concern about the impact of news about the Polish unrest on their own population. The Soviets would not undertake such a move lightly, since it will affect


\(^2\) Basket Three of the Helsinki Final Act holds all participating states to “encourage the wider showing and broadcasting of a greater variety of recorded and filmed information from the other participating States, illustrating the various aspects of life in their countries,” and to “note the expansion in the dissemination of information broadcast by radio, and express the hope for the continuation of this process, so as to meet the interest of mutual understanding among peoples and the aims set forth by this Conference.”
their relations not only with us but with other West Europeans, particularly the West Germans. Moreover, it is likely that the jamming will endure well beyond the duration of the unrest in Poland. (C)

Attached at Tab A is a statement condemning the Soviet action, which I asked State to draft. It has been cleared by Christopher. BBC has already issued a statement and I think we should release ours immediately. State agrees. I also think it should be released by State. AI Friendly concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve release by State of the attached statement. (U)

3 Attached but not printed is an August 20 draft entitled “Contingency Press Statement: Resumption of Soviet Jamming of Voice of America.”

4 Aaron placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph and the recommendation below it.

5 Aaron approved the recommendation.

211. Briefing Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake) to Secretary of State Muskie

Washington, September 5, 1980

Presenting U.S. Foreign Policy to the American People: Bureau Ideas

In response to your request last week, twenty-two bureaus and offices have prepared the attached memoranda on the ways in which U.S. foreign policy problems can best be presented to the American people. This memo summarizes their answers to the questions that were posed to them.

I. What does the public need to know about the world to make it more receptive to the “hard options” of our policies?

Complexity:

Several of the bureaus see a need to convey a greater sense of the complexity of today’s world and the constraints on our freedom of
action. We should not minimize the costs or risks associated with our policies, suggest quick or easy fixes, or downplay the degree to which American foreign policy success depends on the support of other nations, such as our NATO allies or Third World countries.

David Newsom singles out four issues that are particularly hard to explain to the American people: Third World demands, unanticipated political change, the relative strength of the U.S. in the world, and the independent views of our allies.

A number of the memos suggest that more can be done to make foreign policy seem relevant to everyday concerns. We can stress the economic stakes we have in foreign relations (jobs, resources and the prices paid for imports are three immediate suggestions). We can relate development efforts abroad to pressures to emigrate to the U.S. (OES), or to narcotics flows (INR, OES). A number suggest that we can do more to explain foreign policy in human terms, without oversimplification.

Resources

The growing reluctance of Americans to dedicate sufficient resources to foreign affairs, particularly to economic and military assistance, is a commonly recognized problem. It is also agreed that we should actively seek to build support for aid, stressing that it is crucial to our effectiveness in changed international economic and political circumstances. In addition to the competitive (with the Soviets) and humanitarian rationales, we can show that aid helps create stable growing economies which are increasingly important to us as markets for our exports (H, IDCA, PA). Developing countries are sources of raw materials (AID, H). Helping LDC’s address their pressing social and economic problems can enhance political stability (IDCA). The public bemoans a supposed loss of U.S. influence in the world, yet desires reduced aid levels. We can highlight the cost of aid cuts in terms of influence (NEA). One caveat, however: a tendency to exaggerate the benefits of aid in the past is part of our problem today. We should, therefore, be willing to keep expectations reasonable (EB).

Specific Issue Ideas

Third World needs: dramatize with use of Caribbean area. Poverty at home leads to migration pressures on U.S. (P).

Fault found with U.S. policy “weakness” whenever unfavorable change occurs: recall radical changes which occurred during period of preponderant U.S. power (Nasser, Iraq, Castro etc.) (P).

Strategic balance: selective use of “how does it look from Moscow” (P); sober respect for Soviets but not all-powerful, long run mutual interests (PM, PA).
Refugees, immigrants: historical success stories, always adjustment problems (RP); need to share burdens (PA).

Congressional relations: agreement on policies takes work but strengthens policy; legislated constraints can be costly (H).

Intelligence: stress role of intelligence community in digestion of mass of data needed for modern policymaking (INR).

Energy: challenge myths, e.g. no energy problem, U.S. deserves subsidized oil, can break cartel with wheat. Stress collateral role of allies, LDC’s (EB).

Trade: economic/political costs of protectionism, injury alternatives available, effective competition not unfair, LDC’s offer markets (EB).

Narcotics: example of modest assistance program with direct domestic benefit (INM).

Human Rights: grounded in U.S. and international law, pragmatic, promotes security, strong card in ideological competition, long term solution to refugee problems (HA, PA).

Arms Control: preserve base; push SALT without catalyzing business as usual attitude; SALT in our interest, not “favor” to Soviets; TNF—keep low visibility / freedom of action (PM, PA).

Terrorism: decade of violence likely—need to attack root causes (D/CT).

Latin America: Unsung success story; convey sense of changing scene and our confidence that we advance U.S. interests by promoting LA democracy; coolness with southern cone only temporary. (ARA)

II. How can the problems confronting U.S. foreign policy be best presented to the American people?

—Use an overall framework or strategy statement; perhaps revive annual foreign policy statements (H).

—Need quicker adaptation of speaking engagements to changing foreign policy priorities, more aggressive use of FSO visits to hometowns (EUR).

—The Secretary should make a Report to U.S. People on U.S. foreign policy goals and responsibilities. Work in foreign service role in conceiving and carrying out U.S. foreign policy (PER).

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—Need to reiterate themes, particularly those of allies speech
(Commonwealth/WAC August 8). Make two economic speeches in
next two months (EB).

—Require that all Deputy Assistant Secretaries and above make a
speech monthly. Add speaking skills section to efficiency report on
FSO’s (IO).

—Stress citizen services stories to personalize department, build
support, combat ivory tower image (CA).

—Consider establishment of consular services office on Capitol
Hill (OES).

—Intensify and institutionalize communications with key interest
groups interested in foreign policy. Improve press guidance to avoid
cliches, evasiveness. Department Spokesman should be willing to deal
with reasonable hypothetical questions. Testify on Hill on interagency
agreed positions only. Consider monthly summaries of current foreign
policy with Q’s and A’s. Make senior officials available to networks
for a series of TV specials on the problems and imperatives of foreign
policymaking (AF).

4 Reference is to Muskie’s August 8 address made in San Francisco before the
Commonwealth Club of California and the World Affairs Council of Northern California.
Muskie asserted: “We in the United States need to be sensitive to the special concerns
and vulnerabilities of our allies. At the same time, our allies must accept the growing
responsibility that comes with growing strength. They must be prepared to bear their
share of our common burdens.” (Department of State Bulletin, September 1980, p. 17)
212. Memorandum From the Director of the International Communication Agency (Reinhardt) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)  

Washington, September 19, 1980

SUBJECT

Status of Soviet Jamming of VOA Broadcasts

The jamming of VOA broadcasts into the Soviet Union is now entering its second month. The following status report is based on information from our staff in Washington and from monitoring sites within the Soviet Union and on its periphery.

The Current Jamming Effort

As you know, the Soviet Union resumed jamming of VOA, BBC and Deutsche Welle broadcasts on the morning of August 20.  

The broadcasts of Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, Kol Israel and Radio Peking continue to be jammed, as they have been all along. All VOA language services are currently being jammed, i.e., Russian, Georgian, Armenian, Ukrainian, Uzbek, Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian. The attached “Penetration Index” shows the percentage of VOA programming now being received well or acceptably in several languages.  

We plan to send a monitor to Turkey shortly to obtain accurate readings on reception of our Georgian, Armenian and Ukrainian broadcasts.

The Soviet Union is utilizing two types of interference to jam foreign broadcasts. One method, called “mayak jamming,” transmits a distorted version of a regular Soviet domestic program on the same frequency as a VOA program. The other method, “noise jamming,” is a buzz sound transmitted on the same frequency as the VOA broadcast. The jamming noise reaches its targets either by radiation from powerful transmitters beaming signals into the ionosphere and reflecting them back to earth or by groundwave propagation. Skywave jamming can cover large areas, and groundwave jamming can effectively interfere with reception in large cities.

Jamming normally is a very expensive undertaking, more expensive than broadcasting itself. The speed and exactitude with which the Soviets have interfered this time with VOA broadcasts, however, lead us to suspect that they are employing their mobile military transmitters.

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3 Not attached.
for jamming, in addition to those transmitters they used for jamming previously. The military transmitters exist as back-up facilities to satellite circuits; thus their use for jamming would require neither new construction expenditures nor the disruption, under peacetime circumstances, of other uses of the military transmitters.

It is unlikely that we would ever succeed completely in overtaxing the capabilities of Soviet jamming equipment. It is also unlikely that they would ever succeed in thoroughly blotting out reception of VOA throughout the Soviet Union.

**VOA Countermeasures to Jamming**

A combination of several techniques has enabled VOA to penetrate Soviet jamming to some extent: 1) high power transmitters are delivering the strongest possible signal into the Soviet Union; 2) as many transmitters as possible can beam many different frequencies to achieve what is called “saturation broadcasting”; and 3) VOA is transmitting the same program simultaneously from VOA Relay Stations located at different geographical points to take advantage of varying propagation conditions. We have added three transmissions in Russian from our station in Kavala, Greece, and one transmission in Georgian, Armenian and Ukrainian from our station in Tangiers. In addition, due to the fact that VOA is transmitting from West to East, there is a short period each day when VOA can use frequencies higher than the jammers; we refer to this period as “twilight immunity.”

We have begun a series of meetings at VOA to examine a range of technical and political options that might be employed if protracted jamming continues. These will include the possible reassignment and increase of frequencies available to beam the programs, the extension of broadcast time, and the recasting of programs. The latter option would cater to short-span listening by reducing music programs to a minimum and by replacing block programs with a magazine format and an increased number of newscasts. We will also consider broadcasting in Russian and other Soviet languages for longer periods and during different hours.

**History of Soviet and Eastern European Jamming of VOA**

The Soviet Union began to jam VOA and other Western broadcasts in 1948. Most of the Eastern European countries joined in this effort in 1950. In 1956, Poland became the first Eastern European country to stop jamming Western broadcasts. In 1963, the Soviet Union unexpectedly ceased jamming and was followed shortly by Romania, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The Soviets resumed jamming within hours of their invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, 1968. In 1972, VOA started broadcasting in Uzbek, which was heavily jammed minutes after it was on the air. At the time of the CSCE talks in 1973, all jamming of
VOA broadcasts to the Soviet Union again ceased and was not resumed until August, 1980. In September, 1974, Bulgaria, the only Eastern European nation to continue jamming, stopped its electronic blockade of VOA. No Eastern European countries are currently following the Soviet example of jamming VOA broadcasts.

International Prohibitions Against Jamming

In addition to disregarding the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act concerning the dissemination of broadcast information,\(^4\) jamming contravenes a number of other international agreements. In 1950, the U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution 424 (v), which condemned jamming “as a denial of the right of all persons to be fully informed concerning news, opinions, and ideas regardless of frontiers.” Further, the U.S. Government shares with most other countries the position that intentional interference with radio transmissions is a violation of the International Telecommunications Convention.

At the conclusion of the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979, the United States asserted that since some of its broadcasting was subject to interference, it would take the necessary and appropriate actions to protect its broadcasting interests. Neither the Soviet Union nor any other nation entered a contrary statement.

Over the last month, the Soviets have consistently denied that they are jamming our broadcasts, although they have claimed that they would be within their rights to do so. In the past, the Soviets have used a variety of public forums to attempt to justify jamming, citing their sovereignty over the “ether” in their country and their “right and duty” to protect their people from what they consider to be subversive broadcasts and “radio aggressions.”

ADDRESS BY CHARLES W. BRAY III DEPUTY DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY BEFORE THE MID-AMERICA AND THE WORLD CONFERENCE KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI

For thirty years and more, the U.S. Government has conducted overseas information and exchange programs. The best known of these are the Voice of America and the Fulbright scholarship program. In the spring of 1978, these programs were brought together under the new International Communication Agency. On the surface, the reorganization simply brought together a little known bureaucracy—USIA—and a single entity of the Department of State—the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs—to perform functions familiar only to small numbers of the American public.

But the creation of the new agency was something more than a redrawing of the organizational charts of the federal bureaucracy. Indeed, the creation of the International Communication Agency marked a turning point in the manner in which we conduct our relations with other countries. ICA is the first agency of the Executive Branch established to deal centrally with what may increasingly be the two most important elements in our relations with other nations—people and ideas.

President Carter gave the Agency three principal tasks:
— the explanation and advocacy of this country’s foreign and domestic policies.
— the explanation of American society and culture and the encouragement of dialogue between the people of the United States and those of other societies. 2

We carry out these tasks in a variety of ways: personal contact between our officers overseas and opinion leaders in the countries to which they are assigned; sending abroad American speakers on a variety of topics; bringing to the United States each year some 2,000 foreign

1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, USIA Historical Collection, Office of the Director, Biographic Files Relating to USIA Directors and Other Senior Officials, 1953–2000, Entry A–1 1069, Box 25, John E. Reinhardt, Speeches, 1980. No classification marking. A typed notation in the top right-hand corner of the news release reads: “Embargoed for release Friday, October 24, 1980 9:00 am.”

2 See Document 121.
leaders to visit with their American counterparts in government, labor, mass media, science, education and other fields; managing the Fulbright program; sending American artists and their work overseas; running libraries of American books; producing films and videotapes; broadcasting in 38 languages and many other programs.

But we also have a third responsibility: to assist Americans in their understanding of other countries. It is that responsibility which has brought us to Kansas City today.

There is ample evidence that the United States today faces a "knowledge gap," just as we faced a "missile gap" in the 1960s. I refer not to our knowledge of technology or science or economics. The recent Nobel Prizes awarded to Americans indicate that we are doing well in those and other areas. Rather, I am talking about our knowledge of the now shrunken world and our competence to deal with it.

The problem is a serious one. It is nation-wide. And it is probably least recognized in Mid-America. The reasons are not hard to find. If Americans in other regions have believed that the Atlantic and Pacific were wide and deep enough to preserve them from the outside world, mid-Americans had the added buffers of over a thousand miles of continent. The hardships of settling these plains and making them fruitful rightly convinced the early settlers and those who followed that "going it alone" was not only possible, but was the only way. Indeed, "going it alone" has long been part of America's self-image.

In recent years, however, the world "out there" has intruded into our national life with dizzying regularity. Mid-America is very much a part of this world. Grain sales to the Soviet Union and the oil embargo of the early 1970s had great impact here—one pleasant, one less so. Your Free Trade Zone is the largest of its type in the nation. Almost 40,000 Missourians earn their livelihood from exports. One dollar in every five of Missouri's farm sales comes from exports. Missouri ranks only 29th in population among the states, but 12th in agricultural exports and 15th in exports of manufactures.

Nationally, one out of every eight manufacturing jobs depends on exports. One out of every three dollars of U.S. corporate profits is derived from International activities. We import nearly half of our petroleum. Nearly two thirds of our imports are essential raw materials. Significantly the fastest growing export markets are in the developing world, about which we know least as a people.

Indeed, there is a paradox. At a time when neither we nor any other nation in the world can go it alone even if we wished, understanding

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3 Presumable references to the July 1972 Soviet purchase of $750 million worth of grain from the United States and the OPEC oil embargo.
of this fact and our preparation to live in such a world are signally inadequate.

I think it only prudent to assume that, for the first time in our national existence, the issue before us is that of survival.

The question of survival has not been part of our discourse since the War of 1812. America emerged from World War II virtually unchallenged. We believed that we could solve most of our national problems by overwhelming them with our resources and wealth. We did not have to confront the unpleasant fact that a civilization’s existence can never be assured. We believed we were exempt from history, that God’s good grace would protect us. Perhaps some sensed that our national good fortune could not last forever, but even they thought that real change would take generations.

It should now be apparent to us all that it has not.

We need to confront the reality that those who survive are those who are prepared, those who are willing to invest and to sacrifice for survival.

In public discussions of recent years it became fashionable to describe the world as “interdependent.” Certainly the world has changed since 1945. Certainly our great national problems cannot be addressed in other than international terms. But this is not the real news. The real shift is that for the first time in our national existence, we have become dependent on others. The fact shocks us. We have not yet adjusted to it. And we have much adjusting to do.

We are dealing with a puzzle of extraordinary magnitude: for all of America’s long years as a world power, for all its engagements in virtually every part of the globe, we now witness an entirely new stage in world development; and yet too many Americans hardly see it at all. We fail dismally to unhook ourselves from outworn perspectives which have lost their relevance to the new motor forces of world events. We cling to easy dichotomies—East-West; Capitalist-Communist; the haves and have-nots. We fail to see a world awash in new political sub-units brought into being by nationalist or religious fervor, and thrusts toward cultural and ethnic self-determination. In such a world the old ideologies are incorrect, risk being at least misleading. Holding onto them may well have serious consequences.

Old habits of mind die slowly in nations, as they do in individuals. And those old ways of thinking about the world function like blinders. They prevent us from recognizing all of the potentially unpleasant aspects of a smaller, interdependent world. Unpleasant because genuine interdependence suggests a situation for which there is no real precedent in our national experience—that we are now, like most other societies throughout history, at the mercy of important events and decisions beyond our collective grasp.
We live in a world which is increasingly not of our choosing nor of our imagination. This is at variance with what our experience and our education have taught us: that the forces of history were on our side, that we were capable of shaping our own destiny.

What if our circumstances have changed and this should no longer be true?

We are strong as a nation, but far from omnipotent. One of the lessons of our experiences in Indochina, and now in Iran and Afghanistan, concerns the limits of traditional power. We know now that we can no longer live by the application of an overwhelming dominance in political, military or economic power. We face the far more difficult task of living by our wits, by our knowledge of others and by our skill in dealing with them.

By temperament and training, Americans are not well equipped to deal with their new situation. We are thrown into contact and conflict with peoples whose histories and motivations we scarcely understand. Can we comprehend the new forms of political change, quite distinct from Western models, that are evolving before our eyes? How many educated Americans—aside from a few scholars—appreciate in even the vaguest way, the dynamism and values of Islamic cultures? How many of us understand the nature of the conflicts now plaguing the Central American countries?

On another level, few of us speak anyone else’s language. The report last year of the President’s Commission on Foreign Language and International Studies4 indicates that only 8 percent of our colleges and universities have a foreign language entrance requirement, as against 34 percent in 1966 and an astounding 85 percent in 1915. I would be the last to argue that language per se is a path to automatic understanding of other societies, but its virtual absence in our curricula is symptomatic of our approach to the world.

Other evidence is equally discouraging. Consider:
—During 1968–77, a period when some 2 million jobs became dependent on exports, enrollments in college and university foreign language courses dropped 21 percent.
—Only one in twenty undergraduates enrolls in courses dealing with foreign peoples and cultures.
—A bare 5 percent of all the nation’s teachers have had any exposure to international studies and training.
—Fewer than 2 percent of high school graduates have any foreign language competence.

4 See footnote 2, Document 168.
A UNESCO study of 30,000 ten- and fourteen-year-olds in nine nations ranked Americans next to last in their comprehension of foreign cultures.

Unhappily, government and private funding support for international studies has declined dramatically in recent years. In real terms, the $41.2 million dollars provided by the United States and other countries for the Fulbright exchange program last year amounted to only 60 percent of the level in 1965. National Defense Education Act Title VI Fellowships for foreign area study are at an all time low. The Ford Foundation, which invested $242 million in international programs in the 1960s, projected less than $4 million for that purpose in 1978.

Our “gross national inadequacy in foreign languages,” as James Perkins has written, has a direct effect on our foreign affairs. In our embassy in the Soviet Union, only one of our top foreign service officers is required to speak Ukrainian; none speak Uzbek or any of the other Turkic languages of the USSR’s increasingly restive Moslem peoples. A total of 12 officers in our foreign service have Chinese at a truly useful level, while only 19 are fully fluent in Japanese. On the legislative side, there is no full-time Soviet and East European specialist on a Congressional committee staff.

This litany of disturbing facts and shortcomings is not a counsel of despair. But it should be a basis for action.

What then is to be done? How can positive change be brought about? That is for you to decide. Communities and groups around the country are beginning to confront the “knowledge gap” and are hard at work.

Seattle, Washington, is making notable efforts to transform the report of the President’s Commission into reality. An energetic coalition of state and local authorities, educators, academics, business and non-profit people, not to say concerned citizens has succeeded in placing the future of languages and international studies high on the public agenda.

The San Francisco Bay area is forming a similar coalition to make the study of languages and other societies an integral part of curricula there.

This fall, Staten Island’s Curtis High School has begun offering a program of language and international business specifically tailored to the skills that employers seek in the New York City area. A public elementary school in Silver Spring, Maryland, offers a complete curriculum taught in French.

The Kettering Foundation’s extraordinary “Columbus and the World” project, which Chadwick Alger will discuss later, has been a

5 Reference is to the research project “Columbus in the World and the World in Columbus” (CITW: TWIC), which surveyed the international connections of citizens living in Columbus, Ohio. Alger developed the project under the auspices of the Mershon Center for International Security Studies at The Ohio State University.
model for working through all the dimensions of a city’s international engagement. A study of international business education by the American Council of Collegiate Schools of Business led General Electric and the Exxon Education Foundation to subsidize a series of workshops to sensitize business school faculties to the international dimension of business education.

These and other examples have something in common: in each instance, it was a cadre of concerned and interested citizens who made the difference and who are bringing about change.

The Federal government can help by acknowledging the problem, placing it on the national agenda, and providing modest financial support. My own agency’s role in this might best be described as that of a “friendly broker,” alert to matching up individuals, institutions, programs and resources abroad with their counterparts in this country. But the Federal government can only do so much.

The important decisions must be made at state and local levels. This is fundamentally a civic problem; it will respond to citizen interests. But there will be no meaningful, continuous support for enhancing international awareness until citizens perceive international affairs as a local responsibility—something that affects each one of them. Changes in the way we teach and learn about the world will not happen because of massive transfusions of moneys, but by massive transfusions of fresh perspective and intellectual vigor.

I don’t pretend to be an expert on Kansas City or mid-America. I don’t know which business leaders are most supportive of international education, or which are most involved in international business here. I don’t know the examples of effective business participation in linking domestic development to international markets and foreign trade. I don’t know the business leaders who participate in world affairs citizen education groups, and which ones sit on the boards of trustees of your colleges and universities.

I would suggest, however, that you find out who they are and give them full credit and reception for what they are doing. “Turning it around” requires a great deal of mutual reinforcement.

There is much to be done. We are at a pivotal point in our history. We are late in realizing it. We must begin, now, to think and talk about a world where hard choices must be made, where basic human values must be better understood and more carefully responded to, where our decisions must be shaped by a consistent, knowledgeable commitment to the future.

Building appropriate education systems is a long-range task. Just as imperative is the need to find and support palliative measures in the short-term.
For me the palliative, and here I quote Robert Chollar of the Kettering Foundation, is “to preserve the involvement and expand the understanding of the minority who are attentive to international relations.”

Our future would be well-rewarded if, acting together, you here and we in the Federal government, and others who share our concerns, could find ways to support and encourage those in this country who are intellectually engaged with international issues. The importance of providing them with adequate, continuing support in the national interest cannot be overstated.

I am talking about a group which can be numbered in the hundreds of thousands rather than in the millions: people such as you who are part of a community of interest in the larger world.

It is to you, I believe, that we must look for that minimum group of informed and critical intellects—and resulting social discourse—to see us through the next generation.

However real the impediments to an effective response, and they exist, we cannot afford to turn away from involvement.

Education that teaches us to celebrate rather than condemn cultural diversity, to understand rather than undermine differing traditions and beliefs, to respect rather than revile mankind’s infinite variations—such education may not be enough to preserve our precarious perch on the favorable side of history, but surely the effort must be made. I am reminded of what a UN official said some time ago. He noted that a child born today into a world of four billion plus people will, if she or he attains age 60, be sharing the earth with three times as many human beings: “A child born today,” he said, “will be both actor and beneficiary, or victim, in a total world fabric, and he may rightly ask: Why was I not warned? Why was I not better educated? Why did my teachers not tell me about these problems?”

Why, indeed? What greater default than this: that we should fail to warn our children?
DECLINING U.S. POWER IS THE TREND IN FOREIGN PERCEPTIONS

Surveys of foreign public opinion have found widespread evidence of perceptions of declining U.S. power—overall power as well as the elements of nuclear, military, and economic strength.

Perceptions of Declining U.S. Overall Power

U.S. ratings as most powerful have suffered major declines in seven countries for which trends are available. In consequence, while the U.S. still retains some lead in France, Israel and Mexico City, it has slipped behind the USSR in Britain, West Germany and Australia, and dropped to about even in Japan. The failed U.S. effort to rescue the hostages in Iran, which occurred later, might have accentuated the downward trends.

Perceptions of Declining Elements of U.S. Power

Foreign views of declining U.S. overall power are paralleled by similar losses in major components of the power image.

- Surveys in 1979 found pluralities in Germany, France, and Italy viewing the U.S. and USSR as “about equal” in nuclear power—the British predominantly see the Soviet ahead. But in all four countries, there has been a decline in ratings of U.S. nuclear strength compared with 1972 and 1977.

- When last measured in 1977, surveys found marked losses (since 1969) in U.S. vs. USSR military strength with the USSR more often than the U.S. viewed as ahead, in Britain, France and West Germany. Only in Italy did the U.S. retain a slight edge.

- U.S. economic power is also seen as declining in 1979 and 1980 surveys in Western Europe and Japan, with West Germany emerging as a major competitor. While ratings of the U.S. as strongest economically prevail among the Japanese, U.S. standing is far behind West Germany among the British, about equal among the French and the West Germans, and has only a slight edge among the Italians.

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The Seeming Paradox of U.S.–USSR Military Equivalence

Early 1970 surveys in Western Europe and elsewhere have indicated a predominant preference for military equivalence over U.S. or USSR superiority. Accompanying comments suggest not so much anti-Americanism as the belief that peace is better assured through a balance of power. There is, however, the suggestion in other data that lessened perceptions of U.S. superiority may be accompanied by lessened respect and lessened confidence in U.S. wisdom in world affairs.

215. Summary Prepared in the International Communication Agency

Washington, undated

President Carter’s Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1977 consolidated the functions of the former U.S. Information Agency with the State Department’s former Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs into the new International Communication Agency (USICA), established on April 1, 1978. The outcome of the reorganization has been greater managerial efficiency as well as a more coherent approach to the sharing of ideas between Americans and foreign peoples. With maximum credibility and impact as a primary aim, and in fulfillment of the mandate of the President and the Congress, USICA has stressed dialogue over soliloquy in the practice of communication with foreign peoples.

Efforts have also been made to staunch the serious decline in funding suffered by the exchange-of-persons programs prior to the reorganization, and to respond to new opportunities to serve the national interest in China, the Caribbean, Africa and the Middle East and South Asia. Because the Agency’s financial resources have remained essentially static and its personnel levels have declined further over the last four years, communication initiatives have been achieved through the reprogramming of existing funding levels.

1 Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Box 16, Accomplishments: Agencies, G-R, 12/80. No classification marking. Reinhardt sent a copy of the summary to Carter under a December 16 memorandum. (Ibid.)

2 See Document 93.
Following is a summary of several of USICA’s most important activities and accomplishments during the Carter Administration.

INTERNATIONAL RADIO BROADCASTING
(VOICE OF AMERICA—VOA)

In response to President Carter’s March, 1977 call to upgrade the broadcasting facilities of VOA, funds were appropriated for a number of additional transmitters to be located in Europe, Africa and Asia. Four new transmitters are now being installed in the United Kingdom at the facility managed for VOA by the BBC. Two new transmitters at the VOA plant in the Philippines are to be installed beginning in the summer of 1981. A medium-wave relay station reaching southern Africa is being established in Botswana, and six high-power transmitters are planned for the VOA site near Colombo, now that agreement has been reached with the Sri Lankan government and upon the appropriation of funds for the purpose.

At the request of the National Security Council in early 1979, VOA undertook a study of languages and hours in which it should broadcast during the coming decade, updating previous such studies in 1972 and 1976. As a result, VOA has added or expanded programs in Farsi, Dari, Bengali, Urdu, Hausa, Turkish and English to the Near East and South Asia, and is in the process of adding broadcasts in Azeri and increasing Uzbek programs. In the Caribbean, VOA has doubled its English programming to four hours per day, and is seeking a medium-wave outlet for carrying that programming. During the last four years, VOA has added 13½ hours a week and 3 new languages (Farsi, Dari and Hausa) to its programming schedule, bringing its total output up to 686 hours a week in 39 languages. In FY 81 VOA expects to add a daily Amharic broadcast to Ethiopia, and to increase programming in Hausa, Swahili and Indonesian in a further effort to improve U.S. access to Islamic audiences over a wide area.

One of the most significant developments in recent years has been the dramatic increase in VOA’s listenership in the People’s Republic of China. Since the cessation of jamming in 1977, VOA’s Chinese audiences have grown rapidly and are now estimated to number over 100 million listeners.

With the reorganization of the Agency, the Voice of America was made fully responsible for its own output in all its broadcast languages, and its policy advocacy function was clearly separated from its news and other programming operations. As part of the new operating rela-

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3 See footnote 3, Document 14.
4 See Document 165.
tionships, a new set of guidelines and procedures was established for VOA foreign correspondents, placing them for the first time on an equal basis journalistically with their colleagues in the commercial news media, and thus enhancing their credibility and operational mobility.

EXCHANGE PROGRAMS

With the implementation of Reorganization Plan No. 2, which transferred administration of the U.S. Government’s exchange programs from the Department of State to the International Communication Agency, the greatest challenge facing administrators of the exchange programs was to assuage the fears of those inside and outside the organization who doubted the continued efficiency and “integrity” of their conduct in an Agency that had formerly been primarily concerned with informing and persuading foreign audiences. Simply put, this challenge has been successfully met. Not only have the exchange programs been maintained and their links to outside constituencies strengthened; at the same time, they have become essential elements in the Agency’s contribution to the conduct of American foreign relations.

During this period:

—The President’s mandate for USICA established for the first time in the U.S. Government specific responsibility for enhancing Americans’ understanding of other societies and cultures. To carry out that directive, the Agency created a new program of competitively awarded grants to U.S. private organizations involved in “American learning.”

—The first thoroughly original academic exchange program in many years, the Hubert H. Humphrey North-South Fellowship Program, was established to provide American training and internships for promising, mid-career professionals in the public service from Third World countries. The quality of the participants and of the programs arranged for them by American universities testify to the trust and involvement of academic institutions here and abroad and add a program for non-academic professionals worthy of the high standards of the Fulbright program.

—In accordance with the President’s directive to USICA, the Agency made significant progress in coordinating U.S. Government exchange programs and policy. The first reports on Government-wide exchange programs are in the final stages of preparation.

MEDIA AND CULTURAL PROGRAMS

Arts America, a major planning innovation initiated in 1979, is an Agency program designed to take advantage of the powerful commu-

cation potential of the arts in public diplomacy. The point of departure for the operation was a formal agreement to seek the advice of the National Endowments for the Arts and the Humanities in developing the Agency’s international cultural program agenda. This agreement with the Endowments has given USICA wider access to cultural groups within the intellectual and artistic communities of the United States.

The best way to summarize the goals, scope and diversity of the cultural programs carried out by the Arts America staff is by example:

—To share the very best of American culture with audiences abroad, USICA works with leading institutions. For instance, five Washington museums—among them the National Gallery—loaned paintings to a major retrospective of American art that was shown in Mexico City.

—To diversify the sources from which USICA draws its programs, the Agency, on the Endowment panels’ recommendation, worked with a consortium of U.S. businesses to program “Art Inc: American Paintings from Corporate Collections” on a Latin American tour; with the Rockefeller Foundation to program the Solaris Dance Theater in Africa; and with private impresarios to facilitate the National Symphony Orchestra’s performances in Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil.

—To promote a better understanding of the roots and sources of American culture, Arts America sponsors international tours of American folk artists. “Southern Music USA” brought together performers such as D. L. Menard, John Jackson, Ricky Scaggs and Buck Owens for programs in the Far East and South Asia.

—To place American literature in context, leading writers, critics and professors are invited to lecture abroad. Recently, William Saroyan, John Ashbery, Susan Sontag, Joyce Carol Oates and Raymond Smith participated in a writers’ conference in Poland, while John Gregory Dunne and Joan Didion are scheduled to lecture in Japan, Indonesia and Singapore.

—To promote direct contacts between American artists and their counterparts abroad, numerous workshop/exhibitions were carried out, including ones featuring sculptor Mel Edwards and fabric artist Nancy Hemenway, both in several African countries.

ACTIVITIES OVERSEAS

AFRICA

From the earliest stages of Nigeria’s transition from military to civilian rule, beginning in 1975, USICA Lagos has provided ideas and
information about the American experience in federal government to
the men shaping the new Nigerian constitution and its current develop-
ment. Our post arranged a long series of lectures and seminars on our
governmental system, provided copies of philosophical U.S. political
tratises, and sent important Nigerians on IV grants to study the Ameri-
can practice of federalism. USICA’s work has contributed importantly
to the growth of a stable, democratic government in Africa’s most
important black nation—and America’s second most important source
of foreign oil.

All USICA efforts in South Africa are focused on encouraging a
rapid end to apartheid and peaceful transition toward majority rule.
We have brought more than 75 carefully-selected influential white
South Africans to the U.S. to expose them to the American civil rights
experience and to stimulate their thinking on how they might move
toward an inter-racial society of their own. More than 100 South African
black leaders have also come here under USICA auspices to gain new
ideas, and USICA has administered special training and graduate stud-
ies programs that have reached nearly a thousand other important
South African blacks in this period. In addition, we have sent more
than 100 American speakers to South Africa to discuss various aspects
of peaceful change; we supported programs of South African institu-
tions aimed at peaceful change; and we have used our “neutrality” to
allow our premises to serve as one of the very few venues in the entire
country where members of all races can meet as equals for substantive
discussion.

When “human rights” was first articulated as a major American
foreign policy plank, it was greeted with skepticism and sometimes
outright scorn in Africa. Today, four years later, it has become part of
the political agenda throughout the continent, often because of USICA’s
wide range of information and exchange activities. As a spin-off, human
rights has also given us a positive credo to counter the Marxist-Leninist
dogma that has been in vogue on the continent since the days of Soviet
aid to the independence movements of the fifties and sixties. Over the
last four years, USICA has also used all the means at its disposal to
articulate and capitalize on administration policy initiatives to heighten
African awareness of the human dimension of our nation. We have
concentrated our communication on events and policies that have dem-
donstrated that the U.S. is a country of ordinary people committed to
democratic principles, rather than a monolithic entity bent on imperial
neo-colonialism.

CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

Human rights programming in Argentina began in August, 1977
when USICA Argentina designed a series of programs called “Return to
the Rule of Law.” These programs brought together U.S. and Argentine legal experts in an examination of legal reform. The series also included IV grants and American speakers and led to what one participant called an “interchange of ideas that is responsible for the positive changes being made in the Argentine justice system.”

USICA Panama’s work in 1977–78 with local media and with reporters in Panama from the Latin American area made possible a public airing of U.S. views and helped bring balanced discussion of the issues to the public. Our work with Panamanian media and public affairs officers of the Panama Canal Commission and the Southern Command has been instrumental in creating an atmosphere of cooperation in which views and information on treaty implementation can be profitably shared among those in the media.

In response to President Carter’s emphasis on the importance of the Caribbean region and U.S. relations with it, USICA reprogrammed significant resources into its activities in Caribbean countries. We strengthened our staff and our programs in Barbados and the eastern Caribbean, opened a post in Cuba and planned another in the Bahamas, and increased our academic and other exchange programs as much as threefold.

EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

USICA played a leading role during the period July 1978–March 1979 in assuring that the rapidly evolving U.S. relationship with the People’s Republic of China included a cultural dimension and responded to broad educational interests in the United States, while preserving an information and cultural program of high quality with the people of Taiwan. When the PRC leadership first began, in early 1978, to look hesitantly toward the outside world, it defined its needs as scientific and technological. The initial U.S. response was expressed in similar terms. Due in large part to USICA leadership and persistence, the program for U.S. scholars in the PRC that evolved in late 1978 and early 1979 was multi-disciplinary, including social sciences and humanities as well as natural sciences, and including researchers as well as students. USICA also pressed for a cultural agreement with the PRC as well as a science and technology agreement and was the principal drafter of the cultural agreement signed in January 1979 by the President and Vice Premier Deng.7 USICA was active in assuring that an implementing accord related to the cultural agreement was the centerpiece of Vice President Mondale’s visit to the PRC in the summer of 1979.

7 The text of the cultural agreement is printed in Department of State Bulletin, March 1979, p. 10.
of 1979. At the same time, a small conventional USICA operation was established in the PRC.

A more solid basis for programs with the five countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN—Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) emerged when the first real summit meeting of ASEAN leaders was held in 1976. In 1979, ASEAN Foreign Ministers met with the U.S. Secretary of State, who committed the U.S. to seek ways to improve and expand mutual cooperation with ASEAN. USICA began a painstaking process of exploring with the five ASEAN nations possible forms of cultural and educational programming. In 1980, scholars from ASEAN were brought to the U.S. to examine U.S. approaches to educational planning and curriculum development. In the summer of 1980, American scholars in the social sciences and humanities carried out a research and familiarization visit to ASEAN countries. Similar activities are contemplated during the next few years. Although neither large nor dramatic, these exchanges have significant importance as a symbol of U.S. interest in ASEAN and U.S. determination to maintain a framework of mutuality which serves the interests of the ASEAN nations as well as U.S. interests.

**EUROPE**

During late 1979, USICA implemented an intensive public information effort preceding the positive NATO decision to deploy new theater nuclear weapons. A combination of speakers, written background materials, videotapes, press briefings and—most important of all—personal contacts between USICA officers and important European opinion-leaders helped to pave the way for this sensitive, hotly debated NATO action. Although problems with the TNF issue persist (especially in Belgium and Holland), public diplomacy in large measure defused European anxieties and neutralized the Soviet Union’s vigorous anti-TNF campaign.

During the past four years, USICA stimulated both private and government attention to the implications stemming from generational shifts in American and Western European leadership. USICA European posts shifted resources and redirected efforts toward the new European leadership, which lacks the World War II generation’s strong personal

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8 Mondale traveled to China August 25–September 1, 1979. The texts of his address at Beijing University, his dinner toast at a welcoming banquet in Beijing, and his remarks at the opening of the U.S. consulate in Guangzhou are printed in Department of State Bulletin, October 1979, pp. 10–13.

9 The summit took place in Bali February 23–24, 1976.

10 During the 1979 ASEAN summit in Bali July 2–3, 1979, Vance met with the ASEAN Foreign Ministers. For the text of Vance’s July 2 statement and the transcript of his July 2 news conference, see Department of State Bulletin, September 1979, pp. 35–39.
ties with the United States. Our concern had a ripple effect beyond the
Agency, including formation of a high-level “successor generation”
working group in the Atlantic Council and a special “successor genera-
tion” resolution passed by the North Atlantic Assembly. With increas-
ing problems and tensions separating the United States and its tradi-
tional allies in Europe, Americans both inside and outside government
today are more sensitive to the generational dimension of the evolving
Atlantic relationship, an awareness that originated with USICA in 1977.

In response to the government-wide policy of limiting official pro-
grams and contacts with the Soviet Union after its invasion of Afghan-
istan, USICA sharply curtailed many cultural programs with the Soviet
Union; we did continue, however, most of the low-visibility academic
exchanges.

Despite the strains in Soviet-American relations, USICA programs
in non-Soviet Eastern Europe continued to expand during the past four
years. In 1977, we signed an agreement with Hungary to enable us to
increase our bilateral exchanges in culture, education and science.11
One program made possible by the new agreement was the Agency’s
“America Now” exhibit, the largest American exhibit in Budapest since
World War II. A U.S.-Bulgarian cultural agreement was also signed in
1977 and renewed in 198012 to govern slowly improving educational
and cultural exchanges. USICA opened a new information center in
Titograd, Yugoslavia, in 1980. We now have a center in each Republic
of this pivotal Eastern European country. The “America Now” exhibit
was also organized in Bucharest with a record 130,000 Romanian
visitors.

THE NEAR EAST, NORTH AFRICA AND SOUTH ASIA

Perhaps most importantly, the context in which our activities are
carried out in the crucial Arabic-speaking portion of the Middle East
has been characterized since 1976 by expansion, both in program and
geographical terms. This expansion in several Gulf nations, in East
Jerusalem, and in Iraq, coupled with the assignment of more officers
qualified in Arabic, has significantly enhanced our ability to communi-
cate with an audience of immense present and potential importance
to the United States.

11 On April 6, 1977, representatives from the United States and Hungary signed an
Agreement on Cooperation in Culture, Education, Science and Technology. (Department
12 Representatives from the United States and Bulgaria signed the agreement on
June 13, 1977. The agreement was extended through the exchange of notes at Sofia on
March 21 and April 9, 1980. (Department of State Bulletin, July 4, 1977, p. 40 and July
1980, p. 83)
USICA has made an effective contribution to the on-going Middle East peace process through such special efforts as: (a) separate funding for “cultural normalization” IV grants to bring Israelis, Egyptians and other Arabs together under Agency auspices to discuss common concerns; (b) projects such as the May 1980 Salzburg International Affairs Seminar, supported by an Agency grant, which provide additional fora for the consideration of regional issues by Israelis and Arabs alike; and (c) priority production and satellite transmission of VTRs about the Camp David Accords and related developments in the peace process.

Bilateral educational and cultural agreements have been negotiated with Morocco and Tunisia, establishing joint commissions and providing the basis for the rational development of exchanges and other Agency programming in these two important Francophone nations.

The Indo-U.S. Subcommission has provided a stable and innovative focus for long-term cooperation in the arts and education between India and the United States, weathering without difficulty the political ups and downs in the bilateral relationship. USICA also played the role of midwife in the birth of the South Asian Committee on Human Rights and Development (SACOHRD), a five-nation non-governmental body which potentially can make real contributions to two of our major concerns: human rights and the search for regional solutions to common problems.

USICA operations in Iran, which had been maintained at a low level following the Islamic revolution in that country, were of course terminated with the seizure of the hostages on November 4, 1979. Activities at the USICA post in Kabul were suspended indefinitely following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
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