About the Series

The *Foreign Relations of the United States* series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the U.S. Government. The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, under the direction of the General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.


The statute requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the U.S. Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the *Foreign Relations* series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded. The editors are convinced that this volume meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing.

Sources for the Foreign Relations Series

The *Foreign Relations* statute requires that the published record in the *Foreign Relations* series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government en-
gaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State historians by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. Most of the sources consulted in the preparation of this volume have been declassified and are available for review at the National Archives and Records Administration (Archives II), in College Park, Maryland.

The editors of the *Foreign Relations* series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files ("lot files") of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department’s Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and the memoranda of conversations between the President and the Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. All of the Department’s central files for 1977–1981 are available in electronic or microfilm formats at Archives II, and may be accessed using the Access to Archival Databases (AAD) tool. Almost all of the Department’s decentralized office files covering this period, which the National Archives deems worthy of permanent retention, have been transferred to or are in the process of being transferred from the Department’s custody to Archives II.

Research for *Foreign Relations* volumes is undertaken through special access to restricted documents at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and other agencies. While all the material printed in this volume has been declassified, some of it is extracted from still-classified documents. The staff of the Carter Library is processing and declassifying many of the documents used in this volume, but they may not be available in their entirety at the time of publication. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Carter Library include some of the most significant foreign-affairs related documentation from White House offices, the Department of State, and other federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Some of the research for volumes in this subseries was done in Carter Library record collections scanned for the Remote Archive Capture (RAC) project. This project, which is administered by the National Archives and Records Administration’s Office of Presidential Libraries, was designed to coordinate the declassification of still-classified records held in various Presidential libraries. As a result of the way in which records were scanned for the RAC, the editors of the *Foreign Relations* series were not always able to determine whether attachments to a given document were in fact attached to the paper copy of the docu-
ment in the Carter Library file. In such cases, some editors of the *Foreign Relations* series have indicated this ambiguity by stating that the attachments were “Not found attached.”

*Editorial Methodology*

The documents are presented chronologically according to time in Washington, DC. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the *Foreign Relations* series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the Chief of the Declassification and Publishing Division. The original document is reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents within the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the documents are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words or phrases underlined in the original document are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the original text, and a list of abbreviations and terms is included in the front matter of each volume. In telegrams, the telegram number (including special designators such as Secto) is printed at the start of the text of the telegram.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount and, where possible, the nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld after declassification review have been accounted for and are listed in their chronological place with headings, source notes, and the number of pages not declassified.

All brackets that appear in the original document are so identified in the footnotes. All ellipses are in the original documents.

The first footnote to each document indicates the sources of the document and its original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document.
VI   About the Series

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than to page numbers.

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the *Foreign Relations* statute, monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation of the series and declassification of records. The Advisory Committee does not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the series, but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and reviews volumes as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory obligations.

Declassification Review

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, conducted the declassification review for the Department of State of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 13526 on Classified National Security Information and applicable laws.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The declassification review of this volume, which began in 2012 and was completed in 2015, resulted in the decision to withhold 0 documents in full, excise a paragraph or more in 18 documents, and make minor excisions of less than a paragraph in 45 documents.

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process described above, that the documentation and editorial notes presented here provide a thorough, accurate, and reliable
About the Series VII

record of the Carter administration’s policy toward Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean.

Stephen P. Randolph
The Historian

Adam M. Howard
General Editor

Bureau of Public Affairs
December 2016
Preface

Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series

This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the Foreign Relations series that documents the most important issues in the foreign policy of the administration of Jimmy Carter. The subseries will present a documentary record of major foreign policy decisions and actions of President Carter’s administration from 1977 to 1981.


The nine compilations included in this volume illustrate both the formulation of U.S. policy toward the Caribbean as a whole, and bilateral relations with fourteen countries: the Bahamas, Barbados, Cuba, Dominica (independent, 1978), the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Mexico, Saint Lucia (independent, 1979), Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (independent, 1979), Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago.

In three cases, documents on relations with more than one country have been combined into a single compilation. One compilation covers the Eastern Caribbean states of Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, which shared a single ambassador; another covers relations with Haiti and the Bahamas, which were linked by a refugee issue; and a third covers Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago, because of the geographical proximity of the two nations.

Throughout Carter’s term in office, regional policy toward the Caribbean centered upon the smaller states of the Eastern Caribbean, such as Barbados, Grenada, Trinidad and Tobago, along with newly independent Dominica, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. Nations like the Dominican Republic and Haiti were bigger than and linguistically distinct from the English-speaking states of the Eastern Caribbean and were dealt with separately. Cuba was considered a special case. Overall, the Carter administration’s regional approach was defined by the problems of the Eastern Caribbean, but there was significant disagreement about the size of those problems and the proper scope of the U.S. response. The goals of Carter officials were defined by two, often contradictory impulses 1) have the Eastern Caribbean states (many of which had populations of fewer than 100,000 people) work together as a group, and develop a regional identity, so they could attract more foreign investment and act as a stable, financially-secure bloc that
would resist Cuban influence, and 2) do so without a major investment of foreign aid from the United States; many Carter officials did not want to take on old British obligations and make an expensive commitment to a region which was not a priority for many U.S. policymakers.

The conflict between these two impulses emerged almost immediately. Robert Pastor, a member of the National Security Council Staff who advocated a large, multilateral aid package for the Caribbean, ran into strong resistance from Roger Hansen, an NSC staffer who was unsure whether the Soviets were serious about expanding their influence in the region.

Pastor’s pleas for more funding, however, received greater support from the NSC in 1979, after a series of events drew attention to security problems in the Caribbean. The scare of a “Soviet brigade” in Cuba turned out to be the result of an intelligence failure, but it nevertheless had significant implications for the region. The crisis, along with a Marxist coup in Grenada, drew the attention of policymakers who previously had not considered the Caribbean a priority.

Nonetheless, President Carter remained hesitant to commit a large amount of funding to the region, and in an October 1979 Presidential meeting, suggested his own regional policy, which emphasized limited public assistance from the United States, cast doubt on the importance of Cuban influence, and emphasized the role of the private sector.

Readers interested in U.S.-Cuban relations will find compelling documentation in this volume. The Cuban compilation looks in depth at the Carter administration’s efforts to normalize relations with the island nation. Additionally, readers interested in Carter’s human rights policy will find valuable information in the Dominican Republic and the Haiti and the Bahamas compilations.

Other key themes and events discussed in this volume include the debate over leftist non-aligned states such as Jamaica and Guyana, lengthy natural gas negotiations between the United States and Mexico, a military coup in Suriname, the independence of several Eastern Caribbean mini-states, the negotiation of naval base agreements in Barbados and the Bahamas, and the Department of State’s response to the Leo Ryan assassination and the subsequent Jonestown Massacre. The late 1970s were thus a time of political transformation for the Caribbean, and U.S. officials, often reluctantly, made decisions that would forever shape the region.

Acknowledgements

The editor wishes to acknowledge the assistance of officials at the Jimmy Carter Library, as well as Halbert Jones, Myra Burton, David Geyer, Carl Ashley, Adam Howard, Dean Weatherhead, Mandy Chalou, Thomas I. Faith, Stephen P. Randolph, John Fox, Margot Gut-
errez, Susan Weetman, Madeline Poster, John Poster, John Collinge, Michael McCoyer, Peter Hahn, Robert McMahon and Edward Brynn.

The editor collected and selected documentation and edited the volume under the supervision of Myra Burton, Chief of the Africa and the Americas Division, and Adam M. Howard, General Editor of the Foreign Relations series. Myra Burton and David Geyer, Chief of the Europe Division, reviewed the volume. Dean Weatherhead coordinated the declassification review under the supervision of Carl Ashley, Chief of the Declassification Division. Thomas I. Faith performed the copy and technical editing.

Alexander Poster
Historian
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Sources

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In preparing this volume, the editors made extensive use of Presidential papers and other White House records at the Carter Library. The bulk of the foreign policy records at the Carter Library are in the Staff Files for National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material. Within this collection, the North/South Staff Files (particularly Robert Pastor’s), Country Files, and Subject Files proved to be of most value. The Institutional Files contained the records of many important meetings documented in this volume.

The records of the Department of State were another important source. The Department’s central files contain cable traffic concerning the affairs of many of the Eastern Caribbean mini-states, which were too small to receive discussion at the Presidential level. Important documents were also found in the Department’s lot files, particularly within the records of Cyrus Vance.

Research for this volume also involved examining records from the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and, in one case, the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Many of these collections are in the process of being transferred to the National Archives in College Park, MD.

Researchers should also consult the memoirs of Wayne Smith, David Newsom’s account of the Soviet Brigade, and writings of Robert Pastor, for an overview of Caribbean and Latin American policy during the late 1970s.

Almost all of this documentation has been made available for use in the Foreign Relations series thanks to the consent of the agencies mentioned, the assistance of their staffs, and especially the cooperation and support of the National Archives and Records Administration. In addition to the paper files cited below, a growing number of documents are available on the Internet. The Office of the Historian maintains a list of these Internet resources on its website and encourages readers to consult that site on a regular basis.

Unpublished Sources

Department of State

Central Foreign Policy File. These files have been transferred or will be transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland.
XVI Sources

D–reels
P–reels

Lot Files. These files have been transferred or will be transferred to the National Archives
and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland.

81D5

81D64
Assistant Secretary’s Files—Nicaragua

81D85, Entry 75, UD–05D
Records of Matthew Nimetz

81D110
[S/MEX Files]

82D85
Official Files of [P] David D. Newsom, Under Secretary for Political Affairs

82D298
Anthony Lake Working Papers

84D241
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance Files

INR/IL Files
Historical files of the Office of Intelligence Liaison of the Bureau of Intelligence and
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National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland
Record Group 59, Records of the Department of State
Christopher Lot File, Entry P–14
Muskie Lot File, Entry P–10

Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Atlanta, Georgia
Agency Files
Brzezinski Donated Material
Brzezinski Office File
Country Files
Deputy Files
Freedom of Information/Legal Files
General Odom File
Inderfurth/Gates Chron
Institutional Files
Name Files
North/South
Office Files
President’s Files, Plains Files
President’s Files, Presidential Handwriting Files
President’s Daily Report
President’s Daily CIA Brief
President’s Correspondence With Foreign Leaders
Staff Evening Reports
Staff Secretary Files
Subject Files
Trip Files
VIP Visit Files
Walter Mondale Papers

**Central Intelligence Agency**

*Office of Congressional Affairs*
Job 97M00733R: Policy Files

*Office of the Director of Central Intelligence*
Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–1981)
Job 81B00112R: Subject Files
Job 81M00919R: Executive Registry Subject Files (1976–1979)
Job 82M00501R: 1980 Subject Files

*Office of Support Services (DI)*
Job 81T00031R: Production Case Files

**Federal Bureau of Investigation**

*Case Classification 89: Assaulting or Killing a Federal Officer*
Case File 4286, Section 2

**National Security Council**

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Washington National Records Center

Record Group 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense

OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–80–0024
  Foreign Military Rights Affairs, 1969–78

OSD Files: FRC 330–81–0202
  1978 Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Special Assistants to both.

OUSD Files: FRC 330–81–0447
  ASD/ISA—PS ASD/ISA Files 1970–1980

OSD Files: FRC 330–82–0205
  1979 Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Special Assistants to both.

Published Sources


Abbreviations and Terms

A, Bureau of Administration, Department of State
AA, Assistant Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development
AA/LA, Assistant Administrator, Latin America, U.S. Agency for International Development
AA/PPC, Office of the Assistant Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development
AF, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
AF/I, Office of Inter-African Affairs, Department of State
AFFSO, Air Force Financial Systems Office
AFL, American Federation of Labor
AID, U.S. Agency for International Development
ALCOA, Aluminum Company of America
AMCONSUL, U.S. Consul
AMCIT, American citizen
AmEmbassy, American Embassy
ARA, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
ARA/CAR, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Office of Caribbean Affairs, Department of State
ARA/CCA, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Office of the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, Department of State
ARA/CEN, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Office of Central American Affairs, Department of State
ARA/ECP, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Office of Regional Economic Policy, Department of State
ARA/LA, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Bureau for Latin America, Department of State
ARA/MEX, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Office of Mexican Affairs, Department of State
ARA/PPC, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Office of Policy Planning, Public and Congressional Affairs, Department of State
ASEAN, Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AWACS, Airborne Warning and Control System

BPD, Barrels per day
BTN, Bauxite and Northern Railway
BTU, British Thermal Units

C, Counselor, Secretary of State
CAB, Civil Aeronautics Board
CARICOM, Caribbean Community
CCCJTF, Cuba-Caribbean Contingency Joint Task Force, Department of Defense
CDB, Caribbean Development Bank
CDU, Christlich-Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union)
CEO, Chief Executive Officer
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
CIEC, Conference on International Economic Cooperation
CIEP, Council on International Economic Policy
XX  Abbreviations and Terms

CIMEX, Cuban Import-Export Corporation
CINCLANT, Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command
CINCSOUTH, Commander in Chief, Southern Command
COCOM, Coordinating Committee of the Paris Consultative Group (CG)
CODEL, Congressional Delegation
COMECON, Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
COMNAVINTCOM, Commander, Naval Intelligence Command
CONS, Consul
CV, Cyrus Vance

D, Democrat; Deputy Secretary of State
DAA, Deputy Assistant Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development
DAA/LAC, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Latin American and the Caribbean, U.S. Agency for International Development
DAS, Deputy Assistant Secretary
DASD–ISA, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs
DCI, Director of Central Intelligence
DCM, Deputy Chief of Mission
DDCI, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
DD/FF, Destroyer/Frigate hull classification in the U.S. Navy
DEA, Drug Enforcement Agency
DepSecDef, Deputy Secretary of Defense
DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency
DIRNSA, Director, National Security Agency
DNC, Democratic National Committee
DOD, Department of Defense
DOD/DSAA, Defense Security Assistance Agency, Department of Defense
DPQ, Defense Planning Questionnaire
DR, Dominican Republic

E, Undersecretary for Economic Affairs, Department of State
EA, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
EA/J, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Office of Japanese Affairs, Department of State
EB, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State
EB/IFD, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, International Finance and Development, Department of State
EB/IFD/ODF, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, International Finance and Development, Office of Developmental Finance, Department of State
EB/OFD, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Office of Food Policy and Programs, Department of State
EC–9, an informal caucus, usually convened to discuss matters arising at the European Community
ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East
EEC, European Economic Community
EPMG, Ethiopian Provisional Military Government
EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EUR/NE, Bureau of European Affairs, Office of Northern European Affairs, Department of State
EUR/SOV, Bureau of European Affairs, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Department of State
EUR/WE, Bureau of European Affairs, Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State
EX–IM, Export-Import Bank
Abbreviations and Terms  XXI

EXSEC, Executive Secretary

FFP, Office of Food for Peace, U.S. Agency for International Development
FRG, Federal Republic of Germany
FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBIS, Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FMS, Foreign Military Sales
FRG, Federal Republic of Germany
FSO Fund For Special Operations; Foreign Service Officer
FY, Fiscal Year
FYI, For Your Information

G–7, Group of Seven
GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GCOB, Government of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas
GDF, Guyana Defence Force
GOB, Government of Barbados
GOC, Government of Cuba
GOD, Government of Dominica
GODR, Government of the Dominican Republic
GOG, Government of Guyana
GOH, Government of Haiti
GOJ, Government of Jamaica
GOM, Government of Mexico
GOTT, Government of Trinidad and Tobago

Granma, Official newspaper of the Partido Comunista de Cuba (PCC), Communist Party of Cuba

GSP, Generalized System of Preference

H, Bureau of Congressional Relations, Department of State
HA, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State
HMG, Her Majesty’s Government

IAHRC, Inter-American Human Rights Commission
IBRD, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)
ICA, International Communication Agency
IDA, International Development Association
IDB, Inter-American Development Bank
IDCA, International Development Cooperation Agency
IFI, International Financial Institutions
IG, Inter-Agency Group
IMF, International Monetary Fund
INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
INR/DDC, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Deputy Director of Coordination, Department of State
INR/RAR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Office of Research and Analysis for American Republics, Department of State
IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
ISA, Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense

JCF, Jamaica Constabulary Force
JCE, Junta Central Electoral, elections board in the Dominican Republic
JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff
JDF, Jamaica Defence Force
**XXII Abbreviations and Terms**

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JLP</td>
<td>Jamaica Labour Party; Jose Lopez Portillo; Jose Luis Padron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>Legal Adviser, Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L/ARA</td>
<td>Assistant Legal Adviser, Inter-American Affairs, Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L/PM</td>
<td>Assistant Legal Adviser, Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LA</td>
<td>Latin America; Bureau for Latin America, U.S. Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LA/CAR</td>
<td>Bureau for Latin America, Office of Caribbean Affairs, U.S. Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LA/DP</td>
<td>Office of Development Programs, Bureau for Latin America, U.S. Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LA/DR</td>
<td>Office of Development Programs, Bureau for Latin America, U.S. Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAC/DP</td>
<td>Development Planning and Programs Office, Latin America and the Caribbean Bureau, U.S. Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAC/DR</td>
<td>Office of Development Resources, Latin America and the Caribbean Bureau, U.S. Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAC/DP</td>
<td>Development Planning and Programs Office, Latin America and the Caribbean Bureau, U.S. Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAC/DR</td>
<td>Office of Development Resources, Latin America and the Caribbean Bureau, U.S. Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDC</td>
<td>Least Developed Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>LHA</td>
<td>Landing Helicopter Assault ship</td>
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<td>LOS</td>
<td>Law of the Sea</td>
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<tr>
<td>LSD</td>
<td>dock landing ship</td>
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<tr>
<td>LULAC</td>
<td>League of United Latin American Citizens</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAAG</td>
<td>Military Assistance Advisory Group</td>
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<td>MILGRP</td>
<td>Military Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINREX</td>
<td>Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba, Cuban Foreign Ministry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTN</td>
<td>Multilateral Trade Negotiations</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAM</td>
<td>non-aligned movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NBC</td>
<td>National Broadcasting Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>Non-Commissioned Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEA</td>
<td>Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFAH</td>
<td>National Foreign Assessment Center, Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>niact</td>
<td>night action, communication indicator requiring attention by the recipient at any hour of the day or night</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIO</td>
<td>National Intelligence Officer, Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nocontract</td>
<td>no contractor distribution</td>
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<tr>
<td>Noform</td>
<td>no foreign dissemination</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPT</td>
<td>Non-Proliferation Treaty</td>
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<td>NSA</td>
<td>National Security Advisor; National Security Agency</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<td>NSC/S</td>
<td>Secretariat, National Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
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<tr>
<td>OASD</td>
<td>Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCI</td>
<td>Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCR</td>
<td>Office of Civil Rights, Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEP</td>
<td>Office of Emergency Preparedness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Abbreviations and Terms  XXIII

OES, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Department of State
OJCS, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
OMB, Office of Management and Budget
OPEC, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
OPIC, Overseas Private Investment Corporation
Orcon, dissemination and extraction of information controlled by originator (dissemination control abbreviation)

P, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs
Para, Paragraph
PCC, Partido Comunista de Cuba, Communist Party of Cuba
PDB, President’s Daily Brief
PEMEX, Petróleos Mexicanos, S.A., Mexican Petroleum, Inc.
PL, Public Law
P.L. 480, Public Law 480 (Food for Peace Program)
PM, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State
PM/SAS, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Office of Security Assistance and Sales, Department of State

POL/ECON/COMM, Political Section, Economic Section, Commercial Section
POL, Political
POLAD, Political Advisor
PNC, People’s National Congress, Guyana
PNP, Peoples’ National Party, Jamaica and Suriname
PPG, Planning and Programming Guidance
PPP, People’s Progressive Party, Guyana
PRC, People’s Republic of China
PRD, Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (Dominican Revolutionary Party)
PRG, People’s Revolutionary Government, Grenada
PT, People’s Temple

R, Republican
Reftel, Reference Telegram
RG, Revolutionary Government, Grenada; Record Group

S, Office of the Secretary
S/NM, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Narcotics Matters
S/P, Policy Planning Council, Department of State
S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
S/S-O, Operations Center, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
S/S-S, Committee Secretariat Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
SALT II, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks; the second round of bilateral discussions on armaments control between the Soviet Union and the United States
SC, Security Council (United Nations); Security Command, Department of Defense
SCS, Screening and Costing Staff
SecDef, Secretary of Defense
SELA, Sistema Economica Latinoamericano y el Caribe
Septel, separate telegram

SER, Bureau for Program and Management Services, U.S. Agency for International Development
SER/H, Bureau for Program and Management Services, Office of Housing, U.S. Agency for International Development
SER/INC, Bureau for Program and Management Services, Office of International Narcotics Control, U.S. Agency for International Development
XXIV Abbreviations and Terms

SLP, Saint Lucia Labour Party
SNIE, Special National Intelligence Estimate
SPD, Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of West Germany)
Specat, special category
SRG, Senior Review Group
STADIS, State Distribution Only
STR, Special Trade Representative

U, Undersecretary
UN, United Nations
UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNGA, United Nations General Assembly
UNSC, United Nations Security Council
USA, United States of America
USAF, United States Air Force
USAID, see AID
USCINCSC, U.S. Commander in Chief, Southern Command
USG, United States Government
USIA, United States Information Agency
USIS, United States Information Service
USN, United States Navy
USOAS, Permanent Mission of the United States of America to the Organization of American States
USSOUTHCOM, U.S. Southern Command
USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
USUN, United States Mission to the United Nations

VIP, Very Important Person
VHP, Vooruitstrevende Hervormings Partij (Progressive Reform Party of Suriname)
VOA, Voice of America
VP, Vice President

WH, White House; Western Hemisphere Division, Central Intelligence Agency
WHCA, White House Communications Agency
Wnintel, Warning Notice—Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
WPJ, Workers Party of Jamaica

ZB, Zbigniew Brzezinski
Persons

Aaron, David L., Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Abrahantes, Jose, Cuban Vice-Minister for Security for the Ministry of the Interior
Adams, Jon Michael Geoffrey Manningham “Tom,” Prime Minister of Barbados from 1976 until 1985
Adderley, Paul, Bahamian Foreign Minister
Andre, Antonio, Director of the Central Bank of Haiti
Andrews, Mary, U.S. citizen arrested as part of a “preventative detention” effort by the Government of Grenada
Arellano, Richard G., Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economics, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
Armacost, Michael H., member, National Security Council Staff, East Asia/China from January 1977 until July 1978; member of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
Arron, Henck A. E., Prime Minister of Suriname from 1973 until 1980
Askew, Reubin O’Donovan, U.S. Trade Representative from 1979 until 1981
Askey, Dennis, Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy in Port-of-Spain from 1975 until 1979
Atwood, James R., Deputy Assistant Secretary, Office of Transportation Affairs, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State
Austin, Paul, President of Coca-Cola from 1962 until 1966; CEO and Chairman of Coca-Cola from 1966 until 1980
Axelrod, Philip, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Santo Domingo

Baker, Richard W., Special Assistant to the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, Department of State
Balaguer Ricardo, Joaquin, President of the Dominican Republic from 1960 until 1962, from 1966 until 1978, and from 1986 until 1996
Baptiste, Malcolm, U.S. citizen arrested as part of a “preventative detention” effort by the Government of Grenada
Barney, Malcolm R., Director, Office of Andean Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
Barnes, Marsha E., Staff Assistant, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State; Office of Caribbean Countries, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs
Baron, Frederick D., Special Assistant for Attorney General Bell
Barre, Mohamed Siad, President of Somalia from 1969 until 1991; President of the OAU from 1973 until 1974
Barrow, Errol, Prime Minister of Barbados from 1966 until 1976
Bayard, Henri, Haitian Minister to the Presidency
Beckham, Robert W., Office of Caribbean Countries, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
Bell, Griffin Boyette, Attorney General from 1977 until 1979
Bell, Mary L., Office of East Coast Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
Bendjedid, Chadli, President of Algeria
Benes, Bernardo, Cuban-American lawyer and exile
XXVI  Persons

Bennet, Douglas J., Jr., Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, Department of State
Bennett, Ernest, father of Haitian First Lady Michele Bennett
Bennett, Michele, wife of Haitian President Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier
Benson, Lucy Wilson, Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, Department of State
Bentsen, Lloyd Millard, Senator (D–Texas)
Bergsten, C. Fred, Assistant Secretary for International Affairs at the U.S. Treasury from 1977 until 1981
Bessmertnykh, Alexander A., Consul at the Embassy of the Soviet Union in Washington, DC
Binder, David, journalist for The New York Times
Bingham, Jonathan Brewster, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D–New York)
Bishop, Maurice Rupert, Prime Minister of the People’s Revolutionary Government in Grenada from 1979 until 1983
Blacken, John Dale, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Georgetown
Blackwill, Robert, member, National Security Council Staff for Western Europe from September 1979 until January 1981
Blake, John F., Acting Deputy Director of Central intelligence
Blakey, Deborah Layton, member of the People’s Temple of the Disciples of Christ
Blanco, Salvador Jorge, Dominican Senator and potential presidential candidate for the PRD in 1978; President of the Dominican Republic from 1982 until 1986
Blumenthal, Werner Michael, Secretary of the Treasury from January 23, 1977, until August 4, 1979
Bosch Gavino, Juan, President of the Dominican Republic from 1962 until 1963; Leader of the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD)
Bouterse, Desire D. “Desi,” Surinamese military figure and de facto ruler from February 1980 until 1987
Bova, Michele M., Economics, International Financial, Office of Human Rights, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State
Bovey, Robert L., Captain, USN; Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
Bowdler, William Garton, U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador from September 26, 1968, until September 2, 1971; U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala from September 30, 1971, until August 26, 1973; U.S. Ambassador to South Africa from March 17, 1975, until April 19, 1978; Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research from April 24, 1978, until December 17, 1979; Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs from December 17, 1979, until January 16, 1981
Bray, Charles W., Acting Director of the International Communication Agency
Brement, Marshall, member, National Security Council Staff for the USSR and Eastern Europe from May 1979 until January 1981
Bremer, Lewis Paul, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Oslo from 1976 until 1979; Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State from 1979 until 1981
Brezhnev, Leonid I., General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Bridges, Peter S., Director, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Office of United Nations Political Affairs, Department of State
Britton, Theodore Roosevelt, U.S. Ambassador jointly to Barbados and Grenada from December 1974 until April 1977
Brooke, Edward W., Senator (R–Massachusetts)
Brown, Bob, NBC cameraman
Brown, Frederick Z., Spokesman, Department of State
Brown, Richard C., member, National Security Council Staff for Latin American Affairs
Bruma, Eddy, Surinamese writer and nationalist
Brutus, Edner, Foreign Minister of Haiti
Brzezinski, Zbigniew K., Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Burke, John Richard, U.S. Ambassador to Guyana from September 15, 1977, until September 22, 1979
Burnett-Alleyne, Sydney, Barbadian radical
Burnham, Linden Forbes Sampson, Prime Minister of Guyana from May 1966 until 1985
Bushnell, John A. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State from 1977 until 1982
Byrd, Robert C., Senator (D–West Virginia)

Cahill, Jacqueline, Assistant to the Secretary of State
Califano, Joseph Anthony, Jr., Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare from January 1977 until August 1979
Carazo Odio, Rodrigo, President of Costa Rica from May 1978 until May 1982
Carlucci, Frank Charles, III, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from February 1978 until 1981
Carpenter, Stanley S., Head of Insular Affairs, Department of the Interior; co-author of the Department of State report on actions relating to the People’s Temple, the “Crimmins Report”
Carter, Eleanor Rosalynn, First Lady of the United States
Carter, Hodding, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs from 1977 until 1980
Carter, James Earl “Jimmy,” Jr., President of the United States
Castaneda y Alvarez de la Rosa, Jorge, Mexican Representative to the United Nations
Castro Ruz, Fidel, Premier of Cuba
Charles, Mary Eugenia, Prime Minister of Dominica from July 1980; leader of the Dominican Freedom Party
Chin A Sen, Hendrick Rudolf “Henk,” President of Suriname from 1980 until 1982
Christopher, Warren Minor, Deputy Secretary of State
Church, Frank, Senator (D–Idaho)
Civiletti, Benjamin Richard, Deputy Attorney General from 1978 until July 1979; Attorney General from August 1979 until 1981
Clarke, Bruce C., Jr., Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment, Central Intelligence Agency
Claude, Sylvio, leader of the Christian Democratic Party of Haiti (Parti Democratique Chrétien d’Haiti)
Clay, William, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D–Missouri)
Clough, Susan, Presidential Secretary
Coard, Winston Bernard, Deputy Prime Minister of the People’s Revolutionary Government in Grenada
Compton, John, Prime Minister of St. Lucia
Cooper, James C., Alternate Director, Office of Caribbean Countries, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
Cooper, Richard Newell, Under Secretary of State for Economic, Energy and Agricultural Affairs from April 7, 1977, until January 19, 1981; Secretary of State ad interim on May 3, 1980
Crimmins, John Hugh, U.S. Ambassador to Brazil from July 10, 1973, until February 25, 1978, co-author of the Department of State report on actions relating to the People’s Temple, the “Crimmins Report”
Cummings, John, investigative journalist
Cundiff, Carl C, Director, Economic Policy Staff, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State

Davis, Jack, National Intelligence Officer for Latin America, Central Intelligence Agency
XXVIII Persons

Davis, John, Office of Central America, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
de la Madrid, Roberto, Governor of Baja California, Mexico
de Santillana, Gerald, Haiti/Dominica Desk Officer, Office of Caribbean Countries, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
Dellums, Ronald, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D–California)
Denend, Leslie G., member, National Security Council Staff; Special Assistant to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs from January 1980 until January 1981
Derian, Patricia Murphy, Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State until August 17, 1977; Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor from August 17, 1977, until January 19, 1981
Devine, Frank James, U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador from October 11, 1977, until February 15, 1980
Dobrynin, Anatoly F., Soviet Ambassador to the United States
Dodson, Christine, Deputy Staff Secretary, National Security Council, from January 1977 until May 1977; Staff Secretary, National Security Council, from May 1977
Donaldson, John, Foreign Minister of Trinidad and Tobago
Dorrance, John C., Deputy Chief of Mission in Kingston, Jamaica
Dozier, William B., Staff Director, National Security Council Interdepartmental Group, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
Drexler, Robert W., Deputy Chief of Mission in Bogota, Colombia
Dugstad, Richard A., member, Office of International Conferences, Bureau of International Organizations, Department of State
Duncan, Charles, Secretary of Energy from August 24, 1979, until January 20, 1981
Duncan, Donald Keith “DK,” General Secretary of the People’s National Party of Jamaica from 1974 until 1983; Jamaican Member of Parliament from 1976 until 1980
Durán, Alfredo González, Cuban exile activist
Durazo Moreno, Arturo, Federal Judicial Police Commander and Chief of Police of Mexico City from 1976 until 1982; Chief of the Directorate of Control of Medicines, Food, and Beverages
Duvalier, Jean-Claude, President of Haiti
Duvalier, Simone, Mother of Haitian President Jean-Claude Duvalier
Dwyer, Richard A., Deputy Chief of Mission in Georgetown, Guyana

Eddy, John, Deputy Chief of Mission in Bridgetown, Barbados
Eidenberg, Gene, aide to the White House Chief of Staff
Einaudi, Luigi, member, Policy Planning Staff, Bureau of Policy Planning, Department of State from 1974 until 1977; Director of Policy Planning for Inter-American Affairs from 1977 until 1989
Erb, Guy, member, National Security Council Staff for International Economics from September 1977 until January 1980
Estep, Hunter L., Director of the Office of Research and Analysis for American Republics, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

Fagen, Richard, Professor of Political Science at Stanford University
Falco, Mathea, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics Matters
Fascell, Dante Bruno, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D–Florida); Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Feinberg, Richard E., member, Policy Planning Staff, Bureau of Policy Planning, Department of State from 1977 until 1980
Feldman, Mark B., Deputy Legal Advisor at the Department of State
Fernandez, Antonio Guzman, President of the Dominican Republic from May 1978 until July 1982
Ferre, Maurice A., Mayor of Miami, Florida
Flaherty, Peter, Deputy Attorney General of the United States
Ford, Gerald R., President of the United States from August 9, 1974, until January 20, 1977
Forde, Henry, Barbadian Minister of External Affairs
Fox, Richard Kenneth, U.S. Ambassador to Trinidad and Tobago from July 1977 until July 1979
Frechette, Myles Robert Rene, Director, Office of the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
Funk, Gerald, member, National Security Council Staff for Sub-Saharan Africa from December 1978 until January 1981

Gairy, Cynthia, wife of Grenadian Prime Minister Eric Gairy
Gairy, Eric, Prime Minister of Grenada until 1979
Gannon, John, member, Office of Economic Research, Central Intelligence Agency
Garcia, Santiago Roel, Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1976 until 1979
Garcia-Rodriguez, Felix, Cuban attaché at the United Nations
Gates, Robert, Special Assistant to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from April 1979 until December 1979
van Genderen, Olton, Vice Prime Minister of Suriname
Gerard, Sumner, U.S. Ambassador to Jamaica from June 1974 until April 1977
Gilligan, John Joyce, Administrator of USAID from 1977 until 1979
Gilman, Benjamin, member, U.S. House of Representatives (R–New York)
Gilpatrick, Roswell L., Under Secretary of the Air Force from 1951 until 1953; Deputy Secretary of Defense from 1961 until 1964
Glassman, John D., Political/Economic Section Counselor in the U.S. Interests Section in Cuba
Goldschmidt, Neil E., Secretary of Transportation from 1979 until 1981
Gonsalves, Ralph E., attorney and politician
Goodby, James E., Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
Gourgue, Gerard, President of the Haitian Human Rights League
Gousse, Pierre, Information Minister of Haiti
Gower, Gerald F., Deputy Director, Office of Caribbean Affairs, Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, United States Agency for International Development
Gregg, Donald, member, National Security Council Staff for Intelligence Coordination from June 1979 until January 1981
Griffith, John C., Alternate Director, Office of Caribbean Countries, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
Griffith, William E., Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and consultant to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Grove, Brandon H., Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
Gutierrez Muniz, Jose Antonio, member, Cuban Academy of Sciences

Habib, Philip C., Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from July 1, 1976, until April 1, 1978
Hambrick, Marion V., Assistant Administrator for Enforcement, Drug Enforcement Agency
Hansen, Roger D., member, National Security Council Staff
Harris, Don, NBC correspondent
XXX  Persons

Harris, Patricia Roberts, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development from 1977 until 1979; Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare from 1979 until 1981
Havercamp, Roy T., Deputy Chief of Mission in Kingston, Jamaica
Heavner, Theodore J., Director, Office of Operations Policy, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Helms, Jesse A., Senator (R–North Carolina)
Hemenway, Brewster, Director, Office of Central American Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
Henneke, Frederick L., member, Screening and Costing Staff, Department of State
Henzé, Paul B., member, National Security Council Staff for Intelligence Coordination from 1977 until 1980; headed the Nationality Working Group in the NSC from 1977 until 1980 and also covered NSC issues involving Cyprus/Turkey/Greece, the Horn of Africa, and international broadcasting
Herbert, Neville, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF; Director, Research and Administration Legislative Affairs, Department of Defense
Herrera Campins, Luis, President of Venezuela
Hetu, Herbert, Public Affairs Officer, Central Intelligence Agency
Hewitt, Ashley, Director of the Office of Caribbean Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
Heymann, Philip B., Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division
Horan, Hume A., Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Department of State
Horelick, Arnold, National Intelligence Officer for the USSR, Central Intelligence Agency
Hormats, Robert D., member, National Security Council Staff for International Economics from 1969 until 1977; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs from 1977 until 1979; Deputy Trade Representative from 1979 until 1981
Hornblow, Michael, member, National Security Council Staff
Howard, Richard B., Office of Panamanian Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
Howarth, Steven, Political Officer in the British Embassy
Humphrey, Chester, Grenadian citizen arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
Hurwitch, Robert A., U.S. Ambassador to the Dominican Republic from July 24, 1973 until April 5, 1978

Inderfurth, Karl F. "Rick," Special Assistant to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from January 1977 until April 1979
Irving, Frederick, Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs from March 29, 1976, until March 26, 1977; U.S. Ambassador to Jamaica from May 26, 1977, until November 22, 1978
Isham, Heyward, U.S. Ambassador to Haiti from December 19, 1973, until July 8, 1977; Coordinator for Combating Terrorism from October 26, 1977, until August 1, 1978
Iturbe, Nestor Garcia, First Secretary of the Cuban Mission to the United Nations
Jackson, Everett, U.S. citizen imprisoned by the Cuban Government until September 17, 1979
Jacobini, Charles, Staff Assistant, Assistant Secretary and U.S. Coordinator, Alliance for Progress, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
Jagan, Cheddi, leader of the People’s Progressive Party (PPP) of Guyana
Jayne, Randy, Assistant Director of the Office of Management and Budget
Jimenez, Ramon Emilio, Foreign Minister of the Dominican Republic
John, Patrick Roland, Premier and Prime Minister of Dominica
Jones, James Warren “Jim,” founder and leader of the People’s Temple of the Disciples of Christ
Kaiser, Edgar, Chairman of Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation
Katsaris, Maria, aide to Reverend Jim Jones, People’s Temple of the Disciples of Christ
Katz, Julius Louis, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic, Energy and Business Affairs from September 16, 1976, until November 29, 1979
Keane, John, Special Assistant, Assistant Secretary and U.S. Coordinator, Alliance for Progress, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
Kennedy, John F., President of the United States from 1961 until 1963
Kennedy, Mary Virginia, Special Assistant to the Senior Advisor to the Secretary, Department of State
King, John F., Political Officer, U.S. Embassy in Santo Domingo
King, Kurleigh, Barbadian politician and Secretary-General of CARICOM from 1979 until 1983
Kinsman, N. Richard, Political Officer, U.S. Embassy in Kingston
Kirk, Roger, Deputy Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Kissinger, Henry A., Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs until November 1975; Secretary of State from September 22, 1973 until January 20, 1977
Kozak, Michael G., Assistant Legal Advisor for Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
Kramer, Franklin D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Department of State
Kreisberg, Paul H., Deputy Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
Krueger, C. Robert, U.S. Ambassador at Large and Coordinator for Mexican Affairs from October 23, 1979, until February 1, 1981
Lagomarsino, Robert, member, U.S. House of Representatives (R–California)
Lake, William Anthony Kirzopp “Tony,” Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
Lampert, Harvey D., member, Office of Analysis for the American Republics, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Lance, Thomas Bertram “Bert,” Director of the Office of Management and Budget
Landis, Fred, political activist
Lane, Lyle F., Principal Officer of the U.S. Interests Section in Cuba
Lawrence, Loren E., U.S. Ambassador to Jamaica from March 23, 1979, until July 9, 1982
Layton, Larry, member of the People’s Temple of the Disciples of Christ
LeBourgeois, Julien D., member, Office of Caribbean Countries, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
Lincoln, Bonnie M., Economic Officer, U.S. Embassy in Port-of-Spain
Linneman, Joseph H., Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau for International Narcotic Matters, Department of State
Linowitz, Sol M., U.S. Representative to the Organization of American States
Lister, George, Special Assistant and Human Rights Officer, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
XXXII Persons

Lopez Portillo, Jose, President of Mexico
Louisy, Allan, Prime Minister of St. Lucia from 1979 until 1981
Loy, Frank E., Director of the Bureau of Refugee Programs from June 1, 1980, until January 30, 1981
Luckhoo, Lionel, Guyanese lawyer and attorney for the People’s Temple of the Disciples of Christ
Luers, William H., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs until 1977; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from 1977 until 1978; U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela from October 9, 1978
Lunt, Larry, U.S. citizen imprisoned by the Cuban Government until September 17, 1979

Macy, John, Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency
Madden, Frank, USAID Officer, Bahamas
Manley, Michael Norman, Prime Minister of Jamaica from 1972 until 1980; leader of the People’s National Party from 1969 to 1992
Mann, Laurence “Bonny,” Guyanese Ambassador to the United States
Margain, Hugo B., Mexican Ambassador to the United States from 1976 until 1982
Marshall, Ray, Secretary of Labor
Matheny, John, military advisor to Vice President Walter Mondale
Mathews, Jessica Tuchman, member, National Security Council Staff for Global Issues from January 1977 until June 1977
Mathis, Dawson, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D–Georgia)
Mayes, Charles William, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs from April 7, 1977, until April 9, 1980
McAfee, William, Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
McCoy, Richard A., Consul, U.S. Embassy in Georgetown
McGee, H., Liaison Officer, U.S. Embassy, Bahamas
McGovern, George, Senator (D–South Dakota)
McIntyre, James, Director of the Office of Management and Budget
McIntyre, Meredith Alister, Secretary-General of CARICOM from 1974 until 1977
McKenna, Margaret A., Deputy White House Counsel
McMahon, John N., Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency
McNamara, Robert S., President of the World Bank from 1968 until 1981
Mengistu Haile Mariam, leader of Ethiopia
Merino Rabago, Francisco, Mexican Minister of Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources
Miller, George William, Chairman of the Federal Reserve from March 1978 until August 1979; Secretary of the Treasury from August 1979 until January 1981
Miller, Thomas J., Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Moffett, William Adger, III, Vice-Consul, U.S. Embassy in Kingston
Mondale, Walter Frederick, Vice President of the United States
Montoya Mujica, Emilio, Mexican Secretary of Communications and Transport
Moore, Frank, Assistant and Congressional Liaison to the President of the United States
Morales, Claudio Rodrigues, U.S. citizen imprisoned by the Cuban Government until September 17, 1979
Munroe, Trevor St. George, leader of the Worker’s Party of Jamaica
Murphy, Daniel J., Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Muskie, Edmund Sixtus, Secretary of State from May 8, 1980, until January 18, 1981


Neddi, Archibald, Chief Justice of the Grenadian Supreme Court

Newsom, David D., Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from April 1978 until February 1981

Nivar Seijas, Neit, Chief of Police in Santo Domingo

Nolan, Richard M., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D–Minnesota)

Nimetz, Matthew, Counselor of the Department of State from March 30, 1977, until March 19, 1980; Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs from February 19, 1980, until December 5, 1980

Nixon, Patricia, First Lady of the United States from 1969 until 1974

Nixon, Richard M., President of the United States from 1969 until 1974

Nyerere, Julius K., President of Tanzania from 1964 until 1985

O’Donohue, Daniel A., Deputy Director, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Department of State from 1978 until 1981

O’Mahony, Joseph, Deputy Chief of Mission, Trinidad

Odlum, George William, Deputy Prime Minister of St. Lucia from 1979 until 1981

Odom, William E., Colonel, USA; Military Assistant to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from 1977 until 1981

Olson, Jack B., U.S. Ambassador to the Bahamas from November 17, 1976, until April 30, 1977

Ortiz, Francis Vincent, U.S. Ambassador to Barbados and Grenada from July 14, 1977, until May 15, 1979; Special Representative to Antigua, Dominica, St. Christopher-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent, resident at Bridgetown; U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala from July 3, 1979, until August 6, 1980

Ostrander, Nancy, U.S. Ambassador to Suriname from May 25, 1978, until July 8, 1980

Owen, David, British Foreign Secretary from 1977 until 1979


Owen, Roberts Bishop, Legal Adviser, Department of State

Oxman, Stephen, Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State

Padron, Jose Luis, Cuban Army Colonel; founder of the Cuban Import-Export Corporation

Pahlavi, Farah Diba, Wife of the Shah of Iran

Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza, Shah of Iran

Palm, Olaf, Prime Minister of Sweden from October 14, 1969, until his assassination on October 8, 1976

Palmieri, Victor, U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs

Parks, Patricia, member of the People’s Temple of the Disciples of Christ

Pastor, Robert A., member, National Security Council Staff and National Security Advisor for Latin America and the Caribbean from 1977 until 1981

Patten, Edward J., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D–New Jersey)

Pena Gomez, Jose Francisco, leader of the Dominican Revolutionary Party

Perez, Carlos Andres, President of Venezuela

Pierce, David C., member, Office of Caribbean Countries, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

Pindling, Lynden Oscar, Bahamian Prime Minister

Price, George Cadle, Prime Minister of British Honduras (Belize)


Porter, Bruce F., Economic/Political Officer, Bridgetown, Barbados and Grenada
XXXIV Persons

Powell, Joseph L. “Jody,” White House Press Secretary

Radix, Kendrick, Grenadian politician

Rodriguez, Carlos Rafael, Vice-President of the Council of State and Council of Ministers in Cuba

Rangel, Charles, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D–New York)

Ravales, Robin, Surinamese Under-Minister for Cultural Affairs

Reid, Ptolemy Alexander, Prime Minister of Guyana from 1980 until 1984


Resor, Stanley Rogers, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Richards, Henry, member, National Security Council Staff for Sub-Saharan Africa from February 1977 until November 1978

Richmond, Frederick, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D–New York)

Richmond, Julius Benjamin, Assistant Secretary for Health and Surgeon General

Rattray, Alfred A., Jamaican Ambassador to the United States

Rickert, Jonathan B. Political and Labor Officer, Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago

Roa Kouri, Raul, Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations

Roberts, George B., U.S. Ambassador to Guyana from October 12, 1979, until September 8, 1981

Robinson, Greg, photographer, San Francisco Examiner

Rodino, Peter W., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D–New Jersey)

Roldos, Jaime Aguilar, President of Ecuador

Romero, Carlos Humberto, President of El Salvador

Roper, Chris, Editor, Latin American Weekly Report

Rowlands, Ted, British Minister of State from 1976 until 1979

Ruimveld, Edward, Surinamese Minister of Defense

Russell, Kenneth, Bahamian politician

Ryan, Leo Joseph, Jr., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D–California)

Sadat, Anwar, President of Egypt from 1970 until 1981

Saenz, Ricardo Garcia, Mexican Secretary for Planning and Budget

Salomon, Georges, Haitian Ambassador to the United States from March 31, 1975, until November 14, 1979; Foreign Minister of Haiti from 1979 until 1981

Sanchez, Oscar Flores, Attorney General of Mexico

Sanchez-Parodi Montoto, Ramon, Chief of the Cuban Interests Section in the United States from 1977 until 1989

Sapia-Bosch, Alfonso, Chief, Latin America Division, Political Analysis, Central Intelligence Agency

Schechter, Jerrold, “Jerry,” member, Press and Congressional Liaison Office, National Security Council Staff; Press Officer and Associate Press Secretary from January 1977 until February 1980

Schlesinger, James R., Secretary of Energy from August 6, 1977, until August 23, 1979

Schuller, G.J., Rear Admiral, USN; Director, Inter-American Region, Department of Defense

Schneider, Mark L, Deputy Coordinator for Human Rights, Office of the Deputy Secretary of State until August 1977; Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs from 1977 until 1979


Seaga, Edward Philip George, Prime Minister of Jamaica from 1980 until 1989

Seitz, Raymond George Hardenbergh, Deputy Executive Secretary, Department of State
Seraphin, Oliver, Dominican Minister of Agriculture
Shankle, Arthur P., Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Nassau
Shelton, Sally Angela, U.S. Ambassador to Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, and Saint Lucia from May 17, 1979, until February 24, 1981, resident at Bridgetown; Special Representative to Antigua, Dominica, St. Christopher-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent, resident at Bridgetown; U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala from July 3, 1979, to August 6, 1980.
Shinn, William T., Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
Shulman, Marshall D., Special Advisor to Secretary of State Vance on the Soviet Union
Simcox, David E., Director, Office of Mexican Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
Smith, Carl, Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense from April 1978 until July 1983
Smith, Ian Douglas, Prime Minister of Rhodesia from 1965 until 1979
Smith, Wayne S., Principal Officer, U.S. Interests Section in Cuba
Solomon, Anthony Morton "Tony," Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs
Somoza Debayle, Anastasio, Nicaraguan President from May 1967 until May 1972
Southwell, Caleb Azariah Paul, Premier of St. Kitts and Nevis
Speier, Jackie, Staff Aide for Congressman Leo Ryan
Stapleton, Ruth Carter, sister of President Carter
Stedman, William P., Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
Stein, John H., Deputy Director of Operations, Central Intelligence Agency
Stevenson, Adlai E. III, Senator (D–Illinois)
Stimpson, Thomas, Jamaican Charge d’Affaires in Washington, DC
Stoen, John Victor, member of the People’s Temple of the Disciples of Christ and son of Timothy and Grace Stoen
Stoen, Timothy, member of the People’s Temple of the Disciples of Christ
Stoessel, Walter John, U.S. Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany
Stone, Richard Bernard, Senator (D–Florida)
Strauss, Robert S., Special Trade Representative and Special Envoy to the Middle East
 Suarez, Adolph, President of Spain
Svendsen, Eric E., member, Office of United Nations Political Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
Symms, Steven Douglas, member, U.S. House of Representatives (R–Idaho)

Taher, Daniel, Energy and Commercial Activities Chief, Office of Regional Economic Policy, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
Tarnoff, Peter, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Executive Secretary of the Department of State from April 1977 until February 1981
Taylor, Rush Walker, Jr., Charge d’Affaires, U.S. Embassy in Nassau
Theriot, Lawrence H. “Larry,” member, Office of East-West Policy and Planning, International Trade Administration, Department of Commerce
Thomson, James, member, National Security Council Staff for Defense Coordination from April 1977 until January 1981
Thornton, Thomas P., member, National Security Council Staff for South Asia/UN Matters
Thyden, James E., member, Office of Caribbean Countries, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
Tighe, Eugene, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency
XXXVI Persons


**Torras, Pelegrin,** Cuban Deputy Foreign Minister

**Tumminia, Frank,** Desk Officer for Guyana at the Department of State

**Tur, Juan,** U.S. citizen imprisoned by the Cuban Government until September 17, 1979

**Turner, Stansfield M.,** Director of Central Intelligence from March 1977

**Twaddell, William H.,** Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, Office of the Secretary, Department of State

**Vaky, Viron Peter,** U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela from June 16, 1976, until June 24, 1978; Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs from July 18, 1978, until November 30, 1979

**Valdez, Abelardo Lopez,** Assistant Administrator for Latin America and the Caribbean for USAID from 1977 until 1979; Chief of Protocol of the Department of State from October 12, 1979, until January 21, 1981

**Valme, Jean,** Chief of Police for Port-Au-Prince, Haiti

**Vance, Cyrus Roberts,** Secretary of State from January 21, 1977, until April 28, 1980

**Vander Jagt, Guy,** member, U.S. House of Representatives (R–Michigan)

**Vasev, Vladilen M.,** Minister-Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, DC

**Vest, George S.,** Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of European Affairs

**Volkman, Ernest,** U.S. investigative journalist

**Vorster, B.J.,** Prime Minister of South Africa from 1966 until 1978, State President of South Africa from 1978 until 1979

**Waldheim, Kurt Josef,** Secretary General of the United Nations from 1972 until 1981

**Wardally, James,** Grenadian citizen arrested by the U.S. government

**Warne, W. Robert,** Director, Office of Caribbean Countries, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

**Watson, Barbara Mae,** Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs from April 7, 1977, until August 17, 1977; U.S. Ambassador to Malaysia from August 20, 1980, until March 1, 1981

**Watson, Jack H.,** White House Chief of Staff

**Webb, Sidney James,** British socialist and economist

**Webster, William H.,** Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation

**Wheeler, William B.,** member, Office of Caribbean Affairs, Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, United States Agency for International Development

**Whitehead, Unison,** Foreign Minister of the People’s Revolutionary Government in Grenada

**Whyte, Winston,** leader of the United People’s Party of Grenada

**Williams, Eric,** Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago

**Wills, Frederick,** Guyanese Foreign Minister

**Witteveen, H Johannes,** Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund

**Wolf, Ira,** member, Office of the Counselor, Department of State

**Wolfe, Louis,** Co-editor of the *Covert Action Information Bulletin*

**Yost, Robert Lloyd,** U.S. Ambassador to the Dominican Republic from April 7, 1978, until June 7, 1982

**Young, Andrew Jackson,** U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations from January 27, 1977, until September 23, 1979

**Zablocki, Clement John,** member, U.S. House of Representatives (D–Wisconsin); Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs from 1977 until 1983

**Zurhellen, Joseph Owen,** U.S. Ambassador to Suriname from February 18, 1976, until June 2, 1978
Note on U.S. Covert Actions

In compliance with the *Foreign Relations of the United States* statute that requires inclusion in the *Foreign Relations* series of comprehensive documentation on major foreign policy decisions and actions, the editors have identified key documents regarding major covert actions and intelligence activities. The following note will provide readers with some organizational context on how covert actions and special intelligence operations in support of U.S. foreign policy were planned and approved within the U.S. Government. It describes, on the basis of declassified documents, the changing and developing procedures during the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter Presidencies.

Management of Covert Actions in the Truman Presidency

The Truman administration’s concern over Soviet “psychological warfare” prompted the new National Security Council to authorize, in NSC 4–A of December 1947, the launching of peacetime covert action operations. NSC 4–A made the Director of Central Intelligence responsible for psychological warfare, establishing at the same time the principle that covert action was an exclusively Executive Branch function. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) certainly was a natural choice but it was assigned this function at least in part because the Agency controlled unvouchedered funds, by which operations could be funded with minimal risk of exposure in Washington.1

The CIA’s early use of its new covert action mandate dissatisfied officials at the Departments of State and Defense. The Department of State, believing this role too important to be left to the CIA alone and concerned that the military might create a new rival covert action office in the Pentagon, pressed to reopen the issue of where responsibility for covert action activities should reside. Consequently, on June 18, 1948, a new NSC directive, NSC 10/2, superseded NSC 4–A.

NSC 10/2 directed the CIA to conduct “covert” rather than merely “psychological” operations, defining them as all activities “which are conducted or sponsored by this Government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and executed that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if un-

covered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them.”

The type of clandestine activities enumerated under the new directive included: “propaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberations [sic] groups, and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world. Such operations should not include armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage, counter-espionage, and cover and deception for military operations.”

The Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), newly established in the CIA on September 1, 1948, in accordance with NSC 10/2, assumed responsibility for organizing and managing covert actions. The OPC, which was to take its guidance from the Department of State in peacetime and from the military in wartime, initially had direct access to the State Department and to the military without having to proceed through the CIA’s administrative hierarchy, provided the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was informed of all important projects and decisions. In 1950 this arrangement was modified to ensure that policy guidance came to the OPC through the DCI.

During the Korean conflict the OPC grew quickly. Wartime commitments and other missions soon made covert action the most expensive and bureaucratically prominent of the CIA’s activities. Concerned about this situation, DCI Walter Bedell Smith in early 1951 asked the NSC for enhanced policy guidance and a ruling on the proper “scope and magnitude” of CIA operations. The White House responded with two initiatives. In April 1951 President Truman created the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) under the NSC to coordinate government-wide psychological warfare strategy. NSC 10/5, issued in October 1951, reaffirmed the covert action mandate given in NSC 10/2 and expanded the CIA’s authority over guerrilla warfare. The PSB was soon abolished by the incoming Eisenhower administration, but the expansion of the CIA’s covert action writ in NSC 10/5 helped ensure that covert action would remain a major function of the Agency.

As the Truman administration ended, the CIA was near the peak of its independence and authority in the field of covert action. Although the CIA continued to seek and receive advice on specific proj-

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2 NSC 10/2, June 18, 1948, is printed ibid., Document 292.
ects from the NSC, the PSB, and the departmental representatives originally delegated to advise the OPC, no group or officer outside of the DCI and the President himself had authority to order, approve, manage, or curtail operations.

**NSC 5412 Special Group; 5412/2 Special Group; 303 Committee**

The Eisenhower administration began narrowing the CIA’s latitude in 1954. In accordance with a series of National Security Council directives, the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence for the conduct of covert operations was further clarified. President Eisenhower approved NSC 5412 on March 15, 1954, reaffirming the Central Intelligence Agency’s responsibility for conducting covert actions abroad. A definition of covert actions was set forth; the DCI was made responsible for coordinating with designated representatives of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to ensure that covert operations were planned and conducted in a manner consistent with U.S. foreign and military policies; and the Operations Coordinating Board was designated the normal channel for coordinating support for covert operations among State, Defense, and the CIA. Representatives of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President were to be advised in advance of major covert action programs initiated by the CIA under this policy and were to give policy approval for such programs and secure coordination of support among the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA.5

A year later, on March 12, 1955, NSC 5412/1 was issued, identical to NSC 5412 except for designating the Planning Coordination Group as the body responsible for coordinating covert operations. NSC 5412/2 of December 28, 1955, assigned to representatives (of the rank of assistant secretary) of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President responsibility for coordinating covert actions. By the end of the Eisenhower administration, this group, which became known as the “NSC 5412/2 Special Group” or simply “Special Group,” emerged as the executive body to review and approve covert action programs initiated by the CIA.6 The membership of the Special Group varied depending upon the situation faced. Meetings were infrequent until 1959 when weekly meetings began to be held. Neither the CIA nor the Special Group adopted fixed criteria for bringing projects before the

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group; initiative remained with the CIA, as members representing other agencies frequently were unable to judge the feasibility of particular projects.7

After the Bay of Pigs failure in April 1961, General Maxwell Taylor reviewed U.S. paramilitary capabilities at President Kennedy’s request and submitted a report in June that recommended strengthening high-level direction of covert operations. As a result of the Taylor Report, the Special Group, chaired by the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, and including Deputy Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Lyman Lemnitzer, assumed greater responsibility for planning and reviewing covert operations. Until 1963 the DCI determined whether a CIA-originated project was submitted to the Special Group. In 1963 the Special Group developed general but informal criteria, including risk, possibility of success, potential for exposure, political sensitivity, and cost (a threshold of $25,000 was adopted by the CIA), for determining whether covert action projects were submitted to the Special Group.8

From November 1961 to October 1962 a Special Group (Augmented), whose membership was the same as the Special Group plus Attorney General Robert Kennedy and General Taylor (as Chairman), exercised responsibility for Operation Mongoose, a major covert action program aimed at overthrowing the Castro regime in Cuba. When President Kennedy authorized the program in November, he designated Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale, Assistant for Special Operations to the Secretary of Defense, to act as chief of operations, and Lansdale coordinated the Mongoose activities among the CIA and the Departments of State and Defense. The CIA units in Washington and Miami had primary responsibility for implementing Mongoose operations, which included military, sabotage, and political propaganda programs.9

President Kennedy also established a Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) on January 18, 1962, when he signed NSAM No. 124. The Special Group (CI), set up to coordinate counter-insurgency activities separate from the mechanism for implementing NSC 5412/2, was to confine itself to establishing broad policies aimed at preventing and resisting subversive insurgency and other forms of indirect aggression in friendly countries. In early 1966, in NSAM No. 341, President Johnson assigned responsibility for the direction and coordination of counter-

8 Ibid., p. 82.
insurgency activities overseas to the Secretary of State, who established a Senior Interdepartmental Group to assist in discharging these responsibilities.  

NSAM No. 303, June 2, 1964, from Bundy to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the DCI, changed the name of “Special Group 5412” to “303 Committee” but did not alter its composition, functions, or responsibility. Bundy was the chairman of the 303 Committee.

The Special Group and the 303 Committee approved 163 covert actions during the Kennedy administration and 142 during the Johnson administration through February 1967. The 1976 Final Report of the Church Committee, however, estimated that of the several thousand projects undertaken by the CIA since 1961, only 14 percent were considered on a case-by-case basis by the 303 Committee and its predecessors (and successors). Those not reviewed by the 303 Committee were low-risk and low-cost operations. The Final Report also cited a February 1967 CIA memorandum that included a description of the mode of policy arbitration of decisions on covert actions within the 303 Committee system. The CIA presentations were questioned, amended, and even on occasion denied, despite protests from the DCI. Department of State objections modified or nullified proposed operations, and the 303 Committee sometimes decided that some agency other than the CIA should undertake an operation or that CIA actions requested by Ambassadors on the scene should be rejected.

The effectiveness of covert action has always been difficult for any administration to gauge, given concerns about security and the difficulty of judging the impact of U.S. initiatives on events. In October 1969 the new Nixon administration required annual 303 Committee reviews for all covert actions that the Committee had approved and automatic termination of any operation not reviewed after 12 months. On February 17, 1970, President Nixon signed National Security Decision Memorandum 40, which superseded NSC 5412/2 and changed the name of the covert action approval group to the 40 Committee, in part because the 303 Committee had been named in the media. The Attorney Gen-

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12 Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence, pp. 56–57.

eral was also added to the membership of the Committee. NSDM 40 reaffirmed the DCI’s responsibility for the coordination, control, and conduct of covert operations and directed him to obtain policy approval from the 40 Committee for all major and “politically sensitive” covert operations. He was also made responsible for ensuring an annual review by the 40 Committee of all approved covert operations.

The 40 Committee met regularly early in the Nixon administration, but over time the number of formal meetings declined and business came to be conducted via couriers and telephone votes. The Committee actually met only for major new proposals. As required, the DCI submitted annual status reports to the 40 Committee for each approved operation. According to the 1976 Church Committee Final Report, the 40 Committee considered only about 25 percent of the CIA’s individual covert action projects, concentrating on major projects that provided broad policy guidelines for all covert actions. Congress received briefings on only a few proposed projects. Not all major operations, moreover, were brought before the 40 Committee: President Nixon in 1970 instructed the DCI to promote a coup d’etat against Chilean President Salvador Allende without Committee coordination or approval.14

Presidential Findings Since 1974 and the Operations Advisory Group

The Hughes-Ryan amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 brought about a major change in the way the U.S. Government approved covert actions, requiring explicit approval by the President for each action and expanding Congressional oversight and control of the CIA. The CIA was authorized to spend appropriated funds on covert actions only after the President had signed a “finding” and informed Congress that the proposed operation was important to national security.15

Executive Order 11905, issued by President Ford on February 18, 1976, in the wake of major Congressional investigations of CIA activities by the Church and Pike Committees, replaced the 40 Committee with the Operations Advisory Group, composed of the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the DCI, who retained responsibility for the planning and implementation of covert operations. The OAG was required to hold formal meetings to develop recommendations for the President regarding a covert action and to conduct periodic reviews of previously-approved operations. EO 11905

14 Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence, pp. 54–55, 57.
15 Public Law 93–559.
also banned all U.S. Government employees from involvement in political assassinations, a prohibition that was retained in succeeding executive orders, and prohibited involvement in domestic intelligence activities.\textsuperscript{16}

Approval and oversight requirements for covert action continued to be governed by the Hughes-Ryan amendment well into the Carter administration, even as the new administration made alterations to the executive branch’s organizational structure for covert action.

President Carter retained the NSC as the highest executive branch organization to review and guide U.S. foreign intelligence activities. As part of a broader NSC reorganization at the outset of his administration, President Carter replaced the Operations Advisory Group (OAG) with the NSC’s Special Coordination Committee (SCC), which explicitly continued the same operating procedures as the former OAG.\textsuperscript{17} Membership of the SCC, when meeting for the purpose of reviewing and making recommendations on covert actions (as well as sensitive surveillance activities), replicated that of the former OAG—namely: the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the Secretaries of State and Defense; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Attorney General and Director of the Office of Management and Budget (the latter two as observers). The designated chairman of all SCC meetings was the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Carter formalized the SCC’s replacement of the OAG in EO 11985 of May 13, 1977, which amended President Ford’s EO 11905 on “United States Foreign Intelligence activities.”\textsuperscript{18} In practice, the SCC for covert action and sensitive surveillance activities came to be known as the SCC (Intelligence) or the SCC-I, to distinguish it from other versions of the SCC.

The SCC’s replacement of the OAG was reaffirmed in E.O. 12036 of January 24, 1978, which replaced E.O. 11905 and its amendments. E.O. 12036 also reaffirmed the same membership for the SCC-I, but identified the Attorney General and the Director of the Office of Management


Note on U.S. Covert Actions

and Budget as full members of the Committee, rather than merely observers.

Also in the first days of the Carter administration, the SCC-I established a lower-level working group to study and review proposals for covert action and other sensitive intelligence matters and report to the SCC-I. This interagency working group was chaired by the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (David Aaron), or in his absence, the NSC Director for Intelligence Coordination. The working group was named the Special Activities Working Group (SAWG). The SAWG was active in early Carter administration reviews of ongoing covert action, and remained active through at least 1978. NSC officials in mid-1978 sought to downgrade or abolish the SAWG and replace it as needed with ad hoc working groups. Internal NSC reviews at the end of the Carter administration state that the SAWG gradually fell out of use. By late 1979, the means for debating, developing, and guiding certain covert actions was an interagency working group chaired by Aaron at the NSC. This group was referred to by several names during the late Carter administration, including the Deputy’s (or Deputies) group, the Aaron group, the interagency group, the Black Chamber, and the Black Room.

The Carter administration made use of a new category of presidential findings for “world-wide” or “general” (or “generic”) covert operations. This continued a practice initiated late in the Ford administration in response to the Hughes-Ryan requirement for presidential findings. The worldwide category covered lower-risk operations that were directed at broad policy goals implemented on a worldwide basis as assets allowed. These operations utilized existing assets as well as existing liaison contacts with foreign intelligence or security services, and in some cases also consisted of routine training or procurement undertaken to assist foreign intelligence partners or other agencies of the USG. A new type of document—known as “Perspectives”—provided more specific tasking guidance for these general, worldwide covert activities. Perspectives detailed the themes to be stressed in furtherance of a particular policy goal. Riskier operations required their own presidential finding or Memorandum of Notification (see below). Perspectives were drafted by the CIA and cleared by the Department of State, so that the CIA could vet the operational feasibility and risks of the program while State could assess the diplomatic risks and verify that the program was consistent with overall foreign policy goals. At least initially, Perspectives did not require further coordination with the OAG, SCC, or the President. Once an agreed-upon Perspectives document was finalized by CIA and the Department of State, it was transmitted to the field, and posts were required to make periodic reports on any achievements under the Perspectives guidelines. Beginning in 1978, actions in this worldwide category were authorized by the President as specific line-item additions to a previously existing “world-wide”
finding, though Perspectives were still used to provide additional details.

Another new document used during the Carter administration was the “Memorandum of Notification” (MON). MONs were initially used to introduce higher-risk, significantly higher-cost, or more geographically-specific operations under a previously-approved worldwide or general objective outlined19 in a Perspectives document. Like Perspectives, MONs had to be coordinated between the CIA and the Department of State, but they also required broader interagency coordination within the SAWG or SCC. MONs subsequently came to be used for significant changes to any type of finding, not just worldwide ones. Entirely new covert actions continued to require new presidential findings. The Hughes-Ryan amendment stipulated that Congress be notified of new findings “in a timely fashion,” but did not specify how much time that meant. During the Carter administration, the CIA typically notified Congress of new covert initiatives within 48 hours, including those outlined in Perspectives or MONs.

In October 1980, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1981—also known as the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980—scaled back the Hughes-Ryan amendment’s provisions for congressional oversight of covert action. While the requirement to notify Congress about presidential findings remained in place, the new Act limited the committees of Congress that had to be briefed to the two intelligence committees, and also explicitly clarified that this requirement to keep the committees “fully and currently informed” did not constitute a requirement for congressional approval of covert action or other intelligence activities. Moreover, the new Act stipulated that if the President determined it was “essential to limit prior notice to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States,” the President could limit prior notice to the chairmen and ranking minority members of the two intelligence committees, the Speaker and minority leader of the House, and the majority and minority leaders of the Senate—a group that came to be known as the “Gang of Eight.” If prior notice of a covert action was withheld, the President was required to inform the two intelligence committees “in a timely fashion” and provide a statement of the reasons for not giving prior notice.20

19 Executive Order 12036, “United States Foreign Intelligence Activities,” January 24, 1978, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 14, No. 4 (January 30, 1978), pp. 194–214. Since E.O. 12036 governed foreign intelligence activities, all references in the E.O. to the “SCC” were effectively references to what was known in practice as the SCC (Intelligence), or SCC–I.

Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean

Cuba

1. Briefing Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Luers) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, January 28, 1977

Cuban Initiative on Fisheries

The Swiss Ambassador in Havana, Etienne Serra, forwarded today a note handed him on January 26 by the Cuban Deputy Foreign Minister. The note (informal translation at Tab 1 and Spanish-French text at Tab 2) offers to negotiate directly with the U.S. Government over issues arising from the establishment of a 200 miles U.S. fishing zone as of March 1, 1977.

This is the first time in our memory that the Cubans have taken the initiative, through official channels, to propose bilateral negotiations with us on any subject since diplomatic relations were broken in 1961. It was our action of establishing a 200 mile fishing zone which created the need for negotiations with Cuba. Thus, the offer itself is a signal, made explicit by the Deputy Foreign Minister’s comment that “positive resolution of this matter would be regarded as evidence of a new US political orientation toward Cuba.”

We shall send you an action memorandum at the beginning of next week recommending a reply to the Cuban proposal and on return-

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850170–1620. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Gleysteen; concurred in by L and OES/OFA/OCA. Vance initialed “CV” at the bottom of the page.

2 Tabs are attached but not printed.
The Carter administration allowed both the travel ban and the 1973 Hijacking Agreement to expire and ended reconnaissance flights over Cuba.

2. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 5, 1977, 10:00–10:55 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Mr. Alfredo Duran
Zbigniew Brzezinski

SUBJECT

Cuban Relations

I. Mr. Duran made the following points:

1. Cuba is in a very poor economic situation, and Castro wishes to solve his economic problem by improvement in US/Cuban relations.

2. Castro will strive to postpone diplomatic relations because he fears the political impact in Cuba.

3. U.S. priorities tend to be wrong for they put too much emphasis on compensation for expropriated property and not enough on human rights.

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 10, Cuba, 1–2/77. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. Alfredo Duran was a Cuban exile who participated in the Bay of Pigs landing in Cuba, and was Chairman of the Democratic Party in Florida.
4. Human rights issues which it would be appropriate to raise include:
   a. Red Cross visits to prisons,
   b. Some relief for the sick survivors of the Bay of Pigs still in Cuban prisons,
   c. Visiting rights for U.S. Cubans to Cuba,
   d. Relaxation of travel rights for Cubans,
   e. Internal amnesty, etc.
2. It was agreed that Mr. Duran will give Dr. Brzezinski names of bipartisan U.S. Cubans with whom these issues can further be discussed.
3. The possibility should be explored of a speech by Ambassador Young in the UN on the human rights issue if Castro is not responsive. Castro should not be allowed to set the pace and the tone of the US/Soviet relationship.
4. Reference was made to the US/Hungarian example where the Hungarians made some initial accommodation on human rights, followed by an improvement in US/Hungarian relations, followed by more extensive internal Hungarian accommodation on human rights issues. In the case of Cuban relations, further consideration would have to be given also to Cuban external activity in the Caribbean, in America and elsewhere.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

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2 This speech was not given.
3 In 1966, 10 years after the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian Revolution, the United States and Hungary began taking small steps toward improved relations through an exchange of Ambassadors. The two countries signed a bilateral trade agreement in 1978.
4 Printed from a copy with this typed signature.
3. **Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Vance in Cairo**

Washington, February 17, 1977, 0335Z

36308. Tosec 020074. For the Secretary from Todman. Subject: My debriefing of Bingham on his Havana trip.²

1. I met with Representative Bingham at length on February 16 to debrief him on two meetings he had with Castro totalling 8 hours as well as with Rodriguez and other senior Cuban officials.

2. Bingham’s strongest impression, and he will pass this to the President during an appointment he has on February 22, is that Castro is personally eager to normalize relations with us, but Bingham is uncertain whether this would be fully supported by doctrinaire and militant elements of his regime. Bingham thinks now is a uniquely favorable time to move because Castro of course is very much on top. Bingham also believes congressional reaction would be as favorable as at any time, with 15–30 members strongly opposed, 15–30 members who would carry the ball for the administration, and the strong Democratic majorities in both Houses disposed to follow strong Presidential leadership.

3. Castro was adamant that the embargo had to be lifted before the 1973 Hijacking Agreement can be reinstated or before official negotiations can begin. This agreement can only be discussed in a wider framework; otherwise it would be misunderstood by Cuban public opinion. A new hijacking agreement, once the embargo is lifted, could either precede or follow resumption of diplomatic relations.

4. In the meantime Castro wishes to discuss fisheries issues directly with us, to have sports and cultural exchanges, and to cooperate with us and perhaps Jamaica in combatting a sugar cane blight which recently appeared in Jamaica and could spread to Cuba and our southern states. Castro would not rule out secret discussions with us on the broader issues.

5. Cubans said they would welcome lifting of restrictions on travel by American citizens to Cuba. But they are incapable of handling large numbers of tourists and already have more Canadians than they can handle.

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¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 13, Cuba, 1–4/77. Confidential; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Gleysteen; cleared by Luers and in S/S; approved by Todman. Vance was in Cairo to meet with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat about the Middle East peace process.

² Jonathan Bingham (D–NY), a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, was an advocate of lifting the U.S. embargo on Cuba.
6. On Angola, Castro stressed Cuba’s African ties and was ambivalent about Cuban future involvement in other South African countries. Cuba would be guided by its principles but also was aware the negative effect this would have on US-Cuban relations. He described Cuba as being between US and African pressures. Cuban troops in Angola had been cut in half (but he did not give the peak figure except to say it was higher than Kissinger’s highest public estimates). Cuba is rotating its troops, but there is net reduction. They will stay in Angola as long as needed because of the South African threat. Cuba has 4,000 civilian technicians in Angola and will send more.

7. Rodriguez said Cuba had 9 American CIA agents in prison. They might be released, not as a humanitarian gesture, but as a goodwill gesture in the process of larger discussions.

8. As for Cuban political prisoners this was strictly a Cuban affair. Castro harshly said Huber Matos would remain incarcerated until the last day of his term.

9. On Guantanamo Castro merely commented that the US does not maintain bases by force anywhere else but there.

Hartman

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3 On February 16, during a discussion of U.S. relations with Angola, Carter stated, “If I can be convinced that Cuba wants to remove their aggravating influence from other countries in this hemisphere, will not participate in violence in nations across the ocean, will recommit the former relationship that existed in Cuba toward human rights, then I would be willing to move toward normalizing relationships with Cuba as well.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book I, p. 173)

4 In telegram 10646 to all American Republic diplomatic posts, January 15, 1976, the Department estimated that Cuba had “over 9,900” troops in Angola. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760016–1151) Documentation on the Ford administration’s reaction to the presence of Cuban troops in Angola is in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–11, Part 1, Documents on Mexico; Central America; and the Caribbean, 1973–1976.

5 Huber Matos supported the revolt against Batista, but later turned against Castro’s regime. He was released along with other political prisoners and left Cuba in October 1979. (Telegram 4467, from San Jose, September 28, 1979; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File D790448–0162)
4. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Todman) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, February 22, 1977

Your Meeting with Cuban Community Leaders
Friday, February 25, 3:00 PM

PARTICIPANTS

US
The Secretary

Cuban Community
Dr. Carlos Prio Socarras
Ex-President of Cuba
PHONETIC: PREE-oh
ADDRESSED: Dr. Prio
Mr. Erneldo Oliva, Deputy Commander
Bay of Pigs
Mr. Alfredo Duran, Chairman
Democratic Party Florida
Mr. Manuel Reboso, Commissioner
City of Miami
Mr. Alberto Cardenas,
President Ford’s Latin campaign manager
in Florida
Mr. Manuel Arques, President
Miami Cuban Chamber of Commerce

Photographers will be present briefly at the beginning of the meeting.

CHECKLIST

—Welcome—Dr. Prio because of his past position and others because of importance in contemporary life of Cuban community.

—Style—we will approach bilateral talks with Cuba cautiously and as adversary.

—Human Rights—top objective will be to bring about greater family visits and release of political prisoners.

SETTING

The Cuban exile community accepts normalization of relations with Cuba as inevitable. But it will be a traumatic moment for most. The visitors will be polite, apt to jump to far-reaching conclusions, and will express

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840116–1687. Confidential; Nodis. Drafted by Gleysteen, Keane, and Jacobini. Luers initialed for Todman. Sent through Habib. Vance initialed “CV” at the bottom of the page. Biographic sketches of the Cuban community leaders are attached but not printed.
gratitude toward the US, but grave reservations about any dialogue with Castro. The group is far from homogeneous. Dr. Prio is the most senior and may grand-stand. His son-in-law, Alfredo Duran, will smooth things. Our objective is to calm the emotions of the Cuban community, solicit their cooperation, advice, and help. The fact that you are meeting with them about policy before it is implemented is unprecedented. This is your main advantage in what could prove to be a difficult encounter. You should stress the benefits of normalization to the community: the only way to bring about increased family visits and the only hope of freeing political prisoners.

BACKGROUND/ANALYSIS

Half of the middle class of Cuba moved to the US during the 1960’s. Whole families or individuals got away in the early part of the decade, including a good portion of Cuba’s managerial and professional elite. Many remained in Cuba for patriotic or private reasons. There are few Cuban families in the US which do not have respected and loved close relatives in Cuba. The massive 1968–73 airlift, financed by the US, brought over almost 300,000 Cubans. Towards the end these were mainly the old and infirm; from the outset, the airlift excluded males of military age.

The attitude toward normalization among 650,000 odd Cuban community in the US ranges from outright hostility by the elderly, to a 50–50 split among those under 30 years favoring or opposing. The Cuban community is distinguished for being hard-working and law abiding. But on the fringe there is a political tradition of violence and extortion, sometimes mixed with organized crime. This fringe has produced a string of terrorist acts in the name of a continuing struggle to overthrow Castro.

It is probable that immediately following the meeting and after they return home, the Cuban leaders will stress to the press how they warned you of the dangers of negotiating with Fidel and try to disassociate themselves from any appearance of endorsing a possible US dialogue with Cuba. But they will be grateful for the courtesy of having been consulted. Their pride and responsibility, especially among the Democrats, will have been engaged.

Both the Cuban community here and the Cubans in Havana will regard your Friday meeting as the opening shot in starting bilateral contact with Cuba.

All of the Cuban leaders have agreed to attend your meeting except Andres Rivero Agüero, President-elect of Cuba in 1959 who never took office. He was one of Batista’s proteges. The Cubans have agreed not to leak the meeting to the press. We doubt this is possible.

We shall be sending up separate contingency press guidance.
ISSUES/TALKING POINTS

1. Normalization

_Cuban Exile Position:_ Castro has attached himself umbilically with Moscow. He is surrounded by those who have been trained in Russia or who are emotionally attached to Russia and world revolution. Fidel Castro may have a streak of Cuban nationalism in him, but this is balanced by undying hatred of the US.

_U.S. Position—Your Talking Points_

—For the past 18 years, government-to-government relations have been hostile; friendship between the peoples is unchanged.
—Castro cannot be overthrown except by military force and the US public will not support this.
—Cuba has exchanged its close relationship with the US for dependence on the USSR; we can only reverse this historical trend if we offer Castro an alternative.
—The process of normalization will be difficult and slow; no firm US decisions have been taken.

2. Cuban Political Prisoners

_Cuban Exile Position:_ The release of other political prisoners should be a precondition to any resumption of relations.

_U.S. Position—Your Talking Points_

—Release of Matos and other political prisoners is a realistic prospect only if the process of normalization gets under way, and as a unilateral gesture by Castro.
—If we insist on release of political prisoners as a precondition, the negotiations will never get started and prisoners like Matos will end their lives in jail.

3. Reunification of Cuban Families

_Cuban Exile Position:_ Castro will be slow and parsimonious about permitting family visits. _But most Cubans want to revisit their homeland, and liberality by Castro on this issue would be significant._

_U.S. Position—Your Talking Points_

—The division of Cuban families is the greatest human tragedy of the hostile US-Cuban relationship.
—We can only correct this injustice by reestablishing a new relationship with Cuba.
—Castro is unlikely to permit visits by those who are outspokenly against his rule, or who have participated in organizations dedicated
to his overthrow, but he probably will permit visits both ways for Cuban families if US-Cuban bilateral relations stabilize.

4. Fisheries

*Cuban Exile Position:* The US can simply arrest violators of our fishery laws. However, Cuban exiles recognize the constraints of international law and are prepared to accept the need of direct US-Cuban discussions.

*U.S. Position—Your Talking Points*

—We have to talk about fisheries issues immediately under our international law obligations.

5. Hijacking Agreement

*Cuban Exile Position:* It was airport security measures, and not the 1973 Agreement with Castro, which cut down hijackings. However, the exiles are prepared to accept direct US-Cuban discussions.

*U.S. Position—Your Talking Points*

—The expiration of the 1973 Hijacking Agreement between Cuba and the US also concerns us. We need to discuss it with the Cubans soon.2

6. Style

*Cuban Exile Position:* Kissinger was devious. There should be no repetition of the backstairs diplomacy that Kissinger conducted with Castro.3 The Cuban Community should be kept authoritatively and accurately informed of all significant developments.

*U.S. Position—Your Talking Points*

—We plan to be tough in the negotiations, to treat the Cubans as adversaries.

—We will give away nothing of legitimate concern to the Cuban Community.

—The Cuban Community in the US will be consulted and their advice sought regularly.

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2 See Document 1.
3 Kissinger initially pursued a policy of normalization with Cuba without keeping the exile community informed. When the embargo against Cuba was eased in 1975, the Department reported that some exiles characterized the move as “a betrayal of not only their cause but the cause of freedom in general.” (Telegram Tosec 100210/203733 to Kissinger, August 27, 1975; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750296–0480)
7. Terrorism

Cuban Exile Position: In dealing with Castro ends justify the means. Is terrorism worse than what Castro inflicts on Angola and his threats to Latin America? However, Cuban exiles agree in principle that terrorism is morally wrong and will discourage it.

U.S. Position—Your Talking Points

—Terrorism against Cuba has become a serious foreign policy problem in the past few years.
—Such activity must end. It is alien to our political tradition and will not be tolerated.
—The FBI has been asked to increase its efforts to stamp out this scourge.

8. Further Collaboration

Cuban Exile Position: Would welcome as close and frequent consultations as possible.

U.S. Position—Your Talking Points

—The State Department would like to keep in touch individually or collectively with those present about the evolution of US-Cuban relations.
—We want their support and understanding.
—Agree to further meetings, perhaps at a lower level.
—In return we expect a realistic, hard, and honest representation of our position to the Cuban Community.4

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4 No record of the meeting has been found. According to press reports, the exiles declared “they were unanimously opposed to any United States negotiations with the Cuban government of Fidel Castro.” (David Binder, “Exiles Tell Vance They Are Opposed to Any U.S.-Cuban Parley,” The New York Times, February 26, p. 3)
5. Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Information Cable¹


COUNTRY
Cuba

DOI
Mid-February 1977

SUBJECT
Cuban Desire to Begin Direct Negotiations for Renewed Relations With the U.S. as Soon as Possible

ACQ

SOURCE

Summary: [2½ lines not declassified] Cuba wants to begin direct negotiations with the U.S. for renewed relations as soon as possible. The Cubans hope to achieve full diplomatic relations quickly through direct negotiations with agreement on both sides to pursue immediately thereafter specific issues, such as the release of U.S. prisoners, U.S. economic sanctions against Cuba and the existence of the Guantanamo base. He said the Cubans also want these negotiations to begin immediately so the anti-hijacking agreement with the U.S. may be renegotiated. End summary.

1. [3 lines not declassified], regarding the possibility of renewed relations between Cuba and the U.S. According to the Cuban official, the Cuban hierarchy is in unanimous agreement that negotiations with the U.S. should begin as soon as possible and that these negotiations should be conducted directly between representatives of the two countries rather than through an intermediary such as Mexico. The Cuban official said that the Cubans are interested in the possibility of renewed relations because of the desire to adhere to the socialist concept of peaceful coexistence and for obvious pragmatic economic reasons. They believe that such negotiations should begin as soon as possible before U.S. politicians jeopardize their commencement through assertions that the U.S. must insist on preconditions before meeting with Cuban officials. He explained that Fidel Castro Ruz, Cuban President of the Coun-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 10, Cuba, 1–2/77. Secret; Sensitive; Noforn; Nocontract.
cils of State and Ministers, in defense of his own political considerations might react negatively to such statements and torpedo the negotiations before they even get started.

2. The Cuban official enumerated several of the obstacles to renewed relations with the U.S., such as U.S. economic sanctions against Cuba, imprisoned U.S. citizens in Cuba, and the continued existence of the Guantanamo base. He insisted, however, that relations with the U.S. now have such a high priority that senior Cuban officials would not allow any issue to block negotiations. He added that the important first step of direct communication should lead quickly to full diplomatic relations with agreement on both sides to pursue the specific issues immediately thereafter. As an example, the Cuban official said that he believed all U.S. prisoners would be released very soon after negotiations begin but that such topics as U.S. implementation of the 200-mile fishing zone and frozen Cuban assets in the U.S. might take longer to resolve.

3. The Cuban official said that another motive for Cuba's wanting negotiations to begin immediately is the need to renegotiate the anti-hijacking agreement which is of great importance for both nations. Referring to the crash of the Cubana airliner in October 1976\(^2\) which resulted in Cuba’s withdrawal from the anti-hijacking agreement with the U.S., he said the world is full of demented persons against whom both the U.S. and Cuba must take precautions.

4. The Cuban official said that perhaps the most significant benefit which the U.S. would gain from renewed relations is access of U.S. business to the nearby Cuban market. He said that at high levels in Havana the Cubans are talking in terms of U.S. business gaining U.S. $900 million the first year following renewed relations through trade with Cuba. As to benefits to be gained by the Cubans, he said, Cuba’s economic problems might be somewhat alleviated by the ability to sell its sugar to the U.S. market, which is scant hours away by ship.

5. (Headquarters Comment: A regular source [1 line not declassified] reported that in late January 1977 a Cuban military attache in Latin America said that the Cuban Government expects the new U.S. administration to establish diplomatic relations with Cuba. The military attache said that Cuba needs to renew relations with the U.S. because of Cuba’s economic problems and its need to regain the U.S. market. He also said that the U.S. would have to lift the economic blockade before Cuba will make any move toward improving relations with the U.S.)

6. Field Dissem: None.

\(^2\) Cubana Flight 455 crashed on October 6, 1976, en route to Jamaica, killing 73 people. A subsequent analysis of the crash concluded that the plane was brought down by two bombs on board. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–11, Part 1, Documents on Mexico; Central America; and the Caribbean, 1973–1976, Documents 319, 320, 321, and 322.
6. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\(^1\)

Washington, February 26, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Secretary of Commerce
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

PRC Meeting on Cuba

Within the context of the Policy Review Memorandum on Latin America (PRM/NSC–17),\(^2\) the President has approved the holding of a separate meeting of the Policy Review Committee by March 9, 1977, devoted to the question of strategies for negotiations with Cuba with the purpose of normalizing relations. A paper should be prepared by the State Department (no more than 15 pages) in coordination with the Departments of Defense, Treasury, Commerce, Justice, and the Central Intelligence Agency. The paper should address itself to four sets of questions:

1. **Interests.** What are U.S. national and particular interests in a resumption of relations with Cuba, and what interests argue against normalization? These interests should be weighed in terms of their intrinsic importance to the U.S. and in terms of the order, from a tactical perspective (vis-a-vis Cuba and domestic groups in the United States), which they should be advanced in negotiations.

2. **Issues.** The issues which should be discussed from the Cuban perspective, include: the embargo (total embargo; food and medicines), ending of acts of aggression (Cuban terrorist activities), counter-claims (injury due to embargo), trade relations, and the Guantanamo Base. From the American side, the issues include: human rights (U.S. political and other prisoners, American citizens in Cuba, Cubans with families

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\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 7, Cuba, 2–5/77. Secret. Copies were sent to the U.S. Representative to the UN, the Secretaries of Agriculture and Labor, the Director of OMB, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, the Administrator of AID, the Director of ACDA, the Chairman of the JCS, and the Special Trade Representative.

in the U.S., Cuban political prisoners, visitations); compensation for expropriated American assets; Guantanamo Base; Cuba’s international political and military activities (including Puerto Rico); and Soviet-Cuban military ties. The common issues of discussion include the anti-hijacking agreement, fisheries jurisdiction, and resumption of normal diplomatic relations. The paper should include a discussion of the most desirable order in which the U.S. should raise these issues, and the most feasible order, given possible Cuban positions.

3. Forum. What is the best mechanism or forum to discuss these issues from the perspective of U.S. interests?

4. Options. The paper should include a discussion of alternative negotiation positions and time-tables for discussing these issues.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

7. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, March 8, 1977

SUBJECT

Cuba Policy—PRC Meeting

Attached at Tab A is the discussion paper on Cuba for the PRC meeting tomorrow, at Tab B is a Table which groups the issues on the U.S.-Cuban agenda according to likelihood and ease of resolution, and at Tab C, a draft Presidential Directive. State, Defense, Treasury, and Commerce are all basically supportive of an Administration position to improve relations with Cuba. Commerce is especially enthusiastic over the prospect of new trade with Cuba.

The alternative negotiating strategies are not defined very sharply for the simple reason that State essentially wants its current efforts ratified by the PRC so that it can go forward and probe the Cuban positions on a more official basis. I think, however, that it would be a

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 7, Cuba, 2-5/77. Secret. Sent for information. A copy was sent to Aaron.

2 Tabs are attached but not printed.
mistake to merely ratify the drift of current policy without giving it more direction and coherence than it has had, or the attached paper recommends.

1. Discussion of Current Policy

Few areas have been subject to so much foreign policymaking in this first month as U.S. policy toward Cuba. On January 31, Secretary Vance said he would not set any preconditions on discussions with Cuba. The President on February 16, said that several Cuban actions, including improvement in the status of human rights and withdrawal of its military forces from Angola, were necessary before “normalization” could occur. On March 4, the Secretary of State said, and on the next day the President concurred, that full normalization would require the conditions mentioned by the President, but direct discussions could begin without preconditions.

Besides these statements of interest, there have been several decisions. In response to a note from the Cuban Government dated January 24, the Department of State on February 17 sent a note to the Cuban Foreign Minister stating that the United States Government was “prepared to discuss . . . at an early date, issues arising from the entry into force of the fishery conservation zone on March 1, 1977.” (On March 4, the Secretary announced this at a press conference.) All that remains is to set the time and place for discussions. On March 1, the Secretary of State decided to allow the travel restrictions, which technically bar travel to Cuba to expire on March 18. The Secretary also approved travel to Cuba by a group of South Dakota basketball players, and Philip Habib informed Baseball Commissioner Bowie Kuhn that he could organize an exchange of baseball teams.

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3 See the Department of State Bulletin, February 21, 1977, p. 143.
6 See Document 1.
7 See the Department of State Bulletin, April 11, 1977, p. 346.
9 On February 23, Habib wrote a memorandum for the files, which indicated that he had been contacted by Kuhn, who reported that Fabio Ruiz, Director of the Cuban Sports Directorate, was interested in having the New York Yankees travel to Cuba. (Department of State, Records of Philip C. Habib, 1976–1978, Lot 81D5, Box 3, PCH—Correspondence—Official, January, 1977–June, 1977) On March 21, Todman wrote to Vance and reported that the Cubans had called off the match. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770049–1372)
On March 5, in answer to a question by a Yankee baseball fan, eager to see his team play the Cubans in Havana, President Carter suggestively called it “a possibility.”

The apparent purpose of the hints, statements, and decisions made by Secretary Vance and the President was to try to create the atmosphere and the conditions which would make a movement toward normalization of relations possible. In my opinion, the ad hoc and almost random character of the statements were useful in getting things moving, but unless future decisions are better coordinated and made a part of a deliberate policy, we may lose control of the process. Indeed, we may have already.

Fundamentally, the question which Secretary Vance has set for himself is how to get the process moving. But that is the easy question. The more difficult and important one—and the one which is overlooked by the attached paper—is not how to start the process, but rather how to manage it and keep it from getting stuck. How can we take control of the direction and the pace of the process so that it can advance our interests?

2. Objectives

What is it that we hope to get out of negotiations? Our long-term interests in normalizing relations are listed on page 1 of the attached study:

—To lessen Cuban dependence on the USSR;
—To provide incentives to Cuba to cease its foreign interventions;
—To demonstrate to the Third World our willingness to tolerate regimes of different ideological or political philosophies;
—To improve the human rights situation in Cuba; and
—To obtain compensation for expropriated property.

In turn, Cuba wants the U.S.:
—To lift the embargo;
—To curb terrorist activities by Cuban exiles;
—To return Guantanamo; and
—To recognize its sovereign rights and implicitly accept its revolution by establishing diplomatic relations.

Both countries have a mutual interest in gaining agreements on fisheries and on hijacking, and both countries want the process to lead to the establishment of diplomatic and trade relations.

3. Negotiating Strategies

The question is how do we get from here to there, particularly when the U.S. has a vocal and violence-prone Cuban community intensely committed to a policy of extreme hostility to Castro.

The paper suggests two options:

(1) A step-by-step strategy which would rely on gradual and reciprocal gestures.

(2) Or a comprehensive approach whereby the U.S. would quickly lift the embargo and establish diplomatic relations in exchange for release of American political prisoners, some withdrawal from Africa, and a claims settlement.

I think the difficulty with the first option is that after the easy reciprocal gestures are made, the negotiations might well bog down. The second option offers more promise provided that we do not rush into lifting the embargo or establishing diplomatic relations until our interests are clearly met.

My own preference is for an option which combines elements of both. Like the second, it will involve a package of reciprocal actions, but like the first, the actions will be taken by gradual, appropriate, and reciprocal steps. With the possible exceptions of the fisheries and hijacking agreements, which have fixed deadlines, no step would be taken until the entire package was negotiated.

It is necessary, however, to distinguish between three kinds of issues and actions (see Tab B).

(1) Those gestures which both sides can do relatively easily, provided the process is reciprocal;

(2) Those issues and questions which are slightly more difficult, but are negotiable; and

(3) Those issues and actions, like compensation and total withdrawal from Angola, which are not likely to be resolved to our satisfaction in the next few years, if ever.

Our goal should be to establish diplomatic relations and lift the total embargo after completing the negotiations on the second group of issues (while, of course, trying to get the third group decided at the same time). Negotiations on the third group can be continued after relations are established.

We should, however, be careful not to give away easy and friendly gestures—whether that be lifting travel restrictions, exchanging sports teams, or issuing a Presidential statement condemning terrorism—until we can be assured that there will be appropriate and reciprocal gestures by Cuba. It is possible that we may already have expended all the easy gestures (travel restrictions, sports), but since no public announcement
has been made on these issues, we might want to postpone their announcement until we have had some exploratory talks with the Cubans.

We should also be very sensitive to the psychological problems and perspective which the Cubans will bring to the negotiating table. Castro is typical of all Cubans in his feeling that Cuba only became truly independent after the 1959 Revolution, and as Ben Bradlee suggested in his article in the *Sunday Post*, the one thing that will preclude any progress in normalizing relations is to have the U.S. Government *lecture him publicly* on an issue (e.g., human rights), which Castro believes is in the realm of Cuba’s newly-won decision domain.\(^\text{11}\) Castro is much more likely to make gestures on human rights issues, if we do not say anything, but instead make appropriate gestures ourselves.

Thus, I believe our negotiations should address three groups of issues in two stages. In the first stage, we should negotiate the timing and kind of reciprocal gestures; but to the extent possible, we should not begin those steps until the package of reciprocal actions on the second group of issues is agreed to. The second stage of negotiations would begin with the formal establishment of diplomatic relations and would address the third and most difficult group of issues.

The PRC, however, does not need to rigidly agree to a negotiating strategy at this time, but the strategy I have outlined here will at least permit us to approach the exploratory talks with a better sense of what we want to get out of them, and how to conserve valuable political capital until we can use it in the best way to achieve our objectives.

8. Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting\(^1\)

Washington, March 9, 1977, 9:30–10:30 a.m.

**SUBJECT**

Cuba (PRM 15 [17])

**PARTICIPANTS**

*State*
- Secretary Cyrus Vance
- Terence Todman
- William Luers

*Defense*
- Secretary Harold Brown

*Treasury*
- Secretary Juanita Kreps
  - [Under Secretary Anthony Solomon]

*NSC*
- Zbigniew Brzezinski
- David Aaron
- Robert Pastor
- Thomas Thornton
- Michael Hornblow

*Vice President’s Staff*
- A. Denis Clift

*CIA*
- Admiral Stansfield Turner
- Robert Hopkins

*JCS*
- Gen. George S. Brown
- Lt. Gen. William Y. Smith

*Justice*
- Griffin B. Bell
- John Haromon

*Commerce*
- Secretary Juanita Kreps
- Arthur T. Downey

**Summary and Conclusions**

**NSC/PRC Meeting—Cuba**

Secretary of Defense Harold Brown said that it was not our aim to change the internal structure of the Government of Cuba, but we should not lift the embargo until the Cubans indicate in their actions—not just public utterances—that they will not intervene militarily anywhere.

Secretary Vance agreed with Brown’s point on the importance of considering Cuba’s external policy as one of the items to be considered in discussions with the Cubans, but he stressed our own great interest in “beginning to move down the road” toward normalization, though on a reciprocal and a gradual basis.

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\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, 1977–1981, Box 60, PRC 770006—Cuba [2]. Secret. Drafted by Pastor. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. Minutes of this meeting are in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 7, Cuba, 2–5/77.
Attorney General Bell agreed that we should proceed, although with great caution. He mentioned the problem of terrorism, and Vance personally asked Bell to vigorously investigate the terrorist activities in the Cuban communities in the U.S., particularly in Miami. Bell replied that the FBI had had some jurisdictional problems before, but because of Vance’s request, he would see to it that the investigations were pursued.

Secretary of Commerce Juanita Kreps reported that a large segment of the American business community were strongly in favor of a resumption of trade with Cuba, though she thought that the Cubans had not taken into account MFN or credits, and therefore overestimated the advantages which would accrue to them because of trade.

George Brown, Under Secretary of Treasury Anthony Solomon, and Dr. Brzezinski all agreed that we should approach the early exploratory discussions in a cautious way.

Solomon also said that Cuba’s right to export sugar to the U.S. is one of our most important bargaining chips, and we should therefore be careful if and when we lift our (export) embargo on food and medicines that we separately negotiate their right to export to us.

Vance summarized the consensus that all agreed that the United States Government should begin talks with the Cubans in a measured and careful way, keeping in mind that the chip of eliminating the embargo is the ultimate one, and we should play that one well.

In addition to informing various Latin American and NATO governments, Dr. Brzezinski said that we should also touch base with Canada and Japan. With respect to the approach, Brzezinski said we should be careful not to be drawn into making all the concessions at the beginning without being assured of movement on Cuba’s part. He used the example of U.S.-Hungarian relations in the mid-1960s to illustrate the need for face-saving gestures for both sides. He said that progress was most likely if both moved forward with sequential and reciprocal steps. He also suggested that we move from exploratory talks to putting together a more comprehensive package.

Vance agreed and said the discussions will begin on fisheries and move into other issues, including establishing an American Interest Section in the Swiss Embassy and then the anti-hijacking agreement. When the Cubans raise the embargo issue, we would raise Cuba’s foreign adventurism and its activities with regard to Puerto Rico. Vance agreed with Solomon that we should also raise the compensation issue then, even though we do not expect its early resolution. Talks would begin in New York City in mid-March with either the Assistant Secretary or the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State leading the U.S. team.

Dr. Brzezinski said that it is essential that if we are going to retain the momentum, that we should differentiate between three sets of
issues: (1) those, like fisheries, anti-hijacking, and sports exchanges, which can be done easily and quickly; (2) those, like human rights, the embargo, some aspects of Cuba’s foreign policy, and Guantanamo, which are negotiable, and should be done before diplomatic relations are established; and (3) those like compensation and claims, Cuba’s withdrawal from Angola, and political prisoners, which may be irreconcilable, but certainly will involve protracted negotiations, and therefore should be handled after relations are established.

On the issue of Guantanamo, Harold and George Brown both said that Defense’s major interest was to keep it from being transferred to the Soviets.

On the question of getting Cuban adherence to the U.S.-USSR agreements of 1962 and 1970 barring strategic weapons in Cuba, Vance and Brzezinski agreed it was not necessary, and we should not use any bargaining chips to try to get the Cubans to do it.

All agreed that the President and Secretary of State would have to involve the public and Congress in a gradual but continual education process, particularly given the Cuban community’s unanimous opposition to any change in a hostile U.S. policy.


Washington, March 15, 1977

TO
The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

ALSO
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Secretary of Commerce
The United States Representative to the United Nations
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT
Cuba

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 10, Cuba, 3/77. Secret. The President signed his full name at the top of the first page.
After reviewing the results of the meeting of the Policy Review Committee held on Wednesday, March 9, 1977, to discuss U.S. policy to Cuba, I have concluded that we should attempt to achieve normalization of our relations with Cuba.

To this end, we should begin direct and confidential talks in a measured and careful fashion with representatives of the Government of Cuba. Our objective is to set in motion a process which will lead to the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba and which will advance the interests of the United States with respect to:

—Combating terrorism;
—Human rights;
—Cuba’s foreign intervention;
—Compensation for American expropriated property; and
—Reduction of the Cuban relationship (political and military) with the Soviet Union.

The issues we should raise in the exploratory talks include: fisheries and maritime boundaries; the anti-hijacking agreement; human rights conditions in Cuba (including release of American citizens in Cuban jails, visitation rights, and emigration rights); Cuba’s external activities in Angola and elsewhere; Cuba’s activities with regard to Puerto Rico; sports, cultural and scientific/technical exchanges; compensation for American property which was expropriated by the Cuban Government; the possibility of trade relations; and the establishment of an American Interest Section in the Swiss Embassy.

To implement this new policy and to negotiate in pursuit of these objectives, the Secretary of State should designate officials to begin exploratory talks with Cuba with the intention that they will lead to appropriate, reciprocal and sequential steps looking toward normalization of relations between our two countries. Following an exploratory round of discussions, the National Security Council should make recommendations to me on how we should proceed.

The Secretary of State should insure that the NATO Governments, Japan and various Latin American Governments are informed of U.S. initiatives toward Cuba, as appropriate.

The Attorney General should take all necessary steps permitted by law to prevent terrorist or any illegal actions launched from within Cuba.

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2 In the initial round of negotiations, held in New York March 24–29, Todman led the U.S. side. Deputy Foreign Minister Pelegrin Torras led the Cuban side. Minutes of the negotiations are in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 10, Cuba, 3/77. See also Document 15.
the United States against Cuba and against U.S. citizens and to apprehend and prosecute perpetrators of such actions.

J.C.

10. Letter From Reverend Jim Jones of the People’s Temple of the Disciples of Christ to First Lady Rosalynn Carter

San Francisco, March 17, 1977

Dear Mrs. Carter:

I regret I was out of town and missed meeting your sister-in-law, Ruth Carter Stapleton, when she was in San Francisco recently. In case you wish anyone to get in touch with me in the future, the private emergency line at Peoples Temple is (415) 922-3735. (With 9000 members in our San Francisco church, it’s often extremely difficult to get through the main numbers.)

A short time ago I traveled to Cuba with a group of prominent doctors and businessmen from the United States. We met with Cuban officials in the medical field who say their country is badly in need of hospital equipment. The friends who I was with are prepared to make arrangements right away to get the supplies shipped to Cuba that are needed. The Cubans requested they do so, and say it would be a tremendous start in breaking down barriers between them and the U.S.

An urgent response is needed, however, since Cuba cannot wait too long and will be compelled to look to European countries even though European medical equipment is inferior to the same type of equipment manufactured in the U.S.

I am personally of the opinion that such a move is consistent with the humanitarian aid you spoke about not long ago, and is an opportunity to help win Cuba away from the Soviet orbit. Anything that you could do regarding this matter, of course would be deeply appreciated.

You have my sincere best wishes for the continued success of the new Administration, and you can be assured of our vast support in

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 24, Guyana, 1/77–12/78. No classification marking. Rosalynn Carter wrote at the top of the page, “M—Send to Zbig or proper person.” M is presumably a reference to Margaret McKenna or Margaret Costanza.
the quest for a new moral tone that your husband is so valiantly attempting to bring to this country.

Let me again express my deep appreciation for the privilege of dining privately with you prior to the election.²

Very respectfully in Him,

Rev. Jim Jones

² Attached but not printed is an April 12 response to Jones, in which Rosalynn Carter wrote, “Dear Jim, Thank you for your letter. I enjoyed being with you during the campaign—and do hope you can meet Ruth soon. Your comments about Cuba are helpful. I hope your suggestion can be acted on in the near future. Sincerely, Rosalynn Carter.” An attached cover page includes forwarding information to Pastor, and a note in an unknown hand reads, “Dr. Brzezinski.”

11. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, April 5, 1977

SUBJECT

Status Report on Implementation of PD/NSC–6 on Cuba

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President summarizing the follow-up activities of State and Justice on PD/NSC–6 on Cuba. At Tab A is State’s report and at Tab B is the Attorney General’s memorandum.²

Negotiations with Cuba

I must confess a certain degree of unease over the strategy that the State Department appears to have adopted. They apparently believe that the current negotiations on fisheries will flow quite naturally into the next round where other issues can be addressed. This may be correct, but all previous indications—including a recent conversation


² The report at Tab A, dated April 1, was not attached. A copy is ibid. Tab B was not attached and not found.
between Professor Richard Fagen and Manolo Piñeiro, a high Central Committee official—are that the Cubans see the fisheries negotiations as discrete and separate from negotiations on normalizing relations. According to Fagen, whom I spoke with last night, the Cubans said that they will conclude the current talks, and not start again until the U.S. has lifted the embargo on food and medicines and called a halt to all kinds of terrorism.

If we could lift the embargo on food and medicines easily—i.e., without raising the expectations of all those Americans who believe that we should get something for it, then I think the strategy is the correct one. If on the other hand, we cannot, then I believe we should be more cautious about concluding the fisheries and boundary agreements until we can be more assured of reciprocal gestures by the Cubans.

This represents a fundamental split in strategy, and I would recommend that you speak with Secretary Vance about what our desired goals should be, and then which of the two strategies is most likely to deliver us to the promised gates.

State’s present strategy is premised on reaching agreement on one item at a time, and then waiting for reciprocal actions. Unless the Secretary is willing to push through a partial lifting of the embargo, however, we will get stuck as soon as we conclude the fisheries agreement.

An alternative strategy would be to try to put all the pieces of the package together before making the first public move. This would circumvent the problem of lifting the embargo in the near future. Of course, if the Cubans stonewall and refuse to do anything until we lift the embargo, then this strategy will not be any better than the piece-by-piece strategy. On the other hand, since the discussions—or at least, the results—would not have been made public, we are no worse off.

Indeed, we would be back to where the piecemeal strategy begins. For that reason, I think it makes sense to hold off concluding the two agreements until we have made a sincere effort at putting a package together.

In an analysis of the current negotiations, we have to keep two things in mind. First the fisheries agreement means more to the Cubans than to us, and there is no other issue on our early agenda which is like that. Secondly, unless the President and Secretary Vance decide firmly to pursue the package strategy, the piece-by-piece strategy will be chosen by default. Indeed, it may have already been chosen.

(If you agree with my analysis, I will re-draft the memorandum to the President along the lines you recommend.)

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3 Professor of Political Science at Stanford University.
Finally, on the question of the April 20 invitation to visit Havana, ARA is eagerly recommending acceptance, and they expect that the fisheries agreements will be signed then.\(^4\) Todman also thinks that we are more likely to get the Cubans into a discussion of other issues if they meet in Cuba. (The issue, which I think concerns State the most, is the establishment of an Interest Section in Havana). Todman acknowledges that the Cubans might sign and say good-bye, but he doesn’t think they will do that, although the Cubans have given no indication that they will discuss anything else. My inclination is to accept the invitation to Havana only if we have some private assurances from the Cubans that we can talk about issues other than fisheries. (I will work on a memo to you on the issue of what to do about Cuban involvement in Africa.)

**Anti-Terrorist Activities**

I have made a number of phone calls to the Justice Department trying to get an answer to the simple question: what additional steps has the Attorney General taken to put a lid on terrorist activities? The response has been totally inadequate. Instead of giving the kind of priority to curbing terrorism which the President instructed in PD 6\(^5\)—and this could mean anything from assigning more FBI agents to Miami to a statement by Bell—the Attorney General merely requested the FBI to catalogue the kind of activities which they are presently doing.

I understand that when Bell saw the FBI’s report, which blurred the distinction between criminal investigations and domestic security surveillance, he ordered another study to determine whether there was any legal authority to conduct the latter type of activities. In short, I have seen nothing to indicate that Justice has taken any—let alone, all—steps necessary to prevent terrorist or illegal actions.

In several conversations with his Special Assistant,\(^6\) I reiterated the message of the PD, and said that it was our expectation that the FBI would increase its activities in this area. He said that he had interpreted the PD to mean that preventative actions were required, but the Attorney General questioned whether Justice had the legal authority to take such action. I asked him to forward as soon as possible a report which catalogued current activities and suggested new meas-

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\(^4\) The invitation to continue the discussions in Havana was made during the March talks in New York. During the April negotiations in Havana, the two sides succeeded in concluding a fisheries agreement. See Document 15.

\(^5\) See Document 9.

\(^6\) Reference is presumably to Frederick D. Baron, whose specialties included foreign intelligence and counterintelligence.
ures, where appropriate and legitimate. He said he would try to get a report over in a couple of days.

**RECOMMENDATION**

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President.\(^7\)

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**Tab I**

**Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter\(^8\)**

Washington, undated

**SUBJECT**

Status Report on PD/NSC–6 on Cuba

**Exploratory Talks**

In accordance with Presidential Directive NSC 6, the Secretary of State designated Assistant Secretary Terence Todman to lead a US delegation to begin exploratory talks with Cuba. At the first meeting on March 24, Todman raised all the issues listed in the PD, but the Cubans insisted that they were only authorized to negotiate a fisheries and maritime boundaries agreement, and we accepted that.\(^9\)

With the conclusion of the first round of negotiations on March 29, agreement was reached on maritime boundaries, and the US delegation felt that the two sides were so near agreement on a General International Fisheries Agreement (GIFA) that they have speculated that the Cubans might have deliberately stretched out negotiations to a second round so that other issues can be raised. The Cubans invited the US delegation to Havana on April 20, and Secretary of State Vance is presently considering the issue for decision.

In his closing remarks, Todman returned to our interest in having an official response on all the issues raised. He said we have an immediate interest in having the hijacking agreement reinstated and opening a US interest section in Havana. He stressed that reciprocity was needed to improve relations.

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\(^7\) Brzezinski checked the approve option.

\(^8\) Secret. Sent for information. Carter initialed “C” at the top of the page.

Consultation

In accordance with the Presidential Directive, officials of the State Department kept our NATO allies, Canada, Japan, Zaire, and selected Latin American governments informed of the negotiations. In addition, Congressional leaders were consulted on the eve of the talks, and were told of the results of March 31.

Anti-Terrorist Actions

The PD directed the Attorney General to “take all necessary steps permitted by law to prevent terrorist or any illegal actions . . . and to apprehend and prosecute” terrorists. The Attorney General has followed this up with two decisions:

1. He has asked the FBI for a report of its current activities in this area; and

2. He is presently reexamining the legal authority of taking preventative measures against terrorist activity.

He will be forwarding a more detailed report later.10

10 Bell wrote to Brzezinski on April 8 regarding the anti-terrorism language in PD–6. (Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, 1977–1981, Box 3, PD–06)

12. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1

Washington, April 12, 1977

SUBJECT

Political and Economic Impact on the US of Delay in Normalization of Relations with Cuba

1. We do not believe that a delay in normalizing our relations with Havana would have any significant effect on US political or economic interests. Many of our friends in Western Europe and Japan would be concerned and disappointed, and some would join Third World leaders

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, 1977–1981, Box 3, PD–06. Confidential. Robert Hopkins, the National Intelligence Officer for Latin America, forwarded this paper with a memorandum to Pastor on April 12. According to Hopkins, it was drafted in the Office of Regional and Political Analysis and the Office of Economic Research at the CIA.
in public expressions of disapprobation. In Latin America, the Cuban issue has declined in significance since the OAS decided in July 1975 to allow all member states freedom of action in establishing relations with the Castro Government. Now Cuba is well on its way to reintegration in regional affairs, and the Latin Americans are focusing on their bilateral problems with Washington—they are not overly concerned about our relations with Havana. Some of the more conservative military governments in South and Central America would be pleased to see us maintain the status quo toward Cuba. Leaders in Mexico, Venezuela, Panama, and Jamaica, however, would be outspoken in their disappointment.

2. The Cubans would respond to a delay in normalizing relations by stepping up their propaganda campaign against the US; they would press hard on the Puerto Rico independence issue in the UN and other international fora, and they might choose to mount a major public campaign against the US presence in Guantanamo. If the SR–71 missions were resumed, the Cubans would most likely harass the flights. Havana would not, however, revoke agreements which are in its interests—such as a maritime boundary settlement or a renewed hijacking treaty. It would require a major incident—such as the bombing of the Cubana aircraft last October—to cause Havana to annul or suspend these agreements.

3. On the economic side, even with normalization, Havana’s hard currency balance-of-payments problems and its reluctance to become dependent on the US will restrict commerce. Annual US sales to Havana through 1980 would be limited to $300–$400 million at most—less than three percent of total US exports to Latin America and roughly equivalent to US markets in Ecuador, Guatemala, or Panama. US foodstuff producers and small manufacturers would have to forego this small new market, but multinationals could continue trading with Havana through their foreign subsidiaries. Failure to gain access to Cuban sugar would have little impact on US consumers, since competing exporters will absorb most of Cuba’s transportation advantage as long as there is a sugar surplus on the world market. While transportation differentials could be important for US nickel consumers, most current Cuban production is committed, and new capacity will not come on line until the 1980s.
13. Memorandum From Senator George McGovern to President Carter

Washington, April 19, 1977

SUBJECT
Merits and Tactics of Partially Lifting the Cuban Embargo

Objectives of Cuba Policy

The objectives of U.S. policy toward Cuba should be three-fold:
(a) Geopolitical—to gain some influence on Cuba’s international conduct;
(b) Bilateral—to achieve progress on certain specific issues of U.S. concern; and
(c) Humanitarian—to assist, or at least not impede, the Cuban Government’s genuine effort to foster a better life for a people historically plagued by poverty and illiteracy.

The Value of Moving to Normalize Economic Relations

All three of these purposes can be served by a gradual restoration of economic relations between the United States and Cuba:
(a) Geopolitically, President Castro understands that U.S.-Cuban trade, once begun, would constitute an important economic interest for Cuba, which the Cuban Government would thereafter have to weigh carefully in setting its other policies, domestic and international. Indeed, Castro perceives—I think correctly—that the political risk involved in opening economic relations is almost entirely on the Cuban side, because in accepting the economic benefits, Cuba would inevitably have imposed on it certain constraints. This does not mean that Cuba would tolerate any attempt to impose explicit conditions, but the constraints, though circumstantial, would nonetheless be very real. In addition, an obvious corollary of an enhanced U.S. role in Cuban economic life is a diminution of the relative influence on Cuba of the Soviet Union.
(b) Concerning bilateral matters of U.S. concern—such as extending the hi-jacking agreement, negotiating on expropriation claims, and diminishing Cuban agitation on the Puerto Rican issue—it is clear that

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 11, Cuba, 5/77. No classification marking. A stamped note on the first page reads, “The President has seen.” Carter wrote in the margin, “To Cy & Zbig. Brief comment.” McGovern was a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
any progress is now dependent on the U.S. lifting the embargo, at least partially. To be sure, the U.S. has already taken certain affirmative steps—by allowing travel to Cuba and negotiating on a fisheries agreement that Cuba needs. But it must be recognized that, in the overall process of normalization, the Cuban negotiating position is relatively weak, so U.S. policy cannot be premised on the idea that each step must involve equal and reciprocal benefits. To get on to those issues we care about, we will have to take action of some kind on the embargo. While a full lifting right away might deprive us of certain useful leverage, a partial lifting would create a favorable climate for negotiating on a number of issues—without sacrificing the strength of our negotiating position.

(c) Humanitarian considerations also favor a lifting of the embargo, at least partially, to allow the Cuban people access to U.S. food and medicine. Moreover, over the longer term, the restoration of normal relations will serve other humanitarian interests. Cuba is already strong in those areas of human rights which pertain to the right of people to be free from hunger, ignorance, and disease, but is obviously weak as regards the free movement of people and ideas. A gradual normalization—involving expanded economic and cultural relations with the U.S. and the reunification of families—will obviously serve to open up Cuban society.

Tactics

In the early 1960’s, a complicated pyramid of executive and legislative prohibitions was erected against U.S. economic relations with Cuba, and it will now require cooperative action by the two branches if that pyramid is to be entirely disassembled. As matters now stand the President acting alone can take a number of major steps, but there may be political wisdom in involving Congress at an early stage, to lessen the possibility that the normalization process will be undercut at mid-point by Congressional intransigence. One way to obtain such early Congressional involvement would be to enact the partial lifting of the embargo (for food and medicine), which might involve a small amount of controversy but which would, if and when successful, explicitly commit Congress to a movement toward normalization. This, at the beginning, would provide considerable latitude for subsequent Executive action. If a Congress-first approach is to be followed, all that is required on the part of the Executive Branch is that it not oppose the

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2 On January 18, McGovern had introduced S.314, a bill to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to terminate the embargo on the export of food and medicine to Cuba. The bill was referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
enactment of the food-and-medicine provision which I now intend to append to the annual State Department authorization bill.

Whatever approach is taken—Executive action or Congressional—it should be remembered that the policy is reversible. Even if Congress were to enact the partial lifting, the President would retain full authority to reimpose a total embargo at any time. Thus the partial lifting of the embargo can and should be viewed as a concession to Cuba which could, in the worst case, be withdrawn.

With regard to the American public’s reaction to normalization moves, there would seem to be no formidable barriers, either economic or political. On the economic side, the principal potential Cuban export to the U.S. is sugar, which is already on the world market so that its effect on prices is being felt even now. If import quotas were at any point to be imposed, Cuba could be dealt with under whatever criteria were then established. On the positive side, there are of course many U.S. companies interested in selling to the Cuban market. As regards the political or ideological side of public opinion, polls seem to vary. But my own poll—taken personally among the dozens of conservative South Dakotans who traveled to Cuba for the basketball games—showed unanimous support for the opening of economic relations: “I don’t agree with everything they’re doing down here, but if we can trade with China and Russia, why not Cuba?”

George McGovern
14. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter

SUBJECT

Senator McGovern’s Memorandum on Cuba

I agree with the basic thrust of Senator McGovern’s April 19 memo. There are to be sure gains for the U.S. in moving toward normalization of relations with Cuba. That is why we began the process.

I also agree that, tactically, a partial lifting of the embargo might help move the process along. But so far all the steps—lifting the travel restrictions, agreeing to negotiate a Governing International Fishery Agreement (GIFA), and standing-down the reconnaissance overflights—have been on our side. If only to demonstrate the seriousness of their own interest in improving relations, there should be some reciprocal steps on the part of the Cubans. Hence, during the talks next week in Havana, Ambassador Todman will tell the Cubans that the U.S. Government would be prepared to give favorable consideration to lifting the embargo on shipments of U.S. foods and medicines if Cuba were ready to take some steps to contribute to the process of improving relations—such as reinstituting the hijacking agreement, releasing American political prisoners, repatriating U.S. citizens who wish to leave, and increasing visits of divided families.

Finally, a partial lifting of the embargo should not include Cuban sugar imports to the U.S. This represents a key element in the embargo and at present is one of Castro’s primary objectives in his relations with the U.S. To give him access to the U.S. sugar market at the beginning of the process would be to give away most of our bargaining position. It would open the Administration to criticism for having made major concessions to Castro without having secured his commitment to negotiate a satisfactory settlement of compensation claims for nationalized...
U.S. goods and properties, and it would reduce our leverage to secure other objectives, such as repatriation of U.S. citizens, release of political prisoners, etc. Likewise abrupt reentry of Cuban sugar in the U.S. market would be a blow to other sugar producers in the Caribbean—countries which have been friendly with us through thick and thin.\footnote{At the bottom of the page, Carter wrote, “Don’t forget Cuban troops all over Africa.”}

\section*{15. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Todman) to Secretary of State Vance\footnote{Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 11, Cuba, 5/77. Confidential; Nodis. Drafted by Gleysteen on April 30.}}

\textit{Washington, May 2, 1977}

\textit{The Havana Negotiations}

\textit{Summary}

The second round of talks with the Cubans broke the ice. The Cubans privately but officially acknowledged that the US made significant gestures to improve relations.\footnote{The talks in Havana opened on April 25 and concluded on April 27. Accounts of the first and second rounds of the negotiations with the Cubans are in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850016–1846 and P770079–1842. See also footnote 2, Document 9.} They agreed that reciprocity is important. They said they would consider making some gestures themselves: release of American prisoners, more liberal exit permits for American citizens, and more visits by divided Cuban families. Both sides recognized the symbolism of the occasion—the first presence of American officials in Havana and the first agreements concluded directly between the two governments since 1961. Going to Havana was worthwhile because it demonstrated we were accepting equality and reciprocity in the negotiating process. It also made it possible for Cuba to extend the scope of discussions beyond restricted subjects we initially agreed to discuss.
Atmosphere and Arrangements

The Cubans went to great lengths to demonstrate equality and reciprocity in the arrangements, with traces of one-upmanship here and there:

— In New York we provided Dr. Torras heavy security coverage out of real concern over terrorist attempts; in Havana a body guard was at my side constantly except in our hotel accommodations, in the conference room, and at the Swiss Embassy. The entire hotel floor where our delegation stayed was sealed off and an elevator reserved for our exclusive use. For whatever it is worth, Garcia\textsuperscript{3} told us that these measures were necessary because some elements in Cuba are opposed to normalization of relations with us and might try to stage a nasty incident.

— In New York we met secretly in hotel rooms; in Havana we met in the Sierra Maestra Hotel, which was not given out to the press.

— In New York we were caught out by the press after the second day of talks at the Roosevelt Hotel; the Cubans warned us this might happen in Havana too, but it didn’t.

— In New York we served coffee, tea, milk, and soft drinks during the conference breaks; in Havana the same refreshments were provided but with coffee for the American taste as well as for the Cuban and an open box of Havana cigars and supply of cigarettes which were frequently replenished.

— In New York we did not entertain the Cubans socially; in Havana the Cubans declined a proposal of the Swiss Ambassador to hold a reception for the two delegations.

The delegation was informed its members could go anywhere, see anything within the greater Havana area, and could use cars provided by the Foreign Ministry, or use public transportation. They requested that I, however, only use the official limousine provided.

There was in fact hardly any time to sight-see. It was obvious already in New York what kind of a GIFA could be signed. There was ambiguity in the Cuban position on a maritime boundary because the Cubans were behind schedule in providing us with charts of the Cuban coast they had promised. As the Havana talks closed, the charts were still not available and the best the Cubans could do was to set themselves a deadline of providing them “as soon as possible after 15 days.” Thus after the second day of negotiations in Havana, the Cubans began to spin-out the discussions with lengthy discussions of trivia on how the

\textsuperscript{3}Nestor Garcia was the First Secretary of the Cuban UN Mission.
GIFA would be implemented. They suggested we put off our departure until April 28, without giving any particular reason.

Ambassador Serra thought the reason for this spin-out was to keep us in Havana for a possible last minute meeting with Carlos Rafael Rodriguez. Serra’s suspicions on this score were heightened when the Cubans asked him not to have any other foreign diplomats present at a buffet supper he arranged for us on April 26. As appeared on the final day, the real reason for a suggested delay in departure was probably because the Cubans were behind in their paper work.

Secretiveness was heightened by a Cuban request put to us after our arrival that we not contact members of other embassies. There was no press coverage in Havana beyond a terse announcement the day after our arrival specifying that the talks were on fisheries and a maritime boundary. The day after our departure there was another announcement only saying that a GIFA and temporary maritime boundary agreement had been signed and naming the heads of delegations. This low profile may have been dictated by Cuban concern that the Cuban populace would attach too much significance to our visit, that resumption of relations is near, and that hard times will soon be over.

Visit to US Properties, Interviews with American Citizens and Prisoners

The Cubans reluctantly permitted us to visit the American Embassy residence and chancery. They asked us not to go during working hours when Cubans were present. For years both buildings have needed new roofs. The damage to the chancery building is particularly bad and growing because it is no longer weather tight. When I pointed this out to Dr. Torras, he said he would see what could be done to provide, during working hours when Cubans were present. For years both buildings have needed new roofs. The damage to the chancery building is particularly bad and growing because it is no longer weather tight. When I pointed this out to Dr. Torras, he said he would see what could be done to provide new roofs for both buildings. Ambassador Serra said that the Cubans had not permitted work on the US buildings in the past because they were afraid it would be misinterpreted by the population. The Cubans, like people in any totalitarian country, are excessively prone to read between the lines.

The Cubans also were leary about allowing our delegation to interview American citizens in the Swiss Embassy. A green light for this came only on the evening of April 26. As many Americans as could be rounded up were interviewed on April 27. The Americans were tearful and all wanted to leave but only if they could bring close Cuban family members with them.

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4 Carlos Rafael Rodriguez was Vice President of the Cuban Council of State and Council of Ministers.
Permitting us to interview American prisoners was even more difficult for the Cubans. They allowed two delegation officers to remain several more days in Havana to accomplish this. Our officers have only been able to see four prisoners—a representative cross-section: one political, 2 drug smugglers, and 1 hijacker. All appeared to be in good health and to be receiving good treatment.

Substantive Discussions

Foreign Minister Malmierca’s receiving me was a gesture in itself (Memcon at Tab 1).\(^5\) It engaged the Cuban Government officially in discussing the issues I had raised in New York on further steps to improve relations. Malmierca agreed that Cuba might take some reciprocal steps but did not indicate the timing or extent of these. After the conversation Dr. Torras told me and Garcia told Gleysteen that it would be particularly difficult for Cuba to release some of the political prisoners. Malmierca, however, said that Cuba would consider: releasing American prisoners, be more flexible in permitting American citizens to leave with family members who are Cuban citizens or dual nationals, and to increase visits both ways by members of divided Cuban families. Permitting increased Cuban emigration would be more difficult, but Cuba did not wish this to be an obstacle to improving relations.

Malmierca showed great interest in opening interest sections in Havana and Washington.\(^6\) He said if we provided more information on the size, level, and functions of such offices, they would decide on our proposal very fast. Before the meeting with Malmierca, Torras had asked me whether we had in mind something like our liaison mission in Peking!

Malmierca did not raise the subject of lifting the embargo. When I suggested a partial lifting, he said this would be a good move. But a full end to the embargo was necessary for negotiations to begin. He said concrete actions would be more important than a high-level statement on terrorism. Meanwhile, Cuba will firmly discourage hijacking.

The Cubans said they were agreeable to more coordination of cultural, sports, and scientific exchanges. For the time being, this could be done through their UN Mission and the Department.

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\(^5\) Not attached, but a copy is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 11, Cuba, 5/77.

\(^6\) On May 30 in New York, the United States and Cuba exchanged notes agreeing to the simultaneous opening of Interests Sections. (Department of State Bulletin, July 4, 1977, p. 12) On September 1, the U.S. Interests Section, headed by Lyle F. Lane, opened in the Swiss Embassy in Havana, and the Cuban Interests Section, headed by Ramon Sanchez-Parodi, opened in the Czechoslovak Embassy in Washington.
We were surprised that Malmierca did not take exception to the talking point I made on your behalf about our concern over Cuban political prisoners. Malmierca merely said that Cuba normally freed prisoners before the end of their terms if they were no longer a menace to society.

Likewise, Malmierca did not object to our expressed desire to discuss African issues. On the contrary he said such discussions might contribute toward improving US-Cuban bilateral relations. This was underlined by an earlier private representation to me by Dr. Torras that the Cuban Government was disturbed by President Carter’s April 22 press conference statement that the Cubans had trained the Shaba invaders.\(^7\)

We agreed on a temporary, rather than a provisional maritime boundary. This protects our position. It gives us an agreed line up to which we enforce our jurisdiction and minimize the likelihood of incidents. After the Cubans provide us with up-to-date charts we have agreed to work out a provisional boundary on mutually acceptable principles.\(^8\)

We agreed to terminate the 1958 Shrimp Convention in accordance with its terms. We did the same for the 1926 Convention on Smuggling of Intoxicating Liquors.

In closing remarks exchanged after the signature of documents (at Tab 2)\(^9\) Dr. Torras referred to the special significance of the agreements concerned and reiterated the points about equality and reciprocity.

Our delegation believes we made a good start on the long and delicate task of improving relations with Cuba.

**Congressional Consultations**

We briefed selected senators and members of Congress before going down to Havana. Almost all of them wished us Godspeed. The day of our return we filled them in on the results as fully as possible without revealing points sensitive for the Cubans. On the Senate side

\(^7\) At a news conference on April 22, President Carter was asked if Cubans were present in Zaire supporting Katangan separatists. Carter responded, “Our best information is that the Katangans have been trained within Angola by the Cubans. We have no direct evidence at all that there are Cubans within Zaire.” *(Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book 1, p. 703)*

\(^8\) The provisional boundaries were announced on May 26. *(Department of State Bulletin, June 27, 1977, pp. 686–687)* A diplomatic note to the Cuban Foreign Ministry, September 2, informed the Cuban Government that the fisheries agreement had been approved by the Senate. *(Telegram 210627 to Havana, September 2; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770319–0159)* The agreement entered into force on September 26.

\(^9\) Not attached, but a copy is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 11, Cuba, 5/77.
we consulted: Sparkman, Humphrey, Case, Javits, McGovern, Pell, Chiles, and Stone. On the House side: Zablocki, Yatron, Fascell, Ullman, Bingham, Gilman, Derwinski, and Pepper. Roz Ridgway has been in touch with Leggett, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Fisheries. I also informed Governor Askew and Mayor Ferre,\textsuperscript{10} who were anything but enthusiastic.

After our return, the Senators were uniformly gratified with the results. McGovern stressed his support for any move of the Administration to maintain momentum in the discussions. Stone was pleased that we are proceeding at a measured pace and that we had not failed to raise the issue of American citizen exit permits. Reactions on the House side were similar. Fascell does not believe there is any immediate need to normalize relations but will go along if we proceed cautiously. Pepper noted that he had been impressed by the President’s briefing of southern congressmen on April 26,\textsuperscript{11} including the subject of Cuba. He said he appreciated being kept informed, and that he would help to explain our moves to his Cuban constituents and point up the advantages to them.

\textsuperscript{10} Reubin Askew was the Governor of Florida. Maurice Ferre was the Mayor of Miami.

\textsuperscript{11} No record of this briefing has been found.
16. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, June 3, 1977, 12:30 p.m.

SUBJECT
Bluhdorn’s Meeting with Fidel Castro

PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Charles Bluhdorn, Chairman of the Board, Gulf and Western
Lawrence Levinson, Vice President, Gulf and Western
Matthew Nimetz, Counselor of the Department
Ira Wolf, C (Notetaker)

Cuba

(Bluhdorn prefaced his remarks by stating that his company did not expect to benefit financially from his trip to Havana and that because of the large number of ex-Cubans he employs it was critical that his trip remain secret.)

Bluhdorn said that Castro invited him to Havana because of his company’s involvement with sugar, cigars, tourism, etc., and because the Cuban Ambassador in Caracas had reported favorably on Bluhdorn’s previous meeting with Carlos Andres Perez. Bluhdorn spent six hours with Castro from 10:00 p.m. May 26 until 4:00 a.m. May 27.

Castro categorically rejected the possibility of Cuban military or other interference in the Caribbean. Clearly the United States would not permit such activity.

Castro said that his forces were not involved in Zaire. He had planned to withdraw his troops from Angola but stopped the withdrawal when the French and Moroccans came to the aid of Zaire. Castro criticized the United States for supporting the corrupt Mobutu regime and continuing to support military governments throughout Latin America. Castro said that while he will never become militarily involved in Zaire, that is not necessarily true in Ethiopia.

Castro appeared very upset by Bluhdorn’s claim that he was merely a “front-man” for the Soviets in Africa. Castro said he was totally independent of the Soviet Union and, although the two maintain a very close relationship, Cuba does not take instructions from the Sovi-

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1 Source: Department of State, Records of Cyrus Vance, 1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, Nodis Memcons 1977. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Wolf; approved by Twaddell. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office.

2 In March 1977, Katangan rebels in Angola invaded Shaba Province in Zaire. In April, Moroccan troops, aided by the French, beat back the Katangan invaders.
ets. Castro repeatedly emphasized that the Cubans are “militants” compared to the cautious Soviets who are most concerned about the pursuit of detente. In fact, the Soviets are restraining him in Africa in order to prevent problems with US/Soviet rapprochement. On the other hand, later in the conversation, Castro said that Cuban activity in Africa was directly correlated with US actions toward Cuba.

Castro stressed the affinity between the Cubans and the peoples of Africa; both are tropical, the same color, and understand each other. Cuban doctors go without money and without family, but they go with a doctrine. Although the United States possesses technological superiority, Cuba, with doctrine and belief on its side, will survive the American system.

Bluhdorn said that while Castro has perhaps grown more mature as he has aged he is still a fanatic, albeit a “considered fanatic”. He considers himself a first generation revolutionary with worldwide impact. He wants to play the same type of role, particularly in Africa, that Lenin played in the Soviet Union. But he also wants respectability and to be a world statesman. This comes from acceptance by the United States. On the other hand, Castro made it clear to Bluhdorn that Africa provides him with an avenue for global leadership. His place in history is Africa, and he would not abandon it, although he might reduce the level of his activities there.

Castro invited Bluhdorn to communicate with him directly at any time and to return to Havana for further conversations. Bluhdorn said that he has developed a good relationship with Castro and would be happy to serve as an informal channel of communications.

Economics

Castro said that Cuba receives thirty cents per pound for sugar from the Soviet Union (three million tons per year) while the world price is only eight cents per pound. The Russians are also selling him oil at 50 percent of the world price.

According to Bluhdorn, Castro purchased $150 million in high technology goods from Japan but cannot pay the bill. He has already drawn down one large hard currency loan from the Soviets but is too proud to request another. The goods are being held in Japan pending payment.

Castro expects to have an operating nuclear power plant by 1980.

Dominican Republic

After his meeting with Castro, Bluhdorn travelled to the Dominican Republic and met with Balaguer whom he has known intimately for many years. Bluhdorn said Balaguer is America’s best friend in the Caribbean but is very troubled that in eleven years in power he has
never been invited to Washington. Balaguer believes the United States takes the Dominican Republic’s friendship totally for granted. Balaguer is too proud to discuss this with the American Ambassador, but Bluhdorn believes it would be in our interest to treat Balaguer better—beginning with an invitation to Washington.

17. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Todman) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, July 6, 1977

Congressman Dellums’ Visit to Havana

Congressman Dellums of California visited Havana in late May and shortly after returning briefed the President about his talks with Castro. He asked me to come down to the Hill on June 30. I found some of his comments thought-provoking:

Castro assured Dellums that he did not plan to send combat troops to Ethiopia because he could not, Ethiopia being 1½ times as far away as Angola. However, Castro could not give his assurance publicly because it could cause problems for Mengistu whom he admires.

Castro said he is barely hanging-on in Angola and is disturbed by internecine conflict within the MPLA. Castro is shocked by the low value placed on human life throughout Africa and the brutal methods used in Angola to settle scores; e.g., Neto put some of his enemies in a car, set it on fire, and had it pushed over a cliff.

Castro has given up on Latin America as an arena for Cuban international activity because the middle class is too well-entrenched there. Instead Castro has turned to Africa, where he believes the countries can turn directly from tribalism to socialism. Castro thinks Cuba can make a special contribution in eradicating disease because of its surplus of young doctors.

Dellums is convinced that Castro wants better relations with the US because he is uncomfortable being so dependent on the USSR.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770142–1484. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Gleysteen on July 5; cleared in H.
Dellums said he told Castro that the release of political prisoners was critical for bringing about a more favorable US public attitude toward Cuba.

Dellums is well aware that the US and Cuban Governments are now in direct touch. However, if the Department ever needs a direct confidential intermediary to Castro, he is ready to serve.

18. Policy Paper Prepared in the Department of State

Washington, undated

How To Proceed Next With Cuba

We have completed the steps authorized by Presidential Directive/NSC–6, which called for a review once those steps had been taken. PRC review of the options available on Cuba in the months ahead is also timely now in light of the opening of Interests Sections in Havana and Washington scheduled for September 1.

The choices before us center on how to maintain momentum toward increased U.S. influence over Cuba. The gap between what Cuba now wants from us and what Congress and public opinion seem prepared to support creates a major obstacle to further steady progress.

Whatever option is chosen, we should take more effective action against Cuban exile terrorism.

I. The Opening of Direct Contacts

The first formal, official U.S.-Cuban contact since 1961 took place in New York March 24–29. The talks produced substantial agreement on fisheries and a preliminary maritime boundary. The Cubans tested

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Anthony Lake Working Papers, Lot 82D298, TL Sensitive 7/1–9/20/77. Secret; Nodis. An attached August 1 note from Stedman and Lake to Christopher asks approval to send the paper to Brzezinski ahead of the August 3 PRC meeting. Also attached is a draft memorandum to Brzezinski, which indicates that the paper was discussed at a July 29 Interagency Group meeting by representatives from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central Intelligence Agency, and the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, Justice, and Commerce. Christopher did not check any of the action items, but the paper was discussed at the PRC meeting. See Document 19.

2 See Document 9.

3 See footnote 6, Document 15.

4 See footnote 2, Document 9.
our willingness to deal with them on a basis of reciprocity by inviting
the U.S. delegation to Havana April 24–27 to complete the agreements. 5

The Havana negotiations produced written agreements on fisheries
and on a preliminary maritime boundary. The Cubans also said they
accept the principles of equality and reciprocity for improving relations,
repeated their call for a complete lifting of the U.S. embargo6 as the first
step toward full negotiations, and indicated that they would consider
certain other steps in return.

At the conclusion of the Havana round, the Cubans asked for
details on how Interest Sections would operate. We furnished specific
proposals on May 11, and the Cuban Government formally agreed to
them on May 30. On July 1 both sides announced that Interests Sections
would open September 1. In July survey teams from both sides visited
Havana and Washington to begin physical preparations.

Atmosphere of Negotiations

The Cubans have been businesslike, discreet, and have demon-
strated good faith in all negotiations. They have shown little ideological
rigidity, adopting instead the posture of a small power negotiating
against a behemoth.

The Cubans have made some small gestures designed to show
their responsiveness to our concerns, such as freeing 10 out of 30
American prisoners, permitting 6 American citizens to leave, allowing
a handful of visits by divided Cuban families, and exchanging informa-
tion on terrorism (Annex B). They have also been exceptionally coopera-
tive in preparations for our Interests Section in Havana, giving us
priority over African and other diplomatic missions there.

II. Basic Objectives and Other Considerations

U.S. Objectives are to get Cuba to demonstrate:
—restraint in Puerto Rico, Latin America, and Africa;
—-a constructive international position, including support for arms
control and nuclear non-proliferation;
—a gradual decrease in Cuban ties, particularly military, with the
Soviet Union; and
—-meeting specific U.S. interests, such as human rights (political
prisoners and family visits) and compensation for nationalized Ameri-
can properties.

5 See Document 15.
6 Throughout this paper lifting the embargo refers only to non-strategic goods and
technology (and relevant Treasury controls). See Annex A. [Footnote is in the original.
Annexes A–D are attached but not printed.]
Cuba’s objectives with regard to the United States are:
— to vindicate Cuba’s domestic revolutionary process by demonstrating that Cuba can now get along with the United States, and
— to gain access to U.S. markets and technology to stimulate its economy.

As the President has made clear in describing our policy as one of seeking to improve relations on a measured, reciprocal basis, whatever steps are undertaken, their pace and manner must be so calculated as to achieve results and to be acceptable to the U.S. Congress and public as well (See Annex C).

In addition, there are a number of steps we hope to influence the Cubans to take, but whose attainment must realistically depend on improved relations rather than on negotiations as such. They are:
— military withdrawal from Angola (See Annex D);
— release of all Cuban political prisoners;
— removal or even significant reduction of the Soviet military presence in Cuba; and,
— rejoining the OAS.

In similar vein, the U.S. cannot realistically be expected to:
— lift the embargo unconditionally before the Cubans have agreed in principle to negotiate a compensation settlement;
— negotiate Cuban claims for alleged damages to Cuba resulting from the embargo and covert operations;
— permit the re-entry of Cuban sugar to the U.S. market except under phased and controlled circumstances;
— resume diplomatic relations at the Ambassadorial level before Cuba has agreed to discuss all foreign military bases in Cuba.

III. Possible Next Steps

Cuban leaders have been adamant throughout these contacts that no major breakthrough can occur until the embargo is lifted, permitting resumption of two-way trade. Although, as noted in Annex A, lifting the embargo would not remove all impediments to trade, it would remove most impediments, making it the most important single step we could take.

This insistence on an end to the embargo as a precondition to any further movement may be simply a bargaining position, a public posture, or both. Our exploratory talks suggest there are several actions the Cubans might be willing to take—some limited, some larger—in response to steps on our side.

Limited Cuban Steps
A limited package on their side would be:
— release of all or most U.S. political prisoners;
—permit all U.S. citizens to leave Cuba together with most of their Cuban relatives who are not too distantly related;
—establish a monthly quota of about 10 Cuban families to visit the U.S. from Cuba and 10 families to visit Cuba from the U.S.

**Limited U.S. Steps**

Limited Steps we might take, depending upon how fast we wish to move and what kind of response we get from the Cubans, include:
—facilitation of cultural, sports and technical/scientific exchanges;
—termination of vestiges of remaining third country sanctions in trade with Cuba—such as prohibition on importing steel products containing Cuban nickel;
—reestablishment of direct scheduled transportation between the U.S. and Cuba;
—lifting of the embargo on the shipment of foods and medicines to Cuba while permitting shipment of specified amounts of Cuban products (but excluding sugar) to the U.S. to pay for Cuban imports from the U.S. in dollar amounts and commodities to be negotiated by the two governments.

**Larger Cuban Steps**

—become a party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the NPT;
—give private assurances that they will not intervene in the internal affairs of Puerto Rico or their Latin American neighbors;
—agree in principle to negotiate a just settlement of claims (though they cannot pay a large cash settlement);
—mute their agitation in the UN for Puerto Rican independence;
—provide private assurances, backed up by performance, that they will not intervene with combat troops in Africa or increase the size of their garrison in Angola;
—gradually free a significant number of Cuban political prisoners.

**Larger U.S. Steps**

Total lifting of the embargo. (This would require providing for the phased re-entry of Cuban sugar into the U.S. market in agreement with other countries which replaced Cuba as sugar suppliers in 1961. We cannot be more specific as to how this might be worked out until our own sugar policy takes a definite direction, as it should in the wake of an international sugar agreement and Congressional action.)

**IV. Options**

Given our objectives and the potential deadlock described above with respect to measured and reciprocal steps, three broad policy options seem available:
Option One: Continue the step-by-step approach

This option is essentially unstructured. It presumes that the steps we have already taken (e.g., ending travel restrictions, halting over-flights and signing the fisheries agreement) are all we should do without a further gesture from the Cubans, but does not preclude individual steps taken by either side without prior agreement.

We would open our Interests Section as planned and instruct it to continue to press for the release of U.S. political prisoners, the repatriation of U.S. citizens along with their Cuban families, and for expanded visitation rights for divided Cuban families.

To further improve the climate, we would also increase technical cooperation with Cuba on law-enforcement matters, and encourage sports, cultural and scientific/technical exchanges. Should they make some gestures such as release of U.S. prisoners and repatriation of U.S. citizens, we would assess their meaningfulness and respond with appropriate intermediate actions of our own.

**PRO:**

—would correspond to position apparently favored by a majority in Congress and among our public;

—would enable positive developments, such as a high-profile baseball match, to gradually improve the public atmosphere;

—would give Cuba more time to make necessary adjustments in its internal and external policies.

**CON:**

—could lead to a loss of momentum;

—would postpone directly addressing the compensation issue without which no substantial improvement in U.S.-Cuban relations can occur.

—the Cubans may no longer be interested in steps short of lifting the embargo in full.

Option Two: Take the initiative in exploring limited package deals.

Both variants of this option would be aimed at breaking the potential deadlock represented by Cuban insistence on ending the embargo. We would go to the Cubans and offer to think through with them a sequence of actions leading to either (A) partial or (B) full lifting of the embargo in return for an agreed series of Cuban quid pro quo.

**Variant A**—Under Variant A we would offer to restore scheduled transportation links with Cuba and to lift the embargo on the shipment of foods and medicines to Cuba while permitting shipments of specified amounts of certain Cuban products to the U.S. (see U.S. Steps listed
under Section III). In return, we would expect the Cubans a) to release U.S. political prisoners, b) to repatriate U.S. citizens with their Cuban families, and c) to allow increasing visits of divided Cuban families.7

Variant B—Under variant B, we would go directly to a full lifting of the embargo. We would indicate to the Cubans that we would be prepared to lift it, provided they: a) publicly agree in principle to negotiate a just settlement of the claims issue; b) release U.S. political prisoners; c) repatriate U.S. citizens along with their Cuban families; and d) agree to show restraint in Latin America and Africa (we would point out to them that we would consider any new and dramatic activity on their part in the wake of the lifting of the embargo to be in bad faith).

Either variant would permit us to achieve some objectives—and the Cubans some of theirs. Several significant issues would remain for subsequent treatment. Cuba would still wish to discuss U.S. Government facilitation of trade with Cuba, the future of Guantanamo and possibly other issues. We, on the other hand, would still wish to address the issues of Cuba’s nuclear policy and its military relationship with the Soviet Union.

PRO:

—would break the ice further and facilitate substantive discussion of differences;
—bring about more rapid rapprochement with Cuba; demonstrate our willingness to accept ideological diversity in the Caribbean and contribute to reduction in U.S.-Soviet tensions;
—might facilitate earlier solution of human rights questions involving American citizens.

CON:

—would appear to be running after the Cubans, thus giving them the false impression that we have more to gain than they from the process;
—would not give us an opportunity to test the seriousness of Cuban purpose or to see how already agreed upon arrangements (e.g. the interests sections) work out before moving on to even larger undertakings;
—might appear to go against the expressed sense of Congress;
—Cuba may find it difficult to screen substantial numbers of exiles and immigrants for increased visits.

7 In the margin, an unknown hand wrote, “claims.”
Option Three: A Comprehensive Settlement

This option envisages attempting to settle all outstanding problems at once. On our side, we would lift the embargo, discuss facilitation of two-way trade and the future status of Guantanamo. In return, we would want a Cuban undertaking a) to reach a just compensation settlement; b) show restraint in Latin America and Africa; c) release U.S. prisoners; d) repatriate U.S. citizens along with their Cuban families; e) stop agitation in the UN regarding Puerto Rico; f) free a significant number of Cuban political prisoners; g) become a party of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the NPT; and, finally, h) begin to reduce Soviet military presence in Cuba.

These steps would culminate in the resumption of diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level.

PRO:
—would strengthen the fabric of detente and at the same time challenge Moscow and Havana to put their relationship to this test;
—would be well-received by the international community.

CON:
—is out-of-phase with U.S. public and Congressional opinion, which prefers a quid-pro-quo approach;
—runs contrary to our estimates as to what Castro is prepared to undertake—moves too fast and does not permit gradual adjustment of Cuban internal situation to early normalization;
—could interfere with Senate acceptance of the Panama Canal Treaty.
19. Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting

Washington, August 3, 1977, 2:30–3:50 p.m.

SUBJECT

Cuba

PARTICIPANTS

State
Acting Secretary Christopher
Terence A. Todman
Anthony Lake

Defense
Charles Duncan
Captain James L. May

Joint Chiefs of Staff
Lt. General William Y. Smith

Attorney General
Lawrence Gibson

Commerce
Secretary Juanita Kreps
Frank Weil

CIA
Director Stansfield Turner
Robert Hopkins

Treasury
Secretary W. Michael Blumenthal
Fred Bergsten

NSC
Zbigniew Brzezinski
Robert A. Pastor (Notetaker)

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

Introduction

Reviewing the progress of the negotiations with Cuba since the last PRC meeting, Acting Secretary Warren Christopher said that the negotiations had gone unexpectedly well. Whatever Cuba's conduct elsewhere, the Cubans had conducted the talks with us in a very businesslike manner. And they have given us high priority in helping to establish the Interest Sections, which will be opened on September 1, and will give us a place to hold discussions with them.

Christopher reviewed the three options in the paper. Option I would continue the step-by-step approach in an unstructured way. Option II is the intermediate option, to negotiate for limited package arrangements. Variant A would involve a trade-off of various steps by Cuba in the human rights area in exchange for a partial lifting of the embargo by the U.S. Christopher said that State recommended amending that option to include Cuba's agreement in principle to negotiate compensation for U.S. nationalized property. Variant B would

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, 1977–1981, Box 184, PRC 029 Cuba 8/3/77. Secret. Drafted by Pastor. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.

2 See Document 18.
involve a complete lifting of the embargo for more steps by Cuba. Option III is to move toward a more comprehensive settlement.

Agency Preferences

Secretary Blumenthal thought the first option too timid, and prefers Option II (A). Dr. Brzezinski agreed that Option I is too timid, and Option III, premature. Option II, however, was not adequate since it did not go far enough in the human rights area and did not address the issue of Cuban involvement in Africa at all. He was not suggesting that we needed to get Cuba’s agreement to completely withdraw from Angola; rather what was needed was to disaggregate these three issues into smaller steps and trade part of the embargo for progress on human rights and Cuba’s external activities.

The embargo was our biggest bargaining chip, and we should not “puncture” it without getting some commitment to international restraint. We should not lift it entirely until we see some concrete progress in this area. In the human rights area, Brzezinski thought the items listed under Option II (A) were good, but we should expect them to release more Cuban political prisoners.  

Assistant Secretary Todman said that he thought the three human rights steps we expected from Cuba in exchange for a partial lifting of the embargo represented quite a significant gesture on the part of Cuba, and that we were not likely to get even that much since Castro had already said he did not consider a partial lifting of the embargo as that important. [4 lines not declassified] State preferred Option II(A) for the same reasons as Treasury, because it introduced structure into the discussions.

General Smith said that we should seek some restraint on the increase in the number of Cubans fighting in Angola. He also expressed concern about Cuban harassment of our P–3 flights and their seizure of U.S. shipping boats. Deputy Secretary of Defense Charles Duncan agreed that such military considerations should be taken into account. He thought the Interest Sections would be a better place to negotiate than at the UN. Duncan agreed with Brzezinski that we should only begin to lift the embargo when we get substantive changes by the Cubans.

Restraint in Africa

All the participants agreed with Dr. Brzezinski that Cuba’s activities in Africa should be put on the agenda of the next round of discussions and that we should reiterate our strong concern for their restraint.

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3 Carter wrote in the margin, “agree.”
There was a division of opinion on whether we should condition any further steps on our part with concrete steps by Cuba in restraining and reducing its activities in Africa. Treasury, State, and Commerce agreed that at the very beginning of discussions, we should state that we assume that the Cubans will show restraint in their military activities abroad, and that over time there would be a reduction of such activities. If there is not, that would create an obstacle to further progress toward normalization. We should leave that assumption on the table unless the Cubans escalate their activities. Thus, this point would constitute an assumption upon which tacit agreement was reached, rather than an item for negotiations. The approach would be to adopt Option I for the first month and wait for proposals from Cuba; if the Cubans do not offer any proposals, then we would move to Option II (A) in November.

NSC, DOD and JCS agreed to the scenario outlined above, with the amendment being the need to see some tangible, concrete improvement in Cuba’s activities in Africa as a precondition to our puncturing the embargo.

Secretary Blumenthal suggested that the Cubans might respond to the proposal suggested by NSC and DOD by saying that they will only be willing to negotiate with us on their activities in Africa if we negotiate our military activities and bases abroad. The exchange is not likely to be very productive. Blumenthal believed normalization of diplomatic relations with all countries, including Cuba was an important goal in itself. With respect to Cuba, it was of added benefit because it would increase our status in the hemisphere by indicating that we were willing to put the past behind us and accept other political philosophies. These are important points which are necessary to a new approach in the hemisphere. So if we get to the crunch, where Cuba says it will not commit itself to changing its Africa policies to suit us, Blumenthal suggested it would be better to restate our concern and then to negotiate hard on the issues of human rights, compensation, and trade, than to drop all negotiations. Secretary Kreps agreed with this formulation.

Brzezinski disagreed, saying that Cuba’s international activities were so important to us that we cannot permit the normalization process to go forward without some commitment by Cuba to halt such activities.

Congress

On the question of which of the two alternatives would be most acceptable to Congress, all agreed on the need to take additional soundings first. Some thought that we should delay movement in this area until the picture is clearer on how it will affect the way Congress deals with such issues as the Canal Treaty, SALT, and China.
Cuba's Activities in Africa

CIA estimated there were 15,500 Cuban troops in Angola—half of these are military advisers—and 4,500 civilians. In addition to the 20,000 in Angola (500 of whom, the DIA believes have arrived since last March), there are approximately 2,000 Cubans in Africa outside of Angola. The Cubans are paying for their own soldiers and have not had to recruit new soldiers, but the Soviets appear to be paying for all of the equipment which the Cubans are using.

Terrorism

Larry Gibson of the Justice Department said that Justice has undertaken a comprehensive review of its activities to combat terrorism, and it remains very conscious of the September 1 date for the opening of the Interest Sections.

20. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter

Washington, August 5, 1977

SUBJECT
PRC Meeting on Cuba—August 3, 1977

The Policy Review Committee met on August 3, 1977, to review U.S.–Cuban relations since the issuance of Presidential Directive/NSC–6 (which authorized a first round of negotiations), and to decide on the approach we should take in future discussions. I have attached at Tab A a summary of the minutes of the meeting. Let me summarize below the principal conclusions agreed to by the participants and state the principal area of disagreement. That disagreement raises important domestic and international issues.

Conclusions

1. The Interest Sections which will be opened on September 1, 1977, should be the principal medium for holding discussions with the Cubans.


See Document 9.

Tab A, not attached, is printed as Document 19.
2. During September and October, we should be willing to consider proposals from the Cubans while continuing a step-by-step approach. We would increase technical cooperation with Cuba on law enforcement matters and encourage sport, cultural, and scientific exchanges. We would also continue to press for release of U.S. prisoners, the repatriation of U.S. citizens with their Cuban families, and for expanded visitation rights for divided Cuban families. However, we should avoid appearing overeager.

3. After this exploratory phase, we would resume the initiative in exploring limited package deals. In this regard, there was disagreement among the agencies over how to pursue the issue of Cuba’s activities in Africa.

4. State, Treasury, and Commerce believe that at the beginning of the talks we should state that we assume Cuba will show restraint in its military activities in Africa and that over time there would be a reduction of these activities. Progress toward normalization of relations would be inhibited if this assumption did not hold, but the U.S. would offer to restore scheduled transportation links with Cuba and to lift the embargo on the shipment of food and medicines to Cuba while permitting shipments of specified amounts of certain Cuban products to the United States. In return, we would expect the Cubans (a) to release U.S. political prisoners, (b) to repatriate U.S. citizens with their Cuban families, and (c) to allow increasing visits of divided Cuban families.

NSC, DOD, and JCS feel that for international and domestic reasons we should not lift any part of the embargo until Cuba demonstrated also some tangible restraint on its activities in Africa.

5. The key issue: Should we condition a partial lifting of the embargo also on their taking some visible and concrete steps toward restraining and reducing their activities in Africa?

DOD, NSC, and JCS recommend YES.4

State, Treasury and Commerce recommend NO.

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4 Carter checked and initialed this option.
21. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Blumenthal to President Carter

Washington, August 12, 1977

SUBJECT

Next Steps on Normalization of U.S. Cuba Relations

At the PRC discussion of this issue on August 3, two views emerged as to how much leverage is afforded the United States by our trade embargo on Cuba.

I do not believe that our lifting the trade embargo completely, let alone relaxing it partially, would be sufficient to deflect Cuba from pursuits which it considers central to its own national interests, presumably including its involvement in Africa.

Our main lever is opening the U.S. market to Cuban products. Outside of sugar, however, exports to the United States would remain negligible for many years—especially if we did not extend most-favored-nation treatment to them, which would require Presidential certification of Cuban emigration practices. Even on sugar, our leverage in economic terms is quite modest. Access to the U.S. market would provide a slight cost advantage to the Cubans vis-a-vis competing sugar producers, but would not be terribly significant to Cuban export earnings.

On the U.S. export side, there is little if anything which Cuba can buy from the U.S. which is not readily available elsewhere in the world with perhaps a slight cost disadvantage due to transportation costs.

The political significance of both sides of the trade issue far outweighs economic effects. There always a tendency to overestimate political leverage afforded to us by possible economic concessions. The last two administrations made this error regarding the Soviet Union and China; in both cases, efforts to achieve major political concessions in return for increased economic exchange failed almost completely. We should not overestimate the scope for action in this area.

At the same time, several lesser but important U.S. objectives can be served by an exchange of concessions if normalization with Cuba continues. As indicated in your directive of March 15, these include the combating of terrorism, and the release of political prisoners and American citizens in Cuba.2

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2 See Document 9.
In addition, partial relaxation of our trade embargo could logically and effectively be linked to a settlement of Cuba’s liabilities for expropriated U.S. property. U.S. claims now total about $2 billion, on which a settlement of at least $600 million (the usual 30%) might well be possible. Progress on this issue would also generate political support for the entire normalization process and thereby reinforce its prospects for success.

We should certainly seek to reduce Cuban involvement in Africa, using every lever available to us. If the Cubans refuse to negotiate on that issue, however, I believe that we should pursue the talks with other U.S. objectives in mind and seek to achieve the most balanced package possible.

W. Michael Blumenthal

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3 Printed from a copy with this typed signature and a stamp that indicates that Blumenthal signed “Mike” above the typed signature.

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22. Memorandum From Senator Frank Church to President Carter

Washington, August 12, 1977

SUBJECT
Visit to Cuba

President Castro asked me to pass on to you the following messages:

1. He understands that the process of normalizing relations between Cuba and the United States has to be slow and that “a spectacu-
lar thing can’t be done over night.” He expects to continue to work in the direction of normalization.3

2. He recognizes that the Panama Canal problem is of number one priority to President Carter in this part of the world and that the President “can’t do both at once.”

3. He is pleased at what the President has done so far.

4. He said that it is difficult for Cuba to find ways to show its own good faith. For example, he said Cuba has no surveillance plane operations that it can stop in response to President Carter’s actions. If the embargo were lifted, they could not respond because they have never imposed an embargo on the United States. He hopes the President will realize his difficulty in responding to gestures from the United States.

5. He repeatedly said that the number one world problem, as he saw it, was furthering detente between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. He said that he has never been asked by the Soviets to talk to others about such problems but feels it very important to try to convey the Soviet view of such problems.

6. Castro wanted you to know that Cuban involvement in Africa had no anti-American purpose and that he preferred to send doctors, not troops. He views the purpose of the Cubans there as giving stability to the government of Angola. They sent forces in after Angola had been invaded by South African forces. He cannot believe that South Africa, which has always been so cautious on such matters, would have sent forces without the complicity of Kissinger.4 He suspects the French want to get control of the Gulf oil facilities. He implied that once the French threat has been removed from the area5 and Namibia has achieved its independence thus removing another threat of involvement by South Africa, that would then permit the withdrawal of all Cuban forces. He believes his purpose is not inconsistent with the objectives in Africa of the Carter Administration.

He stressed that the Soviets had not sought Cuban intervention in Africa and Cuba was in no way acting as a proxy for the Russians.


4 South African forces covertly intervened in the Angolan Civil War in 1975 in an exercise known as Operation Savannah; Cuban officials had cited the incident as a reason for their subsequent decision to also intervene in Angola.

5 France supported separatists from the Angolan Province of Cabinda during the Angolan Civil War.
7. On terrorism, he said that he felt that President Carter was a religious and moral man of good will and thought that he was doing what he could to bring about an end to terrorist activities. He appreciated being informed of possible terrorist activities when the U.S. learned about them and felt that such cooperation was in the interest of both countries.

**Recommendations for Action:**

1. Look for opportunities to further cultural, sports, educational and scientific exchanges with Cuba. There are many mutual interests that could be pursued through such exchanges.


3. Relax the restriction on financial transactions with Cuba. For example, a tourist cannot now pay for his hotel bill in Havana with a U.S. check since Cuba cannot cash the check.

4. Consider the possibility of meeting with Castro at the United Nations General Assembly meeting this fall.

5. Expand anti-terrorist activities.

6. Look for ways to cooperate on controlling the international drug traffic.

7. Explore ways to ease the embargo on trade.

### Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter

**SUBJECT**

Cuban/Angolan Covert Action Program

**Here is a status report on the above subject:**

—-[number not declassified] CIA stations and bases have been informed of this program and tasked. [number not declassified] stations

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have forwarded specific plans for covert action exploitation, most of which have been approved for immediate implementation. These plans involve media placements, stations’ briefings of cooperative liaison and other senior government officials, and a variety of supporting operations such as mailing materials to foreign leaders and opinion makers; the use of organizations to issue statements on Angola; and sending [less than 1 line not declassified] to visit UNITA-controlled areas in Angola for on-the-spot reporting.

—CIA Headquarters has prepared a major article for placement in [less than 1 line not declassified] to serve as the linch pin in the media campaign; sent a comprehensive fact sheet on the Angolan situation for use by media assets (in English, French and Spanish); provided two summaries of press items, and sent to the field several tailored articles for local media placement.

—[4 lines not declassified] A wide range of briefings has been arranged. [4½ lines not declassified]

—A major problem in developing momentum for this campaign has been a delay in our planned primary placement in a major [less than 1 line not declassified] newspaper. [3 lines not declassified]

24. **Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section in Cuba**¹

    Washington, November 19, 1977, 2331Z

    278223. Subject: Highlights of Cuban Section Chief’s Calls at Dept.

    1. Earlier in week Sanchez-Parodi informed CCA he had letter from Castro to Secretary and wished to call on Undersecretary Habib to deliver it. (Letter was simply reply to Secretary’s September communication to Castro expressing satisfaction over departure of AMCITS and families. Copy pouched to USINT).² At same time he indicated wish to come in for chat with Asst Secretary Todman.

    2. On Nov. 17 Sanchez-Parodi called on both Messrs Habib and Todman. He expressed concern to both over that morning’s New York Times and Washington Post stories quoting high-ranking U.S. officials

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¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 11, Cuba, 10-12/77. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.

² A copy of Vance’s letter is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 13, Cuba, 5–10/77.
as indicating that “alarming Cuban build up in Africa” meant process of normalization could go no further.  

Sanchez-Parodi asked if U.S. going back to pre-February position in which withdrawal from Angola was precondition to any U.S.-Cuban dialogue. This was puzzling, he said, since U.S. had earlier indicated it willing to negotiate with Cuba on basis of equality and without preconditions.

3. Asst. Secretary Todman emphasized that we were not returning to pre-February situation. U.S. continues to see value in dialogue. However, we have all along indicated that Cuban involvement in Africa was matter of concern to us and would be factor in pace and even possibility of normalizing relations. Recent Cuban increase in Africa cannot but affect prospects for improving relations. Talking is one thing, but actual forward progress in relations is another.

4. Undersecretary stressed that Sanchez-Parodi should report to his government how seriously U.S. views Cuban military activities in Africa. Our own position is that African problems should be solved by Africans without interference from external forces. Cubans would note, for example, that U.S. had not intervened in any way in Somali-Ethiopian conflict.

5. Sanchez-Parodi remarked that Cubans were in both Angola and Ethiopia at request of governments there. While there were small numbers of military personnel in Ethiopia, there were no combat troops in any country save Angola. He said he was puzzled by U.S. estimates of Cuban troop strength. At time when there had been many more Cuban troops in Angola than are there now, U.S. estimates had been very low—actually about half true number. Now, when there are fewer troops than at peak of deployment, U.S. estimates are very high.

6. Undersecretary indicated that in any event it was principle of outside intervention which concerned us and that certainly there were more Cubans in Angola now.

7. Sanchez-Parodi said Cuba was making no effort to hide that and in fact had announced that additional technicians will be sent during months ahead.

In a statement to the press on November 17, Hodding Carter remarked that the Cuban intervention in Africa “will have an impact on the pace and even the possibility of normalizing relations.” “In light of the military activity,” he added, “it appears we have gone as far as we can at this time.” (John M. Goshko, “Expanded Cuban Presence Decried by U.S.,” The Washington Post, November 18, p. A22) The New York Times reported that “high-ranking Administration officials” had concluded there was “no possibility of re-establishing diplomatic relations with Havana under these circumstances.” (Hedrick Smith, “U.S. Says Castro Has Transferred 60’s Policy of Intervention to Africa,” The New York Times, November 17, p. 1) Wayne Smith, Director of the Office of the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, later asserted that the official who spoke to the Times was Brzezinski. (Smith, The Closest of Enemies, p. 123) Brzezinski, in his memoirs, stated that he had cleared his comments with President Carter. (Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 180)
8. Undersecretary closed conversation by saying we appreciated expeditious handling of first contingent of AMCITS in Sept. We understood USINT had asked for exit permits for second contingent and we trusted Cubans would handle as expeditiously.

9. In conversation with CCA Director Smith who escorted him out of building, Sanchez-Parodi expressed puzzlement over references in press to what being described as Cuban promises to U.S. to reduce troop strength in Angola. So far as he aware, he said, no such promises had ever been made. In 1976 letter to Swedish Prime Minister, President Castro had indicated intention to reduce and in fact reduction had begun. Conditions had changed, however, and reduction had been halted and even reversed. He believed Cuban officials had indicated to us Cuba’s continuing hope and intention to resume reduction “when conditions permitted,” but that, he stressed, might not be for several years. Meanwhile, he said, making it a precondition in such a public manner would not be helpful.

10. Comment: Tone of conversations was cordial and both sides referred to continuing usefulness of communicating through Interests Sections. At same time, seriousness with which USG views Cuban involvement in Africa was confirmed to Sanchez-Parodi. For his part, he predicted strong reaction in Havana. Will appreciate USINT’s reporting and interpretation that reaction.

Vance

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4 The text of Castro’s message to Palme on Angola is in telegram 2985 from Stockholm, May 25. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760203–0184)
25. **Memorandum of Conversation**

Washington, December 2, 1977

**PARTICIPANTS**

William P. Stedman, ARA
Wayne S. Smith, ARA/CCA
Ramon Sanchez-Parodi, Chief of Cuban Interests Section

**SUBJECT**

U.S.-Cuban Relations

Ambassador Stedman opened the conversation by asking Mr. Sanchez-Parodi if he had seen press reports that morning of the remarks on Cuban troops in Africa attributed to President Carter and Secretary Vance by two U.S. Congressmen.²

When Sanchez-Parodi said he had not, Mr. Smith gave him a Reuter report to read. Having done so, Sanchez-Parodi said he thought Carlos Rafael Rodriguez had already clarified Cuba’s position in his conversation with the Chief of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana.³ The recent “dramatic build-up of Cuban troops in Africa” referred to by U.S. intelligence reports simply did not exist. Additional troops had been sent to Angola in the spring of 1977 because of the threat of counter-invasion from Zaire by Moroccan troops, but there had been no troop increases since at least June or July; hence, it was difficult to fathom what the U.S. was complaining of. Cuba had sent additional technicians to Angola, to be sure, and would be sending more, as had been publicly announced. But troop levels were static.

Cuba had also sent some military advisors to Ethiopia, Sanchez-Parodi said, but added that the number was relatively small and that there were no combat units.

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¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 11, Cuba, 10–12/77. Confidential. Drafted by Smith on December 6; cleared by Stedman. The meeting was held in the Tiberio Restaurant in Washington.

² Congressmen Frederick Richmond (D–NY) and Richard Nolan (D–MN) visited Cuba from December 1 to December 5 and met with Fidel Castro. “The message we’re supposed to take,” Nolan stated when they left Washington, “is that we’re eager and ready to begin high-level, official negotiations with a presidential appointee, step-by-step, but that must include a step-by-step withdrawal from Africa.” (“U.S. to Cuba: Quit Africa,” The Chicago Tribune, December 2, p. 2) A summary of their meeting with Castro and their activities during the visit is in telegram 781 from Havana, December 6. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770397–0478)

³ A summary of this November 18 meeting was transmitted in telegram 643 from Havana, November 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770430–0556)
Mr. Smith replied that even granting that Sanchez-Parodi’s information was accurate, that still meant there were more Cubans in Angola now than a few months ago, whether troops or not, and more Cuban military advisors in Ethiopia. The relative increase might not be large, but the U.S. Government had to be concerned as to what the increases might imply in terms of Cuban intentions. The Ford Administration had started secret talks with Cuba only to see Cuba intervene militarily in Angola.4 The present Administration obviously would have reservations about going ahead with the process of normalization in the face of any build-up in Angola and perhaps a repetition in Ethiopia of the Angola pattern.

Sanchez-Parodi said this was not the case. Cuba has no wish to repeat its experience in Angola in any other African state. Further, Angola is in a difficult situation economically and without trained personnel to run things; hence, Cuban technicians are needed. In that sense, Cuba will probably be involved in Angola for several years. But once the military situation permits, she would like to resume the reduction of troops which had begun in 1976.

Ambassador Stedman asked if there were any possibility of a reduction soon in the overall number of Cuban troops in Africa.

Sanchez-Parodi replied that with the exception of Angola and Ethiopia the number of Cuban military personnel in any given African country was insignificant. And as he had said, reductions in Angola would depend upon the situation there. Further, he said, if the U.S. side wants to talk about Cuban troop reductions in Africa, Cuba would wish to raise the matter of U.S. troops at Guantanamo.

Mr. Smith said that while there might appear to be some logical progression from talking about Cuban troops in Africa to American forces at Guantanamo, in fact the two situations were different and there was nothing practical to be gained from attempting to tie discussion of the one to the other.

Sanchez-Parodi disagreed, saying the one was as valid a subject for discussion as the other.

Ambassador Stedman asked if Sanchez-Parodi had any comment or thoughts on press reports of remarks attributed to the Secretary by the two U.S. Congressmen that Cuba should begin discussing the withdrawal of its troops from Africa.

Sanchez-Parodi reiterated earlier statements that Cuba’s relations with Angola—and with Ethiopia and the other states—were bilateral affairs and not subject to negotiation. Discussions to clarify Cuba’s

position were something else again, but even there, he wondered if there was really anything to be gained, since Carlos Rafael Rodriguez had already stated Cuba’s position clearly.

26. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency (Wells) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Todman), the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Saunders), and Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff

Washington, December 22, 1977

SUBJECT
Comments by a Cuban Official Concerning the Views of Fidel Castro on Reestablishing Diplomatic Relations with the United States

1. The following information was obtained by a regular source from a medium-level Cuban official who was aware that the information would reach the U.S. Government and who claimed that it represented the views of Cuban leaders. While it is possible that the Cuban Government would want to surface trial balloons in unofficial channels, it is not clear why the Cubans would choose this relatively low-level channel to do so.

2. According to a Cuban official [3 lines not declassified] Castro is anxious to hasten the reestablishment of full diplomatic relations with the United States. For that reason, he has attempted to send the U.S. Government a sign of his good faith at every opportunity. According to the Cuban official, every U.S. official visitor to Cuba has managed to obtain Cuban approval for at least one request, such as the release of U.S. prisoners from Cuban jails. The Cuban official also said that Castro is pleased that there have been signs of good faith from the U.S. too, but that Castro is hopeful the U.S. soon will find the opportunity

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 11, Cuba, 10–12/77. Secret; Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals; Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor/Consultants.

2 In telegram 768 from Havana, December 6, the Interests Section reported that during the Richmond and Nolan visit, Castro said he would consider the emigration of two released political prisoners who were U.S. citizens, and vowed to consider the release of five others. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770452–0685)
to send additional, more profound signs aimed at moving towards full diplomatic relations.

3. The Cuban official added that contrary to public statements that Castro does not see the likelihood of a meeting with President Jimmy Carter during his present term, Castro said that the sooner he and President Carter meet to discuss key issues, the better it will be for both countries and the hemisphere as a whole. According to the Cuban official, Castro suggested that the meeting with President Carter be held in a neutral site in a Caribbean country. The Cuban official said that Castro wants the U.S. economic blockade against Cuba to be lifted, but that Castro does not believe that that will help Cuba to the extent needed. What Castro seeks is most favored nation status in commercial dealings with the U.S.

4. The Cuban official reiterated Castro’s desire to receive additional signs from the United States that President Carter is just as interested as Castro in reestablishing full diplomatic and commercial relations between their countries. The Cuban official said Castro admitted that many points of conflict exist between the U.S. and Cuba, but that Castro believes relations should be established first because negotiation of the various issues would be facilitated if diplomatic relations were established. According to the Cuban official, one major sign of good faith would be for the United States to demonstrate that it comprehends Cuban policy in Angola by reducing the strength of its campaign for immediate Cuban withdrawal from Angola. The Cuban official said that an intelligent analysis of Cuba’s policy in Angola by the U.S. Government would probably convince the U.S. to moderate its criticism. (Field Comment: The Cuban official implied that Cuba finds itself militarily trapped in Angola with no immediate solution in sight. He seemed, however, to be trying to avoid stating that explicitly.)

5. No further distribution of this information is being made.

William W. Wells³

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³ Printed from a copy that indicates that [name not declassified] signed the original for Wells above this typed signature.
27. **Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section in Cuba to the Department of State**¹

Havana, December 27, 1977, 1437Z

937. Subject: Castro Lashes Out at US.

1. In major speech to National Assembly of Poder Popular December 24, Fidel Castro delivered most sweeping critique of US policy since Carter administration took office—including harsh and emotional rejection of recent USG declarations on Cuban policy in Africa. Castro also rebuffed and ridiculed recent US (including presumably senatorial) appeals on behalf of Cuban nationality political prisoners. Castro, in discussing various policy issues, suggested that President Carter has been misguided by his advisors and that, unless USG policy changes, the Cubans will “fight against” President Carter, as they have against previous American Presidents.

2. Major theme of Castro speech was to lay out long-term strategy of consumer sacrifice and heightened investment to reduce Cuba’s dependence on West. While admitting utility of US-Cuban rapprochement, Castro sought to convey impression that he is dealing with US from position of relative strength and that he need not be moved by US pressures and blandishments. He again appeared to condition further progress on contentious US-Cuban issues (e.g., release of remaining AMCIT political prisoners) on full or partial lifting of US embargo, which he termed an immoral negotiating arm of US.

3. Details follow in septel.²

4. Comment: This is first Castro speech since September opening of Interests Sections in which underlying premise is that US-Cuban relations may just as likely deteriorate as improve. Lowering of expectations in this regard may be intended to condition Cuban public opinion in event normalization process comes to naught, to reaffirm Cuban loyalty to USSR at time of sensitive Moscow-Havana economic negotiations, and to place tactical pressure on US administration to soften embargo.

5. Castro was obviously emotionally aroused in this speech, and it remains to be seen whether or how his fiery line will be reflected in early policy decisions and actions. Upcoming visit of Codel Reuss may permit further insights. USINT recommends low-key USG official

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¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770482–0141. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated for information to Moscow.

² Telegram 945 from Havana, December 28. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770483–1146)
reaction to Castro’s attack, emphasizing that normalization is at best a difficult process and that actions on both sides are more important than words.3

Lane

3 In telegram 10 from Havana, January 4, 1978, the Interests Section reported Congressman Reuss’s conversation with Castro, in which the Cuban leader argued that his December 24 speech was “not intended to write-off U.S.-Cuban normalization process,” but he remained cagey about the degree of Cuba’s military commitment to Africa and urged the lifting of the U.S. embargo. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780007-0419)

28. Memorandum From Rick Inderfurth of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)1

Washington, March 23, 1978

SUBJECT
Cuba and Africa: Next Steps

As you know, today’s SCC meeting on the Horn will include a discussion on Cuban credits and the possibility of resuming Cuban reconnaissance overflights.2

For what it is worth, I believe it would be a mistake to rely on these tactics to influence Castro. The embargo has probably had a positive impact on the development of Cuba, certainly not a negative one. Past reconnaissance flights were an irritant, nothing more. I believe one of the greatest assets we have today with Castro is that he perceives the Carter Administration to be different than past Administrations. The initial turnoff of reconnaissance flights was a signal in this respect. I believe Castro understood it. Obviously, our decision to establish an interest section was a step in bettering relations, and I think Castro

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 13, Cuba, 3–9/78. Secret.
2 The meeting was rescheduled for March 27. See Document 29.
appreciated this, although his actions in Africa have not been influenced by it.

If we begin now to resort to old and ineffective tactics, I believe we will lose whatever chance we have for influencing Castro in a positive direction. He will say the same old crowd is in charge in Washington, nothing has changed, and he will go about his business accordingly.

What we must do, therefore, is to find positive ways to influence Castro, rather than negative ones. The Administration’s more cooperative approach to Latin America and Asia is one step in this direction, although a long term one. Our commitment to majority rule in Southern Africa and our pursuit of the Anglo-American plan will help to undercut Soviet and Cuban support among the front line states and the Patriotic Front.

I regret to say that I have no immediate answer to the question of how to induce Castro—in a positive way—to reduce his presence in Africa. I believe the SCC should ask for immediate recommendations on this. Perhaps actions toward the non-aligned nations would be one possibility. I am sure others could be conceived.

To reiterate, my basic point is that our best hope for influencing Castro is based on his perception that he is dealing with a new political team in Washington, one that is ready and able to challenge his “leadership” of the Third World.
29. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting

Washington, March 27, 1978, 4:00–5:45 p.m.

SUBJECT
Horn of Africa

PARTICIPANTS
State
Cyrus Vance
Richard M. Moose, Jr. (Ass’t. Sec./African Affairs)
Donald McHenry (USUN)

Defense
Harold Brown
Charles W. Duncan, Jr. (Deputy Secretary of Defense)
David E. McGiffert (Ass’t. Secretary/ISA)

CIA
Frank Carlucci (Acting DCI)

[Name not declassified] (Chief, Africa Division)

White House
David Aaron (Chairman)

NSC
Paul B. Henze (Notetaker)

JCS
General David C. Jones (Acting Chairman, JCS)
LTG William Y. Smith (Assistant to Chairman, JCS)

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
[Omitted here is discussion of the Horn of Africa.]

Measures against Cuba:

Secretary Vance reviewed possibilities for bringing economic pressure to bear on Cuba and concluded that they offered little promise considering the effort they would entail. The group did not believe that representations by a special emissary to Castro would produce favorable results. Secretary Vance was opposed to consideration of closing the Interest Sections. Resumption of SR–71 flights over Cuba was discussed. The Chairman and the Secretary of Defense favored resumption of these flights; the Secretary of State was inclined against them. The Acting Director of Central Intelligence noted that they were not needed for intelligence collection. Secretary Brown mentioned the possibility of taking more dramatic measures to enhance our military posture in the Caribbean rather than confining ourselves to resumption

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, 1977–1981, Box 184, SCC 068 Horn of Africa, Cuba’s role in Africa, 3/27/78. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Henze. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.
of SR–71 flights. The group decided to make no recommendation on this question for the time being.

There was an extensive discussion of the risks and possibilities of increasing aid to UNITA in Angola with the aim of heightening the costs of their intervention for the Cubans. Acting Director Carlucci described the current status of the CIA intelligence relationship with Savimbi, the very substantial support Savimbi is now receiving from other friendly countries and some of the measures that could be taken to improve Savimbi’s communications. The consensus of the group, however, was that very little could be done without Presidential Findings, congressional briefings and perhaps efforts to have legislative restrictions that may still be in effect waived or repealed. State and CIA will study the congressional/legal situation in greater detail.

The only action on which the group reached consensus was that there should be increased covert media activity on Cubans in Africa with special effort to project information on Cuban casualties and problems into Cuba itself. CIA will prepare plans for implementation, including additional Presidential Findings, if required.

[Omitted here is discussion of South Yemen.]

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2 In an April 6 memorandum to Secretary Brown, McGiffert discussed using the Non-Aligned Movement to put pressure on Castro to reduce the Cuban military presence in the Horn of Africa. The memorandum is printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XVII, The Horn of Africa, Document 77.

3 In an April 7 memorandum to Brzezinski, Turner called for a new “Omnibus Finding” that would authorize the covert action discussed in the SCC meeting. (National Security Council, Carter Intelligence Files, Box 29, USSR-Cuban Intervention in Africa, 9 Jan 1978–7 Jul 1978)
30. **Note From Paul Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)**

Washington, May 4, 1978

**SUBJECT**

Castro on his Involvements in Africa—Significant CIA Report

Here is the CIA report I mentioned in my evening report of yesterday. It is worth reading in its entirety. CIA tells me they regard its source as very reliable.

The information in this report rings true. It matches most of the less authoritative and more piecemeal reporting we have been receiving lately. Castro clearly sees the disadvantages of getting caught in the Eritrean morass. Moreover, he clearly senses that he is close to being bogged down in an Angolan morass. And that bothers him because he would rather see Cuba “bringing its full military weight to bear on more pressing Southern African problems.”—This provides the strongest justification yet for what you have been pressing the USG to do re Angola: step up Savimbi’s capabilities and complicate Cuba’s problem; this will limit what they can try to do farther south. . .

This report reveals interesting facets of Castro’s psychology, in which there is a certain naive quality which I suspect is not entirely contrived—much as Castro must realize that he is effectively serving the Soviets as supplier of mercenaries for their own African purposes. Suggest you will want to show this report to the President if it has not been included in the PDB.

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1 Source: National Security Council, Carter Intelligence Files, Box 29, USSR-Cuban Intervention in Africa, 9 Jan 1978–7 Jul 1978. Secret. A copy was sent to Pastor. At the top of the page, Brzezinski wrote, “RI [Inderfurth], DR [Daily Report] item on Angola.”

2 Attached but not printed.

3 A notation at the top of the page reads: “PDB Fri [May 4].”
31. **Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section in Cuba to the Department of State**\(^1\)

Havana, May 15, 1978, 1500Z

1250. Subject: MINREX Vice-Minister Comments on Africa and Other Topics in U.S.-Cuban Relations.

1. Begin summary. Cuban First Vice-Minister of Foreign Relations says there is no early prospect of Cuban military withdrawals from Ethiopia or Angola due to continuing external threats to those countries. He reaffirms Cuban support for political settlement in Eritrea and expresses absolute Cuban support for SWAPO and Popular Front in the south. Conversation also covered Treaty of Tlatelolco and pending consular problems. End summary.

2. I requested a meeting with First Vice-Minister of Foreign Relations Rene Anillo to review several pending problems prior to my departure on May 20 for home leave and consultations. Interview was granted on May 12. Subjects covered included Cuban presence in Africa, reported in this message, as well as continuing delays in our consular access to American prisoners, repatriation of dual nationals and their families, and the Cuban position on the Treaty of Tlatelolco. These other topics will be covered in septels.\(^2\)

3. I began by asking if there were anything new in the Cuban perception of the situation in Africa, with particular reference to Ethiopia, Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia which the Vice-Minister could tell me prior to my departure for the U.S. Anillo, who is the embodiment of taciturnity at best, first responded by referring me to Fidel Castro’s speech and the communique which followed President Mengistu’s recent visit to Cuba,\(^3\) and also to Vice-President Almeida’s speech at the recent UN Special Session on Namibia. On further probing, he made the following additional points:

   A. Cuban troops will remain in Ethiopia because Somalia has not renounced its aggressive designs and in fact continues to talk about

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780206–0059. Confidential. Repeated for information to Addis Ababa, Mogadiscio, and Moscow.

\(^2\) In telegram 1251 from Havana, May 15, the Interests Section discussed the Cuban position on the Tlatelolco Treaty. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780206–0046) Telegram 1261 from Havana, May 16, reported on consular access to American prisoners in Cuba and prospects for the repatriation of dual nationals. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780209–0059)

\(^3\) In telegram 1100 from Havana, April 27, the Interests Section reported that Castro gave an April 26 speech during Mengistu’s visit. Castro stressed “peaceful, political settlement,” but affirmed that Cuban troops would remain in Ethiopia “indefinitely.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780181–110)
war in Ogaden. Paradoxically, Anillo stated that the Somali army which invaded the Ogaden had been destroyed, and that there is currently very little military action in that region. With respect to Eritrea, Cuba sees this as an internal problem for Ethiopia, although Anillo suggested that the recent increase of secessionist activity is due in large part to outside help and encouragement taking advantage of the unsettled Ethiopian revolution. Fuzzily and with notably little conviction, he repeated the now standard line that Cuba favors a peaceful political settlement in Eritrea and does not plan to participate in military action there. He said with no suggestion of optimism that the prospects for peace depend upon all the contending parties. In response to my specific question he added that Cuba is trying to advance the cause of peace among those parties but he offered no details.

B. Cuban troops will also remain in Angola in view of the continuing threat from Zaire and South Africa. Anillo had very little hope for the current diplomatic efforts to allay either of those threats. He of course castigated South Africa for its recent invasion of Angola, and listened without comment to my assurances that the Western Five would continue their efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement in Namibia. He did say that it was his personal understanding that SWAPO has not definitely broken off conversations with the Five, but he would not admit that Cuba has any specific information on SWAPO’s position in this regard. He repeated the line frequently voiced by Cuban officials here that Walvis Bay is the most critical problem in the negotiations.

C. The principal element in Cuba’s policy toward both Namibia and Zimbabwe is absolute support for SWAPO and the Popular Front respectively. Anillo condemned the internal settlement in Rhodesia and was not hopeful of a peaceful outcome. I stressed that the U.S. and U.K. are continuing their efforts to bring all the parties together. Anillo would not be drawn out further on possible Cuban reaction if current peacemaking efforts in Rhodesia and Namibia fail.

4. Comment: With exception of limited progress on consular problems (septel), this conversation was not encouraging with respect to Cuban movement on matters of concern to us. It was once again clear that Cuba is not prepared at present to make concessions in its foreign policies, especially in Africa, to accommodate the U.S. or advance the normalization process. If it shows restraint in Eritrea or in Southern Africa, this will be a function of Cuba’s relations with other countries involved in those regions and more generally with the NAM rather than with the United States. Nevertheless, Vice-Minister Anillo agreed with my observation at the conclusion of the meeting that our two countries should continue a dialogue on these matters.

Lane

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4 A Ministerial meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement was held in Havana May 18–21.
32. **Action Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake) and the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Gelb) to Secretary of State Vance**

Washington, May 26, 1978

**Trade and Financial Embargo Against Cuba**

**Issue for Decision:**

Whether you or the President should raise in private discussions during the NATO Summit the possibility of a Western trade and credit embargo against Cuba.²

**Discussion:**

Despite our strong verbal statements and the decisive and coordinated action of the U.S., French and Belgians against the Katangan gendarmes, the Cubans’ perception of our inability and/or unwillingness to counter their moves in Africa probably remains largely unchanged. Nor have our efforts to encourage members of the Non-Aligned Movement to criticize Cuba been very successful so far.³ The Cubans feel able to act with the Soviets and in support of their friends—governments as well as liberation movements—without incurring serious costs to themselves at our hands. Looking ahead, the Cubans may well expand their role in southern Africa, on the basis of this general calculus. They have, however, shown some concern about our recent reactions to their African policies, as evident in Castro’s personal assurances of Cuban non-involvement in the Shaba affair.⁴

Cuba’s behavior in Africa—and our inaction—has become a salient issue on both the foreign and domestic fronts. Internationally, important allies, such as the Saudis, are worried by the proximity of Cuban troops, and others are taking note of our failure to meet this challenge. The time might be ripe for us to ask our allies how far they would be

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¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Anthony Lake Working Papers, Lot 82D298, Box 17, TL Sensitive 4/1–6/30/78. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Cleared by Katz, Moose, Bushnell, and Vest.

² The NATO Summit was held from May 30 to May 31 in Washington. Telegram 138250 to USNATO, May 31, summarized the summit discussions and did not mention Cuba as a major issue. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780228-0365)

³ See footnote 2, Document 29.

⁴ Lane was called to Castro’s office on May 17 so Castro could send a message “urgently and in strict confidence to Secretary Vance and President Carter” denying Cuban involvement in Shaba. (Telegram 1300 from Havana, May 18; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780208–1126)
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prepared to go in taking joint action against Cuba. The NATO Summit offers us an excellent forum to do this, particularly if we find ourselves pressed to indicate what further action we intend to take against the Soviets and Cubans in Africa, by asking their views on a trade and credit embargo against Cuba.

A trade and credit embargo against Cuba by the West could significantly increase the costs to Cuba of its African policy. In 1976, 39% ($1.4 billion) of Cuba’s imports came from non-Communist countries. Since Cuba has been running a trade deficit with the West, it has had to borrow to finance additional imports, from Western commercial banks and official credit agencies. In 1975 and 1976, recorded Eurocurrency medium-term commercial borrowings were averaging about $200 million per year. Data for 1977 and 1978 is sparse, although in February a $42 million loan was extended by a Japanese consortium. Since 1973, Western governments have extended some $3 billion in official trade credits and guarantees, generally tied to national capital goods exports, of which perhaps $1 billion have been utilized. In addition, Cuba has received development assistance of about $20 million annually from the West.

If a universal trade embargo were implemented, a credit squeeze would be superfluous (trade with Comecon is on a barter or soft currency basis). However, nations that wished to ignore a trade embargo would be hampered by an absence of credit facilities.

We would link the lifting of the embargo to “substantial withdrawal” of Cuban military personnel from Africa. The pressures on the Cubans would be transferred to the Soviets quickly since Moscow would be called on to make up the economic costs of an Embargo. This could produce strains on the Soviet-Cuban relationship and certainly would increase the costs to Moscow of a more forward African policy.

The Risks

In the past, the Europeans have refused to include Cuba as a proscribed destination for the COCOM strategic embargo, even when the OAS was supporting our Cuban embargo. There has been a general feeling that the United States has been overly obsessed with Cuba. Moreover, since US trade and credits are already largely prohibited, the Europeans might feel that our suggestion was designed to get them to bear the full cost of the embargo, and to avoid more direct US efforts to deal with the Soviet/Cuban problems. The economic costs would be substantial for some countries; for example, in 1976, Canada sold $279 million to Cuba, Spain $221 million, Japan $213 million, France, Germany and the UK about $100 million each. In addition, existing Western bank exposure, at over $1.3 billion, could be jeopardized should Cuba feel that political motives were being introduced into commercial relationships.
Less costly to the Europeans—but still of importance for Cuba—would be a halt to official government trade credits and insurance for commercial trade credits. In addition, several Western governments have expressed intentions to review closely their aid programs, and Trudeau has decided not to renew a $10 million line of credit and $4.5 million in technical assistance.

The Europeans might balk also at an embargo against Cuba because of the precedent effect it could have for future OPEC consideration of another oil embargo. They may also argue that while it is important to halt the Cubans, it would be seriously damaging to the West’s “free trade” objectives at this time for the Europeans to impose a politically motivated trade embargo against another country. Finally, they would probably ask whether Japan or Spain, which are Cuba’s principal Western trading partners, would join in. (Our estimate is that Japan might but Spain might not participate in such an embargo.)

An embargo against Cuba could also have political costs for us. The cold war mentality it would recall could affect public attitudes toward other dimensions of East-West relations on which we seek progress—notably, SALT. It is also possible, however, that this move would increase public confidence in the Administration’s firmness, which could translate into reduced misgivings about our policies in areas of East-West cooperation—again, most notably, SALT. We may also encounter pressures from some African states to explain why we are willing to embargo Cuba but not South Africa, and we could come under heavy criticism for dealing with a problem in Africa, i.e., Cuban military involvement, by actions outside Africa which are basically keyed to East-West competition. Many African states do not consider Cuban assistance illegitimate when requested to defend territorial integrity. The non-aligned countries may rally to Cuba’s defense, even those which disapprove of Cuban policy, in order both to illustrate their solidarity with a member country under western pressure and because each may fear it could be vulnerable to similar pressure in the future. And, of course, instead of moderating Cuban behavior, a Western economic embargo would push the Cubans into greater dependence on the Soviets and possibly make Cuban behavior even more reckless, including in this hemisphere. Nor is it likely to bring about a major change in their present African policy.

On balance, however, we believe that the Europeans should be asked whether they are prepared to pay some of the costs of bringing real pressure to bear on the Cubans. An embargo is the only way to show Cuba quickly that the price of interventionism is economic deprivation and political isolation, at least within the West. We also believe that since many of our allies have repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction with our “inaction” we should not hesitate to ask for their
cooperation. Broad western participation would, however, be indispensable to impose such measures.

If it were disclosed this subject had been discussed, the results would be mixed. It could jeopardize any chance of European cooperation and make it easier for those European Governments reluctant to chance an embargo to shy away. This could reinforce an image of US-NATO inability to deal with the Cuban problem, focus attention on allied disunity, and potentially exacerbate our alliance relationships. At the same time, it would underscore for others, including Saudi Arabia and Iran, and for the American public that we were seriously looking for ways to constrain the Cubans.

Because of the adverse foreign policy consequences of a premature “leak” we believe it is particularly important to limit exploration of this idea to careful discussion in private, either by the President or yourself next week, perhaps initially at the Quadripartite Dinner Monday night. The context should be a European query to us as to what we might do rather than a clear US initiative to the Europeans.

S/P, PM, and EB believe a careful feeling out of European views is useful even if the likely results are negative, if only to underscore for the Europeans the dilemma of finding appropriate ways in which to deal with Cuba. EUR has no objection to such approaches but is uncertain about the results. ARA does not believe we can get wide support for a trade embargo and believes raising the issue could be counterproductive. ARA does not object to raising the credit issue but believes even if all western countries cut off new credits, Cuban policy would not be significantly affected. AF is opposed to an approach and to an Embargo which it believes would seriously compromise our African policies.

Recommendation:

That you sign the attached memorandum to the President suggesting that he raise the embargo issue at the NATO Summit.5

5 The memorandum is attached but not printed. Vance checked the disapprove option. Tarnoff clarified Vance’s decision with the following comment, “Question of a trade/credit embargo against Cuba should be studied in the PRM–36 exercise and not be raised with foreign governments before decisions are made in the context of PRM–36.” PRM/NSC–36, “Soviet/Cuban Presence in Africa,” May 23, directed a PRC review of U.S. policy aimed at limiting Soviet/Cuban activity in Africa.
33. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter

Washington, June 19, 1978

SUBJECT
Contact with Castro’s Representative, Jose Luis Padron

Attached (at Tab A) is a summary of the main points of Dave Newsom’s talk with Castro’s representative, Jose Luis Padron, in New York on June 15. As previously agreed, Dave will brief Congressman Fascell on that portion of the conversation dealing with prisoners on Tuesday morning.

We now have two questions before us:
1. The timing and form of a follow-up on the prisoner aspect of the conversation.
2. Whether, and in what form, to follow-up on the broader political aspects of the conversation.

Prisoner Release

In the various conversations which Padron has had with Cuban exile representatives, he has given them a total of six lists of persons who have been, or currently are, prisoners together with the number of dependents, all of whom presumably are covered by Castro’s decision to permit such persons to leave Cuba. The six lists include, with dependents, 1596 persons.

Dave explained both to Padron and the exiles that we cannot respond to this aspect of the approach without further examination of the matter within the U.S. Government and that this could take some time. I believe that we should move promptly to give the Cubans a definitive response on whether we are prepared to receive these people.

I suggest therefore that:
1. With your authority and coordination with the NSC I approach the Attorney General on an urgent basis and seek his authority to tell the Cubans that we will propose parole entry for those in this category permitted to leave Cuba. If approved, funding will have to be worked out with Joe Califano at a later date.
2. That once we can speak more authoritatively on this matter, Dave seek a further meeting with Padron to relay the answer.

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 60, Alpha Channel—Cuba, 6–8/78. Secret; Nodis. Carter initialed the memorandum indicating that he saw it.
2 Tab A is attached but not printed. A full transcript of the June 15 meeting with Padron is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Box 61, Cuba, 5–7/78.
3 June 20.
The six lists are attached at Tab B. Any further conversations with Padron on the prisoner issue would presumably also deal with the question of the four remaining U.S. citizen prisoners.

**Broader Political Issues**

David Aaron had one previous conversation with Padron which covered broader aspects of U.S.-Cuban relations. Padron covered this same ground with Dave Newsom. Zbig and I had agreed that David Aaron would continue to be in touch with Padron on the political issues while we in the Department would take care of the prisoner issue. If Padron can be taken at face value, it would seem worthwhile to continue to explore with him Cuban policies. It would seem, in this case, particularly important to follow up on the question of circumstances under which Cuba might be prepared to withdraw its troops from Angola and Ethiopia. Cuban actions towards Puerto Rico suggest another topic.

With your approval, I will be talking to Zbig on how we conduct future conversations with the Cubans on political issues and in particular how we respond to the latest conversation with Padron.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

1. That you authorize me to discuss the question of the admission of these Cuban prisoners with the Attorney General. 

2. That I talk to Zbig about how we follow-up on the political aspects of the two previous conversations with Padron.

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4 Not attached and not found. In an August 10 memorandum to Attorney General Bell, the Secretary stated that the Cubans would be paroling 48 prisoners and 31 dependents into the United States, with as many as 500 to arrive in the future. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 60, Alpha Channel—Cuba, 6–8/78)

5 On April 14, Aaron and Gates held an informal meeting with Padron to discuss the Cuban presence in Africa. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Box 61, Cuba, 2–4/78)

6 Carter checked the approve option.

7 Carter checked the approve option and initialed below the recommendations. Negotiations with the Cubans regarding the prisoner issue continued through July and August 1978. The minutes of Newsom’s July 5 meeting with Padron are in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Box 61, Cuba, 5–7/78. In a memorandum to Carter on July 7, Brzezinski expressed concern delegating the negotiations to Newsom and Tarnoff, stating that having them discuss issues beyond the scope of prisoner repatriation was “not a good idea.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 60, Alpha Channel—Cuba, 6–8/78) Newsom, accompanied by Aaron, met with Padron again on August 8. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Office, Box 61, Cuba, 8/78) An August 23 meeting of Justice, State, and NSC representatives set guidelines for prisoner parole, permitting Justice and the CIA to screen the parolees. During the meeting, the number of dependents allowed to accompany the prisoners was lowered to 30. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 60, Alpha Channel—Cuba, 6–8/78)
34. Memorandum From William Odom of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\textsuperscript{1}

Washington, August 3, 1978

SUBJECT

Crisis Potential: Soviet Units in Cuba

[\textit{less than 1 line not declassified}] there is an [\textit{less than 1 line not declassified}] report of Soviet tank troops in Cuba.\textsuperscript{2} I have queried the intelligence community on this to learn that the evidence is far from conclusive. The [\textit{less than 1 line not declassified}] is compatible with as benign an interpretation as Soviet military advisers going out for their annual summer military reserve training in groups of a dozen or so. The [\textit{less than 1 line not declassified}] could be as benign as “maneuvers” on a tank driving exercise course. In a word, the situation is very unclear. Arnold Horelick reports that an intensified effort to clarify the situation is under way.

He was worried that we might overreact. I am giving you this memorandum to provide a better sense of limits and validity of [\textit{less than 1 line not declassified}]

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 13, Cuba, 3-9/78. Top Secret; Sensitive.
\item Not found. A July 31 telegram from the National Security Agency to the Department of State summarizing the existing intelligence regarding Soviet units in Cuba is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 15, Cuba, Soviet Brigade, 5-8/79.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
35. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

WASHINGTON, SEPTEMBER 13, 1978

SUBJECT

Castro Appeals to the Cuban-American Community

Castro’s interview with Cuban-American newsmen on September 6 offered the strongest evidence to date of a Cuban tactic which has been gathering momentum for several months: a play to the some 600,000 Cuban-Americans and Cuban exiles in the U.S. in hopes of reducing their support for anti-Castro terrorism and eventually of persuading them to exert pressure on us to lift the embargo and take other steps sought by Havana.²

This marks a sharp change of pace on Havana’s part. As of a year ago, when the interests sections were opened in the two capitals, Cuban officialdom regarded the Cuban-American community here as their worst enemy and consistently described it as composed of “counterrevolutionary worms.” Exiles who had the temerity to apply at the Cuban Interests Section for authorization to return to Cuba to visit families were often rebuffed abruptly and without explanation.

That Castro has shifted away from such pointless attitudes and tactics is a tribute to his political acumen. For some months now, Havana has been permitting an increasing number of Cubans resident here to return to Cuba for family visits. Contact has been established with various representatives of the community and a dialogue begun on release of prisoners and several other issues.

What Havana has in mind was seen clearly in the remark of a Cuban diplomat here some months ago; he expressed admiration for and interest in the Israeli government’s success in utilizing the American Jewish community as a pressure group. The direction in which Havana would wish to channel such pressures is indicated by the fact that exiles applying to visit families in Cuba are often now politely

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780158–1095. Secret. Drafted by Smith on September 11; concurred in by Vaky.

² In telegram 2692 from Havana, September 7, the Interests Section reported that Castro gave an interview to 25 Cuban-American media representatives. During the interview, Castro stated that he had come to appreciate the concerns about Cuban exiles, and declared that the exiles would no longer be referred to as “worms,” but instead as the “Cuban community abroad.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780364–1135)
refused with the statement that all could travel back freely if only Washington would lift the trade embargo. Cuban diplomats here have also commented that the more the Cuban-American community becomes involved in family reunification, etc., the less they will be disposed to support the exile terrorist organizations.

Castro’s play to the Cuban-American community may convince an increasing number of its members to call for new steps toward normalizing relations between Washington and Havana. Neither ploy nor effect is necessarily antithetical to our own objectives and interests, however; on the contrary, the new channels of communication which have emerged in the process are useful, and the actions which Castro offers as enticement to the Cuban-American community—release of prisoners, increased family visits, etc.—fulfill our objectives as well as theirs. Castro may say he is releasing prisoners as a gesture to the overseas Cubans, rather than as a result of President Carter’s human rights policies, but the results are the same. And controlling exile terrorism is an objective we share with Havana.

Nor would there seem to be any real danger that Castro could carry things so far as to turn the Cuban-American community into a pro-Castro force against us. The animosities of almost 20 years will die hard, if indeed they ever die. If certain of the Cubans here are now willing to deal with Castro, that does not imply any fondness for him or acceptance of the system he has imposed; rather, it reflects a pragmatism on their part which is typically Cuban. They have concluded that if families are to be reunited and prisoners freed, it will only come about through a dialogue with the present government. Their opening to Havana, then, is predicated on considerations similar to those which motivated our own. The time may come when they will want to move ahead faster than will suit our purposes. The Cubans here are interested in visiting their families and getting them out of Cuba, not in Castro’s troops in Africa or in compensation for nationalized U.S. property. But even should they begin to get ahead of us, this should not prove a serious problem. As a pressure group, the relatively small Cuban-American community has definite limits. We moved ahead in opening the normalization process despite their objections; we should be able to control its pace even should they urge a faster one.

In the final analysis, a muting of hostilities between Havana and the Cuban community here should benefit all sides.

Peter Tarnoff
Executive Secretary
Memorandum for the Record by the Under Secretary of Defense (Resor)

Washington, October 25, 1978

SUBJECT
Soviet Strike Aircraft in Cuba

I met with David Aaron, David Newsom, and Bob Bowie today to discuss Soviet strike aircraft in Cuba.

Aaron reviewed the terms of the Soviet commitment as evidenced first by the published records. He characterized the commitment in the words used by President Kennedy in his 20 November 1962 statement, namely that the Soviets had “agreed to remove from Cuba all weapon systems capable of offensive use (and) to halt the further introduction of such weapons into Cuba.”

He then referred to an exchange with the Soviets which took place in 1970 in connection with the submarine base issue. As part of that exchange, the US referred to the Soviet commitment that “all offensive weapons be removed and kept out of the hemisphere in the future.” He said that the Soviets had responded that “they affirmed their strict adherence to the 1962 agreement.”

Aaron then raised the issue of whether the MIG-23s were D or F models. The CIA did not have detailed information at the meeting.

Introduction of MIG–23D

Aaron then asked for views as to whether the introduction by the Soviets of nuclear capable MIG-23s into Cuba would violate the Soviet commitment. All present agreed that this would constitute a violation.

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1 Source: Washington National Records Center, Files of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Special Assistants to both, FRC 330–81–0202, Cuba. Secret; Sensitive. Brown initialed the memorandum indicating that he saw it. In a covering note to Brown, Resor wrote, “Attached is a memorandum for record of today’s meeting which was inconclusive.” Brown replied in the margin, “Stan: Good work.”

2 See Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath; Documents 95, 102, and 104. For President Kennedy’s statement, see Public Papers: Kennedy, 1962, pp. 830–831.

Introduction of Non-Nuclear Capable MIG–23

At my suggestion, the meeting addressed the issue of whether introduction of MIG-23Fs into Cuba would constitute a violation of the Soviet commitment if the aircraft had not been modified to be made nuclear capable.

State pointed out that the 1962 agreement had not required the removal of the MIG-19s. They went on to take the view that the MIG–23 represented an increased capability which might have been expected to be developed over the years since 1962 and that the agreement had not dealt with this case. Accordingly, in their view it was not covered by the agreement unless it was nuclear capable.

I pointed out that President Kennedy’s 23 October 1962 proclamation announcing the US’s intention to interdict delivery of offensive weapons to Cuba had specifically included in the prohibited material “bomber aircraft.” I noted that the MIG–23 ground attack aircraft was the first aircraft designed for ground attack to enter the Cuban air forces since 1962, that it had a range and payload comparable to the IL-28s and, accordingly, constituted aircraft with significant offensive capability. I gave Aaron a map showing the area which it could reach in the United States with its 615 mile radius.

I noted that President Kennedy’s 22 October 1962 television address, in addition to referring to offensive missile sites, had also stated that “jet bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons” were being assembled in Cuba. However, I reported that General Smith’s recollection of the exchanges which led to the removal of IL-28s, reported in the 20 November 1962 Presidential announcement, had not focussed on the nuclear capability of the IL-28s but had treated them merely as bombers.

I indicated that DoD felt that the introduction of MIG–23 ground attack aircraft, regardless of whether they were nuclear capable, would probably violate the 1962 understanding since the aircraft had a significant offensive capability, comparable in range and payload to the IL-28s.

Aaron did not try to develop a consensus as to whether only nuclear capable aircraft were proscribed by the 1962 understanding.

It was agreed that a decision should be made within the relatively near future.

Stanley R. Resor

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37. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron) to President Carter

Washington, October 30, 1978

SUBJECT
Private Meeting with the Cubans

The private meeting with the Cubans resulted in a complete impasse. The Cubans were on a very tight leash and spoke largely for the record. They said their presence in Africa was not negotiable, and explicitly held open the option of increasing their forces in Angola and elsewhere in Southern Africa because of what they termed adverse developments in Namibia and Rhodesia. They did not respond to the offer to reopen Coast Guard talks but said the prisoner release would continue and in all likelihood increase.

Because of the impasse on Africa no further meeting was scheduled. The Cubans pressed hard for a U.S. visit to Havana, but also said we would not find any change in the Cuban position, particularly on Africa, even if we did go to Havana. Over dinner they explained that they had exhausted their instructions and that any further clarification of their position (they cited parallel actions on Africa and the trade embargo) would require direct discussions in Havana.

Our assessment is that the Cubans are preparing to increase their presence in Southern Africa and that they have, therefore, decided that this channel should go dormant until the issue of Africa is no longer an obstacle to normalization. The suggestion that a Havana meeting might make it possible to discuss parallel actions appeared to be a final effort merely to encourage a meeting in Cuba and not an indication of serious interest in the parallel approach.

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 60, Alpha Channel—Cuba, 9–11/78. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.
2 Aaron, Newsom, and Tarnoff met with the Cubans on October 28 in Cuernavaca, Mexico from 9:30 a.m. to 9 p.m. A memorandum of conversation is ibid.
3 In January 1978, Cuban and American officials began talks to come up with a plan in which the Cuban and U.S. Coast Guards would work together to prevent terrorism and hijackings. (Telegram 58 from Havana, January 10; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780015-0261)
4 Carter underlined the phrase “no further meeting was scheduled” and wrote in the margin, “Do not plan another.”
38. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting

Washington, November 14, 1978, 9:30–11:00 a.m.

SUBJECT
MIG’s in Cuba

PARTICIPANTS

State
Ambassador David Newsom
George Vest

Defense
Secretary Harold Brown
Charles Duncan
Stanley Resor

JCS
General David Jones
Lt. Gen. William Y. Smith

White House
Zbigniew Brzezinski
David Aaron

NSC
Robert Pastor
Reginald Bartholomew

CIA
Admiral Stansfield Turner
Robert Bowie

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

1. Purpose of the Meeting. To determine the kind, number, and capabilities of MIG’s currently in Cuba as well as those (MIG-25’s) which are expected to be delivered soon; to determine whether the escalation in weaponry constitutes a threat to the U.S. and a violation of the 1962 and 1970 understandings between the U.S. and the USSR, and to recommend a strategy for dealing with the introduction and future delivery of these weapons.

2. Evidence. Present evidence indicates that there may be 12 MIG-23’s in Cuba—one or two MIG–23 D/F have been sighted and possibly as many as 5–9 are present. We do not know whether the general attack MIG-23’s are F (normal export model) or D (30% of which are apparently used by the Soviets for nuclear missions). There was a consensus that both D and F represent a significant jump in offensive capabilities for Cuba in that both are specifically designed for air-to-ground attack. The D represents an additional issue in that its nuclear capability and previous deployment only with Soviet forces raises questions about ultimate Soviet intentions. MIG–23 B/E (of which Cubans have at least three) and MIG-25’s which the Cubans claim they expect
to receive soon) are interceptors, designed primarily for air-to-air attack, though all of these represent a decidedly enhanced capability for Cuba over the MIG-21’s which they presently have.

3. **Threat.** All of the planes can be modified to carry nuclear weapons, and all can reach the U.S., though the D/F’s have the widest range (600–800 miles).

There were three hypotheses suggested as to why the MIG-23’s were deployed now: (1) natural upgrading of Cuban air force capabilities; (2) a deliberate act designed to test the 1962 and 1970 understandings; or (3) to increase the capabilities of Cuba’s air force so that they could use the weapons in Africa.

While no one thought that the reason the Soviets introduced the weapons was to deliberately thwart the understandings, there was a consensus that the introduction of offensive weapons (defined as air-to-ground attack aircraft—MIG–23 D/F) did constitute a violation of the two understandings.

4. **Objective.** There was a consensus that our objective should be to seek a halt on further deployment of MIG–23 D/F, and if possible to obtain their withdrawal.

5. **Approach.** The consensus was that we should approach the Soviets, preferably Secretary Vance to Ambassador Dobrynin, inform them we are following the recent deployment very closely, and register our concern with the introduction of MIG-23’s. (We should not make a distinction between D’s and F’s.) We should inform them that we view MIG–23 D/F’s as offensive weapons, that their deployment in Cuba constitutes a violation of the 1962 and 1970 understandings, and that their deployment will affect our relationship and could jeopardize ratification of the SALT treaty by calling into question Soviet adherence to past understandings. We would express our willingness to indicate a capacity to rationalize the presence of one or two MIG-23’s temporarily, but no more.

6. **Congressional Consultations.** State will forward recommendations on who to consult in Congress and what to say. We would not consider any public statement until that time.

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3 In telegram 290640 to Moscow, November 16, the Department reported Vance’s November 14 démarche to Ambassador Dobrynin regarding the MiG aircraft in Cuba. “Questions would certainly be raised in this country,” Vance warned, “as to whether the provision of air to ground aircraft is consistent with the 1962 understanding.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850081–2616) In telegram 296057 to Moscow, November 22, the Department reported the November 19 Soviet response, “The Soviet side did not and does not undertake anything in Cuba that would contradict agreement reached in 1962. The aircraft in question belong to the same class as those which have already been there for a long time.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840139–1961)
7. Consultations with Latin Americans. CIA believes that most Latin Americans are likely to view this as a U.S. problem, but at some future point, Colombia, Venezuela, Brazil, Mexico and Argentina should probably be briefed and consulted.

39. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)

Washington, November 22, 1978

SUBJECT
Cuban Political Prisoners

A rather cynical idea has been growing in my brain since I read the memcon of David’s conversation in Cuernavaca. For the first time, Padron began fudging—uncharacteristic of him—in his description of the number of political prisoners which Castro would release. At one point, he said 1200 names had already been given, and we could expect 2000 more. Later, he referred to an “additional 3000.” I recalled a cable I read last July in which there was a public discussion for the first time in Cuba—as far as we knew—of an unemployment problem, involving perhaps 18,000 people, 15,000 of whom were formerly political prisoners, probably incorrigibles. I suspect when that figure was brought to Castro’s attention, he first expressed surprise, and then perhaps a lightbulb flashed in his head. He may have thought, what a wonderful way to eliminate Cuba’s human rights problem, its unemployment problem, its problem with the Cuban-American community, and at the same time, make a positive gesture to Jimmy Carter.

As Castro’s press conference yesterday demonstrates, he has effectively exploited this issue, even to the point of putting us on the defensive, forcing us to explain why our procedures are so slow. He has

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 13, Cuba, 10–11/78. Secret; Eyes Only. Sent for action.
2 See Document 37.
3 In telegram 3794 from Havana, November 23, the Interests Section reported that Castro announced at his November 21 press conference that the possibility for family reunification of Cuban political refugees depended largely on the willingness of the U.S. Government to grant entry to those seeking asylum. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780483–0186)
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whetted the appetite of the Cuban-American community, who most likely would not be disturbed by the prospect of dumping half of the Cuban population into Florida, and has pointed them towards putting pressure on us. And he has begun to suggest that there are many more than just 3000 political prisoners at stake. I sensed the possibility that Castro may be sending us aging political dissidents, rather than recently released political prisoners, and spoke to Harry Brandon of the FBI before he went down to Cuba with the latest Justice Department team. I gave him a series of questions which he could use to test my theories, and he promised to do that. I expect him back next week, and will get a read-out for you. But my guess is that Castro may intend to release as many as 15,000 political dissidents—not including their families.

If this is the case, we are in for real trouble unless the President leans very hard on Griffin Bell. Bell plans to continue processing the prisoners with all deliberateness, and no speed. Furthermore, his assistant has informed me that Bell does not intend to go beyond paroling 1000 political prisoners and their dependents. Then he will consider any case above that on an individual basis.

There are two issues for us to consider: whether to expedite the procedures, and how many parolees will the US take. As regards the procedures, there are a number of things we can do, and I attach a list of items suggested by Wayne Smith of State, at Tab A. 4

As regards the total number of prisoners, this is a difficult political issue, and we will need some Presidential guidance. The President stands a good chance to turn around the Cuban-American community in Florida, a community approaching one million. The release of prisoners by Castro is a tremendous human rights opportunity, which Castro has exploited more than us. The President really should meet with some of the Cuban political prisoners, and he would score a tremendous triumph if we could tell them that he is prepared to expedite the procedures and take all the political prisoners Castro is willing to release.

RECOMMENDATION

I recommend that you chair a small meeting on Monday or Tuesday, involving State and Justice Department officials, with an eye toward preparing a memo on this subject for the President. 5

4 Not attached and not found.

5 There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation. In a marginal comment on a follow-up memorandum from Pastor, Aaron wrote, "I agree and we need to start a campaign about Castro 'dumping' his unemployed in the U.S.—which is the truth behind his policy!" (Memorandum from Pastor to Aaron, November 27; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 8, Cuba, 8–12/78) In a November 27 memorandum to Aaron and Brzezinski, Pastor stated that he met with Justice Department officials himself. (Ibid.)
One additional item. Castro has seized the initiative, not only on the human rights issue, but on the question of who takes the next step. This is demonstrated by the fact that people have stopped asking us what we are going to do about Cuba in Africa, and have started asking us what steps are we going to take in response to Castro’s “human rights gesture.”

40. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance and Secretary of Defense Brown

Washington, November 28, 1978

SUBJECT

Presidential Guidance on Foreign Policy Issues

As a result of our meeting this morning, the President has made the following decisions:

1. MIG Aircraft in Cuba. The President approved seeking Soviet confirmation of our understanding of the nature of Soviet aircraft deployments in Cuba and the statement that “an increase in the number of ground attack MIG–23 aircraft would have a serious, adverse effect on US/Soviet relations.” The President emphasized that in our discussions with the Soviets, the Congress and the public, we should stress the importance we attach to the 1962 Understandings and Soviet compliance thereto.

2. Cuba Visit. The President decided that the proposed visit of Newsom and Aaron to Havana should take place only if the Cuban Government is prepared to commit themselves to the release of the

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 60, Alpha Channel—Cuba, 9–11/78. Top Secret; Sensitive.

2 The President met with Brzezinski, Vance, Brown, Mondale, and Jordan from 8:45 a.m. to 10 a.m. in the Cabinet Room. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary)

3 At his press conference on November 20, Carter stated, “There have been MiG-23’s in Cuba for a long time. There is a model of the MiG-23 that’s been introduced there late last spring which we have been observing since that time. We would consider it to be a very serious development if the Soviet Union violated the 1962 agreement.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1978, Book II, p. 2101)
four American political prisoners.\footnote{The four American political prisoners were Larry Lunt, Everett Jackson, Juan Tur, and Claudio Morales. They were released on September 17, 1979. (Smith, *The Closest of Enemies*, p. 191)} If they are not prepared to make such a commitment, we would be willing to send a lower level delegation to Havana or meet at the Newsom/Aaron level some place else.

[Omitted here is discussion of the Conventional Arms Talks and SALT.]

\footnote{Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 8, Cuba, 8–12/78. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent through Vance and Brzezinski. Printed from an uninitialed copy.}

\footnote{December 2.}

## 41. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) and Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to President Carter\footnote{Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 8, Cuba, 8–12/78. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent through Vance and Brzezinski. Printed from an uninitialed copy.}

Washington, undated

**SUBJECT**

Our Trip to Cuba, December 2–4, 1978 (S)

On Saturday,\footnote{December 2.} we held five hours of discussions with Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez and Raul Valdez Vivo, Secretary of Foreign Relations in the Central Committee. President Castro received us for five very full hours of a wide-ranging discussion from 10:00 p.m. Sunday evening to 3:00 a.m., Monday.

*Mood.* The Cubans were generous and warm in their private contacts with us; and in informal conversations, they were quite open and friendly on issues we raised.

The mood of the first conversation was diplomatic and correct. We reviewed the purposes of our trip, and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez explained Cuba’s positions and its perception of the state of our discussions. In order to let our responses sink in and because we sensed that Rodriguez was relatively restrained and would be transmitting his conversations with us to Castro, we deliberately tried to create a mood with him that would encourage the Cuban side to demonstrate a more
positive attitude on the issues of most importance to us: the U.S. political prisoners and Africa.

After hearing a report of the meeting, Castro evidently decided that our positions were “unacceptable” to him and that we had not heard or perhaps had not understood the depth of Cuba’s commitment to its current policies. He, therefore, was deliberately aggressive, painting his mood in terms of disappointment with you, whom he considered moral and interested in a new relationship with Cuba. “Disappointments” which he listed included the SR–71 flight, which he said was a deliberate provocation since it could not provide any information which we could not get by satellites, the Gulf-Ex Naval Exercise,\textsuperscript{3} Shaba II, press distortions of MIG’s, and others. As he spoke, it seemed to us that we were viewing a man who had bottled up 20 years of rage and was releasing it in a controlled but extremely impassioned manner. It is clear that he has given the issues we discussed a lot of thought, and that he had been waiting for many years to have the opportunity to vent the pressures that had been building in him to USG officials. His presentation seemed almost like a catharsis, something he needed to get out of his system.

His principal message was that Cuba wants to be treated with respect, as an equal, by the same rules. He views the embargo as “morally indefensible”—“a dagger at Cuba’s throat”—the single fact which denies Cuba the opportunity to negotiate on a basis of equality. In short, he seeks legitimacy for Cuba; he believes his quest is just, and our position isn’t; he knows that only the U.S. can bestow it and that rankles. The amount of time which the President and Rodriguez devoted to the talks and to preparing for them is an indication of the importance they attribute to this point since it was their principal message.

Castro is tall and physically imposing, but his manner in private talks seems almost shy and demure. When he speaks, however, he comes alive and though he speaks softly, it is with great power.

Because his words were precise and his arguments were well thought out, we strongly recommend that you read excerpts from the transcript. The summary which we will provide below does not convey

\textsuperscript{3} On November 16, U.S. officials announced the resumption of photo reconnaissance flights over Cuba to determine if the MiG-23’s violated the 1962 understanding. (Richard Burt, “U.S. Photo Flights Resume Over Cuba,” \textit{The New York Times}, November 17, p. A11) In telegram 283884 to Mexico, November 7, the Department described Operation Gulf Ex-79, a naval exercise conducted across the Gulf of Mexico and northwestern Caribbean between November 14 and December 4. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780460–316)
the emotions which are an essential part of trying to understand his position.

Summary of Results. There was no give on any issue, nor very much that we hadn’t heard before. We were unsuccessful in achieving the principal purpose of the trip: to secure the release of the prisoners. We do, however, believe that the trip was worthwhile because our positions were repeated to the highest levels of their government, and because we received the first direct communication from Castro to USG officials on the full range of issues before us since the beginning of your Administration.

The major point that we made was that progress in lifting the embargo required progress in other areas, and two issues of special concern to us were Africa and Puerto Rico. The major point the Cubans made was that Cuba’s African policy was not negotiable, and the embargo must be lifted because it is immoral. In short, we missed each other.

Issues.

—On U.S. prisoners, the most forthcoming statement we heard was from Castro at the end of our conversation, when he said that under “more favorable conditions” (SR–71; Gulf-Ex Naval Exercise; press treatment of MIG’s had “created” the current unfavorable conditions), Cuba might try to find a solution. At other times, Castro reiterated Cuba’s interest in a parallel release of Puerto Rican prisoners. We do not expect them to be released soon, unless we release the four Puerto Rican prisoners of interest to Cuba.

—On Africa, they reaffirmed their determination not to make any explicit commitment with regard to future intentions. They said they were not opposed to a peaceful and political solution and would not create any obstacles to peace. Castro pointed to several recent events as indications of Cuba’s desire for peace in the region (e.g., Zaire-Angola). He denied that Cuba’s military presence or future intentions were obstacles to peaceful negotiations; indeed, he suggested the opposite: that South Africa and Rhodesia would be unrestrained in their external and internal repression if the threat of Cuban troops were not present. He and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez expressed considerable pessimism in their assessment of the situation in all of Southern Africa.

—But on Ethiopia, Castro suggested that there might be a drawdown of Cuban troops soon.

—On Rhodesia, Castro said that under present circumstances, he did not see a need to get involved, but that would change if South Africa got involved. He stressed his preference was to see independence achieved by local forces.

—He showed keen interest in our policies on Namibia, but said that he felt the South Africans had been duplicitous and that the U.S. should join with Cuba in seeking sanctions in the U.N.
—On Puerto Rico, there was considerable disagreement over the role Cuba has been playing. They said that Cuba could not put out fires at the U.N.; and we said that we acknowledged the different approach to the subject and were mainly asking Cuba not to start fires, which we believe it has done. Rodríguez said that Cuba would try to find a less controversial way to express its position, but our inference was that this issue would be the barometer of our relationship: when relations were bad, Cuba would be hostile and aggressive; when good, Cuba would be quieter.

—On Guantanamo, Rodríguez said that it is “an essential point; but not a prerequisite” to normalization. Cuba has not made this a “hot” issue not because it is uninterested, but because it recognizes the “broader implications” of such a strategy.

Summary. While there are a few minor items raised in the discussions which require follow-up, we believe that everything of importance has been said. Positions are clear, and neither side looks like it will budge. We therefore do not see the need for any more meetings at this time.

4 During the Special Committee on Decolonization (Committee of 24) consideration of Puerto Rico, which began in New York on August 28, Cuba pressed for Puerto Rican independence.

42. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, December 11, 1978, 1756Z

4098. Subject: Castro Takes Pessimistic Line on US Relations.

(C) 1. Begin summary: Castro, following signature of GOC-Cuban exile “Final Act” (septel), states that relations with US are “going badly”. Cuban leader’s renewed criticism of US administration—heavily laced with sarcasm—is less than evenly balanced by accustomed

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780511–0654. Confidential; Immediate.

2 In telegram 4089 from Havana, December 11, the Interests Section reported the signing of the “Final Act” regarding the release of Cuban political prisoners. Approximately 3,600 prisoners were freed and permitted to leave Cuba. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780511–0197)
favorable comments on certain aspects of administration’s policies vis-à-vis Cuba.

(C) 2. Castro, for first time publicly discloses and castigates SR–71 overflight and characterizes his failure to fire on aircraft as act of restraint and gesture to avoid embarrassing President Carter. He emphasizes that there is no guarantee that this restraint will continue. Castro also condemns USG fishery policy and recalls USG challenge to his personal integrity during Shaba events. Castro says he will not release four of (six) USG political prisoners “for now”, but is willing to talk about matter with USG. Overall, Castro’s attitude toward USG is harshest we have seen since 26 of July speech—-in part possibly due to conscious effort on his part to place what may be perceived as conciliatory gestures towards exiles (and indirectly toward USG) in appropriately “revolutionary” framework.

End summary.

(U) 3. Fidel Castro, following signature of “Final Act” with Cuban exile community “representatives”, December 9, held press conference for resident and visiting US and Spanish journalists. In addition to spelling out details of Final Act (septel), Castro discussed his current view of US-Cuban relations.

(U) 4. Most significantly, Castro declared—contrary to assumption of questioning journalist—that, despite US acquiescence in his political prisoner release/departure plan, US-Cuban relations are not improving, but rather are “going badly”. Castro cited “farce” of MIG–23 issue and SR–71 overflight (“a flagrant violation of sovereign air space”), untrue accusations of Cuban involvement in Shaba (“equal to saying we are liars”), and US fishery policies toward Cuba (“a deception”) to prove his point.

(C) 5. His references to President Carter, although not devoid of now customary praise on certain points (particularly with regard to curtailment of alleged former USG support for Cuban exile “terrorists”—a step, Castro says, which made his current prisoner release moves possible), contained new elements of ambiguity. He said, for example, that he is not sure how things will turn out with current administration and stated that, although this administration is best he has dealt with, “this has begun to change”. In most sarcastic comments we have ever seen here regarding President Carter, Castro responded to question as to whether he would be willing to invite President to Havana by mocking President’s supposed inability to come here in

3 In telegram 2157 from Havana, July 27, the Interests Section reported that Castro gave a July 26 speech in which he lambasted President Carter’s human rights policy as hypocritical and attacked the United States for criticizing Cuba’s role in the Non-Aligned Movement. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780308–0628)
face of “reactionary and anachronistic” forces in US. When questioner persisted, Castro added . . . “if Carter wants to come as a tourist, he can come to Cuba anytime he wants.”

(LOU) 6. Castro elaborated on the following specific developments souring relations with the Carter administration:

A. SR–71 overflight—Castro said suspension of overflights was one of most appreciated gestures of Carter administration. He allowed there has only been one overflight (November 12), but said such flights are “flagrant violations” of Cuban airspace and Cuba does not recognize US right to monitor Cuban arms. (He repeated that MIG–23 is “tactical defensive” aircraft.) Castro said that he would be within his rights to fire at SR–71, but he has not made a decision to fire because he does not want to “complicate Carter’s position.” On other hand, Castro stated that he is “not disposed to give any guarantee or assurances (regarding safety) of those spy planes.” (Castro, somewhat ironically, said creation of artificial crisis over MIG–23 spurred by “leak” was probably not best move for Carter because domestic political enemies can now portray him as “weak”.)

B. Fishing—Castro claimed that US promised to respect Cuban “historical fishing rights in US 200 Mile Fishery Conservation Zone when GIFA signed (in 1977).” This, he says, was a “deception”. Instead, Castro said, “conditions and requirements” imposed by US are so rigid that it has proved “absolutely impossible” for Cuba to fish in US zone.

C. Shaba—Castro criticized leak of his conversation with USINT Chief last May and again lambasted “brutal accusation” of Cuban involvement—an “imputation” equal to statement that “we are liars.” Again, sarcastically, Castro said that he would never lie to a child—much less to the “all-powerful master of a great empire” (yet another sarcastic reference to the President).

D. Embargo—Castro recognized that President Carter inherited “the blockade” but charged he is maintaining it and trying to use it as a “weapon of pressure” against Cuba. Castro labeled this as a “crime” and an “indecency”.

(LOU) 7. On pending policy issue of US political prisoners, Castro said he is not prepared to release them now. (Comment: He referred to four political prisoners. This could mean that Cuban-US dual nationals—Armas Estevez, Hernandez and possibly Blanco-Boix—will be handled with other Cuban prisoners. Other dual national—Juan Tur—is apparently being linked with resolution of cases of single-source AMCITs Lunt, Jackson, and Rodriguez Morales.) Castro stated, how-

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4 See Document 15.
5 See footnote 2, Document 32.
ever, that he is willing to talk over AMCIT political prisoners question with USG.

(LOU) 8. Regarding GOC-exile “Final Act”, Castro pushed hard for US acceptance of ex-prisoners and families who were “dragged into counterrevolution by US.” He said that, in light of US “moral obligation” flowing from past policies and Carter’s acceptance of another relic of past policy (Guantanamo) (yet another barb), US cannot reject ex-prisoners. Castro commented that opening up of Cuban port to allow exiles to pick up relatives not documented for entry into US (as was done by Castro in early 1960’s in face of USG slowness in documenting Cuban emigrants) is not yet necessary. He suggested that, if only, say, 100–150 current prisoners per month wish to go to US, Washington can use remainder of monthly (parole) quotas of 400 for ex-prisoners. (FYI He said that only 82 of first list of 400 prisoners now wish to go to US—but that final number could rise to 150. End FYI.) This first list was apparently given to the Cuban community representatives, but has not yet been published or provided to USINT.

(C) 9. Begin comment: Castro’s barbed solicitousness of President Carter’s supposed domestic political problems plus his taunting if not ridicule of President over other issues strikes us as marked departure from past public statements by the Cuban leader. Previously, Carter administration has been attacked on single issues (Shaba, human rights, et cetera), but Castro’s criticism has not taken on such a programmatic or personal form. Castro’s December 9 statements come close to such an across-the-board attack and are the harshest we have seen since his July 26 speech. Nevertheless, the Cuban leader kept his options open by again acknowledging President Carter’s positive policies, such as ending of support for exile terrorists and acceptance of Cuban political prisoners. Castro’s unwillingness to write off cooperation with the administration (and his prisoner/emigration gestures—though these are probably motivated also by domestic problems) reflect strong desire on his part to continue opening to US which could bring lifting of trade embargo. At same time, Castro’s escalation of criticism of US may be intended to counterbalance perception among some here that reconciliation with exiles is sell-out to USG or will ideologically or economically deform Cuban revolution. Criticism, of course, also reflects real Castro hostility to recent US policy toward Cuba and US failure to acquiesce in Cuban activism abroad.

Lane
SUBJECT
MIG’s in Cuba

On Friday, the Soviets replied to our note concerning the MIG’s in Cuba. Their reply is attached at Tab A.

It is fair to say that the response is unhelpful. It rejects the idea that the MIG–23 aircraft should not be increased; it rejects any relationship between the aircraft and the Understanding of 1962; and it fails to give any assurance that the non-nuclear status of the MIG-23’s includes the MIG 23–D/F which the Soviets refer to as MIG-27’s. (We have questioned them specifically on this point, and their refusal to clarify it is disturbing.)

The State Department is preparing a further note to be given to the Soviets. Warren Christopher, Stan Resor and David met today and agreed that to leave the exchange of correspondence as is would create great difficulties in regard to SALT. At the same time, as you have indicated, we do not want to blow this out of proportion. The new note should be available for your review tomorrow.

It is worth noting that Soviet rejection of our concern about MIG-23’s in Cuba is inconsistent with the Soviet concerns about the much less capable carrier aircraft which the British have been considering selling to China. Similarly, our effort to discourage the British from this sale has not been matched by Soviet sensitivity about transfers of MIG-23’s to Cuba.

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 13, Cuba, 12/78–4/79. Secret; Sensitive. Carter initialed the memorandum indicating that he saw it.

2 In a meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin on November 29, Secretary Vance delivered an oral message regarding the MiGs in Cuba. (Telegram 302435 to Moscow, November 30; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840139–2032)

3 Undated; attached but not printed. Carter initialed the Soviet note and wrote at the top of the page, “unsatisfactory.”

4 In the margin to the left of this paragraph, Carter wrote “ok.”
Cuba 99

44. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State

Santo Domingo, January 9, 1979, 1346Z

131. Subject: Codel Bingham Meeting With Castro.

1. Summary. During Jan 6 meeting with Codel Bingham, President Castro expressed pessimism about US-Cuba normalization. He reminded the Codel that although he had harshly criticized the US in his Jan 1 speech, he had not attacked President Carter. He outlined at length the standard Cuban positions on Africa, China, the trade embargo, and US property claims. Although the Codel made a strong pitch for the release of the remaining US political prisoners, Castro merely reiterated his proposal that the US first release Puerto Rican nationalists. End summary.

2. On Jan 6, Codel Bingham’s second day in Havana, all nine Congressmen and one staff member were invited to late evening meeting with President Castro. Highlights of the meeting, which lasted almost four hours, follow:

3. US-Cuban relations. Castro discussed his recent speech in which he lambasted the United States in such strong terms that USINT Chief Lane walked out. Castro characterized his criticism of the US as “hard” but “not insulting.” He emphasized, however, that his speech was critical of the United States rather than of President Carter. He reminded the Codel that Carter is the first US President to make some favorable gestures toward him (Castro).

4. Castro said recent US actions make him skeptical about the normalization process. He said the SR–71 overflight, the continuing trade embargo, recent “exceptional” US naval maneuvers, and “hysteria” over the MIG-23s had forced him to speak out against the United
States. He contended that the MIG-23s have been in Cuba for over a year and that they are tactical, defensive weapons.

5. Castro said Cuba wants detente and has made positive gestures toward the US. But some people in the US wish to “poison the climate” of US-Cuban relations. Every time some progress is made, they manufacture a new crisis. He recalled the Shaba incident, saying with great emotion that Cuba had nothing to do with the Katanganese invasion and that he was “betrayed” by the leaking in Washington of his confidential assurances to USINT Chief Lane. What happens now, he concluded, depends on the US. If the US position is as it seems, then he must prepare the Cuban people for a long struggle.

6. China. Castro expressed concern that our normalization of relations with China may have been designed to counter the Soviet Union. He praised the Soviets, saying they are interested in peace and never interfere with Cuba’s policies, nor encourage hostility toward the US. In contrast, China is chauvinistic, aggressive and expansionist; the Chinese want weapons from NATO and nuclear power plants from France and the US. Moreover, China’s foreign policy is unprincipled and therefore unstable. The Chinese preach one thing and the next day do another. Castro warned that, for these reasons, the US may well have problems in the future with China.

7. The Horn of Africa. Congressman Bingham asked Castro if Cuba has become involved in Eritrea. Emphatically stating that Cuba played no part in the Eritrea conflict, Castro launched into a lengthy review of the history of Cuba’s involvement in Ethiopia. He claimed that the US offered weapons to Somalia on 15 July 77. Barely a week later, Somali troops invaded Ethiopia. Ethiopia was then on the verge of collapse, but the US press ignored the situation there. Cuba was asked to provide assistance, did so, and “is not ashamed of it at all.” Castro argued that after repelling the Somali invasion, Ethiopia showed great restraint by not proceeding across the border into Somalia. He added that Somali troops did not withdraw voluntarily from the Ogaden, as the Somalis claim, but were completely destroyed. Cuba would much prefer to send doctors instead of troops, Castro continued. As conditions requiring a Cuban troop presence disappear, Cuba will no longer have an interest in remaining. But the decision to withdraw, he emphasized, rests only with two governments—Ethiopia and Cuba.

8. Southern Africa. Castro expressed skepticism about the effectiveness of the OAU and other multilateral organizations. He recalled that the OAU had been unable to save Angola and did nothing for Ethiopia.

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4 An unidentified hand wrote in the margin at the end of this sentence, “And the Soviets don’t?”
Similarly, the OAS had not prevented the US from going into the Dominican Republic, and the UN has been unable to achieve a Namibian settlement or to wipe out apartheid. The only ones who can solve the Namibia problem, he said, are the Namibians themselves. (Castro offered no comment on Rhodesia.)

9. Trade embargo. Castro attacked the embargo, calling it immoral and illogical. (Note: Congressman Bingham had remarked earlier in the day to Minister of Foreign Trade Fernandez Font that the term “bloqueo” (blockade), which the Cubans habitually use when referring to the embargo, seemed inappropriate for describing the US policy on trade with Cuba. Perhaps having learned that Bingham had raised this point, Castro for the most part employed the term “embargo” rather than “bloqueo.”) Congressman Bingham asked how Cuba might view a partial lifting of the embargo. Castro avoided a direct reply, instead restating his objections to the maintenance of the embargo. Similarly, he shed little light on how Cuba would view a lifting of the embargo only on medicines, noting only that such a move would be tactical and not a solution. He commented that the one-time offer of medicines made earlier by the US was a “restricted” offer which Cuba had been unable to accept.

10. US property claims. Asked about compensation for US property seized in the early days of the revolution, Castro responded, “I believe these questions should be discussed when the embargo is lifted.” He said he thought mutual indemnification for the US claims and Cuban counterclaims (for damages allegedly suffered from the embargo, the Bay of Pigs, and other anti-Castro actions) would be the best solution, “but of course I am willing to discuss this.” He later reiterated that unless the US merely wants a “symbolic solution” (he repeated this phrase twice), mutual indemnification would be the best solution. Comment. Castro seemed to be suggesting that if the US would be willing to accept a token, i.e., small, payment, Cuba would drop its counterclaims. End comment.

11. US political prisoners. The Codel made a strong appeal for the release of the remaining US prisoners, emphasizing that this would significantly improve the climate of US-Cuban relations. Castro immediately linked this issue to the normalization process. He pointed out again that Cuba has made several recent gestures toward the US, such as allowing the dual nationals to leave Cuba. In contrast, the US carried out an intelligence overflight, violating Cuban airspace, which Cuba called “irritating” and “a serious offense.” He implied that the only card he has left in his hand to play is the US political prisoners.

12. Castro said the Lunt case (in which Congressman Gilman was particularly interested) is very serious because Lunt was recruited by the CIA. However, he said, Cuba wants a solution to the US political
prisoner problem. He said he has already proposed a formula to resolve it, namely, that the US first release the Puerto Rican nationalists. He said he was not proposing an exchange—there need be no negotiations, no publicity. Parole for the Puerto Ricans would not be required, only that the US discreetly “eliminate” (i.e., reduce) the sentences. If the US would make this gesture, Cuba could then make a gesture toward US by releasing the US political prisoners. Castro concluded this topic by saying, “now you have made an appeal, and I have proposed a solution.”

13. Comment. Castro appeared tense and testy during the first hour or so of the meeting, perhaps anticipating hostile questions from some members of the Codel. But as late evening turned into early morning, he warmed to the occasion, and the meeting broke up on a cordial note. End comment.

14. Codel has cleared this cable.

Yost

45. Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Information Cable


COUNTRY
Cuba/Panama

SUBJECT
Continued Cuban Support for the Sandinist National Liberation Front (FSLN) (DOI: January 1979)

SOURCE
[5½ lines not declassified]

1. During his recent trip to Havana to attend the celebration of the 20th Anniversary of the Cuban Revolution, Lt. Col. Manuel Antonio Noriega, the Panamanian National Guard (GN) G–2, spoke privately with Cuban Premier Fidel Castro Ruz about Cuban support for the Sandinist National Liberation Front (FSLN). Castro told him that he is

1 Source: Department of State, Assistant Secretary’s Files—Nicaragua: Lot 81D64, Box 2, Nicaragua—Misc. Memoranda, Feb. 1–Mar 16, 1979. Secret; Immediate; Whintel; Noform; Nocontract; Orcon.
of the opinion that the FSLN has no chance of defeating Nicaraguan President Anastacio Somoza Debayle, unless the disparate factions unite. Despite this, Cuba will continue to support the FSLN logistically and provide safehaven and training in Cuba.

2. Castro went on to say that Cuba would not provide arms’ support directly to the FSLN, but would continue to do so through Panama or some other third country. Castro said that it was dangerous to give too many weapons to the FSLN because the excess armament could be used for other purposes, such as causing trouble in Costa Rica. (Source comment: Panamanian policy towards the FSLN remains fundamentally the same and Panama will continue to support efforts to topple Somoza. However, instead of granting safehaven to FSLN exiles in Panama, as in the past, it was agreed that they would be sent on to Cuba. This is unfortunate because it will give the Cubans an opportunity to convert them to Communism.)

3. ACQ: [1 line not declassified]

4. Field Dissem: [3½ lines not declassified]

46. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, March 15, 1979

SUBJECT

Cuban Perceptions of American Policy Makers

1. The following information was received from [1 line not declassified] senior officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Cuban leaders involved in foreign affairs. It is believed that this information will be of particular interest and use to you because of the insight it offers on Cuban officials’ perceptions of U.S. foreign policy. The information in paragraph three, with the exception of the first sentence, is also being made available to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. No further distribution of the information will be made. (S)

2. According to a senior official of the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), senior Cuban foreign policy makers, particularly Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, Vice President of the Council of State and Ministers, assess American foreign policy makers as weak. Rodriguez holds a strong dislike for Presidential Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and considers him incompetent. Rodriguez has commented that while former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was hated by many government leaders throughout the world, he was nevertheless held in high regard and respected for his competence and intelligence. According to Rodriguez, Brzezinski is not. (S)

3. The senior MFA official said that Brzezinski’s key role in normalizing relations between the U.S. and China has served to increase the Cuban leadership’s dislike for him. Cuban leaders perceive a left and a right wing among American policy makers. They see Brzezinski as heading the right wing, but they are not certain who heads the left, given their belief that Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in their analysis yields little overall power or influence. (S)

Stansfield Turner²

² Turner signed “Stan” above this typed signature.

47. Memorandum for the Record by the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff)¹

Washington, March 19, 1979

Benes called to relay a message that Padron, speaking for Castro, asked be transmitted to me when they met in Havana this past weekend. The substance of the Castro message was as follows:

Cuba is not interested in pursuing the conversations that have been conducted with us in the Padron channel. Cuba needs a gesture from the U.S. before the dialogue can usefully be resumed. Castro understands that the U.S. has other priorities in its foreign policy, eg: SALT,

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 13, Cuba, 2–4/79. Secret; Sensitive.
China normalization, the Middle East. Last year, real progress in Cuban-American relations might have been possible, but these chances seem to have evaporated, at least until the end of President Carter’s first term. The United States should know, however, that Cuba will do nothing to provoke hostile relations with the U.S. The establishment of the Interests Sections, the elimination of “incidents” (Note: presumably intelligence operations against Cuba) and the cooperation on the prisoner release programs have all been to the good. While Cuba foresees no immediate hope for progress in bilateral relations, it does not want any backsliding either. Cuba remains interested in pursuing links with the Cuba-American community, in keeping up contacts with the U.S. on the prisoner release programs, in holding talks with the U.S. Coast Guard later this spring and in continuing its cooperation with the FBI on security matters affecting the Pan-American Games that will be held in Puerto Rico.²

Benes added that Padron (again speaking for Castro) asked him and us to do everything possible to keep all our past official and unofficial contacts with the Cuban Government confidential. Padron came back to this request several times in his talks with Benes, putting a special emphasis on it that seemed to show Castro’s own interest. Benes believes that the Cubans would be highly embarrassed by any disclosure of the official Cuban-American contacts since they were never shared with the Soviets, and Cuba is now negotiating with the USSR for a substantial increase in Soviet assistance for its next economic plan. Finally, Benes found the Cuban officials he met highly preoccupied with the state of the Cuban economy, but resigned to the view that only supplemental aid from Moscow could possibly help, since productive trade relations with the West in general and the U.S. in particular would not likely develop in time.

Peter Tarnoff
Executive Secretary

² In telegram 120485 to Havana, May 11, the Department reported that the Coast Guard talks, held from May 8 to May 10, were largely uneventful. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790221–0852) The Pan American Games took place in San Juan from July 1 to July 15.
Memorandum From William Odom of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, March 27, 1979

SUBJECT
Soviet Military Personnel in Cuba

The CIA assessment strikes me as a benign view of a malignancy in its early stages.² Their paragraph 7, which lists explanations in descending order of likelihood, is not at all convincing. The first four explanations have no precedent and make little sense from a practical Soviet viewpoint. The last two explanations are conceivable, but they don’t explain enough. (TS/[portion markings not declassified])

The Soviet ground force training must be put into context with improvements at Cienfuegos harbor, the MIG-23s, HIP–E ground assault helicopters, and more frequent Soviet naval deployments in Cuban waters. We should also consider the support and operational coordination between the Soviet and Cuban military in Africa. This overall perspective inclines me to believe that we are witnessing a growing Cuban-Soviet military relationship which will surprise us in a number of ways in the future. Just because Cuba is geographically small by comparison with the U.S. does not mean that it is an insignificant island as a military citadel and a Soviet power projection base.³ (TS/[portion markings not declassified])

Many students of the 1962 crisis insist that U.S. regional conventional military superiority was the major determinant of the outcome. We cannot always assume that we shall enjoy such superiority in light of the emerging Cuban-Soviet military relationship. (S)

I suggest that:

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 15, Cuba, Soviet Brigade, 8/78–4/79. Top Secret; [codewords not declassified]. Outside the System. Sent for information. At the top of the page, Aaron wrote on April 4, “ZB—I find this very troubling. I would like to pursue it first with CIA and after clarifying the issues for us probably have an SCC.” In the left margin, Brzezinski wrote, “RI [Inderfurth]—WO is right. Task the CIA for an in-depth assessment—also DOD, DIA—pointing toward an SCC.”

² A reference to a March 13 memorandum entitled “Soviet Military Personnel in Cuba.” (Ibid.)

(a) the Cuban-Soviet military relationship be made one of the highest intelligence collection priorities;
(b) the political and military implications of that relationship be examined as a U.S. security and foreign policy problem.
(c) Cuba, as a Soviet military base in this hemisphere, be given much higher priority in our bilateral relations with Moscow. (S)
The issue is worth an SCC. (C)

49. Memorandum for the Record by Peter Bourne, Executive Director of the UN Development Programme

Havana, June 1, 1979

SUBJECT
Meeting with Fidel Castro

The meeting lasted approximately two hours. Those present were Vice Minister of Health, Dr. Ernesto de la Torre, a member of Castro’s staff who took notes, my interpreter, Fidel Castro and myself. There was some initial confusion about the seating arrangement that got the meeting off to a stiff beginning. Castro asked me about what I had seen and particularly what my impressions were of the Cuban health care system. I was able to respond with genuine enthusiasm. Not only was the primary health care system very impressive but the obvious success in reducing infant mortality and eradicating diseases such as malaria was striking. I also described how immensely impressed I was by the Havana mental hospital in this country.

I mentioned that we had discussed the embargo as it related to drugs and medical journals, and I hope that we might be able to work out an exemption on humanitarian grounds although I explained that the imminence of the election next year made any change very difficult.

We then talked about the Presidential election. He had many questions about the individual candidates; I reviewed my estimate of the chances for each of them. I told him that the most likely scenario was for Reagan to get the Republican nomination and then be beaten by

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 16, Cuba SCC 7/20/79 Meeting, 10/78-8/79. No classification marking.
Carter in the general election. He expressed his strong wish for the President to be reelected then added, “Can you imagine a world with Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher?” I suggested that he could help President Carter’s chances for reelection by not precipitating any events that the Republicans could use against him. Specifically, I cited the need for Cuban restraint in avoiding a major military confrontation in Rhodesia, and suggested that he use his influence to prevent the Non-Aligned summit in Havana in September from becoming a forum for anti-U.S. statements. I stressed the serious concern that exists in this country about Cuban involvement in Africa and the lack of any chance to significantly improve U.S./Cuban relations until there was some clear evidence that they were reducing that involvement.

He talked about his strong desire to improve relations with the United States and talked at length about the high regard he had for President Carter. He cited his appreciation for the steps taken early in the administration to improve relations, and the President’s willingness to fight the battle over the Panama canal. He also said he felt his leadership on SALT and his attempts, no matter how frustrated, to deal with the energy problem.

With regard to Cubans overseas Castro talked about the vision he has to make Cuban technical talent an exportable commodity. Cuba’s education system is being geared to provide advanced technical education to anyone who has the capacity to benefit from it, and to produce numbers of these individuals well in excess of Cuba’s needs. His intention then is to send them to the developing world wherever they are requested, having the host country pay for their services when they are able to, and working free where they can not.

We talked about the health of the world and how it could be improved. We discussed specifically the eradication of smallpox and what this dramatic accomplishment meant in terms of dealing with other infectious diseases in the developing world. He was particularly interested in the new efforts in the United States to shape people’s health by trying to influence behavior patterns relating to diet, smoking, driving, drinking, etc. Cuba is on the verge of eliminating infectious disease as a major cause of mortality, and he was interested in adopting some of the strategies that we have found useful in extending life span in a post infectious disease era.

We talked about water, and my role with the U.N. Water Decade. 2 I specifically asked for his personal commitment to support the Decade’s

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2 Bourne was the Coordinator of the International Drinking Water Decade, a United Nations program designed to provide clean drinking water to millions of people worldwide.
goals in Cuba, and also suggested it was an area in which he might take the lead with the Non-Aligned nations.

We discussed my background and my early relationship to President Carter.

I found Castro to be low key and very well informed. He asked most of the questions and I did most of the talking. I had the sense that twenty years after the revolution there is a great deal of satisfaction with what has been achieved in Cuba in terms of improving the quality of life. However, with perhaps another twenty years of active political life ahead of him, it is clear that he now is thinking in terms of a global role. He might alter his Africa strategy for pragmatic reasons, but basically to ask him to reverse completely Cuba’s overseas involvement is asking him to abandon what he clearly sees as his destiny. Despite our objections to his specific military involvements it was clear to me that he had great understanding and empathy with the peoples of the developing world, and perceives the global political trends in a very perceptive way.

50. Memorandum From William Odom of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\(^1\)

Washington, June 6, 1979

SUBJECT
Talking Points for Vance on Cuba/Soviet Relations (C)

I understand that Vance will see Dobrynin on Cuba to foreshadow what the President will say on Cuba at the Summit. Talking points that you suggest, naturally, must be in line with what the President wants to achieve at the Summit, something no one is clear about. (S)

To the extent there is a view of an objective, it seems to be that the President should invoke the 1962/70 agreements in light of recent Soviet activity.\(^2\) As you know, I researched the agreements and determined that (a) they are ambiguous, allowing both sides quite different

\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory File, Box 83, Sensitive XX, 6/5/79. Secret. Sent for action. Copies were sent to Bartholomew and Pastor.

\(^2\) See footnotes 2 and 3, Document 36.
interpretations; and (b) there is no solid case that the Soviets are break-
ing the letter of the understanding although their complex military
relation with Cuba has broken the spirit by a large degree. Thus, chiding
Brezhnev and Dobrynin about the 1962 understanding won’t accom-
plish much but a demonstration of our ineffective policy. (S)

I suggest an alternative aim for the Summit:

a) Make it clear to the Soviets that their relationship with Cuba is
unacceptable to us in the following ways:
—Soviet military activities in Cuba have reached a level that could
danger detente and world peace unless checked.
—Cuban military activities and capabilities have reached a level
that is endangering peace in the Western Hemisphere.
—Soviet-backed Cuban operations in Africa and elsewhere have
reached a level that already adversely affects our bilateral relations.

b) We would welcome a Soviet commitment, private, or public, at
the Summit, to reduce Soviet-Cuban military activities in Cuba and
elsewhere, although there is no chance of getting one.

c) The Soviet leadership should take note of the seriousness of
U.S. concerns and reach the objective conclusion that increased Soviet
military collaboration with Cuba makes Cuba less secure, not more secure.
Cuban security depends on the U.S., not on the USSR. (S)

We cannot hope to get a Soviet commitment on Cuba, and attempts
to invoke the 1962–70 understandings will only bring Soviet ridicule
because we never made them deliver the final answer on the number
of MIG-23s permissible. The President let them off the hook by a press
announcement before they had answered.3 (S)

We can make the Soviets aware that we know what is going on
and that we will not accept it. We should avoid saying what we will
do about it because there is no sign that we know. (S)

After the Summit, we can hold a series of SCCs for developing a
number of courses of action. If they lead to pressure on the USSR and
the Cubans, the Soviets cannot cry foul play. They will have been
warned. You should notice particularly the last point, c), which hints
at U.S. military action against Cuba in certain circumstances notwith-
standing Soviet commitments to Cuba. This raises ambiguities about
the 1962 U.S. commitment which the Soviets may try to clarify. We
gain by creating and maintaining the ambiguity. It truly puts the Soviets
on notice that we too can back away from the 1962 understanding
the way the Soviets are doing through present military programs in
Cuba. (S)

3 For Carter’s statement, see footnote 3, Document 40.
If you accept the foregoing tactic, then the memorandum at Tab I should go to Vance as instructions for dealing with Dobrynin on the Cuba issue. You also may want to send a memorandum to the President to get his approval of this tactic. Such a memo is at Tab II. (S)

Attached but not printed. No evidence has been found that the draft memorandum was sent. Vance and Dobrynin met on June 6 but did not discuss Cuba. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 198. Documentation on the Vienna Summit, held June 15–18, during which Cuba was not a major topic of discussion, is ibid., Documents 199–208.

5 Attached but not printed.

51. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jamaica

Washington, June 7, 1979, 1632Z

146235. For Ambassador. Subject: Soviet-Cuban Intentions in Central America and the Caribbean. Ref: Kingston 3784. 
1. (S—Entire text.)
2. The Department prepared the following as a preliminary and partial response to inquiries from Kingston (reftel). It is transmitted to other posts since it may have broader utility. Policy analysis on the deeper issues raised in ref tel is underway.
3. Cuba’s approach in Central America and the Caribbean is two-pronged: a) to foster cooperation with “progressive” governments, and b) to maintain contacts with leftist revolutionaries in countries whose governments it regards as reactionary. Thus, Cuba has developed close

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 13, Cuba, 6/79. Secret; Priority. Repeated for information to Havana, Bridgetown, Curacao, Georgetown, Nassau, Martinique, Paramaribo, Port au Prince, Port of Spain, Santo Domingo, San Salvador, Guatemala, Belize, Managua, San Jose, and Tegucigalpa.
2 In telegram 3784 from Kingston, May 29, the Embassy requested guidance regarding “Soviet/Cuban intentions in Jamaica and the Caribbean and what, if anything, we should be doing about their growing role and influence.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790244–0571)
3 In telegram 153514 to Kingston, June 15, the Department provided an overview of U.S. policy toward Jamaica. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790270–0116)
ties with the Governments of Jamaica, Guyana, and Panama. At the same time, it has provided modest levels of assistance—training, asylum, propaganda support and some equipment and financing—to revolutionary groups in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala.

4. Until recently, primary Cuban emphasis seemed to be on developing political influence with the more progressive governments. It was more cautious in providing support to revolutionary groups, both because it was skeptical of their short-term chances of success and because of the reaction such assistance might have provoked from the U.S. and from Latin American governments it was trying to assure of its good intentions. Since the FSLN attacks of last fall and the recent coup in Grenada, however, Havana may well have revised upward its assessment of possible gains in the area and may now be willing to run greater risks. Cuban support for the FSLN in Nicaragua which has included some small arms and ammunition, had also been of modest proportions until recently but there are some indications that it has been increasing in scope over the past few weeks.

5. The coup in Grenada pointed up the vulnerabilities in the Eastern Caribbean. There is no evidence the Cubans specifically engineered it, but they at least had a previous relationship with the New Jewel Movement and may have had foreknowledge of the coup. They have long wanted an ally in the Eastern Caribbean and they moved quickly to exploit the Bishop government’s request for assistance. They would doubtless be ready to exploit any new opportunities. And given the serious social and economic problems faced by all the states of the area, and the political instability faced by most, the chances that such targets of opportunity could emerge are high.

6. Cuba’s tactical approach has been essentially opportunistic. As a result of the aforementioned reassessment, Cuban policy in the area may become more activist, but it is unlikely to become reckless or adventurist. Rather, Cuban strategies will continue to be geared to targets of opportunity, and the manner and degree to which they attempt to exploit any emerging opportunities will be circumscribed at least in part by their calculations as to how the U.S. is likely to react.

7. The Soviet approach to Central America and the Caribbean appears closely to parallel Cuba’s but the Soviets have greater concern over clashing with the U.S. in such an uncertain political environment. The Soviets probably share the perception that the “revolutionary potential” in the region has increased. However, at least in the period immediately following the U.S.-Soviet Summit, Moscow may be more

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4 The New Jewel Movement, led by Maurice Bishop, overthrew Grenadian Prime Minister Eric Gairy on March 13. See Document 313.
sensitive than in the recent past to the potentially negative fall-out on U.S.-Soviet relations of Soviet support for Cuban opportunism in the area. This sensitivity, combined with Moscow’s desire not to risk disruption of state-to-state relations with key Latin American countries such as Venezuela and Mexico, suggest that the Soviets will, if anything, keep an even lower profile in the near future.

8. Within this general policy framework, Soviet-Cuban activities in Jamaica will depend very much on how far the Manley government will let them go. If the latter offers them opportunities, they will retreat. Likely U.S. reactions are also a factor in the equation, but the Soviets and Cubans are aware that so long as their activities are condoned by, or are conducted at the invitation of, the host government, the scope of possible U.S. responses is narrowed.

Vance

52. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, June 21, 1979

SUBJECT
Cuba and Nicaragua (U)

On Tuesday morning I requested that the CIA provide a short memo on the increasing Cuban involvement with the Sandinistas and also supporting documentation. Today I received the memo at Tab A along with about 2 inches of intelligence reports. (S)

Based on this intelligence, it is quite clear that Cuba has significantly increased the level of and the kinds of its assistance to the Sandinistas. Since last Fall, the Cubans have accelerated the rate of training for Sandinista guerrillas and have urged that the various factions unify and pretend a moderate and pluralistic front in order to gain greater acceptance in Nicaragua and internationally. (S)


2 Not attached. An intelligence report about Nicaragua, dated June 20, is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 14, Cuba, 9/21–24/79.
In recent weeks, Cuba has not only been sending these guerrillas back to Nicaragua to fight, they have been supplying an unbelievable amount of arms, including anti-aircraft guns, heavy mortars, and recoilless rifles. There are also reports that Cuban artillery specialists have been sent to fight with the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, but these are not confirmed. (S)

At the same time, Cuba has launched a propaganda barrage against the US to put us on the defensive. The Secretary of State should make very clear in his remarks at the OAS that the Nations of the Americas will not tolerate Cuban intervention in Nicaragua or anywhere else and will not be deluded by the pretense of pluralism which many of the Sandinista guerrillas have advocated. It is not the US that is intervening, but the Cubans. (S)

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3 In an undated memorandum to Aaron, Pastor described a Cuban radio broadcast that denounced the “threat of direct intervention by the U.S.” in Nicaragua, referencing the “Yankee Marines [who] decided which government our people should have.” Pastor concluded, “we should be pumping up Cuban involvement.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 14, Cuba, 6/79)

4 Vance’s June 21 speech at the Meeting of Consultation of the OAS Foreign Ministers did not focus on Cuba but instead called for Somoza to resign and an OAS peacekeeping presence. (Department of State Bulletin, August 1979, pp. 56–58)

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53. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter

Washington, July 12, 1979

SUBJECT
Daily Report

Information

Soviet Foreign Ministry Instructions on NAM: The Soviet foreign ministry recently sent a message to its missions abroad having interest in the nonaligned movement instructing them to promote the concept of the Cuban leadership role to begin at the sixth NAM summit at Havana and continue for the three years until the next summit at Baghdad. A reliable Soviet source who had access to the message

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 14, Cuba, 7–8/79. Secret; Sensitive. Printed from an uninitialed copy.

2 The Non-Aligned Movement Summit was held in Havana from September 3 to September 9.
reports the ministry also instructed its missions to stress that Cuba has a foreign policy completely independent of Soviet influence and that Cuba’s military involvement in Africa is not directed by Moscow. In this regard, the ministry instructed the missions to downplay Soviet economic aid and other forms of assistance to Cuba and to allude to the possibility that Cuba is receiving aid from other countries.\(^3\) (S)

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\(^3\) At the bottom of the page, Carter wrote, “Zbig—Let us do just the opposite—By telling the truth about the Soviet puppet—JC.”

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54. Interagency Intelligence Memorandum\(^1\)

NI IIM 79–10013J

Washington, July 19, 1979

POSSIBLE PRESENCE OF SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN CUBA\(^2\)

1. This memorandum addresses evidence bearing on the possible presence of an organic Soviet ground force unit in Cuba.\(^3\) The issue is raised by fragmentary [less than 1 line not declassified] evidence gathered over a period of several years, indicating that Soviet units have conducted small-scale tactical exercises on the island since at least July 1976, and that these units may be subordinate to a brigade headquarters. The memorandum also reviews other evidence—[less than 1 line not declassified]—that might be expected to corroborate the existence of such a Soviet ground force presence in any significant strength.

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\(^1\) Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–1981), Box 2, Folder 2: Cuba: Soviet Brigade. Top Secret; [handling restrictions and codewords not declassified].

\(^2\) This memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for USSR and Eastern Europe in the Office of Political Analysis, National Foreign Assessment Center. It was coordinated within the Central Intelligence Agency; with the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; with the Defense Intelligence Agency; with the National Security Agency; and with the intelligence organizations of the Department of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. Information available as of 1200 EDT on 19 July 1979 was used in the preparation of this memorandum. [Footnote is in the original.]

\(^3\) The full range of issues involved in the Soviet-Cuban military relationship will be dealt with in a forthcoming Interagency Intelligence Memorandum. [Footnote is in the original.]
Background

2. After the withdrawal in late 1962 and early 1963 of Soviet strategic weapons and of some 20,000 combat troops from Cuba, the Intelligence Community estimated that 3,000 to 4,000 Soviet military personnel remained there. By the early 1970s this estimate had been lowered to approximately 2,000. Of these, some 1,500 have been estimated to be located at Lourdes, a large Soviet SIGINT facility southeast of Havana. The estimate of 1,500 was supported by [less than 1 line not declassified] two years ago. The balance of previously identified Soviet military personnel in Cuba, estimated to number roughly 500 (but possibly as many as 1,000), comprise the Soviet Military Assistance Group (MAG), also headquartered at Lourdes. [less than 1 line not declassified]

3. In March 1977, [3 lines not declassified] Soviet tactical training in Cuba—training unrelated to any Cuban [1½ lines not declassified] various small units such as platoons and companies, [1 line not declassified] evidence was insufficient to permit any confident judgment concerning numbers of personnel involved in the training, their organizational subordination, or their mission. Nor could it be determined if the Soviet personnel were drawn from the SIGINT or MAG units already identified or if they were a distinct entity.

4. On 13 July 1979, [4 lines not declassified] (Brigades are not a standard formation in the Soviet Army. We know of only three, possibly four—all apparently specially tailored units located in forward areas and manned in strengths ranging from 1,400 to 2,300).

5. Taken together, [less than 1 line not declassified] indicates that a Soviet ground force unit, [less than 1 line not declassified] a brigade, is present in Cuba and that it may be headquartered at Guanabo, just east of Havana. The brigade, commanded by a colonel, apparently has subordinate rifle, armor, and support elements. The subordinate elements include battalions and companies and may be located at Alquizar and the Candelaria/San Pedro training area.

Missions

12. Depending on the size of the Soviet unit, [less than 1 line not declassified] its mission could include any, some combination, or all of the following:

—Training for Soviet personnel.
—Training for Cuban personnel.
—Development of Soviet tactics and training, and evaluation of equipment, for tropical areas.
—A small but concrete commitment of Soviet military support for the Castro regime, which might be intended as the nucleus of an expanded Soviet military capability in time of crises. The available evidence is compatible with any of these possibilities but inadequate to prove any of them.

Comment on Collection and Guidance

13. Efforts are under way to obtain more information on the presence of a Soviet ground force unit in Cuba:
—We are examining [less than 1 line not declassified] which has not been exhausted.
—[1½ lines not declassified]
—[less than 1 line not declassified] has been fragmentary and spotty; we are attempting to obtain [1 line not declassified] used by the Soviets.
—All available clandestine assets are being tasked but returns will come in only slowly and are not likely to be conclusive.

14. In sum, short of a breakthrough in [less than 1 line not declassified] we may remain uncertain about this issue for some time. The best near-term hope is information from the [1½ lines not declassified]
[3 images not declassified]

55. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordinating Committee Meeting

Washington, July 20, 1979, 3:45–4:45 p.m.

SUBJECT
Cuba After the Summit

PARTICIPANTS
State
Secretary Cyrus Vance

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Box 16, SCC Meeting #185 held 7/20/79, 6–7/79. Secret. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.

Summary of Conclusions

1. U.S. Strategy to Cuba. The SCC explored different strategies for the U.S., but we did not reach any conclusions. NSC believes that the U.S. should communicate a willingness to maintain normal relationships where they exist, but should find ways to punish Cuba for activities which are detrimental to U.S. interests. This translates into a cool but communicative strategy where we try to expand the areas (e.g., cultural exchanges, particularly to Cuba) of contact where the U.S. as a nation can begin to influence Cuba as a nation. At the same time, we would tighten the wall around Cuba by seeking agreement from our allies on denying preferential economic arrangements (e.g., aid, credits, guarantees) and discouraging private capital flows. We would try to cooperate with countries in the Non-Aligned Movement in order to seek an escalation of the criticism of Cuba’s international activities. State, on the other hand, placed greater emphasis on the need for candid dialogue with the Cuban government on areas of growing concern to the U.S. like Central America and the Caribbean. State believes that we should not encourage the Europeans to deny credits, etc. because that would only be a “pin-prick,” irritating them but having no real impact. The SCC agreed to discuss these issues in greater depth in the future, perhaps reconvened as a PRC.
2. **Non-Aligned Movement.** The SCC agreed that the USG should continue its strategy of encouraging the moderates to take part and weigh in at the Non-Aligned Summit.

3. **Intelligence-Sharing.** The SCC agreed that we should share intelligence on Cuba’s military build-up and what it is doing internationally with other friendly countries, particularly those in the region. We should convey this information on a regular and systematic basis through diplomatic and intelligence channels.

4. **Intelligence Collection.** DCI will prepare a proposal for the NSC on ways to improve the intelligence collection on Cuba.³

5. **Military Presence.** OSD, JCS, State, and NSC will prepare detailed recommendations on ways the U.S. can increase its military presence in the Caribbean in order to serve one or two objectives: to enhance the security and the stability of the nations of the Caribbean and to send a message of caution to Cuba. An SCC on the Caribbean will explore these recommendations.⁴

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³ On July 18, the President’s Daily Brief mentioned that “some type of Soviet ground force element is present in Cuba,” but stated that the existing intelligence “sheds no light on strength, mission, or subordination.” President Carter wrote on the PDB, “It is amazing to me that we have such poor human intelligence from Cuba!” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 16, Cuba, Soviet Brigade [miscellaneous], 9–10/79) Brzezinski copied Carter’s comments and forwarded them to Turner, adding the word “Stan” to the beginning of the President’s note. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 8, Cuba, 6–8/79) In response, Turner, in coordination with Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and Defense Intelligence Agency Director General Eugene Tighe, drafted a statement arguing that the Soviet military forces in Cuba were not significant. The statement was issued by the Senate Armed Services Committee, chaired by Frank Church (D-ID). Only Senator Stone dissented from the statement. An aide to Senator Jesse Helms, however, leaked information about the alleged brigade to ABC News; Ted Koppel reported on the issue and the administration’s denials on July 20. (Newsom, *The Soviet Brigade in Cuba*, p. 20) In response, Stone wrote to Carter on July 24, expressing concern about the Soviet units. See *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 210. Vance responded to Stone on July 27, stating “there is no evidence of any substantial increase of the Soviet military presence in Cuba over the past several years or of the presence of a Soviet military base.” See the Department of State *Bulletin*, October 1979, p. 63.

⁴ See Document 364.
56. Memorandum From William Odom of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)

Washington, July 23, 1979

SUBJECT

Soviet-Cuban Military Relationship: Mini SCC

These points are important background, in my view, for you to take to the mini-SCC today.2

—The military character of Soviet activities, capabilities, and potential support in Cuba has grown markedly since 1976. (S)

—Other than the MIG–23 deployment, nothing has come close to being a clear violation of the overlap between our understanding of that understanding. In CIA’s afteraction report, they argue that we muffed our dealings with Moscow on the MIG–23 and let the Soviets off the hook so that we have, in effect, codified a significant change in the 1962 understanding in favor of greater air capabilities there. (S)

—The “quantitative” increases in Soviet military presence and supply to the Cubans has reached a point of “qualitative” change in the character of the threat to our security and security in the Caribbean region. We have real security problems, not just an intelligence problem and a public relations problem with the Congress. The danger of a blow-up with the Senate is not really SALT ratification (except secondarily) but rather being propelled into actions to reduce the security threat which will be too hastily conceived and therefore feeble. (S)

Against these realities and considerations, I strongly recommend that we tell Stone—in private if possible—that:3

(a) There is a threat, a quantitative buildup in funding, resources, conventional arms, and ship visits. (S)

(b) There is no clear violation of the 1962 understanding which is worth a crisis confrontation at present. (C)

(c) We will need to build a Congressional and public consensus to support a strategy, yet to be fully developed, for carefully reducing that threat in the next year or two. (S)

2 No record of the meeting has been found.
3 See footnote 2, Document 55.
Obviously, this approach will require a certain modification of our past policy toward Cuba, but that is overdue. Weaning Castro away from Moscow is not a U.S. option because we cannot offer him the world-wide role of revolutionary and expeditionary. The “weaning away” policy simply lets Castro have the best of both worlds, the benefits of our benevolence without yielding anything in his tie with Moscow. Failure to take this reality into account will soon put the Administration into trouble with more Senators than Stone, and not without grounds.4

4 In a memorandum to Brzezinski on July 30, Odom concluded that “Soviet capabilities in Cuba are the greatest threat to our national security,” and proposed a new policy that would “seek the reduction of Soviet presence and Cuban military capabilities.” He presented a list of policy options including re-raising the issue of Soviet MiG aircraft in Cuba, blockading Cuban ports against certain shipments, and stopping wheat sales to the Soviets. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 16, Cuba, Soviet Brigade, 10/2/79–5/80)

57. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Director of Central Intelligence Turner1

Washington, July 27, 1979

SUBJECT

Intelligence on Cuba (S)

I request that you do all possible to place greater emphasis and priority on intelligence collection efforts directed against Cuba. All operational elements of the intelligence community—NSA, DOD, and CIA—should be instructed to intensify their collection efforts so that we can improve our presently ambiguous judgments regarding the numbers and purposes of Soviets in Cuba, as well as Cuba’s future plans and intentions toward political ferment in Latin America and political conflict in Africa. (S)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

58. Memorandum for the Record Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, August 10, 1979

SUBJECT

Working Group Meeting on Soviet Ground Forces in Cuba

1. [name not declassified] chaired a meeting on [less than 1 line not declassified] to review the growing body of [less than 1 line not declassified] evidence that indicates a Soviet ground forces brigade is stationed in Cuba. [name not declassified], OSR/[initials not declassified], [name not declassified], OPA/[initials not declassified], and [name not declassified], OCR/USSR, attended the meeting along with analysts from DIA, State, NSA, Army, Air Force and OIA. [portion marking not declassified]

2. The working group concluded that a Soviet ground forces unit—which they are calling a brigade, commanded by an Army colonel—is in Cuba. The group also tentatively concluded that:

—The Brigade is not garrisoned at a single location as it would be if it were stationed in the USSR.

—The unit structure suggested by the [less than 1 line not declassified] closely resembles a standard Soviet motorized rifle regiment, which suggests it could have a maximum strength of some 2,300 men.

—The brigade is not a cadre (skeletal) unit, but its current personnel strength is not known. Some analysts believe that because the brigade is so far from the USSR it probably is nearly fully manned. [portion marking not declassified]

3. Although the working group did not estimate the missions of the Soviet brigade, it cast doubt on two hypotheses that have been consistently advanced. Inasmuch as [less than 1 line not declassified] the unit’s training is virtually identical to ground forces training in the USSR and contains no [less than 1 line not declassified] testing equipment, the brigade does not appear to have a tropical training mission. Because [less than 1 line not declassified] any contact between the unit and the Cuban Army, the brigade probably does not have the mission of performing tactical demonstrations for or otherwise training Cubans. [portion marking not declassified]

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1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services, Job 81T00031R: Production Case Files, Box 1, Folder 84: Working Group Meeting on Soviet Ground Forces in Cuba, Copy No. 7. Top Secret; [codewords not declassified]. Drafted by [name not declassified] on August 10. Copies were sent to, among others, Clarke and the NFAC Senior Review Panel.
4. During the meeting, some interesting additional facts came to light. [4 lines not declassified] the year the first instances of ground force training were detected. This suggests that the Soviets may have planned to form the brigade prior to the Cuban intervention in Angola in 1975. [portion marking not declassified]

5. Our knowledge of the Cuban order-of-battle, [1 line not declassified], is poor. Considering that the Soviet brigade is stationed at several locations and may be colocated with Cuban units, a great deal of basic research may need to be done before the components of the Soviet brigade can be identified [less than 1 line not declassified]. [portion marking not declassified]

59. Evening Report Prepared for President Carter

Washington, undated

EVENING REPORT ITEMS

[Omitted here is discussion of intelligence collection.]

August 20—Intelligence community has developed new communication and photographic information on what appears to be a recent exercise of a Soviet tank battalion in Cuba, which suggests that the Soviets have the equivalent of a full brigade of 2,300 personnel on the island. (TS)

August 21—Three Soviet battalions were identified as taking part in exercises August 17, 18, 19 and 20. Photos reveal more than 30 tanks and enough tents to accommodate 1,850 men. It thus seems clear that we are dealing with at least one full-sized Soviet combat brigade. (TS)

Draft Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section in Cuba

Washington, August 24, 1979

Subject: Soviet Brigade in Cuba.

1. You should arrange to make following démarche, on August 25 if possible, at highest available level of FonOff:

   —From a variety of sources, we have received growing evidence which we consider conclusive of the presence of a Soviet brigade in Cuba.

   —We wish to advise your government of this fact, and of the concern this creates in the United States and the obvious impact on our relationship.

   —We do not intend to make this fact public, but we are required to report our conclusions to the Congress and must expect that this information will eventually become the subject of public debate in the United States.

   —We would welcome your government’s explanation as to the reasons for this unfortunate development.

2. Report reaction.

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 13, Cuba, 8/15–31/79. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Niact; Nodis. Drafted by Newsom; cleared by Lake, Bremer, Goodby, O’Donohue, and Vaky; approved by Christopher. Talking points for use with the Soviet Embassy are attached. The draft telegram was not sent. Instead, a more sharply-worded text was drafted on August 29 after the telegram was discussed in an SCC meeting (see Document 61). The revised text was sent as telegram 227405 to Havana, August 29, printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 217. The démarche was also delivered in Washington; see Document 63.

2 On August 29, Richard Baker, a special assistant in Newsom’s office, was notified that Aviation Week magazine was preparing to publish a story on the Soviet military presence in Cuba. According to Newsom, a paragraph in the story matched an August 22 report in the classified National Intelligence Daily about updated intelligence on Cuba which had been ordered following the leak of ambiguous intelligence about the Soviet presence in Cuba to Senator Richard Stone on July 17. (Newsom, The Soviet Brigade in Cuba, p. 22)
61. Summary of Conclusions of a Mini-Special Coordination Committee Meeting

Washington, August 29, 1979, 11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT
Soviet Military Presence in Cuba (S)

PARTICIPANTS

State
David D. Newsom, Lt. General John Pustay,
Under Secretary Assistant to the
for Political Affairs Chairman
James E. Goodby, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
European Affairs

Defense
Walter Slocombe, Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary for International Affairs

CIA
Frank Carlucci, Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence
[name not declassified]

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The meeting reviewed the talking points recommended by State for use in a demarche with the Soviet Embassy and the Cuban Government on the presence of Soviet ground forces in Cuba. State expressed the view that we have only a short time before the latest information, confirming the presence of Soviet ground units in Cuba, will be leaked to the press, creating public pressures for action. Secretary Vance, therefore, wants to make a demarche informing both the Soviet and Cuban Governments that we are aware of the Soviet troop disposition. Having taken this step we will be better prepared to deal with the Congress, public pressures, and other factors. (S)

Defense expressed serious reservations about making such a demarche until we know what our larger policy objective is and what next steps we can take. (S)

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 8, Cuba, 6–8/79. Secret. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.

2 See Document 60.

3 See footnote 2, Document 60.
CIA expressed similar concerns but acknowledged State’s legitimate need to do something now. CIA also judged that the intelligence loss, which might occur through cancellation of a scheduled Soviet brigade training activity on September 3, is marginal at this point and not a strong reason for withholding the demarche. (S)

The NSC Staff expressed similar concerns as Defense about next steps and our policy objectives. It was pointed out that a demarche could easily draw a Soviet denial and the statement of a Soviet position which would become firm and difficult to change later on. It was also pointed out that a demarche could, on the one hand, cost us an intelligence loss through the cancellation of the September 3 exercise, or on the other hand, demonstrate disdain for our demarche by letting the exercise take place. Finally, it was explained that State has an answer to public reactions in the event of disclosure of the confirming evidence of the Soviet ground forces presence: we are planning to raise the issue at a much higher level when Gromyko comes to the United States in September, and we have scheduled meetings of the NSC principals on the matter in early September. Furthermore, the recent Shulman/Barry demarche to the Soviet Embassy has already communicated the seriousness with which we view a Soviet ground force presence in Cuba. (S)

No agreement was reached on whether or not to make a demarche. It was decided to ask Secretary Vance to take up the issue by telephone with Dr. Brzezinski and Acting Secretary of Defense Claytor. (S)

The wordings of the State Department draft demarches for the Soviet Union and Cuba were edited extensively by the group to leave the greatest latitude for policy choices later on and to reduce the possible difficulties we might encounter with the Soviets, Congress, and Senator Stone. There was some discussion of the advisability of including or excluding the Cubans as a recipient of the demarche and its significance for the level of relations between our two countries. (S)

There was agreement on the revisions of the two demarches, which were made as close to identical as possible. (S)

The President is to be made aware of the new intelligence before he meets Senator Stone in Florida on Thursday. (S)

4 Shulman met with Bessmertnykh on July 27 and stressed the “importance and sensitivity” to the United States of the issue of Soviet combat units in Cuba. (Telegram 196366 to Moscow, July 28; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790344-0084)

5 See Documents 63 and 66.

6 August 30.
62. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter\(^1\)

Washington, August 29, 1979

SUBJECT

Your Forthcoming Meeting with Senator Stone

Stone will want to know what we are doing about our new intelligence confirming that the Soviets have a combat brigade-type unit in Cuba. Dave Newsom has given him by phone an outline of the situation, and we have scheduled a briefing in Washington for September 4. It would nonetheless be useful for you to tell him we have already approached the Soviets and to enlist his support for our efforts to deal with the matter.

Background

We have had inconclusive evidence for several years of the presence in Cuba of what appeared to be a Soviet unit of some type. Until very recently we were uncertain as to the size, nature, and configuration of the unit—which the Soviets refer to in their communications as a “brigade.” We have now confirmed through a variety of intelligence means that the unit is indeed Soviet, numbers from 2,000 to 3,000 men, and has organic armor, artillery, and motorized infantry components. We remain uncertain as to its mission and the precise date of its placement in Cuba.

As presently configured and supported, the unit does not appear to constitute a threat to this country or to other countries in the hemisphere. The presence of this unit does not appear to violate our understandings with the Soviets on Cuba, which do not address the question of Soviet ground forces. We therefore think it unlikely the Soviets would accede to any demands for the unit’s withdrawal, and are exploring options for demonstrating to both Moscow and Havana our displeasure over the unit’s presence.

The key question for Stone, however, is whether or not the unit’s presence constitutes a Soviet base. You advised Stone in a letter of January 1978 in connection with the Panama Canal Treaty ratification effort that the administration would oppose Soviet efforts, direct or

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\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 15, Cuba, Soviet Brigade, 5–8/79. Secret. A cover page by Owen states, “I do not agree with background memo on one point: I suspect that it is premature now to draw any conclusions as to whether this Soviet combat brigade does or does not constitute a ‘threat’ to our interests in the Western Hemisphere.”
indirect, to establish military bases in this hemisphere. In a July letter to Stone, I reaffirmed this position. Based on leaks of our initial, fragmentary evidence on the unit in Cuba, Stone alleged during the early SALT hearings that the Soviets were attempting to establish a “base” in Cuba and challenged the administration to remove it. He suggested our failure to do so would reflect an unwillingness to challenge the Soviets on possible SALT violations.

We would suggest that you defer until his briefing next Tuesday any specific questions Stone may have, focusing instead on steps we have taken to deal with the unit. After interagency consultations, we have made demarches to the Soviets here and to the Cubans in Havana to express concern over the unit’s presence. We have told the Soviets we will want to raise the matter with Gromyko when he is here in September for the UNGA.

Attached are suggested talking points and a copy of your letter of January 1978 to Senator Stone.  

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2 September 4.

3 Talking points for Carter’s meeting with Stone are attached but not printed. The letter to Senator Stone has not been found. Vance wrote to Stone the following day in order to assuage the Senator’s concerns that Soviet submarine “port calls” to Cuba were in violation of the 1970 U.S.-Soviet agreement. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 15, Cuba, Soviet Brigade, 5–8/79)
63. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Washington, August 30, 1979, 1504Z

228582. Subject: Demarche to Soviets on Soviet Combat Forces in Cuba. Ref: State 227407.2

1. Secret (Entire text).
2. Summary: Undersecretary Newsom called in Soviet Charge Vasev August 29 to express concern over presence in Cuba of Soviet combat forces, indicating Secretary would be raising this issue with Gromyko at UNGA. End summary.

3. FYI: We have had inconclusive evidence for several years of the presence in Cuba of what appeared to be a Soviet unit of some type. Until very recently we were uncertain as to the size, nature, and configuration of the unit—which the Soviets refer to in their communications as a “brigade”. We have now confirmed through a variety of intelligence means that the unit is indeed Soviet, numbers from 2,000 to 3,000 men, and has organic armor, artillery, and motorized infantry components. We remain uncertain as to its mission and the precise date of its placement in Cuba. End FYI.

4. Undersecretary Newsom called in Soviet Charge Vasev August 29 and read to him the following talking points.

—Marshall Shulman informed Bessmertnykh on July 27 that we would regard the presence of organized Soviet combat units in Cuba with deep concern.3
—Our concern is not theoretical. We know that there are Soviet combat forces in Cuba.
—We regard this as a serious matter which cannot help but burden our relations.
—The Secretary sees the meeting with the Foreign Minister in New York as an early opportunity to have comprehensive discussion on the trends in our relationship of which this deployment is one significant element.

5. Vasev asked what the legal basis for our representation was. Newsom replied that he thought the Soviets could appreciate that the presence of organized Soviet combat units was of obvious interest and

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840142–2439. Secret; Cherokee; Niac Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Shinn; cleared by Goodby and Bremer; approved by Newsom.
2 See footnote 2, Document 61. The text is identical to the text Newsom read to Vasev.
3 See footnote 4, Document 61.
concern to the U.S. He thought the technical basis of this concern and the history of its development could best be left to the Secretary, Dobrynin and Gromyko to discuss. His purpose had been simply to invite the attention of the Soviet Government to this issue. Vasev persisted, arguing that we had attempted to widen the scope of existing understandings. He asked whether this was indeed our purpose, whether we had any new proposal to make. Newsom promised to convey this question to the Secretary. Vasev predicted that if this was not clarified the discussion between the Secretary and Gromyko could be over in two minutes. Newsom hoped this would not be the scenario. We felt justified in bringing this to Soviet attention. He was sure Vasev had seen suggestions in the press about an organized Soviet brigade in Cuba. This speculation has been found to have a basis in fact. We could hear more about it when Congress returned. A public discussion was possible. Our desire, however, was to discuss the matter in official channels first.

6. Vasev then pointed out that the discussion concerned Soviet-Cuban relations and questioned whether we would permit a similar discussion with the Soviets of our relations with other countries. Newsom pointed out the history of previous discussions between us with the implicit recognition that the subject of Soviet forces in Cuba was a legitimate subject to discuss. Vasev conceded this but argued that previous talks had been limited to particular circumstances and restricted in scope. They had dealt with weapons directed against U.S. physical interests. A brigade was not of the same nature. The Soviets could not accept this. He noted that historically the U.S. had penetrated the Cuban border. He concluded that the best solution was normalization of US-Cuban relations. He denied that the Soviets were opposed to this. To the contrary, they were much in favor and expected us to take a similar attitude toward Soviet relations with countries on the Soviet borders. Newsom conceded that Cuba had the right of defense but Cuba already had large and capable armed forces. We would be concerned naturally if these forces reached a level which created an offensive danger to us, however, we found it unusual that combat elements were being introduced into another country when there was no legal or other basis for this.

7. Vasev concluded by saying he had simply tried to be helpful in clarifying certain points and promised to convey our presentation to Moscow.4

Vance

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64. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, August 31, 1979, 2103Z

8030. Subject: Demarche: Soviet Brigade in Cuba. Ref: (A) Havana 7962, (B) Fitzgerald-Smith telecon of Aug 31.2

1. Upon hearing BBC broadcast of Senator Church’s statement early this morning (Aug. 31)3 I called Foreign Ministry to ask where my urgent request for audience stood and to indicate it was of utmost importance that I be received today. Response was that Vice Minister Pelegrin Torras would receive me but could not do so until morning of Sept. 1. I indicated that was not adequate and urged either that Vice Minister find a few minutes during day or designate someone else to receive me.

2. Subsequently, I called Luis Garcia of North American Desk, explained situation to him and suggested he receive me and pass on substance of demarche to superiors. When he inquired as to nature of matter to be raised, I replied it had to do with deep concern of my government over presence Soviet military unit in Cuba. I emphasized that it would seem to be in interest of both sides to discuss matter as soon as possible. Garcia said he would consult and get back to me later.

3. Office of Protocol called back mid-afternoon to say Vice Minister still planned receive me 8:30 a.m. Sept. 1, could not do so sooner and that there no other Ministry officers, including Garcia, available, all being tied up with Summit.

4. I have complained to Ministry that communications between our two governments are hardly adequate if it takes two days to arrange interview on urgent basis. Ministry has registered complaint but is sticking to Sept. 1. In any event, in indicating nature of topic to be raised I have already made known USG concerns over presence Soviet unit. Cubans doubtless also listened to foreign radio broadcasts this

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840625–1184. Secret; Cherokee; Niact Immediate; Nodis.

2 In telegram 7962 from Havana, August 30, the Interests Section reported that the Cubans told Smith that it would be necessary for him to wait a day or two before delivering his démarche, due to personnel “tied up” in the Non-Aligned Movement Summit. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840131–1650) The August 31 telecon was not found.

3 On August 30, Newsom briefed Church by telephone. During his press conference, Church remarked that the United States “cannot permit the island to become a Russian military base 90 miles from our shores, nor can we allow Cuba to be used as a springboard for Russian military intervention in the Western Hemisphere.” (“2,300-Man Soviet Unit Now in Cuba,” The Washington Post, August 31, p. A1)
morning. Dilatory approach in scheduling audience is clearly by design. They know what is to be discussed and want to postpone it. One reason may be so they they can first issue a statement of their own in response to Dept’s noon briefing.

5. I will report results of interview with Pelegrin Torras.

Smith

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65. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Slocombe) to Secretary of Defense Brown

Washington, August 31, 1979

SUBJECT

Soviet Forces in Cuba

At the noon briefing, State’s spokesman (Hodding Carter) made the attached statement on the Cuban forces. It parallels what Dave Newsom used in talking to the majority and minority leaders of the Senate and House and the chairmen and ranking members of the Foreign Relations Committees last night. Carter was also to use a later version of the attached Q&As in answer to questions and to refrain from further comment.

There has been no formal contact with the leadership of the Armed Services Committees. Newsom suggested you might want to call the chairmen and ranking republicans. In view of the formal State announcement and the leaks, there is nothing new to be said to them, but I think the gesture might still be appreciated—and could be useful: If you call you are likely to be asked what we plan to do. I suggest you answer by

—noting that we agree that, as the statement says, the forces are not a military threat to the US,

—they are a matter of concern on broader grounds,

—we have raised the issue with the Soviets and are carefully considering our next steps (FYI: NSC now expects a principals-level meeting on Wednesday.)

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2 Attached but not printed. For the text, see the Department of State Bulletin, October 1979, p. 63. See also Newsom, The Soviet Brigade in Cuba, p. 35.

3 See Document 67.
—it is important that we not over react and put ourselves in the position of making demands that go beyond our real interests and on which we are not prepared to follow through.

It would, I believe, be highly desirable if the armed services committee leadership were sensitized (more than well-known hawk Frank Church seems to be) to the danger of blustering demands we can’t (and perhaps shouldn’t) back up.

In sum, I think that the calls would be worth the effort. They might also give you some sense of the congressional reaction to the problem. (Newsom informs me that Church’s reaction was not shared by all his colleagues: Javits and Zablocki said they were concerned about “pressures to over-react.” Stone will issue a statement which he told Newsom will say he feels the US should indicate its strong opposition, and that he considers that this force is a matter of concern because it could be “leading to the establishment of a base.” Given the importance of what’s a “base” in terms of the President’s commitment, that’s a quite moderate position.)

Walter Slocombe
Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense
International Security Affairs

4 At the bottom of the page, an unknown hand wrote, “Recently confirmed 2000–3000 combat troops in Cuba.”

66. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, September 1, 1979, 1432Z

8038. Subj: (S) Demarche: Soviet Brigade in Cuba. Ref: (A) State 227405 (B) Havana 8030.

1. (S—Entire text)

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 15, Cuba, 2/29/80. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis.
2 See footnote 1; Document 60.
3 See Document 64.
2. Vice Minister Pelegrin Torras received me promptly at 8:30 this morning. I read to him points in Ref (A), i.e. that we knew Soviet unit was here, that this was cause of deep concern to my government and would burden our relations.

3. Vice Minister heard me out, took careful notes and said he would immediately transmit substance of demarche to highest levels of GOC. By way of official reply, he said Cuba would neither deny nor confirm presence of Soviet unit or units. It was Cuba’s sovereign right and duty to arrange its own defenses. It owed no explanations to U.S. or anyone else. Nothing in Cuba threatened security of U.S.

4. He went on to add personal comment that some in U.S. still did not seem to understand that U.S. could no longer make demands on Cuba as though it not a sovereign country, nor demand explanations for actions which were within Cuba’s sovereign rights. He noted further that Cuba was aware of threatening statements on part of some political figures in U.S.

5. I pointed out to him that my instructions were to express the deep concern of my government—a perfectly legitimate concern under the circumstances; I was not instructed to demand explanations, as he would see by reviewing his notes. I could not answer for statements made by those not members of executive branch of USG, but whatever position of individuals might be, position of USG was clear; it regarded presence of Soviet unit as matter of concern which was better to raise now lest Cubans have impression U.S. was indifferent. Concern was being expressed through proper diplomatic channels and in prudent, responsible manner. We had already spoken to Soviets, as the other government involved.

6. Vice Minister noted that Cuba had often been threatened by U.S., most recently by air-naval maneuvers late last year. U.S. never offered explanations to Cuba of such menacing moves but seemed to expect Cuba to explain even clearly defensive measures. I reiterated that present demarche was not demand for explanation but expression of concern. It went without saying, however, that comments of GOC which would help us to understand situation would be useful and appreciated.

7. Vice Minister repeated that he would transmit concerns to highest levels of GOC.

8. GOC has made no public comment on subject. Some newsmen here had been alerted by mid-level Cuban officials to expect a statement, but when question re Soviet troops in Cuba was put to Cuban briefers at NAM Conference Hall last night, it received only a “no comment.” “Granma” this morning ignores whole issue.
9. If asked by American newsmen if I have raised matter with GOC, I intend to say I have but make no further comment.

Smith

67. Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting

Washington, September 4, 1979, 2:00–4:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

Soviet Brigade in Cuba

PARTICIPANTS

The Vice President

State

Secretary of State Cyrus Vance

David Newsom, Under Secretary for Political Affairs

OSD

Secretary of Defense Harold Brown

JCS

General David Jones, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

DCI

Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director of Central Intelligence

Arnold Horelick, National Intelligence Officer, USSR and East Europe

NSA

Admiral Bobby Inman, Director, National Security Agency

NSC

Marshall Brement (Notetaker)

White House

Zbigniew Brzezinski

David Aaron

Lloyd Cutler

MINUTES

Secretary Vance opened the meeting by asking Admiral Turner to bring the group up to date on the subject. (U)
Admiral Turner. [less than 1 line not declassified] August 9 revealed to us that Soviet troops were contemplating a training exercise. [less than 1 line not declassified] August 16 confirmed that the exercise was to take place the following day. This allowed us to target the event and to acquire [less than 1 line not declassified] evidence of the exercises from August 17 to August 20 as they were taking place. This [less than 1 line not declassified] evidence, combined with [1 line not declassified], allowed us to verify for the first time beyond any question that we were dealing with a Soviet ground combat activity. The day after the exercise ended, we [less than 1 line not declassified] observed that a good bit of equipment that had been located there had been transferred to the Lourdes Communications base and to Santiago de las Vegas. From all this new evidence we were able to flesh out our concept of what the Soviet brigade looked like. (TS)

As a result of the pinpointing of this exercise, we have gone back and looked at all the evidence we have on the subject since 1962. We cannot be sure that the Soviets withdrew all their ground combat forces from Cuba after 1962, and it is possible that this brigade could have been positioned on the island since that time. We have evidence of a Soviet training exercise directed against amphibious forces which took place in 1971. From 1971–1975 there was a dearth of information. Since 1976, we have had [less than 1 line not declassified] 15 tactical training exercises by the Soviets. (TS)

We have picked up [1 line not declassified] of the unit and know it is commanded by a colonel. I emphasize that the [less than 1 line not declassified] were not highly conclusive or clear-cut evidence. But by last spring there was enough indication of Soviet training activities having taken place that we found it advisable to do a national estimate. After an intensive review of past [less than 1 line not declassified] on July 12 [less than 1 line not declassified] an evaluation that there was indeed a Soviet brigade in Cuba. (TS)

While not a typical Soviet combat formation, the brigade is not unique to Cuba. Other brigades exist in East Germany, Mongolia and elsewhere. The facility in Santiago de las Vegas is manned by Soviet personnel. (TS)

We are concerned that we have not been able to [1 line not declassified] An exercise was scheduled for September 3, but this did not occur, and we are not sure why. It may be a result of our concern or it may have something to do with the current hurricane or the meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement. (TS)

What we know is that we are dealing with a unit of approximately 2,000–3,000 men and that it is commanded by a colonel. We assume that it is at full strength because it is so far from home, and we have positively identified enough equipment, e.g., 33 tanks, for a full-strength tank battalion. (TS)
Vance. Would it be possible that this unit had some connections with the [less than 1 line not declassified] (TS)

Turner. There is no evidence this group has any connection with the [less than 1 line not declassified] (TS)

Admiral Inman. [5 lines not declassified] (TS)

Dr. Brzezinski. How many took part in the exercise? (TS)

Horelick. About 750–800 people actually took part. (TS)

Vice President. What do we estimate is the function of the brigade? (TS)

Turner. We now know that it is not to train Cubans, or for jungle warfare training, which some people had previously assumed, and that they are not there to protect the Lourdes facility. Our best hypothesis is that the brigade is there as a gesture of support for Castro. We cannot exclude that it has been there since 1962. (TS)

Vance. The number of Soviet troops in Cuba in 1962 reached 20,000. Kennedy insisted that the Soviets take out the personnel who serviced the offensive weapons and also the technicians and the guards of the installations where they were installed, but did not ask for a withdrawal of all combat troops. The Soviets did withdraw most of their military personnel, but did not withdraw all their troops from Cuba. (TS)

Turner. In 1971, some Soviet combat elements were in Cuba. In 1975, we witnessed an enlargement of the facility at Santiago de las Vegas. And from 1975 to 1977, this facility was modernized. This was consistent with the major modernization of the Cuban armed forces which the Soviets were undertaking at that time. We assume that the brigade was fleshed out and gotten up to strength during this period. From 1977 to 1979 we saw no evidence of further construction, no inflow of people, or anything else to indicate that the size of the unit was being increased. We therefore assume that it reached its present size by 1976. (TS)

Inman. We have a human source who stated that the brigade was there in 1968, but this cannot be confirmed. (TS)

Brzezinski. Had we done this kind of intelligence scrutiny before, would we have been able to identify a Soviet unit in 1968, assuming one was there at the time? (TS)

Horelick. [less than 1 line not declassified] Cubans and Soviets use the same equipment. [2 lines not declassified] Knowing what we now know, we reviewed an exercise which occurred a year ago and we discovered that it had the same signature as the exercise which recently took place. We are now prepared to say that the 1978 exercise was also carried out by this Soviet brigade. (TS)

Turner. If this subject had had a higher priority we might have discovered it earlier. But the [less than 1 line not declassified] information
is spotty. [less than 1 line not declassified] is not the kind of [less than 1 line not declassified] which fills one with confidence. We still cannot prove beyond all shadow of doubt that Soviets were in those tanks. (TS)

_Vance._ Both Harold and I a month ago, with the full clearance of the intelligence community, made statements that there was no evidence of a Soviet brigade in Cuba.² (TS)

_Secretary Brown._ What I said was that there was a [less than 1 line not declassified] set-up, but no convincing evidence of a brigade. (TS)

_Brzezinski._ I briefed the President at that time and I remember that the expression I used was that we had no “conclusive evidence” of the existence of the brigade. (TS)

_Aaron._ During the days when we were engaged in paramilitary operations in Cuba did our agents ever run into any Russians? (TS)

_Inman._ I have gone over the evidence and we have no information about any organized Russian unit in Cuba. (TS)

_Vance._ I think we should now turn to the issues which we are facing. This is a very serious and complex situation with domestic and international overtones. In dealing with it we must be seen as effective and coordinated and must follow the situation on a daily basis. To do this I want to set up an interagency group to meet daily on this problem under the chairmanship of Under Secretary Newsom. We need to examine the strategic implications of the Soviet brigade in Cuba. The questions we must ask ourselves are what are the implications in the region as a whole and in the world in general, as well as on the domestic side and for the SALT ratification process. (TS)

_Vice President._ Does this action violate the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement? (TS)

_Vance._ No it does not. The correspondence between Kennedy and Khrushchev was supplemented by other communications between McCloy and Kuznetsov and Mikoyan and by various other exchanges. Essentially, it dealt with offensive weapons in Cuba and not with ground troops. (TS)

_Vice President._ And the brigade does not threaten us at all? (TS)

_Brown._ The brigade is not a threat to the continental United States, but if it had a lift capability it could be considered an effective force in the rest of the Western Hemisphere. (TS)

_Vance._ Kennedy referred to 6,000 troops but did not identify the troops as a threat, only their association with offensive weapons was mentioned. (Under Secretary Newsom then read to the group the perti-

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² See footnote 2, Document 55.
ent parts from the Kennedy speech dealing with Soviet combat troops in Cuba.)³ (TS)

Brzezinski. We must be careful not to give the Soviets a clean bill of health on this. People will read this Soviet brigade as being there in conjunction with a new situation in which the Soviets are using the Cubans in a far more assertive fashion than was the case before 1975. It is here that the US-Soviet connection becomes difficult. (TS)

Vice President. If we seem too soft on this issue it could be damaging to us domestically. How to flag our concern without feeding the lions in the Senate is a tricky question. (TS)

Vance. We have to express our concern. At the same time, we have to look at our main ultimate objective, i.e., to get the brigade out. The more you build up the issue publicly, the more difficult it will be to get the brigade out. (TS)

Brzezinski. We have to sound convincing to the Soviets, but do not want to pump the issue up publicly. We ought to say to Moscow that we are seriously concerned and that this issue has struck a sensitive nerve for us, which affects our vital interests and the SALT ratification process as well. The Cubans for the first time have been given the capability to project their power, and this creates a difficult situation for us. We would hope that the Soviets would understand our sensitivities and withdraw. If not, we will have to make it clear to them that we will not be sensitive to their concerns. We ask for reciprocity. If we do not get it, we should make clear to the Soviets that the character of Harold’s upcoming visit to China will depend to some extent on their reactions to our concerns about this issue. You should all know that Senator Byrd just told the President that resolutions will probably be offered in the Senate delaying final SALT ratification until this issue is resolved satisfactorily. Byrd said that he was not yet decided on how he would vote on such a resolution. We tried to jack him up and he wants to be helpful on SALT, but this is a real issue. (TS)

Vice President. We have to develop an approach that has some bite to it so that Senator Stone and others who feel the same way he does will be satisfied. (TS)

Brown. Our ultimate aim is to get the Soviets to pull their forces out. But maybe getting them to cap the number of their troops in Cuba is a possible first course. After we get an agreement on no more troops then they could get out later and more quietly. (TS)

Vance. I don’t think that capping is enough. We must have withdrawal. (TS)

³ See footnote 5, Document 36.
Brzezinski. We might give them the option of saying to us that this was some sort of a training unit. They would be given to understand that we would accept such an explanation provided that they phase the unit out of existence. This might be a way out of the dilemma which we face. (TS)

Brown. The Soviets will not worry about any posture we adopt until we do something concrete to drive our concerns home to them. (TS)

Aaron. Maybe the best approach to the Soviets would be to ask for no more exercises. This might be the best we can get from them. We should not establish criteria which we cannot monitor. How would we know whether the Soviets actually withdrew? (TS)

Newsom. We could try to convince the Soviets that we are entering a new phase and that this is a burden on our overall relations. (TS)

Brown. We should not tie this to SALT. We should rather say that this is unacceptable to us in terms of our overall relationship. (TS)

Brzezinski. There has to be sensitivity to the special interests of both sides. This is a new situation. We are now more neuralgic than we have been to Cuba’s ability to project its power as well as to its actions in Africa. Unless the Soviets desist from certain forms of activity, this cannot help but influence the overall relationship. (TS)

Cutler. Does this Soviet facility qualify as a base? (TS)

Brown. It is hard to see how it does not. (TS)

Aaron. It is difficult to maintain that it is not a base. (TS)

Vance. If we say it is a base, this makes the task of coming to some solution of the problem much more difficult. (TS)

Newsom. We do not in fact know that the Soviets are not on a Cuban base. (TS)

Brown. We have not talked about the effect of this action on Latin America, and how we are to portray to others this new Soviet ability to project their power. (TS)

Brzezinski. This will be perceived as a test of this Administration. In responding to it, we must differentiate between our public posture and what we will be saying privately to the Soviets. In public we must explain our concern about this brigade in the context of growing Cuban adventurism over the past several years. Privately, we must convince the Soviets that unless we get some satisfaction on this we are in a very difficult situation. We will almost certainly confront strong public demands that we delay SALT ratification until this problem can be settled. As I said, Senator Byrd told the President that a resolution will be offered in the Senate linking final ratification of the treaty with a settlement of this problem, and that he himself is wavering and may have no choice but to support it. Byrd insisted that we need quick
action. This makes it all the more urgent that we talk to the Soviets about it. (TS)

Vance. We received word today that Dobrynin is due back on Friday. I have sent him a message that he return as soon as possible. (TS)

Cutler. Our position with the Senate must be that if it is a base, we will ask the Soviets to take it out. (TS)

Vance. A demand such as that will lessen the chances of bringing it about. (TS)

Brown. Should we not say that if it is a permanent base, this will have grave consequences for our relations. (TS)

Brzezinski. It is clear that the Soviets will not tolerate a public humiliation in Cuba or a reliving of the 1962 missile crisis. (TS)

Cutler. Nevertheless, the issue of the Carter letter to Stone has to be addressed.4 (TS)

Newsom. We should keep in mind that the Soviets have had a Sigint base in Cuba for a long time. (TS)

Cutler. This is a separate question. Intelligence collection facilities in third countries have not been a contentious issue. (TS)

Aaron. In dealing with the Soviets, we could note that we have only seen this unit in operation on an intermittent basis. It is extremely important to emphasize this because it is much harder for the Soviets to withdraw a combat brigade completely than it would be to close out a facility. (TS)

Brzezinski. Perhaps we should first discuss what outcome we really want. Can we go on living with 2,800 Soviet troops in Cuba? (TS)

Vance. I say we cannot live with the maintenance of a Soviet combat brigade there. (TS)

Brown. From what Inman has said, those 2,800 people are not advisors. (TS)

Brzezinski. Can we live with them operating on a lesser level, for example a platoon? (TS)

Turner. We have never seen them operate as a full brigade. (TS)

Brown. The recent exercise was at a level of only two battalions. (TS)

Brzezinski. Can we, as an Administration, accept a continuation there of Soviet combat forces at whatever level? (TS)

Cutler. We need convincing evidence to assuage Congressional critics. (TS)

Brzezinski. What is our minimum objective? Is it that the Soviets should no longer ever hold exercises? (TS)

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4 Vance responded to Stone for Carter; see footnote 2, Document 55.
Newsom. Is it conceivable that the Soviets would say they would disband that command and we could announce the removal of the brigade structure? (TS)

Jones. Our big problem is that we don’t know why the brigade is there. Removing their headquarters would not really solve the problem. (TS)

Aaron. If we take the position that we want the brigade out of there, the first question we will be asked is how do we know that the Soviets are complying with such an agreement? How can we possibly verify it? My fear is that we would be getting into some kind of arms control agreement on this question. (TS)

Brown. Withdrawal is a very tough objective, and it is more difficult to achieve this objective once you state it. (TS)

Cutler. It is very hard for the President to climb off the base question which he articulated in the letter to Stone. If there is no convincing evidence that this is not a base, then we are committed to oppose it, and if we fail to get some positive action out of the Soviets this would definitely impact on SALT. (TS)

Aaron. What we are trying for is an explanation. This is the important thing. We need to know that this is not a combat operation. Right now we are not looking for a deal or a withdrawal, just for a satisfactory clarification. (TS)

Brzezinski. It is not inconceivable that the Soviets may act in a positive manner on this. Their naval task force that was heading for Cuba turned around on August 14 and went off to West Africa and this may have had something to do with the demarche that George Vest made on this subject. If we say to them that if they refuse to cooperate we will view this as insensitivity to our interests and will therefore be less sensitive to their concerns in the future and tie this to Harold’s visit, it may have some effect. (TS)

Newsom. Might we not ask for a commitment that no Soviet troops be directed against any place else in the Western hemisphere? (TS)

Secretary Vance. A Senate Resolution on this would be extremely difficult to handle. Is there a Senator who would not vote for a Resolution calling for withdrawal of Soviet ground combat forces from their base in Cuba? (TS)

Brzezinski. Perhaps we might ask the Senate to give us six weeks to resolve the issue. (TS)

Cutler. Something has to be done about it by the end of September. (TS)

Brown. We require that the Soviets change what they are doing. We must not be satisfied with mere camouflage. (TS)

Turner. You cannot tell a Soviet from a Cuban tank. (TS)
Vance. Let me then try to summarize what I will be saying tomorrow morning at my press conference and tomorrow afternoon when we meet with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. First of all, I will convey that we will be talking to the Soviets about this as soon as Dobrynin arrives in Washington and that we will be making a parallel demarche in Moscow. At that time I will ask for an explanation of the purposes and the intentions of the Soviet unit in Cuba. Our next steps will depend on how we assess the purposes and intentions of the brigade.5 (TS)

Brzezinski. Don’t you want to indicate that it is impossible for us to accept a permanent military combat base in Cuba and that given the rapidly rising public crescendo, we will have to respond to the issue? (TS)

Vance. We will have to be very clear about it. (TS)

Brzezinski. As we have discussed, we should be hinting to them what we can live with, as well as what we plan to do about it if they are not responsible. (TS)

Brown. There are other alternatives. We might, for example, consider reinforcement exercises in Guantanamo and perhaps suggest a trade. (TS)

Brzezinski. This would create problems for us in that it would pit a big United States against a small Cuba in a public confrontation. Sympathy would therefore be generated for the Cubans from many of the non-aligned nations, especially in Latin America. Furthermore, that kind of action makes the continuation of a Soviet presence even more likely. (TS)

Aaron. What kind of guard forces do we have in Guantanamo? (TS)

Jones. Really not too much. Those 40 Soviet tanks would probably run right over them. (TS)

Vice President. Most Americans do not know about the 20,000 troops that were in Cuba in 1962. It may well be that this Soviet unit is no threat to us at all. Nevertheless, we must make it clear that we are not taking this matter lightly. (TS)

Newsom. How much do we tell the Soviets about what we know of this unit? (TS)

Vance. I think we have to go quite far. (TS)

Brzezinski. I think we have to be very careful on that. But to recapitulate, (1) you will be calling in Dobrynin; (2) you will be asking for an

5 Regarding the Secretary’s September 5 press conference, see footnote 4, Document 68. After Vance’s testimony at the closed session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Church commented, “I see no likelihood that the Senate would ratify the SALT–II treaty as long as Soviet combat troops remain stationed in Cuba.” (Bernard Gwertzman, “Vance Tells Soviet Its Troops in Cuba Could Imperil Ties,” The New York Times, September 6, p. A1)
explanation of the purposes and intentions of the brigade; (3) you will
draw for him a picture of the domestic consequences if we do not get
some satisfaction on this issue; (4) you will note that we are serious
about our concerns and that we expect reciprocity from the Soviets,
i.e., that we expect them to be as sensitive to our concerns as we are
to theirs; and (5) you will convey that there are concrete steps we might
have to take if we do not get satisfaction.6 (TS)

Aaron. The MIG–23 incident suggested that it would be helpful to
let them know what we want so that our discussions do not get off on
the wrong track. (TS)

Brzezinski. We should explain that if we are not satisfied on this,
there will be a massive public outcry, which will inevitably jeopardize
SALT. Underlying our approach would be the intimation that we are
not necessarily calling for formal withdrawal of the brigade from Cuba,
but rather for a disaggregation of the brigade and a non-continuation
of brigade headquarters. (TS)

Vance. That may not be enough. But at the same time we would
be asking the Congress not to force us to take positions with the Soviets
which would not help us move toward some solution to the problem.
We now have to work out a statement for my press conference tomor-
row, and figure out what we are going to say to Senate leaders. At
this stage we should avoid expressing our view as to whether the
Soviet facility is or is not a base. (TS)

Aaron. Our objective should be to get the Soviets to clarify whether
this is a permanent installation and whether we are dealing with a
permanent functioning combat unit. Concrete steps we might ask for
as meeting our needs would be no further exercises and removal of
brigade headquarters. (TS)

Brzezinski. Cuban activism is our problem, and at some point soon
we have to get at this issue. (TS)

Jones. Our biggest concern is that the Soviets are getting a combat
foot in the door in the Western hemisphere. How we handle this is a
real dilemma. (TS)

Cutler. Stone is going to demand removal of those troops. We will
have to convince Dobrynin that this is new information to us and
that we have not created this issue. Whatever happens, it is terribly
important for the President to be seen as strong on this issue. (TS)

Brzezinski. We must not be seen as in any way excusing what the
Soviets have done on this. (TS)

(Since both Secretary Vance and Dr. Brzezinski had four o’clock
appointments, the meeting broke up at this point.)

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6 For the discussions with Soviet officials between September 10 and September 14, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Documents 221, 222, and 223.
Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter

Washington, September 4, 1979

SUBJECT

Cuba Report

I enclose a statement which I might make tomorrow, as a commentary on Castro’s speech. Alternatively, Vance has a press conference scheduled for tomorrow and he could make such a statement; and you might wish at some point to top all of this with some general observations.

Subject to your direction, we will proceed as indicated, though Cy has strong reservations about going public. I will bring this matter up at the PRC this afternoon, and report to you tomorrow morning.

I also attach a top secret background paper from the CIA, containing a basic summary of Castro’s dependence on the Soviet Union.

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 15, Cuba, Soviet Brigade, 10/2/79–5/80. Confidential. At the top of the page, the President wrote, “Zbig—I’ve talked to Cy. His press conference Wed. will be great.”

2 Not attached. Brzezinski added the following handwritten footnote here, “or even later today.”

3 In Castro’s speech at the opening of the NAM Summit on September 3, he attacked the United States and reaffirmed Cuba’s loyalty to the Soviet Union. (Telegram 8072 from Havana, September 3; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790402–0857)

4 In his September 5 press conference, Vance stressed that the Soviet military presence in Cuba “runs counter to long-held American policies,” and that the “status quo” was not acceptable. He also maintained, however, that the Soviet unit lacked the airlift and sealift accompaniment to give it the “assault capability” it would need to attack the United States. (Department of State Bulletin, October 1979, p. 14) President Carter’s September 7 remarks to reporters reiterated Vance’s language, stressing “we consider the presence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba to be a very serious matter and that this status quo is not acceptable,” while also emphasizing, “It [the brigade] is not an assault force. It does not have airlift or sea-going capabilities and does not have weapons capable of attacking the United States.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book II, pp. 1602–1603) Brzezinski, in his September 7 statement, remarked that “Castro is a puppet of the Soviet Union and we view him as such,” adding, “Militarily, Cuba is entirely dependent on the Soviet Union.” (Martin Schram, “President Pledges ‘Firm Diplomacy’ Talks Planned on Soviet Unit,” The Washington Post, September 8, p. A1)

5 Not attached. At the bottom of the page, Carter wrote, “Zbig, Tone down any anti-Soviet rhetoric & emphasize Cuban aspect, as underlined & on my memo—J.”
Washington, September 6, 1979

SUBJECT

Synopsis of U.S. Intelligence Information on the Soviet Brigade in Cuba 1962 to 1979

1. 1962: The Soviets were estimated to have 20,000 military personnel in Cuba. As a result of the negotiations over the withdrawal of Soviet missiles, all Soviet personnel associated with the missiles were believed withdrawn. At that point we estimated a residual of between 500–2,000 signals intelligence operators and military advisers but had no hard count.

2. 1968–1972: [5 lines not declassified]

3. 1973–74: We obtained [less than 1 line not declassified] alluding to Soviet artillery exercises. These were insufficient to alter the basic view expressed above.

4. 1975: We began receiving [less than 1 line not declassified] fragmentary and ambiguous references to a “brigade.” There were no indications of the nature of this brigade, or of any connection between it and previous training exercises.

5. 1976–77: We began [1½ lines not declassified] It was suspected that these were training exercises for the 1,500–2,000 Soviet [less than 1 line not declassified] military advisory personnel then estimated to be in Cuba. (Our estimate of the number of Soviets present had changed due to the growth of the [less than 1 line not declassified] effort, 1962–1975.)

6. August 1978: As a result of [1 line not declassified] in Cuba, we raised (in the PDB) the possibility that a Soviet ground forces unit had been training in Cuba since 1977.

7. Early 1979: An intensified analytic effort was made to review all of the clues regarding Soviet military activities in Cuba. As a result, in mid-July we published the key conclusion that the Soviet brigade was not made up of elements of the Soviet Advisory Group presence but was a separate ground forces unit. We were not, however, able to determine the unit’s size, organization, or mission.²

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 15, Cuba, Soviet Brigade, 9/1–18/79. Top Secret; [codewords not declassified]. There is no indication Carter read the memorandum.

² See Document 54.
8. August 1979: An intensified intelligence collection effort paid off on 9 August when a [2 lines not declassified] This permitted targeting [less than 1 line not declassified] onto that exercise area on the 17th. The results constituted the first clear evidence of training activity that could be [less than 1 line not declassified] (the exercise area is used by both the Cubans and the Soviets and their equipment is virtually identical). On 20 August, [less than 1 line not declassified] All of the Soviet equipment had been removed. What was apparently the same equipment was [less than 1 line not declassified] being prepared for restorage at the facilities where we suspect the Soviet personnel are garrisoned. This equipment had not been visible [less than 1 line not declassified] on the 17th. Analysis of this equipment and the size and configuration of the Soviet installations involved, in combination with the accumulated [less than 1 line not declassified] reporting received in August, led to a determination that the references to a Soviet brigade in Cuba were, in fact, references to a separate combat unit whose size was probably between 2,000–3,000 personnel.

9. Retrospective: We have inadequate data to determine when the unit first arrived. It is possible that a ground forces unit of some size has been in Cuba since 1962. It is also possible that it was introduced or expanded in the period 1975–77 when there was a substantial increase in Soviet support for Cuban military forces. One of the principal facilities in which it is presently housed was enlarged during that period. We have seen no other sign of facility improvements, organizational change, or extensive movement of equipment or personnel since that time.

10. Summary: Our confidence levels are:
   a. [less than 1 line not declassified]—that there is a separate Soviet ground forces brigade in Cuba.
   b. [less than 1 line not declassified]—that it is commanded by a colonel.
   c. [less than 1 line not declassified]—that it has three infantry and one tank battalions, plus various supporting elements.
   d. [less than 1 line not declassified]—that it contains 2,000–3,000 personnel with our best estimate at 2,600.
   e. Finally, we have [less than 1 line not declassified] and no direct evidence on the mission of the Brigade. If it were left behind in 1962, it was most likely intended as a commitment to Castro against the possibility of a US invasion of Cuba. It is conceivable that the unit also had a function to train Cubans at that time. If it were introduced in the mid-1970s, it was probably intended to be a symbolic commitment to Castro in exchange for his commitment to adventurism in Africa. It
is also quite possible, of course, that the Brigade’s mission shifted from the first hypothesis to the second over time.

11. All portions of this memo are TOP SECRET [codewords not declassified]

Stansfield Turner³

³ Turner signed “Stan Turner” above this typed signature.

70. Report From the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Webster)

Washington, September 6, 1979, 1858Z

Soviet Military Activities in Cuba: Foreign Counterintelligence—Cuba.

On September 4, 1979, a source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that during a recent trip to Cuba, he visited a Cuban military base at Guantanamo, Cuba. Source traveled to Guantanamo from Havana, Cuba, during the week of August 19–23, 1979. The Cuban military base overlooked the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo, Cuba. (S)

Source visited the Cuban military base with a Cuban guide and a Cuban driver driving a military vehicle, similar to a jeep. Before entering the base, source was told by his Cuban guide to “forget everything you see inside the base.” (S)

About ten minutes driving time from main gate, source, guide, and driver were checked at guard gate. Source observed two male guards therein. One guard was Cuban; the other guard was believed by source to be Russian. Source heard the Cuban guard to speak with the Russian guard in what he believed to be the Russian language. (S)

Once inside the base, source observed about 1,000 Russian troops in military uniforms. Source was on the base at approximately 11:30

a.m., and his presence inside base was approximately 30 minutes. Some Russian troops were standing in line for lunch. (S)

Source also observed military weapons, military vehicles, including tanks, and cement bunkers built into sides of caves. (S)

Source further advised that a high ranking Government of Cuba official, Ramiro Valdes Menendez, in a previous conversation, had advised him that “Russia maintains 4,000 troops in Cuba all the time for training purposes”. Further, during a trip within Havana, source observed a convoy of military troop carriers on Avenida Mexico. Source was advised by a Cuban official of MINREX, with whom he was riding, that there were 30 troops in each truck and that 27 trucks were in the convoy. (S)

Details to follow. (U)

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2 The September 5 oral message delivered by Vasev asserted that “in actuality there has existed in Cuba for 17 years a training center where Soviet military specialists train Cuban officers in the use and maintenance of Soviet military equipment in the inventory of the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces. And one could hardly imagine that the US side has been unaware of all of this.” See footnote 4, Document 63. In a September 22 memorandum, General Carl R. Smith reported to Brzezinski that there was “no active attempt of deception by the Soviet Brigade in Cuba,” and “The Soviet installations were not disguised in any special manner, and communication security was consistent with general Soviet practices.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 15, Cuba, Soviet Brigade 9/19–30/79)

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71. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, September 6, 1979, 2351Z

8173. Subject: Likely Castro Reaction on Soviet Troop Issue. Ref: A) Havana 8038.2

1. S— Entire text.
2. I take it from Secretary’s public statement of Sept 6 that matter of Soviet unit is to be pursued with Amb Dobrynin.7 It is probably as

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 15, Cuba, 2/29/80. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis.
2 See Document 66.
3 Reference is presumably to Vance’s September 5 press conference. See footnote 4, Document 68.
well not to pursue it further with Cubans at this point. We have raised it with them, as we should have. They have not responded and are not likely to do so. Further demarches at this point would simply invite kind of defiant, stone-wall response which would be unhelpful in defusing situation.

3. Bolstered by what now has all appearances of major and resounding foreign policy victory at NAM Summit, a victory which increases his worth to and bargaining position with Soviets, Castro will be in no mood to offer explanations and certainly not to take any initiatives in direction reduction or withdrawal. Nor is he likely quietly to acquiesce to any possible Soviet decision to reduce or withdraw units. On contrary, he will use added leverage of Summit victory to prevent any backdown on their part, a la 1962. Cubans regarded Soviet response then as cowardly and still do. 1962 will be uppermost in Cuban minds as they watch Soviet management of troop issue.

4. USINT’s assessment that announcement presence of Soviet unit unlikely to influence thinking of many NAM delegates (Ref B)\(^4\) has been strengthened over past few days. Troop story drew a ho-hum, but to the extent there was any reaction, it was overwhelmingly that announcement was clumsy US effort to influence outcome of Summit. Castro’s soundings were doubtless more complete than our own but must have produced same results. He, then, will likely be operating on assumption that awareness of presence Soviet unit here will not do him any particular harm in the NAM.\(^5\)

5. Given the above, Castro is likely to calculate that most of the factors in the equation are in his favor. He can therefore be expected to take a firm stand and to make it difficult for the Soviets not to do so.

Smith

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\(^4\) Not further identified.

\(^5\) In telegram 8377 from Havana, September 9, the Interests Section remarked that although Castro “emerged as a major recognized leader of the NAM,” the moderates were able to deflect some of his more anti-West and anti-U.S. initiatives. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790464–1094)
72. **Memorandum for the Record Prepared by Herbert E. Hetu,**
Public Affairs Officer, Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, September 14, 1979

**SUBJECT**

Mini-PRC/PA Meetings Concerning Soviet Combat Brigades in Cuba

1. **Background:** At about 1:15 p.m. on Monday, 10 September, Jody Powell called me to say that the President wanted all government public affairs officers concerned with the Soviet combat brigades in Cuba to get together to discuss the public affairs ramifications of the discovery, to be certain that there was no inter-agency disagreements via the news media. Jody said that meeting would take place at 6:00 p.m. that night in conjunction with the mini-PRC in the White House Situation Room.

I told Jody that David Binder had asked to come and see me that afternoon to discuss a chronological story he was preparing concerning Soviets in Cuba. Jody said he knew about the Binder article and that was one of the reasons we were all getting together. Jody and I then discussed whether or not I should cancel the meeting with Binder. We decided it might make sense for me to meet with Binder to get a better and more detailed idea of the type of article he was preparing.

I did meet with Binder at 3:00 p.m. on 10 September and reported on that meeting at the PRC meeting later that same day (see below).

2. What follows is a very brief description of what occurred at the three mini-PRC/PA meetings that took place.

a. Monday, 10 September. The meeting convened at 6:00 p.m., chaired by David Newsom. Jody Powell came in and said that the President wanted it made clear in any dealings with the press that: (1) there was no intelligence failure; (2) he did not want agencies taking issue with one another concerning intelligence and; (3) there would be no answering charges allegedly made by one agency in the media by other agencies. It was decided at that meeting that there would be no comment on any of the Vance/Dobrynin meetings.

We then discussed in some detail the problems we could expect to face from the media. The result was a list of problems which were:

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1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–1981), Box 1, Folder 1: DCI Booklet—DCI Testimony on Cuba (II). Secret.

2 See footnote 6, Document 67.
(a) The need for a chronology of intelligence activities which would be for internal use only in the event it was decided to brief Binder;

(b) Address the charge that footdragging by the Intelligence Community on getting out the word on the Soviet brigade was a SALT saving episode, i.e., trying to hold the information until SALT was ratified;

(c) Activities at Cienfuegos;

(d) The intelligence priority assigned to Cuba;

(e) Caves in Cuba;

(f) Soviet naval task forces using Cuban bases;

(g) Soviet pilots in Cuba.

Preparation of the chronology was assigned to Arnold Horelick and questions and answers concerning the other seven topics would be prepared by State and NSC. It was agreed that the chronology and questions and answers would be discussed at our next meeting at 6:00 p.m. on Tuesday.

There was also some discussion about the probability of back-grounding David Binder but a solution was never arrived at and it was left hanging. It was noted that Binder had been put off another day either by Jody Powell or Jerry Schecter. As noted above, I reported at the meeting on Binder’s plan. I said he was writing the article not so much as a day to day chronology but in phases—in his words, “phases of heightened attention by the Intelligence Community.” To wit: 1 March—Brzezinski and Turner discussed the problem and Turner was told to take a hard look; April—Brzezinski sends Turner a memorandum and tells him to make an indepth analysis; July—White House calls CIA and tells CIA to step up activities;3 August—Another call from the White House assigns highest priority to the problem. Binder asked me if I could provide more specific dates and details. I told him I was sure that I could not provide specifics but the scenario as described by him was not an indication of failure but a description of how the intelligence process should work.

b. Tuesday, 11 September. The group convened again in the White House Situation Room at 5:00 p.m. and spent literally the entire meeting going over in minute detail the questions and answers discussed above. David Mark was the recorder who promised to get the refined answers to everyone present by the next morning for a final review. Arnold Horelick had one copy of a rough chronology which I did not see and which was not discussed in the meeting. NOTE: David Binder called in at 4:25 just as I was leaving for the meeting to see if I was able to

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3 See Document 57.
provide any information relative to his story. I told him I did not have any information and asked if he was writing for the next day. He said he was uncertain; that the White House had promised him answers—in his words, “Promised a big briefing tomorrow,” but that his uncertainty was caused by the suspicion that they were being sandbagged because the SSCI hearings on the subject began the next day (Wednesday).

c. Wednesday, 12 September: Meeting convened at 5:00. Binder had called me at 4:00 to ask again if I was able to provide answers he had requested. I told him I could not and asked if he was writing for the next day. He told me that he was because they could just not wait any longer. I reported this at the beginning of the meeting and Jerry Schecter left the meeting to call Binder to find out what was happening. He came back and confirmed that Binder was writing for Thursday.4 There seemed to be a general consensus that they were off the hook as far as briefing Binder and it was my perception that preparation of the chronology, while still important, was not quite so relevant. Arnold Horelick did a detailed critique of the Oberdorfer article of the previous Sunday verbally.5 All participants had a copy of the article. Following that the meeting degenerated into a very lengthy discussion about Secretary McNamara’s press conference of February 1963.6 People left one at a time and the meeting ended about 7:00.

Herbert E. Hetu

6 McNamara held a press conference about Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba on February 6, 1963.
Memorandum From Marshall Brement of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)

Washington, September 14, 1979

SUBJECT

Foreign Reaction to the Brigade Issue (U)

It is worth keeping in mind that there has so far been no Third Country reaction of which I am aware which would in any way incline the Soviets toward making concessions to us regarding the brigade in Cuba. All signals to them on this score would point the other way. Our Allies have been studiously silent. No statements of support have emanated from any European capitals. This contrasts markedly with 1962, when all of them within two days voiced complete backing for us in the showdown with the Soviets. (C)

Nor has the issue created much of a stir in Latin America. Conservative governments (e.g., Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay) have regarded reports of the Soviet unit as confirmation of their own concerns over Soviet-Cuban activities, but they have not viewed the brigade, in itself, as a real threat. Furthermore, there has been no significant official reaction to this event from any of the major non-aligned countries. (C)

In other words, the only consideration weighing upon the Soviets to make some sort of accommodation on this issue derives strictly from the US-Soviet context. Seeing themselves as having just had a major triumph with the NAM, and knowing that our Allies and the whole developed world are skeptical about this issue and not supportive of the position we have taken, the Soviets have little impetus on the international front to see things our way. (C)

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74. Summary of Conclusions of a National Security Council Meeting\(^1\)

Washington, September 17, 1979, 9:45–11:45 a.m.

SUBJECT
NSC Meeting on Soviet Ground Force Presence in Cuba

PARTICIPANTS
The President
The Vice President
State
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
Defense
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown
Deputy Secretary of Defense Graham Claytor
JCS
General Lew Allen, Jr., Chief of Staff of Air Force
Central Intelligence Agency
Director Stansfield Turner
The White House
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lloyd Cutler, SALT Coordinator
Jody Powell, Press Secretary to the President
National Security Council
Colonel William E. Odom, USA, Military Assistant to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The President convened the meeting of the National Security Council on Soviet ground combat forces in Cuba with opening remarks on the growing importance of the issue, its long-lasting impact on U.S.-Soviet relations, and on the American people’s attitude toward this Administration. He underscored that how we handle this issue will have enormous consequences on all three counts.

The first part of the meeting was devoted to a review of what our intelligence shows about the Soviet ground force presence in Cuba. It was reiterated that the Kennedy Administration told the Soviets in November 1962 that Soviet ground combat forces in Cuba were not

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\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 57, NSC–022, 9/17/79, Soviets in Cuba. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. On a covering memorandum from Brzezinski, Carter wrote, “Zbig, Poor drafting & not quite accurate—Go over with principals & resubmit. (No copies floating around).” The Summary of Conclusions printed here is the revised text.
acceptable. In February 1963, Secretary of Defense McNamara asserted that the reduction of Soviet combat troops had reached the 4,000–6,000 level and that the combat equipment had been turned over to the Cubans. The level of Soviet troops dropped to the figure of about 2,000 in 1964 or 1965. There have been minor fluctuations since. For the remainder of the 1960s, our intelligence indicates that there was some joint Soviet-Cuban combat training. It is unclear whether or not such training continued into the early 1970s. Since 1976, however, the evidence strongly indicates that Soviet ground force units have engaged in exclusively Soviet combat training—with Cuban participation. Surveillance since 1976 indicates unmistakably that Soviet ground combat forces are stationed in Cuba and that they train exclusively as such. Although it is not clear when and how the change in training activity took place, it is clear that the nature of the Soviet ground force presence has changed since 1963 even if the number of Soviet troops has not changed significantly. It was also pointed out that there is some evidence of additional Soviet combat units beyond those we have confirmed at present. The intelligence community has low confidence in that evidence.

The President next asked Secretary Vance to report on his meetings with Dobrynin. The purpose of the meetings has been to ask the Soviets for additional information on their forces in Cuba. The last meeting was described as very stormy. Dobrynin had to query Moscow for additional information before further discussions could take place. Word has been received from the Soviet Embassy this morning that he has a reply which he will deliver to Secretary Vance before the end of the day.

The President next asked Dr. Brzezinski for a summary of the Policy Review Committee discussion which took place immediately before it was turned into a National Security Council meeting. The PRC discussion focused on two points. First, it was assumed that Secretary Vance’s list of points for a proposal to the Soviets is adequate; the issue in that case was additional points that might be added for the purposes of negotiating tactics rather than any basic alteration in Vance’s proposal. Second, it was asked if the proposed list is indeed adequate.

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3 According to his memoirs, Brzezinski suggested that Carter attend the meeting, since the former found “the PRC under Vance’s chairmanship filled with his more dovish State Department associates” undesirable. (Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 349)

4 Vance’s proposal for negotiating topics suggested Soviet elimination of brigade headquarters, discontinuation of field exercises, and removal of combat equipment. (Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 57, NSC–022, 9/17/79, Soviets in Cuba) A list of additional measures to be taken against the Soviet Union is described in a draft proposal in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 15, Cuba, Soviet Brigade, 9/1–18/79.
Two answers to this question emerged. The first accepted the proposal as an adequate response to what is seen as a political problem, not a military problem. The second answer judged the proposal inadequate as a full response to the Soviets. It runs the risk of being primarily cosmetic and impossible to verify. The very minimum successful outcome from a negotiation with the Soviets at this point is that some Soviet equipment be withdrawn from Cuba. Anything less will seriously damage the ratification possibilities for SALT. Other steps that might be added to Vance’s list include reinforcing the U.S. presence at the Guantanamo Naval Base, a “Carter Doctrine” for the hemisphere, and linking Soviet presence in Cuba to a broader international context of Soviet-Cuban military relations. These two answers were then rearticulated by their proponents.

The first answer was reaffirmed by the Vice President, Secretary Vance, and Lloyd Cutler. The thrust of their argument is that we deal now with the short-term problem of Soviet ground combat force presence in Cuba. We have described this presence as unacceptable. We should go to the Soviets with Vance’s proposal, seeking a cooperative Soviet response. If that fails, then we must change the unacceptable status quo in Cuba by our own unilateral actions. They would include first, a significant increase of our intelligence surveillance of Cuba and second, reinforcement with U.S. ground troops of our naval base in Guantanamo. Once that is done, we would be able to argue convincingly to the Senate that we have redressed the situation in Cuba and that we can proceed with SALT. In the event we cannot get a negotiated agreement with the Soviets, we will have to work closely with Senator Byrd and others on the Hill to learn what is acceptable as a firm U.S. response. The proponents of this position agreed that there may be broader geopolitical implications in the Soviet-Cuban military relationship which will require U.S. action outside of Cuba. A decision on such actions, however, is of enormous significance and should be debated and taken separately from the handling of this phase of dealing with the Soviets. It was suggested that we have already tilted excessively toward China in this regard.

The second answer was restated by Harold Brown and Brzezinski. They agreed that we need to go forward with Secretary Vance’s proposal to the Soviets, but we should add to the list a request for information about any additional Soviet combat units which we may not as yet have identified, and that we should include the option of separating the Soviet troops from their equipment in Cuba. This approach is most likely to fail, and if it does, we must not confine our response to Cuba alone. That limitation carries a number of dangers. First, it is a very weak response to Soviet “messing around in our backyard” which the public will see as nothing more than cosmetics and will not accept.
Second, reinforcing our presence in Guantanamo runs the risk of merely legitimizing the Soviet combat ground force presence in Cuba, and perhaps provoking a Soviet reaction of increasing that presence. Third, it leaves wholly unaddressed the larger geo-strategic problem of the Soviet-Cuban military relationship in other parts of the world. Finally, the worst outcome for this Administration is it be caught somewhere between the two positions, with what is seen as a cosmetic solution and therefore picked apart not only by the public and the Congress, but also within the Democratic Party. A number of broader responses are essential, such as an increase in the Defense budget and an improvement of our Indian Ocean military presence. We need actions, not just more expressions of concern through demarches to the Soviet government. In fact, judging by the recent transfer of a patrol boat to Cuba, the Soviets are showing increasing disregard for our demarches.

The President turned the discussion to public and Congressional attitudes toward the problem. His talks with several Senators during his recent visit to Southern states after the hurricane have impressed him with a much stronger sense of public concern and demand for strong action than have discussions here in Washington with Senators Byrd and Nunn. Although Byrd, Goldwater, and Nunn have behaved responsibly on the issue while Senators Church and Stone have behaved irresponsibly, the American public is closer to Church and Stone. The American people are demanding action, and they will not give this Administration more than a couple of weeks to act. This assessment was shared by most of those present, but the Vice President, Vance, and Cutler expressed a preference to follow Senator Byrd’s lead rather than Senator Stone’s. They argued for actions in Cuba first before considering other steps.

In reviewing Vance’s proposed list for negotiations, the President expressed a desire that our negotiating list for the Soviets be one that we could make public to the Congress. He is dubious, therefore, about negotiating “bargaining chips” being added to Vance’s list. Several doubts were expressed about the advisability of announcing our list publicly. It was argued that we negotiate the list in secret and that we let our public position develop based on actions we have in fact taken.

After considering the various views and discussion, the President asked for the following action:

—Two points are to be added to Secretary Vance’s proposed list for negotiations with the Soviets. It must include a request for information about additional Soviet forces in Cuba, and it must include a proposal to separate Soviet troops from their equipment.
—If Dobrynin’s answer today is not acceptable, Secretary Vance is to ask for a meeting with Gromyko in the near future.  

—For the event that the Soviets reject our proposal, the following list of possible U.S. actions is to be reviewed and differentiated as to those against Cuba and those against the Soviet Union, given an appropriate sequence for execution, distinguished for those to be announced publicly and those to be merely carried out and, finally, assessed for their immediate and ultimate consequence for U.S.-Soviet relations:

1. Reinforce Guantanamo;
2. Increase the Defense budget;
3. Consider additional sales to China;
4. Highlight the Vice President’s recent visit and Harold Brown’s upcoming visit to China;
5. Increase intelligence capabilities;
6. Possibly alter the Clark amendment;\( ^6 \)
7. Ask the Congress to reinstate registration for the military draft;
8. Renew SR–71 flights over Cuba;
9. Augment our military presence in the Indian Ocean;
10. Deny MFN to the Soviet Union;
11. Delay a SALT vote in the Senate; and
12. Announce a “Carter Doctrine” for the Caribbean.

A brief discussion followed on the advisability of renewing the SR–71 flights. Harold Brown and General Allen favored renewal as a strong gesture. The President was reluctant about renewal if it is only a gesture, not needed for intelligence purposes. It was also pointed out that we should not go forward with renewal without first making a strong case for the intelligence need and then considering the actions we will take on the remote chance that an SR–71 is shot down. Turner stated that there is no intelligence need for SR–71 flights. A final decision on renewal was not expressed by the President.

\( ^5 \) When Vance met with Dobrynin later that day to receive the Soviet answer to the September 14 U.S. oral message, he informally and “off-the-record” raised possible negotiating topics. In a meeting with Dobrynin on September 20, he officially transmitted the suggested topics. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 224.

\( ^6 \) The Clark amendment to the Arms Export Control Act prohibited U.S. aid to private groups engaged in the fighting in Angola.
75. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, September 18, 1979, 1424Z

8481. Subject: (S) Soviet Troops in Cuba. Ref: Havana 8435.2
1. (S—Entire text.)
2. At lunch today Jose Luis Padron indicated “top levels” of GOC were mystified by US intentions in making issue at this time of Soviet unit in Cuba. Conventional wisdom was that US aim was to influence outcome of NAM Summit. “Top levels” of GOC, however, were more astute than that. In their view, announcement created more problems for USG and Carter administration than for GOC; hence, NAM Summit link was implausible.

3. Padron continued, however, that while his principals were pretty certain what US intentions were not, they were uncertain as to what they were. Cuba would say nothing publicly, he indicated, but privately he would confirm to me that Soviet unit has been in Cuba since 1963. It incomprehensible that US intelligence community has been unaware of its presence. Over the years it has many times engaged in joint maneuvers with Cuban units. US electronic surveillance must have detected this years ago even if other intelligence sources had previously been unaware.

4. Padron indicated that unit was here principally for purpose of training. It was a line unit and Padron admitted that in years just after missile crisis, presence of Soviet unit “had made Cubans feel a little more secure.” But unit’s purpose was not combat. “Cuban armed forces do not need a few Russians to help us defend our island,” he concluded. Rather, purpose was to conduct joint training exercises with Cuban units. There was nothing provocative in its presence and as responsible US officials had noted, it violated no understandings.

5. Comment: Padron’s tone was matter of fact and at no time did he urge any particular course of action on USG. Rather, his observations were almost those of bemused observer. On other hand, there was certainly no hint of give, or that Cuban side would easily acquiesce to withdrawal of Soviet unit.

Smith

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840125–1182. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis.
2 Not found.
Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance, Secretary of Defense Brown, and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter

Washington, September 22, 1979

SUBJECT
U.S. Strategy to Cuba

In our concern with the issue of Soviet combat forces in Cuba we should not lose sight of the longer-term issue of U.S. strategy toward Cuba itself. After Cy’s trip to Ecuador, before we confirmed the presence of the Soviet brigade, and more recently we have discussed U.S. strategy to Cuba. We agreed that we ought to continue to seek to contain Cuba as a source of violent revolutionary change. Specifically, we agreed that our policy should be directed at the following four objectives:

—To reduce and eventually remove Cuban military forces stationed abroad. (S)
—To undercut Cuba’s drive for Third World leadership. (S)
—To obtain Cuban restraint on the Puerto Rican issue. (S)
—To inhibit the Soviet buildup of Cuba’s armed force. (S)

To pursue these objectives we agreed to adopt a six-prong strategy (these are longer term measures, independent of whatever we do in connection with the Soviet brigade):

—With the Caribbean and Central America, we intend to work with like-minded Latin American governments in an effort to compete with the Cubans and increase the chances of peaceful and democratic change. We intend to explore the possibility of increasing our presence in the area. On the military side, this would include port visits and training in order to demonstrate our concern for the region and enhance the security of the region. Also, the U.S. should be prepared to provide greater amounts of economic and military assistance to governments

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 14, Cuba, 9/21–24/79. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Carter initialed the memorandum indicating he saw it. All brackets are in the original.
2 Vance visited Ecuador from August 9 to August 12 to attend the inauguration of President Roldos.
3 See Documents 61 and 74.
4 An attached paper, dated August 6, contains a list of policy recommendations for Cuba.
5 Carter wrote in the margin by this point, “How do OAS states line up now? (US vs Cuba).”
in the region that respect human rights and democratic values, and also resist Cuban influence. [The drop from 2.2 percent (in FY 79) to 1 percent of the FMS budget allocated to Latin America in FMS credits will have (FY 80) to be reversed, and perhaps even increased to 4–5 percent.] (S)

—With key Western allies and with selected governments in Latin America and the Third World, we will share intelligence information on the Soviet buildup in Cuba and on Cuban intelligence, political and military activities abroad.6 (With Latin American governments, we should seek to raise their consciousness of the Cuban problem as their problem—not just ours—in order that they begin to seriously consider actions to curb Cuban adventurism.) We should also hold periodic consultations with these governments about measures that might be taken individually or collectively to counter expansionist actions by Cuba. We should encourage them to adopt an approach, which denies the Cubans the recognition they seek and raises the costs to the Cubans of continued intervention abroad, including the denial of credit—an economic area where concerted action might give us considerable leverage. (S)

—With moderate members of the NAM we should urge attention to issues like human rights, arms restraint, non-intervention and foreign aid which could lead to criticism of Cuban and Soviet activities.7 We should continue to encourage the moderates in the NAM to resist strongly and publicly efforts by the Cubans to use their three-year NAM chairmanship to impose pro-Soviet positions, of the kind reflected in the Cuban draft declaration for the NAM Summit.8 (S)

—We should continue to press vigorously to preclude Cuba from gaining a seat on the UN Security Council or from hosting the next UNCTAD Summit.9 (S)

—With the USSR, we should—both in the context of the brigade issue and otherwise—make very clear the depth of our concern about Cuba’s activities in the Caribbean and in Central America (as well as in Africa) and inform them of the costs to our relationship of continued

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6 In the margin, Carter wrote, “With which ones?”

7 In the margin, Carter wrote, “Let’s answer NAM ‘manifesto’ from Havana mtg.” The final NAM declaration from the Havana meeting was summarized in telegram 8261 from Havana, September 9. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D7900411–0891)

8 The text of the Cuban draft declaration was transmitted in telegrams 7944, 7945, 7946, 7947, and 7961 from Havana, August 30. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790396–0991, D790397–0272, D790397–0222, D790396–1238, D790397–0091, and D790397–0260, respectively)

9 In the margin, Carter wrote, “ok.”
Soviet support (or even acquiescence) in Cuba’s activities. In this connection, we are transferring a few limited examples of dual-use high technology to the PRC. (S)

—With Cuba, we should seek to use the Cuban Americans as a potent force for influencing the Cuban people. They are returning to the island for frequent visits, and we should benefit from the insights gained during their visits. We should also increase the influence of U.S. culture on the Cuban people by promoting cultural tours and by permitting an arrangement to distribute U.S. films on the island. (S)

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the objectives and measures described above. (U)

10 In the margin, Carter wrote, “ok.”
11 In the margin, Carter wrote, “ok.”
12 Carter checked the approve option and initialed below.

77. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 24, 1979

PARTICIPANTS

John J. McCloy, Sullivan and Cromwell Attorneys
Robert Perito, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Department of State

At Marshall Shulman’s request, I met with John McCloy this morning to allow him to review the file of transcripts of his conversations with the Soviets during the Cuban Missile Crisis. In 1962, McCloy was designated by President Kennedy as his personal representative to negotiate the removal of Soviet missiles and IL–28 bombers from Cuba. In this capacity, McCloy spent an extended period at USUN where he and Ambassador Stevenson negotiated with Khrushchev’s personal

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P810138–0216. Confidential. The meeting was held at the Metropolitan Club.
representative V. V. Kuznetsov.2 Our meeting, however dealt with the related issue of the presence of Soviet combat troops in Cuba.

McCloy said the documents confirmed his recollection that the principal focus of his efforts in 1962 was, first, the removal of the missiles; and, second, the removal of the IL–28 bombers. The subject of Soviet military personnel in Cuba arose only incidentally and then, in the context of their role in protecting the missiles. In this context, McCloy told the Soviets that the troops would have to be removed because their presence opened the possibility that the missiles might be reintroduced at a later time. The negotiations on removing Soviet military forces occurred after the missiles and bombers had been removed and McCloy had withdrawn from the negotiating process. McCloy said he had little to contribute to our current effort to complete the record on our 1962 discussions with the Soviets on this issue.

Turning to present confrontation over the presence of a Soviet brigade, McCloy said he was not worried about a few thousand Soviet troops in Cuba since they presented no strategic threat to the United States. What did concern him, however, was the Soviet training mission in Cuba and its role in training Cuban troops which could be deployed to trouble spots around the world. McCloy said the training of a force of Soviet surrogates which could intervene in areas where the US has vital economic interests was a strategic threat equal to that posed by the missiles in 1962. Quoting “West Germans” whom he said had information from East German and Soviet sources, McCloy said the Soviets were preparing Cuban forces for use in oil producing areas of the Middle East. This effort, he said, posed a real danger to the United States and should be the subject of our immediate concern.

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2 For documentation on these meetings, which began in late October 1962, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath.
78. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Staff work backing up your speech regarding the Soviet brigade in Cuba (C)

My latest speech draft, which we have discussed, gives a recommended package of actions, which I have discussed with Ham, Jody, and Pat Caddell.\(^2\) Four of the items, i.e.:

A) seeking augmentation of the Rapid Deployment Force;
B) enhancing our intelligence capability;
C) increasing economic assistance to Central American and Caribbean nations; and
D) giving additional security assistance to those nations;

require supplemental funding for AID, Defense, and Intelligence, in my view and that of Cy, Harold and Stan, respectively. (S)

Jim McIntyre’s position is that we could accomplish the same objectives without asking for Intelligence and Defense supplementals, and that the proposed aid and security package for Central America and the Caribbean can be cut in half.\(^3\) (S)

My staff is now in the process of examining these issues with OMB, State, Defense, and CIA. We have not come to any conclusions and have yet to receive formal recommendations and requested back-up papers, which we should have by mid-morning on Thursday. But given the time constraints we are under, I thought you should have a preliminary idea of the kinds of programs that we are thinking about so that your views can influence our final product.\(^4\) (S)

Jim’s opinion to the contrary, I can see political advantages in having the Congress approve the proposed supplementals without any important opposition. Such an action would have an important symbolic value in showing our determination in the face of the Soviet challenge. (S)

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\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 16, Cuba, Soviet Brigade (Policy/Options Papers), 9/20–28/79. Top Secret. Sent for information. At the top of the page, President Carter wrote, “Zbig—This is a typical (and unacceptable) bureaucratic response—J.”

\(^2\) Presumably a reference to a draft of the speech to the Nation on the Soviet combat troops in Cuba and SALT that President Carter delivered on October 1. See footnote 2, Document 80.

\(^3\) In the margin, Carter wrote, “I agree with Jim.”

\(^4\) In the margin, Carter wrote, “Everyone will naturally want more $.”
In any case, once we decide on what we plan to do (presumably by Friday, after Cy has seen Gromyko tomorrow evening), I think it essential that we confer with the Congressional leadership to let them know what we have in mind. I could see Byrd and Nunn, and suggest that Fritz be instructed to contact Cranston, in an effort to get immediate Senatorial approval. (S)

Intelligence

We have Stan Turner’s package for a supplemental and will be going over it in detail with his people and with OMB. He proposes an increase in FY 1980 spending [1½ lines not declassified] to increase and improve analysis, provide greater support to the analytical process, increase human source and covert collection, improve our worldwide contingency capability, expand reconnaissance, and other technical collection, of Cuba and the Middle East, and provide for greater crisis support. (S)

The supplemental is focused on providing direct and relatively immediate improvement of our intelligence coverage of Soviet and Cuban activities worldwide and is divided into near-term [number not declassified], mid-term [number not declassified], and long-term [number not declassified] payoff categories. The supplemental contains items of three general types: (S)

- Support for activities that are directly related to increasing collection and analysis on Cuba and Soviets in Cuba. These include funding for additional flights by reconnaissance aircraft, CIA operations, and expanded analysis of ship and aircraft movements. (TS)
- Support for activities that respond to the broader threat raised by the Soviet/Cuban military relationship. These include accelerating improvements in our para-military capabilities, expanding CIA operations resources to direct against Cuban and other targets, and improving collection and exploitation of Cuban and Soviet communications. (TS)
- Support for activities that enhance our ability to do general analysis or provide crisis support, in anticipation of a period of heightened US/Soviet tension. Many of these items involve acceleration or expansion of programs already underway or planned. (TS)

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6 [text not declassified]
7 In the margin, Carter wrote, “This is silly. [1 line not declassified]”
8 In the margin, Carter wrote, “Refocus planned capabilities.”
9 In the margin, Carter wrote, “Publicity on intelligence activities should be minimized.”
Our preliminary judgment is that a viable minimum level—as a signal of intent—should include at least a substantial portion of the near-term and a portion of the mid-term items with a heavy focus on manpower to strengthen our analytical, linguistic and HUMINT-oriented needs. [2½ lines not declassified] Beyond this level, there remain some questions as to the justification, which we, the DCI and OMB are in the process of examining. (S)

Defense

We do not as yet have the package from Defense. But I understand that Harold has looked at how we can enhance the RDF within the framework of an FY 80 defense supplemental, and has concluded that the following four items would be most appropriate.\(^{10}\)

1. Forward Afloat Equipment Stocks and Ships (there is evidently a problem here with the Marine Corps, and Harold will reportedly be recommending that you talk to the Commandant about it). $100M
2. Advanced Tanker Aircraft Program (four KC–10) $226M
3. Two additional FFG–7 Convoy Escort Ships. $400M
4. Expansion of the JCS Exercise Program. $ 90M

Total — $816M

In addition to the above, JCS, in response to our request to examine the possibilities of increasing our military and naval presence in the Caribbean, is reportedly considering recommending:

A. Expansion of P–3 flights
B. Expansion of facilities at Key West NAS.
C. Expansion of facilities [1½ lines not declassified]
D. [1 line not declassified]
E. [less than 1 line not declassified]
F. Increasing reconnaissance flights over Cuba and the Caribbean. (S)

State/AID

We are still working on the proposed economic and security assistance supplemental for Central America and the Caribbean, and are in the process of laying out for your decision the various options involved in a dispute between State, AID, and OMB on what the most effective package might be. The following line items are being considered:

A. A supplemental ESF for Nicaragua (up to $120M);

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\(^{10}\) In the margin, Carter wrote, “I prefer no supplemental—change priorities to accomplish goals if possible.”
B. Supplementals for Honduras and El Salvador designed to give impetus to a broader multilateral development effort in Central America;

C. ESF of $5M to address balance-of-payments problems in the Eastern Caribbean;

D. FMS, MAP, and IMET programs which could help to equip and train an Eastern Caribbean Coast Guard—a proposal which is currently being considered by several governments in the region and the UK;

E. An additional $10 million project to address Caribbean unemployment through immediate high-impact development projects. (S)

The total Caribbean supplemental proposed by the State Department is $30.6 million, and the total for Central America is $145.6 million. OMB and Henry Owen think this should be cut.11 (S)

As noted, we are examining all the above proposals carefully and will try to have the options fully staffed out for you by c.o.b. tomorrow so that we can move ahead on Congressional consultations on Friday. (S)

11 Carter underlined the words “OMB” and “Henry Owen” and in the margin wrote, “Sound thinking.”

79. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter

Washington, September 27, 1979

SUBJECT

11:00 AM Meeting on the Soviet Brigade

Though your participation in it will be brief, it will be extremely important in setting the tone and in providing guidance for our subsequent deliberations. Your presence will assert your personal leadership and will thus be both substantive and symbolic.2


2 According to the President’s Daily Diary, Carter met with Mondale and other senior officials regarding Cuba from 11:10 to 11:24 a.m. on September 27. No substantive record of this meeting has been found. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary)
Let me draw your attention to a few things you may wish to have in mind:

1. As I told you, I am concerned that the exercise in building consensus by convoking a large number of alumni—which no other President did in a crisis—could backfire, and could be perceived on the outside in an adverse manner. Perhaps this has gone too far to be called off, but we certainly have not gone too far to get it under control. I certainly do not favor prolonged discussion with the group of your options and alternatives.3

2. As to the options, the group will be presented with a larger number than is desirable and probably with some that are too extreme to be adopted. In thinking about options, you should take into account the following factors:
   —What is needed to preserve SALT?
   —What is needed to project firm personal leadership?
   —What is needed to show that the United States means business when it concludes that the Soviet/Cuban activity has gone too far?
   —How do we impose some penalty on the Soviets themselves without excessively inflaming the situation?

   The above calls for a judicious mixture of options that reflect heightened U.S. defense and intelligence efforts, some response to Cuban activism, and some penalty for the Soviets. Confining the problem to Cuba alone will be seen as giving the Soviets a free hand (after all, it is a Soviet brigade that is involved and it is the Soviets who have sponsored the Cubans in Africa), and it will certainly hurt SALT, which is a U.S.-Soviet issue.4 Those who wish to reject SALT are doing it largely because of frustration over what they perceive to be a pattern of U.S. acquiescence vs. Soviet assertiveness. We need to demonstrate that we are assertive vs. the Soviets, and thereby strengthen our case that we can proceed with SALT, having responded to the Soviet challenge.

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3 The President invited notable policymakers from past administrations to advise him in dealing with the Soviet brigade issue. He met with the “Citizens Advisory Committee” from 12:34 to 2:04 p.m. on September 29. (Ibid.) Participants included Dean Rusk, Roswell Gilpatrick, John McCone, John McCloy, William Rogers, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Brent Scowcroft, Sol Linowitz, W. Averell Harriman, Henry Kissinger, and Clark Clifford. An incomplete account of this meeting is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 15, Cuba, Soviet Brigade, 9/19–30/79. See also Bernard Gwertzman, “President Gets Wide-Ranging Advice on Soviet Troops From 15 Experts,” The New York Times, September 30, p. 3.

4 Brzezinski hoped that the President would use the brigade issue to adopt a tougher stance toward the Soviets, increase defense spending, condemn Soviet-Cuban activities in the Third World, and ostracize Cuba by developing a dialogue with the nation’s Western European donors. Carter, however, rejected this advice. (Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 350)
3. Just a reminder regarding the package that I think you should have in your response, in the light of the above: (1) increased military presence in the Caribbean; (2) enhanced Rapid Deployment Force; (3) enhancing intelligence capabilities; (4) lifting of Congressional restrictions on U.S. operations to counter Cuban activism; (5) more assistance to Central America and the Caribbean, both economic and MSA; (6) postponement of the decision on MFN for the Soviet Union until better climate; (7) careful review of technology transfer; (8) presidential commission on manpower; (9) a broad statement that we will resist intrusion of Soviet or Cuban armed forces into Western Hemisphere nations. Harold and Lloyd will have some additional items to recommend. The overall options list is longer. Others may wish to cut this list down.

4. Finally, on the assumption that nothing transpires today with Gromyko\(^5\) that alters your decision to go on Sunday,\(^6\) you should tell us what kind of consultations you want with the top Congressional leaders, in addition to the so-called alumni group. I would guess that you will not make your final decision on the options until tomorrow morning’s NSC meeting at the earliest. With Lopez-Portillo eating up much of your time on Friday and Saturday morning,\(^7\) the best time for the consultation presumably would be on Saturday afternoon. In some cases, moreover, individual consultations may be desirable (e.g., getting Nunn on board). We will be operating on an extremely tight schedule, and therefore the more guidance we get from you earlier, the better.\(^8\)

\(^5\) See footnote 5, Document 78.
\(^6\) September 30. Presumably a reference to the President’s speech.
\(^7\) Carter and Lopez Portillo met in Washington on September 28 and 29. No NSC meeting was held that morning. See Documents 164 and 165.
\(^8\) At the bottom of the page, Brzezinski wrote, “P.S. Byrd told me, when I called him this a.m., that he will go public on SALT ‘sometime next week.’” On September 23, the President met with Vance and Senator Byrd. Byrd stated that the only way to save the SALT II negotiations was to move beyond the “phony” Soviet brigade issue and cool U.S. rhetoric. Vance concurred, arguing that the issue be limited to Cuba and not involve the entirety of East-West relations. (Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 350)
80. Notes Prepared by William Attwood

Havana, undated

Notes on Conversation With President Fidel Castro on October 3, 1979

I arrived in Havana Oct. 1 and was invited to Castro’s office in the Council of Ministers’ Palace at 6 p.m. Oct. 3; also present were his aide, Alfredo Ramirez, and a woman interpreter named Juanita. This was our first meeting since February, 1977 and our fourth since 1959. Following are the highlights of our talk, which lasted an hour and a half:

1. He was pleased that Carter in his speech two nights before finally admitted that the Soviet troops had been here a long time but he regretted that the President sounded so “arrogant.”

2. He wondered, ruefully, why our political leaders always sound “bellicose and aggressive” when talking about Cuba—even while being relatively pleasant to the Russians. I suggested that Carter’s speech was directed to the Russians and to the Senate hawks and asked him how it could have been phrased differently. Castro acknowledged that under the circumstances it was perhaps understandable—“You are always having to worry about elections in America”—but that all the saber-rattling about the Caribbean was greatly overdone. I also inferred that he resented Carter’s earlier reference to him as a puppet.

3. The “disclosure” about the brigade during the Non-Aligned Conference was, he said, “too much of a coincidence.” He “knows” Brzezinski headed a team in Washington whose mission was to sabotage this Conference. Senator Church, he said, was called in and deliberately given this misleading information about the “brigade.” But the effort failed and only made the U.S. look foolish in the eyes of the world.

4. He said the so-called crisis was false and a “comedy” because the same number of troops with the same training functions have been

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 14, Cuba, 10/1–3/79. No classification marking. Attwood, former Ambassador to Guinea and Kenya, was a leading advocate for a rapprochement in U.S.-Cuban relations.

2 The President addressed the nation on October 1 about the Soviet military presence in Cuba. During his speech, President Carter stated that “the brigade issue is certainly no reason for a return to the cold war. A confrontation might be emotionally satisfying for a few days or weeks for some people, but it would be destructive to the national interest and security of the United States.” Instead, Carter proposed increasing surveillance in Cuba, establishing a Caribbean joint task force, expanding military maneuvers in the Caribbean, assuring regional allies of U.S. support, and increasing economic assistance to the Caribbean. Carter concluded that “the greatest danger to all the nations of the world” was the threat of nuclear war, and called upon Congress to ratify SALT II. (Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book II, pp. 1802–1806)
there since 1962. President Kennedy even okayed their presence after the October missile crisis. And there were two “lies” in the U.S. disclosure. First, that the Soviet unit was a new one; and second, that its mission had changed from training to combat.

5. Castro feels grateful to the Russians for standing firm on this issue. They could have compromised—for example, by removing some of the troops—to help get SALT ratified. But they backed him up because they knew he was right.

6. Carter, he said, was “badly advised” on this whole matter, indicating by gesture and expression that he was prepared to exonerate him. In Castro’s mind, Brzezinski is clearly the villain. Anyway, he considers the episode closed and won’t talk about it any more unless in reply to questions.

7. He plans to go to the U.N. later this month, or early in November, but he asked me not to mention it yet. He will go as a spokesman for the Non Aligned movement, not to raise problems like this mini-crisis. He asked me what he should say in his speech. I suggested a lofty theme, like cooperation for development transcending ideology as we look ahead to the 21st Century.

8. Returning to the brigade issue, I suggested that Washington’s real concern was not about 2,000 Soviet troops but rather whether a new attempt at deception was involved. This was important in the SALT context. After all, I said, the Russians did lie to us about the missiles in 1962. Castro agreed they “handled that badly” by lying; he, Castro, never would have denied their presence in Cuba.

9. He would be willing to meet Carter on this projected visit to the U.N. if Carter wants to see him, but it is not up to him, Castro, to request such a meeting.

10. He sees no reason why the process of normalizing relations, which has been stalled for some time, cannot go forward now that this crisis is past; in fact, it might even give it fresh impetus. But lifting the trade embargo—which he still considers an act of war—remains a precondition for meaningful negotiations. This is important mainly for symbolic reasons, he said, since lifting it would actually help U.S. firms more than Cuba. He wondered aloud why we always treat Cuba different from other “socialist” countries. He believes Brzezinski and others would prefer that Cuba be an outright satellite of the Soviet Union because this would make it easier to discredit him; but it simply isn’t true. Cuba depends on the U.S.S.R. for help but it doesn’t take orders.

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3 Castro addressed the United Nations General Assembly on October 12. (Telegram 4346 from USUN, October 13; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790469-0236)
11. I asked him why he refers to us so often as imperialists: where and when have we acted as imperialists lately? I reminded him that we just lowered our flag in Panama and that we have assisted the revolutionary side in Nicaragua. Castro smiled and pulled on his beard and finally said he couldn’t think of any recent imperialistic action by the U.S., off hand, though our incessant efforts to isolate and discredit Cuba in Latin America certainly was a form of imperialism. Then he mentioned that imperialism also took economic forms like capitalistic investment in the Third World. I pointed out that our mutual friend, Sekou Toure of Guinea, seemed to welcome U.S. private capital to help develop and sell his bauxite reserves.

12. About Panama and Nicaragua, he said he had been helpful to us by telling Torrijos to be patient when the Senate was stalling on the Canal Treaty. Also, he said, Cuba showed restraint in Nicaragua and did not go rushing in, as we probably expected. And he added that Cuba had nothing whatsoever to do with triggering the strictly internal uprising in Grenada. (Castro seemed to be trying to say he was not trying to meddle in the Caribbean.)

13. I asked him about Angola. He said that the death of Neto and continued bombing raids by South Africa compels him to keep troops and technicians there; but if Namibia became independent, the situation would be more stable and he might be able to start phasing them out.

14. Going back to U.S.-Cuban relations, we agreed that it was unfortunate they were always strained. He said that since he has more influence with the non-aligned nations than do the Soviets, it certainly doesn’t help us to make an enemy of him; but if we wanted him as an enemy then he is prepared to oblige. But it is up to us: “The real problem between us is a moral one. What we need is a climate of peace.”

15. Although Castro looked very weary, he wound up our meeting talking amiably and with considerable animation about solar and wind energy, Pol Pot, U.S. politics, the uses of kenaf, the lunacy of nuclear war, what kind of trees grow in Connecticut and the health and well-being of my family, whom he met two years ago. I left him feeling, as usual, that treating a man with such personal and political charisma as a mortal enemy for 20 years has not been to our advantage.5

Bill Attwood

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4 Agostinho Neto died of cancer in Moscow on September 10.
5 An account of an October 4 meeting between Smith and Castro, in which similar topics were discussed, is in telegram 9009 from Havana, October 5. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850029–2386)
81. Presidential Directive/NSC–52

Washington, October 4, 1979

TO

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Commerce

ALSO

The Director, Office of Management and Budget
United States Representative to the United Nations
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director of Central Intelligence
Director, International Communication Agency
Administrator, International Development Cooperation Administration

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy to Cuba (U)

The President has directed the United States Government to continue to seek to contain Cuba as a source of violent revolutionary change. In addition, U.S. policy should be directed at accomplishing the following four specific objectives:

—To reduce and eventually remove Cuban military forces stationed abroad. (S)
—To undercut Cuba’s drive for Third World leadership. (S)
—To obtain Cuban restraint on the Puerto Rican issue. (S)
—To inhibit the Soviet build-up of Cuba’s armed forces. (S)

In pursuit of these objectives, the President has directed implementation of the following measures:

—With respect to the Caribbean and Central American region, the State Department should direct a strategy to engage like-minded Latin American governments in an effort to compete with the Cubans and increase the prospects for peaceful and democratic change. The Department of State should explore with governments in the region the possibility of increasing our presence in the area. On the military side, the Department of Defense should increase port visits and training in order to demonstrate our concern for the region and enhance the security of

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Subject, Box 59, NSC Policy Decisions by Country, Caribbean, 10/80. Secret; Sensitive.
the region. Also, the Administrator, International Development Coop-
eration Administration, should develop budgetary programs to pro-
vide greater amounts of economic and military assistance to govern-
ments in the region that respect human rights and democratic values,
and also resist Cuban influence. The Department of Defense should
reverse the decline of FMS credits allocated to Latin America. The FMS
budget allocated to Latin America should be increased in FY 81, perhaps
to 4–5 percent of the total FMS budget. (S)
—The Department of State, working in close coordination with the
National Security Council, Department of Defense and Director of
Central Intelligence, should share intelligence information on the Soviet
build-up in Cuba and on Cuban intelligence, political, and military
activities abroad with the nations of Western Europe, Canada, Japan
and with like-minded governments in the developing world. (With
Latin American governments, we should seek to raise their conscious-
ness of the Cuban problem as their problem—not just ours—in order
that they begin to seriously consider actions to curb Cuban adventur-
ism.) We should also hold periodic consultations with these govern-
ments about measures that might be taken individually or collectively
to counter expansionist actions by Cuba. The Department of State, in
close coordination with the Secretary of Defense, National Security
Council, Department of the Treasury and Department of Commerce,
should encourage these governments to adopt an approach, which
denies the Cubans the recognition they seek and raises the costs to the
Cubans of continued intervention abroad, including, but not limited
to the denial of credit. (S)
—The Department of State should consult with moderate members
of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and urge attention to issues
like human rights, arms restraint, non-intervention and foreign aid
which could lead to criticism of Cuban and Soviet activities. We should
continue to encourage the moderates in the NAM to resist strongly and
publicly efforts by the Cubans to use their 3-year NAM chairmanship
to impose pro-Soviet positions, of the kind reflected in the Cuban draft
declaration for the NAM Summit. (S)
—The Department of State should continue to press vigorously to
preclude Cuba from gaining a seat on the UN Security Council or from
hosting the next UNCTAD Summit. (S)
—The Department of State and appropriate agencies should con-
inue to make clear in discussions with officials from the government
of the U.S.S.R. the depth of our concern about Cuba’s activities in the
Caribbean and in Central America (as well as Africa) and inform them
of the costs to our relationship of continued Soviet support (or even
acquiescence) in Cuba’s activities. (S)
—The Department of State and appropriate agencies should under-
take periodic discussions with Cuban Americans, who return to Cuba
for visits in order to benefit from the insights gained during their visits and in order to encourage the spread of U.S. influence on the island. The Director, International Communication Agency, in coordination with the Department of State and the National Security Council, should increase the influence of U.S. culture on the Cuban people by promoting cultural tours and by permitting an arrangement to distribute U.S. films on the island. (S)

The timing and implementation of these measures should be carefully coordinated with appropriate departments and with the National Security Council. To do this, the Department of State should establish an interagency working group on Cuba chaired by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. This working group should transmit a report to the President each month on the status of implementing these and other measures to pursue the objectives described above.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

82. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, October 18, 1979, 1915Z

9316. Subj: (C) Cubans Complain of U.S. Violations of Hijacking Agreement.

1. (C—Entire text.)

2. Carlos Zamora, Acting Director North American Affairs, called USINT Chief to MINREX Oct 17. Zamora opened by stressing that on de facto basis Cuban side continued scrupulously to adhere to terms of Anti-Hijacking Agreement even though on de jure basis Cuba had allowed the agreement to lapse. One reason Cuba had done so, Zamora stated, was that U.S. side had in some cases not lived up to terms of agreement. Hijacking of boats was as serious as hijacking of planes, especially if it involved overpowering the crew, yet U.S. had never prosecuted or even charged Cubans thus arriving in U.S. for commission of an illegal act.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790478-0227. Confidential; Priority.

3. Zamora said GOC wished call USG’s attention to this in view of new spate of incidents. Not only was U.S. not prosecuting boat hijackers, but VOA and other official entities seemed to have embarked on propaganda campaign to stimulate hijackings. Zamora said that if it is necessary to enter U.S. by small boat, that may have to do with fact that U.S. is chary with its entry visas. Cuba has issued departure documents to hundreds of Cuban citizens who have then been refused entry by the U.S.

4. Comment: Complaint was made in rather pro forma fashion. Cubans are obviously uncomfortable over increase in number of people leaving country by small boat, but are probably more irritated over “officially-sponsored propaganda campaign” than over fact U.S. not prosecuting “hijackers.” Latter point, however, is one they may throw back at us in future air hijacking cases.

5. Last point raised by Zamora has some validity. USINT is and has been forced to turn away many Cubans who have departure documents and wish to emigrate to U.S. INS usually refuses to give humanitarian parole, so that unless Cubans have some preference under quota conferred by close family members or through some other means, or unless they qualify for parole under prisoner program, there is little we can do for them. Word has gotten around that this is case. It may indeed have contributed to increase in boat cases.

6. Given possibility of embarrassment to USG—e.g., if one contrasted restrictive measures we now apply to Cubans to President Johnson’s 1965 assurance that any Cuban who sought freedom in U.S. would find a welcome3—USINT would recommend that VOA and other government-associated media treat this issue with great deal of caution.

7. Action Requested: Stealing small boat to get out of Cuba is one thing. Overpowering crew or otherwise endangering lives in process is another (though difference may not be accepted on Flagler Street).4 Our attitude toward latter should be governed by our anti-terrorist objectives. Would appreciate if Dept could examine this problem and provide USINT some indication of USG thinking on subject.

Smith

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4 A street in Miami.
83. **Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section in Cuba to the Department of State**

Havana, November 18, 1979, 0235Z

10155. Subj: Castro Offers Good Offices. Ref: (A) Havana 10120 (B) State 299655.  

1. (S—Entire text.)  
2. Castro called me to his office tonight to say he has sent message to Iranian authorities as suggested by Jose Luis Padron (see Ref A) calling on them to release hostages and offering good offices as President NAM. He said he hoped release of women and black hostages was first step on Iranian side toward more rational position. Cuba wished to help defuse situation which had dangerous implications not only for Iran and US but for whole world. If his efforts in this matter are to have any chance of success they would have to be extended with utmost discretion. They should not rpt not become matter of public knowledge.  
3. I indicated appreciation for efforts to obtain release our hostages. I emphasized however that US would not be blackmailed. Taking of hostages was simply unacceptable and first step in defusing situation should be their release unharmed.  
4. Castro expressed full appreciation for US position. He urged that US continue to show prudence and patience under great pressure which had characterized its reaction for past two weeks. US prestige had gained by such coolness while Iran was now left virtually isolated. Thanks to US patience hostages were still alive and chances that Iranian authorities would listen to reason seemed to have increased. US should of course continue to show firmness of purpose but must be patient yet a bit longer. He had impression Iranian authorities might be looking for way out but would need time to get their people under control. He would use any influence he had with them to bring about release

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840131–1646. Secret; Cherokee; Niact Immediate; Nodis.  
2 In telegram 10120 from Havana, November 16, the Interests Section reported that Cuban officials condemned the Iranian decision to take Americans hostage as “irresponsible” and “uncivilized.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840131–1648) In telegram 299655 to all diplomatic posts, November 17, the Department announced that the Iranians had decided to release “women and black” hostages. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790529–1188) Iranian students seized more than 60 U.S. diplomats and citizens on November 4.
of hostages and defuse situation. He promised to inform me immediately of Iranian reaction to his message.³

Smith

³ In telegram 10338 from Havana, November 25, Smith reported that Cuban Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez received a reply from the Iranian Revolutionary Council declining Cuba’s offer of its good offices but suggesting that the Iranians might intend to use the Cubans as a channel to communicate with the United States. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840133–2368) In telegram 10388 from Havana, November 27, Smith stated that Rodriguez declared there was “little more Cuba could do,” but hinted that if the Cubans won a seat on the Security Council, they could be more active about the hostage situation in the United Nations. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840131–1637)

84. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, January 3, 1980

SUBJECT
Conversation with Castro—Your Request for my Comments (S)

Les² gave me a copy of the FBI report of the visit by a prominent Cuban-American to Havana in November 1979.³ I found the report quite useful and reasonably informative. It is clear that Castro and Padron are interested in using the Cuban-American community to learn as much as possible about the U.S. and the current thinking of the Administration, as well as of other presidential candidates. It is also clear that Castro has the ability to awe even his worst enemies. (S)

The “source” appears to be a reasonably good listener and reporter, although he also appears to have “ego” problems quite similar to that

² Presumably Les Denend.
³ Attached below.
of Benes. It is difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate an anonymous source after a single report. I have asked the FBI if they would disclose the identity of the source, and I will then try to determine, through my own sources, his credibility. If he is a perceptive and observant reporter, there is no reason why we should not use him in the same way that Castro uses him—to ask questions and extract information; and to convey a mood, which would be designed to keep Castro off balance and uncertain of our actions and intentions. On this point, I disagree with State, which apparently feels that it is better for us to convey our intentions and actions clearly to Castro in order to avoid misunderstandings. I believe that it would be better for us if Castro was uncertain about what we had in mind, and perhaps even a little fearful about what we might do. (S)

If the FBI has problems in disclosing the source to me, I will seek your assistance directly with the Director. Otherwise, I will check him out through friends in the community, and send you a more specific recommendation. (S)

Attachment

Report Prepared in the Federal Bureau of Investigation

Miami, November 30, 1979

RE

Foreign Political Matters—Cuba

The following information is classified secret in its entirety, except where marked “U” for unclassified.

The source of the following information has previously been in contact with this Bureau, but has furnished insufficient information as to judge reliability. The trip by the source to Cuba has been verified. (C)

Source attended the University of Havana from 1948 to 1955, and advised that he developed a close personal friendship with FIDEL CASTRO during and following their respective days at the University of Havana. Source, who describes himself as an active revolutionary from 1948 to 1961 when he fled to the United States, advised that he

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4 Bernardo Benes was a Cuban exile lawyer. A March 22, 1978, memorandum from Carlucci to Brzezinski discussed Benes’s February 16, 1978, meeting with Castro. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 10, Cuba, 2–4/78)

5 Secret.
and CASTRO followed different revolutionary and ideological paths, but acted in concert fighting first the PRIO Government and then the BATISTA regime. In 1949, Source claimed [1½ lines not declassified] CASTRO was to return to Cuba and launch his infamous attack on Moncada in 1953. Again CASTRO fled Cuba, this time to Mexico. Source married in December, 1955, went to Mexico on his honeymoon, and according to Source, [1½ lines not declassified] As the revolution intensified with CASTRO’s return to Cuba from Mexico in 1956, Source aligned himself with ELOY GUTIERREZ MENOYO, who commanded rebel forces called the Second National Front of the Escambray. In 1958, Source claimed he contacted the U.S. Embassy in Havana to warn the United States that CASTRO’s group was dominated by communists and to seek United States support for GUTIERREZ MENOYO’s group over CASTRO. When CASTRO seized power in 1959, Source, as did other factions, supported CASTRO’s revolution [1 line not declassified] As the CASTRO revolution became more and more communistic, Source began to oppose CASTRO and in September, 1960, he was removed [less than 1 line not declassified] for denouncing communism and the communists in CASTRO’s Government. Source went underground rejoining GUTIERREZ MENOYO’s group. Fearing arrest, Source, GUTIERREZ MENOYO, and 17 others fled Cuba and arrived in the United States on January 26, 1961.

On November 16, 1979, Source furnished the following information on a confidential basis and not to be disclosed outside official U.S. Government channels:

Travel to Cuba

Source travelled to Cuba during the period November 8–11, 1979, [1 line not declassified] It was his first visit to Cuba since 1961.

Source arrived in Havana on a chartered Lear jet at 9:00 AM, Thursday, November 8, 1979. He was met at the airport by CARLOS ALFONSO, the President of Havanatur, S.A. (the Cuban controlled Panamanian travel agency and the only agency authorized by the Cuban Government to operate Cuban exile tours from the United States to Cuba). ALFONSO took care of Source’s immigration and customs formalities. A driver and a late model Mercedes sedan were placed at his disposal.

Source was driven to and lodged in an area once known as the Country Club section of Havana where heads of state and delegates to the 1979 Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Summit Conference were lodged. Situated nearby was the pre-CASTRO Biltmore Country Club and the newly constructed palace where the NAM Summit was held.

At his quarters, Source was greeted by CASTRO aide (Colonel) JOSE LUIS PADRON, who asked Source who he would like to see.
Source asked to see only two persons, JOSE RAMON MACHADO VENTURA, and an old friend, ALFREDO GUEVARA VALDES.

MACHADO is a member of the Cuban Communist Party Politburo, Secretariat, and Central Committee. He is also a member of the Cuban Government’s Council of State. According to Source, MACHADO is the Chief Organizer/Administrator of the Party.

GUEVARA is reportedly a Vice Minister of the Ministry of Culture. According to Source, GUEVARA oversees Cuba’s film industry/institute and has recently been placed in charge of plans to preserve the section in Havana called Old Havana.

Source made one additional request to PADRON, and that was for a comprehensive listing of books published in Cuba from which list he would be permitted to buy what he wanted. (A listing was furnished to Source two days later and Source bought five books.)

For lunch that first day, PADRON told Source that (Brigadier General) JOSE ABRAHANTES (Vice Minister for Security) would like to have lunch with him. Source agreed and ABRAHANTES appeared within an hour. Source advised that he and ABRAHANTES [2 lines not declassified] They had a polite and social lunch. According to Source, ABRAHANTES made no attempt to interrogate him or to engage in a give-and-take discussion about the Cuban exile community in Miami, its leaders, or Source’s role and influence. Source surmised that ABRAHANTES chose not to discuss Cuban exile matters for professional reasons, i.e., to avoid the danger that a man in his position would probably give up more information than he could gain.

During his lunch with ABRAHANTES, ANTONIO (TONY) DE LA GUARDIA, an associate of JOSE LUIS PADRON, arrived. According to Source, PADRON and DE LA GUARDIA are well known up-and-coming members of the next generation of Cuban leaders. After lunch, DE LA GUARDIA took Source on a tour of the area and the former Biltmore Country Club where today Cuban athletes and gifted children are trained and educated.

At approximately 4:00 PM, that first day, JOSE RAMON MACHADO VENTURA, supra, arrived. Source advised that MACHADO had been a medical student at the University of Havana during the period circa 1952–1957. Despite widespread radical opposition to BATISTA by university students and repression of students by BATISTA at that time, MACHADO remained completely non-political. However, on March 13, 1957, according to Source, MACHADO did him a favor by taking in and treating a sick revolutionary friend of Source. This act and contact with two “revolutionaries” fighting the BATISTA regime politicized MACHADO and, despite his medical background, MACHADO joined the growing revolution against the BATISTA regime. Today, according to Source, MACHADO is the Chief
Administrator of the Communist Party of Cuba. Source characterized MACHADO as a hard working individual completely immersed in his work without conviction. In Source’s opinion, MACHADO does not have a drop of communism or Marxism in his blood. The reason for his position is that he is an excellent organizer, which was demonstrated when he was in charge of the reorganization of the medical and health system under CASTRO. It is Source’s overall opinion that the Cuban Government is Castroism and that Cuba’s communist political system is a sham.

At approximately 7:00 PM, that first day, his old friend, ALFREDO GUEVARA, supra, arrived and they reminisced about family and friends. Source advised that GUEVARA has no influence within CASTRO’s ruling circle.

On Friday, November 9, 1979, Source spent the day sightseeing and waiting for CASTRO’s call for their private meeting. That night he diplomatically informed JOSE LUIS PADRON that his meeting with CASTRO had to take place within the next 24 hours because he had to get back to Miami no later than Saturday night. PADRON called him late Friday night explaining that CASTRO was tied up in a meeting since 3:00 PM that day.

On Saturday, November 10, 1979, Source was informed by PADRON that CASTRO would see him at 1:00 PM that day, alone. At 1:00 PM sharp, ABRAHANTES arrived and said that CASTRO was waiting. ABRAHANTES drove Source to the palace. ABRAHANTES had a gun openly displayed in his car. His car was a simple Russian made Lada with no air conditioning. There were no bodyguards with or following ABRAHANTES. He drove no differently than the common driver in Havana. Judging from the people who recognized ABRAHANTES as he drove by, Source surmised that ABRAHANTES regularly drives himself about in the same car and without bodyguards.

At the palace, while exiting the elevator leading to CASTRO’s office, Source observed “PEPIN” NARANJO, who Source characterized as CASTRO’s Chief of Staff.

Four Hour Meeting With Castro

CASTRO was standing away from his desk when Source was ushered in. He politely greeted Source and led him to two chairs situated away from CASTRO’s presidential desk which Source interpreted as a signal that their meeting was to be informal. The only other person in the room was ABRAHANTES, who had pulled up a chair at a discreet distance, but within earshot of the ensuing conversation.

CASTRO began by asking Source about his well being and his family.

CASTRO was keenly interested in the 1980 presidential election in the United States, solicited Source’s views on the CARTER versus
KENNEDY battle, and asked if in the final analysis President CARTER would be reelected. CASTRO solicited Source’s views on KENNEDY’s position on various political and economic matters and was most inquisitive about details concerning KENNEDY’s Chappaquiddick incident. On the other hand, CASTRO asked Source about the possibility of a Republican Party candidate winning the election.

CASTRO was very inquisitive about Source’s business, personal income, and the United States income tax system. At CASTRO’s prodding, Source explained in detail to CASTRO the United States tax system, both business and personal. CASTRO acted surprised that Source paid $40,000 in personal income taxes on a personal gross income of $100,000. Source pointed out to CASTRO that because of his background and notoriety, he paid his personal taxes above board to avoid any problems with the U.S. Government. CASTRO contrasted the same $100,000 gross personal income against most European tax systems indicating that although a tax of $40,000 on $100,000 was very high in his opinion, it was not nearly as high as it would be in most European countries.

On the Soviet troop issue, CASTRO told Source that Soviet troops had been dispatched to Cuba during the 1962 missile crisis and that he had asked the Soviets to keep the troops in Cuba as a guarantee that the United States would not invade Cuba. CASTRO told Source that since 1962, there has been no substantial change in the composition or mission of the Soviet troop detachment in Cuba. CASTRO stressed that the Soviet troops in Cuba are under the complete control of the Cuban Government and that they can do nothing without the consent of the Cuban Government.

CASTRO told Source that he believes that there are people in the U.S. Government who are stumbling blocks to the lifting of the trade embargo and to normalization of relations. CASTRO cited national security adviser ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI as the principal stumbling block.

CASTRO told Source that the United States charge that the Cuban Government had trained and directed the invasion of Shaba Province (in southern Zaire by Katangan rebels based in Angola during May, 1978) was not true. CASTRO told Source that he had dispatched a private message to President CARTER in advance of the invasion telling President CARTER that the invasion was imminent.

CASTRO told Source that he personally urged Panama’s OMAR TORRIJOS to sign the Panama Canal Treaty as written.

CASTRO told Source that Cuba supported and assisted the Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua. On the other hand, CASTRO claimed that Cuba was/is responsible for influencing the Sandinista ruling junta to “moderate” the revolution, i.e. setting a moderate course in carrying
out the final stages of the revolution and in implementing the policies of the new (Sandinista) Nicaraguan Revolutionary Government. CASTRO told Source that had he wanted to, he could have really “screwed up” the Nicaraguan situation in terms of violence before and after the downfall of the Somoza Government (and perhaps with respect to the membership and policies of the ruling Sandinista junta that emerged following Somoza’s downfall).

CASTRO asked Source how much he paid for electricity in the United States and asked questions in general about the growing cost of electricity in the United States. CASTRO told Source that Cuba was building a nuclear power station and that in his opinion, nuclear energy was the only foreseeable solution to the world’s energy problem. CASTRO acted dumbfounded at the growing anti-nuclear movement in the United States and asked Source how the United States was going to solve the problem of nuclear energy vis-a-vis the anti-nuclear movement.

CASTRO did not discuss the origins of his African policies, but did point out to Source, particularly with respect to Angola, that Cuban troops and technicians would remain in Angola and that he would not pull them out without the concurrence of the Angolan Government. CASTRO maintained that Angola cannot function without Cuban assistance to the point that the Cubans have to drive buses in Angola because the Angolans cannot manage that simple mechanical task themselves. CASTRO indicated that Cuba is striving to make Angola self-supporting, a policy somewhat akin to the goals of the American Vietnamization Program in Vietnam. African students on the Isle of Pines in Cuba are there with this objective in mind—to educate and train them to achieve a self-supporting home country.

Concerning the political prisoner release program, CASTRO told Source that all political prisoners that are to be released under the announced program have been released (3,600 according to published figures in the news media). CASTRO indicated that the political prisoner release program was announced and completed without a response by/from the U.S. Government. CASTRO told Source that (because of a lack of response from the United States) the remaining political prisoners will not be released for they now represent “cards” for future negotiations with the United States.

On the subject of the recently concluded 6th Non-Aligned Summit Conference in Cuba and CASTRO’s assumed leadership of the NAM during the next three years, CASTRO and Source both agreed that despite views to the contrary, CASTRO and Cuba have less flexibility in carrying out Cuban policies abroad because CASTRO now has the added burden of “consulting” with member NAM Governments.
Observations

According to Source, at no time before or while in Cuba was he told by CASTRO or his aides why CASTRO wanted to see him. In Source’s opinion, this is another trial balloon launched by CASTRO to open a sincere channel of communication between Cuba and the U.S. Government. Source surmises that others, particularly Miami banker [Omission is in the original], have failed to establish a meaningful third party dialogue between Cuba and the United States, i.e. that [Omission is in the original] is perhaps misunderstood or viewed with skepticism by U.S. Government officials with whom [Omission is in the original] discusses his meetings with CASTRO. Source believes that he is one of a select few who knows and understands CASTRO and more importantly that he is a person who cannot be manipulated or fooled by CASTRO and CASTRO knows this. Source therefore believes that he can more adequately explain and interpret the substances and nuances of CASTRO’s conversations, his views, and policies.

In a discussion regarding CASTRO’s past and future intentions in Central and South America, Source retorted that according to his sources, Mexico, with its newly discovered energy resources, has laid claim to Central and South America as its sole sphere of influence. Source’s sources informed him that CASTRO’s recent meeting with the President of Mexico was called for by the President of Mexico for that very reason—to put CASTRO on notice that Central and South America were Mexico’s exclusive sphere of influence and that CASTRO was to limit his sphere of influence to the Caribbean.

Source advised that CASTRO appeared to be physically well, however, his skin appeared to be unusually pale in color despite CASTRO’s claim that he regularly jogs and swims to keep fit. CASTRO indicated that at age 53, he intends to slow down (he did not indicate under doctor’s orders) and conduct matters of state in a more tranquil manner. The subject of tranquillity surfaced during their discussion of the upcoming 1980 presidential election in the United States. Source pointed out and cautioned CASTRO that Cuba was likely to be a campaign issue and that CASTRO should understand American politics and not be drawn into responding to the Cuban issue each and every time the issue was raised; to do so would be foolhardy and never ending. Among CASTRO’s parting comments to Source was that he was going to follow his advice and be “tranquilo” towards any campaign rhetoric about Cuba.

The information furnished by our Source is sensitive and singular in nature. No dissemination may be made outside of your headquarters without the prior concurrence of this Bureau.
85. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter

Washington, January 15, 1980

SUBJECT
Mission to Cuba

As per their discussion with you, Tarnoff and Pastor will travel to Havana on Wednesday and Thursday for talks with Castro in response to his personal request. The central purposes of the journey are to listen; to ask questions designed to better understand his views on a range of different issues, including Afghanistan and Iran; to convey our great concern about Cuban subversion in Central America and the Caribbean, troops in Africa, support of extremist groups in Puerto Rico; and to suggest that we are prepared to consider a new relationship if he is prepared to move toward meeting our concerns. In addition, they will convey your comments and personal concerns about the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan.

US Objectives

Although the objectives below will probably be impossible to achieve at this meeting, Tarnoff/Pastor should try to obtain the following:

1. Afghanistan. To explore his views of the invasion and to try to detect whether there is any change in Castro’s perception of Cuba’s relations with the USSR. To point out to Castro that Cuba’s statements in support of the Soviet invasion would make progress toward normalization of relations with the US politically difficult for us.

2. Iran. To ask Castro to press publicly and privately for the unconditional release of the hostages and to use his influence with the Soviets to try to get them to modify their position on sanctions against Iran.

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 60, Alpha Channel—Cuba, 7/79-9/80. Secret; Sensitive. A handwritten notation by Carter at the top of the page reads, “Zbig, give cc Bob & Mike.”

2 Pastor and Tarnoff visited Cuba from January 16 to January 17.

3 Carter underlined this sentence beginning with “convey” to this point and wrote “emphasize” in the margin.


5 In this paragraph, Carter underlined “privately” and wrote in the margin, “privately may help.” He also underlined from “use his influence” to the end and wrote in the margin, “fruitless—no.”
3. Central America and the Caribbean. To seek the cessation of: (a) Cuban support (arms, aid, political direction) for groups which are intent on overthrowing or subverting the established governments in the region (particularly El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala); (b) Cuban encouragement of the use of political violence and intimidation to undercut or suppress democratic institutions (particularly in Jamaica and Grenada); (c) Cuban assistance in building up the Grenadan armed forces to a point clearly in excess of the island’s legitimate security needs and to the point where it constitutes a threat to neighboring islands; and (d) Cuban facilitation of contacts between extremist groups from different countries (and government officials from Nicaragua and Grenada). In discussing Central America and the Caribbean, we should convey our deep concern that Cuba’s support for guerrilla groups could put us on a collision course with serious consequences that we would prefer to avoid.

4. Puerto Rico. To cease the support of extremist groups that practice or have committed acts of violence in Puerto Rico; to adopt a more moderate course on Puerto Rico in the UN, respecting the right of the people of Puerto Rico to determine their future.6

5. Cuban Combat Troops Abroad. To seek the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and Ethiopia and to seek a commitment against introducing or expanding their presence elsewhere (e.g., Yemen, Afghanistan). To suggest that Cuba’s continued military presence in Ethiopia may be a factor leading Somalia toward a closer relationship with the US and a factor leading us to be more receptive to Somalia’s defense needs.7 In addition, with respect to Angola to suggest that the Cubans may want to use their influence to urge the MPLA to pursue an accommodation with UNITA.

6. Soviet Brigade in Cuba. To question the continued need for a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba and to explore whether the Cubans could under certain circumstances request its withdrawal.8

Cuban Objectives—US Response

The principal objective of the mission is to listen to Castro and report back. However, if there is any significant movement on the part of the Cubans toward US objectives, or if Castro asks what the US would be prepared to do in response, Tarnoff/Pastor will indicate a general willingness on our part of the US to make some movement on the issue of greatest concern to Cuba (e.g., embargo), without indicating

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6 Carter underlined this sentence beginning with “respecting.”
7 Carter underlined and highlighted this sentence and wrote in the margin, “may be counterproductive.”
8 Carter bracketed and crossed out the phrase, “under certain circumstances.”
what we would do precisely. (Our preference would be to disaggregate,
to take small steps, like trade on films, medicines, etc., before lifting
the overall embargo.)

Given the serious internal problems in Cuba, it is conceivable that
Castro may ask us to accept another 10–20,000 ex-political prisoners.
If he does so, Tarnoff/Pastor would refer the issue to Washington
but indicate reservations to Castro given the numbers of Indochinese
refugees that the US is now admitting in the wake of the Vietnamese
occupation of Kampuchea and repressive internal policies in Vietnam.9

Attachment

Paper Prepared by the Executive Secretary of the Department
of State (Tarnoff)10

OUTLINE

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

After receiving word of the invitation for me and others to come
to Havana, the issue was immediately reviewed at the highest levels
of the USG. On Thursday afternoon, Bob and I met with President
Carter who decided that we should go to Havana. The President asked
me to tell you the following:11

—The President considers the opportunity for us to have this meet-
ing an important one. He received Bob and me to underline his personal
interest in this meeting, and to give us our instructions. President Carter
also told us that he will listen to our report of this conversation with
interest after our return to Washington.

—The President has from the beginning of his term been favorable
to an improvement of relations between the US and Cuba. The President
wants our nations to live in peace together, and he would like to be
able to lift the embargo, allowing trade and tourism and other contacts
to develop normally between our countries.

—The President is interested primarily in receiving a report of
your views on the important and critical international issues that affect

9 Carter wrote in the margin by this paragraph, “oppose more firmly.”
10 Secret; Sensitive. The paper is apparently talking points for Tarnoff and Pastor’s
meeting with Castro.
11 Carter wrote in the margin by this paragraph, “this exceeds my level of interest.”
both of our countries. He stressed to me that we should go to Havana with neither threats nor inducements. Mainly to listen.

—The President is very preoccupied with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which he regards as a threat to international peace. The US and most of the international community regard this violation of the sovereignty of a nation member of the Non-Aligned Movement as abhorrent. The US has no problems with the notion of Cuba being truly non-aligned and neutral, but the closeness of Cuban and Soviet positions on virtually all major international issues has been of concern to us. Speaking with our usual frankness, this closeness seems to have been a factor in the erosion of non-aligned support for Cuba’s bid for a UN Security Council seat in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.12

—In an area where Cuba is directly involved, Central America and the Caribbean, we are deeply concerned about Cuban efforts to assist groups working to overthrow established governments by force or undermine democratic institutions.

On the subjects that we have proposed to discuss, Afghanistan and then Iran are our major concerns. However, we would also be most interested in your views on developments in areas that we have talked about before: Africa and Puerto Rico. We would also be prepared to discuss issues such as the Soviet brigade in Cuba and the positions adopted by Cuba at the NAM summit in Havana last summer.

ASIDE

President Carter also wanted President Castro to understand the depth of feeling that exists in the US and the tenacity of sentiment on the Soviet invasion issue. We will have to consider seriously withdrawing from the Olympics, as well as other actions, if in coming weeks the Soviet troops continue to occupy Afghanistan.13

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12 Mexico was elected to the Security Council. See Document 169.
13 Carter wrote below this sentence, “Would Cuba support move of Olympics?”
86. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) and Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to President Carter\(^1\)

Washington, undated

**SUBJECT**

Discussions with Fidel Castro, January 16–17, 1980 (S)

**Atmosphere**

We met with Castro and Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez for eleven hours (4:00 pm–3:00 a.m.) with only one break for ten minutes. The discussion was wide-ranging, largely following our agenda of concerns; the exchange was candid but cordial, contrasting sharply with the more confrontational meeting of a year before.\(^2\) The discussion focused on international as opposed to bilateral issues, unlike the meeting a year ago where he vented his rage on the embargo and other alleged US crimes against Cuba. (S)

However, Castro clearly indicated his interest in continuing our contacts and also in normalizing relations, although he realizes there is no prospect of this soon. He believes progress is only possible in a climate of improving relations between the US and USSR, and is deeply preoccupied over the rapid and significant deterioration in relations between the two superpowers. (S)

**Afghanistan**

We probed very deeply on this issue in an effort to detect any potential differences between Cuba and the Soviet Union; we also pressed him hard for a statement condemning the Soviet intervention. Castro was extremely honest and frank in stating his embarrassment with the Soviet involvement and his displeasure with the failure of the Soviets to brief him on their views. He blamed Cuba’s inability to secure a Security Council seat on the Soviet action in Afghanistan, as well as on our strong lobbying effort before that, and he did not hide his great disappointment. (S)

Castro said that Cuba was prepared to support a resolution, being prepared by a Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) caucus, which restated the NAM’s support for non-intervention and condemned violations of

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\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 15, Cuba, 1/1–15/80. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent through Vance and Brzezinski. At the top of the page, Carter wrote, “Extraordinarily frank & helpful—J”

\(^2\) See Document 41.
it, but when it was transformed into a pro-US, anti-Soviet, east-west resolution, he decided to oppose it. After we pressed him for an explanation of his Ambassador’s speech at the UN, he admitted it was anti-US, but he also pointed out that it was deliberately not pro-Soviet, and it did not endorse Soviet intervention. (He also said that he personally revised the speech to remove all personal criticism of you.) (S)

We pressed him very hard to issue a statement condemning the intervention, and he openly agonized over the dilemma and the contradictions of being a revolutionary, a socialist, a non-aligned leader, and a friend of the USSR. It was clear that he felt the weight of the USSR, saying “they would have real problems” with that. He tried several times to wiggle out of his dilemma by criticizing us, the French, the Chinese and others for inconsistencies regarding the issue of non-intervention. (“If there are contradictions in our position, there are also many in yours.”) (S)

We explained your recent actions and the depth of your concern about the invasion. In the end, he said that he would immediately take the initiative to meet with the Soviets and convey his view of the profound and dangerous impact their actions were having on international relations; he would “analyze” the question of whether to speak out; he would, however, not participate in any boycott or anything that would, in his eyes, “sabotage” the Olympics. He also said that he thought that your decision not to sell more food to the Soviets would “really hurt” them and others, including Cuba (since the Soviets transship some of that grain to Cuba). (S)

He cautioned us, however, to be careful about not giving the Russians a feeling they are being cornered. (S)

Cuba-US-USSR Relations

As we probed to detect differences between Cuba and the Soviet Union, Castro interrupted to address our implicit question of Afghanistan’s significance for US-Cuban relations. He said, “We will not betray the USSR; we are not opportunists, nor would you want to be our friend if we were.” He said that the Cuban revolution “would have perished without the support of the Soviet Union, and we will not forget that.” With regard to the question whether the Cubans would

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3 In telegram 159 from USUN, January 15, the Mission reported that Cuban Ambassador Raul Roa gave a speech before the United Nations General Assembly that attacked the United States for its policy toward the Middle East, accused American leaders of publicly condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan for the sake of public opinion, and stressed that the United States had intervened in many nations in the past. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800025–0047)

4 On January 4, President Carter announced a grain embargo against the Soviet Union. (Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81, Book I, pp. 21–24)
contemplate asking the Soviet brigade to leave, he said that it is sym-
monic of the Soviets’ readiness to stand with Cuba, if necessary, and he
appreciated that the Soviets did not succumb to US pressure seeking
its withdrawal. He expressed the belief that normalization of relations
between the US and Cuba could only occur in a period of detente
between the US and USSR, not in a period like the present, of rising
tensions. Therefore, he wanted to work to relax tensions, and he was
extremely concerned with a line in your speech after Vienna on June
18, 1979 (the date was vivid on his mind) where you said that you told
the Soviets of your concern with Cuban activities in Central America
and the Caribbean.5 Surprisingly, it was not the “surrogate” dimension
of that statement which bothered Castro but rather the suggestion that
it was Cuba which was interfering with detente. He sees Cuba as the
victim of our rivalry with the Soviets rather than as a contributing
factor. (S)

We were also somewhat surprised by how small Castro saw Cuba’s
role in the world (emphasized perhaps because of Iran and Afghan-
istan) and how much he felt that the US was successful in isolating
and hurting Cuba. (On reflection, we believe both the US and Cuba
consistently under-estimate our ability to influence the other and over-
estimate the other’s ability to influence international events.) (S)

Iran

Castro was totally sympathetic to the problem, but he opposes
sanctions for two reasons: (1) he thinks it will solidify the resistance
in Iran; and (2) he opposes an embargo as unjust (whether against Iran
or Cuba). We may have convinced him of our view that sanctions
would generate opposition in Iran to the captors, and we weren’t
talking about a complete embargo. Castro was extraordinarily inter-
ested in the details of the problem, and in the end, he promised to
devote himself immediately to try to get the Iranians to accept Red
Cross visits of all the prisoners and also to seek their release. (S)

Central America and the Caribbean

We described in some detail the nature of our concerns in the
region, and after disabusing him of the notion that the US was opposed
to all change, we asked him whether he could support the reformist
government in El Salvador and whether he would cease his support for
those who pursue a violent path in Central America and the Caribbean.
Though bothered by the directness of the questions, Castro said he
would not lie, but he also would not answer all the questions; he

provided us the fullest exposition of Cuba’s policies we have ever obtained. (S)

He said he treats Central American governments differently from those in the Caribbean because the former have pursued a hostile policy toward Cuba, participating in numerous interventions in Cuba (mainly Bay of Pigs) while the latter contain many new nations willing to deal with Cuba on the basis of mutual respect. Therefore, he has not and will not give weapons to revolutionary groups in the Caribbean, or encourage violent change, although he will maintain contact with them; by implication, he suggested he would not deny himself doing that with Central American groups. (S)

In Grenada, Castro admitted he turned down a request for arms from Bishop both before the coup and after, but Cuba did respond within moments of the coup to Bishop’s request for civilian assistance. He claims there are only six Cuban military instructors there. He said that to his knowledge Grenada had nothing to do with the Union Island incident, and he invited us to join Cuba (as we are doing in Nicaragua) to assist in the economic development of Grenada. (S)

He said that he wanted to “wait-and-see” before deciding on his response to the new Salvadorean government. He admitted that Cuba follows the principle of encouraging “revolutionary” (he refused to refer to them as “terrorists” or “guerrillas”) groups to unite, as they are doing in El Salvador and Guatemala. We stressed our great concern that we could be on a “collision course” in Central America and the Caribbean if Cuba continues to support groups seeking a violent path. Castro responded that Cuba is not interested in creating conflicts with the US. (S)

He said that the real problems in the area were poverty and the price of petroleum and that Cuba does not have the resources to compete with the US in addressing these problems. He also said that revolutionary groups do not remain in open societies, like Costa Rica or Panama, which permit the free expression of views. He said that the worst violence in Central America is not perpetrated by idealistic youth but by the armies and the oligarchy. (S)

In summary, we clearly put Castro on notice that we are deeply concerned about developments in the Caribbean and Central America. We urged him to support moderate, rather than violent, change, and suggested that the support for violent groups could lead to serious problems. (S)

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6 See footnote 3, Document 373.
Puerto Rico

At our request, Castro said that Cuba would consider publicly acknowledging your July 25, 1978 declaration on self-determination for Puerto Rico. He also said categorically that he would not encourage or support terrorism or give any weapons to groups in Puerto Rico, and he will consider whether he will make a statement condemning “acts of violence” by Puerto Rican groups. However, in his view, the prospect of statehood for Puerto Rico “offends the sensibilities of all Latin Americans,” and if this were a real possibility, he would support the status quo. (S)

Africa

We pressed him to withdraw Cuban troops from Angola and Ethiopia, and he expressed interest in doing that, but said, “it is easier to go in than get out.” He said that Cuba has reduced its forces by 30 percent in Ethiopia, has avoided any involvement in Eritrea, and is pressing the Ethiopians to bring the rest home. But while the Ethiopian government has made progress in consolidating its hold, they still want the Cubans to stay a little longer because of the struggle in the North and the unpredictability of Siad Barre. Similarly, Angola has asked the Cubans to stay because of South African threats. However, the Cubans are not fighting UNITA anymore and are, according to Castro, very careful about not interfering in Angola’s affairs. Therefore, Cuba would not even promote a settlement between the MPLA and UNITA, nor would they object to it. He said that if Namibia were settled, Cuba could probably reduce its troop levels rapidly. *We strongly encouraged Castro to make his own decision to withdraw troops.* (S)

Political Prisoners

In response to Castro’s concern about more ex-political prisoners above the 3500 level, we explained that as a result of the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea, the global situation on refugees probably prevented receiving any further refugees from Cuba. He said that if this were the case, it was important for the US not to provide encouragement to Cubans to flee illegally to Florida by giving so much publicity to their arrival. We said that the US could not return these individuals to Cuba for historical reasons. (S)

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Non-Aligned Movement

We criticized Cuba for attempting to steer the NAM toward an anti-US position, and explained that many of his international setbacks since then could be attributed to this effort. He said that he wanted to get the NAM to play a new and different role to foster economic cooperation and development along the lines of his October 12th speech. He said that he considered the positive participation of the West essential to that effort. We told him that he would have to dramatically change his approach—style and policies—if he hoped to create the political climate which would permit the kind of cooperation he envisaged. (S)

Conclusions and Recommendations

We believe the US should not underestimate the importance of communicating our perspective and concerns directly to Castro, and in using the opportunity to learn more about what motivates him. We now have a lot better idea of what will work and what won’t. For example, the idea of making a separate deal with the Cubans behind the back of the Soviets is out of the question. We now know, by Castro’s own admission, that the embargo hurts Cuba as does international isolation, and they really want us to change those policies. On the other hand, they will not significantly modify their foreign policies to achieve that goal, although they might do so if we can persuade them it is in their interests (unrelated to embargo). We think further contacts at periodic intervals would be helpful, and would recommend inviting Padron here to talk with Secretary Vance and Dr. Brzezinski. (S)

If the Cubans follow through as promised on Afghanistan and Iran, we should respond with a small step like approving the license for COMSAT or permitting RCA to improve their undersea cable. (S)

Castro expressed great concern about your State of the Union Address and the hope that it would not increase world tensions. If Cuba is not mentioned in the address, we should convey that point to the Cubans before the speech; it would be a small but welcome gesture. (S)

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8 See footnote 3, Document 80.

9 President Carter’s January 23 State of the Union speech did not mention Cuba directly, only making a passing reference to the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. (Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81, Book I, pp. 195–196) According to a January 24 memorandum from Tarnoff to Vance, Carter omitted Cuba intentionally, following the Tarnoff/Pastor negotiations with Castro. (Department of State: Records of Cyrus Vance, 1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 3, Jan/Feb/Mar 1980, Presidential Breakfasts) President Carter initially made Castro’s COMSAT request conditional on his help with issues concerning Afghanistan and Iran, but changed his mind; the request was granted in June 1980. (Memorandum from Tarnoff to Vance, January 31; ibid.)
87. Memorandum of Conversation of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting

Washington, February 28, 1980, 5:35–5:50 p.m.

SUBJECT
Soviet Brigade Exercise in Cuba (S)

PARTICIPANTS

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<td>Secretary Cyrus Vance</td>
<td>Bruce Clarke, Director, NFAC</td>
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<td>Warren Christopher</td>
<td>White House</td>
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<td>Deputy Secretary of State</td>
<td>Lloyd Cutler, Counsel to the President</td>
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<td>Secretary Harold Brown</td>
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Zbigniew Brzezinski: The next question on the agenda is the exercise which the Soviet Cuban brigade is now carrying out. Our problem is how do we handle this.

Secretary Brown: It is not fundamentally different from what they did before.

ZB: However, we expected them not to do it.

HB: But the public did not expect to see any difference.

ZB: Is this consistent with the conversations which we had with the Soviets on the subject?2

HB: We did not like what the Soviets were doing before and we do not like this.

Lloyd Cutler: We have to keep in mind that the Church reservation3 is now on the record and that it complicates the President’s decision.

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, 1977–1981, Box 100, SCC 282a, Soviets Brigade in Cuba, 2/28/80. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.


3 On October 11, 1979, in a speech on the Senate floor, Church proposed that Senate approval of the SALT II Treaty be conditional on an affirmation by the President that “Soviet military forces in Cuba are not engaged in a combat role.” (Robert G. Kaiser, “Church Details Conditions for SALT Approval,” The Washington Post, October 12, p. A2)
ZB: CIA should bring us up to date on what we have.

Bruce Clarke: [11 lines not declassified]

ZB: How often have such exercises taken place in the past?

BC: About semi-annually.

ZB: Is this normal training or are the Soviets perhaps sending us a signal?

Secretary Vance: I think that may well be what they are doing.

LC: In the various consultations we had with the Soviets about this we certainly gave Anatoly the word not to hold such exercises.

BC: We flew an SR–71 mission two weeks ago [1 line not declassified] We also have an SR–71 on standby. [1½ lines not declassified] You should all be aware that in connection with the Jack Anderson article of Tuesday, a man from our staff met with Senator Percy, Bader, and Rick Inderfurth and gave essentially the same commentary that Hodding Carter made the day before. We left the group with an impression and this will have to be corrected.

David Aaron: The first operational question is how we handle this as an intelligence matter. Then we have to deal with Congressional and public aspects.

ZB: How long do we have before we must be ready to make a public statement?

CV: Not more than 24 hours. Some time tomorrow we have to decide what to say publicly about this.

ZB: David should hold a meeting with State and with others to draft Q’s and A’s and to make recommendations on how we deal with the subject.

DA: One thing the President raised previously on SR–71 flights is the question of why we should not cross the island, instead of flying up and down alongside it, thereby minimizing its exposure. DOD should consider this suggestion and come up with a reply. Any public statement should be drafted with Lloyd Cutler’s observation about the Church reservation very much in mind.

LC: What will we say to the Soviets about this?

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5 Hodding Carter’s statements are in telegram 53150 to Moscow, February 28. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800103–0303)

ZB: We have to review what has happened in light of previous assurances.
CV: Nothing has changed.
ZB: You dealt with this matter at a press conference.
CV: What I said at the press conference was that the facts were not discouraging.\(^7\)

LC: Our biggest problem will be whether this is a combat unit engaging in a combat exercise.
ZB: The reporters are certainly going to bore in on that question.
CV: From the State Department, Hodding Carter and Reggie should participate in the group.
DA: We will meet early tomorrow on this.\(^8\)

\(^7\) See footnote 4, Document 68.
\(^8\) No record of this meeting has been found.

88. Briefing Memorandum From the Department of State Legal Adviser (Owen) to Secretary of State Vance\(^1\)

Washington, March 24, 1980

Cuba: Maritime Hijackings

This is in response to your request\(^2\) for an update on the status of our efforts to deter additional maritime hijackings from Cuba by prosecuting offenders who reach the U.S.

We have raised with Phil Heymann of the Criminal Division the policy concerns which are posed by our failure to prosecute Cuban maritime hijackers. I have also informed him of the President’s interest in the matter. He asked that we state our concerns in writing as a prerequisite to conducting a review of the various legal and policy problems involved in prosecuting cases of this nature. I have accord-

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800057-0764. Confidential. Drafted by Kozak; cleared by Feldman and Frechette. A stamped “CV” indicates Vance saw the memorandum.
\(^2\) Not found.
ingly transmitted the attached letter.\(^3\) We will press for an early meeting to identify the present obstacles to prosecution and alternative means of resolving them.

In addition to these efforts to develop a workable approach to the overall problem, we have continued to express to Justice our interest in the status of the most recent hijacking case which occurred February 24.\(^4\) We are told that after a very brief initial investigation of this case, the hijackers were released into the community by the federal authorities in Miami. Thereafter, Justice learned that the case may have involved an attempted murder,\(^5\) and at the beginning of March asked the U.S. Attorney’s office in Miami to request further investigation by the FBI. In mid-March we learned that the FBI in Miami was unaware of this request, and brought this to Justice’s attention. Justice has now informed us that they are sending a memorandum to FBI headquarters here ordering a thorough investigation and specifying the areas to be looked into. They anticipate the results of this investigation in two to three weeks.

In connection with this case, Justice has also begun research on several legal questions which will be relevant to the development of an overall policy in this area. Included is the problem of establishing U.S. jurisdiction on the basis of transportation in interstate or foreign commerce where the hijacked vessel is towed into U.S. waters by the Coast Guard rather than entering under the control of the hijackers. Also being addressed is the possibility of establishing venue outside of Miami (e.g., in Washington). This is a highly important issue because Justice regards the Miami environment as not conducive to successful prosecutions. (Miami juries can be expected to contain a high percentage of Cuban refugees who would be sympathetic to these hijackers.) Moreover, the threat of violence from extremist groups is such that extensive security measures would be required. Justice expects to have completed this research in 2–3 weeks.

We have considered the timing of a public statement designed to deter hijackings. We believe that to be most effective, such a statement should be coupled with concrete action (e.g., the initiation of a prosecution in the most recent case). However, if it is now impracticable

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\(^3\) In the attached letter to Heymann, March 24, Owens expressed the Department’s concern about armed hijackers from Cuba seeking asylum in the United States. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800057–0766)

\(^4\) In telegram 50655 to Havana, February 25, the Department reported that a Cuban fishing vessel was commandeered by hijackers and used to transport refugees to Florida. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800098–0558)

\(^5\) Justice has reason to believe that one of the hijackers discharged a pistol aimed at the master of the hijacked vessel; fortunately the gun was defective and exploded in the hijacker’s hand. [Footnote is in the original.]
to prosecute for past violations, a carefully worded statement of intention to prosecute future cases could be helpful if we are prepared to follow through.

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89. Summary of Conclusions of a Mini-Special Coordination Committee Meeting

Washington, April 9, 1980, 8:35–10:00 a.m.

SUBJECT
Cuban Refugees in the Peruvian Embassy (S)

PARTICIPANTS

\textit{State}
Amb. William Bowdler
Amb. Frank Loy
Miles Frechette

\textit{OSD}
Frank Kramer
Gordon Schuller

\textit{Justice}
David Crosland

\textit{OMB}
John White
James Barie

\textit{JCS}
LGEN J.S. Pustay
LTC Edward Cummings

\textit{DCI}
Jack Davis

[\textit{name not declassified}]

\textit{White House}
David Aaron
Robert Maddox
Phil Wise
Gilbert Colon
Tom Laney

\textit{NSC}
Robert Pastor
Lincoln Bloomfield

\textbf{SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS}

\textit{At the Peruvian Embassy}. 3,000–11,000 Cubans are crowded on the Peruvian Embassy grounds in Havana, and despite some Cuban provisions for food, water, and medicine, the sanitary conditions are growing

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\footnote{Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 9, Cuba, 12/79–4/80. Secret. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. A discussion paper for the meeting is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 17, Refugees, 4/1–12/80.}
more and more serious.\textsuperscript{2} The Cuban security officials have said they would permit people to go back and forth, but most people fear arrest and are not moving. All the Peruvian Embassy officials have left Cuba. Peru has spoken to the International Committee of the Red Cross, which in turn has spoken with the Cuban government. The Cubans said they do not need any help at this time. The UN Human Rights Commission has said that it is difficult for them to act while the Cubans are still in Havana, but it would help once they left. ICEM could also be helpful in transporting the Cubans out. Costa Rica wanted to raise the issue in the OAS, but Peru asked them to hold off. Chile might also take some refugees. The Andean Foreign Ministers are meeting in Lima today to discuss the problem. (S)

\textsuperscript{2} According to Smith's memoirs, on April 1, a busload of Cubans wishing to exit the country entered the Peruvian Embassy, where they received asylum. In response, Castro removed the Embassy's Cuban guards, thus allowing all Cubans wishing to live elsewhere to seek asylum at the Embassy. Approximately 10,800 Cubans decided to leave. (Smith, \textit{The Closest of Enemies}, pp. 209–210) Cuban officials announced on April 5 that the Cubans who had sought asylum in the Peruvian Embassy could leave the country. ("Cuba to Allow Exodus of 1,500 in Asylum At Peruvian Embassy," \textit{The Washington Post}, April 6, p. A18)
90. Memorandum From the Assistant National Intelligence Officer for Latin America (name not declassified) to Director of Central Intelligence Turner, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Carlucci), the Director of the National Foreign Assessment Center (Clarke), and the Deputy Director for Operations (McMahon)

Washington, April 11, 1980

SUBJECT
Mini-SCC Meeting on Cuban-Peruvian Situation, 11 April 1980

1. David Aaron of the White House chaired the meeting. There were participants from State, NSC, JCS, ICA, ISA, as well as A/NIO/LA and [less than 1 line not declassified] for CIA.

2. There was no charge to CIA as a result of the session.

3. Aaron said that the President had decided the US should announce its willingness to accept up to 3,500 of the roughly 11,000 Cuban asylum seekers in the Peruvian Embassy in Havana. The White House had already canvassed key Congressmen on the issue and had found substantial support for such a policy.

4. There was general consensus that the President’s policy should be made public as soon as possible. This would not only demonstrate the degree of US concern but would place early pressure on other governments to make good on offers to accept some of the refugees. Peru has indicated it will take 1,000; lesser offers have come from Costa Rica, Spain, among others.

5. There was considerable discussion of how and when the emigres could be gotten out. It was noted, for example, that Costa Rica had offered to serve as a “staging area”, from which the refugees could ultimately proceed to their ultimate destinations. State noted, however,

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1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–1981), Box 18, Folder 15: PRC Meeting—Cuban/Haitian Refugee Problem. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified].

2 On April 14, President Carter signed Presidential Determination No. 80–16 allowing “25 to 33 percent of the persons who have taken sanctuary at the Peruvian Embassy in Havana, up to a maximum of 3500 refugees,” to settle in the United States. The refugees would be admitted according to the requirements of the Refugee Act of 1980. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 17, Cuba: Refugees, 4/13–25/80) The same day, Powell read a White House statement announcing the President’s policy. (Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81, Book I, pp. 682–683)

3 Costa Rican President Rodrigo Carazo attempted to resolve the crisis by offering to fly the Cubans in the Peruvian Embassy to Costa Rica, accept some, and serve as a staging area for moving the rest to other countries. (“300 Cubans Reported Set to Leave,” The New York Times, April 16, p. A4)
that Costa Rica was really terribly limited. Responding to a subsequent suggestion that the asylees be taken to Guantanamo and then abroad by ship, CIA pointed out the logistical and other difficulties involved in such a move. The idea was quickly shelved.

6. There was general agreement that along with announcing our willingness to take some of the refugees, Washington should also quickly and persuasively urge other nations to make serious efforts to help, insist on better facilities and efficient processing of the refugees in Havana, and call on UN Secretary General Waldheim to issue an appeal echoing our concern for the welfare of the asylum seekers while still in Cuba.4

7. Aaron strongly advocated that we do our utmost to stress before world opinion the “failure” of the Cuban system that the refugee situation represents. Others argued that we ought not to go overboard in this vein; after all, they noted, the incident largely “speaks for itself”, and we don’t want to appear to gloat or to prompt Castro to retaliate with harsh treatment of the refugees.

In telegram 1392 from USUN, April 12, the Mission reported that McHenry had sent Waldheim a note “asking if he might intervene on the Peru Embassy issue in Havana as the issue was reaching crisis proportions.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800183–0041)

91. Presidential Finding1

Washington, April 16, 1980

Finding Pursuant to Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended, Concerning Operations Undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency in Foreign Countries, Other than Those Intended Solely for the Purpose of Intelligence Collection

I hereby find that the following operation in a foreign country (including all support necessary to such operation) is important to the

1 Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Congressional Affairs, Job 97M00733R: Policy Files, Box 1, Folder 11: Cuba-Presidential Finding/Memorandum of Notification. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.
national security of the United States, and direct the Director of Central Intelligence, or his designee, to report this Finding to the concerned committees of the Congress pursuant to Section 662, and to provide such briefings as necessary.\(^2\)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCOPE</th>
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<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>Publish and infiltrate all forms of propaganda into Cuba, through creation of a clandestine distribution capability for the purpose of exacerbating Cuban internal tensions and reducing Cuban foreign adventurism.</td>
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Jimmy Carter

\(^2\) This finding stemmed from an April 7 SCC meeting on covert action which briefly discussed Cuba. During the meeting, the “CIA proposed a publication/mailing program into Cuba to encourage growing intellectual and popular discontent, \[less than 1 line not declassified\] It was endorsed unanimously.” (National Security Council, Carter Intelligence Files, Box 20, SCC Minutes and SC 1980) An April 2 Central Intelligence Agency paper calling for “a modest radio broadcasting program” is in the Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–1981), Box 13, Folder 15: SCC (I) Meeting—7 April 1980, Covert Action.

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92. **Summary of Conclusions of a Mini-Policy Review Committee Meeting\(^1\)**

Washington, April 22, 1980

*Summary of Conclusions*

1. **Update on Cuban Refugee Problem.** There are approximately 1400 Cubans left in the Peruvian compound, who for one reason or another, have rejected Castro’s offer for safe conduct. 8,000 have been documented and are currently awaiting in their homes for the evacuation,

\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 9, Cuba, 12/79–4/80. A covering memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter states, “We are going to try to discourage as actively as we can the sending of boats by Cuban/Americans to pick up their compatriots in Cuba, and we intend to indicate that such actions on their part would constitute a felony.” Carter initialed the covering memorandum.
but Castro has suspended the flights to Costa Rica and insists that all flights should go directly to the place of final settlement. \(^2\) Castro is obviously concerned about the adverse publicity which has occurred in Costa Rica. Thus far, 324 asylees have gone to Peru, 40 to Spain and 353 remain in Costa Rica. (S)

2. *The Boat Problem.* Yesterday, Cuba’s official newspaper, *GRANMA*, implied that Cuban/Americans could bring their boats to Cuba to pick up the refugees. Two shrimp boats left Florida over the weekend and returned with 40 Cubans, and one or more boats have left today. The Mini-PRC addressed the problem of what to do if a flotilla of US boats go to Cuba, as they did in the mid-1960’s, and picked up Cuban refugees, perhaps more than the 10,800. (S)

3. *US Objectives.* The Mini-PRC agreed on the following objectives: (1) we should continue to seek the evacuation of all Cubans seeking asylum in the Peruvian Embassy safely and rapidly; (2) we should maintain maximum international concern and participation in the solution to this problem; we should avoid the outcome, desired by both Castro and the Cuban/American community, though for different reasons, of having this issue become a US-Cuban issue; and (3) we should adopt a policy which is wholly consistent with our refugee laws, and with our approach to the Haitian and other refugee problems. (S)

4. *US Policy.* The Mini-PRC agreed on the following steps:

(1) We would contact leaders of the Cuban/American community immediately, express our sympathy for their concerns, but urge them to use their influence to hold back the sending of any boats to Cuba. We will inform them that the transport of Cubans to the United States is a violation of US Immigration laws; as a felony, it could involve a fine, possible imprisonment and confiscation of vessel. (S)

(2) We will urgently consult with Costa Rica, Peru and the Andean Pact, the UN Secretary General, and other interested governments and urge them to bring maximum international pressure, public as well as private, on Castro to resume evacuation flights to Costa Rica as soon as possible. In addition, we will suggest to Costa Rica and Peru the idea of sending a large boat, preferably Latin American, but possibly US, to Cuba to pick up refugees being transported by these smaller boats, and bring them to Costa Rica. Such a vessel will be a deterrent to the small-scale flotilla, and will insure the possibility of using a third country staging area, i.e., Costa Rica. (S)

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(3) Wednesday, noon, State will issue an announcement which urges Cuba to resume the flights immediately,\(^3\) expresses sympathy with those who would like to shortcut the process, but informs them that support of the Cuban refugees by these smaller vessels is a violation of US law and is punishable by penalties of up to five years in prison, a fine of $2,000, and the forfeiture of the vessel.\(^4\) (S)

(4) The Coast Guard has been informed to seize any such vessels illegally bringing refugees to the United States. (S)

(5) We will meet again tomorrow to discuss the reactions of the Cuban/American community, to review the possibility of sending US ships, and to look into the potential costs of sending US vessels off Cuba.\(^5\) (S)

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\(^3\) In telegram 107544 to selected diplomatic posts, April 23, the Department requested Embassies to ask their host government to pressure the Cubans to resume the flights. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800202–0304)

\(^4\) On April 23, a Department of State spokesman called for immediate suspension of the sealift and warned captains of private vessels that they could face fines or imprisonment. (Department of State Bulletin, June 1980, p. 68) The text of the statement was transmitted in telegram 107601 to all diplomatic and consular posts, April 23. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800202–0377)

\(^5\) At the bottom of the page, Carter wrote: “ok. J.”

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93. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter\(^1\)

Washington, April 24, 1980

SUBJECT

Mini-PRC on Cuban Refugees—April 23, 1980

Dave Newsom and Victor Palmieri chaired an inter-agency Mini-PRC meeting, Wednesday evening, to review the implementation of your decisions on Cuban refugees.\(^2\) State issued an announcement (Tab

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\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 17, Refugees, 4/13–25/80. Secret. Sent for information. On an April 23 covering memorandum, Carter wrote, “We should bite the bullet and get moving to take them in. We cannot enforce a policy to keep them out. It doesn’t help the Haitian problem to play into the hands of Castro on this one. Can’t we become a staging area?”

\(^2\) See footnote 2, Document 90.
A) at noon, Wednesday, demanding that Castro resume the airlift to Costa Rica, and informing the Cuban-American community that the use of their boats to pick up Cubans “is contrary to U.S. law and policy.” Unfortunately, INS and Customs officers in the Miami area were, at the same time, communicating a very different message. Customs was clearing the departure of vessels, and INS was reported by the press that they “would look the other way.” We will work vigorously and rapidly to correct this misimpression.

The law, which INS, Customs, and the other agencies will now actively enforce, applies to two cases: (1) If the owner tries to smuggle Cubans in, he will be subject to penalties of up to five years in prison, fines of $2,000, and the forfeiture of the vessel. (2) If the owner of the boat reports to the INS office (as is the case with the six or seven ships which have already arrived with about 400 people), then INS will fine the owner $1,000 for every passenger who does not have a valid visa. The vessel will be impounded until the fine is paid. INS will begin enforcing this on Thursday.

In the meantime, the Cubans are making clear that Cuban Americans can come and get their relatives as well as some of those who were in the Peruvian Embassy, and there are reports that 50–100 boats are either on their way or are about to go. The last time Castro invited Cuban Americans to pick up their relatives and friends was in 1965–66, and the result was an exodus of 250,000 to Florida. The Cuban Government is at the same time blasting us for taking Cubans, but not Haitians, suggesting that we are racists.

As the announcement suggests, we are trying to discourage the Cuban Americans from being used by Castro, who has stopped the airlift to Costa Rica. The other 13 countries that had volunteered to take some of the refugees are just waiting to see whether we will take them all and relieve them of their obligation. Latin American concern about Cuba has diminished in proportion to the degree it has become a U.S. problem.

The Mini-PRC considered the possibility of sending a USG vessel to pick up all the refugees and take them to Costa Rica for processing, but the group ruled out that idea since we cannot get a vessel there until May 4; Castro will never accept the idea, nor would the Cuban-American community or the refugees.

We hope the fines will discourage the Cuban Americans, and Christopher will invite a group of leaders from the community and try to

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3 Not attached. See footnote 4, Document 92.
4 See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana, Document 308.
enlist their support. But frankly, if the Cuban community is willing to pay the fine, which is quite small by their standards, they can bring in as many Cubans as Castro lets them.

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94. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter

Washington, April 25, 1980

SUBJECT
Cuban Refugees: Mini-PRC, April 24, 1980

Victor Palmieri and Dave Newsom chaired a Mini-PRC on Thursday, April 24, 1980 on Cuban refugees. The situation is getting worse very rapidly. Fourteen boats have already landed in Florida with 904 people, but 600 boats are on their way to Cuba, and 18 are on their way back. Already there are 30 distress cases, and the Coast Guard believes that if the weather changes, there is a fair probability of loss of life.

The U.S. Government has clearly made known that we view the trips as unlawful, and INS served notice of fines for two boats that arrived this morning. It intends to fine all the boats, but local manpower is overwhelmed. The fines will not be much of a deterrent in the short term when people leave for their relatives, but it might have a small impact after a while. Part of the problem is that Castro is selecting who the skippers can take—some asylees, some family and others. It is difficult to know how many people he will permit to go; CIA estimates that Castro might allow 150–200,000 to leave and that about 500,000 would go if he let them. HEW estimates that it would cost about $60 million to resettle and provide public and medical assistance and social services for about 50,000.

The Mini-PRC reviewed options, but none are attractive. We will be looking into legal authority to tighten the enforcement, although this could be done only at the risk of further enraging the Cuban-

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 9, Cuba, 7–8/80. Secret. Sent for information. In a covering memorandum to Brzezinski, April 24, Pastor commented, “I have never spent more time accomplishing less than on this issue of Cuban refugees. There is no easy answer; there may not be an answer.”
American community, which is becoming hysterical. The alternative—to turn the tables on Castro and welcome the Cubans—could mean 500,000 refugees and a difficult precedent for dealing with the Haitians. The Florida Congressional delegation is obviously equally disturbed, and hungry for action, although it is not clear what.

For the moment, we agreed to continue with our policy of trying to discourage skippers from going by issuing fines when they return. We will also try to open up a dialogue with the community and the Congressional leadership (from Florida and from Judiciary committees), but there was no consensus yet on how to do it. Still, it is essential that we try to reach out to the community or risk encountering increasing defiance and confrontation.

95. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, April 25, 1980, 1855Z

3998. Subj: Cubans Push Small Boat Departures As A Solution. Ref: (A) Havana 3908 (B) Havana 3971 (C) Havana 3866.

1. C—Entire text.

2. Caught in an embarrassing dilemma, Castro clearly sees the Mariel small-boat formula as a way out. It will put him in a position to claim he is not impeding the departure of the Peruvian Embassy refugees; better, it will (or at least he hopes it will) shift the entire focus and onus to us. His contention will be that it was to the US that the overwhelming majority of those departing wished to go anyway; he is accommodating them. Why go to a processing center in Costa Rica, he will ask, when they can go directly to the US?
3. The other governments involved secretly may be relieved (and some not so secretly), for in fact the Mariel formula does put the onus on us (and removes it from them). Further, experience with the refugees who have arrived in Madrid and Peru indeed suggests that most of them will not be content until they set foot on Flagler St. Other governments may therefore ask themselves why they should put themselves out to take in refugees only to have them immediately demand to go to the US. Hence, we can probably expect little support for the idea of reopening the air bridge to Costa Rica, or to any other third country.

4. We are, then, no longer talking of 3,500 refugees; rather, even if Castro does not pull the plug entirely and resume an unrestricted Camarioca-type operation, we are likely to get all of the remaining 8,000 refugees from the Peruvian Embassy, plus several thousand family members and friends of those who come down to pick them up (see Ref A). A conservative estimate would suggest that 12 to 15 thousand Cubans may arrive in Florida from Mariel during the next month or so.

5. There is almost no chance of negotiating a solution with the Cuban Govt at this time. With the Cubans already suspicious of our intentions and embarrassed by their own blunder at the Peruvian Embassy, our announcement of military maneuvers at Guantanamo closed off any possibility of such negotiations, at least for the present. In its ire, Havana can now think only of ways to stick it back to us. And sticking it to us at Mariel helps get them off the horns of the dilemma they themselves had created at the Peruvian Embassy. Recalling that we had done nothing to stop maritime hijackers and that all 400 some-odd Cubans who arrived by small boat in Florida last year had been “greeted as heroes”, the Cuban Govt is now chortling that Mariel will pay us back in kind.

6. Beyond the fallout from the Peruvian Embassy, there looms the possibility that Castro will indeed pull the plug, i.e., that he will issue exit documents to 100 to 200 thousand people and invite their friends and relatives to pick them up at Mariel. That decision has not yet been made, however, and Castro realizes that there are risks involved.

7. The US must carefully review its options as the dimensions of the problem, and Cuban intentions, come into better focus. At least so long as the exodus is related to and includes the refugees from the Peruvian Embassy, it would be a major error on our part to close our doors. Having expressed our sympathy with those seeking refuge in the Peruvian Embassy, it would appear cynical and hypocritical to refuse them entry, especially as they may suffer savage harassment

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and even physical abuse so long as they are in Cuba. Public statements concerning our immigration laws have no impact on anyone save ourselves. Indeed, they are likely to be seen as a bureaucratic/legalistic response to a humanitarian problem of major proportions.

8. Castro will consider halting the exodus only if it becomes embarrassing. Public statements or postures on our part suggesting alarm or intentions to block the flow will only encourage him and give him fuel for his propaganda. In this regard, USINT considers the statement read by the Spokesman on April 23 as counterproductive.\(^4\) We should move quietly to take legal action against boat owners on a selective basis, but that should not include arrests. In the final analysis, our best bet for the moment is to turn the exodus against Castro by emphasizing the drama of thousands of people fleeing Cuba by small boat. It is our best bet and yet we seem not yet to have even mounted an effort. USINT has not yet heard a single interview on VOA. Interviews with those arriving by small boat which play up the beatings and intimidations to which the refugees were subjected prior to departure would be especially effective.

9. Meanwhile, to handle the incoming flow in a more orderly manner better designed to protect our own interests, consideration might be given to the establishment in Florida (rather than Costa Rica) of a center where refugees could be concentrated and housed while being processed. We may as well make preparations for the inevitable.

Smith

\(^4\) See footnote 4, Document 92. The statement asserted that “it is a felony to bring into the United States any alien not duly admitted by an immigration officer and is punishable by penalties of up to 5 years in prison, fines of $2,000 and the forfeiture of the vessel.”
96. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter\(^1\)

Washington, April 25, 1980

SUBJECT

Cuban Refugees

Dave Newsom chaired a Mini-PRC meeting on Friday, April 25, 1980 to discuss U.S. policy on the Cuban refugee problem. There are now 1,000 ships enroute to Cuba or returning. Thus far 1310 Cubans have arrived on 17 boats. Today Castro said he would welcome airplanes to take the Cubans away and already one plane has returned. There have already been 70 distress cases, and the Coast Guard is fearful that bad weather this weekend might be disastrous.

Today Victor Palmieri briefed the Congressional staff, and found them generally aware of the difficulties of the problem. Saturday the Vice President will chair a Cabinet-level meeting to review an options paper and consider recommendations to you.\(^2\) After the meeting, he is planning to issue a statement indicating our deep interest in this problem and our hope that Cuban Americans will understand that their boatlift is unlawful and dangerous, and that their government is searching for alternative ways to rapidly evacuate the Cubans.

Cy will meet with 30 Cuban-American leaders Saturday afternoon to explain our policy and try to reduce the tension and confrontation, which seems to be building. After the meeting, Victor Palmieri and others will be travelling down to Florida to work to further defuse the situation. The Coast Guard is presently exploring the steps which it will need to take to prepare for the possibility of emergency conditions at sea this weekend.


\(^2\) See Document 97.
97. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter

Washington, April 26, 1980

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy on Cuban Refugees

The Vice President chaired a Cabinet-level meeting on Saturday to discuss U.S. options for dealing with the Cuban refugee problem. The meeting grappled with several problems:

1. The compelling emergency problems related to the hazardous weather conditions off Florida and the fact that 1,000 boats are between the U.S. and Cuba;

2. The enforcement problem;

3. The problems associated with what do do once the Cubans arrive (i.e., status and benefits);

4. The fact that Castro has thrown us on the defensive and converted an international issue into a U.S.-Cuban issue.

The participants agreed that the Vice President should issue a statement after the meeting, which indicated our deep and continuing concern with the problem, putting the onus for the dangerous situation clearly on Castro, asking the Cuban-American community to respect the law and stop the voyages, indicating that you have directed the Navy and Coast Guard to render all possible assistance to those at sea, calling upon Castro to resume the airlift and permit an orderly, safe and humane evacuation of refugees. In addition, as an olive branch to the Cuban-American community, the statement commits the U.S. to accept the plantados, those 200–400 Cuban political prisoners in Boniato Prison, who refuse to cooperate with the Cuban Government. The statement is attached for your approval (Tab A).²

The group reviewed an options paper prepared by my staff and Stu’s (Tab B).³ It describes four options:

1. welcome the Cubans;

2. try to control the flow;

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² Not attached. For the Vice President’s statement released on April 27, see the Department of State Bulletin, June 1980, p. 68.

3. invoke national emergency powers and the most severe enforce-
ment measures; and
4. position a ship to take Cubans to a third country.

The group agreed to recommend option 2, which includes the
following components:
— stricter enforcement of existing laws as a deterrent;
— seek to pursue the Cuban-American community to stop or at
least discourage the boat lift. (Warren Christopher met with a group
of 30 or so leaders Saturday afternoon as a first step in this process. Vic
Palmieri is going to Florida Saturday evening to continue this process.)
— maximize international pressure on Castro to resume the airlifts;
— call for an international conference (preferably under UN aus-
pices, and including those nations which already pledged to receive
some of the Cuban refugees) to negotiate an international formula with
Cuba to resettle Cuban refugees in a humane manner. (This could
include an international processing center in Havana.)

The group recommended you present this approach in a speech
early next week. Bob Pastor will work with the speechwriters on this.

The group also discussed the question of whether we should trans-
form SOLID SHIELD 80, a massive U.S. naval exercise which includes
the landing of Marines at Guantanamo, from a very sizable political
liability to a significant humanitarian asset. At the moment, Castro is
mobilizing countries in the Caribbean area to denounce what he, and
unfortunately many, consider as a violation of the principle of non-
intervention. While at the same time reaffirming our determination to
oppose Cuba and Soviet aggression, you could announce in your speech
your decision to utilize the naval forces, which would have participated
in SOLID SHIELD, to serve as a rescue mission for ships in distress,
and to be on hand to assist in the international solution to the problem.
Defense and JCS oppose because they fear that any changes in the
exercise could be viewed as a sign of weakness and indecisiveness.
We will give you a memo on this Monday.

In addition, the group agreed that the Attorney General should
set up a Task Force to coordinate the law enforcement effort, and the
Director of OMB should chair a Task Force to consider issues related
to determining the status of the refugees and budgetary implications.
Both groups will prepare recommendations for you next week.

RECOMMENDATION:

1. That you approve the Vice President statement (Tab A).\(^4\)
2. That you approve Option 2 (page 2, Tab B) as a framework for
a strategy for dealing with the Cuban refugee problem.\(^5\)

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\(^4\) Carter checked the approve option.
\(^5\) Carter checked the approve option and initialed at the bottom of the page.
MEMORANDUM

WASHINGTON, APRIL 28, 1980

TO

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
The Secretary of Transportation
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency

SUBJECT

U.S. Operations—Caribbean Refugees

The President reviewed the conclusions of the Vice President’s meeting on U.S. policy to Cuban refugees, and the options paper for that meeting and approved Option No. 2, as modified by the meeting to reflect the goal of “trying to control the flow of Cuban refugees into the United States.” This strategy includes the following components:

—strengthen and enforce existing laws to serve as a deterrent to further voyages by Cuban-American boats;

—seek to persuade the Cuban-American community to stop or at least to discourage the boatlift;

—maximize international pressure on Castro to resume the airlifts, to permit an orderly and humane evacuation of refugees, to place this issue back into its appropriate international context, and to place Castro on the defensive;

—after appropriate preparation, call for an international conference (preferably under UN auspices and including those nations which already have pledged to receive some of the Cuban refugees) to negotiate an international formula with Cuba to resettle Cuban refugees in a humane manner. (This could include an international processing center in Havana.)

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 14, Cuba, 4/80. Confidential. Vance resigned on the day this memorandum was distributed.

2 See Document 97.
On the immediate operational side, the influx of Cuban and Haitian refugees requires the highest degree of coordination of the Federal government’s domestic resources to insure that the President’s policy decisions are fully implemented.

Jack Watson will assume lead responsibility for convening and directing an interagency group to achieve that result. Jack has already moved to establish such a group and to set-up the necessary lines of communication and control.

99. Central Intelligence Agency Information Report

TD/[report indicator not declassified]/11487–80
Washington, April 28, 1980, 1133Z

COUNTRY
Cuba

SUBJECT
Plans of Cuban Government to Permit Mass Exodus of Refugees to the U.S.
(DOI: [number not declassified] April 1980)

SOURCE
[4½ lines not declassified]

1. [3 lines not declassified] said that Fidel Castro is planning to permit 1.5 million Cubans to leave the country for the U.S. [name not declassified] said the principal reason for this policy decision is the economic embargo directed toward Cuba by the U.S. Government.

2. [name not declassified] also stated that, if the Mariel-Key West boat operation was stopped by the U.S., the Cubans would resort to any means to facilitate the exit of people from Cuba. One option would be the dumping of Cubans on Florida shores in order to produce a situation similar to the massive concentrations of Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees.

3. [name not declassified] also stated that the Government of Cuba was going to allow any aircraft to fly into Cuba to pick up individuals

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 18, Cuba, Refugees, 4/26–30/80. Secret; Winintel; Nofor; Nocontract. Sent to the Department of State, JCS, DIA, DIRNSA, FBI, NSC, and the White House Situation Room.
desiring to leave the island. (Field Comment: On 25 April 1980, the Government of Cuba announced that it will permit aircraft to be used in transporting Cubans to the U.S.) A chartered DC10 aircraft is scheduled to arrive in Miami, Florida on 25 April carrying approximately 110 Cuban emigres.²

4. References: [less than 1 line not declassified]

²Another intelligence report, [text not declassified], April 28, concluded, “Fidel Castro is selectively emptying the jails in Cuba of petty criminals, narcotics users and pushers, prostitutes and social misfits and placing them on the boats leaving the country.” (Ibid.)

100. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, April 29, 1980, 2246Z

4083. Eyes Only for Assistant Secretary Bowdler. Subject: Cuban Refugee Flow to US.

1. C—Entire text.

2. I have left message with Padron’s aide that I need to talk to him on urgent basis regarding movement of people to US. Aide promised to get in touch with Padron—who is directing operation at Mariel—and have him call me this evening if at all possible. I hope therefore to see him late tonight (April 29) or sometime tomorrow.²

3. Against my expectations, some receptivity may be developing on Cuban side. Their own immigration facilities and procedures have been swamped. Mariel resembles a madhouse. Several Cuban immigration officials I saw at airport Sunday looked as though they had not slept in days. Moreover, Mariel has become a national distraction, with one large part of population now concentrating on ways to get there and get out, and a second part of the population spending a good deal of time and energy excoriating the first. Castro has certainly worked

¹Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 15, Cuba, 5/80. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis.

²In telegram 4150 from Havana, April 30, Smith reported on his meeting with Padron. “Padron expressed great concern over deterioration of our bilateral relations. Mariel might appear to U.S. as irrational act ‘and perhaps it was,’ he acknowledged.” (Ibid.)
up their revolutionary fervor, harnessed their passion, etc., but sooner or later, they have to go back to work. There are, then, good reasons for GOC to wish to move to more orderly defined procedure. Question is whether they are thinking logically and dispassionately enough (#) to (#) those interests. Leadership has behaved for past month as though it had gone slightly mad. Conversation with Padron my well provide some clues as to whether their frenzy is abating.

Smith

3 As in the original; presumably a transmission problem.
4 In his memoirs, Smith surmised that the death of Celia Sanchez, Castro’s secretary and purported mistress, may have been the reason behind the Cuban leader’s instability. (Smith, The Closest of Enemies, p. 206)

101. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, April 29, 1980

CUBA: Implications of Refugee Situation

By initiating a massive exodus of Cubans directly to the US, President Castro hopes to alleviate growing domestic pressures on his regime. The Cuban leader probably believes his tactics will press the US to negotiate on his terms to control the flow. Continued disorder in Mariel, however, could create new domestic problems for Castro and cost him international prestige. [portion marking not declassified]

Castro’s primary objective is to get rid of political malcontents as well as those dissatisfied with economic conditions. Over the past few years crime, vandalism, worker apathy, illegal departures, and even some isolated incidents of antigovernment activity have increased. [portion marking not declassified]

The Cuban leader also is retaliating against Peru and Venezuela, which had embarrassed his regime by granting asylum to people forcing their way into those countries’ embassies. Similarly, Havana is

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 18, Refugees, 4/26–30/80. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. Prepared by [2 names not declassified], CIA.
striking back at the US for failing to prosecute boat hijackers.² In addition, Cuba wants to embarrass the US by portraying Washington’s reluctance to accept the refugees as a contradiction of its human rights policy. [portion marking not declassified]

Castro apparently believes that he is in the driver’s seat and that he can retain the initiative regardless of what the US does. He will continue—and may step up—the flow of refugees in order to press Washington to enter into formal negotiations.³ [portion marking not declassified]

In any discussions with the US, Castro will resist attempts to involve other countries or international organizations and will push the US to accept large numbers of refugees. He also may seek assurances that, despite planned US military maneuvers and “threatening” statements by US leaders, the US has no hostile intent toward Cuba. In addition, he may exert pressure on the US to prosecute those who hijack boats to Florida. [portion marking not declassified]

Castro hopes to keep the US on the defensive by stirring up an international outcry over the US military exercises beginning on 8 May at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base. His address at a massive rally on 1 May probably will key the campaign.⁴ The Cubans also are planning their own military maneuvers and large demonstrations throughout the island on the first day of the US exercises—including a march of one million people past the US Interests Section in Havana. [portion marking not declassified]

Pressures on the Regime

In recent months, Castro has become increasingly disturbed by signs of what he regards as growing US hostility toward Cuba. He probably also fears that Washington might—particularly in the wake of the abortive rescue attempt in Iran—act precipitously against his regime. The Cuban President sees events in Central America as heightening internal pressures on the US for action to contain Communism, and he believes that Cuba would be the most inviting target. [portion marking not declassified]

² See Document 88.

³ Palmieri, in testimony before the House Judiciary Committee on April 30, said that the United States was not in direct negotiations with the Cuban Government to control the flow of refugees. (“Refugee Coordinator Says U.S. Is Not Negotiating With Havana,” The New York Times, May 1, p. A23)

⁴ In his speech, Castro said the United States must accept the Cuban refugees and warned the Cuban people to prepare for a naval blockade. (Marlise Simons, “Castro Says U.S. Must Accept Refugees,” The New York Times, May 2, p. A22) The Department transmitted details of the speech in telegram 116535 to select diplomatic posts, May 2. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800219–0509)
If the chaos caused by the refugee exodus begins to work against him, however, Castro could find it more difficult to dictate terms. Over 1,000 boats are tied up at Mariel harbor, and the Cubans are encountering growing problems in processing the refugees. Such difficulties apparently already have forced Havana to suspend plans for permitting private aircraft to pick up refugees.\textsuperscript{[portion marking not declassified]}

Although Havana had announced that any Cuban may leave the island, some have been denied exit permits. As the flow of emigres becomes more orderly the government is likely to tighten its restrictions for departure—particularly on military-aged males. The refusal of several hundred Cubans to vacate the Peruvian Embassy pending guarantee of safe passage could further undercut Castro’s credibility.\textsuperscript{[portion marking not declassified]}

**Implications**

The departure of between 200,000 to 500,000 persons—2 to 5 percent of the population—would alleviate some economic difficulties. The actual benefits, however, would be limited.\textsuperscript{[portion marking not declassified]}

Such an exodus would reduce pressure in the housing sector, but it would bring only a small and temporary reduction in demand for food and scarce consumer goods. While Cuba has an overall surplus of labor, the sudden departure of skilled individuals could disrupt some sectors of the economy.\textsuperscript{[portion marking not declassified]}

The domestic political benefits could be higher. Castro has been successfully using the refugees as a scapegoat for the regime’s economic failures, and a mass exodus would reduce the need for greater repression. On the other hand, the continued presence of boats waiting to pick up friends and relatives could have an increasingly unsettling effect over time on those who remain.\textsuperscript{[portion marking not declassified]}

Castro evidently recognizes that his actions will have negative repercussions in Latin America, and he probably has written off any major Cuban gains there in the near future. Relations with Peru and Venezuela will be the most seriously affected, but the negative fallout probably will not be significant in those states generally friendly toward the Castro regime. If Castro does not resolve the refugee issue rapidly, however, Cuba is likely to fail again in its bid for a seat on the UN Security Council.\textsuperscript{[portion marking not declassified]}

Havana is on the defensive elsewhere because of its efforts to softpedal the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Prolonging the refugee crisis is likely to erode Havana’s influence among Third World states. Moreover, no matter how the refugee issue is resolved, Cuba is bound to lose some of its allure as a model for economic development.\textsuperscript{[portion marking not declassified]}
SUBJECT

Mini-SCC on the Cuban Refugee Issue (U)

David Aaron chaired a Mini-SCC meeting on Wednesday, April 30, 1980, to discuss an international strategy for dealing with the Cuban refugee problem. The group approved press guidance to be used in announcing the transformation of Solid Shield 80 to a humanitarian rescue mission to deal with the crisis caused by the irresponsibility of the Cuban government. The Pentagon already released a statement on the subject yesterday. (Tab A).

In addition, the group reviewed a six-part strategy for maximizing international pressure on the Castro regime, and for seeking an international solution to the problem, perhaps through an international conference. (S)

1. *International Conference.* We will send an urgent message to President Carazo of Costa Rica, informing him of the change in the Solid Shield Exercise, and asking if he would call an international conference (perhaps including those nations which have already pledged to take Cuban refugees) to fashion an international response to the crisis caused by Castro. At the minimum, the conference ought to aim for a resolution, perhaps modeled on the Andean Pact Resolution, clearly fixing responsibility for this crisis on Castro. In addition, the conference could: (a) deal with the numerous problems created by Cuba, and manifested in the refugee problem; (b) encourage the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to investigate charges of human rights violations

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2 A discussion paper for the meeting is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800867–1669.

3 For the White House statement issued on May 2, see the Department of State *Bulletin,* June 1980, p. 69.

4 Attached but not printed. Carter underlined the phrase “released a statement” and wrote in the margin, “went well.”

5 Carter underlined the words “President Carazo” and wrote in the left margin, “good response.”

6 The Department transmitted the letter on May 1. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Box 105, 5/80)
in Cuba and against the Cuban refugees; and (c) establish a five-

country planning group to consider negotiations with Cuba. (We will

try to keep the conference secret until we can be assured it will be

launched.) 7 (S)

2. Human Rights Violations. The Mini-SCC agreed to informally

contact the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to see

whether they might be interested in interviewing several of the Cuban

refugees who have charged the Cuban government with physically

abusing them when they were trying to leave. This approach and the

IAHRC visit would be in a very low-key manner. 8 (S)

3. Public Affairs Program. An interagency group, including ICA,

State, NSC, and DOD, will meet daily and provide guidance and

direction for VOA programs on the Cuban issue. DOD will assign

one PSYOPS to VOA to assist in getting the message out. In addi-
tion, the group will consider whether to broadcast a special extra one-
hour program each day on the Cuban refugee issue, and whether
to engage journalists in the Cuban/American community in such an
operation. 9 (S)

4. Naval Assistance for Rescue Missions. DOD and JCS will coordinate

with the Coast Guard and report on how the naval vessels, which were

supposed to have been assigned to Solid Shield, will be used in the

rescue missions. The group considered whether to obtain the co-
operation of other Latin governments in these missions, e.g., the Vene-
zuelan navy, but rejected the idea as too difficult at this stage. DOD
and State will work out the funding arrangements for these rescue
missions. 10 (S)

5. Reaching the Cuban/American Community. The group agreed that
to obtain the cooperation of the Cuban/American community, we will

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7 A conference held in San Jose, May 8–9, was attended by representatives from 20
nations. The nations pledged to “join their efforts in an international program for the
resettlement of those wishing to leave Cuba and to offer material and financial support
for the effort.” (Telegram 2596 from San Jose, May 9; National Archives, RG 59, Central
Foreign Policy File, D800229-0387)

8 In the margin to the left of the paragraph, Carter wrote, “ok.”

9 In the margin to the left of the paragraph, Carter wrote, “ok.”

10 In the margin to the left of the paragraph, Carter wrote, “Probably needs mini-
mal effort.”
need more carrots (related to the numbers we will accept) and more sticks (enforcement). Jack Watson will assume responsibility for our contacts with the community.\footnote{Carter underlined the words “Jack Watson” and wrote in the left margin, “good.” On May 14, President Carter spoke at length to reporters, announcing and explaining in detail the administration policy toward the Cuban refugees. See \textit{Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81}, Book I, pp. 912–914. The White House issued a statement later the same day. See ibid., pp. 914–916.} (S)

6. \textit{Negotiations with Cuba}. We are currently exploring with the Cuban government whether they might be interested in talking about the Cuban refugee issues, but the preference of the Mini-SCC would be to try to approach the Cubans within an international framework.\footnote{In the margin to the left of the paragraph, Carter wrote, “changed For Pol break- fast.” See footnote 4, Document 105.} (S)
103. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, May 5, 1980, 0740Z

4182. Subject: USINT Status Report No. 8. Ref: Havana 4178.2
1. S—Entire text.
2. In conversation last night, Jose Luis Padron said there no possibility for immediate solution of problem USINT’s 400 boarders. He thought original intention had been to work out their immediate departure, but, he said, “with security situation being what it was,” GOC could not afford to establish precedent of rewarding with immediate departure those who crashed into diplomatic establishments by force. He acknowledged that idea of immediate departure had been in everyone’s mind first afternoon, but situation had now become “more complicated.” He alluded to widespread violence (an amazingly frank admission that GOC may have some serious trouble on its hands), and said things would have to cool down a bit.

3. I noted that GOC’s position as reported in Granma was totally unreasonable. It left everyone in blind alley. Refugees no more willing to come out now than before and now there seemed to be no possibility negotiations. Padron said there every possibility negotiations [garble]. He also said he did not blame those inside for not coming out. In their place, he also would stay put. Passions were running high and some regrettable things were happening.

4. I protested vigorously that we had not created this situation and that it was unreasonable simply to leave it hanging.

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 15, Cuba, 5/80. Secret; Nia ct Immediate.
2 On May 2, a group of nearly 800 released political prisoners and their families gathered around the U.S. Interests Section for processing to leave Cuba for the United States. A pro-government group of civilians arrived and began to assault the ex-prisoners; approximately 400 people took refuge in the Interests Section as the angry mob gathered outside. In telegram 4178 from Havana, May 4, the Interests Section reported that the Cuban Government’s position toward the ex-prisoners was the same as published in the May 4 edition of Granma: that the ex-prisoners were in the U.S. Interests Section illegally and needed to turn themselves in without conditions; women and children would be given safe conduct, but only to their homes. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800222–0333) According to his memoirs, Smith found the Cuban position untenable and allowed the ex-prisoners to remain in the Interests Section. Beds were set up, the State Department provided supplies, many staff members were evacuated, and all classified material at the Interests Section was destroyed. Many of the ex-prisoners remained in the Interests Section until September 1980, when they could finally leave the building safely. (Smith, The Closest of Enemies, pp. 217–228)
5. Padron said he understands my irritation but that he really saw nothing that could be done for moment. All sides had to be patient. Meanwhile, he would make certain our security cordon adequate. If we needed anything else—medicines, etc., just to let him know.

6. Comment: I will comment further in morning. Initial reactions were two: 1) I feel somewhat reassured as to our security situation, and 2) while at this point, even references to an eventual solution are welcome, we clearly are in for a long haul.

Smith

104. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter

Washington, May 14, 1980

SUBJECT
U.S. and Friendly Forces Versus Cuban Forces in the Caribbean

You asked for a brief net assessment of allied and Cuban forces which could be brought to bear in the Caribbean within 72 hours.

**ALLIED FORCES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ground Forces</th>
<th>Naval Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Ranger Battalion</td>
<td>1 Carrier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Airborne Brigades</td>
<td>3 Cruisers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Marine Battalions</td>
<td>5 Destroyers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air Forces</strong></td>
<td><strong>8 AMPHIBs (LPH/LST)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Tactical Fighter Squadrons</td>
<td>6 Frigates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(528 aircraft)</td>
<td>1 Oiler</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Tactical Reconnaissance Squadrons (42 aircraft)</td>
<td>1 Command Ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Marine Attack Squadrons</td>
<td>4 Submarines (SSN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(45 aircraft)</td>
<td><strong>British</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Destroyer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 14, Cuba, 5/80. Secret. Sent for information. Drafted by Odom. Carter initialed the memorandum indicating that he saw it. In a covering memorandum to Aaron, May 13, Odom observed, “we can buzz around in the air and sea but we would get licked if we try to send Teddy Roosevelt up San Juan Hill again.”
1 Marine Fighter Squadron
   (12 aircraft)
6 Navy Fighter Squadrons
   (77 aircraft)
10 Navy Attack Squadrons
   (149 aircraft)

1 Frigate
1 Oiler

Dutch
2 Destroyers

French
1 Lighter Transport
1 Patrol Boat

**CUBAN FORCES**

*Ground Forces*
2 Armour Divisions
2 Mechanized Infantry
   Divisions
11 Infantry Divisions
1 Artillery Divisions
15 Reserve Divisions

*Naval Forces*
2 Attack Submarines
26 Missile Attack Boats
   (KOMAR/OSA)
14 Submarine Chasers
32 Patrol Boats

*Air Forces*
89 All Weather Fighters
   (MIG–23/21)
75 Day Fighters
   (MIG–21/17/15)

**Conclusion:** The US, even without its allies, can mount enormous air and naval superiority within 72 hours. US ground forces would be of little or no military significance vis-a-vis the Cuban ground forces, which, upon mobilization of the 15 reserve divisions, would out-number US ground forces many times. The US ground force is about 1 division equivalent. Cuban ground forces are 15 active and 15 reserve, plus 1 artillery division, a strength of about 146,000. For details see the attached book prepared by Defense.²

² Not attached.
105. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, May 19, 1980, 1310Z

4499. Subj: Return of USINT Dependents and Members of Staff Now in Miami. Ref: (A) Havana 4492 (B) Havana 4498.

1. C— Entire text.

2. Havana remains tranquil. Disorders of past few weeks appear to have ceased, or at least now to be so scattered and infrequent as to be negligible in broad picture. Malecon was opened this morning, a good indication Cuban side is expecting situation return to normal. Virulent propaganda campaign against US has been dramatically toned down.

3. USINT staff of seven plus six Marines have now been standing 24-hour watch for five straight days. We are beginning to wear thin and could certainly use staff members now in Miami; should we get consular access to Mariel, for example, we could barely spare anyone to send. Additionally morale would be considerably improved by return of families.

4. Recommendation: In view of fact order and calm now prevail in Havana and given increasing difficulties of managing operation here with reduced staff, I strongly recommend that dependents and staff members now in Miami return to Havana tomorrow (May 20).

Smith

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 15, Cuba, 5/80. Confidential; Flash.

2 In telegram 4492 from Havana, May 18, the Interests Section reported that the mood in Havana had calmed considerably. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800245–0560) In telegram 4498 from Havana, May 18, the Interests Section reported that the situation in Havana was “completely calm.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800245–1011)

3 The Malecon is a long roadway that runs along the shore in Havana.

4 At the bottom of the page, Pastor wrote, “ZB, is it time now to pursue the breakfast instructions—i.e. see if Castro wants to talk?” At the top of the page, Brzezinski replied the same day, “RP, follow-up on possible talks.” In telegram 4518 from Havana, May 21, the Interests Section reported that the Cubans “are willing to talk to us—and to others for that matter—on bilateral basis. Cubans willing to negotiate modalities which would normalize—and limit—refugee flow. They under no illusions that we could even discuss embargo, Guantanamo, and other major issues at this time.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 14, Cuba, 5/80)
106. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the International Communication Agency (Bray) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\(^1\)

Washington, June 6, 1980

SUBJECT
Publicizing the Cuban Refugee Problem (C)

I am responding to your memo of May 30.\(^2\)

We continue to play the Cuban refugee issue heavily in all our media and through our posts abroad. Since April 4 our press service has provided posts with over 200 texts of policy statements, stories, interviews with refugees, background on Cuba and the like. VOA remains heavily on the case, and all of its Cuban coverage has also been placed on its correspondent feed which services over 2,500 indigenous radio stations throughout Latin America.

We are using the themes developed by the inter-agency group and are actively working with other agencies to develop supporting factual material for our media.

To assist these efforts, and to capitalize on the refugees, we are now producing a film which will tell the story of life in Cuba as the refugees themselves experienced it. We have filmed interviews with Cubans in the Florida camps. I’m told it is powerful material. The film itself will be ready for distribution by mid-June.

We have given considerable thought to your staff’s proposal that VOA produce a daily one-hour program on Cuba for broadcast simultaneously to Cuba and other countries. The question of costs aside, we conclude: (1) Cubans know more than we can tell them about Cuba; (2) both commercial radios and VOA are already getting a heavy message into Cuba about refugee reception here and their views as to why they left; (3) audiences elsewhere will quickly conclude that a packaged program on Cuba is propaganda and tune it out; (4) that our best hope of keeping Cuba in the minds of VOA audiences is to insert the story into programs to which they are drawn for other reasons.

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\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 14, Cuba, 6/80. Confidential. A copy was sent to Muskie. At the top of the page, Brzezinski wrote to Pastor on June 9, “RP, need your recomm.”

\(^2\) In the memorandum to Bray on May 30, Brzezinski wrote, “The President has directed the International Communication Agency to continue providing maximum publicity of the Cuban refugee issue through the Voice of America and other appropriate channels.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 14, Cuba, 5/80)
VOA has been working with elements of the Department of Defense to assure that it is technically feasible to use DOD-furnished medium-wave transmitters to get an effective VOA signal into the eastern Caribbean. I am told that they have almost concluded their technical studies, which look like being positive. Cost estimates are being developed. If the project appears practicable (and we should know next week), the next step will be to survey the U.S. Navy base on Antigua which appears to be the only feasible site, then consult with the UK and the Antiguans.

Finally, I would like to flag one matter for NSC attention. Your staff will recall that well before the refugee issue arose, we were instructed by the NSC to develop a cultural exchange attraction to tour Cuba. Alvin Ailey’s dance troupe was selected and is currently scheduled to spend one week in Cuba in September. USICA and the Cuban Government are splitting the costs 50/50 (our share is approximately $130,000).

We will need to know by approximately July 15 whether to proceed.3

3 In a memorandum to Bray on June 16, Brzezinski stated he agreed that he was “not persuaded” by the request for a “daily one-hour program on Cuba.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 16, Cuba, Broadcasting [Cuba and Caribbean], 12/79–12/80)

107. Memorandum From Attorney General Civiletti to President Carter1

Washington, June 9, 1980

SUBJECT

Hijacking of Cuban Vessels

Pursuant to your instructions I have discussed with the Secretary of State the issues presented by the hijacking of Cuban vessels by Cuban citizens to come to the United States and seek asylum.

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Unfiled Material, Box 128, Cuba. Confidential.
It is understood that there have been only four such hijackings since January 1, 1975. However, since all have occurred during the past six months, there is basis for concern that the trend may be toward increased hijacking activity in the future.

It appears that most such hijackings are technically subject to federal prosecution under the kidnapping or interstate transportation of stolen property statutes. However, jurisdiction for prosecution would be difficult to establish if, as happened in one of the four hijackings, the vessel is towed into United States waters by the Coast Guard to save the vessel and individuals involved.

The primary difficulty confronted in seeking a judicial resolution to the hijacking problem centers on the fact that there is a very minimal likelihood of conviction. Absent unique factors which have not been present in the hijackings to date, these cases must be prosecuted in the Southern District of Florida, where we would face juries sympathetic to the defendant refugees. Indeed, where the hijacking has been accomplished without putting life in danger, the defendants may find trial judges sympathetic to a defense of duress or justification, based on alleged persecution in Cuba. The fact that the United States grants these hijackers refugee status as opposed to returning them to Cuba will doubtless be cited in support of claims of persecution.

Another practical problem with the prosecution of these cases is the fact that, in some instances, crew members defect to the United States once the vessel arrives in Florida. For example, in the most recent hijacking, three of the four crew members defected. Neither the families of the hijackers nor defecting crew members can safely be relied on to carry the Government’s burden of proof in a criminal prosecution.

Notwithstanding the serious difficulties which confront prosecution and the low prognosis for success, we are prepared to pursue cases in which the lives or safety of innocent persons have been placed in jeopardy. To that end, the most recent hijacking is presently under intensive FBI investigation. We understand that good-faith prosecution of hijackers, whether successful or not, would constitute a net plus in our efforts to retain the cooperation of the Government of Cuba in aircraft hijacking cases. As relates to future hijacking incidents, I recommend that we take the following steps:

1. Make a public announcement condemning forcible hijacking as a means of escaping Cuba, and stating that we intend to enforce U.S. law against hijackers who place the lives or safety of innocent people in jeopardy.

2. Conduct a thorough investigation in each future case, including requests to the Cuban Government for assistance in determining the facts. The Department of State and the Department of Justice will be on the alert for hijackings which, were it not for the special circumstances
in Southern Florida, would present reasonable prospects for obtaining a conviction. We will bring such cases in an effort to demonstrate our intentions and to confirm that the hijacking of vessels to the United States from Cuba is contrary to U.S. law and policy.

3. The Cuban Government should be informed that:

(a) We are reiterating publicly our policy against forcible hijacking and our intent to enforce the law, particularly against hijackers who place the lives of innocent persons in danger.

(b) Cuba should be aware, however, that there are serious problems in attempting to prosecute Cuban citizens who hijack Cuban vessels, and the prognosis for conviction is not great. Further, in some instances, jurisdiction for prosecution may be lacking. Accordingly, in light of our mutual interest in creating a deterrent, we will wish to prosecute cases which we have a possibility of winning. It would be counterproductive to lose the initial cases.

(c) The Justice Department will continue to conduct an intensive investigation of all hijacking incidents for the purpose of determining which have appropriate potential for criminal prosecution.

(d) Where our criminal laws permit, the United States is determined to act in appropriate cases, particularly those in which human life is put in serious jeopardy by actions of the hijackers.

4. The Cuban Government should also be informed that it will continue to be the firm policy of the United States to ensure that Cuban property is promptly returned to its rightful owners and to expedite the return to Cuba of any and all individuals who desire to so return.

The Secretary of State joins me in making these recommendations and, if you agree, we will take the necessary steps to implement them, and will issue an appropriate release.²

Benjamin R. Civiletti
Attorney General

² See footnote 4, Document 113.
108. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) and Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to President Carter

Washington, undated

SUBJECT
Cuban Discussions, June 17, 1980—Summary and Next Steps (TS)

After informing Castro that our principal interest in having this round of recent talks was to prepare the way for a negotiation of the immigration and USINT issue, we met for seven hours in Havana with three senior Cuban officials. However, we found them reluctant to discuss these two issues unless we expressed a readiness to negotiate a removal of the embargo, abandoning our base at Guantanamo, and ceasing the overflights. In addition, the Cuban side was unusually polemical, retracing 20 years of alleged American hostility to Cuba and raising trivial complaints. It became clear to us that although these confidential talks have proven useful in helping us to understand Cuba’s views on a wide range of issues, we have clearly reached a dead-end in terms of resolving problems. We need to decide on next steps to ensure that a number of problems on the horizon are managed effectively. (TS)

During previous discussions, but with greatest clarity and force on June 17, the Cubans argued that our continued presence in Guantanamo, the embargo, and the overflights are unjust and a violation of international law, and if we were serious about wanting a relationship based on mutual respect, we would have to change our positions on these issues. They reject our argument that we can only change our positions on these issues if they are responsive to our concerns with regard to Cuban activities in Africa, the Caribbean and Central America, and Puerto Rico; they refuse to equate the bilateral "GEO" issues (Guantanamo, Embargo, Overflights) with issues involving their foreign policies. (TS)

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 16, Cuba, 6/17–18/80. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Outside the System. Sent for action. Sent through Muskie and Brzezinski. On a covering memorandum to Brzezinski, June 18, Pastor wrote, "Tarnoff and I drafted the attached memo on the trip back from Havana. The memo brings the President up to date on the last round of negotiations and its implications." Pastor wrote by hand at the bottom of the page of his covering memorandum, "Zbig took this to Summit. Didn’t respond until his return. Then said: hold PRC. Re-do memo for Secy of State w/NSC concurrence. I told him on Jun 27 that it was all O.B.E." Pastor and Tarnoff were in Cuba on June 17 and 18. Another account of their discussions with Cuban leaders is ibid.
In our conversations with the Cubans, we had held out the prospect of improved relations with us—including moves toward lifting the embargo—if Cuba moderated its behavior in several specific areas of foreign policy interest to the US. Castro has now indicated unequivocally that he will not accept such linkage. On the assumption that negotiated agreements with us are not now possible, the Cubans indicated that they now intend to take their bilateral demands to the court of international opinion as a way to try to pressure us to change. They will do this not only because they see it as the only way to persuade us to change, but because Castro wants to use the “GEO” issues to divert his people’s attention from the most serious economic and political problems his nation has faced in at least a decade. Because of the present impasse in our bilateral relations and the conditions that are drawing Cuba into a more confrontational position, we have several decisions to make on policies toward Cuba in the coming months. (TS)

We believe that our principal objective should remain to moderate Cuba’s international behavior. The US has always believed that the embargo, and the possibility of lifting it, gives us some leverage over Cuba’s international posture, but this assumption is increasingly open to question. On June 17, the Cuban side was quite candid in explaining how the embargo had hurt the Cuban economy, but they were equally clear that they would not modify Cuba’s role to get us to lift it—for probably three reasons: (1) Castro is unwilling to compromise with us the activist world role that he covets; (2) the Soviets not only foot the bill, but they also help the Cubans in everything, largely because of this international role; and (3) Cuba wants the embargo lifted more for the legitimacy and dignity it will confer on the revolution than for its economic benefits, and they will not do something they view as undignified in order to resume trade. (TS)

Although even a partial lifting of the embargo is out of the question for now, we should recognize the effect that it might have over time, not on Castro’s attitudes but on the fabric of Cuban society. The return this past year of 100,000 Cuban-Americans for short visits exposed Cuba to the economic and cultural magnetism of the US, and probably had a greater impact on opening up Cuba than anything the USG has previously done; to lift the embargo and open Cuba to US business and contact could not but affect Castro’s regime. Nevertheless, the principal argument against lifting the embargo remains one of credibility; for three years, we said we needed some progress by Cuba on a number of international issues before we took such a step. To take the step in the absence of any positive sign from Cuba would be to show the world that the US has no staying power. The fundamental issue of the embargo need not be addressed soon, but we have to deal now with the immediate issues of USINT and immigration and with the
prospect that Cuba intends to launch a major international campaign to force us to lift the embargo. (TS)

Recommendation

Here is what we recommend on these matters:

1. USINT. The Cubans were unequivocal in their demand that we hand over to them the 361 Cubans in our Interest Section. These people may now be in for a long wait and the Cubans could well bring pressure on US officials in Havana to show their displeasure. While the morale of the people at USINT is high now, that might not last, and we could face a serious security problem when it breaks. We propose three courses of action:

   (a) President Lopez Portillo is going to Cuba in late July. We propose Bill Bowdler and Bob Pastor brief him on these recent talks with the Cubans and ask his intercession with Castro to obtain the release of the 361 in our Interest Section.2 (TS)

   (b) We should take our case to the World Court or the Inter-American Human Rights Court. (TS)

   (c) We should ask the European Community to lobby the Cubans on this issue, and you might want to raise it at the Summit.3 We should seek to maximize international pressure on Castro to release the 361, comparing the Cuban attitude to that of the Iranian authorities who are prolonging a hostage situation because of a political dispute between governments. This should be highlighted. (TS)

2. Criminals and Mental Patients. We asked the Cubans whether Cuba would assume responsibility and accept repatriation if recognized international representatives were to confirm that the people are in fact criminals and mental patients. The Cubans dodged the question, having already said that they did not force such persons to emigrate. We propose that this issue be on the agenda for all three discussions described above—briefing Lopez Portillo; raising it at World Court; and maximizing international pressure. (TS)

3. Immigration. The Cubans claimed that there can be no progress on a "partial problem" like immigration without dealing with its fundamental cause—the embargo, US hostility. We can expect that they will not be cooperative; indeed, they may try to start up Mariel again or some variation of it, e.g., an airlift to points in Florida. (TS)

   (a) We propose that Jack Watson chair an interagency meeting to develop a full strategy to prevent a second Mariel. This would mean prosecuting the boat owners who have gone to Mariel and perhaps

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2 See Document 171.
3 Carter attended the Economic Summit in Venice June 19–24.
requesting new legislation.\textsuperscript{4} It might also require a tightening of the embargo (to prevent the flow of money to Cuban-Americans who were forced to pay through a Miami intermediary exorbitant fees to the Cuban Government). (TS)

(b) We should press for a second conference at San Jose to discuss the Cuban immigration problem and to agree on a strategy for raising it in the OAS or at the UN in the context of the “Mass Exodus Resolution.”\textsuperscript{5} We should pursue all international paths to encourage Cuba to respect the immigration laws of the US and other countries and to develop an orderly immigration program. (TS)

(c) The Attorney General will be recommending to you soon that we enforce strong measures to prohibit boat hijacking. We support that recommendation as a further way to prevent the illegal flow.\textsuperscript{6} (TS)

4. \textit{International Campaign}. The Cubans gave us some indication that they might delay the initiation of an international campaign until after the November elections (since they are aware it could have a counter-productive effect). Nevertheless, it is quite possible that Castro might launch such a campaign as a reaction to our international efforts on the immigration and USINT issues. Since their arguments against the embargo, Guantanamo, and overflights are likely to have an appeal in the Third World, we need to be prepared to brief world-wide on our positions in a way which will erode the force of their campaign. Pastor and Tarnoff will draft such a briefing cable. (TS)

That you approve the steps described above.\textsuperscript{7} (U)

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\textsuperscript{4} A June 19 paper prepared for this meeting is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 18, Cuba, Refugees, 6/80.

\textsuperscript{5} Regarding the first San Jose conference, see footnote 7, Document 102. The second San Jose conference, held from June 30 to July 2, urged attendee nations to “continue entering into bilateral or other arrangements designed to permit persons wishing to leave Cuba to apply for admission and travel to nations willing to receive them. (Telegram 3763 from San Jose, July 2; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800318–0518)

\textsuperscript{6} Not found. See footnote 4, Document 113.

\textsuperscript{7} Carter checked neither the approve nor the disapprove option.
109. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter

Washington, June 30, 1980

SUBJECT
Halting More Cuban Refugees

David Aaron and Gene Eidenberg chaired a special Situation Room meeting on a report that there is a large vessel in Mariel Harbor in Cuba ready to bring up to 2,000 refugees to the States, possibly July 4. This vessel is unique in that it is not American but formerly British and now stateless. The Coast Guard and the other agencies represented are deeply concerned that if this vessel is permitted to land in the United States, there will be another wave of Cuban immigrants on such stateless vessels which number in the dozens in the Caribbean.

As a first step, we are contacting the British to see if they will tell the Cubans that the vessel is still legally British and that it should not be loaded with refugees to go to the United States. We don’t know if this will have any effect.

Everybody agreed that the key is to prevent the ship from arriving in the United States but that to do so will require either the use or threat of force. However, they further agreed that we do not wish to use force against the refugees themselves. With these two points in mind, the group discussed a wide range of options and developed the following concept for possible consideration:

—The Coast Guard would halt the vessel as it emerges from the Cuban 12-mile limit, turn the ship around and escort it back into Cuban territorial waters close enough to shore so that it can be anchored.
—The Cuban Government would then be told that it is responsible for the ship which is anchored in its own territorial waters.
—The Cuban Government would also be told if it takes hostile action against the Coast Guard ship escorting the stateless ship, the United States would retaliate.
—This operation would be accompanied by a show of U.S. navy and air power.

The purpose of this action would be to place the responsibility on the Cubans for initiating any use of force. However, it should be recognized that while boarding the vessel could probably take place

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 14, Cuba, 6/80. Secret; Sensitive. Carter wrote “Zbig” at the top of the page.
without incident, disabling it could result in violence, although the
Coast Guard would seek to do it surreptitiously.

There are obvious risks in any such operation. It could lead to a
serious military confrontation or clash with the Cubans. However,
without such a step, it is likely that the Cubans will find ways, such
as using stateless ships, to continue sending large numbers of Cubans
to the United States.

I recommend that this alternative be given high-level consideration
tomorrow in an SCC meeting in which we would get the judgements
of your senior advisors on the risks and desirability of attempting such
a response.

RECOMMENDATION

That you get the advice of an SCC on this option.²

² Carter checked the approve option, initialed, and wrote at the bottom of the page,
“Advise me today—We should move early & publicly to prevent the confrontation, but
face it if it comes—J”

110. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination
Committee Meeting¹

Washington, July 1, 1980 4:00–5:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Cuban Refugees

PARTICIPANTS

State
Secretary Edmund Muskie
Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher
John Bushnell, Ag. [Acting] Assistant Secretary for Bureau of Inter-American
Affairs
Ambassador Victor Palmieri, Special Coordinator for Refugees

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South,
Pastor, Country File, Box 18, Cuba: Refugees, 7/1–5/80. Secret. The meeting was held
in the White House Situation Room.
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

(1) Status of Blue Fire. The Coast Guard claims that it has identified the Blue Fire, a stateless vessel, docked in Mariel, but the CIA has not confirmed this yet. CIA will alert us when they know for certain. Since the boat could be loaded with 2,000 Cubans and on its way to the United States within 48 hours, we proceeded on the assumption that it is there and that there are other ships which could bring more Cubans to the U.S. illegally. (S)

(2) Objectives. Our objectives are to prevent any more boats from bringing Cubans to the U.S. illegally without unnecessarily endangering lives. The discussion focused on a range of options to achieve this objective. (S)

(3) Options. We explored the following options: (1) Step up current policy of trying to deter the flow through enforcement measures and trying to maximize international pressure on Castro to negotiate an orderly emigration program. (Comment: This has succeeded in reducing the flow, but boats are still coming, and there is a real possibility

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2 In telegram 174854 to Panama, July 2, the Department reported that the ship, known as the Kirk Dale/Blue Fire, had possible Panamanian registry, instead of British. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800318–1056)
that over a period of time large numbers of additional Cubans will arrive.) (2) We could send these boats to third countries for re-settlement. (Comment: It is not clear that any third country would assume such a responsibility even if we were to agree to finance such an operation.) (3) We could station a U.S. vessel at 12 miles where we would process the Cubans, permitting some to go to the U.S., and excluding others. (Comment: It is not clear that we will have any more success in returning these excludables than any others—like the criminals—who we have asked Cuba to accept, but it is likely that our acceptance of some of these Cubans would be an additional incentive for other Cubans to leave.) (4) We should seek some way to stop the boats and force them to return to Cuba, first by private diplomatic means and then with some public display of force. The SCC pursued this option in greatest detail. (S)

(4) U.S. Policy. The SCC recommended the following steps:

(1) Secretary of State Muskie should send Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez a strong note, which clearly, but in a non-threatening way, points out that we have reached the limit of our tolerance in permitting Cuba to send these vessels illegally to the United States.3 (S)

(2) We should position three or four U.S. naval vessels 12 miles from Mariel Harbor as a quiet demonstration that we are prepared to turn back vessels illegally bringing Cubans to the United States. (Because it may take as long as 48 hours for several of these vessels to reach that position, JCS has begun moving these vessels now.)4 (S)

(3) DOD will prepare a recommendation on whether we have the capability of intercepting boats going to Cuba with the possible intention of picking up Cubans for the voyage to the United States. State will look into the legalities of such an exercise. (S)

(4) DOD and the Coast Guard will prepare a plan on ways we could surreptitiously deposit the criminals and other undesirables, who have recently arrived from Cuba, somewhere in Cuba or on an island adjoining Cuba.5 (S)

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3 In the left margin beside this paragraph, Carter wrote, “ok.” In telegram 174997 to Havana, July 2, the Department transmitted Muskie’s message to Rodriguez. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 15, Cuba, 7–8/80)

4 In the left margin beside this paragraph, Carter wrote, “ok.”

5 The CIA consulted with the Defense Department, and on July 11, prepared a report that discussed options for the clandestine return of the Mariel refugees. The report is attached to an August 7 note from Davis to Turner, in which Davis stressed that neither he nor Defense Department officials found the prospect of a clandestine return promising. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00112R: Subject Files, Box 16, Folder 16: (SCC) Cuba)
(5) DOD and Coast Guard will examine a range of options on ways that illegal vessels can be stopped and returned to Cuba.  

(6) State will investigate the option of whether it would be desirable for us to process Cubans travelling on such vessels at sea.

(7) Justice will pursue its investigations of anyone seeking to engage in the illegal trafficking of undocumented Cubans to the U.S.

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Carter bracketed paragraphs (3), (4), and (5) and wrote in the left margin, “should have been done already. Expedite.”

In the left margin beside this paragraph, Carter wrote, “doubtful.”

In the left margin beside this paragraph, Carter wrote, “ok.” Below the paragraph, he wrote, “Prepare a public statement—have ready to issue when needed—J.” In telegram 5218 from Havana, July 4, the Interests Section reported that Rodriguez announced that the Kirk Dale/Blue Fire would not load refugees. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 18, Cuba, Refugees, 7/1-5/80)

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111. Memorandum From the National Intelligence Officer for Latin America (Davis) to Director of Central Intelligence Turner and the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Carlucci)  

Washington, July 3, 1980

SUBJECT

Mini-SCC Meeting on Cuba, 3 July 1980

This follow-up to the meetings of 30 June and 1 July continued the process of refining US options for preventing the movement of Cuban refugees to the US on large “mother ships”, such as the “Blue Fire”.

• Paragraphs 1–3 present some background on White House definition of the problem.
• Paragraphs 4–6 describe some of the diplomatic initiatives to force Castro to desist.

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1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00112R: Subject Files, Box 16, Folder 16: (SCC) Cuba. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Turner initialed the memorandum on July 17.
• Paragraphs 7–10 describe the military measures under consideration.
• Paragraphs 11–14 address the implications for the CIA.

The Problem

1. It is assumed—probably correctly—that the Castro regime intends to use the “Blue Fire” and other ships of like size obtained by Cuban-Americans as a means for ferrying large numbers of refugees to the US at a time. This is in response to the fact that the Coast Guard has very largely shut off the movement of small boats from the US to Mariel.

2. There is no evidence that the “Blue Fire” is being loaded, perhaps because of yesterday’s representation by the Panamanian government that the ship is under Panamanian registry and it does not want Cuba to use it as a ferry to the US. If the Cuban intention had been to have the boat arrive in the US as a “July 4 present”, this timetable has been thwarted. But the Cuban strategy of using relatively large ships as ferries remains a threat to the US.

3. The White House defines such a Cuban policy as an aggressive act against US sovereignty, specifically our immigration policy. Dr. Brzezinski has described it as “an invasion of the US”. The President wants it stopped—by diplomatic measures if possible; apparently, by military measures if necessary.

Diplomatic Measures

4. The US has made a closely-held diplomatic approach to Cuba for bilateral discussions on refugees. The Cubans have refused to discuss the refugees unless the US also discusses revision of the Guantanamo treaty. The President considers this linkage as blackmail and it has been rejected.

5. Secretary Muskie has sent a strongly-worded message to the Cubans stating that the US views the use of ships such as the “Blue Fire” as intolerable. The message stopped short of threatening the use of force. But the signal of possible use of force is being made through the deployment of additional USN ships in the Florida Straits. The message was to be delivered by Wayne Smith at 1330 on 3 July. [1½ lines not declassified]

6. Among the other diplomatic moves under consideration:

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2 In telegram 176862 to Havana, July 4, the Department reported on the July 3 statement by the Panamanian Government. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800322–0257)
3 See Document 108.
4 See Document 112.
—A second message from Secretary Muskie, this time threatening the use of force.
—A message from the FRG to the Soviets for the latter to bring pressure on Havana.
—Approaches to NATO and to the UN on the Cuban threat to peace.

Military Moves

7. The Coast Guard and DOD insist that there is no way to stop overloaded ships in international waters, without near certainty of large numbers of refugee casualties.

8. Two military alternatives are being considered to stop the “mother ships” (see Coast Guard options paper, attached).5

—US military personnel board a “mother ship” at sea, sail it onto Cuban atolls, and disable it there.

—The US establishes a blockade three miles off the Cuban shore, initially off Mariel, and interdicts suspected “mother ships” from reaching Cuba to onload refugees.

9. DOD and Coast Guard believe that either of these measures is likely to draw a military response from Cuba. DOD in particular (Kramer of ISA) showed lack of relish for these actions. Both ISA and JCS representatives requested time to build up US forces in the area.

10. Coast Guard and DOD were tasked with refining these plans and developing the cost estimates for effecting them.

Implications for CIA

11. There almost certainly will be additional meetings on the subject, possibly cabinet-level meetings.6

[Dated July 2; attached but not printed.
See footnote 5, Document 110.]
112. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, July 4, 1980, 0158Z

5217. Subj: Call on Rafael Rodriguez. Ref: (A) State 174997 (B) Havana 5213.2

1. S—Entire text.

2. I called on Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez at 1:30 p.m. July 3 and delivered Secretary's message (Ref A). After reading it carefully, Vice President said he appreciated message. There were some barbs in it, but tone and intent he took to be basically constructive. And it was almost always better to handle difficult matters through direct and private messages rather than through public statements. To my comment that this was admonition he should make to his own government rather than to us, he chuckled (in agreement?) and said it was to be hoped two governments could in future deal with their problems more on this basis than on that which had characterized their exchanges of past few months.

3. With respect to specific issue of stateless vessel which might be loading in Mariel, Vice President said he could not respond immediately; indeed, he not personally familiar with circumstances of case. What he could say to us in strict confidence was that Castro has made decision to do nothing which could be construed as deliberately provocative during months ahead. Mariel would remain open, at least technically, and Cubans reserved their options, but Castro had given instructions that additional departures not rpt not be handled in such a way as to place Carter administration in more difficult situation. I might have noticed in today's Granma, he said, that "News from Mariel" column will no longer be carried on daily basis (Ref B). This is meant as signal that a phase has ended.

4. I commented that loading of large stateless vessel would definitely be construed in U.S. as provocative. Vice President responded that while he would have to consult with Castro before giving us specific reply, he could repeat that they intended to take no action

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 15, Cuba, 7-8/80. Secret; Cherokee; Nodis. The White House Situation Room repeated this telegram as WH80817 to Oakland, California, for immediate delivery to Susan Clough, Carter's personal secretary, for the President.

2 Telegram 174997 to Havana, July 2, transmitted Muskie’s message. See footnote 3, Document 110. In telegram 5213 from Havana, July 3, the Interests Section reported that Granma was no longer publishing its "News from Mariel" column, indicating that traffic at the port had dwindled. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800320–0501)
which could be interpreted as provocative. He suggested we leave it at that for moment. He will consult with Castro and then get back to me.

5. On matter of refugees in USINT, he said he had informed Castro of our conversation of June 30.\(^3\) They were considering ideas therein raised and he was trying to push matter in direction of solution—at least partial solution for moment which hopefully would then lead to full one. He was not yet in position to give me definite response, however. “I have to let Fidel mull it over another few days,” he concluded, adding that he would be in touch with me soon on matter.

6. I informed Vice President that Radio Free Cuba idea was initiative of Senator Helms, not the administration. He expressed relief, noting “our relations are bad enough as it is without adding more complications. What we need is truce, not escalation.”

7. Comment: Carlos Rafael Rodriguez’ response, while not definitive, was encouraging. I left convinced he intended use his influence to turn off loading of Kirk Dale if it was still ongoing. He may not have been aware of today’s SR71 overflight,\(^4\) however, and even if he was, it may result in his being overruled. Cubans will doubtless be angered over flight which resulted in loud sonic boom almost knocking members USINT from their chairs and almost certainly resulting in material damage in Havana area. I fully appreciate and share concern over loading of Kirk Dale/Blue Fire but would it not have been advisable to hold off on overflight at least until we heard what Carlos Rafael Rodriguez had to say on subject? If any progress was made in meeting with him this afternoon it may well have been counteracted by this morning’s flight.

8. Action Recommended: I would strongly urge that US Naval vessels, which I understand are now deployed close in to Cuban coast, be withdrawn toward Key West. They have doubtless already been seen on Cuban radar. Point has been made. Our seriousness of purpose, if that was intent in sending them, has been stressed. To leave them where they are will be seen by Cubans as blatant threat and they

\(^3\) In telegram 5172 from Havana, June 30, Smith reported on his meeting with Rodriguez, noting that Cuban attitudes toward the refugee situation in the U.S. Interests Section were becoming more flexible, but Cuban officials were concerned about the prospects of Radio Free Cuba. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870149-0426)

\(^4\) According to Smith’s memoirs, Rodriguez, at one point, told him that the SR–71 overflights “almost ruined everything,” because Cuban officials wished to allow the Kirk Dale/Blue Fire to load in retaliation. (Smith, The Closest of Enemies, p. 233)
more likely to react in ways which would undercut any possibility accomplishment our aims.\textsuperscript{5}

Smith

\textsuperscript{5} Telegram WH80817 contains a typed note by Brezinski that reads, “Reference paragraph 8, I am making sure with Secretary Brown that we are not too.” The note is cut off at the bottom of the page.

\section*{113. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section in Cuba to the Department of State\textsuperscript{1}}

Havana, July 7, 1980, 1415Z

5232. Subject: US Gestures To Strengthen Hand Of Moderates. Ref: A) Havana 5218 B) Havana 4844 C) Havana 4980.\textsuperscript{2}

1. S—Entire text.

2. The Cuban leadership’s decision not to load the \textit{Kirk Dale/Blue Fire} was the first indication in months of a more reasonable attitude on their part—and the first time since April \textsuperscript{3}that Castro seems to have accepted the counsel of moderates such as Carlos Rafael Rodriguez. It is eminently in our interests to push the leadership further in this direction. Two quick steps which would contribute to that objective come immediately to mind:

A) Make immediately the long-delayed public statement condemning maritime hijacking. Such a statement in any event is needed and

\textsuperscript{1} Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 15, Cuba, 7–8/80. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis.

\textsuperscript{2} For telegram 5218, see footnote 8, Document 110. In telegrams 4844 and 4980 from Havana, June 10 and June 17, the Interests Section forwarded Cuban protest notes regarding alleged U.S. violations of Cuban airspace on June 9 and June 12. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800283–1039; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800296–0282)

\textsuperscript{3} See footnote 2, Document 92.
would be consistent with our present efforts to halt illegal maritime activity of all kinds between Cuba and the US.\(^4\)

B) Answer the two protest notes on violation of Cuban air space by planes from the Guantanamo Naval Base (see Havana 4844 of June 10 and Havana 4980 of June 17), probably by indicating that if there were incursions on the part of our planes at the base, they were inadvertent and are to be regretted. We would, of course, not mention the SR–71 overflight also protested in the first Cuban note.\(^5\)

3. These two steps, and/or others like them, would strengthen the hand of the moderates by suggesting that favorable actions such as halting the loading of the \textit{Kirk Dale/Blue Fire}, which they recommended, will be met by positive gestures on our part. They will thus also enhance a solution to the USINT refugee problem, a solution which will depend very much on those same moderates.

\textbf{Smith}

\footnotesize

\(^4\) According to a memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter, July 11, the President approved a plan to 1) condemn forcible hijackings, 2) guarantee an investigation in each hijacking case, 3) inform the Cuban Government of the change in U.S. policy regarding hijacking. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Unfiled Material, Box 128, Cuba) The Justice Department issued a statement on July 18 that it would prosecute persons who hijacked boats or planes to come to the United States. Telegram 189380 to Havana, July 18, transmitted the statement to the Interests Section. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800346–0028)

\(^5\) In telegram 183946 to Havana, July 12, the Department transmitted a message for the Cuban Government that maintained that U.S. officials were unable to confirm whether the United States had violated Cuban airspace on June 9 and June 12, but nonetheless vowed “to take all possible steps to avoid such incidents,” adding that had any U.S. aircraft strayed, “the U.S. can assure the Cuban Government that such actions were regrettable errors on the part of the aircraft pilots and do not reflect U.S. policy.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 18, Cuba, Refugees, 8/80)
114. Memorandum From the National Intelligence Officer for Latin America (Davis) to Director of Central Intelligence Turner, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Carlucci), and the Director of the National Foreign Assessment Center (Clarke)¹

Washington, July 28, 1980

SUBJECT
SCC Meeting on Cuba, 26 July 1980

1. No action required, for your information only.

2. David Aaron directed the meeting toward plans for preparation of a comprehensive set of options on the refugee issue. CIA is to assist State in developing the “Negotiation” option. DOD has the lead on the “Confrontation” option, and OMB on the “Status Quo” option.

3. Another meeting of this “working group” is scheduled for 30 July (Aaron, Eidenberg, White House; Pastor, NSC; Bushnell, Palmieri, State; White, OMB; Admiral Costello, Coast Guard; Michel, Justice; Admiral Schuler, General Johnston, DOD).

4. A meeting of principals is likely to follow shortly thereafter.

5. The Status Quo Option. Various participants anticipated an increasing leakage of boats through the Coast Guard “blockade”. The increasing cost and dangers of the inflow, even at the present rate of 500–700 a week, were depicted as “an explosive situation” by White House and OMB participants, and also by Palmieri, Coordinator for Refugee Affairs.

6. The problems surrounding the 1,700 major criminals and the 800 mentally and psychologically incompetents were labelled particularly serious. They are now held under concentration camp conditions, and legal proceedings may force their release from the camps. In recent days, some arrivals have come directly from Cuban prisons.

7. Various proposals for strengthening the “blockade” were received by Coast Guard and Justice as either ineffective, illegal, or both (e.g., closing Key West and other ports). Pleas for improved legislation and more rigorous prosecution of boat owners were noted by the Justice representative.

8. Presidential Perspective. Eidenberg and Aaron indicated that the President wanted the flow stopped—but without military confronta-

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00112R: Subject Files, Box 16, Folder 16: (SCC) Cuba. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified].
tion. The purpose of developing the “Status Quo” option was to indicate the difficulties in stopping the flow, as well as the increased costs and dangers of the present situation.

9. Negotiation Option. Negotiation with Castro was discussed more seriously than in past meetings. NIO/LA presented CIA views on Castro’s position, and recommended consideration of carrot and stick approach (some concessions about discussing other bilateral problems; warnings about confrontation), to get him to the table.

10. Confrontation Option. Various plans for forcing the “undesirables” back on Cuba have been under consideration by DOD and Coast Guard. All seem flawed. NIO/LA made the point that if the US chooses confrontation we should not complicate the problems of success by centering our action on return of the undesirables.

11. Participants agreed that all three options were difficult and unappealing. The goal of the followup meetings (first the working group, then the principals) was to prepare for the President a single document that laid out the choices, costs, and risks. Because of the much greater pressures for people to leave Cuba, the much lower tolerance of US public opinion to receive refugees, and such complications as a more vigorous Cuban-American community and the presence of the undesirables, the participants agreed that the US faced a much tougher problem than the similar Cuban refugee confrontation in the 1960s.


a. Assistant Secretary Bowdler asked President Lopez Portillo to inform Castro, during his early August visit to Cuba, that the US considers the continuation of the present flow of illegal refugees as a provocative act.2

b. Aaron indicated that the White House considers large shipments of refugees (“mother boat” or flotilla) and the undesirables as more serious problems than the refugees in the US Interests Section. Even the current flow is considered more provocative than the latter problem.

c. Eidenberg indicated that President Carter’s decision on the “Blue Fire”, had it sailed with refugees was (1) let it pass out of Cuban waters without confrontation, but (2) once in US waters, prevent it from landing.

d. After the meeting, NIO/LA made the point to Deputy Assistant Secretary Busnell that though CIA had not seen all the traffic on negotiations, the Cuban insistence on linking negotiations on the refugees with

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2 Bowdler visited Mexico in July. Lopez Portillo visited Cuba from July 31 to August 3.
the Guantanamo Treaty should not be taken as Castro’s “bottom line”. Busnell, who presumably has seen all the traffic, said the exchanges tell us “nothing” about Castro’s thinking.

Jack Davis

See Document 108.

115. Memorandum From the National Intelligence Officer for Latin America (Davis) to Director of Central Intelligence Turner, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Carlucci), and the Director of the National Foreign Assessment Center (Clarke)

Washington, August 6, 1980

SUBJECT

Mini-SCC Meeting on Cuba, 31 July 1980

1. No action required, for your information only.

2. This follow-on to the meeting of 26 July, conveyed a lowered sense of urgency. Chairman David Aaron continued the movement toward comprehensive options on the Cuban refugee problem, but slowed the pace. The next meeting is scheduled for the week of 11 August.

3. Work on the “Status Quo” option had not been completed at the time of the meeting. State’s Coordinator for Refugee Affairs (Palmieri) characterized the present situation as not quite severe enough to justify either the “Negotiation” or the “Confrontation” options. In contrast, at the previous meeting, he and others had characterized the status quo as “explosive”.

4. Admiral Costello (Coast Guard), however, held to an alarmist view. He saw already rising pressures against the Coast Guard’s infor-

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00112R: Subject Files, Box 16, Folder 16: (SCC) Cuba. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified].

2 See Document 114.
mal blockade of boats seeking to move from Key West to Cuba to pick up refugees. If the early court cases go against the government and exonerate boat owners of charges of illegal action in ferrying refugees, Costello expects a renewed flood of boats and general disregard of the Coast Guard’s interdiction efforts.

5. The Justice Department representative stated he did not expect to win all the cases, and might lose most of them, because of sentiment in favor of family reunification in Southern Florida.

6. State (Assistant Secretary Bowdler) tabled a preliminary draft of the negotiation options, which reflected some of the views conveyed to State in an informal CIA paper. In general, State is more pessimistic than CIA on the likelihood of Castro accepting limited US concessions in exchange for regulating the refugee flow. Furthermore, there is little support within State, apparently, for extending limited concessions (e.g., minor modifications of the embargo, termination of SR–71 overflights, opening up the agenda to other non-refugee bilateral issues).

7. DOD is apparently similarly unenthusiastic about its preliminary explorations of confrontation options (e.g., a blockade of Mariel or of Cuba’s entire North Coast). DOD is concerned both about costs of deployments and about the likelihood of Cuban military reaction—including an attack against Guantanamo.

Jack Davis

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3 Neither the State Department nor the CIA paper was not found.
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

[Cuban Refugees]

Mariel Harbor remains open and despite vigorous efforts by the Coast Guard, there remains a continuing flow of Cubans to the US, which averaged about 500 a week until it recently increased to about 1100. There are now about 37 boats in Mariel. There is no indication that the Cubans will do anything provocative like sending all the boats at once, but there is also no indication that Mariel will be closed. In addition, we have a continuing problem with the fact that the Government of Cuba will not accept the criminals or other undesirables who have been brought to the US. (S)

We reviewed three sets of options for dealing with the problems of the continuing flow of Cubans and the repatriation of criminals and other undesirables: (1) Modifications on Current Policy. Apparently, we have the legal authority and with substantial cost the capability to keep boats off of Rt. 1 and to close all ports in South Florida in order to stop the flotilla, but the economic impact of such an act and the political consequences would probably make this option prohibitive. Justice does not believe that a new, more specific law would be any more helpful in deterring another flotilla. State does not think that we could induce a third country such as Honduras to accept many future refugees for re-settlement, but they have agreed to take another look at it. (2) Diplomacy. With regard to diplomatic negotiations with Cuba, State has prepared a paper with options, all of which call for alterations in our overall policy to Cuba (particularly on the embargo) as a way to...

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 19, Cuba: Refugees, Mini-SCC Meeting, 8/20/80, and SCC Meeting 8/28/80 [I], 8/80. Secret. A list of participants for this meeting was not found. A covering memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter reads in part, “The meeting was difficult. There was considerable resistance on the part of the various agencies, since the unusual nature of these problems requires actions and decisions outside their normal operating procedures. If we are to get the kind of coordinated action that we require to deal with these two complex problems, we will need your firm guidance to set the tone.” Carter underlined the sentence “The meeting was difficult” and wrote, “cc Zbig, Lloyd—I expressed my wishes clearly in staff meeting Thursday. Act to carry them out—I will issue directives or ask Congress for clear law as needed—J.”
induce Castro to the bargaining table on the refugee issue; these options do not offer anything useful. We are seeking support from OAS countries for a resolution which would reaffirm the basic principles of respect for other nations’ immigration laws, which Cuba has violated. We intend to press for that resolution in the OAS and then seek additional support from the ASEAN countries for a UN resolution, which we hope will have the effect of embarrassing and restraining Castro.

(3) Military Options. We examined a number of options prepared by DOD to forcibly return to Cuba the criminals and other undesirables, but concurred with DOD that these involved unnecessarily high risks of a military confrontation in a way which would make us appear ineffective or needlessly provocative. Harold Brown will reexamine several other ideas suggested at the meeting and forward them for further consideration on Monday. Coast Guard and DOD indicated that they could significantly reduce the flow of Cubans to the US if you so direct, although only with substantial additional cost.

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2 Presumably the paper tabled at the July 31 Mini-SCC meeting. See Document 115 and footnote 3 thereto.
3 The Department of Defense prepared a paper on August 9 about Cuban refugees, in anticipation of a Monday, August 11 meeting. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 18, Refugees, 8/80)
4 Carter underlined the phrase “significantly reduce the flow of Cubans to the US.”
5 Carter drew an arrow pointing to the phrase “although only with substantial additional cost” and wrote below the paragraph, “How, and at what cost?”
MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES COORDINATOR FOR REFUGEE AFFAIRS

SUBJECT

Determination pursuant to Section 2(c) (1) of the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962, as amended, and Amending Presidential Determination Number 80–18

Pursuant to Section 2(c) (1) of the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962, as amended (the “Act”), I hereby determine that Presidential Determination Number 80–18 is amended by striking paragraph three of the Determination.²

I further determine that unexpected, urgent refugee and migration needs continue to exist in Florida and in other localities and that it is important to the national interest to continue assistance to those Cubans and Haitians arriving in the United States and applying for political asylum.

I further determine that a total of up to $20 million shall be made available from the United States Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund for the purposes of processing, transporting, caring and associated administrative costs for assisting such asylum applicants on such terms and conditions as the United States Coordinator for Refugee Affairs shall determine on my behalf or for the purposes described in Presidential Determination Number 80–16,³ as amended.

The United States Coordinator for Refugee Affairs is requested to inform the appropriate committees of the Congress of this Determination and the obligation of funds under this authority.

This Determination shall be published in the Federal Register.

Jimmy Carter

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 18, Cuba: Refugees, 8/80. No classification marking.

² Paragraph 3 of Presidential Determination 80–18, May 2, reads, “I further determine that a total of up to $10 million shall be made available from the United States Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund for the purposes of processing, transporting, caring, and associated administrative costs for assisting such asylum applicants on such terms and conditions as the United States Coordinator for Refugee Affairs shall determine on my behalf or for the purposes described in Presidential Determination Number 80–16, as amended.” (Ibid.)

³ See footnote 2, Document 90.
118. Summary of Conclusions of a Mini-Special Coordination Committee Meeting

Washington, August 20, 1980

Summary of Conclusions

1. Overview of Current Situation. The “trickle” of Cubans into Florida continues at about 80–100 per day (roughly twice as many as from Haiti), with a relatively higher percentage of family members than before. Incoming processing is handled by INS in Miami, which is over-burdened. The Coast Guard estimates that there are about 35 boats in Mariel now and an average of 3–5 boats going south and 2 northbound per day. The Coast Guard estimates that its interdiction rate is about 50%. Only about 16,000 Cubans remain in camps, but of these about 1500 have serious psychiatric problems, and an additional 2000 unaccompanied minors, many of them also with serious psychological problems. In addition, over 1700 have confessed to serious crimes and are incarcerated in federal prison. Still, the Refugee Coordinator concludes that we have a mechanism in place at this time to manage a flow of 2000–3000 new Cuban entrants per month with some strain on the budget. Wayne Smith, Chief of our Interest Section in Havana, believes that Castro wants to keep Mariel open, permitting a small flow, but that he is unlikely to permit the departure of any large boats or many more criminals. (S)

2. Legal Situation. The Justice Department is vigorously pursuing all possible punitive actions against those persons involved in illegally importing undocumented aliens from Cuba, but Coast Guard feels that the laws are not specific or direct enough to act as a full deterrent. Justice indicated that there is a bill pending in Congress which is relevant to this problem and that they will urgently consult with Committee Chairmen to see if we could get this legislation passed soon. Justice also agreed to examine whether any modifications in that bill or any additional legislation is necessary. Justice feels that we are at the point of maximum deterrence as they have not lost any cases yet, but Justice agreed to draft a statement which the Attorney General could deliver, indicating the seriousness of the problem and trying to

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raise the consciousness of those who are dealing with this matter in the courts. Justice also agreed to look into two cases where businesses in Florida have been used to send money to Cuba, assisting those participating in the boatlift; these would be violations of the embargo. (S)

3. **New Plans for Stopping the Outflow of Boats.** Justice agreed to develop a plan in consultation with the Coast Guard and with State and local law enforcement officials for monitoring, and if necessary at some future point, interdicting the movement of boats across the causeway going to Key West with the intention of sailing to Cuba. This plan will include the idea of setting up a checkpoint on the causeway to question people with boats. Such a checkpoint would serve as a psychological deterrent; it would provide a data base to chart irregular flows; and Justice could use the information in prosecuting those who ignore the warning.² (S)

4. **Returning the Criminals and Undesirables.** We have already identified 1700 criminals and 1500 emotionally disturbed people, whom we would like to repatriate to Cuba, and we estimate that there might be as many as 5000–7000, whom we would like to exclude. Thus far, the Justice Department has completed “final orders” for returning 70 individuals, and they expect to be able to complete action on 1000 cases by the end of the year. This could be accelerated to October. The group examined a number of military options for forcibly returning the criminals to Cuba, but agreed that the options are not feasible. We will not be able to repeat the military action and are not ready legally to move the 70 people now. Moreover, the risk of detection and thus military confrontation is high and the current environment is not suitable for such an action. If we were faced with another Blue Fire-type incident, we might consider intercepting such a boat, and DOD was tasked to do a paper on that, but absent that, no one would recommend a military approach at this point. (Gene Eidenberg suggests that we also consider the possibility of intercepting refugee boats from Haiti outside the three-mile limit and returning the people to Haiti.) We will seek to encourage Cuba to repatriate those individuals directly, and through actions we will take in the OAS, UN and the Inter-American Court on Human Rights. (S)

5. **Reducing the Flow of Boats at Sea.** Currently, the Coast Guard interdicts and turns around about half the number of boats intending to go to Cuba. The Group explored a number of military options aimed at significantly reducing the flow by 70% and 90%. DOD estimated that it would involve 32 small combatants (DD/FF), 24 patrol craft, 1

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² In the margin to the left of the paragraph, Carter wrote, “ok.”
LSD/LHA, and 6 AWACS at a cost of about $500,000 a day to achieve a 90% interdiction rate. To do this, however, would affect scheduled deployments in other vital areas. DOD judges that it could provide a 70–75% interdiction rate with a lot fewer forces and at the rate of about $75,000 per day. In light of a number of questions raised, DOD promised to re-examine the costs and return with more precise estimates of the budgetary and the opportunity costs and political/military implications for these two options. (S)

6. Negotiations with Cuba. A number of options were reviewed, and the group tasked State to refine one which aimed at beginning a discussion with the Cubans on a narrow range of subjects dealing with the emigration issue and suggest a wider discussion some time in the future. The objective would be to test the intention of the Cubans to shut off Mariel and accept criminals and other undesirables for repatriation in return for a dialogue and a process, which could perhaps develop into a wider range of agreements on the movement of people between the US and Cuba. (S)

7. International Strategy. Although the group did not have an opportunity to review the strategy, State intends to call a meeting of the OAS Permanent Council soon with the purpose of seeking a resolution on: (a) respect for other nations’ immigration laws; and (b) repatriation of a nation’s citizens, including criminals. We would then consult with ASEAN nations and seek a similar resolution at the UN General Assembly this fall. (S)
8. Activities in Cuba and the Caribbean. David Newsom chaired an interagency meeting on August 20 to review the findings of an ongoing intelligence community exercise to monitor possible Soviet moves in Cuba and the Caribbean. The review concluded that Soviet military activity in the area has not reached any of the thresholds which would pose a threat to U.S. interests or require a U.S. response. The Soviets have been pursuing a relatively cautious military posture. There is, for example, no evidence of significant deliveries of sophisticated military equipment, of Soviet fleet activities in the area or of visits of Soviet submarines to Cuba during recent months, and the Soviet brigade appears to be maintaining its normal training cycle. There is no evidence of any new ballistic missiles being delivered to Cuba, and the SA-9s deployed with the Soviet brigade are of limited (40 kilometers) range.

Newsom asked the CIA to continue its monitoring of Soviet activities in Cuba and the Caribbean area. The interagency group will review the situation again in October and will remain in operation to report to you as necessary on Soviet/Cuban challenges to the U.S. and on our efforts to anticipate or respond to such challenges.

1 Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Box 8, 15. Secret. Carter initialed at the top of the page. Pastor sent an excerpt of this report to Aaron on August 21. In the margin, Aaron commented, “This is bullshit. This must not happen again. Why were we not included? Pastor, what the hell is this?” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 16, Cuba, 8–9/80)

2 In the margin to the left of this paragraph, Carter wrote, “good.”
120. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the Cabinet Secretary (Eidenberg) to President Carter

Washington, August 29, 1980

SUBJECT
SCC Meeting—Cuban Refugees

The Special Coordination Committee met today to discuss the Intelligence report on a large ship in Mariel harbor which you indicated should be stopped from entering US waters—and several other topics related to the Cuban refugees. The results of that meeting were as follows:

1. Large Ship in Mariel Harbor. It appears that the Intelligence report on the large ship loading refugees in Mariel harbor was not very “fresh.” The Coast Guard reported at the SCC meeting that a large ship arrived yesterday in Key West with 298 Cubans on board—almost certainly the ship referred to in the report. This conclusion was supported [1½ lines not declassified]. You will recall that the Intelligence item estimated a capacity of 400 passengers for the ship—not inconsistent with the roughly 300 passengers on the ship that arrived yesterday. While the capacity of this ship was unusually large (the average has been about 60 passengers per boat), it is not unprecedented. You should also be aware that the daily arrival rate over the last few weeks has been two to three boats and about 180 passengers.

2. Interdiction of Southbound Boats. Based on a DOD options paper, it is recommended that the Navy and Coast Guard be directed to supplement their forces in the area in order to increase the interdiction of southbound boats from the current level of about 50% to a level of 70–75%. The incremental cost, according to Graham Claytor, will be $75,000 a day. The specific Defense Department proposal is attached at Tab A.

3. Interdiction of Northbound Boats. If you wish to interdict northbound boats loaded (usually overloaded) with refugees, this can be done either just outside Cuba’s claimed 12-mile limit or close to the

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 18, Cuba, Refugees, 8/80. Secret. Sent for information. Carter initialed at the top of the page.

2 A copy of the paper is attached to the Summary of Conclusions in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800128–1281.

3 In the margin to the left of the paragraph, Carter wrote, “do so.”

4 Not attached and not found.
US 3-mile limit. In either case, this will probably require the use of force and a possible loss of life for the passengers on the northbound boats. They also may simply jump into the sea in which case the Navy and Coast Guard have an international obligation to rescue them and bring them to the states. In this context, it should be noted that virtually all the passengers currently embarking from Mariel harbor are believed to be relatives of Cubans already in the US. An alternative to risking the lives of the refugees in the open sea would be to blockade Mariel harbor or otherwise threaten the Cubans with military action. This would involve penetration of Cuban waters and territory and almost certain conflict with Cuban armed forces. Thus, any decision to interdict northbound traffic involves the threat or use of force and possible loss of life as well as a major confrontation with the Cubans. You could decide to instruct DOD and the Coast Guard to deny entry to US waters to either all or large vessels. Assuming the Cubans would not permit these boats to return to Cuba, we would face the prospect of American-owned vessels loaded with Cuban nationals floating in the Florida straits with no available port of entry.

4. Negotiations. The State Department has developed some possible negotiating scenarios set forth at Tab B. They do not cover the possibility of a political message being delivered to Castro, but could, in fact, accompany such a message. Recent reports from Cuba indicate that the Cubans believe that they are not being provocative, but do not believe any genuine negotiations are possible until after our election. The State Department tends to favor Option 2 in the attached paper (Tab B), “Step-by-Step Talks with Minimal US Concessions.” Given the unproductive nature of the Tarnoff/Pastor conversations and the fact that the Cubans are after bigger game—lifting the embargo, achieving US withdrawal from Guantanamo, normalization of relations, etc.—it seems unlikely that this narrow approach would work. However, it is worth discussing with your principal advisers at the breakfast on Friday. In this connection, we will want to make sure that the level and type of representation of any diplomatic initiative does not give Castro the opportunity to embarrass us politically. Thus, you may wish to find a deniable way to probe his receptivity to productive negotiations.

5. Legislation. Justice and local enforcement officials have been ineffective in inhibiting the reuse of US boats to transport refugees from Cuba. Prosecution of boat owners has been at about 20%, due to the present need to demonstrate probable owner consent prior to prosecution. Justice will be making another effort to find some means of expe-

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6 See Documents 41 and 108.
diting prosecution of boat owners under existing laws. As previously reported to you, the Justice Department will be pressing for a review of the law that will permit seizures irrespective of owner consent or involvement. House action, however, is not expected until September 9 when Liz Holtzman, the designated Floor Manager of the legislation, will return to Washington. Justice, in concert with Frank Moore’s office, will be seeking an alternative Floor Manager in order to expedite this legislation.  

In addition to the continuing Cuban entries, we have been receiving approximately 50 Haitian refugees per day over the same period. The situation in south Florida is critical in terms of our ability to receive, process and settle these people. Presently we have 900 Cubans in a tent city in Miami; 1,000 Haitains in an unhealthy former Nike missile site in Dade County; and another 700 Cubans in a second former Nike missile site in Dade County.

We are developing urgent plans to deal with the situation which will involve relocating some of these people out of the south Florida area. Our relocation plans will be very sensitive to community attitudes.

7 In the margin to the left of the paragraph, Carter wrote, “This is ridiculous! Find any ‘germane’ law & get it passed.”

8 Beneath this paragraph, Carter wrote: “Zbig—You & Lloyd [Cutler] compile a firm directive for me encompassing everything that we can do to minimize this illegal influx—Expedite—J. P.S. I called K.” Presumably a reference to Charles H. Kirbo, whom the President telephoned on August 29. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary)
121. Memorandum From President Carter to Attorney General
Civiletti

Washington, August 30, 1980

SUBJECT
SEIZURE OF VESSELS BRINGING ILLEGAL CUBAN ENTRANTS TO U.S.

I am very concerned that we do everything possible to achieve vigorous, prompt, fair and effective enforcement of the laws against bringing illegal Cuban entrants to the United States, including the seizure and subsequent forfeiture of vessels used for these purposes.

I request that you and the Department exert your maximum efforts to enforce these laws, with special emphasis on the vessel seizure provisions.

I am advised that the seizure process has been retarded by the need of the immigration officer to satisfy himself that there is probable cause to believe that the owner or master of the vessel was a consenting party or privy to the illegal act. I understand you are reviewing the existing regulations and enforcement guidelines to determine whether they can be administratively modified so as to simplify the applicable standard for determining consent or privity. I would also like you to press forward to obtain the enactment of pending legislation that would, among numerous other amendments of the immigration laws, modify the existing consent and privity requirements. My legislative staff will give you all possible assistance for this purpose. With their help it may be possible to move rapidly by identifying a pending bill approaching enactment, to which an appropriate amendment of the vessel seizure provisions alone could be added.

The national interest requires that we enforce our existing laws (and amend both existing laws and regulations if necessary) so as to deter the continuing violation of these laws by our own citizens and residents. I am counting on you and your colleagues to do your utmost to accomplish this objective.

Jimmy Carter

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 18, Cuba, Refugees, 8/80. No classification marking. In an attached handwritten note to Aaron, August 29, Brzezinski reported, “DA, Lloyd [Cutler] will develop this p.m. the part dealing with law enforcement and [unclear]. You shall do the rest: i.e. DOD Coast Guard (negotiations need not be touched) legislative push—i.e. Fred [likely Frank Moore] ZB.”
122. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)  

Washington, September 3, 1980

SUBJECT
US Trade Policies with State-Controlled Economies—A Long-Term Idea (U)

During a luncheon I had with Bob Herzstein, Under Secretary of Commerce, on US trade policies as they relate to Central America and the Caribbean, we also discussed the comparative disadvantage which the US has in trading with state-controlled economies, like those in the Communist bloc. Communist countries are well positioned to manipulate one US corporation against another, and maximize not only their economic advantage, but also our dependence on them, since they are in a better position to control the flow than we. (C)

I have long wondered whether it is not possible for the US to consider setting up a USG-exporting company just for coordinating trade with Communist bloc countries. Such a coordinator could manage the flow in a way which maximizes our economic advantage and their dependence. Instead of permitting the Communist countries to let our companies bid against each other, we could define the areas of trade and investment, and determine which company would participate, perhaps by a lottery. The Communists could then take it or leave it. (C)

In the case of Cuba, we have tended to view the trade embargo as either a single unit, or as discrete elements (e.g., on food, medicine, etc.); we have never really focused on ways we could manipulate trade to our advantage rather than Cuba’s. I told Herzstein that I did not anticipate that we would be considering any alteration in the embargo anytime in the near future, but I did expect that the embargo would not last forever. I wondered whether Commerce would consider contracting with some consultant for a long-term study on how we could control trade with a state-controlled economy so that we kept that country on a short leash, rather than ourselves. He expressed interest in the idea, agreeing there was a gap in our policy. I have followed up with his staff to sketch out some ideas, always making it clear that this is not a White House effort or even idea, and we are not thinking about changing the embargo in any way. (C)

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 16, Cuba, 8–9/80. Confidential. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Owen and Odom.
I am sending copies of this to Henry Owen and Bill Odom because of their experience with trade and COCOM. I would appreciate comments or ideas.2

2 In the margin, Odom wrote, “Bob—You are on a key issue. If E-W trade is to continue, we must develop an alliance trade coordination policy precisely to deny the ‘planned’ economy’s advantage and to control political aspects. This should be on the Economic Summit agenda for next summer.”

123. Memorandum for the Record by the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff)1

Washington, September 8, 1980

SUBJECT

Account of Mr. Paul Austin’s Conversation with Cuban President Fidel Castro

On September 6, 1980 I visited Mr. Austin in his Atlanta office to hear his account of the meeting held in Havana on Wednesday, September 3, with Castro. Austin was accompanied in Havana by Coca Cola’s Chief for Latin American Operations, Mr. Ted Circuit. Castro had Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez present for the second half of the meeting which lasted three hours at his official office. Also on the Cuban side was translator/notetaker Juanita Vera.

Austin said that he opened the meeting by conveying to Castro a message from the President roughly as follows:

The President asked Austin to present his compliments and good wishes to Castro. The President made clear his genuine interest in establishing good relations with Cuba if he is reelected. This was evident to Austin in his conversation with the President the day before (September 2). The President wanted to propose a two-stage plan to Castro. First, there should be a face-to-face summit meeting between President Carter and Castro before Christmas. This meeting would be held without aides and the two Presidents could discuss frankly the problems between the U.S. and Cuba, and set the agenda for the negoti--

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 15, Cuba, 9–10/80. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis; Alpha Channel.

2 Paul Austin was the Chairman of the Coca-Cola Company.
ation of outstanding issues. Second, starting in January, there would begin a series of meetings between officials from the U.S. and Cuba to try to negotiate differences. The President and Castro might attend the first of these sessions but the ongoing talks, which Austin said he thought had to be confidential, would be pursued by this small, select group in an informal setting—not a conference atmosphere. Two or three people should be present on each side.

Austin then stressed the importance of Cuba adopting a restrained and neutral position during a U.S. election year. He added that President Carter was prepared to proceed with the lifting of the embargo against Cuba and to make available a wide range of American medicines to Cuba by the end of the year. But he expected that Castro would also make some moves, namely: (a) adopt a different attitude on the question of refugees leaving Cuba; (2) reduce Cuban criticisms of the U.S. in Third World councils; and (3) stop intemperate public attacks against the U.S.

Austin then referred to the desirability of stopping the refugee flow from Mariel and the need for Cuba to begin taking back without reprisals some of the refugees who have entered the U.S. illegally, possibly starting with those who wish to return to Cuba. He mentioned U.S. willingness to renegotiate a new hijacking agreement with Cuba, but did not refer to the possibility of the U.S. discussing early next year an agreement for regular commercial air service with Cuba.

Austin concluded by expressing the hope that his meeting with Castro could remain secret, without any publicity.

Castro, whom Austin found to be extremely friendly and low-key but always the “consummate actor,” responded that he had received the President’s message with pleasure and gratitude. He appreciated the President’s willingness to find mutually beneficial solutions to outstanding issues. The U.S. and Cuba, which exist 90 miles apart, should live in harmony in this modern, troubled world. If the U.S. and Cuba establish better relations, this would be a good example for the rest of the world.

Castro said that he was very interested in both the short-range and long-range objectives that Austin had conveyed on behalf of President Carter. He agreed completely with the proposal.

Castro said that he hoped that President Carter had read carefully his July 19 statement in Managua and his July 26 speech in Havana.\(^3\)

\(^3\) In both Castro’s July 19 statement and his July 26 speech, the Cuban leader focused his criticism of the United States on the Republican Party platform. (Telegram 3381 from Managua, July 20; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800349–0109; telegram 5526 from Havana, July 27; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800349–0109)
because they were intended to show a moderate attitude on dealing with the U.S. and the need for the two countries to have better relations.

Castro then went on to make the point strongly that while the American elections were none of Cuba’s business, he had the right to believe and to warn the world that there would be a threat to world peace if Reagan won the election. He asked Austin to make sure to convey this specific point to President Carter. Describing himself as the leader of the Third World, Castro reiterated that he has the responsibility to warn the Lesser Developed Countries that this threat to world peace existed, although he could not say this publicly. He had found strong feelings against the Republican Party platform in the Third World and among the leaders of Western Europe who were also very concerned. The recent coup in Bolivia was, he said, a “Reagan plot”.

Assuring Austin that Cuba understood all the intricacies of an American election year, Castro said that he would do everything possible to be cooperative with the U.S., for example:

1) Cuba was handing out extremely severe jail sentences to all air hijackers, and the planes, crews and passengers were immediately returned to the U.S. He wanted President Carter told that he should not worry about Cuba’s attitude on airplane hijacking, as he was determined to take strong measures against such “air piracy”.

2) Cuba had tried to handle the USINT “embarrassment” with moderation, although it considered the action of the U.S. and those who occupied our offices illegal. While not agreeing that these refugees could immediately leave the country, and insisting that they surrender to Cuban authorities, Castro had ordered that they not be mistreated on returning home and that publicity over the incident be minimized. As a result, only 12 refugees remained in USINT out of close to 400 original occupants.

Castro then explained that because of the Austin visit and the message from President Carter, he was inclined to make a new gesture in order to demonstrate his good will and willingness to cooperate. There were approximately 30 American citizens in Cuban jails charged with a variety of offenses, especially drug running, common crimes and counter-revolutionary activities. Unlike the situation in Iran, these prisoners are not hostages but convicted criminals. Castro said that he had decided that it was opportune to release these criminals unilaterally, without preconditions, as a good-will gesture. He asked that Wayne Smith be made available to interview each prisoner in order

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4 In 1980, after a series of contested elections, General Luis Garcia Meza Tejada carried out a violent coup in Bolivia.
to determine whether he wants to return to the U.S. The release would have a positive political impact in the U.S. There was even a chance that the release would teach the Government of Iran that freeing the American hostages in Tehran would have a similarly beneficial political effect. Castro explained that he wanted to proceed with the release in the very near future so that Cuba would get credit for it, not the U.S.

On the question of stopping the refugee flow from Mariel and accepting the return of some of the Cubans who had entered the U.S. illegally, Castro said that these matters would be among the first of the subjects that he would be prepared to discuss with President Carter. Castro did not react to the proposal that the U.S. and Cuba start a discussion next year about renegotiating the hijacking agreement.

Castro assured Austin that no leaks about their meeting would come from the Cuban side, but that such secrecy was more difficult for Americans to guarantee.

Castro ended the meeting in a show of great cordiality, repeating that he set great store in the Austin visit, and the message received from the President.

After the meeting, in an aside to Circuit, Vice President Rodriguez said that Castro had been very interested in talking to Austin who was close to the President but had no political axe to grind. He explained that when Castro meets U.S. Congressmen and Senators, even certain U.S. diplomats, he sometimes finds them more interested in enhancing their own personal images, rather than improving relations between the two countries. Castro is apprehensive about dealing with U.S. politicians, and he “hates” American television commentators, who “distort information and are only interested in their ratings”.

Peter Tarnoff
Executive Secretary

5 According to Smith, U.S. officials decided to wait until after Reagan’s inauguration before asking for authorization to interview the ex-prisoners. No such authorization was granted. (Smith, The Closest of Enemies, p. 237)
124. Situation Room Checklist

Washington, September 13, 1980

1. Tarnoff’s Meetings with Castro: The first meeting lasted six hours which Castro described as one of the “most positive” of several he had with Tarnoff. He was very favorably impressed with Secretary Muskie’s public statement and the President’s message expressing condolences over the murder of Garcia-Rodriguez. Castro stressed that he wanted to take some unilateral steps in coming weeks to meet our concerns but that it should not involve public bilateral discussions that could damage the President’s re-election chances. After discussing the proposals with the politburo, Castro informed Tarnoff in their second meeting what measures Cuba will take. First, on September 16 Cuba will announce that anyone responsible for future hijackings of U.S. aircraft to Cuba will either be sentenced to death in Cuba or returned by Cuba to the U.S. for trial. Most hijackers will be deported. Those responsible for the recent hijackings will be tried and sentenced but the new harsher measures will not be applied retroactively. Second, Cuba will grant unconditional amnesty to the 33 imprisoned Americans in Cuba. They will be free to remain in Cuba or emigrate to the U.S. or another foreign country. Third, Cuba will “suspend” all departures from Mariel starting September 25. Castro would only guarantee that Mariel would remain closed until November 4, after which he would review the situation. Castro stressed that this did not signify resolution of the refugee problem which is subject to future negotiations. Castro was unprepared to agree to the return of refugees who want to return to Cuba. Fourth, he would allow chartered U.S. flights to take out all those who had sought refuge in the U.S. Interests Section. Fifth, he said he would not limit his efforts to being helpful in bilateral matters, but would urge moderation in dealing with the U.S. to third world and communist leaders. He will also accelerate pressure on Iran to release the hostages. Castro concluded by asking that the President be

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 15, Cuba, 9–10/80. Secret; Sensitive. Carter initialed the checklist indicating that he saw it. An enclosure that contains Tarnoff’s talking points, including Carter’s revisions, is attached but not printed.

2 On September 11, Cuban diplomat Felix Garcia-Rodriguez was murdered in New York by a group of militant exiles. In telegram 242705 to Havana, September 12, the Department forwarded Carter’s message of condolence to Castro, in which the President stated, “I wish to express deepest regret over this cowardly and reprehensible deed. I assure you that we will spare no effort to find those responsible and bring them to justice.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800424–0312) Secretary Muskie’s statement, quoted in telegram 242727 to Havana, September 12, used similar language. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P910096–1770)
told that he was taking these steps as part of a gradual, deliberate process to reduce tensions. These measures were unilateral and unconditional. Castro did not expect any direct reciprocity or firm commitment from the U.S. He regards U.S. willingness to discuss issues of bilateral and wider concern as a statement of good faith by the President. The U.S. should not conclude, however, that it has contracted any obligation. Castro reiterated his preference to delay formal negotiations until November at the earliest. (Havana 6492 and 6495, LDX, NODIS CHEROKEE) (S)

3 Telegram 6492 from Havana, September 12, and telegram 6495 from Havana, September 13, contain longer summaries of Tarnoff’s September 12 conversations with Castro. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 15, Cuba, 9–10/80)

125. Presidential Determination No. 80–27

Washington, September 21, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES COORDINATOR FOR REFUGEE AFFAIRS

SUBJECT

Determination pursuant to Section 2(c)(1) of the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962, as amended, and Amending Presidential Determination Number 80–24, dated August 7, 1980.

Pursuant to Section 2(c)(1) of the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962, as amended (the “Act”), I hereby determine that Presidential Determination Number 80–24 of August 7, 1980 is amended by striking paragraphs two through five of the Determination.

I determine that unexpected, urgent refugee and migration needs continue to exist in Florida and in other localities and that it is in the national interest to continue to provide assistance to those Cubans and Haitians arriving in the United States.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800136–0539. No classification marking.

2 See Document 117.
I further determine that a total of up to $31,644,173 shall be made available from the United States Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund for the purposes of processing, transportation, caring, and resettling, and associated administrative expenses, for these Cubans and Haitians. Assistance shall be provided to these persons in accordance with such terms and conditions as the United States Coordinator for Refugee Affairs shall establish on my behalf or for the purposes described in Presidential Determination Number 80–16, as amended.3

The United States Coordinator for Refugee Affairs is requested to inform the appropriate committees of the Congress of this Determination and the obligation of funds under this authority.

This Determination shall be published in the Federal Register.4

Jimmy Carter

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3 See footnote 2, Document 117.
4 On September 30, Carter issued Presidential Determination No. 80–29 which permitted “an additional 5000 refugee admission numbers to be available.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800137–2288)

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126. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron) to President Carter

Washington, September 30, 1980

SUBJECT

Phase Down of Coast Guard and Navy Units in Florida

In the memorandum at Tab A,2 Admiral Costello recommends a gradual phase down of the Coast Guard and Naval forces which have been deployed to Florida in response to the illegal influx of Cubans. Under this proposal, force levels in southern Florida would be reduced to pre-crisis levels by the end of October.

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2 Not attached and not found.
Now that Castro’s promise to close Mariel Harbor has been confirmed by the forced departure of U.S. vessels, our present force posture is no longer necessary. Should Castro change this policy in the future, the Coast Guard estimates that we could return to our current posture within three weeks.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve a phase down of Coast Guard and Navy units to pre-crisis levels.

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3 In a September 24 memorandum to Brzezinski, Pastor wrote, “There are an increasing number of intelligence reports suggesting that Castro will suspend Mariel soon. Judging by the State Department’s effusive praise for Castro’s decision to give us two more hijacker criminals and several hundred ex-prisoners, who have since left USINT, I suspect that they will probably nominate him for a Nobel Peace Prize if Castro lowers the gun he has been pointing at our heads and stops the flow of refugees into the U.S. Are you still interested in U.S. policy to Cuba?” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 18, Cuba, Refugees, 9–12/80)

4 In the margin, the President wrote, “We may need a quicker build-up.”

5 Carter the checked the approve option and initialed below.

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127. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section in Cuba

Washington, December 2, 1980, 2230Z

319355. Eyes only for Wayne Smith from Peter Tarnoff. Subject: Discussion of Orderly Departure Program. Ref: Havana 8201.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. You are authorized to approach JLP and to make the following points:

—We appreciate President Castro’s raising the question of an orderly departure program with us. As we have said previously,

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 16, Cuba, 1/81. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Tarnoff; cleared by Muskie, Christopher, Bowdler, and in RP; approved by Tarnoff.

2 In telegram 8201 from Havana, November 28, the Interests Section reported that Castro had expressed curiosity about establishing an immigration policy centered around an “orderly departure process.” (Ibid.)

3 Jose Luis Padron.
we believe that it is in the best interest of Cuba and the U.S. for both countries to agree on regularized procedures for authorized immigration.

—President Carter is prepared to have the U.S. begin discussions of an orderly departure program at an early date. The head of our small negotiating team would be Ambassador Frank Loy who is director of the Bureau of Refugee Programs. We propose holding these conversations in New York starting on December 15. After agreement has been reached on the opening of the talks, we propose that both governments release simultaneously a brief joint public announcement.

—The incoming administration has been informed at a high level of the Cuban Government willingness to begin conversations with the U.S. on an orderly departure program. The incoming administration has no objection to having the present administration initiate these talks, and will not comment publicly if the talks do begin.

3. FYI: We prefer to use your channel to Castro through JLP to reach agreement on opening these talks. I would be prepared to become involved in setting them up (but not to participate in the discussions) only if you and JLP believe it necessary for me to do so in order to reach an agreement to start. End FYI.4

Muskie

4 The first round of talks, held on December 22 and 23, were inconclusive. The Cubans asked the American delegation to accept “30 to 40,000 Cubans annually.” U.S. officials maintained their ceiling was 29,000 Cubans per year, but President Carter wrote “no” next to that number when reading a December 24 summary of the talks. (Presidential Evening Reading, December 24, drafted by Loy; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 16, Cuba, 1/81)
Mexico

128. Telegram From the Embassy in Mexico to the Department of State

Mexico City, January 18, 1977, 0040Z

623. For the Secretary. Subj: Conversation With President Lopez Portillo.

1. I had a cordial visit of an hour with President Lopez Portillo prior to accompanying Mrs. Lopez Portillo to Washington. The President, who was calm and composed, made following points: (A) he was sending his three children to accompany his wife as he sensed that the Carters too were a united family and hence would enjoy receiving a Mexican family visit; (B) he was already thinking of his own visit to Washington looking forward to the opportunity to discuss mutual interests as well as mutual problems with President Carter and his new Cabinet members. The matters he envisioned discussing would be similar to those covered when he traveled to Washington as President-elect last September. He was particularly concerned over trade imbalance citing the recent U.S. restriction of Mexican imported shoes as an example. Mexico’s financial problems were enormous, but they could be overcome with some leeway on trade matters. He specifically expressed appreciation for the understanding received from Treasury, the Federal Reserve as well as the IMF. Regarding his agreement with the IMF, he said he hoped to live up to it with the proviso that there would be some flexibility and that his point of view be taken into account during the present delicate period.

2. The President showed optimism and confidence regarding Mexico’s internal problems. Despite his fears, shared by many others, for the month of January, we were now half way through it, the country was tranquil, and the wage increases had been limited to nine percent. In his mind, the industrial sector now had a debt to labor as well as to government in view of the fact that increases as high as 20 to 40 percent had been feared.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770017–0819. Confidential; Exdis.
2 President Lopez Portillo visited the United States from February 13 to February 17. See Documents 130 and 131.
3. He suggested that I call on him again on my return from Washington in order that we could begin exchanging views as to the program for his visit as well as for the agenda to be discussed. He particularly was interested in hearing the items which President Carter, for his part, will wish to cover in their conversations.

4. Comment: Our conversation was very relaxed and covered a variety of additional matters of varying importance which will be reported as appropriate. The difference between Echeverria and Lopez Portillo was a night with day. The conversation was low-key and he stressed the need for friendship and understanding with U.S. The President emphasized that he follows rational work program and, unlike Echeverria, has delegated considerable responsibility to his Cabinet members. He expressed the private opinion that Echeverria had so overworked himself and “over-energized” his collaborators that toward the end he was not fully fit to make the most important decisions such as those concerning devaluation.

Jova

129. Telegram From the Embassy in Mexico to the Department of State and the Mission in Geneva

Mexico City, February 9, 1977, 2308Z

1581. Dept pass all CCINC agencies. Geneva for Mathea Falco.²

Subject: Narcotics Control in Lopez Portillo Administration.

1. Summary: After seventy days of the new administration, my staff and I have the distinct impression that narcotics control programs are off to a better start than even the most optimistic dared to predict. If this spirit prevails, we should witness cooperation far exceeding that of the previous administration. End summary.

2. Last fall, Washington agencies expressed great concern about how the new Lopez-Portillo administration would handle narcotics

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¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770047–0025. Confidential. Repeated for information to all the Consulates in Mexico.

² Falco was in Geneva for the UN Conference on Narcotic Drugs.
control. Messages received here expressed the prevailing fear that the new administration would be less dedicated and less vigorous, and that the hard-won commitments of Echeverria and his Attorney General, Ojeda-Paullada, would evaporate.

3. The new Attorney General, Oscar Flores-Sanchez, himself called the first meeting on narcotics control after only seven days in office. He had already discussed cooperative programming with his old friend and new Secretary of Defense, Lieutenant General Felix Galvan-Lopez. By the time Sheldon Vance (S/NM) and Peter Besinger (DEA) visited Mexico City in mid-December, Flores had appointed his second deputy, Samuel Alba-Leyva, as overall Narcotics Coordinator for his Ministry. Embassy officers have seen Alba and/or his key staff members almost daily since that time, and both Flores and Alba have made several trips to field locations to get the program moving.

4. Flores has made good on his statement that he would get the military involved. Task Force “Condor I” is already operating in Sinaloa Province, with its headquarters at San Jose del Llano. According to a letter from Galvan to Flores (seen by an Embassy officer), Condor I now has 1,200 men in the field with an additional 1,900 men spread through six other military commands for narcotics eradication and interdiction activities. The latter are pursuing what to the army is a continuing and permanent task. We have also seen a Presidential directive to the Treasury ordering immediate disbursement to Defense of over dols 550,000 to support these military in the field, primarily intended for Condor I.

5. In what can only be considered in recent years, the Mexican Air Force (MAF) has permitted our aviation technicians to inspect air force helicopters to determine how best to get them airborne for this campaign. (This, of course, is not without benefit to the MAF.) The air force has also seconded ten of its own helicopter pilots to the Attorney General’s office and, again setting precedent, has permitted our instructors to give tests to determine their proficiency. To appreciate the significance of these steps, one must recall that the previous administration insisted on doing as much as possible without involving the military.

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3 The Department of State and the Embassy in Mexico City expressed concern about the Lopez Portillo administration’s commitment to narcotics control due to suspicions that one of Lopez Portillo’s allies, Federal Judicial Police Commander Arturo Durazo Moreno, was involved with drug trafficking. Durazo expressed interest in becoming Chief of Customs when Lopez Portillo took office, but was instead appointed as Chief of the Directorate of Control of Medicines, Food, and Beverages. (Telegram 12279 from Mexico City, September 24, 1976; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760361–1079)
6. On the enforcement side, Flores and his staff have been exceedingly open with DEA representatives here. Carrying of weapons was orally approved, an intelligence unit has been established for which we are providing on-the-job training, and plans for joint prosecution and the return of fugitives were finalized with only minimum discussion. The addition of twenty-six TDY personnel from DEA to observe and monitor the eradication campaign was received with gratitude and, I am told, TDY personnel and their counterparts are working successfully in the field.

7. The assistance program is on a more professional level than ever before. After some initial false starts, the Attorney General now talks not of equipment needs but of missions to be performed, and his staff now looks for alternative approaches to resolve problems. The recently identified need for troop lift capability is an excellent example. When we noted problems with providing medium-lift helicopters such as Chinooks, the Attorney General’s staff itself came up with the suggestion to divert five Bell 212s already in inventory to this purpose, asking if we could replace them with the equivalent spray capacity in smaller Bell 206s. This suggestion makes better sense both for the Mexicans (increased flexibility) and for us (a saving of about dols three million). More far-reaching is the Attorney General’s invitation to Embassy officers to participate in internal meetings on personnel and budgeting for his Ministry to discuss levels of staffing, position descriptions and budget requirements for future fiscal years.

8. Problems do, of course, remain. The relationship between the Attorney General’s office and the Ministry of Defense is murky. When Condor I personnel began to arrive in the field, there was evidence that the military attempted to take over both the eradication and interdiction effort. This generated working-level friction which has not entirely disappeared. (We do know, however, that when we called this situation to the Attorney General’s attention, he immediately spoke to the Secretary of Defense, who called his commander in the field. This alleviated the problem, at least temporarily.)

9. Nor have we yet seen solid evidence that Mexico will be as vigorous in arresting and prosecuting traffickers as it is in the more impersonal eradication of illicit crops. Both corruption and personal relationships will have to be overcome if there is to be a truly effective law enforcement effort, and it is too early to tell if the new administration will effectively address these problems.

10. The bottom line after seventy days speaks for itself. According to figures given to me Friday by the Attorney General, between December one and February three, Mexico destroyed 9684 poppy fields (4,653 acres); destroyed 3,657 marijuana fields (1,823 acres); seized 96 cars and three aircraft; arrested 605 Mexicans and 34 foreigners on narcotics
charges; and had 376 people working in the field, not counting those contributed by the military. If the Lopez-Portillo administration can maintain this momentum, establish effective Defense-Attorney General coordination, and continue its open discussions with the Embassy, we can reasonably expect narcotics control cooperation exceeding that of the previous administration.

Jova

130. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 14, 1977, 11:10 a.m.–12:25 p.m.

SUBJECT
Meeting Between President Carter and President of Mexico Lopez Portillo

PARTICIPANTS
President Jimmy Carter
Vice President Walter Mondale
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski
Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs-designate Richard N. Cooper
Assistant Secretary of State-designate Terence A. Todman
U.S. Ambassador to Mexico John Joseph Jova
NSC Staff Member, Robert A. Pastor
President of Mexico Jose Lopez Portillo
Secretary of Foreign Relations Santiago Roel Garcia
Mexican Ambassador to U.S. Hugo Margain Gleason

President Carter: The two countries are so closely linked that there is no way to separate their future. During this visit there are many things to discuss. I think the most important is the economic future of our two countries. We must deal with the problems of inflation, unemployment, the expansion of trade, and the required financial base in Mexico and in the U.S. We are eager to help in any way we can and hope that you can help as well.

President Lopez Portillo: I agree that the most important aspect of our relationship is the economic aspect. For Mexico, unemployment

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 28, Mexico, 2–3/77. Confidential. Drafted by Pastor on February 23. The meeting was held in the Oval Office. The time of the meeting is taken from the President’s Daily Diary. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials)
and inflation have special importance. Both are linked to what happens in the United States. When inflation is high in the United States, the situation in Mexico is worse. As a result of inflation being so much higher in Mexico than in the United States, Mexico was forced to devalue recently.

This resulted from a long political process and is causing a difficult political situation. The last 100 days of the previous administration saw a deterioration of the situation which has put me in a very delicate position. The attitude of the IMF and the behavior of some wealthy Mexicans made matters worse. The IMF imposed more discipline on the Mexican economy, which is good. But if the measures are too rigid and do not consider political and social factors, they can make matters worse and introduce distortions. Wealthy Mexicans did not help by sending money out of the country.

This is how I visualize Mexico’s problems. After World War II, Mexico entered into a period of stabilization and development based on industrialization by import-substitution. This meant a sacrifice of the rural sector. The emphasis was on price stability, monetary and political stability, but this was at the cost of ignoring the proper and just compensation of labor. The Mexican Revolution had to make the necessary adjustments to the Bretton Woods scheme. Labor and the rural areas were hit hardest. But in the 1970s, Mexico was no longer able to maintain price stability due to internal pressures. Once price stability was lost, pressure mounted on wages. Simultaneously, Mexico was forced to make loans to maintain Central Bank reserves, in an attempt to keep the peso at parity with the dollar. We took enormous political risks to keep parity, and it deformed our entire structure. Everything revolved around the dollar rather than around development.

With the devaluation in September of last year, another of the three legs on which stability rested was lost. Now only political stability remains. The balance will be precarious if a way is not found to replace the two legs which were lost, particularly since unemployment and underemployment can be explosive.

The IMF is basically interested in controlling inflation, relying primarily on monetary measures to reduce demand. This may work well

2 In telegram 14623 from Mexico City, November 17, 1976, the Embassy transmitted a summary of Mexico’s economic difficulties, negotiations with the IMF, and recent devaluations of the peso. The Embassy wrote that the second devaluation “shocked all sectors of the economy into realizing how serious the Mexican economic situation could actually be.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760429–0515) Mexico’s stabilization agreement with the IMF was ratified by the Mexican Government on December 30, 1976. (Telegram 16258 from Mexico City, December 30, 1976; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770001–0274)
in industrialized countries, but in developing countries, it creates more problems than it solves. We need a system that controls inflation not by curbing demand but by increasing supply.

For example, the export of oil might help to control inflation by reducing our balance of payments deficit. But in order to develop and export oil—especially refined—Mexico needs external financing and would have to import equipment, technology, and raw materials. Since the Mexican oil company, PEMEX, is a government corporation, any imports would increase the trade deficit and the government’s budgetary deficit, leading to more inflation and a continuation of a vicious cycle.

The same is true for other raw materials which Mexico would like to process. To control inflation in the ways required by the IMF, there must be a limit on government expenditures and a narrowing of the trade deficit, and therefor a reduction of the activities of the State. This framework presupposes counterbalancing private investment. However, in Mexico those who have money to invest think in different terms. They are not prepared to take risks. They wish only to speculate and send their money out of the country.

Due to Mexico’s commitments with the IMF, the government cannot undertake the necessary investments. The private sector is not contributing. Thus, there is nothing left but foreign investment, which must be sought as long as it fits the ideals of Mexican society. In other words, everything revolves around finances.

President Carter: The explanations given were very helpful for an understanding of Mexico’s problems. Obviously, it is better to have both economic and political stability in both countries.

We have some possibility of helping each other. The U.S. Government has little control over the private sector but it does have some influence in the IMF, the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and others. The use of this influence would help Mexico acquire long-term loans to get through the present crisis.

We need products which Mexico can export later, such as oil. This is certainly one area where investment can bring benefits to both countries. When Mexico decides how much it wishes to export, the United States Government and private oil companies would be glad to help Mexico increase its production. I understand that Mexico is reluctant to relinquish control over production, processing and refining. I also believe that long-term financing and more rapid production would benefit both countries. The decision on how much to produce is, of course, Mexico’s to make. But once you make that decision, the U.S. Government and private lenders will be eager to help, and both countries will no doubt benefit.
Two things have recently occurred to improve the situation. The first is that your demonstrated leadership, with your business and economic background, is considered very favorable to an improvement in Mexico’s economic situation. In addition, the constant display of cooperation between our two countries will help to create stability, especially when others are convinced that cooperation between the two countries will be permanent. With efforts by our two countries, expansion in the area of tourism and trade can benefit both sides.

I hope that your discussions with members of the Cabinet will form the basis for a common approach to these important issues, which cannot be separated. I wish to insure also that there will be mechanisms for improving communication and that you and I will have a mechanism where we can communicate directly. My preference would be to have the Secretary of State as the main channel of communications between the two countries. I hope the Secretary of State and the Mexican Foreign Minister will keep in close touch with each other. But, if any problem arises, I invite you to get in touch with me directly.

President López Portillo: I was deeply satisfied with the global analysis you made and with your statement about the interrelationship of various problems. I am also convinced that the economic problems are tied to two of the biggest problems the U.S. has in our relationship—migrant workers and illegal drug traffic. If those problems are seen and dealt with as a package, they can be solved more easily and better than in isolation.

I am aware of the importance that Mexican oil has for the United States and the contribution it could make to getting Mexico through the present crisis. However, as Mexico tries to decide what to do about its oil development it has to think also about its responsibility towards future generations. Mexico must orient its plans for utilization so that some is left over for the 21st Century since other sources of energy are unlikely to be adequately developed before that time.

Mexico realizes that it must use oil to help resolve its present problems. Fortunately, Mexico has many other resources, both renewable and nonrenewable. The development of all will depend on finance and labor. That’s why I believe that Mexico’s problem is not just long-term, but short-term, not just underdevelopment but underadministration. Therefore, I am committed to improving administration.

At the same time, I am convinced that Mexico needs to strike a balance with outside sources to solve its financial problems. The factors which you mentioned would help. If monetary, financial and trade problems are linked, a solution is possible. I will be pleased to talk to your associates on more specific matters, but feel it is important here to agree to visualize the problem as a whole.

For Mexico, the most important problem is the large trade deficit it has with the United States. What is needed now is to permit Mexico
to sell more to the United States, and to avoid any new restrictions. Mexico has a similar trade problem with Central America with one critical difference. We have a favorable trade balance with Central America and have invited the Central American countries to sell more to Mexico, but they have nothing to sell. Mexico does have things to sell to the United States.

I hope that we will consider this matter and find reasonable ways to implement it. One approach would be to use the complementarity of our two economies. I realize that it will pose short-run problems for specific interests in the United States. But in the long run, it would be good for both of us. Solution of other problems depend on what can be done in the trade area. They must be seen together. Mexico has agricultural products that are not available in the United States at all or during certain seasons. There must be a way to reach agricultural agreements which would help to reduce the risks to farmers. Mexico also has manufactured products which should be looked at carefully. For example, the sale of Mexican-made shoes in the United States would help both countries since Mexico imports many basic materials from the United States to manufacture shoes.

Further analysis would show other ways in which both sides can benefit. What is needed now is political backing for this approach. When one side wins all the chips, then the game cannot continue. This is what has happened in trade along the U.S.-Mexican border. Trade must be linked to finance and to improving the monetary situation. If Mexico could sell more, there would be more work in Mexico and thus less migration of Mexicans to the U.S. and reduction of the drug traffic. If we visualize these problems as a whole, they could be solved more easily.

I realize that these problems are not subject to short-term solutions, but I feel that the basis can be laid. This approach opens new vistas, and by strengthening political stability in my country, it reduces the risk of what I call a “South American solution” or Fascism, which is spreading throughout Latin America. If the economic situation deteriorates and the people see no hope, then strong and repressive governments come to power. I want to maintain a democratic government and system in Mexico. It is important that this problem be handled carefully.

President Carter: The subjects raised are sensitive and most important: including undocumented workers, illegal traffic in drugs and weapons, border problems, population growth, management of scarce water supplies, air pollution across the border, matching of transportation systems across the border, competitive imports, the need to protect farmers, and others.

All of these problems are interrelated. It would be difficult for us to establish an in-depth discussion of all of these issues for every
country. But relations with Mexico are so important that it may be well to form in-depth discussion groups at the sub-cabinet level to deal with an agenda which the two of us would establish and report back to us through our Cabinets. These personally which we would study and then meet again to discuss. Most of the work by these sub-Cabinet level experts could be done without delay if you agree.

President Lopez Portillo: I agree entirely and enthusiastically. I wish to thank you very much for this suggestion. I also appreciate your comment and the attitude that the problems of our countries deserve such treatment. I favor the establishment of the working groups, and hope they can begin work immediately. There are many items to be considered on the agenda. But of special importance is the political will.

I consider it important that there be a global conception of the whole matter since in the past, urgent matters have taken precedence over important matters and introduced distortions. That’s why I believe these Working Groups can have a beneficial impact.

President Carter: I will send a personal letter to you listing proposed agenda items. On receipt of a response from you, we will choose the individual experts to participate in this Working Group. Secretary Vance, could you comment?

Secretary Vance: I consider the approach outlined an excellent way to proceed. Once we put the mechanism together, I look forward to working with Foreign Secretary Roel.

President Carter: You and I will be talking again tomorrow. Meanwhile, I will begin working on the letter describing the questions that I think ought to be addressed. I will make the letter frank and personal and would prefer that it not be given any publicity.

President Lopez Portillo: I agree fully. If there is no sincerity and frankness, then there can be no solutions. Some things are very difficult to deal with but when they are said with intellectual honesty, sincerity and good will, then there is no real problem. My only interest is to serve Mexico and to build good relations with the United States. You can count on my sincerity and frankness, and I hope to be able to count on the same from you.

Foreign Secretary Roel: I had a very good meeting yesterday with Secretary Vance regarding the policies of the two Presidents. I thought it might be interesting to tell an anecdote. During the Presidential campaign, we could not understand the U.S. press comment asking about “Jimmy Who.” In any event, a group of political analysts connected with the Lopez Portillo campaign was asked for an analysis of

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3 See Document 133.
the U.S. elections, and they predicted that President Carter would win. They also said that President Carter would be a very friendly person and it would be good for Mexican-U.S. relations. My meetings with Cyrus and this meeting with you, President Carter, proves that the political analysts were right.

President Lopez Portillo: I told you he is a good diplomat.

President Carter: If we ever have any differences, I’m sure our wives could solve them. Perhaps Dick Cooper could comment.

Under Secretary Cooper: I was very impressed with President Lopez Portillo’s presentation of the economic situation in Mexico and on the approach to solutions. I agree fully with the President’s analysis. I feel it worth mentioning that in Mexico because many enterprises, such as Pemex, are government enterprises, their activities directly affect the Mexican budget and its trade deficit in a way which would not occur if they were operating in the private sector, as in the United States.

President Lopez Portillo: Mr. Cooper’s remark is very important. Experts should analyze most carefully the nature and components of the Mexican deficit. The accounts of the Mexican Government have been very distorted. For example, when the telephone company was in private hands, it got loans easily. However, the moment it became public, it began to be viewed differently and to have problems because of the new accounting system. The Federal Government in the U.S. has a more reasonable situation, but the U.S. is very decentralized. This is one reason why I wish to re-organize and decentralize the administration of the Mexican government, particularly in these areas which account for more than 50 percent of the public budget.

President Carter: During my campaign, I also spoke of the need to reorganize the government. I believe that the problems between the two countries will be solved if we approach them in the right spirit and harness the strength of our two countries to work in that direction.
131. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 15, 1977, 10:40–11:40 a.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting Between President Carter and President Jose Lopez Portillo of Mexico—
10:40 a.m.—11:40 a.m.

In addition to two interpreters, the participants at the meeting included, from the American side:

  Vice President Walter Mondale
  Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski
  Deputy Secretary of State-designate Warren Christopher
  Assistant Secretary of State-designate Terence Todman
  U.S. Ambassador to Mexico John Joseph Jova
  NSC Staff Member Robert A. Pastor

From the Mexican side:

  Jose Lopez Portillo, President of Mexico
  Jose Ramon Lopez Portillo (his son)
  Secretary of Foreign Relations Santiago Roel Garcia
  Under Secretary of Foreign Relations Juan de Olloqui
  Mexican Ambassador to U.S. Hugo Margain Gleason

President Carter opened the meeting again.

President Carter: I have thoroughly enjoyed your visit, both officially and personally, as well as the meeting of our families. I know that my Cabinet officers have also been very impressed in the meetings that they have held with you and your Cabinet officers. I would appreciate your suggestions on how we should follow up the decisions that we made yesterday\(^2\) and how we might deal better with the other nations in this hemisphere and in the world. At the outset let me say that we plan to prepare a letter outlining the agenda items, and I will send this letter to you personally within a week.\(^3\)

Lopez Portillo: I greatly appreciate the welcome. The case of Mexico is a typical one. U.S. relations with Mexico are representative in many ways of U.S. relations with Latin America and the developing world.

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\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Box 29, Mexico, 1–6/77. Confidential. Drafted by Pastor on February 24. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room.

\(^2\) See Document 130.

\(^3\) See Document 133.
In the case of Mexico, all factors become more acute because of the proximity of our country. Therefore, in a sense, Mexico can serve as a laboratory of what can occur and what should or should not occur between nations at different levels of development. Mexico can also serve as a sounding board for new ideas on the dialogue between the North and the South. Wherever the United States goes in Latin America or in the developing world, it will find problems similar to Mexico’s—countries embarking upon industrialization, raw materials producers with trade problems. And these problems of trade are complicated in turn by financial problems. Politically, there are problems of repression and the loss of freedom as well as the absence of social justice. The solutions devised at Bretton Woods are just not sufficient for dealing with the problems of today. I do not believe that the IMF or the World Bank or the Inter-American Bank or even the OAS have been able to address these kinds of problems adequately. Yet, these problems cannot be ignored just because they are difficult.

There is no way that we can divide the economic issues from the political issues. If the United States seeks to maintain other countries in a dependent relationship, eventually there will be loss of democracy in those countries. However, if the relationship is to be based on equality, then the U.S. will have to be more forthcoming in the economic field. Once it is decided what kind of political relationship is wanted, then there must be a willingness to accept the economic consequences.

Yesterday I discussed my theory of the tripod. I underlined the point that Mexico is standing right now on only one leg—political stability. We will not last long on this leg if our economy is permitted to deteriorate. Or if labor, which has been very understanding up to now, withdraws its support from our government and decides to press its demands for high wages. But if business does not respond sufficiently to the cries of injustice, then labor indeed might withdraw its support and then prices, of course, would rise dramatically. We cannot postpone solutions to these problems. If wage increases do not keep pace, there will be disorder, and the government will be pushed towards repression, and democracy will be seriously threatened, if not lost. This is what has happened in many Latin American countries. The fascist shadow is already a reality. Even countries as rich as Argentina have not been able to find democratic paths.

Therefore, if we wish to solve the political problems of Latin America, we should approach them from an economic perspective, and we should try to solve the trade problem. Anything else will be mistaken. Any alternatives can only postpone decisions which need to be made.

This is my analysis. I understand the specific problems you have with Panama, Cuba, and some part of the liberal sector in American society have with human rights, especially in Chile. I want to underline
that the relationship between the United States and Latin America is not solely Panama, Cuba, or Chile. *The real basis of U.S. foreign policy to Latin America and the real basis of the relationship is economic.*

It is true that the U.S. lacks a policy to Latin America, but we must also recognize that Latin America does not have a policy to the United States. The system is not working. But we should not react to the system’s failure by creating other systems, instead of improving this one.

This is basically the way I visualize the position and the policy of the United States to Latin America.

*President Carter:* I particularly like your statement that the creation of new mechanisms is not an answer to a problem but often only an artificial covering-up to delay a solution. I also agree that there is little coordination in economic policies to the region. For example, there is no coordinated economic policy between the IMF and the other international financial institutions and with United States bilateral assistance programs and other financial flows.

We can make the OAS more effective by looking at real, basic questions. At the next General Assembly meeting, we should begin preparation and do a lot of staff work and address the specific problems that you raised. I also think that the broad economic policy issues that you mentioned should be dealt with on a multilateral basis rather than just on a bilateral basis. I would also like to involve or at least to inform Latin American countries with respect to decisions which we make which will have a great impact on them. This is something that we had not taken into account previously, but we should.

We have long-standing problems with Cuba. You have made progress with your dealings with Cuba. We plan in a quiet way to search with Cuba for common ground. But the basic question we have with regard to Cuba is that of human rights and the treatment of political prisoners and others in Cuba. We have hundreds of thousands of Cuban refugees in the United States who have a deep interest in the way this problem is resolved. Cuba, on the other hand, has a basic interest in reestablishing trade relations. And I think both our countries have a common interest in trying to reduce the influence of the Soviet Union as well as to have peaceful relations with one another.

To the extent that the U.S. and Mexico and you and I can cooperate, we can help each other to deal better with other Latin American countries. The same general principle of cooperation and mutual respect applies also to the Panama situation. Although there has been a delay, we have every intention to terminate a mutually advantageous treaty as aggressively as possible.

There are other nations in the Caribbean which over the last 10 or 15 years have drawn away from us, and we would like to reestablish our close relations with these countries.
There are also other Latin American countries which have moved away from the United States since the time of President Kennedy. We would like to repair this damage and to establish better relations with them. Your frank and continuing advice in a personal and confidential way would be very, very helpful.

One possible serious problem we have now is with Brazil regarding the reprocessing of nuclear fuel which can be used to make weapons. We want international control of such material, and we have been working closely with Germany and Brazil to prevent the sale of such sensitive material. We recognize we have no authority to prevent the sale, but sometimes if other voices are heard along the same lines, our own voice could be strengthened.

In addition to communicating on specific agenda items, I would like an exchange of personal correspondence with you on a continuing and confidential basis.

President Lopez Portillo: I agree that an appropriate forum to normalize relations between the United States and Latin America is the OAS, if all hegemonic aspects disappeared. That was the idea of the Alliance for Progress, which was fine in its purpose, but made little progress. It had the problem of awakening expectations, but not realizing them.

With the premature death of President Kennedy, very little was achieved, and disillusion and disappointment set in among the Latin Americans. The climate for U.S. initiatives then was far more favorable than it is now. Latin America was more united then. At present, we are divided. Only Costa Rica, Colombia, Venezuela and Mexico have tolerable democracies. This, contrasted with the existence of many totalitarian governments in Latin America, makes for deep divisions in the area. Many Latin American countries have no relations with Cuba while Mexico has none with Chile. There are disputes and contentious issues among many of the countries. Argentina distrusts Brazil. Brazil distrusts Argentina. SELA developed as a substitute for the lack of effectiveness of the OAS. In the effort to build better relations with Latin America, you will have to start from a much lower point than President Kennedy did.

President Carter: Why do I have to start from a lower point?

President Lopez Portillo: In the current atmosphere among the Latin American countries there is no possibility for substantial agreement among the Latin Americans to accept any U.S. initiative. A new move would have to struggle against the shadow left by the disappointment of the failure of the Alliance for Progress. Latin American nations today are far more divided. Our nationalism has become more aggressive. Brazil has a new kind of manifest destiny. It is like an island in Latin America and has a strong personality. This was strengthened by the special treatment given to Brazil during the Ford Administration and
especially by the visit of former Secretary of State Kissinger. This action by the United States was somewhat understandable but it didn’t help to solve the problems in U.S. relations with Latin America. To solve the problem, we need a general structure.

I know that the United States does not need Mexico’s help, but in any event I gladly offer to assist in any way that Mexico can. For example, Mexico’s good relations with Cuba could be helpful. Mexico already has helped to solve one problem by a trade-off under which Mexico will ship oil to Cuba in exchange for the Soviet Union shipping oil to some Mexican markets in Europe and Asia. This saves transportation and ties Cuba closer economically to the Latin American area. The breakdown in the Cuban economy cannot be repaired if it does not participate in the region’s economy. With regard to Brazil, the purpose of the Tlatelolco meeting was to try to obtain agreement on denuclearization in which Mexico firmly believes. I believe that it is by this international and non-hegemonic approach that the problem could be solved. Thus, Mexico shares U.S. desires in the field of non-proliferation.

Foreign Secretary Roel: There were two protocols coming out of the Tlatelolco meeting. Brazil, Argentina, Cuba and Chile have not signed the first protocol. Yesterday, on the tenth anniversary of the Tlatelolco Treaty, the Soviet Union reportedly indicated its willingness to sign. I wonder whether this might be attributed in some way to the present visit.

President Carter: I appreciate your offer and hope that Mexico will be helpful. It may be too late to work for a serious effort to discourage reprocessing at the next meeting of the OAS but for the September meeting there should be a full exchange of views on a whole range of issues to make that meeting meaningful. At the one meeting of the OAS which I attended, in 1974, I found it to be involved in discussing many superficial matters when it should have been treating basic issues. We will review our policy toward other countries on a bilateral basis to try to repair what damage has been done.

I feel that in the past we had been guilty too often of treating the Latin American countries as a group instead of individually. I will treat the large and the small countries on an individual basis in the years ahead and hope that this will bear fruit.

President Lopez Portillo: I welcome your statement that you will try to make progress in general solutions without ignoring bilateral

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4 The meeting was held in Mexico City in February to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, or the Treaty of Tlatelolco.
relations. I am reminded of the statement by Aristotle that “equals should be treated equally and unequals, unequally.” The same solutions cannot be applied to each country and the treatment of each country would have to consider the differences among them. Although the individual problems may be small, the consequences can become large and affect relations seriously. Justice requires that we treat unequals as equals. The expectations are high that this Administration will be able to accomplish a great deal although it will have to fight the Kennedy shadow. I hope you will not be discouraged.  

President Carter: I hope that the expectations will be kept low enough so that the results will exceed them.

Mr. Brzezinski: Mr. President, you have stated that Mexico could serve as a laboratory for relations with Latin America and other developing countries. This raises a fundamental question. Every new Administration has talked about the need for a new policy. I believe we do not need a new policy, but rather a different approach. I think that the focus on Latin America should be in the global context rather than as a separate entity. This approach should concentrate on general problems and on bilateral relations. Rather than excluding, we should emphasize our neighborly relations. But we should move away from a policy which, even with our best intentions, has been seen as paternalistic. This led us to be blamed for Latin American failures and to be expected to deliver more than we possibly could. I see the need now for more of a “normalization” along the lines I have indicated.

President Lopez Portillo: I think your (Mr. Brzezinski’s) observation is correct. That is why President Carter’s statement was so good. If the goal of the U.S. is to assist, then it is badly stated because a country that is assisted is not earning its own way. What Latin America wants and needs is balanced economic and political relations which would permit it to manage its own affairs.  

For example, Mexico is seeking an equalization in trade relations with the United States. It must be remembered that Mexico is the fourth largest buyer of U.S. goods and the U.S. is the largest seller to Mexico. If trade is based more on balance, then the money of the two countries will stabilize and the relationship will not be one of dependence. Except for the most desperate cases, the way out is not paternalism but balanced trade.

The problem is that trade relations are often regulated by private companies including multinationals whose principal interest is in private gain. The government’s part is minimal, and therefore decisions of equilibrium are not made. Corporations think of profit; only governments can think of balance. But since improving the balance of trade is so important, the real question is what can be done by the governments to improve the balance in the face of the attitude of the private
companies and the multinationals. I know this is a delicate issue, but I want to speak frankly and only ask that you become aware of this problem. The U.S. must not have a paternalistic attitude. The real problem is whether the government can control the selfishness of the multinationals and other private companies. I do not know how this can be worked out but something must be done.

President Carter: In our private correspondence, I would welcome specific explanations and details including mention of any companies involved. I will not make any promises but at least the letters will help me to understand the problem, to let the companies know and to make whatever corrections or improvements are possible.

President Lopez Portillo: I will do that.

Ambassador Jova: I want to sound a note of caution after years of experience. I think I heard you (Mexico) asking for a special relationship at the same time, you were saying that the U.S. should renounce its special relationship.

Foreign Secretary Roel: I do not agree. The world’s problems are global. We are not asking for special treatment but for just and balanced treatment. I agree with Dr. Brzezinski that there should be no paternalism. What is needed instead is a mature attitude to see our problems clearly, and to see the world as a unit. I would move further in that direction.

I want to raise one other matter which I have not discussed with my own President but which seems important to mention. I think it would be helpful if there could be talks between Mexico, the U.S. and Canada—the three nations of North America and three democracies. This could in time lead to agreements with the other democracies of the hemisphere from which the strength of the democratic forces could be built. Mexico is very concerned with human rights as is the United States. The problem is how to proceed and how to avoid backing governments which end up as dictatorships.

On practical matters, I would like to know what steps will be taken to implement the conclusions reached during the discussions.

President Carter: As soon as the list of subjects is agreed upon, we can appoint representatives of both countries to meet for discussions and explore the possibility of agreement and report back. After that, we should move some of the issues to the Presidential level; others to multilateral global discussions; other issues might go to the OAS. But at the sub-Cabinet level, we should begin looking for areas of agreement. These meetings would not preclude the continuing personal and confidential correspondence between President Lopez Portillo and me. I will also move to strengthen U.S. relations with our other neighbors and with other countries of the area.
I want to state again what a personal pleasure it was to have President Lopez Portillo and Carmen make this visit. I believe that relations in the area will be well served by the signs of cooperation between us.

I will ask Mr. Christopher and Dr. Brzezinski to work with you to prepare a Joint Communique to give to the public.\(^5\) There will be a Press Conference at 2:00 p.m. where it could be released. (In a brief exchange after the meeting, President Carter and Foreign Secretary Roel agreed that it could be issued later—perhaps Wednesday or Thursday—if more time was needed.)

President Lopez Portillo: Before saying a final word of thanks, I want to take one moment so as not to leave any doubt about Mexico’s views on the question of a special relationship. The mention of Brazil was not done with any thought of criticism or envy but rather out of a feeling that it was the wrong way to proceed. I realize that any general policy will have exceptions due to differences between individual countries. However, where exceptions are made or special treatment is accorded before a general policy is stated, then it creates suspicion. Latin America is not monolithic. There is no Latin American policy towards the U.S. or even a policy among Latin American countries. Mexico is not motivated by selfishness or by a desire for any special treatment.

Finally, I want to thank you, Mr. President, for the splendid hospitality. I have to admit that I am very attracted by your personality and have a feeling that we have become friends. I hope that we will be able to meet again and to deepen our friendship. I believe this will help our countries very much.

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Mexico, February 22, 1977

SUBJECT

Mexican Economic Problems

In conjunction with the Washington visit of Mexican President Lopez Portillo, we have been reviewing the immediate and longer-term prospects of the Mexican economy. Treasury and Federal Reserve officials have worked together and have had discussions with their Mexican counterparts to establish the facts and their meaning.

We have concluded:

1. The longer-run economic prospects of Mexico are quite good, but
2. A serious situation may develop within the next few months, primarily because of Mexican difficulty in following through with the major stabilization program agreed with the IMF. A financial crisis could involve a run on the peso and would confront us with difficult policy choices, a significant economic impact on the U.S., and potentially serious consequences for overall U.S.-Mexican relations.

We are following up two approaches to deal with this situation:

1. A short-term program to be negotiated with the Mexicans, designed to prevent a serious financial crisis or, at least, to keep the situation within manageable bounds;
2. Examining contingency plans for possible U.S. action, assuming a “worst case” situation of a collapse of the peso with attendant financial and economic turmoil in Mexico.

WHAT IS THE PROBLEM?

Mexico’s total external debt is about $23 billion. $6 billion of this is public sector debt which must be refinanced in this year. $3 billion or more of additional new loans are also needed.

Much of this borrowing is from U.S. private banks who feel overexposed and who view with anxiety (1) President Lopez Portillo’s reluctance to take stern internal measures to bring this budget under control; (2) the possibility that he will not meet previously agreed to IMF goals; and (3) the lack of any long-term program to contain inflation, cut expenditures and limit foreign borrowing.

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 28, Mexico, 2–3/77. Secret; Priority.
A crisis could rapidly develop and escalate if, in the next few weeks, private banks do not extend additional credits, and worse yet, refuse to refinance the outstanding $6 billion or so in existing loans to Mexico.

A POSSIBLE SHORT-TERM PROGRAM. WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT THIS SITUATION?

Treasury, keeping the Federal Reserve fully informed, has impressed on the Mexican team the need to move quickly on the following:

(1) As quickly as possible, an authoritative statement specifically defining Mexico’s commitment and determination to implement a stabilization program (even though they insist it will be necessary to modify “slightly” the IMF targets on reducing the budgetary deficit).

(2) A private session with U.S. banks in which the Mexicans explain their situation and their future plans in detail and negotiate the new money they will need.\(^2\)

(3) Negotiation of a substantial line of credit with Mexico by Ex-Im Bank during the next few weeks to finance the capital equipment imports from the U.S. necessary to increase Mexican petroleum production and distribution (including natural gas), ultimately leading to an increase in Mexican exports.

The Mexican public announcement contemplated in point 1 would bolster confidence in Mexico and also add resources to the Mexican economy beyond the amounts envisioned under the IMF program.

The Mexicans have already announced large additional petroleum reserves. They are thinking of announcing a program of Ex-Im credits on March 18, the anniversary date of their expropriation of the oil companies in the 1930’s and the date on which the Mexican national oil company issues its annual report.

The above program could engender sufficient confidence to prevent the commercial banks from pulling out and thus enable Mexico to get over the next few months.

LONGER TERM CONTINGENCY PROGRAM

Meanwhile, Treasury officials are meeting with the Federal Reserve to think through a series of steps which we might be prepared to take if the

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\(^2\) In late March, officials of the Mexican Government stated, at the Mexican Bankers’ Convention, that they planned to borrow $6 billion in 1977 to cover public sector debt and interest payments, although they insisted that their financial agreements would not influence the government’s domestic policies. (Telegram 3576 from Mexico City, March 24; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770102-0169) They later circulated a confidential prospectus that pledged a closer commitment to the IMF. (Telegram 3769 from Mexico City, March 25; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File D770104-0773)
above program fails and a serious Mexican financial crisis develops in coming weeks.

RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) That the above consultations with Mexican financial authorities, the Fed and the Ex-Im Bank be pursued quietly and without publicity so as to avoid adding existing concerns in the international financial community.

(2) That your letter to President Lopez Portillo list the issues to be discussed between the two countries in general terms, while making no particular reference to the financial specifics or to the serious potential problems in the Mexican economy.3

(3) That I be charged with insuring that State and NSC be fully informed on the progress of implementing the above program in Treasury discussions on financing with the Mexicans.4

W. Michael Blumenthal

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3 See Document 133.
4 Although Carter’s letter to Lopez Portillo had already been sent, Brzezinski, in a February 25 memorandum to Carter, summarized Blumenthal’s recommendations. The President checked the approve option. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 48, Mexico 1–12/77)

133. Letter From President Carter to Mexican President Lopez Portillo1

Washington, February 22, 1977

Dear Mr. President:

Rosalynn and I greatly enjoyed your and Carmen’s visit to Washington. It was an honor to us, and a symbol of our friendship with you, to have you as the first State visitors during my administration.

Your stay enabled us to lay a firm foundation for even closer and friendlier relations between our nations. As you suggested during the
welcoming ceremony, amicable neighbors, who understand one another and act in good faith, can find solutions to whatever problems may arise.

As we discussed during our meetings, I want to propose an agenda of issues which both our governments might examine intensively over the next few months, covering the following areas:

—Trade, with particular emphasis on increasing the flow of, and achieving a better balance in, both agricultural and manufactured products.

—Investment, especially concerning Mexico’s development needs and measures that might be taken to encourage long-term investment.

—Financial Affairs, with discussion of U.S. and Mexican measures that could contribute to the stabilization of the Mexican economy and Mexico’s desire for increased access to the international financial institutions.

—Undocumented Workers, with stress on the need for mutual, humane efforts to deal with the problem.

—Illicit Traffic in Narcotics, Arms and Smuggled Goods, with consideration of cooperative measures that can be taken, particularly in the border area.

—Energy, with discussion of Mexico’s development plans and needs for imported technology and financing.\(^2\)

—Tourism, with discussion of measures to increase the flow in both directions.

—Border Environment, with discussion of the problems of cross-border traffic, water usage, pollution, border industries and crime.

As you know, I am seeking early ratification by our Senate of the treaty covering the prisoners in each country. I believe we should discuss ways to ensure proper treatment of persons arrested or detained in accordance with each of our countries’ laws.\(^3\)

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\(^2\) In telegram 24241 to Mexico City, February 3, the Department reported that Foreign Secretary Roel had offered “to supply additional crude oil and gas to the United States during the energy shortage caused by the hard winter.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770038–0097) Acting on advice from Brzezinski, Carter accepted the gas and declined the oil, urging private companies to contact the Mexican Government if they needed petroleum. (Memorandum from Katz to Vance, February 10; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770031–0234)

\(^3\) Carter sent the Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences to the Senate for ratification on February 15. (Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book I, pp. 156–157) In telegram 171121 to Mexico City from July 22, the Department reported that the treaty had been ratified that day by a vote of 90–0 in the Senate. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770261–0216)
I look forward to receiving your views and comments on these items, and on any other topics we might usefully discuss. Once we have agreed on the specific subjects to be covered, we can decide on the best ways to develop and coordinate our policies.¹

Let me say once more how much I value our friendship and how much I look forward to a close working relationship with you.

Cordially,

Jimmy Carter

¹ In telegram 2982 from Mexico City, March 10, the Embassy transmitted a reply from Lopez Portillo to Carter, in which the Mexican President accepted President Carter’s agenda and proposed that the high-level working group to consider the agenda be convened as soon as possible. Mexican participants in the working group would be the Secretariats of Treasury, Programming, Patrimony (oil), and Commerce. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D970083–0265)

134. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, May 25, 1977

SUBJECT

U.S.-Mexico Consultative Mechanism

Attached at Tab A is the schedule; at Tab B are Secretary Vance’s Talking Points; and at Tab C is a background paper which ARA prepared for Vance, telling him everything he needs to know if he cares.²

In essence, the purpose of the meeting is to set up five working groups to begin tackling problems in U.S.-Mexican relations along the lines suggested by the two Presidents. In fact, it is a formal meeting to give the Mexican people the sense that this operation is meaningful and going forward, though neither are true.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 28, Mexico, 4–7/77. Confidential. Sent for action.
² None of the tabs is attached.
The truth is that ARA diddled around for the last month giving fifth grade tasks to the agencies and never bothering to try to work out the considerable differences which exist between the various departments. The truly difficult choices in U.S.-Mexican relations require hard trade-off between, for example, Treasury’s interest in maintaining austere IMF conditions, and State and AID interest in rural development. There are similar trade-offs between STR and State, Treasury and Energy, Labor and Justice. The decision to set up five working groups dealing with compartmentalized issues is really a decision to sidestep the hard decisions in exchange for the *empty symbol* of cooperation. This might not be a bad point to raise with Secretary Vance as a way to trying to increase the chance for success of the mechanism.  

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3 Vance met with Foreign Minister Roel Garcia on May 26 to establish the U.S.-Mexico Consultative Mechanism and set up the working groups.

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135. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter

Washington, August 31, 1977

SUBJECT

U.S.-Mexican Relations

The consultative mechanism established by you and President Lopez Portillo in February has been slow in getting started and slower in exchanging ideas with the Mexicans. Indeed, the mechanism has been almost completely dominated by a single issue—the undocumented workers’ problem—which you raised for reasons other than having to do with U.S.-Mexican relations.

After last year’s financial crisis brought on by excessive government spending and the attendant high rates of inflation, Mexico has reached

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 28, Mexico, 8–9/77. Confidential. Sent for information. Brzezinski wrote below the subject line, “This is an update, in case you chat with Minister Roel. Carter underlined “Minister Roel” and wrote, “No.” Reference is presumably to a possible meeting during the Panama Canal Treaties signing ceremonies in Washington.
agreement with the IMF on a stabilization program. Mexico has succeeded in holding wage increases to below 10 percent and inflation to roughly 15 percent. The major problem is that the program has caused increases in unemployment, on top of the high levels which existed before the program was instituted. Moreover, investment has been slow to pick up because of a continued lack of economic confidence and borrowing ceilings required by the stabilization program. Low investment and tight fiscal and monetary policies mean a decline in jobs. Growing population pressure on the rural and urban areas makes this decline a potentially volatile political situation. The U.S. immigration policy—which the Mexicans expect will result in the return of some workers and denial of access to new ones—is seen as seriously worsening the problem. Without the investment to create jobs in Mexico, or the ability of workers to seek jobs in the U.S., Mexico is worried that the problem of unemployment will reach crisis proportions.

Treasury is developing a proposal for a U.S.-Mexican Development Fund, designed to create employment in the rural areas of Mexico. It sounds like it might be a good approach to a very difficult problem. We will report to you when the outline of the plan is completed, which should be next week.

Attachment

Washington, undated

US–MEXICAN RELATIONS

ISSUE FOR DISCUSSION

—To determine in the light of our priority objectives in our relations with Mexico the US economic assistance that might be made available in connection with the undocumented aliens program.

2 In telegram 14900 from Mexico City, September 6, the Embassy stated the best way to spur Mexican rural development and address the problem of undocumented immigration was to build industrial plants in the interior of Mexico, which would prevent “drawing job seekers to the frontier.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770322–1004) In late September, Senator Lloyd Bentsen (D–TX) proposed a plan to create a joint U.S.-Mexican development fund that would finance job opportunities in regions of Mexico where undocumented workers originated. President Carter, however, had not yet proposed the plan to the Government of Mexico (Telegram 16467 from Mexico City, October 3; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770360–0269)

3 Confidential.
ESSENTIAL FACTORS

Status of the Consultative Mechanism—The US-Mexico Consultative Mechanism, established in May under the direction of Secretary Vance and Mexican Foreign Secretary Roel provides for high level Social and Economic Working Groups, with the Economic Groups further divided into sub-groups on Trade, Tourism, Finance and Energy, Industry, Investment and Minerals. All of these groups completed a full round of meetings in July and August.

The principal theme of the meetings of the Social Working Group in July and August was the US proposals on undocumented aliens. We explained the program, stressed its humanitarian aspects and sought Mexico’s cooperation in its implementation. The Mexicans voiced a wide range of objections to the proposals. They hoped that implementation might be indefinitely delayed or, failing this, that it be implemented in a gradual and humane manner. The Social Working Group agreed on a joint work program providing for further cooperation in curbing forgers and smugglers of aliens in studying the social and economic aspects of immigration, and in expanding cooperation in law enforcement, health and environment and border development.

Improvement of access to each others’ markets was the principal agenda item of the Trade Sub-group. Agreement was reached in principle on a tropical products agreement. The Mexicans reported progress in reducing their quantitative import restrictions, though these remain a problem. We reaffirmed our readiness to consider carefully specific Mexican proposals for liberalization, working within the context of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations. The two sides exchanged views in the Energy Sub-Group on the Mexican proposal to export natural gas to the US (which is now before the Federal Power Commission). In light of Mexico’s need for investment, we examined aspects of Mexican legislation considered restrictive by private investors. We also agreed to examine ways of assisting Mexico to stimulate small and medium-size business.

In the other sub-groups, Tourism and Finance, principal concerns were means of expanding the two-way flow of visitors and Mexico’s performance in implementing its stabilization program and financing Mexico’s energy development.

Follow-up action has been taken on some issues and consultations with the Mexicans on other issues surfaced in the working groups are continuing through regular channels.

Basic Objectives and Issues—Our basic objective in Mexico, which underlies and impinges on our specific interest, continues to be the preservation of a stable country on our border well disposed to cooperate with the US. Mexican stability and cooperativeness is the essential
foundation on which we seek to advance our more specific current interests of: a) stopping the flow of illegal migrants; b) curbing the influx of narcotics; c) preserving US access to Mexico's oil and gas reserves; d) assuring decent treatment of American visitors and residents in Mexico; e) maintaining Mexican cooperation on human rights and on other international issues; f) keeping Mexico a major market for US goods, and g) stabilizing the economy.

In the Consultative Mechanism, the undocumented worker proposals have emerged as the principal current issue in our relationship, an issue which has the potential for significantly affecting other US interests. The Mexicans have claimed that our proposals may harm their social stability and economic health. They have also warned that adverse domestic political reaction to our measures could make it difficult for the Lopez Portillo Administration to maintain its policy of close cooperation with the US. There have also been suggestions that Mexico's cooperation in narcotics control or its support on international human rights issues could be affected, or that the condition of Mexican undocumented workers in the US could itself become an international human rights issue. (Our interests in access to hydrocarbons, the good treatment of US citizens, and a close bilateral trade relationship involve important economic advantages to Mexico as well and there has been no suggestion so far that the Mexicans might limit their cooperation in those fields.)

The Mexicans have reacted more positively to our offer of economic assistance and improved trade for immigration-source countries. They have stressed the linkage between access to US markets and employment levels in Mexico in the Consultative Mechanism and have indicated in general terms through diplomatic channels their interest in economic assistance. Some GOM officials remain skeptical that our assistance will be nothing more than a scheme to placate them. In treating this issue in the Consultative Mechanism we have agreed to consult further with the Mexicans on the interrelation of the undocumented aliens problem with other economic issues and to work jointly in research on the economic and social aspects of migration. In response to their trade interest we have also urged the Mexicans to submit proposals for products of special interest to be considered during the current round of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations.

US Objectives in the Consultative Process—Recognizing the undocumented aliens problem as the most pressing current issue in our bilateral relationship, we intend to give it, and its related economic issues, priority attention in the consultative process. We intend to use the Consultative Mechanism to consult closely and frequently with the Mexicans as the immigration program goes through the legislative process, stressing the humanitarian aspects. We intend to reaffirm our
willingness to cooperate in alleviating the root causes of illegal migration and engage the Mexicans in more specific discussions of possible forms of assistance. We will continue to encourage the Mexicans to seek improved market access in the US and in other countries within the context of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, but in close consultations with us to identify specific products of special interest to them in the US market. Finally, we intend to use the Mechanism, availing ourselves of any added leverage we may derive from economic assistance, to impress on the Mexicans that greater ability to export must ultimately depend on improvement in the competitive position of Mexico’s heavily protected industries.

**ASSISTANCE TO MEXICO**

The Mexicans would find the US measures for undocumented aliens more palatable and would be more disposed to cooperate in their implementation if accompanied by some positive indication of US economic assistance directly targeted at the root causes of migration. However, because of the size of the Mexican economy, its fundamental structural problems, and the great disparity between the standards of living of our two countries, it is unlikely that any amount of external aid would in the short run eliminate the incentive for Mexicans to emigrate to the United States.

Among the internal structural elements requiring attention in Mexico are: a maldistribution of income, a concentration of wealth and economic power in the urban centers, leading to a dismal and potentially explosive agrarian condition, and continuing corruption in all levels of Mexican society.

A major source of Mexico’s economic woes can be laid at the door of its government’s policy of adherence to a “State Capitalism” model. A model which current evidence would indicate is not meeting the pressing development needs of that nation. The private sector has become overly cautious reflecting its deep and fundamental distrust of GOM economic policy prescriptions. Statist economic development policies have led to a burden of some 900 state enterprises. Most of these operate in an economically inefficient manner. Massive Federal intervention in the economy has been financed, in large part, by external borrowings when internal capital formation capacity was outrun. The results have been economic stagnation coupled with inflation, capital flight, a loss of international confidence and eventually a major devaluation. President Lopez Portillo appears to be vacillating in terms of continuing this pattern. It is important that we encourage him not to replicate the mistakes of the past.

Economic assistance at this time could provide a considerable stimulus to Mexican recovery and economic development. Therefore, assist-
ance should not be viewed solely as a means of alleviating the flow of aliens or of assuring Mexico's acquiescence to our undocumented alien program. Rather, it serves the US interest of having a politically and economically stable neighbor to the south, whose domestic problems impinge heavily on the US. For this reason an assistance program should continue to be made contingent on Mexico undertaking reforms agreed to by the US and the International Financial Institutions (IFI's) as necessary for its stabilization and recovery.

Currently Treasury is coordinating for interagency consideration a proposal for the formulation of a US-Mexican Development Fund, which could be financed jointly by both countries, and disbursed through the IFI's under conditions designed to obtain maximum effectiveness in developing the Mexican economy. This effort is not far enough along to be discussed with any specificity with the Mexicans.

Recommendation:

That we reiterate to the Mexicans our desire to exchange views with them on what the US might do to assist Mexico in connection with our undocumented aliens program. You may wish to indicate that this question is currently under study within the USG. However, we should express our interest to them in the possibility of achieving a more market-oriented allocation of resources, in the interest of economic efficiency.⁴

⁴ Carter checked the approve option but wrote in the margin, “I’m not meeting w/Mexico.”
136. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Mexico

Washington, September 9, 1977, 2145Z

216581. Subject: Narcotics—Mexico Southern Border. Ref: (A) DEA Mexico 834, (B) Mexico 15109.

1. We support the proposal from the Embassy to provide assistance to Mexican Attorney General Flores in examining the problem of illicit drugs entering Mexico and U.S. from South American countries through the Guatemala-Mexico border and commend his initiative in wishing to expend GOM narcotics control efforts. It is important to provide a timely and substantive response to the personal request of A.G. Flores, especially in view of his planned fall meetings with U.S. principals and his request to meet with the Ambassador in mid-September.

2. Recent congressional visits to cocaine producing and transit countries in South America have resulted in increased public comment about the growing traffic in cocaine to the U.S.

3. We understand that the present steps in providing a response to the A.G. consist of initial intelligence assessments at the Embassy with A.G.’s office to determine the scope of the problem. Once the available intelligence has been examined, we understand a feasibility plan to assist the A.G. will be prepared. Because of the urgency expressed in reftel (B), the Embassy may need USG assistance in carrying out the study and should consider combining the two phases of the study. Because the problem involves the flow of illicit drugs into Mexico by air, sea and land from South and Central American countries and concerns border interdiction, U.S. Customs technical assistance should also be helpful in developing an effective program. S/NM can

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770327-0930. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Dugstad; cleared in ARA/RPP, ARA/MEX, CIA, Customs, DEA, SER/INC, and S/NM; approved by Falco.

2 Telegram 834 from DEA Mexico was not found. In telegram 15109 from Mexico City, September 9, the Embassy described Mexican Attorney General Flores’s report on narcotics enforcement in Mexico, which advocated increased enforcement barriers at Mexico’s southern border, the use of technology to monitor smuggling patterns, and a better illicit crop detection system. Flores requested assistance from the Embassy’s technicians on how best to address the problems. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770327-0349)

3 No record of a meeting in mid-September has been found. In telegram 20768 from Mexico City, December 14, the Embassy cited a proposed meeting among Flores, Falco, Special Assistant to the President Peter Bourne, and other U.S. and Mexican officials that would focus on illicit crop eradication. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770465-0779)
coordinate with U.S. Customs on how such help can be provided; along with the Mission U.S. Customs Attaché. We understand that the seizure rate for cocaine at the Mexico City airport increased significantly following the November 1973 U.S. Customs training program for airport inspections. Combined DEA and U.S. Customs expertise in conducting such a study and preparing a workable program for the A.G. may be needed. S/NM concurs with the Embassy suggestion that DEA S/A Walter Sears participate in conducting the proposed study in view of his earlier review of the use of the GOM military in the Mexican eradication and interdiction campaign as well as his extensive background in planning programs in South American countries. We understand that he would not be immediately available, but may be free from other assignments later to assist in the proposed study. We think it is urgent to carry out a careful study as rapidly as possible and be able to indicate to the A.G. what specific steps will be taken.

4. It is assumed that an objective analysis of the problem will assist A.G. Flores in increasing the effectiveness of the interdiction campaign in the southern zone using existing resources. We would not want any proposed U.S. team program to interdict illicit drugs along the Mexican-Guatemalan border to interfere with or reduce the effectiveness of the campaign against opium poppies and heroin within Mexico. Nor would we think it desirable that extensive resources of the U.S. Government or the Mexican Government should be diverted or augmented to respond to the movement of illicit cocaine entering and transiting Mexico from Central and South America, but a rationally developed study that provides recognition of the problem with suitable levels of response appears to be needed urgently. We must also keep in mind that this area of narcotics interdiction will become increasingly important as the Mexican eradication program continues to become more successful, resulting in new opium poppy sources developing south of Mexico.

5. Following are initial reactions as requested Department views on A.G.’s specific points mentioned in ref tel (B): We will provide first the study he requested as rapidly as possible. He should be encouraged in his initiative that confirms the increased commitment of the GOM to joint control efforts. Concerning the suggestion for an advanced remote sensing system, he should be informed that this effort is beginning, and U.S. team will be prepared to brief him on the subject in the near future. The development of increased enforcement barriers in other Central American countries is dependent upon an examination of the size of the threat, the trafficking routes and methods along with the host countries’ capabilities to carry out effective enforcement programs. The proposal for the use of radar involves many complex factors and continues to raise the question of cost effectiveness, but it should be addressed as part of the aforementioned study.

Vance
137. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Todman) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, December 16, 1977

SUBJECT
Comments of Mexican Foreign Secretary on Gas Price Negotiations

At your request, I called Secretary Roel this afternoon. He told me that President Lopez Portillo wanted us to know that Mexico cannot modify the price that it is asking for its natural gas ($2.60 per 1000 cubic feet) and which was agreed to by the six U.S. gas transmission companies. Roel added that since the U.S. companies had agreed to the $2.60 figure in the letter of intent, the U.S. Government should discuss the price question with them. He added that for Mexico to take any further action would not be proper as it would be equivalent to intervening in an internal U.S. affair. He said that Mexico would therefore wait until the U.S. Government worked out this question with the private companies.

The President, Roel continued, had requested him and the Director of PEMEX, Jorge Diaz Serrano, to come to the U.S. if necessary to explain this position to us. He concluded by saying that he does not believe it would do any good for him and Diaz Serrano to come, since they would have nothing to add to the above. However, he would come if we so request. I told him that I would convey this information to you.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780029–1711. Confidential. Drafted by Simcox.

2 On August 3, PEMEX signed letters of intent with six American gas companies (Tenneco, Texas Eastern, Florida Gas, Southern Natural Gas, Transcontinental Gas, and El Paso). (Telegram 12968 from Mexico City, August 4; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770279–0998) In telegram 5886 from Mexico City, April 11, 1978, the Embassy reported that Lopez Portillo “spoke of the gas sale in the past tense,” and suggested that “Mexico had been victimized by entering into the letter of intent with the six U.S. companies.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780155–0924)

138. Backchannel Message From Vice President Mondale to President Carter¹

Mexico City, January 21, 1978, 1637Z

827. I raised in some detail with Lopez Portillo the increased problem of Russian and Cuban intervention in the Horn of Africa and explained the potentially grave consequences.² I said these interventions threaten US-Soviet relations and jeopardized the hope of improved relations with Cuba which the two of you had discussed.

President Lopez Portillo said he was aware of the gravity of the situation. He said he would be happy to do anything he could to alleviate tensions and would be willing to talk to the Cubans about it. He had the impression that Castro would not pay too much attention to Mexico on this issue but he would be willing to try.

It is my understanding that the Cuban Foreign Minister will be coming to Mexico in the near future which may provide an opportunity for Lopez Portillo to discuss the subject directly. I will have Ambassador Lucey follow up.³

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¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 8, Backchannel Messages, Latin America, 6/77–12/78. Secret; Sensitive. Sent through Brzezinski.

² Mondale met with Lopez Portillo in Mexico City on January 20 and January 21. (Memorandum from Mondale to Carter, undated; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 48, Mexico, 1–12/78)

³ During a meeting with Lucey in late March, Roel reported on his recent meeting with Castro in Havana; he also reiterated “Mexico’s full support for the U.S. goal of eliminating or reducing the Cuban presence in Africa.” Roel noted that he felt that the Cubans were deeply in debt to the Soviets for “support and assistance since 1959” and were now “paying a tribute in blood to the Soviets.” (Telegram 5205 from Mexico City, March 31; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780155–0924)
Washington, February 13, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

I wanted to thank you for the generous hospitality which you extended to Vice President Mondale, his wife Joan, and his delegation.\(^2\)

The Vice President has given me a full report, and I was pleased that your discussions were so productive. Ambassador Lucey will be in touch with Foreign Minister Roel shortly to review in greater detail the actions that we might take in the light of these discussions.

I particularly appreciated your cooperation in relaying our concerns to Cuba about developments in the Horn of Africa. Recent reports indicate that the Cubans have begun to fly bombing missions for the Ethiopians, and that the number of Cuban military in Ethiopia continues to grow. I am deeply concerned, and I seek your advice on how we might persuade them to exercise more restraint.

We are proud of the progress our two countries have made in 1977, and we have high hopes for 1978. Among other things, I hope that 1978 will see the implementation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the American Convention on Human Rights—both will strengthen our values in human rights, national sovereignty, and international peace. I hope we can work together to see these two treaties implemented.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter
140. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State

Mexico City, May 5, 1978, 1818Z

Secto 5011. Subject: Highlights of May 4 Vance-Roel Conversations.

1. At Roel’s request in view of forthcoming Mexican visit to Soviet Union, conversation focused primarily on world issues, particularly those with which Soviet Union is involved. Conversation consisted largely of presentation by Vance of U.S. positions on SALT, Soviet-Cuban actions in Africa, preparations for Special Session on Disarmament, “neutron bomb”, China, Korea, Vietnam, U.S. arms package to Middle East, and Namibia.

2. Issues of special interest to Latin America were conventional arms restraints in Latin America and OAS (septels), Cuba and Tlatelolco.

3. On Cuba, Roel expressed belief that Cuban action in Africa is primarily “blood payment” to Soviets for massive assistance. Cubans are also getting benefit of training for their troops in actual combat situation. He thought Cuban action based only slightly on desire to play leadership role in Third World or to foster world revolution. Roel said if U.S. would lift blockade, it might be possible resolve other issues with Cubans since Castro is clearly interested in improving relations with U.S. Secretary Vance said one of his first statements at the beginning of this administration was to favor normalization with Cuba. U.S. took number of general steps in this direction. However, Cuba did not respond satisfactorily and we could not afford to give away our major bargaining chip for nothing from Cuba. Roel said he understood U.S. position and would be glad to be of any help he could.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780196-0761. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated for information Immediate to Helsinki, USINT Havana, and Caracas. Vance made an official visit to Mexico May 3–5.

2 Telegram Secto 5012 from Mexico City, May 5, reported that Vance had informed Roel of a Venezuelan initiative (the broadening of the Ayacucho Declaration) to reduce arms in Latin America. Roel expressed sympathy with the Venezuelan proposal. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780192-0873) Telegram Secto 5014 from Mexico City, May 5, reported that Vance and Roel agreed to exchange views on strengthening the OAS. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780192-0889)

3 See the Department of State Bulletin, February 21, 1977, p. 143.
4. Tlatelolco Treaty. Both Secretary Vance and Foreign Secretary Roel agreed that Soviet announcement of intention to accede to Tlatelolco is most favorable development. Now that France has agreed to make similar announcement probably during Special Session on Disarmament, Cuba remains the only country not to have signed. Roel agreed to discuss this issue further with Cubans.

Vance

141. Telegram From the Embassy in Mexico to the Department of State

Mexico City, June 20, 1978, 2132Z

10132. Subject: Ambassador’s Meeting With President Lopez Portillo: Natural Gas.

1. My meeting this morning with Lopez Portillo was a disappointment. The thrust of the President’s remarks was that last year’s USG refusal to accept what he regarded as fair terms had proven an embarrassment and that now Mexico must use its gas domestically.2

2. I explained to the President that following the recent House/Senate Joint Conference Committee action on natural gas pricing,3 I had been authorized to approach him to suggest re-opening the government-to-government talks. I told him that we wished to establish mutually acceptable guidelines under which the companies could negotiate. In this manner we expected to avoid the problems associated with last year’s ill-fated letter of intent. I noted that we were amenable to any form of talks. We would be willing to set up a negotiating team or designate a single representative. The talks could be private or well-publicized. They could take place in Mexico, Washington or some other location.

3. Lopez Portillo said he hoped his remarks would not be misinterpreted and that he has great respect for the U.S. and President Carter. He also insisted that he was speaking as the Mexican President and

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780257–0631. Confidential; Immediate.
2 See footnote 2, Document 137.
3 The House/Senate Joint Committee considering the gas section of the energy bill agreed on a price of $1.75/thousand cubic feet for natural gas. (Adam Clymer, “Senate Conferees Agree To End Curbs on Gas Prices in ’85,” The New York Times, May 25, p. 1)
not as a businessman trying to get a better price for his gas. However, following the lapse of the letter of intent, he had directed PEMEX to study using Mexico’s gas domestically. He said we must understand how delicate politically energy matters and relations with the U.S. are in Mexico. This project had, of course, encompassed both of these sensitive elements. He said he and his advisers had studied the sale of gas to the U.S. thoroughly before deciding to take what for them was a stiff political risk. They felt that gas would offer an opportunity for Mexico to redress the huge trade deficit with the U.S. They assumed the contract would be a simple commercial transaction and never envisaged problems with the USG. Lopez Portillo remarked again that he had been left quote hanging by the paint brush unquote by the USG refusal to accept what he felt were reasonable contract terms.

4. I noted that regardless of Mexico’s efforts to use its gas domestically there would be substantial gas surpluses during the next several years and that the cost of conversion would be enormous. Lopez Portillo agreed with both points but suggested that he had been compelled to make this decision by USG inaction. He noted that the reduced levels of surplus gas could be sold to U.S. buyers on a short-term basis through the existing northern pipeline system. At any rate, he saw no reason for renewed government-to-government talks until after Congress had completed action on the President’s energy bill.4

5. FYI: I am flying to Washington this afternoon and will be available to discuss this matter further.

Lucey

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142. Telegram From the Embassy in Mexico to the Department of State

Mexico City, June 27, 1978, 0017Z

10477. For the Secretary. Subject: Disseminating Intelligence Related to Cuban/Soviet Operations Against the United States.

1. For some months there have been various indications that a campaign is under way in Mexico to criticize the United States, and the Carter administration in particular, for alleged hypocrisy in supporting human rights causes abroad while failing to protect or adequately respond to human rights violations in the United States involving Mexican-Americans and undocumented Mexican workers. As you know, concern about mistreatment of undocumented Mexican workers and other people of Hispanic background in the U.S. has long been a sensitive and emotional public issue in Mexico which frequently receives heavy coverage in the media. As one might expect, Mexican political groups on the left—especially the Mexican Communist Party (PCM) and the Socialist Workers Party (PST)—have been actively exploiting this issue, although manifestations of concern about human rights violations in the U.S. and an alleged lack of responsiveness are by no means confined to identifiable Communist leaders or organizations.

2. In recent months there has been a proliferation of visits and public statements by Chicano leaders and/or organizations (some with well-known regional or national reputations, but others relatively unknown to us) who have alleged mistreatment, discrimination or human rights violations in the U.S. and expressed public opposition to the President’s proposed legislative program for responding to the growing number of undocumented workers in the U.S.\(^2\) Their freedom of expression is not an issue or source of concern here; as American citizens they, of course, have every right to speak out publicly on any issue abroad or in the U.S. What is of concern, however, are fragmentary, informal, and often inconclusive comments by some of our Mexican contacts which tend to suggest or supplement other indications in the press that some of these Mexican-Americans have been in contact with the same Communist parties or organizations in Mexico which

\(^1\) Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Roger Channel, Mexico, 1963–79. Secret; Roger Channel.

\(^2\) On August 4, 1977, President Carter proposed to Congress actions to reduce the flow of undocumented aliens into the United States and to regulate the presence of those already in the country. (Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book II, pp. 1416–1420) Congress did not act on the proposal.
have publicly been exploiting the issue of alleged human rights violations in the U.S.

3. This apparent relationship, whether innocent or otherwise, raises some question in my mind and among members of my staff as to whether the Cubans and/or Soviets—acting directly or through leftist parties in Mexico—may be orchestrating a campaign involving Chicanos which is designed to undermine the credibility of President Carter’s human rights policy and indeed to mount a counteroffensive criticizing human rights violations against Hispanics (especially Mexican-Americans and undocumented Mexican workers) in the U.S.

4. [4½ lines not declassified] information from intelligence sources which confirms Cuban/Soviet involvement in contacts with certain individual leaders and Chicano groups. While this information has been forwarded to Washington, I understand that it has not been disseminated [less than 1 line not declassified] because of the U.S. Attorney General’s procedures related to Executive Order 12052.³

5. While I fully understand and am in accord with the intent of the cited Executive Order (to protect the constitutional rights of American citizens), I am also concerned about the proper handling and dissemination of intelligence information which might confirm a clandestine Soviet and/or Cuban intelligence operation aimed at discrediting the United States Government and its foreign policy. I thought that you should be aware of this situation which, if confirmed, could negatively impact on our good relations with Mexico and involve broader policy considerations of probable interest to other agencies, the National Security Council, and the Intelligence Community.

6. I would very much appreciate any comments and/or counsel you might be able to offer me regarding this matter.⁴

Lucey

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³ Reference is in error. Executive Order 12052 defined the membership of a committee on antitrust laws. The reference might be to Executive Order 12036, January 24, provisions of which include, “no intelligence operation would be undertaken against a U.S. citizen unless the President has authorized the type of activity involved and the Attorney General has both approved the particular activity and determined that there is probable cause to believe that the person is an agent of a foreign power.”

⁴ No response to this telegram has been found.
143. Telegram From the Embassy in Mexico to the Department of State

Mexico City, July 18, 1978, 2351Z

11731. For the Acting Secretary from Ambassador Lucey. Subject: Mexican Natural Gas. Ref: (A) Mexico 10132, (B) State 179554.  

1. Your most recent cable regarding Mexican natural gas is both puzzling and disconcerting. I have emphatically repeated my conviction that President Lopez Portillo spoke in earnest and with candor when he advised me of his intention to use gas domestically rather than export to the United States. There is no reason whatsoever to believe this was stated as a bargaining ploy—the President himself specifically assured me that this was not the case.

2. During my discussion with President Lopez Portillo, I suggested that the House/Senate Joint Committee action on natural gas regulation would add flexibility to the US position on contract terms. This was of no consequence. Instead, the President detailed the reasons for the Mexican decision to use its gas domestically.

3. In retrospect, I believe that we have collectively mishandled these negotiations and that the result is likely to be a significantly reduced availability of Mexican gas for the US market. I have been working on the assumption that the US still needs the full amounts of gas that Mexico can export and that we want the gas as soon as it can be made available. If this is true, I think we need to focus on alternative strategies for both our reapproach to the Mexican Government as well as for the renewed negotiations. From my standpoint, this suggests that the executive branch must develop a clear understanding regarding the necessity of the gas and acceptable contract terms. I believe that we must also prepare for the possibility that no energy legislation is passed by Congress this year. If no legislation is passed, will we be able to make an approach to the Mexicans?

4. I am hoping to be able to construct an economic argument, based on the position papers prepared by the Departments of Energy and State, supporting our basic contention that the Mexican sale of gas to the US is in their interest. I will continue to seek other possible ways

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2 For telegram 10132, June 20, see Document 141. In telegram 179554 to Mexico City, July 15, Christopher asked Lucey if Lopez Portillo’s stance was genuine, or if it was a ploy to extract larger concessions from the United States. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780291–0650)

3 Not found.
to affect the Mexican position and believe this should be a major concern of both the Departments of State and Energy.

Lucey

144. Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC–41

Washington, August 14, 1978

TO

The Vice President
The Secretary of State

ALSO

The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Treasury
The Attorney General
The Secretary of Agriculture
The Secretary of Labor
The Secretary of Commerce
The Secretary of Energy
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The United States Representative to the United Nations
The Special Trade Representative
Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs
Administrator, Agency for International Development
Director of Central Intelligence
The Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy

SUBJECT

Review of U.S. Policies Toward Mexico

The President has directed that the Policy Review Committee of the National Security Council undertake a review of U.S. relations with Mexico. The central objective of the review is to develop a coordinated and well integrated approach to our relations with Mexico. To do so, we need to improve our understanding of the interrelationships of the issues which concern our two countries.

The Secretary of State should chair the PRC, and the paper should be prepared and coordinated by an interagency committee organized

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at the assistant secretary level. The review should provide the basis for a Policy Review Committee meeting by November 1.

The paper to be prepared for the Policy Review Committee meeting should not exceed 20 pages exclusive of appendices, and should concentrate on the longer term prospects for cooperation on the central issues in U.S.-Mexican relations, including immigration, energy (oil, gas, and nuclear), trade (agriculture and industrial), and their impact on overall U.S.-Mexican relations.

Attention should be given to the impact of different bilateral and multilateral policies on patterns of Mexican economic development and on domestic U.S. policies. Reference should be made to the impact of different policies on specific interest groups in the U.S., and on regional concerns of the United States.

In addressing each major issue, the paper should describe the status of policies, and explicitly consider alternative U.S. approaches, to the extent possible estimating the costs and benefits of each for both the U.S. and Mexico. It should relate the issues in U.S.-Mexican relations to each other, identify potential trade-offs between issues, and suggest options, which in effect would represent packages of policies relating to these issues. These options would provide a choice among comprehensive strategies for approaching U.S.-Mexican relations.

Appendices may be used to give more complete information on each issue.

Zbigniew Brzezinski
SUBJECT

Letter to Lopez Portillo

Attached at Tab A is the letter from you to President Lopez Portillo on natural gas which you requested. Apparently, Senator Bentsen is afraid that Lopez Portillo is being pressured by the leftists in his party to include a section which calls for the development of Mexico’s natural gas for Mexico alone. We are as concerned as Senator Bentsen, but believe that a direct request by you would be counter-productive. Therefore, we have phrased the letter in such a way that he understands our concerns, while at the same time we do not mention specifically his State of the Union Address.

Pat Lucey met with Lopez Portillo in late June, and Lopez Portillo told him that he had directed PEMEX to study the use of natural gas in Mexico alone. He also said he saw no reason for new talks until after Congress completed action on the energy bill. Since then, we have received intelligence suggesting that he is very disturbed by our two governments’ failure to reach agreement, but he believes that it was Mexico that “bungled” it. In time, we believe that he will be able to back away from his current position, and therefore we share Bentsen’s hope that Lopez Portillo will not say anything in his speech which will make future agreement more difficult.

The letter has been cleared by Fallows and by State Department. Pat Lucey has also discussed it with my staff and cleared an early draft.

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2 Dated August 18; attached but not printed. “Once my energy plan is passed,” Carter wrote, “I look forward to strengthening our relationship on this critical issue [energy] to our mutual benefit. An agreement on the sale of natural gas could provide an opportunity for doing that.”

3 See Document 142.

4 In telegram 215074 to Mexico City, August 24, the Department transmitted an account of Secretary of Energy Schlesinger’s meeting with Margain, during which Schlesinger told Margain that the United States would be ready to resume talks on natural gas when congressional action on the energy bill was completed. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780345–1037) In his State of the Union speech, Lopez Portillo “left the door open on gas sales to the U.S.” (Telegram 14511 from Mexico City, September 2; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780359–0312)
Mexico’s Interests and Objectives in the United States

Mexico’s perception of its historical economic and to some extent political dependence on the United States is changing. The existence of huge petroleum and gas reserves—and the increasingly evident US interest in their rapid development—presage, in the Mexican view, an increase in Mexican leverage or, at the very least, a change from dependence to interdependence. Moreover, the Mexican government believes that its bargaining strength vis-a-vis the United States will steadily improve; thus, it is in no hurry to conclude deals on matters of mutual interest.

The Mexican government is constrained in its dealings with the United States by a number of self-imposed principles. It generally lives up to the principle of noninterference in other nation’s internal affairs and expects other countries to reciprocate; Mexico City would deeply resent what it perceived as US efforts to influence Mexican policy

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through economic pressure or appeals to Mexican interest groups. Mexico goes beyond most LDCs in its dedication to national dignity, especially as personified by the Mexican president; Mexico has never accepted traditional aid or military assistance programs and real or imagined slights to the president are taken extremely seriously. Despite their exceptional control of the political process, Mexican presidents avoid taking steps in foreign affairs that would create domestic political risks; since there is no great penalty for inaction in foreign affairs it is considered more expedient to avoid controversial agreements.

Lopez Portillo came to power with a well defined political and social philosophy which stresses democracy, administrative efficiency, and social justice that is tempered by the realities of the Mexican system. The president has maintained the viability of the Mexican system while making cautious openings in keeping with his philosophy. His major commitment is to the preservation of the system and he will step back from reform if he perceives it to threaten political stability.

Mexico’s economy and society are closely tied to those of the United States by geography and history. The US security umbrella provides the cover for Mexico to freely pursue its independent and essentially pacifist foreign policy. While geography has made the two countries neighbors, economics have made them partners. Although a minority partner, Mexico has benefited considerably from this relationship. The United States is by far Mexico’s most important trading partner, source of foreign capital and technology and access to its labor market provides Mexico a safety valve for its excess population.

These connections, of course, not only underpin the relationship but also complicate it. In particular, it has left Mexico especially vulnerable to any setback in the U.S. economy and any effective action by the US to stem the flow of illegal immigrants would have serious destabilizing political and economic consequences for Mexico. Aside from the physical and economic link Mexico, also, periodically rebels against the cultural overflow from the United States—the “colossus of the north”.

Lopez Portillo has placed primary foreign policy emphasis on relations with the United States although there are signs that Mexico is beginning to exert a leadership role in regard to certain Third World causes, though not so flamboyantly as under Echeverria. Despite some indications that the President is disappointed with the slow progress made by the binational groups studying outstanding issues between United States and Mexico, he is not inclined to push for solutions at this time. Lopez Portillo’s go-slow approach may reflect his view that Mexico’s oil wealth is a potential bargaining chip that will increase in value with the passage of time. In the one instance where the President did seize the initiative in bilateral relations—launching plans for a vast...
new pipeline to sell natural gas to the United States—he was personally embarrassed by the subsequent US government rejection of the deal.

Mexico’s main objectives in regard to the United States are: (1) the establishment of a relationship in which Mexico is an equal partner; (2) the avoidance of any US action on illegal migration; (3) trade advantages; and (4) an agreement by the United States to buy Mexican gas on Mexican terms.

On the trade issue, Mexico would like to obtain better access to the US market through removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers, change in the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), and assurance that the US government will resist domestic pressures to repeal customs provisions favoring assembly operations in Mexico. Despite the relative openness of the US market, Mexico resents tariff and non-tariff barriers to its exports, particularly marketing orders on tomatoes and the competitive need restrictions on GDP.

While all dealings with the United States are sensitive issues in Mexico, those involving the nation’s jealously guarded hydrocarbon resources require any President to walk on eggshells. Therefore Lopez Portillo’s assertion that Mexico will follow the less economical route of consuming the surplus gas at home cannot be considered altogether a bluff.

Mexico’s status as an important potential source of oil for the United States is almost certain to change the bargaining relationship between the two countries. The perception that Mexico has something that the United States badly needs will affect the attitude of Mexican negotiators if nothing else. This change in perceptions will be in direct proportion to US efforts to encourage the Mexicans to expand oil production and exports.

Although this perception of new leverage may be limited to oil negotiations, it seems more likely that it will strengthen Mexican interest in dealing with most issues as a package. The linking of issues will make the entire network of relations between the United States and Mexico more complicated, more sensitive to political considerations in both countries, and probably more difficult to manage.
SUBJECT

Concern of Mexican President over Relations with US

On Friday October 13, Jose Lopez Portillo met for an hour and a half in Tijuana with California Governor Jerry Brown. The meeting was arranged by Baja California Governor Roberto de la Madrid. The two have met several times previously, but are not close.

The following summary of major points was conveyed to me today by my former student and colleague, Richard Maullin, now head of the California State Energy Agency, who was present.

Lopez Portillo expressed himself about the United States in an intelligent, occasionally rhetorical, apparently frank, and certainly exasperated manner. His predominant mood seemed to be a mixture of outrage and perplexity.

Lopez Portillo said he had greatly enjoyed his state visit in 1977, and had been impressed with President Carter, who had said all the right things. Lopez Portillo came away convinced that US-Mexican relations were off the back burner, and that Mexico’s oil finds would lead to a process in which outstanding issues could gradually be settled.

He had thought the gas deal was the first step. When the US government did not approve it, he felt more than betrayed. He felt stunned. He felt neither he nor his advisors understood U.S. intentions, and could not predict what the US might do next—on anything.

What was so disturbing to him, Lopez Portillo said, was that not knowing what to expect from the US meant that Mexico could not plan its own internal development. He apparently emphasized agricultural policy as a current headache. How could he authorize investments in irrigation for export production, he asked, knowing that some grower in Florida might get the ear of some congressman and shut off a market that Mexico was feeding?

As for gas, Lopez Portillo said that the failure of the gas deal had led him to change policies and decide in favor of the only market that

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 29, Mexico, 10/78. Confidential; Exdis.
2 See Documents 130 and 131.
3 See Document 137.
was certain: Mexico’s internal demand. Dry gas will be left in the
ground, and PEMEX has committed itself to the technology required
to use associated gas internally so as to free fuel oil for export, primarily
to Europe.

Asked whether Mexico was still interested in selling gas to the US,
Lopez Portillo answered affirmatively, but noted that it was now too
late for the large quantities anticipated in the proposed 1977 deal.

Pressed whether PEMEX might still have an exportable surplus at
some point, Lopez Portillo again answered affirmatively, saying that
PEMEX might have an exportable surplus in 12 to 18 months.

Asked whether he advised California energy authorities to begin
immediate discussions of possible purchase arrangements, Lopez Por-
tillo told Maullin to get in touch with Ricardo Garcia Saenz. 4

Maullin believes that a California-Mexico deal, even drawing on
a smaller total quantity, might still match the share California would
have obtained from the 1977 deal. He will go to Mexico Saturday,
October 28, after two days in Washington.

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4 Garcia Saenz was the Mexican Secretary for Planning and Budget.

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148. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of
State (Nimetz) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs (Vaky) 1

Washington, November 2, 1978

SUBJECT

Mexico PRM

I appreciated the opportunity to participate in the PRM exercise
and was sorry that I could only stay for half of this morning’s meeting.
I do have several comments that you might find useful.

I am somewhat concerned about the way in which we are structur-
ing the PRM. 2 I believe the key problem in the U.S.-Mexican relationship

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor (Nimetz),
Lot 81D85, Box 2, Mexico. Confidential.
2 See Document 146.
is one of management. We have “special” or “unique” relationships of varying degree with many countries throughout the world, UK, FRG, Canada, Iran, Israel, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Yugoslavia—the list is long. However, there is an essential difference between our relationship with those countries and with Mexico. The former set of relationships developed because of strong mutual interests in certain key areas. In the Mexican case, however, the issues highlighted in the PRM—energy, trade, migration, border—are precisely those issues where our interests either conflict or, at a minimum, do not coincide. We and Mexico do not share basic views—either in these areas or in how we view the essential nature of our relationship. I have doubts about the usefulness of imposing an essentially verbal construct—“partnership” or even a “special relationship”—on the relationship when it is based on differences, rather than similarities, of interests.

The issue of the “Tijuana Curtain” is simply one example supporting my thesis. Upgrading and slightly expanding a fence along the border is, to us, an essentially trivial event, with no policy implications. To the Mexicans, it is indicative of the nature of our relationship and portends further significant U.S. measures in developing an electronic border. Although it may be true that the Mexican media distorted the facts, there certainly was a fertile Mexican populace and leadership ready to react strongly and emotionally to this issue. A mechanism within the U.S. Government to coordinate the Mexican relationship could have handled this issue more smoothly.

I believe the PRM exercise would be most productive if it focussed on the important specific issues between the U.S. and Mexico and in turn led to a meaningful discussion of possible methods to manage our side of the bilateral relationship. Talk of “special relationship” or “partnership” simply raises a philosophical issue that will blur the real and practical decisions we must make in the next few years.

3 The proposed expansion of border fences near Tijuana was heavily criticized in the Mexican media. The U.S. press dubbed the proposed fences near El Paso the “Tortilla Curtain.” (The Washington Post, October 24, p. A6)
149. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski), the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron), and Henry Owen of the National Security Council Staff

Washington, December 1, 1978

SUBJECT

A Strategy for Handling PRM–41 on U.S.-Mexican Relations

I recommend that you skim the PRM response which is only 18 pages before reading this memo. (Response at Tab A)

Over the last three months, I have participated in many discussions of the PRM and of U.S.-Mexican relations, and I have discovered that they all follow a frustrating and unproductive pattern. (David has experienced this pattern.) Unless the three of you and Secretary Vance deliberately seek to avoid this pattern, I predict the PRC will repeat it. Let me use this memo, then, for three purposes: (1) to describe the pattern and its pitfalls; (2) to suggest a structure for the discussion which will try to avoid the pitfalls and lead to the most productive discussion; and (3) to suggest one outcome which I believe is worth aiming for.

I. Likely Scenario: What to Avoid?

The discussion passes through four stages:

(1) We have been ignoring our relationship at great risk to our nation’s security. In this stage, Mexico’s importance to the U.S. is highlighted: Mexico has oil and gas on the level of a Saudi Arabia, but it’s next door; 12–19 million Hispanics in U.S.; major population in California and Texas; fifth largest trading partner; underdevelopment and instability in Mexico have a direct impact on the U.S.; bad relations harm our security. Conclusion of this stage: we (speaking of the U.S., but actually meaning the participants in the meeting) have ignored Mexico for so long. It’s time for the U.S. to extend itself and make some concessions as a long-term investment in our relationship.

(2) Issue-by-Issue: It’s Their Fault. In the second stage, the discussion gets into the details of the issues which divide our two countries. Beginning with a desire to find ways to cut through the bureaucracy

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2 Not attached, but see Document 146.
to make decisions on our future, the participants are soon taught by the specialists of each issue that the U.S. has gone more than half-way; it’s the Mexicans who haven’t responded. On trade, they have many more barriers than we; they still have not yet joined GATT; they have been reluctant to get involved in the MTN. On energy, we warned Lopez Portillo several times that we couldn’t accept a higher price for Mexican gas than for Canadian particularly while the Congress was debating the energy bill, and he didn’t listen. We can’t be blamed for the expiration of the gas agreements. On illegal aliens, they are trying to shovel their social costs of adjustment on us. Mexico is a traditional conservative society in which the distribution of income is probably more inequitable than anywhere else in the world. Why should we take their unemployed when they are unwilling to do anything about it themselves?

As the discussion begins to veer toward hostility, someone stops it and pushes it to the third step.

(3) Return to Status Quo. Everyone is sobered to the stickiness of the issues. Then, someone reminds the group of Mexico’s importance, as per the beginning of the meeting. (If this reminder comes prematurely, he will be accused of being “soft” on the Mexicans.) At this stage, there is the first glimmer of understanding of both the real difficulties of making any progress in U.S.-Mexican relations and why it requires our constant efforts.

(4) New Organizational Mechanism. By this time, the meeting has gone at least 20 minutes longer than anyone has planned. People begin looking toward the exit, but the Chair insists on a conclusion, and since everyone has tacitly concluded that something must be done but no progress on any of the issues is possible, the next best thing is to recommend a “high-level organizational consultative structural mechanism framework”. At least, two of those words will be in the recommendation; the order doesn’t matter.

II. How to Structure the Discussion.

The PRM itself provides an outline for a good discussion. I suggest that you begin with a 10-minute general and conceptual discussion of alternative frameworks from which to visualize the future of U.S.-Mexican relations (pp. 4–6): whether to deal with our problems on an ad hoc basis as we would deal with any other “upper-tier” developing country? or whether we should recognize that our problems are interrelated and should be approached in a systematic way with two possible goals in mind: to try to better manage our increasing interdependence, or to try to move step-by-step towards an economic community or partnership? I think we should choose the latter, and that a decision on this could be very significant, but such a choice at the beginning of a meeting will be difficult and meaningless.
Instead, it’s essential to cut the philosophical discussion short (10 minutes) with the intention of returning to it after a discussion of the issues. This will permit the participants to more fully grasp the implications of each “policy direction” before making a decision.

**Energy. Option One:** Seek gas purchases primarily as an investment in broader cooperation. Schlesinger will resist this route, but it is the critical piece of the package; and furthermore, it not only makes sense from the perspective of trying to build a more durable long-term relationship with Mexico but also from the perspective of trying to secure long-term energy supplies. This issue will need to be decided by the President. With the PRC’s recommendation, you will also want to transmit some ideas of how we would go about implementing option #1 and how would the President’s visit fit into that scenario. Some discussion of this at the PRC would be useful.

**Trade. Somewhere between option 2 and 3.** The most important decision we can make in trade is to begin exploring with the Mexicans the possibility of long-term sectoral arrangements, starting with agriculture, but perhaps moving towards light manufacturing goods. The Mexicans have already begun thinking about sectoral arrangements and have even studied the U.S.-Canadian Automotive Agreement, which they concluded was not as desirable as they had thought. I think they will be open to ideas in this area, but we should not press for a Community yet because they are not ready for it.

**Migration.** On this issue, we have considerable maneuverability between what the President proposes (which could be tough with employer sanctions; or emphasize the soft part, amnesty) and what the Congress is likely to do next session which is probably nothing. They will probably sit it out, waiting for the Commission to issue its report (1980). The Mexicans prefer us to do nothing. Their second-order preference is for us to regularize the flow (through a temporary worker program of some sort) at as high a level as possible. I recommend that we re-sensitize the President to the implications of this issue, and suggest a range of possible policies. In his conversation with Lopez Portillo, he can select within that range according to how flexible Lopez Portillo is on the other issues. The domestic agencies (Justice, Labor, Commerce, Stu) feel strongest about this.

**Border. Option One.** I don’t think it would hurt to explore option 2—special borderlands agreement—with the Mexicans, but I think it’s unrealistic. The problem with border arrangements is that we like to

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3 Reference is to the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy established by P.L. 95–412, October 5. The Commission issued its report on March 1, 1981.

4 Stuart Eizenstat was the President’s Assistant for Domestic Affairs and Policy.
coordinate such arrangements at the local or state level on the border, and they like to do it from Mexico City. This is changing marginally, but not enough to permit useful coordination yet.

*Illustrative Framework.* After discussing the issues at some length, it will be necessary to pull the discussion back to the general issue of how to structure our overall relations. I favor Option #3—*Partnership.* To really implement this, we need to develop it with the Mexicans. I strongly recommend option one on “negotiating structure”, to appoint a high-level Presidential representative to discuss, and perhaps eventually negotiate, the complete set of bilateral issues affecting the U.S. and Mexico with a person of comparable stature appointed by Lopez Portillo. Hopefully, the outcome of the PRC meeting as approved by the President would provide the negotiating parameters. The negotiators seek a “package” agreement.

In addition, Vaky feels strongly of the need for greater coordination within the USG on a continuing basis on U.S.-Mexican relations. He would create a Special Office of U.S.-Mexican relations in State headed by someone of the stature of the special negotiator. I think the idea is good, but impractical. U.S.-Mexican relations impinge on too many domestic and political interests to think that it can be managed like any other foreign policy issue.

Let me emphasize the importance of trying to keep the discussion structured or else it will pass like sand through everyone’s hands. There is a specific outcome which we want to aim for, but that can only be achieved if the discussion is guided by a strong hand.

**III. Outcome**

Let me review a possible outcome. If you agree this is worth aiming for, I will draft a PD on that basis. I suggest you speak with Secretary Vance since he has discussed the PRC meeting with Vaky, Cooper and others several times, and possibly has some firm ideas on how he wants to handle the meeting.

We want to aim for a set of policy directions on the major issues in our relationship which will sum to a comprehensive package. This then can be used as a basis for discussions between high-level representatives of both Presidents (with teams of just 3–4 specialists). The premise that underlies this exercise is that our relationship with Mexico will be characterized by increasing interdependence—our societies, politics, and economies will increasingly affect each other—and that we need to find a better way to manage this interdependence to the benefit of people in both countries. We also ought to be moving down a road in.

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5 No Presidential Directive on Mexico was issued during the Carter administration.
which the barriers to trade are reduced, and the U.S. and Mexico can increasingly view each other as a single community.

With regard to specific policy directions:

— **A Comprehensive Package.** In his conversation with Lopez Portillo, President Carter should begin with the idea articulated by Lopez Portillo (JLP) in their first conversation: to focus on the interrelationships between the issues and try to put together a comprehensive and long-term package. The President should propose that he and JLP appoint a special high-level negotiator to do that, but that the two Presidents should first sketch out the parameters of such a discussion.

— **On Energy,** long-term interests of both our countries clearly suggest the need for an arrangement. We should permit the maximum flexibility for our companies to negotiate a deal. That means that we should recognize that the outcome of the deal will have an effect on our long-term relationship as well as on our long-term energy requirements.

— **On Trade,** we should develop a relationship that builds upon Mexico’s entry into GATT. We should look to ways to gradually reduce the barriers to trade between our two countries and to increase the long-term complementarity of our economies—perhaps starting with the agricultural sector—in a way which will minimize the harmful effects of an adjustment process and maximize the benefits to both economies.

— **On Migration,** we do not intend to seal the border, nor do we think it possible to eliminate the flow of illegal aliens to the U.S. Still, we think the flow can be reduced, and we seek the cooperation of the Mexican Government to that effect. New legislation should not be introduced into the Congress until after the President has had a good and full opportunity to discuss this with Lopez Portillo.

— **Border Arrangements** should be one of the subjects considered by the special negotiator. Greater coordination is desirable.

— In summary, we should move towards more of a partnership in our relationship with Mexico.

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150. Minutes of a Presidential Review Committee Meeting

Washington, December 6, 1978, 9:30–11:00 a.m.

SUBJECT
U.S. Policy to Mexico

PARTICIPANTS

State
Secretary Cyrus R. Vance
Amb. Viron Vaky,
Assistant Secretary for
Inter-American Affairs
Ambassador Patrick Lucey,
U.S. Ambassador to Mexico
David Newsom,
Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs

OSD
Walter Slocombe,
Principal Assistant Secretary
OASD–ISA
Lt. Col. Emmette W. Smith,
OASD–ISA

Treasury
C. Fred Bergsten,
Assistant Secretary for
International Affairs

Justice
Mike Egan,
Associate Attorney General
Doris Meissner,
Deputy Associate Attorney
General

JCS
Lt. Gen. J.A. Wickham,
Director, Joint Staff

Office for Trade Negotiations
Steve Lande,
Assistant Special Trade
Representative
Sandra O’Leary,
International Economist,
Bilateral Trade and LDC’s
Office

Agriculture
Dr. Quentin West,
Special Assistant for
International Scientific and
Technical Cooperation

Labor
Charles Knapp,
Special Assistant to the Secretary

Commerce
Acting Secretary Haslam
Abraham Katz,
Deputy Assistant Secretary
for International Economic
Policy and Research

Energy
Secretary Schlesinger
Harry Bergold,
Assistant Secretary for
International Affairs

CIA
Admiral Turner
[name not declassified],
Analyst, Office of Economic
Research

OMB
Ed Sanders,
Deputy Associate Director,
International Affairs Division

White House
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
David Aaron
Amb. Henry Owen

NSC
Robert Pastor,
Staff Member

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 29, Mexico, 12/1–14/78. Confidential. The meeting was held in room 305 of the Old Executive Office Building.
Secretary Vance opened the meeting by asking Ambassador Lucey to brief on the social and political situation in Mexico.

Current Situation in Mexico

Ambassador Lucey began with a brief historical perspective on Mexico and a description of the political scene. Mexico has a political party, which some have described as a combination of Democratic and Republican parties, although it is even wider than that. The PRI has been in power for 50 years, which is longer than any other political party has been in power except perhaps in the Soviet Union. Economically, Mexico has done quite well, with a consistent 6% rate of growth through the 1960’s. It has slowed somewhat in the 1970’s. They have, however, done relatively nothing with regard to the social structure or the distribution of income. One bright prospect is their oil reserves, which are currently estimated at 200 billion barrels. President Lopez Portillo used that figure in his *Informe*, but Diaz Serrano, the Director of PEMEX, is expected to announce a new figure of perhaps 300 billion barrels around January 1st.

The population problem is a disaster, with the rate of growth of about 3.5 or 3.6 percent a year. In the last years of the Echeverria administration, the policy changed to one of “responsible parenthood.” Ambassador Lucey said that he believed that the present program is working, and the Mexicans claim that the rate of population increase has declined to 3.1 or 3.2 percent, and they are hoping to reduce it to 2.9 percent by 1985. The employment problem continues to be very bad, with the combined unemployment and underemployment rate of about 50% of the work force.

In summary, Ambassador Lucey said that the U.S. has fundamental interests in a Mexico which remains stable, friendly to the United States, and humane. Mexico’s human rights record is not perfect, but it is far better than most Latin American countries, and they are aware of the global concern for human rights.

Secretary Vance said that there is general agreement on the strategic, political, and economic importance of Mexico to the United States. The task for the PRC meeting was to reach some agreement on policy priorities. He assumed that all could probably agree that we haven’t done as good a job managing our relationship with Mexico as we should have, and we need to find better ways. He said there are two basic questions that we need to address: one is the short-term question related to the President’s visit, and the other is a long-term question.

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2 Roughly equivalent to the State of the Union address. See footnote 4, Document 145.
which arises out of the increased interdependence and importance of Mexico to the United States.

He said that our problems will increase in size and complexity, and would be exacerbated if we don’t deal with them now. Mexico is currently working on these issues, and if we don’t find a way to work with them, we will not only have lost an opportunity but perhaps make problems worse.

Secretary Vance said that the first issue in the PRM\(^3\) is whether the U.S. should approach our relationship as a partnership or as a relationship similar to what we have with other countries. Obviously, there are many important relationships which fall in between these two poles, but rather than discuss this philosophical question at this time, Secretary Vance suggested that the group move on to specific issues, and then return to the more general issue at the end. He invited Secretary Schlesinger to comment on the energy issue.

**ENERGY**

Secretary Schlesinger said that the United States has known through the intelligence community that Mexican oil reserves come close to, if they don’t equal, Saudi Arabia, in terms of prospects for future oil. He then summarized the state of negotiations between the United States and Mexico.

In his first meeting with Jorge Diaz Serrano, Director of PEMEX, in early 1977, Schlesinger indicated that the United States was very sensitive to Mexico’s long-standing concerns about its natural resources. He informed Diaz Serrano that the United States would be prepared to help with technical assistance to the extent desired by the Mexicans, but Schlesinger pointed out that the level of Mexican technology and technical confidence is very impressive. On financial assistance, we informed the Mexicans that we would be prepared to intervene with the IMF to try to get the IMF to treat loans which were given for oil development as outside of its standby arrangement with Mexico. As Schlesinger pointed out, oil was the solution for Mexico’s balance of payments problem, not the problem. Since then, the U.S. has been engaged in negotiations on gas with Mexico, and much less so on oil.

On gas, there was a proposal made by six U.S. companies to follow the price of the No. 2 distillate fuel oil. To do this, would have required a substantial rise in the price at which we are buying Canadian gas, and no one wants to see that price go from $2.16 to $2.60 immediately. The Canadians have been very blunt about what they would do if we

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\(^3\) See Document 146.
gave the Mexicans $2.60. The problem is that President Lopez Portillo has said publicly that Mexico would be unwilling to accept a price below $2.60. In order to protect Lopez Portillo’s political position, we will have to come up with that figure. Since Lopez Portillo’s announcement, a team from the State Department and DOE visited Mexico and proposed a formula starting at $2.60 kept at a level commensurate with the Canadian level. This was initially accepted at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level in the Mexican government, but somehow it was rejected by the time it wove its way up to the top to higher levels.

At this point, the natural gas debate in the Congress was occurring, and we decided to let this issue slide until the National Energy Act passed. Of course, it took much longer than we had originally anticipated. But now that it is completed, we are now prepared to go back to the Mexicans to express our interest in negotiating natural gas, and to do so on the basis of certain principles, which we will have to recognize:

—First, we would have to accept $2.60 at a minimum, or else Lopez Portillo probably could not accept such an arrangement.

—Secondly, we cannot accept a price which will cause the Canadians to significantly raise their own prices. This is the case for both economic reasons and for political reasons since Senator Jackson and the legislators from New England are likely to scream if the price goes up any higher.

—Thirdly, the price of the natural gas in the future should be tied to residual fuel oils, rather than to the price of distillate fuels. There are two reasons for this: First, the gas which will be imported into the United States would substitute for residual fuel oil, and therefore it is an appropriate criterion. And secondly, the Mexicans are currently flaring 400–500 million cubic feet a day of natural gas, and while they are adapting their industry to be able to take some of this gas, they are losing it at about the rate of $2.00.

Secretary Schlesinger then summarized by saying that he hoped to develop a package that President Lopez Portillo and President Carter could consider and perhaps some favorable sounds could emerge from the discussions, which could then permit more detailed negotiations.

Oil was different since it is moveable, whereas the natural market for gas is the United States. Secondly, the Mexicans have an interest in trying to diversify their market on oil. Recently, Japan has made an arrangement to be able to call on 20% of Mexico’s oil for a concessional loan of about $2 billion. The Germans are also expressing some interest. Mexico’s motives on oil are different from that on gas; they don’t want to get themselves tied to a single market on oil, and while transportation costs to the U.S. would be less expensive than to other areas, the difference is not as great as in the case of gas.
Secretary Schlesinger said that we could encourage Mexico’s oil production to increase without appearing to be demanding that. He said that we do not have any desperate need for the gas at this time, but he thinks that we should try to reach a resolution of that outstanding problem anyway.

As far as the interrelationship of energy with other issues, he believes that if we work out the gas problem, this will no doubt have a favorable impact on our overall relationship and might lead to the favorable resolution of other issues. President Lopez Portillo, of course, has said that he would like to view the various issues in our relationship jointly.

Both sides believe that whatever position it adopts on oil and gas will permit them to have leverage on other issues. Schlesinger, however, believes that neither are likely to be right in this assessment. Negotiations on oil and gas will be worked out on the basis of underlying economics, and neither side is likely to gain any influence as a result of the outcome.

In answer to a question from Henry Owen about whether a failure to reach agreement on gas will inhibit oil production, Schlesinger said that as a practical matter, he doubted it. He said he believes that PEMEX’s timetable for oil production is unlikely to be affected by any agreement on gas. PEMEX is working under real constraints, but these relate to equipment, financing, and to the fact that PEMEX wants to do it all itself. Schlesinger said there is a conceptual possibility that the pace of the development of oil could be inhibited by a failure to reach agreement, but he believes and expects that a gas agreement will be reached, and that the Mexicans have every motive to come to us to reach that agreement since they are flaring so much gas every day.

Henry Owen said that the World Bank has already developed a large program to help developing countries on energy projects, and it’s quite possible that the Bank could help Mexico as well.

Schlesinger pointed out that we are limited as a government in helping other governments on developing their energy resources, and there seems to be a growing reluctance by these governments to deal with U.S. companies. The only tool the United States really has is the Export-Import Bank. Other governments can do much more, and indeed do. He suggested that we need to develop better mechanisms for front-end assistance.

In answer to a question from Fred Bergsten, Schlesinger confirmed that our basic objective is to have Mexico produce as much as it can as soon as it can. But Schlesinger pointed out the great sensitivities of the Mexicans on this very issue. He also said that there is a temptation on Capitol Hill to believe that our energy problem can be solved by
Mexico. He said that this is considerably exaggerated, and that the issue is not understood on Capitol Hill.

Ambassador Lucey confirmed that there are more and more Senators, Congressmen, and staff who are going down to Mexico, and that even staff people want to meet with Diaz Serrano.

Secretary Vance said that he had spoken to Senator Church about this the day before, and both agreed that there was a need for this issue to be managed well.

Secretary Vance summarized by saying that State and DOE would work with NSC in preparing a paper prior to the President’s trip which would outline a package and a plan which President Carter could use in his discussions with President Lopez Portillo.4

David Aaron said that one of the key implications of developing an energy relationship is trade. Instead of looking at energy as a potential instrument for leverage, one should examine the implications in our balance of trade that the new energy relationship is likely to bring.

Secretary Vance agreed on Aaron’s point, and said that energy also intersects with the population problem in Mexico.

**Overall Relationship**

Dr. Brzezinski said that he would like to raise the issues of how we structure our relationship with Mexico, organizationally and conceptually. He said that this was not the first time the government had addressed this issue, but usually the complexity of the issues and the dispersal of authority in the U.S. Government have resulted in the process getting bogged down. Therefore, he said that we should define the relationship conceptually. The U.S. and Mexico have a special relationship, but we have to be very careful about defining that so that it doesn’t frighten the Mexicans. “Partnership” may not be the right way to describe it. This is something that the President really needs to discuss with President Lopez Portillo, and perhaps the two of them could find a mutually compatible definition. He, however, suggested that a decision on this broader conceptual problem be deferred until after the conversation between the two presidents.

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4 The Department of Energy paper, a December 14 memorandum from Schlesinger to Carter, is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. XXXVII, Energy Crisis, 1974–1980, Document 174. The memorandum proposed a strategy for negotiations for the purchase of Mexican natural gas. The NSC’s comments on the memorandum, circulated on December 21, are in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Box 30, Mexico, 10–12/78. For Secretary Vance’s comments, circulated on December 26, see Document 151.
Secretary Vance interjected by saying that he agreed totally with Dr. Brzezinski, but particularly in his belief that the definition must be developed through a dialogue with the Mexicans.

Dr. Brzezinski said that the worst thing to do would be to attach a new slogan to our relationship. This would be bad not only because we have eschewed the idea of sloganeering with regard to our approach to Latin America and the Caribbean, but also because it would be unilateral, and we want to proceed together with the Mexicans. However, it is essential that we do the preparatory work on the different approaches to U.S.-Mexican relations. He said that he is attracted to the idea of someone being designated a Coordinator for U.S.-Mexican relations in order to negotiate these diverse issues. Unless we adopt this approach, we will find ourselves pulled apart by fragmentation again. He therefore favors a deliberate choice of someone to work out the details of this relationship. He said such a relationship is justified in that Mexico shares so many problems, and also because it is undergoing a radical historical transformation at this time.

Secretary Vance agreed on the need for a fresh look. One alternative would be a special representative or coordinator of U.S.-Mexican relations. He said that he also thought that we shouldn’t push aside the Consultative Mechanism which Lopez Portillo had first proposed in his first conversation with President Carter. This mechanism could still be used, but the question of the special representative is one which should be considered. The questions should relate to coordination, and where that coordination should be located.

Henry Owen said that we could link both ideas by placing the coordinator in the consultative mechanism, and by strengthening the consultative mechanism.

Secretary Vance said that he had thought of some people who could be able to do something like that.

Schlesinger pointed out that one problem with a coordinator is that in the area of energy, price agreements must be approved by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and could not be approved just by the Coordinator.

Trade

Secretary Vance then moved to trade and border issues, where he felt some choices were necessary. On trade, he sketched out the three options in the PRM. First, treat Mexico as any other “upper tier” developing country; second, mutual accommodation; and third, towards an economic community. State prefers Option Number 2.

Fred Bergsten said that Ambassador Lucey and Secretary Schlesinger were wrong in thinking that there was only one bright spot on the Mexican horizon. The real growth rate for Mexico of 6 to 7% in
the last few years has generated a 20 to 25% year increase in real exports during the last decade. But David Aaron was correct in pointing out that Mexico is still not a member of GATT, and there are high trade barriers in Mexico. Indeed, he said that the Mexican trade problem is moving in the direction of the Japanese problem, though it is not nearly as bad. He said that Mexico may be making a decision within the week on the MTN.\(^5\) This whole issue is a time-bomb, with the possibility of tremendous spill-over effects onto other issues. If Mexico does not enter GATT, we will have a much more conflictual trading relationship. However, he recommended that we have got to do something to jointly manage the trade problems better.

Secretary Vance said that in addition to just the MTN, we want to get some movement towards accommodation in other areas.

Steve Lande of STR agreed with Bergsten. If we continue to press the Mexicans, we are more likely to get Mexico to join the GATT. If Mexico does not join the GATT, we may have to withdraw our own concessions, and that will be at considerable political cost. He therefore urged that we apply as much pressure as possible on Mexico in the next week to make sure that Mexico joins the GATT, and after that decision is made, then we should look into other trade decisions on accommodation and the other options. In short, we should defer any further decision on these trade issues until the Mexican decision on GATT.

Secretary Vance agreed with that statement and asked if there was any disagreement.

Henry Owen said that STR was correct. The problem is how to orchestrate the pressure on Mexico during the next week. In response to a question by David Aaron about how the President should be involved, Henry Owen said that he would speak to Strauss after the meeting about the possibility of a Presidential letter.

Lande cautioned, saying that when Hernandez was in Washington, he said that whatever the United States does on GATT, it should not appear as if we are pressuring them to join, because it might be counterproductive.

Secretary Vance agreed with that statement, and urged Lande to speak to Strauss as well.

Dr. Brzezinski said that regardless of what happens on GATT, the discussion seemed to be consistent with Option Number 2, which he preferred.

\(^5\) In telegram 310476 to Mexico City, December 9, the Department reported that there was “still a considerable gap to close between the U.S. and the Mexican positions in the Multilateral Trade Negotiations.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780507–1026) Mexico did not join the GATT until 1986.
Secretary Vance said that in the long term, we should look at Option 3—an economic community—as a real possibility.

Dr. Brzezinski said that he visualized Option Number 2 as definitely leading to Number 3. All agreed that the idea of an economic community is an interesting one which should be pursued, but Secretary Vance reaffirmed the need to have this idea emerge from a dialogue rather than just from the United States.

Henry Owen said that Brookings was trying to set up a seminar involving several Mexican scholars that would look into this general idea of an economic community. He said that it would probably be preferable for a private group to be considering this idea, and especially for a private Mexican group, than for the U.S. Government.

The Acting Secretary of the Commerce Department Haslam said that a decision to pursue and discuss sectoral arrangements need not wait until Option #3 is selected.

David Aaron pointed to the need for joint planning with Mexico on resources that will be coming out of the United States. It is necessary that Mexico recognize that the growing interdependence will require long-term and joint planning between our two countries. That’s where partnership will lead to. This issue is essential; and we want as a result of that decision to have a say in their development issues.

Secretary Schlesinger cautioned that the Mexicans are extraordinarily sensitive about our involvement in their development process. We have not done anything like that in Saudi Arabia or in Venezuela or in Iran or anywhere else. The Mexicans are even more sensitive than the others.

David Aaron elaborated by saying that the oil created an economic dynamic in Mexico, and we both have an interest in understanding that dynamic better and in planning for the way it would play out.

Lande said that before moving from Option 2 to Option 3, the President should definitely talk to the Mexicans first.

Secretary Vance agreed, and reiterated that as this relationship develops, the most important thing is to pursue full consultations. The relationship won’t work if we just step off of a plane and announce a new relationship. It must be developed as a result of a dialogue.

Ambassador Vaky agreed completely with the Secretary. He stressed the importance of the two Presidents’ exploring the central focus as well as the various issues in our relationship.

Henry Owen said that there were basically two issues: first, the broad question of relating to the nature of the relationship, and secondly, the organizational mechanism that will best serve our other purposes. Under the second question, is whether we should proceed by negotiations, or whether the Consultative Mechanism will be adequate.
Secretary Vance moved the discussion to immigration. The short-term question is what does the U.S. Government do this year with regard to the policy developed in August 1977. Should we reintroduce the legislation, modify it, or delay in introducing it?\(^6\) The second question is a long-term one, whether we should wait for a decision to be made by the Select Committee. He said that a related question centers on the border arrangements. Before departing, Secretary Vance said that it will be necessary to set up a second PRC meeting to complete discussion of these issues. (Under Secretary Newsom became the chairman.)

Mike Egan of the Justice Department explained that we currently have a policy in which 45,000 Mexicans enter the country annually on a legal basis, and a half a million enter illegally. He said that if Justice were given sufficient resources, they could stop the illegal migration, but it would be a tremendous cost to Mexico. Mexico obviously needs to export its labor; there are not enough jobs to go around. Anything that the United States does to stop that flow causes great concern in Mexico. Right after the President announced his undocumented workers policy in August 1977, a high-level United States delegation visited Mexico and encountered an angry and hostile reaction. Part of the problem was that General Chapman, the Director of INS in the previous Administration, had stirred the country up into thinking that this issue was a great problem to the United States. Since his departure, this issue has died down considerably. The bill that the President introduced was received very coldly; there was practically no interest in dealing with the subject. To the extent that the Administration decides to stir up interest in the bill again, Egan believes that we will stir up concern about the issue itself.

Egan said that he didn’t think it was urgent from a political perspective to do anything about this issue at this time. He said that Labor may have a different view on this.

Justice was uncomfortable with the policy of letting the illegal migrants enter the states, but overall, there was no political necessity to address this issue at this time.

As to the specifics of such a policy, Justice continues to believe that employer sanctions are important. The degree to which these sanctions are enforced is, in a sense, our “faucet” to be turned on or off depending on the degree of cooperation we are receiving from the Mexicans; we can use border enforcement in a similar way. Justice also believes that amnesty is important. In the bill we introduced, 1970 was the pertinent date for adjustment of status; but perhaps this could be

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\(^6\) See footnote 2, Document 142.
moved up to 1974 or 1975. Realistically, there is really no way to deport these people at this time. Of course, when we do adjust the status of so many people, we will be creating new family cells which will lead to many more immigrants. Another option is to consider the expansion of the H–2 program. Egan understands that the Secretary of Labor is considering that.

In the long-term, Egan said that the only way to solve the problem is to build up labor-intensive industries in Mexico, and to discuss this directly with the Mexicans. He said that the Mexicans don’t want us to do anything that will cause a reduction in the flow of migrants to the U.S. He reiterated, however, that a capability could be created in INS that would severely curtail the flow of illegal immigration into the United States.

Newsom agreed that is the question, whether to go in the direction of more enforcement or less.

Charles Knapp of the Labor Department said that whatever decision is made on illegal aliens is likely to strain the relationship with Mexico. A central issue that Labor was examining is the temporary workers program. It would be very difficult politically to get a bracero-type program, and this probably holds for an expansion of the H–2 program as well. However, such an expansion has never really been tested, so we really don’t know.

Owen summarized by saying that more enforcement would certainly adversely affect U.S.-Mexican relations and could generate instability in Mexico, while it is unclear whether or not the aliens harm the United States or whether they fill a need. Given the certainty of the problems that would be caused by stringent enforcement, and the uncertainty of the real effects of illegal migration, he argued strongly for maintaining the status quo.

Ambassador Newsom agreed with that analysis.

Egan explained that the status quo will only exacerbate tensions along the border and within INS.

Ambassador Lucey said that in a conversation he had with a high Mexican official, Lucey asked what is the best thing Jimmy Carter has done for Mexico. The Mexican explained that it was Carter’s inability to get a bill passed on undocumented workers. If we could recognize the inevitability of a flow of undocumented aliens and regulate that flow, as Mike Egan said was possible, Ambassador Lucey said that could be very good.

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7 An H–2 visa allows a foreign worker into the United States for seasonal or agricultural work.
Ambassador Vaky suggested caution. While recognizing that this is “our” problem, we really shouldn’t do anything on this issue before the President goes down and has an opportunity to describe our concern to the Mexicans.

Mike Egan agrees as did Charles Knapp. However, Knapp pointed out that if unemployment goes up, we are likely to have a lot of political problems which will cause us to look at this issue quite differently.

David Aaron suggested that one possible reason why the bill has gotten such a poor reception in the Congress is because current policy is what people want. He questioned whether anybody would want to tolerate an H–2 program which would involve 400,000 to 500,000 Mexicans, and probably a vast expansion of the bureaucracy to handle it.

Knapp said that it was an option which should be considered.

David Newsom summarized the consensus that nothing should be done before the President’s meeting with Lopez Portillo, and nothing should be done without full consultations with the Mexicans. On his third point, he said that we need to take a closer look at the impact of the illegal alien issue on labor dynamics in the U.S., but after interjection by Henry Owen, who pointed out the empirical difficulty of designing such a program, he backed away from the third point.

David Aaron asked whether Justice and Labor believed they could get Mexico to agree to a flow of 400,000 to 500,000 people.

Knapp said that Labor would be willing to consider this option, and would consult on it to get some outside views.

In answer to a question about the fence, Doris Meissner said that the fence has been redesigned and is ready to be built, but we want to talk to the Mexicans first before building it. David Aaron asked for a complete memo from the Justice Department, including pictures, aspects related to the building, when the fence is likely to be built, how long it’s likely to take.

Henry Owen repeated that because of its controversial nature, the fence issue should be reviewed in the White House before any decisions are made.

Doris Meissner thought that construction of the fence before the President’s trip would be desirable.

Bergsten asked whether border management proposals were in need of high-level attention.

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8 See footnote 3, Document 148.
Newsom, Ambassador Lucey, and David Aaron all agreed that it was necessary to discuss the border management issues with the Mexicans first before announcing them publicly.

Ed Sanders of OMB said that the reorganization people expect to send the memorandum to the President later this month, and they believe it is necessary to talk to the Mexicans about it.

Henry Owen reiterated that like the fence issue, this should be reviewed by the White House.

David Newsom asked what should be the relationship between the federal government and the governors in the border states? He suggested that the next PRC meeting should focus on the issue of finding an organizational mechanism to better manage our relationship.⁹

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⁹ On December 12, Brzezinski sent a memorandum to members of the Cabinet informing them that the President approved the conclusions of the December 6 PRC meeting, including reaching an agreement on natural gas with Mexico. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 32, Mexico: PRM 41 (Policy), 10/77–11/78)

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151. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, December 26, 1978

SUBJECT

Mexican Natural Gas

As requested, I have reviewed Jim Schlesinger’s memorandum on Mexican gas negotiations. It is a thorough analysis of the technical aspects of the gas question.² From the perspective of our overall relationship with Mexico, however, I am concerned that the analysis does not fully take into account the critical importance of increased U.S.-Mexican cooperation in areas such as migration, trade, and energy. In particular, I believe that Jim’s proposed strategy of going back to the

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¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 29, Mexico, 12/15–31/78. Secret.

² See footnote 4, Document 150.
Mexicans with an offer essentially the same as the one rejected by Lopez Portillo a year ago could adversely affect your trip and the longer-term prospects for U.S.-Mexican cooperation.

The Mexicans view these gas negotiations as an indicator of our interest in over-all cooperation. They have displayed anger and bewilderment over the events which led up to the suspension of discussions last year.\(^3\) While their reaction may be part of the bargaining process to some extent, the outcome apparently has left Lopez Portillo personally troubled and has provided a major focus for domestic criticism of his efforts to strengthen ties with the U.S. The Mexicans see us as paying very high prices for Algerian or Indonesian liquified gas, but vetoing a deal negotiated between PEMEX and U.S. companies which would cost American consumers much less than this other imported gas—or than the gas we are planning to bring down from Alaska. While they can understand our concern with the effect of a Mexican deal on the Canadian price, they are also aware that this concern has not deterred us from arranging for gas from these other sources at even higher prices than the Mexican proposal.

Against this background, I fear that Jim’s going-in offer will not provide a basis to continue the discussions. It is essentially the same offer we made a year ago—$2.60 price when the gas starts flowing in 1980, with an escalator related to the inflation rate and/or world oil price increases. It would come after another round of OPEC price increases and after press reports of high level attention to Mexican policy in the U.S. Government. Lopez Portillo could cut the dialogue short and your visit would take place under adverse conditions.

This is not to say that we should simply accept the Mexican price. At the very least, I think Jim should consider how to make sure that our positions are presented in such a way as to keep the negotiations going forward. He might emphasize that he is talking about general pricing concepts (not hard and fast numbers) and that the actual purchase would be negotiated in detail between private companies and PEMEX. When you visit Mexico, you could discuss the gas issue briefly and in general terms (since in any event the Mexicans would not want a commercial transaction to become the focus of your state visit) and set the stage for serious commercial negotiations commencing \textit{after} your visit, in an atmosphere that will increase—rather than diminish—the chances for growing cooperation between our two countries in the decades ahead.

In preparation for these negotiations, I question whether our ultimate fallback should be, as Jim proposes, a link to residual fuel oil that

\(^3\) See Document 137.
closes less than half of the price gap between us and the Mexicans. In light of the larger stakes we have in U.S.-Mexican cooperation, I am not sure we can afford to adopt as a final bottom line a proposal that refuses to meet the Mexicans half way.

Mexico’s population may exceed ours in a few decades. With a 2,000-mile border and 160 million legal crossings (and about a million illegal crossings) a year, with narcotics a major concern, with a level of bilateral trade exceeded by only four countries, with Hispanics soon to be our largest minority, with the real possibility of social turbulence in Mexico in the coming decades as migration, income-disparity, urbanization and unemployment all increase, it is in our interest to work closely with Mexico—not antagonistically.

A policy of waiting three or four years to pressure a weaker Mexico into submitting to our terms would, I believe, be detrimental to our national interest. A more dramatic concrete example of North-South confrontation could not be imagined—right on our own borders. We are likely to pay for it in many ways—in reduced cooperation on narcotics, migration, trade, border issues, and also politically within the Hispanic community. Although Jim may be correct that Mexican gas will flow into the U.S. market in the next few years, the Mexicans have demonstrated over the years that they are capable of making decisions to their economic detriment where national pride is involved.

152. Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting

Washington, January 19, 1979, 10:30 a.m.—noon

SUBJECT
PRC—Mexico

PARTICIPANTS
State
Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher
Matthew Nimetz, Counselor

Commerce
Frank Weil, Assistant Secretary for Industry and Trade Administration

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, 1977–1981, Box 73, PRC 091 Mexico 2/6/79. Confidential. The meeting was held in the Roosevelt Room at the White House.
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

1. Science and Technology. Frank Press briefed on the status of discussions with the Mexicans on cooperation in science and technology (S&T). A US team will be meeting soon with their Mexican counterparts to agree on communique language which stresses our desire to reinvigorate the US-Mexican S&T agreement of 1972, to agree on new cooperative programs on arid crop development and on housing, and

to place all existing S&T agreements under a single umbrella, which will be coordinated on our side, first by State and NSF and later by the new Foundation for International Technological Collaboration. We have been careful not to raise their expectations on program funding. Press agreed to circulate to appropriate agencies a paper summarizing the agreement.

2. Trade. Alan Wolff noted that STR has paid special attention to Mexico because it is warranted by our current trading relationship and by future prospects. The primary US objectives have been to encourage Mexican accession to the GATT, which Mexico has apparently just announced, and completion of a trade agreement under the MTN. We will demonstrate our interest in these topics by a reference in the communique, and the President might raise them with Lopez Portillo, depending on the status of negotiations. We have made a significant proposal to them in the MTN, and we await their response. There was considerable skepticism in the group on the utility of sectoral arrangements, but STR will complete a short paper on that for the next PRC meeting. STR also cautioned against packaging issues as Lopez Portillo has suggested because it would be detrimental to our interests. The idea for examining macro-economic questions associated with the long-term complementarity of our economies was broached, and Treasury subsequently agreed to work on this issue in the context of the trade paper.

3. Undocumented Workers. There was disagreement within the group on what course to follow, and that is reflected in the memorandum attached at Tab A. However, all agreed that no firm decision and no announcements should be made by the Executive Branch prior to the President’s conversations with Lopez Portillo.

4. Border Issues. Justice plans to have the fence at the border rebuilt after your trip. On the issue of the border management reorganization proposal, the Mexicans have appreciated our consultations, and have informed us that their concern is with the substance of our undocumented workers policy, rather than the mechanism. With regard to cooperation on border issues, the US has shown an eagerness to work within the context of the consultative mechanism which has not been reciprocated. Ambassador Lucey suggested that we try to organize our four border Governors into a group, using Title V funding, although he recognized that this idea would still face the recurrent dilemma that Mexico manages border issues from Mexico City while we do it at a local level.

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3 Not attached, but a copy is in the Carter Library, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 29, Mexico, 1/17–1/31/79.
5. **Next Meeting.** The next PRC meeting will deal with trade and energy issues and how to organize the US government to negotiate and manage US-Mexican relations.

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153. **Memorandum From Guy F. Erb of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski), the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron), and Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff**

Washington, January 24, 1979

**SUBJECT**

Lopez Portillo’s Views on U.S. Policy Toward Latin America and Energy (C)

While in New York on Monday\(^2\) I had a conversation with a high UN official who discussed with me President Lopez Portillo’s conversations with Secretary General Waldheim during the latter’s official visit to Mexico. (C)

Lopez Portillo said that the United States cares only about Panama and Cuba in Latin America and that there was no well structured U.S. policy toward individual countries nor toward the region as a whole. (C)

Lopez Portillo also said that the United States had destabilized the situation in Nicaragua but had not provided an alternative to Somoza, who, despite his faults, had maintained a stable regime. (C)

On energy, Lopez Portillo said that the United Nations could provide an international framework for Mexico’s bilateral energy relations with the United States. Lopez Portillo therefore supported a revival of Waldheim’s initiative for an international energy institute.\(^3\) Waldheim may well act on the Lopez Portillo suggestion to revitalize the energy institute proposal. (C)

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\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Box 30, Mexico, 10-12/78. Confidential. Copies were sent to Owen and Poats.

\(^2\) January 22.

\(^3\) Waldheim proposed in 1977 creating an International Energy Institute to assist less-developed countries with the development of energy technologies. (Telegram 1951 from USUN, June 17, 1977; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770217-0712) The proposed institute was not created.
Lopez Portillo saw energy and food issues as two key elements in North/South relations: other components of an emerging international order could be put in place after agreements were reached on energy and food.\(^4\) (C)

\(^4\) In a follow-up memorandum to Aaron on January 26, Erb noted that “Lopez Portillo implied that U.S. human rights policies had unsettled the situation in Nicaragua. He did not say that the United States had intervened directly in a way that destabilized the situation in that country.” Aaron wrote in the margin, “If Waldheim was your source, remember Kissinger’s comment about him—‘Make no mistake, behind that vain and vacuous exterior lies a vain and vacuous man!’” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 49, Mexico, 1–2/79)

154. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to Secretary of State Vance\(^1\)

Washington, January 27, 1979

Dear Cy,

In conjunction with preparations for the President’s trip to Mexico and as a part of the ongoing review of our policies toward Mexico, I believe we should address, as a major issue of U.S. security interest, the question of a broad petroleum agreement with Mexico.

I believe Mexican petroleum is, or should be, one of the basic factors in our quest for an improved bilateral relationship. Our PRC deliberations in this area, however, have centered only on the narrow subject of the importation of natural gas.

The deteriorating situation in Iran has magnified the serious question of continuing availability of oil from the Persian Gulf in the future, causing us to reexamine our military requirements and look for alternative sources of supply. Accordingly, our bilateral relations with Mexico and ready access to Mexican oil have rapidly emerged as extremely important U.S. security interests.

The attached assessment prepared by my Assistant Secretary for Program Analysis and Evaluation provides a starting point for consideration of our future requirements and how we should be attempting

\(^1\) Source: Washington National Records Center, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Special Assistants to both, FRC 330–82–205, Box 14, Mexico (Jan–Mar). Secret. A copy was sent to Brzezinski.
to satisfy them. If we add to these concerns the potentially precarious political scenarios that could develop in the Persian Gulf area there is even more reason for concern. Given these facts, prudence dictates addressing these issues prior to the President’s trip to Mexico. As Secretary Schlesinger has recognized, the pace at which Mexico expands its petroleum production is an important factor in the equation—one which we should be working on at top levels in our bilateral deliberations.

I believe that it is essential that we address this subject in the forthcoming PRC meeting on Mexico, now scheduled for January 31.3

Sincerely,

Harold

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2 Dated January 17; attached but not printed.
3 The PRC was subsequently rescheduled for February 6. See Document 155.

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155. Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting

Washington, February 6, 1979, 4:10–5:30 p.m.

SUBJECT
U.S. Policy to Mexico

PARTICIPANTS
State
Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher
Matthew Nimetz, Counselor
Jules Katz, Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs
Luigi Einaudi, Staff Director, NSC Interdepartmental Groups
Ambassador Patrick Lucey, U.S. Ambassador to Mexico

CIA
Admiral Turner, Director of Central Intelligence
Hans Heymann, National Intelligence Officer for Political Economy

OMB
James McIntyre, Director of OMB

Domestic Policy
Stu Eizenstat
Kitty Schirmer

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 32, Mexico, PRM–41 (Policy), 2–7/79. Secret. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.
Chaired by Warren Christopher, the PRC met for its third session on PRM–41 (U.S. relations with Mexico)\(^2\) and considered three issues: (1) energy relations, including Presidential discussions and U.S. strategy for subsequent negotiation of a gas price formula; (2) organization of the U.S. Government for a more coordinated approach to relations with Mexico, and (3) the general approach to the Presidential visit to Mexico. (S)

**Energy.** It was agreed that the United States should seek to develop an extensive set of energy relationships with Mexico, designed to increase world energy supply, enhance U.S. energy security, and support rapid but stable Mexican economic and social development. The President’s visit is critical to establishing a more positive political climate for negotiations on gas supply and a possible subsequent oil supply agreement. He should sensitively refute Mexican suspicion of U.S. intentions. As a way to improve the atmosphere and place the gas issue in a broader context of energy cooperation, he could suggest: (a) joint studies of potential electric power interchange and gas transmission cooperative arrangements along the common border; (b) U.S. technical consultation and R & D cooperation on solar and geothermal development, enhanced recovery of oil, and uranium processing; and

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\(^2\) See Documents 150 and 152.
(c) if the Mexicans express interest, support of an accelerated rate of oilfield development through long-term U.S. purchase contracts for the Strategic Petroleum Reserve or the Defense Supply Agency. He should indicate to President Lopez Portillo that we are interested in a long-term arrangement for importing natural gas from Mexico. (S)

It was agreed that the President should outline in general terms the U.S. approach to gas pricing (including the fact that our regulatory agencies must approve any agreement), and elicit Lopez Portillo’s position, but he should avoid a discussion over whether residual oil is the right price yardstick, referring it to the technical experts. The President should express interest in completing negotiations early. To do this, the President would designate a representative who will work with one designated by Lopez Portillo to decide on a formula for natural gas pricing that takes into account market conditions, the prices of comparable products, and the long-term relationship we wish to create with Mexico. (S)

We should seek inclusion in the joint communique of agreement to an early specified date for negotiation of the gas price formula. Negotiations between Mexico and the gas companies would proceed only after negotiators of the two governments agreed on standards. (S)

In discussions of oil, the President should welcome Mexican interest in swapping Mexican oil for Alaskan in supplying Japan and the U.S. Gulf Coast, but note that this depends on U.S. Congressional approval. He also should encourage Mexico to increase oil exports to Israel. (S)

Coordinator of U.S.-Mexican Relations

There was a consensus that our bilateral relationship with Mexico was quantitatively different than with any other country’s: more issues span the abstract dividing line between foreign and domestic concerns; more domestic departments are involved with the resulting problem of coordination; more issues impact directly on domestic politics. With the exception of OMB, there was a consensus that some special mechanism was necessary for dealing with the coordination of these issues. (S)

The symbolism would be helpful to our relationship as well. A special coordinator to negotiate the outstanding issues in U.S.-Mexican affairs should be considered only if a person of substantial political stature could be found. Also suggested was the idea of doing a study of our relationship in 10–20 years, but it was felt that this would be more appropriately done outside the government. On the issue of day-

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3 The February 16 joint communiqué issued at the end of President Carter’s visit to Mexico did not mention agreement on a specific date to begin gas price negotiations. (Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book I, p. 291)
to-day management of U.S.-Mexican affairs, it was left to the State Department to decide how it would organize itself for these issues. (S)

Approach to Trip. Matt Nimetz reported on his conversation with Foreign Minister Roel about the agenda for the trip.4 Roel suggested an agenda of almost every conceivable issue in bilateral relations and a number of international issues. Ambassador Lucey said that Lopez Portillo would value suggestions from the U.S. on how to structure the meeting. (S)

4 In telegram 1428 from Mexico City, January 26, the Embassy reported on Nimetz’s meeting with Roel regarding Carter’s visit. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790038–0332)

156. Memorandum of Conversation

Mexico City, February 14, 1979, 12:20–2:45 p.m.

SUBJECT
Discussion of International Issues

PARTICIPANTS

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<th>U.S.</th>
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<td>Secretary Vance</td>
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<td>Dr. Brzezinski</td>
<td>Hugo B. Margain, Mexican Ambassador to Washington</td>
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<td>Ambassador Lucey</td>
<td>Jesus Reyes Herodes, Secretary of Government</td>
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<td>General Felix Galvan Lopez, Secretary of National Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>R. Pastor, NSC Staff</td>
<td>Jose Andres Oteyza Fernandez, Secretary of National Wealth &amp; Industrial Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>M. Nimetz, Counselor, State</td>
<td>Oscar Flores, Attorney General of the Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>J. Powell, Press Secretary</td>
<td>Jose Ramon Lopez Portillo, Director General for Documentation and Analysis, Department of Programming and Budget</td>
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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Box 30, Mexico, 2/79. Confidential. The meeting was held at the Presidential Residence, Los Pinos.
LOPEZ PORTILLO: It has been suggested that this first session take up international matters. If that is agreeable, shall I or you begin?

CARTER: Let me exercise the prerogative of a guest and suggest you start.

LOPEZ PORTILLO: Let me describe how we see the world—from the perspective of a developing country. I have recently travelled to Russia, Japan, China, Spain and have received several Chiefs of State.²

First, some general comments: Humanity has supposed that international fora ought to be able to solve problems and channel opportunities. This is a valid dream but it is as yet unrealized. This worries me. The UN has become bureaucratized; blocs, prejudices, a priori positions, antagonisms, policies impede analyses. Due to some obscure psychological reason, we have personalized the UN as if it is an impersonal entity, ignoring the fact that it will be what we want it to be. We should strengthen it, not multiply fora. The most satisfactory way to solve problems is to solve world problems.

From our point of view we are entering a period of adjustments; we have a series of new interests. The most powerful nations, the U.S. and the USSR, have not formulated new policies. This makes it difficult for us to shape our policies. The USSR’s objectives in its sphere of influence are clear. It has organized its area with a division of work; nations can plan predictably. It is an area of “order.”

Very frankly, the U.S. does not have clear objectives or policies. There is disorder, with no system of interests or purpose save the flow of interests. This includes Japan and Europe. This worries us. Lack of a policy complicates issues and solutions. This is particularly true of Latin America. The U.S. has not defined a policy toward Latin America. Every day we are further away.

² López Portillo visited Spain in October 1977, the Soviet Union and Bulgaria in May 1978, and China and Japan in October and November 1978.
I recognize that Latin American nations do not have a policy among themselves. It is not a monolithic, ideological area.

I note with interest China’s entry into the modern world. I believe that normalization of relations between the U.S. and China is a most important event. We believed a few years ago that the union of China and the USSR was intended to define a strategy. This proved to be untrue. The rupture of the left complicates the situation. Possible Japanese-Chinese unity would present a powerful new force in the next century. China is patient, however.

China says that USSR hegemony is growing while U.S. hegemony is declining. There is bitterness in USSR-China relations. The trend in the USSR is clearly toward an increase in the standard of living for its people. China will fight for equality. There have been recent problems along its borders. The logical joining of Japan and China would be interesting. There is a potentially significant future there.

There is imbalance in the Near East. Recent events in Iran are an example. There is a serious risk that this could extend to other Arab countries, which would be very serious because of oil. Let me give a personal view: The U.S. involved itself (through human rights) in Iran and stimulated change before it had developed a scheme or a substitute. Thus, it created instability in a critical area.

I am also worried about Africa. There are states there “without nationality.” The division of influence in Africa is not clearly defined; Africa is a critical mass. This worries us.

European self-definition is also in crisis. The risk of instability there worries us.

In all these instances there is no forum where these things can be brought up.

Latin America is in a similar situation. Panama has been stabilized thanks to your efforts. I congratulate you on what I know was a most difficult political thing to do. U.S.-Cuban relations are stagnant. The possibility of closer ties has been complicated by events in Africa and geopolitics. Nicaragua worries us. Again, the situation was stimulated without a substitute equilibrium ready to be put in place. Mexico’s own relations with Latin America are not much better. We have no relations with Chile. We have difficulties with Argentina over the Com- paro asylum case. We are very interested in preserving the right of asylum for refugees.

We all face a great challenge. To respect freedom one cannot destroy justice.

CARTER: I have listened to your remarks with great attention and interest. I know of your perspective as a leader of a great and developing country and of your own background as a philosopher, a writer, an administrator. Let me give you my views.
To me, our policy in foreign affairs is clear. We intend to remain strong, and to magnify our strength for the benefit of all mankind.

The relationships between the U.S. and other nations are complex and are complicated by a number of factors. Our primary goal is to assure peace and recognize the inevitable changes which are taking place in the world. Everywhere, there is a desire of people to control their own affairs and determine their own lives. More than a hundred nations have now been formed; they are determined to control their own future. The time for colonialism is gone. The time for super-powers to control events has passed. The concept of a two-power condominium is not valid. We recognize this gratefully and with some degree of relief.

I agree that the UN has not realized its potential, but new regional organizations have shown vitality. The EC is stronger. ASEAN is strong and growing. The U.S. has supported the African effort in the OAU. The OAS has not fulfilled its potential, but we hope it will be strengthened.

We have tried to reach out to nations like China from whom we have been alienated. My hope is that our new relationship with China will ease tensions between the PRC and the USSR and not exacerbate the problems that exist. We have made this clear to both China and the Soviet Union. I believe our success in that has been good.

We have had some problems in our relations with the Russians, but we consult on a number of matters. We are approaching the conclusion of SALT II. Only a few small technicalities remain. The UK will join us in pushing for a comprehensive test ban which would prohibit for the first time the testing of all nuclear explosives. We have worked with the Soviets to limit the sale of conventional arms. In the meantime, we have taken some unilateral actions with regard to conventional arms restraints.

We have tried to enhance the degree of commitment to basic human rights both in the U.S. and encourage others outside the U.S. to do the same. Awareness of violations of human rights has risen although serious violations still occur. We look on our progress with some satisfaction. In the western Pacific, this was our most serious problem two years ago.

Now, for the first time in my life, we have better relations with India, Japan and China. Australia, New Zealand and Korea are stronger. ASEAN nations are oriented to the same principles we ascribe.

I am concerned about problems in this Hemisphere. We have attempted to maintain the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs. We have made good progress with reference to the Panama Canal, and treaty implementation. Under the auspices of the OAS and working with two other governments, we have tried to improve the situation in Nicaragua, but that effort was not successful. This is a
matter in which the influence of Mexico might be exerted in a more forceful manner and would be constructive. Central America is explosive. The dangers of instability could spread to Nicaragua’s neighbors. El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras have similar problems. There is little cohesion to preserve peace. The Nicaraguan situation also has an effect in Costa Rica and Panama. The situation in Central America—and in Latin America—could benefit from Mexico’s strong leadership.

You have good relations with Cuba, many others do not. We tried to establish good relations with Cuba. Diplomatic Interest Sections were established, and I extended the hand of friendship to Mr. Castro for the first time in many years. But our public expressions of concern have not been considered adequate. In recent months, Cuba has greatly expanded its interventionist effort in Africa. Cuban personnel are in twelve nations besides Angola and Ethiopia. Cuba has armed itself to a much greater degree than is necessary. Their refusal to sign the Treaty of Tlatelolco has caused us some concern. I am worried about Cuban influence in Central America if the situation there deteriorates.

We have also tried to lessen tensions and find peaceful solutions in other areas as well—Namibia, Rhodesia, Cyprus. I have spent more personal time to try to bring peace to the Middle East than on any other issue. We have made progress in some areas; in others we have not. We have no control over other leaders; all we share is a dedication to peace.

Economic stability also concerns us. We equally look for instruments to assure progress, to an enhancement of open trading relationships, a more equitable distribution of wealth, more stable markets, lessening of tensions. I want to listen to friends on these and other matters.

What I have outlined is descriptive of our situation and the limitations on our influence and on our abilities. In spite of these problems, we look on the future with a modest degree of optimism and a hope that we can make a better world.

LOPEZ PORTILLO: Let me elaborate a little more, and let me take Central America as the illustration since it is a region to which Mexico is deeply committed.

This is a region whose problems are to some degree determined by the size of the nations there. They have no oil and are too small to be viable; historically, the area should have been a federation. Mexico would have been like Central America had it not established a federal structure. Save for Costa Rica, the countries have military systems that do not give adequate alternatives to the people. Mexico has an

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3 See Documents 6 and 7.
institutional structure that satisfies its people. Central America does not have that. It is easy to see the Cuban model being accepted if the peoples’ hopes are dissipated. When there are no prospects for improvement, troubles lead to extremes. If Central America cannot solve its economic problems and meet its aspirations, its present system will be destroyed. It will be an area of unrest, prey to any scheme that promises something better. We want to see solutions in Nicaragua and in Central America. We understand the situation and the constant risk that the region will be destabilized.

The economic issues are vital. Economic systems are trying to solve international problems which are beyond their capabilities. The national state system cannot solve or deal with interdependencies. Transnational corporations operating without a political structure and with no social responsibility are becoming increasingly important. They are in fact getting out of control and are controlled by no nation. The U.S., Europe, and all sovereign States are losing the battle. They have practical answers for transferring goods that States don’t have, but without social responsibility, they are, in effect, irresponsible. The transnationals tend not to think of or deal with those dimensions. There is thus tension for the future between development and social needs.

This “de-metropolization” of the economic structure is cause for worry. The multinationals have acquired tremendous strength, but they ignore social problems. This is something we should look at.

CARTER: What can we do now in Nicaragua? The mediation has been unsuccessful. What can we do now?

LOPEZ PORTILLO: There are delicate aspects to this. I believe that if the problems are not posed in their correct dimension they will not be solved. Friends must speak frankly. The background and nature of the Nicaraguan problem must be understood.

Mexico firmly holds to the principle of non-intervention. For reasons which I have pointed out, U.S. intervention in Nicaragua was evident for many years. The political and economic system is proof. The U.S. created it. At this point, frankly, the problem was created by the expression of the U.S. human rights policy which pulled the carpet out from under Somoza without first having created a substitute system to take its place. Now we find the only alternative is revolution or U.S. intervention. Mexico will frankly not participate in either.

The responsibility rests basically with you. We hope you understand the situation and our position.

CARTER: You have described the past, but what about the future? We believe the Nicaraguan people should express their political will freely. In the absence of Mexican involvement, we volunteered to mediate a peaceful solution along with the Dominican Republic and
Guatemala. The U.S. has no desire to overthrow Somoza. Perhaps within the framework of the OAS, the marshaling of opinion and influence might yet be constructive in inducing a peaceful solution. Is this possible?

LOPEZ PORTILLO: We would like to find a formula, but the OAS is suffering from sclerosis. Therefore, institutional intervention is not appropriate. But I believe it is possible to act through the OAS and still respect non-intervention.

I should note that we heard of a lamentable case last September in which Venezuela, Costa Rica and Panama had decided to intervene in the situation by arms—to invade Nicaragua—and the U.S., when it heard of this, braked this absurd adventure. There is thus a disparity of criteria within the OAS. It is suggested by some that what is happening in Nicaragua is an attempt against humanity, and that armed intervention is justified. We do not sympathize with Somoza, but we believe that non-intervention is a solemn commitment. It is difficult for outsiders to define the situation within Nicaragua.

We lived in a similar situation for years. It was necessary to solve our problems by ourselves—by arms if necessary. Over the last sixty years, we have become a stable society. There are, of course, risks, but it is essential that outsiders allow a people to resolve their own problems.

The question is what is the alternative to Somoza. If it is not possible to find a democratic alternative, the alternative will be the Cuban model.

I believe, Mr. President, that we should insist on a solution in the OAS which would allow the Nicaraguan people to decide their fate. I must insist that Mexico cannot intervene directly unless at some time both sides want and invite some action. Perhaps then Mexico’s prestige may be helpful, but this does not appear possible. The dispute between both sides is serious and deep. Even if there were agreement not to use guns, they would still fight with clubs and bare hands. It is that serious. The only solution is perhaps through the OAS if we can strengthen that organization. The solution lies there. Certainly anything we could do legitimately outside the OAS, we could do inside.

CARTER: As you know, the mediators will soon submit the report of their mediation effort to the OAS. There may be a thorough debate. In the meantime, the U.S. will use its limited influence to pursue the idea of a freely-held plebiscite with everyone permitted to register and to vote with the OAS officials monitoring the fairness of the process.\(^4\)

Do you share our concern over the spread of tension to other nations in the region?

LOPEZ PORTILLO: Of course. For the economic reasons I mentioned, the tensions will be critical. There is no outlet for the peoples’ hopes and aspirations. Save for Costa Rica, the regimes are not democratic. Their problems in depth are connected to economic disorders. I believe that what is happening in Central America is representative of what is happening in the world to developing nations in their relations with developed nations. There are no outlets for their growth. Energy price hikes cause deterioration in these economic conditions. If the Middle East raises prices, Central America, for example, in order to obtain oil, will have no choice but to “export” its standard of living, that is, increase its level of poverty.

In effect, in these situations, raw materials are not treated fairly in the market place. In a “free play of forces,” the weaker countries suffer. They cannot compete, and the situation deteriorates markedly. They can become despairing. And when a man is without hope, he explodes. We must give hope to nations. If we do not, Central America will be replicated in Africa and Asia. If a Cuban solution is resorted to, then it is no longer a small problem, and the temptation arises to intervene to resolve the situation and prevent a radical solution. This is the danger in Nicaragua.

There is a serious situation for those countries in the Free World’s sphere of influence. The Free World sphere of influence does not provide a system or solution for the countries’ economics, standard of living and migration problems.

Mexico, to cope with this, proposed the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties. It had value as a declaration, but unfortunately no steps were taken to implement it. Neither financial, commercial or monetary systems provide developing nations with any hope. The powerful can ignore this situation for a while, but trouble will occur. Then the strong nations will feel compelled to intervene to defend their rights, a la Roman Empire—and as we know that led to the dark ages.

If we want to really resolve situations like Nicaragua—which is a symbol of the conditions that exist—we must establish a new economic order, especially in finance and trade. Otherwise the world will follow a dangerous course.

The Free World has neglected its sphere of influence more than the Socialist bloc. The latter have some hopes for development; the Free World does not. All can see its deterioration. This is my profound

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5 The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States was adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 1974.
conviction. If we do not understand the specific cases we cannot deduce valid general conclusions.

CARTER: I believe that improving the quality of life is a basic goal and we must press to achieve it. That is why we have sought to make progress in the international economic area—in such measures as the MTN. How do you assess the contribution that can be made by the ongoing Multilateral Trade Negotiations to the developing countries? How do you view the importance of the GATT in shaping a new system? What can we do to resolve the apparent deadlock in the Common Fund?

LOPEZ PORTILLO: We can discuss these issues tomorrow. Entry into GATT depends upon resolving our bilateral trade relations with the U.S., since that represents 70 percent of our total trade. For this reason, I view GATT as a bilateral issue.

Let me say the following: When I was Minister of Finance I led the Mexican delegation to the Tokyo Round.\(^6\) It was established as a principle there that liberalization of trade meant a structure “to treat the equal equally and the unequal unequally.” The U.S. must consider Mexico’s development problems. It needs tariff protection. The relative cost of inputs must be calculated to compensate for imbalances.

While initially we embarked on import substitution, this distorted our productive structure since it was highly protective and it concentrated on industry in Mexico City. We must now organize to export. To do that we need to develop the coastal area. We must make major changes. We have major resources in water, oil and agriculture. But we need to channel this development; we need time. Otherwise we will lose an historic opportunity. In acceding to GATT, we must consider the relative position of the U.S. as regards industrial development here. Just to liberalize trade risks failure. I insist that we must “treat equals equally and unequals unequally.”

Let me outline what we must do economically. Energy is a serious and major problem. Oil price increases triggered a vicious chain of events. Mexico has energy potential as you know. But we believe that energy resources are the patrimony of mankind. What is necessary is to organize all resources internationally for the good of all. It is not only the powerful who have energy needs. We need an international organization or arrangement to deal with all energy sources, not just the powerful.

\(^6\) Telegram 18353 from Geneva, November 29, 1978, reported that the 2-week conference on the Common Fund was being held to reach an agreement to create the framework for an institution to stabilize commodity prices, but that an agreement remained out of reach (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780492–0688)

\(^7\) The Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations began in 1973 and concluded in April 1979.
oil. Many options have hydro-electric potential, for example, but access to funds and technology are beyond their reach. If we could finance world needs in this regard, we would relieve energy demands.

Mexico is willing to participate in a serious international effort to rationalize development, production, distribution and consumption patterns. If the U.S. would take this seriously, we could rationalize economic problems in the world.

CARTER: I note that the World Bank has expanded its support of hydro-electric and other energy production. This is something we should encourage. The U.S. has sought to concentrate its bilateral economic assistance in the poor sectors to meet basic needs.

The possibility of further oil discoveries even in Central America is good.

We believe that we need a reasonable forum for discussions between the developed countries and the G–77. Up to now, there has been rhetorical confrontation rather than a search for tangible solutions.

These subjects will be at the top of our agenda when we meet for the economic summit in Japan this summer.\(^8\) energy, Common Fund, production of food, reduction of trade barriers. Prime Minister Manley and Carlos Andres Perez have been very helpful in trying to bring some stability and substance to conversations between developed and developing countries. Prior to the meeting in Japan, I would welcome your suggestions. We will of course brief you completely afterwards.

I would like also to refer to development in the Caribbean. We have established a new mechanism to strengthen the economies of the Caribbean countries. We believe this important, and are anxious to participate. We hope others will also.

As you noted, we can discuss the MTN and GATT tomorrow.

Is there an opportunity for you to exert your influence with Cuba to urge them to withdraw their troops from Africa, to reduce their purchases of arms, to control the spread of nuclear weapons?

LOPEZ PORTILLO: There are many ideas on alternative sources of energy and rationalization of management. Perhaps because of our Latin temperament, we want to take these specific ideas and make them general.

We shall talk to Cuba even though we already know their point of view about their policies and their commitment to the USSR. Through my Foreign Minister, I have already spoken with them.\(^9\) However, we will make good use of any future occasion to make these points again.

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\(^8\) Carter attended the G–7 Economic Summit in Japan on June 28 and June 29.

CARTER: The idea you have given us concerning a worldwide approach to energy is an important one. The energy problem will no doubt get worse. I hope we can explore your idea so that we can implement a broad approach to this issue. Perhaps our two Foreign Ministers can pursue this topic at a later meeting.

LOPEZ PORTILLO: For our part, we are indeed greatly interested in pursuing this. Perhaps my Minister of Industrial Development and Planning and the Director of PEMEX can join in such exchanges. These are things we have worked on for a long time. Hence, you have the benefit of the views of a country which has large energy resources and does not want to distort the system. We would participate in a rational world system. We would commit our resources to that.

CARTER: This is one of the many good ideas you have put forward. It is worthy of follow-up.

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157. Memorandum of Conversation

Mexico City, February 15, 1979, 9:00 a.m.–noon.

SUBJECT
Discussion of U.S.-Mexican Bilateral Issues

PARTICIPANTS

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<td>J. Katz, Assistant Secretary</td>
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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 30, Folder: Mexico, 2/14–16/79. Confidential. The meeting was held at the Presidential Residence, Los Pinos. All brackets are in the original.
LOPEZ PORTILLO: Yesterday, Mr. President, we began our discussions on international topics. It is proposed that today we take up bilateral matters. If you agree, you may wish to initiate the discussion.

CARTER: I would like to do so. Let me say first that we are eager to conclude this visit with an agreement between us—and with a perception by the peoples of our two nations—that this has been a successful visit and constructive. Of all the visits I have made, this one has aroused the greatest interest in my country. This is an accurate measure of the importance we attribute to Mexico and our relationship.

There are serious problems and issues, but we want to turn them into opportunities. Some of the major issues are energy, trade, border questions and future collaboration on technology and the achievement of a better quality of life for our two nations.

Let me begin frankly with energy:

We are pleased and excited over your prospects for developing major energy resources. We have no desire to influence such matters as your production, exploration, distribution of your resources. This is entirely your prerogative. We would like to be good customers for what you may want to sell to us. We want to pay a fair price and would like to negotiate long-range arrangements without delay.

As far as oil goes, a fairly standard world price pattern exists in terms of long-term contract and spot-price purchases. At present our purchases of your oil are normal and routine—and are satisfactory. We do think that there is an advantage to you in selling to us because our location means lower transport costs. At present we import 45

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2 See Document 156.
percent of our consumption. For a number of years therefore the U.S.
will be a ready market for whatever oil you decide to sell to us.

As regards gas, for now and the immediate future we have ample
supplies of gas. We have increased local production and are construct-
ing the Alaskan pipeline which will increase supplies. But my expecta-
tion is that when your gas development reaches the point where you
are ready to sell, we would be prepared to buy it. Obviously the terms
of delivery and price would have to be arrived at through negotiation.

I regret last year’s misunderstandings on gas. It was embarrassing
to both. Our problem is that our government does not play a role in
the purchase, commercialization and distribution of gas and oil. That
is in the hands of private companies. But our regulatory agencies must
control prices and protect consumer interests. Private oil companies
are interested in keeping prices as high as possible because they control
reserves they would like to sell in the future.

Our desire would be to have our government representatives meet
without delay to determine the terms of such future sales as you deem
it best to make. Then within those parameters, the companies would
be free to purchase gas or oil. I have studied the history of the negotia-
tions last summer, and I believe we can negotiate an agreement satisfac-
tory to the interests of both countries. There is no doubt that our market
will be a growing one. We want to be good neighbors and customers,
recognizing your patrimony over your own resources. Would you like
to comment on these points?

LOPEZ PORTILLO: I am afraid my answer will be long, because
I want you to understand our views. Oil for us is a symbol as well as
an energy source. The Cardenas expropriations were historic mile-
stones. Our whole history has been a fight for decolonization. In the
19th century it was a political fight. In the 20th it was oil expropriation.
Thus oil is a symbol and surrounded with great emotion here. We
define our identity in terms of oil.

Oil is also a non-renewable resource. Thus we must plan carefully
for the future, and exploit oil on the premise that we do so to improve
renewable resources. We must “sow the oil.”

This year we will produce 1.5 million BPD. We are increasing at an
approximate daily rate of 25,000 barrels. All this requires considerable
investment; it also means we must import large amounts of goods for
this exploration and exploitation. Our studies show that we have oil
throughout the territory of Mexico. Thus two points come up with
regard to our economic structure—the amount of investment and the
level of imports. The first relates to indebtedness. We have agreed with

3 See Document 137.
the IMF to respect certain limits regarding indebtedness—both public and foreign. A great speed-up of investment could deform the whole structure, and create inflation. Because we need imports we must also watch the level of imports to avoid a balance of payments problem. We have in short to be cautious with regard to our oil investment.

As far as production goes, there will come a time when we will have export surpluses, and relatively soon. We thought by 1982, but now it appears that point may be reached as early as 1980. What volume of exports? We do not want to go too fast. We need to develop projects first to use the petro-wealth we will earn, projects relating to poverty and unemployment. That takes time, and we want them in place first. Even if we have projects they must be implemented with a certain rhythm. We do not want to go so fast we provoke inflation or create a capital surplus and capital exports.

In short, we must link oil to internal development. We want to use oil as the trigger for our development “take off.” We have a globally congruent plan for development, centered around reorienting industrial development and helping create a more equitable population distribution. Simple import substitution does not serve us now. We must produce to satisfy the needs of the masses, not the middle and upper classes. We must organize to export. Oil enables us to do this, and we have a number of plans covering such things as agriculture, forestry, tourism, marketing education, etc.

The general structure of our plan was to divide my Administration’s period into three 2-year periods. The first two years were aimed at recovering from deteriorated conditions and reactivating the economy. We have been successful. The present two years will be aimed at consolidating our economy, and the last two years to acceleration. What does consolidation mean? Maintaining the indices, resolving certain bottleneck problems—petro-chemicals, trained labor, transport infrastructure. We have identified some seven to eight bottlenecks. Transport is a good illustration. We need the infrastructure to move the oil and the products of development. If we just produce oil we cannot take advantage of it without transportation infrastructure. What do we do first?

The fact that we found that gas was associated with oil meant that to activate oil production we had to decide last year how to handle the gas. Our alternatives were either to sell the surplus rapidly or use the gas to foster our industrial development. At that time—a year ago—we decided to sell the gas to our natural market quickly, i.e., the U.S. So I authorized PEMEX to negotiate with private companies who were interested. An agreement was not possible. This created political problems, but we have overcome those. We then decided to route the pipeline to Monterrey and circle our territory. This gas will replace other fuels which are easier to export.
Let me now relate specific conclusions regarding production. By 1980 we should reach our first production plateau of 2.25–2.5 million BPD. This will produce four billion cf of gas. Of this we will probably have 600–700 million cf to export, and with some increasing trend. There is a gas line from Reynosa to Monterrey that can carry this amount now. When we reach that production plateau we will review the economic situation to determine what we do next. Obviously we are flexible. We will then decide on the next plateau.

Within the range of all that I have said, then, we are in the market; we will respect the rules of the game. The U.S. is a natural client. We have of course had relations with you for a long time, selling both gas and oil. It would be absurd if for whim’s sake or xenophobia we withdrew from the market. Negotiations should be opened to reach sales agreement. Price and terms should be worked out.

On price, I repeat that the economic order is not designed to help LDC’s. We want to rationalize flows. We need to revalue our assets because our terms of trade deteriorate. With reference to gas, price was one of the objections to last year’s negotiations. Gas can be considered a fuel; it has caloric value. Is it not reasonable to give it a price equal to other fuels even if it is the lowest price? I put these considerations on the table. This is the rationale that should govern the price of gas. We are ready to talk about gas and oil. We should come to some agreement on a system for long-term relationships, established on a rational basis as regards terms for trading in this crucially valuable and emotionally charged resource.

But I must say clearly and frankly, Mr. President, that the basis we established for gas sales cannot be modified by us without domestic difficulties and without damage to my own credibility and position. This is not abusive; it is realistic.

In short, we are disposed, once the U.S. has determined its policy (and we do not wish to interfere in its domestic politics or policies) to negotiate. This is not a bluff. Neither you nor we are in a hurry. It would not be a failure if we could not agree on price. What we should do, however, is establish permanent bases for the long term. If these are well balanced, flexible, there should be no problem.

CARTER: I presume, then, that you think it would be advisable to resume discussions at the government level, recognizing that we are not in a hurry, and with respect for each other’s interests, looking to the future.

LOPEZ PORTILLO: Let me clarify this. You are talking about government negotiations? Because an alternative is to have the companies negotiate with PEMEX.

CARTER: Government to government.
Lopez Portillo nodded assent.

Good. Your explanation has been very helpful. I believe I understand the special symbolic importance of energy to your country. Many of these considerations are not unique to Mexico. The question of depletion of non-renewable energy resources is certainly a concern of ours. Problems of debt, balance of payments, trade—these issues are on my plate as well.

As is true of Mexico, the U.S. also has a rapidly growing number of adults entering the job market. We are also concerned about investments to provide employment for these people coming into the labor market.

It would be a mistake for the U.S. to blame Mexico or for Mexico to blame the U.S. if we sometimes have difficulties. There is no question of the need for fair play. I am determined that my country will always act in good faith.

There are ways in which we could collaborate and cooperate. In nuclear energy, we would be glad to cooperate with you, if you wish, depending on what your plans are. Solar energy is another area in which we would welcome close collaboration. We could study electricity exchanges along the border. Transportation systems in both countries have needs. Railroad as well as other types. We could collaborate in exchanging information in that regard. There would be a great advantage in increasing tourism for both countries and expanding student exchanges, and these areas offer opportunities for cooperation. As your country industrializes, we would be glad to share our experiences with you so that you could profit by our successes as well as by our mistakes. Mutual financing arrangements and inflation control are additional areas in which we could exchange information and ideas. We have made full progress in the area of water resource management, but there is a need for cooperation in sanitation and pollution problems, and these should be tackled jointly.

I could mention other areas, but the point is that the bases for cooperation in all these areas would be complete equality and mutual respect and with no intention to influence each other against each’s interests. We established a Consultative Mechanism in 1977 to pursue some of these subjects. It made some progress but my assessment is that it needs to be improved. The ones that consult should have more authority to decide and act, specific assignment should be broadened and agenda items expanded.

Our Ministers should explore all this without delay—and you and I can be in touch with each other personally or in writing to handle

4 See Document 131.
differences that may arise. We can explore this more at our private meeting at breakfast tomorrow.\(^5\)

I want our frankness to result in tangible accomplishments and future agreements.

And I hope we won’t wait two more years to get back together to resolve our differences.

LOPEZ PORTILLO: I would like to go a little bit deeper into energy. I want to ratify Mexico’s position that oil will be treated as the heritage of mankind. I want to reopen the idea of establishing an international order to manage consumption, production, distribution—not only of oil but all energy sources. I note, by the way, that Mexico buys butane and propane at American market prices.

Let me refer to uranium. My associates tell me that the U.S. has not authorized the return of uranium sent up for enrichment, adducing the need for some security safeguards. This illustrates the problem of dependence, which we don’t want for other areas because it would encourage us to turn to other sources. We are a peaceful country, and we will not use atomic energy for anything but peaceful purposes.

On electricity, let us by all means explore such exchanges. We are totally willing to enter into such arrangements.

We believe the technological development of the United States is extraordinary. We are certainly interested in making use of your technology. We need to explore its links to financing and markets. We are interested greatly in solar energy and alternative sources of energy, and we offer what we have. I believe we can find a just and fair exchange. What you said is very interesting to us.

In general all these things would be part of the general system I talked about yesterday.

CARTER: I am pleased that we can move on electricity exchanges. On nuclear fuels, I think I can assure you that the problem will be resolved when you are ready for it. I will give this my personal attention when I return.

As you know, Congress has passed a non-proliferation law that has caused problems and delays in regard to nuclear fuels, but these are being resolved.

We can also explore the possibility of an oil swap between Alaska, Mexico and Japan to save transportation costs and benefit all concerned.

\(^5\) The two Presidents met for breakfast the morning of February 16. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary) Carter commented on the meeting in his diary. (Carter, White House Diary, p. 293)
I suggest that we allow our strengthened consultative group to explore all these things and then you and I get together again sometime, perhaps this summer if that is convenient to you, to assess what has happened and resolve any differences that exist. If we announce we will meet personally to assess their work, this might stimulate our staffs to move more expeditiously. We have done so well in narcotics cooperation, under the leadership of Attorney General Flores. This shows that when we work well together the progress can be great.

LOPEZ PORTILLO: I want to underline the importance of the possibility of supplying oil to Japan from Alaska which we would deliver to you. This is just the kind of rationalization of oil flow I referred to when I talked of international cooperation and organization. For ideological reasons and clients we distort and make prices higher than necessary. We accept the idea of a swap with enthusiasm.

CARTER: Do you agree that we should meet early this summer or at the beginning of summer?

LOPEZ PORTILLO: In view of the similar views of our associates about the meeting [all around the table smiled after the President’s remarks on the matter to expedite decision making by a Presidential meeting], I am in agreement with your ideas.

CARTER: Let me raise trade. I realize you have some concerns about the advisability of Mexico joining GATT. I want to point out that our mechanism for concluding bilateral understandings is based on the GATT and MTN framework. We have no desire to influence you against what you think are Mexico’s best interests, but we do believe that any trade differences could be resolved better within GATT than outside. We recognize that there is a need for bilateral agreements and understandings. I do believe that GATT is the best avenue for progress in that regard. But we are determined to resolve our bilateral problems regardless of your decision on GATT, but you may wish to consider them in this light.

LOPEZ PORTILLO: Let me first go back to drugs. Attorney General Flores has asked for the floor. Let me give it to him.

FLORES: Mr. President, the eradication campaign is effective and cooperation is good; by next year it should be completely successful.

I am always receiving missions from the United States, but everything is fine. This effort is almost totally on the shoulders of the Mexican side, and it is a difficult task to cover a 3,000 kilometer border.

One point I should make is that Mexico will be a channel for drug flow from the south. That will be our responsibility. We have proposed the establishment of radar lines on the Mexican-Guatemalan border to detect planes flying over—this would benefit mainly the U.S.

We have urged the U.S. to help us prepare teams and plans for Central America, because the drug trade is going to move south. We
have proposed that teams of young officers from these countries be trained here.

I want to note that the U.S. does not control in any way the hundreds of planes that leave commercial airports in the U.S. and bring contraband to Mexico. 99 percent of these return with drugs. We are not warned, nor do you watch them. It would help if you could.

With the problem of paraquat, we thought it was just a political problem in your country. We said if you give us something else to spray the fields, we will use it. We are willing to try different markers, colors, scents or even vitamins if you like. Since then, the campaign in the U.S. against paraquat has diminished.

We had asked the UN for assistance in rehabilitating zones which had been growing poppies. We believe this was warranted since the Mexican government in effect deprived peasants of a livelihood. Our request was pigeonholed in a study committee in the UN and nothing has happened. So we are going on our own.

Let me finish by reemphasizing the point that we should prepare plans and people now to confront what will surely be a shift of the drug trade south to Central America.

LOPEZ PORTILLO: On GATT, on January 16 we contacted the Director General of GATT to ascertain the conditions for acceding. Bear in mind, however, the results of the Tokyo Round and the need for non-reciprocal preferences. We cannot be competitive with more developed countries.

There are differences in my Cabinet on this issue. Minister Hernandez, for example, believes we should join the GATT. Minister Oteyza of Patrimony, has reservations about joining the GATT because he is responsible for developing new industries. We surely need industrial protection for now. We cannot go suddenly to a new system, especially given our need to shift industry to the coastal belt. We have to be careful.

We contemplate entering GATT; we do not want to be left out. But GATT must look at the problems of developing countries. I believe in principle that there is some reason to be optimistic about the possibility of Mexico entering GATT, but we will have to study it carefully. It will not be an arbitrary decision.

CARTER: It is not the most important thing in the world, but we see some advantages in this relationship. Perhaps these problems can be discussed with our people who are familiar with the GATT/MTN framework. We believe that your problems can be handled with the flexibility you need in that framework.

Let me now turn, Mr. President, to the border problems—smuggling and migrants. Immigration is a sensitive matter in both the United States and Mexico. I am required to enforce the laws of my country,
including immigration laws. I realize you do not want to settle my problems. But I wanted to discuss this with you. I've set up an excellent Commission on Migration to advise me on this; Governor Reubin Askew will chair it. It will deal with migration generally, not just Mexico. He will be studying this matter.

I would like the advantage of your consultation and advice on these issues. There are, for example, a growing number of migrants from other countries who simply pass through Mexico. How do we handle that? I am determined that people who are present in the U.S.—regardless of their status—will be protected under the law. Their human rights will be protected.

LOPEZ PORTILLO: Let me give you my points of view. The United States is totally in the right in trying to solve by laws and policy the situation and status of people in its territory or entering into its territory. Mexico and all countries act in similar ways. But one thing happens. In spite of law, migration occurs. We are faced with a fact—this violates the law, and we have no study adequate to resolve it. When violations occur on this scale something is wrong.

Mexico wants to protect its citizens wherever they are—as does the U.S. As a nation we are not responsible for individual violations, but if a violation occurs we believe the violator should be protected by legal procedures and laws. For example, the United States was concerned about the treatment of United States citizens in prison in Mexico on narcotics charges. A migrant therefore should be dealt with in accordance with the law he broke, i.e., immigration laws, and not the labor code.

Let us look at the facts. There is a market for Mexican labor. If there weren’t, the phenomenon wouldn’t occur. We are undertaking a study costing a million dollars to examine the origins and destinations of these people. We need time to study and plan, so we do not have an immediate reply for you. We understand that these matters must be decided by you. We would like to help, however, in defining and studying the problem. I understand that opinion in the U.S. is divided. The problem is that the issue is not defined, the problem is not stated right. We will help with our facts, considerations, and studies to define the nature of the problem. If these problems are not addressed, they will get more complicated.

Let me present some painful concerns: There has been an increase in persons accused of violating the labor laws. In the last month there

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6 On March 22, President Carter designated Reubin Askew Chairman of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy. (Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book I, pp. 450–451)
has also been an increase in one form of human rights violations. This involves the expulsion of mothers who are forced to leave their family in the U.S. This seems to us a violation of the essence of family unity. The figures are impressive. The expulsion of women may be legitimate under the law, but it is certainly cruel.

We need time to study this (general problem of migration). We need to see how best to combat it. We want to find formulas, and would like to analyze the situation. We should both study this matter in depth—we now have no bases for sound judgments.

There is another situation that pains me. The County of Los Angeles has determined it will not extend medical care to undocumented workers. It has the right to do that without question. But Mexican workers contribute more in taxes than the benefits they receive. This shows the complexity of the human problem.

I suggest that this being such a complex, long range, human problem, it may be an error to resolve it by police measures.

CARTER: We have no wish to be pushed into errors. Errors have been made, and clearly we must understand the problem better. I have devoted a lot of time to this problem. I recognize that a prerequisite for dealing with it is to understand it. The average stay of a Mexican migrant worker is only 4–5 months. But obviously more stay than return. We now have an estimated 7–8 million undocumented workers in the U.S.

The Department of Justice has concentrated its effort on protecting the rights of these workers. One quarter of civil rights cases involve protection of such rights. Actually, the loudest and most frequent criticism of the flow of migrants comes from Chicanos—who are citizens and many of whom compete for the same jobs.

I have no doubt that undocumented workers are contributing to the U.S. economy.

It is difficult to amend our law. There are intense feelings on all sides. If it is convenient, Governor Askew might like to see you when he comes to Mexico. Perhaps we should share and do joint studies. These studies will continue for years in the future because the problem is complex and changing.

We want to take action immediately. But because of our relationship we want your advice.

I had not heard of the problem of women being expelled. Since they know they are in violation of the law, undocumented workers

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7 Askew met with President Lopez Portillo in Mexico City on April 18. Telegram 6472 from Mexico City, April 20, reported on the discussion. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790182–0818)
are reluctant to register their complaints. This is the kind of information which is difficult for us to get, so that it is difficult for many to protect their rights. Hence, you may obtain such information easier than we can.

Thus, we need your advice and consultation. Governor Askew should explore mechanisms to permit us to analyze the situation.

I am determined to deal with this problem as fairly as I can.\(^8\)

LOPEZ PORTILLO: I thank you for your words Mr. President.

Our studies show interesting things. Motives are not always just unemployment; it is sometimes better salaries. Hence, for some the pull is survival, for others improvement. People are not only coming for agriculture but for industry and services.

This is a problem which is characteristic of a worldwide phenomenon. We find it wherever development and under-development is in contact.

A serene statement of the problem will make it easier to deal with it. By the end of this century we should be able to provide full employment for our population—but we cannot now. And if we mismanage oil we may never be able to. This is the enormous responsibility of this generation. In the meantime let us seek solutions. We are very willing to do everything possible. We are most interested in the problem. We appreciate your concern about the human rights of Mexicans in the United States.

With your permission Mr. President, one of my colleagues raises the question of tuna. With the American tuna fleet fishing without permission in Mexican waters during your visit, what shall we do? Let me ask the Director of Fisheries to comment on this.

RAFFUL: The problem of reaching agreement resides in the number of ships. We have only 24 ships that fish for tuna; the U.S. has 800. If we could establish some joint venture combinations this would meet many of our mutual interests and help us develop our resources. If the U.S. would work with us, the solution could occur tomorrow. The problem is that under the U.S. formula for allocating tuna, 28,000 tons would be allotted to us; we feel we need 38,000 tons.

Cannot American shippers associate with us—say as regards up to 50 ships?

\(^8\) In a September 27 memorandum to Vance, Brzezinski wrote, “With reference to the annex on Mexico in this morning’s PDB, the President has instructed me to inform you ‘that Mexico’s help in administering U.S. immigration laws or insuring civil rights is not needed—any more than we intrude in Mexico’s internal affairs.’” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory File, Box 78, Sensitive X, 9/79)
The tuna negotiations have been suspended. Ambassador Negroponte is inflexible. But we feel we need a solution.

LOPEZ PORTILLO: I want first to instruct you to make no seizures for now. I am sure we can construct solutions. There are many possibilities.

CARTER: I will try to become more familiar with the problem. I do have some problems. Ambassador Negroponte thinks the Mexicans are inflexible. Congress thinks our offer on percentages is too generous.

As I understand it it will be difficult to expand your capacity to meet the goals you want this year in any case. Perhaps it would be advisable to phase in a change over time. We have a law that prescribes that any seizure of U.S. ships results in an embargo of that country's fish products. I would like to see this matter resolved as quickly as possible in a spirit of cooperation. We have just concluded a more complicated agreement with Canada. I will instruct my negotiators to match the flexibility of Mexico’s negotiators. We will pursue this with a determination to resolve it. By tomorrow morning I will try to learn more about this problem.

LOPEZ PORTILLO: Thank you Mr. President. On the boats fishing in our zone, we will reserve our rights even though we do not seize, because there is a violation under our laws.

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9 John D. Negroponte was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs. Reference is to U.S.-Mexican negotiations to regulate tuna fishing in the Exclusive Economic Zone of Mexico.
158. Telegram From the Embassy in Mexico to the Department of State

Mexico City, March 3, 1979, 1731Z

3627. For Secretary Vance, Counselor Nimetz and Asst Sec Vaky from Ambassador Lucey. Dept please pass White House for Wise and NSC. Subject: U.S.-Mexican Relations: The Critical Months Ahead. Ref: Mexico 3088. ¹

1. (C—Entire text.)

2. During the coming months which precede the summer meeting between President Carter and President Lopez Portillo, I believe we will have an unprecedented opportunity to influence the future course of U.S.-Mexican relations. From my admittedly limited perspective, however, it does not appear that our government is engaged in the kind of planning process which suggests that we are likely to take full advantage of this historic opportunity. At the risk of stating the obvious, I would therefore offer the following observations.

3. In my view, the President’s recent visit to Mexico provided the occasion for the Government of Mexico to clear off its chest a number of long-held grievances. Mexicans believe that Lopez Portillo was also able to send a signal to the U.S. about the existence of a “new” Mexico and to make clear that in all future dealings Mexico will expect our bilateral relationship to mature and to accommodate the new importance of our southern neighbor. One beneficial feature of these occurrences was the lancing of the infection that had developed in our relationship as a consequence of hard feelings about the failure of earlier gas negotiations.

4. It seems to me that we are presently in a position to enter into negotiations on a number of important matters without having to contend with the emotional hangups and rancorous sentiments that have permeated a range of subjects over the course of the last year. The Mexicans will always be tough negotiators on sensitive issues although they may not always be as prepared in detail as we would like. They will no doubt continue to press demands that cannot be satisfied and be inadequately sensitive to the requirements of U.S. domestic interests. But there is probably never going to be a better

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790110–0025. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated for information to all Consulates in Mexico.
² In telegram 3088 from Mexico City, February 23, Lucey discussed the recent meetings between Lopez Portillo and Carter and offered suggestions for natural gas negotiations and immigration strategy. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790092–0227)
time than the next few months to confront these problems and to
develop a momentum for constructive progress.

5. Lopez Portillo is a strong President. He is prepared to treat the
U.S. fairly, and he has now positioned himself so that he can reach
reasonable accords with the U.S. without undermining his own standing
in Mexico.

6. All of these circumstances suggest to me that this is a time for
the United States to seize the initiative and to seek out a framework
for making progress on a number of bilateral issues. The initiative
must clearly be ours. (The recent experience in preparing the joint
communique is illustrative of this point.) It would be tragic if we
missed out on the opportunity to have significant, concrete results
available for the summer meeting of the two Presidents only because
we provided insufficient time in the end for the Mexican bureaucracy
to have its required participation in the ratification of salutory accords.

7. It is, therefore, my very strong recommendation that a high-
ranking official be assigned to head up the effort these next few months
to develop American positions, to prod the Mexicans and to take what-
ever initiatives can be devised to enhance the prospects for substantial
bilateral progress. (I should think that this would involve everything
from pressing for the early ratification of Tlatelolco, finding occasions
for private correspondence with Lopez Portillo initiated by President
Carter, beginning the process of collaboration on the planning for the
summer visit and preparing U.S. negotiating teams for early contacts
with Mexico on a whole set of pending substantive matters.)

Lucey
159. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance and Secretary of Energy Schlesinger to President Carter

Washington, March 30, 1979

SUBJECT

US-Mexico Natural Gas Negotiations

As follow-up to your meeting with Lopez Portillo, we have proposed and the Mexican Government has agreed to begin discussions on April 3 and 4 in Mexico City on possible United States purchases of Mexican natural gas.

Our objective at this first meeting will be to resume the previously terminated discussions and to obtain a better understanding of the current Mexican position. Specifically, we will seek to ascertain the readiness of the Mexican Government to proceed with gas sales in the near future, the volumes which might be available, the term of a possible contract, and, finally, the pricing mechanism.

The indications we have so far are that the Mexicans may not be in a hurry to conclude an understanding. They may continue to maintain that they have not yet determined available volumes. They will undoubtedly open with the position that the price should be determined on the basis of the BTU equivalent of distillate fuel oil—a formula which would yield a price in excess of $3.30 per mcf.

For these reasons we propose to use the initial meeting to probe Mexican intentions, to analyze the market for Mexican gas, and to seek to establish what are the competitive alternatives for Mexican gas in the US market in order to determine the appropriate BTU equivalency. In this manner, we believe that we can find areas of agreement and avoid prematurely an impasse on the question of price. After this initial meeting we can better determine our follow-on strategy.

In preparation for our meetings with the Mexicans, an advisory group was formed, made up of a number of representative groups from the private sector including interstate pipeline companies, natural gas distribution companies, state regulatory authorities, and gas consumers. In the first meeting, held on March 26, there was a useful exchange of views which established a clear interest in the importation of Mexican gas at an acceptable price. The general view was that a price of $2.60 per mcf at the present time would be in the interest of natural gas consumers but that a price as high as $3.30 would limit

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the market severely. The advisory group suggested a number of useful areas for discussion with the Mexicans. We intend to consult with the advisory group following our meeting with the Mexicans and as our negotiations with the Mexicans proceed.

We will, of course, keep you closely advised of the progress of the discussions with the Mexican Government.

Recommendation

We recommend that you approve the exploratory approach we propose to have the United States delegation take at the first meeting with the Mexicans.\(^2\)

\(^2\) Carter wrote at the bottom of the page, “Do not let the Mexicans nor US oil companies adversely affect the interests of American people. Do not assume the role of supplicant. Do not let imported gas prices boost overall domestic prices.” In telegram 5537 from Mexico City, April 4, the Embassy reported that, although the two sides were unable to reach agreement at the first round of discussions, “the first session served to lower their [the Mexicans] expectations on price.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 49, Mexico, 3–4/79)

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160. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Mexico\(^1\)

Washington, April 28, 1979, 0226Z

107264. For Ambassador only. Subject: Support for Puerto Rican Independence.

Warning Notice—Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved—Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor/Consultants—Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator.

1. (S—Entire text)

2. Department has received [less than 1 line not declassified] report\(^2\) [less than 1 line not declassified] indicating that President Lopez Portillo may have agreed to provide official support and pay some expenses of the “Second International Congress for Solidarity With the Puerto

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790169–1720. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Svendsen; cleared by Vaky, Pastor, Bridges, and in INR/DDIL/OIL and S/S–O; approved by Maynes.

\(^2\) Not found.
Rican Independence Movement” to be held in Mexico City on September 10–13. We would be quite concerned if an organization of this nature should obtain the backing of the Mexican Government. You should therefore approach Mexican officials at highest possible level, drawing on talking points below and emphasizing the deep concern with which we would view any external involvement in the political situation in Puerto Rico.

—We have received newspaper and other reports of plans for holding the Second International Congress for Solidarity With the Puerto Rican Independence Movement in Mexico City on September 10–13. These reports allege that President Lopez Portillo has agreed to provide official support for the Congress.

—It is for the people of Puerto Rico themselves to decide fundamental questions regarding their political system. We strongly reject any outside interference in the affairs of Puerto Rico, which is unwarranted because of the free and open nature of its society.

—President Carter is fully committed to accept whatever status the people of Puerto Rico might choose in the future. In his July 25 proclamation to the Puerto Rican people President Carter declared that he would support whatever political status they might wish—statehood, independence, commonwealth status or mutually-agreed modifications in that status.3

—The principle of self-determination is one we greatly value. We view this conference as an attempt to undermine this principle and therefore find it objectionable. We would strongly object to any official Mexican involvement in Puerto Rico. We would appreciate GOM clarification of this matter.4

Vance

4 Lucey made these points in a meeting with Roel on April 3. In a later telephone call with Lucey, Roel passed on Lopez Portillo’s comment that he considered reports of his approval of Mexican support for the conference to be a “defamation of character,” since he agreed that the question of Puerto Rican independence was an internal U.S. affair. (Telegram 6986 from Mexico City, April 3; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790201–0278) In telegram 7995 from Mexico City, May 16, Lucey reported that Roel told him in a May 14 meeting that the conference was being cancelled. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790224–0546)
161. Telegram From the Embassy in Mexico to the Department of State

Mexico City, August 3, 1979, 2050Z

13133. For Assistant Secretary Katz from Ambassador. Subject: My Meeting This Morning With Mexican President Lopez Portillo re Gas.

1. (C—Entire text.)

2. Summary: I had a very successful meeting this morning with President Lopez Portillo. He saw no difficulty with a $3.40 per thousand cubic feet price and was confident that if we could get our delegation to Mexico next week, the issue could be resolved once and for all. End summary.

3. I explained to the President that we felt this agreement would be largely symbolic but that that symbol would be very important. I also noted that this agreement would have a political impact in both our countries.

4. I told him, however, that despite the obvious symbolic and political import of the natural gas issue, we could not agree to too high a price. I told him that if Mexico were, in fact, unalterably tied to a price of $4.00 per thousand cubic feet, I would have to, in all good conscience, recommend to my government that we drop the matter. I explained to him our situation vis-a-vis Canada noting the vast difference in the volumes and dollar amounts involved. I also pointed out that we had already offered Mexico considerably more for its gas than we are currently paying Canada. I expressed our disappointment in the lack of progress in the last round of talks and said the formula which we proposed at that meeting would have given a price of $3.31. This, I said, was very near our maximum and that the range of $3.30 to $3.40 was as far as we could go without damaging our ongoing relationship with Canada. I also explained that we could only go that high because we expected Canada to adjust its prices again in October to reflect the most recent OPEC oil price increases.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840131–1760. Confidential; Niacit Immediate; Nodis.

5. Lopez Portillo said he saw no difficulty with the price in that range and that his major concern going back as far as 1977 was that Mexico’s export prices be tied to some well-established energy market. I assured him we could work up a formula that would not only justify the base price on that ground but would maintain the desired tie to other energy prices. He recognized the symbolic benefit to Mexico of an agreement but said he had gone out on a political limb before and had taken it on the chin. He said he was willing to take another chance on the gas issue to get an agreement. (The risk he referred to was the fact that the $3.40 price would be substantially below the price of the gas under the original contract—he felt sure some Mexican reporter would pick up on that fact.)

6. Lopez Portillo said he would prefer to wait on an agreement until such time as the U.S. had a new Secretary of Energy. I explained to him that no action could be taken on that until after Labor Day because of some U.S. legislative problems. He agreed that under those circumstances no delay was necessary and suggested that if we could get our delegation to Mexico next week, the issue could be resolved once and for all. He said he would inform Patrimony and PEMEX of the substance of our meeting and direct them to reach an agreement along the lines we had discussed. (Note: It was not until after our meeting that I learned that Duncan had been confirmed by the Senate. My understanding remains, however, that he will not take office until after Labor Day.)

7. Other topics discussed during my meeting this morning will be reported septels.

Lucey

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3 See Document 137.
4 James Schlesinger resigned as Secretary of Energy on July 20. Charles Duncan was confirmed as his replacement on August 24.
5 Telegram 13203 from Mexico City, August 6, and telegram 13345 from Mexico City, August 8. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790357–0623 and D790361–0738)
Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Cooper to President Carter

Washington, August 11, 1979

SUBJECT

Mexican Gas Negotiations—One More Reversal

Contrary to assurances from President Lopez-Portillo to Ambassador Lucey that he wanted to conclude a natural gas understanding this week and saw no problem with an initial price of $3.40 mm/BTU, Mexican officials were not in fact prepared to reach agreement with our representatives. The Mexicans insisted that the price should be negotiated between the companies and PEMEX within a price range agreed between the two governments. The Mexicans proposed that the price range be $3.50–$4.00. In response to our delegation’s protest that this was contrary to Lopez-Portillo’s assurances, the Mexicans claimed that there had been a “misunderstanding.” Privately, we were told that Lopez-Portillo had reversed himself following pressures from his advisors.

Since we were unable to get agreement on a $3.40 price, or to an acceptable range within which company negotiations might take place, the two sides agreed to consult with their governments about the possibility of authorizing company negotiations without specifying the range within which the negotiations would take place. The risk of such a procedure is a possible repeat of the 1977 experience and the associated political embarrassment. With close monitoring of the negotiations we believe that these risks can be minimized. The advantage of direct company negotiation is that it might be easier for the Mexicans to accept a reasonable price that was “commercially determined” than it could through government-to-government negotiations. We will assess with Department of Energy more thoroughly the risks and benefits of

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2 See Document 161. The negotiators met again in Mexico City on August 10. (Telegram 13518 from Mexico City, August 10; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840173–2453)

3 See Document 137.
such a procedure and make a recommendation to you within the next ten days.\footnote{On August 13, Pastor prepared a draft memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter. In the first paragraph, he wrote that the Department of State had suggested that Carter should “rely, for now, on Lucey and a well-placed Mexican intermediary to convey to Lopez Portillo your displeasure over his reneging on his gas price offer,” referencing Cooper’s memorandum, which he attached at a tab. In the second paragraph, Pastor wrote that “we will bring to you soon coordinated views on whether to (a) suspend government-to-government negotiations until we are assured that Mexico is ready to sign off on a price acceptable to us, or (b) accept the suggestion to turn negotiations over to PEMEX and the US companies, subject to independent price guidance by the two governments to the negotiating parties.” Pastor attached a cover sheet, which indicated that he and Department of Energy officials concurred with Cooper’s suggestions. On the cover sheet, Gregg wrote, “ZB—Para #2 seemingly contradict Para #1.” Brzezinski did not initial the memorandum and there is no evidence it was sent. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 30, Mexico, 6–8/79)\footnote{Lucey sent a letter to Governor de la Madrid on August 11, thanking him for expressing to Lopez Portillo the Ambassador’s concerns regarding the gas negotiations. (Telegram 209852 to Tijuana, August 11; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790369–0569)}}

On the brighter side, the Mexicans have agreed to abandon full reliance on #2 fuel oil and on New York Harbor as a basing point. Thus, we have narrowed the price gap, even though we have not yet been able to close it.

I spoke with Ambassador Lucey about a demarche on President Lopez-Portillo indicating our surprise and disappointment at the recent turn of events. We agreed that for the moment it would be preferable to use Baja California Governor de la Madrid, who is a close confidant of President Lopez-Portillo and who would like to see the gas negotiations successfully concluded, as an intermediary. This is in keeping with the Mexican practice of reliance on intermediaries and runs less risk of a counterproductive confrontation over Lopez-Portillo’s apparent reversal of position. De la Madrid has been helpful in the past. Lucey has sent a message to him on pursuit of the negotiations.\footnote{Lucey sent a letter to Governor de la Madrid on August 11, thanking him for expressing to Lopez Portillo the Ambassador’s concerns regarding the gas negotiations. (Telegram 209852 to Tijuana, August 11; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790369–0569)} Lucey (who is now in Wisconsin) is prepared to return to Mexico on short notice if that would be helpful.
163. Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Information Cable

TDFIR DB–315/14414–79 Washington, August 15, 1979

COUNTRY
Mexico

SUBJECT
Reasons for the Decision of President Jose Lopez-Portillo To Break Off Gas Negotiations With the United States Government. (DOI: [less than 1 line not declassified] August 1979)

SOURCE
[3 lines not declassified]

1. (Field Comment: On 9 August 1979, negotiations between representatives of the United States and Mexican Governments over the purchase of Mexican natural gas were broken off because of a last minute decision by the Mexicans to substantially increase the selling price for the gas. The decision to raise the price was made on orders of President Jose Lopez-Portillo after he had previously agreed to sell the gas at U.S.$3.40 per thousand cubic feet. [4 lines not declassified]

2. Lopez-Portillo’s decision to raise the selling price for Mexican natural gas was made in order to forestall any agreement with the United States Government at this time. The underlying motive for this decision is Lopez-Portillo’s belief that the present U.S. administration is politically finished for all intents and purposes and that it will not be in office after January 1981. Lopez-Portillo wishes to reassess the Mexican position to determine if he can better exploit the weakness of the U.S. administration to Mexico’s advantage. He also believes that there is a good chance that he can obtain better concessions in terms of economic investment, trade, or immigration, from either Democratic or Republican interests which may replace the present administration.

1 Source: National Security Council, Carter Intelligence Files, Subject Files, F-R, Mexico, Box 26. Secret; Wnintel; Noforn; Nocontract; Orcon. A cover memorandum from Carlucci to Brzezinski reads, “1) We received a report this morning [less than 1 line not declassified] on the reasons behind President Lopez-Portillo’s decision to break off gas negotiations with the U.S. We are attaching a copy of the report which contains comments critical of the U.S. Administration. In the report as received the critical comments referred specifically to President Carter but were altered in the disseminated version to refer to the U.S. Administration. We regret that the report was disseminated in this manner rather than in the more sensitive memorandum format. 2) We will not carry the information in any of our publications, including the President’s Daily Brief. You may therefore wish to discuss the report personally with the President.” An August 17 handwritten note by Denend on Carlucci’s memorandum reads, “Paul Henze only has seen this letter from Carlucci before forwarding it to you.”
3. Although Lopez-Portillo is now restudying the Mexican position, the door is not closed to any kind of agreement with the United States concerning natural gas sales or even Mexican accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

4. (Source Comment: A limited gas agreement with the United States is still possible. But the Mexican terms or conditions for such an agreement have not yet been decided. In approaching this subject, the President has stated that he would never sign any gas or GATT agreement which would tie the hands of the Mexican Government or do anything to limit the options of his successor, since, in the President’s own words, “my responsibilities extend beyond 1982.” Lopez-Portillo has also not gone completely to the left. Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado, newly-appointed Secretary of Programming and Budget, is probably the most pro-business and pro-U.S. Secretary in the Cabinet and he is gaining strength with the President on domestic matters.)²

5. ACQ: [1 line not declassified]

6. Field Dissem: [less than 1 line not declassified]

7. Washington Dissem:
   To State: Exclusive for the Director, INR
   To Treasury: Exclusive for the Special Assistant to the Secretary (National Security)
   To DOE: Exclusive for the Principal Assistant Secretary for International Affairs

² A final round of natural gas discussions was held in Mexico City August 29–30. (Telegram 14866 from Mexico City, August 31; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840175–2441)
164. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 28, 1979, 11:20 a.m.–12:30 p.m.

SUBJECT
Bilateral Issues and President Lopez Portillo’s Energy Proposals

PARTICIPANTS

U.S. Mexico
The President President Lopez Portillo
The Vice President Jorge Castaneda, Secretary of Foreign Relations
Secretary Vance Jorge de la Vega Domínguez, Secretary of Commerce
Secretary Duncan Jose Andres Oteyza, Secretary of Patrimony and Industrial Development
Dr. Brzezinski Alfonso de Rosenzweig Diaz, Under Secretary for Foreign Relations
Assistant Secretary Jules Katz Jorge Diaz Serrano, Director of PEMEX
Assistant Secretary Viron Vaky General Miguel A. Godínez Bravo, Chief of Staff, Pres. Gen. Staff
Robert Krueger, Amb. at Large-Des. Rafael Izquierdo, Advisor to the President
Ambassador Patrick Lucey Jose Antonio Ugarte, Advisor to the President
Ambassador Henry Owen Dr. Robert Casillas Hernandez, Private Secretary to the President
Jerry Schecter, NSC Staff Rosa Luz Alegria, Under Secretary for National Planning and Budget
Guy F. Erb, NSC Staff Andres Rozental Gutman, Director General of North American Affairs, Secretariat of Foreign Relations
Everett Briggs, State Hugo Margin, Mexican Ambassador to the United States

President Carter opened the meeting by saying he was delighted, pleased, and honored to meet again with President Lopez Portillo in the White House. Lopez Portillo thanked him. President Carter sug-

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gested that they take up bilateral issues at this meeting and international issues on the next day. Lopez Portillo agreed. (C)

The President said he had read President Lopez Portillo’s speech to the United Nations.² He understood it had been well received. It was beautiful in tone and language. Energy was indeed a key problem. If you would permit me, he said, I would like to comment on it before the American people in my toast this evening.³ Lopez Portillo smiled and nodded. (C)

President Carter said that he was pleased that our negotiators had reached a tentative agreement on natural gas sales, which he hoped would soon be final. It could be a precursor of other agreements. President Carter thanked Lopez Portillo for his agreement and his patience. President Lopez Portillo acknowledged this remark with a smile.⁴ (C)

President Carter invited Lopez Portillo to open the discussion. He would then respond and a general discussion could follow. Lopez Portillo thanked the President and said the structure for the two-day discussion was fine. (C)

Lopez Portillo thanked the President for the kind words about his speech. He said he wanted his concepts to be interesting and useful. He would like to repeat the themes of his speech at some point during the discussions. Energy was a bilateral and a multilateral affair and we could discuss it either Friday or Saturday. (C)

With regard to bilateral questions, President Lopez Portillo said that the Consultative Mechanism and its subgroups had made good headway on some issues. On others, studies were underway and conclusions pending. (C)

Lopez Portillo said the two countries had made substantial progress with regard to gas. There had been some misunderstandings. What was important to him was the principle on which our dealings would be based. We now had a permanent basis and it was worth the long discussion. Now we had established a principle and had a pattern to

² In telegram 4012 from USUN, September 27, the Mission transmitted the text of Lopez Portillo’s speech. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790443–0483)

³ For the toasts of the two Presidents at the State Dinner, see Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book II, pp. 1781–1784.

⁴ In telegram 16281 from Mexico City, September 20, the Embassy reported that the Mexican and U.S. Governments had reached an understanding on a framework for the sale of 300 thousand cubic feet per day of natural gas by PEMEX to U.S. purchasers, with an initial price of $3.625 per million BTU as of January 1, 1980. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790175–2419) For the September 21 U.S.-Mexican announcement of the agreement, see Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book II, pp. 1703–1704.
follow in our negotiations. He was happy with the outcome. It gave us a structure that can be taken to any other field. (C)

President Lopez Portillo said he might begin by talking of undocumented workers. He understood that groups in each country were gathering information. Once these data were complete we would be able to draw conclusions from them. In the meantime, some things upset us, Lopez Portillo said. With all due respect, he would like to bring them up and leave them for your consideration. Both in Mexico and New York he had met with Chicanos and they had brought some concerns to him.⁵ These issues were not in his competence and perhaps he didn’t have the right to bring them up, but he had promised to do so. The Chicanos were preoccupied over changes in Federal laws that would withdraw Federal assistance and support from undocumented workers. They believed, and they were right, that such withdrawals would be inconvenient. They were concerned that such changes might be applied across the country. With all respect, he wanted to share this issue, and would appreciate it if it were considered in some detail. (C)

In due time, said Lopez Portillo, our Foreign Ministers could give us a summary of the progress that had been made in the Consultative Mechanism. It was our political will that led to its creation. He did not want to bore the President with detailed statements of all the work of the Mechanism, but he would comment on some issues. There were commercial and monetary aspects, and we have a way of dealing with them. On financial relations we had reached some of our best moments, with regard to both the government and the private sector. Trade matters were brought up, energy had been mentioned. In general we were following the right road. We could ask our collaborators to give us a summary of progress. Should Secretary Vance or Castaneda comment first? He suggested that Castaneda speak. President Carter agreed. (C)

But first, said President Carter, he would respond briefly to Lopez Portillo’s comments. The President said that he had met frequently with Chico groups. In fact, he and his wife had recently lunched with the head of LULAC.⁶ He had listened carefully to their expressions of concern. After the February meeting in Mexico he had sent a letter to the Governors and had also instructed Heads of Federal Departments and Agencies to be mindful of the human rights of undocumented workers.

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⁵ In telegram 10008 from Mexico City, June 16, 1978, the Embassy reported that a group of Chicanos held a press conference in New York and planned to meet with Lopez Portillo. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780257–0139)

⁶ President and Mrs. Carter had lunch with Ruben Bonilla, National President of LULAC, on August 5. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary)
workers. He had instructed them to administer existing laws with sensitivity to the civil rights of undocumented persons and to interpret the laws in a generous fashion. But he would look into this further to see if there were some aspect that needed further attention. He would ensure that Chicanos were able to contact him directly so that Lopez Portillo would not have to bear this burden. (C)

Secretary Castaneda then began to present a summary of the work of the Consultative Mechanism. In February, the Presidents had agreed to restructure the mechanism. There were now eight groups. The Mechanism had been strengthened. Its report to the Presidents showed that progress had been made. Rather than reading that document in detail...

President Carter interrupted to say that he had read it that morning. There were items or problems they might be worked on by the two Secretaries or by him and Lopez Portillo: could we accelerate this meeting by referring issues to the two Secretaries, he asked. (C)

Secretary Castaneda began his review of the Consultative Mechanism report with the subject of undocumented workers. He said the Mechanism had agreed that the two countries would be better able to agree on how to treat this important matter when data on the magnitude and the nature of the problem had been assembled. Data were being collected on the number of crossings and the contributions which migrants made to the American economy, including their salaries. Data would be worked out before negotiations commenced between the two countries. We needed details; then we could deal jointly with this issue. Castaneda referred to the creation of the Select Commission on Migration and said that it was due to report in 1981. President Carter said that it would report to him and to the Congress. Castaneda said he understood that legislative proposals would be based on its report. The President said yes. (C)

Castaneda said Mexico had mounted a gigantic effort. Its Department of Labor and Welfare had a survey in hand of 56,000 Mexican families. The survey had not yet been completed, but would be next...

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8 The February 16 joint communique includes language on strengthening the Consultative Mechanism and calls for recommendations in 4 months on “ways the mechanism can more effectively solve problems.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book I, p. 288) On June 22, Carter appointed Robert Krueger as Special Coordinator for Mexican Affairs and U.S. Executive Director of the Consultative Mechanism. (Ibid., pp. 1134–1135)

9 A U.S.-approved draft of the report is in telegram 247691 to Mexico City, September 21. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790431–0565)

10 The Select Commission issued its report on March 1, 1981.
year. It would be an excellent basis on which to understand the real problem. (C)

President Carter said that if the American people, including Hispanic people, and the Congress, used data from the Mexican survey it would make the acceptance of legislative proposals more likely on the Hill. There had been some doubt about the closeness of our consultations on this point in the past. An open door and cooperation on data and information would help us resolve the problem. The public and Congress should know that we are cooperating. (C)

President Carter said we recognized the importance of this issue. We are not putting the full responsibility on the Commission. He, the Secretary of State, and the Vice President were directly involved in finding solutions. It would be a great achievement if we could resolve it satisfactorily for the people and countries affected. It was an important theme. We welcomed frank and forceful discussions. You need not be reticent in putting forth your views. We would not be reticent in expressing ours. The more honest we were, the more likely that solutions would be found. He appreciated President Lopez Portillo's willingness to share views. Exchanges would help us achieve legislation. (C)

Castaneda said the two groups had met recently with the objective of making the information more trustworthy. They had achieved good results. Consultations were helpful. The Secretary of Labor wanted the type of legislation that would help both countries. There was great concern over the withdrawal of Federal funds for assistance, medical care, and education to undocumented workers. This issue was connected with human rights. (C)

On energy, Castaneda said that there had been an agreement on gas. It was well received and he was well satisfied. Mexico sold 500,000 b/d of crude petroleum to the United States, 80% of their crude oil exports. Sales of electric energy were promising across the California and Texas borders, particularly in the San Diego area. There was a possibility of selling electrical energy generated through geothermal facilities. This could take place by 1983. (C)

President Carter said this was all very encouraging. There was no need, he said, to repeat our frequent statements that how Mexico develops and sells its energy was your decision. We wanted to be reliable customers and good trade partners, that was our goal. Mutual analysis of energy programs had good prospects. He and his government had expressed their willingness to explore new ways to sell energy across the border. (C)

President Carter said he was also eager to solve other trade problems. With the appointment of Governor Askew, he expected these matters to be taken up promptly. He believed that the tomato issue
could be solved. Other agricultural problems and other products could be helped by the Consultative Mechanism. For example, Secretary Miller would soon meet with his counterpart on tax and monetary matters. (C)

President Carter said that the prisoner exchange program had posed some problems. He cited the case of a Connecticut court decision where a release of prisoners had occurred, against the Administration’s wishes. He said that the Attorney General felt we could win that case on appeal. He didn’t want to see the prisoner exchange program endangered. The United States was seeking similar agreements with other countries. It was a good program that had been satisfactory to both sides.

President Carter suggested that Secretaries Vance and Castaneda seek an agreement on fisheries and report tomorrow. This matter affected us and other countries and we wanted to progress on it. (C)

Tourism and air travel and the new processing center at Otay Mesa were all important issues. He was determined to expedite the processing center. (C)

The President also referred to a number of Americans who had been held in Mexican jails for more than a year without trial or sentence. This had created a disturbance in the U.S. Congress. Perhaps President Lopez Portillo could look into this matter and let us know if there were a problem. (C)

President Carter said that Governor Askew was from a State that is related to the tomato question. He had a special interest in resolving this matter (laughter). (C)

Lopez Portillo said that the Mexican government was preoccupied by the issue that had arisen because of a sentence passed by Connecticut courts. That sentence broke the principle of the Prisoner Exchange

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11 In telegram 9175 from Mexico City, June 2, the Embassy reported that Mexican officials refused to consider an agreement on the sale of Mexican tomatoes in the United States. U.S. farmers had accused Mexican farmers of “dumping” their vegetables in American markets. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790250–0274) Carter nominated Askew to be U.S. Trade Representative in August. Askew took office in October.

12 In an October 20 memorandum to Brzezinski, Tarnoff stated that the U.S. District Court for Connecticut released three prisoners transferred from Mexico, on the justification that the prisoners had not consented to the transfer. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P790165–2035) In January 1980, the extradition treaty with Mexico that included narcotics offenses entered into force. (31 UST 5059; TIAS 9656)

13 In his October 20 memorandum to Brzezinski, Tarnoff stated that Vance and Castaneda met on September 28 regarding the tuna negotiations and planned to hold another round of talks on October 30 and October 31 in San Diego. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P790165–2035)

14 Askew was the former Governor of Florida.
Treaty itself. He understood that it was a local decision. He said we would be very grateful for your efforts to respect the terms of the treaty as it was signed. This was important as it involved a matter of principle. (C)

President Lopez Portillo said that he was greatly concerned over the problem, which President Carter had just raised, of Americans that had been held in Mexico for more than one year. He would instruct his staff to look into this matter and he would take the necessary decisions. (C)

President Carter said that the U.S. government would appeal the Connecticut decision to the Federal District Court and, if necessary, to the Supreme Court. The Attorney General believed we had a case and that we would win. If not, we would seek a legislative remedy. We share your concern. (In a side conversation with President Carter, Secretary Vance informed him that he would give a list of American prisoners to Secretary Castaneda in the afternoon.) President Carter informed Lopez Portillo that Secretary Vance would give to the Mexican government a list of alleged cases where prisoners had been in jail too long. He had known that President Lopez Portillo would be concerned, he said. Sometimes our laws were not administered as we intend. A resolution of this problem would alleviate an issue for us.

President Carter said he was pleased with the joint work on farming of arid lands. He considered this work to be of great benefit to our countries. Lopez Portillo said we were very interested in that subject. It was one of the more interesting prospects that we have before us. Much of the productivity of our land is in natural rainfall areas and in semi-arid lands. President Carter said that we had a lot of land with the same possibilities. (C)

President Carter hoped that we could conduct our bilateral relations through the Consultative Mechanism. (C)

President Carter said that he was very interested in Lopez Portillo’s energy plan and he suggested that he discuss it. (C)

President Lopez Portillo said he would like to underline two things. The problem was that we were in transition between two eras. If this were so we must face other problems. Give or take a decade, in forty years, he said, petroleum would no longer be the principal energy source for the human race. Humanity was moving at an accelerated pace. The stone age had lasted thousands of years, the iron age much less, the petroleum age might last no more than 100 years. We were living at the end of an era. His first appeal was that we understand

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15 In his address to the UN General Assembly (see footnote 2 above), Lopez Portillo proposed a “World Energy Plan.”
this situation. Our generation would witness the end of the petroleum era. The objectives of our energy plans should be clear: to prepare the transition from one era to another and to introduce the use of other resources. In this transition we must explore, conserve, produce and rationalize use of petroleum. We must use it in a more satisfactory manner. By doing this we would be able to make the change to the next era. (C)

A universal body should prepare the substance of the solution of the energy issue. This in itself required a strategy. That was the thrust of his proposal to the United Nations General Assembly: to plan the transition between two eras, to lay out a program, to establish a Working Group which would encompass the industrialized countries of both East and West, oil exporters, and the oil consuming developing countries. Mexico had consulted with all these groups and was ready, in general, to sit around the table and discuss this. If we were to establish this group we could take up both broad and narrow issues. The Working Group could make proposals that could be studied and considered by others. (C)

The energy problem affected the entire world. Lopez Portillo was especially concerned with the situation of developing countries. Rich countries could find substitutes for petroleum. They had the ways and means to do so. Developing countries had no such possibilities. He always gave two specific examples that moved him, he said: Costa Rica and Jamaica. Both had democratic governments, very respectable democratic governments. Their problem was that more and more of their GNPs was devoted to the purchase of oil. He had met President Carrazo of Costa Rica before the oil price rise. At that time 27% of Costa Rica’s GNP was used to buy oil. Perhaps it was 30% now. This caused him great anxiety. Costa Rican democracy was running a great risk because of this problem. A similar reflection, not so dramatic perhaps, was made by Manley at the Non-Aligned Movement meeting in Cuba. That was why, while proposing long term measures of transition, he also sought immediate solutions. Developing countries said that they were not interested in the long term. What were we going to do in the short term? (C)

One of his great concerns, he said, and Mexico was a potential oil producer, was to look for ways out for these countries, not for tomorrow but for today. And this must include supply, prices and conditions of purchase, avoidance of speculation, and a mechanism to transfer real resources to the developing countries. That was why he had proposed a fund, or several funds, which would finance the long-term and the anxiety-creating problems of developing countries that import oil. The oil exporters should recognize that we had a special commitment to them. (C)
This had been set out in general terms. He would give an example of what he meant by rationalization of the management of oil while we enjoyed that product. Between Mexico and Guatemala flowed the Usumacinta River. It was the largest river in Central America and could generate a great deal of electric power. To do this we needed funding, equipment and a political agreement because the lands threatened by the dam would be Guatemalan. We had not yet reached an agreement with Guatemala that would provide power to all Central America. Under his proposal the global community would make it necessary to come to an agreement, said Lopez Portillo. It was not right not to use potentially available electricity. It was a case of what he meant by rationalization, that is, the use of a parallel source of energy. This project could solve the energy problems of Mexico and Central America and would make it possible to save oil. (C)

Lopez Portillo said that if we explored in each country in the world, we would discover sources that had not been tapped because of a lack of funds, technology, or equipment. It should be possible to organize mankind in such a way that energy was wisely used. The only substitute today for oil is the oil we discover tomorrow. It was our responsibility to discuss this problem. (C)

The developed countries only wanted to discuss the price of oil in their conversations with oil exporters, as if this were the only issue between them, said Lopez Portillo. The exporters would not discuss this point in isolation from others. They wanted to discuss the entire economic order. That was where things stood. In the meantime other things were happening. If we reflect on this impasse, it was not a matter of principle but of methodology. We should agree on methods. President Carter nodded his agreement. President Lopez Portillo said that he believed that his method was appropriate. We had determined that energy, not only oil but alternative sources, was the principal problem of mankind. We should determine long-term and short-term solutions. He believed that with political will we would be able to make the best use of the world’s last oil opportunity. (C)

Disorder could not continue, said Lopez Portillo. Either we put order into the situation or else it would be imposed on us by the party that won the struggle, which itself would consume energy. Order would come in one way or another. He believed that the rational way was best. (C)

President Carter said that Secretary Duncan, the State Department, and the National Security Council Staff were studying the proposal and its bilateral and multilateral aspects. He asked Secretary Duncan and Henry Owen to report to him tomorrow.\textsuperscript{16} He said he had thought

\textsuperscript{16} No record of this report has been found.
it would be useful to hear the remarks of President Lopez Portillo so that we could prepare our response overnight. (C)

President Carter said that he looked forward to seeing President Lopez Portillo that evening. Tomorrow they could discuss international issues and meet alone as well. President Carter said that the American people had been excited about the visit and were hopeful of beneficial results. He knew he shared a desire not to disappoint them. (C)

Lopez Portillo thanked him and said he looked forward to the meeting tomorrow with great pleasure. (C)

165. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 29, 1979, 10:15–11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT
International Issues and Energy

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.
The President
The Vice President
Secretary Vance
Secretary Duncan
Dr. Brzezinski
Mr. Eizenstat
Assistant Secretary Jules Katz
Assistant Secretary Viron Vakey
Robert Krueger,
Amb at Large-Des.
Ambassador Patrick Lucey
Ambassador Henry Owen
Jerry Schecter, NSC Staff
Guy F. Erb, NSC Staff
Bob Pastor, NSC Staff
Everett Briggs, State

Mexico
President Lopez Portillo
Jorge Castaneda,
Secretary of Foreign Relations
Jorge de la Vega Dominguez,
Secretary of Commerce
Jose Andres Oteyza,
Secretary of Patrimony and Industrial Development
Alfonso de Rosenzweig Diaz,
Under Secretary for Foreign Relations
Jorge Diaz Serrano,
Director of PEMEX
General Miguel A. Godinez Bravo,
Chief of Staff, Pres. Gen. Staff
Rafael Izquierdo,
Advisor to the President
Jose Antonio Ugarte,
Advisor to the President
Dr. Robert Casillas Hernandez,
Private Secretary to the President

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 30, Mexico, 9/12/1979. Confidential. Drafted by Erb on October 3. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room.
Saturday morning

President Carter said he had enjoyed the dinner and that the toasts and comments showed our publics that we are working well together. (C)

President Lopez Portillo agreed. He lamented the impression that had been given of the last meeting. The spirit had always been as it was today. He was very glad of that. (C)

President Carter said he had looked into Lopez Portillo’s U.N. speech and his proposal for a UN Working Group, which he found to be promising. It would be advisable if the two Secretaries of State quietly kept each other informed on this matter. We would confine our public remarks to the joint positions that they reach. (C)

President Carter said that the United States would continue to support energy development in developing countries through the World Bank and bilateral programs. At the Tokyo Summit, we and others had resolved to limit to the maximum degree possible the future imports of oil. Actions which he had taken alone and with the Congress would reduce our otherwise likely imports by four million barrels a day by 1985. Additional measures now awaiting Congressional approval would reduce our demand for oil imports by another 4 million barrels a day by 1990. With your permission, Secretary Duncan would describe briefly the presentation that he made in Paris. (C)

Secretary Duncan described the Paris meeting of the seven Energy Ministers of the Summit countries. The meeting had opened with a determination that world oil supply and demand were in a fragile balance, but for several reasons there existed a possibility of supply

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2 See footnotes 2 and 15, Document 164.
3 Duncan met with European and Japanese Energy Ministers in late September.
interruptions. The situation seemed to be set for 1980, but that could be affected by economic changes or by political events or disruptions. In the medium and long term the fact that the system would continue to be fragile drove the need for conservation measures and constraints on imports. (C)

Duncan then discussed the measures that had been taken since the Summit to reduce reliance on oil imports. The main questions had been what the members of the European Community would agree to as their individual targets for 1979 and 1985. They had agreed to 472 million tons, approximately 9.5 million b/d, as the ceiling for EC members in 1980. The figure of 472 million tons compared favorably to EC imports in 1979, which were projected at 515 million tons. All nine EC countries had accepted the necessity of adopting national targets and the four Summit countries in the EC had already made national commitments. Japan had accepted a range but the Japanese Energy Minister had said at the meeting and at a press conference that he would try to achieve the lower end of the range, that is 6.3 million barrels per day. Secretary Duncan also mentioned the 1980 U.S. import commitment of 8.5 million b/d and the 1979 target of 8.2 million b/d a day. (C)

In Paris, Duncan said, they had also discussed a crude oil transaction register. It would record transactions in the crude oil market and make them public on a monthly basis. There was also a discussion of energy technology and how to communicate that technology. Improvements would be sought in the exploitation of coal, nuclear power, with an emphasis on safety, and alternative sources of fuel. Conservation was also emphasized. There had been considerable interest in the President’s energy program. With the President’s approval Secretary Duncan gave a fact sheet to Secretary Castaneda. (C)

President Carter thanked Secretary Duncan. To summarize, the President said, all of us realized that we had been using, wasting, and importing too much oil. All agreed that despite economic growth, imports would not increase through 1985 and then would be reduced through the use of alternate sources of energy. To help maintain stable supply and stable prices we were eager to share our technology with developing countries and provide or help provide finance for exploration. He understood that these goals were compatible with Lopez Portillo’s. (C)

President Lopez Portillo said yes, he was not saying anything new, only that there would be serious and grave consequences if there were no action. He believed that, put together, the Tokyo Summit ideas and President Carter’s energy programs were close to his U.N. proposals. But there were certain considerations that he would like to raise. The Tokyo Summit countries were trying to reduce their dependency by controlling demand. There were two problems with that approach. (C)
If bloc policies were followed, said Lopez Portillo, then the producers would cartelize supply; they would look for balance in the market and for an advantageous situation in the world economy. Therefore, reliance on blocs was ill advised. Bloc bargaining added great danger. During the period in which we try to control demand we run the risk of a recession because a cut in demand would reduce economic growth. A reduction in demand would cause OPEC to reduce supply and upward pressure on prices thus would continue. The position of developing-country oil importers would become even more serious. They would be cut by a scissors: the price of petroleum would rise while a recession affected their exports. This would be very unfavorable for the developing countries. (C)

That is why President Carter’s energy program for the U.S. was interesting. What you had proposed for the United States was close to what should be approved by the entire world. We could not act on isolated parts of the whole problem. For this reason we supported your plan. President Lopez Portillo had reservations about the Tokyo results but he hoped that reason would prevail and that energy would be taken up in a global forum. (C)

Lopez Portillo said that there were dangers of misunderstanding. An OPEC country had already said that Mexico’s proposal had been thought up as a means of dividing OPEC. He had foreseen that this would happen and for that reason had said that the United Nations is the place in which to raise the problem. Mexico’s position was separate from the producer and consumer positions. He believed, however, that it was the correct view. He viewed the Tokyo Declaration with sympathy, but it had the dangers to which he had referred. However, the Tokyo meeting indicated that there was a trend toward order which gave him hope that it would be possible to negotiate. (C)

President Carter said he recognized the concerns of Lopez Portillo. We were making every effort to avoid creating a recession. Our principal emphasis was on conservation and elimination of waste. Our second effort was to produce oil and gas more efficiently from existing fields and with advanced techniques for recovery. We wished to use other forms of energy which were plentiful; that is shale, coal and solar energy, as well as increase the ability of developing countries to find energy resources. We were eager to share our superior technology with all other nations and were making some progress. (C)

President Carter asked if they might pass to the Middle East. Lopez Portillo agreed. President Carter said he would persist in efforts to have a comprehensive peace, security for Israel, and recognition of the legitimate rights of Palestinians. Compared to a year ago, primarily because of the courage and foresight of President Sadat, we had made remarkable progress. Prime Minister Begin had also been courageous.
He had a democratic society and must assuage different forces. Recognition was growing in our country and in Israel itself of the need to recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. We were encouraged but the peace effort needed support of others with influence, like the leaders of Mexico. (C)

The accord signed at Camp David was a very good commitment to the Palestinian cause, to a comprehensive peace and to the security of Israel. It had become almost a Bible for the three countries. We would not deviate from that commitment. President Carter hoped that to the extent possible Lopez Portillo would give support to the document. Lopez Portillo said within the modesty of the Mexican position he would be happy to support it. He was totally in agreement with the principle that we must seek to resolve the Middle Eastern problem. He believed that the possibility of resolving it depended heavily on the Palestinian issue. President Carter agreed. President Lopez Portillo said that the problem could be solved. (C)

There were ancient, new forces at play, said Lopez Portillo. He hoped that what he was about to say would not be interpreted as the theories of a former political science professor. He feared that old forces had come into play. In Iran we saw the force of an old religion that we had not counted on. He had seen that and associated it with something else that had occurred in Mexico. At the same time that events in Iran showed the strength there of religious feeling, a surprising show of support for the Pope took place in Mexico. The backdrop to our deliberations was an age old question. The Middle East was the meeting point of three great religions, Islam, Judaism and Christianity. These religions had not yet resolved their differences. In the background of many problems that seem objective we found these old tensions that we had forgotten. This fact would influence all positions, even on energy. But he did not mean to be excessive; Mexico would make all efforts possible to point toward a solution of a problem that had lasted too long. (C)

President Carter raised SALT II. He considered the ratification of the SALT treaty to be the most important priority that he had. It was vital to the enhancement of the peace and security of our nation. It was difficult to obtain ratification of a treaty. It had been difficult in the case of Panama; only a narrow margin of support was obtained. (C)

There were some members of the Senate that didn’t want to cooperate with the Soviet Union. Others felt that SALT was not balanced and not in the U.S. interest. Others felt that we should not ratify it as long as the Soviet Union and Cuba were placing troops throughout Africa and in other countries. Still others believed that we should not ratify the SALT accords unless there were a substantial increase in defense expenditures. The sum total of opposing forces could not exceed one
third of the Senate. The issue was complicated by the fact that we were entering a highly partisan election period. Even some former officials that had laid the basis for the SALT negotiations now had expressed doubts. The task was very difficult. (C)

President Carter said he was determined to do everything possible to have SALT ratified. He was dealing with public opposition and with individual members of the Senate. We had at this time a doubtful prospect. He would not be discouraged nor deterred, he said. Our NATO allies had been helpful, especially among those Senators that were committed to strong military forces and who feared the Soviet threat in Europe. He knew President Lopez Portillo’s sensitivity to interference in other nations’ political affairs, but within the bounds of non-intervention and propriety, he was asking for anything that Lopez Portillo could do with Senate members or public opinion. Lopez Portillo’s efforts would be useful, whatever contacts with high officials he thought were appropriate. Success or failure might depend on the vote of one U.S. Senator from a Southwestern state, who might be influenced by Mexico’s views or by Chicanos that would listen to Lopez Portillo’s voice. Lopez Portillo should use his own judgement. President Carter had wanted him to know that he was very determined. SALT was of great importance to our mutual objectives. (C)

Lopez Portillo said that it was a very important and very delicate matter. He was realistic; he knew that the positions of powerful countries were at stake. Concord between powerful countries meant peace and was important to bring about. He knew this peace could be negotiated and hoped President Carter would be successful. (C)

He must bring up some points, he said, he wouldn’t like to say what he could not repeat outside. Mexico was very much aware that strength is an important factor in world politics and that it was legitimate that the powers defend themselves. Mexico used principles to defend itself. That was why Mexico was so insistent in ratifying them. Mexico repeatedly stated the principle of non-intervention. Mexico was against foreign military activity in any country. That was Mexico’s position. It had not changed and never would. He hoped that this view was not troublesome, but for Mexico it was the same thing to have Soviet troops in Cuba as American troops in Cuba. The presence of troops was the protection of the interests of one or the other country. He understood the world. Cuba should be free of Soviet and American troops. (C)

Mexico didn’t want Soviet or American troops in Mexico. Mexicans didn’t want for others what they didn’t want for themselves. We didn’t want Soviet or Chinese troops in the United States. That is Mexico’s position. (C)

Within the framework of Mexico’s resolve he would do everything possible, within Mexico’s modest competence. He would appeal to the
major powers that they should come to an understanding and that they should agree that mankind didn’t belong to the powers, but that the powers belonged to mankind. (C)

Any mistake by a super power could affect the world. Mexico was small but, nevertheless, a part of the world. Lopez Portillo hoped that the major powers could negotiate disarmament and peace and that there would be no further military interventions. President Carter said he agreed with those objectives completely. (C)

President Carter asked if there were any other themes to take up. President Lopez Portillo said that on Friday he had talked with Secretary Vance on Nicaragua and the risks in El Salvador. We would celebrate tomorrow in Panama an important decision.4 Did President Carter want to repeat matters of which he and Vance had spoken yesterday? President Lopez Portillo thought they had dealt with them extensively. President Carter agreed. Lopez Portillo said he would like to emphasize Nicaragua. Good, said President Carter. (C)

Lopez Portillo said that we were in a delicate stage in Nicaragua and in the destiny of all Latin America. If aid to Nicaragua were conditioned on steps toward a certain type of political system, we would be trying to bend the arm of self-determination in Nicaragua. We would substitute one political caricature for another. Mexico gave aid, and Mexico is helping to the extent possible, so that we could support free determination by Nicaraguans. We should give the Junta the elements necessary to guarantee a peaceful transition from Somoza to a system set up by Nicaraguans. (C)

If we insisted on conditions, we would repress the will of the Nicaraguan people. We would continue to commit the errors of the past. The Nicaraguan people would never come of age. (C)

Mexico is helping in what it could. Mexico had offered oil, but the refinery in Nicaragua belonged to Esso. Mexico’s decision depended on what Nicaragua decided to do with the refinery. If a political position were taken by the radicals, they would try to nationalize the refinery. Mexico had been confronted with this problem after it had made the offer of oil. If we could find some kind of interpretation that would allow oil to be refined in Nicaragua, without anything happening to or in the refinery, we could help. He understood that there were temptations to nationalize the refinery. (C)

We must permit a transition period to democracy. There were daily problems: food, medicine, and clothing; and short-term problems: the restoration of agriculture and small industry. Mexico would help in every way it could, particularly in energy. The Nicaraguans had to

4 U.S. sovereignty of the Panama Canal Zone ended on September 30.
learn how to handle their finances and trade. If we drew Nicaragua
down by reducing the prices of their raw materials we would have a
problem like that of Sisyphus. We didn’t want Sisyphus in Nicaragua,
but “None-of-us.” (Laughter) (C)

President Carter said the United States was providing aid to Nicarag-
ua. He had a constructive meeting earlier in the week with individuals
in the Junta. He had offered aid to agriculture, industry, and for
 electrical systems. The United States would be very supportive of the
new government. (C)

President Carter said he had told the members of the Junta that
if they would not hold him responsible for the past actions of U.S.
Administrations, he would not hold them responsible for past actions
of Somoza. Bravo, said Lopez Portillo. (C)

Lopez Portillo said that Nicaragua was of interest to a variety of
political trends. Everyone wanted to find an example there. President
Carter agreed. Lopez Portillo said that it would be an error to try to
put conditions on their actions. What we wanted to see in Nicaragua
was what we wanted to see in the bull ring: The spectators say when
too many helpers crowd around a bull fighter, “Leave him alone.” (C)

President Carter asked Secretary Duncan to look into the Esso issue.
Secretary Duncan said that it appeared to be a Nicaraguan decision
but that he would look into it. Lopez Portillo said that he maintained
the offer of 15,000 b/d, without price speculation and, indeed, with
special consideration for their problem. If the United States could help
resolve the refinery issue, Nicaragua’s energy problem could be
resolved. (C)

President Lopez Portillo said that he and Secretary Vance had dealt
with the other matters and it was unnecessary to repeat what he had
d said to the Secretary. (C)

President Carter said the only other matter was a sensitive one.
He thought it would be a mistake to bring up the oil spill and river
salinity too directly, but we should have some means of discussing
environmental issues without that discussion being considered a reflec-
tion on what has happened before. It would be useful to have an
agreement to discuss environmental issues without seeming critical
of each other. What was Lopez Portillo’s view? Should we use the

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5 Documentation on this meeting is in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XV, Cen-
tral America.

6 In June 1979, a PEMEX-owned oil well suffered a blowout, leading to a large spill
in the Gulf of Mexico. Beginning in the 1960s, pollution in the Colorado River led to
increased salinity of the water in the Mexicali Valley.
Consultative Mechanism? Our objective would not be to levy damages, but to minimize damages if we had a problem in the future. (C)

Lopez Portillo (showing some surprise) said that personally he was with President Carter. The framework for such issues was now given by international law in all its possibilities. It was the system that makes it possible to put one’s rights forward. Mexico had a right to claim damages with regard to salinity in the Mexicali Valley. The United States had a right to claim damages in the case of the Campeche Bay spill as well, but such rights were not yet set in international law. (C)

Lopez Portillo said that there had been great indignation in Mexico because there had been no opportunity to put forward claims on the United States with regard to the Mexicali Valley. Lopez Portillo said that before things happen, let us establish legal rights. We could come to agreement to avoid damages and even to redress and offer indemnity when things happen. That was friendship. We should turn right and reason into law. He quoted a Mexican saying: clear accounts maintain friendship. He was now instructing Secretary Castaneda to establish an institutional system, which would allow us to protect, conserve, and remunerate for environmental damage. (C)

Mexico wanted these affairs put forward legally by the United States. He cited another Mexican saying: everyone should have either long tails or short tails. That was democracy. He shared President Carter’s idea. (C)

President Carter said that if a problem arises, for example, salt in a river or an immediate problem like the oil spill, we should have a mechanism to deal with the problem jointly without dispute. Lopez Portillo retorted that would be all right if the mechanism were included in a legal agreement. We must make haste in reaching an agreement said Lopez Portillo. All right, said President Carter. (C)

The meeting closed at 11:30 a.m.™

™ For the joint press statement issued at the end of Lopez Portillo’s visit, see Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book II, pp. 1789–1791.
166. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Mexico

Washington, October 21, 1979, 1938Z

275028. Eyes only for Charge. Subject: The Shah’s Illness.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. FYI: Rockefeller’s office has informed us that Lopez Portillo sent the following message to the former Shah on October 20 responding to a request made to him by the Shah to permit Shah’s return to Mexico following medical treatment in U.S.\(^2\) Quote: Your home is always Mexico. This is your country. You are always welcome. We are distressed and disturbed by your health. A King should have premier medical treatment, you should go to the United States and we await your return. You can live anywhere in Mexico, be it Cuernavaca, Acapulco, or Mexico City. We will give you security and asylum. Unquote. End FYI.

3. Charge should see that following message is conveyed to GOM soonest by whatever channel you deem most appropriate:

A) We have decided to permit Shah to come to U.S. for private medical treatment on recommendation of French and American doctors who have been treating him. Their medical report has revealed that Shah has serious condition immediately requiring further diagnosis and evaluation, B) We understand that President Portillo has agreed to the Shah’s request to keep open the possibility of his returning to Mexico following his forthcoming medical treatment in the U.S. We wish to express our appreciation for this decision. He and Shahbanu\(^3\) will be travelling to U.S. immediately. We do not plan to publicize the travel and we would appreciate your government’s cooperation in maintaining confidentiality. If news of travel leaks, we plan low key confirmation that Shah is coming to U.S. for diagnosis and evaluation. We will keep you informed of developments following further medical evaluation.

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\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 49, Mexico, 10/79-1/80. Secret; Cherokee; Niat Immediate; Nodis. Drafted in P; approved in P and S/S-O.

\(^2\) The Shah arrived in Mexico on June 10, despite opposition from both the left and the right. (Telegram 9653 from Mexico City, June 10, and telegram 9797 from Mexico City, June 13; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790265–0083 and D790270–0107)

\(^3\) Farah Pahlavi, Empress of Iran.
4. Please report Niatc Immediate when message delivered and any GOM reactions, which we assume will confirm above understanding of GOM willingness for Shah to return to Mexico.

5. We are in touch with Rockefeller group to arrange immediate travel to U.S. and on extremely confidential basis. Shah and Shahbanu have valid U.S. visas, but invalid Iranian passports. Request you appoint and inform us of name of officer to handle documentation. You should arrange passport waiver for entry into U.S. If you cannot insure that it can be done confidentially, please inform us and we will arrange waiver in U.S. at point of entry. Since former Shah and Shahbanu no longer have any claim to governmental authority in Iran, you should insure that visa is B–2 tourist visa (and multiple entry for maximum period of validity).

6. Current plans are for Shah’s departure from Mexico City for U.S. early tomorrow afternoon (October 22). Rockefeller representatives will be in contact with Embassy. We have given them Charge or Dunn as initial point of contact.¹

Christopher

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¹ The Mexican Government was informed by U.S. officials on November 28 that the Shah wished to return to Mexico. Mexican officials proceeded to inform the Shah that his visa, which expired on December 9, would not be renewed and that “he would not want to return for such a brief period.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840131–1726) A November 30 Intelligence Report concluded that the Mexican Foreign Ministry decision not to renew the Shah’s visa was motivated by: 1) fears of assassination attempts against the Shah, 2) an opportunity to show the independence of Mexico’s foreign policy, and 3) the fact that the Shah had been offered safehaven elsewhere. ([report number not declassified]; National Archives, RG 59, Official Files of [P] David D. Newsom, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Lot 82D85, Box 4, SHAH: Asylum Contacts/Panama stay Nov. 1979) In telegram 21803 from Mexico City, December 28, the Embassy reported, “A possible further explanation for GOM reaction to the issues surrounding the Shah and U.S. Mexican relations since their decision not to readmit him may be provided by the following interchange between the Shah and Ambassador Margain. According to SRE Under Secretary Rosenzweig-Diaz, when Margain delivered the final GOM decision, the Shah’s immediate reaction was to ask ‘Did you clear this with Secretary Vance?’ If the Shah’s statement is reported accurately, it was guaranteed to raise Mexican ire.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840131–1723)
Mr. President:

This is a personal letter, not a protocol letter. It is in response to the protest made to me through Ambassador Margain about my statements related to the freezing of Iranian assets by your Government.¹

I profoundly regret that an opinion of mine about a public decision of your Government might have added tensions to the many which you are facing with firmness and courage in the painful case of the attack on the United States Embassy in Teheran.

What concerns me most is that an uncivilized, medieval act—which we have condemned in every forum and on every occasion—might have the potential of causing the modern world to lose its way and provoke a chain reaction of painful situations, errors, and confrontations which, in our case, even though we are only indirectly concerned, are still very serious and could cause the further deterioration of the contemporary world in which we live. For you, as the head of the most powerful country in the world, and for me in this modest nation of Mexico.

I understand the irritation of your country, and the sensitivity with which you receive the positions of the rest of the world, and that of your neighbors. We are concerned by, but not responsible for, the grave events. We are not part of the causes and we do not wish to be (part) of the consequences. This can not bother anyone.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 13, Mexico, President Jose Lopez Portillo, 6/78–6/80. Secret. The letter is an unofficial translation; the original letter in Spanish is attached. According to a typed note on the letter, Lopez Portillo wrote it while “In Flight Over Chihuahua State.”

² Lopez Portillo criticized the American action during a December 3 press conference. He characterized the U.S. decision to freeze Iranian assets as “aggressive,” and stated that it was “going to impair seriously the international monetary system because the petroleum producing companies will think twice before converting a real resource that is deep in the ground for foreign currencies that will be devalued.” (Telegram 20583 from Mexico City, December 4; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790560–0093) Newsom met with Mexican Ambassador Margain on December 5 and delivered a strong demarche regarding Lopez Portillo’s remarks. Margain replied that the Mexican President’s remarks were not intended to be viewed as supportive of Iran. (Telegram 31477 to Mexico City, December 6; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790584–0488)
I expressed in a press conference an opinion—which, by the way, was generalized by the press and in the financial world—about the effect the freezing of funds of one petroleum exporting country could have on the International Monetary System, funds which are obligatorily recycled within the industrialized economies, because in the developing world, they have neither a discrete destiny nor guaranty. I considered this decision precipitous because if the funds are frozen, they are not recycled and this runs the risk of not producing the petroleum that generates them. This will further complicate the energy crisis.

I do not know if this opinion is considered the cause of an injury or is the reason for the protest. I confess my disappointment. I have already said that I am sorry. Such an honest opinion manifests a concern on my part that we should never face (these types of) arbitrary Iranian measures and less, that it should pit us against the United States. The international situation worries me. I know that you have the serenity to avoid a violent confrontation and that you will find peaceful means to the solution. But there will remain the consequences, the lack of confidence, the animosities and an even greater deterioration in the economic world which we cannot effectively rationalize. And this is without considering the political and social aspects.

It would be painful if one of the secondary effects or consequences of an action which we all find reprehensible—the abuse of fanaticism—would be to separate two neighboring countries which, despite their dissimilarities, are encountering better ways of renewed understanding, given the permanence of being neighbors. I hope that the lack of communication, inertia, misunderstandings, will not separate us. I find no reason nor utility in this. Our enemies would celebrate this.

I have opinions about world problems and I have expressed this with sincerity and intellectual honesty.

That which is happening and that which will happen in the future is important to all of us.

I fear that the democratic world no longer has the answers to all of the economic problems and express my concern as I have already done in our conversations, that many poor countries in the area of your influence are giving up their hopes, for not even in the repressive regimes are they resolved. The powerful world does not manifest itself through rational decisions at a universal (global) level, and on the other hand, it seems to contemplate violent measures. It is sad that the reasonable does not appear to be the possible.

In summation, even though there is much more to say, I shall not distract you from your grave responsibilities. I conclude:

I am concerned about the protest made to our Ambassador.

I hope that an opinion, which is not exclusively mine, and not stated to create, but rather to put forth problems, shall not be the cause
for animosity, nor for the grave deterioration of bilateral relations
between our two countries, as was formulated in the protest.

With all simplicity and sincerity, I want to protect a relationship,
which being permanent, everyone agrees that it should be good, and
which desirably should be improved.

The times require cool heads and serenity on the part of everyone.
In all modesty, I aspire to this and I say that to you.

Please receive affectionate greetings (best wishes) from someone
who wants to maintain a good friendship.3

3 In an undated memorandum to Carter, Brzezinski summarized the Mexican Presi-
dent’s remarks and mentioned that the National Security Council was “considering how
best to reply.” The President wrote on the memorandum, “When drafting, remember
the Shah, Puerto Rico, his toast remarks, his criticism of action on Iran funds, and his
call to boycott the $.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/
South, Pastor, Country, Box 30, Folder: Mexico, 10–12/79) In his reply to Lopez Portillo
on December 20, Carter wrote, “Thank you for your letter of December 8, 1979, in which
you expressed regret over the adverse reaction of the American Government and people
to your statements criticizing my response to the intolerable acts of Iran.” “What is of
central importance to me and the American people is that our hostages be released
unharmed and be reunited with their families and fellow countrymen. Any statements
or actions that might be injurious to this urgent purpose inescapably risk giving serious
offense to the people of the United States.” “It is important that we and our peoples
maintain the mutual respect and understanding that must be the foundation of the
relationship between our nations. Let us work together to achieve accords exemplifying
that respect and that understanding.” (Ibid.)
168. Memorandum From the United States Trade Representative (Askew) to President Carter

Washington, December 18, 1979

SUBJECT

Trade Negotiations with Mexico

My Office has completed negotiations with Mexico on a major trade agreement which includes concessions on several hundred products totaling nearly $850 million. More important than the specific provisions of this agreement is the fact that it is a prerequisite for Mexican membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

The present trade situation between the United States and Mexico is not as fair as it should be to U.S. exporters. As a GATT member, the United States generally accords liberal trade treatment to Mexican products. However, because Mexico is not a GATT member, and because we have not had a bilateral trade agreement with Mexico since 1947, our exports to Mexico are subject to protective and capricious import policies by that country. Recently, Mexico has begun to liberalize these policies. Without the disciplines of GATT, though, there is nothing to prevent future Mexican administrations from reversing this liberal trend.

Consequently, an important objective of your policy toward Mexico has been their accession to GATT. Mexican entry into GATT would reduce the bilateral irritants in the trade relations between our two countries, require Mexico to exercise greater restraint in its trade policies, and generally hasten Mexican entry into the international trading community.

Currently, the Mexicans are engaged in a national debate over whether to enter GATT. This decision must be made by May. The agreement we have reached with Mexico contains concessions of the kind required of any country when it joins GATT. In fact, the agreement will not go into effect unless and until Mexico becomes a GATT member. Mexico has completed similar negotiations with all its principal trading partners except the United States. Our approval of the agreement would fulfill this one remaining external prerequisite to GATT membership.

As is usually the case with our agreements with developing countries, the trade coverage of this agreement is weighted in Mexico’s

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 49, Mexico, 10/79–1/80. No classification marking.
favor. However, without this agreement, Mexico would remain free to prohibit entry of the U.S. products the agreement covers. As a member of GATT with obligations to other GATT members, we do not have such freedom. For this reason, among others, there is more qualitative value in the Mexican concessions to the United States than in our concessions to them. This is true despite the weighted ratio in trade coverage, which, in this agreement, unlike some others, is less than two to one.

This agreement binds the Mexicans to more certainty in our mutual dealings, protects existing U.S. interests in Mexico, and provides an expanded potential for U.S. exports to one of our most important trading partners. In my view, approval of this agreement is clearly in the best interests of the United States. Therefore, I request your approval to allow me to proceed with the agreement.\(^2\)

\(^2\) Carter checked and initialed the approve option.

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169. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Mexico\(^1\)

Washington, January 8, 1980, 2203Z

5799. Subject: Letter to Mexican President.

1. Please transmit the following letter to President Lopez Portillo as soon as possible.

2. Begin text. Dear Mr. President: Please accept my sincere congratulations on Mexico’s election to the United Nations Security Council. Mexico’s stature in the United Nations is reflected in the virtually unanimous vote in the General Assembly in support of Mexico’s candidacy.\(^2\)

3. I can assure you that Ambassador McHenry looks forward to strengthening cordial and cooperative relations with his Mexican col-

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800014–0932. Confidential; Flash. Drafted by Bowdler and Krueger; cleared by Maynes, Seitz, and Denend; approved by Vance. Repeated for information to USUN.

\(^2\) Mexico was elected to the UN Security Council on January 7, after Cuba and Colombia withdrew their candidacies. (Telegram 59 from USUN, January 7; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800014–0991)
It is my hope and expectation that our two delegations will find much common ground and shared interests in carrying out their important responsibilities.

4. Mexico assumes its place on the Council at a time when grave issues of the highest importance are before it. Yesterday a majority of the Council, including Mexico, voted to deplore the Soviet Union’s military invasion of Afghanistan. The Council continues to be faced with Iran’s continued defiance of the unanimous call of the international community for the release of American hostages, which threatens the peace and the norms of international behavior by which diplomacy is conducted.

5. I wish to take this opportunity, Mr. President, to address the continued detention of hostages in Iran, which you, in your letter of December 8, 1979, characterized as uncivilized and medieval, and which Mexico has condemned in every forum and on every occasion.³

6. Iran’s dispute is not solely with the United States of America, but with the international community. Despite the restraint shown by the world community, the authorities in Iran continue to hold our citizens prisoner in violation of international law, basic human rights, and elementary morality. They have refused to comply with the order of the International Court of Justice of December 15.⁴ They continue to defy Security Council Resolution 457 adopted over one month ago on December 4, as well as Security Council Resolution 461 adopted on December 31.⁵ Meanwhile 50 of our innocent citizens are subjected to intolerable stress which the World Court itself warned could lead to irreparable harm to the individuals.

7. Secretary General Waldheim’s report to the Security Council illustrates the extent of Iranian inflexibility and intransigence. Neither the Ayatollah Khomeini nor those occupying the Embassy compound were willing to see the Secretary General on his mission of mediation; nor was Secretary General Waldheim allowed to visit the hostages. His mission was marred by hostile demonstrations throughout and officially-inspired propaganda against the United Nations and against the Secretary General personally.

³ See Document 167.
⁴ On December 15, 1979, the International Court of Justice ordered Iran to release all American hostages held at the Embassy. (Department of State Bulletin, February 1980, pp. 49-53)
⁵ UNSC Resolution 457, which was adopted unanimously on December 4, 1979, called on Iran to release immediately American Embassy personnel and allow them to leave the country. UNSC Resolution 461, adopted on December 31, reaffirmed Resolution 457. (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1979, pp. 311–312)
8. I believe it is essential that the Security Council act without delay on the course it set for itself in its resolution of December 31 which stated that if the American captives were not freed by January 7, it would meet to adopt effective measures under Articles 39 and 41 of the UN Charter. Accordingly, the United States of America yesterday proposed a resolution in the Security Council which would impose limited but significant economic sanctions on Iran.

9. We respect the strong stand you and your government have taken on this issue in other forums and on other occasions and know of Mexico’s devotion to traditional international legal norms and principles.

10. I hope I will have your firm support on this resolution. The people of the United States of America would consider it an act of friendship from a valued neighbor if Mexico would join us and other members of the international community in upholding the earlier decisions of the World Court and the Security Council in defense of standards that protect us all.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

11. Signed original letter being sent by pouch.

12. As soon as text has been delivered to President Lopez Portillo, please call Ambassador McHenry’s office at USUN to inform Ambassador Krueger, so that he can pass a copy to Foreign Minister Castaneda.

Vance

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6 Article 39 states that the UN Security Council can determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression, and can apply appropriate sanctions. Article 41 dictates sanctions, not involving armed forces, that the Security Council can impose.

7 Lopez Portillo responded to Carter’s letter by telephone at 11:02 a.m. on January 17, stating that he “shared the American sense of outrage over Iran” and “appreciated” the actions taken by the United States following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. (Department of State, S/MEX Files, Lot 81D110, Box 1, Carter/Lopez Portillo Contact, 1/1980) Mexico, however, abstained in the vote on the January 13 UN resolution that would have imposed sanctions on Iran.
170. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Carlucci) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Bowdler)\textsuperscript{1}

Washington, February 21, 1980

SUBJECT
Discussion with President Jose Lopez-Portillo

1. I had a 40-minute discussion with President Jose Lopez-Portillo during my recent visit to Mexico. A number of topics were discussed in a most frank and friendly atmosphere. The attached memo covers these points.

2. In my opinion it is evident that the President lacks access to reliable information on political events in various parts of the world. It is clear that he needs more dialogue with well informed U.S. officials. This could help to counter and hopefully change many of his notions on the world’s problems and possible solutions.

Frank C. Carlucci\textsuperscript{2}

Attachment

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Carlucci)\textsuperscript{3}

Washington, undated

SUBJECT
Discussion with President Jose Lopez-Portillo

While discussing the political situations in Central America and the Mid-East the President made a number of observations, the more significant of which are summarized below.

In spite of almost insurmountable difficulties the Nicaraguan Government is making commendable progress and is deserving of unconditional support. While the junta serves as a smoke screen for the more

\textsuperscript{1} Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 82M00501R: 1980 Subject Files, Box 12, Folder 17: Mexico. Secret.

\textsuperscript{2} Carlucci signed “Frank” above this typed signature.

\textsuperscript{3} Secret.
militant leftist elements who hold power in Nicaragua, there are no present indications that Nicaragua will become another Cuba or become dominated by the Soviet Union or Cuba. Nicaragua has a number of highly nationalistic, inexperienced, young leaders who are attempting to find a way of their own and not fall under the domination of the extreme left or extreme right. Mexico believes in their cause and is lending all the unconditional help it can to Nicaragua, with the exception of military aid which Mexico is not able to provide.

For the time being the U.S., Mexico and other interested nations should adopt a hands off policy toward El Salvador. It is still too early to determine if the junta is worthy of support and will work for the interests of the less privileged classes. If a hands off policy leads to civil war, so be it.

Mexico is not particularly concerned with political developments in Central America. It does sympathize with those elements of society who are striving for a better standard of living and political freedom and believes they deserve encouragement.

In past years the U.S. has had a tendency to support oppressive military regimes in many areas of the world and, as a consequence, has left the oppressed populations of these countries no alternative but to seek a radical leftist solution. The U.S. would do well to change this policy in favor of substantial economic aid. This should take the form of guaranteed prices for raw materials. A new economic order, largely underwritten by the U.S., would solve most of the problems of the developing nations and bring political stability to the world.

The U.S. let the Shah of Iran down badly during the last months of his regime and, as a consequence, is not considered a reliable partner by many in the world.

The USSR has demonstrated by its invasion of Afghanistan that it does seek a warm water port on the Persian Gulf and is attempting to extend its influence in that critical area.

Mexico refrained from voting economic sanctions against Iran because it believes no one is firmly in control in Iran and it would be unjust to punish the whole population for the misdeeds of the terrorists who hold the American diplomats hostage. Sanctions would also in essence deliver Iran to the Soviets on a silver platter.

Oil resources are becoming of increasing concern to the USSR as is demonstrated by the fact that several satellite countries are now seeking oil contracts with Mexico.

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4 A reformist coup deposed Salvadoran President Carlos Humberto Romero on October 15, 1979.
171. Telegram From the Embassy in Mexico to the Department of State

Washington, June 26, 1980, 0033Z

10540. Subject: Meeting With President Lopez Portillo.

1. (Secret—Entire text.)

2. Summary: During my meeting with President Lopez Portillo, June 24, the President told me that the GOM, in contrast to its approaches to the Western European countries and Japan, will not seek a comprehensive economic cooperation “package” from the U.S. On his World Energy Plan, the President said that more active endorsement by interested states is opportune and that the proposed early 1981 North-South summit might provide an occasion for more solid commitments on energy. With regard to the Cuban refugees in USINT Havana, the President, notwithstanding my reiteration of U.S. unwillingness now to address broader issues with Cuba, volunteered that he would raise the USINT refugee problem, among others, with Castro during his upcoming visit to the island. End summary.

3. I met with President Lopez Portillo, at Los Pinos, June 24, to have an informal exchange of views focusing primarily on the President’s recent trip to Europe and other domestic and international developments. Foreign Secretary Castaneda was present during the conversation.

4. Economic cooperation “package:” After discussion of the comprehensive economic cooperation “packages” (including trade, finance, technology transfer, investment, training) which Mexico recently has sought to obtain from Japan, France, Sweden, the FRG, and Canada in implicit exchange for petroleum supplies, I asked President Lopez Portillo to spell out his views with regard to the U.S., pointing out, for

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800330–1149. Secret; Immediate.

2 See footnote 15, Document 164.

3 Regarding the Cubans being sheltered in the U.S. Interests Section, see Document 103. Beginning on May 26, the Mexican Government began acting as an intermediary between the United States and Cuba, so that the refugees in the U.S. Interests Section could leave Cuba. (Telegram 8777 from Mexico City, May 27, Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 49, Mexico, 2/80–1/81) In telegram 168732 to Mexico City, June 26, the Department instructed Ambassador Nava to thank Lopez Portillo for his assistance (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800309–1059)

4 In telegram 8299 from Mexico City, May 15, the Embassy reported that Lopez Portillo planned a trip to France, West Germany, Sweden, and Canada in mid-to-late May, with the aim of reducing Mexico’s trade deficit and promoting petroleum exports. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800241–0016)
example, that even indirect linkages between U.S. food supplies and Mexican oil deliveries could be “political dynamite.”

5. The President, in response, stated that relations with the U.S. are a special case, given the high percentage of both Mexican oil and other exports which go to the U.S. He added that trade with the U.S. is going well, albeit with room for improvement. There is no need, the President said, to shape a new comprehensive economic cooperation package with the U.S. He said that the elements of such a package—trade, oil deliveries, investment—are already in place. The President added that, if the GOM proposed a “package” to the U.S., as had been done in the case of Sweden, people in the U.S. would say that he (President Lopez Portillo) is “crazy”—the things asked for already exist. The “package” approach, the President continued, is intended only for countries with which Mexican economic relations are not fully developed, countries which are the target of Mexican diversification efforts. With regard to the U.S., the President said, comprehensive cooperation is ensured through the working groups of the Consultative Mechanism and this is sufficient. Secretary Castaneda seemed restive during this discussion, but made no remarks.

6. The World Energy Plan: The President made extended remarks on his concern for the present economic plight of the non-oil developing countries and his dissatisfaction with current rancor between the OPEC and industrialized nations. In this regard, the President expressed regret that the Venice Summit, in his view, seemed to place all blame for current economic problems on OPEC.5 The President said that, unless the industrialized nations are willing to accept part of the blame and to recognize that the problem of inflation antedated the 1973 oil price increases, it will be impossible to go beyond exchanges of recriminations to the necessary solution of problems and the acceptance of shared responsibility to undertake concrete actions.

7. The President said that Mexico has indicated its willingness to convene a North-South summit of, perhaps, 21 nations in early 1981 in order to give a political impulse to the solution of current global economic problems. The President, after I mentioned our support for his world energy plan, said that this summit might provide an opportunity for the industrialized nations to express their support and undertake concrete commitments with regard to a global energy regime. If such commitments were possible also on the part of the OPEC nations attending, the President said, an energy-related initiative in the UN context (presumably in the “global dialogue”) might take shape and be given momentum.

5 The 6th G–7 Economic Summit was held in Venice from June 22 to June 23.
8. In the interim, the President said that it might be possible to discuss appropriate strategy and modalities for expressions of support for the world energy plan by the U.S. and other industrialized nations—support which now appears opportune and desirable.

9. With regard to the short-term future, the President said that he and President Herrera Campins of Venezuela have come to an agreement on how to ease the economic burden of non-oil countries of Central America and the Caribbean. The details of the agreement, he said, will be announced during President Herrera’s trip to Costa Rica. The President views this agreement as a step or model for a global one.

10. I took advantage of the President’s discussion of his world energy plan to ask him how the plan squared with the GOM’s current effort to secure economic benefits from its petroleum beyond those provided by market price. The President said that the answer is simple—Mexico is willing to assume obligations that would imply a sacrifice if all other nations are willing to do so. While this is not the case, Mexico will pursue its particular interests.

11. Cuba: I thanked President Lopez Portillo for Mexico’s efforts, albeit unsuccessful, in seeking to resolve the refugee problem in the U.S. Interests Section, Havana. Secretary Castaneda, in his only intervention during the meeting, asked whether there was anything new on this situation. I replied that the United States still believes that the problem is humanitarian in nature, flowing from Castro’s abuse of his own citizens, and that the U.S. continues to be unwilling to address broader questions with Cuba in connection with this matter.

12. President Lopez Portillo interjected that he would raise the USINT refugee problem, among others, when he meets with Fidel Castro in Havana in late July-early August. He said that in direct President-to-President conversations many things can be discussed and resolved. The President, while saying that he preferred that nothing be “formalized” before the meeting, said that a possible “formula” might be found to solve the problem during his Castro conversations. He added that, “you can trust us” on this matter.

13. Begin comment: The conversation with President Lopez Portillo was particularly useful because the President, in Secretary Castaneda’s presence, specifically discarded the possibility of seeking additional comprehensive economic benefits in the form of a new “package” agreement from the U.S. in exchange for Mexican oil. While a slight loophole was left on the question of trade, the context of the President’s

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6 Lopez Portillo visited Cuba from July 31 to August 3. In telegram 12943 from Mexico City, August 8, the Embassy reported on his visit. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800378–1033)
remarks appeared to suggest that trade issues would be handled on their merits, rather than linked to oil. We understand from FonSec sources that preparation for an intersecretarial meeting on a desirable economic approach to the U.S., in light of Mexico’s new efforts to seek comprehensive economic cooperation, is underway. It is not inconceivable that President Lopez Portillo’s response to us preceded such a meeting—thus possibly upsetting Secretary Castaneda whose recent Council on Foreign Relations’ speech appeared to presage some type of link between oil and other economic benefits from the U.S. This may have explained Castaneda’s apparent restiveness at this point in the conversation.

14. With regard to the President’s World Energy Plan, he now appears more receptive to expressions of support from industrialized nations. We will discuss with the Mexicans here how our support might usefully be shown. It also appears clear that the President will seek to use the proposed 1981 North-South summit, should it take place, to give new impetus to his plan. Washington will presumably wish to begin considering this matter, particularly with regard to the energy-related “concrete commitments” which the President appears to be seeking.

15. On Cuba, the President clearly understood my statement that the U.S. would not accept a linkage between the USINT refugees and discussion of broader U.S.-Cuban issues. His expression of readiness to seek to solve the problem with Castro would, therefore, appear to imply an effort to seek their departure without the conditions advanced by the Cubans heretofore. I sensed from his tone that he plans to have a very frank discussion with “Fidel,” as he put it. End comment.

Nava
172. Telegram From the Embassy in Mexico to the Department of State

Mexico City, August 21, 1980, 1722Z

13617. Subj: Meeting With President Lopez Portillo and Foreign Secretary Castaneda.

1. (C—Entire text.)

2. Ambassadors Nava and Bowdler met with President Lopez Portillo (JLP) at Los Pinos morning of August 19 for an hour and half (much longer than we had expected). Foreign Minister Castaneda accompanied the President.

3. The conversation focused primarily on Cuba, Bolivia and El Salvador. JLP said that his trip to Cuba had gone well. He found Fidel Castro sobered by 21 years in power and more pragmatic about his problems. Castro realized that he had carried his revolution about as far as it would go and now had to work on readjustments. JLP thought the supreme accomplishment of the Cuban revolution is to have produced as near an egalitarian society as possible. JLP noted that the levelling process is visible and palpable. We commented that while the reduction of serious economic and social disparities is a commendable goal, the system imposed in Cuba is hardly a model that commends itself to others. JLP thought the Mexican revolution had been at work for 60 years and still had not succeeded in closing the gap between rich and poor as it should. Is it not preferable, we asked, to maintain an open society and seek to raise the lot of the poor than pursue a model which has produced a forced egalitarianism that is an economic failure? JLP said he, of course, prefers the Mexican revolution but is concerned that it has not met its goals. He acknowledged that the essential difference is personal liberty, the granting of which carries complications and risks. In this exchange JLP seemingly argued with conviction but his reasoning was not credible, leaving us with the impression that he was trying to rationalize a relationship. He recognizes Castro as a powerfully charismatic figure who appeals strongly to revolutionary groups in the area. We are inclined to believe that JLP’s fascination with Castro, while having elements of genuine admiration, is largely a calculated defensive mechanism to maintain contact and influence in Havana and tranquilize the left at home.

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 49, Mexico, 2/80–1/81. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis.
2 See footnote 6, Document 171.
4. JLP raised the issues involved in U.S.-Cuban relations but did not press any particular point or course of action. He brought no explicit message from Castro. He accepts that our elections inhibit dialogue at this time but clearly hopes that after these are over, efforts will be resumed toward normalization. He is apprehensive that if improvement is not continued, retrogression will set in with serious risks of confrontation. JLP brought up return of Guantanamo, lifting of the embargo, and resumption of tourism as areas that need to be explored. We commented that Castro has his agenda and we have ours. At some future time the two sides might examine both lists. For the moment the Mariel and Interests Section problems, now further complicated by Castro’s refusal to allow persons who have recently departed to return giving rise to the skyjackings, should be resolved. JLP observed that from a Cuban standpoint these questions have to be considered in the broader context.

5. Regarding Central America JLP said he saw no fundamental change in the situation since we had met last month. He thinks Costa Rican democracy is strong enough to resist foreseeable pressures. The Nicaraguan revolution is gradually working out its problems. He believes the junta has no chance of success in El Salvador and the conflict can only degenerate. He declined use of Mexican influence to encourage a moderate solution. He sees no hope in Guatemala as long as President Lucas is in power. We took issue with him on El Salvador, pointing out the failure of the general strike, changing attitudes in Europe, prospects for improved economic support and performance, and firmness of the junta in resisting the strike. He remained fixed in his view that the level of violence reached and the hatreds generated foreclose any kind of reasonable settlement. We made clear we do not accept that assessment and continue to believe that the junta offers the best alternative which democratic countries should support. He was again critical of our backing of the junta but acknowledged that the Frente was also receiving help from the outside and expressed equal criticism of that help.

6. On Bolivia JLP and Castaneda (the only subject in which the latter intervened) insisted that the democracies should go for an MFM. They acknowledged that there are only 15 votes at present but believed that the other three could be picked up by forcing a meeting. Even if it does not work out this way and we fall short of a majority, the democracies, JLP contended, need to stand up and be counted against the military dictatorships among which he counted Brazil. To our argument that failure to achieve a majority would be a blow to the OAS and play into the hands of the military regime in Bolivia, he said the
OAS is dead anyway and a 15-democracy vote against Bolivia would be a severe blow to the Garcia Meza regime in any event.  

7. At a dinner with FonSec Castaneda in his home in which Under Secretaries Alfonso Rosenzweig Diaz and Manuel Tello also participated (an unusual event since Castaneda rarely entertains foreign officials in his home) we had an opportunity to review some of the foregoing points. On Cuba Castaneda declined to recognize that Cuba is intervening in Central America and the Caribbean in any significant way. He admitted to no serious internal problems confronting Fidel, although he seemed to agree that under a controlled socialist system such as Cuba’s there are difficulties in motivating people and maintaining acceptable levels of productivity. We also discussed the high degree of dependency of Cuba on the Soviet Bloc and the restrictions this imposes on Castro’s freedom of action. Castaneda’s response consisted of a mixture of acknowledgment of these facts combined with an effort to justify Cuba’s actions in terms of U.S. policies which quote forced unquote Castro to turn to the Soviets. Bowdler admitted to mistakes in the past but also pointed out historical instances where Castro moved in that direction from choice.  

8. On Nicaragua we urged Castaneda to use Mexico’s not inconsiderable influence with the FSLN to counsel maintenance of an open, pluralistic system, diversification of advice and support from abroad, and caution in defining its positions on international issues. We stressed the sensitivity of American public, press and congressional opinion to events in Central America and the importance of keeping this in mind in terms of our ability to continue to be of assistance in Nicaragua. Castaneda got the point although he made the usual protestations about Mexico not interfering in the affairs of other states.  

9. With respect to Bolivia we reviewed the country alignment, particularly where three more votes might be picked up. Castaneda thought Honduras was a possibility. Trinidad and Dominica are the other more likely possibilities. We urged GOM lobbying in capitals to obtain these votes. Castaneda showed no great enthusiasm but said that he and his colleagues would look into the possibilities for diplomatic action.  

10. During the course of the dinner which took place in a most cordial atmosphere, the Mexicans told us that they had spent part of Sunday afternoon together listening to a tape recording of Ambassador Nava’s August 15 press conference (where comments on Mexican-
Cuban relations were misquoted and criticized in the press\(^4\) and had expressed satisfaction both with the formal statement and the responses to questions, lamenting the inaccurate and distorted coverage by some newspapers.

Comment: Discounting the occasion and the friendly atmosphere surrounding it, it nevertheless seems clear that Foreign Secretariat reaction to the press conference was much more positive than that of the press. In this connection it is our analysis that the sharpest criticism concerning the conference came from leftist writers and media.

**Nava**

\(^4\) During his August 15 press conference, Nava commented that U.S. fears about the strengthening of ties between Mexico and Cuba were “not false” and that there was a “certain confusion or lack of understanding among various sectors of the American people about this intimate friendship between Mexico and Cuba,” adding “I do not fully understand it either.” (Telegram 13628 from Mexico City, August 21; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800399–0498)

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173. **Telegram From the Embassy in Mexico to the Department of State\(^1\)**

Mexico City, November 6, 1980, 2305Z

17225. Subject: President Lopez Portillo Comments on the United States Elections.

1. (C) Summary: President Lopez Portillo, in his first comments after the U.S. election, praised the American electoral system and predicted no change in U.S.-Mexican relations. At the same time, the President went beyond traditional words of congratulation to the new administration to address substance. The President, speaking in a non-contentious tone without reference to any anticipated positions of the next U.S. administration, cautioned against intervention and repressive approaches in this region, arguing that Latin America’s problems are

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800531–1051. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Glassman. Repeated for information to all Consulates in Mexico and USSOUTHCOM Quarry Heights.
primarily economic in origin and should be addressed as such. End summary.

2. (LOU) President Lopez Portillo, November 5, dispatched a letter of congratulations to President-elect Ronald Reagan and a letter of regard to President Jimmy Carter. Interviewed briefly after departing a Mexico City meeting, President Lopez Portillo stated that President-elect Reagan’s victory and President Carter’s gracious acceptance of his loss, “really gave proof of the excellence of the exemplary (American) system.” He added that, “nothing has changed” between the United States and Mexico.

3. (LOU) President Lopez Portillo was interviewed the same day by Robin Lloyd of NBC and Franco Catucci of Eurovision. He responded as follows to questions on what he would recommend to President-elect Reagan re U.S.-Latin American policy.

4. (LOU) Intervention. Speaking in general terms without attributing specific intentions to the prospective U.S. administration, the President stated that “interventionist political treatment” of economic-social problems is not correct and that such problems should be handled on their own terms and not through “structures of repressive control which go against the essence of the Free World.” Queried specifically about desirable U.S. policy in Central America, the President suggested that the U.S. not intervene. He said that it would be inappropriate to intervene to protect political or economic interests. The President expressed hope that the “internal process” of the countries of the region would be respected and said that, “if the hegemonies (outside powers) leave these countries free, they will be able to express their own freedom and thus obtain, through an institutional path, their own solutions.”

5. (LOU) Economic-social problems. The President characterized Latin America’s problems as basically economic and social. He said that these problems revolve basically around trade with the industrialized nations and its terms. He said that the solutions to these problems are to be found in economic measures, in the trade and monetary areas, not in political and “repressive” responses.

In the letter to Carter, dated November 5, Lopez Portillo wrote, “At this time when the world has learned of the decision of the people of the United States expressed in yesterday’s elections, I take pleasure in sending you my heartfelt congratulations for the high sense of responsibility and the democratic faith you have professed and demonstrated. I should also like to send you my best wishes for your personal well-being and express to you once more the assurance of my friendship and esteem.” (Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 5, Heads of State Farewells: Italy-Portugal, 11/80-5/81) On November 18, Carter replied, “Dear Mr. President: I was deeply touched by the kind sentiments contained in your message to me following the American elections. It has been a privilege to work with you during my term of office, and I look forward with confidence to a continued strong and positive relationship between our two nations in the future. Sincerely, Jimmy Carter.” (Ibid.)
6. (LOU) Bilateralism. President Lopez Portillo said that Latin America is not a monolithic bloc and that the idea of a total Latin American dialogue with the U.S. is “impossible.” He added that, despite the existence of various regional and sub-regional blocs, “what must prevail are the bilateral relations between the (individual) Latin American countries and the United States.”

7. (C) Comment: President Lopez Portillo’s favorable comments on the American electoral process were presumably intended to send a positive signal to the prospective administration. At the same time, it is striking that, in his very first post-election statements, the President chose to engage not just in banalities but also in substantive comment, albeit in a softened, non-polemical manner. The President clearly wished to put the GOM on record early on as being opposed to greater U.S. military involvement in Central America—a specter now being raised here in extensive leftist press commentary (including some of Cuban origin). It is notable, however, that the President maintained an objective tone and scrupulously avoided specifically attributing to the Reagan administration the military approach against which he was arguing.

Ferch
Jamaica

174. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to Jessica Tuchman and Robert Kimmitt of the National Security Council Staff

Washington, February 11, 1977

SUBJECT

Security Assistance

1. While I agree with State that security assistance to Uruguay should be eliminated and to Argentina reduced by half, I also agree with OMB’s assessment that Congress will regard that as “tokenism”. I think the best way to reconcile the two positions, however, is not in asking State for alternatives but in asking it for a framework to justify these cuts. Since Argentina and Uruguay have two of the worst human rights records of all those Latin American nations receiving security assistance, I don’t believe it should be especially difficult to justify these as opposed to other cuts.

2. Jamaica Assistance. $31.5 million in supporting assistance will not be sufficient to realize the extravagant claims made by the State Department like relieving their economic crisis or reversing the leftward drift of the government. But some assistance from the new Administration is essential to send a new signal to Jamaica, to other Latin American and Caribbean countries, and to the international community about Jamaica and about the U.S. It will indicate a new tolerance in U.S. foreign policy for ideological pluralism which will be well-received in the Caribbean and in the developing world. (And we should remember that Jamaica has a democratic government.) The U.S. does not need $31.5 million to send a signal, however; half of that would be sufficient.

If the U.S. were interested in improving relations with Jamaica, the worst thing it could do is begin a bilateral assistance program because before too long, we would raise unrealistic expectations in the U.S. that we could transform their government at the same time that we aggravated nationalistic predispositions in Jamaica. Even worse

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 28, Jamaica, 2-4/77. No classification marking. Pastor forwarded the memorandum to Brzezinski on February 16 and noted, “Attached one heartless memo for the starving urchins of Kingston. Long live the Zbigniew Brzezinski Memorial Aquarium for Wetbacks!”
would be to use the money to try to get Jamaica to accept the IMF Stabilization package because Jamaica will probably accept the package anyway and because $31.5 million is not sufficient to persuade them and would not be welcomed as a reward for "good behavior." For the moment, then, I would recommend that the President agree to grant only enough assistance to send a signal. A soft loan for a new hospital in Kingston would be perfect. At the same time, he should appoint a new Ambassador and make clear that we are undertaking a comprehensive review of U.S. policy to the Caribbean.

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2 President Carter reduced the State Department FY 1978 budget request of $31.5 million in supporting assistance for Jamaica to $10 million. (Telegram 37488/Tosec 20097 to Vance in Cairo, February 18; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770057–1050)

175. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 3, 1977, 5 p.m.

SUBJECT
Manley Visit; Bilateral Relations; Economic Assistance; Revere; Cuba; International Economic Questions; Western Hemisphere Politics

PARTICIPANTS
Jamaica
Foreign Minister Percival N.J. Patterson
Ambassador Alfred Rattray, Embassy of Jamaica
Mr. Frank Francis, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs
Mr. Robert Mason, Ministry of Finance
Mr. Thomas Stimpson, Counselor, Embassy of Jamaica

United States
The Secretary
The Deputy Secretary
Assistant Secretary-designate Terence A. Todman, ARA
James E. Thyden, ARA/CAR (notetaker)

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 28, Jamaica, 2–4/77. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Thyden; approved by Twaddell. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office.
Secretary Vance opened the conversation by welcoming Patterson for a full exchange of views on topics of mutual interest, including Southern Africa and the Middle East. Patterson said he was glad to be here and looked forward to the discussion because he wanted to do everything possible to maintain good relations between Jamaica and the U.S. The two countries could make significant contributions to world peace and comity.

Manley Visit

Patterson said he brought best wishes from Prime Minister Manley, who hopes for a meeting soon with President Carter. The Secretary asked Patterson to convey warm greetings to Manley and said that, although the President has an extremely tight schedule now and many foreign visitors, we want to arrange a visit for Manley and will try to find a mutually convenient time.

Patterson said Manley also has problems at home that require his full attention, but the sooner the meeting could be arranged, the better. Manley would be ready for discussions whenever convenient for the President.

Patterson recalled that he and Mrs. Manley had met then-Governor Carter in Atlanta in 1972. He said the Jamaican Government (GOJ) has been greatly impressed with the President’s energy and zeal and his willingness to work for economic justice and equality. Patterson thought it not inappropriate for Manley to be received also as a representative of the Third World.

Bilateral Relations

Patterson said the GOJ places great emphasis on good relations with the U.S. There has been a long, close relationship. Constant dialogue is necessary to maintain this or misunderstandings will arise, especially if one tries to conduct communications in the press. Patterson said that in preparation for this visit he had reviewed the range of U.S./Jamaican interests and was surprised to find how few real issues there are between us.

The Secretary responded that he, too, wants to have a dialogue. Too often issues arise which should not even exist and could be prevented by a conversation. Then relations would not be damaged by press articles.

Patterson asserted that in objectives the U.S. and Jamaica are similar. We both want to do what we can to remove exploitation, recognize the dignity of mankind, and relieve poverty. We cannot always pursue these goals by the same methods because of differences in our history and levels of development. Despite these differences, we share a common target.
The Secretary agreed and added that each must pursue these goals by methods best suited to our respective countries. The USG accepts that and will not interfere in the methods Jamaica chooses.

Economic Assistance

Patterson discussed some of his government’s economic and social development plans, and said the GOJ is trying by a variety of techniques to involve the people in making decisions. Establishment of cooperatives, reduction of illiteracy, and more democracy in schools and industry are parts of the program to develop Jamaica’s human resources. He described the World Bank-supported Sites and Services Program for making permanent, livable communities out of squatter settlements, and he expressed appreciation for USAID assistance in housing and road construction. At the Secretary’s request, Patterson described GOJ problems and policies in public health and education.

Patterson said unemployment of 23% is Jamaica’s most desperate problem. Immediately following the December election, the new government had to come to a firm decision that they could not afford the social costs of reducing social programs. The cost of such reductions would have fallen on those least able to pay. Instead, Patterson said, the GOJ decided on a route of self-reliance and adopted severe import restrictions. They felt they had to make the people realize that they would have to solve their own problems.

Patterson said the GOJ is trying to broaden its economic options and has received assistance from many sources, including the World Bank, Lome Pact, U.S., FRG, UK, Cuba—which should be seen in the context of hemispheric relations—Venezuela and Mexico.

Patterson said the U.S. is Jamaica’s principal export market and source of imports and tourists. He therefore wished to suggest the establishment of a group of technical experts to study opportunities for economic assistance and better terms of trade. If it were possible to obtain more flexibility in the terms of trade, that would greatly benefit Jamaica.

The Secretary said we would be happy to explore the possibilities, which would need careful study. We would take Patterson’s proposal under consideration and follow up promptly.

IMF Cooperation

Patterson referred to Ambassador Rattray’s earlier call on the Secretary when Rattray had expressed the GOJ’s hope that the IMF would be sympathetic to Jamaica’s economic problem.² Patterson said the

² Vance met with Rattray on February 1. (Telegram 24234 to Kingston, February 3; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770038–0057)
The balance-of-payments problem is acute and he hoped the USG could help so that Jamaica would not be driven to even more drastic solutions.

The Secretary replied that we hope the IMF will be sympathetic. He reminded Patterson of the Administration’s budget proposal of $10 million in supporting assistance for Jamaica and said this shows our desire to help and to encourage other countries to do likewise. Patterson responded that the GOJ had noted the Secretary’s Appropriations Committee testimony with great warmth.3

In reply to the Secretary’s question concerning cooperation with the IMF, Patterson said the GOJ’s economic plans would be published in a new Production Plan which would emphasize agriculture, tourism and bauxite/alumina. Following the publication of that plan in late March, the GOJ and IMF are agreed to resume discussions in early April.

*Newsweek*

Patterson referred to the problems of the tourist industry and said he thinks it has begun to recover. That is why the GOJ is so upset about last week’s *Newsweek* article.4 He said it is surprising how easily a traveler can misunderstand what is happening in a country.

It was agreed that the press cannot be controlled and that it is unfortunate when misunderstandings occur. The Secretary said he had noted the *Newsweek* article and understood it contained some inaccuracies. He asked Patterson to explain Jamaica’s relations with Cuba.

*Jamaica/Cuba*

Patterson said the relationship is based on problems common to developing countries. Jamaica is taking advantage of Cuban experience in housing and school construction. Patterson said expensive schools inhibit education because the government cannot afford the needed school buildings; housing construction is handicapped by costs and lack of resources. Jamaica also has many areas which chronically suffer from either flood or drought. The Cubans had solved a similar problem with microdams and had helped Jamaica to build some. Patterson said Jamaica is advising Cuba on tourism. Other mutual interests include commodity questions, for example, sugar.

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3 The Secretary testified on February 24. His statement is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, March 14, 1977, pp. 236–241.

4 The February 28 issue of *Newsweek* magazine contained an article by Arnaud de Borchgrave entitled “Cuba’s Role in Jamaica.” Rattray condemned the article at his press conference on February 25. (Telegram 893 from Kingston, February 27; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770068–0185)
Patterson said the two countries are agreed that each has its own political system and will not try to persuade the other. The GOJ has made clear what they mean by “democratic socialism”—a mixed economy with the private sector working within guidelines. Jamaica prefers ownership to be with the people, not the state. They are trying to form cooperatives and stimulate worker participation. Patterson said Jamaica is working out its own model and wants to make it succeed. In this hemisphere, where some have taken an authoritarian or even fascist route, there should be some who show it can be done democratically.

Revere Disputes

Ambassador Todman referred to the Production Program and asked if the emphasis on bauxite would include a settlement with Revere? Secretary Vance said that would be very helpful. If OPIC had to pay Revere’s claim, it would have an adverse effect on bilateral relations because of the U.S. laws which would automatically restrict economic assistance.

Patterson replied that the GOJ is aware of the implications of an OPIC decision. He reviewed the GOJ position on the economic viability and value of the Revere plant. He said the GOJ had initialled an agreement with Revere at one point and is still willing to follow through on it. But Revere is not and has gone to court. Patterson said the GOJ will accept the court decision, which is due in four to five weeks.

Patterson maintained that no nationalization or expropriation has taken place. He said Revere is trying a sleight-of-hand or blackmail operation. They want someone to pay an inflated price for an uneconomic unit or be compensated by the U.S. taxpayer. It would be a travesty of justice if Jamaica had to capitulate to Revere’s blatant attempt at a rip-off.

Ambassador Todman asked about Southwire’s role. Patterson replied that Southwire is interested in joining the GOJ in the Revere plant, but there is no agreement on price. The figures mentioned by Southwire and OPIC are unrealistic. The GOJ is not against an agreement but so far there have been only discussions, and the terms remain to be worked out.

Patterson said the GOJ would be most unhappy if the Revere action would damage bilateral relations. Todman emphasized the automatic

5 Revere Alumina filed suit against the Government of Jamaica in 1976, after company officials discovered they were charged $6 million for permits that were not required by law. (Telegram 204311 to Kingston, August 17, 1976; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760316–207)
nature of relevant U.S. law. Rattray said he could not see by any stretch of the imagination how Revere could win.

**International Economic Questions**

Patterson said that in the international forums where imbalances between rich and poor countries are discussed, there should be some progress. The U.S. has a moral responsibility in this area. Especially in Paris nothing much is happening and people are becoming impatient.\(^6\) Concrete proposals are needed.

The Secretary said we are interested in progress, not confrontation. The new Administration has set up a task force on CIEC to make recommendations on what is possible to do. There is some question of whether the proposed common fund is feasible; this provides us more problems than do some of the other items. He said that Mr. Christopher is working on this problem and that he would give it personal attention as the date for the next meeting gets closer.

Patterson also expressed concern about lack of progress in the Multilateral Tariff Negotiations. The Secretary agreed, saying the longer this goes without progress, the more chance there is of the protectionists prevailing. The European countries can help greatly.

Patterson responded pointedly that there is a tendency to make someone else the scapegoat to conceal one’s own reticence. If the U.S. does not move on this question, it will get the blame.

**Western Hemisphere Political Problems**

Patterson asked the Secretary’s views on relations in the hemisphere and prospects for improvement. The Secretary reviewed the status of the Panama Canal negotiations and concluded that it should be possible to reach a just and fair agreement.\(^7\)

He said he believes Cuba and the U.S. should begin quietly to discuss the differences that divide us. We have been too long in a state of non-communication. Patterson said normalization with Cuba would reduce tensions, and he offered Jamaican assistance if desired. The Secretary responded that Jamaica could help, as we must all help each other to work together as a family of nations.

Patterson and the Secretary expressed the view that the OAS should be made a more dynamic, problem-solving body.

Patterson expressed concern at indications from Guatemala of a more belligerent attitude toward Belize. He said if there is any narrow-

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6 The Conference on International Economic Cooperation had been meeting intermittently in Paris since December 1975.

ing of differences between the U.K. and Guatemala, that probably indicates widening differences between the U.K. and Belize. He urged active U.S. support for the territorial sovereignty of Belize. Secretary Vance responded that we had tried direct intervention in the 60’s and some had found that not helpful. He said the U.S. is supporting OAS efforts to find a solution.

**Middle East**

Patterson asked the Secretary’s views on the Middle East. The Secretary said it is one of the most dangerous situations in the world. In every country he had visited, local leaders wanted to channel resources away from arms and into economic and social needs. Unfortunately all parties are deeply suspicious and the atmosphere is incredibly difficult. The Secretary felt it would be possible to solve the issue of how to deal with the PLO and to reconvene the Geneva Conference in the latter half of this year.

**Southern Africa**

Patterson referred to his conversation March 1 with Ambassador Young and said Jamaica has a profound interest in the problems of Southern Africa. He said it was the GOJ’s feeling that the U.S. should use its position of moral leadership to end racism. It would be a great tragedy if reluctance on this led others to be reluctant and finally made Southern Africa the scene of conflict.

The Secretary indicated that the UK has the first responsibility in this area but that we have some ideas which may lead to reconvening the Geneva meetings. He said that in Nairobi we will play a more frontal role because South Africa is clearly in an illegal situation. The situation is not easy because of divisions among the black African leaders.

Patterson emphasized the need for the U.S. to be seen in opposition to apartheid and to be fully identified in leading the expressions of outrage. He asked the U.S. to support a pending UN resolution on segregation in sports. The Secretary said the U.S. will press for solutions. He thought the Byrd Amendment would be repealed soon.

**LOS and Fisheries**

Patterson referred to past U.S. agreement in principle to support Kingston as the site of the LOS Seabed Authority, and he asked for

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8 In telegram 603 from USUN, March 3, the Mission provided a summary of Young’s March 1 meeting with Patterson in New York. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770073–1124)

9 The Byrd Amendment allowed the import of chrome ore from Rhodesia in violation of UN sanctions. It was repealed on March 14.
continued support. The Secretary said he was not aware of any U.S. position on this but he was sympathetic.

Patterson said now that the U.S. has extended its fisheries boundary, Jamaica would soon do likewise. The GOJ would like to consult with us at some time.

Other Business

Patterson told the Secretary he intended to raise a variety of subjects in other conversations during this visit. He wanted to talk with Ambassador Todman about air security in the hemisphere. Air piracy in all forms should be discouraged. All forms of sabotage and terrorism should be stopped. He felt this would require the cooperation of all.

Subjects for discussion with other agencies included sugar, an extradition agreement to enable the GOJ to control the illegal flight of currency, and the limitations on tax deductions for foreign conventions.

Patterson presented the Secretary an inlaid wooden box of Jamaican cigars and Manley’s book of speeches The Search for Solutions. He said he would not ordinarily knock the competition, but the cigars are better than the Cuban product.

176. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Todman) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, April 18, 1977

Jamaica: Resumption of AID Lending

Issue for Decision

Whether to remove a 1975 restriction on AID capital lending to Jamaica.

Background/Analysis

In June, 1975, Secretary Kissinger decided that no further AID capital lending would be considered for Jamaica until there was a

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770065–1631. Confidential. Drafted by Taher and Wheeler; concurred in by AA/LA, L/ARA, and EB/IFD/OIA. Sent through Habib.
satisfactory solution of an investment dispute between the Jamaican Government and U.S. bauxite producers there.\textsuperscript{2}

This restriction was imposed in connection with a decision to proceed with a $9 million Rural Education Loan that had been deferred for a year following the unilateral imposition of large new bauxite taxes by Jamaica in 1974. Both actions involved Department consultations with Treasury.

Following your meeting with Foreign Minister Patterson on March 3,\textsuperscript{3} the Jamaican Government requested an amendment adding $2 million to the $9 million Rural Education Loan. The Jamaicans are likely to view our response to their request as the first test of our sincerity in trying to cooperate with their development and to improve our bilateral relations. We are prepared to proceed if you remove the capital lending restriction.

This restriction is inconsistent with recent decisions made by you and the White House, reflecting a more forthcoming policy toward Jamaica:

—You agreed with Mr. Patterson that we should explore Jamaica’s economic requirements by establishing joint technical teams.

—The White House approved requesting $10 million in Supporting Assistance for Jamaica in FY 1978 in the latest Congressional Presentation, which also proposes $10 million in development loans for FY 1977 and $10 million in Housing Investment Guarantees for FY 78.

The bauxite dispute is largely resolved:

—The three major U.S. aluminum firms involved (Alcoa, Kaiser and Reynolds) have signed agreements with the GOJ.

—A fourth company, Revere, closed its plant and filed suit in the Jamaica courts, claiming the bauxite levy is illegal under Jamaica law. The court’s decision is expected this spring. Charging that GOJ actions are equivalent to expropriation, Revere also filed a claim for compensation under its political risk insurance with the Overseas Private Investment Corporation. Nevertheless, negotiations to settle the dispute have continued, with the USG urging flexibility on all sides. It is not at all clear that the Revere dispute involves expropriation as defined in relevant U.S. law and the case may not be settled for years.

The ban on capital lending has been an irritant in our relations and is inconsistent with our new initiatives.


\textsuperscript{3} See Document 175.
Recommendation:

That you rescind the 1975 Secretarial decision halting AID capital lending to Jamaica.

Vance checked the approve option on April 22.

177. Telegram From the Embassy in Jamaica to the Department of State

Kingston, May 3, 1977, 2135Z

2167. Subject: Meeting With Prime Minister Manley.

1. Deputy Assistant Secretary Luers and Charge called on PriMin Manley May 3 for a 45-minute discussion. (Call immediately preceded arrival of Cuban Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, for one-day talks with Manley and other officials.) At opening of conversation, Luers stressed that Carter administration seriously desires improved relations between the US and Jamaica, and wants to place the recent difficult period behind the US. The US team now in Kingston for economic discussions is part of a serious effort in that direction. PriMin Manley expressed gratification for the arrival of the team and for Luers’ presence in particular. Both agreed that the joint US/Jamaican team meetings which began on May 2 appear to be off to a good start.

2. Luers stressed that while we wish to be able to give concrete expression to movement toward improved relationships, there will be problems. Luers discussed the general negative attitude of Congress toward bilateral and multilateral assistance and the fact some congressional leaders and others believe most past assistance programs were used to shore up authoritarian regimes. This administration attaches importance to improved relationships with Jamaica, said Luers, precisely because it is an exception to the pattern of non-egalitarian, authoritarian regimes elsewhere. Manley replied that he suspects that such

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770155–0357. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis.

2 Officials from AID, Treasury, and State met with Jamaican officials May 2–6 to discuss trade, aid, and foreign investment. (Telegram 2289 from Kingston, May 9; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770163–0291)
expressions of congressional concern about the Third World are in fact only an excuse for being generally opposed to anything which interferes with traditional conservative American attitudes toward property and the free enterprise system. Luers said Congress and the American people were in no way monolithic.

3. Luers then discussed the origins of President Carter’s emphasis on human rights, pointing out it rests in the strong American emphasis on liberty as the bedrock of our Constitution. He said that the egalitarian qualities in American society flowing from the Declaration of Independence are also strong but have never been equal in American history to our stress on preservation of liberty. Thus, for many Americans, the retreat from liberty in the Third World is disillusioning and the argument in favor of applying egalitarianism to nations does not hold up in view of the large number of Third World nations which do not place a priority on income distribution and egalitarian principles. Manley at this point commented that one of the most exciting things he has seen in the new administration is President Carter’s effort to give a new dimension to foreign affairs issues and to US policy—to revive “Americans’ moral perception of themselves and the world.” He considers Carter to be a “watershed” President—the last one being President Roosevelt. As Roosevelt had first directed the American government toward a sense of responsibility toward its citizens’ well being, President Carter was summoning the American spirit and projecting it abroad. He contrasted the genuine vitality of Carter’s stress on values to the “showiness” of the Kennedy era which resulted in power plays.

4. Luers briefed Manley on state of play of the US/Cuban relations. Manley clearly has followed closely recent Cuban/American negotiations and indicated his understanding of the problems that both we and the Cubans face. He did add that he is totally opposed in principle to the US embargo of Cuba. Not only is it wrong in principle, he said, but it also distorts completely the true character of the US and Cuba. The US appears to the rest of the hemisphere but especially to the youth as a bully. Cuba emerges as a hero figure and the entire Cuban revolution becomes over romanticized in the eyes of many. However, he said, he was very impressed by the manner in which President Carter had kept from being drawn into the Cuban issue throughout the Presidential campaign.

5. Manley commented that Jamaica’s relationships with Cuba have been excellent in large measure because the Cubans have been “completely principled” and had not interfered in any manner whatsoever in Jamaica’s domestic affairs. He pointed out that Jamaica has perhaps a unique relationship with Cuba because of a number of common concerns which relate not to Cuba’s Communism but rather to Cuba’s similar Third World concerns, e.g., Southern Africa and the need for
a new international economic order. He stressed that Cuba, while Communist, also sees itself as a Third World nation with its own Third World concerns separate from those of the Soviet Union. Also, Manley interjected, Jamaica has a series of common concerns and interests with the U.S. Luers said it was curious that Manley and Castro got along so well since historically Social Democrats and Communists have been the most dedicated enemies. Manley replied that he thought he and Fidel were an exception (Euro-Communism aside). Comment: Manley clearly was attempting to display a middle ground for himself and the US.

6. Turning to Southern Africa, Manley said that “anybody who settles that one is ‘my hero.’”—“Even if the US does it with battle cruisers.” He said it was extremely important that this not be an East-West conflict and that the West not swallow Vorster’s not particularly adroit effort to sell a Communist menace”. He said that he felt that there is little hope for the negotiations course in Southern Africa. “The international community could bring down the racists with economic sanctions, but the will to do so does not exist”. Therefore, “armed struggle is inevitable.” He expressed concern that the world is headed toward an apocalypse and again emphasized that it is for this reason that Southern Africa not become an East-West issue.

7. Comment: The meeting was extremely cordial. The fact that Manley on little notice took time out from an extremely hectic schedule for 45 minutes was of itself some indication of the importance he attaches to improving relationships with the US.

Dorrance

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3 B.J. Vorster, Prime Minister of South Africa, argued that South Africa needed Western support because the nation was threatened by Communists. (Telegram 135 from Cape Town, January 29; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770033-0632)
178. Telegram From the Embassy in Jamaica to the Department of State

Kingston, June 2, 1977, 1915Z

2852. Dept pass to USIA/ILA for George Miller; Lima and Quito pass to official party. Subject: Mrs. Carter’s Visit: How It Went.

1. The May 30–31 visit of Mrs. Carter to Kingston went very well, alterations to the program caused by vagaries of weather notwithstanding. All arrangements worked, and cooperation extended by Government of Jamaica (GOJ) was thorough and effective. All meetings were marked by warmth and cordiality, and leavened by relaxed good humor. Insofar as the ordinary Jamaican was concerned, it was very much a visit by a kind of queen, and thus a matter of great pleasure and satisfaction.

2. Insofar as the substantive side of the visit was concerned, Mrs. Carter had seven hours of talks with Prime Minister Manley over the twenty-four hours she was in town. Whatever concrete may emerge from these discussions, it is clear that Manley saw the visit in large measure as an excellent opportunity to demonstrate to his domestic critics that he is acceptable to the US and that there is no question as to the legitimacy of his government. His purposes did not require that Mrs. Carter announce any assistance program; it was sufficient to have the President of the US send his wife to visit Jamaica. He has not abandoned his desire for American assistance, but he needs equally to reassure his own party’s moderate wing that his commitment to “non-alignment” is real, and does not jeopardize older relationships. In addition, the opposition Jamaica Labor Party (JLP), which has so consciously and publicly identified itself with the US (and continues to note that the Manley government speaks for only a little more than half of Jamaica) suggests by implication that it (the JLP) would have greater access to the USG. Manley surely welcomed a powerfully symbolic event which demonstrated that this is not necessarily the case. These opportunities Mrs. Carter’s visit provided, and in a way which could not have been done by senior officials of the USG who, after all, are required to treat with those who (as the case may be) wish the US either well or ill.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770197–0147. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated for information to Lima, Quito, Bridgetown, Georgetown, Nassau, and Port of Spain.

2 An account of the First Lady’s meetings with Manley is in telegram 3616 from Quito, June 2. (Carter Library, Brzezinski Material, Trip File, Box 30, Mrs. Carter, Latin America and the Caribbean, Kingston 5/30/77–6/13/77)
3. Jamaica went on, of course, being Jamaica, the visit notwithstanding. While Mrs. Carter captured most attention, other things continued to happen on the periphery.

—The BOJ announced on May 31 that it had concluded an agreement with Cuba in Havana covering continued cooperation in economic and technical matters. The agreement, signed on behalf of Jamaica by Minister of Mines Dudley Thompson, provides for collaboration in agriculture, construction, tourism, fishing, public health, the food industry, sports and education.

—Stokeley Carmichael arrived on May 29 to speak at an African Liberation Day Rally. His remarks were prominently featured on the front page of the daily news on the morning of Mrs. Carter’s arrival.

—Jamaica Broadcasting Corporation (JBC), the state-owned radio and television company, carried the last program in a week-long series on African Liberation Week on the evening of Mrs. Carter’s stay. The program, made up of man-in-the-street remarks by Jamaicans, unevenly laid the blame for African problems on “American imperialism”.

—JLP leader Eddie Seaga was summoned on May 31 to answer charges of felonious assault. (See Kingston 2847) These developments underscored once again—but this time for the radicals in the ruling party—Jamaica’s new commitment to even-handed “non-alignment”. They allowed Manley to assert, if required, that notwithstanding the visit of Mrs. Carter and the need for American assistance, Jamaica will act as it best sees fit.

4. Insofar as we are concerned, Mrs. Carter’s visit very substantially reinforces our continuing contention to the Jamaicans that we have no interest in “destabilizing” their country. Clearly, Mrs. Carter would not have scheduled a stop here had that been the case. In addition, the visit will help here and elsewhere to buttress our contention that we are quite prepared to cooperate with countries which have or seek to create socio-economic systems which are quite different from those found in North America or Western Europe. Insofar as the Jamaicans are concerned, the endorsement of Michael Manley which the visit suggests will be seen as the beginning of more harmonious relations in which American sympathy for and generosity toward Jamaica will figure prominently. Although there was no mention of American assistance in Mrs. Carter’s discussions with Michael Manley, Jamaicans will

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3 Bank of Jamaica.

4 In telegram 2847 from Kingston, June 2, Dorrance discussed assault charges filed against opposition leader Edward Seaga that stemmed from an incident during the 1976 elections in Jamaica. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770197–0485) Telegram 4074 from Kingston, July 28, reported Seaga was acquitted of all charges on July 27. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770271–1048)
quickly place the recent visit of the technical team to study economic cooperation in juxtaposition with Mrs. Carter’s stop. Whether we intend it or not, this linkage will be seen as presaging relatively substantial assistance. If it is not forthcoming in relatively generous fashion, the lustre may very rapidly fade from the memory of Mrs. Carter’s visit.

5. Reporting on substantive talks will be done by Mrs. Carter’s party; draft memcons provided separately to Ambassador Todman and Mr. Pastor. Media reaction reported septel.

Dorrance

5 See footnote 2 above.
6 Telegram 2848 from Kingston, June 2. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770195-0756)

179. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Blumenthal to President Carter

Washington, June 16, 1977

SUBJECT

Follow-up on Mrs. Carter’s Conversation with Prime Minister Manley

In response to the memo from Zbigniew Brzezinski concerning Mrs. Carter’s conversations with Jamaican Prime Minister Manley, I wanted to share with you some of my thoughts on this issue.

Mr. Manley raised two points on donor efforts to assist Jamaica. The first dealt with the more general question of the conditions imposed on recipient countries by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as a prerequisite to its loans. Mr. Manley considers this role of the IMF an infringement on the sovereignty of recipient nations.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770109–1671. Confidential. Copies were sent to Secretary Vance and Brzezinski.
2 Brzezinski’s June 14 memorandum to Blumenthal discussed reviewing the adequacy of U.S. assistance to Jamaica, given Jamaica’s difficulties with the IMF. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850089–2531)
On this general question, I believe it is essential that before donors commit large sums of money, recipient countries must agree to take measures to improve their economic situation. Self-help measures are the essence of effective assistance. In addition, in recent years, Congress has insisted that recipient nations accept the full share of the responsibility for resolving their own development problems.

IMF standby agreements often include conditions which, in many cases, recipients would otherwise not be willing to accept even though they continue to seek external assistance. Where the IMF suggests conditions which are appropriate the U.S. should stand behind the IMF. In most cases, the U.S. cannot muster sufficient resources on its own to meet the financial needs of the LDCs. Even if we were able to provide sufficient resources on our own the U.S. would be forced to get directly involved in the internal affairs of potential recipients. This approach has gotten us into problems in the past. For these reasons, the U.S. should, in general, rely on international financial institutions, other donor nations and commercial banks to join with us in our efforts once recipient countries have agreed to implement the self-help measures which the international financial community—normally led by the IMF—see as essential.

Mr. Manley’s second major point relates to his concern with the specific measures the IMF had requested of the Government of Jamaica and particularly the requirement that the Government reduce substantially the portion of the budget deficit to be financed by running the printing press. While these budget cuts are certainly politically difficult for Manley, the current Jamaican economic plight appears to stem primarily from the economic policies the government has taken over the past few years. The government’s policies have created uncertainty among the Jamaicans and have led to substantial flight of capital and trained labor from the island. Based on our analysis of the Jamaican situation, the economic measures being proposed by the IMF in these negotiations are necessary and reasonable. To provide assistance without an agreement would (a) not deal with the basic economic problems facing the economy, and (b) put the U.S. and other donors in the position of providing assistance over the long term at levels we are not likely to sustain.

One final issue in this situation concerns U.S. policy towards Jamaica. On economic grounds, our assistance efforts should be linked to an IMF-GOJ standby agreement for a number of reasons:

—the IMF can provide up to 36 million dollars over the next 9 months to help Jamaica fill its estimated $200 million foreign exchange gap,

—this link will help ensure that our assistance will be used effectively,
—psychologically, an IMF-GOJ agreement is likely to encourage the international financial institutions, the commercial banks and other governments to join us in supporting Jamaica.

In addition, the amount of aid we give the Jamaicans should be significant enough to have a real economic impact. At the same time we should not seek to fill Jamaica’s total foreign exchange needs but rather rely on other countries and the international financial institutions to join with us.

For your information, the IMF team returned to Jamaica on June 16 to resume negotiations on a standby agreement. The negotiations have stalled for the past few weeks as the Jamaicans had refused to make substantial cuts in their budget. With the return of the IMF, we are hopeful that the Jamaicans will agree to the necessary steps and an agreement will ensue.

In sum, Mr. President, I believe that we should link our assistance efforts to an IMF agreement with Jamaica on a standby and that the IMF is not out of line with the demands it is making on the Jamaicans at this time. I will continue to pay close attention to this issue.

W. Michael Blumenthal

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3 Blumenthal signed “Mike” above this typed signature.
180. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\(^1\)

Washington, June 25, 1977

**SUBJECT**

Short-term Assistance for Jamaica

All U.S. Executive Agencies agree that Jamaica faces severe economic problems in both the short and the longer run. The longer-run problems would be addressed by a consortium under the IBRD. We have recommended that the President discuss such a consortium with Venezuelan President Perez next week.\(^2\)

This memorandum addresses the short-run question. We need to decide on the elements of an immediate U.S. assistance package. The Jamaican Deputy Prime Minister will be here with a high-level team on Monday and Tuesday to negotiate with the IMF and to talk with us.\(^3\)

We recommend that a short-run package include the following elements:

— $12 million in PL-480 for FY 77.
— $10 million in PL-480 for FY 78.
— $15 million in Housing Investment Guarantees.
— $15 million in development loans for FY 77.
— $10 million in Security Supporting Assistance for FY 78.

A package of this magnitude, together with assistance from the IMF, the Netherlands, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela, other potential donors, would help carry Jamaica through the next critical months.

An immediate question is the extent to which the package is to be contingent on Jamaica’s reaching an agreement with the IMF. Such an agreement remains the key element in any recovery program. The IMF and Jamaica have been negotiating for nearly two months.

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 40, Jamaica, 1/77–10/79 through Japan, 6–12/78. Confidential.

2 President Carter and Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez met on June 28 and June 29. During their meetings, Carter agreed to the assistance plan outlined in Tarnoff’s memorandum. (Memorandum from Pastor to Brzezinski, July 13; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Box 23, Jamaica, 1977)

3 Jamaican officials met with Cooper on June 27 and discussed Jamaica’s IMF negotiations. (Telegram 160436 to Kingston, July 11; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850091–0153)
We recommend that the package be contingent upon Jamaica’s reaching agreement with the IMF, with only one exception: we recommend that we be authorized to proceed with $8 of the $12 million in FY 77 PL–480 prior to an IMF agreement. PL–480 takes 6–8 weeks from decision to balance-of-payments impact. A decision now would provide much-needed assistance in the third quarter, but it would not be enough to deter the Jamaicans from reaching agreement with the IMF. Congress is generally unsympathetic to aid in the absence of an IMF agreement, but we think this amount of PL–480 aid can be justified at this time.

The President has a $5 million AID contingency fund which could be used to aid Jamaica. We do not recommend its use in advance of an IMF agreement. In any event, there would be a question about using the entire fund for this balance-of-payments purpose.

If approved, we would explain to the Jamaicans that the short-run package would essentially depend on Jamaica’s reaching an agreement with the IMF, and that some parts would depend on Congressional action or notification. However, we would tell them that we are going ahead with the $8 million now in the hope it will help pull them through and on the expectation that they will reach agreement with the IMF. For the longer run, we would tell the Jamaicans we are exploring the creation of a consortium and under IBRD auspices.4

Peter Tarnoff
Executive Secretary

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4 In telegram 3729 from Kingston, July 13, the Embassy reported that Prime Minister Manley announced an agreement between the IMF and Jamaica. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770251–0434) Six days later, President Carter approved the $62 million aid package. (Memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter, July 19; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 85, Venezuela, 1/77–12/78) The $10 million in security supporting assistance was later reconsidered. (Memorandum from Stedman to Benson, August 19; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770144–2510)
181. Telegram From the Embassy in Jamaica to the Department of State

Kingston, November 21, 1977, 2350Z

6948. Subject: Meeting With Prime Minister on “Penthouse” Article and Duncan Poisoning Charge. Reference: (A) State 276345 (B) Kingston 6824.

1. Summary: Prime Minister still believes “some CIA people” were trying to destabilize his government and perhaps “even” assassinate him last year. He is prepared to believe that “top level officials” of the USG, including the Director of CIA, gave no orders to interfere in Jamaican affairs last year, but claims that there is sufficient “irrefutable” intelligence which he cannot divulge but which makes him believe that at least some lower echelon CIA personnel were involved with members of the JLP opposition in the alleged plots. Regarding the Duncan poisoning charge, he is “satisfied” that CIA was not involved but says he is not willing to say this publicly because he never “publicly claimed CIA involvement.” He said he is “satisfied” also that “as of this moment” no elements of CIA are interfering in Jamaica. Also that he “has confidence in the integrity of the present Ambassador to Jamaica and leaders of the present administration and will sincerely believe whatever they say concerning actions since January of this year”, but cannot believe any of us had access to the full range of USG activities for us to exonerate the entire CIA in last year’s exploits. End summary.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770431–1160. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis.

2 Reference is to an article entitled “Murder as Usual,” published in the December 1977 issue of Penthouse, in which the investigative journalists Ernest Volkman and John Cummings alleged that the CIA was plotting against Manley. The article was published more than a year after the Jamaican Government accused U.S. officials of planning a destabilization campaign. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–11, Part 1, Documents on Mexico; Central America; and the Caribbean, 1973–1976, Documents 463 and 467. Duncan and Manley announced on November 12 that Duncan’s recent illness had been caused by poisoning by “reactionary forces.” (Telegram 6772 from Kingston, November 14; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770421–0365)

3 In telegram 276345 to Kingston, November 18, the Department instructed the Embassy to approach Manley about making a public statement condemning the accuracy of the Penthouse article. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770427–0283) In telegram 6824 to Kingston, November 6, the Embassy reported Irving’s efforts to meet with Manley after the release of the article. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770424–1189)

4 Manley’s allegations about the CIA are discussed in telegram 824 from Kingston, February 21. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770060–0872)
2. My conversation with the Prime Minister on these subjects lasted about half an hour and can best be described as spirited. He entered the room taking the offensive immediately. He said that he knew what I wanted him to do but in no way will he “perjure his conscience” and say things in public just for the sake of maintaining US/Jamaican friendly relations. I told him that nobody was asking him to speak untruths but that we were puzzled by his recent statements which have led not only some of us, but Jamaicans as well to believe he was implicating USG in the alleged plots against him. He said that Andy Young and I tried to convince him that CIA was not out to get him, but as much as he wants to believe us, he cannot because we, nor “anyone else” in the present administration know with certainty what was going on at the “lower echelons of CIA.” He is not willing to believe that we had access to all records and all actions under the previous administration.

3. He said that his intelligence service and his military service have proof that opposition leader Seaga had met with Cuban exiles in Miami and with lower echelon CIA officials last year on several occasions. He said he is willing to believe that the top levels of the last administration were unaware of these meetings and were unaware of the plots Seaga was perpetrating against him and his government. He said he has proof that lots of elements in Jamaica and elsewhere were involved in the destabilization attempt. When I asked him if he would give me an instance of such proof, he said that it was not the type he could just lay out.

4. The Prime Minister said that there was an attempt on his life in Canada and if I wanted proof, to ask the Canadian police. I asked him if the police implicated the CIA. He replied that no one was certain who was involved. I asked him if there was an attempt on his life at Jamaica House, which “Penthouse” article describes. His answer was that he was not aware of any attempt at Jamaica House. I asked him why then was he being selective in choosing which items to believe. He did not respond.

5. He said the “Penthouse” article must be looked at with some credibility. He said the conversation with Kissinger, for instance, in December 1975, as reported by Penthouse, is “absolutely accurate.”

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5 Ambassador Young visited Jamaica and met with Manley on August 6. (Telegram 3637 from San Jose, August 9; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770288–0203)

He then went into a description of how Kissinger tossed out the possibility of a $100 million line of credit to Jamaica with the strong implication that it was tied to Manley taking Kissinger’s position on Angolan issue. When he, Manley, did not go along with what Kissinger wanted, the $100 million line of credit “seemed to have evaporated.”

6. With respect to the Duncan poisoning, he said he is “satisfied” that CIA had nothing to do with it but he is “convinced” that some of the same elements that were involved in the destabilization effort last year were also involved in the poisoning. When I asked him whether he would be willing to make a public statement absolving the CIA or the USG, he demurred saying that since he never accused the USG publicly of complicity he could not make such a public statement. We had quite a go-around on this one too. In the process he remarked that proof is developing which will clearly implicate Seaga and his “reactionary” followers, some of whom are abroad.

7. Comment: Our conversation was characterized by the same frankness that he and I have used with each other. The only difference was that he was more excited than he usually is and displayed more showmanship than he usually does on such occasions. As reported several times earlier, Manley does, indeed, believe there were destabilization attempts against him and his government last year. I doubt that anyone other than perhaps the President can make him believe otherwise. Even so, I doubt he will admit it publicly because of the extreme political embarrassment it would cause him locally. Although he denied any intention of publicly absolving USG complicity in the Duncan “plot”, I would not rule out that possibility.  

Irving

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7 In a memorandum from Christopher to Turner through Blake, December 15, Christopher denied the CIA was involved in efforts to destabilize Jamaica during the nation’s 1976 elections. Turner noted, however (in reference to Manley’s claim of “irrefutable evidence” of CIA covert action in Jamaica), “Jack, Let’s ask [less than 1 line not declassified] what that [evidence] could be.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Box 23, Jamaica, 1977)
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182.  Letter From Jamaican Prime Minister Manley to President Carter

Kingston, December 2, 1977

Dear Mr. President,

I am very much looking forward to meeting you on December 16th and to the opportunity for discussing a number of issues on which we share a deep concern.

The main purpose of writing to you now is to give you an indication of our thinking on the proposed establishment of a Consortium or Consultative Group for the Caribbean Region which is to be the subject of a meeting in Washington on the 14th and 15th December. I feel that it might be useful to give you these indications on our thinking in advance of that meeting.

Thinking has been developing along the lines of a Consortium or Consultative Group for the Caribbean Region as a whole. We are in general agreement with this concept, but are equally aware that if the proposal is to achieve its real objective, care must be taken from the very outset to ensure that both national and regional development objectives are pursued simultaneously. Accordingly, it would follow that any mechanism which may be developed to deal with the problems of the Region should be so designed as to reflect an awareness of both national and regional priorities.

As we understand it, the proposed Consortium or Consultative Group will have as its first priority the provision of assistance in the implementation of development plans and programmes as envisaged by each recipient country or group of countries. To achieve this end, the proposed new multilateral effort must contemplate making available to the Region considerably greater financial and technological resources. Equally important, will be the necessity to ensure that the priority areas of each country’s development plan or programme will receive the necessary resources and that this should be done on terms and conditions which will not jeopardize future national economic and social development.

I know that you, for your part, are fully aware of all the factors which can act as constraints on implementation of even the most care-

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2 The World Bank convened a meeting in Washington December 14–15 attended by 31 governments and 12 international agencies. The participants reached agreement to form the Caribbean Group for Cooperation in Economic Development. See Document 354.
fully formulated plans. As you may also know, we in Jamaica are now in the process of preparing our Five-Year Development Plan. An important part of this exercise is the precise identification of the total resource requirements of this Plan. Analyses indicate that the widening balance of payments gap is a fundamental constraint. What this brings out clearly is that any mechanism for assistance must take account not only of development needs per se but also of the country’s balance of payments problems. It is simply not possible to deal with the first without dealing with the second as well.

In this context I would now like to make a specific comment relating to the effect of the debt burden. In-depth study has revealed the paralysing effect of our debt obligations on the country’s financing capability. It is clear that this is a critical problem which has to be solved if any proposal for external economic assistance is to be truly meaningful. It might surprise you to learn that Jamaica’s debt servicing as a claim on Government resources now amounts to about one-quarter of our foreign exchange earnings, and the cost of servicing the total debt, including private debt, is nearly one-half of our foreign exchange earnings. I need hardly remind you that the cost of servicing private debt also has to be met from the country’s foreign exchange earnings. Because of the massive preemption of foreign exchange to service our external debts it will be impossible, without some mechanism of relief, to realize the necessary incremental inputs into our Five-Year Plan.

We are already pursuing a wide range of policies including incentives and the streamlining of machinery to stimulate and facilitate export development. However, it is clearly recognized that it will be some time before the full effects of these policies will begin to be realized. In the meantime for countries like Jamaica, our debt service payments have first call on our external resources and we are now living with the grim prospect of this continuing inhibition on the development and growth of our economy.

It is therefore patently clear to me that any Consortium or Consultative Group to be effective in terms of our development plans must contain adequate solutions for the problem of debt.

In view of the forthcoming December meeting, I felt that I owed it not only to Jamaica but perhaps to all the potential recipient countries to raise these points with you now. We will, of course, have an opportunity to discuss the matter further in our meeting, at which time the Washington discussions will have been concluded.

With warm regards,
Yours sincerely,

Michael Manley
183. Letter From President Carter to Jamaican Prime Minister Manley

Washington, December 12, 1977

To Prime Minister Manley

I too am looking forward to our meeting, and I appreciated your letter of December 2 setting forth some of your ideas on the Caribbean Conference and on our meeting.²

The Conference on the Caribbean, which will be held at the World Bank on December 14 and 15, offers a unique opportunity for those of us who are interested in fostering the development of the Caribbean nations and of the region as a whole. I am sure that Jamaica will play a key role in the Conference and in the Caribbean Group, and I am pleased to learn of your ideas. Your suggestion that the Caribbean Group should recognize both national and regional development objectives is one I completely support.

The Caribbean faces the same challenge as the rest of the world: how to improve the economic system as a whole in a way that will enhance the prospects for economic development of the people and the nations in that system. As you suggest, a regional effort can succeed only if it builds on the uniqueness and the individuality of each nation.

I believe that this attempt to promote Caribbean development will capture the imagination and support of the American people. If this effort is launched successfully, it can focus attention on the problems of the area and demonstrate the willingness of many nations to cooperate toward a common goal. Under these circumstances, I am confident the American people will be prepared to make a stronger contribution to the development of the Caribbean.

I am aware of the financial and the developmental problems of your country, and we have tried to be helpful. The International Monetary Fund will be participating in the Caribbean Group, and that should be useful in assuring consideration of the balance-of-payment problems faced by Jamaica and other countries in the region. I have read with interest your description of Jamaica’s debt-servicing dilemma. I look forward to discussing this when we meet on December 16th.

Since you were so kind to share with me your ideas, permit me to reciprocate. I think the Conference has three main purposes:

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¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 25, Jamaica, 5–12/77. No classification marking.
² See Document 182.
—to recognize the interdependence of the people and the nations which inhabit, border, and are concerned about the Caribbean;
—to ensure that these nations are represented and intend to participate in this multilateral effort;
—and to launch a Caribbean Group for Economic Cooperation and Development as described in the World Bank’s papers.

As a result of the discussions during the Conference, I hope that there will be better understanding of each nation’s programs and priorities and that we will begin to address the same questions for the region as a whole. I hope that the Caribbean Group will meet in the Spring to begin to construct a strategy which will contribute to the quality of life of all the peoples of the area.

We have much to talk about.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

184. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, December 16, 1977, 11:10 a.m.–12:15 p.m.

SUBJECT
Summary of the President’s Meeting with Prime Minister Michael Manley

PARTICIPANTS
President Jimmy Carter
Vice President Walter Mondale
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
(lunch only)
Terence A. Todman, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
Frederick Irving, American Ambassador to Jamaica
Anthony M. Solomon, Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs
(lunch only)

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Box 23, Jamaica, 1978. Confidential. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. A briefing paper for the President’s meeting with Manley is attached to a memorandum from Christopher to Carter, December 12. (Ibid.)
The President opened the meeting with an expression of warm welcome to the Prime Minister and members of his delegation. He said that he recognized the strong role that the Prime Minister is playing in the Caribbean and in the Third World. He thanked the Prime Minister for the warm and friendly reception he gave to Mrs. Carter and later to Andy Young on their visits to Jamaica. Both had reported back to him about their talks and the hospitality extended to them.

The President suggested dividing the meeting into two parts, the first in the Cabinet Room to concentrate on matters of concern to our two countries, to the Caribbean region as a whole, and to regional political matters like Cuba and Belize. During the luncheon, they could concentrate on North-South issues.

That schedule was agreeable to the Prime Minister, who also thanked the President for his kind and gracious welcome. He said he doesn’t really deserve the kind remarks about him and the role he is said to be playing in international affairs.

Manley said that he was particularly happy with the visit to Washington for two reasons. He described U.S.-Jamaican relations as historically friendly, which went through some strain in recent years, which he regrets. Secondly, he and others in Jamaica had watched with keen interest how President Carter had injected a new dimension into international relations—human rights. He said he felt human rights could be a touchstone in international affairs, and went on at some length to express his admiration for the President and the manner in which he is handling foreign affairs—contrasting it with the “pragmatic” approach to international relations taken by others. He concluded that Jamaica welcomes the President’s approach, noting that the moral leadership of the U.S. is more important and influential than its military power.

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The Prime Minister then said he would like to touch quickly on five technical matters which arose in his discussions with the Presidents of the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), and the IMF.

—First, the International Development Association needs to be replenished, and the U.S. contribution to that is very important.

—Secondly, he said that he supports Mr. McNamara’s views that the capital base of the World Bank must be expanded.

—Third, he feels it essential that the USG maintain its contribution to the Inter-American Development Bank.

—Fourth, he understood that the USG is trying to get the IADB to change its criteria for soft-lending to be more in line with those of the World Bank, using rather artificial per capita income criteria. He said that if this view prevails, Haiti would be the only country in the Caribbean which would be able to get a soft loan from the IADB.

—Fifth, with respect to the IMF, the Prime Minister said that he had a very good conversation with its Managing Director, Mr. Witteveen. Apparently, a logjam has developed in the supplemental funding facility toward the Third World. The Prime Minister asked that the President use his good offices to try to break that logjam.3

The President said that the Prime Minister had presented these points very well, and that he had some knowledge of all of them. Secretary Vance indicated that State had discussed this thoroughly with the Treasury, and Secretary Vance said that he would report back to him (the President) later in the day. The President introduced Under Secretary Cooper, who was the State Department’s expert on economic matters. Mr. Cooper would be talking with his counterpart in Treasury and will report back.

The President in further response to the points mentioned by the Prime Minister said that he would take to heart the requests being made today, that he hoped funding for the Caribbean would continue, but that, like every President, he has some problems with obtaining funds from the Congress.

The Prime Minister thanked the President for the USAID program in Jamaica, speaking very highly for its aid and effectiveness. The President facetiously interjected by asking if he found the amount of aid we were giving to Jamaica excessive, whereupon the Prime Minister replied that if he could make that statement he would be the happiest politician in the country.

The Prime Minister then, in pointing to Ambassador Irving, said that he wanted to thank the President for his appointment and pay tribute to the warm cooperation given to him in Jamaica by the new U.S. Ambassador.

The Prime Minister said that the economic recovery of Jamaica will depend on a number of things, the major one being exports, not only bauxite, but on a broad range of items including tourism and agriculture to many different markets. In the long term, an export-led recovery is the only way out of Jamaica’s problem. The Prime Minister said that at this point he would like to make a request. He said that he had heard that the USG was thinking of increasing its stockpile of alumina. The Prime Minister said it would be of very great value to Jamaica if the United States would look to Jamaica as one of the suppliers for that alumina.

In this connection, the Prime Minister mentioned the Revere problem, which he described as unfortunate in U.S.-Jamaican relations. He said the Revere project was not well planned, was based on low-grade bauxite, and was risky in terms of profitability. He said that the company had lost a lot of money, and that the government had tried to save it. But then Revere took the case to court and to OPIC, claiming that Jamaica’s actions constituted expropriation. The Prime Minister denied that it could be considered expropriation. He said that he had useful talks with Southwire Company, which is from the President’s own state, and they were interested in acquiring Revere’s interest in the bauxite enterprise. The President interjected by saying the Southwire Company was a very reliable company.

The Prime Minister said he was hoping to encourage Southwire into acquiring the interests of Revere and perhaps with Government of Jamaica participation get the enterprise going probably at a level of 100,000 tons of alumina a year. He said that he would like to propose that the United States buy this output for a five-year period for USG stockpiling purposes. He said that of course Jamaica would have to sell this to the United States at competitive prices and stated that the price could be made worthwhile to the United States. As an aside, the Prime Minister said he knew, of course, the United States would not

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4 See footnote 5, Document 175.
use its stockpile to depress prices on the world market. The President said that it would be contrary to U.S. law and policy to misuse the strategic stockpile program for pricing purposes.

The President changed the subject by remarking that he understood the IMF was pleased with Jamaica’s efforts in eliminating its balance-of-payments deficit. The President remarked that he wishes the U.S. could eliminate its deficit so quickly. The Prime Minister responded by saying that the deficit was “almost” eliminated, but it wasn’t done without great strain and certain adverse effects on the social development of the country.

The Prime Minister brought the subject back to the strategic stockpiling matter by asking which USG agency had the major interest. The President and Secretary Vance replied that there are about three agencies, each with an interest, but that Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Cooper will follow through and advise the Jamaicans with whom to deal.

The Prime Minister then said that he would like to talk about the Caribbean Consortium, but first he wanted to mention to the President a project which he considers very exciting and which will be of tremendous economic and social value to Jamaica. He said he was referring to agricultural bench terracing. Hence, again, he paid great compliment to USAID for its Project Pinders River Valley which has shown the value of bench terracing.5

He said that 20 percent of Jamaica’s land is arable, but only 47 percent is presently cultivated. The only way to increase the productivity of agriculture in Jamaica was to use the hills and mountains. He said that individual farmers have neither the means nor the physical strength to do the project themselves even if they banded together in a cooperative venture. He said that unless the State helped, it wouldn’t be done. There are about 400,000 acres of hills which should be used. The social advantage was obvious in that it would increase employment; it would help the balance-of-payments by reducing the need to import food.

The Prime Minister then went on to discuss unemployment and crime, and the terracing project as a way to do something about that. He had thought about the idea in 1972, but regretted that he only began moving on it a year ago.

He said that the Norwegians and the FAO have expressed interest in it, but that help from more than one country would be necessary.

5 In telegram 7244 from Kingston, December 2, the Embassy described bench terracing as “a method of conserving the soil on slopes as to make the hills productive.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770448-0375)
He was hoping that the U.S. would take a greater interest in it. He thought that the project could also help Jamaica by arresting the migration to the urban areas.

The President asked whether in its agricultural development Jamaica was utilizing human labor or moving toward greater utilization of machinery. He also asked what the Jamaican wage scale was for unskilled labor.

The Prime Minister answered that such labor received the minimum wage, which is about $5.30 a day. He said that it was low, but even the labor unions accept this low rate of pay because it increases the number of places in the job market. (The Prime Minister did not specifically respond to the use of machinery versus human labor, but by his answer one could infer that human labor was preferred in those projects which had government participation.) The Prime Minister then described briefly the seriousness of the unemployment problem: over 30 percent of the youth, over 40 percent of women; and 24 percent overall for the nation. The Prime Minister said that what his Government is trying to do in Jamaica can be called “social engineering.”

The President asked if the USAID project on bench terracing was only a small pilot project. The Prime Minister said that it wasn’t; indeed, it covered 26,000 acres. He said that with AID’s help, Jamaica had worked out the kinks in the project, and was prepared to expand it to the 400,000 acres. The President said that Secretary Vance had just indicated to him that he would follow through and will give a report on the bench terracing proposal by the evening.

The Prime Minister remarked that he would like to talk about the two regional political issues—Belize and Cuba—later, and to talk about the Caribbean consortium now. He started by expressing his own strong appreciation and that of the Caribbean nations for Ambassador Todman’s role in this matter. The Prime Minister said that Jamaica was seriously concerned about Trinidad’s ambivalence toward the Caribbean group. The President interjected by asking whether any other country besides Trinidad, say Barbados, fit into that category. The Prime Minister replied that Trinidad was a special case, and the fact that it is the only donor country in the Caribbean, is not unrelated to its ambivalence. He believes that Trinidad’s attitude is largely due to its problems with CARICOM and partly to its Prime Minister, Eric Williams, who tends to retreat into silence when he has a problem. Also, Williams is probably preoccupied with other things, like the University and his plan for regional cooperation. The Prime Minister said that he hopes that CARICOM will get back on the right track next year. He said it would be very important to have Trinidad participate in the Caribbean group, and that he would do everything to try to get Trinidad involved. But he believes the best strategy would be not to
push Williams, nor to make the establishment of the Caribbean Group conditional on his participation.

*The Prime Minister* said that Jamaica’s problems are an example of the problems most of the Third World nations face. He said that Jamaica is working hard with the IMF on a stabilization program, but remarked that it is not particularly helpful when a country has 24 percent unemployment.

He said that his government was working equally hard on a five-year plan which will be put into effect starting April 1, 1978. He did not describe its particulars, but said that it is a plan which emphasizes national “self-sacrifice” and structural change. He said the Plan is to maximize Jamaica’s national ingenuity. Jamaica is facing a situation of having to overcome the effects of 200 years of colonialism which has left Jamaica exporting essentially one product and importing all its food and much of its other needs. He said that this is something that cannot continue, and therefore he is trying to diversify the economic structure of Jamaica so that it can become self-reliant in the basics.

*The President* interrupted to say that he understood that Jamaica had met the IMF’s rigid requirements, and he asked whether relations had improved. The Prime Minister replied by saying it is not as bad as it was. The President asked whether the IMF’s constraints are compatible with Jamaica’s goals. The Prime Minister said that he hoped so. He said that they are trying to fine-tune the economy, and he has learned a great deal from the IMF. He hopes, however, that the IMF will learn about the social and political context within which the IMF rules must work. He said that in his conversation with Witteveen he mentioned that too much austerity would drive people into the streets. Witteveen listened “in a friendly manner.” *The President* asked the Prime Minister about the rate of inflation in Jamaica. The Prime Minister stated it is now about 13 percent, “which is better than Mr. Callaghan is doing.”

*The Prime Minister* said that in looking at the five-year plan and wanting to increase the country’s self-reliance by placing maximum emphasis on savings, the greatest stumbling block was the lack of foreign exchange. Up to 1972, Jamaica had a borrowing program that was both sensible and manageable, but when grain prices rose in 1973, Jamaica had to borrow “short.” Next year Jamaica will need $195 million to service the government’s debt, and $150 million to service the commercial debt. Energy will cost another $220 million. Eighty-one percent of total foreign exchange earnings next year will be spent on debts and on energy. The debt repayment problem is strangling Jamaica, and this is true of other LDCs. He mentioned Guyana as one of them. He said that Jamaica’s foreign exchange gap is running at $300–$400 million a year, which he said he hoped would be on a
decreasing scale. If Jamaica restricted imports any more, there wouldn’t be any capital goods imported, and investment would be slowed even further. He said Jamaicans are serious people who are trying to move ahead—he hopes that unemployment would be reduced to 15 percent—but they need help.

The Prime Minister said that he didn’t want to do any special pleading, but Jamaica is one of the strongest democracies in the world. He said that Jamaica has a cantankerous press—second only to the US—but nevertheless it is a free press. He said that Jamaica is one of the few real democracies that is in such bad economic straits. It is essential that Jamaica be helped to demonstrate that in a democracy, development and the raising of standards of living can occur; that democracies can satisfy both social and basic needs as well as maintain freedom. He was concerned that economic constraints might overwhelm Jamaica’s democracy, and that a totalitarian solution might be the alternative.

The President remarked that the United States has a great interest in Jamaica, and that he had personally studied Jamaica’s financial problems. He wanted the Prime Minister to know that he saw another dimension in Jamaica’s economic plight—the relative unwillingness of U.S. business to invest in Jamaica because of the fear of expropriation. He said that private investors were apprehensive about the political stability of the country and its leaders’ future intentions. He said that if Roy Richards of Southwire should invest in Jamaica, that in itself would be a good sign that the climate for business is good. He suggested that Jamaica ought to encourage visits of delegations from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce or the National Association of Manufacturers to alleviate any concerns which U.S. business may have. The President also said that he would be glad to send down a team from the Department of Commerce to obtain information on the improved business climate in Jamaica and disseminate this information to U.S. business. It might be of interest to Jamaica for these organizations to make suggestions on ways to further encourage U.S. and domestic private investment and to identify constraints to such investment. The President said that if this tremendous source of development and jobs is not tapped, then Jamaica will be confined to searching for only government loans. In the U.S., we could not prosper without private investment; he suggested that Jamaica may want to look at such investment as an additional source of help to attain their development goals.

The Prime Minister said that these were very good suggestions and that he would follow through on them. He remarked that nationalism and Jamaica’s social welfare goals led to Jamaica’s wanting joint ventures to ensure that investment capital is in harmony with its develop-
ment goals. He said, however, this does not mean that all U.S. investments must be joint ventures, but that is clearly Jamaica’s preference. He then remarked that he talked with officials of Anaconda the day before about the possible expansion of their investment in aluminum, and they were very surprised to hear of Jamaica’s interest. He said he felt that the meeting with Anaconda relieved some of their concerns.

The Prime Minister said that before discussing another subject, he wanted to emphasize that with regard to the Caribbean consortium, “speed is of the essence,” otherwise Jamaica’s five-year plans will be jeopardized, and her balance-of-payments problem will remain a powerful constraint.

The Prime Minister said that before coming to Washington he met with President Perez of Venezuela, and Perez authorized him to tell President Carter that he strongly supports Manley’s view that the consortium should address the debt problem as one of its top priorities.

The President said that he would be interested in hearing about the conference on Belize in Kingston on December 9.

The Prime Minister responded by saying that there were some principles that have to be safeguarded in the Belize problem. He remarked that if we start ceding territories as a way to resolve disputes, then where will it stop? The consequences for Africa and Latin America would be very serious. He said that the British wanted to get Belize off their back, and are very vexed with him because he has been unwilling to push Belize into ceding some territory to Guatemala. He remarked that Britain’s only interest is to get the matter settled. He said that the countries that met in Kingston authorized him to tell the President that they would like him to make efforts to protect the independence and territorial integrity of Belize and to ensure that its borders will be secure. They felt that if the United States exerted moral pressure on Guatemala, Guatemala would back down and the issue could be solved without problems.

The President remarked that he had a long meeting with the President of Guatemala, and the Secretary of State has had many other meetings. He explained that because of its intimate involvement in the Middle East, the U.S. has been reluctant to get involved in other disputes. And so the United States has tried to stay aloof of the Belize problem. He then asked Secretary Vance to comment.

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6 Foreign Ministers from seven Caribbean and Latin American countries met in Kingston December 9–10 to discuss Guatemala’s claims on Belize and Belize’s independence. The Embassy reported on the meeting in telegram 7450 from Kingston, December 12. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770462–0449) Documentation on the territorial dispute is in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XV, Central America.
Secretary Vance said that he had talked to Price and others. We can understand the question of principle, but there is also a question of how to achieve a practical solution to this problem. Secretary Vance said that ceding some territory to Guatemala would not set a precedent if it is done voluntarily. He mentioned that even Venezuela is considering ceding some of its territory to Guyana to solve one of its festering problems.

Secretary Vance said there is a real danger of violence if a solution is not reached. He said that in the last analysis the parties in dispute really have to solve the problem themselves, but others may play a role in suggesting what is best for them. Therefore, we don’t want to get in the position of imposing a solution to the problem, but we also do not want to reject an agreeable solution either just because it contravenes a principle.

The President said that there were important precedents for ceding territory including Bolivia’s long-standing aspiration for a sovereign corridor to the sea. A voluntary agreement which cedes territory would not establish a bad precedent provided it was voluntary. The U.S. has supported the parties in trying to reach agreement, but we have stayed out of direct negotiations.

The President asked whether Guatemala and Belize are in direct negotiation, and the Prime Minister said that they weren’t, that the British and the Guatemalans have negotiated behind Price’s back. Also, he thought that the Mexicans were ambivalent about the issue and probably wanted the Belizeans to become independent without ceding territory.

Patterson, in summary, said that he understood why the U.S. for historical reasons had remained aloof from negotiations; but under President Carter, the U.S. had reasserted its political and moral leadership in the hemisphere, and the Belizean problem is one the U.S. could help to solve. He said that as long as the U.S. remains aloof, Guatemala will be reluctant to accept Belizean independence. The moment the U.S. gives some indication that it opposed territorial cession, and perhaps would assist in joint development projects between Belize and Guatemala, then Guatemala will re-think its position. Lastly, Belize should be involved in the negotiations; keeping them out only increases suspicion.

The President said that the U.S. position is not one of disinterest, but rather of deferring to the British, who have the responsibility for Belize.

The President announced that lunch was waiting and invited everyone to adjourn to the Family Dining Room to continue the discussions. He said he would like to talk to the Prime Minister about Cuba.
(There are no notes on the luncheon discussion between the President and the Prime Minister because the notetakers were not within earshot.)"7


185. Briefing Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Saunders) to Secretary of State Vance†

Washington, February 13, 1978

SUBJECT
Jamaica’s Manley

US-Jamaican relations have improved substantially during the past year, but we continue to receive clandestine and other reports that point to Prime Minister Manley’s hostility toward the US. We also continue to get reports that, despite a slowdown in his government’s movement toward authoritarianism, Manley is persisting in authoritarian-like behavior. At Under Secretary Cooper’s suggestion we have examined Manley’s recent activities in these areas. We conclude that:

—Manley will take whatever actions he deems necessary to obtain needed assistance and to insure his continuation in power;2

—Manley’s rapprochement with the US results not from a change of attitude toward the US on his part but rather from a reluctant decision to seek improved relations for purely pragmatic economic reasons;

—Manley undoubtedly plans to maintain close relations with the Cubans, to champion Third World causes, and to expand ties with Eastern Europe.3

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 25, Jamaica, 1–7/78. Secret; Noforn; Orcon; Exdis. Drafted by Lampert in INR/RAR. Sent through Cooper. Kirk initialed for Saunders.

2 Pastor circled “whatever actions” and wrote in the margin, “What proof? free elections.”

3 Pastor circled “to champion” and wrote in the margin, “in same category—betrays bias ag [against] 3rd world.”
Manley Needs But Distrusts US

Manley is torn between his fundamental distrust of the US and his urgent need for US aid.

—On the one hand, his ideological outlook forces him to see the US as the chief exploiter of the Third World. Frictions with previous US administrations undoubtedly contributed to these sentiments, as did his perception of Washington as a supporter of South Africa and his apparent view that past US “failures” to assist him economically were deliberately aimed at ousting him.

—On the other hand, Jamaica’s economic situation requires him to reach some sort of understanding with the US and other Western sources of aid. His seeming perception that President Carter is more understanding of Jamaica than his predecessors facilitated rapprochement by allowing him to believe that it is the US, and not Jamaica, which has changed policies. Nonetheless, he continues to feel that Washington will not in the long run willingly tolerate a socialist state on its doorstep.

We believe that Manley, given his personality and the stresses of Jamaica’s political turbulence and economic plight, will continue to act from time to time—generally in private or covertly—in ways that reflect distrust of and hostility toward the US. As long as his need for (and his expectation of) US understanding and support outweigh the perceived internal pressures pushing him toward radical courses, however, he will so conduct himself as to maintain a viable relationship with the US.

The conflict between these two competing drives is illustrated in a number of developments over the past year or so:

—Following the PNP’s election victory in December 1976, the government shifted sharply to the left, with radicals in virtual control of all ministries dealing with the economy.

—Only when efforts to obtain needed economic assistance from the Arabs, Eastern Europe, and other nations untainted by capitalism or “neo-colonialism” failed, did Jamaica turn to the US.  

—During Castro’s visit last October, Manley—in language far sharper and more polemical than the Cuban leader’s—denounced the “neo-colonialists” who had “worked for years to keep the two countries apart.”

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4 Pastor marked this point and wrote in the margin, “Crap—he turned because of Carter. —Nov. 1976: critical. —Mrs. Carter.”

5 Pastor drew an arrow and wrote in the margin, “play ideology to radical—move back.” Castro visited Jamaica on October 20, 1977. (Telegram 6190 from Havana, October 21; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770388–0166)
—Last November, Manley gave implicit credence to *Penthouse* magazine’s allegations of CIA intervention in Jamaica and linked them to claims by former government official D.K. Duncan that he (Duncan) had been poisoned.6 (Manley later privately denied that he believed that CIA was involved in Duncan’s “poisoning.”)7

—The same month, speaking privately to Ambassador Irving, Manley rejected assurances that the CIA was not “out to get him.” He insisted that the US administration did not know with certainty what was going on in “the lower echelons of the CIA.”8

—Clandestine sources report that, as recently as the end of last year, Manley was instructing the Special Branch that the US should be treated as an enemy9 country—instructions almost identical to ones he had issued in 1976 at the height of Jamaican accusations of US attempts at “destabilization.”

—The Deputy Governor of the Bank of Jamaica told an Embassy Kingston officer late in January that Manley was trying to force him to falsify10 statistics in order to satisfy IMF requirements.

—Several clandestine reports have indicated that Manley is continuing his efforts, with Cuban assistance, to politicize the police and has been pressuring the Special (intelligence) Branch to cover up details of a recent shootout that could embarrass the regime.

**Manley’s Views**

*Of Himself.* Manley believes that he is the “natural” ruler of Jamaica (his father was a famous pre-independence Premier). His charismatic (and often demagogic) nature craves popular adulation, a hunger which makes it difficult for him to take unpopular decisions.11 Caught between a drive to do what his messianic nature conceives to be “right” and this need for approval, he usually adopts a pragmatic course; he then rationalizes that his move is either a temporary diversion from, or “really” a vindication of, his previous policy.

*Of Human Rights.* Manley’s confidence in his destiny to rule Jamaica also conflicts with a genuine commitment to Western-style democracy and human rights.12 The latter requires acceptance of a legitimate opposition, but it is hard for Manley to admit that he may be wrong or that

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6 Pastor wrote in the margin, “worst case.”
7 See Document 181.
8 Pastor circled “enemy” and wrote in the margin, “skeptical.”
9 Pastor circled the word “falsify.”
10 Pastor wrote in the margin, “much more pragmatic.”
11 Pastor underlined the second half of this sentence and wrote in the margin, “contradicts first page.”
his critics are not opposing him for base purposes. As long as things are going well, this inconsistency remains submerged. When he sees a serious challenge, however, he becomes receptive to such ideas as a one-party state or the temptation of “saving democracy from itself”—as he reportedly did in 1976, when it appeared for a while that his ruling Peoples National Party (PNP) might lose the upcoming elections. Moreover, though Manley does not agree with those who feel “political” human rights, such as free elections, are unimportant, he lays much more stress on social and economic rights.\footnote{Pastor underlined the last phrase and wrote in the margin, “most people in 3rd world.”}

Of the Press. Manley supports freedom of the press, but he also believes press activities should reflect the objectives of the society in which it exists. In a speech last September, Manley warned the \emph{Daily Gleaner}—Jamaica’s most respected and usually anti-PNP newspaper—that “freedom of the press is not a one-way street for capitalism, but must express the views of the majority.” If any part of the media fails to do so, “the government has no obligation to support it, either economically or otherwise.”

These views carry over into the international sphere, where Manley feels that most of the Western press does not address the needs of developing countries. Moreover, in his view, Western media frequently—if often unwittingly—are used as a tool by capitalist regimes to help undermine socialist governments (e.g., by publishing stories of high crime rates in Jamaica and thus discouraging tourists).

Of the World. Underlying Manley’s perspective of foreign affairs is a strong ideological bias.\footnote{Pastor wrote in the margin, “not as strong as this memo.”} While not a doctrinaire socialist bound by a rigid dogma, he does see the world as distinctly divided between the haves and have-nots, the developed nations and the underdeveloped. In his view, the former, regardless of the good intentions of any particular leader, will inevitably seek to exploit the latter, and the latter, in turn, can hope to obtain justice only by sticking together. Consequently, he reasons, Jamaica must side with the Third World, break its old economic dependence on the West, and balance its political ties by expanding relations with the Marxist world—in short, it must become non-aligned.\footnote{Pastor underlined the phrase “it must become non-aligned” and wrote in the margin, “what’s wrong with that?”}

Of Jamaica’s Problems. Manley faces major economic and political problems. Jamaica has a substantial balance of payments deficit, large foreign debts (the debt-servicing charges alone amount to 18 percent of its exports), and an unemployment rate as high as 30 percent. Without
massive outside aid, economic collapse is almost certain. But in order to obtain that assistance, the government must adopt austerity measures set by the developed world—measures which Manley feels are neither “right” nor popular. (He is certainly correct about their unpopularity.)

Manley’s efforts to meet the demands of foreign lenders, moreover, have forced him to turn increasingly to the moderates within his own party. Aside from going against his personal sympathies, this course has weakened the factional balance within the PNP upon which Manley’s power depends. He must now somehow maintain his “radical” credentials (a major reason for Castro’s October visit) without losing the support of the moderates. Having paid this price for external assistance, he is not about to forfeit it docilely because of “marginal” failure to meet some statistical criterion, especially when he believes the requirement is irrelevant anyway.

186. Memorandum From Richard Feinberg of the Policy Planning Staff to Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff

Washington, March 13, 1978

SUBJECT

Jamaica’s Manley: Comments

Rather than focus on Manley’s supposed psychological needs, more attention should be paid to historical facts.

—In his dealings with the bauxite companies, despite tensions, Manley has acted in a responsible, businesslike manner, and the companies have generally been satisfied with the nationalization agreement. Since dealings with the bauxite companies are, by far, Jamaica’s most important “north-south” issue, Manley’s behavior is suggestive of how he might approach serious negotiations on other issues that have advanced beyond the rhetorical stage.

—Amongst Third World spokesmen, Manley is relatively serious and is certainly less hostile than Algeria, Cuba, etc. We should recognize this relative willingness to dialogue and take advantage of it.

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 25, Jamaica, 1–7/78. Confidential.
—Despite being well into his second term, Manley has shown no indications that he intends to socialize the Jamaican economy. The Jamaican state continues to account for a relatively small percentage of GDP, compared to other LDCs.

—Manley has, in fact, been cautious in his approach to Cuba. The level of economic and other exchanges remain modest, especially considering the pro-Fidel sentiment in the PNP.

—Manley’s extensive writings reveal him to be a social democratic in the Webbian tradition. His writings emphasize traditional liberal concepts much more than one expects from an LDC leader.

—Manley is not the reverse anti-North racist implied in the INR memo. His mother was British and I am unaware that he suffers from maternal hate. Rather, he probably harbors the mixed feelings toward the Anglo-Saxons that one expects among the ex-colonized. We ought to be able to deal with such emotions in a mature manner that is sensitive to history.

—Manley probably does consider himself to be a born leader, which is not surprising considering that his father was Prime Minister. But the accusations of dictatorial intentions are without supporting evidence, and are contradicted by his actual experience in power. Elections and all the democratic paraphernalia remain as much a part of the Jamaican political scene as when Manley took office. During the last parliamentary elections, the opposition fully exercised their political freedoms.

—With reference to Manley’s concern about the CIA, it can at least be said that the evident hostility of the US Embassy toward Manley during the previous Administration probably contributed to an atmosphere of mutual distrust.

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2 See Document 185.

3 Reference is presumably to the previous Ambassador, Sumner Gerard, who was very critical of Manley.

4 At the bottom of the page, Pastor wrote, “Should ask CIA to substantiate its allegations & also ask whether CIA has ever done anything to make it [Jamaica] suspicious.”
187. Telegram From the Embassy in Jamaica to the Department of State

Kingston, May 16, 1978, 1204Z

4030. From Ambassador. Subject: Seaga Asserts Assistance Keeping Manley in Power.

1. Opposition leader Edward Seaga sent his political confidant, Senator Ronald Irvine, to see me with a message this morning (May 15). Irvine said that Seaga was urging that major bilateral aid donors temporarily suspend their assistance to Jamaica. Irvine went on to say that continued provision of aid would not be used effectively as long as Michael Manley remains in office but would have the sole result of “propping up” the Prime Minister. What Jamaica needs now, said Irvine on Seaga’s behalf, is the removal of Michael Manley. Only then can any kind of credibility be restored to the Government of Jamaica. (Irvine subsequently said that he had already made Seaga’s views known to the British High Commissioner.)

2. I reminded Irvine that American policy is not directed toward shoring up Michael Manley but toward aiding the development of Jamaica. Our aim is to assist the Jamaican people and in so doing, to strengthen the climate for democratic institutions and the protection of human rights. Our goal is the survival of Jamaica, and we would pursue this whether the People’s National Party (PNP) or the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) were in power.

3. I then added that in the present setting, our assistance may have the derivative effect of strengthening the ruling party. However, to the degree that it does, it serves to strengthen the moderate faction and to make it possible for them to resist pressures from within the ruling party to seek solutions to the country’s problems on the authoritarian left. Irvine replied that strengthening the moderates will not cure Jamaica’s most pressing problem—the continuance in power of Manley. The moderates will not gain adequate confidence to challenge Manley for they fear he will call an election in which they will be driven from office. (The Senator added that if such an election is held, the JLP will abandon its decision to boycott elections.)

4. As the meeting drew to a close, I restated our position. I said that the United States will not interfere in the affairs of Jamaica. We will not be manipulative. We will not undertake any actions which

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780209–0072. Confidential; Exdis. Repeated for information to Bridgetown, Georgetown, Nassau, and Port of Spain.
will adversely affect the Jamaican people in order to obtain some alleged short-term political end. At this point, Irvine appeared persuaded, and acknowledged that to play any other role would be wrong. His understanding was summed up in a final thought. As Irvine put it, if the United States could work to undermine a PNP government, equally it could work to undermine a JLP government.

Irving

188. Memorandum From the Staff Secretary of the National Security Council (Dodson) to the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff)\(^1\)

Washington, October 3, 1978

SUBJECT
State-Commerce Report on its Investment Mission to Jamaica

We have reviewed the report which you submitted on August 25, 1978 on the State-Commerce investment mission to Jamaica.\(^2\) We would like your recommendation on whether the President should follow up his conversation of last December with Prime Minister Manley with a letter highlighting certain aspects of the team’s report. We are attaching a draft of such a letter and would like your comments on that as well. Also, we would like your recommendation on whether the President should also attach a brief summary of the report for the Prime Minister’s use, and if so, could you please provide that.

Christine Dodson
Staff Secretary

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\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 40, Jamaica, 1/77–10/79 through Japan, 6–12/78. No classification marking.

\(^2\) Arellano, along with representatives from the Department of Commerce, visited Jamaica from July 25 to July 28. Their report, which was critical of the state apparatus in Jamaica, is attached to an August 25 memorandum from Tarnoff to Brzezinski. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 25, Jamaica, 8–12/78)
Draft Letter From President Carter to Jamaican Prime Minister Manley

Washington, October 2, 1978

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

When you and I met in Washington last December, we discussed at some length the question of the Jamaican investment climate and steps that might be taken to stimulate increased private investment in Jamaica.4

The U.S. Government investment team, whose visit resulted from our discussion, has now reported to me, and I want to share its findings with you. The team reports that both foreign and Jamaican private investors are reluctant to make investments because they perceive that the government is either uninterested in, or negative toward, such investment. Furthermore, the report finds that various government regulations also discourage private investment.

Because private investment, both domestic and foreign, will undoubtedly be important in Jamaica’s long-term economic recovery, I felt I should share these observations with you. There is little that my government can do to alter the perception of Jamaica’s investment climate. This is, of course, a matter for your government to consider without interference. But if you wish, we would be ready to help your Embassy in Washington contact appropriate U.S. business organizations to invite them to explore the opportunities available in Jamaica.5

Sincerely,

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3 No classification marking.
4 See Document 184.
5 The suggested letter was not sent. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, 1780174–1809) Since Ambassador Irving left post on November 22 (Ambassador Loren Lawrence presented his credentials on April 12, 1979), the Chargé d’Affaires, Roy Haverkamp, was instructed to convey the message to Manley orally in December. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 40, Jamaica, 1/77–10/79 through Japan, 6–12/78)
189. **Telegram From the Embassy in Jamaica to the Department of State**

Kingston, May 1, 1979, 1235Z

3086. Subject: Call on Prime Minister Manley: US-Jamaica; Jamaica Internal; Cuba; Grenada; UNCTAD and IMF.

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. I made my first call on Prime Minister Manley (protect throughout) on April 26. I was received promptly and the call lasted for about an hour and 20 minutes. Present, in addition to the Prime Minister was Gordon Wells, Permanent Secretary to the Prime Minister, Don Davidson, Director of Protocol, and O.K. Melhado, Special Assistant to the Prime Minister (who also acted as notetaker).

3. The Prime Minister commenced with a longish and overly complimentary statement about myself, pegging his impressions on conversations or exchanges he had had with mutual friends. He closed with the hope that it would be possible for us to develop the rapport for a candid, frank and brutally honest future relationship. He indicated that he trusted President Carter and that he was sensitive to the increased interest in the Caribbean, generally, and Jamaica, specifically. He said he wanted me to know that he believed that the CIA was not at this time and had not for some time been up to dirty tricks in Jamaica. He indicated that while my predecessor had always denied any CIA dirty tricks at any time in Jamaica, the PM was not, at this time, sure of exactly what to believe.

4. The Prime Minister wanted to take time to give me his assurances, and he hoped that if I did not believe them at this time that I could grow to believe that he was totally dedicated to the concept of democracy, the democratic institutions in Jamaica, the two-party, plural society that Jamaica has enjoyed. He indicated that regardless of what the opposition or the Gleaner had to say on this subject, his dedication to the concept was unwavering. He flatly stated that he was not intending “to take over” Jamaica, to make himself a strongman or to perpetuate his tenure of office through methods unconstitutional. He said it was for these reasons that he had come out advocating electoral reforms as being advanced by the opposition. He indicated that he has always been for electoral reform but until he came to office, it was not really

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790198–0911. Confidential. Repeated for information to Bridgetown, Caracas, Georgetown, Nassau, and Port of Spain.

2 The *Daily Gleaner*, Jamaica’s largest newspaper, ran articles and editorials critical of the government and Manley and friendly to the JLP.
possible to do much about it, and he was only now getting around to it. He reiterated that the last elections were honest and straight. He acknowledged that it was possible that there may have been some isolated incidents of “hanky panky” but that he doubted it. He likened such hypothetical incidents to the situation of President Kennedy in Chicago.

5. He then suggested that perhaps we could do away with the protocol of a first visit and proceed further—he had a few items on his mind he wished to discuss and was sure that there were some items that I would like to ask him about.

6. One—his relationship to Fidel Castro. He stated that Castro was a close personal friend, a man whom he admired, a man who had inspired in Manley a deep love and respect. However, he indicated that this did not mean that Mr. Manley was a Communist or that he was bringing Jamaica into the sphere of influence of Cuba or that he was seeing Cuba as a role model for Jamaica. Rather he felt that Cuba and Jamaica had sufficient similarities—that he should examine Cuba carefully and accept solutions to problems that the Cubans have found where such solutions seemed relevant to Jamaica. Equally, solutions that were not relevant were rejected. This statement was followed by a rambling presentation that if Jamaica had a political party with intellectual curiosity, the PNP was it. Within the PNP there were all shades of political thought from extreme right to extreme left of many countries, picking a bit here and rejecting a bit there. The fact of such examination should not be interpreted here in Jamaica by the opposition or in the United States as suggesting Jamaica was accepting any particular ideology. He concluded this paragraph by reaffirming his dedication to greater equality of opportunity for a greater number of Jamaicans. He said he was disturbed that many people in the U.S. could not make this differentiation, particularly as it applied to his relationship to Fidel Castro.

7. The second point that he wished to make was that he was sorry to see the U.S. make the kind of mistake he felt it had in instructing Bishop of Grenada. The U.S. should by now know when dealing in the Caribbean where leaders frequently had little more in assets than fierce personal and national ego, that any kind of instruction instantly evokes serious reaction.

8. Manley’s next point was an expression of hope that it would be possible for himself, or Mr. Nyerere (who he understood President
Carter held in high esteem) or someone else, to capture a few minutes of President Carter’s “thinking time” on the subject of UNCTAD. He felt that while great progress had been made, the U.S. should come a little bit further both in terms of Jamaica’s needs and of his perception of the kind of reputation the U.S. might wish to have.

9. I responded to the PM on the above points by saying that I felt that the nucleus of my responsibilities in Jamaica was to get to know him, that my understanding, interpretation and knowledge of him were as near totally accurate as possible and that my Embassy’s reporting on him and Jamaica would be truthful, accurate and comprehensive. Also, that by the same token I would endeavor to be of service to him and to Jamaica by attempting to interpret the U.S. and its views as accurately as possible. I felt a good rapport between the two of us was essential. I indicated that I did not, at this point, have a “lot on my desk” that I wanted to take up with him but that there was one point we were concerned about and that was the recent joint release that FM Patterson had participated in on his recent trip to Cuba. Of particular concern to us was what was meant by the reference in that statement to Puerto Rico. (Kingston 3013). We understand Jamaica was broadly knowledgeable about the situation in Puerto Rico and the U.S. position on the future of Puerto Rico and the peoples of Puerto Rico. The PM responded instantly that he was not in total agreement with Castro on all points and that the issue of Puerto Rico was one in which he was in disagreement. He did understand the U.S. was not opposed to self-determination for the Puerto Rican people but at this point the Puerto Rican people had not made their decision as to their future direction (sic). He then called attention to the fact that the statement in its totality operated on the basis of “recalling” previous positions taken.

10. Our visit concluded with Mr. Manley wanting to know if he could deal with me confidentially from time to time and upon receiving my acquiescence proceeded to address a new problem. He indicated that negotiations had been taking place with the aluminum companies and that he had only just discovered that his negotiators, as a result of being a relatively new team and working with a Minister who was overburdened and tired and frequently out of the country on official business had agreed to some elements in the negotiations for the bauxite levy adjustment that were further than Jamaica could, in fact, go. He

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5 Telegram 3013 from Kingston, April 27, described a Cuban-Jamaican joint communique issued after Patterson’s April visit to Cuba. It contained language regarding Jamaican support for Puerto Rican independence. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D7900195-0440)
stated he recognizes that Jamaica is not competitive in bauxite pricing and that it must move to a competitive position but that what had been agreed to was more than Jamaica could afford. He said he had telephoned Edgar Kaiser on April 25 and expressed a desire to meet with him. He indicated Kaiser would be in Jamaica over the weekend and that he hoped to lay out for him the facts and seek counsel and advice. He hoped I would be available over the weekend to meet with him and Mr. Kaiser should this prove necessary.

11. Comment: The meeting was warm, charming and aggressive on his part. As one experiencing a first exposure to Mr. Manley, I came away convinced the complexities of the man would take considerable time to penetrate and comprehend.

Lawrence

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6 Edgar Kaiser, Chairman of Kaiser Aluminum, often chose to negotiate with Prime Minister Manley during bauxite negotiations.

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190. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Murphy)

Washington, June 13, 1979

Dear Dan:

Your letter of 6 June reflects my feelings concerning the apparent increase in influence of the KGB and the DGI over Jamaica Prime Minister Michael Manley. Similar concern has been expressed in the

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1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81M00919R: Executive Registry Subject Files (1976–1979), Box 13, Folder 34: C–361 Jamaica. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by [name not declassified] on June 12; concurred in by Stein on June 12.

2 In his letter, Murphy cited reports of a rise in Manley’s contacts with the KGB and the DGI. Murphy suspected Manley was using foreign intelligence personnel to enhance the PNP’s agency within Jamaica. (Ibid.)
Bureau of Inter-American Affairs at the Department of State and by Ambassador Lawrence in Kingston. (S)

The Agency has closely watched the expansion of KGB and DGI activities in Jamaica since the original sensitive source reports were received [less than 1 line not declassified]. Based to a significant extent upon these sensitive source reports as well as Embassy Kingston reporting, I briefed President Carter concerning these developments, as well as other developments in the Caribbean, on 3 May 1979. (S) The Department of State is now in the process of an appraisal of U.S. policy vis-a-vis Cuban and Soviet activities in the Caribbean as a whole. (S)

I agree with you that under the Presidential Findings on Cuban and Soviet intervention, we have authority to publicize and criticize this Soviet and Cuban intervention in the Caribbean. The Agency has already initiated a media campaign in selected countries to emphasize the undesirable effects of these moves by the Soviets and the Cubans. In addition, selected CIA Stations throughout Latin America and the Caribbean have been authorized to brief their intelligence service counterparts concerning the significance of these activities. I appreciate your offer of help and will call upon you for assistance if an expansion of this campaign is considered desirable. (S)

Yours,

Stansfield Turner

3 In telegram 4149 from Kingston, June 11, the Embassy expressed a point of view that appears to run counter to Turner’s assertions. In the telegram, Lawrence expressed skepticism about the degree of DGI infiltration in the Jamaican Government, and pointed out Seaga’s and the JLP’s vested interest in exaggerating such connections. Lawrence quoted political scientist Carl Stone who wrote, “those facts and the supporting facts advanced by Mr. Seaga [about organizational upgrading of Cuban intelligence in the country] do not add up to evidence to support his inference that the country is in danger of Communist inspired and Cuban-supported subversion.” Stone concluded, “I have to wonder whether we are not again being prevailed upon by skillfully orchestrated party propaganda.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790265–0193) Telegram 3965 from Kingston, June 5, reported Seaga’s charges of Soviet and Cuban infiltration. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790257–0666)

4 Turner met with Carter, Mondale, and Brzezinski on May 3 from 11:20 a.m. to noon. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary) No record of the meeting has been found.

5 Not found.

6 Printed from a copy that indicates Turner signed the original.
191. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)

Washington, August 22, 1979

SUBJECT
U.S. Policy to the Caribbean: The Case of Jamaica (U)

Recent developments in Jamaica confirm the correctness of our overall political objectives—e.g., free press, free elections—in the Caribbean. While there are many in the Caribbean, particularly in the younger generation, who increasingly look to Cuba as a model and an inspiration, there are at least as many who view Cuba with suspicion and fear. Prime Minister Manley, one of the most adept politicians in the Caribbean, is extremely sensitive to both currents. He has leaned to the right in purging his government of radicals, in signing an IMF agreement, and in instituting an austerity program. He has leaned to the left in his continuing contacts with the Cubans and with radicals who have set up independent political parties. But all in all, he has maintained a free press in Jamaica, and he has permitted the free expression of views by those who oppose him. That freedom will keep Jamaica from tipping too far to the left. (S)

The opposition political leader, Edward Seaga, gave a number of speeches in June and July of 1979, where he named names of Cubans and Soviet intelligence operatives who have penetrated the Jamaican government, or who have close relationships with people in the Jamaican government. Seaga obviously had some very good sources, and he disclosed an extraordinary amount of information on what people in the Jamaican government were up to with the Cubans. (S)

At first, there were those in the Jamaican government who accused the CIA of providing this information to Seaga, but these accusations never really caught on. Instead, the Jamaican people reacted vehemently against this intensive penetration of Jamaica by the Cubans and the Soviets. The opposition newspaper The Daily Gleaner, has repeatedly run stories on Seaga’s information and the implications for Jamaica. (S)

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 40, Jamaica, 1/77–10/79 through Japan, 6–12/78. Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to Gregg and Henze. Brzezinski initialed the memorandum and wrote, “Interesting.”

2 See footnote 3, Document 190.
There have been two very positive results from this episode. First, an electoral reform law was passed recently, and our Embassy called it a "clear plus for democracy in the Caribbean." Our Embassy believes the main reason it passed was because the government compromised for fear that stubbornness would be interpreted as an attempt by Manley to move toward a single party state. The effect of the law will be to guarantee a fair electoral process. Secondly, the Cubans and the Soviets have clearly been put on the defensive. Our Embassy reports a dramatic increase in popular Jamaican anti-Cuban feelings, and there have been demonstrations against the Cubans. An intelligence report (Tab A) suggests that the Cuban presence in Jamaica has been reduced, and the new Cuban Ambassador to Jamaica paid a visit on our Ambassador recently, and clearly conveyed great concern with the tremendous anti-Cuban feeling which has emerged. A recent speech by Carl Stone, a leading independent, shows the degree to which the moderates in Jamaica have stopped criticizing the U.S. and have started criticizing the new big brother, Cuba. (Tab B)

I believe that the lesson of this episode is that the best way to contain and even to reduce Cuban influence in the Caribbean and to assure a more moderate direction by the governments in the region, is to focus our public attention on the continued desirability of a free press and free elections. At the same time, we should not be averse to passing facts on Cuban activities in the area to our friends. (S)

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3 The new electoral law established a bipartisan committee that would appoint an official to oversee the conduct of elections in Jamaica. (Telegram 3560 from Kingston, May 18; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790229–0650)

4 Not attached.

5 Lawrence described the meeting in telegram 5906 from Kingston, August 16. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790376–1316)

6 Not attached, but see footnote 3, Document 190, for some of Stone’s remarks.
192. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jamaica

Washington, September 8, 1979, 2220Z


1. (C—Entire text)

2. A decision is about to be finalized to eliminate the FY 1981 PL–480 program of $9.9 million in Jamaica.

3. The decision is forced by the absolute need to include $14.1 million for Nicaragua in the FY 1981 PL–480 budget.

4. The intensely negative reaction in Washington to the statements by Jamaican Prime Minister Manley at the NAM conference in Havana has been a factor in the impending Washington decision to make the budget-forced cut in Jamaica.²

5. There would be no announcement made concerning cutting the PL–480 program in Jamaica, but information concerning the cut would become public in February 1980. The absence of a PL–480 component in U.S. assistance to Jamaica would become evident at the May/June 1980 Caribbean Group meeting. Any comments you wish to make should be received by noon on Monday, September 10.³

6. We would welcome Embassy’s views soonest on how best to inform the GOJ of this decision. For example, we might call in Ambassador Rattray to indicate our extreme displeasure over the NAM statement and Ambassador Lawrence could do the same in Kingston.⁴

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¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790410–0404. Confidential; Nact Immediate; Stadis; Exdis. Drafted by Cooper; cleared by Warne and in S/S–O, and approved by Bushnell.

² On September 4, Prime Minister Manley gave a speech before the Non-Aligned Movement Summit in Havana praising Castro and the Cuban revolution and asserting that “anti-imperialist forces were now stronger than ever in this hemisphere.” (Telegram 8126 from Havana, September 5; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790405–0772)

³ On September 10, the Embassy replied, concurring with the decision and recommending the Department “go public with this action.” (Telegram 6548 from Kingston, September 10; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790413–0294) In telegram 240525 to Kingston, September 13, the Department stated that “at this time we do not repeat do not wish to link the PL 480 decision to our displeasure with Manley’s speech and its implications,” adding, “Decision to reprogram funds from Jamaica to Nicaragua was compelled primarily by Nicaragua’s more pressing requirements.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790418–0472)

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 194.
Subsequently, we would inform the GOJ of the decision to eliminate FY 1981 PL–480 for Jamaica.

Vance

193. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, September 22, 1979

SUBJECT
Manley Attacks on the U.S. (C)

The President has read of the reaction in Jamaica to Prime Minister Manley’s anti-U.S. speech before the Non-Aligned Summit,² including opposition leader Seaga’s statement that the populace anticipates a cutoff of U.S. aid and would blame Manley for this rather than the U.S. (C)

In response, the President drew an arrow to Seaga’s comment about a cutoff of U.S. aid and wrote, “we should react—why have we waited?” (C)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 26, Jamaica, 1–9/79. Confidential.
² See footnote 2, Document 192.
194. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jamaica

Washington, September 22, 1979, 0136Z

249355. Subject: U.S. Response to Manley’s NAM Speech. Ref: Kingston 6884, State 247590.\(^1\)

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Embassy is authorized to discuss in a low-key way with opposition leader Seaga the U.S. reaction to Manley’s NAM speech; however, talking points for this discussion should be more general than those transmitted in State 247590 for use with FonMin Patterson and key PNP moderates. You should draw primarily from the first three talking points (Paragraph 8, State 247590).\(^3\)

3. If possible, meeting with Seaga should not repeat not appear to be specially arranged for the purpose of expressing U.S. concerns. It should be low-key and characterized as part of the continuing U.S. effort to maintain communication with all responsible parties in Jamaica. Our concern is to avoid the possibility of an attack by Manley or others on the Embassy for “interference” in domestic Jamaican affairs, however unfounded such allegations might be.\(^4\)

4. Guidance in this telegram should be applied to other conversations that may arise with persons for whom talking points were not specifically designed.

Vance

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790433–0192. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by LeBourgeois; cleared by Warne and Grove; approved by Vaky.

\(^2\) See footnote 2, Document 192. In telegram 6884 from Kingston, September 20, the Embassy broached the idea of informing Seaga of U.S. concern about Manley’s speech. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790430–0957) Telegram 247590 to Kingston, September 20, provided talking points to convey to Foreign Minister Patterson the U.S. reaction to Manley’s speech and the cuts in assistance. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790430–0550) On September 25, the Embassy reported that Patterson attempted to downplay the Prime Minister’s speech, stating that Manley’s rhetoric did not constitute any sort of a policy shift toward the United States. (Telegram 6991 from Kingston, September 25; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790439–0427) The Embassy also reported on October 1 that Patterson was “evasive and unresponsive” to the U.S. démarche. (Telegram 7130 from Kingston, October 1; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790449–0616)

\(^3\) The three talking points discuss 1) concerns about Manley’s Havana speech, 2) the leftward shift in Jamaican policy, and 3) Manley’s reversal on Puerto Rican independence.

\(^4\) Lawrence met with Seaga on October 1. Seaga told Lawrence that “he believes crisis sparked by growing public mass confrontation is imminent in Jamaica within the next two months.” (Telegram 7165 from Kingston, October 2; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])
WASHINGTON, SEPTEMBER 24, 1979

SUBJECT

Jamaica (U)

The President has read a recent intelligence analysis reporting that Jamaican Prime Minister Manley is turning to the radical Jamaican Left in an attempt to shore up his weakened political position. The analysis reviews his harsh criticism of the U.S. and endorsement of Cuban/Soviet positions on a number of issues at the Non-Aligned Conference, and later at the Annual Conference of his ruling party.

The President reacted to the analysis with the comment, “We should rap him in a way to strengthen his opposition.” The Department of State should implement the President’s instruction, and please inform the President.

Zbigniew Brzezinski
196. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, October 3, 1979

SUBJECT

Jamaica (U)

The President has read Ambassador Lawrence’s cable concluding that Prime Minister Manley’s decision to align Jamaica with Cuba and the Soviet Union necessitates the implementation of an effective program to slow him down or reverse this course. Lawrence noted that this could involve changes in our AID program and speaking candidly on investment and tourism to a broad spectrum of interested persons as well as a review of some of our other programs. (S/S)

In response to this cable, the President directed “Let’s do this.” The Department of State should implement the President’s instruction and inform the President of measures taken. (C)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 26, Jamaica, 10–11/79. Secret; Sensitive.

2 Reference is to telegram 7170 from Kingston, October 2, in which Lawrence noted Manley’s alignment of Jamaican policies with those of Cuba and the Soviet Union and argued that “we need to show our displeasure in a way that stands a chance of slowing him down or reversing this course,” including changes in the U.S. aid program and “blunt speaking” on investment and tourism. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])
197. Memorandum for Members of the Special Coordination Committee

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Covert Action Options for Jamaica

1. INITIATIVE: This paper proposes a covert action program in Jamaica. It has been prepared by CIA as a means of countering Soviet and Cuban moves to gain control over Jamaican policies and to expand their influence in the Caribbean.

2. ISSUES FOR DECISION: The Action Options listed below have been developed to allow for contact with a leader of the opposition party in Jamaica and to explore possible covert support to this moderate political group. The goal of this support would be to strengthen the moderate democratic elements in Jamaica in order to enable them to resist the pro-Soviet/Cuban and anti-U.S. policies of the Jamaican Government under Prime Minister Michael Manley. This support would also seek to frustrate any initiative by Manley to move towards a one-party totalitarian state. Our ultimate aim is either the political defeat of Manley and the replacement of his government with one more friendly to the U.S. and appreciative of U.S. interests, or, at a minimum, the application of enough pressure on Manley and his People’s National Party (PNP), to force moderation of their foreign policy, particularly a reversal of the trend towards closer ties with Cuba and the Soviet Union.

3. ACTION OPTIONS:

a. OPTION NO. 1: Unilateral. Establish direct confidential contact with Edward Seaga, the leader of the main opposition party, the Jamaican Labor Party (JLP) and also provide guidance, assistance and funds to the JLP in the upcoming Jamaican national election campaign. (TAB A)

   Risk: Moderate to high
   Cost: [dollar amount not declassified]

b. OPTION NO. 2. Unilateral. Through the international network of covert action assets, call for retention of democratic institutions in Jamaica, condemn Manley’s close ties with the Cubans and Soviets,

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 26, Jamaica, 10–11/79. Secret.
2 Tabs A–D are attached but not printed.
and expose Manley’s efforts to suppress political freedom and prevent free elections. (TAB B)

Risk: Low

Cost: [dollar amount not declassified]

4. COMMENT: The political posture of Jamaica’s Prime Minister Manley and his PNP has recently taken a distinct turn to the left and towards closer relations with Cuba. This was highlighted by Manley’s speech at the Non-Aligned Movement Conference in Havana on 4 September 1979, in which he purposefully supported the carefully orchestrated Cuban position on key international issues. Also, Manley and high-level PNP leftists recently met in Kingston with Grenada’s pro-Cuban leader Maurice Bishop. This meeting resulted in a decision by the two countries to work together to remove the most important obstacle to their growing influence in the Caribbean, the moderate Government of Trinidad and Tobago’s Prime Minister Eric Williams. As an apparent result of Jamaican-Grenadian consultations, Bishop with the assistance and guidance of the Cubans, reportedly is now providing paramilitary training to selected activists of the extremist opposition, the Working People’s Alliance (WPA), to Guyana’s Prime Minister Forbes Burnham. It would appear that the Cubans are using Manley and his Marxist supporters in the PNP to rally the University of the West Indies (UWI)-centered Caribbean radical left to work towards the installation of more leftist governments throughout the Caribbean. (TAB C provides additional comments on Manley’s policies.)

5. FINDING: It is believed that the options outlined in this memorandum require a Presidential Finding (TAB D)

6. SOURCE OF FUNDS: [1 line not declassified]

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3 See footnote 2, Document 192.
MEMORANDUM

To the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research

From: Deputy Director of Coordination of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research

Subject: Your October 18 Meeting with Ambassador Vaky: Jamaica

Washington, undated

The RAR analyst most knowledgeable about Jamaica is Liz McKune. Hunter thinks she would be useful in your meeting.

I judge from the Embassy’s recent reporting and the CIA proposal that they have given up on working with Manley and want to concentrate on replacing him with Seaga. The latest interagency study, contained in the attached Exdis, says Manley is not a lost cause, but parts of the cable seem to support the opposite view.

My personal intuition is that Seaga will not win the next election, with or without CIA’s intervention. Furthermore, I am not at all sure we would find him any easier to live with than Manley, even though he almost certainly would not play the Cuban game.

I conclude that we should, once again, try to work with Manley—which really translates into continued efforts to help him fend off economic disaster.

When I told Ambassador Vaky why you wanted to meet with him, he said he is opposed to any covert action in Jamaica. He favors the strategy outlined in the attached Exdis, to be implemented by overt means.

You may want to discuss with Ambassador Vaky some of the following:

—Importance of coming to a decision about Manley: have we written him off, or do we still want to try to work with him? Is a double track feasible, i.e. can we support Manley and try to influence him while encouraging opponents and potential opponents in both the JLP and the PNP?

1 Source: Department of State, INR/IL Files, Volume 22, Transfer Identification Number 9806-43000012, Jamaica, 1977–80. Secret; Sensitive.
2 Hunter Estep of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.
3 Attached but not printed.
4 No record of a meeting between Bowdler and Vaky has been found.
—Usefulness of a joint State/CIA instruction asking for a survey of the PNP, with emphasis on identifying moderates whom we can work with and perhaps assist, either overtly or covertly.

—Should we again stroke Manley with a high level visit? Could we somehow acknowledge his aspirations to spearhead the “new international economic order”?

—What opportunities, overt and covert, are there in the labor field, in the Gleaner, in the private sector?

—How can we present a positive and active program to the SCC without endorsing some covert action?

### 199. Editorial Note

On October 17, 1979, President Carter sent a handwritten note to Secretary of State Vance and Director of Central Intelligence Turner, that reads, “To Cy and Stan, Re: Jamaica. I’m afraid we may be on the verge of driving Manley and Jamaica irrevocably to Cuba. Let’s reassess & see if we can’t move Manley back toward us. He’ll be P.M. until 1981—J.C.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 26, Jamaica, 10–11/79)

In an October 19 meeting about the Caribbean and Central America, Carter revealed that he was initially inclined to “knock the hell out of Manley and support a moderate group,” but was dissuaded from that course of action during a conversation with Andrew Young, who insisted that “such a policy would be suicide in Jamaica, that Manley is in power until 1981 and he is too strong to be overthrown.” Carter then stated he would be prepared to invite Manley to the White House for a visit if necessary, or perhaps send Andrew Young, former U.S. Representative to the United Nations, to Jamaica. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 4, Folder: Caribbean 10–12/79) Portions of the Summary of Conclusions of the meeting are printed as Document 368.

At an October 23 Special Coordination Committee meeting, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Brzezinski, Turner, Secretary of Defense Brown, and Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Newsom, among others, met to discuss covert action in Jamaica. The SCC concluded “the political proposal presented by the CIA appeared premature. Just what needs to be done—and what could be done in Jamaica, it was felt—needs to be examined in greater depth. The Chairman (Brzezinski) directed the State Department to plan a full
PRC review of the Jamaican situation and possible options for U.S. Government action, both covert and overt, in the near future. Meanwhile, it was agreed propaganda activity in support of our present policy objectives could be undertaken within the scope of the existing Findings.” (National Security Council, Carter Intelligence Files, Box 20, Minutes—SCC 1979) For the CIA proposal, see Document 197. For the Summary of Conclusions of the PRC meeting, see Document 370.

200. Memorandum of Conversation

Miami, November 29–30, 1979, 11:20 p.m.–2:20 a.m.

SUBJECT

Summary of Meeting with Prime Minister Michael Manley

PARTICIPANTS

Phillip Habib, Special Adviser to the Secretary of State
Andrew Young
Robert Pastor, Staff Member, National Security Council
Prime Minister Michael Manley
Minister of National Security Dudley Thompson
Ministry of Industry and Commerce Danny Williams
Ambassador to the United States Alfred Rattray

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 40, Jamaica, 1/77–10/79 through Japan, 6–12/78. Secret. Drafted by Pastor; cleared by Habib. The meeting was held in Manley’s suite at the Hotel Intercontinental. Manley was in Miami to attend the Caribbean Conference on Trade and Development. Manley’s memoirs also contain an account of this meeting. He recounted that Habib attempted to embarrass him by revealing a PNP pamphlet that supposedly alleged that the United States was conducting a destabilization campaign in Jamaica. Manley stated that Pastor then brought up the issue of Jamaican support of Cuba and Grenada. Manley responded by reaffirming his friendship with President Carter, urging the United States to normalize relations with Cuba, and lobbying the U.S. delegation to leave the New Jewel Movement alone. Manley wrote, “I was sure the discussion had accomplished nothing.” (Manley, Jamaica: Struggle in the Periphery, pp. 175–179)

2 The PRC discussed sending a mission to Manley at its November 13 meeting (see Document 370), and President Carter approved the mission on November 27. (Memorandum from Brzezinski to Vance, November 27; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 26, Jamaica, 10–11/79)
Introduction

Andrew Young explained the reasons why the US Government (USG) wanted to meet with Manley at this time. The USG is very concerned that perceptions between our two countries were growing farther apart, and hoped to halt any possible deterioration of our relations by exchanging concerns and increasing our understanding. Young said that unless we do, it will be increasingly difficult for the US to maintain the Caribbean policy that this Administration established at the beginning, and in which Habib, Pastor, and Young had played a large role. He said that Iran has had an interesting effect on the US, and there is an increasingly strong feeling that Americans should not get pushed around by small countries anymore. In regions close to the US, like the Caribbean, Americans are more apt to respond. Young said that our concerns with Jamaica fall into four categories: democratic institutions; working with Cuba and Soviet intelligence groups; a tilt in foreign policy; and an economy which is rapidly deteriorating.

De-Stabilization and the KGB/DGI Connection

Pastor said that before getting into a discussion of current concerns, it was important to put a mischievous problem completely behind us. Although Ambassador Rattray had been told in clear and unequivocal terms by Mr. Vaky and by Mr. Pastor, that the article in the Latin America Weekly Report was erroneous and the allegations about a U.S. de-stabilization campaign were false, Pastor said that apparently the Prime Minister had not been convinced yet since he sent Rattray in again a second time. For Manley’s personal benefit, Pastor repeated

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3 Vaky and Habib suggested the possibility of using Andrew Young, who resigned as UN Ambassador on September 23, as an intermediary with Manley, since Young was sympathetic to the Prime Minister’s policies and might win the United States more credibility with the Jamaican leader. (Memorandum from Pastor to Brzezinski through Owen, November 21; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 40, Jamaica, 1/77–10/79 through Japan, 6–12/78) Carter met with Young on October 17 from 9:25 to 9:40 a.m., at which time he presumably broached the idea of Young meeting with Manley. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary) See also Document 199.

4 Pastor visited Jamaica and met with Seaga on October 16. (Memorandum from Pastor to Brzezinski, October 18; ibid.) The Daily Gleaner subsequently published a story that included a list of KGB and DGI agents inside Manley’s government; the list was given to the Gleaner by Seaga. The CIA evaluated Seaga’s assertions as accurate. (Memorandum from Sapia-Bosch to Pastor, October 29; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Box 23, Folder: Jamaica, 1979) The November 16 issue of Latin America Weekly Report then published a story accusing Pastor of passing intelligence to Seaga. Pastor denied the charges. (Memorandum from Pastor to Roper, November 27; ibid.) Ambassador Rattray delivered a November 27 démarche regarding the alleged leak of intelligence. The démarche was reported in telegram 308207 to Kingston, November 29. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790549–0850)
that the article was wrong, and specifically three allegations in it—that Pastor had received documents from Seaga, that he passed them to others in the government and in the press, and that he started a public relations effort to de-stabilize Jamaica—are all completely false. Pastor said that he had told Rattray that the spread of this information was obviously an attempt to further divide the U.S. from Jamaica at a delicate point in our relationship, and that he ought to be very careful before he believed or repeated the allegations to others. (S)

Manley said that he accepted Mr. Pastor’s explanation and his denial, and as far as he is concerned, the matter is completely closed. Manley then asked whether the U.S. would also accept his assurances that the chart drawn up by Seaga describing 58 people in his government as collaborating with the KGB or DGI is false. Manley said he would say for the record that neither he nor the Jamaica House have been working with the KGB or DGI. Pastor said that he had never seen the document to which Manley referred. (S)

Habib said the U.S. has information on the subject of the Jamaican-KGB-DGI relationship which is independent of Seaga’s information, but which deeply distresses the USG. Habib said that the U.S. knew the names of KGB and DGI operatives who were involved in the PNP and in relations with his government, and that their work was directed not just towards influencing Jamaica but at the U.S. This clandestine operation included efforts designed to attack U.S. interests in the Caribbean and even to recruit people for the KGB to send to the U.S. to work against us there. He said that some of these activities could be unknown to the Prime Minister. (S)

The Prime Minister admitted, of course, that he might not know everything that was going on. However, he said that none of his Ministers nor the Jamaica House had any such relationship with the KGB or DGI. He said he was aware that the CIA is watching Jamaica and watching the KGB/DGI which, of course, is watching the U.S. and Jamaica. But he didn’t see any evidence that would confirm attempts by the DGI/KGB to unfairly influence Jamaican domestic politics. He was aware that the Cubans sometimes work through the left wing—Trevor Munroe’s faction—but he didn’t believe there was any evidence that the Cubans were giving any money to him or trying to interfere with the Party. Even among those in the Party who are of the left there is not the slightest indication that they are deliberately trying to get the party to criticize the U.S. or to take steps toward forcing Jamaica down the road toward Cuban model. (S)

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5 Trevor Munroe was the leader of the Worker’s Party of Jamaica, a Marxist organization.
Habib said that we had information from the recent PNP conference in Montego Bay that the Party published documents whose purpose was to warn Jamaicans of U.S. efforts at de-stabilization. Habib said that these documents were directed at U.S. interests, and this disturbed us. Manley denied that the PNP would publish such documents. He said that while he thought the previous Administration had engaged in de-stabilization efforts, he never thought nor did he allege that the Carter Administration would do anything like that. (S)

Habib then showed him the PNP document “Psychological Warfare: What It Is—How It Works” which clearly defined de-stabilization and identified it as “a CIA technique.” The document quoted liberally from the CIA’s efforts to de-stabilize Chile, and it quotes from a Department of the Army pamphlet. Manley first denied this was a PNP document, saying it was obviously published by Seaga, who is brilliant at these kinds of things. Then, Danny Williams admitted that it was published by the PNP and authorized at a medium level. Manley then said that the purpose of the document was to identify Seaga’s techniques at provoking violence and undermining democracy in Jamaica. It was not intended to accuse the U.S. of anything like destabilization. (S)

(Comment: Manley was clearly embarrassed at having his bluff called, and was hardly convincing in his explanation that the purpose of the document was to expose the Jamaican people to Seaga’s machinations.) (S)

Habib underscored the seriousness which we viewed any actions which would give the KGB or DGI an inside track at manipulating the Jamaican political system. It is possible that agents could burrow themselves into his government and party and try to move Jamaica away from democracy during troubled times. Manley said that if the US ever had any specific evidence of this, we should bring it directly to his attention. (S)

Democracy in Jamaica

Manley said that despite Seaga’s provocations and despite the Daily Gleaner’s libelous charges which “abuse the freedom of the press,” he remains irrevocably committed to democracy. That commitment is so deep and strong that not only would he not contemplate anything that would harm democracy in Jamaica, but he would fight to prevent others from trying to harm democracy in Jamaica. As an example of his commitment to democracy, he continues to work closely with the

6 Not found.
opposition party to develop a fair election law. (Habib said that Seaga confirmed Manley’s cooperation on this.) (S)

Pastor expressed concern that Seaga uses the same language in characterizing the position of Manley’s PNP as Manley does in referring to Seaga and the JLP. Both claim the other is seeking confrontation, hurting the country, undermining free institutions. If this polarization continues, both sides would lose. Manley acknowledged the point, but denied his party was engaged in these tactics. Habib noted that there may be some radicals in his party who are deliberately trying to provoke the JLP in order to create increased polarization. (S)

Manley said that he was aware that some have suggested that he is obsessed with power and plans to subvert the electoral process if he cannot win a free election. Manley said that there is no truth to that. He said that he enjoys the time he spends teaching at the University, and could see himself pursuing a career teaching and writing if he lost the election. He would be quite content with such a career pattern. (S)

**Jamaica’s Foreign Policy**

*NAM Speech.* Young said that there were many in the USG who are sympathetic to Jamaica, but were disappointed with Manley’s speech in Havana. He thought much of that disappointment was based on misunderstanding of the speech, but some of it was due to a few controversial positions, such as on Puerto Rico. (S)

As someone who is sympathetic to Jamaica, but disappointed with the speech, Pastor said that his concern was not based on a few controversial issues, but rather on the entire thrust of the speech which placed Jamaica alongside Cuba and the Soviet Union and in opposition to the US and the West. Prime Minister Manley has the prerogative to tilt Jamaican foreign policy however he wishes, but he should not expect the US to be happy with it. The speech began by praising Lenin and the 1917 revolution and ended with a paean to Castro’s revolution. In the speech, Manley said that “no other area of the world has had a more extended exposure to, experience of, nor proximity to imperialism than Latin America and the Caribbean.” Throughout the speech, Manley laid all the ills of the developing world on the doorstep of US and Western imperialism. It is true, as Andy Young said, that we were troubled by Manley’s position on issues that are sensitive to the US, like Puerto Rico, but we were troubled even more by the issues he selected and the tone and the imbalance of the speech, which seemed so close to the Soviets and so far from the US. Why did he mention US intervention in Guatemala and the Dominican Republic and neglect

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7 See footnote 2, Document 192.
Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, Cuban intervention in Latin America and Africa, and Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia. Indeed, last month, 91 countries endorsed the ASEAN resolution at the UN condemning Vietnamese intervention and only 21 Soviet bloc countries voted against it. If Jamaica’s stand is determined by its adherence to the principle of non-intervention, why did Jamaica abstain on that vote? Why is Jamaica silent about Soviet/Cuban intervention but loudly protests US intervention? That is why Americans are troubled by the direction of Jamaica’s foreign policy. Those are the questions we have. (S)

Moreover, Pastor continued, if Jamaica thinks that the best way to get the attention of the US is to hit us over the head, the Prime Minister might want to consider the reaction in the US to his speech and other speeches at the NAM in Havana. It was not the venue, as Manley has suggested in his press interviews, that disturbed the US; it was the tone and the substance of the speeches. As Congress considered US appropriations for bilateral aid and for the multilateral development banks, many Legislators, including Senator Tsongas, a former Peace Corps Volunteer and friend of the Third World, frequently referred to the NAM in deciding to reduce US aid by almost as much as $1 billion. This is a clear example of the counterproductive impact of the NAM. (S)

Manley said that he accepted Pastor’s points, and he now understands the reasons for our concerns, but he did not view himself or his remarks as anti-American. He said that his speech at the NAM reflected Jamaica’s desire to identify with the Third World, not with the Communist bloc. He viewed himself as a Democratic Socialist and felt more of an affinity to the British Labor Party or to German Social Democrats than to the Communists. He greatly admires the US—as he had said in his speech that evening—and when the Seabees had recently been in Jamaica, he spent a lot of time with them and thought they were “good guys.” How could he be anti-American, and give a speech like he gave in Miami. (Pastor said that Manley should not be inhibited from repeating that speech elsewhere.) Manley said that he had sought commerce and investment from Western Europe, Japan, and Eastern Europe, but that could not be interpreted as anti-American. (S)

Pastor said that, on the contrary, the Carter Administration’s approach to Latin America and the Caribbean had recognized the importance of diversifying relations (particularly with Europe and Japan) as a way to reduce the sense of dependency in the region. This was the premise of the multilateral Caribbean Group. No, what concerned Americans, was the hostile tone of Manley’s speech at the NAM and the appearance that Manley had joined the Cuban bloc. (S)

Cuba. Manley said that the problem of US policy to the Caribbean is that it is obsessed with Cuba. If the US would eliminate the threat
of the embargo and normalize relations with Cuba, there would not be any reason to be concerned with pro-Cuban or anti-Cuban behavior. Manley admitted that he wrote the NAM speech the night before he gave it, and he wrote it when he and his colleagues in the NAM were outraged over the charges that Cuba was a surrogate of the Soviet Union and outraged that the US was making such a big issue out of Soviet troops that had been training Cuban troops for seventeen years. He said that everyone at the NAM saw that charge as a crude attempt to attack Castro, and this increased the support for him. He said he cannot understand how the US can really see Castro as a surrogate. (S)

Pastor said that there is no developing country as dependent on an industrialized country as Cuba is on the Soviet Union. The USSR accounts for 25% of Cuba’s annual GNP through aid. Cuba is the only Communist country that receives military hardware and training from the Soviet Union free. The increased political and military coordination and cooperation is a consequence of that dependence. We do not think that the Cubans merely march to Soviet instructions, but there is no way that the Cubans could keep over 40,000 troops in 15 countries, embassies in 100 countries, technical assistants in several score—there is no way Cuba could do this if the Soviets believed that the Cubans were not serving their interests. The Cubans may think that they are following their own revolutionary imperative, and they may be right, but they are also serving Soviet interests, and they are subverting democracy, and we view that as antithetical to US interests. (S)

Manley asked why we were so concerned about Cuban involvement in Africa, and so unconcerned about French intervention. Pastor drew the distinction between French troops who came and went, and Cubans who stayed. Habib then argued the differences between the two cases with Manley and Andy Young with no agreement reached. (S)

Pastor and Habib discussed US attempts to normalize relations with Cuba at the beginning of the Carter Administration, and explained the reasons why it was not successful. Cuban intervention in Ethiopia was the first serious obstacle. Manley himself admitted that he couldn’t understand why the Cubans got involved in Ethiopia, nor was he ever really interested in that (Andy concurred), and he always suspected that the Soviets pulled the Cubans in for geopolitical reasons (“the Horn”) whereas he thinks the Cubans dragged the Soviets into Angola for reasons related to national liberation. (S)

Caribbean. Manley said that he felt Carter’s policy to the Caribbean was clear and understanding of basic currents in the region until the October 1 speech.8 He wondered whether the US would continue to

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8 Reference is to Carter’s address to the Nation about the Soviet brigade in Cuba. See footnote 2, Document 80.
accept ideological pluralism, for example. Pastor alluded to the President’s strong statement about his commitment to democracy in the region; the most important factor for US policy is free elections and a free press, not the philosophy of political groups. That is why we were so concerned with the March 13 coup in Grenada—the interruption of the democratic process. Pastor asked for Manley’s views about Grenada. (S)

Grenada. Manley said that he thought the coup occurred because Bishop and his allies had evidence that Gairy was about to arrest them. The coup was preemptive. Manley was in touch with Bishop and his colleagues a good deal at the beginning, and they were very fearful that Gairy would launch an attack using Cuban mercenaries. Bishop therefore immediately asked for assistance from all quarters, and the Cubans were the quickest to respond. Manley is convinced that Castro was dragged into Grenada; he had no plan, nor any intention of getting involved at the beginning. (Habib and Pastor disputed this, pointing out that Cuban military advisers were there before Bishop even asked for U.S. assistance.) Manley said that when Ortiz mentioned his concern about the Cubans, Bishop saw this as intervening in their right to establish a relationship with Cuba, and protested. (S)

Manley said that he no longer followed developments in Grenada closely, but he feared that relations between the U.S. and Grenada had become very strained. Habib pointed out that the Grenadians have become complete sycophants of the Cubans in all international fora. Moreover, the closing of the Torchlight and the arrest of 70 opposition leaders greatly concerned the U.S. Manley said that he viewed Grenada’s leaders as young, idealistic kids. He said that they had asked him for assistance to apply to the Socialist International; these were not closet Communists. Manley asked the U.S. what could be done at this point to improve relations. (S)

Habib and Pastor said that Manley’s initial advice to Bishop to have free elections represented the single best way to get US-Grenadian relations back on track. However, these elections would have to be completely free, with opposition parties and a free press, and perhaps also international observers, e.g., perhaps from CARICOM. Manley said that he would be “the U.S. Ambassador” to encourage progress in this direction. (S)

Cuba/Central America and the Caribbean

In concluding his thoughts on Cuba, Manley said that he retains strong personal affection and admiration for Castro; he will never

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9 See Document 313.
repudiate Cuba nor turn his back on Castro. In his experience and in his discussions with Omar Torrijos, Carlos Andres Perez, and Luis Herrera Campins, he had never heard anyone suggest that Castro was trying to subvert the democratic process or interfere in their country’s internal affairs. Manley has no doubt that Castro would like to create Communist governments in his image in the area, but he has not yet seen any evidence suggesting that Castro is interfering in these governments’ affairs. (S)

Pastor explained that the reason for heightened US concern with Cuba in the last year is because Cuba has shifted its global strategy back to Central America and the Caribbean with a vengeance. Cuba has increased its assistance, training and political direction to guerrilla groups in Central America and to radical groups in the Caribbean. This has had the effect of quickening the pace of political polarization and making the prospects for democratization more precarious. That is the source of our concern with Cuba. (S)

Manley said that he could understand why Castro would exploit the opportunity he had in Nicaragua, but he thinks the US is wrong if it believes that Castro was behind the Grenada coup. (S)

Jamaica’s Economy

Manley demonstrated awareness of the deteriorating state of the Jamaican economy. He said that he felt that Jamaica was in a vise. He imposed what he views as a legitimate tax on the bauxite companies, but the companies not only protested, they have stopped investments. What is a small country like Jamaica to do in the face of a decision like that of the bauxite companies? When he talked about imperialism, he was not talking about the U.S., but of a system which permitted companies to make life and death investment decisions over small countries. That is why he has called for a new international economic order, and why he has asked the international community to regulate the practices of international firms. (S)

Manley said that he is energetically trying to attract U.S. business, but having very little success. He had a conversation with Charles Bludhorn of Gulf and Western (G&W), who may be interested in investing in Jamaica, and he was even prepared to fly to New York just to see Bludhorn when he heard about a SEC complaint against Gulf and Western. Manley asked whether he should continue to seek G&W’s investment, whether it is a reputable firm. Andy Young, as a private citizen, promised to check and get back to Manley. Manley feels that if he can attract one large investment, this will provide a psychological climate which will lead to more investment. He expressed happiness that tourism has picked up in Jamaica. (S)

Habib pointed out that investors are reluctant to invest in Jamaica because of the mixed signals they are getting from Manley and his
government. It is not possible for the U.S. to continue to shoulder the burden of assistance to Jamaica because of inflation and budgetary concerns, and also because it is difficult to continue to make a case for such aid if Jamaica, itself, is not taking the necessary steps to reverse the economic decline. It is difficult to get support on Capitol Hill when Manley gives speeches like he did at the NAM. (S)

Manley explained the difficult problems he has had with trying to impose austerity in Jamaica in accordance with the IMF guidelines. Nonetheless, he is determined to do that, but he needs some help. He said that the new IMF Director for Jamaica, Albertelli, understands Jamaica’s problems, but needs support within the IMF to convince his seniors of the need to seek more gradual adjustments in the Jamaican economy. Manley asked whether it would be possible to stretch out the demands being put on the Jamaican economy by December over the next six months. Habib said he would look into that. (S)

Andy Young described his trip to Africa with American businessmen and the heads of government agencies like the Export-Import Bank. They were able to consummate several billion dollars worth of business. Manley asked Young if he could be helpful in a similar way with Jamaica, and Young said that he would. (S)

Summary

Habib summarized by saying that we were pleased by the PM’s assurances about democratic institutions and about his desire to encourage private investment and to steer the economy back on the right track. We are also encouraged by the PM’s assurance that his Government is not collaborating with the KGB or DGI in any way which could be considered directed at U.S. interests or towards undermining democracy in Jamaica. However, Habib noted that “one swallow does not a summer make.” Because of our deep interest in Jamaica, the U.S. intends to continue to closely watch developments in Jamaica over the next six months in order to determine the kind of relationship we will be able to have. (S)

Prime Minister Manley said that he appreciated the exchange with government officials and found it very useful. He said that he enjoyed his rapport with Ambassador Lawrence, who he thought was a very good representative from the US. (S)

Habib said that the US Government has the fullest confidence in Ambassador Lawrence, and we were pleased by Manley’s remarks. A decision was made to have three representatives come from Washington to convey the views of the highest levels of our government on the state of our relations with Jamaica. That was the purpose of this conversation. (S)
201. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\(^1\)

Washington, December 7, 1979

SUBJECT
Conversations with Manley (S)

At Tab I is a long memcon which I did on the conversation with Manley. Habib has cleared it.\(^2\) (U)

As per your instructions, I met with CIA, State, and Ambassador Lawrence to discuss specific indicators which we can watch in Jamaica which will permit us to judge Manley’s performance during the next six months on the issues which we raised with him. Ambassador Lawrence will be returning to Jamaica on Saturday and will be seeing Manley on Monday.\(^3\) I suggested to him that he review with Manley in the clearest terms our concerns and his assurances on the four major issues which we discussed. Since the meeting went for four hours and ended on a cordial note, I told Lawrence that it is possible that Manley may have left it with the wrong impression. Lawrence understands that point, and intends to be very clear in reasserting our concerns, and indicating that we will be watching the situation in Jamaica very closely over the next six months. (S)

With regard to the indicators, there are essentially two kinds: passive and active indicators. “Passive indicators” are decisions which Manley’s government will make over the next six months, and we will monitor. If he or his government does anything that (a) suggests a tilt in foreign policy to Cuba or away from the U.S., (b) discourages private investment, (c) threatens Jamaica’s democratic institutions including the press, or (d) suggests a conspiracy between the Jamaican secret police and the KGB or DGI, our Ambassador should immediately bring this piece of evidence to Manley’s attention and protest. Similarly, if Manley does anything positive in these four areas of concern, we should

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\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Box 23, Jamaica, 1979. Secret. Sent for information. A copy was sent to Owen. A stamped notation on the document reads, “ZB has seen.” Brzezinski wrote a note to Pastor at the top of the first page, “Should we ask the P to approve the indicators? Then we can go back in 6 months.”

\(^2\) Not attached; printed as Document 200.

\(^3\) The Embassy reported in telegram 9069 from Kingston, December 14, that on December 10 Lawrence reiterated to Manley the points that were made by Habib and Young on November 29. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790581–0809)
positively reinforce him. An “active indicator” is a test which we would give Manley. For example, when we develop good, hard evidence on collaboration with the KGB or DGI, we should bring it to his attention and make clear that we see this as a test of his sincerity. Ambassador Lawrence is alert to both kinds of indicators, and will bring them to our attention. (S)

The CIA believes that they can already see evidence that the moderates in Manley’s Cabinet have had an important impact on him, and this has been reinforced by our reaction. Apparently Manley has either accepted Bell’s plan to readjust political and economic policy towards a more moderate course, or he is about to do that. Of course, Manley’s recent speeches have been clear signals of moderation. But, as Habib said, “One swallow does not a summer make.” We will have to watch closely over the next few months. (S)

I have tasked the CIA to go back and look closely at all their evidence on KGB/DGI collaboration to see what we can present to Manley. I told Lawrence to keep that door explicitly open when he meets Manley, by saying that we intend to follow up his invitation for evidence in this area soon. As soon as I have something good, I will forward it to you. (S)

202. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)

Washington, January 21, 1980

SUBJECT
Manley and the KGB/DGI/CIA (S)

The attached report suggests that Manley was informed by Andrew Young that a Jamaican Special Branch official was informing to the CIA on his government. It is not clear whether this report is a result of: (a) our conversation with Manley in November;2 (b) Andy’s deliber-

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 26, Jamaica, 1–2/80. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. A copy was sent to Gregg.
2 See Document 200.
ate or unintentional informing to Manley; or (c) [less than 1 line not declassified] unawareness of the conversation in Miami or deliberate attempt to pass a message to Washington that we should not pass any kind of information on intelligence matters to Manley, or else risk blowing the cover of our assets. I really don’t know which of the three interpretations is the correct one. (S)

But I am inclined to be more cautious as a result of the report, and unless you suggest otherwise, I will not press the State Department to undertake a demarche to Manley which specifies contacts between Manley and his government and the KGB/DGI.³ (S)

Attachment

Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to Secretary of State Vance, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski), and the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Bowdler)⁴

Washington, January 8, 1980

SUBJECT
Concern by Prime Minister Manley that a High-Level Jamaican Police Official Reports to the United States Government

1. [1 line not declassified], in late December 1979 Prime Minister Michael Manley said he had been told that a senior officer of the Jamaican Constabulary Force (JCF) Special Branch was reporting to either the Department of State or the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States Government. Manley, who discussed the matter with a high-level JCF Special Branch officer, said he had been advised of this by Ex-Ambassador Andrew Young in a private conversation in Miami in late November. (S)

2. The Special Branch official who spoke with Manley denied the allegation, and suggested that whatever information may be reaching the U.S. Government is being supplied by opposition leader Edward Seaga of the Jamaica Labor Party. Manley said he did not accept this,

³ On January 31, Pastor asserted to Brzezinski and Aaron that CIA officials possessed ulterior motives when they accused Young of divulging sensitive information. The “ulterior purpose” of Turner’s memoranda, he clarified, “is almost transparent: there are those in the CIA who obviously question on which side of US-Jamaican relations Andy Young sits.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 26, Jamaica, 1–2/79)

⁴ Secret; Noforn; Nocontract.
and that he did not believe the information was being provided by Seaga. (S)

3. [1 line not declassified] Manley may have been referring to information regarding Soviet and Cuban activities in Jamaica which was recently brought to Manley’s attention in Miami by U.S. Government officials. The JCF Special Branch is responsible for counterintelligence, which includes the activities of foreign embassy personnel in Jamaica. [less than 1 line not declassified], dated 28 November 1979, [less than 1 line not declassified], reported that according to Arnold Bertram, Minister of Mobilization, Information and Culture, Manley had cautioned Bertram to conduct his meetings with Soviet officials quietly in light of Jamaica’s economic problems and strained relations with the U.S. Government. Bertram said he had passed Manley’s admonition on to Soviet Embassy First Secretary Vladimir Klimentov, a known KGB officer, along with Manley’s late November comment that Jamaica’s foreign policy toward the USSR has not changed. (S)

4. No further distribution of this information is being made. Please bring this memorandum to the personal attention of the President. (S)

Stansfield Turner

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5 Not found.

6 Turner signed “Stan” above this typed signature.
Washington, February 15, 1980

SUBJECT
Jamaica (U)

You may recall that at our conversation with Michael Manley in Miami in November, he said that he would welcome any evidence of KGB/DGI efforts to subvert his government. One of the items which we want to test him on is his sincerity in following up on our information. (S)

State proposes to send down two items of information to be conveyed by our Ambassador directly to him: (1) a report that some Jamaicans are working with the Cubans to transship Cuban sugar to the US; and (2) a report that some Soviet officials are targeting moderates in Manley’s party. (S)

Unless you disapprove, I believe we ought to send the cable to test Manley. (It is attached for your information, but you really do not need to read it.)

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 26, Jamaica, 1–2/80. Secret.
2 See Document 200.
3 Not attached.
4 Brzezinski checked the approve option. In a memorandum to Brzezinski and Aaron on March 19, Pastor expressed reservations about the Department of State’s plan to test Manley, stating that such a test “would only intensify Manley’s paranoia.” Brzezinski agreed to turn off the démarche. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country, Chron, Box 23, Folder: Jamaica, 1980) On March 29, the Department instructed the Embassy to refrain from raising the issue with Manley “at this time.” (Telegram 83180 to Kingston, March 29; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800158–0116)
204. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jamaica

Washington, March 18, 1980, 1037Z

71678. Subject: The U.S. and Jamaica’s Elections. Reference: Kingston 1514, Kingston 1551.2

1. C—Entire text.

2. Department approves and commends guidelines established for the conduct of Embassy personnel during Jamaica’s electoral campaign (Kingston 1551). As stated in Kingston 1514, the actions of U.S. officials will receive careful scrutiny from all political factions in Jamaica, and partisan efforts to distort our behavior and intentions can be anticipated. In Washington and Kingston, therefore, we should ensure to the extent possible that our deeds and words convey the unambiguous U.S. stance of strict neutrality toward Jamaica’s electoral contest. Our interests will be best served by support for the principle and actual occurrence of free, fair elections. We are following substantially identical guidelines here and appreciate your timely input and suggestions.

Vance

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800138–0670. Confidential. Drafted by LeBourgeois; cleared in ARA/CHP and ICA; and approved by Warne.

2 In telegram 1514 from Kingston, February 29, the Embassy stated that “the USG will have to be extra sensitive to developments in the electoral process here that are potentially damaging to the United States and its interests,” such as PNP efforts to scapegoat the United States for Jamaican domestic problems. At the same time, however, the Embassy concluded, “we cannot avoid being used by both sides in the election.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800109–0697) In telegram 1551 from Kingston, February 29, the Embassy reiterated its strategy, delineating the duties of key Embassy officers. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800110–0099)
205. Summary of Conclusions of a Mini-Special Coordination Committee Meeting

Washington, March 26, 1980, 11:40 a.m.–12:40 p.m.

SUBJECT
Jamaica, El Salvador and Suriname (S)

PARTICIPANTS
State
John A. Bushnell, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
Richard Cooper, Under Secretary for Economic Affairs
OSD
Rear Admiral Gordon Schuller, Director of Inter-American Region
Franklin Kramer, Special Assistant to Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs
JCS
General John Pustay, Assistant to the Chairman
Lt Colonel Edward Cummings, Western Hemisphere Division, J–5
DCI
Frank Carlucci
Jack Davis, NIO for Intelligence
AID
Edward Coy, Acting Assistant Administrator
OMB
Randy Jayne
White House
David Aaron
NSC
Robert Pastor

Summary of Conclusions

1. Jamaican Economy: Decision on IMF. The Jamaican Cabinet just rejected any further cooperation with the IMF, concurring in the decision made by the Executive Council of the PNP (Manley’s political party). Two leading, moderate economic ministers resigned, and one was replaced by an extreme leftist. Rejection of the IMF program means that Jamaica will not receive the $175 million allocated from the IMF for this year, and it will probably lose substantial aid from other governments like Venezuela, whose grants were contingent on an IMF agreement. Manley will be announcing an alternative set of policies soon.

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 26, Jamaica, 3/80. Secret. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.
but there appears little he can do with regard to Jamaica’s external debt except perhaps seek more help from sources like Venezuela and Libya. There is likely to be a major increase in social and political unrest, and many of the radicals in the PNP may try to postpone elections or even seize power. The recent vote on the IMF indicates that the radicals have taken control of the PNP, and Manley has come increasingly under their influence. (S)

2. Political Situation in Jamaica. It is possible that Manley may call for an early election, and it was the consensus of the group that this would be more desirable as delay could play into the hands of those who want to undermine Jamaica’s democratic institutions. If elections occur soon, Edward Seaga and the Jamaican Labor Party (JLP) would probably win, and if it were a landslide, it is possible that Seaga could restore confidence in the Jamaican economy and encourage needed investment. US and other foreign assistance would still be required, but at least such aid could contribute to a solution to Jamaica’s economic problem, rather than just serve as a stop-gap. It is not clear what the reaction of Jamaica’s military or police would be to an attempted coup by the radicals. (S)

3. US Policy to Jamaica. There was a consensus that our Ambassador should engage in a dialogue with Prime Minister Manley, Seaga and other leaders in Jamaica as a way to indicate our continuing concern about the maintenance of democratic institutions in Jamaica. US aid policy should proceed as usual; we should not seek any additional money, or actively reduce our levels for the time being. We should undertake a higher level briefing with the Venezuelans to encourage them to talk to Manley about early elections.2 We should also talk to the Canadians and encourage them to play an active role in Jamaica. [2 lines not declassified]3 CIA should undertake a review of Jamaica’s military and police and their possible reaction to an attempted coup.4 State should examine the impact of events in Jamaica on the rest of the Caribbean, and should do some contingency planning on how the US should respond to the possibility of a coup or any other extra-constitutional development in Jamaica. (S)

[Omitted here is discussion of El Salvador and Suriname.]

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2 On April 10, Luers planned to meet with Venezuelan officials to urge them to continue aid to Jamaica and support free elections there. (Telegram 3313 from Caracas, April 12; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800183-0860)

3 On April 3, Warne met with Canadian officials to discuss the situation in Jamaica. The Canadian officials pledged to continue aid to Jamaica and to support free elections. (Telegram 88905 to Kingston, April 4; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800168-0169)

4 In its subsequent report, April 4, the CIA concluded that prospects for a leftist coup in Jamaica were small. (Memorandum from Pastor to Brzezinski and Aaron, April 17; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Box 23, Folder: Jamaica, 1980)
206. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense
(Claytor) to the President’s Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT
Jamaica; Covert Action Proposals (S)

(S) BACKGROUND: In November 1979, the SCC considered and
rejected several proposals for covert action to sustain the political oppo-
sition to the Cuban-oriented Government of Jamaica.² Under the leader-
ship of Michael Manley, an open and avowed Marxist, the Peoples
National Party (PNP) government was showing signs of a possible
resort to violence to hold down and deny the right to democratic
processes to the opposition Jamaican Labor Party (JLP).³

The proposals for covert aid were rejected in November in large
part because it was felt that overt and non-governmental aid to the
JLP had every good chance of sustaining it through an election and
that the risks inherent in covert support outweighed the small addi-
tional benefit that might accrue.

(S) DISCUSSION: Since last November, some analysts have held
that the JLP is doing well in making its case that Manley is ruining
the economy and free traditions of Jamaica. So well, in fact, that they
will probably win an election and put Manley out in favor of JLP leader
Edward Seaga. This same analysis holds that Manley will accept defeat
and seek to fight another day.

We believe such a view to be unsupported by the evidence. To
expect Manley, whose background and profile do not display any
tendency to gracious acceptance of defeat, suddenly to hand over power
without using the strengths he has cultivated for the past few years
strikes us as ingenuous. Indeed, the evidence now shows that Manley
is more likely to try to forestall an election by inciting violence and
instability which would lead to either a declared or undeclared State of
Emergency:
—Item: [less than 1 line not declassified] of PNP youths being sent
to Cuba for training in weapons and tactics.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South,
Pastor, Country, Box 26, Jamaica, 4–6/80. Secret. Copies were sent to Vance and Turner.
² Reference is in error. The SCC met on October 23, 1979; the PRC met on November
13, 1979. See Documents 199 and 370.
³ See Documents 197 and 198.
—Item: The bombing, during the week of 20 April, of a JLP office.
—Item: The raid by a number (25–100) of fatigue-clad gunmen on a JLP rally in Kingston which left 5 dead and 10 injured.
—Item: Sensitive reports of increasing Cuban arms inflows.
—Item: Reports of high level PNP planning to instigate violence and derail the upcoming elections.

The U.S. Ambassador to Jamaica has concluded that “we must consider that (Jamaica is) on the brink of political tribal warfare which could threaten the Democratic processes.”

(S) RECOMMENDATIONS: We agree with the Ambassador. We further agree that the U.S. Government should take a number of steps he has recommended.

—Support a call for outside observers.
—Make a joint demarche against violence.
—Explore possibility of a visit by the IAHRC.
—Explore possibility of [less than 1 line not declassified] aid to security forces.

Other overt initiatives which might be explored include a campaign to ensure the elections are held this summer, more overt support to the JLP by U.S. and non-communist labor groups and greater efforts to involve the free world press. It is equally important at this juncture to raise once again the necessity for supplementary covert actions to help prevent a slip into anarchy which could only benefit the Soviet-Cuban interventionists.

We recommend, therefore, that:

—[less than 1 line not declassified] the PNP [less than 1 line not declassified] increasing our knowledge of the intentions and tactics of its leaders and that

—CIA prepare and submit for SCC approval a new Presidential Finding that covert action should be employed to:

—use the propaganda infrastructure to discredit and undermine the Manley Government;
—provide counter-terrorist training to the JLP leadership;
—identify and disrupt the shipment of weapons and other paramilitary support from Cuba.

Further delay may lead to a fait accompli such as we now face in Grenada but one with far more dangerous consequences. Recommend this issue be put on the agenda for the next SCC (I).

W. Graham Claytor, Jr.

4 At the top of the first page, an unidentified NSC Staff member expressed disapproval with the proposal by writing, “Kill it!”
207. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter

Washington, June 12, 1980

SUBJECT

Jamaica Update (U)

Elections in Jamaica are unlikely to occur before September because of the length of time required to register and enumerate voters. By then, the economy may be bankrupt—i.e., unable to purchase imports—or approaching it. (S)

Seaga’s Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) is reported to be far in front in the polls, and as shortages become more of a problem and unemployment reaches 30–40%, most political observers believe he will win a free election decisively. The problem is that the radicals have apparently gained control of Manley’s political party (PNP), and there is an increasing number of reports that they have not only sent hundreds of party members to Cuba for training, but they have also received arms as well. Recently, the Police Federation called for the resignation of Manley’s radical Minister of National Security, who is reported to have been involved in a large shipment of arms which arrived on the coast of Jamaica from Cuba. (S)

The Venezuelans and the British are as concerned as we that the radicals in Manley’s party are escalating the violence to provoke a clash and promulgate an emergency. They could then ask the Cubans for help. (S)

On May 4 in a conversation with Andy Young, Manley conveyed his suspicion that the NSC was undertaking a destabilization program against him. I am afraid that Andy not only failed to deny this, but

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 26, Jamaica, 4–6/80. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Carter initialed the memorandum on June 16. Although no drafting information appears on the memorandum, Pastor forwarded a draft to Brzezinski on June 6 and commented, “I debriefed Andy on his conversations with Manley, and was disturbed that he seems to be tipping closer and closer to a paranoid world of conspiracy theories,” adding, “Andy naturally believes that we may have a malign influence on the President on Jamaica, and because he may feel even more strongly about the re-election of Manley than he does about the re-election of Jimmy Carter, I have no doubt that he will get through to the President at some point in time.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 40, Jamaica, 1/77–10/79 through Japan, 6–12/78) Young met with Manley on May 4.
indeed may have even encouraged Manley to think this was possible. Andy is very close to Manley and has told us that he will virtually campaign for him, either directly or by identifying Seaga with right-wing nuts in the US. We have tried to encourage him to adopt a more neutral approach to the Jamaica elections. Andy thinks that Manley is still very much in control of his party, that Manley will win the election, and that Manley’s victory is not only in the interests of Jamaica but also the US. We question each of these points, but intend to continue to pursue a policy which stresses our desire for free and peaceful elections (hopefully with international observers) and our impartiality with respect to the two political candidates. (S)

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2 In a May 31 memorandum to Brzezinski, Pastor stated that on May 24, Prensa Latina, a Cuban news agency, reported that “Andrew Young, former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, and Julian Dixon, congressman from Los Angeles, have confirmed that the U.S. National Security Council at this time is developing a plan to overthrow the Jamaican government.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 26, Jamaica, 4–6/80)

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208. Telegram From the Embassy in Jamaica to the Department of State

Kingston, June 23, 1980, 1930Z

4618. Subject: Prime Minister Requests Security Protection in US for Visiting Opposition Leader.

1. C—Entire text.

2. I requested a meeting with the Prime Minister this morning to express our concern about the attempted coup (septel). A meeting was first arranged for Wednesday, then the Prime Minister called back to ask me to come over right away.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800304–0256. Confidential; Niact Immediate.

2 In telegram 4599 from Kingston, June 23, the Embassy reported that it had learned that “a group from the JDF and the JCF with a few civilians were planning an early morning attack before Monday (June 23).” The Embassy notified the Jamaican Government, although Ambassador Lawrence stated, “While I believe we did the right thing I was never under any illusion that the information we were presenting would not be turned to domestic political uses.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800304–0058)
He saw me alone and began by explaining that he had just received a report from the U.S. three (3) minutes before he had called me that a group or a person was planning to assassinate opposition leader Seaga during Seaga’s current visit to the United States. (I did not reveal that we had received and already acted on the same information). He said he was asking me to have the USG treat such reports with seriousness and provide Seaga with the necessary protection. He wants Seaga alive to fight in the election. He further asked to be kept informed if we learned anything more about the threats.

3. Comment: Coupled with the reports of a plot to overthrow the government, the rumors of an assassination attempt on the leader of the opposition indicates a new level of tension has been reached in the Jamaican election campaign.

Lawrence

209. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, July 7, 1980

SUBJECT
CIA and Jamaica (S)

At a meeting with Bowdler and me this morning, DDO/Latin America said that the Christian Democrats in Germany [1 line not declassified] sending twenty “observers/journalists” to Jamaica at the request of Seaga’s Party to observe the elections. I said that I thought it was a crazy idea for several reasons. [1 line not declassified] Second, we ought to try to avoid partisan observers of the elections. It would be much more desirable to encourage the SPD and the CDU to try to elicit an invitation from Manley to observe the elections, than for the CDU just to support Seaga’s Party. Alternatively, it would be useful to try to get the British or the Germans to get a unified request from the EC-9 to ask Manley if they could observe the elections. I think Bowdler will follow up on this last idea, but I wanted to mention to you the CIA’s original proposal in case they raise it again. (S)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Box 23, Jamaica, 1980. Secret. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that Brzezinski saw it. Copies were sent to Gregg and Blackwill.
210. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jamaica**

Washington, July 19, 1980, 0027Z


1. C—Entire text.

2. Summary. Undersecretary Newsom met with Jamaican Ambassador Rattray July 15 to express the deep concern of the U.S. for the safety of Embassy Kingston personnel, who are jeopardized by the anti-U.S. campaign being conducted in Jamaica. Newsom noted that the freedom given those making allegations against the U.S. was not consistent with the good bilateral relations desired by the U.S. In response Rattray emphasized Jamaica’s regard for freedom of the press and the negative treatment accorded the GOJ and Prime Minister Manley in the U.S. media. Newsom argued for the GOJ’s use of persuasion with those making irresponsible and inflammatory attacks against the U.S. and said the U.S. would take the necessary measures to ensure the safety of its personnel. Ambassador is requested to seek an appointment ASAP with Manley to reinforce in Kingston the points made to Rattray here.

3. On July 15 Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs David P. Newsom called in Jamaican Ambassador Alfred A. Rattray and made the following points:

—Expressed the deep concern of the U.S. over the attacks on U.S. Embassy personnel;

—Recognized that Jamaica is amidst a heated electoral campaign, toward which the U.S. remains neutral and detached;

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800346–0682. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by LeBourgeois; cleared by Bushnell, Warne, and Pastor; approved by Newsom.

2 In telegram 5190 from Kingston, July 15, the Embassy reported that allegations that the Daily Gleaner published stories planted by the CIA led to anti-U.S. sentiment in Kingston. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800341–0131)

3 The Embassy reported in telegram 5165 from Kingston, July 14, that the homes of AID contractor Jesse Jones and Political Officer N. Richard Kinsman were attacked. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800344–0055)

4 Lawrence met with Manley on July 23. Although Manley stated that he and JLP candidate Seaga were “cooperating to reduce violence,” the Prime Minister “offered no commitment to squelch anti-U.S. campaign.” (Telegram 5415 from Kingston, July 23; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800354–0295)
—Expressed the further U.S. concern over the freedom allowed those making allegations against the U.S. in the Jamaican media which endangered the safety of U.S. officials in Jamaica;

—Regretted the consequent departure for security reasons of several AID personnel, who had been working on projects of benefit to Jamaica;

—Stated U.S. appreciation for the help promised by Prime Minister Manley following the attack on Mr. Kinsman’s house; and

—Noted that the participation by some GOJ officials in anti-U.S. activities was not consistent with the good bilateral relations the U.S. desired with Jamaica.

When Rattray pressed for details, Newsom explained the U.S. perception of an orchestrated campaign in the Jamaican media, encouraged by individuals such as Landis and Wolf and using themes that misrepresented U.S. policy and placed U.S. personnel in jeopardy. Deputy Assistant Secretary Bushnell mentioned the handbills and posters now circulating designed to inflame readers against Embassy personnel and the upcoming seminar sponsored by the People’s National Party youth organization on alleged CIA and imperialist destabilization in the Caribbean.

4. Rattray’s bottom-line response was to say he would convey (A) the U.S. concern over the safety of U.S. personnel and (B) the U.S. request for the GOJ to use its power of dissuasion on the media and individuals attacking the U.S. Before arriving at the bottom line Rattray observed that:

—Jamaica was not a dictatorship where the government could control the press;

—The government-owned media were not government-controlled;

—He had made past representations to the USG about anti-GOJ, anti-Manley reports in the U.S. press (which continue), but to no avail;

—The PNP and its constituent parts were likewise not subject to government control;

—Manley has said publicly he is assured the CIA is not now, in contrast with 1976, trying to destabilize his regime, and he believes this; and

—The GOJ has been responsive to specific requests from the U.S.

5. Newsom explained the extreme sensitivity in the U.S. on the issue of security for diplomats overseas and noted that the USG would take measures if Jamaican diplomats here were subjected to the treat-

5 Louis Wolf was the co-editor of the Covert Action Information Bulletin, a U.S. publication critical of the CIA; Fred Landis was the individual who initially leaked the story about the CIA collaborating with the Daily Gleaner. Wolf identified Kinsman as the CIA Station Chief in Kingston. (Jo Thomas, “Gunmen in Jamaica Hit Home of U.S. Aide,” The New York Times, July 5, p. 1)
ment American diplomats are receiving in Jamaica. If the GOJ is not prepared to do what it could through persuasion and other means to protect U.S. personnel from being singled out for intimidation and possible acts of violence, the US would take the necessary measures to ensure their safety. Bushnell commented that the GOJ and PNP were certainly related, since both were composed largely of the same people.

6. Rattray commented that the perception was abroad in the U.S. press that the USG favored the electoral defeat of the Manley government, as evidenced by the U.S. stance on aid (including the lack of a PL–480 program in FY–81 and the failure to make a pledge to Jamaica at the recent Caribbean Group meeting). Newsom stated the U.S. record on Jamaica was clear and included (A) hard work to support Jamaica’s relationship with the IMF, (B) continued disbursements of assistance in the pipeline, and (C) a position of neutrality toward the election with no steps to influence its outcome. Bushnell reminded Rattray that the IFI’s had not found Jamaica eligible for extraordinary assistance through the Caribbean Group’s Caribbean Development Facility and that some countries had simply taken the opportunity of the meeting to describe their ongoing programs. He further commented that the U.S. policy of “business as usual” regarding economic assistance could not be maintained if the anti-American campaign continues in Jamaica, forcing U.S. personnel needed to implement our aid programs to depart to protect their safety and well-being.

7. Action. Ambassador is requested to seek an appointment with Manley—Foreign Minister Patterson if the former is unavailable—to make the points contained in para 3 above, and in following paragraphs as appropriate. You should also make the point (drawn from Kingston 5165) that while the U.S. appreciates the Prime Minister’s strong condemnation of the attack on Mr. Kinsman’s house, the problem remains that unfriendly, unwarranted accusations against the U.S. go without rebuttal or discouragement by the GOJ. In relating this demarche to the Ambassador’s previous one of July 4 (Kingston 4916),6 you should refer to the incident outside the Jones residence July 7 and the continuing efforts of the government-owned media that jeopardize the security of U.S. personnel (Kingston 5099, Kingston 5190).7 Department will respond by septel to Kingston telegrams 5164 and 5165.8

Christopher

6 Dated July 4. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800341–1179)
7 Telegram 5099 from Kingston is dated July 10. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800335–1068)
8 In telegram 5164 from Kingston, July 14, the Embassy requested a change from the “business as usual” policy, in light of the growing Cuban and Soviet influence. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800350–0183) In a note to Pastor on July 21, Aaron asked, “Pastor, is there anything we can/should do about this? Why not recall our Ambassador or break relations?” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 26, Jamaica, 10–12/80)
211. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\(^1\)

Washington, July 21, 1980

SUBJECT

SCC(I) Jamaica (S)

I have had a long discussion with Frank Kramer in Defense and with the DDO for Latin America from CIA, and both agree with me that CA proposals for Jamaica would be counterproductive at this time. Moreover, the proposals which Turner put forward are extraordinarily weak and demonstrate only a lack of understanding of the political struggle within Jamaica.\(^2\) (S)

One of those proposals is to encourage the CDU in Germany to provide international observers for the election. I wrote you a memo on that and thought you agreed that this idea was mistaken (Tab A).\(^3\) I have since learned from the CIA that you thought it was a good idea and wanted it developed further. Needless to say, it would be useful to get a better understanding of your views on this subject. I would recommend that we not include any items on Jamaica at the next SCC(I). Do you agree?\(^4\) Yes_____. No_____. If no, can we meet and talk about it?\(^5\) Yes_____. No_____.

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\(^2\) In a July 23 memorandum to Henze, Pastor described the CIA proposals as: 1) funding the CDU to observe elections in Jamaica, 2) funding the \textit{Daily Gleaner}, 3) funding the JLP, 4) funding the Jamaican military and police forces to ensure stability. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 26, Folder: Jamaica, 7–8/80) A CIA paper also dated July 23 described the actions as 1) funding the CDU, 2) calling for the retention of democratic institutions and condemning Manley’s ties to the Cubans and Soviets through an international network of covert assets, 3) assisting the JLP to provide guidance to Edward Seaga. The paper also suggested an action that could be performed overtly: providing spare parts to the Jamaican Defense Force. (National Security Council, Carter Intelligence Files, SCC Meetings 1979–1980)

\(^3\) Printed as Document 209.

\(^4\) Brzezinski checked the no option.

\(^5\) Brzezinski checked the yes option.
212. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee (Intelligence) Meeting


SUBJECT

Intelligence Operations

PARTICIPANTS

State
Amb. David Newsom
Amb. David Mark

OSD
Adm. Daniel Murphy
Amb. Robert Komer

JCS
Gen. John Pustay

CIA
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski*
David Aaron**

White House
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski*
John McMahon

NSC
Paul Henze (Notetaker)
Robert Pastor***

* Present only for, and chaired, second part of meeting.
** Chaired first part of meeting.
*** Present only during Latin American discussion.
**** Present only during Latin American and Near Eastern discussion, respectively.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

Annual Review

The meeting was in two parts. The first hour was devoted to the annual review of sensitive collection and covert action operations as required by E.O. 12036 on the basis of briefing books distributed by the DCI to principals and collected again when this portion of the meeting was concluded. Categories of sensitivity were as agreed last year, the DCI explained. There was no disagreement with his selection of operations for review. In the discussion that ensued, no operations were identified for termination or major adjustment. Some members of the group, particularly DOD representatives, questioned the adequacy of several categories of operations (e.g., [less than 1 line not declassified]) in light

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1 Source: National Security Council, Carter Intelligence Files, SCC Meetings 1979–1980. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.
of urgent intelligence needs. The Chairman expressed the strong view that HUMINT operations are not extensive enough and not being developed rapidly enough to meet urgent priority needs.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Jamaica.]

Jamaica:

A long and heated discussion of the situation in Jamaica and prospects for deterioration there this fall produced consensus that there was a grave problem but no agreement on covert action proposals presented by CIA. It was agreed that State would enlist maximum support from our allies (the Germans and British) for efforts to ensure free elections and reduction of violence. The Chairman asked State to hold an urgent review of Jamaica policy as a result of which decisions on specific covert action proposals could, if still considered desirable, be reached.

Several additional proposals remained to be considered. The Chairman asked that a follow-up meeting be scheduled at an early date.

213. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Bowdler) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Newsom)¹

Washington, October 8, 1980

SUBJECT
Release of Information on Military Training in Cuba

ISSUE FOR DECISION
Whether to authorize the passing of information on Cuban military training of People’s National Party (PNP) youth to interested Jamaican parties.

ESSENTIAL FACTORS
According to an Agency report,² the Jamaican Constabulary Force arrested Delroy Laing, a 28 year old People’s National Party (PNP)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 26, Jamaica, 10–12/80. Secret. Drafted by Barnes on October 7; concurred in by CIA. Printed from an uninitialed copy.

² Not further identified.
supporter on August 10. Laing had on his person notes he had taken on the military training he received in Cuba between June 13 and August 1 of this year. According to Laing’s notes he received training in the manufacture, care and use of US, Soviet and Belgian infantry anti-tank weapons, anti-tank mines and grenades. Additionally, participants in the training program were taught how to manufacture and use explosives. Basic first aid and the care of soldiers wounded in battle was also included in the curriculum.

Although rumors of a military training program for PNP youth in Cuba have circulated for some time, Laing’s notes offer the first concrete evidence of such training.

THE OPTION

The Embassy believes that releasing full details of the Laing case would endanger the security of its source but judges that partial information could be passed [less than 1 line not declassified] to interested parties. This may provide sufficient information to enable them to obtain the full story while still protecting the source. The Embassy believes that revelations of Laing’s Cuban training would be a useful counter to continued allegations of US, especially CIA, attempts to destabilize Jamaica and support the opposition. The Cuban connection has emerged as an issue in the campaign and disclosure of Laing’s training could prompt further criticism of Manley’s ties with Cuba.

Recommendation:

That you authorize Embassy [less than 1 line not declassified] to pass partial information on this case to interested parties by approving the attached cable.³ CIA concurs.

³ Not attached. Newsom initialed the approve option. In telegram 283442, the Department transmitted the information to the Embassy. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 26, Jamaica, 10–12/80)
214. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter

Washington, October 14, 1980

SUBJECT

Letter to Michael Manley (U)

I was prepared to draft a brief response for you to send to Manley, but then read his letter to you again and realized that his letter deserved more than a brief response. His is a perceptive letter which succinctly describes your appeal to the Third World and then identifies three tasks for you to address early in your second term—a summit on North-South relations in Mexico, Namibia and Cuba.²

I believe that you should reply with an agenda of your own—one which aims at the perceptual and the attitudinal gap between the developed and developing worlds. Manley is an idealistic individual; while not always sincere or honest, he is capable of acknowledging that when one points this out to him. The three issues noted in your letter not only have important implications for the future of the North-South dialogue, but they also have a special resonance for Manley and Jamaica. (S)

One of the integral elements of the campaign which his political party (PNP) has been waging is crude and vicious anti-Americanism: the radicals in his party continually harp on CIA de-stabilization of Jamaica; or Seaga, Manley’s opponent, as a reactionary US puppet; or imperialism as the source of Jamaica’s problems. While Manley also often repeats the anti-imperialist theme, he is not personally engaged in this campaign; nonetheless, as the leader of his party, he must take some responsibility for it. The CIA believes that he is either acquiescing or directing the campaign. Thus, your first question strikes near to home. (S)

The second and third questions—on Cuba and on the implications of Third World rhetoric—also touch on sensitive issues. Nonetheless, I believe that Manley will take your questions seriously, and perhaps in searching for answers, he may recognize the dilemma he poses for
us, or perhaps he may shed some light on why our perceptions are so different. (S)

RECOMMENDATION

I recommend you sign the letter at Tab A because I really believe it could deepen the dialogue. However, I have prepared a second brief response at Tab B should you prefer to send that.³ (C)

³ Both Tabs are attached but not printed. Carter signed the letter at Tab B.

215. Telegram From the Embassy in Jamaica to the Department of State¹

Kingston, November 1, 1980, 1750Z

8091. Subject: President’s Message: Meeting With Prime Minister Designate. Ref: WH8181.²

1. Confidential entire text.

2. Summary. President Carter’s message was delivered to Prime Minister designate Seaga on November 1. Seaga was visibly pleased by it. In the conversation that followed he had one message, we are broke, help us to earn our way out. He says he will have to produce results and the next 30 days are critical. On security he gave me a list of JDF needs (septel).³ Until the vote count is final, probably by the middle of next week, he will not name a Cabinet. He hopes Parliament can be recalled in time to meet on November 6 to review the Suppression of Crimes Act. End summary.

3. Prime Minister designate Edward Seaga received me this morning, November 1, so I could deliver the President’s message of congratulations on Seaga’s election. He moved into Jamaica House, the PM’s office, at the same time and in fact had not even looked around the

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800522–1057. Confidential; Niac Immediate. On October 30, the JLP won 57.6 percent of the popular vote in the Jamaican national elections, easily defeating the PNP.

² Not found.

³ In telegram 8093 from Kingston, November 1, the Embassy listed the various military equipment Seaga had requested. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800521–0621)
place yet. He read the Presidential message attentively and without comment although visibly pleased. Hugh Shearer was present throughout. In the conversation that followed, Seaga said he has one message for me and for Washington, “we’re dead broke”. On election day there was not $1 dollar in foreign exchange in the bank although a $10 million loan from OAS received subsequently. This will see the country through the next Wednesday. He then presented me with a list of JDF needs which will be the subject of a septel.

4. Seaga said the next 30 days will be crucial for the future stability and political orientation of Jamaica. The people do not expect miracles, but they do expect visible movement on the economy. In addition to security forces needs, his priorities are food, raw materials and jobs. All require money, money that must come first of all from Jamaica and hopefully from foreign investment. He again stressed his intentions to get Jamaica out of the debt trap by relying on increased foreign exchange earnings and investment rather than loans. He claimed debt servicing next year will cost over $500 million.

5. Other issues raised during the meeting were the Cabinet and the Parliament. Members of the Cabinet will not be named until final results are in on all the elections, probably not until next Tuesday or Wednesday. Seaga is pushing the bureaucracy to finish ASAP. In the interim he will take charge of security and foreign affairs himself. Another reason he is anxious to get the election results settled quickly is the necessity to call Parliament into session November 6 to review the Suppression of Crimes Act which will otherwise expire November 9.

6. I told Seaga that I felt it would be useful and important for me to bring the AID Mission Director and the Embassy Economic Counsellor to meet with him and appropriate members of his staff ASAP. The purpose would be to explain the goals and operations of our AID Mission and to have an in depth discussion on their views of the economy and how they plan to get it moving.

7. Hugh Shearer noted with great glee a reported claim by Radio Moscow that with the departure of the Manley government the USSR had [garble—lost an?] ally. He and Seaga then mentioned their monitoring of the PNP radio gave them some cause for concern. They said they heard PNP General Secretary D.K. Duncan screaming for a revolutionary reaction to new government. We have heard these rantings and ravings by Duncan. They are in character with what we know about him but with the security forces playing an independent constitutional role he does not have much opportunity to go beyond raving, organizing, and planning just now.

8. Comment. Seaga and Shearer were sober and restrained although clearly delighted with the outcome of the election. The meeting went on as a continuation of the friendly businesslike meetings we have had.
over the past six months. I would also stress that despite rumblings from the PNP and the far left that they wuz robbed, and blustering statements from some of them, Jamaica’s democratic institutions, with the help of the security forces, are proceeding in an orderly constitutional manner. The people all over the island are calm. Many are still celebrating. There is not panic or insurrection anywhere.\footnote{Lawrence also visited Manley on November 1. Manley blamed his defeat on police interference, election violence, and the economy. (Telegram 8092 from Kingston, November 1; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 40, Jamaica, 1/77–10/79 through Japan, 6–12/78)}

Lawrence

\footnotetext{216. Memorandum Prepared in the National Foreign Assessment Center, Central Intelligence Agency\footnote{Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Box 23, Jamaica, 1980. Secret. Prepared by John Gannon, Office of Economic Research, and [name not declassified], Latin American Division of the Office of Political Analysis, and coordinated with the National Intelligence Officer for Latin America. According to a note on the first page, the memorandum was requested by Brzezinski.}}


JAMAICA: Need For Assistance

Prime Minister Edward Seaga, faced with an empty treasury, is moving quickly to negotiate balance of payments assistance with the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—which likely will pave the way for additional aid from Western countries. Talks with IMF officials in Washington are scheduled later this week and an accord may result by the middle of next month. [portion marking not declassified]

In the interim, Seaga’s overwhelming election mandate gives him the leverage to avert further political deterioration. In the longer term, however, both local and international experts agree that substantial Western assistance—fast-disbursing aid for the current fiscal year—will be essential for political stability and economic recovery on the troubled island over the next four or five years. [portion marking not declassified]
Seaga’s Problems and Prospects

Seaga’s election has improved prospects for Jamaica’s recovery across the board. Although the government is virtually bankrupt and may be forced further into arrears on its foreign debt—now about $1.4 billion—Seaga will have widespread support for the near term among the private sector, organized labor, small farmers, the security forces, and the international financial community. As he formulates and begins to implement his recovery program over the next few months, local opposition groups probably will have little success in capitalizing on continuing economic hardship across the country. [portion marking not declassified]

Seaga recognizes that a new IMF agreement is the first critical step in securing additional aid. The World Bank, for example, is considering a $30–$50 million loan to accompany IMF credits. Jamaica also has negotiated a $100 million credit from a consortium of US and Canadian commercial banks that is tied to the IMF negotiations. [portion marking not declassified]

The Jamaican government, particularly concerned about shortfalls over the next two months, appears to have a good chance of bridging the gap. Seaga expects within the next few days to receive $48 million in credits from Venezuela’s oil facility. He also has available a $25 million loan from Iraq, which he intends to keep in reserve unless Caracas fails to honor its pledges. The Prime Minister hopes that bilateral aid from Western countries will enable him to save the Iraqi funds and to avoid requesting early payment of Jamaica’s levy—about $55 million due on 15 January—on North American bauxite companies. These alternative sources, nevertheless, provide him an ace in the hole. [portion marking not declassified]

The Longer Term

Despite their current euphoria, Seaga’s supporters will tolerate only a short “honeymoon;” they have high expectations of “delivery” from the eight years of negative economic growth under the Manley government. To consolidate his position, Seaga will have to quickly translate his popularity among the local business community into increased confidence among Western aid donors and gradually among foreign investors. [portion marking not declassified]

IMF talks will concentrate on a three-year economic recovery program that would allow Jamaica to draw about $190 million annually from the IMF and to benefit from IBRD assistance of about $60 million. [5 lines not declassified] The fund hopes that the US will kick in $50–$60 million in fast-disbursing aid in 1981. Seaga’s success in convincing Washington and other Western donors to provide increased assistance both in the near and long term will largely determine the stability of
his government. His first crisis will be precipitated by powerful unions resisting further cuts in real wages under a new IMF program. Eventually, any strains in Seaga’s government will benefit the pro-Cuban left, which is certain to regain its political influence if Seaga’s moderate course does not lead visibly to economic recovery. [portion marking not declassified]
Dominican Republic

217. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, April 22, 1977

SUBJECT
The Political Situation in the DR: Views of the PRD

PARTICIPANTS
Jose Francisco Pena Gomez, Secretary General of the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano
Terence A. Todman, Assistant Secretary for American Republic Affairs
George Lister, Special Assistant and Human Rights Officer—ARA
Gerald de Santillana—ARA/CAR

After an exchange of courtesies, Pena Gomez reported briefly on his attendance at recent meetings of the Second (Socialist) International in Europe. He remarked that the Socialist International was very interested in Latin America, and had delegated Portuguese Prime Minister Mario Soares (whom Pena Gomez had met with) to head a special mission to several Latin American countries later this year.

Support for the Administration’s Foreign Policy

Pena said the PRD executive committee had asked him to convey the party’s warm support for the foreign policy of a recent statement by ARA Deputy Assistant Secretary Bray before subcommittees of the House International Relations Committee on U.S. policy concerning the recent elections in El Salvador (copy of Mr. Bray’s statement attached). The PRD had been very pleased to learn of the U.S.’s interest in free elections and of the connection between U.S. assistance programs and the observance of certain human rights. Pena said he had brought Mr. Bray’s statement to the attention of the Socialist International.

The Political Situation in the DR

Pena said the Dominican Republic at present is neither a dictatorship nor a democracy, but somewhere in between. The country has

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770066–1854. Confidential. Drafted by de Santillana; cleared by Todman and Lister. The meeting was held in Todman’s office.
2 The Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD) was the leading opposition party in the Dominican Republic.
3 Not attached. In telegram 51614 to San Salvador, March 8, the Department transmitted the text of Bray’s statement. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770080–0276)
“all the conditions” for a democracy, including a completely free press and freedom for opposition parties. Repression has diminished greatly in the past few years, and the Dominican military has become “more moderate”.

At the same time, the military has become more involved in politics than they should. Referring briefly to his own run-in with the Dominican military earlier this year, Pena said in his January meeting with the military leaders he had strongly censured them for campaigning on behalf of President Balaguer. According to Pena, some “over-eager” members of President Balaguer’s Reformista party have been lobbying the military, drawing them into politics on behalf of the Reformista party. This could lead the country to disaster.

In sum, Pena said the PRD is concerned for possible military intervention in the 1978 general elections. It hopes for “moderation” by the military, and elections that are basically free.

The U.S. Role

Pena said that the U.S., which has great influence in the Dominican Republic, can play a vital role in helping to assure “relatively free” elections and the attainment of full democracy in the country. Most of the other parties in the DR, and other important institutions, such as the Catholic Church, share the PRD’s views on the elections. Moreover, some of the Dominican military, such as Police Chief General Neit Nivar Seijas, seem to be relatively moderate, and would listen to the U.S. On the other hand, some of the Dominican officers are incredibly ignorant, Pena said; several of them had accused the PRD of being communist for its participation in the Socialist International!

The 1978 elections, he concluded, would be a major “test case” for democracy in the Hemisphere.

President Balaguer

Pena Gomez characterized Balaguer as a highly talented and capable political leader, who has achieved impressive progress in making the DR a freer society. If Balaguer could complete the attainment of democracy by ensuring free elections in 1978, his place in history would be assured.

Amembassy—Santo Domingo

Pena Gomez commented favorably on Ambassador Hurwitch and our Embassy in Santo Domingo, which he said has maintained close and friendly contact with the PRD.

Ambassador Todman said he was very pleased to learn of Pena Gomez’s views, and to have had the opportunity to meet with him.

COMMENT: Pena Gomez was quite friendly and positive in tone. He seemed genuinely encouraged with the progress in the Dominican
Republic. Pena remarked that he had also met with Ambassador Young in New York, and with Rep. Donald Fraser and Mr. Schneider of Sen. Kennedy’s office here in Washington.

218. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State

Santo Domingo, June 17, 1977, 1415Z

2942. Subject: GODR Effort To Counter Local Press Reports That U.S. and Dominican Republic Diverged on Human Rights Issue at Grenada.

1. Following was drafted by Ambassador before he departed post this morning.

2. At 11 p.m. last night Rafael Bello Andino, Private Secretary to President Balaguer, came to see me at President’s instruction, he said, to show me cable from Fon Sec Jimenez reporting his bilateral talk with Secretary Vance. Substance of cable was that talk was very cordial and that Secretary Vance conveyed warm greetings from President Carter to President Balaguer. Further, that Secretary Vance mentioned approvingly progress made by Dominican Republic in recent years. Finally, that Secretary Vance had evinced surprise upon hearing that Dominican press was reporting that Dominican Republic diverged from U.S. on human rights issue, for he thought both governments united on question.

3. Bello said that GODR strongly desired to publish text of Jimenez cable and purpose of his visit was to inquire as to whether there would be any objection to doing so. I cautioned Bello that bilateral talks between Foreign Secretaries were normally considered privileged, unless agreement had been reached beforehand between the participants to make all or part of it public. I added that if, notwithstanding

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770217–0098. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated for information to the U.S. Delegation to the OAS General Assembly meeting in Grenada.

2 In telegram 46 from Grenada, June 19, the Delegation reported on the June 16 meeting, during which Vance and Jimenez discussed the economic progress of the Dominican Republic, terrorism, and human rights. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770219–0058)
normal practice, GODR decided to publish Jimenez’s message, I would undertake to explain the circumstances. 

4. Bello expressed hope that Department might find appropriate occasion to mention publicly U.S. and Dominican identity of views re human rights.

5. Comment: Although Presidential and other elections are still eleven months away (May 1978), local political maneuvering and keen public interest give impression that elections are imminent. June 15 edition of widely read El Caribe carried top headline that U.S. and Dominican Republic diverged on human rights stance at Grenada. Same story mentioned that in congressional subcommittee suggestion had been made to include Dominican Republic in list of countries whose human rights policies warranted exclusion from military and economic assistance, but that suggestion was rebuffed. Conclusion that average reader could reasonably reach was that U.S. and Dominican Republic were at odds and that GODR respect for human rights might be inadequate in U.S. view. In current charged political atmosphere where relations with U.S. play important role, President Balaguer’s concern that El Caribe story could provide political opposition with telling ammunition is reasonable. Publishing Jimenez’s cable would undoubtedly clarify the situation here. I expect therefore that it will probably be made public.

6. I am persuaded that there is no important divergence of view between U.S. policy on human rights and that of President Balaguer. Since the report to Congress regarding the status of human rights in the Dominican Republic (which apparently caused no concern in Washington), President Balaguer has taken a number of steps to improve his performance in this area, including reinstatement to his chief oppositionist, Pena Gomez, of his right to speak on the radio. All of these steps are a matter of record in the Department. Accordingly, I perceive no objection to some U.S. official fulfilling hope expressed para 4 above. Such a step on our part would certainly clear the air here.

Axelrod

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3 In telegram 2948 from Santo Domingo, June 17, the Embassy reported that extracts from Jimenez’s report to Balaguer on his meeting with Vance were published in the Dominican press “under headlines noting identity of Dominican and US human rights positions at OASGA meeting.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770217–0336)

4 The Department of State submitted reports to Congress on human rights in countries receiving security assistance, including the Dominican Republic. The reports were made public on March 12. (Bernard Gwertzman, “U.S. Says Most Lands Receiving Arms Aid Are Abusing Rights,” The New York Times, March 13, p. 1)
219. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 8, 1977, 2:45 p.m.

SUBJECT
President Carter/President Balaguer Bilateral

PARTICIPANTS

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
Joaquin Balaguer, President of the Dominican Republic
Foreign Secretary Jimenez
Ambassador Vicioso
Ambassador to the OAS Dipp-Gomez
Dominican Aide Rafael Bello Andino
Mayor of Santo Domingo Estrella Rojas

U.S.
President Carter
Secretary Vance
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
Assistant Secretary Todman
Robert Pastor, NSC
Robert A. Hurwitch, Ambassador,

President Carter thanked President Balaguer and his associates for coming to Washington to participate in the Panama Canal Treaties signing ceremonies. The Treaties were very important to the U.S. and for its relations with Latin America. President Balaguer’s presence was very beneficial to these ends.

Human Rights

President Carter also expressed his appreciation for the hospitality shown to Ambassador Young during the latter’s visit to the Dominican Republic. Ambassador Young had reported with satisfaction President Balaguer’s intention to sign the American Convention on Human Rights, and President Carter noted with gratification that the GODR had done so yesterday.

President Carter also thanked President Balaguer for co-sponsoring the resolution on Human Rights at the OAS General Assembly in Grenada. The example Balaguer is setting in the Dominican Republic is having a positive effect on other countries.

Dominican Elections

Referring to the Dominican elections in May 1978, President Carter expressed the hope that they would be conducted with cognizance of everyone’s rights. If Balaguer were to be a candidate, he wished him

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770168-1185. Confidential. The meeting was held in the White House. President Carter’s talking points for this meeting stressed the importance of the 1978 elections and the International Sugar Agreement. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Latin America: Bilateral Meetings Background Material, 9/77)
2 Ambassador Young visited the Dominican Republic on August 15.
well. President Carter asked how President Balaguer saw the forthcoming elections and inquired as to the attitude of the Dominican people.

Balaguer responded that it was a great pleasure to participate in an historic signing ceremony. The New Panama Canal Treaty will greatly strengthen U.S. relations with the hemisphere. As he had said in remarks upon arriving in the U.S., Balaguer asserted that the Latin American nations should put their houses in order, improve the standard of living of their peoples, and respect human rights, including the rights to work and to enjoy education within the means of a developing country. Dominican support at Grenada and the signing of the Human Rights Convention conform to Dominican traditions in those areas.

President Balaguer admired the efforts President Carter was making to obtain the support of the American people for the new Panama Canal Treaty. Although there is little a small country could do, President Carter could count upon the full measure of Dominican moral support.

Concerning the forthcoming elections in the Dominican Republic, President Balaguer said that the process was proceeding normally. The institution of the electoral register (“registro electoral”) guaranteed the probity of the elections. Fraud was not possible under this system, although losers often cried fraud. The electoral register system had been initially proposed by a Chilean jurist; it is a progressive system and is better than any other in Latin America with the possible exception of Venezuela and Chile before Allende. All candidates will have an equal opportunity, Balaguer continued. If his party selects him, he will subject himself to the same conditions affecting all candidates—he would seek no advantages from his incumbency. President Balaguer said that he has not yet made up his mind regarding his candidacy and under the law is not required to do so until two months before the elections. Frankly speaking, although he thinks he should make way for a younger person, no one has arisen in his party, nor in the opposition, who can guarantee peace, progress and unity of the Armed Forces. This last is important, otherwise there is a risk of a repetition of the events of 1965. He had unified the Dominican Armed Forces, and although they are not monolithic, no severe rivalries now exist within the Armed Forces, as was the case elsewhere in the hemisphere. The Dominican Armed Forces now know their role to be that of peacekeepers. President Balaguer said that he has no further political ambi-

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3 The United States occupied the Dominican Republic in April–May 1965 after unrest stemming from conflicts between the governing junta and supporters of exiled former President Juan Bosch threatened the lives of American citizens. See *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, vol. XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana.
tions, and if he decides to run again, it would be a source of sacrifice, not satisfaction.

Sugar

The President responded that it was a very exciting and gratifying experience to hear President Balaguer’s description of the political developments in the Dominican Republic. It is well on the way to becoming one of the most democratic of the countries of the hemisphere. The President continued that he knew both countries were seeking an international agreement on sugar, which he hoped would become a reality before the year’s end. The U.S. imports and produces large quantities of sugar and would value President Balaguer’s views concerning a sugar agreement, and concerning Cuban intentions on sugar.

President Balaguer replied that GODR did not have diplomatic relations with Cuba, but understood that Cuba was generally in line with the point of view of the Dominican Republic and other sugar exporters. As far as the Dominican Republic is concerned, it is unfortunately still a mono-culture, overly dependent upon sugar. Sugar represents 85 percent of its total exports.

The Dominican Republic hopes for special U.S. assistance in this area and at the least, if preferential treatment were not possible, equitable treatment. If no agreement could be reached at the international sugar negotiations in Geneva, and a U.S. quota system were reconstituted, then the Dominican Republic desired a quota approximately equivalent to its recent exports of sugar to the U.S.

President Balaguer emphasized that no other country found itself so dependent upon sugar. He is making strenuous efforts to diversify agricultural exports to diminish that dependence. Coffee production is being improved; new lands are being brought into production through an irrigation network. The Dominican Republic needs a period of from 2–5 years to diversify. In the meantime it is counting upon U.S. assistance, either through a Geneva agreement which would establish a 13.5 cent floor for sugar prices, enabling the Dominican sugar industry to survive, or through some other means.

President Carter replied that U.S. and Dominican positions would be compatible and that the U.S. would help. It was helpful to be reminded how important sugar is to the Dominican economy.

4 In December 1977, the United States and the Dominican Republic both signed the International Sugar Agreement (ISA), which Ambassador Hurwich described as “the only method of achieving higher sugar prices.” (Telegram 7360 from Santo Domingo, December 14; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770466-0557)
Bilateral Relations

The President expressed appreciation for the identity of views between our two countries at the UN, and expressed hope that the cooperation would continue during forthcoming sessions. He presented Balaguer with a copy of his book and a book of satellite photos. Satellite photos served geologic and similar purposes as well as military.

If President Balaguer desired, the possibility of doing such photos of the Dominican Republic could be explored. The President closed the session with expressions of warm appreciation and admiration.

Balaguer responded equally warmly, and presented the President with a wooden case of 100 year old Dominican mahogany containing several pieces of 18th century ceramics.

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220. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State

Santo Domingo, October 21, 1977, 2115Z

6383. Subject: Asst Sec Todman’s Visit to the Dominican Republic Oct 16–19. Ref (A) Santo Domingo 6344 (Notal) (B) Santo Domingo 6351 (Notal) (C) Santo Domingo 6286.2

Summary. Ambassador Todman’s visit reinforced present excellent state of US–GODR relations and elicited Dominican desire to participate actively in Caribbean Consultative Group’s approach to socio-economic problems in the subregion. Todman’s reaffirmation of Carter administration’s determination to pay closer attention to Caribbean warmly received by all sectors in Dominican life. At same time, textiles and sugar remain as outstanding bilateral issues. Finally, unsurprisingly, visit was seen by two main contending political forces, government and opposition (PRD), as event to be exploited for partisan advantage. End summary.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770390–0384. Confidential. Repeated for information to Port au Prince.

2 Telegram 6344 from Santo Domingo is dated October 20. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770386–0688) Telegram 6351 from Santo Domingo is also dated October 20. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770386–0772) Telegram 6286 from Santo Domingo is dated October 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770384–0272)
1. Ambassador Todman took advantage of his invitation to address annual InterAmerican Press Association (IAPA) convention here to underscore Washington’s intensified concern with developments in the Caribbean. He reiterated administration policies for promotion of human rights that include respect for the human person, political freedoms and economic and social needs of poorest. In Dominican context, main implication of this emphasis was considered to be support for free and open elections.

2. Regarding national elections scheduled here next May, Todman emphasized US neutrality both in private meetings with government and opposition figures and publicly in answer to questions from the press, which gave heavy and uniformly positive coverage to visit. In hour long meeting with leaders of Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD), principal opposition party, he rejected their criticism of President Carter’s praise of President Balaguer for progress made in DR under his administrations (Ref A). PRD has been smarting under government’s exploitation of President Carter’s Sept 8 reference to Balaguer’s commitment to human rights as “source of inspiration”. PRD showed itself at a loss to cope with Balaguerista propaganda offensive. Some press commentary, for example, needles the party for its immaturity.

3. Asst Sec Todman’s emphasis on US interest in all groups in Dominican society, was manifest in his visit to Republic’s second city, Santiago, and in his tour of Santo Domingo, including poorest sections. Todman’s visit to Bishop Roque Adames, head of the Dominican Bishops’ Commission of Justicia y Paz in Santiago and leading force for defense of human rights in DR, while not as widely noted as his other activities here, further focused attention on weight US attaches to protection of human rights. He employed his appearance before IAPA convention to demonstrate coincidence of US and GODR policies supporting free press so staunchly defended by hemisphere Press Association.

4. Closeness of US and Dominican positions on most other issues also came through clearly in Todman’s formal meetings with President Balaguer and FonSec Jimenez, although latter expressed some apprehension about USG designs on DR textile exports (Ref B), and, in subsequent approach, about sugar. Convergence of US-Dominican interests regarding proposed Caribbean Consultative Group quickly became evident following Asst Sec Todman’s detailed outline of its aims and purposes. Dominicans emphasized interest in helping pro-
mote development of Haiti and in cooperation with GOH in island-
wide tourism promotion effort. Foreign Secretary noted he had author-
ization to sign technical accords negotiated some time ago with Haiti
on commerce, banking and transport and was eager to conclude them
but he claimed that GOH was procrastinating on them.

5. At request of Foreign Secretary, Todman met with sugar execu-
tives to discuss recently concluded negotiations on ISA (Ref C). They
complained that DR had been shortchanged in final version of ISA
agreement and speculated that Dominican Congress might not approve
ISA. (However, President Balaguer has plainly indicated to Ambassa-
dor that GODR will sign and ratify pact.)

6. Comment: Although Ambassador Todman had heavy competi-
tion with the torrent of publicity expended on encomiums to the press
during the IAPA convention, his visit here received prominent and
very favorable attention from Dominican media. Embassy contacts
from various sectors of Dominican society also were complimentary,
noting his ability to communicate in Spanish; skill in keeping his pres-
ence here, and USG, which is commonly assumed to arbitrate Domini-
can politics, disentangled from the electoral process now in full swing
here; and his visits to both the Republic’s most honored monuments
and its most wretched slums. While Dominican officials show unease
over impending restraints on textile marketing in US and over prospects
for Dominican sugar exports to US, and others speculate hopefully
that USG’s new focus on Caribbean portends renewal of assistance on
scale of Alliance for Progress, Todman visit, following on Ambassador
Young’s tour here and President Balaguer’s talk with President Carter,
was palpable evidence of US desire to maintain and strengthen close
and cordial ties with this country.

Hurwitch
Santo Domingo, February 16, 1978, 2127Z

941. Subject: Meeting With President Balaguer: Politics and the Elections. Ref Santo Domingo 931.2

1. In meeting with President Balaguer reported ref tel, I informed the President that I planned to depart soon for the COM conference in Washington and expected that our mutual friend, Assistant Secretary Todman, would inquire about him and his election plans. Balaguer asked that I convey his warmest regards to Todman. He continued that he saw no alternative to his becoming a candidate again. His own party had not produced any strong candidates and the calibre of opposition candidates was worse. He decried the divisions within several opposition parties and their inability to find unity among them. He attributed this unfortunate state of affairs to the lengthy Trujillo dictatorship and the deep divisions that led up to the events of 1965.

2. When I inquired regarding his running mate for the Vice Presidency as a means of ensuring his policies should he be elected and be unable to fulfill his term, Balaguer launched into what is becoming a favorite theme: one cannot impose a successor on the people. The Presidency is not an inherited office, he continued, and therefore a President, if he is to govern successfully, must emerge from the society itself; otherwise, an “imposed” President risked being toppled easily, with all the ensuing consequences of instability. When I asked whether he thought the situation would be different four years hence, Balaguer replied that he thought the next four years would witness considerable political ferment out of which he expected new political leadership to arise. He said that were he to continue as President, he would place no obstacles in the way of an emerging leader. He thought the PRD had an important role to play, had considerable strength in several parts of the country, and could even win the elections. “People are fickle,” he concluded.

3. Comment. It is reasonable to assume that Balaguer will run again3 and that his Vice Presidential candidate will either be Goico

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780073–1104. Confidential.

2 In telegram 931 from Santo Domingo, February 16, the Embassy reported on Hurwitch’s meeting with Balaguer. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780073–0957)

3 Telegram 1135 from Santo Domingo, February 28, reported that Balaguer formally indicated he would run for another term. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780093–0162)
Morales (present incumbent) or a similar candidate who has no Presidential ambition.

4. The President is being disingenuous in his observations regarding lack of leadership in the parties and divisions among the opposition. His own authoritarian manner has discouraged real leadership within his party and his well known tactic of wooing certain opposition leaders has in part been responsible for opposition division.

Hurwitch

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222. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State

Santo Domingo, April 11, 1978, 1700Z

1867. Subject: Dominican Military Attitudes Toward PRD.

1. According to reports from confidential sources, some ranking officers of the armed forces have been saying privately that if Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD) were to win the Presidency in May 16 election, there would be military intervention to prevent PRD from governing country.

2. This kind of speculation may have figured in announcement by PRD SecGen Pena Gomez (SD 1806) that he would stand down from leadership role after PRD Presidential and Vice Presidential winners are installed in office. Pena has long been bete noire of Dominican military, most of whom fear and some even hate him; they see Pena as dominating the party’s Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates, as well as the party, and they believe he would, if the PRD won the election next month, gain effective control of the country after the August 16 Presidential inauguration.

3. It is therefore not surprising to receive reports that senior military personalities, watching PRD’s campaign unfold more or less smoothly while considerable turmoil continues within Balaguer’s Reformista Party, are thinking aloud about possibilities of an electoral upset.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780156–0234. Secret.

2 Dated April 7. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780154–0415)
Clearly, they are apprehensive about what this would portend for them individually and for the armed forces.

4. At this time, however, it seems very improbable that well-known divisions within Dominican military hierarchy could be overcome sufficiently to permit effective conspiratorial action to prevent, by force majeure before or after election, PRD from coming to power. In any case, we have no indication to date that the two rival factions within Dominican military are coordinating anything that could be construed as operational plans to this end, nor is there any evidence that any group is mobilizing for a possible coup action if PRD wins the election.

5. There is always the possibility, of course, that factions might decide to mount some extra-constitutional effort independently of one another or in parallel to thwart an electoral decision in favor of the PRD. At this juncture, however, there is general consensus on the public record strongly in favor of respecting the integrity of the electoral process. It would thus be extremely difficult for a military group to find a plausible pretext for taking extra-constitutional action to frustrate the popular will. Following the lead taken by President Balaguer, statements by the Secretary of the Armed Forces and other ranking military have emphasized the intent of the military to avoid partisan intervention and respect the rights of contending candidates. President Balaguer himself, the one figure who retains the loyalty of all factions of the armed forces, has urged, both publicly and privately, that electoral campaign be conducted in atmosphere of civility and mutual respect. He recently told Ambassador Hurwitch he would be first to send congratulatory message to a victorious opposition. And in April 7 campaign speech he affirmed he would win election “con votas no con botas” (“with votes not boots”).

6. Nevertheless, a change in atmosphere and conditions and reckless actions remain possibilities, however unrealistic they may appear at this juncture, and we shall remain alert to any indications that they are taking more than speculative form. Dominicans are well aware of primary US concern that elections be free and fair, of US neutrality among contenders and of US intent to maintain cordial relationship with the resulting elected government. For benefit of military and their civilian associates who may have ideas of carrying further musings re extra-constitutional action that might be taken to frustrate an opposition victory—perhaps in belief US would in the end condone such action—Mission officers have taken opportunities, as elections approach, to make clear that US is genuinely concerned that democratic process be respected.

7. Such message was conveyed, for example, to certain military and political figures at Ambassador Hurwitch’s March 31 farewell
reception and at reception offered by Secretary of Armed Forces on April 6 for visiting members of Inter-American Defense College as well as in other recent contacts. In conversation on subject at reception for IADC, Armed Forces Secretary Beauchamp assured Charge that he was maintaining non-partisan stance of military forces, despite provocative statements of PRD SecGen Pena Gomez. In conversation April 3, the Foreign Secretary, Vice Admiral Jimenez, opined to DCM that he expected Balaguer to win but in the event of PRD triumph, military would accept results, though trouble would brew if thereafter the PRD government sought to make radical changes in armed forces. He recognized that the new President would have the right to designate the Armed Forces Secretary of his choice, but, he asserted, there would be resistance if, for instance, the PRD President appointed one of the party’s politicos as a general.

8. In conversations on the elections with important military and political figures, senior Mission officers are making following points:

A. The USG favors no party or candidate.

B. We have said publicly on various occasions that we expect to maintain our traditional cordial and constructive relations with whatever constitutional government takes power next August.

C. We note that the present electoral climate has remained calm and that a spirit of mutual respect and constructive dialogue among the contending candidates has emerged.

D. This is consistent with public declarations by President Balaguer that the elections will be clean and free. It is consistent also with declarations by the Secretary of the Armed Forces and other senior military officers that the armed forces and police will be completely neutral in the election campaign and will respect the outcome of the elections.

E. Extra-constitutional or illegal actions to frustrate free elections and their results seem implausible under these conditions, but any such moves that might be made would provoke a strongly negative reaction from Washington.

Axelrod

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3 In telegram 1768 from Santo Domingo, April 5, the Embassy transmitted the text of Hurwitz’s speech at his farewell party. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780148-0559)
Washington, April 15, 1978, 0347Z

97375. Subject: Dominican Elections. Ref: (A) Santo Domingo 1867; (B) Santo Domingo 1768.  

1. Department appreciates Embassy’s thorough reporting and analysis of Dominican election campaign, particularly on issues related to Dominican military attitudes. We concur fully with the initiatives the Embassy has undertaken to make clear USG concern that the elections be free and fair, our complete neutrality with respect to candidates, and our intent to maintain cordial relations with any government which may emerge from free elections.

2. As elections approach, Embassy should continue to take appropriate opportunities to make U.S. positions known, particularly to the Dominican military, without injecting the U.S. in the campaign. Also, as Chief of Mission considers it appropriate, the Embassy should make clear to any ranking Dominican military officers whose attitudes or intentions may be questionable that any actions to frustrate free elections would impact severely and adversely on U.S.-Dominican bilateral relations.

Christopher

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780163–0182. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by de Santillana; cleared by Shelton, Hewitt, and Schneider; approved by Bushnell.

2 See Document 222 and footnote 3 thereto.
224. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State

Santo Domingo, May 15, 1978, 2205Z


1. MAAG officer was paid a visit by PRD Presidential candidate Antonio Guzman, May 11. Formal visit was arranged by officer’s neighbor who is friend of Guzman’s. PRD Presidential hopeful used opportunity to inform US military of his plans for Dominican armed forces should he win May 16 elections.

2. Guzman expressed deep concern over corruption in Dominican military under current administration. He said he wanted a military which adhered to professionalism and refrained from politics and excessive money-making. To deal with problem he said he planned to gradually remove several leading general officers should he be elected, specifically politically powerful Chief of National Police MGen. Neit Nivar Seijas. PRD leader also expressed his friendship toward the US, lauded President Carter and his human rights policy and assured MAAG officer that despite the widely heard view that the PRD is left-leaning, he is not a Communist sympathizer.

3. Curious circumstance of Guzman taking time out of busy schedule in final busy days of hard-fought campaign reflects degree of preoccupation in PRD leadership over difficulties they may encounter in dealing with present Dominican military leadership. Most of these officers learned their trade under the late dictator Rafael Trujillo and for the last twelve years have known nothing but absolute loyalty to President Joaquin Balaguer. Example of this was public statement May 13 by Navy Chief of Staff Vice-Admiral Francisco Javier Rivera Caminero who, while assuring he would respect results of upcoming election, took opportunity to declare himself “a Balaguerista from the top of my head to the tip of my toes.” He said Balaguer would win the May 16 election.

4. EmbOffs have often heard PRD leaders express interest that US military establishment understand that their party is not hostile to US and use its influence to mollify the Dominican military should it come to power. (This reflects an unrealistic, though commonly held view here of degree of MAAG influence over Dominican armed forces, as well as opinion that somehow US military can act independently.)

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780205–1236. Secret.
5. Comment: Whatever Guzman’s intentions, he has touched on a very sensitive subject. In his own public statements, he has emphasized that he would respect the current structure of the armed forces. However, he is saying in private that he would remove some key officers. It is precisely this attitude which makes the DR military hierarchy so fearful of the PRD’s achieving power. Should the PRD win the election, any precipitate moves vis-a-vis the military are likely to set off a strong reaction.

Yost

225. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic


123668. Exdis for the Ambassador. Subject: Dominican Elections: Contingency Instructions. Ref: (A) State 097375; (B) de Santillana/Axelrod telecon.3

1. The Department has noted recent intelligence reports indicating that some elements of the Dominican military may be giving consideration to extra-constitutional action to thwart a possible victory by the opposition PRD party in tomorrow’s Presidential elections.

2. As stated in previous instructions, the USG has a strong interest in free and fair elections in the Dominican Republic and in an orderly constitutional transfer of power, if a candidate other than President Balaguer should win.

3. If you should receive evidence or information leading you to conclude that the Dominican military intends to take action to frustrate free elections or PRD victory, you should without waiting for further instructions, seek immediate meetings with President Balaguer and with ranking officers of the Dominican military. In meetings you should:

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780205-1106. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by de Santillana; cleared by Griffith, Shelton, and in S/S-O; approved by Todman.
2 See Document 223.
3 No record of the telephone conversation has been found.
4 Presumably telegram 97375 to Santo Domingo.
—Stress as forcefully as possible the USG’s deep concern at information of intended military action;
—Note President Balaguer’s statement to President Carter in Washington last September the election would be free and open;\(^5\)
—Emphasize our strong interest in free elections in the Dominican Republic, and that their results be respected;
—Make clear that unconstitutional action to frustrate free elections or PRD victory would provoke a strongly negative reaction by the USG and have seriously adverse consequences for U.S.-Dominican relations; and
—(For Balaguer) urge him to immediately exert his great influence with the Dominican military and in his country to ensure that free elections and constitutional procedures are respected.

4. The Deputy Chief of Mission should make this approach to one or more Dominican military leaders in place of the Ambassador if urgency requires simultaneous meetings.

Vance

\(^5\) See Document 219.
1. Reports reaching US indicate that the electoral process may have been interrupted by intervention from the military. I want to emphasize that if the elections were not permitted to proceed freely and honestly, there would inevitably be an adverse effect on the close and cooperative relations between our two countries.

2. I have been trying to reach you on the telephone this morning and have been unable to get through. It is urgent that I speak with you about this matter which is of the utmost importance for our relations.

Vance

3 In telegram 2630 from Santo Domingo, May 17, the Embassy reported that members of the armed forces, led by Nivar, stopped the vote count during the morning of May 17, after Guzman’s returns in the cities were higher than expected. Guzman was leading Balaguer 2–1 at the time. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780208–0614)

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227. Backchannel Message From the White House Situation Room to the Embassy in Panama


WH80697. Panama: Please deliver to Mr. Bob Pastor, National Security Council, with the Staff Advance Team.

(State 125048.) Subject: GOC Reaction to Situation in Dominican Rep. Ref: Bogota 4658; Barnebey-Drexler telcons May 17.

1. Confirming telcons, Department is most appreciative for GOC offer to make demarche and take other diplomatic steps to help safeguard Dominican democracy. We have made efforts along these lines, including the Secretary’s having sent a personal letter to Balaguer.

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 8, Folder: Backchannel Messages: Latin America: 6/77–12/78. Confidential; Sensitive; Immediate.

2 In telegram 4658 from Bogota, May 17, the Embassy wrote about a Colombian offer to assist the United States in regard to the elections in the Dominican Republic. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780208–0027) No record of the telephone conversations has been found.

3 See Document 226.
2. Situation in Santo Domingo has improved. Military commanders have agreed to recognize results of elections. City is calm.

3. In effort to undergird GODR resolve to maintain democratic system, we believe it would be helpful for Colombians to make demarche in Santo Domingo. We also understand Venezuelans are making a similar approach.\textsuperscript{4}

Vance

\textsuperscript{4} Backchannel message WH80705, May 17, informed Pastor that Venezuela, Costa Rica, Panama, and Colombia delivered démarches “urging the results of the [Dominican] vote be honored.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 8, Folder: Backchannel Messages: Latin America: 6/77–12/78)

228. \textbf{Backchannel Message From the White House Situation Room to the Embassy in Panama}\textsuperscript{1}

\textit{Washington, May 17, 1978, 2334Z}

WH80706. From: The Situation Room. To: Bob Pastor.

Rick Inderfurth instructed us to inform you that the President has received two letters from Latin American Heads of State.

President Carazo of Costa Rica expressed his deep concern over events evolving in the Dominican Republic and asked that our Embassy in San Jose keep him informed as appropriate.

President Perez\textsuperscript{2} characterizes the Dominican situation as the most serious crisis in the Caribbean since the Cuban revolution and suggests applying the most severe OAS measures against the de facto regime should the Dominican election be nullified.

Meanwhile, the Panamanian Foreign Ministry today expressed its “deep concern over events in the Dominican Republic, which seem to be aimed at changing the results of the vote in which the Dominican people expressed their will.”

\textsuperscript{1} Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 8, Folder: Backchannel Messages: Latin America: 6/77–12/78. Confidential; Sensitive; Immediate.

\textsuperscript{2} Carlos Andres Perez, President of Venezuela.
President Joaquin Balaguer told OAS observers that the counting of the votes cast in yesterday’s elections—suspended this morning by the military forces—will be resumed.\(^3\)

\(^3\) In telegram 2646 from Santo Domingo, May 18, the Embassy reported that the counting of votes did not resume until 8:30 p.m. on May 18. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780208-0915)

229. Morning Reading Item for President Carter Prepared in the Department of State\(^1\)

Washington, May 18, 1978


As of 5:00 a.m. on May 18, 1978, the situation in the Dominican Republic is as follows:

It appears that Balaguer and the Dominican military, faced with questionable prospects for Balaguer’s reelection, have decided to vouchsafe his “reelection” by any means available, whether the pretext is plausible or not.

—The government probably acted before it had thought through the consequences of its actions. There appears to be some disarray within the government.

—Despite its present difficult position, the government seems to have decided to “cuff it out” in the hope that the entire problem will eventually disappear and leave Balaguer in peace—and in power.

—The government is trying to deflect responsibility for the army’s actions onto the opposition. Only government claques seem to take this seriously.

—President Balaguer responded to the Secretary’s note to him of yesterday morning.\(^2\) He was disappointingly vague, and even disen-

\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 17, Dominican Republic, 1/77–1/81. Confidential. Carter wrote at the top of the first page, “To Cy, We must support actual decision of voters—Be forceful & public.” The Reading Item was returned to Vance on May 18, under a covering memorandum from Aaron who wrote, “The President has returned the attached State Department Situation Report on the Dominican elections with a note for your further action.”

\(^2\) See Document 226.
genuous in places. He claimed that the vote count was interrupted “not by military interference but by rumors propagated by anti-democratic sectors about a supposed coup d’etat.” He added that his honor was at stake and that he would honorably fulfill his duties as president of his country and as a Dominican.3

—The government has vacillated over whether to continue the vote count. First Balaguer informed the OAS observers that there would be no further vote count; then he reversed himself. The possibilities of fraud are manifold and manifest, however, and it may well be that the only possible proof of an honest election would be a Guzman victory.

—A strong reaction by the opposition Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) could be developing. Its general executive committee voted late yesterday to reject any effort by the government to restart the tabulation. A general strike could be called to head off the count, but no time has been set.

Meanwhile, several Latin American countries, organized by President Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela, have begun to plan a strategy to ensure an honest election:

—For a while it appeared that either two or all three of the OAS observers would leave the country. Perez reacted strongly to these reports and lobbied hard with the OAS to keep all of them in place. Our Deputy OAS Representative also urged acting Secretary-General Zelaya to keep the observers in the Dominican Republic. Finally, they agreed to stay for two more days.

—President Perez has consulted with President Lopez Michelsen of Colombia, General Torrijos of Panama, and President Carazo of Costa Rica. They have all agreed that, if the tabulation of the votes is not resumed or if the result is fraudulent, they will sever their diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic. If they do so, they would want the United States to take a similar action.

—President Perez also suggested that a meeting of the OAS Organ of Consultation (Foreign Ministers, the equivalent of the UN Security Council) be called to discuss the Dominican elections. We thought this would be premature until the situation in the Dominican Republic clarifies itself. It now appears that Perez has had second thoughts and agrees with us.

We are waiting to see how the situation in the Dominican Republic develops today before we consider any concrete courses of action.

3 The Spanish text of Balaguer’s letter was transmitted in telegram 2649 from Santo Domingo, May 18. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780208–0996)
SUBJECT

Events in the Dominican Republic

It is still uncertain as to whether the Balaguer regime has reconsidered its plan to perpetrate an electoral fraud. There has also been considerable domestic interest in your position during this human rights crisis.\(^2\)

I recommend, therefore, that you approve the issuance of the attached Presidential statement. Secretary Vance agrees and has read and approved this proposed language. Fallows has cleared.

If you approve, we will first send the text to our Ambassadors in the Dominican Republic, Colombia, Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Panama, and will then issue this statement after allowing them a short time to inform their host governments.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve issuing the attached Presidential statement along the lines outlined above.\(^3\)
Attachment

Draft Presidential Statement

Washington, undated

Draft Presidential Statement on the Dominican Republic

I am closely following the events surrounding the election in the Dominican Republic and have been in touch with the Presidents of several neighboring countries in Latin America. I believe we share a common concern for the integrity of the democratic process. I retain my hope that the legally constituted electoral authorities in the Dominican Republic will be able to fully carry out their responsibilities, and that the outcome of the elections will be respected by all.

4 No classification marking.

231. Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Information Cable


COUNTRY
Dominican Republic

SUBJECT
1) President Joaquin Balaguer orders cancellation of election fraud
2) Dominican military reaction to the Presidential order (DOI: [number not declassified] May 1978)

SOURCE
[3 lines not declassified]

1. President Joaquin Balaguer Ricardo, Reformist Party Presidential candidate for reelection to a fourth term, has buckled under intense domestic and foreign pressures and has ordered his military supporters

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 16, Folder: Dominican Republic, 9/77–6/78. Secret; Immediate; Wnint; Noforn; Nocontract.
to cancel plans to alter through fraudulent means the results of the 16 May national elections. Balaguer has ordered that the ballot counting be permitted to proceed normally, without interference, regardless of the outcome. The President informed his military supporters of his intention to impugn the election results because he has strong evidence that the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) did in fact commit fraud during the electoral process. However, Balaguer said that if the PRD is declared the legitimate victor, and his charges of fraud against them are proven unfounded, he will relinquish power to the PRD on 16 August 1978, inauguration day.

2. The President resisted vigorous arguments by his military supporters to proceed with the election fraud. His order has caught the armed forces leaders by complete surprise and has resulted in complete destruction of the newly established unity of the military. The military has split again into the previous factions led by Major General Neit Rafael Nivar Seijas, Chief of the National Police, and Major General Enrique Perez y Perez, Commander of the First Brigade of the Dominican Army. In order to pacify the agitated state of his military supporters, Balaguer has promised that before the end of May 1978 he will give the armed forces and police a substantial increase in salaries.

3. (Embassy comment: The Embassy is now receiving reports to similar effect from other sources. Have just heard that President Balaguer is due to make announcement over TV very shortly.)

4. Acquired: [2 lines not declassified]

5. [2 lines not declassified]

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2 Balaguer spoke on television the night of May 19. The Embassy summarized his speech in telegram 2694 from Santo Domingo, May 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780210–0705)
Dear Mr. President:

I have just learned the results of the Presidential election in the Dominican Republic, and I want to express my deep admiration for the statesmanship you have shown in this period of such great importance to the Dominican people. Your long and illustrious career in service to the Dominican people ensures that your name will always live among the people of your country and of our hemisphere.

I recall our meeting in Washington last September, when you told me of your commitment to democracy and truly free elections. The Elections Board, which you helped establish, acted courageously and independently to carry out this commitment.

As you pass the burdens of office to your elected successor, I am sure that history will remember your contribution to the establishment of true democracy in the Dominican Republic as one of your finest achievements.

I want to assure you that my government desires to cooperate with yours in every way, both during the transition period and after your successor takes office, to promote the further democratic progress and well-being of the Dominican people.3

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 5, Folder: Dominican Republic: President Joaquin Balaguer, 8/77–11/79. No classification marking.

2 See Document 219.

3 In telegram 2897 from Santo Domingo, May 30, the Embassy transmitted a brief, cordial reply from Balaguer dated May 29. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780226–0457)
233. Letter From President Carter to Dominican President-elect Guzman

Washington, May 27, 1978

Dear Mr. Guzman:

Please accept my most sincere and warm congratulations on your election as President of the Dominican Republic.

This is a most important day for the Dominican Republic and for relations between our two countries. The people of your country have completed their electoral process and have freely voted you—the candidate of the opposition party—as their next President. They have provided a democratic example for the rest of the world, and of that they should be proud.

I hope that the temporary divisions which any political campaign brings will soon be healed, and the unity of the Dominican Republic reinforced for the development challenges which lie ahead.

I look forward to your inauguration in August, and to working with you to maintain and strengthen the excellent relations between our two countries and peoples. As the Dominican Republic prepares to go forward under your leadership, the people of the U.S. join me in extending you best wishes for the success of your government.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 16, Folder: Dominican Republic, 9/77–6/78. No classification marking.

2 In a May 31 reply to Carter, Guzman expressed his gratitude for Carter's letter. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 5, Folder: Dominican Republic: President Antonio Guzman, 8/77–11/79)
234. Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Information Cable¹

TDFIR DB–315/08317–78
Washington, June 15, 1978

COUNTRY
Dominican Republic

SUBJECT
1) Intent of military faction to force President from office
2) Dominican President loses control of military (DOI: [number not declassified]
June 1978)

SOURCE
[3 lines not declassified]

1. On [less than 1 line not declassified] Vice Admiral Ramon Emilio Jimenez, Secretary of State of Foreign Relations, and Major General Salvador Lluberes Montas, Director of the state-owned flour mills, stated [less than 1 line not declassified] that they intend to try and execute a plan of restriction to quarters of the First Brigade and Combat Support Command of the Dominican Army. The plan is to take effect 16 June 1978 for the purpose of demanding that President Joaquin Balaguer Ricardo respect the election results of 16 May 1978 and allow Silvestre Antonio Guzman Fernandez to assume the Presidency. If Balaguer refuses they will force him from office and send him into exile leaving Vice-President Carlos Goico Morales to complete what remains of Balaguer's term of office. According to Jimenez, he and Lluberes intend to seek the cooperation on 15 June of Major General Enrique Perez y Perez, Commander of the First Brigade, and Brigadier General Manuel Cuervo Gomez, Commander of the Combat Support Command, to execute the plan and together inform Balaguer that he should instruct the Central Electoral Board (JCE) to officially declare Guzman the winner of the national elections or they will force Balaguer from office. Jimenez said that such a move is imperative in order to prevent Major General Neit Rafael Nivar Seijas, Chief of the National Police, and other recalcitrant Reformista Party leaders from any further attempts to nullify the elections. Also, that any attempts by Nivar of taking over the government would plunge the country into a state of civil war. Jimenez added that he remains staunchly loyal to Balaguer but that in his view close advisors of the President have so confused him that he has ceased to make rational decisions. Jimenez is also concerned that

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 97S00360R: Intelligence Document Collection (1977–1981), Box 34, 3150802378–3150979978. Secret; Immediate; Wnintel; Noforn; Nocontract; Orcon.
further delay in finalizing the electoral process which began on 16 May would cause irreparable damage. (Source Comment: Jimenez is uncertain if Perez and Cuervo would accept their plan.)

2. On 13 June Cuervo said that Balaguer has lost control of his command, particularly of the armed forces. Many senior ranking officers have lost respect for the President for not taking a firm stand on the election results and for permitting some military leaders to exploit the results for their own personal means thus causing a high state of nervous tension within the armed forces and decreasing the chances for a solid military institution. Cuervo said that he was detained for several hours on 12 June on orders of Major General Marcos Jorge Moreno, Army Chief of Staff, in an unsuccessful attempt to get him to support the Nivar group in its plans for nullifying the election results. Jorge then attempted unsuccessfully to convince the President to relieve Cuervo of his command. (Embassy Comment: The foregoing report is of particular interest in light of remarks made by Foreign Secretary Jimenez during a meeting with the Ambassador today, which implied that he was out of sympathy with the machinations of Nivar and his Reformista associates and that he and others would oppose their efforts to upset the electoral outcome.)²

3. Acquired: [1½ lines not declassified]

4. Field Dissem: [2½ lines not declassified]

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² Yost reported on his meeting with Jimenez in telegram 3292 from Santo Domingo, June 15. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780251–0196)

235. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State¹

Santo Domingo, June 21, 1978, 2035Z

3420. Subject: Ambassador’s Meeting with President-Elect Antonio Guzman.

1. The Ambassador called this morning on President-elect Antonio Guzman at the latter’s request.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780262–0834. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated for information to Caracas and Port au Prince.
2. The purpose of the meeting appears to have been to solicit the
Ambassador’s views on current developments in the Dominican scene.
While it was not made explicit, it was apparent from Guzman’s com-
ments that he was under pressure from elements of the PRD to make
statements which he considered unsettling and that he wanted to take
Embassy assessment into account before a media appearance scheduled
for the afternoon. His own evaluation continued to be that a calm and
unruffled approach was both warranted and necessary.

3. The Ambassador went over the major elements of the situation:
Balaguer had stated to the Ambassador his intention to turn over the
administration on August 16 and to retire. Thanks to the efforts made
by Guzman himself, as well as to pressures which had been placed
on them both domestically and internationally following May 17, the
military appeared to have receded as a threat and could probably be
expected to go along with the change in regime at this time. The
problem of the election challenges was somewhat disturbing, mainly
because of the way it was keeping all parties stirred up and was
affecting the economy, but here President Balaguer had made clear
that such challenges did not apply to the Presidential election results
but rather to the results in the municipalities and for Senatorial and
Deputy seats.

4. Guzman’s assessment of the situation paralleled ours. He said that
Balaguer had given him the same assurances with regard to the turn-
over and that his impression was that Balaguer was to some extent the
prisoner of the demands of those around him who found it difficult
to adjust to the concept of defeat. Guzman seemed to be virtually
unconcerned about the Presidential turnover. He also felt that the
military were now under substantial control and in general ready to
accept the results of the election. He noted the exception to this in the
case of “one or two generals” (read Major General Neit Nivar Seijas)
but Guzman seemed to feel that the latter were no longer a relevant
element in the overall power equation. On the question of the electoral
challenges, Guzman said he had been encouraged by informal word
that he had just received that the Chilean computer specialists brought
in by the JCE had reported nothing abnormal in the makeup of the
computerized registration lists. He was hopeful that the junta would
pronounce itself in a relatively brief period of time. He noted, however,
the severe damage that was being done to the economy in the interim.

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2 Balaguer told Yost in a June 16 meeting that he would turn over power on August
16. (Telegram 3328 from Santo Domingo, June 16: National Archives, RG 59, Central
Foreign Policy File, D780252–0993) In telegram 3862 from Santo Domingo, July 14, the
Embassy reported that Balaguer officially conceded on July 13. (National Archives, RG
59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780289–1026)
5. The Ambassador took this opportunity to note that it would be useful for Embassy personnel in the economic field to have continuing contact with the people who were working with Guzman on economic matters. He mentioned the importance for the Dominican Republic of current efforts of the Caribbean Consultative Group and the problems, on which Balaguer had already briefed Guzman, related to the Dominican debt situation. Guzman said he would ask his people to be in touch with the Embassy’s E/C section and with USAID for an on-going exchange of views.

6. In view of Guzman’s previously-shown concern that the U.S. military might be operating on a different wave length from other parts of the U.S. Government, the Ambassador also reiterated the integrated nature of the U.S. Government’s policy formulation and execution process as regards the Dominican Republic.

7. Guzman expressed his appreciation for the support which he had received from many countries in the hemisphere and again noted that the role of the U.S. and President Carter personally had been a crucial one in fending off early efforts to overturn the results of the elections as well as in the period of continued uncertainty that has followed.

8. Ambassador suggested that his visit could not be held quiet from the press. He and Guzman agreed that any press inquiries would be met with a statement which would include the points that (A) the meeting had been held at the request of Guzman for an exchange of views; (B) that these exchanges of views were normal with an incoming administration; (C) that the meeting was without prejudice to the certification of the election board; and (D) it was in line with the contacts that have taken place between President Balaguer and Mr. Guzman. As it turned out, a reporter from the local tabloid “La Noticia” was waiting when the Ambassador emerged from the Guzman house and the above line was used.

Yost
236. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic

Washington, July 24, 1978, 2313Z

186835. Subject: Guzman’s Plans To Confront Dominican Military. Ref: Santo Domingo 40062 (Exdis).

1. We share President-elect Guzman’s concern over the recent appointment of Major Gen. Neit Nivar—apparently the main instigator of May 17 military intervention in the elections—as Commander of the strategic First Brigade.

2. The Ambassador is authorized to assure Guzman, as recommended by Embassy, that the USG continues unequivocally to support the unimpeded carrying out of the democratic process in the Dominican Republic.

3. At the same time, we would appreciate Embassy’s assessment ASAP of the probable reaction of Generals Nivar and Beauchamp, as well as the reaction of other key officers of the Dominican armed forces, if Guzman carries out his stated intention to sack Nivar and Beauchamp after his inauguration. We would also appreciate Embassy’s views on ability of Guzman administration to govern effectively under new laws pushed through Congress during past week and to rescind the legislation.

4. Unless you perceive objections, the Ambassador should also request a meeting with President Balaguer to raise issues of possible threat to a successful democratic transition in the D.R. posed by Nivar’s command of the First Brigade. Such an approach would probably be most effective if placed in context that we share what we are confident is Balaguer’s own desire for the success of the first peaceful and constitutional transfer of power in the Dominican Republic in this century.3

5. Provided you concur, you should make the same point to Balaguer that you made to Guzman, and stress in the manner you consider

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780304–0075. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by de Santillana; cleared by Shelton, Griffith, Miller, and in S/S; approved by Vaky.

2 In telegram 4006 from Santo Domingo, July 21, the Embassy reported Guzman’s concerns about Balaguer’s post-election maneuvers, notably Nivar’s continued high-profile presence in the military. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780302–0272)

3 In telegram 4075 from Santo Domingo, July 26, Yost reported on his meeting with Guzman, when he explained the dangers of firing Nivar, which could lead to discontent within the military. Yost presented intelligence that stated that other officers in the military would work to restrain rogue generals. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780306–0981)
most appropriate our belief that any reversal of the democratic process would have the most serious effects not only on U.S.-Dominican bilateral relations but also on the Dominican economy, the welfare of the Dominican people, and Balaguer’s own place in history.

6. We would hope that such an approach, if successful, might also help deter Balaguer to some extent from ramming through further lame-duck initiatives that will make it more difficult for Guzman to govern, and possibly threaten the success of democracy in the D.R.4

7. We would appreciate Embassy views on anything further USG might do to promote our interests in the democratic process in the D.R., including possible inclusion of a statement similar to assurances given Guzman (para 2 above) in arrival statement of Secretary Vance for Guzman’s inauguration.5

Vance

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4 Telegram 4158 from Santo Domingo, July 28, reported Yost’s meeting with Balaguer that day to express the “continued U.S. concern about the current activities of his regime.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780310–1134)

5 In telegram 4138 from Santo Domingo, July 28, the Embassy reported that Guzman visited several high-ranking military leaders and received assurances of their loyalty. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780312–0082) In telegram 4116 from Santo Domingo, July 27, the Embassy reported that other senior officials in the government, including Foreign Minister Jimenez, privately expressed discontent with Balaguer’s campaign to weaken Guzman, and many of Balaguer’s initiatives to restructure the government would not be pursued. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780310–0676)
237. **Telegram from the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State**¹

Santo Domingo, July 26, 1978, 2124Z

4094. Subject: Letter to President Carter From President-Elect Guzman.

1. Following is informal Embassy translation of letter to President Carter from President-elect Antonio Guzman, dated July 14 and delivered by hand to Embassy July 24. Proposed reply follows septel:

Quote

Dear President Carter:

Following the official acknowledgement by the central electoral board of our triumph in the past elections, I am very pleased to take this opportunity to express to you, once again, my thanks for the noble interest which you have demonstrated for the survival of democracy and well-being of my country and my people.

On this occasion, permit me to reiterate my wish that you honor us with your presence in the ceremonies of the turnover of government, which will be held next August 16, and which will have great significance for representative democracy in the Dominican nation and in Latin America.

As President of the Dominican Republic, I intend, as fundamental goals of the government which I will preside, to strengthen democratic institutionalization and to achieve a harmonious economic development which benefits Dominicans at every social level. In this latter matter, we propose to re-orient public investment towards education, health, energy and agriculture. These last two fields are of vital importance since our country is eminently agricultural and we are aware of the seriousness of the energy problem in any development program, whether short, medium, or long term.

I wish to share with you my concern for the economic situation in which the present government will leave the country, which has become aggravated in the past days with unplanned measures of salary increases, suppression of taxes which considerably reduce the public income, initiation of construction of projects of considerable cost and other steps which greatly bind my administration.

In addition to this worrisome economic panorama, I should mention the crises in our sugar industry, the decapitalization of our state

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¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, Box 5, Folder: Dominican Republic: President Antonio Guzman, 5/78–6/80. Limited Official Use; Immediate.
bank, the Banco de Reservas of the Dominican Republic, the general contraction of industrial and commercial activity, and other problems which we will have to face and which we are sure we will be able to overcome through planned and coherent actions utilizing available resources.

Facing this situation, I have considered it timely to undertake a diagnostic study of the present state of the national economy. This study is being prepared by distinguished national economists, and it would be of great interest to count on the cooperation of economists from friendly countries such as the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, England and Brazil. In this respect, we hope we can count on your valuable cooperation and that of international institutions such as the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank.\(^2\)

As President-elect, I have the firm objective that my regime be marked by the principles of a free society where social justice may be achieved. I will be very pleased to collaborate closely with your government and yourself, within the framework of a Western Hemisphere formed by countries which struggle to achieve a world where human rights are fully observed.

Permit me, Mr. President, to convey to you the sentiments of my highest consideration and esteem, I am

Sincerely yours,

S. Antonio Guzman

President-elect of the Dominican Republic

Unquote

2. Text of letter being pouchèd.

Yost

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\(^2\) In a July 31 memorandum to Vance, Vaky and Cooper recommended that the Department of State contact World Bank President Robert McNamara and inform him of Guzman’s request for a study of the Dominican economy and ask if the World Bank could send a team to the Dominican Republic. Vance approved the recommendation on August 4. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780125–0356) In telegram 198898 to Santo Domingo, August 7, the Department summarized the views of the IMF and World Bank on the economic prospects of the Dominican Republic. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780323–0988)
Washington, August 11, 1978

Dear Mr. Guzman:

Thank you for your letter of July 14, telling me about the objectives you intend to pursue and the challenges you will face when you take office as President of the Dominican Republic.

I appreciate your concerns and your intention to direct your actions toward strengthening democratic institutions, speeding economic development, and improving social justice. My government supports you in pursuing these objectives, and I look forward to working closely with your administration in your efforts to promote them in the Dominican Republic.

It was kind of you to invite me once more to your inauguration, and I deeply regret that I am not able to attend. As I noted in my letter of July 12, I am pleased that such distinguished officials as Secretary of State Vance and Ambassador Young will represent me.

I have referred to the Department of State your request for the participation of the United States in a study of the Dominican economy. You can expect to hear further from Secretary Vance or Ambassador Yost on this subject.

I wish you every success in the future leadership of your country.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, Box 5, Folder: Dominican Republic: President Antonio Guzman, 5/78-6/80. No classification marking.

2 See Document 237.

3 In telegram 178232 to Santo Domingo, July 14, the Department transmitted a message from Carter that congratulated Guzman on the official certification of his electoral victory and stated that Vance and Young would attend his inauguration. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780289-1065)

4 Below his signature, Carter wrote, “Best wishes! J.C.” In telegram 4508 from Santo Domingo, August 16, the Embassy transmitted Guzman’s response, which thanked Carter for his support and renewed a previous Dominican request for $42 million in PL-480 funds and CCC financing to purchase agricultural products. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780335-1002)
Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, August 18, 1978

SUBJECT
My Trip to the Dominican Republic

The two-day trip to the Dominican Republic was extremely valuable for three reasons: First, it gave me an opportunity to speak to the new leaders of the Dominican Republic and to get a flavor of the atmosphere on the eve of an important change in regime; second, it gave me a very good opportunity to speak to Andy Young and Secretary Vance about a wide range of issues; and third, it gave me an opportunity to speak with ex-President Oduber of Costa Rica, Venezuelan Foreign Minister Consalvi, General Torrijos, and the leader of Peru’s major political party. I am writing the memcons at this time, but don’t expect to complete them until next week. And I thought it would be useful to give the President a feel for the inauguration before that and so I have drafted a memorandum for you to send to him.

On the return plane trip, Pete Vaky and I had a wonderful and long opportunity to speak to Secretary Vance about Argentina, Nicaragua, Central America and the Dominican Republic. On the Dominican Republic, the Secretary is very concerned about the economic situation there, and believes we have a very important obligation to help them through their problems in the next couple of years. On Central America, he agreed that the situation warranted our close attention, and welcomed the Nicaraguan study as an opportunity to try to come to grips with the problem of succession in Nicaragua. On Argentina, all of us seemed to share the same basic approach. Vaky will be going there in early September, and before then, we hope to have decisions on the various issues which I noted to you in my recent memo. We also spoke about the Common Fund, and the Secretary’s strong support for a positive posture in the North-South negotiations was very clear.

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2 Vance, Pastor, and Young were in the Dominican Republic on August 16 to attend Guzman’s inauguration.
3 Attached but not printed.
4 The Dominican Republic received $48.41 million in economic aid from the United States in FY 1979, an increase from $6.13 million in FY 1978. (USAID Greenbook)
It is assuring to know that he continues to push hard for good positions on North-South issues in spite of more conservative economic advice.

All in all, my time spent in these conversations made the trip extremely worthwhile. As an aside, I would recommend that you spend some time with Andy talking about African issues. While your approaches and emphases may differ, I believe both of you, as well as our policy, would very much benefit from a long conversation on the subject.

**RECOMMENDATION:**

That you send the memorandum attached at Tab I to the President.\(^5\)

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\(^5\) There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation. See footnote 1 above.

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**240. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State**\(^1\)

Santo Domingo, October 5, 1979, 1615Z

6173. Subject: Call on President Guzman by Ambassador and CAR Director Warne.

1. (C—Entire text)

2. Summary. Ambassador and ARA/CAR Director W. Robert Warne called on President Guzman on morning of Oct 4 to introduce Warne and discuss current developments in US assistance. Guzman noted that US/DR relations continued to be excellent and was most appreciative of US hurricane assistance.\(^2\) He expressed his interest in improving DR’s relationship with Haiti and other Caribbean countries. He also emphasized the need to focus on rehabilitation efforts in the agricultural sector and repeated his interest in attracting foreign investment. The hour long interview was relaxed and friendly. End summary.

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790457–0556. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated for information to Port au Prince, Bridgetown, Kingston, Port of Spain, Georgetown, and Nassau.

\(^2\) In telegram 5551 from Santo Domingo, September 13, the Embassy reported on the damage caused by Hurricane David and the need for assistance. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790418–0433)
Emergency Assistance

3. Noting the continued widespread goodwill toward the DR that was apparent in the administration and the Congress during his recent visit to Washington, Ambassador explained the current status of the extraordinary House-initiated supplementary appropriation for emergency assistance to the Caribbean countries affected by Hurricanes David and Frederick (in the amount of $20 or $25 million, depending on final congressional action). He also noted that the USG had agreed per the President’s requests to replace the helicopters now delivering emergency supplies in the country but that these aircraft had an Oct 25 withdrawal date at the latest and that helicopter assistance in transporting relief supplies would therefore end as of that date. With the help of marked maps, it was explained fully to the President where the aircraft had been operating and why it was essential that organizational plans be put in place promptly for filling the needs which would remain after Oct 25. The President said that he recognized the problem and would reinforce his efforts. He noted in this regard that he was moving as fast as he could to establish joint groups for the management of relief efforts, including local civilian and military authorities and representatives of the churches. He emphasized once again his determination that the distribution of relief supplies be carefully watched and no diversions tolerated.

4. The Ambassador noted that progress was now being made on arrangements for US help in restoring the electrical system west of Santo Domingo. It was made clear that funding problems remained serious and might further delay this project although it was hoped that initial steps might be undertaken in the meantime. In discussion of PL–480/CCC, it was explained that the Mission would shortly be submitting to Washington its justification for a needed level of commodity assistance to the DR and had been in touch with various elements of the GODR in this regard. The Ambassador reminded the President that the US had met the President’s request totaling $42 million, made in August 78, but that it was our impression that the total of approximately $170 million which had now been requested was beyond practical possibilities. The President asked again that we do what we can

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3 In telegram 296797 to Santo Domingo, November 15, the Department transmitted a message from Vance to Guzman that noted that Congress approved $20 million in disaster relief funding for the Dominican Republic and Dominica. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790527–0124)

4 Vance’s message transmitted in telegram 296797 also informed Guzman of U.S. FY 1980 assistance in the form of $15 million in PL–480 assistance, $10 million in CCC credits to purchase agricultural commodities, and an additional $35 million in CCC credit guarantees.

5 See footnote 4, Document 238.
since this would be an important contribution to meeting the food deficiencies they could expect over the coming year as well as contributing to longer-term rehabilitation and developmental needs. The President also expressed appreciation for whatever the US could do to promote a multilateral effort to help finance the medium-term reconstruction effort. Warne described the World Bank’s efforts to organize a possible consortium of donors to provide reconstruction financing and the US active support in this regard.

Caribbean Policy

5. In response to Mr Warne’s question, President Guzman said that his government was strongly interested in reinforcing the DR’s Caribbean posture. A Caribbean Foreign Ministers meeting scheduled for early Sept had to be postponed because of the hurricanes, but he expected that it would be reconvened at some time in the near future. He promised to look into the question of providing further ideas on possible roles for the DR in the region and on regional issues as a whole. In this context, President Guzman noted his own decision to support the candidacy of DR SecState for Foreign Affairs Jimenez for the OAS Secretary Generalship and remarked on the heightened role for the DR in the region that Jimenez’ election would provide.

6. Guzman went on to emphasize the importance of the bilateral DR/Haiti relationship. His government had sought improved relations with Haiti and he thought there was much that could be done in the way of joint projects to further improve these relations. He mentioned connecting roads (bringing up specifically an improved road in the north from Cap Haitien to Monte Christi via Dajabon, and improvement of the border road from Dajabon south to Elias Pina); a diversion dam on the Massacre River along the lines of the recently opened dam on the Pedernales in the south; and the general importance of developing the frontier area. Guzman said he assumed that financing of viable bilateral projects could be obtained through such mechanisms as the Caribbean Group. He also reacted favorably to mention of reforestation as a useful common objective. Guzman asked what the US policy was toward economic development assistance in Haiti. Warne replied that the US was maintaining a balanced approach toward the GOH, i.e. pressing on sustaining its aid levels to meet basic human needs while at the same time encouraging a satisfactory human rights environment.

Agricultural Rehabilitation

7. Guzman emphasized in connection with his assessment of food supplies that his government continued to give primary importance to restoring and developing the agricultural sector. Efforts were gotten under way immediately after the storms to replant the traditional Dominican food items such as bananas, plantains, yucca, yams and potatoes. Now the GODR was doing what it could to open up roads
for example, to the coffee producing areas) and to provide help to farmers whose crops had been destroyed or plants damaged and who needed help in seeds, implements, or financing to carry them through.

Foreign Investment

8. Guzman emphasized his interest in foreign investment and noted that his government would continue to encourage it in any way possible.

US/DR Relations

9. In response to a question, President Guzman said that relationships between the US and the DR were excellent and the prompt and generous support of the US in the hurricane situation greatly appreciated. There were no problems in his mind in this regard. In a related discussion, Guzman took the opportunity to emphasize that the GODR maintained no relations with Cuba nor did his government intend to enter into such relations.

10. The Ambassador and Mr Warne subsequently met separately with the President’s son-in-law Jose Maria Hernandez, Administrative Secretary to the Presidency, and with Dr Milton Ray Guevara, Secretary of State without portfolio. Hernandez reinforced the President’s remarks on the need for foreign investment. While apparently not entirely conversant with the terms of the DR’s existing foreign investment legislation, Hernandez said he was convinced of the need for active efforts on the part of the GODR to move out and attract investors from abroad. The Ambassador strongly encouraged him but noted the less than satisfactory basis provided for this by the current legislation, pushed through in the flurry of laws passed at the end of the previous administration in July 1978. Ray Guevara was quite articulate on the concern of the GODR about Cuban activities in the Caribbean and in particular the potential for mischief in the English-speaking states. He also promised that he would provide any ideas on the Dominican role as well as on the Caribbean problem as a whole. He did not appear to be overly concerned about any actual Cuban presence or activities in the DR at this time, though he once again went back to the longstanding concern of the administration at the number of scholarships being provided by the Soviets for Dominican students to study in the USSR (about 200 a year he said). He said he hoped some way could be found to offset this with similar scholarship offers from the US. Ray also brought up and reinforced the need for improving and maintaining relations with Haiti.

Yost
Haiti and the Bahamas

241. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Caribbean Affairs (de Santillana) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Luers)

Washington, February 17, 1977

SUBJECT

Human Rights

It seems to me that our experience with Papa Doc in the 1960’s is not irrelevant to the human rights issues we are talking about now. In 1963 we exercised the full range of our leverage against Papa Doc: cutting off economic and military aid, strong rhetoric, fleet maneuvers off Haiti, [1 line not declassified]2

This policy of severe sanctions did not lead to any improvement of the human rights situation. To the contrary, the period 1963–67 was the worst of Papa Doc’s repression.

We cannot say that our sanctions caused the intensified repression in Haiti, but the sequence of events is there. Papa Doc, already paranoid and repressive, became even more so in the face of our hostility. Moreover, when I was in Haiti a few years ago, I was told by all sources that the ones who suffered the most from our aid cut off in the 1960’s were the “little people.” Papa Doc and his machine took their cut from whatever money there was in the country; the masses just got less.

Conversely, as we have resumed more normal relations with Haiti since 1971, including an AID program, the political atmosphere there has improved. Again, we cannot say this has been a cause and effect relationship.3 The new leaders of the GOH have wanted to improve their country’s image in any event. Nonetheless, a strong argument can be made that our aid and the general acceptance we have accorded the new regime have helped tip the balance in favor of the improvements that have taken place.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850126–0103. Confidential. Copies were sent to Bray and Lister. Luers wrote at the top of the page, “Gerry, I think you’re absolutely correct. Fascinating. I wonder if this is ‘documented’ or supported anywhere? Bill L.”

2 For documentation on the Kennedy administration’s use of these tactics in Haiti in 1963, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XII, American Republics.

242. Telegram From the Department of State to the White House1

Washington, March 21, 1977, 1545Z

Following is repeat State 61960, sent Port au Prince 19 March:

Quote 61960. Subject: Reported Plans To Overthrow Duvalier Government. Ref: Port au Prince 964.2

1. As you are keenly aware, in the many past instances when we received reports of coup plots, our judgment was that coup attempts in Haiti are most likely to result in widespread bloodshed. A period of chaos, and if successful, a new regime as repressive and authoritarian as that now in power. We have been encouraged during the past year by the modest but genuine improvement in the human rights performance of the Duvalier government. We continue to believe the cause of human rights will best be served by such evolutionary change within the framework of political stability and economic development.

2. In short our policy in regard to coup attempts has not changed. We are in no way encouraging the overthrow of governments, and we have not agreed with any Haitian coup plotters that we will “look the other way” should they attempt to overthrow Duvalier.

3. We believe you should, as in past, inform Duvalier that we are again getting reports of active coup plotting. As in past, you should give no details. Our concern here is that failure to warn the GOH could be read as USG participation or at least complicity. On the other hand, if we supply any details, we may be a party to reprisals and police action against innocents as well as the guilty.

4. We are keenly aware of the complexities and difficulties implicit in the above. We would appreciate any views you may have on both the immediate problem and our policy for future.

Vance Unquote.

Vance

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2 In telegram 964 from Port au Prince, March 17, the Embassy reported on a potential coup scheduled to take place before April 21. The coup never occurred. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D850056–1700) In telegram 1007 from Port au Prince, March 21, the Embassy counseled against informing Duvalier about the reports, citing the fact that the source of information about the coup was a journalist who strongly supported American human rights objectives in Haiti. According to the Embassy, divulging information about the coup planning to Duvalier would encourage the Haitian media to portray the United States negatively. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D850056–1702) The Department concurred in telegram 65436 to Port au Prince, March 24. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 24, Folder: Haiti, 1/77–12/79)
243. Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Information Cable

TDFIR DB–315/03666–77
Washington, March 31, 1977

COUNTRY
Haiti

DOI
Late March 1977

SUBJECT
Probability That President Jean-Claude Duvalier Will Not Resign From The Presidency In Order To Hold Elections

ACQ
[less than 1 line not declassified]

SOURCE
[3½ lines not declassified]

1. In late March 1977, Guy Noel, confidential advisor to President Jean-Claude Duvalier, said that the President now is inclined to give up earlier plans to resign the Presidency and to seek election through popular vote. This change is due to his belief, and to that of his advisors, that the interim period between resignation and election would destroy the stability of the Haitian Government. Noel added that the President now is prepared to endure what he believes to be pressure by the United States to hold elections and, in order to reduce this type of pressure, he plans to seek financial assistance from Venezuela, Senegal and Saudi Arabia. Duvalier would use these funds to attempt to modernize Haiti as rapidly as possible in order to demonstrate his own capabilities to U.S. officials.

2. According to Noel, Duvalier is convinced at present that the only internal opposition to his regime comes from former collaborators of his father. The President is frustrated by the interference of his mother, Simone Duvalier, in his efforts to carry out reforms in the country and by her desire to continue accumulating money from public funds for the Duvalier family.

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 24, Haiti, 3/77–12/79. Secret; Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals; Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor/Consultants.

2 In telegram 70682 to Port au Prince, March 30, the Department provided information about an off-hand remark Duvalier made to a friend about resigning the Presidency. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770113–0199)
3. Noel said that the President plans to continue, but at a more rapid pace, to dismantle the Ton Ton Macoutes (TTM) and replace them with a group of competent young technicians. Duvalier calls the group “the Volunteers” (Vols). At present, the group has less than ten members; Noel is a member. Noel explained that members of the Vols belong to the private sector and have as their primary purpose to provide the President with written reports on recommended solutions to local problems and on proposals for new projects. Authors of proposals of interest to the President are called in to elaborate on or explain their ideas in greater detail to the President who occasionally contributes suggestions. The President normally presents the recommendations as his own ideas to the Cabinet. One of the recommendations presented by the Vols to the President was advice against Duvalier resigning in order to hold elections.3

4. Field Dissem: None.

3 Duvalier declared himself “President for life” on April 22.

244. Telegram From the Embassy in Haiti to the Department of State1

Port au Prince, June 29, 1977, 1944Z

2326. From Ambassador. Subject: U.S.-Haiti Relations: Tour d’Horizon With President Duvalier. Ref: State 141895.2

1. In accordance with instructions, I had a useful hour-long tour d’horizon June 28 with President Duvalier (we had covered some of these topics in June 15 conversation reported by memcon).3 On Joint

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770233–0389. Confidential; Priority; Stadis.

2 In telegram 141895 to Port au Prince, June 18, the Department instructed Isham to discuss Cuba, human rights, refugees, and U.S. assistance programs with Duvalier. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770218–0072)

3 Not found. Haitian Foreign Minister Edner Brutus and Haitian Ambassador Georges Salomon met with the Secretary, Habib, and Todman on June 15 in Grenada and discussed human rights and economic development. A memorandum of conversation is in telegram 33 from the U.S. Delegation to the OAS General Assembly in Grenada, June 17. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 24, Folder: Haiti, 1/77–12/78)
Commission meeting, he expressed strong agreement with our definition of objectives, particularly the need for closer meshing of donor plans with Haitian five-year plan.\(^4\) As example of promising new project, President mentioned that during his last week’s visit to Artibonite Valley, head of Artibonite Authority Destin had said that although irrigated areas now totaled 32,000 hectares, another 26,000 hectares now not irrigable could be farmed if system of pumping stations were installed. I said this project should be explored with AID and other international agencies. The President also again mentioned his plan to use new satellite-linked TV system—scheduled to be operational in early 1978—to reach peasants and provide them with educational programs, including presentations on family planning. He expressed hope that AID would assist in training Haitian technicians to operate new television system, following up AIDSAT demonstration earlier this year. I said this remained an important AID objective.

2. On drought disaster the President agreed on need to have more effective ongoing disaster relief institution. He said that one plan suggested by Minister without Portfolio Bayard is to intensify development of transformation industries in Gonaives, the city nearest to the chronically drought-afflicted northwest region, utilizing recent legislation offering financial incentives for decentralization. With Gonaives offering additional employment opportunities, resettlement from hardest hit areas in northwest might be feasible, accompanied by intensified reforestation.

3. The President made no comment on refugees other than to reaffirm assurances that Haitians deported from the United States to Haiti will not suffer reprisals.

4. On human rights, Duvalier listened carefully. It was to be expected, he said, that those who objected to good U.S.–GOH relations would seek to spread stories of U.S. complicity in maneuvers against government. Haitians were congenitally disposed to oppose any government in power, he said; one should carefully study history of Haiti in order to understand this destructive mentality. In any case, Duvalier said, his government had never paid any attention to such stories and rumors.

5. The President listened with interest to suggestion that GOH invite a mission of Inter-American Human Rights Commission to visit Haiti. He said that it was difficult without actually visiting the country

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\(^4\) In telegram 2701 from Port au Prince, October 5, 1976, the Embassy discussed with some skepticism Haiti’s second five-year development plan. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760375–0780) A Joint Commission of Haiti’s bilateral and multilateral donors, chaired by the OAS, met in Washington June 27–29 to coordinate donor assistance and development priorities in Haiti. The Joint Commission met annually.
to have an idea of the accomplishments that had taken place in the past several years. I strongly emphasized the prevalence of continued allegations of human rights violations in Haiti and the impact that such reporting has on public and congressional opinion. I reminded him we had often discussed the gulf between what Haiti had done in this field and how its image appeared to outside observers. The LAHRC is in position to issue objective report that could lay to rest exaggerated or outdated allegations. The President (somewhat to my surprise) appeared receptive and said that he would study the suggestion carefully.

6. I also took occasion of the meeting to describe our appropriate technology project, for which AID has earmarked $585,000 for a three-year pilot project to start in late 1977. I explained the rationale and handed him a detailed list of task areas. I called his attention to the feature of the project providing for a small team of technicians working very closely with a designated Haitian organization. I pointed out that the GOH might wish to consider seeking the assignment of five Peace Corps volunteers with technical background to the project team (probably to be situated in St. Marc). Volunteers could assist Haitian and American technicians in the pilot testing and site adaptation. The President appeared to be interested in this idea but, as in previous discussions of Peace Corps role in Haiti, he remained non-committal.

Isham
245. Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Information Cable¹

TDFIR 314/01479–77 Washington, August 12, 1977

COUNTRY
Haiti

DOI
Late May–Early August 1977

SUBJECT
The Power Structure and Decision Making Process of the Government of Haiti
Under President Jean Claude Duvalier

ACQ
[less than 1 line not declassified]

SOURCE
[3 lines not declassified]

Summary: The ultimate authority in the Government of Haiti (GOH) is the President and his mother, both of whom have supporters who attempt to influence them or gain favors from them. These spheres of influence can be divided into two parallel, but not completely separate, lines of competition for authority. A second force in the GOH is composed of the military and the Cabinet; both, however, are responsible to the President and act under his instructions. No Minister would attempt any significant change or reform without prior approval from the President. However, it would be incorrect to assume that the Cabinet’s actions accurately reflect the full intention of the President. In any judgment of President Jean Claude Duvalier’s intentions, all forces acting to influence him and his mother must be understood. One example of this is the Cabinet appointed in late May 1977, which was an overt attempt of the President to assert his independence from his mother; however, the Cabinet selections reveal the complex forces which influenced Duvalier.² End summary.

1. The primary force and ultimate authority in the Government of Haiti (GOH) is President Jean Claude Duvalier and his mother, Simone Duvalier. In practice, these individuals head two parallel and competing lines of authority. Within these parallel, but not completely separate, spheres are individuals whose ability to influence, or gain the favor


² The Embassy commented on the new Cabinet Ministers in telegram 1960 from Port au Prince, June 1. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, D770195–0872)
of, the President and/or his mother is constantly changing. The first level is composed of the one individual who exercises the most influence on the President or his mother at a given time. As of early August 1977, Henri P. Bayard, Secretary of State without Portfolio, occupies this position of influence over the President, and Victor Constant, member of the legislature, has this level of influence with Madame Duvalier. While others seeking to gain personal favors may attempt to use Bayard or Constant, or someone else in this position, usually they try to develop direct contact with the President or his mother.

2. The second level of influence in the sphere of the President is occupied by selected military officers. General Gracia Jacques, head of the Palace Guard, has a special position at the Palace which permits him to exercise some influence over both the President and his mother; Jacques, however, primarily is concerned with the physical protection of the President. Younger officers, such as Colonel Jean Valme, Chief of the Internal Security Service, and Colonel Serge Coicou, Commander of troops at the National Palace, now occupy this secondary level of influence, primarily by virtue of their positions which require them to accompany the President on trips outside the Palace and to join him during periods of relaxation. Duvalier’s association with other younger officers is an attempt by the President to develop support among an element in the military who will derive its rank and authority directly from him and not from past loyalties to his father and mother. The second level of influence over Madame Duvalier is composed of her two daughters, Nicole and Marie Denise, and her two nieces. Madame is still upset with her son for excluding her two daughters from the Palace. As a result of the absence of her daughters, Madame Duvalier has turned to her nieces for support and to help her persuade her son to accept her point of view on various subjects. Many believe that the President’s exclusion of his sisters was an attempt to reduce his mother’s influence in the Palace.

3. The third level of influence over the President is composed of his current girl friends and his old classmates with whom he maintains some contact. In Madame Duvalier’s case, this level includes old supporters and friends of her husband, for whom Madame often is attempting to gain favors.

4. The second force in the decision making process of the GOH is occupied by the Cabinet and the military. All ministries lack official policy guidance; in practice, each Cabinet member is engaged in daily problem solving, usually with the direct participation of the President. A Cabinet member’s primary objective is to anticipate and seek guidance to avoid situations which might cause embarrassment to the President or to resolve situations which if left too long might annoy the President. Most ministries are reluctant to exercise any initiative, even
if the laws of the country or the regulations of their ministries permit some latitude. No Minister would be bold enough to attempt any significant change or reform unless the action had been specifically approved by the President. In addition to operating under this unofficial rule, each Minister is aware that he must conduct his affairs under the scrutiny of Madame Duvalier and her associates and under the observation of the President’s closest advisors. The President remains basically uninformed and/or unconcerned about the process of government, but he will act on the advice of his entourage or under pressure from his mother and her friends, some of whom are Cabinet members. Various officers and elements in the military exercise influence on the Cabinet and on activities at the Palace. The President attempts to keep the three major elements of the military, which are the Palace Guard, the Leopards Battalion, and the army, essentially divided and directly loyal to him.

5. (Source comment: While it is correct that Cabinet officers rarely act without Presidential approval, it would be incorrect to assume that their actions accurately reflect the full intentions of the President. It is necessary to take into account what the military and police are doing, which sometimes appear to contradict the actions of Cabinet officers. In order to make any judgment concerning the President’s intentions, it is important to understand that all of the forces described above come into play. Certain actions indicate that the President is making a serious attempt to become independent by reducing his mother’s influence and by developing his own support elements. The appointment of a new Cabinet in late May was an overt attempt to demonstrate his independence, but the forces described above still influenced Duvalier’s selection.)

6. Two members of the Cabinet are old-line Duvalier supporters. Edner Brutus, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Worship, is a friend of Madame Duvalier and his appointment was a concession by the President to his mother, and Emmanuel Bros, Secretary of State for Finance and Economic Affairs, is a long-time Duvalier supporter but is considered to be a serious and capable Cabinet officer. Edouard Berrouet, Secretary of State for Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development, formerly worked with Bayard at the Institute of Mines and was recommended for his Cabinet position by Bayard. Achille Salvant, in charge of Labor and Social Affairs, was appointed as a reward for his past services to the President’s mother and father. Aurelien C. Jeanty, Secretary of State for Interior and National Defense, was recommended by a family friend but is an active individual who will not hesitate to carry out the President’s orders. Willy Verrier, Secretary of State for Public Health and Education, has an affinity and closeness with the President with which both are comfortable.

7. Field Dissem: None.
246. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 8, 1977, 8:45 a.m.

SUBJECT
The Secretary’s Bilateral with Haitian Foreign Secretary Brutus

PARTICIPANTS
Haiti
Edner Brutus, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Haiti
Georges Salomon, Haitian Ambassador to the U.S.

U.S.
The Secretary
Assistant Secretary Todman, ARA
Ambassador William B. Jones
Gerald de Santillana, ARA/CAR (notetaker)
Ms. Sophia Porson (Interpreter)

Brutus expressed his government’s great appreciation for the invitation to attend the Panama Canal Treaty ceremonies in Washington.

He then reported that his government is planning a number of new measures to promote human rights in Haiti. It has just created a new civilian court to judge all persons accused of political or security offenses. All so-called political offenders will now be tried as expeditiously as possible, and either released or, if found guilty sentenced to fixed terms.

Brutus also reported the Haitian Government plans to adhere to the American Convention on Human Rights (the Pact of San Jose). He said he left instructions for implementing this before his departure from Haiti. In addition, he said President Duvalier told Ambassador Young of his plan to invite a mission of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission to visit Haiti. The Commission will be invited after Haiti has formally adhered to the Pact of San Jose. (NOTE: Brutus

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770156–0899. Confidential. Drafted by de Santillana; cleared by Todman; approved in S/S on September 21. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office.

2 On September 27, Salomon deposited Haiti’s instrument of adherence to the American Convention on Human Rights. (Telegram 234322 to Port au Prince, September 29; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770355–0889)

3 Ambassador Young met with Duvalier on August 16. During the meeting, Duvalier announced Haiti would receive a delegation from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. (Telegram 2983 from Port au Prince, August 16; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770295–0724) A Special Commission of the IAHRC visited Haiti August 16–25, 1978. It did not issue a report until December 1979. See Document 261.
told Ambassador Jones September 5 that Haiti plans to complete adherence to the Pact of San Jose by November).

Brutus said he wished to assure the Secretary and the USG that his government is determined to do everything possible to make a “new style of life” in Haiti. His country experienced an “exceptional political situation” in the recent past (i.e., under the elder Duvalier). But circumstances have changed, and the GOH wishes to return to normality, including the observance of human rights traditional in Haiti since its independence. He asked only that an effort be made to understand the true situation in Haiti.

The Secretary said we are very gratified with the various measures Haiti is taking in the area of human rights. He also expressed appreciation for the very warm reception Ambassador Young received in Haiti.

Brutus said President Carter made an excellent choice in sending Ambassador Young to the Caribbean. Haiti, he said, is an old friend and faithful ally of the United States. In the past there have been misunderstandings, but these things happen among friends.

The Secretary stressed that the U.S. values its friendship with the government and people of Haiti. He expressed our deep appreciation for Brutus’s presence in Washington for the Canal Treaty ceremonies. Although ratification of the Treaties will not be easy, it will help for the world and the people of the United States to see the solidarity with which the nations of our hemisphere stand behind the Treaties.

Brutus said that Duvalier and his government regard the Treaty as a sign of a “new direction” of U.S. policy toward all countries of the hemisphere. As another component of this “new direction”, Brutus thought the establishment of our Caribbean Task Force an excellent idea. Already the U.S. had quickly responded through the Task Force to a Haitian request for help in replacing a critical bridge which collapsed recently in northern Haiti. (Brutus appeared to consider the Task Force as an immediate action organization with funds).

Brutus said there are a number of other topics his government would hope to discuss with the Caribbean Task Force, including Haiti’s needs in agriculture and education. Also the Task Force might help with the problem of the so-called Haitian refugees in the U.S., by assisting the Haitian Government create more jobs in Haiti. Since most of the refugees leave Haiti for economic reasons, (although some claim political asylum in the U.S. after their arrival here—in order to be allowed to remain), more jobs in Haiti is the best solution to the problem.

The Secretary asked how Brutus saw Haiti’s economic situation, and what his government’s development priorities are. Brutus said the economic situation in Haiti is very difficult, but the GOH has firm
hopes of making progress, with the help of Haiti’s friends. He named increased agricultural production as his country’s key development need, including improved irrigation, improved farming methods, a fertilizer plant, and new water resources in the northwest. Haiti does not wish to have to call on its friends for emergency disaster relief every two years, he said.

The Secretary asked whether the GOH has obtained financing for the proposed fertilizer plant. Brutus replied it had not. He said he would be most grateful if our Caribbean Task Force could help on this matter. The Secretary said we will be sure the Task Force includes the Haitian fertilizer plant project in its work.

In conclusion, Brutus expressed his government’s appreciation for the assistance the U.S. has rendered Haiti. He also asked the Secretary to express to the President the hope of the Haitian Government that he and Mrs. Carter will be able to visit Haiti some day. Brutus said the GOH would also welcome a visit by the Secretary.

The Secretary said he would convey Brutus’s invitation to the President, and that he also hoped to be able to visit Haiti.

247. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 9, 1977, 2:45 p.m.

SUBJECT
Bilateral Meeting between the President and Prime Minister Pindling

PARTICIPANTS

The Bahamas
Lynden O. Pindling, Prime Minister
Paul L. Adderley, Minister of External Affairs
Livingston B. Johnson, Ambassador to U.S. and U.N.

United States
The President
Secretary Vance
Assistant Secretary Todman
Mr. David Aaron, NSC
Mr. Robert Pastor, NSC
Mr. William Schwartz, Ambassador-designate to The Bahamas
Mr. Rush W. Taylor, Jr., Charge d’Affaires, Nassau

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 2, Pastor, Country, Bahamas, 6/77–12/78. Confidential. Drafted by Taylor. The meeting was held in the White House.
The President opened the meeting by recalling a visit he had made some years earlier with his wife and daughter to Green Turtle Cay. He expressed warm memories concerning the visit, and his hope that Ambassador-designate Schwartz would soon be “subverted” by the friendliness of the Bahamian people and the Island’s scenic beauty, and that Mr. Schwartz would enjoy The Bahamas as much as he and his family had.

The President continued that it meant a great deal for him to receive the approval and support for the Panama Canal Treaties from his fellow heads of state and chiefs of government in the hemisphere. He realized the personal sacrifice that many of the visiting Chiefs of State had made in order to come to Washington and he was grateful. The President expressed the hope that it had been an enjoyable and profitable experience for the Prime Minister to come to Washington and to get to know some of the other leaders in the hemisphere, and to get acquainted personally with each other.

Prime Minister Pindling congratulated the President on the successful completion of the Treaties and expressed his particular appreciation for having been invited to the signing, as the GCOB was not formally a member of the OAS but nevertheless was part of the western hemisphere. The Prime Minister went on to say that The Bahamas is only in its 4th year of independence and is one of the smallest but certainly one of the most stable governments in the area. He commented that, while he was perhaps being presumptuous, he felt his government in its position on and practice with regard to human rights might equal and even surpass that of the United States. The President thanked the Prime Minister for the Bahamian contribution and support in the field of human rights but noted that there was a long way to go in this area. He hoped that governments whose record left something to be desired would understand that their economic and social welfare would be enhanced should they be more forthcoming in the field of human rights. Prime Minister Pindling noted that the U.S. in the past had not in his opinion fully appreciated that the English-speaking Caribbean shares many common traditions with the United States and has great appreciation for democracy and the rights of man. He stated that the English-speaking region of the Caribbean was, in his opinion, the area in the western hemisphere which had the least problem with human rights and that there was a great reservoir of goodwill in the region for those who share similar views. While some in the region might attack democracy the principles inherent in it and the benefits derived from it were difficult if not impossible to assail. The President commented that a multinational approach on human rights is needed in order to let some of the more oppressive regimes know our feelings and that we are together in our opposition to the violation of those rights.
The President said that he had observed the Prime Minister’s election victory with pleasure and complimented the Prime Minister not only for having been the father of an independent Bahamas but for having continued to maintain the abiding esteem and affection of the Bahamian people. The Prime Minister stated that his successes were due equally to his colleagues, “an able bunch of fellows.” He stated that although the last five years have not been easy the situation was a good deal better now, and that by and large prospects for the future were good.

The President asked about the economic prospects of the Bahamas. The Prime Minister responded by saying that the Bahamian economy which had been severely hit by the worldwide recession was nevertheless beginning to rebuild. There has been negative or minimal growth for the last three years and “help from friends would speed up their recovery.”

Air Routes. The Prime Minister said tourism was the country’s number one industry and over the years the Bahamian people had built up the necessary expertise to man that industry. The main problem at the moment is the “delivery of bodies to the Bahamas.” The situation was bad this summer and in his view it would be compounded during the winter tourist season, especially on the New York-Nassau air route.

He explained that Pan American Airlines which together with Eastern and Delta had been servicing The Bahamas had suspended service in the spring of 1976 and that he doubted if Pan Am would reinstate its routes. Delta was the only carrier from some New York airports to Nassau. American Airlines had requested to establish a service from New York which The Bahamas had strongly supported, but its petition had been rejected by the CAB. It was his understanding that American had reapplied. In response to the President’s question as to whether The Bahamian Government had spoken to Delta in order to persuade them to increase capacity, the Prime Minister stated that he was sure they had but without success.

The Prime Minister continued by saying that the problem was an immediate one in that extra seats should be made available before mid-December and that American Airlines, were it to get the route, would have to wait 90 days before it can begin flying the run. He also agreed with the President that 2 airlines serving the New York-Nassau run would be preferable to one. He reiterated his doubts that Pan Am would renew the route with which Secretary Vance agreed. The President expressed his sympathy and requested Secretary Vance to look into

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2 On July 19, Prime Minister Pindling’s Progressive Labor Party won a landslide victory in national elections.
the matter and to contact both the Chairman of the CAB and the Secretary of Transportation and to tell them he was personally interested in this matter.

*Fishing Rights.* Prime Minister Pindling noted that his government had recently received a communication from the Embassy in Nassau concerning the negotiation of fishing rights between the two countries. He noted that his government was also anxious “to resume discussion” as legislation had passed in May which was similar to that of the U.S., claiming a 200 mile fisheries and economic zone, particularly as it related to the continental shelf. The President noted that it was important that we conclude an agreement with our close neighbor, The Bahamas, and that we are willing to press ahead with the matter. He expressed the hope that negotiations could be commenced in the near future. In response to the President’s question as to whether similar talks between The Bahamas and Cuba had been completed, the Prime Minister responded that they had requested conversations with the Cubans but that these had not yet begun.

*Delineation of Maritime Boundaries.* The Prime Minister pointed out that the eventual delineation of maritime boundaries between the two countries—a matter which had been the subject of February discussions—presented no problems with regard to the “Bay Side”, i.e., the straits of Florida, but there were problems as far as the “ocean side”, between the Bahamas and the eastern seaboard of the United States. In this regard he noted that the GCOB had received a “communication” from the U.S. Embassy in Nassau which his government found rather difficult to accept since the U.S. seemed to be suggesting a different position with The Bahamas than in similar cases with other countries. Responding to the President’s question, he stated that his government had not yet made any formal response to the communication. The President stated that he would be waiting for such a response.

*Facilities Agreement.* The President then raised the subject of military facilities in The Bahamas which he hoped were of mutual benefit for both governments. The Prime Minister responded that he could not really say that “the benefits were in fact mutual”. The President stated that we remained ready to work out a permanent agreement on the facilities and expressed hope that the rental derived from such an

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3 Telegram 273 from Nassau, February 25, reported on the February 24–25 discussions on maritime boundaries. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770066–1257)

4 Reference is to a diplomatic note transmitted in telegram 192793 to Nassau, August 15. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770294–0068) The Bahamian Government did not reply until December 16. (Telegram 2012 from Nassau, December 19; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770472–0940)
agreement would be of benefit to The Bahamas. The Prime Minister said that the problems of a facilities agreement involved both the basic rental payment as well as whether The Bahamas and the U.S. could agree in principle on direct economic assistance which would help in local industry, agriculture and fisheries, and education and health. The Prime Minister continued that there was no difficulty in agreeing in principle on the duration of a 10 to 15 year arrangement (15 years beginning in 1973 or 10 years beginning in 1978) but he noted that the U.S.’s past reluctance to agree on direct economic assistance had caused a problem. The President explained that base rental was easier for Congress to accept than direct economic assistance tied to securing bases. He expressed the view that Congress might be reluctant to establish a broader economic package for base rentals in The Bahamas particularly since it might offer a precedent for negotiations for bases in Greece, Turkey, Spain, Portugal, and the Philippines. It would, in his opinion, be best to separate the two items in discussing what the best quid pro quo for the bases might be. Secretary Vance agreed with the President who went on to say that while he did not wish to preempt the negotiators who would be primarily responsible for arriving at an agreement, he nevertheless wished to take this opportunity to point out the legal and other difficulties involved. The President repeated that any military base agreement with The Bahamas, our close neighbor and very good friend, would set a precedent which might complicate other base negotiations. In response to the Prime Minister’s question as to whether all forms of economic assistance must be approved by Congress, the President responded that it depended on the type of assistance. No special approval, for instance, was needed on PL 480 assistance but military base rental and bilateral economic assistance would require Congressional approval and the Congress is highly reluctant to equate the two.

The President stated that he had noted with interest the Prime Minister’s reaction to his expression of hope that military facilities in The Bahamas were of mutual benefit. The Prime Minister responded that he could not truthfully say that the bases were of no value whatsoever but at the same time they were only of “minimal” value. Bahamian employment at the bases was limited to the bottom rung of the scale. At the same time he felt that many more jobs existed at the bases for Bahamians higher up the ladder and that these jobs could be performed by Bahamians. The President noted that should this be the case the negotiators should most definitely take it into account and that it should be an integral part of any eventual agreement. The President went on to say that he very much hoped that this employment pattern did not reflect any vestiges of racial discrimination. The Prime Minister responded by saying that any discrimination which might exist was
not to his knowledge racially motivated but the fact was that U.S. contractors were allowed to fill the higher paid jobs with Americans, leaving the Bahamians to work only as cooks, maids, and gardeners. The President requested that Secretary Vance look into the matter with the Secretary of Defense and requested that it be rectified now as we begin negotiations in order to promote a better climate for those talks to succeed.

The Prime Minister also noted one other minor problem in that his government had understood that only military personnel at the bases would be exempt from Bahamian customs, but in practice U.S. contract employees were also being exempted. The President noting that he appreciated the Prime Minister’s candor said that these were the sort of subjects which were not often brought to his or Secretary Vance’s attention and requested that the Secretary look into this matter as well.

Section 602 of the Internal Revenue Act of 1976. The Prime Minister noted that along with the Canadians, Mexicans, and Bermudans Section 602 of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 concerning taxable deductions for attending foreign conventions had presented problems for the Bahamians, and expressed the hope that a bill in Congress which would amend the section would be successful. The President inquired as to the status of the bill and asked Mr. Pastor to look into the matter.

Law of the Sea. The President expressed appreciation for the support which the GCOB had given in the LOS negotiations. He noted that our positions throughout the negotiations had been similar and that we were most appreciative for the work and efforts of the Bahamian Government in this regard.

U.S. Investments in The Bahamas. The President noted that U.S. investors accounted for the largest foreign investment in The Bahamas and asked if there were any problems in this connection. The Prime Minister responded that there were no problems but that it might be useful to investigate the possibility of a more liberal trade policy vis-à-vis Bahamian exports. He noted that the Bahamas principal export was “sun, sand and sea”, i.e., tourism and that anything which the United States might do to assist Bahamian tourism would fall into his definition of liberalizing “trade relations”. He mentioned that another opportunity in addition to extra airline seats and the amendment or repeal of Section 602 of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 would be the

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5 Section 602 of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 discussed deductions related to foreign travel. S.627, introduced in the Senate on February 4, proposed to repeal the amendments made by Section 602 and remove annual limitations on business deductions for conventions in foreign countries. The bill was referred to the Senate Finance Committee. A similar bill, S.749, was introduced on March 26, 1979.
passage of another bill which he understood was now pending in Congress. This bill according to the Prime Minister would raise the amount of duty free goods which could be purchased by U.S. tourists from $100 to $300. Assistant Secretary Todman pointed out that the Virgin Islands might be opposed to such legislation and the Prime Minister stated that it was his understanding that customs free purchases in the Virgin Islands would be considerably higher which should cause the Virgin Islanders no problem.

Ambassador-designate Schwartz. The President noted in closing that Mr. Schwartz was a long-time friend with whom he and his family had a special relationship. He pointed out that the Ambassador-designate was a “good, sound, tough businessman” with considerable experience in the real estate field particularly in Florida. He stated that it would be to his own and Prime Minister Pindling’s mutual advantage if there were a friendly exchange of communications and open dialogue between the Prime Minister and the Ambassador. He hoped that through this contact we could not only maintain but enhance the trust and friendship which characterized the relations between the Bahamas and the U.S. The Prime Minister stated that he intended to make every use of the new Ambassador and very much hoped that he would stay long enough to get to know The Bahamas as Mr. Schwartz would be the fourth American Ambassador in Nassau in as many years.

In summing up, the President stated that we would look into the matter of air routes and the other matters raised, and stated that we look forward to hearing from the Bahamians on the matter of fisheries, facilities, and boundary delineation.

248. Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Information Cable


COUNTRY
Haiti

DOI
21 September–Late October 1977

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 24, Haiti, 1/77–12/79. Secret; Priority; Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals; Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor/Consultants.
SUBJECT

Apparent Deception of President Jean Claude Duvalier on the Issue of Human Rights

ACQ

[less than 1 line not declassified]

SOURCE

[5 lines not declassified]

1. In late September 1977, General Gracia Jacques, head of the Palace Guard, said [less than 1 line not declassified] that the release of political prisoners on 21 September had been set up to make the U.S. Government (USG) believe that President Jean Claude Duvalier was liberalizing his regime when in fact about 80 percent of the prisoners released were common criminals. According to Jacques, Duvalier believes that the USG's current emphasis on human rights will pass in a few years. In the meantime, Duvalier will give public allegiance to liberalizing his regime while he keeps the political prisoners hidden, releases a few petty thieves now and then, and continues to deceive the USG. ([less than 1 line not declassified] Comment: [less than 1 line not declassified], dated 27 September 1977,[3][less than 1 line not declassified], also reported that 80 percent of the prisoners were common criminals and the remaining were well known for their opposition to Duvalier; it also reported that the release was a part of the Government of Haiti (GOH) plan to appear sincere in its human rights efforts, particularly following the visit to Haiti of the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations.[4] The Department of State had the following comments on [less than 1 line not declassified] The Embassy in Haiti maintains a careful check on the political prisoners there and, according to Embassy information, at least 40 of the 103 individuals released were guaranteed political prisoners and several more could be shown as political prisoners. In addition, 20 of those released were hard core, violence prone extremists and their release came as a surprise.)

2. Jacques said that some of the political prisoners had been killed and that the others were hidden in remote jails throughout the countryside where no one knew of their existence. ([less than 1 line not declassified]

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2 The Haitian Government released 104 political prisoners on September 21 to commemorate 20 years of Duvalierist rule. The next day, Duvalier gave a speech in which he claimed that there were no more political prisoners in Haiti. (Telegram 3590 from Port au Prince, September 22; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770345–0934)

3 Not found.

4 See footnote 3, Document 246.

5 Not found.
Comment: The timing of these deaths was not discussed, but it is probable that they took place over a period of time, rather than recently. The source described in the Field Comment of paragraph one of this report said recently that Colonel Jean C. Valme, Chief of the Internal Security Service, indicated during a confidential discussion that some political prisoners had been sent to jails in the countryside and some were in such bad mental condition that they themselves were not certain of their identity. This source also said that Duvalier was considering the possibility of abolishing completely the Ton Ton Macoute (TTM) organization in an effort to further deceive the USG of his real intentions regarding human rights.) Jacques added that Duvalier’s comments on 22 September welcoming Haitian exiles to come back were merely to deceive the public since the President is aware that none of the exiles will return because they realize that to do so would be risking prison.

3. Jacques said that he had recently discussed with the President and others the activities of Jean Dominique, reporter of Radio Haiti who has been relatively aggressive in recent news conferences with Duvalier, asking the President embarrassing questions concerning human rights in Haiti. Duvalier believes that Dominique is a Communist. Jacques thinks Dominique is trying to develop a revolution and said that “they would get him first.” Jacques added that he would not be surprised if Dominique had a fatal accident in the near future.

4. Field Dissem: [less than 1 line not declassified]

249. Telegram From the Embassy in Haiti to the Department of State

Port au Prince, January 30, 1978, 1431Z

354. Subj: Meeting With Foreign Minister Brutus.

1. At his request, I met Friday with Foreign Minister Brutus for about 45 minutes in his office. Brutus said he wanted to occasionally meet with me to discuss relations between the US and Haiti in an informal manner.

2. Brutus stressed his desire that we have friendly, cordial relations although he said he still believes Americans do not understand Haiti.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780044-0624. Confidential; Priority. Repeated for information to Bogota and Santo Domingo.

2 January 27.
and its complexities. Brutus, as is his custom, proceeded to recount the peculiarities of Haitian history and concluded that given their history things must move slowly. He said that if the GOH attempted to move faster in its liberalization policy things would soon get out of hand. Brutus expressed his opinion of the Haitian press by saying that complete press freedom in Haiti was impossible. He said that some journalists were their own worst enemies in that they take advantage of relaxed government policies and get themselves in trouble. He said no newspaper in Haiti could survive without some kind of outside support, either from the government or other sources. Brutus said no one in Haiti really buys a paper, rather everyone will borrow someone else’s copy so that circulation can never be adequate to support a really independent press.

3. I indicated to Brutus that it was possible that a team from the Inter-American Press Association might visit Haiti and urged that every effort be made to cooperate with the visit if it is made. Brutus said he saw no problem in this and that GOH would not impose any restrictions on such a visit.

4. I then asked Brutus if GOH was going to stick to its promise to invite the OAS Human Rights Commission. Brutus said the commitment was made and will definitely be honored. He declined to fix a time, but said Ambassador Salomon was being sent instructions to make arrangements for such a visit.³

5. We then turned to the subject of economic assistance, and I told Brutus we were considering a new approach to our aid programs. I said it would be an increased program, but would impose tough restrictions and fiscal requirements.⁴ Brutus said he was delighted to know of a new aid initiative and would welcome tough economic controls. He said, that of course, GOH would not accept political conditions affecting their internal affairs. Brutus said he hoped we would be particularly tough in two requirements: first, the fixing of priorities for development and second, imposing tight controls so that there would be absolutely no chance of any “thievery”.

6. We then discussed Haiti’s image, which we both agreed was quite bad, to say the least. Brutus said that he had deliberately chosen to be on foreign assignment during the reign of Francois Duvalier and that he had been frequently embarrassed over events in Haiti. He said he understood the need to improve Haiti’s image. I asked about the current visit of Information Minister Gousse to the U.S. and Brutus

³ See footnote 3, Document 246.
⁴ Haiti received $27.54 million and $24.76 million in total economic assistance in FY 1978 and FY 1979, respectively, a drop from $40.70 million in FY 1977. (USAID Greenbook)
said Gousse was there to work on improving Haiti’s image. He said Haiti intended to hire a public relations firm. I stated that our relations with Gousse had not been satisfactory and that Gousse seemed to avoid contact both with our Embassy and with U.S. journalists. Brutus said Gousse was an odd person who was not as accessible as he should be.  

7. Brutus then mentioned that the agreement with Santo Domingo on a dam and irrigation project in the southeast (Pedernales) would soon be signed. He also said agreement with Colombia was near on sea rights and that a Colombian delegation would be coming to Haiti to conclude the agreement.

8. We parted with the usual exchange of courtesies and agreed to meet again soon.

9. Comment: Brutus seemed anxious to smooth things over following the Neree incident. He, as expected, pushed for understanding and patience in US-Haitian relations. His espousal of tight controls on aid funds reflects his penchant for personal honesty and integrity. Things seem to be simmering down and Brutus may be signaling a return to the slow, deliberate pace toward liberalization.

Jones

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5 Gousse met briefly with the Deputy Assistant Secretary Shelton on January 31 for a courtesy call. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850126–0109)

6 In telegram 4590 from Port au Prince, December 16, 1977, the Embassy reported on the aftermath of the attack by two of Duvalier’s Volunteers for National Security on the co-editor of the Jeune Presse, Luc Neree. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770470–0156)
250. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Todman) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)\(^1\)

Washington, March 9, 1978

**SUBJECT**

Proposed PL–480 Title III Program for Haiti

**ISSUE FOR DECISION**

Final action by Interagency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance on PL–480 Title III program for Haiti.

**ESSENTIAL FACTORS**

At the February 27 meeting of the Committee you asked for a report on several questions concerning this program:\(^2\) The AID General Counsel advises us that the human rights language of our PL–480 Legislation is applicable to Title III agreements, in addition to Title I. Ambassador Jones and Mark Schneider agreed to add the standard human rights language to the agreement.

Ambassador Jones also stated he would communicate to the GOH that future year commitments are dependent both on fulfillment of PL–480 program requirements and on performance in the area of human rights.

The Department of Agriculture has now formally approved the Title III program, as proposed. All other concerned agencies have also approved (A.I.D., Treasury, and OMB) as well as EB.

*Remaining Issue*: HA is concerned that approval of this program would amount to an increase in PL–480 assistance for Haiti. This would conflict with the concept reflected in Presidential Directive 30 of channeling resources toward countries with positive human rights records.\(^3\)

ARA, AID, and the other concerned agencies and bureaus are agreed that the performance objectives of the program cannot be met at reduced levels, particularly in view of the very stiff reforms to be demanded of the Haitians: tax reform, budget reform, and administrative and policy reforms. These amount to a virtual revolution in the

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Christopher Papers, Box 34, Human Rights—Haiti. Confidential. Drafted by de Santillana on March 8; cleared in HA, AID, AA/LA, and EB/IFP.

\(^2\) Not found.

Haitian Government’s entire development effort. Ambassador Jones and our AID experts report the proposed levels—$18 million in FY–1978 and $25 million in succeeding years—are essential to the integrity of the program. I concur fully.

I also believe that this program conforms with the concepts in PD–30 of promoting basic economic and social rights, and giving consideration to countries with an improving record of human rights observance.  

Attached is a table showing how past and future levels of assistance to Haiti will be affected by the Title III program. There is no increase in overall assistance this fiscal year, and only a relatively modest increase in FY–1979: 15 percent. Should such an increase appear too high in light of the human rights situation in the future, the AID program could be adjusted.

HA notes that previous years’ assistance levels contained exceptional resources to meet the emergency humanitarian needs of drought relief and more than $9 million each year went through private organizations (down in FY–79 to $4.8 million). Also, since we are now in March, it should not be difficult to use a lower first year figure since $18 million was for the full fiscal year. A final year figure of $12–13 million would be approximately equivalent to last year’s level and permit us to still plan for higher figures in future years based on both fulfillment of the Title III requirements and additional human rights improvements.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the proposed Title III program for Haiti.
251. Airgram From the Embassy in the Bahamas to the Department of State

A–16
Nassau, March 31, 1978

SUBJECT
Bahamas: US Goals and Objectives

REF
State’s 037394 as amended by State’s 042729

FOLLOWING AIRGRAM SHOULD BE SUBSTITUTED FOR NASSAU’s A–6.

1. OVERVIEW STATEMENT

Our overall approach to achieving our goals and objectives in the Bahamas is conditioned by two factors: (1) our limited (but, in our opinion, sufficient) resources and (2) the GCOB’s inability to digest more than one bilateral issue at a time, and its resentment at being pressured (in its view bullied) into negotiations for which it is not prepared.

With regard to the former we feel that our limited Embassy personnel resources—augmented by the Department on an ad hoc basis—are sufficient to cope with upcoming facility and maritime delimitation negotiations. We do not feel that additional resources in the form of concessional economic assistance would be either justified or properly utilized at this time. We do recommend, however, that we begin to explore all available forms of non-concessional assistance which like our two Preclearance Facilities in Nassau and Freeport—both of great importance to the tourism industry—would help the GCOB to help itself.

2 In telegram 37394 to Nassau, February 13, the Department transmitted the approved version of the Ambassador’s goals and objectives for the Bahamas, focused on base negotiations, narcotics interdiction, economic cooperation, and participation in the Caribbean community. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]) In telegram 42729 to Nassau, February 17, the Department clarified the plan for implementing the goals and objectives statement, placing more emphasis on U.S. security interests and adding more detail about promoting American investment. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780074–0657)
3 Airgram A–6 from Nassau, February 9, transmitted the Embassy’s initial implementation plan for the goals and objectives statement. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780020–0086)
With regard to the second factor almost five years experience in dealing with this newly independent Government has taught us that it does no good, and in fact is counter-productive, to push too hard or to push on too many fronts simultaneously for consultations, action or decisions. The fact, for example, that the Law of the Sea Conference was until recently the GCOB’s major and overriding concern made it impossible for us to pursue talks on our facilities here. Likewise, the imminent resumption of these talks will, along with other factors mentioned below, prejudice an early commencement of maritime boundary delimitation talks. The Department should thus be aware that impatience on our part to conclude all outstanding bilateral issues on a schedule devised by ourselves is both impossible and quite possibly could be prejudicial to our long range, substantive goals.

We therefore suggest a low keyed and measured approach in our dealings with this Government, being prompt and positive in responding to their reasonable (and not too frequent) requests for assistance and not overly anxious in attempting to resolve all outstanding bilateral problems.

2. DISCUSSION OF KEY POLICY ISSUES

The principal US objective in the Bahamas for the next two years is the continued existence of a politically stable and friendly neighbor. This in turn rests on a viable and healthy economy.

The Bahamian economy has not been immune to the worldwide economic difficulties of the last several years, and while there is no reason to believe that it will appreciably worsen in the next two years, there are, at the same time, few firm indicators on which to predict any significant improvement. The economy’s extreme dependence on tourism causes it to reflect outside economic trends and developments almost immediately. In addition, the newly reelected PLP government’s program to increase needed foreign investment is either disturbingly vague or remains largely unimplemented. The problems of increasing unemployment and long overdue family planning have yet to receive the attention they merit. While the politically moderate PLP is securely in power for the next five years, an economic downturn could produce unexpected and for us possibly adverse changes in its general direction if not its philosophy.

Government leaders as well as speakers for the fragmented opposition are almost unanimous in proclaiming 1978 as the “year of decision” i.e., the deadline for taking steps to prevent stagnation and possible further deterioration of the economy. They likewise concur that the problem could rapidly be compounded as an ever increasing workforce competes for a limited and non-expanding number of jobs. They are far from unanimous, however, on what needs to be done, and how to
do it. Until they are and until they begin implementing some workable solutions (as opposed to rhetoric), the primary US objective here will become more difficult to project into the future.

Should the economy falter, or should it fail to keep pace with a rising population growth and rising expectations, we would be faced with several policy issues and have to answer some relatively difficult questions. Among those: (1) Should the Bahamas continue to be ineligible for concessional economic assistance because of its relatively (and misleadingly) large per capita income? (2) Should an exception be made in the Immigration & Nationality Act to permit Bahamians to enter the US, the traditional safety valve for excess workers? (3) Should we seek to make an exception for the Bahamas in laws, regulations and rules relating to Civil Air and Income Tax Matters (deductions for attending foreign conventions) and duty free Customs limitations? (4) Should we (assuming that a successful facility treaty has been negotiated) consider raising the agreed rental quid? (5) Should we accede to the Bahamians’ demand for equidistance in establishing maritime boundaries giving the Bahamians a larger share of mineral rights on the ocean floor than our present position would indicate with the proviso that we be given the first option to purchase. We would like to reiterate the importance we attach to the continued growth of this economy which in large measure translates into the tourism industry. In our opinion it is shortsighted and contrary to our long range interest to neglect or fail to respond positively to GCOB requests for assistance in the area whether for more passenger seats from New York City, more routes to other US destinations, or amendment to the Tax Act allowing for deductions for attending conventions in the Bahamas. By not responding positively now we run the risk of not attaining our objectives in the Bahamas. Finally, we should keep in mind the effects of a rapprochement with Cuba on the Bahamas tourism industry.

3. PROPOSED COURSES OF ACTION

III. Strengthened Bilateral Economic Cooperation

a. Promote Bahamian Economic and Political Stability by Supporting Bahamian Requests to Strengthen its Tourism Industry

The Bahamian tourism industry accounts for 77 percent of GNP and is vital to the economy. The Embassy and the Department have already assisted it by opening a second preclearance unit in Freeport and by supporting additional air routes from the US. The latter, because of CAB’s autonomy, is considerably more difficult to accomplish and there has thus far been no resolution. We strongly urge that the Depart-

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4 These headings correspond to the goals and objectives statement in telegram 37394 to Nassau (see footnote 1 above).
ment make every effort in achieving a satisfactory and early conclusion to what we feel are reasonable Bahamian requests. It is unfortunate that the Administration’s tax reform proposals failed to take into account the Bahamian dependence on the American tourist dollar in formulating its formula for income tax deductions for attending overseas conventions and in our view this merits reconsideration.

b. **Negotiate Mutually Agreeable Fishing Zones and Maritime Boundaries**

The negotiations of mutually agreeable fishing and maritime boundary zones raise problems of priorities. US-based fishermen were excluded in 1975 from catching spiny lobsters in Bahamian waters under the terms of Bahamian legislation copied from similar US legislation. Theoretically, this Bahamian action could eventually enhance the Bahamian economy although at the same time it has created a hardship for Florida-based fishermen. Given the additional fact that the issue has strong emotional/nationalistic overtones for the Bahamian electorate, we must ask ourselves if we should continue to press the claims of the Florida fishermen (which in our view would be obtainable only at an exorbitant price, if at all) at the risk of prejudicing other interests. The question of eventually establishing fisheries zones and a fisheries agreement permitting fishing for fin-fish and lobster in Bahamian waters was made even more complicated because of our own unilateral action in October of 1977 when we issued tenders for seabed oil exploration in the undelimitated area of the Blake Plateau.\(^5\) The GCOB’s reaction (which had been predicted) was to respond that both fisheries and economic zones must be one and the same, that the former could not be negotiated until the latter had been agreed upon, and that it would not be possible to proceed with the latter until the Bahamas had likewise called for tenders in the area. Maritime boundary delimitation is thus at an impasse and successful negotiations will prove to be difficult, if not impossible, if in fact our position is not based on “the principles of international law and equity” or is incompatible with our stance vis-a-vis the Mexicans and Canadians. We should consider too whether anything less than an equitable settlement of the issue would outweigh our overall interests in the Bahamas, including both its long term economic stability and its continued friendship. Having already made clear our interest in negotiations, we strongly recommend that we not press the GCOB on the matter until they—by the issuance of their own tenders—have equalized their pre-negotiating stance.

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\(^5\) In telegram 1720 from Nassau, November 8, 1977, the Embassy reported on the November 7 meeting with Adderly in which the Foreign Minister expressed displeasure at the U.S. decision to begin seabed oil exploration before maritime boundaries had been set. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, D770412-0518)
IV a. Encouragement and Assistance to Increase GCOB Economic Stability

The Embassy has in the past encountered difficulties in achieving this goal principally for two reasons: (a) the Bahamian failure, thus far, to proceed with formulating planning goals and (b) what we understand are the limited assistance resources available to be offered. Until the Bahamian Cabinet agrees amongst itself as to the Government’s own goals and priorities there is little that we independently can or should do. Likewise the GCOB is still wary of the political risks inherent in implementing family planning and given its local racial and political connotations, we strongly believe that we remain in the background until we are unequivocally asked for advice or assistance. A US team is tentatively expected to visit Nassau this Spring to discuss possible assistance options and it remains to be seen if the GCOB will have formulated development plans or if the assistance we are capable of offering (non-concessional aid) meets Bahamian expectations.

I b. Negotiations of Continued US Use of Military Facilities

The long stalemated facility negotiations recently showed some movement when in a conversation with Assistant Secretary Todman in early December both Prime Minister Pindling and Minister of External Affairs Adderley stated that they would be ready to resume talks at any time after January 9, 1978 with the hope of reaching agreement by July of 1978. A US negotiating team is scheduled to come to Nassau in March for preliminary discussions. It appears that we remain far apart on the amount of the quid to be paid for use of the bases both in cash rental payment and possible additional economic assistance. While we have attempted to explain to the GCOB that it is most unlikely that our quid can, per se, contain anything but a cash rental payment, the Bahamians remain doubtful. We expect them to insist on a concurrent economic assistance package before they sign a facilities agreement and they will most probably demand concessional economic assistance as a part of this package. Given these circumstances it is essential that the Embassy and the negotiating team enter the discussions with a clear and accurate understanding of the bases’ actual value to DOD and the existence of resources to support that position.

II. Cooperation on Narcotics Interdiction and Control of Tax Evasion

We continue to enjoy full support from the Bahamian Police authorities in our efforts to interdict narcotics shipments passing through the Bahamas. Given the fact, however, that illegal trafficking is rapidly

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6 During his visit to Nassau, Todman discussed the base negotiations with Prime Minister Pindling and Foreign Minister Adderley on December 2, 1977. A memorandum of conversation was transmitted in telegram 1968 from Nassau, December 13, 1977. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770465–1123)
increasing and that the Bahamian resources remain modest there is the real possibility that they will be unable to comply, or comply in a sufficiently prompt manner, given the growing number of requests for assistance. While this situation may be partly alleviated by the creation of the Bahamian Defense Force i.e., Coast Guard, we feel that we should begin examining now what steps we should or could take to be of further assistance to the Bahamas to help them better police their own territory. Likewise given the GCOB’s strong sensitivity to real or imagined breaches of their sovereignty, we should explore whether present arrangements of liaison and cooperation could be improved.

With regard to the control of tax evasion we are satisfied that the present informal arrangement whereby IRS operations in the Bahamas are carried out under guidelines formulated by the Embassy, and where necessary with the knowledge of the Office of the Attorney General of the Bahamas, are working to the satisfaction of all parties concerned. Consequently, and in light of public statements by the Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs rejecting the idea, we see no reason to push at this time for an exchange of information agreement even if those US agencies involved were able to agree among themselves to the language for such an agreement.

4. CURRENT SITUATION

A. Facilities negotiations are due to commence in March of 1978. Given what appears to be the difference between what we are willing to pay for rental and Bahamian expectations of how much they should receive, we are not confident of reaching an early agreement.?

B. Maritime boundary and fishing discussions are at a temporary impasse. As it takes two sides to enter into discussions and as the GCOB has indicated in no uncertain terms its unwillingness to talk at this time, we do not see an early resolution of this issue.

C. The CAB continues to defer a ruling on American Airlines’ request to compete on the New York-Nassau run relinquished by PANAM pending a decision whether to consider the Bahamas’ application separately from the other applications contained in the “Caribbean Services Investigation”. The ruling, which was expected as early as last October, continues to be unforthcoming to the detriment of the local tourism industry.

Schwartz

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7 In telegram 98221 to Nassau, April 18, the Department transmitted a message from Todman to Adderly designed to “answer Adderly’s concerns,” as well as keep “momentum gained in the March 6–7 technical negotiating session.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780165–0265)
252. Airgram From the Embassy in Haiti to the Department of State¹

A–50 Port au Prince, July 25, 1978

SUBJECT
A Different View on U.S. Policy Towards Haiti by Two Departing Officers

Enclosed for the Department’s information is a personal view on what U.S. policy should be towards Haiti as prepared by two officers departing post. These views do not reflect Embassy policy, but Ambassador Jones authorized submission of their views in this form. The Embassy will submit its comment on these views in a separate message.

Meade

Enclosure

Paper Prepared by Alden H. Irons and Francis D. Gomez of the Embassy in Haiti²

Port au Prince, undated

U.S. POLICY TOWARDS HAITI: A DIFFERENT VIEW

REFERENCES
(A) Port-au-Prince A–14 of February 28, 1978
(B) Port-au-Prince 3236 (1977)
(C) COMNAVBASE GTMO 152338Z Jul 78
(D) Port-au-Prince 2932

SUMMARY: This message, submitted with the consent of Ambassador Jones, presents the personal views on U.S. policy toward Haiti of Political Officer Alden H. Irons and Public Affairs Officer Francis D. Gomez. Both officers are departing in July after having served two years in Port-au-Prince. They hope that their views will encourage new analysis in Washington and Port-au-Prince of the Haitian government and particularly the implication of this analysis for the primary objectives of U.S. policy in Haiti—to alleviate this country’s poverty and

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780122–1724. Confidential. Drafted by Meade. Repeated to ICA.
² Confidential. Drafted by Irons and Gomez on July 24.
under-development and promote improved observation of human rights. They conclude that because effective use of foreign assistance is not possible under the present circumstances, U.S. aid should be reduced to a minimum with the hope that this action will encourage change that in turn can truly improve the quality of life of the masses. END SUMMARY.

1. Introduction. U.S. policy toward Haiti since the accession of President-for-Life Jean-Claude Duvalier in 1971 has been based on the premise that the stability his regime afforded would be propitious for improved observance of human rights and effective attention to poverty and development. The mission’s current statement of goals and objectives recognizes that some human rights improvements have been made and that “AID programs resumed five years ago are just now beginning to show results.” For some time the drafting officers believed that the policy of persuasion and encouragement was paying off. But we now realize that the little progress achieved thus far can go no further. The goals statement fails to give due consideration to several fundamental factors which will continue to impede real change in the long term. It has become increasingly apparent that the most powerful members of the Duvalier government are not only overwhelmingly concerned with preserving power and the corruption which sustains it, but actually fear development as a threat to their power. We are convinced that seven years of Jean-Claudiste “rule” have produced little, if any, real progress. The GOH pretends to have a genuine commitment to development and improved human rights practices, and the United States pretends to believe it. Nonetheless, aid levels mount constantly. It is clear that real progress in human rights in the broadest sense—food, shelter, clothing, education, freedom of speech and association, and popular participation in Haiti’s destiny—are inimical to the Presidency-for-Life. Consequently, U.S. assistance has not, cannot and will not have the desired effect. Haiti under the Duvaliers many times over has proven itself unworthy of large scale foreign aid. The basic assumption on which U.S. Policy is founded, therefore, merits reconsideration.

2. Haiti: Killing a nation to save a dictatorship. In February 1973 the U.S. renewed aid to Haiti after a 10-year hiatus of severely strained relations growing out of the brutality and corruption of Francois Duvalier’s rule which ended in his death in 1971 and his replacement by his then 19-year old son, Jean Claude. Aid was renewed only after the U.S. had received indications that the abuses of the past were being checked and that the “new” regime would take the country’s develop-

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3 See Document 251.
ment needs seriously. Today, five and one-half years later, violations of individual human rights have declined; but the sincerity of the GOH to do anything meaningful about the grinding poverty of the masses remains very much in doubt.

3. In May, 1978 the Embassy presented for consideration by the GOH a 5-year, $125 million PL–480 aid proposal which calls for fiscal and administrative reforms as proof of the stated commitment of the government to address fundamental human needs. Specifically, it requires budget unification; modernization of the tax system; increased resources for the development ministries; expenditure controls; increasing the workday from 6 to 8 hours; a national population policy; and renewed efforts to promote industrialization. We hope that this laudable proposal will succeed; it is the toughest, most ambitious U.S. aid package ever presented to the GOH, and one which focuses squarely on one of the most important factors in Haiti’s development equation today: corruption.

4. After two years in Haiti, however, we cannot be sanguine about the prospects for success; for the proposal strikes at a foundation of deeply rooted, institutionalized corruption on which Duvalierist power is built. Even in the relatively enlightened period since 1971, the unmistakable pattern has been for the Duvaliers and their lieutenants to do the absolute minimum in order to continue to receive aid while at the same time holding to the corrupt purse-strings of fortune. For the donor community, Duvalierist rhetoric has become a tragically acceptable substitute for action. The fact that the President does not hold cabinet meetings, that the civil service is replete with incompetents and that there is no rational development strategy has been adequately considered. The GOH saved the aid flow at last year’s Joint Commission meeting in Washington by agreeing to create a National Development Fund using half the receipts of the Regie du Tabac. Although the fund was established, there has been no adequate accounting of deposits or expenditures. At this year’s just concluded session of the Joint Commission the GOH, after much suspense, announced at the last minute that it is prepared to fiscalize some government receipts. The Embassy, on the other hand, has already received indications that the GOH is devising measures to resist the genuine implementation of reforms and to continue the flow of illicit funds to private hands. Writing in his 1972

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4 See footnote 7, Document 250.
5 See footnote 4, Document 244. Regie du Tabac was the government-run tobacco monopoly; Duvalier directed in April 1977 that 50 percent of its receipts would be used for development purposes. (Telegram 1280 from Port au Prince, April 7, 1977; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770242-0933)
book “Haiti: Its Stagnant Society and Shackled Economy”, economist and former IMF representative in Haiti, O. Ernest Moore, said:

“It should hardly surprise anyone, under the circumstances, that Haiti showed little or no genuine progress under Francois Duvalier. Indeed, most of the news from Haiti indicated that the country was steadily sliding backward, despite all the financial and economic aid received. Where the people have lost all hope, there cannot be that elan, that ambition, on the part of individuals which is an essential ingredient of progress.”

Little has changed since Moore wrote those words more than six years ago. Resignation and despair characterize the attitude of the silent majority in and out of government. And for good reason. The population is expanding more rapidly than ever, while at the same time deforestation and erosion diminish the already small amount of arable land. Agricultural production, already the lowest in the hemisphere, continues to decline. Once a major exporter of coffee, sugar, rice, timber and cotton, Haiti now imports all except coffee and even coffee exports are declining. The once promising light industrial sector is threatened by increasing production costs, byzantine government practices, arbitrary decisions and unreliable utilities. A recent study on Haitian education by an AID specialist concluded that “the GOH commitment to ‘lead’ a national improvement effort in this sector is not evident.” He determined that “formal education suffers from an absence of national policy, guidelines, leadership, purpose, budgetary planning, and definition of the (Creole/French) language issue.” Such is the state of affairs after more than seven years of Jean-Claude Duvalier and hundreds of millions of dollars of foreign assistance. As Moore has indicated, it is not surprising. The Duvalierists fear education, development and human rights as threats to their power. Haiti, to use the oft repeated jest, is lamentably “an underdeveloping country.”

5. Power Corrupts. Mission reporting during the past two years has not addressed substantively the institutionalized corruption of the GOH and its effect on development. This is due largely to the fact that hard evidence of corruption is difficult to come by; but at the same time, it is manifestly clear that graft extends to every level of society. Duvalier’s favorite Presidential Guard officer, Lt. Col. Prosper Avril, maintains offices in the National Palace, the Central Bank, the National Planning and Development Council and the Regie du Tabac. Even the President of the Central Bank, himself a financial “wizard” who is able to meet commitments and still funnel money to private hands, admits to ignorance of and inability to control funds manipulated by the good colonel. In 1977 the President-for-Life purchased a $1 million yacht, began building a $300,000 docking facility for it, purchased a $2.5 million villa in Monaco, and continued to spend hundreds of thousands
of dollars on cars and other gifts for his girlfriends and Palace favorites. Other family properties include extra homes in Port-au-Prince, elsewhere in Haiti, in France and the United States, and a ranch near the capital. The family directly controls or profits from numerous enterprises, among them two casinos, a movie theater complex, a glue factory, a cement monopoly, a chocolate factory (reputed 1977 income: $5 million), large agricultural holdings, a domestic airline, hotels and others. Millions of unfiscalized dollars are spent each year on luxuries, foreign travel or direct payments to ensure the good behavior of hundreds—if not thousands—of Haitians (the government has no per diem system for “official” travel, paying functionaries in large fixed sums instead); the family and/or friends of the family receive kickbacks on most major contracts. The Duvaliers are direct beneficiaries of insurance taxes on travel, property taxes, passport taxes and exit taxes. They even exact payments from tens of thousands of Haitian workers who cross the border to cut Dominican sugar. The laborers must pay to leave, must remit part of their earnings, and must pay to return. All vehicles in Haiti are “inspected” every three months, another source of income for the Palace. It is no wonder that the GOH is pleased with the increasingly massive flows of foreign aid. For they allow the government to divert public and other monies for private uses. In the meantime, where can one find evidence of any real concern for the needs of the masses?

6. Human Rights: A Sham. The Haitian government frequently states that no one can teach anything about human rights to the first slave state to throw off the colonialist yoke and that recent improvements in observance of rights of the individual are a natural result of the internal political evolution of the country. It can be persuasively argued, however, that nearly all the steps that have been taken, have been taken reluctantly, and as the result of external pressures. We will not repeat here the litany of cause and effect—it has been amply documented in the copious human rights reporting from this post. A few examples will serve: A political prisoner released in December 1976 told the Embassy just recently of the sudden change in attitude of prison authorities the day after President Carter’s election. He credited his subsequent release to the government’s desire to appease the new American administration. Ambassador Andrew Young’s August 1977 visit was followed a month later by the liberation of all remaining political prisoners, the signature of the San Jose Treaty, an invitation to the IAHRC to visit, and the so far untested and apparently cosmetic reforms designed to provide death certificates to families of persons

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6 See footnote 3, Document 246.
who disappeared after being arrested. Examples of the limits of government tolerance of human rights reforms abound. When the press became too outspoken last fall, two new journals were closed and the editor of another was severely beaten by “Tonton Macoutes”\(^7\). This paper, too, has not reappeared since and, although the assailants were tried and convicted after the intervention of the Inter-American Press Association, the sentences were little more than a slap on the wrist. Indeed, the men were conspicuous members of President-for-Life Duvalier’s honor guard when he opened the 1978 session of the Legislative Assembly on April 22. The flurry of trade union activity that took place in the heady months following Young’s visit has been contained by the government. Reporting on the status of 44 Haitian “economic” refugees rescued at sea near Guantanamo in July, the base cabled: “The expanded definition of basic human rights to include such things as food, clothing, shelter and governmental protection raises fundamental questions as to the genuine concern of the GOH for the economic plight of its citizenry, and its ability or willingness to control the rampant abuse of power and position by corrupt officials.” (COMNAVBASE 152358Z Jul 78)\(^8\)

Despite Foreign Minister Brutus’ assurance to the Embassy last August that habeas corpus would henceforth be respected (Port-au-Prince 3236),\(^9\) no change has occurred. A Haitian lawyer recently told us of a client who had been held for more than three weeks without being charged. When a habeas corpus petition was presented to a judge, he agreed to the impeccable legal basis of the petition, but would not act on it because he was “afraid” to confront the arresting military authorities with a demand for the man’s release. During the disastrous 1977 drought the GOH refused to recognize the emergency and only created a relief coordinating committee after the U.S. and other donors had pressured it to do so. We could go on for pages. We believe, however, that the analysis provided in the recent summary cable on the VIII OAS General Assembly (STATE 174797)\(^10\) is particularly appropriate to Haiti: “Support of human rights in the OAS (add ‘in Haiti’) may be explained by sincere conviction but may more realistically represent adoption of protective coloration by regimes fearful of being spotlighted for human rights violations.” Whether in the field of development or in the field of human rights, the indictment made by a highly respected intellectual states the fact

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\(^7\) See footnote 6, Document 249.

\(^8\) Not found.

\(^9\) Dated August 30, 1977. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770313–0815)

\(^10\) Dated July 11. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780285–0027)
eloquently: “The Duvalierists are killing a nation to save a dictatorship.”
A great number of the educated classes believe that the U.S., in having
first recognized and “blessed” the government of a 19-year old “Presi-
dent-for-Life”, and in lending sustenance to a regime whose overween-
ing goals are power and enrichment, is an unwitting accomplice to
that “crime”.

7. Conclusions. In view of the foregoing, we believe that U.S. aid
should be reduced to minimum levels. We recognize the practical
problems such an action would pose. A drastic reduction in the absence
of overt provocation would open us to charges of interference. Notwith-
standing the risk of such charges, we view the Title III proposal as a
means to expose the hollowness of the government’s rhetoric. The
conditions contained therein should be rigidly insisted upon as a test
of GOH sincerity to take human needs—broadly defined—seriously.
Their rejection, in fact or in spirit, would mean that the GOH is not
committed to do what is necessary to further development and that
U.S. aid is largely wasted. In such an event, U.S. policy should be:
— to withdraw the Title III proposal and inform the GOH and the
Haitian public of our reasons for doing so;
— to serve notice that no new aid commitments will be undertaken
and that there will be no resumption of Title I programs;
— to instruct U.S. representatives at international lending institu-
tions to oppose new commitments to Haiti;
— to encourage bilateral donors to follow our lead.

There are those who maintain that the reduction of aid would
adversely affect those who need it most—the rural poor. They point
to the experience of the sixties when a cut-off of assistance had little
or no effect on GOH policies. Regardless of the effect, the quality of life
of the poor has not measurably changed since U.S. aid was suspended
in 1963, nor has it improved since aid was renewed in 1973. Therefore,
the question is irrelevant. There are also those who hold that a reduction
in aid would play into the hands of the most reactionary members of
the government—the so-called dinosaurs. This theory postulates that
the human rights situation would deteriorate and that the U.S. would
become the scapegoat for the failure of the government to carry out
its “economic revolution.” They would appeal to national pride in
assailing U.S. policies. It is equally possible, however, that a reduction
of aid would strengthen the hand of the perhaps more numerous
progressive elements in and out of government who genuinely seek
constructive change. Such an action may also accelerate the demise of
the dinosaurs. Were this to occur, the door would then be open for
renewed assistance as a means to encourage and support progressive,
enlightened leadership. We have reason to believe that various sectors
of Haitian society are beginning to coalesce in an effort to bring about
more responsible government. Among these are representatives of the intellectual community, industrialists, businessmen, military officers and the media, all of whom are supported at least spiritually by an increasingly large number of lower and middle class people whose expectations have been raised by the communications revolution and their contact with Haitians living in the U.S. and Canada. No matter how well-intentioned they may be, these elements presently are powerless to affect the course of events. They are frustrated by a U.S. policy which in their eyes fails to achieve its objectives and merely serves to perpetuate the status quo. They are awaiting a signal. A reduction in aid would serve to encourage them to make themselves felt and heard.

8. It is therefore clear that anything less than full GOH acceptance of Title III terms should justify a prompt reduction in assistance, an action which we hope will bring about more responsible government actions and, thereby, the achievement of our two basic policy objectives. Last June in Panama President Carter stated that in order for the nations of the hemisphere to enjoy the friendship and cooperation of the United States, they must respect human rights and work toward more representative government.11 The Duvalierists receive our cooperation and seem to enjoy our friendship by doing neither of these. Addressing the OASGA June 21 the President reiterated that “the rights and dignity of human beings must be defended and enhanced. We will continually support and encourage political systems that allow their people to participate freely and democratically in the decisions that affect their lives.”12 We fail to see, however, how present U.S. policies have any effect on a regime which regards the full exercise of human rights—in the broadest possible sense—as a threat to its power. U.S. aid has continued to grow for almost six years; and there is little hope of it being used effectively in the advancement of our objectives. For too long we have accepted the insincere rhetoric of a morally bankrupt government. In the eyes of Haitians with a genuine concern for their nation’s future, we have been tainted by our association. We should not repeat our mistakes in Vietnam and elsewhere. It is a moral imperative that we disassociate ourselves as much as possible from a government that will not and cannot respond to its people’s basic needs.

9. Nothing in this paper is intended to imply that we should reduce or eliminate our existing minimum level security assistance program.

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11 The President visited Panama June 16–17 to sign the Panama Canal Treaties. He made several statements, but see especially the joint statement issued by Carter and the Presidents of Colombia, Costa Rica, and Panama and the Prime Minister of Jamaica printed in Public Papers: Carter, 1978, Book I, pp. 1123–1125.

12 For the President’s address, see ibid., pp. 1141–1146.
We endorse the recently submitted Embassy integrated security assistance program (Port-au-Prince 2932).\footnote{In telegram 2932 from Port au Prince, July 18, the Embassy advocated a “modest and carefully circumscribed security assistance program for Haiti” that amounted to less than $1 million. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, 780295–0027)}

10. The timing of this message may give the impression that it is a “parting shot” that was deliberately delayed to the last minute and that the climate in the mission may not have been receptive to our views. Such is not the case, for the Ambassador and the Country Team have always been accessible and open to interpretations and recommendations from any member of the Mission. These have been weighed accordingly in the formulation of policy. Our own perceptions of Haiti’s complex situation have undergone numerous changes during the past year, and we have expressed and reported them accordingly. It was only in the last several weeks, however, that a series of events, some of them mentioned here, have converged to crystalize our interpretation. Our intent is to be constructive, to shed new light on some realities to contribute to the analysis of U.S. policy options in Haiti. We appreciate Ambassador Jones’ receptivity to our desire to express our views and his willingness to have them presented in this format. We recommend that the process continue through the broadening of the discussion to include all elements of the mission willing to participate.

### 253. Telegram From the Embassy in Haiti to the Department of State

Port au Prince, August 14, 1978, 1944Z

3348. Subject: Comment on “A Different View on U.S. Policy Towards Haiti by Two Departing Officers”. Ref: Port au Prince A–50.\footnote{See Document 252.}

1. Summary: In their beliefs (1) that withdrawal of U.S. aid would destabilize the Duvalier regime to the point of overthrow, and (2) that a successor regime would possibly be progressive, Messrs. Gomez’ and Irons’ views diverge from the realities of both Haitian history and the
current structure of power. Their policy prescriptions consequently would stand a good chance of precipitating a return to repression and an end to any hopes for development. Meanwhile, negotiations continue on the Title III program—"the toughest, most ambitious U.S. aid package ever presented to the GOH, and one which focuses squarely on one of the most important factors in Haiti’s development equation today: corruption" (their words). End summary.

2. Introduction. Following is Country Team message commenting on memo transmitted by Port-au-Prince A–50. Country Team comment is classified Secret in view of its sensitivity. We believe A–50 and accompanying Gomez/Irons memo should be upgraded from Confidential to Secret for same reason.

3. The Gomez/Irons memo propounds a major policy shift—pressuring the Haitian Government to the point of overthrow to achieve U.S. goals—with which we do not agree. It also propounds a subordinate tactic—using our Title III PL 480 proposal as a means to test the GOH commitment to development which is current Mission policy.

4. The basic U.S. objectives for Haiti are A) to help alleviate its great poverty B) in the process, to get it on the road to development and C) to create out of this development the bases for desired political, social and economic reform. The prospects for the success of this policy are limited by the extraordinary backwardness of the country, its people and its institutions; the country’s dismal history since independence; the depth to which its people are mired in poverty; and great sensitivity towards external pressure (particularly from the U.S.). Even with the best will in the world on the part of the government and other change agents, progress is likely to be slow.

5. Contrary to the impression created by the Gomez/Irons memo, political and economic conditions have improved measurably since 1971, as is attested to by the return of hundreds and possibly thousands of Haitians after long exile. Moreover, there are progressive elements in the government. With respect to human rights:

—All political prisoners have been released.
—A system has been established to account for those who disappeared during the Francois Duvalier regime. When recently tested, it worked.
—The judicial system, while undeniably weak, has been reinforced by the resumption of civil and criminal trials.
—Abuses of power by the military and paramilitary forces are notably fewer.

3 Jean-Claude Duvalier took office in 1971.
—There is greater tolerance of dissent.
—Visits have been made or planned by the Interamerican Press Association and the Interamerican Human Rights Commission.

With respect to the economy:
—Private investment in employment-intensive industry has created 30,000 new jobs.
—Unprecedentedly high levels of public investment have been achieved, importantly a reflection of unprecedented bilateral and multilateral aid.
—Tourism has picked up.
—The construction industry is booming.
—The government has publicly committed itself to major fiscal reforms.

6. This is not to say that most Haitians are much better off than they were seven years ago. But then there was no hope. There is some hope today.

7. Destabilization policy. We consider the proposed policy of massive pressure (drastic reduction of assistance) to effect a change of government as impractical in general and most likely to be counterproductive in the case of Haiti.

8. The U.S. essentially followed this tactic in 1963. Cutting off assistance then, at a time when our influence in Haiti was greater than now, did not ameliorate conditions nor lead to the overthrow of the government even though it was accompanied by periodic efforts of Haitian exile groups to bring down the Duvalier regime. Indeed, it may have contributed to the regime’s pursuit of even harsher policies.4

9. Fifteen years later the U.S. is no longer preeminent in Haiti. There are a number of countries following independent policies towards the government, and the relative magnitude of our assistance vis-a-vis the assistance of other donors has diminished. Jean-Claude Duvalier is now in power and is considerably more popular than his father was in 1963; the security forces—the ultimate arbiters of power—appear to be solidly behind the government; the opposition is far more amorphous and narrower than depicted in the Gomez/Irons memo; and the President does enjoy broad support in the countryside. Under these circumstances, the “destabilizing” policy urged in the Gomez/Irons memo would probably work against U.S. objectives in Haiti.

10. There are any number of possible consequences to cutting off U.S. assistance, depending in part on whether other donors and private

investors would follow the U.S. lead and, if so, the extent they did so. The following are suggested in descending order of apparent probability:

—Jean-Claude Duvalier would draw on his military forces to stabilize his regime, reverting to his father’s repressive policy if necessary.

—A hard line military or civilian dictator could replace Jean-Claude, ending any forward movement.

—A more “progressive” leader might emerge who, like Papa Doc (widely considered in 1957 as pro-U.S., a modern and humanitarian reformer), would turn out to be anything but progressive.

—A reformer might replace Duvalier, emasculate the security forces, galvanize the enlightened elements from all walks of life, pursue a vigorous and sustained development program, and set up free elections. (Haitian history as well as an assessment of the current power structure suggest that the odds against this happening are astronomical.)

11. With the exception of the latter alternative, these scenarios could revive exile attempts to invade or infiltrate Haiti, with attendant bloodshed and repression. They would end U.S. influence on the government. They would abort the liberalization policy, threaten achievements attained, and engender resistance to further change. They could also promote significant domestic and foreign disinvestment.

12. Title III. With respect to the Title III program, the Gomez/Irons memo is both highly laudatory (see the quote in the summary) and echoes existing policy, viz. that our Title III PL480 proposal should be used as a means to test the commitment of the GOH to development. We are no less suspicious of the motivations and intentions of the reactionaries and we are committed to rigorous negotiations and enforcement of a Title III program.

13. But we do not regard the Title III proposal only as a test. We consider it to be a potentially effective means to encourage the GOH to continue moving in the direction of our policy goals. We have already seen measurable changes in human rights practices in the past few years in response to our renewed economic assistance program and human rights policies. We have identified broad development policy reforms, in consultation with other donors, which have been incorporated in the Title III proposal. The pressures we have so far exerted on the GOH stand a fair chance, we think, of leading to further reforms even though they will continue to come slower than we would wish.

14. At the moment, however, the GOH has not failed the test. We are still in negotiations with the GOH on the Title III proposal. The GOH, in fact, accepted a major part of the Title III package at the July Joint Commission meeting when it committed itself to sweeping fiscal
reform. We are negotiating now for the other proposals incorporated in our Title III package. Only if the GOH rejects the Title III package, or reneges on its promised reforms would the question of the appropriate U.S. reaction come into play.

15. We agree with the Gomez/Irons memo that should the GOH reject the Title III proposal, or fail to carry out reforms after having made a commitment to them, the U.S. should react sharply. How we react would have to depend on the circumstances, but in principle we would want to take action that would be understood by the GOH while still making it possible for us to work with the other donors in a sustained development effort to achieve long term U.S. policy objectives. For now, however, our major immediate objective is to move the GOH towards full acceptance and execution of the Title III package.

Meade

254. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Caribbean Affairs (Hewitt) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Vaky)¹

Washington, August 24, 1978

SUBJECT
Reversing the Negative Trend in U.S./Bahamian Relations

As Representative Dante Fascell stated in his recent letter to President Carter (Tab 1),² The Bahamas is our third border. Our relations with The Bahamas are typified by the same range of interests and issues as our relations with Canada and Mexico. Although the total volume of day-to-day business with respect to The Bahamas is clearly less than with our two larger neighbors, Bahamian issues are of intense interest to those in the United States who are directly affected. Obviously, Bahamian problems have an immediate and significant

² Dated August 17; attached but not printed. In the letter, Fascell cited a recent incident when the crew of an American fishing boat got into a gunfight with Bahamian officials in disputed waters, resulting in the shooting of a 13-year-old boy. Fascell urged the President to begin talks with the Bahamas on bilateral issues, including a fishing agreement and a maritime delimitation agreement.
impact on important interests in Florida. It is no exaggeration to say that The Bahamas, along with other areas in the Caribbean, impact on the southeastern United States as much as Mexico on the southwest.

Although The Bahamas occupies a position with respect to the United States similar to that of Canada and Mexico, it has not gotten anything close to equal attention. The Bahamians are acutely aware of their third-class status. As a result of our lack of attention to The Bahamas and Bahamian sensitivities, relations have recently shown a tendency to deteriorate. This tendency has been exacerbated by Bahamian administrative inexperience and incapacity, and by the growing belief in The Bahamas that only by confrontation tactics does one succeed with the U.S. The recent fishing boat seizures in which a U.S. resident alien was shot through the head are a chilling example of what the future might hold unless this negative trend is reversed.

Broader issues are involved as well. Since independence, The Bahamas has seen its future as increasingly bound up with the United States and has tended to support us in international fora. Its views on most issues are conservative or middle-of-the-road. As a Black developing nation that is not unsympathetic to the United States, The Bahamas can form a useful bridge to the third world.

Perhaps more important, waters in dispute between the U.S. and The Bahamas may cover important oil bearing structures. The future exploitation of these resources depends on a cordial, working relationship between the two countries.

Our relations with The Bahamas lend themselves to examination by an interdepartmental group type exercise because of the wide range of issues, the number of actors involved on our side, and because in most cases the State Department lacks the means to effect solutions or improvements by itself. A summary of current issues between the U.S. and The Bahamas and the status of each is attached at Tab 2.3

A brief examination of the list of issues in our relations with The Bahamas suggests that in all but a few cases we are the demandeur. Hence, it would appear that there is little advantage to explicitly linking these issues one to another and seeking an overall package settlement with The Bahamas. There are a few trade-offs between issues possible for us. The net result of linking issues would probably be to strengthen the Bahamian position relative to our own. In the few areas such as bilateral economic assistance and U.S. tax laws where Bahamian interest and concern are great, our hands by and large are tied and we have little or no flexibility permitting us to meet Bahamian desires.

3 Undated; attached but not printed.
Although seeking a quick package solution to most of our outstanding problems with The Bahamas does not seem desirable or even possible, prompt action to devote more high-level attention to The Bahamas and its problems could have a positive effect on the entire context of our relations with The Bahamas and greatly facilitate achieving solutions to separate issues. In addition, there is no reason why we should not have an internally integrated and coordinated strategy with regard to The Bahamas, even though there is little merit in explicitly linking the various issues.

I recommend that we launch an interdepartmental group type exercise on The Bahamas at once, roughly paralleling the Presidential Review Memorandum exercise on Mexico and following the same timetable—that is, reaching conclusions and making decisions no later than early November. This exercise would consider, along with other things, the suggestion made by Dante Fascell for the establishment of a permanent joint commission to deal with our periodic problems with The Bahamas.

I also strongly endorse Fascell’s suggestion that the President devote a few hours of his time to The Bahamas in the near future. The simplest method would be for the President to invite Prime Minister Pindling to Washington as Fascell suggests. Since The Bahamas are perceived generally as having a common border with the U.S., an invitation by the President to Pindling would not necessarily increase pressure from other Chiefs of State in the Caribbean or elsewhere for similar treatment.

An alternative which might have an even greater impact on The Bahamas and actually be easier for the President would be a brief “wheels-down” visit of five or six hours to Nassau by the President while en route to some place else. This would be the clearest demonstration of U.S. interest and concern for The Bahamas at the highest level while avoiding many of the scheduling difficulties the President finds in Washington. A Presidential “laying on of hands” would not necessarily have to await the completion of an IG exercise.

Should you approve the suggestion of an IG type exercise on The Bahamas, we will need your guidance on authority, format, and methodology. In view of Fascell’s letter and the need for high-level attention, there is some merit in making it an NSC exercise. Sally Shelton, Luigi Einaudi, and I should meet with you this week to discuss how to proceed.

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4 No record of such a group was found.
5 See Document 144.
255. Telegram From the Embassy in Haiti to the Department of State

Port au Prince, March 27, 1979, 1817Z

1323. Subject: Title III—Conversation With Antonio Andre. Ref: State 73043.  
1. Entire text Confidential.
2. I met privately for an hour with Antonio Andre on the Title III and other subjects; I told Antonio of our decision to set aside negotiations on Title III for the time being and to move to a new Title I.

We discussed the problems surrounding Title III, particularly the lack of progress in the area of fiscal reform. I stressed that we were not abandoning our efforts to have a Title III, but that since negotiations had not been completed, I thought it best to proceed with a Title I and that it would be at about the same level as Title I obligations this fiscal year. I was careful to make it clear that our actions were in no way punitive or related to any of Haiti’s other fiscal problems, particularly the current furor over Cement d’Haiti.

3. Antonio did not seem perplexed or upset, but rather relieved. He said he saw little possibility for any real fiscal reform in the present climate. He said that reform was a matter of integrity and he did not see this in several of the present Cabinet Ministers. He then went into a rather long tirade against Berrouet, Minister of Agriculture and Bauduy, Minister of Commerce.

4. I then asked about presenting the issue to President Duvalier and suggested that it might be well for the President to be aware of the situation before I met with him. Andre agreed and said he would informally raise our decision with the President when he talked with him by phone on March 27. Andre would then let me know the mood and reaction and advised me how to proceed with the President. However, Andre did not think there would be any significant problem as the President would probably be relieved at not being pressured to

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790141–0758. Confidential; Priority.

2 In telegram 73043 to Port au Prince, March 23, the Department informed the Embassy of the decision to substitute Title I PL–480 assistance for a Title III program, because of Haiti’s non-compliance with IMF conditions for fiscal reform. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790135–0738)

3 Antonio Andre was the Director of the National Bank of the Republic of Haiti (Banque Nationale de la Republique d’Haiti).

4 Telegram 941 from Port au Prince, March 6, set forth the Country Team recommendation for suspending the Title III program and continuing with the Title I program. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790103–0462)
make reforms. Andre said several Cabinet Ministers had always spoken against the Title III.

5. Andre then went into a discussion of the various financial woes of Haiti. He is against the takeover of Cement d’Haiti. The new management group has asked for a $600,000 letter of credit to purchase fuel. Andre said that this makes the National Bank exceed IMF limits, but he has extended the credit. However, he is requiring pay back at $8,000 per day or $40,000 per week. He said that the IMF team coming down would surely object to the situation. Andre seemed to hope that the IMF would be tough to justify the warnings he has given the President. I emphasized that we had no direct interest in the Cement d’Haiti matter, but only hoped for a speedy and equitable settlement.

6. Andre concluded that the Bank now has only $18,000,000 in reserve and so cannot extend credit for other non-economic schemes put to the President by Guy Noel, Bauduy and other advisers. He mentioned a proposed new sugar mill which would be set up to run Hasco out of business, the second cement plant and the Spanish fishing boat scheme. Andre said the persons involved all stood to make handsome commissions on the deals and were only interested in feathering their own financial nest. Unfortunately, these people had the ear of the President and he had agreed to all of these projects.

7. We concluded the discussion with Andre again promising to get back in touch with me after talking with President Duvalier.

8. Comment: Andre, as usual, seemed on the verge of imminent physical collapse, but he spoke with vigor and determination. He is definitely in a life and death struggle with his enemies. I think he is personally relieved about not having to worry about a Title III at this time. He would like to see it proceed, but his major preoccupation now is with saving the Bank and coming out on top in the current power struggle. From Antonio’s description of things within top levels of the GOH, I am ever more convinced of the rightness of our decision. President Duvalier has not displayed the type of leadership or understanding that is needed to pull Haiti up economically.

Jones
256. Telegram From the Embassy in Haiti to the Department of State

Port au Prince, April 4, 1979, 2121Z

1470. Subj: Meeting with President Duvalier on Title III. Ref: Port au Prince 1402 (Notal).2

1. C—Entire text.
2. I met with President Duvalier privately and outlined to him our position on Title III. In order that he clearly understand, I gave him a short paper in French setting forth our position on Title III and on the negotiation of a new Title I. Duvalier carefully read the paper and said he had been expecting my visit and had been informed of the situation. He said he had met the day before with a Vice President of the World Bank who had also discussed the need for fiscal reform. I then stressed that we considered fiscal reform to be the key to a Title III and that we looked forward to the discussions with the IMF and also to the Joint Commission meeting in June.

3. The President responded that he was indeed interested in making fiscal reforms and added that much more than fiscal reforms was needed in Haiti. However, he said now was not the time. Duvalier said that Haitians were by nature extremely individualistic, each out for what he could get. These tendencies were very deep and it was impossible to move rapidly. He said he realized our concerns but that it simply was impossible for him to push for the kind of reforms we wanted at this time.

4. I then suggested a timetable for the possible resumption of Title III discussions. I noted the upcoming Joint Commission meeting of all major donors in June, and suggested that after this was concluded we might be able to resume discussions based on decisions taken at that meeting.3 The President said that such might be possible. I suggested that we review the situation in July with a view to completing a Title III in the autumn. The President said he hoped the Joint Commission meeting and particularly the IMF discussion would prove satisfactory.

5. We then shifted to other topics:

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790156–0209. Confidential; Priority. Repeated for information Priority to Santo Domingo.
2 Not found.
3 The Joint Commission met in August. See footnote 2, Document 257.
A. Relations with the Dominican Republic:

I asked the President if he planned to meet with President Guzman at the opening of the new dam on the border. He said he hoped to meet earlier, if possible. I said we favored cordial relations between the DR and Haiti and that there were many constructive things the two nations could accomplish by working together. Duvalier then said that one problem affecting relations between Haiti and the DR was a racist attitude in the DR. I countered that during my visit to the DR I had seen and met many blacks in high government positions and that Pena Gomez was of Haitian extraction. The President said he wanted to emphasize that Pena Gomez was not Haitian but only of Haitian origin. In any case, he said he wanted improved relations with the DR but there was considerable lack of understanding among Dominicans of Haiti.

B. Investment in Haiti:

I told the President that I considered private investment to be the best hope for Haiti’s future progress. Haiti’s sole resource is its people. However, I said, there must be a climate of confidence and investors must know that they are welcome. The President said he has always supported private investment and that he appreciated our efforts to encourage investment. I noted that I have been meeting with a steady stream of American businessmen interested in Haiti and that they all ask my opinion as to the investment climate. I said that I try to be encouraging.

6. We then concluded the meeting. President Duvalier thanked me for coming in and said he would like to have more frank, informal discussions with me. I said I would be ready at any time; all he need do was to let me know when he would be available.

7. Comment: Duvalier was relaxed and informal. He did not seem the least bit upset by the Title III situation. However, it was clear to me that he realizes he is not fully in charge and does not have the power to push for needed reforms. Whether he is, in fact, sincere about making reforms is another matter. Certainly, he wants us to believe that he is sincere. But, more important, I take it as a candid admission that he lacks real executive power to issue orders and have them carried out. I would interpret the statement about endemic Haitian individualism to mean that he has few people who he can really trust or rely on. Everyone is out to feather his own nest and the President realizes this. Nor did I sense a mood by the President to assume a

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4 The Pedernales Dam was a joint construction project between Haiti and the Dominican Republic located on the border between the two nations. It opened in September.

5 Jose Francisco Pena Gomez was the leader of the Dominican Revolutionary Party and three-time candidate for President.
more vigorous leadership role. He seems to feel boxed in and content to ride things along. Whether he will be willing or able to push through the reforms we and the other donors, particularly the IMF, feel are needed is doubtful. I am sure he will say he wants to act, but actually acting is something quite different. Further, I think the President does indeed want to have more contact with me and would like to have my advice. I deliberately left the door open, putting the ball in his court to get in touch with me. It is quite certain that even this is difficult as he would be in some jeopardy if he got too close to the U.S. Ambassador. Again, this is a situation he will have to judge, but I do stand ready to speak frankly with him at any time.

As far as prospects for Title III, I would rate them less than 50/50. Economic conditions and coordinated donor pressure may force even the most conservative Duvalierist to heed the necessity for real reform—beyond mere lip service—and the President may be willing to bite the bullet. However, I think Duvalier is quite right that things in Haiti must move slowly and that there is a strong sense of individualism that dominates Haitian life. Haiti is a place where every man tries to be for himself and, in that regard, the President himself should not be taken to be an exception.

Jones

257. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, July 26, 1979

SUBJECT
US-Haitian Relations

PARTICIPANTS
Mr. Philip C. Habib
H.E. Gerard Dorcely, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Haiti
H.E. Georges Salomon, Ambassador of Haiti
T.H. William B. Jones, American Ambassador to Haiti
Mr. Robert Pastor, NSC
Ms. Mary Gin Kennedy (S/PH—notetaker)
Mr. Robert W. Beckham (ARA/CAR—notetaker)
Ms. Sophia K. Porson (interpreter)

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 24, Haiti, 1/77–12/79. Confidential. Drafted by Mary V. Kennedy. Copies were sent to Christopher, Newsom, Derian, Bushnell, Grove, Warne, Beckham, Pastor, Valdez, the CIA, and the Embassy in Port au Prince.
After introductions and an exchange of greetings, Mr. Habib proposed that each of the participants make their principal points and responses and began the dialogue by stating that:

—The United States Government is pleased by the degree of progress in human rights in Haiti whereby the GOH has broadened its approach to governing and to its own people. Human rights remains a fundamental element in President Carter’s foreign policy.

—Although the US is in the process of increasing its assistance to Haiti, we have encountered a roadblock with the stabilization measures. If Haiti’s presentation on the status and progress of fiscal reforms is satisfactory at the OAS-sponsored Mixed Commission meeting in August, the most important problem will be on its way to solution.²

Foreign Minister Dorcely responded by thanking Habib for the positive human rights assessment. On the matter of economic development, he remarked that Haiti has studied the history of US assistance policy and has noted that when the US wants to render assistance, it does. Otherwise, it imposes technical barriers which are really political in nature.

Mr. Habib objected to this conclusion by saying:
— the US has learned over the years that aid must go to the least-advantaged in a society, although this is a difficult task;
— unless fiscal and monetary policy are organized, aid is unsuccessful; and
— the US does not impose conditions for political purposes. Technical conditions are necessary if aid is to be useful. Such conditions are also imposed by other donors and international lending agencies and are not limited to Haiti.

In response, Dorcely said:
— Haiti agrees that aid must reach the needy and has accepted US aid, using it for rural development, which is tantamount to national development in a country with an 80% rural population.
— Haiti is very aware that it lacks technical and management expertise; consequently, Dorcely had established a school of management in Haiti to remedy this problem. Canada already offers technical and managerial training in connection with its development projects.
— It is very difficult for Haiti to implement AID’s technical requirements for a Title III program although the government is very willing to do so.

² The OAS Joint Commission met in Washington August 15. (Telegram 214840 to Port au Prince, August 16; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790373-0754)
Habib said he would call the technical management issue to the attention of the proper people. Nevertheless, Dorcely must carry back the message to Haiti that the US believes fiscal and monetary reform will benefit the Haitian economy and must be examined in that spirit.

At that point, Ambassador Salomon interjected that Haiti was particularly upset by US attitudes on this issue. While President Duvalier intends to implement the reform program, the US Congress took action against Haiti before the government was able to do so [apparently a reference to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee recommendation to terminate economic assistance to Haiti because of failure to implement the reform]. Nevertheless, Haiti has implemented a number of the reform measures not requiring legislative action. Mr. Habib then assured Salomon that the Department appreciated the difficulty of Haiti’s task.

Mr. Pastor said he wished to comment more generally on the impact of political change in the region:

—The US is committed to the policies of human rights and non-intervention and will support political and socio-economic changes if they are necessary. It is not moral or practical to support the status quo if inequities exist. While the Cubans have aggravated the problems in the area, they have not caused them. Such problems are indigenous and must be solved by the people themselves.

—Events in Nicaragua have had and will continue to have an impact on the region. The US does not know what will evolve and does not believe there is a pre-determined outcome. We have received certain assurances from the new government, but do not take the assurances at face value. If we deny their validity, however, we play into the hands of the Communists who do not want the assurances carried out. The US has no desire to see Somoza replaced by a Communist totalitarian government. It must be recognized that the causes of Somoza’s defeat were dissatisfaction and alienation shared by all sectors of the economy.

—The US recognizes not all change is positive or desirable, but the US does not control change. We see an internal engine of change and try to assist people, groups and governments to progress toward positive change. The most difficult task is to allow gradual change

\[^{3}\text{Brackets are in the original. On May 1, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee proposed to cut foreign aid to 10 nations, including Haiti, from the President’s budget request. The Committee cited Haitian failure to implement fiscal reforms and end corruption as reasons to cancel the President’s request for $18.4 million in aid to Haiti. (Karen DeYoung, “Carter Request For Foreign Aid Slashed by 10%,” The Washington Post, May 2, p. A1)\]
which includes social, economic and political participation by the people.

Dorcely said he does not share US optimism regarding Nicaragua, especially the assurances. While he agreed the domestic situation in Nicaragua favored and contributed to the downfall of Somoza, he challenged Pastor’s remarks about the US willingness to facilitate change by noting there is a nuance in US policy that a friendly dictatorial government may be traded in for an enemy dictatorial government. The US should not forget the lesson of Cuba.

The US policy of non-intervention allows others to intervene and cause change, while the US reacts, never taking the initiative. He questioned whether there was an inconsistency in the US policy of non-intervention when the US stands by and lets others (Cuba) intervene. Latin America’s main reproach is that the US does not take action against outside intervention.

In concluding, Pastor replied that President Carter is accused of too many foreign policy initiatives, not too few. Not many accuse the US of passivity in Latin America! As a result of Nicaragua, the inter-American community will hopefully recognize types of intervention and will react in the same way as in past US intervention, thus having an impact on developments. Habib added our friends, like Haiti, should appreciate the need to understand the importance of common action, common purpose and common views in Latin America.

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258. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Haiti

Washington, November 13, 1979, 1750Z

295108. Subject: Incident of November 9.

1. Haitian Ambassador Salomon was called in to Department November 10 to discuss violent November 9 incident in Port-au-Prince with ARA/CAR Director Warne and Country Officer Beckham.2 Warne

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790523–0164. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Beckham; cleared in ARA/CPH and HA; approved by Warne.

2 On November 9, Duvalier supporters disrupted a meeting held by the Haitian Human Rights League. Gerard Gourgue, President of the Haitian Human Rights League, his wife, an Embassy officer attempting to help them, and hundreds of attendees were beaten. Embassy officials suspected that the Haitian Government played a hand in organizing the attack. (Telegram 5119 from Port au Prince, November 10; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790517–1151)
conveyed our serious concern about the incident, both because of mistreatment of EmbOff and because it raises serious questions about GOH attitude and policies regarding human rights and liberalization. Ambassador Salomon was informed of cancellation of Thunderbird visit and of withdrawal of the decision memorandum on munition licences. DeptOffs asked to be informed of results of GOH investigation of incident, and expressed hope that those responsible for the attack would be prosecuted.

2. Salomon expressed regret and conveyed his government’s apologies for treatment of EmbOff, but categorically denied any GOH involvement in incident. According to Salomon, the meeting had been heavily and somewhat sensationaly publicized in press and radio, and attracted a crowd of approximately 6,000 consisting of both supporters and opponents of Professor Gourgue. Although police had orders not to interfere with the meeting, they did attempt to intervene when shouting match turned into violent confrontation.

3. DeptOffs pointed out that this version of the incident did not entirely correspond with eyewitness accounts we had, and that it was not clear to us that this was a spontaneous incident, rather than an orchestrated one. They repeated that the attack appeared to have been condoned by the GOH, and if so, Dept. considers it a very serious matter. Pending development of further information, we maintain an open mind on the matter, but (in response to Ambassador’s assertion that judgement had already been passed) explained that Thunderbird visit or approval of munition licenses immediately following such a disturbing incident could easily be misinterpreted by both GOH and its critics.

4. Salomon concluded discussion by repeating that the incident had been blown out of proportion, that there was no GOH involvement, and that in retrospect it was unavoidable unless meeting had been cancelled, which GOH did not wish to do. He indicated that he would confer with his government and seek additional information which he would convey to Dept. ASAP.

5. Dept. wishes to commend EmbOff Silins for his quick thinking and courageous action in coming to Professor and Mrs. Gourgue’s assistance during the melee. He may well have been instrumental in preventing more serious injury from occurring to both.

Vance

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3 The USAF Thunderbird Aerial Demonstration Squadron was scheduled to fly over Port au Prince on November 14 and 19. (Telegram 291828 to Port au Prince, November 8; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790516–0340) In December, Jones informed Salomon that the Department of State had denied the Haitian Government ten munitions licenses. (Telegram 5677 from Port au Prince, December 17; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790581–0357)
259. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\(^1\)

Washington, January 26, 1980

SUBJECT

Report on US Narcotics Enforcement Activities in the Bahamas

On January 10, 1980, Prime Minister Pindling conveyed to our Charge his displeasure at alleged improprieties in the Drug Enforcement Administration’s (DEA) conduct of its activities in the Bahamas.\(^2\) The following day, the Prime Minister reiterated his concerns to Ambassador Schwartz.\(^3\) On January 21, Deputy Assistant Secretary Linnemann of the Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics Matters met with DEA to review the Prime Minister’s allegations of DEA misconduct.\(^4\) Because the Prime Minister’s complaints also involved Florida State law enforcement officials, contact was made with Florida Governor Graham’s office. After consultations among DEA, the NSC, Governor Graham’s office, ARA, and INM, we decided to send Deputy Assistant Secretary Linnemann, DEA representative Pringle, and, at the suggestion of Governor Graham, his Director of Florida’s Department of Law Enforcement, Jim York, to meet with the Prime Minister and Ambassador Schwartz.

In a two-hour meeting on January 24, the Prime Minister and his chief officials raised what they perceived as problems in narcotics control cooperation: DEA using residents of the Bahamas as informants/agents without keeping the Government of the Bahamas informed; an inadequate exchange of narcotics information among DEA, Florida State officials and Bahamian enforcement officials; DEA activities in the Bahamas apparently being solely for USG purposes and not sufficiently aiding the GOB with its narcotics problem; and Florida TV and newspaper reports of alleged corruption by Bahamian officials with no response by DEA and USG officials. Ambassador Schwartz and the US delegation clarified misunderstandings of the

\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 5, Bahamas, 1/77-1/81. Confidential.

\(^2\) The Embassy reported Pindling’s meeting with Shankle in telegram 72 from Nassau, January 11. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 2, Bahamas, 1/79-11/80)

\(^3\) The Embassy reported Pindling’s meeting with Schwartz in telegram 73 from Nassau, January 11. (Ibid.)

\(^4\) An account of the meeting, a January 22 memorandum from DEA Assistant Administrator for Enforcement Hambrick to Linnemann, is attached but not printed.
Prime Minister and his staff and pledged actions to remedy shortcomings in our cooperation. The Prime Minister was pleased with the USG’s rapid response to his concerns by having sent a team to meet with him, and the meeting ended with the Prime Minister and his chief officials seemingly mollified. We hope a basis has been prepared for better future cooperation on narcotics control and on other bilateral issues.

Peter Tarnoff
Executive Secretary

5 In telegram 194 from Nassau, January 24, the Embassy provided an account of this meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800042-0263)

260. Telegram From the Embassy in Haiti to the Department of State

Port au Prince, April 2, 1980, 1319Z


1. X—Entire text.

2. In reftel A the Ambassador discussed the limitations and possibilities that confront the U.S. in Haiti and made policy recommendations. We believe that message remains a valid description of the proper U.S. posture vis-a-vis Haiti. It recognized that there are real constraints on U.S. influence in Haiti; events since then, especially the effects of the U.S. budgetary process, have reemphasized the need for and difficulty of remaining [maintaining] a steady and consistent policy in all areas where we can bring influence and resources to bear.

3. The process of modernization in Haiti is probably as difficult as anywhere in the world. Those who are on top in the local society intend

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800172-0615. Secret; Exdis.

2 In telegram 5048 from Port au Prince, November 7, 1979, the Embassy characterized the Duvalier government as “insecure” and cautioned against destabilizing it. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790518-0768) In telegram 75770 to Port au Prince, March 22, the Department asked the Embassy to re-assess the U.S. role in Haiti. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800145-0663)
to stay there whatever it may cost the society as a whole. Haiti remains a peasant country with over 80 percent of the population eking out a miserable existence on ever smaller plots of land which, however, usually belong to them, not to some Latifundista landlord. The country’s resources are appallingly limited; the one operating mineral concession, the Reynolds Bauxite Mine, is being closed down this year as economically exhausted. Deforestation and erosion are making the land throughout the country ever less productive. There is such a shortage of resources that “more efficient use” thereof is unrealistic as a contribution to improvement in the quality of Haitian life. There is no such thing as a “quick fix” for Haiti.

4. On the political side perhaps the most interesting development in recent months has been the increased public activity of the “President for Life.” Although last November’s Cabinet shuffle brought back to power some of the old guard associated with Jean Claude’s father, he himself has made far more public appearances than his father. Jean Claude just returned from several days at Cap Haitien to kick off a drive for the rehabilitation of the Citadel; this is said to be the first time since he became President that he has spent the night away from Port au Prince. While it is difficult to be sure, we believe he is regarded by most Haitians as the legitimate holder of power. There is no indication that those who hate Jean Claude and his family are warming up to him but in any case they have neither the organization, the personalities or the publicized grievances to have created effective opposition. Thus now and for the foreseeable future, in the absence of outside military incursion or a palace coup, when we seek to do something here it has to be done through the present regime. Even if it were in our power to destabilize the local situation, the consequences of a revolution would almost certainly be less to our liking, and harder on the Haitian people, than accepting the present regime and working with—and on—it.

5. There is a small but growing group of middle level educated technocrats mostly working for the government. It is this group we had especially hoped to encourage, support and influence by means of a Title III agreement. While we accept the aid program as the principal means by which we might influence the modernization process, in view of the lack of local institutions it will take years to affect the government and the economy in a comprehensive fashion. Institution building remains both a necessity and a challenge, and we continue to seek to contribute to this vital process. The cutbacks in the aid

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3 In telegram 5179 from Port au Prince, November 15, 1979, Jones characterized the Cabinet changes as “a decided turn to the right.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790526–0325)
program this year and next—staff and funds—are forcing us to do less than we might in seeking modernization by this route.

6. The fact that it has not yet been possible to work out a Title III program should not distract our attention from the need for a continuing balanced program of assistance to Haiti, both PL 480 and development assistance. Haiti remains the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, and it is economic pressure, not political ones that drive more and more Haitians to seek a better life as refugees in the U.S. The principal approach we see for the U.S. to this worrisome problem is to help improve economic and social conditions in Haiti especially by encouraging the creation of greater employment opportunities.

7. One group in Haiti which seems to be doing well is the businessmen. This is ostensibly a free enterprise country and in fact is one of the freest in the area. The transformation industries are providing additional employment and their expansion, along with such standbys as tourism and handicrafts, seems to be Haiti’s best bet for economic growth. Increasing efforts to promote private American investment and the spread of American management techniques will contribute to the modernization of economic and commercial life in Haiti.

8. At a time when our own resources are particularly tight, there seems to be little point in advocating any greatly expanded program of assistance to Haiti and, as noted above, the lack of local institutions and dedicated personnel would pretty much preclude such a program having an immediate impact. We should continue privately but firmly to encourage the President and others to improve the climate for the exercise of human rights. We should not, in our public pronouncements on Haiti, make the situation out to be worse than it is. We must of course speak up when, as is all too likely given Haiti’s history, there are repressive incidents like last November’s break up of a human rights meeting. Although the United States has traditionally enjoyed great influence here, it is best used in small doses; we cannot create an educated population, for example.

9. We should certainly give careful consideration to increased assistance to the Haitian armed forces (not to the VSN). The armed forces in many Third World countries through training, education and using their personnel and resources in productive ways, make an important contribution to the modernization process.

10. In sum, a “busy body” approach to Haiti, dashing about trying to influence this or that for quick change will not work and will very likely make matters worse. Patience, careful planning, continuous firm but realistic pressures over a long period of time are the best medicine. Consistency, continuity and candid contacts should be the principles of our policies.

Jones
261. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Haiti

Washington, April 26, 1980, 0444Z

109664. Subject: Dialogue With President Duvalier. Refs: (A)-(B) Port-au-Prince 807; C-State 63221.²

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. Department views recent increase in frequency and substantive nature of Ambassador’s dialogue with President Duvalier as very useful. We would like to take advantage of these meetings to reinforce in a positive manner our interests, particularly in human rights field. Recent IAHRC report on Haiti (pouched) makes such action now especially appropriate.³ As Embassy is aware, Department has a munition control license application for commercial purchase of small arms ammunition by Haitian military (refs A and B). ARA and HA agree that this presents us an initial opportunity to use leverage on the GOH in a positive manner.

3. Ambassador should take early opportunity to follow up on last meeting with President Duvalier on subject of GOH security concerns. Ambassador should tell Duvalier that he has consulted with USG on this subject, assure him that we understand and share these concerns, and stress we wish to be as helpful as possible within the limits of our own policy. This policy involves clear restraints on the export of arms and ammunition. As an important step in overcoming some of these restraints, we seek a clear and explicit understanding with the President regarding his willingness and intention to pursue a policy of continued progress in respect for basic human rights. As this policy is borne out in the form of concrete actions taken by the GOH, we will undertake to acknowledge this progress in appropriate ways. Ambassador should attempt to engage Duvalier in a dialogue on this subject, and elicit his views on appropriate USG actions.

4. For purpose of initiating this dialogue, we suggest Ambassador make the following points:

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¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 24, Haiti, 1/77–12/79. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Beckham; cleared by Warne and in HA, PM/SAS, and ARA/RPP; approved by Bushnell.

² In telegram 807 from Port au Prince, February 21, the Embassy discussed Haitian applications for naval munitions purchases. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800091–0911) In telegram 63221 to Port au Prince, March 13, the Department weighed the pros and cons of admitting Haitian dissident Sylvio Claude to the United States. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800131–0703)

³ The IAHRC issued its report on Haiti on December 13, 1979.
A. USG understands that Haiti has legitimate security concerns and we want to be helpful in meeting GOH security needs. General USG policy is to restrict trade in arms and other lethal equipment, and specifically to link approval of MC export licenses to human rights performance.

B. We are disturbed that recent evidence suggests reversal in GOH policy of liberalization and democratization. We would like to hear the President’s views on how the GOH plans to proceed to improve the human rights environment.

C. USG policy is based on a frank assessment of U.S. interests, which, we believe, coincide with those of the GOH. We believe improvement in both human rights and security capability are desirable for Haiti over the next few years.

D. We propose to take into consideration specific GOH measures to improve the human rights environment in considering the approval of munitions control license applications and other USG decisions affecting Haiti. For example, one of the following steps during the next weeks would be helpful in consideration of a recent MC application for small arms ammunition.

—Trial or unconditional release of Sylvio Claude.

—Trial or unconditional release of alleged conspirators in the St. Marc gun smuggling incident.

E. In addition, U.S. would look favorably on the following:

—Evidence of special GOH attention to improvement of prison conditions.


—Action to apprehend and try persons responsible for November 9 disruption of HR League meeting.

5. Embassy may have additional suggestions re appropriate GOH initiatives, in which case Department would appreciate your views.

6. Embassy should also report promptly steps taken pursuant to ref tel C.

4 Christian Democratic Party leader Sylvio Claude was arrested in late August 1979. He was released in May 1980. A draft statement on his release, written by Beckham on May 2, is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 24, Folder: Haiti, 5–12/80.
7. Department officers also plan to keep Ambassador Charles informed here of our views and interests concerning human rights matters. Hopefully his direct contacts with President Duvalier will reinforce your efforts.\(^5\)

Vance

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\(^5\) Ambassador Jones was not able to meet with Duvalier, but instead read the démarche to Salomon on May 19. Jones noted that “it is preferable to first discuss these with him [Salomon] than go directly to Duvalier,” adding that Salomon was a “positive influence” and that Duvalier’s wedding plans prevented a quick meeting with the Haitian leader. (Telegram 2381 from Port au Prince, May 19, National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800248-0827)

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262. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)\(^1\)

Washington, May 28, 1980

SUBJECT
A Cloud Over the Bahamas (U)

In a conversation with our Ambassador last week, Bahamian Prime Minister Pindling asked for a briefing on Cuba. Before going on vacation there on Thursday, I checked with Bowdler and Ambassador Schwartz, and thought it would be useful if I offered to do that briefing, if Pindling so requested. He did, and he also asked me to meet with his Foreign Minister.\(^2\) (S)

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\(^2\) In telegram 1340 from Nassau, May 27, the Embassy reported that Pastor, on vacation in the Bahamas, “made himself available to brief Adderly and Prime Minister Pindling on U.S. assessment of developments in Cuba in an effort to help explain Flamingo incident.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800260–0343)
We had good, wide-ranging discussions, and I have prepared a more detailed Memcon, but let me summarize the main points for you. The Bahamians have clearly thought about the incident much more than we have, but they hesitate to wrestle through its implications because they clearly do not want to play a large role in the Caribbean, and see no benefit in confronting the Cubans. Our interests are slightly different, and in our conversation, I tried to define the issue in a way which would encourage the GOB to keep this incident alive long enough to embarrass and isolate the Cubans and to begin playing a larger, leadership role in the Caribbean region. Foreign Minister Adderly was more agreeable to playing a larger role than Pindling, but I think there is a reasonable chance that if we continue to prod the Bahamians gently but helpfully, that they will come out of this incident with a more assertive and positive approach to the Caribbean. (S)

The Incident

Adderly has prepared a detailed factsheet of the incident, but the major events are as follows. On May 10, The Bahamian ship, Flamingo, captured two Cuban vessels fishing one quarter mile off a Bahamian island. Pindling feels that since many of the fishermen had been captured before, they radioed for help, and may have disguised the fact that it was a Bahamian Coast Guard vessel. Several MIG-21s arrived, harassed the Flamingo, and then sunk it and strafed and killed four Bahamian Coast Guardsmen. The Commander of the Flamingo still managed to take control over one of the Cuban boats and all of the Cuban fishermen, and brought them into Ragged Island. This occurred in daylight and clearly within Bahamian territorial waters. Sunday morning, several Cuban aircraft, including a large transport plane, a helicopter and two MIG fighters, flew low over Ragged Island and engaged in a “sustained threatening and intimidating aerial display of force at rooftop level.” The helicopter actually landed on the ground. At several points during the day, these Cuban planes and fighters returned to Ragged Island, and Adderly thinks that the Cubans were looking for the fishermen to try to rescue them, at least in part to embarrass the US after our failed rescue mission in Iran. (S)

While one can explain the readiness of the Cuban Air Force to respond to a distress call, it is more difficult to explain a clear Cuban decision to sink and strafe a vessel—the Cuban Government claims they did not know it was Bahamian—in clear Bahamian territorial

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3 Not found.

4 Ambassador Schwartz met with Prime Minister Pindling on May 23 and May 24 and discussed the Flamingo incident. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 2, Bahamas, 1/79–11/80)
waters (although the Cubans dispute that, too). It is more difficult to explain the subsequent harassment of a Bahamian Island by the Cuban Air Force, and one must conclude those decisions were made by Castro. (S)

**Implications**

Pindling and Adderly both fear that the Cubans were trying to send a message to the Bahamians: leave our fishing boats alone, or else. Until my briefing, they clearly had not bothered to inform themselves about Cuban military capabilities or internal developments in Cuba. Nor was Pindling even aware of the President’s October 1, 1979 speech.⁵ Pindling would like this incident to go away, but he is aware of these implications, and he will have to respond to domestic political pressure, much of it coming from those who want to take a tougher approach to Cuba. Adderly, on the other hand, seems interested in trying to keep the issue alive, at least long enough to assure the GOB that Cuba will not try something like this again. (S)

I encouraged Adderly to look to his like-minded neighbors in the Caribbean Basin—Venezuela, Barbados, Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Colombia and Brazil, as well as the US, UK and Canada. I encouraged him to play this issue out in a way which will bring enhanced security to the Bahamas, rather than try to settle the issue as quickly and neatly as possible. The first step is obviously to brief his colleagues in these countries, and to bring their perceptions of the *Flamingo* incident up to speed in a way which encourages them to formulate responses to this increased security threat from Cuba. I said that the United States would be prepared to discuss these issues either with the Bahamas directly or within a regional context. Adderly expressed interest in this, but he was anxious to obtain confirmation that the *Flamingo* sunk where its Commander said it did—1.5 miles off a Bahamian Island, rather than 14 miles as Cuba maintains. I promised that I would try to get some help for him in this regard. It is clear to me that we cannot get in front of the Bahamians on this issue without losing them, so we need to keep prodding them to play a leadership role.⁶ That is one of the reasons why we need to get a US Naval vessel down to the area to confirm that the *Flamingo* sunk where the Bahamians believe it did. This will not only help Adderly make his

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⁵ The President addressed the Nation on October 1 about the Soviet military presence in Cuba. See footnote 2, Document 80.

⁶ In telegram 1381 from Nassau, May 30, the Embassy reported that on May 29, the Government of the Bahamas withdrew its request for assistance in finding the wreck of the *Flamingo*. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800265–0598)
case, but it will indicate that we are prepared to move rapidly to assist the Bahamians when necessary. (S)

The *Flamingo* incident raises a number of important questions, and gives us a number of important opportunities which we should not hesitate to exploit. I recommend that we take the following steps:

1. I will pursue with Bowdler, Nimetz, and DOD, the need for a metal detection ship to be sent to the Bahamas as soon as possible. If I need any help, I will send you a message before your lunch with Brown. (S)

2. Pindling asked for regular briefings on intelligence and security matters, and we said that we would be prepared to do that. Actually, I learned later that the ball is in his court since we already offered this several weeks ago. It would be very useful to us if we used the briefing to try to piece together the details of this incident, in order to get a better idea of what Castro had in mind. (S)

3. We have not yet begun negotiations on our military facilities in the Bahamas because the Bahamians have shown little interest until now. I suspect this will change. Such negotiations however, could lead to significant tensions and disagreement between the US and the GOB because our perceptions of the value of the bases are so different. They want to negotiate on the scale of the Spanish Bases Agreement, and DOD is only willing to consider a paltry amount. Our Ambassador is very interested in trying to conclude this agreement soon, but I am worried that unless we get our own act together first, and make a clear political determination that good relations with the Bahamians at this time are worth our paying more than DOD would normally want, then frankly, we should avoid negotiations. If you agree, I will ask for some background papers on this and related subjects for possible consideration by a Mini-SCC. (S)

4. Pindling’s Opposition in Parliament has asked that the GOB consider a special Defense Treaty or arrangement with the US. I don’t think a treaty is in either of our country’s interest, but I do think that some informal arrangement, which would permit us to respond rapidly to a request from the GOB, would be in the interest of both our countries. For example, I think we should have sent a number of Phantoms to overfly Ragged Island as a show of strength and support for the GOB after Cuba buzzed the Island and our own plane and helicopter. Of course, we should only do it if the GOB requests it, but to the extent

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7 Aaron underlined this sentence and wrote in the margin, “the hell with State, just work with DOD + Navy.”

8 Donald Gregg wrote “ok” in the right margin.
that the GOB knows that we would respond immediately, they might be more likely to request it. (S)

5. We should also begin doing something about regional security. Matt Nimetz’s Task Force has addressed the seven questions in your memorandum to the Secretary on security assistance to the Eastern Caribbean.\(^9\) I met with him today, and will send you a memo on specific items for possible consideration of an SCC or PRC.\(^10\) (S)

\(9\) See footnotes 2 and 3, Document 375.
\(10\) See Document 379.

263. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter\(^1\)

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Weekly Report: The *Flamingo* in the Bahamas (U)

While on vacation in the Bahamas last week, Bob Pastor offered to brief Bahamian Prime Minister Pindling on the Cuban situation if he so desired. He did, and he also asked Bob to meet for extensive conversations with Foreign Minister Adderly. The discussions centered on the *Flamingo* incident and its implications for the security of the Bahamas and the entire Caribbean.\(^2\) (S)

On May 10, the Bahamian Coast Guard boat, *Flamingo*, captured two Cuban fishing vessels one quarter mile off a Bahamian island. The Cubans, some of whom had been captured before, radioed for help and several MIG–21s arrived, harassed the *Flamingo*, and then sunk it and strafed and killed four Bahamian sailors. Still, the Commander of the *Flamingo* took control of one of the Cuban boats, captured the eight fishermen and brought them to Ragged Island. This occurred in daylight and in Bahamian waters. Sunday morning, a Cuban transport


\(^2\) See Document 262.
plane, a helicopter and MIG fighters harassed the island, apparently looking to recapture the Cubans. (S)

The Government of the Bahamas (GOB) is a moderate and progressive government, interested in internal development and disinterested in international affairs. Pindling’s preference would be to try to close out this incident as quickly as possible, but he is also worried that the Cubans may have been sending a message with graver implications for the Bahamas: leave our fishing boats alone or else; Cuba is a power to be reckoned with. Nonetheless, the GOB induced the Cubans to negotiate by threatening to take the issue to the UN Security Council. After some give and take, the Cubans responded with a note, which the GOB interpreted as largely meeting their three conditions: (1) that Cuba was responsible for the incident; (2) that Cuba will pay for damages; and (3) that Cuba will respect Bahamian sovereignty. (S)

Bob explained recent internal developments in Cuba and the increasing close relationship between Cuba and the USSR in military, political and economic affairs. After Bob described the large quantities of offensive military equipment which the Soviets have given free of charge to the Cubans, Pindling said: “If you get that much military power, you are going to want to use it.” Pindling was concerned about future Cuban aggression. As he was unaware of your October 1, 1979 speech on the Soviet brigade,3 Bob described it and explained that the US would be prepared to assist the GOB in resisting Cuban aggression. But Bob encouraged the GOB to look to its like-minded neighbors in the Caribbean Basin to formulate appropriate security responses to the Cuban threat, and said that the US would be interested in discussing these issues in greater depth with other moderate nations in the area. It is not clear whether the GOB will follow up and play a larger role in the Caribbean area, which would clearly be in our interests as well as those of the GOB’s neighbors. But we shall follow this closely. In addition, we are reviewing a wide range of security issues as they relate to the Caribbean area and to US-Bahamian relations. (S)

3 See footnote 5, Document 262.
264. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Haiti**

Washington, August 1, 1980, 0257Z

203377. Subject: DAS Bushnell Meets With Charles on Aid Cuts.

1. (Confidential—Entire text.)

2. DAS Bushnell met with Ambassador Serge Charles July 31 to review recent developments, including aid cuts in House Appropriations Committee. Charles re-emphasized “devastating” psychological impact of committee action on GOH. He said amount of money involved was not as important as symbolic value of action. Charles claimed resentment to this “signal” is giving comfort to those in Haiti who wish to see GOH and United States drift apart.

3. On subject of refugees, Charles noted two recent developments: the GOH has apprehended a military official involved in organizing the refugee traffic and forced his resignation, and the GOH is in process of purchasing six new Coast Guard patrol boats to help curb illegal emigration. Charles said GOH would reconsider these purchases if U.S. security assistance stopped because of recent committee proposals.

4. Bushnell stated administration is opposed to aid cuts and plans to work vigorously to restore funds. He expressed Department’s satisfaction with President Duvalier’s recent moves to bring on a more dedicated economic team. Bushnell urged that the GOH continue its progress both on economic and human rights fronts. He noted that it will take time—and a continuation of steps in the right directions—to change public and congressional perceptions about Haiti.

5. Present with Charles was Auguste Douyon, designated as “Private Secretary to the President.” Department would appreciate any information about Douyon.

6. Department would also appreciate any information Post can obtain regarding new developments described para 3 above.

Muskie

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800368–0097. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Davis; cleared by Warne; approved by Bushnell.

2 On July 24, the House Appropriations Committee approved $5.2 million in foreign aid to Haiti in FY 1981, a reduction of $2 million to “demonstrate its concern for brutality and corruption.” (“House Committee Votes Restraint On Foreign Aid,” The Washington Post, July 25, p. A18)

3 In telegram 202972 to Port au Prince, July 31, the Department provided the Embassy with a list of talking points regarding the aid cuts. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800367–0431)
265. Telegram From the Embassy in Haiti to the Department of State

Port au Prince, September 27, 1980, 1417Z

4748. Subject: Haitian Boat People.  
1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. According to Cap Haitien businessmen and residents interviewed during trip north by Econ Officer Sept 21–24, the movement of Haitians to south Florida has become big business in the north and northwest. The flow of Haitians will continue to increase, according to local inhabitants, because the word has filtered down to the villagers that going to the United States offers the best hope of improving their economic situation. Our contacts believe that, because of the de facto U.S. policy of accepting all of the boat people, the flow has become practically irreversible. Many Capois complained that even their best salaried and experienced workers are beginning to leave, attracted by the sheer adventure and possibility of going to the United States, the ultimate step up the ladder, in their view. While the urge to go is stimulated by the lack of jobs, many believe that a certain magnetism about the trip has developed and that it has become an end in itself regardless of the availability of jobs. Although the north and west clearly account for the majority of boat people departures, there are apparently reliable reports that a considerable number depart from Leogane and island of La Gonave.

3. One long-time American resident of the north observed that while economics is central in the boat peoples’ motivation to leave, another reason is “cultural fatigue.” As our interlocutor explained, the Haitian peasant is subject to many societal strains with voodoo playing a major role. As a result when the opportunity presents itself to “get away from one’s enemies” one usually takes it. Again, because the people in the countryside now know that no one is turned back, they look upon the trip to Miami as a true escape from their societal problems.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800465-0604. Confidential.

2 In telegram 29221 to Port au Prince, February 2, the Department discussed the issue of the “boat people,” urging the Embassy to pursue the issue with Salomon. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800079-0625) In telegram 589 from Port au Prince, February 6, the Embassy reported a meeting between Salomon and Ambassador Jones regarding immigration. Jones took a skeptical position toward directly assisting Haitian boat patrols, and there is no indication the U.S. position changed during the following months. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800065-0273)
4. All of our contacts emphasize the ease with which one makes the arrangements for the trip, which costs in Cap Haitien between 100 and 1800 dollars per head. Peasants usually sell their livestock and many times their land to be able to afford the trip. As a result, the decision is made to leave and probably not to return, necessitating the transport of family members at a future date. Although making arrangements is not done in the open market, it is easy to make the necessary contacts. There is a considerable return flow of the trips’ organizers to Haiti; they bring boat motors and special provisions with them for the trip. EconOff observed three large wooden boats being built on the Cap Haitien water front; carpenters readily admitted they were building the boats for the Miami trip.

5. The government’s ability, especially in the north, to stop illegal departures (all Haitians require passports and exit visa by law to leave the country) is limited at best. In this connection, during call on Captain Hypolite Cambetta, the Chief of Police of Cap Haitien, EconOff raised the problem of the refugees. Cambetta evinced little interest in problem from the standpoint of illegal departures. He did say that he is newly arrived (past 3 months) and had not had a chance to look into the whole matter, which he acknowledged is of concern to us.

6. Comment: Common theme of our discussions on the boat people problem thus far indicate that it is the ease of departure and arrival which is increasingly attractive to Haitians seeking a better life. According to the street talk in Cap Haitien one can leave Haiti on Saturday, go to work on Monday and send one’s first check back on Friday. Equally characteristic is the lack of mention of any political reasons for making the trip.

7. In a courtesy call on Foreign Ministry Director General Yves Francois on Sept 24, he told Dick Howard (ARA/CAR) and Charge that in his opinion if the U.S. had promptly sent back, beginning in 1972, those Haitians arriving illegally the problem would not have reached its present proportion. He also said that of all possible destinations for Haitians only Miami and New York were really desired.
266. **Telegram From Secretary of State Muskie to the Department of State and the Embassy in Haiti**

New York, October 1, 1980, 2116Z

Secto 8047. Subject: (U) Secretary’s Meeting With Haitian Foreign Minister Salomon, September 30, in New York.

1. (Secret—Entire text.)

2. Summary. Haitian FM Salomon asked for the following: (1) U.S.G. support for Haiti’s economic development and assistance in obtaining the cooperation of other governments and international institutions; (2) Increased foreign private investment; (3) Expanded bilateral economic development assistance, including a Title III PL 480 program; (4) Expanded Exim Bank loans; (5) Assistance in combatting drug trafficking; and (6) Visits by top-level administration and congressional officials. Secretary Muskie assured the GOH of the USG’s deep interest and continuing concern in the future welfare of Haiti. End summary.

3. Disaster Relief: FM Salomon, Haiti UN Perm Rep Coradin, and Haitian Ambassador to the U.S. Charles met with Secretary Muskie on September 30 in New York. Also participating were Ass’t Sec Bowdler and ARA/CAR Director Warne (notetaker). Salomon expressed the GOH’s gratitude for the USG’s immediate help and continued disaster and rehabilitation assistance in responding to the hurricane damage. Salomon said that the GOH and USG do not always see eye-to-eye on all issues of the North-South dialogue. But, nevertheless, the GOH is a staunch ally of the USG as its recent votes on the Iranian hostage and PLO representation issues indicate. Salomon asked that the USG also treat Haiti as an ally.

4. Human Rights: Salomon continued that the GOH firmly supports President Carter’s human rights policy. He believes the GOH human rights record is good, noting that there are no political prisoners in Haiti. The FM added that the Haitian people enjoy more freedom now than in the past, and President Duvalier was committed to liberalization. Salomon indicated that the Haitian people want to live in democracy and freedom, and the GOH is determined to provide such an environment.

5. Economic Reform: Salomon said that the GOH had asked the IMF to undertake a study of its fiscal problems, and the GOH had

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800469–0536. Secret; Immediate. Repeated for information to USUN.

2 Hurricane Allen caused high winds and flooding in Haiti in August, resulting in more than 200 dead and hundreds of thousands homeless.
complied with 90 percent of the Fund’s recommendations, including reform of its budget and increased fiscal discipline. International economic assistance has been substantial but its results so far are not apparent and deeply felt, according to Salomon. Much of this assistance has been devoted to public works infrastructure projects and, as a result, takes considerable time to be completed. Salomon, nevertheless, pointed out that Haiti has made significant economic progress, increasing its per capita income from $60 per annum to over $200. But, most of the population still lives below the poverty line. Ambassador Charles pointed out that many Haitians do not have even one adequate daily meal. Salomon suggested that the way to stem the outflow of “boat people” was to provide increased economic opportunities, especially jobs. Secretary Muskie concurred.

6. GOH Requests: FM Salomon had several items he would like to ask of the USG: (A) The GOH needs support for its economic development program; not only does it need direct USG assistance but also USG cooperation in promoting assistance from other governments and international financial institutions; (B) The adverse image created by the “boat people” and other factors have caused foreign private investment to diminish. The GOH seeks USG help in promoting investment; (C) Increased bilateral economic assistance is needed; (D) The Export-Import Bank has adopted a stringent loan policy of only granting 90-day credits to Haiti; Exim only treats four countries to such tight terms; Salomon asked for the Department’s help in seeking Exim’s reconsideration of this policy; Warne proposed arranging an appointment for Ambassador Charles with appropriate Exim officials to discuss this matter; (E) Drug trafficking is increasing in Haiti because it is on a direct line between Latin America and the U.S.; the GOH is presenting to our Embassy at Port-au-Prince a request for increased assistance to check this traffic; and (F) The FM renewed his government’s invitation that President and Mrs. Carter visit Haiti after the President’s re-election.

7. USG Response: Secretary Muskie assured the FM of the USG’s deep interest and abiding concern in Haiti. The Secretary noted that the USG wanted to help with Haiti’s difficult economic problems, including facilitation of investments and bilateral aid. The Secretary indicated that the appointment of Finance Minister Bros was a favorable development because of the Bros’ reputation for sound fiscal management. The Secretary added that it was important that Haiti establish its eligibility for purchases from the IMF under the proposed new Extended Fund Facility. Mr. Muskie noted that IMF eligibility would stimulate confidence in Haiti and would make a favorable impression on the administration and Congress.

8. Secretary Muskie said that the “boat people” were a serious concern. It was imperative that economic opportunities be created so
that this problem could be alleviated. These illegal immigrants created serious domestic political problems here, the Secretary added, noting that these illegal immigrants often became disillusioned. The Secretary noted that a joint effort was needed to resolve this problem; FM Salomon agreed.

9. PL 480: Secretary Muskie asked FM Salomon what was the status of Title III PL 480 negotiations. Salomon replied that at first the complex and stringent conditions were not well understood, but a series of working groups had been set up to clarify the issues. Salomon hoped that the negotiations would be concluded shortly. Warne indicated the USG hoped that the GOH would take the necessary measures to be in compliance with the IMF EFF; subsequently the USG would go ahead with final consideration of the Title III program. Warne noted that the USG wanted to complete the negotiations as soon as possible.

10. Political Reform: Secretary Muskie asked about the GOH’s plans for liberalizing its political process and carrying out economic reform. Salomon explained that the first priority must be the education of the Haitian people. Haiti had not enjoyed the benefits of a democratic heritage and lacked a well-developed administrative structure. As a result, the GOH is centralized and authoritarian in its orientation and depends on the army for support because of its lack of political institutions. Nevertheless, the GOH according to Salomon, is determined to find its own form of democracy. Salomon noted that Haiti had three political parties, but they had no experience in organizing and mobilizing support. He added that the most encouraging development was President Duvalier’s commitment to political liberalization and reform, including protection of human rights.

11. Economic Needs: Ambassador Charles added that the Haitian people do not give priority to political liberty but to economic opportunity. He believes the focus should be on improving the quality of life which is the basic want of 95 percent of the population. Haiti’s elite focuses on liberalization because they already enjoy economic benefits, but this is not representative of the broad base of the population. Charles suggested that senior administration officials should visit Haiti in order to appreciate the real needs of the people.

12. Secretary Muskie concluded by saying that the USG wishes Haiti well in its liberalization and economic development efforts. The USG will do all it can to be helpful. The Secretary noted that Haiti must also do its part, such as establishing a sound fiscal program and carrying out needed reforms.

Muskie
267. Telegram From the Embassy in Haiti to the Department of State

Port au Prince, October 21, 1980, 1821Z

5237. Subject: Illegal Migrants—Consultations. Ref: State 278113.1

1. C—Entire text.

2. Illegal Haitian immigration to the United States will continue as a major irritant in our bilateral relations as long as the Haitians believe that regardless of their legal status, they are better off outside Haiti than they are in Haiti. Given the very poor economic conditions in Haiti, there is little incentive to remain in the country for those Haitians with the money to buy a passage out on “refugee boats”, or with the qualifications for an immigrant visa to the United States. Outside the principal cities, Haitians have limited access to education, to health facilities or improved job opportunities. The Haitian is aware, however, that these desires may be satisfied by his emigration abroad, and given the close proximity to the United States, many choose to make the voyage to Florida.

3. Haitians desiring to leave face little in the way of official obstacles. Those who are able to purchase forged documents for visas to the United States do so knowing that GOH authorities will make only limited and sporadic attempts to apprehend them, while those who seek passage on refugee boats are able to do so in the knowledge that local officials will, in most cases, choose to ignore their impending departure. Haitian “boat people” have had first hand experience that those seized on illegally departing vessels are neither fined nor imprisoned on their return to Haiti. At the most, boat captains are minimally fined and spend a couple of days in prison.

4. Those Haitians who successfully make the trip to the United States feel confident that they will not be sent back to Haiti from the U.S. for illegal entry or attempted illegal entry. This brings us to what seems from Port au Prince a fundamental and indisputable factor: that as long as our policy on Haitians illegally resident in the United States remains unclear, the average Haitian surmises that once in the United

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800503–0354. Confidential; Immediate.

2 In telegram 278113 to Nassau and Port au Prince, October 18, the Department transmitted plans for negotiations with Bahamian and Haitian officials regarding illegal immigration. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800498–0298)
States, he will not be turned away.\textsuperscript{3} We estimated some months ago, as a surmise, that a million Haitians would leave for the United States if they could. There have been no developments warranting lowering that estimate.

5. Any serious effort to thwart the continued outflow of Haitian migrants requires a substantial investment in the improvement of the country’s economic infrastructure. This includes a firm commitment from the government to this development. This commitment requires also the development of jobs, particularly in the rural areas, which offer future opportunities for individual economic improvement. Infusion of massive bilateral and international funds must be closely coordinated, for in the very short term, the putting of more money into the hands of poor hard-working Haitians is likely to spur the construction of more boats and the exodus of more people. However, programs which have sufficient long term focus, should serve to stem the initial negative consequences, and ultimately develop an environment in which the rewards of remaining in Haiti will compete with the imagined rewards of migrating. Economic assistance alone will not provide a quick fix for Haiti’s woes. More importantly, our efforts along these lines must be tempered by reality. We should also be alert to certainty that GOH will maneuver for increased bilateral assistance, without having any concrete plans in mind for economic development projects. Consequently, we should consider outlining specific projects, under controls agreed upon between the two countries for any new economic assistance endeavor.

6. To complement the effects of a long term economic strategy for Haitian development, closer cooperation between the United States Government and the GOH on the treatment of illegal migrants should be established. We need to recognize that Haitian authorities are sensitive to international charges of human rights abuse and must be encouraged to step up their efforts to interdict the refugee outflux. Conceivably the linking of substantial financial investment in the country with observable improved efforts to stop the boats would have a beneficial effect in spurring the GOH into action. Yet, for this effort to have meaning, USG actions must convey to the GOH and the Haitian people that continued illegal migration will not be tolerated. Along these lines, the U.S. Coast Guard might serve such a function by providing humanitarian assistance to refugee vessels it locates, and then towing them back into Haitian waters. We are all agreed that loss of life should

\textsuperscript{3} In telegram 265544 to Nassau and Port au Prince, October 4, the Department reported that “the USG would like to explore the possibility of a cooperative arrangement to intercept boats carrying undocumented Haitians and to return them to Haiti.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800474–1035)
be avoided; however, stern USG action to turn the ships away would have dramatic effect on the streets of Port au Prince and throughout Haiti.

7. We are also obligated to seek the legal clarification of those Haitians now in the United States, and under Judge King’s injunction, the issue must be raised, once again, whether these Haitians are entitled to asylum in the United States. If the judgement is that they are so entitled, then we are legally obligated to provide sufficient refugee numbers for Haitians. If Haitians are not accorded special refugee status, then we are forced to raise the issue of repatriation. Regardless of the decision taken, we are worse off without a decision, for we encourage the aspirations of those in Haiti who see, as of now, no real hope for immediate improvements here.

8. Useful talks, we believe, must contain a mixture of these elements, and must direct their focus to what we are in a position to do to make for immediate and long term alleviation of the Haitian illegal migrant problem. We also believe that it would be useful for the delegation to come with statistics of the number of Haitians now in the United States, the number of boats, passengers, and frequency of arrival for the past year. (FYI. Embassy would appreciate receiving these figures ASAP in our preparation for these talks.) Delegation may also wish to bring updated reports on the status of Haitian illegal migrants.

Kimelman

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4 In July 1979, U.S. Federal District Judge James King issued a temporary injunction against the INS to suspend deportation of the Haitian refugees, and in July 1980 ordered INS officials to formulate a plan to begin processing Haitian’s asylum claims.
268. Telegram From the Embassy in Haiti to the Department of State

Port au Prince, October 31, 1980, 1245Z

5437. Subject: US–GOH Consultation on Illegal Migration. Ref: (A) Port au Prince 5386.2

1. (Confidential—Entire text.)
2. Summary: Three members of the U.S. delegation and Ambassador Kimelman met for 90 minutes on October 28 at the Presidential Palace with President Duvalier. There was an animated exchange of conversation with Duvalier demonstrating a detailed grasp of the many issues surrounding the question of the illegal migration of Haitians to the U.S. and other matters of mutual interest. Duvalier not only reaffirmed his willingness to cooperate with the U.S. in seeking a solution to the illegal migration problem but stressed that new stricter laws soon to be enacted to deal with this problem were developed before the arrival of the U.S. delegation. He emphasized, however, that the basic problem in this issue is the overall poverty of Haiti and that those leaving were economic and not political refugees. U.S. delegation thanked Duvalier for his initiative in writing to President Carter3 and advised him that they had been impressed by the direct approach to this issue taken by the Haitian delegation at the previous day’s talk (reftel).

3. Haitian President Jean Claude Duvalier met with Ambassadors Kimelman and Loy and DAS Finley at 11 a.m., October 28 at the National Palace. RP AFLA Director Beck served as sole interpreter. Duvalier received the delegation alone. It should be noted that Serge Charles, Haitian Ambassador to the U.S., who greeted U.S. delegation in reception area, was not invited to join.

4. Amb. Kimelman opened the meeting by introducing the members of the delegation. He expressed the appreciation of the USG for the initiative taken by Duvalier in writing directly to President Carter. He also thanked the President for his leadership in arranging the previ-

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59 Central Foreign Policy File, D800521–0065. Confidential; Priority. Repeated for information to Nassau and Santo Domingo.
2 Telegram 5386 from Port au Prince, October 28, summarized a meeting between the U.S. and Haitian delegations on Haitian migration. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800515–1127)
3 In telegram 4798 from Port au Prince, September 30, the Embassy transmitted a letter from Duvalier to Carter. Duvalier stated his intent was to “work closely with the United States Coast Guard in preventing unwarranted loss of life during this crisis.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800467–0729) There is no evidence of a response from Carter.
ous day’s meeting (reftel) with such a distinguished group of Ministers, headed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. He complimented Duvalier and advised him that delegation felt that responsiveness and candor of yesterday’s talks was because of his instructions. Amb. Loy reiterated Amb. Kimelman’s thanks, etc. and stated the delegation’s satisfaction about the attitude of openness and cooperation which the Haitian side had exhibited during the previous day’s meeting. In the spirit which had been established, Loy was certain that further discussion would lead eventually to mutually agreed upon solutions to the problem. Duvalier responded that Haiti is the most studied country in the world. Officials of U.S., other countries and international development agencies have studied every conceivable aspect of Haiti, and now it is time for action. There ensued a lively conversation which covered, among others, the following issues.

5. Economic problem. Duvalier stated emphatically that neither administrative infrastructure nor law enforcement could be counted on to stop the flow of boat people out of Haiti as long as Haitians have no economic opportunities in their homeland. To support his statement, Duvalier referred to the rise in Haiti’s national fuel bill from $12–$13M in 1973 to $70M in 1980. Meanwhile, Haiti’s world price of bauxite and coffee have remained at the same level and the costs to Haiti of needed finished product imports have risen enormously. In addition to his description of the economic situation, Duvalier stated that there has been no important new U.S. investment in Haiti in 30 years. The result of these diverse factors is that the Haitian people are desperate to find places to work in order to make their living.

6. Refugees. Ambassador Loy stated that the responsible authorities in the USG were convinced that nearly all, if not all, of the people arriving in Florida are economic migrants as opposed to political refugees. Nevertheless many in the U.S. prefer to infer that the arrival of significant numbers of Haitians is proof of political oppression in Haiti. This fact in turn reduces the possibility of creating a political climate in the U.S. which would permit the USG to increase various sorts of assistance to Haiti. Duvalier stated that he was well aware of the presence of many actors with sinister motives in the refugee problem. Duvalier claimed that many of those who sought to embarrass the Haitian Government were directly involved in the transport of the boat people and in fact were accruing huge profits in the process. Duvalier also mentioned his conviction that the U.S. company Gulf and Western is part of the refugee problem since it attracts many illegal migrants to work on its sugar cane plantations in the Dominican Republic where the Haitian earns enough money to pay $700 to be transported to Miami. Even the U.S. Coast Guard is part of the process because the Coast Guard picks up the Haitians from small boats and helps them complete the journey to Florida.
7. U.S. immigration policy. Duvalier raised several questions about U.S. immigration policy which seemed to be an indication of his doubts about whether U.S. policy was fair. The first of his questions was whether the quota for legal immigration of Haitians to the U.S. could be raised and Ambassador Loy responded that Haitians like other national groups all are accorded an immigration quota (ceiling) every year of 20,000 persons. DAS Finley added that any changes in this limit would require new legislation from the U.S. Congress. Duvalier then asked about the number of places accorded to Vietnamese each year. His purpose was obvious. Loy’s response was that there are 168,000 places each year for Lao, Cambodian and Vietnamese political refugees, placing special emphasis on their characterization as “political.” This point was not lost on Duvalier. Duvalier next stated that from the official statistics of the USINS he had learned that there are 11 million Mexicans illegally in the U.S. This gave him cause to wonder why there was so much noise about the much smaller number of Haitians. Loy answered that the USG is by no means just interested in Haitians and that ongoing USG actions were directed against all aspects of the illegal immigration problem including Mexicans, Cubans and many other groups. Loy added that he doubted if the figure of 11 million Mexicans was factual and he stressed that at this time a Presidential commission is studying all aspects of U.S. immigration with the goal of making recommendations for significant changes in U.S. policy in the near future. Duvalier finally stated that many Haitians who possessed the amount of money needed to comply with the support and return requirements for being granted U.S. tourist visas were being denied tourist visas by the U.S. Consulate in Port au Prince. This in Duvalier’s opinion was both insulting to Haitians and leads many people, who simply wanted to go to the U.S. for a short term adventure to enter the U.S. illegally and then be trapped in the current confusion over refugees.

8. GOH short term action. Ambassador Loy expressed the appreciation of the USG for the willingness expressed in President Duvalier’s letter to President Carter to accept back all Haitian citizens who are repatriated from abroad. Loy further commented that he hoped that the GOH would do two things in the short term: accept back all those Haitians being repatriated now by the Bahamian Government and eventually from the U.S. as well, and secondly to enact soon the legislation against refugee traffickers now being considered by the Haitian Government. Duvalier’s response was that the enactment of a new law against traffickers had nothing to do with the arrival of the U.S.

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4 Reference is to the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy.
delegation in Port-au-Prince. Such action had been under consideration by the GOH for some time and it was expected to be enacted shortly.

9. US-Haiti relations. Duvalier next stated that the USG has been aware of the Haitian illegal migrant problem for more than 5 years and that Haiti during the entire period had demonstrated its willingness to cooperate with the USG on this question, but that the American Government had never before been willing even to talk to the government about the problem. Amb Kimelman seized this occasion to emphasize the presence in Haiti of Amb Loy and DAS Finley, who was in a new position specifically charged with U.S. Caribbean relations in the State Department, should be interpreted by the GOH as proof of a high level interest in the USG in seeking a new basis of cooperation with the GOH on concerns. Duvalier, at this point, expressed his disillusionment over his and government’s past experiences with even the U.S. Embassy in Port au Prince. Duvalier specifically mentioned his impression that frequently in the past U.S. Embassy had spoken with several voices with the effect that the USG had transmitted two, three and even four widely divergent views on the same subject to the GOH. Amb Kimelman responded that, whatever the experiences of the past had been, during his tenure as U.S. Ambassador, Duvalier and the GOH could count on the Embassy speaking with one voice. Finley added that Haiti was fortunate to have as its Ambassador from the U.S. a person who enjoyed the respect of and access to people in the highest reaches of the U.S. executive and Congress. Loy noted, however, that the U.S. as a democracy has, by its very nature, many voices, and the best insurance for Haiti was an unassailable record. Duvalier next returned to the subject of visas for Haitians who wish to visit the U.S. He personally knew many people who had been denied visitors visas with no apparent reason. Duvalier also indicated that Haitians feel strongly about the fact that they at times must queue up outside the U.S. Consulate at 4 or 5 in the morning in order to be certain of being able to see a U.S. consular officer on that day. Kimelman thanked the President for drawing his attention to this issue and advised that he would immediately look into it.

10. Haiti’s image: Continuing Ambassador Loy’s theme about the creation of political climate in the United States which would allow the USG to assist Haiti, Ambassador Kimelman stressed the importance for Haiti to avoid the kind of problems which the detention of Sylvio Claude, Compere Philo and Compere Plume had caused during the past weeks. President Duvalier noted that Sylvio Claude had been accorded due process according to Haitian law and Ambassador Kimel-
man agreed this had been so. However, Kimelman raised the point that due process had not been accorded Compere Plume, who had been held in detention for over a week. President Duvalier responded that he agreed, and assured the Ambassador that he would give his close personal attention to seeing that due process was followed in all such cases. Kimelman stated that no matter what the attitude of Haiti’s President, the action of all GOH personnel would continue to be scrutinized by individuals and groups outside Haiti. Kimelman referred to the recent Diederich article in *Time*, which Duvalier said he had read, as the sort of publicity which Haiti needs. However, Kimelman advised that earlier that morning a UPI reporter had tried to contact him by phone to obtain confirmation that Evans (Compere Plume) had been badly beaten in jail and for a statement of the U.S. position on human rights in Haiti in view of these recent events. The Ambassador had not talked to the UPI reporter and stated that he regretted that such issues were still a problem for Haiti. Duvalier agreed that an improvement in Haiti’s image certainly was to be desired, but he disagreed that he and his government would be acting responsibly if the sort of illegality and anarchy which have become the atmosphere of certain other countries of the region were allowed to grow in Haiti. During the discussion on this issue, Duvalier’s voice raised to its most audible level during the 90 minute meeting, especially when Amb Kimelman urged him to recognize the significance of Sylvio Claude and release him. Duvalier replied that despite the small following of someone like Sylvio Claude, Haiti was opposed by an organized and potentially disruptive campaign supported by international socialism. Duvalier claimed to have evidence, which he could not publicize from the rooftops, that the threat to Haiti is strong and real. Also the Claude case was now in the Haitian courts, and Duvalier would be unable to release Claude even if he wanted to do so. Amb Kimelman then suggested that simply following impeccably the laws of Haiti with regard to due process for prisoners would go a long way to improve and guard Haiti’s image.

11. Comment: Duvalier was well prepared for this meeting, referred to no notes, and was on top of the issues. He had no difficulty at all holding his own in the spirited repartee which characterized the long conversation. We were favorably impressed with his ability to articulate the issues, and his evident concern for the Haitian poor. The U.S. delegation was optimistic that further exchanges such as this would be useful.

Kimelman
Port au Prince, December 2, 1980, 2106Z

6009. Subject: The Dinosaurs Strike Back.

1. The latest “Black Friday” marked another of Haiti’s regrettable marches to the rear, with the arrest of a mixed bag of civil rights activists, the few identifiable political oppositionists, and most of the increasingly-outspoken press critics of the regime. So far, we have been shown no evidence of any leftist plot, and the city remains its usual colorful albeit run-down self. However, those arrested now number forty or more, with some reports of more arrests on Monday. Given the lack of any acute crisis, the questions are why? And why now?

2. The country’s economic situation is poor. Sugar is short and prices of foodstuffs are rising, for which the government is being blamed. The Cayo Lobo affair, and the government’s handling of it, was criticized as a national disgrace, and the government obviously has neither resources nor ideas to deal with the returned boat people. Like many governments, this one contains a lot of people whose idea of how to deal with criticism is to silence the critics, and Haiti has never been noted for its tolerance of criticism. There are a number of continuing tensions with no reasonable prospect of real alleviation. There was a bomb explosion at Carrefour about November 18, for which there has been no explanation. Foreign Minister Salomon informed the Charge on Dec 2 that a fire the day before at Bolosse near the Carrefour which destroyed a score or so of houses was the work of anti-GOH conspirators. Thus it is easy, and perhaps politic, for the hard-liners to raise the spectre of subversion and dissidence, as a pretext to renew their grip on power.

3. Personal ambition and concerns undoubtedly play a part. There had been reports that the cutting edge of the present repressive sweep, Police Chief Col. Jean Valme, was in danger of losing his job, but he

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800579–0385. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated for information to Santo Domingo, Nassau, and CINCSOUTH Quarry Heights, Panama.

2 On Friday, November 28, the Haitian Government began arresting journalists, politicians, and human rights activists. Jean Valme, Port au Prince Police Chief, released a communiqué claiming the detainees were Communist-inspired. (Jo Thomas, “Haiti, Facing Economic Crisis, Arrests Major Critics,” The New York Times, December 1, p. A3)

3 Haitian refugees were stranded at Cayo Lobo in the Bahamas in 1979. The Haitian Government demanded their repatriation, and some of the refugees resisted violently. (Telegram 303471 to Nassau, November 23, 1979; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790539-0599)
seems to have bounced back strongly. A more shadowy, but supposedly more important, figure in the present power struggle is 45-year-old Roger Lafontant, an old friend of the President’s who is thought to be Valme’s patron. The “fiscalization” of various accounts, especially of the Regie du Tabac, threatens the Palace’s traditional sources of income to support the VSN, the Duvalier family and the Palace Guard. The temptation to produce a threat, internal or external, to the regime is strong, especially given President Duvalier’s penchant for listening hardest to the person who has seen him most recently.

4. Why now? Politically aware Haitians accept as given that the defeat of President Carter means the US is abandoning its championship of human rights. The recent visit of French Minister of Cooperation Galley was trumpeted by the official media as evidence of unqualified French support of the Duvalier regime. The Germans have just announced continued, even amplified technical and capital assistance. Minister of Plan Berrouet has told the German Ambassador that the government will not tolerate criticism of its policies and practices on its own soil, thereby rendering negligible (in the government’s view) any criticism in the context of the Joint Commission meeting (scheduled here December 8–10). Thus the hard-liners may well have convinced themselves and the President, that a turn in the direction of repression will cost the government nothing.

5. While we doubt that President Duvalier initiated last Friday’s clampdown, it is assumed, and we do not doubt, that it took place with his approval. What we do not know is who was consulted. From our contacts with the Haitian armed forces it appears they were neither excited by the rumors of subversion nor involved in the arrests. Ambassador Charles in Washington and the Foreign Ministry here evidently knew in advance that something was going to happen.

6. We suspect Duvalier was persuaded that it was necessary to act by several arguments: 1) There was an externally-supported subversive threat; the President apparently is an easy mark for reports of conspiracies and prospective coups, 2) in the face of growing criticism, it was necessary to demonstrate a strong hand at the tiller; 3) given the factors noted in para 4 above, the crackdown would not endanger foreign aid to Haiti. It might be noted also that the President was reportedly extremely upset by an item in “Jeune Afrique” to the effect that the USG had decided to get rid of him because he was ineffectively anti-Communist.

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4 Haitian officials introduced new auditing reforms in April that more closely monitored receipts from taxes and government monopolies. (Telegram 2009 from Port au Prince, April 29; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800219–1063)
7. There are people here of broader and longer vision. Unfortu-
nately they have little tactical strength, and like most people they live
from day to day. They are unwilling to risk their positions, much less
their necks, in defense of a lunatic fringe of “intellectuals”. And if things
get worse, they know they can always use their green cards and flee.

8. As of Tuesday afternoon,\(^5\) the scenario, insofar as we can deduce
it, seems to be that the authorities are seeking to evict from Haiti
those they regard as most troublesome, and that the remainder will
be released (septel reports that a number of smaller fry already have
been).\(^6\) Radio Metropol newscaster Marc Gracia (aka Marcus) was put
on the American Airlines flight for this afternoon (he already had a
US visa).

9. The situation remains fluid and many local figures are lying low
until they can get a better picture of the forces at work.

Bergesen

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\(^5\) December 2.

\(^6\) Valme claimed to have released 17 prisoners on December 1. (Telegram 6008 from
Port au Prince, December 2; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File,
D800576–0434)

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270. Airgram From the Embassy in Haiti to the Department of
State

A–65

Port au Prince, December 16, 1980

SUBJECT

Ambassador’s Meeting With President Duvalier

Enclosed for distribution is the full Memorandum of Conversation
of the meeting between President Duvalier and Ambassador Kimelman
which took place on December 12, 1980 in Port-au-Prince.

Kimelman

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800168–0110.
Confidential; Exdis.
Enclosure

Memorandum of Conversation

Port au Prince, December 12, 1980, noon

PARTICIPANTS
Jean-Claude Duvalier, President of the Republic of Haiti
Ambassador Henry L. Kimelman, American Embassy, Port-au-Prince
Michele Duvalier, Interpreter

SUBJECT
Bilateral—GOH/USG

The long-awaited bilateral with President Duvalier was held in the informal atmosphere of Villa d’Accueil, the GOH’s guest residence. It was originally scheduled for the day before upon my insistence that a meeting be held as soon as possible. (The President's secretary had called to state that the President was very busy and preferred to delay the meeting to December 18–19.) Henri Bayard, the Minister to the President, telephoned me the morning of the December 11 appointment to advise that the President was ill and to advise that the meeting would be held at the same time and place the following day. Embassy faced this planned meeting with great trepidation, in view of recent events in Haiti and because of the talking points suggested by Ambassador Bowdler, DAS Bushnell, ARA/CAR Director Warne, HA, etc. We at the Embassy believed that the President was not overly enthusiastic about meeting with Ambassador at this point in time. We presumed also that he expected the Ambassador to arrive “loaded for bear”.

The sensitivity of the problem was accentuated in our opinion by the following statement which appeared in the New York Sunday Times Week in Review section of December 7: Report by Transition Team—Ambassadors “are not supposed to function as social reformers.” Human rights considerations should not be allowed to “paralyse or unduly delay decisions on issues” where they “conflict with other vital U.S. interests.” We had to assume that the President was aware

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2 Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Kimelman on December 15. The meeting was held at Villa d’Accueil.

3 In telegram 6211 from Port au Prince, the Embassy noted that the talking points were transmitted in a December 6 memorandum. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]) The memorandum was not found.
of this statement as well as Ambassador Robert White’s criticism of the transition team, page 1, New York Times, December 10.⁴

As a consequence, a considerable amount of time was spent with various Country Team members and specifically A/DCM, POLOFF,⁵ and Consul in preparing an effective strategy for this meeting. My past experience in government, politics and the private sector, has taught me to always try and place myself in the position of the other person involved in any negotiation or controversy. I was therefore of the opinion that it was conceivable that the President could greet me and in his own way quote from the statement that appeared in the New York Sunday Times. He then might have added that human rights considerations should not be allowed to paralyze the decision he made to prevent a potential Communist takeover. He believed that new administration would undoubtedly agree with him that such a takeover conflicted with vital U.S. interests which would have left me with nothing to talk about.

I, therefore, came to the conclusion that the best approach to President Duvalier in the hopes of accomplishing our demarche was to hopefully create a friendly atmosphere similar to my first meeting at the same location (see MemCon October 26, 1980)⁶ and specifically to build his confidence. On a plan devised and concurred with by ECONOFF⁷ and POLOFF, Consul and other Country Team members and with my conviction that Mme. Duvalier would be the interpreter, I opened our talk by thanking them for their invitation to dinner the following Tuesday evening and by notifying them that my daughter-in-law had last week presented my wife and I with a new and lovely grand-daughter. They congratulated me and we spent a few minutes on discussion of family, grandchildren, etc. I then related to the President an incident that occurred about half an hour before our meeting. A Danish businessman who had lived in Haiti for three years (1976–79) had come to my office to tell me how upset he was concerning the bad publicity he had recently read in the foreign press about Haiti. He stated that he lived in Port-au-Prince for three years by choice. He took that decision because he believed Haiti was the safest place in Central America to raise his children and that he felt comfortable leaving his wife and children while he was away on frequent trips of three and

⁴ The article reported Ambassador White’s charges that he was being undercut by a report by the Reagan transition team that urged a reduction in the influence of human rights advocates in the Department of State. ("U.S. Envoy in Salvador Charges Reagan Team Is Undercutting Him," The New York Times, December 10, p. A1)
⁵ Alf E. Bergesen and Ints Silins.
⁶ Not found.
⁷ John B. Craig.
four weeks duration. I then complimented the President on his past overall program of democratization and advised him that in conversation with six or seven other chiefs of mission they had unanimously concurred that he was committed to helping his people and his country. This obviously pleased him. I informed him that the German Ambassador had told me at a meeting in his office on November 20 (prior to “Black Friday”)8 that Bonn’s chief Public Affairs Officer had recently traveled Central America and returned to Port-au-Prince to advise the Ambassador that Haiti had the most open press of the sixteen or seventeen countries he had visited. This brought a smile of approval to the President’s face.

The general atmosphere was warm and cordial with the three of us enjoying an excellent rum punch while seated very comfortably on a lovely open terrace overlooking the harbor of Port-au-Prince. He was much more relaxed than I expected. Comment: I reached the conclusion that it would be in our interests and the President’s interests for all subsequent meetings with the President to be held in the atmosphere of Villa d’Accueil rather than the very formal and stark atmosphere of his Presidential office where he usually sits very stiff and formal behind a desk. End Comment.

After this approximately 15–18 minute tour d’horizon I said, “Mr. President, my government would like to know why you felt it necessary to take the action you did on November 28.” I settled in my armchair and said, “Mr. President, the U.S. Government is deeply distressed by the action you took on November 28 to silence opposition critics and free expression of opinion. You are aware, Mr. President, that this action has proven extremely damaging to Haiti’s international reputation.” Before he replied I inquired if he had any objection to my making notes of his response. I explained that I wanted to make certain that I reported his comments accurately to my government. He nodded his agreement. He then proceeded to relate a chronicle of events going back to 1971. Soon after he became President in 1971 he publicly invited all exiles, independents and other opposition leaders who had left the country to return to Haiti. He made it clear that they would not be imprisoned or arrested. Many returned. The purpose of his invitation, he said, was to obtain their cooperation and assistance in solving Haiti’s economic and developmental problems. He recalled incidents during 1972, 1973 and 1974 in which he met with many of those who had returned and his consistent program of solicitation of their cooperation for the benefit

8 See footnote 2, Document 269. In telegram 6009 from Port au Prince, December 2, the Embassy noted the crackdown on dissidents coincided with a German promise of “continued, even amplified technical and capital assistance.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800575–0385)
of Haiti. However, during these years none of these individuals or the
groups they represented had offered constructive advice and in the
main in whatever forum was available to them criticized both him and
the government. Some time during 1974 or 1975 he called a group of
them to the Palace to see if he could solicit their cooperation for the
benefit of the people of Haiti. He said that the group interpreted this
as a sign of weakness. He stated that none of these individuals or
groups respected the office of the Presidency nor the institutions of
the country. Their only aim, he said, was to destabilize the government
and to remove him from power. At this point I inquired as to whether
he was of the opinion that this antagonism was due to the fact that
his name was “Duvalier”. Unstated by me but obvious by inference
was the fact that he had inherited his father’s mantle and reputation.
After deliberating a moment or two and exchanging glances with
Michele he surprisingly to me replied that he thought not. He indicated
that these individuals and groups were at best self-serving and were
interested only in their accession to power. Michele added with a
broad grin that each and every one wanted to be President. He named
specifically as leaders Sylvio Claude, Jean-Jacques Honorat, Gregoire
Eugene and included the press (I presume he meant all communications
media) as an additional key group. He noted that although these groups
functioned separately and had diverse interests they had from time to
time joined together in concerted effort to destabilize and/or overthrow
the government. He reiterated what Michele had said earlier that none
of those involved had any genuine interest in Haitian people but were
primarily motivated by their own personal ambition. If they were
successful in achieving their objectives the process of democratization
and liberalization that he had started in Haiti would be halted. At this
point in time, approximately fifteen or twenty minutes into his dia-
logue, he brought up as the said goal of this group Haiti’s drift toward
Socialism and eventually Communism. This, he said, he could not and
would not tolerate as being in the best interests of his people. He added
that it would also not be in the best interests of the United States.

He felt it necessary to take action on November 28 after carefully
considering all the consequences. He stressed that if he had not acted
to disrupt this conspiracy to destabilize, Haiti would be faced with
critical choices, if not immediately certainly in the near future. He was
aware that the arrests may have only postponed the threat of what he
referred to as “a Communist conspiracy” and said the possibility of
its resurfacing, probably within the next year or two, was still his major
concern. He referred to the “brains” behind these activities as members
of the international Communist party and a French-dominated and
Communist-inspired labor organization. The principal players (where
this plot to destabilize was conceived) were from Venezuela and Bel-
gium, the latter a combination of Haitian exiles and international Communists resident in Belgium. I interjected at this point to advise that at simultaneous meetings yesterday ECONOFF and I with Minister to the Presidency Bayard,9 and POLOFF with Colonel Valme, Chief of Police, the former had said that the plot was hatched in Belgium and the latter in Venezuela.10 A shy smile crossed the President’s face and he replied “I do not confide ‘everything’ to my key people. Be assured, Mr. Ambassador, that it was from both countries, although I probably told Bayard Belgium and Valme Venezuela.” He said he had evidence that forces in both Cuba and Nicaragua were also deeply involved. He said that he was convinced that the threat was real and that the climax to their planned activities was to occur somewhere between December 5 and December 15. He emphasized the dates as being important by saying that these leftist groups felt their opportunities for destabilization would be reduced after the Reagan administration took office on January 20. He quickly pointed out, however, that he wanted our government to know that his response had nothing to do with the American election. In other words, if the time-frame had been the same he would have taken the same action if President Carter had been reelected.

After he completed this lengthy discourse I advised the President that my government had instructed me to raise specific questions as outlined in Confidential Memorandum from Assistant Secretary Bowdler, dated December 6. I then took up the matter of Haiti’s image and advised him that it had suffered great damage in the United States because of this action and that it would take considerable time for the damage done to be reversed. The GOH action had provided fresh ammunition to those groups in the U.S. who believed that Haiti could do nothing right and had deprived friends of Haiti of the ability to defend his stated commitment toward democratization and liberalization. He indicated that he was fully aware of these consequences but reiterated that under the circumstances he had no alternative. In a sense of resignation and with some bitterness he said that Haiti would always have a poor public image in the United States no matter what it did. He also noted that the U.S. and other countries criticized Haiti specifically in the area of human rights more than they did other countries whose human rights record was far worse. I recall him men-

9 In telegram 6039 from Port au Prince, December 11, the Embassy reported that Bayard had claimed the crackdown on dissidents occurred in order to mollify rightist elements in the government, so a proposed “liberalization program” could be carried out. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800590–0078)

10 In telegram 6176 from Port au Prince, December 11, the Embassy reported that Valme had claimed that the crackdown on dissidents was a response to a “Communist plot.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File D800590–0923)
tioning Argentinia but implied if not actually stated were Nicaragua and El Salvador. I then queried him as to whether the purge was over, noting again the conflict between Bayard’s statement that it was “one hundred percent under control” and Valme who told POLOFF that he knew who the key organizers were since he had them under surveillance for the past three years and that he was going to “get them”.

The President then emphatically stated that he was the President and that Valme takes his orders from him. He then informed me that the purge was over for the time being. I asked how many people had been arrested and how many remained in jail. He replied that approximately 45 had been arrested and that “not even ten people” remained in jail. I then queried as to why those people have not been charged and if not, why have they not been released? I was prepared to receive the reply Minister Bayard had given us at our meeting yesterday which was that the “Duvalier law” was very strict on Communists and that if charged and found guilty they would be condemned to death. The President hesitated in replying for almost a full minute, obviously thinking and then said that those remaining in jail would be released within a few days and would be expelled from the country. I inquired as to whether they had exit visas and he said he did not know. He admitted that he had not yet determined as to how he would get rid of these people but that he would send them to countries which would receive them. He then told me that Dr. Titus had been released the previous day for humanitarian reasons even though the GOH had evidence that he had been a member of the Communist party for at least ten years. In interpreting this comment Michele sought his approval for a correction to “fifteen years” rather than “ten”.

To my question as to whether any of those arrested had been beaten, he smiled, looked me right in the eye and said perhaps two or three. Michele in translation offered that they had been “spanked a bit” but not really harmed. I raised the question of whether any harm would come to members of the immediate families, husbands, wives, children, of those detained and expelled and they both reacted with a look of amazement. He assured me as did Michele in a very careful translation that no harm would come to any members of the families of those arrested and subsequently released or expelled.

I then inquired about Colonel Valme’s statement to POLOFF at their meeting yesterday that not only would the roundup continue but would probably include the arresting of some priests and nuns. I was most emphatic in stating that such action on the part of the GOH would be catastrophic—particularly in light of recent events in El Salvador. My comment was made primarily to caution him before the fact of the extent of the damage that could be created in the GOH/US relationship by such action. He responded by saying that there would be no further
arrests. He repeated that he was the President and was in control of
the situation.

I advised him that the credibility of his commitment to democratization and liberalization had suffered a grave setback by these recent actions. He assured me that despite recent events he was committed and would continue to be committed to a program of democratization of his country. He stated however that it was important for the U.S. to understand that the situation in Haiti is considerably different than that in the U.S. His people are uneducated, illiterate and in the main underfed and hungry. He made it clear that while he is willing to tolerate opposition, governing Haiti is far different than governing the U.S. and that the brand of democracy achieved for Haiti, even at its ultimate goal, would be different than the kind of democracy the U.S. enjoys.

I inquired as to his plans for Jean Dominique, (Director of Radio Haiti Inter) a leading figure who reportedly remains in asylum in the Venezuela Embassy residence. I advised him of the discrepancy that existed in the statements of Bayard and Valme (aforesaid meetings yesterday). Bayard had told us that Jean Dominique was a personal friend of his but that he was misguided, close to Manley in Jamaica and that at minimum a Socialist and probably a Communist. However, Bayard assured ECONOFF and I that Dominique would be free to leave the country. Valme indicated otherwise to POLOFF. He again hesitated for perhaps a half minute and then replied that Dominique would be free to leave the country. He reiterated that all of “these people”, including Dominique, were involved in the conspiracy. He inferred that he had the facts from his own intelligence agents and in searching for the right words to describe his agents’ activities Michele interjected and said, “like your CIA”. Again, he repeated that he was forced to act when and how he had.

I advised the President that I had been involved in politics in the United States for almost twenty years and would be pleased to offer some of my observations of our electoral process if he were interested. He nodded and I proceeded to explain that candidates of both major political parties in the U.S. campaign across a wide spectrum from left to right and I held out both hands to make the point. I explained that many candidates often campaign with a rhetoric that differs from the reality they face after being elected to office. This also applies to the U.S. presidency. While still holding my hands out I explained that Carter had campaigned in 1976 from a position to the left of center but that once elected he moved gradually and over a period of time closer to the center and moderated many of his positions. As a Chief of State I added that he better than most could understand the compromises that are forced by the responsibilities of office. I explained that
President-elect Reagan had begun his campaign from a position to the far right, using my outstretched right arm to make this point, but that in the waning days of the campaign as the election drew near he began to moderate his position. I told the President that it was my opinion that once in office President Reagan would moderate even further and that perhaps while he might be somewhat right of center he, like President Carter, would move closer to center. To emphasize my point I held both hands out in front of me approximately three or four inches apart with the imaginary line in between representing the center. I continued by saying that concern for human welfare (human rights) did not begin with the Carter administration. I advised the President that I had with me a summary of human rights legislation which I then handed to Michele. I suggested that he might want to turn this material over to his Department of Justice officials for analysis. Basically the point which I believe was made was that the Government of Haiti should not expect a sharp reversal in the U.S. Government’s concern and position on human rights.

Before closing we discussed ways of improving Haiti’s public image in the United States. Embassy officials had come to the conclusion that the removal from office of FM Salomon, FinMin Bros and Ambassador Charles at this time would not be in the best interests of the GOH. We discussed the different methods of introducing this subject without having it seem that we were attempting to interfere in the internal politics of the GOH. This conversation on ways to improve the image of the GOH in the United States provided the opportunity I was looking for. I told the President about the TV interview I gave in Miami to the CBS affiliate station. We had positive comments from individuals who saw the interview. I advised the President that I was hopeful of getting a video recording which I would deliver to him for his viewing. The trend of discussion provided me with an opportunity to suggest that he had available in his government people of stature whom I believe would be very effective representatives for the GOH on radio, TV talk shows and in interviews with journalists. I specifically mentioned FM Georges Salomon and Ambassador Charles, both of whom are highly regarded and respected in the United States. Both seemed interested. I suggested that in my opinion it should be relatively easy to arrange TV and radio appearances with prominent talk-show hosts and interviews with journalists who are anxious to know more about Haiti. I did, however, raise the specter of possible adverse press if not handled delicately by representatives sophisticated and knowledgeable with some experience in dealing with the communications media.

COMMENT: The major question with possible long-range ramifications for our bilateral relations is: “Does Jean-Claude believe what he said or is he trying to lead the USG down the primrose path?” Secondly,
and more important is the question as to whether Jean-Claude is really in charge; by this I mean is he his own man or is he, as is the common perception, really reflecting the advice and opinions of the last person he has talked to? This latter question is the more difficult one to answer. I believe, based on the dialogue of our past meetings including this one and the nature of the relationship we have established, that Jean-Claude was convinced that the conspiracy threat was real; not as imminent as he may have indicated, but yet real. It is possible, however, that he overstated the nature of the threat because of the still lingering effect of older and more mature men advising him, i.e., no one has to remind him that he inherited the Presidency and did not earn it. I believe he is aware of this almost 24 hours every day and perhaps for that reason and his own intellectual insecurities, he tends to rely on or give more credence to the advice of older and more experienced advisors.

From information we have been able to obtain, Minister to the Presidency Bayard, Minister of Youth and Sports Achille, and Minister of Information Chanoine emerge as the key figures in instigating activities which led to “Black Friday” decision. Our information indicates this factor to be beyond any reasonable doubt. (FYI Achille was brought into government by Private Secretary to the President Douyon. We are advised that he has now emerged as a strong figure, is very ambitious and on reliable information, seeks the position of Minister of Defense and Interior. End FYI.) Both Achille and Chanoine are relatively young (late-30’s); Bayard is in his mid-50’s. Important to note also is that the private sector, from all the information we have been able to gather, supported the President’s “Black Friday” move. They were extremely concerned about labor unrest and possible Communist takeover and/or the introduction of an internationally-led “Communist-inspired movement.” Achille and Chanoine appear to be emerging as representatives or lobbyists for this private sector group. They are being identified as the “new right.” I am advised that Douyon, while still personally close to the President, is now considered to be, by the President and others, in the liberal group with Foreign Minister Salomon and Charles.

Is Jean-Claude in charge? This is obviously more difficult to assess. It is my opinion that he is certainly more in charge than he was perceived to be a year or two ago. In other words, the pattern of his leadership, while still not dominant, is strengthening. I believe that he, despite an introverted personality, which in itself plays a role in the quality of leadership, will gradually exert more control and continue to take a stronger leadership role. In analyzing my feelings, I believe that Michele is a strong personality. Over the past six months she has been instrumental in influencing him to take more decisions on his
own. As reported in this MemCon he mentioned at least three or four times that he was in charge and that Valme, Bayard, etc. took their orders from him.

It is my belief as well as that of those of other Ambassadors I have spoken to and senior Embassy officials, that he genuinely wants to improve his country. The problem is, does he know how and can he accomplish it? He talks about democratization and being committed to it. He points out however the differences that exist between achieving democracy in a country like the U.S. and one like Haiti. The question remains, can he achieve this goal while stifling press criticism and by further “Black Friday” endeavors? The two obviously are inconsistent. He knows it but has not resolved it. There is no question that he is concerned about his image in the U.S. and most assuredly in the long run does not want to displease the USG if he can help it. He realized the long-range ramifications of recent events. I believe, however, that our interests are not well-served by constantly dangling AID assistance on a “yoyo” in front of the President and his government.

We are aware that the above does not provide a clear-cut answer to Jean-Claude and the future of Haiti. It is still our belief, however, that the strategy outlined in our cable (PAP 5849)\textsuperscript{11} remains applicable.

\textsuperscript{11} In telegram 5849 from Port au Prince, November 21, the Embassy reviewed its policy toward Haiti, stating, “Haiti is vulnerable to external pressures which could stimulate drastic and potentially leftist political changes within the country,” adding, “In terms of human rights, the regime has made progress and continues to do so; nevertheless, we will continue to stress the need for moderate political change. On a scale of zero to ten, with the higher number representing an ideal, the average estimate of Country Team places Haiti at present at four.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800558–0650)
271. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Haiti

Washington, December 25, 1980, 0018Z

339226. Subject: Title III Program for Haiti.
1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. Recent human rights developments in Haiti have practical impact on our assistance levels to Haiti. This is particularly true of Title III program which was not in the FY 81 allocation tables notified to Congress. Under current human rights conditions, Department has determined that Title III program for Haiti can not be justified this year. Pursuant to this decision, Embassy and AID Mission are instructed to inform appropriate GOH officials:

—That the deteriorated human rights environment resulting from recent GOH actions has made it inappropriate for the USG to continue discussions about a Title III program with the GOH at the present time.

—Accordingly, there will not be a Title III program for Haiti in FY 81.

3. As soon as Embassy has informed GOH, please notify Department so we can pass similar message to Amb. Charles.

We wish to keep Charles informed in order to maintain good communications and protect his position. For same reason, we prefer first to pass notification regarding termination of Title III discussions directly to GOH in Port au Prince rather than through Amb. Charles.

Muskie

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800610–0812. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Davis and Howard; cleared in AID/LA/CAR, ARA/ECP, HA, and EB/OFP; approved by Bushnell.

2 See Document 269.

3 In telegram 438 from Port au Prince, January 26, 1981, the Embassy reported that Kimelman met with Duvalier on January 26 to inform him of the termination of Title III discussions. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D810039–0123)
Guyana

272. Telegram From the Embassy in Guyana to the Department of State

Georgetown, January 19, 1977, 1135Z

126. From Charge. Department pass Assistant Secretary-designate Todman, San Jose; USIA/ILA; AID LA/CAR. Subject: Guyana 1977. Ref: Georgetown 0051 (Notal).

1. The following is a brief analysis of US–GOG relations and political prognosis for Guyana from our vantage point here as we enter 1977.

2. US–GOG relations. As the new year begins, our relations with Guyana can be summed up in one word—impasse. Nevertheless, Guyanese official comments to me and those few favorable articles that appear about the United States in the local press seem to indicate that the GOG believes the Carter administration will be more sympathetic toward Guyana. While this may be true, my concern is that the recent deterioration of our relations beginning with Burnham’s accusations of indirect USG complicity in Cubana air crash and subsequent charges of destabilization, the characterization of the United States as the capitalist enemy, and unfavorable articles accusing the CIA of everything from climate control to political assassination make one wonder where we can begin. It now appears to be de rigueur for any high-ranking GOG official making public statements to claim Guyana’s economic problems are in part caused by destabilization from abroad. It is generally accepted here that USG is primary destabilizer although Cuban exiles, Venezuela and Brazil have also been mentioned.

3. This naturally leads one to ponder how we can improve relations with Guyana and indeed whether we should. I recognize that our interests and influence here are minimal. We have basically little in common except language and proximity. Our aid activities are limited

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770020-0052. Confidential; Priority. Repeated for information to Brasilia, Bridgetown, Caracas, Kingston, Nassau, Paramaribo, Port of Spain, and USUN.

2 In telegram 51 from Georgetown, January 10, McCoy summarized his conversation with Guyanese Foreign Minister Wills regarding Cuba, the USSR, and the Non-Aligned Movement. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770009-0364)

3 Cubana Flight 455 crashed on October 6, 1976, en route to Jamaica. A subsequent analysis of the crash concluded that the plane was brought down by two bombs on board killing 73 people, including 11 Guyanese passengers. In telegram 2076 from Georgetown, October 18, 1976, the Embassy provided the text of Burnham’s October 17 speech, which stated that the bombers enjoyed “the hospitality of the great American people in Miami.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760396-1184)
to the implementation of ongoing projects. Since two planned new loan projects have been delayed for over one year, AID staff is being cut back. Moreover, it is apparent that the GOG is suspicious of our intentions toward Guyana. Obviously, if our relations are to improve or at least normalize, there is a need to develop mutual trust and confidence. On our part, we must continue to make clear to the Guyanese that we are not opposed to their socialist revolution and their close relations with the Cubans et al. On their part, the GOG must cease or certainly mute its statements accusing U.S. of destabilization. This may be an over-simplification of the present problems in our relations but credibility does appear to be at the heart of this present situation.

4. Whither Guyana in 1977—East or non-aligned? As the Department has noticed in our reporting over the past several months, we have expressed our concern over what we consider to be Guyana’s drift toward the Eastern world. Official GOG statements in the press and from Burnham on down parallel at times a political line that sounds straight from Havana. This rhetoric causes us to consider what we believe to be growing Cuban influence within the entire framework of the GOG. Even the trade union movement has also shown itself to be vulnerable to Cuban penetration. For example, the Guyana Trade Union Congress platform at the recent Caribbean labor conference in Antigua last week was developed in Havana as reported in Georgetown 0087 (Notal). In analyzing this unfortunate trend, I continually ask why. My analysis at this time leads me to believe that Burnham is pursuing this policy to neutralize his major opposition, the Moscow-line Communist People’s Progressive Party (PPP). To achieve this, the GOG must preempt in part the policies and doctrine of the PPP and the result has been an apparent increased receptivity to Cuban political influence and doctrine.

5. I also believe that this decision by Burnham to radicalize his political policy has directly affected the Guyanese economy. In reviewing GOG economic activity in 1976, I am convinced that political decisions were taken that have exacerbated the economic problems of the country in 1977. To be sure, bad weather and low sugar prices also hurt Guyana, but my opinion is that political decisions affecting the economy have been made regardless of the economic conditions at the time. In particular, the pouring of funds into the People’s Militia, national service and Upper Mazaruni Road project and other basically non-productive areas at the expense of capital investments in agriculture and other productive sectors has deepened the economic crisis.

4 Telegram 87 from Georgetown, January 14, summarized the Guyanese proposal to admit Cuba to the Caribbean Congress of Labor. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770014–0908)
Plain mismanagement and some corruption has helped. Also in this connection, it is interesting to note that Burnham refused to reveal total defense expenditures for 1976–77 in the Parliamentary budget debate. Foreign assistance to date has not been forthcoming in any significant amount to cover Guyanese shortfall in the projected balance of payments deficit in 1977. Reportedly, the Venezuelans have offered to assist Guyana but for political reasons the GOG may not accept this offer. Libya and Nigeria have also been solicited for aid but at this time there are no indications any funds will be forthcoming. That leaves the Soviet Union and the West. Under present circumstances, it is hard to imagine any aid coming from the U.S. and if so would the GOG swallow its pride and accept Soviet aid, I have been told by the FonMin, depends in part on the strings attached to such aid. Other Western donors or banks have not indicated a willingness to bail out the Guyanese at this time. Therefore, some hard political decisions in the near future must be made which could decide Guyana’s future both domestically and externally.

6. We have not been able to determine what decisions, if any, were made at the recent Chiefs of Mission conference held on January 10–14 that would provide us with an idea of the direction to be taken in Guyanese foreign policy in the coming year. The only hint was reported in the press on January 18 in a short article disclosing domestic economic issues dominated the discussions.

7. Internally, the government still appears secure although there are signs of disaffection. I am concerned that the austerity measures introduced by the GOG to alleviate some of the strain, if unsuccessful, could affect the stability of Guyana especially if insufficient assistance from abroad is forthcoming. As reported reftel, FonMin believes crunch will come in three to four months. I believe this is a valid assumption. I continually hear and read of opposition primarily from the East Indian community to the Defense Bonds Committee and apathy toward and suspicion of the purpose of the Guyana People’s Militia established last month. So far as I can determine, Burnham’s call for unity in face of external and internal pressures has not been successful.

8. At this point, I believe if the situation does not worsen, the GOG will somehow muddle through. However, the lack at this time of any apparent coherent economic or political policy enunciated by the government, coupled with unproven allegations of destabilization occurring within and without the country have created some confusion.

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5 The Embassy described the Guyanese Chiefs of Mission conference in telegram 120 from Georgetown, January 18. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770019–0430)
6 Not found.
among the Guyanese population. The Guyanese people are also beginning to question why the GOG appears so strongly influenced by Cuba when purportedly the Cubans are in no position to offer any substantial economic assistance. When the Foreign Minister can express concern over the government’s drift, it is easy to imagine what people outside the government have been expressing to Embassy officers. One constant rumor we hear is that Burnham is losing control. I do not believe this; but I do believe that Burnham has moved further left in order to achieve tighter control within the government and isolate the PPP, his only real foe at this time.

9. In conclusion then, I am somewhat pessimistic about our opportunities to improve relations with the GOG in 1977. I believe that we could at best characterize our relations for 1977 as a holding operation with the U.S. maintaining a relatively low profile. Improvement of relations should depend upon a cessation of irresponsible attacks against the USG, our officials and our policies. However, if the opportunity presents itself, we should be prepared to help the Guyanese if only to provide an alternative for the GOG and to show the GOG and the non-aligned world USG intentions are good toward countries where our interests are minimal. It would bring us goodwill throughout Caribbean and certainly lessen suspicions about USG intentions in the area. One thing that has become clear to me in the past three months is that regardless of the official attitude of the government, Americans in Guyana still receive a hospitable welcome from the average Guyanese, choke-and-rob problems notwithstanding. This has made our lives here bearable under the pressures of almost unrelenting official hostility and calumny since last October.

McCoy
273. Telegram From the Embassy in Guyana to the Department of State\(^1\)

Georgetown, January 20, 1977, 1830Z

137. From Charge. ARA for Deputy Assistant Secretary Luers. Department pass Assistant Secretary-designate Todman. ARA/CAR for Bläcken/Heavner. Subject: US–GOG Relations in 1977. Ref: Georgetown 136.\(^2\)

1. Following information was forthcoming during lengthy meeting between Charge and FonMin January 19. FonMin Wills began discussion of US–GOG relations by apologizing to me about Ambassador Mann’s late departure to Washington. Wills assured me Mann had left today (Jan. 19 instead of the 18th as he had previously said) and indicated the delay was simply due to Mann’s own slowness in arranging his departure.\(^3\) Wills said he wanted Ambassador Mann to be in Washington for the inauguration and had instructed him to resume contact and discussion of our relations with the appropriate officials upon his arrival. The official GOG statement regarding Mann’s return would be that he was simply called home for consultations and was now returning to his post.

2. Wills said that by his meeting me in his office he hoped that he was beginning a dialogue with the U.S. that would grow when the Carter administration takes office. He hoped that he would have the opportunity in the near future of meeting with Secretary-designate Vance to get to know him and to have substantive talks about issues of mutual concern. Wills said it was important for him and the Secretary-designate to get to know one another. Wills continued that there were bound to be points of conflict between the U.S. and Guyana. However, if matters can be discussed freely and frankly then he for his part was certain that any major problems that would arise would be resolved without relations deteriorating into impasse with the recall of our Charge as happened last October. I pointed out to the Foreign Minister that he was aware that USG decision to recall our Charge was because of strong insinuations and half-truths by the Prime Minister in his

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Secret; Exdis. Repeated for information to Brasilia, Bridgetown, Caracas, Kingston, Paramaribo, Port of Spain, and USUN.

\(^2\) In telegram 136 from Georgetown, January 20, McCoy summarized Foreign Minister Wills’s discussion of Central America, Peru, and the Caribbean. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770033–0925)

\(^3\) Telegram 51 from Georgetown, January 10, reported that Wills told McCoy that he wished Mann to return to Washington in time for President Carter’s inauguration on January 20. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D77009–0364)
speech on Oct. 17 accusing us of involvement in the Cubana air crash. The recall of our Charge reflected Washington’s anger after repeated assurances by USG that we were in no way involved in that terrorist act. Wills replied that he was aware of this but at that time he was convinced the Prime Minister did not believe our protestations. On his part, he initially also thought we were involved but later concluded that USG had unfortunately created a Frankenstein monster in the Cuban exile movement which now causes people in area (read Guyana and Burnham) to be deeply suspicious of the U.S. Government. However, Wills said, we must put all this behind us.

3. I then asked what, if any, policy decisions had been made at the recent Chiefs of Mission conference pertaining to future US–GOG relations. Wills answered that Guyanese foreign policy toward the United States would be one of peace and pluralism. Wills continued that Guyana hopes to have constructive relations with the United States and would inform the United States of any changes in its foreign policy to insure that the USG would never consider Guyana because of its relations with Cuba and the Soviet Union to be a threat to its security. However, the United States Government must be aware that at the present time the Prime Minister was conducting a policy both domestic and foreign of establishing close ties with the socialist world in order to preempt Jagan. As such, Guyana would identify to a certain extent with Cuba. However, as Wills pointed out, the big difference was that Cuba was a client state of the Soviet Union and Guyana would never permit itself to become a client state of any power—East or West.

4. Wills thought it was important that Guyana and the United States establish credibility toward one another. He said he knew that we were deeply concerned about the rhetoric appearing in the local press, and the direction in which Guyana is moving. He reiterated that Guyana is building its own brand of socialism and under no circumstances would it ever permit itself to be dominated by any country. He continued though that there were radicals within the government who were deeply suspicious of the United States because of its interventionist policy in the last 20 years. Wills mentioned our roles in Chile, the Dominican Republic, Cambodia, Cuba (Bay of Pigs), and Vietnam as instances when the U.S. Government intervened politically or militarily to achieve its own policy ends. Therefore, some Guyanese suspect our intentions and that is why a constructive dialogue must

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5 See footnote 5, Document 272.
be established to put these suspicions to rest. Wills indicated though that GOG would proceed cautiously in relations with the U.S. at least in the near future. At the same time, it was up to Guyana to assure the United States our relations need not be hostile and that while Guyana may have close ties with the socialist world, this does not necessarily mean that Guyana would always be opposed to the U.S. and U.S. interests.

5. Comment: I can only assume from this conversation that Wills was indicating that Guyana intends to establish closer relations with the Soviets and if possible the Cubans. [less than 1 line not declassified] has reported on this purported shift from the basis of comments made by the Foreign Minister at the recent Chiefs of Missions conference.\(^6\) It is indicative that from Wills’ comments concerning future US–GOG relations and Guyana’s relations with Cuba reported sep[156x-10129] that he was at pains to make himself very clear about our future relationship.

McCoy

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\(^6\) Not further identified.

\(^7\) Telegram 138 from Georgetown, January 20. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770022-0023)

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274. Action Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Luers) to Secretary of State-Designate Vance\(^1\)

Washington, January 21, 1977

Representation in Guyana

The Problem

Following an October 19[17] speech by Guyanese Prime Minister Burnham, charging USG complicity in the terrorist bombing of a Cubana flight, our press spokesman called Burnham’s charges bald-
faced lies and we withdrew our Chargé, John Blacken. Blacken has been in the U.S. since October. The Guyanese have indicated they want him to return, and their Ambassador returned to Washington on the eve of the inauguration. When should we return Blacken to Guyana?

**Discussion**

Blacken has especially good rapport with Prime Minister Burnham and Foreign Minister Wills. Burnham’s speech and our reaction aborted what appeared to be a gradual improvement in our relations with that country.

It has been clear for several months that the Guyanese leadership hopes for improved relations with the Carter Administration. Although Burnham has not retracted his charges, neither has he repeated them, and GOG anti-U.S. rhetoric has generally been muted. I think Burnham now understands that we cannot fail to react strongly to allegations of USG involvement in terrorism.

Recent reporting from our Embassy indicates a possible GOG movement toward closer relations with both Cuba and the Soviet Union, but I am convinced that it is still both possible and in our interest to get our relations with Guyana back on a more normal footing. Newly returned Guyanese Ambassador Mann has invited me to have drinks with him Sunday. I would like to be able to tell him that we are returning our Charge to Georgetown within the next 10 days.

The GOG would take Blacken’s return as a signal of goodwill and a desire by the new administration to resume normal relations. The move would not pass unnoticed by the Guyanese and Caribbean press, and we might get press inquiries here as well. I think this is desirable. In any event, a failure to return our Charge promptly will also be read as a signal of the intentions of the new administration toward Guyana.

I believe Blacken’s quiet return would serve as a sufficient gesture to the GOG at this time, and I accordingly recommend that he not carry any message from you or President Carter. He can of course state his own hopes for improved relations.

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2 See footnote 4, Document 273. In telegram 2109 from Georgetown, October 21, 1976, the Embassy reported the Guyanese Foreign Ministry reaction to State Department spokesman Fred Brown’s accusation that Burnham was telling “bald-faced lies” in regard to the Air Cubana crash. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760394–1295)

3 See footnote 7, Document 273.
Recommendation:

1. That you authorize Blacken to return to post as soon as possible.
2. That he return with no message from you or the President.

ALTERNATIVELY, that he return with an oral message from you, indicating our interest in a new beginning and our hope for improved relations.

ALTERNATIVELY, that he return with a written message from you. (If you approve this option, we will prepare an appropriate message for your approval.)

3. That you authorize me to tell Ambassador Mann that Blacken will be returning to post shortly.

4 There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendations, but, in telegram 16801 to Georgetown, January 25, the Department reported that Blacken would return to Guyana on January 25 to resume his duties. He did not carry a message from the Secretary. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770027–0590)

275. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 9, 1977, 6:15 p.m.

SUBJECT
U.S./Guyana Bilateral Relations, Southern Africa, Economic Assistance

PARTICIPANTS
Guyana
Frederick R. Wills, Foreign Minister
Rudi Collins, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Laurence Mann, Guyanese Ambassador
Rashleigh Jackson, Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Burnett Halder, First Secretary, Embassy of Guyana

United States
The Secretary
Philip C. Habib, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Terence A. Todman, Assistant Secretary, ARA
Donald Tice, Special Assistant, P
Frank Tumminia, ARA/CAR (Notetaker)

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 24, Folder: Guyana 1/77–12/78. Confidential. Drafted by Tumminia; approved by Twaddell. Foreign Minister Wills visited Washington March 5–9, and met with Secretary Vance on the last day of his visit. The meeting was held in Habib’s office.
Foreign Minister Wills congratulated the Secretary on his appointment as Secretary of State and wished him well in his endeavors. The Secretary asked about Prime Minister Burnham’s health, and Wills assured him that the recovery was proceeding well.\(^2\)

**Bilateral Relations**

The Secretary expressed his pleasure with the visit by the Foreign Minister and the opportunity that it gave him to discuss matters of mutual interest. He indicated his desire that relations between the two countries grow close again. He stated that he would do all he could to ensure that better relations materialized.

Wills, in reply, said that relations between Guyana and the United States had soured in 1976 and that Guyana was more aggrieved by this than the United States. He went on to say that relations between Guyana and the U.S. had been good when his party had first come to power. He added, however, that his government had been greatly disillusioned when it had not received U.S. economic assistance for the major industrial developments which it had planned. He noted that this lack of assistance had occurred in spite of Guyana’s excellent human rights record.

Wills went on to say that relations had worsened in 1975. He added that this turn of events had been due to a lack of communications. Guyana was strongly anti-apartheid. It had supported the MPLA in Angola, because the MPLA had been attacked by South Africa. In this context the Minister pointed out that he had full confidence in United States motives but could not agree with the methods followed in U.S. policy toward southern Africa. He noted that Guyana, contrary to Cuba, had withdrawn its athletes from the Olympic Games in Montreal because of its opposition to apartheid. Guyana had also been attacked, because it had been willing to permit Cuban use of its airfield during the Angolan airlift. He continued by saying that there had been bombings aimed at Guyanese establishments by Cuban exiles. (He was referring to the September, 1976, bombing of the Guyanese Consulate in Port-of-Spain.) He also remarked that Guyana had been subjected to pressure from its neighbors, because it was not willing to modify its policies. All of these acts, in Guyanese eyes, represented efforts to destabilize Guyana.

**Cubana**

Wills went on to say that the bombing of the Cubana aircraft had been the climax in this chain of events. He stated that Prime Minister Burnham had reacted strongly to the crash, because he felt personally

\(^2\) Burnham suffered a mild heart attack in January.
responsible for the loss of some of the Guyanese killed in the crash, 
since he had convinced them to accept scholarships to Cuba.

Wills stated that he had gone to Barbados himself to examine the 
evidence connected with the crash and that there was no doubt in 
his mind that the evidence pointed to Cuban exiles’ involvement. He 
admitted, however, that there was no evidence to indicate that any U.S. 
agency had been involved. However, in view of the lack of credibility 
because of previous activities by U.S. government agencies, there was 
reasonable doubt in the minds of many Guyanese in this respect. The 
Guyanese people had been shocked and distressed at the statement by 
a State Department spokesman that the Prime Minister’s speech about 
the crash contained “bald-faced lies.”  He stated: “We are surprised 
that there has been no softening of the statement.” The average Guy-
anese was also wondering why Castro had not been called a liar when 
he had made similar statements. Wills remarked that the “grass roots” 
in Guyana thought that this smacked of racism. Wills added that too 
often the United States press published articles which were not helpful 
since they distorted Guyanese realities.

_A New Beginning_

Wills stated that he had come to Washington “to rebuild bridges 
between the two countries.” He said that Guyana had no human rights 
problem, had a working parliamentary system and yet was not receiv-
ing any significant economic aid. In this context, he noted that Jamaica 
and Guyana had even been removed from the GSP. While he personally 
understood that this was a decision reached by the U.S. government 
because of internal events, the average Guyanese would not interpret 
it this way.

The Secretary, in reply, stated that he understood what the Minister 
was saying. He added that “the past is past and we should build on 
the present.” We should find common grounds. We should not “chew 
on the past, but we should move forward.” He indicated that he himself 
would work toward this end and that, in doing so, he hoped to rebuild 
the bridges that once existed between us.

_Guyana’s Policy_

Wills replied by stating that it was important for the Guyanese 
government to be “believed.” He pointed out that Guyana follows a 
pragmatic policy. It will not allow the Cuban presence in Guyana to 
get out of hand, since this would only end up by helping “the other 
party.” He forcefully asserted that Guyana was a non-aligned country

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3 See footnote 2, Document 274.
and did not intend to become the satellite of any state—the Soviet
Union, Cuba, or any other.

The Secretary replied by saying that he believed the Minister’s
statement. He added that, even though we have a different social
system, there is no reason why we cannot work together.

1978 Elections in Guyana

Wills then made a reference to Guyana’s elections scheduled for
1978. He said that, if his party does not have to overcome external
challenges, it can win the election; but if it is weakened because of
pressure from outside the country, it could face serious difficulties.
Wills emphasized that his party wants national consensus within the
country.

U.S. Ambassador

He then stated that he wanted an Ambassador from the United
States, since the Soviet Union and Cuba had Ambassadors in George-
town. Under Secretary Habib pointed out that Charge Blacken had
returned to Georgetown as soon as the new administration had taken
over. He noted that this was a signal which he hoped the Guyanese
government had understood. He went on to say that Ambassadorial
appointments were being worked out and that within the next few
weeks the panel which is presently screening candidates will have
completed its work. Then Ambassadorial nominations will be
announced. The Secretary agreed with Mr. Habib and stated that the
delay was due to the fact that the President wanted to ensure that only
qualified persons were chosen for Ambassadorial assignments. Wills
added that his remark about the lack of an Ambassador was no reflec-
tion on Mr. Blacken, whom he held in the highest esteem. Mr. Habib
pointed out that Blacken had done a very good job and that this was
why we had sent him back.

U.S. Reaction to Burnham’s Speech

Ambassador Todman emphasized that, while he could assure the
Minister that the U.S. government does not interfere in the internal
affairs of other countries, he could not guarantee what the press might
say about any given country, since we do not control it. He went on
to say that we understand the reaction of people in other countries
when certain statements are issued; but, by the same token, it should
be clear that our Government, our Congress and our people cannot
accept accusations such as the one made against us in connection with
the Cubana crash. When such an accusation is made, our government
is bound to respond to it. The Guyanese government and people should
understand our response to the accusation leveled against us by the
Guyanese government in this light. Ambassador Todman said that he
was pleased to hear that the Minister had confidence in the motives, even though he did not agree with the methods in U.S. policy toward southern Africa. Todman added that he was convinced that the United States government was against apartheid. However, methods vary on how to find a solution to this problem. Above all, it is essential that we keep down public rhetoric in order to avoid the need for strong reaction.

Wills, referring to recent press reports regarding CIA funding of foreign leaders, stated that President Carter’s remarks that the reports were partially inaccurate had, by implication, inferred that some were accurate. In the same fashion, when Burnham had stated that the CIA could easily infiltrate the Cuban exiles and other groups, it could be inferred that some USG agency might have been involved in the bombing of the Cubana aircraft. Wills concluded by saying that, in these two statements of President Carter and of Prime Minister Burnham, there had been a logical gap leading to a wrong interpretation of what was said.

Southern Africa

Wills then turned to the problem of southern Africa. He stated that Guyana’s position was clear: it subscribed to the Lusaka Manifesto which, while accepting a military option toward the solution of the southern Africa problem, did not write off the possibility that an answer could be found through negotiations. He stated, however, that Smith was only procrastinating. Guyana did not believe, as former Secretary Kissinger did, that Vorster could twist Smith’s arm. Vorster’s party would not allow him to do so. He went on to say that, when the U.S. votes against resolutions in the U.N. which condemn interference in the internal affairs of smaller states or when it abstains on resolutions such as the one on Transkei, it takes a stand which the average Guyanese citizen simply does not understand.

Both the Secretary and Mr. Habib pointed out that we want to find a peaceful solution in southern Africa and stressed that we have worked and we are working in conjunction with the Frontline Presidents as well as the national movements of the area. Former Secretary Kissinger had been able to bring Smith to the negotiating table without the use of force. We want to pursue this line of negotiated settlement.

Wills stressed the fact that apartheid in countries such as Guyana, where the majority of citizens are descendants of slaves, is equated to slavery. He expressed his belief that Smith accepted the so-called
Kissinger Package only as a delaying tactic in the hope that he could merge the southern Africa problem in the East/West confrontation. Wills repeated that he appreciated United States efforts. Guyana, too, did not wish a blood bath in southern Africa.

Southern Africa: A Three-Pronged Problem

Secretary Vance noted that in southern Africa we have three separate problems, each with its own nature and each requiring its own solution—namely, Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa. However, regardless of the nature of the problem, the trend is toward majority rule; and this trend is irreversible.

Wills replied by saying that Guyana recognizes that the trend is irreversible, but it objects to its time frame. He stated that Vorster is as liberal as any South African can ever be, but even so, dealing with him is unlikely to produce any positive results. Mr. Habib pointed out that the Frontline Presidents have been saying that Smith can be convinced through Vorster. Wills said that President Nyerere of Tanzania now believes that Vorster cannot convince Smith to bring about changes. Wills remarked that U.S. policy toward southern Africa had changed considerably since 1973 and that the U.S. now was much more active in Africa.

Mr. Habib pointed out that a solution to the southern Africa problem is difficult to find because, over and above all the other difficulties, there is no unanimity among interested parties on how to approach it. However, although methods differ, the aspiration and commitment of those who seek a just solution are deep and are identical.

The U.S.: Major Influence in Southern Africa

Wills noted that the U.K. no longer has a great influence in Africa. In his estimate, such influence had passed to the United States. He added that basically the problem of Namibia “was a simple one with a difficult solution.” He stated that Namibia is Vorster’s Sudetenland; the South African Prime Minister is using Namibia as a buffer zone.

Wills also indicated that countries such as France, which sold arms to South Africa, were not helping matters. Namibia should be turned over to the U.N., which should prepare it for independence. He said there must be sanctions against South Africa and they must be enforced. He said that South Africa is defending its apartheid policy on the border of Angola. He concluded by expressing the hope that the U.S. can get Vorster to move.

Secretary Vance said that, so far, we have been able to move Vorster somewhat, but not all the way. Wills said that we should know how to make him move. We could count on Guyana’s support in our effort to do so.
Bilateral Economic Assistance

At this point, the Secretary stated that he had to attend another meeting but that he wanted to raise three points before leaving. With regard to the sugar question, he stated that we are now reviewing our entire policy in this area and that we will keep in mind the needs of countries such as Guyana. Turning to the $1 million Manpower Training Loan which has been awaiting signature since 1975, he asked whether Guyana was still interested in it. Wills replied that Guyana certainly was interested. The Secretary told Wills that we would go ahead with it. He then referred to the overview of the Mazaruni hydro-electrical project which had been sent to the Department by Ambassador Mann and stated that we would study it.

Multilateral Economic Assistance

Ambassador Todman pointed out that the Food Crops Production Loan had now apparently been taken over by the Inter-American Development Bank. He said this was a good thing, since the United States preferred to work through multilateral organizations such as the Bank, to which it contributed.

Ambassador Mann stated that Guyana would very much like to have us look at the Mazaruni project. Mr. Habib remarked that we would study the overview in the new spirit which he hoped would now prevail in our bilateral relations.

276. Telegram From the Embassy in Guyana to the Department of State

Georgetown, April 1, 1977, 1900Z

671. Subject: 380 Members Of People’s Temple In California Plan To Immigrate To Guyana.

1. Foreign Minister Wills on March 31 gave Charge copy of memo of conversation between Vibert Mingo Minister of Home Affairs and Bishop Jim Jones of People’s Temple, a religious organization located in California, who presently have approximately 40 members of their

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770113–0421. Limited Official Use; Priority.
2 Not found.
organization farming outside Port Kaituma in the North West territory of Guyana.

2. The conversation pertained to a decision on the part of the People’s Temple to have 380 members of their organization immigrate to Guyana on Sunday, April 3 by two chartered planes. Minister Mingo requested that People’s Temple officials postpone the arrival of the 380 prospective immigrants to Thursday, April 7 pending further information about their bona fides. GOG has requested that the list of 380 persons including the number of men, women and children be forwarded to Claude Worrell at the Guyanese Embassy in Washington for his review before permission to enter Guyana can be given.

3. After the meeting took place, James Mentore, Chief of Special Branch, who was present at the meeting, indicated that the delay in the arrival of the 380 persons would give Worrell the opportunity to check their backgrounds with the police in California and then forward this information on to Guyana. At this time date of arrival of group is still undecided pending completion of background checks.

4. The most disturbing aspect that surfaced in meeting is a statement by Bishop Jones to the Guyanese when he indicated that the 380 prospective immigrants “represent some of the most skilled and progressive elements of his organization and as such are most vulnerable to state repression on the part of the American authorities”.

5. At this meeting the Bishop also exhibited an envelope that he claimed contained a check for $500,000 that he intended to deposit in the Bank of Guyana for use of the intending immigrants to help them settle. He also spoke of his intention to have all or most of the assets of his organization transferred to Guyana.

6. GOG is also concerned about rationale behind Bishop Jones’ decision to suddenly bring large numbers of Americans to Guyana. Wills is apprehensive that Jones is carrying out this operation because of possible hostility on the part of his organization toward the USG. GOG definitely does not wish to harbor a colony of expatriots who may be hostile toward USG and publish literature attacking us. GOG is also concerned that the group may have been smuggling foodstuffs into Guyana and Mentore has suggested the need to establish a police outpost in the region.

7. On the other hand People’s Temple organization currently has a good reputation with GOG as an industrious, hard-working organization who is helping to develop Guyana’s interior. In this connection People’s Temple officials here have close working relationships with the Ministry of National Development. GOG therefore while chary of program, nevertheless has no reason to deny entry if members of the group are eligible in all other respects of Guyanese law.
116534. Subject: Guyanese Inquiry Concerning Financial Assistance. Ref: Georgetown 0828, 0829, 0857.1

1. Department has carefully considered thoughtful Embassy’s refrels and shares Charge’s concerns on directions of U.S.-Guyana relations, but it remains skeptical that any U.S. assistance would be successful in modifying Burnham’s foreign affairs posture.

2. FYI The logical source which might be available to GOG for immediate balance of payments assistance is the International Monetary Fund. We note that as of end-March 1977 Guyana had only drawn on its first credit tranche in the International Monetary Fund for 7.3 million SDR (about dols 8.4 million). Theoretically, Guyana has potential to draw on its remaining three credit tranches for 21.75 million SDR (about dols 25 million) or, alternatively, on the IMF Extended Fund Facility for 28 million SDR (about dols 32.2 million). Access to the higher credit tranches would require negotiation of another one-year standby agreement with the Fund, which would require more conditionality on Guyana’s economic policies than for access to the first credit tranche. The somewhat greater access to Fund resources through the Extended Fund Facility (which substitutes for the three regular, higher credit tranches) would require a three-year arrangement which normally includes measures to improve a country’s balance of payments structure as well as the usual economic stabilization measures. In either case disbursement of IMF financing is spread out over the life of the agreements with the Fund and conditional on the borrowing country meeting its commitments to the Fund concerning economic performance. Guyana will also have potential access to a remaining 5 million SDR (about dols 5.75 million) from the IMF’s Compensatory Financing Facility as of December 1977. This is subject to verification by the Fund of an export earnings shortfall largely beyond Guyana’s own control, a balance of payments need and evidence that Guyana is


2 Telegrams 828 and 829 from Georgetown, April 22, discussed worsening economic conditions in Guyana and Wills’s request for $100–150 million in grant aid. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770142–0371 and D770201–0156) Telegram 857 from Georgetown, April 27, transmitted the Embassy’s comments on the Guyanese aid request. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770196–1123)
cooperating with the Fund to improve its balance of payments position. Whether Guyana wants to arrange for any of this additional access to IMF resources is a question for Guyana to decide in consultation with the Fund. The USG cannot offer to intermediate nor promise in advance to approve IMF loans to Guyana of which the details remain to be worked out between the Fund and Guyana. End FYI.

3. As Embassy knows, A.I.D.’s Development Assistance Authority does not provide for overcoming balance-of-payments difficulties such as Guyana is experiencing. In those special cases where balance of payments assistance is provided, it is done under Security Supporting Assistance (SSA). Such programs require a security or political rationale which we do not consider exists in the case of Guyana. Moreover, the FY 1978 budget proposal has already been presented to Congress and we do not believe it would be possible to obtain a special SSA authorization or appropriation for Guyana. (FYI—A dols 9.5 million SSA commodity import loan for Jamaica included in the congressional presentation has encountered intense questioning during hearings.)

4. However, if the GOG is interested, A.I.D. would be willing to explore possible new development assistance programs in addition to the training loan now being negotiated. Specifically, A.I.D. would be prepared to consider assistance for selected projects in agriculture, education or health. For example, A.I.D. could consider projects such as small farmer food production and marketing, farm to market roads, and development of low cost health delivery systems if such projects can be justified under normal criteria. As Country Team is aware, A.I.D.’s congressional mandate would not permit it to consider Guyana’s proposed hydroelectric project or other such infrastructure projects. FYI No provision has been made for development loan assistance to Guyana in A.I.D.’s FY 1978 congressional presentation, and indeed there were no GOG requests at that time other than the manpower training loan. If justifiable projects can be developed by FY 1978 they would have to be submitted to Congress for its review. (As you know in the past there has been some congressional criticism of assistance to Guyana.)

5. In addition to development assistance, the USG might consider such assistance as could be provided in the future through PL 480 Title I or housing investment guaranties. PL 480 programs would be subject to commodity availability, budget-limitations and worldwide requirements. FYI You should be aware that PL 480 Title I has already been programmed on a preliminary basis through FY 1978, and under existing regulations, 75 percent of all PL 480 Title I assistance must be provided to countries whose per capita income is not higher than dols 300. There are many claimants on the remaining 25 percent. Guyana’s case would be considered on its merits against these other claimants.
6. If the Country Team believes it would be helpful, AID/W would be prepared to provide TDY assistance to the Mission to review GOG development requirements and help identify areas of possible aid cooperation.

7. Department has no objection to Charge discussing Guyanese request with Prime Minister Burnham provided it is made clear that the USG is not in a position to supply balance of payments assistance. Charge may indicate that we would be pleased to initiate discussions with the GOG leading to the consideration of new A.I.D. developmental assistance for selective projects in agriculture, education or health. We would also be willing to explore the justification for future PL 480 Title I programs and housing investment guaranties. Any such programs would, of course, be subject to normal criteria, including congressional review at an appropriate time. Charge should not initiate discussion of possible additional balance of payments support loans to Guyana from the International Monetary Fund. Should Guyanese raise the issue, it would be interesting to know whether GOG is considering further loans from the Fund and is prepared to meet the necessary policy conditions.³

Christopher

³ In telegram 1108 from Georgetown, May 27, the Embassy noted that, on May 25, Wills "expressed appreciation" for the U.S. decision to discuss new development assistance programs. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770190-0031)
1217. Subject: Guyanese Expression of Concern Over Cuban Activities in the Caribbean. Ref: (A) Georgetown 893, (B) Georgetown 923. Summary: FonMin Wills has brought up again the theme that the US should consider the Caribbean as an area of special responsibility, and he expressed concern over Cuban efforts to extend their influence in the area, particularly in the small dependent states and Belize. This time he said that the Venezuelans were also attempting to do the same, but Guyana did not find the prospect of increased Venezuelan influence in the area comforting either, primarily because of the implications this might have for the Guyana-Venezuelan territorial dispute. Wills expressed the belief that the US should act in a positive way to preempt the Cuban thrust. He also said that Prime Minister Burnham was considering a proposal that Guyana clarify its position on Puerto Rico in a way the US would regard as positive. Wills' comments appear to reflect a shift that is taking place in the thinking of Guyanese leaders, but—even though such a reorientation is in process—must be taken with caution as Wills is also trying to convince the US of Guyana's reliability, and secondly the Prime Minister may not be fully in accord with this line of thinking concerning the Cuban "threat." End summary.

1. During a meeting in his office June 4, Wills commented on Cuba's activities in the Caribbean and an initiative he said he had proposed to Burnham concerning Puerto Rico.

2. Wills told me that he and Guyana's PermRep at UN, Rashleigh Jackson, had recommended in writing to Burnham that in the near future Jackson should make clear in a public statement that Guyana did not associate itself with Cuban efforts concerning Puerto Rico. The rationale given would be that the Puerto Rican people had made their wishes known in the elections last November.
3. Wills then referred, as he had in the past (ref ts), to the political vacuum that he believes is developing in the Caribbean. Cuba and Venezuela were attempting to move into it. Castro’s agents were extremely active in Dominica, St. Kitts and St. Lucia. Wills also referred again to the Belize problem and Cuban activities in connection with it. He also said the Cubans also hoped to use Manley as a stalking horse, but that did not seem to be working out.

4. The Venezuelans were not an adequate alternative to the Cubans because if Venezuela increased its strength and influence in the Caribbean it would more easily try to assert its claim over Guyanese territory.

5. Wills lamented what he said was a “seeming lack of response by the United States to these (Cuban) incursions.” He went on to say that the failure of the US to assert its influence would narrow the options of countries like Guyana. Why was it, he said, that except in such cases as the initiatives made to the Soviet Union and China that US foreign policy seemed to be a damage-limiting operation. The US would pay attention to and provide large-scale assistance to countries after a situation gets out of control, such as the situation in Southern Africa. In the Caribbean, on the US’ doorstep, the US seemed oblivious to the problem of Cuban and Soviet influence.3

6. I responded that I was very glad to hear him talking in this fashion. Then I reminded him of US experiences throughout the past 15 years. I said the Carter administration was building a new basis for policy, not only in the Caribbean but elsewhere. This new policy based on non-intervention, respect of human rights and self interest could help in development and in strengthening the stability of the Caribbean. We were not going to be paranoid, however, about the Cubans or the Russians. I also reminded him that Guyana’s past attitudes had not been conducive to the kind of initiatives that he now implied that the US should take.

7. Wills said that much of the criticism of the US in the past particularly from the Caribbean area resulted because the area’s leaders felt they were being left out of international decision-making. Their views and problems had not been considered when larger nations had made decisions affecting them. He then said “all we are asking for is more consultation and influence in shaping decisions affecting us.”

8. Comment: Wills has now raised several times the issue of what he calls the growing vacuum in the Caribbean due to the phase-out of

3 In telegram 1218 from Georgetown, June 8, the Embassy reported on Guyanese-Soviet tensions. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770205–0274)
In telegram 1684 from Georgetown, July 30, the Embassy discussed Prime Minister Burnham’s July 22–25 trip to Cuba. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770274–0310)
British influence and the growth of Cuban and, directly or indirectly, Soviet influence. During our meeting June 4, however, he was much more explicit in saying that the US should exert its influence in the area. His special emphasis at this time could be genuine or it could be part of his efforts to gain US favor and attention to Guyana’s economic problems. Wills is acting to cultivate closer relations with the US, but the extent to which the GOG is willing to change some of its other policies to achieve this remains uncertain. Also, although Wills intimated that Burnham shares this concern about the Cubans, he did not say so directly. He is not above conveying a more positive picture than overall circumstances would warrant.

9. Concerning Puerto Rico, Wills remains adamant that his delegation at the NACC Foreign Ministers meeting in New Delhi did not actively support the Cuban position and that it worked to water down Cuban initiatives during drafting sessions. I had also discussed this with Ambassador Mann while he was here and he too insisted that Guyana behaved as Wills had said at New Delhi. Nevertheless, I told them impression left at New Delhi was that the Guyana delegation cooperated closely with the Cubans. Wills apparently remains sensitive about this and is attempting to impress upon us that Guyana is not with Cuba on the Puerto Rico issue.

Blacken

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4 The Foreign Ministers of the Non-Aligned Coordinating Committee met in New Delhi April 6–11. The section of the communiqué on Latin America is in telegram 5079 from New Delhi, April 10. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770125–0064)
279. Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Information Cable

TDFIR DB–315/10036–77
Guyana, August 29, 1977

COUNTRY
Guyana

DOI
[number not declassified] August 1977

SUBJECT
Prime Minister Burnham’s Comments on US/Guyana Relations

ACQ
[1 line not declassified]

SOURCE
[4 lines not declassified]

1. In discussing Ambassador Andrew Young’s recent visit to Guyana Prime Minister Forbes Burnham told close advisors that he hopes that the Carter administration does not misunderstand Guyana and her goal of becoming a truly independent socialist state, as he feels other administrations had done in the past. Burnham pointed out that Guyana is in a difficult position as a non-aligned country, and consequently cannot obtain substantial aid from the Soviet Union nor the United States because Guyana is neither far left nor far right politically. Burnham emphasized that he is a socialist. Which does not mean automatic alignment with other socialist states, a point which the US Government (USG) does not understand. Burnham explained that as far as the USG is concerned, renewed good relations depend not only upon the will of President Carter and Ambassador Young, but to a great degree upon the attitudes of the US Congress and public opinion. He commented that these two considerations could be the overriding factor in maintaining good bilateral relations with the US.

2. Talking about past relations with the US, Burnham commented that he feels that the USG has never properly analyzed Guyana’s political and economic situation, nor Guyana’s leader (referring to himself). As a result, Guyana has been treated as a socialist/Communist state, much like the Soviet Union. Burnham said that following the Young

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1 Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 24, Folder: Guyana, 1/77–12/78. Secret; Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals; Not Releasable to Contractor or Contractor/Consultants.

2 The Embassy reported on Young’s August 9–10 visit to Guyana in telegram 1849 from Georgetown, August 12 and telegram 1995 from Georgetown, August 23. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770291–0540 and D770304–0905)
visit, he hopes the Carter administration now understands Guyana’s position and her determination not to become a satellite of any major power. Burnham commented that he clearly will not be any trouble for the US nor harm US interests.

3. Field Dissem: [1 line not declassified]

280. Telegram From the Embassy in Guyana to the Department of State

Georgetown, September 8, 1977, 1700Z

2175. Dept. pass ARA/CAR/Tumminia. Subject: W/W: John Victor Stoen. Ref: (A) State 206679 (B) Georgetown 2087.2

1. Reftel B reported Consul confirmed presence of John Stoen in Guyana.

2. Post has been in frequent contact with U.S. attorney, Jeff Haas. Embassy arranged meetings for Haas with high level GOG officials including Foreign and Justice Minister and Solicitor General. While GOG appears sympathetic and favorable to Haas snag has developed.

3. Haas accompanied by local court marshal traveled to Jonestown on September 6, to serve process on Jones to appear with Stoen boy in court in Georgetown on Friday, September 9. Haas informed Consul today, September 7, that Jones evaded process by having representative of People’s Temple explain to marshal that Jones had not been in Jonestown for several days. However, Haas claimed he talked with two GOG immigration officers shortly after leaving Jonestown who indicated they had seen Jones earlier in the day in his town. Haas is convinced Jones is deliberately evading process and is concerned that his client will lose custody of her son by default because she does not have the financial resources for a lengthy court dispute. Haas indicated Jones apparently cannot be held in contempt of local court if he is not personally served papers.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770325–0838. Limited Office Use; Immediate.

2 In telegram 206679 to Georgetown, August 30, the Department summarized the history of the Stoen custody case. Stoen’s parents, Grace and Tim, were former People’s Temple members who did not take their child with them when they left the Temple. Once in Guyana, Jones claimed paternity and refused to return John Victor Stoen to the United States. A California court awarded custody of the child to the Stoens. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770312–0874) In telegram 2087 from Georgetown, September 1, the Embassy described Consul McCoy’s trip to Jonestown to check on the welfare of John Victor Stoen. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770318–0342)
4. Embassy position on this case has been to provide sympathetic assistance where possible to attorney. Consul declined to accompany Haas to interior on September 6. He believed that this was a matter primarily involving GOG judicial and official presence. He did coordinate Haas’ trip with GOG Commissioner of Police to provide Haas and court marshal with appropriate authority and official support. Consul has informed Haas of requirements of consular service of process as outlined in 7 FAM.

5. Consul consulted with local attorney retained by Haas on September 7 who will now request that court authorize local police official in Northwest District serve court summons. Consul had, earlier on September 7, discussed this procedure with Chief Justice of the Supreme Court who stated it was frequently used by court in view of the distance and difficulty in traveling to the interior.

6. Consul also contacted representative of People’s Temple in Georgetown on September 7 and strongly recommended that Bishop Jones respond to service in order to prevent situation from escalating further. Consul advised representative that if Jones did not respond to summons or appeared to evade same this could legally jeopardize his position in Guyana as well as any attempts to retain custody of John Stoen.

7. Haas believes that Jones will not appear in court and has urged Consul to accompany him to Jonestown to insure papers are served in the event police are unsuccessful. Haas’ position is that an American mother has been awarded custody of an American child, by competent American judicial authority and he wants an American official of the Embassy (i.e. Consul) to personally assist him to insure Jones’ court appearance. Consul, while recognizing merits of Haas’ case, is still reluctant to place himself in quasi-legal position unless all other judicial avenues are exhausted.

8. Action requested: Post would appreciate Department guidance and/or comments regarding our role in this case.  

Blacken

3 In telegram 216553 to Georgetown, September 9, the Department instructed the Embassy not to provide an officer to accompany Haas to serve the custody papers. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770312-0874) In telegram 2269 from Georgetown, September 19, the Embassy reported that on September 12, government interference was delaying the outcome of the case. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770340-0536) In telegram 2206 from Georgetown, September 12, the Embassy noted that a Guyanese Supreme Court Justice, after being told that a People’s Temple representative refused to accept the court summons, ordered that John Victor Stoen be taken into the custody of the court and directed that Jones be summoned to appear in court or be held in contempt. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770329-0821) In telegram 2236 from Georgetown, September 14, the Embassy stated that an emergency passport for Stoen had been prepared. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770334-0100)
281.  Action Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Devine) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, September 21, 1977

SUBJECT
Recommendation for Appointment with President Carter for Guyanese Prime Minister Forbes Burnham

Issue for Decision:
Whether to recommend that the President receive Prime Minister Forbes Burnham of Guyana during the period of October 17–21 or October 31 through November 4.

Essential Factors:

Guyana’s Prime Minister Burnham has asked our Embassy to transmit to President Carter his desire for a meeting with the President in late October or early November. Prime Minister Burnham will be visiting Canada on October 25–30 to meet Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau. He is prepared to come to Washington during the week of October 31–November 4 if a meeting can be arranged then. If this timing is inconvenient, he could visit Washington between October 21–24.

Prime Minister Burnham was unable to attend the signing of the Panama Canal Treaties because of severe economic and political problems at home. However, he fully endorsed the Treaties and sent to the signing ceremony his Deputy Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister.

The call would be an excellent opportunity to reinforce the trend toward moderation in Guyana’s policies and can strengthen those within the GOG who favor moving closer to the United States. It would confirm the positive reaction to the visit to Guyana by Ambassador Young this August. That visit served to indicate to the Guyanese leaders our desire for better relations.

A meeting between President Carter and Prime Minister Burnham can also bolster Burnham’s determination to maintain Guyana’s relatively good human rights record. In view of Burnham’s present economic and political stress, including an ongoing sugar worker strike organized by his communist opponent, Cheddi Jagan, such bolstering would be timely and useful.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850157–0252. Confidential. Drafted by Tumminia; cleared by Bova. Sent through Habib. A written note on the first page reads, “Not necessary to go to Secy; approved by P.”
Recommendation:

That you approve the transmittal of the attached Tarnoff-Brzezinski Memorandum recommending that the President receive Burnham sometime during the period of October 21–24 or October 31–November 4.\(^2\)

\(^2\) Although Habib checked the approve option, the meeting did not occur. The memorandum is attached but not printed.

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282. Memorandum From the Military Adviser to the Vice President (Matheny) to Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff\(^1\)

Washington, October 3, 1977

Over the past couple weeks—at the request of a former staff member of the Vice President’s—I have been assisting a Mr. Steven Katsaris concerning the well being of his daughter, Maria, who currently resides in Guyana.

Maria Katsaris is one of several hundred “converts” to a religious sect (not unlike that of the Reverend Moon’s) known as the First Temple Church. It was started in Northern California as a community self-help operation and, over time, gained a reputation for responsible civic action on behalf of the poor of the region. The founder, a Mr. Jones, and his followers have now migrated to Guyana and there are, at best estimate, several hundred Americans (in their late teens to early twenties) who live there on a few acres of land near the Venezuelan border.

Mr. Katsaris, who lives in Ukiah, California, has tried on several occasions to talk to and gain permission to see his daughter. Finally, in desperation, he went to Guyana last week in an unsuccessful attempt to do so. Frank Tumminia, the Desk Officer at State, and our Consul there, Mr. McKay [McCoy], were very helpful to Mr. Katsaris but admit that there is no legal basis for overriding the Temple’s refusal to allow Katsaris to see his daughter. In the midst of all this is an ambiance—

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\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 24, Folder: Guyana, 1/77–12/78. No classification marking.
painted mainly by Katsaris—of suspicious activity on the part of Jones and his followers: unexplained suicides, highly ambivalent communications between followers and their parents and friends (Katsaris has many examples of this on the part of Maria), several disappearances, etc.

The man’s story seems plausible for the most part. Given State’s concern on his behalf and their willingness to be of help would support this. His characterization of his daughter’s complete turnabout is vouched for by Mondale’s former staff member who also knows his daughter. In fact, Mr. Jones appears to be in some sort of trouble in California concerning the “deeding” of property to the Church by several of its converts, but thus far has not had charges filed against him that would warrant the State Department requesting Guyanan assistance in returning Mr. Jones to the U.S.

All this is to say that this case represents something which may become of interest to you (apparently there are several hundred irate parents all over the country who would like to see Mr. Jones derailed). Mr. Katsaris has returned to California with great uncertainty as to the future status of his daughter. His address for your reference is: 915 North Church Street, Ukiah, California 95482; telephone: (707) 743-1364. Frank Tumminia at State, who talked with Mr. Katsaris both before and after his visit to Guyana, can supply more detail should the need arise.²

² In telegram 2425 from Georgetown, October 3, the Embassy reported on the Katsaris case. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D70360–0442)
Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\(^1\)

Washington, February 24, 1978

SUBJECT

Dinner with the Guyanese Ambassador

At the request of Laurence Mann, the Guyanese Ambassador to the U.S. and a friend, I dined with him on Tuesday, February 21, 1978. It was one of the less pleasant dinners I have ever had.

Though extremely cosmopolitan and sophisticated like a diplomat should, he went directly to the point. Prime Minister Forbes Burnham wants to see the President. This is an election year in Guyana, and Burnham wants to show the moderate elements of his party that his pursuit of moderation in 1977 paid off.

The more radical elements of the party want him to accept an invitation to Moscow which was extended to him last year, but Burnham believes in Carter and wants desperately to meet with him.

I simply responded that in my judgment the chances of a meeting between the Prime Minister and the President were not good this year, and I explained the problems of scheduling. He was visibly shaken, as if his life, and certainly his career, were on the line. He said repeatedly, “I can’t take that message to Burnham. He won’t believe that this is a scheduling problem.” (See Tab A for a confirmation of the seriousness with which Burnham views this matter.)\(^2\)

He wouldn’t leave the subject despite my repeated efforts. I did not have the courage to explain directly why Burnham just doesn’t rank on our list of top priorities, though I tried to indirectly suggest reasons why that would be the case. He was so distraught that he didn’t read my message. He told me that the Prime Minister wanted him to speak to Secretary Vance; and I didn’t discourage him from making that effort. When we finished, after repeating for the thirteenth time why a meeting was critical, he asked if the decision was final. I broke, and said that while the chances were poor, I wouldn’t want to put it quite as final as he did, and promised to get back to him.

We discussed several other issues; one of interest to you was the Horn. Guyana is as non-aligned as any third world nation, but they

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\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 24, Folder: Guyana, 1/77–12/78. Confidential.

\(^2\) Not attached and not found.
have supported the Cubans’ efforts. I explained in some detail our reasons for concern, and he responded by saying two things: (1) he had never heard the information which I relayed (though he should have, because I essentially repeated what was in the papers), and he was persuaded by my arguments, and (2) he recommended that we use our Ambassadors more often to brief on more subjects like this. He said that Guyana has very little access to good outside information, and we would score points if our Ambassadors would brief a country’s leaders more often.

I have spoken to Deputy Assistant Secretary John Bushnell of ARA, and he persuaded me that we shouldn’t give a definite “no” to Burnham for two reasons: first, we don’t want to give away an important chip if we don’t have to. If Burnham continues to hope for a visit he is less likely to attack the US. Secondly, something might come up—at the U.N., at a Panama ratification ceremony, who knows? Why say “no”, when events may create a “yes”. I think his suggestion has some merit to it, even if it is cynical. And so, unless you disapprove, I will call Ambassador Mann and tell him: I continue to believe that the chances for a meeting in 1978 are not good, but there is a small possibility at the end of the year. But we can’t promise anything, one way or the other at this time.3

Addendum: Our Ambassador to Guyana, James Burke, is in town, and I will be speaking to him early next week. I want to explore with him the possibility of the President’s trying to assuage some of Burnham’s concerns by sending a letter to him.

3 Brzezinski checked the disapprove option.
284. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\(^1\)

Washington, April 4, 1978

**SUBJECT**
Letter to Prime Minister Burnham

State and I have been wrestling with the problem of what to do with the repeated requests Guyanese Prime Minister Forbes Burnham has made to meet with the President. He has gone to extraordinary lengths to persuade us of the need for such a meeting, but I am still unpersuaded. I do agree, however, with State that a letter as an alternative to a meeting would be extremely helpful. State has drafted the letter at Tab A, which was cleared by Fallows, and I recommend that you send it along with the memorandum at Tab I.\(^2\) In that memo I have also explained why we have recommended against such a meeting, and I have also tried to provide the President with a little bit more understanding of the politics of the Caribbean.

**RECOMMENDATION**
That you send the memorandum at Tab I and the letter at Tab A to the President.\(^3\) (Tab B, incoming from State, need not be sent.)\(^4\)

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\(^2\) Tab A is not attached. An April 6 draft letter from Carter to Burnham is ibid. A handwritten note on that letter reads, “not delivered.” Tab I is an undated memorandum from Brzezinski, in which he recommends to Carter that the President send a letter to Burnham, but not meet with him, because “already there have been complaints in the Caribbean that the Carter Administration is paying too much attention to the leftist governments in the Caribbean and too little to the more moderate ones.”

\(^3\) Inderfurth wrote beneath the recommendation, “ZB, I think the letter is a good idea, but I think you could approve and have Susan sign it.” Aaron wrote, “I agree.” Brzezinski wrote, “ask Susan Clough.” Clough wrote, “letter at Tab A signed 4/6/78.”

\(^4\) Not attached and not found.
285. Telegram From the Embassy in Guyana to the Department of State

Georgetown, April 27, 1978, 1130Z

1338. For Asst Secretary Todman. Subject: Presidential Letter to PriMin Burnham. Ref: Georgetown 5012 and previous.

1. As the Department is aware, we have had before us in our relations with Guyana, even pre-dating my arrival last Sept., the outstanding request of PriMin Burnham that he be permitted to pay a courtesy call on President Carter. In the various exchanges on this request certain essential elements were defined:

   (A) Burnham wanted this appointment to precede a visit which he had planned during 1978 to the USSR, other Eastern European countries and North Korea;
   
   (B) Burnham felt that such a meeting was necessary as a prelude to visits he hoped to make to various communities of Guyanese located in some of the major cities of the United States such as New York, Chicago and Los Angeles;
   
   (C) We felt that such a meeting would provide an opportunity: to review with Burnham the administration’s stand on human rights; demonstrate our acceptance of ideological pluralism; indicate our interest in obtaining Guyana’s understanding (as a Third World bellwether) of our position on such issues as the North-South dialogue, Caribbean development, etc.; and to convey our belief in the importance of preserving a democratic framework in Guyana.

2. As time went by and it became apparent that more pressing domestic and international demands on the President’s schedule were conspiring to diminish the likelihood of a Burnham-Carter meeting within the timeframe the Prime Minister had hoped for, it was decided to inform him candidly that this was the case. In response to my proposal I was authorized to so inform him before my departure from Georgetown for the Chiefs of Mission meeting (State 42625). Unfortunately, an unexpected event occurred (i.e., the sudden firing for unexplained reasons of ForMin Wills who had been associated with the request for the Carter meeting) and it was decided that delivery of the oral ‘turn down’ of the request for a meeting should be deferred lest it be linked with Wills’ sacking in the minds of Burnham and his people.

3. While in Washington for the Chiefs of Mission meeting in February I discussed the situation with your staff and with the NSC. From

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 24, Folder: Guyana, 1/77–12/78. Secret; Stadis; Exdis.
2 Not found.
3 Dated February 17. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780074–0408)
these talks it was agreed that a Presidential letter, full of ‘cotton candy’ and little substance would be the best way to pass the word that a Presidential appointment was not likely to be forthcoming before 1979, and at the same time making clear to the PriMin that the turn-down of his request was unrelated to any change in USG attitude toward him or Guyana.

4. On the expectation that such a letter could be generated, approved and signed within a reasonably brief period—by mid-March, at the latest—I was convinced that this was the best way to proceed. Unfortunately, for various reasons this was not possible. In the meantime, Burnham announced his trip to Moscow, North Korea, and East Germany, and is now embarked on it, and though the total impact of the trip and the commitments he has made along the way are not yet fully known, it seems apparent from Moscow’s 08811\(^4\) that he may have gone far to accommodate himself and his government to the USSR during his talks. Domestically, he has rammed through the PNC-controlled Parliament (on April 10, the eve of his departure for Moscow) a bill to change the key article of the Constitution, which, if adopted by a simple ‘yes-no’ referendum, will give him and his party carte blanche to introduce a new Constitution, and insure his and his party’s control of the Government of Guyana for the foreseeable future.

5. In view of these developments, I am convinced that a personal letter from the President would be inadvisable at this time. I am certain that Burnham would use such a letter publicly for his own purposes and, until we have a clearer idea of the nature of the Constitution which he and the People’s National Congress (PNC) intend to impose, we should avoid any gesture which could be construed as approval of this effort. I recommend, therefore, that that initiative be canceled and that I be authorized to inform the Prime Minister orally and privately on his return that unfortunately the President’s schedule is committed for the remainder of 1978 due to the press of domestic and international obligations and as a consequence there is no possibility of an appointment before sometime in 1979 at the earliest.\(^5\)

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\(^4\) Dated April 24. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780174–1080)

\(^5\) Despite Burke’s concerns, the text of a letter from Carter to Burnham was transmitted in telegram 124767 to Georgetown, May 16. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780207–0105) In telegram 1587 from Georgetown, May 17, Burke reaffirmed his position. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 24, Folder: Guyana, 1/77–12/78) On June 8, the Department instructed Burke to deliver the letter. On June 9, he gave it to the Acting Foreign Minister since Burnham was away from Georgetown. (Telegram 144877 to Georgetown, June 8, and telegram 1865 from Georgetown, June 9; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780238–0900 and D780242–0332)
Memorandum of Conversation

Georgetown, September 15, 1978

SUBJECT
Conversation with Prime Minister.

PARTICIPANTS
The Honorable Linden Forbes Burnham, Prime Minister, Cooperative Republic of Guyana
Ambassador John R. Burke

Prime Minister Forbes Burnham received me at his country residence at Belfield at 5:00 P.M. on Friday, September 15. I had requested the appointment in order to have a general tour d’horizon with him following my return from home leave and consultation in the U.S.

Prime Minister Burnham was a few minutes late for our appointment having just driven out from Georgetown himself. As is his custom when receiving at Belfield, he greeted me on the veranda and we seated ourselves on the seaward side looking out over the Atlantic and the rice fields that separate his residence from the sea wall. Having come from a full day of meetings in his Georgetown office, he seemed quite weary and appeared to be somewhat “up tight,” but after lighting an English-made Benson and Hedges and taking his first sip of a Chivas Regal and Soda he appeared visibly to relax. He was dressed in sport shirt, slacks, socks and espadrilles, all in his favorite color: lavender.

The conversation began with Burnham asking me about the summit meeting at Camp David which was then in progress. I told him that I knew no more about it than the press men who were covering it. He observed that the convocation of the meeting was a “big gamble” for President Carter. A successful outcome would be a great coup for him, in Burnham’s opinion, while a failure, though not necessarily amounting to an irretrievable disaster, would be very difficult for President Carter to recover from.

I rehearsed with the Prime Minister my discussions in Washington during consultation and I referred particularly to my meeting with his Ambassador, Laurence Mann, taking the opportunity to praise the Ambassador for the job he was doing in the U.S. on behalf of Guyana. I also informed him that the transition from Assistant Secretary Todman to Assistant Secretary Vaky in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850157-0707. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Burke on September 19.

2 The Israeli-Egyptian talks at Camp David began on September 17.
was now concluded.\(^3\) It was obvious that the Prime Minister knew little about Mr. Vaky’s background so I provided him orally with a curriculum vitae. I told him further that it was my understanding that Assistant Secretary Todman was very pleased to be going off to Madrid, and as Ambassador to Spain he would be the first black American to serve as Ambassador to a major Western European capital.

The AID Program in Guyana

I then provided the Prime Minister with a three-page status report on our AID efforts in Guyana. I reminded him that when Assistant Administrator Valdez had been in Georgetown in company with Ambassador Young in August 1977 he had spoken to the press about the possibility of a program for Guyana in the neighborhood of $12,000,000.\(^4\) On the basis of the latest figures available it is apparent that our program will far exceed that estimate.\(^5\) I drew to the Prime Minister’s attention the fact that we were concentrating our program in the agricultural sector which was quite in keeping with the agricultural policy he had set forth for the nation during his address at Black Bush Polder in December of last year.\(^6\) It was obvious to me that this was the first time the Prime Minister had seen in concentrated outline a full resume of the current U.S. aid effort in Guyana. He was very interested in it and I suspect that he will be discussing it in detail with the members of his Cabinet in the days to come. He took particular note of our rice modernization loans and the seed farm project stating that these two specific efforts were of great and obvious value to Guyana.

Political Developments

Having been absent on leave when the July 10 referendum was held, I asked the Prime Minister about local political developments and particularly whether or not the opposition parties, specifically Dr. Cheddi Jagan’s People’s Progressive Party (PPP), would be participating in the work of the Constituent Assembly.\(^7\) The Prime Minister was

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\(^3\) Viron P. Vaky assumed his duties as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs on July 21.

\(^4\) See footnote 2, Document 279.

\(^5\) Guyana received $26.75 million in total economic assistance from the United States in FY 1978, an increase from $6.33 million in FY 1977. (USAID Greenbook)

\(^6\) In his speech, Burnham announced that the Guyanese development strategy would shift emphasis from infrastructure projects to diversification of agriculture and exploitation of Guyana’s natural resources. (Telegram 3313 from Georgetown, December 22, 1977; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770478–0666)

\(^7\) The Embassy reported the results of the referendum on a bill to amend the Constitution, which the government won by 97 percent, in telegram 2273 from Georgetown, July 14. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780289–0194)
somewhat disdainful of the opposition generally. He opined that they would “probably” participate in the work of the assembly, but gave the impression that in his view it really didn’t matter. He said he had spoken to Cheddi Jagan about the PPP’s participation and Jagan had responded by stating he would have to “discuss the matter with my advisers.” Burnham observed that “for the leader of any political party in Guyana to make such a statement is pure ‘bullshit.’”

The Economy

The Prime Minister went on to say that the economy rather than domestic politics was his principal problem. He is very concerned about meeting the IMF “targets” in the last quarter of 1978. He informed me that he had told the members of his government as well as labor leaders that any belt tightening which had gone on previously was nothing to what the country would be obliged to go through by the end of the year. (Though he did not mention it during the conversation, he has just appointed a committee to be headed by Deputy Prime Minister Dr. Ptolemy Reid to oversee the country’s economic performance with particular reference to the matching up of foreign exchange availability with the acquisition of essential commodities.)

Problems in the State Corporations

I told the Prime Minister that since my return I had noted that he had been paying visits to various of the state corporations. He said that these “inspections” were necessary in order to keep the management of these various enterprises on their toes. He went on to say that though Guyana did have some highly intelligent managers there were serious gaps at the middle management level and he was not at all sure how these lacunae could be filled. He recalled his visit of December 1977 to the principal generating plant of Georgetown and how he had observed at that time certain practices which seemed to him likely to cause trouble in the future. (This indeed did happen in early April when there was a week-long blackout in the capital.) He said he had warned Minister of Trade, George King, about the practices at the plant but despite his warning corrective measures had not been taken and a disastrous failure had occurred.

We spoke briefly of the two new turbine generating units which had been purchased from the British as a result of the April failure.\(^8\) I asked the Prime Minister whether there would be qualified people to operate these units and he replied that the British Ministry of Overseas

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8 In telegram 3250 from Georgetown, October 4, the Embassy reported that, in response to widespread power outages in April, the Guyanese Government purchased two high-speed turbine generators from the British. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780409–0575)
Development would be supplying supervisory personnel for the first several months after the units went into operation. I said I had heard that these sets had a “champagne taste” in terms of the fuel required to run them. The Prime Minister replied that Sir Lionel Luckhoo, who had headed an investigative commission to look into the April power failure and the operations of the General Electric Corporation (GEC), had assured him that though the units did require a more expensive fuel than that consumed by diesel units they would operate more efficiently and thus the extra fuel cost would not be prohibitive.

Foreign Investment Code

In view of Guyana’s great need for foreign exchange, I asked the Prime Minister whether or not progress was being made in drafting and issuing a private investment code. He replied that the government had hoped to issue the code before the end of 1977 but had failed to make that deadline. The government is now polishing up a final draft of the code and he told me there would be a meeting on Thursday, September 21, to discuss the latest draft. He is not optimistic that the issuance of a code will result immediately in any important inflow of foreign capital; however, he feels it would be useful to have a document which potential investors could refer to. The principal “hang-up” on the draft, according to Burnham, is the political problem of dealing fairly with Guyana investors. Obviously, they cannot be offered the same incentives and terms as those to be made available to foreign investors; nevertheless, something must be done for them.

Labor Unrest

I told the Prime Minister I had noted that he had met on Wednesday, September 13 with a group of labor leaders to discuss the new regulations covering employee contributions to the Widows’ and Orphans’ Fund, specifically that significantly higher payments would be required of the workers. I asked Burnham if the labor leaders had sought a “show” meeting merely to give the impression to the rank and file that they were discussing the matter with government so that they might be prepared to answer criticism at the upcoming meeting of the Council now set for the week of September 25, or was it a spontaneous reaction on their part to the new rates. Burnham felt that the leadership was frankly concerned. He said the Cabinet had carefully considered these rates before putting them into effect and had even spent a total of ten hours on this subject alone at the final Cabinet meeting at which they were approved. Burnham said that he had told

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9 Sir Lionel Luckhoo also represented Jim Jones and the People’s Temple.
10 Trades Union Council. [Footnote is in the original.]
the labor leaders to do their own rates and schedules and that if they could come up with a better solution he was prepared to discuss it further. However, he is of the opinion that they will not be able to challenge the government’s computations. As another possibility he had also offered a cut-back in government assistance and subsidies to other social programs in order to reduce the contributions required for the Widows’ and Orphans’ Fund, and had identified free public education as one such program. At this suggestion one of the labor leaders responded by bouncing up and shouting “Good Christ, Prime Minister, No!” The Prime Minister allowed as how it was the first time anyone had ever called him Christ or implied that he was particularly good. The point was, according to Burnham, that something else would have to “give” if the scheduled payments for the Widows’ and Orphans’ Fund were reduced.

Prospects for Sugar and Rice

I then asked the Prime Minister whether or not he thought the sugar and rice harvests would be adversely affected by the weather conditions which had been prevailing. (The rains which normally stop in mid-July have continued and, as a consequence, the sugar harvest has been seriously delayed and the rice fields in many areas are still too wet to work though the grain is ready for harvest.) Burnham felt that rice might be a problem, but he was still hopeful that they would be able to get an acceptable harvest. As for sugar, the director of GUYSUCO (Guyana Sugar Corporation) had told him they could prolong the harvest season into late December and make up most of the shortfall that they had experienced in the first few weeks of the harvest.

The Case of Pastor Tidemann

I then raised with the Prime Minister a matter which had come to my attention since my return from home leave and consultation. An American Lutheran missionary named Paul Tidemann, who had been working in Guyana for some years, had recently been notified by the Ministry of Home Affairs that his visa would not be renewed. Tidemann and his wife are currently in the U.S. and the order would mean that they would not be permitted to return to Guyana to pick up their effects and pay their farewells to their parish. According to information available to the Embassy from unofficial sources the expulsion order on the Tidemanns was motivated because of his political efforts against the referendum held in July. (At the time he was Secretary of the Guyana Council of Churches which had actively opposed the referendum.) As such he had participated in many of their protest meetings, particularly an acrimonious one the group had had with the Deputy Prime Minister, during Burnham’s absence in Russia and North Korea in May.
I outlined my understanding of the problem to the Prime Minister. I told him that I was not personally aware of all of Paul Tidemann’s political activities in the pre-referendum period. I felt, however, that the summary fashion in which the expulsion order had been issued could do potential harm to the relationship between our two governments, particularly if it were to receive wide publicity in the U.S. Furthermore, I said it was my understanding that the Tidemanns had done some excellent work since their arrival in Guyana both for their congregation and beyond that in terms of an extension program with which Paul Tidemann had been involved. The Prime Minister listened attentively to what I had to say. He admitted that the decision to issue the expulsion order had been cleared at the political level and mentioned that the Deputy Prime Minister had been particularly exercised as a result of his meeting with the Guyana Council of Churches. Burnham strongly implied that he had acquiesced in the issuance of the order due primarily to the Deputy Prime Minister’s insistence. He said that he would look into the matter personally and see what might be done. I told him that it was my understanding that the Tidemanns had planned to complete their mission in June of 1979 and that ideally they should be permitted to do that. However, if circumstances of which I was unaware dictated otherwise, at the very least they should be allowed to come back into the country to wind up their affairs and say a proper farewell to their congregation.

Nicaragua

The discussion then turned to recent events in Nicaragua which obviously interested Prime Minister Burnham a great deal. I asked him what he thought of the situation and he replied that one of the difficulties for the opponents of Somoza was the absence of any clearly identified leader. There was no strong individual comparable to Castro in the opposition movement. Furthermore, he felt that Somoza had been wise in developing a loyal militia over the years whose fate was so closely associated with his own. Presumably, if he falls they do too. “Why did he have to be so greedy?” observed Burnham in reference to Somoza. “Couldn’t he have taken just a modest amount in terms of money and lands and have been satisfied with that? Why couldn’t he have shared just a bit of it?” I told the Prime Minister that I had had no experience in Central American affairs and that my acquaintance with the situation in Nicaragua had been derived principally from journalistic sources over the years. I observed, however, that if President Somoza were as intelligent and supple as the Prime Minister, he might not now be in the position in which he finds himself. At this, Burnham burst into laughter and with obvious reluctance, ended the session. (He had already kept his next appointment, the participants to the Commonwealth Science Conference, waiting for over fifteen
minutes.) As he walked me to my car, he suggested that we get together soon again.

287. Telegram From the Embassy in Guyana to the Department of State

Georgetown, September 25, 1978, 1840Z

3125. ARA only. For ARA/CAR Ashley Hewitt. Subject: Congressman Ryan’s Plan To Visit People’s Temple In Guyana. Ref: State 241892.

1. In accordance with your request para 3 ref tel, following are my thoughts on the potential problems which can arise in connection with a visit by Congressman Ryan to Guyana to inspect the People’s Temple community at Jonestown. Essentially they break down into three categories: physical, political and legal.

A. Physical

I assume that FSO Richard McCoy has already explained the physical problems of getting from Georgetown to Jonestown to Congressman Ryan and his staffer. Nevertheless, it is important that the Congressman fully understand the magnitude of these difficulties so that he is not frustrated when he arrives in Guyana and is confronted with the realities of travel to the northwest region of the country. Assuming that he does carry through on his plan to come here he will have to either charter an aircraft at the CODEL’s expense or go via the rather primitive and unreliable commercial means which are available in order to get to Jonestown. The Embassy has no transportation of its own suitable for the trip. If commercial means are used the trip would probably take at least 2 to 3 days to negotiate under the best conditions. It would involve a commercial flight to Mackenzie, an overland trip from Mackenzie to Port Kaituma, and then travel via a 4-wheel drive vehicle from Port Kaituma to Jonestown. The vehicle for the last leg would have to be furnished either by the Govt. of Guyana or the People’s Temple. If a charter aircraft were used it would in all likelihood be

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780392–0446. Limited Official Use; Priority; Stadis.

2 In telegram 241892 to Georgetown, September 22, the Department reported a conversation between Christopher and Congressman Ryan about the potential challenges associated with visiting Jonestown. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780388–0998)
possible to complete the visit in one day depending on how long the Congress­man wanted to stay in Jonestown. It should be remembered that even if a charter aircraft is used, ground transportation from the airstrip to Jonestown and return would have to be provided by the GOG or People’s Temple. Lately there have also been problems involving the availability of charter aircraft and the physical condition of the airstrip at Port Kaituma. These should also be kept in mind.

B. Political

As you will have seen from our unclassified telegram 3098 Attorney Mark Lane paid a visit to Guyana last week during which he gave a press conference in which he charged that certain agencies of the USG were conspiring to destroy Bishop Jones and the People’s Temple. He indicated in his press conference that he was considering the filing of civil suits for damages on behalf of the People’s Temple against the Attorney General and various Federal agencies. Congressman Ryan, if he is not already aware, should be apprised of this development.

It is essential that before undertaking any trip to Georgetown with the expectation that he will be able to visit Jonestown community, Congressman Ryan should first obtain agreement from the People’s Temple to such a visit. The People’s Temple is occupying land in Guyana which was made available to them by the government. They have legal possession of this land and have demonstrated in the past a willingness either to permit or deny access to individuals seeking to visit the community. It seems clear that the GOG is prepared to honor the wishes of the People’s Temple management in exercising its control over this community. It is unlikely therefore that the Guyanese Government would attempt to force entry on behalf of Congressman Ryan or any other outsider if the management of the People’s Temple indicated an unwillingness to receive such visitors.

C. Legal

The Embassy has always taken a position vis-a-vis the People’s Temple and the community at Jonestown that our relationship with it and with the American citizens residing there is identical with our relationship to any other American citizen or citizens in Guyana, as provided for in Foreign Service regulations. Accordingly, we have provided consular services to the community and have responded to requests from next of kin in the U.S. in directing welfare whereabouts inquiries to the People’s Temple and the AMCIT residents of Jonestown. We have instituted a series of quarterly visits, with the agreement of the People’s Temple, to perform such services. In the discharge of our

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3 Dated September 23. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780389-0009)
responsibilities we have borne particularly in mind the requirements of the Privacy Act and the Freedom of Information Act. I am sure that Congressman Ryan and his staff are aware of the provisions of these two laws and can appreciate their possible application to the present case.

2. We of course stand ready to provide any appropriate assistance to Congressman Ryan and his party should they decide to visit Georgetown. In order to avoid any confusion, I think it important that the points set forth above be discussed in detail with them so that the Congressman and his party will be under no misapprehension when they arrive. Further, I believe it would be useful and desirable for a Department lawyer from the staff of the Legal Adviser to accompany the CODEL to Guyana and Jonestown.4

Burke

4 In telegram 284988 to Georgetown, November 9, the Department reported that it would not provide a legal adviser, but Ryan included his own lawyer, Jacki Speier, in his delegation. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780462-1366)

288. Telegram From the Embassy in Guyana to the Department of State1

Georgetown, November 5, 1978, 1340Z


1. Ambassador spoke with Guyanese Ambassador to Washington Laurence Mann afternoon Nov 4 regarding proposed visit of CODEL Ryan to Guyana for the purpose of making contact with the People’s Temple (PT) community at Jonestown.2 Ambassador told Mann that American Consul had been informed by PT representatives in Georgetown that it was now PT intention not RPT not to receive Congressman Ryan at Jonestown. Mann said that he had heard of this decision and had told the People’s Temple that he personally considered it to be ill-

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780457–0244. Limited Official Use; Nlact Immediate.
2 No record of this conversation has been found.
advised. Nevertheless, he went on, it was their decision and Government of Guyana could not force PT to receive CODEL within their community just as GOG could not dictate to its citizens whom they receive in their homes. Mann went on to say that PT seemed convinced that CODEL was hostile, would be arriving with well-developed prejudices against PT and merely wanted an on-the-spot visit to enable CODEL to return to U.S. and reiterate prejudiced view of People’s Temple community with more authority than before. PT officials had apparently cited to Mann coincident visit by NBC camera team as proof-positive of CODEL’s bad faith.

2. Ambassador repeated for Mann’s benefit what Consul had already conveyed to PT representatives re CODEL’s visit: It was to give Congressman Ryan an opportunity to familiarize himself personally with a community which had generated great interest in his constituency. Furthermore, Congressman had made no secret of his intentions and in fact had sent a message directly to the PT asking that he be permitted to visit Jonestown. Ambassador observed to Mann, as he had previously, that CODEL visit to Jonestown would appear to be an excellent opportunity for People’s Temple to respond to criticism in the U.S. about their community effort in Guyana. On the other hand, a flat refusal to receive the CODEL at Jonestown might have just the opposite effect. As for the NBC camera team, Ambassador informed Mann that on the basis of the reftelecon, it was the Embassy’s clear understanding that the Congressman had not invited the team to come and that NBC San Francisco had only become interested in covering the story when news of the Congressman’s proposed trip became known. Further, it was our understanding that NBC had been told that they would have to clear any trip to Jonestown with People’s Temple and any visit by a camera team to the Guyanese hinterland with the Government of Guyana.

3. Ambassador Mann professed to understand all of this but repeated his statement that GOG was powerless to force PT to receive CODEL at Jonestown if the group was adamantly opposed. He expressed again his personal view that he felt that the PT was wrong to refuse. He wanted it emphasized to Congressman Ryan that GOG, for its part, would welcome his visit to Guyana and that ForMin Rashleigh Jackson and other officials would be pleased to receive him if he decided to come.

4. Within an hour of the Ambassador’s conversation with Mann, a PT representative called the Consul to tell him that Ambassador’s impression was not accurate: PT had not definitively closed the door to a visit by Congressman Ryan, but were setting three conditions:

   A) that CODEL must have balance (i.e. that it include representation sympathetically disposed to PT);
B) that there be no media coverage associated with the CODEL’s visit to Jonestown;
C) that Attorney Mark Lane be present for CODEL visit to Guyana and Jonestown.³

5. PT representative also informed Consul that their response to Congressman Ryan’s cable would be communicated through attorney Mark Lane.⁴

Burke

³ Lane did accompany Ryan. See Document 293.
⁴ In telegram 278140 to Georgetown, November 1, the Department sent the text of Ryan’s cable to the People’s Temple, which contained “an open and honest request to you for information.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780451–0320)
these occasions the Congressman was told it could be dangerous to fly into a primitive airstrip in the midst of very rugged country. He was also aware that the People’s Temple community was opposed to his visit. Defectors from the Temple group had reported the presence of guns in the community, plus such practices as physical abuse and even dry-run suicide drills. Since June of 1977 approximately 5 consular visits were made to Jonestown to look into allegations that Jonestown residents were being abused. No clear indications of abuse were obtained. Relatives of Jonestown residents continued to say “would be” defectors were either being brainwashed or intimidated. (With regard to threat assessment, consular officers had performed activities similar to those which led to the Congressman’s death—but without apparent threat or hazard to themselves.)

The Shootings

The ambush which killed Congressman Ryan and four others and wounded nine more has been reported. Confirmed also is that Guyana Security Forces after carefully approaching Jonestown have so far found about 400 dead. No survivors in Jonestown have yet been reported.

Current Activity—Additional Personnel

We do not want to over-burden Georgetown’s small staff but we are responding to their needs as determined through constant telephone and cable traffic. The Embassy staff has been increased by 3 consular officers and 4 communications officers. Two (2) consular officers and a communications unit will be in Jonestown this morning. A senior consular officer (who handled the Tenerife aircraft crash) will also be going down tonight. A Graves’ Registration team from DOD of about 20 men is also leaving for Guyana tonight.

The total Jonestown community may in fact not much exceed the 400 dead. Accounts that the community numbers more than 1,000 may be exaggerations.

Burial of Congressman Ryan’s Party

Congressman Ryan’s family wishes his body transported directly to San Francisco for a Wednesday funeral at the Golden Gate National

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2 On October 3, Timothy Stoen sent a private telegram to Christopher declaring he would “retrieve my son John Victor Stoen by any means necessary” and warning the Deputy Secretary about preparations for mass suicides at Jonestown. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780166–2384)

3 Telegram 3776 from Georgetown, November 19, transmitted the initial report of Ryan’s death on November 18. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780476–1143)

4 A total of 909 people died in the suicides at the Jonestown site; 918 people died overall.
Cemetery. Three other dead also, we think, may be buried in California. The fifth victim resided in Ohio.

Burial of Jonestown Victims

Guyanese police say some of the Jonestown dead died by poison and others gunshot wounds. For legal prognostics, sample autopsies are being made from both groups. Guyana law requires burial within 36 hours. It has so far not been possible to identify the dead but in many cases we believe the next-of-kin would not want to be responsible for the costs of transport or even burial. Also, the return of these dead at U.S. Government expense would be a precedent. Under existing regulations if financial arrangements cannot be made to return a dead American, consular officers arrange for local burial. The matter, however, is being intensively studied. A mass burial of such a pathetic group could look a little heartless. The climate, communications, and Guyanese law might in the end make local burial obligatory.

Aircraft

Nine wounded returned to the U.S. via a C–141 last night. They were met by Miss Watson. Aircraft are available to bring back a great many dead and any wounded (who may yet be discovered). A C–141 is on the ground in Georgetown and may return this afternoon or evening—perhaps carrying the bodies. Another C–141 arrives today. At least two other aircraft (C–130’s) will be in Georgetown by tonight or tomorrow morning. They are carrying helicopter assembly equipment and supplies. A C–5A may fly in tomorrow with additional helicopters. Helicopters will break the bottleneck of access to Jonestown which now is only via a Guyanese 18 passenger Otter and another 5-seat aircraft.

Mark Lane

The well-known criminal lawyer, Mark Lane, who represented the Rev. Jim Jones is in Georgetown. Somehow he made his way to the capital from Jones’ settlement. A report from the Embassy is expected momentarily.5

Press

I will be interviewed by Susan King for WDVM–TV (Channel 9) at 2:00 p.m. today.

5 Telegram 3807 from Georgetown, November 20. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780477–1118)
290. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Vaky) to Acting Secretary of State Christopher

Washington, November 21, 1978

SUBJECT
Your Meeting With Ambassador Laurence E. Mann, Guyanese Ambassador to the United States, at 2:30 p.m., Wednesday, November 22

Ambassador Mann’s purpose is simply to express condolences and give assurances of his government’s desire to cooperate in the situation in Guyana. We do not expect him to raise any substantive issues concerning arrangements for dealing with the problems there. We would prefer to keep the discussion of these matters in Georgetown between our Embassy and the cabinet level Task Force set up by the government. However, there is one issue of substance we suggest you raise. The Government of Guyana had agreed to receive a six-man FBI team to assist in the investigation. The Team was on the way when the Government changed its mind because of a newspaper story in the U.S. about the FBI visit. Their presence, our Ambassador was told, would cause a political problem. (They have accepted the legal attache from Caracas, who was already in Georgetown.) We believe the Team could be helpful. The Deputy Attorney General called John Bushnell to stress the importance of the FBI participation. An attack on a Congressman and U.S. diplomat virtually requires the FBI to participate in the investigation. Talking points on this matter are included.

Ambassador Mann expects the call to be brief. For your background the situation reports on the crisis are attached.

Talking Points:
—We know the burden this calamity has placed on the Government of Guyana.
—We appreciate the rapid and effective response of the government to the crisis.
—The cooperation we have received has been outstanding.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780181-2414. Limited Official Use. Drafted by George E. Brown (ARA). Secretary of State Vance was in Argentina.
2 Vaky wrote, “(known as ‘Bunny’).” Mann’s actual nickname was “Bonny.”
3 Telegram 296138 to Georgetown, November 23, reported on the meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780481-0955)
4 Attached but not printed.
—We intend to provide as much assistance as is needed to deal with the many problems that still face both our governments.
—Substantial progress has already been made.
—This has been due in large measure to the fine work of the Cabinet Committee under the direction of Minister of Health Hamilton Green and Prime Minister Burnham.
—One point of concern, is the need we see to have a small FBI team visit Guyana to provide assistance in some of the technical aspects of this complex criminal matter. The Government had originally approved the idea, but changed its mind.
—I still believe the team could be very useful.
—in an attack on a U.S. official or Congressman abroad the FBI routinely cooperates with police authorities of other countries.
—We have complete faith in your police, but participation of the FBI would add credibility to the conclusions of your police investigation for some sectors of the U.S. public.
—You may assure your government that the Team will go quietly about its business in cooperation with your police without attracting attention.\(^5\)

\(^5\) In telegram 302465 to Georgetown, November 30, the Department reported that a team of four forensics experts from the Department of Justice would be arriving in Guyana that day. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780480–0427)
291. Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Information Cable


COUNTRY
Guyana

SUBJECT
Views of Guyanese officials on the possible impact the ambush of Congressman Leo Ryan and his party at Port Kaituma will have on the Government of Guyana (DOI: [number not declassified] November 1978)

SOURCE
[6 lines not declassified]

1. On 20 November 1978, Col. Cecil Martindale, Commandant of the Guyana People’s Militia (GPM) discussed the events surrounding the 18 November 1978 attack on defectors from the People’s Temple religious cult (PT) and the murder of Congressman Leo Ryan, members of the United States press who accompanied him and a member of the PT who was among the defectors. Col. Martindale commented that he was Deputy Chief of Customs when the leader of the PT, Rev. James Jones, first arrived in the Republic of Guyana in 1973. The movement had the full support of Deputy Prime Minister Dr. Ptolomy Reid, who was Minister of Agriculture at that time. In Col. Martindale’s view, Dr. Reid’s strong support of the PT was couched in his belief that they represented a valuable element in the Government of Guyana’s anti-colonialist philosophy taking form in the People’s National Congress (PNC) government led by Prime Minister Forbes Burnham. In addition, Dr. Reid strongly approved of the integrationist themes espoused by the PT.

2. As a result of Dr. Reid’s patronage, representatives of the PT were able to gain privileged status with the Guyana customs service and enjoyed protection denied others. Col. Martindale cited as an example of what he meant, the instructions he received from Dr. Reid to waive customs inspections in order to facilitate the entry of heavy duty machinery for use by the PT in developing an agricultural project in the northwest region of Guyana. In a demonstration of their appreciation, the PT gave Col. Martindale a gift (not further identified) and offered to entertain him whenever he visited Miami, Florida. Martindale contacts with members of the PT led to the development of a close

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1 Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Case Classification 89, Assaulting or Killing a Federal Officer, Case File 4286, Section 2, Document 190. Secret; Noforn; Nocontract; Wnintel.
friendship with one of the liaison persons for the PT who frequently called for assistance in arranging customs clearances.

3. In Martindale’s opinion, the PT actions at Port Kaituma and in Georgetown have discredited Dr. Reid and will force Prime Minister Forbes Burnham to dismiss him from Cabinet.\(^2\)

4. On 20 November 1978, a PNC Party cadre who is an officer in the GPM said that the events at Port Kaituma has caused the senior officers of the Guyana Defense Force (GDF) particularly Brig. Clarence Price, Chief of Staff, to express impatience with Prime Minister Forbes Burnham. These officers are disgusted with the overbearing manner in which the Prime Minister has intruded on GDF planning for operations in Jonestown and the Port Kaituma area. On 20 November, Lt. Col. Joseph Singh, Commanding Officer, GDF Training Command, and recognized as one of the outstanding infantry officers in the GDF, was sent to Port Kaituma to oversee operations presently under the command of Maj. Randolph Johnson, Commanding Officer of the “Pirai” Bn. While there, Lt. Col. Singh was harried by frequent radio calls from Brig. Price relaying orders from Burnham. Out of disgust Singh requested and was granted leave to return to Georgetown. (Field Comment: It is unknown whether Singh actually carried out Burnham’s instructions, however, GDF troops under Johnson’s command entered Jonestown during the night of 19 November and secured the town.)

5. The PNC cadre officer said that, in his view, the government will have to face up to this calamitous situation and accept some of the blame. For the moment, Dr. Reid has lost a great deal of favor with Burnham because of his, Reid’s, identification with the PT.

6. ACQ: [1 line not declassified]

7. Field Dissem: [1 line not declassified]

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\(^2\) Reid remained active in Guyanese politics and served as Prime Minister from 1980 to 1984.
Alleged Request for Extradition of Jim Jones

The Department has never received any request for the extradition of Jim Jones, late leader of the Peoples Temple organization, from any Federal or State Judicial Authority. Jones was a co-defendant in a child custody suit in California brought by the child’s mother Mrs. Grace Stoen in early 1977. The court had awarded custody of the child, John Stoen, to his mother and ordered Jones to return the child immediately or be held in contempt of court. However, as Jones was in Guyana at the time of the court’s decision the court order could not be legally enforced.

Mrs. Stoen’s attorney went to Georgetown on September 1, 1977 to begin legal proceedings in the Guyanese Courts to enforce the California Court order. Early in the case the Guyanese presiding judge had ordered Jones’ arrest when it appeared he was evading summons to appear in court. The Embassy was reliably informed that the GOG had intervened in the case to stay the arrest order and made an official protest to the GOG about their alleged intervention. While the arrest order was never enforced, the case proceeded without apparent further official intervention and was pending at the time of the Jonestown tragedy.

The Department and the Embassy had received reports from unofficial sources that Jones and other members of the Peoples Temple had been under investigation. However, we were never officially informed that there were any outstanding warrants of arrest or indictments issued by any Federal, State or Municipal Judicial Authority against Jim Jones or other members of the Peoples Temple.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780182-2415. Confidential. Drafted by McCoy; cleared in L/ARA.
2 See footnotes 2 and 3, Document 280.
3 In the margin, an unknown hand wrote, ”Judge threatened with assassination and disqualified.”
293. Telegram From the Embassy in Guyana to the Department of State¹

Georgetown, November 30, 1978

4041. Subject: DCM Dwyer’s Report on CODEL Ryan’s Visit to Jonestown and Subsequent Murder. Ref: A. State 301207 B. Georgetown 4013.²

There follows a report of American Embassy Georgetown DCM Richard A. Dwyer, control officer for CODEL Ryan, of the visit of Congressman Ryan to the People’s Temple agricultural community at Jonestown, in northwest Guyana, and the subsequent murder of Congressman Ryan and four other Americans at the airstrip in Port Kaituma. The account begins with the group’s departure from Timehri Airport in Georgetown on Friday, November 17, and concludes with the return of the bodies of the slain Americans toward dusk of Sunday, November 19. A subsequent cable will deal with the CODEL’s activities in Georgetown before the departure for Jonestown.³

The local police have requested a statement from Dwyer. Please advise whether the Department concurs in making a copy of this report or an abbreviated version thereof available to the Guyanese police.

Begin text:

1. Congressman Ryan’s party departed from Timehri Airport Friday, Nov 17, at approximately 1400 hours. The group had no absolute assurances from the People’s Temple that it would be received at the People’s Temple agricultural community in Jonestown before its departure.

2. The group consisted of Congressman Ryan; his aide, Ms. Jackie Speiers; and myself, Counselor of Embassy Richard Dwyer, the escort officer to Congressman Ryan; four concerned relatives, Mrs. Oliver, Ms. Carol Boyd, Mr. Jim Cobb and Mr. Anthony Katsaris; two lawyers for People’s Temple, Mr. Mark Lane and Mr. Charles Garry; and eleven newsmen, including a four-man NBC news team headed by Mr. Bob Flick and including Messrs. Bob Brown, Don Harris and Steve Sung;

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780495–1121. Limited Official Use; Immediate.

² In telegram 301207 to Georgetown, November 28, the Department requested a detailed report from Dwyer, who accompanied Ryan to Jonestown. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780490–0986) In telegram 4013 from Georgetown, November 30, the Embassy reported that Dwyer’s report was nearly complete. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780494–0158)

³ Telegram 4114 from Georgetown, December 5. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780500–1082)
Mr. Lindsay of the National Enquirer, Mr. Charles Krause of the Washington Post, Mr. Grey Robinson and Mr. Tim Reiterman of the San Francisco Examiner, and Mr. Ron Javers of the San Francisco Chronicle. We were also accompanied by Ministry of Information Officer Neville Annibourne.

3. Shortly before the plane’s approach to Port Kaituma, the pilot, Captain Spence, informed me he had had a radio call from the tower in Georgetown conveying a message from the PT at Jonestown that the Port Kaituma airstrip was not serviceable and was unsafe. The group discussed the possibility of going into Matthews Ridge; however, Captain Spence suggested making a pass at the runway at Port Kaituma to determine its condition. The strip appeared in good condition and we went into Port Kaituma where the plane landed at about 1530. Capt Spence informed me later that a fellow pilot from the GDF had gone into Port Kaituma earlier in the day and had had no reports on runway difficulties.

4. The group was met by about six PT representatives including Tim Carter upon our descent from the plane. The PT representatives were uncommunicative to most of the group and drew aside to talk with their two lawyers. The lawyers announced that the PT had decided that the two lawyers should go to Jonestown and confer with Jim Jones on whether the remainder of the group would be allowed to enter Jonestown. It was pointed out to the members of the PT and their lawyers that the plane had to leave Port Kaituma before darkness at about 6:00 p.m. The two counsels then departed with members of the PT in the large truck which was used by the PT to traverse the bad road into the temple. This and the PT tractor were purported to be the only vehicles in the area able to make the trip. A few minutes later, however, the truck reappeared and the lawyers announced that it had been decided that the Congressman, his aide, Ms. Speiers, and myself would be permitted to accompany the group. After several delays, including one delay necessary to remove from the Jonestown road a two wheel cart loaded with heavy logs, the group entered Jonestown at about 1630 or 1700 hours. After talks with Jim Jones and other leaders of the PT, during which Congressmen Ryan expressed the opinion that free entry to and egress from Jonestown were essential to prove that Jonestown is an open and free community, Jim Jones reluctantly agreed, upon the urging of counsel, to permit the newsmen and the concerned relatives to enter Jonestown. Mr. Jones decided, however, that Mr. Lindsay of the National Enquirer would not be permitted entry into Jonestown and Mr. Lindsay therefore returned with the plane to Georgetown.

5. The truck was sent to fetch the newsmen and the concerned relatives. It was agreed that the Congressman’s party would pass the
night at Jonestown while the remainder of the group would have dinner at Jonestown but spend the night at Port Kaituma and return the following morning. While awaiting the press and concerned relatives to arrive, Congressman Ryan and his aide, Ms. Speiers, began interviewing the numerous residents of Jonestown about whom they had had inquiries or other reports. With the arrival of the newsman supper was served to the visitors and a number of the leaders of Jonestown. The newsman were able to speak with Jim Jones and others for some considerable time.

6. It was announced that following supper a musical show would be presented by the “Jonestown Express”, a group preparing for its annual Christmas concert in Jonestown. Mrs. Jones announced to the assembled group that no one need be photographed if they did not wish to be, that the NBC team would be using bright lights and television cameras and that if anyone did not wish to be photographed, they should raise their hands and the lights would be turned off and the TV cameras turned away from them. As the concert progressed, however, I observed no incidents of people refusing to be photographed. The musical show contained considerable talent and the people of Jonestown were very enthusiastic throughout the show and in apparent good humor.

7. Midway in the show Mrs. Jones got up and warmly introduced Congressman Ryan, who came to the stage to say a few words. The Congressman noted that he had already met at Jonestown some of his former students, a school classmate of his daughter’s, and others with whom he had mutual friends or acquaintances. He said that he had already talked to a considerable number of residents of Jonestown and he was happy to hear that a number of these people felt that Jonestown was the greatest place on earth, upon which statement the audience rose with enthusiastic and prolonged applause. Congressman Ryan then went back to his interviewing and the show progressed. The Congressman continued interviewing persons on his list, in private, following the show.

8. At the end of the evening I was approached by Mr. Vern Gosney, who asked me if I could arrange for him to get out of Jonestown that night as he was very, very frightened and was afraid that once he had been seen talking to me he would be in extreme danger. I replied that I could do nothing that night as I myself was staying at Jonestown but that Mr. Gosney if that was his wish, was welcome to leave Jonestown in the morning with the group. I noted that Mr. Jones and legal counsel had assured the Congressman, the newsman and myself that anyone who wished to leave with us was free to leave Jonestown. At about the same time Mr. Gosney had slipped a note to one of the NBC crew saying that he and Miss Monica Bagby wanted to leave.
9. At the conclusion of the evening’s interviewing, Congressman Ryan and I discussed the situation. Miss Bagby and Mr. Gosney were two persons who had clearly expressed the desire to depart, and the Congressman thought that there might be others on his list of names to interview who also wished to depart. He noted he was saving his best documented cases for the morning. It was therefore agreed that Miss Bagby and Mr. Gosney would be put on the Congressman’s list with those about whom the most serious concerns had been expressed and that they would be called for interviews by the Congressman towards the end of the next morning, as shortly as possible before the group was scheduled to depart. The Congressman and I agreed that despite Mr Jones’ assurances that people would be free to leave, there might be concern among the People’s Temple when it became apparent that some members were preparing to depart.

10. Next morning, Saturday, Nov 18, the Congressman began the remainder of his interviews. The news group returned and also began interviewing leaders and members of the PT. In the meantime the PT had given permission for one or two other concerned relatives then in Georgetown to come to Jonestown with the plane that was to pick up the Congressman’s group and to spend some time in Jonestown with their relatives before returning to Georgetown by commercial means. The Congressman and I agreed that this was undesirable. I explained on the radio to Consul Ellice and to the Congressman’s HIRC aide, Mr. James Scholleart, the decision that there should be no concerned relatives on the plane that went up to Port Kaituma to pick up the Congressman and his party.

11. The NBC television news crew had also decided to tape its principal interview with Jim Jones shortly before departure Saturday. The news team had been told by a local official at Port Kaituma the previous evening, I later learned, that the official alleged that he had delivered to Jones at Jonestown an automatic weapon as well as GOG permit to have the weapon. In the interview, however, Jones denied this report, as he had denied possession of anything more than a few shotguns for hunting since he arrived in Guyana.

12. At approximately 11:00, after consulting with Congressman Ryan, I called Jim Jones and his lawyers aside and informed them that there would be several people who wanted to leave Jonestown and that these people would depart with the Congressman and myself. Mr. Jones was visibly upset but was calmed by Mr. Lane and Mr. Garry, who both pointed out that it appeared that only a half dozen to a dozen people wished to depart, which in its way was a credit to a community of 1100 to 1200 people. Congressman Ryan also stressed to Mr. Jones that unhindered departures would improve the image and reputation of the PT.
13. By approximately noon, in addition to Miss Bagby and Mr. Gosney, several members of the Park family had expressed a desire to leave and were holding a family council to decide whether they should all depart together or whether some might remain in Jonestown. It was about 1330 when they decided that they would all depart at the same time with the Congressman and myself and had collected their belongings. Congressman Ryan and Ms. Speiers went with members of the Park family to reassure them while they collected their belongings. The family consisted of grandmother, parents and four children and Mr. O’Neil, a close friend of daughter Brenda Park. It was apparent by this time that a second aircraft in addition to the GAC Twin Otter (which could hold 19 persons) would be needed and was requested by PT radio. A small aircraft of 5 passenger capacity was therefore sent up from Georgetown scheduled with the Otter to arrive in Port Kaituma at 2:00, according to message received from Georgetown. As the departure time from Jonestown came closer, there were several other persons who expressed a desire to leave to the Congressman and myself. It was agreed that the people from Jonestown would be given priority on the planes and that the press and Mr. Garry, who wished to return to Georgetown, would take subsequent aircraft. In addition to the Park family, the Bogue family, consisting of Jim Bogue, Mrs. Bogue, Tina and Tommy, and a close family friend, Harold Cordell, were to leave with the group. At the last moment, Mr. Larry Layton urgently requested that he be permitted to leave and he entered the truck.

14. Congressman Ryan stated that as there were apparently still others who might wish to leave Jonestown, he and I would remain at Jonestown to insure their departure the following day. I was to accompany the departing group to the airport at Port Kaituma to oversee the departure and to relate to the captain of the GAC aircraft the requirements for aircraft the following day. I was also to stop at the Assistant District Officer’s office at Port Kaituma to relate these messages through that channel to assure prompt and accurate receipt by the Embassy.

15. The group was loaded in the back of the large truck. I got on last. The truck started to depart but slid in the mud at the side of the track. The group was told that a bulldozer would be necessary to put it back on the track. (A previous delay had occurred which Ms. Speiers attributed to the fact that the driver of the truck wanted to leave with the group and refused to drive the truck out unless he could be given assurances that he could leave. He was told that he could leave with the group the next day.) As the group waited for the bulldozer to come to free the truck, shouts were heard from the central pavilion of Jonestown where Congressman Ryan was waiting, together with Mr.
and Mrs. Jones, Mr. Garry, Mr. Lane and other ranking individuals of the PT. I ran from the truck to the pavilion where I found a small group surrounding the Congressman, whose clothes were disheveled and bloody. The Congressman had been attacked by a knife bearing distraught member of the PT who had been disarmed by Mr. Lane, Mr. Garry and others of the PT. The Congressman was uninjured. I was told that the blood had come from a minor wound the assailant had suffered as the knife was taken from him. The Congressman told Jim Jones that the incident would present a problem for the PT but that it was not one which could not be overcome if legal processes were allowed to take place. Jim Jones expressed the wish that he himself had been killed directly on the spot rather than that this incident should happen to the Congressman. He said that the police had been called. He appeared deeply troubled. The Congressman and I had a private conversation in which I urged the necessity for the Congressman to leave Jonestown. The Congressman agreed finally, to do so, with the understanding that I would return to Jonestown and organize the departure of those who wished to depart the following day after the Congressman and group had left Port Kaituma for Georgetown. The Congressman and I then joined the truck, which by this time had been freed from the mud, and proceeded to the airport at Port Kaituma approximately an hour away.

16. The truck stopped for a few moments at the entrance to Jonestown where it was joined by a guard from the gate, who made a careful survey of the passengers in the truck without speaking. Although the two aircraft had been scheduled to arrive at Port Kaituma at 1400, they were not there when the group arrived, about 1530. During the trip out, incidentally, several members of the group leaving Jonestown expressed to me and to others their concern that one Larry Layton had been permitted to join the group as they considered him a fanatic follower of Mr. Jones and did not believe that he actually wished to leave the organization.

17. Upon arrival at the airport I asked Congressman Ryan to be sure all members of the group were thoroughly searched before being allowed to board the aircraft should they arrive before my return and to pay particular attention to Larry Layton about whom we had been warned.

18. As there was no aircraft in sight upon the group’s reaching Port Kaituma airfield (except for the disabled Guyana Defense Force “Islander” under repair by four GDF members), the GOG Information Officer, Mr. Annibourne, who had accompanied the group throughout and I asked the driver of the PT truck to take us up to the District Office at Port Kaituma to see if we could get in touch with Georgetown by radio to determine what had happened to the planes. I also wished
to relay as quickly as possible an account of the attack at Jonestown on Congressman Ryan. We reached the District Office only to be told that Assistant District Officer Thomas was across the way at a small establishment. As Mr. Annibourne and I were conversing with Mr. Thomas, relating the events of the day to him and asking that Georgetown and the police be contacted immediately, the two airplanes were sighted overhead preparing to land at Port Kaituma. The large Jonestown truck immediately turned around and departed for the airport to the surprise of Mr. Annibourne and myself. We therefore prevailed upon Assistant District Officer Thomas for transportation to the airport, which was supplied in the person of Mr. Jeffrey Sempel, a local businessman, and his truck. An individual with a shotgun, whom I took to be a police constable, although he was in mufti, also got into the back of the truck. Mr. Sempel, accompanied by Assistant District Officer Thomas, and Mr. Sempel’s two small children, drove Mr. Annibourne and me to the airport where the process of loading the airplanes had already begun. The journalists were still on the ground as they wished to film the departure and as not all of them could be accommodated in the two aircraft. The Congressman was also on the runway. After a brief conversation with the Congressman regarding the number of people who might wish to depart the following day, and the necessity of getting an aircraft back to Port Kaituma promptly the next day (during which conversation the Congressman told me that the members of the group had been searched before they had been allowed on the plane), I walked over to discuss arrangements with Captain Spence, the pilot of the GAC aircraft, which was mid-way down the airstrip. The five seat Cessna was near the head of the runway, close to the disabled GDF Islander.

19. Shortly thereafter shots rang out from a tractor and two trailers belonging to the PT which had been parked at the side of the runway nearest the aircraft. Shots also began from the PT truck parked in front of the airplane on the other side of the runway. Congressman Ryan ran under the nose of the aircraft or close by the nose of the aircraft to get away from the shots coming from the tractor and two trailers, as did I. I saw the Congressman hit once and go down, apparently attempting to seek shelter behind the wheels of the aircraft. By this time I realized that shots were coming from both sides and that there was little hope of being able to cover the distance from the airplane to the side of the runway and into the shelter of the bush. I also saw that at least one and possibly two others of the group had already been hit. I therefore threw myself on the ground on my back to simulate death. As I was falling I was hit by a slug from what apparently was a small calibre weapon, possibly a 22, in my left thigh. The firing continued for several minutes and then there was a short pause before
the firing recommenced. It seemed to me that one or more of the assailants with shotguns was proceeding amongst the wounded, firing a blast at each of them. For unknown reasons I was not shot by those with the shotguns nor, it developed later, was Mr. Charles Krause of the “Washington Post”, who later told me that he also had feigned death on the other side of the Congressman. The truck and tractor were heard to drive away and after a few moments those who had had not been wounded and the ambulatory wounded began to get to their feet. The pilots of the Otter aircraft, still in the cockpit, had not been attacked and the engines of the plane were continuing to run. I went over to the Congressman, who had been badly hit. It was clear that he was dead; I then moved the body away from under the wheels of the aircraft and checked on the others. The NBC newsmen, Bob Brown and Don Harris, were both lying dead under and to the rear of the aircraft. I ran around to the steps of the aircraft where Mr. Greg Robinson of the San Francisco Examiner lay crumpled, also apparently killed instantly. I cannot recall whether I first saw Ms. Jackie Speiers still on board the aircraft or at the foot of the steps. It appeared evident, however, that she was seriously wounded as was Mr. Anthony Katsorsis, who lay near the foot of the aircraft steps. I ran up the steps of the aircraft where I found that Mrs. Patricia Park had received what appeared to be the full blast of a shotgun in the back of her head. She was leaning across the aisle of the airplane. With the help of a local Amerindian who appeared on the scene I removed the body from the aircraft in the hope that the aircraft could still fly, but only then noted that the left hand tires had been shot out. I do not recall seeing any other passengers on the aircraft and presumed they had run towards the heavy bush on the near side of the runway. Those remaining unhurt and some local residents carried Mr. Katsorsis, Ms. Speiers and NBC newsman Stephen Sung, also seriously injured, into the bush at the side of the runway.

20. The major concern of the group was that the PT assailants might return to complete the assassinations. The wounded were therefore moved into the bush and those able to walk stayed near the bush. Mr. Bob Flick of the NBC news team who had taken shelter in a small corrugated steel building at the side of the runway with several Guyanese and was not injured by the gunfire directed towards him, ran down the runway to where the other light plane was. There were four members of the GDF at the disabled GDF Islander, three of whom had automatic weapons and the commanding officer, Lt. Joseph who had an automatic pistol. Lt Joseph later told me that none of his group had discharged their weapons because they could not tell the assailants from the victims as all were Americans and the incident was over so quickly.
21. Mr. Fernandes, the pilot of the Cessna, joined the group near the Otter, where he told me that one of his passengers had attempted to kill the other passengers with a revolver and had seriously wounded at least two. Mr. Dale Park, who had been a passenger on Mr. Fernandes’ Cessna, told me that the passengers consisted of Miss Monica Bagby, Mr. Vern Gosney, Mr. Larry Layton, himself and one other. He stated that as the Cessna was preparing to depart, Mr. Layton shot Miss Bagby and Mr. Gosney once each in the back. The door of the plane then was opened and Miss Bagby and Mr. Gosney ran out of the plane and were shot again once each by Mr. Layton, who then turned the gun on Mr. Park. Mr. Park stated that there was one further discharge of the weapon but that he was not injured and was able to take the weapon away from Mr. Layton after a struggle and attempt to discharge it at Mr. Layton, without result. Layton then is said to have disappeared temporarily. (One of the GDF soldiers stationed by the GDF aircraft under repair near the Cessna later told me that he thought Mr. Layton had left the area with the PT group.) Subsequently, however, Mr. Layton was identified by several members of the Park family and others mingling with the group of survivors at the side of the runway near the disabled Otter.

22. By the time I had taken possession of the revolver from Mr. Park and one round of ammunition which Mr. Park said had apparently failed to fire, two Guyanese in civilian clothes asserting that they were associated with the Guyanese authorities had hold of Mr. Layton and said that they would escort him to jail. I heard Mr. Layton tell these individuals that he was an American citizen resident in Guyana, that he denied the crimes of which he had been accused and that he insisted upon his right to be brought to trial by the Guyanese legal process and that he demanded to see the area public prosecutor as soon as possible. Mr. Layton was taken away. At about this time the Cessna aircraft began to take off, apparently containing Captain Spence from the GAC Otter and his co-pilot, and pilot Fernandes. As the aircraft began to take off I ran toward it to flag it down so as to take out some of the wounded. Captain Spence gestured to the rear of the aircraft, which I took to mean that there had been another appearance of the group from the PT and the survivors and I therefore once again took to the bush. I was later to learn that Captain Spence apparently was gesturing to the badly wounded Monica Bagby whom they had put on board.

23. Numerous Guyanese approached the survivors cautiously. We prevailed upon one individual with a Land Rover to request help from the clinic in Port Kaituma, pain killers at the very least, and hopefully means of transportation for the wounded to the clinic. The individual did return, stating that all residents of Port Kaituma had been ordered to stay indoors, that the practitioners were afraid to help the survivors
at the center at Port Kaituma, which they felt, in any event, might be unsafe. The man did, however, deliver a package of pain killers.

24. It should be noted that before Captain Spence’s departure and while he was in radio contact with Guyanese authorities elsewhere, either in Matthews Ridge or Georgetown, he assured me that assistance would be immediately on the way. This was at approximately 1630 hours which meant that there should have been time for an aircraft to reach Port Kaituma from Georgetown before night had it left immediately. With this assurance, the group assembled by the edge of the runway. Several individuals were missing—Mr. James Cobb, Mr. O’Neil, the Park children, Tracy and Brenda, and the Bogue children, Tina and Tommy. They had run deep into the bush and could not be located. I talked with the lieutenant in charge of the small detachment at the GDF plane at the head of the runway, requesting the cots of the four man detachment to be used as stretchers. The lieutenant agreed that the wounded could be brought to his four man unit’s tent but recommended that this be done after dark. In hopes that an aircraft might still arrive, the group remained close to the bush near the Otter with the wounded hidden in the bush until after 2000, when the wounded were carried down to the GDF tent where they were made as comfortable as possible. The wounded consisted of Ms. Speiers, Mr. Sung, Mr. Katsorsis, and Mr. Gosney, who had been located lying wounded in the bush by some Amerindians. Throughout it should be noted that several residents of the area immediately surrounding the airfield and particularly the clients of Jeff Sempel’s tavern were of great assistance to the group. They warned us of the possibility of attack from the far end of the runway, helped carry the wounded and helped search for those lost in the bush.

25. At this point the decision had to be made whether to attempt to keep the ambulatory members of the group together in one place to facilitate their departure should transportation arrive, or whether it would be safer to attempt to scatter them, either in the bush or amongst the houses of inhabitants living near the airport, if possible. I elected the former option and with the assurances of Mr. Sempel that his family would welcome the group, two persons were left to stay with the wounded and the rest of the group assembled in Mr. Sempel’s tavern about one block from the head of the runway. Mr. Sempel offered the use of his living quarters for the group which were above the tavern proper and where the group gratefully assembled. The normal Saturday night activities of the tavern continued below, in some measure serving as camouflage for the group.

26. About 2300 hours Assistant District Officer Thomas appeared at the tavern to state that he had just come out of the bush where he had taken cover when the shots began. He said he had been in touch...
with the authorities by radio from his office in Port Kaituma and that an aircraft would be sent in shortly to be guided by lighted oil pots alongside the runway. This tactic had apparently been used in the past by the PT when they had an urgent need for medical evacuations at night. Mr. Thomas and I returned to the airport to discuss with Lt. Joseph of the four man detachment the placing of the oil lights and awaited the aircraft.

27. Mr. Thomas returned to his office. It became apparent that the aircraft would not come in that night. Mr. Bob Flick of NBC refused to leave the wounded and nursed them to the best of his ability throughout the night. I also stayed with the wounded to be on hand at the arrival of the first aircraft after instructing the group at the tavern that no one was to leave under any conditions unless Mr. Flick, myself, or a GOG official gave permission whether or not an aircraft was heard to land.

28. At approximately 0130 or 0200 in the morning a message came from Lt. Joseph that there was a radio telephone message for him from Matthews Ridge from his commanding officer. I accompanied him to the telephone where I was able to converse with Joseph’s commanding officer, Major Ronnie Johnson, and with Second Secretary Len Barrett of the U.S. Embassy, who had accompanied Major Johnson.

29. Major Johnson informed me that a company of troops, approximately 120 men, were being sent from Matthews Ridge to Port Kaituma by rail but that they had orders to dismount five miles before Port Kaituma and walk in. I expressed the hope to Major Johnson and the authorities in Port Kaituma that every effort be made to get a group of soldiers at the airport before dawn, as quickly as possible, to offset any effort by the PT to ambush rescue aircraft which it was hoped would arrive at dawn. The first troops arrived at about 0630, just after dawn, and were installed at the airport. By approximately one hour later the full company was on hand guarding the perimeters of the airport and six soldiers with automatic weapons at my request were assigned to the tavern to guard the Americans staying there. A paramedic arrived with the troops and assisted the wounded.

30. The first rescue aircraft, a GDF Islander, arrived at approximately 0945–1000 in the morning. It arrived without any medical facilities, without stretchers, without blankets, without mattresses. The three most seriously wounded were laid on the bare floor of the cabin from which the seats had been removed, and two others, less seriously wounded and who could sit, were also put in the aircraft and sent to Georgetown. Other Guyanese aircraft were scheduled to arrive shortly thereafter.

31. At this time it became apparent that there was a serious problem with people who had fled People’s Temple, namely, the Park and
Bogue families and Mr. Cordell. These were the individuals who had told me of the possible treachery of Mr. Layton and who stated that they felt themselves, as the first to leave Jonestown, the number one targets of any Jonestown assassins who might still be hunting for them. They stated that the main Jonestown security team had consisted of the basketball team currently in Georgetown. This made them very fearful of being sent to Georgetown. They claimed that they knew of plans in the event people tried to escape from Jonestown whereby teams of sharpshooters in Georgetown would attempt to pick them off as they landed at or departed from the Georgetown airport. They also maintained that the PT had other such sharpshooters at Trinidad and Caracas and they feared that there were infiltrators amongst the Jonestown group that had begun to straggle into Matthews Ridge. The second problem was the five children lost in the jungle. The families felt they could not leave Port Kaituma without the children or without some word as to their safety. I promised to attempt to transfer the group at Timehri Airport to the American military medical aircraft which would be departing Georgetown shortly if it had room for the group. This message was conveyed by me through the aircraft commander and military officials for relay to Timehri. Secondly, I urged each family to leave one male member at Port Kaituma to take care of the children should they be found. I spoke directly with Police Superintendent Smith and the Deputy GDF Commander on the subject of the children in the bush and was assured by both that the Guyanese authorities would devote as much help to the search as possible.

32. At about this time Mr. Jim Cobb emerged from the bush, stating that he had been in the bush ever since he had run there the previous afternoon. He had not seen the other missing persons in the bush. Second Secretary Len Barrett of the Embassy in Georgetown arrived by helicopter from Matthews Ridge to assist with the care of the Americans. In what was expected to be the last aircraft of the day for Georgetown, the members of the Park and Bogue families, Mr. Cordell and Mr. Cobb were flown to Georgetown. (One member of each family remained to search for the children.) Subsequently an aircraft arrived to transport the bodies of Congressman Ryan and the four other dead Americans to Georgetown. Mr. Barrett and I accompanied this aircraft to Ogle Field in Georgetown.
294. Letter From Senator Jesse Helms to Secretary of Defense Brown

Washington, November 30, 1978

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The United States government has demonstrated its ability to react swiftly in a humanitarian way to the tragic events in Guyana. Personnel of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the U.S. Army who participated in the awesome task of returning the bodies of the suicide-murder victims to the United States deserve to be congratulated for their performance.

Nevertheless, many of my constituents have been deeply disturbed by the apparent lack of authority for the United States government to act as it did. They are appalled at the reported $10 million cost to the U.S. taxpayers, and wonder why other obvious alternatives, such as burial or cremation in Guyana, were not chosen. Unlike persons caught in natural disasters, the residents of Jonestown went there of their own volition and chose to make their lives there. It has been made clear that this group was disenchanted with the United States—and, indeed, that their ultimate destination was the Soviet Union. In any event, the evidence clearly suggests that they specifically rejected the land and society of their birth. Therefore, I am asking the following questions:

1) What is the policy of the U.S. government with regard to the return home of the bodies of ordinary citizens who die abroad, whether by murder, suicide, or natural causes? Are such bodies returned without a guarantee of costs from the next-of-kin?

2) What statutory authority does the United States government have to act as it did in the Jonesville case?

3) What has been the cost to date, and from what account have the funds been drawn?

4) What is the projected unrecovered cost yet to be expended?

5) Will the Jonesville case set a precedent for altering U.S. policy for the return of the bodies of other U.S. citizens who die abroad? Are guidelines being written?

6) In the light of reports that assets of the Peoples Temple may amount to more than $10 million, what steps are being taken for the recovery of costs to the United States government?

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780181-0242. No classification marking. The letter was forwarded to Bennet on December 5, under a covering memorandum from Herbert. In a December 5 letter to Helms, Herbert told him to expect a response from the Department of State. (Ibid.)
I would appreciate specific answers to each of these questions so that I can respond properly to my constituents.²

Sincerely,

Jesse Helms

² No response to Helms has been found. According to Grove, the State and Defense Departments decided to split the cost of the disposal of the remains at Jonestown. (Grove, Behind Embassy Walls: The Life and Times of an American Diplomat, p. 214)

295. Memorandum From the Deputy Political Counselor of the Mission to the United Nations (Blacken) to the Director of the Office of Caribbean Affairs (Hewitt)¹

New York, December 5, 1978

SUBJECT

The People’s Temple in Guyana: My Involvement in the Stoen Case, A Visit to Jonestown, and Some General Observations

REF

Your Telephone Request of December 2, 1978²

In this description of my contacts with members of the People’s Temple and official actions taken concerning the People’s Temple while I was Charge of the U.S. Embassy in Guyana, I will focus on clarifying the background upon which decisions and impressions were formed. The official record of what was done and precisely when is a matter of record in the Department. This account is being written from memory without recourse to notes or written records available in the Department. Consequently, some dates may be inaccurate.

My direct contacts with representatives of the People’s Temple were relatively few because the Consul handled most of the business with them. I met Jim Jones only once. I do have considerable knowledge, however, of the relationship between the People’s Temple and the

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800141–0757.
Confidential.
² No record of the telephone request has been found.
Government of Guyana. These will be touched on herein to shed light on our perception of how the People’s Temple operated.

Period Covered

My tour of duty in Guyana spanned the period from July 3, 1976 to March 17, 1978, when I was transferred to USUN. I was absent from Guyana for three months—October 20, 1976 to January 26, 1977—when I was recalled as an expression of the United States’ displeasure over a speech Guyana’s Prime Minister gave on October 17 in which he implied U.S. complicity in the October 6 sabotage of a Cubana airliner.3 Prior to September 28, 1977, when Ambassador John Burke arrived at post, my duties were those of Charge d’Affaires. Thereafter, I was Deputy Chief of Mission.

Initial Impressions

During briefings after arrival at post I learned that a group of Americans, perhaps numbering 150–200, were living in a religious farming settlement called Jonestown in Guyana’s northwest region. They were affiliated with a religious group called The People’s Temple with headquarters in California. I was informed that the group appeared to have established a good working relationship with the Guyanese Government perhaps because they claimed to be socialists and they were dedicating themselves to agriculture in Guyana’s remote interior. The settlement of the interior was a goal of the Guyanese Government.

After I had been in Guyana about five or six weeks, I was called upon in my office by two representatives of the Georgetown Office of the People’s Temple. One of them was Debra Touchette. I do not recall who the second person was. They said they had known my predecessor who had visited Jonestown and they wanted to give me information about the People’s Temple and Bishop Jim Jones. They talked about Jones’ efforts in the U.S. to help the minority groups, drug addicts, and the poor. They referred constantly to Jones’ relationships with prominent U.S. politicians and community leaders. When asked about the religious faith of the People’s Temple, they mentioned its link to a church group in the U.S., but remained vague about the Temple’s teachings, except that it followed the teachings of Jesus Christ and socialism. They said that the People’s Temple welcomed people from all faiths into its fold.

Jones was still in the U.S. at this time. I do not recall having other meetings with People’s Temple representatives during 1976. I was

3 See footnote 3, Document 273.
absent from Guyana when Lt. Governor Dymally of California visited in November.

The Influx of People to Jonestown in 1977

Not long after my return on January 26, 1977 to Guyana to resume duties as Charge, the then Foreign Minister of Guyana, Fred Wills, told me that the People’s Temple had requested permission to significantly increase the number of people at Jonestown. (Specific numbers were reported to the Department by cable.) Wills let me read a copy of a memorandum of a meeting between high GOG officials and representatives of the People’s Temple concerning the request by the Temple. According to the memo, the People’s Temple representatives had alleged that Jones and the Temple were being persecuted by the FBI, the CIA and right wing forces in the U.S. They had alleged that racism was on the rise. Jones, therefore, wanted to move himself and a much larger number of people to Guyana.

Foreign Minister Requests Information on the People’s Temple

Wills told me that the Prime Minister had assigned him the responsibility for dealing with the People’s Temple representatives and he wanted to familiarize himself with them. Despite the enthusiasm for the People’s Temple expressed by Deputy Prime Minister Ptolemy Reid, Wills said that he sensed something “fishy” about the group. They had offered to deposit $2 million in the Bank of Guyana in return for permission to expand the settlement at Jonestown. Wills requested that I provide him with any information that I could concerning the group. Particularly, he wanted to know whether the People’s Temple or its leader, Jim Jones, was in trouble with the USG. After the severe strain in U.S.-Guyanese relations which followed the Cubana airliner disaster, he said, he did not want misunderstandings over a group like the People’s Temple to provide an irritant in our relations. I transmitted the request to the Department by cable.  

Upon receipt of an answer from the Department, I told Wills that to my knowledge neither Jones nor the People’s Temple appeared to have had any problems with the USG, nor could I provide details about Jones’ alleged difficulties in California. The USG could take no position—for or against—the Temple’s petition to bring large numbers of people to Guyana. Soon thereafter, the GOG gave permission for large number of people to be brought to Guyana.

In subsequent meetings with me, Wills recounted gossip about the People’s Temple and informally expressed some personal misgivings

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4 See Document 276.
5 Not further identified.
about the group and its maneuvers. We learned from Wills and other Guyanese officials that the People’s Temple representatives often expressed fears that the U.S. was headed toward fascism; however, as far as I know, the People’s Temple representatives in Georgetown did not express these thoughts directly to American officials. Occasionally I saw People’s Temple representatives attending official Guyanese events such as Republic and Independence Day ceremonies. Day to day problems such as those involved in handling passport matters and social security checks were handled by the Consular Section of the Embassy.

The Stoen Case: First Phase

With the arrival during August 1977 of Jeffrey Haas, the California attorney for ex-People’s Temple members Tim and Grace Stoen, I was drawn more deeply into the affairs of the People’s Temple. Haas had in his possession a California court order empowering him to take custody of John Stoen on behalf of the parents. His arrival had been preceded by a cable from the Department indicating that the Embassy should provide appropriate assistance to Haas. After receiving Haas in the Consular Section, U.S. Consul Richard McCoy brought Haas to my office for a discussion of the case and the People’s Temple. Haas showed us several press clippings from California newspapers highly critical of Jones and the People’s Temple. Some of these articles described techniques that Jones’ allegedly used to maintain discipline and control over Temple members.

Haas asked to see the highest possible Guyanese official. I arranged for him to see the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Justice, Fred Wills. At the latter’s request, I accompanied Haas to the meeting. This meeting took place on the day after Haas’ arrival in Georgetown. The meeting lasted over an hour. Wills listened to Haas’ description of the case and to his allegations against Jones. Wills explained that under Guyanese law, the California court order by itself was not binding. It could be presented as evidence (and judges usually gave considerable weight to such evidence), in a Guyanese court; however, Haas would have to obtain a Guyanese court order to get legal custody of the child in Guyana. Wills also explained that the matter would probably be facilitated if the mother were present at the time of the court hearing. Wills said that Guyanese courts usually always decided in favor of the mother receiving custody of young children. Haas insisted that he was in a hurry and hoped to leave Guyana with the child in less than a week. Wills said he would see what he could do to expedite matters. Before the meeting ended he phoned Guyana’s Attorney General to make an

6 See Document 280.
appointment for Haas and summoned the Solicitor General to the
meeting. After introducing him to Haas, Wills requested that the Solici-
tor further familiarize Haas with Guyanese judicial procedure and law.
Haas only reluctantly accepted the idea that he would have to wait to
have a court hearing before obtaining custody of John Stoen.

After accepting the necessity of going to court, Haas engaged a
prominent Guyanese lawyer, Clarence Hughes, to pursue the matter
for him. During the next few days, Haas wanted the full weight of
the Embassy thrown behind him in this case to induce the Guyanese
authorities to take the Stoen child from the custody of the People’s
Temple and give the child to him. We responded that while we would
offer whatever assistance we believed appropriate, we could not be in
the position of taking sides in a dispute between Americans. At times
he talked of kidnapping John Stoen from the Jonestown community.
He asked us whether we could issue a passport for John Stoen (in
addition to the passport which was in the control of the People’s Tem-
ple) if he somehow obtained physical control of Stoen. After consulting
with the Department by cable, a passport was prepared and held in
the Consulate in order to have it immediately available should Haas
suddenly obtain the child and have to leave immediately. Haas said
that he was certain that if he did not depart immediately, Jones would
use force to regain custody of the child.

Within about a week after Haas’ arrival in Georgetown, due appar-
ently to Wills’ intervention, Justice Bishop of Guyana’s Supreme Court
inserted the case on the court calendar ahead of many other pending
cases and issued a writ of habeas corpus for John Stoen to be brought
to the court for a hearing. Jim Jones was also subpoenaed to appear
in the court. Haas accompanied a clerk of the court and a police con-
stable to Jonestown to serve the papers. They were told that Jones
would be gone for several days on a fishing trip up the river. Neither
Jones nor the child, John Stoen, appeared in court on the designated
date. Justice Bishop, reportedly angered over this turn of events, issued
warrants for the arrest of the child and of Jones in order that they be
brought to the court for the hearing.

In the meantime, representatives of the People’s Temple had also
been busy. They circulated documents among Guyanese officials to
show that Grace and Tim Stoen were unfit parents and that Jim Jones
was the natural father of the child. They called on McCoy at the Consu-
late or had phone conversations with him. If I remember correctly,
McCoy brought a group of them to my office for a discussion (I am
not sure whether this meeting took place during this first visit of Haas
or later when the Stoens personally came to Guyana). They had called
upon Wills and told him that the people around Jones would fight and
die to avoid giving up the child. The child had been with them for
over three years during which the Stoens had shown no interest in regaining custody. They charged that the efforts to obtain the child were part of the conspiracy against Jones in California. Wills told me of the representations to him which had been made by the People’s Temple representatives. He said that he urged them to present their case in court and abide by the results.

The warrants for the arrest of Jones and the child were not acted upon. We learned confidentially from a clerk of the court that the Deputy Prime Minister, Ptolemy Reid, had requested that the police not act upon it. In the meantime, Foreign Minister Wills had left the country to attend an international conference, and was gone for more than a week. Upon his return, I requested a meeting with him to try to get the matter back on track. After making inquiries, he said that in his desire to be helpful in expediting the case, he may have gone too far. Justice Bishop was under criticism for having given the case precedence over others and for having issued the arrest warrant without taking certain other necessary legal steps first. Wills said that the matter had been taken out of his hands and he had been told to stay out of it. The People’s Temple representatives had convinced their patron, Ptolemy Reid, that this was an unjust effort to take the child and destroy Jonestown.

I explained to Wills that the U.S. Embassy’s interest was in seeing that due process of law was being followed. The Embassy had no vendetta against Jones or the People’s Temple. But at the moment, the orderly procedure under law appeared to have come to a dead halt. No action or indication of what should be done next was being made. I pointed out that Haas was threatening to join the press campaign against Jones in California and to attack the Guyanese Government as well as Jones. After several conversations with Wills over a period of a couple of days, I told him that I would have to send a diplomatic note expressing concern over the delay. He welcomed the idea, saying it would give him leverage in breaking the Stoen case out of the political realm and putting it back in the court. The note was sent. In addition, I believe that I spoke to Prime Minister Forbes Burnham about the case, urging that it be processed according to due process of law. A date for a court hearing was set for February 1978.

The Stoen Case: Phase Two

In January 1978, Tim and Grace Stoen came to Georgetown to follow-up on the court case for custody of John Stoen. I met with them,
accompanied by Consul Richard McCoy. During the same week we received visits from People’s Temple representatives Sharon Amos, Tim Carter and another person whose name I do not recall. The People’s Temple delegation alleged that they were being harassed by organized forces from California. During one of these conversations, Sharon Amos broke into tears and emotionally asserted that the people of Jonestown would rather die than allow John Stoen to be taken from them.

During the encounters with the Stoens and with People’s Temple representatives, we explained repeatedly that it was not up to us as U.S. government officials to take sides in a dispute between Americans concerning custody of a child. We sympathized with the Stoen’s predicament and gave them our best advice concerning how to proceed. Consul McCoy kept in touch with the lawyers and court officials concerning the hearings. My intervention was required at one point when I was informed that the Stoens and their lawyer had been arrested for allegedly giving false statements at the time they had entered Guyana (the charges were that they had said they were members of the People’s Temple). We obtained the release of the Stoens and they were given one or two extra days.

A few days later we learned that the Stoens’ permits to stay in Guyana had not been renewed and they had been told to leave immediately. As the hearing of their case had not been completed, this clearly would have made it impossible for them to have pursued the case. We were informed that the order for the deportation had come from the Minister of Home Affairs, Vibert Mingo. I called Foreign Minister Wills, whom I located at a meeting at Prime Minister Burnham’s residence, explained the circumstances to him, and strongly urged that immediate action be taken to stop the deportation of the Stoens and their lawyer. Wills took the next necessary action and the deportation was stopped. Subsequently, the Stoens and their lawyer were given permits to stay in Guyana for the duration of the court proceedings.

Visit to Jonestown

In connection with a visit of the State Department’s Guyana Desk Officer, Frank Tumminia, to Guyana on an area familiarization trip, we contacted People’s Temple representative to arrange for a visit to Jonestown. They responded that they and Jones would welcome the visit. We chartered a small plane for the trip.

When we arrived in Port Kaituma, we called on the Regional Commissioner and met with him to discuss the People’s Temple. He said that he had had no serious problems with the People’s Temple. They were hard working and had done impressive work in agriculture. But they kept to themselves more than the Guyanese had originally anticipated. The Commissioner said that Guyanese officials had hoped
that the Americans at Jonestown would be catalysts for development of nearby Guyanese communities, but this had not happened. He mentioned two things which were of some concern. First, he said that his customs officer was concerned over not being able to monitor adequately the goods being brought into Jonestown by the People’s Temple boat. Secondly, he was concerned that the Jonestown school was not operating in full compliance with Guyanese law concerning curriculum of schools. The Regional Commissioner provided a vehicle for our transportation and accompanied us to Jonestown.

When we reached the edge of the People’s Temple property, we encountered a gate and a small guard hut manned by two young men. We saw no arms, but both carried sheath knives in their belts. From the guard hut to the center of Jonestown the distance was about three miles.

Jones met us on arrival. Initially, he appeared tense, and as we walked toward the community center, his conversation seemed to be directed at people around him rather than at Tumminia and me. Gradually he relaxed and talked freely. As we walked to the community center we saw a children’s playground. The children there appeared healthy and normal. Although the roadways and paths throughout the settlement were of dirt, the overall appearance was tidy and neat. Having already heard allegations that people had been ill-fed and mistreated, I was alert for signs of malnutrition and for persons who might show signs of being abused. During the entire visit, which I believe lasted about three hours, I saw no evidence of malnutrition or beatings. I realized, however, that anyone recently beaten could have been kept out of sight.

At the community center, Jones and his people showed us handicrafts made by people at Jonestown. A large number of people were gathered together there, and a choral group performed. Another group put on a skit, and a woman who appeared to be in her mid-thirties sang solos, Jones said she had been a drug addict in San Francisco before joining the People’s Temple. After the cultural presentations, we sat at a table surrounded by an immediate circle of 20–30 people. Some of these appeared to be members of the People’s Temple leadership cadre, others were clearly ordinary members.

During a period of about 45 minutes, Jones and I discussed the allegations being made against him and the People’s Temple. Jones responded that the charges that people were beaten or held against their will were totally false. Frequently, we were interrupted by persons who would add an anecdote to illustrate some good works that Jones had done. Jones pointed out several young men who he said had been engaged with the Weather Underground before they had become associated with the People’s Temple and had changed from a violent to non-violent approach to achieving socialism.
Jones kept returning to the theme that a conspiracy existed in the U.S. to destroy him and the People’s Temple. I told him that I was absolutely positive that no agency of the United States Government had hostile intentions toward him. I said if the stories which were being spread were untrue, in time they would disappear. I urged him to allow the families of Temple members to visit them in Jonestown. He said that he had no objections to such visits, but sometimes the individuals themselves objected. Several people near us chimed in during this conversation, charging that some of the families who had become interested in their relatives at Jonestown had only done so in the past two or three months, and that they were being incited and bribed to join the campaign of defamation against Jones and the People’s Temple.

When we discussed the case of John Stoen, Jones became quite agitated. He said he had heard that I had intervened against him. I told him that my position and that of the U.S. Government were neutral as to the merits of the case. My responsibility was to ascertain that due process of law was followed and that once a court decision was made, to see that it was enforced. I told him that I had reason to believe that he had sought to influence Guyanese officials to drop the case. Jones denied this. I repeated that my duty was to ascertain that both sides got fair treatment in the courts. I was not taking sides. Jones calmed down, but someone near us asserted that they would die before allowing the child to leave them. There was much talk by members of the group and by Jones about the unsuitability of the Stoen’s as parents. Jones asserted to me that he was the natural father of the child.

Jones also talked at length of his background and ideology. He said that several years earlier he had been close to advocating violent revolution, but since then had moderated his views. He hated war and violence, he said, and he hoped that the two superpowers could work toward peace. We talked of religion and ideology. He told me he had become an agnostic, but he believed in the teachings of Christ. Christ, he said, was a great prophet. He commented that since coming to Guyana, his approach to socialism had become non-doctrinaire. His experience with his people at the Jonestown community had shown him that people needed incentives to work productively. It was hard to get people to work for a vague common good.

At times during our conversation, Jones exhibited signs of paranoia, but at other times he appeared normal.

I had the names of two people to whom I wanted to talk. I no longer remember the specific concern that their relatives in the U.S. had expressed, but I believe the allegation had been made that one of the persons had had her head shaved as punishment. The other had not been responding to family letters. We met both persons. Neither
had short hair. Both acknowledged receiving letters from their families and in response to my urging, promised to write home more often.

After our meeting at the community center, Jones accompanied us on a walking tour of Jonestown. We visited houses where four people appeared to be living and some larger dormitory-style dwellings where double bunk beds were crowded into the available space. All residence houses were neat and clean. When entering such houses, people took off their shoes. We visited the dining hall where people were fed in shifts what appeared to be simple but wholesome food. We were shown the library containing in addition to books, movie films and cassettes for the closed circuit TV set which was located in the Pavilion. We also visited the food and medical supply centers. There were large stocks of dried and powdered foods. The supply of medicines and drugs we saw at the medical supply center appeared to be primarily of U.S. manufacture. The books in the library included a range of titles including works by well-known U.S. authors. There were works on Marxism and socialism. I saw books on Hitler and fascism. Overall, the literature appeared to focus heavily on social criticism.

We met the young American doctor, Dr. Schacht. He said he had graduated from medical school but had not completed his internship. When time allowed he had people who were seriously ill evacuated to Georgetown. On occasion, he would perform emergency operations by himself. He said that he sometimes sought and obtained help and advice from doctors in the U.S. by use of a short-wave radio. He showed us people in the dispensary. The few people there were elderly. The community had a quarantine house for persons afflicted with communicable diseases. The dispensary had an electrocardiogram.

If I remember correctly, we were told that Jonestown had about 600 inhabitants when we were there. We estimated that we saw fewer than that number.

At one point late in the day, someone reminded Jones that he was overdue for taking his “pill”. Thereupon he took a pill out of a container and swallowed it. No explanation of its nature or purpose was given us.

Once during the tour, I asked Jones whether anyone at Jonestown was an active drug addict. He replied negatively. In response to a question concerning the charges that he was keeping people under sedatives or tranquilizers, Jones said that a few of the older people with heart problems were sometimes given tranquilizers. He insisted, however, that usually those who required medication because of heart problems or tension had either stopped requiring medication or were able to decrease dosage in the calm atmosphere of Jonestown.

Shortly before departure, I stopped to talk alone with a group of elderly women who were sitting around a table shelling beans. One woman, the most talkative of the group, said she considered Jonestown
Guyana 729
to be a paradise for old people. The climate was good and they had useful jobs to do. They were treated with respect by the younger people and they had much interaction with the young generation.

One of the things that I found most notable about Jones was his manner of interaction with older people. Whereas one sensed a degree of fanaticism in many of the younger people, the older people seemed more relaxed and clearly enjoyed the respectful and affectionate manner in which Jones treated them.

One element of tension in the visit was when Regional Commissioner raised with Jones the issue of having the Jonestown school conform to the curriculum standards required by Guyanese law. Jones maintained that the requirements were being met. Others heatedly argued that the subjects and approach used in the Jonestown school could not be changed. On the way back to Port Kaituma, the Regional Commissioner said that compliance with Guyanese law would have to be enforced sooner or later.

Frank Tumminia told me he had the impression that people at Jonestown, particularly the choral group had appeared to move as automatons, as if they were drugged or under some form of mind control. We discussed this, but could reach no definite conclusions to substantiate these suspicions. I speculated that they might have been tired from doing field work.

Having visited Jonestown and having talked at some length with Jones, I could not draw firm conclusions that anyone was being held against their will. Nor could we be sure that people were free to leave, despite Jones’ assertions that they could and the claims of a number of the people that they were free to leave if they so wished. The neatness of the community and the hard work that had gone into the cultivation of the various crops being grown on over 600 acres in the jungle clearing was impressive. Jones showed paranoia, but did not appear totally irrational. Clearly he was the leader around whom the community revolved.

I would guess that over half of the people there were over 50 years of age. Many of the others were 25 years of age or less. Probably 80 percent of the people were black. The other 20 percent were mainly white, although I saw a few people of oriental and American Indian ancestry. The people who exercised leadership roles under Jones were both men and women. The women leaders appeared to be in their twenties, whereas the men ranged from 20 to 45 years of age. Perhaps three-fourths of the leadership cadre were white.

Government of Guyana and the People’s Temple

I believe that representatives of the People’s Temple approached the Government of Guyana sometime in 1973 to seek permission to
establish in Guyana’s hinterlands a multiracial agricultural community organized on socialist concepts. Reportedly, the People’s Temple told the Guyanese that the Americans who were brought to Guyana would have technical and agricultural skills which would be useful in training Guyanese and in helping develop Guyana. Many middle-class Guyanese were leaving Guyana for what they perceived as greater economic opportunities in Toronto, London, and New York. The Guyanese Government welcomed the opportunity to point to the influx of Americans and argue that Guyanese should not emigrate, but should instead follow the Americans’ example and turn their energies to developing Guyana’s wild interior.

The decisive figure in the Guyanese Government connected with the agreement to allow the People’s Temple to lease the jungle land at the Jonestown site was Deputy Prime Minister Ptolemy Reid (who was also Minister for National Development). Reid, a graduate in veterinary medicine from Tuskegee College, is the oldest member of the Guyanese leadership. His life has been devoted to agriculture and agricultural development in Guyana. He also has a strong consciousness of race and has worked hard at inspiring black Guyanese to take leadership roles in politics and the development of Guyana. His experience in the U.S. south as a student in the 1930’s and 1940’s conditioned him to believe the allegations that People’s Temple representatives made about the racism they claimed to be fleeing from in the U.S. I have been told, but was never able to substantiate with evidence, that the Guyanese Government agreed to allow the People’s Temple to bring agricultural equipment and other supplies into Guyana duty free.

The Government of Guyana had a policy of trying to attract immigration of black people from other Caribbean countries. This included efforts aimed at encouraging Guyanese, Jamaicans and others who were living in the U.S., Canada or England to go to Guyana, take up land in the interior and farm it. The People’s Temple agricultural community fitted in well with this policy.

The perception held by Guyanese officials and (to the extent there was any public awareness), the Guyanese public in 1976, during the first months after my arrival in Guyana, was that Jonestown was a model agricultural community.

By late 1977 and early 1978, Guyanese officials as well as the Embassy were aware of the allegations coming from California about strange practices at the People’s Temple in San Francisco and Jonestown. Some of the allegations seemed to be so extreme and contradictory of the local image projected by the People’s Temple, that the Guyanese tended to doubt the allegations or to give more credence to the People’s Temple spokesmen who claimed these stories were part of a conspiracy directed against them.
By November 1977, however, some Guyanese officials were privately expressing misgivings about the rumors, but apparently had no firm evidence to back up their misgivings. Immigration officials expressed concern over the numbers of old people that the People’s Temple was bringing into Guyana.

People’s Temple representatives in Georgetown were active in providing positive information to the press and at maintaining communication with prominent Guyanese as well as government officials.

It became generally known that Dr. Reid was a sort of patron of the People’s Temple. His motivation appeared to be simply that he believed in the objectives of the People’s Temple as they had been described to him. He could see the exemplary progress they had made in creating a socialist farming community in Jonestown, and reportedly believed the People’s Temple’s allegations that they were the subject of slander and attack by “reactionary forces” in the U.S.8

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8 Blacken wrote an addendum to this memorandum on December 6. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800141–0754)

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296. Memorandum of Conversation1

Georgetown, August 15, 1979

SUBJECT

Meeting with Senior Government Ministers—Georgetown, Guyana

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Philip C. Habib
Mr. Gavin R. Kennard, Minister of Agriculture
Mr. Hugh Desmond Hoyte, Minister of Economic Development and Cooperatives
Mr. Hubert O. Jack, Minister of Energy and Natural Resources
Mr. Frank E. Hope, Minister of Finance
Mr. Clarence Ellis, Chief of the State Planning Secretariat
American Ambassador to Guyana John R. Burke

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Minister of Economic Development and Cooperatives Hoyte opened the August 15 meeting between senior government ministers and Ambassador Habib² by summarizing Guyana’s current economic situation. He said Guyana had been reasonably successful in meeting the IMF financial targets at the cost of no economic growth. The Guyanese government is serious about reform, and, as a result, is increasingly unpopular. It is not willing, for example, to increase wages in the absence of economic growth. The biggest problem is the increased price of fuel. While Trinidad could help to alleviate this problem, its policy is not to extend credit.

Mr. Habib responded that he was reassessing the US role in the Caribbean, but that his initial impression was that increased economic development was the key to political and social stability. He praised Guyana’s efforts to meet the IMF guidelines as evidence of the political will to make tough decisions. Habib then asked for the ministers’ views on what the US role should be.

Minister of Energy Jack pointed to the pervasive impact of American culture on the region and said that rising expectations were beyond the capability of regional entities to satisfy. In such fragile economies the leaders are unable to deliver goods and services fast enough. The US should direct its development assistance toward development priorities identified by the countries themselves.

In addition to the Westminster tradition, Guyana follows the US lead on human rights, but human rights is a function of the state of a society. Human rights can only occur concomitantly with economic development and not in one big leap.

While there has been an upsurge of radicalism in the region, the US should not be overly concerned because the USSR is not in a position to exploit the situation. The US stand in Nicaragua has earned good will for the US.³

Minister of Finance Hope concurred that the region’s problems were economic and said individual states have a good probability for internal development if they are protected from external difficulties. While monetary assistance is important, the US must help the region to find market access on reasonable terms and use its influence in international forums.

² Habib visited the Caribbean August 12–23.
Minister of Agriculture Kennard said Guyana can make a major contribution to increased food production and self-sufficiency. US assistance in this area has been prompt and reasonably adequate. Guyana’s immediate need is equipment and spare parts which are not available due to foreign exchange constraints. He stressed the need for an AID project to supply equipment and spare parts so that progress in other areas (such as drainage) is not jeopardized.

Jack then asked for sympathetic assistance from the US for Guyana’s application to the World Bank to build the Upper Mazaruni hydroelectric/smelter project. He said Brazil has offered to loan Guyana $100 million to study the project. He stressed Guyana may be able to solve its energy problem which tied in with US policy to develop alternative energy sources. The weakening of CARICOM is the result of the economic difficulties of Guyana and Jamaica.

Habib agreed with the ministers on the importance of economic development as a fundamental element of stability and progress. The US maintains a general interest in the capacity of the region to work together. He said he would take an independent look at the hydro/smelter project (but made no promises) and would include the concept of increased food/fiber production in his report. Habib then expanded on US human rights policy by saying the US looks at the direction, not the movement, of human rights policy in a society and at how governments treat their own people. He defined human rights broadly to mean whether or not social development was allowed to occur.

In response to Mr. Warne’s question about CARICOM and integration, Hoyte said the US can exercise its influence by helping to stimulate regional trade and CARICOM, but that there would be no great change until economic problems are solved. It is difficult to get a common strategy on the rational location of industry and the collective use of resources because each leader must deliver to his own people. Many of the smaller islands do not see benefits in integration.

Hope commented that ECCM members have never given CARICOM a chance although the most certain way to increase trade in non-traditional exports was through regional trade. CARICOM can play a substantial role by providing markets for smaller manufacturers. While Guyana has not always benefited, it supports CARICOM and the con-

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4 In telegram 214000 to Georgetown, August 16, the Department responded to the Guyanese request for U.S. support, instructing the Embassy to express “our support for Guyana’s effort to develop alternate energy sources, but note that AID has been directed by the Congress to focus on basic human needs, i.e., agriculture, health, and education, leaving the funding of capital projects to the IFIs,” adding that IBRD “officials have told Desk Officer that, while they are sympathetic to the Guyanese request, it will be some time before they will be able to judge the feasibility of the entire Upper Mazaruni scheme.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790372-0250)
cept of an integrated market. Guyana develops a strong manufacturing sector; a strong CARICOM Secretariat provides the framework. Hoyte concluded by saying that the political heads of government must decide on a policy. The US is in a favorable position to help the region develop its own personality.

ACTION: Mr. Habib will take an independent look at the hydro-smelter project.\(^5\)

\(^5\) Not further identified.
Eastern Caribbean Mini-States

297. Action Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Luers) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Habib)

Washington, January 24, 1977

Request by Prime Minister Gairy of Grenada for Appointments with President Carter and Secretary Vance

The Problem

Prime Minister Gairy of Grenada will visit New York and Washington January 24–29 and has requested appointments with President Carter and Secretary Vance on January 26 or 28.

Background

Gairy will be here to attend a Congressional Prayer Breakfast at the White House January 27 and to confer with OAS officials regarding the OAS General Assembly scheduled to be held in Grenada this spring.

Gairy is irresponsible and sometimes irrational. (He has been referred to by other Caribbean leaders as the Idi Amin of the Caribbean.) He is in the habit of demanding that foreign leaders provide economic assistance for his impoverished mini-state. He made such a pitch to President Ford at a chance meeting at the UN, and he attempted to see the President again at last year’s Prayer Breakfast. He subsequently castigated the U.S. in general and President Ford by name for not providing “promised” assistance.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770021–2326. Confidential. Drafted by Thyden in ARA/CAR. Ortiz initialed the memorandum on January 25 and wrote, “Oral instructions to ARA.”

2 Luers may be referring to a U.S. Senate “prayer meeting” that Gairy attended on January 29, 1976. (Telegram 118 from Bridgetown, January 22, 1976; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760024–1045)

3 On October 7, 1976, Gairy made controversial comments about Ford at the United Nations. Gairy labeled Ford a “liar and a cheat” for not following through on a supposed aid commitment. (Telegram 4346 from USUN, October 11, 1976; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760382–0938)
Recommendation:

I propose to handle this by seeing Gairy myself. We have met before, and I can explain to Gairy that the President’s and the Secretary’s schedules do not permit a meeting at this time.\(^4\)

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\(^4\) Habib wrote “Discussed with Heavner in ARA” under the approve option. On January 25, during Gairy’s visit, he again attacked former President Ford in an “unpleasant incident at OAS lunch.” On January 28, he “had long meeting with Acting Assistant Secretary Luers, and he apparently left Washington mollified if not totally satisfied by that conversation,” despite receiving “no, repeat no, commitments [on aid] from USG.” (Telegram 22981 to Bridgetown, February 2; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770036-0600)

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298. Memorandum of Conversation\(^1\)

Washington, April 12, 1977, 9:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

Bilateral Aid, OASGA—Grenada

PARTICIPANTS

Barbados
R. Orlando Marville, Charge d’Affaires a.i., Embassy of Barbados

United States
David C. Pierce, Barbados Desk Officer (ARA/CAR)
Thomas Wolfson, newly assigned Consular Officer, AmEmbassy Bridgetown

Pierce and Wolfson called on Charge Marville to ask his thoughts on consular work in Barbados. After a long discussion comparing consular work in the United States and Barbados, Marville began to talk about U.S./Barbadian relations.

Bilateral Aid

Marville reiterated the “squeaky wheel gets the grease” theme—that Barbados and some other Caribbean countries are not receiving U.S. bilateral aid because they are not causing the U.S. enough trouble.\(^2\)

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P830077-1904. Confidential. Drafted by Pierce. The meeting took place in Marville’s office.

\(^2\) Barbados received $730,000 in economic assistance from the United States in FY 1977, but received less aid each successive year during the Carter Presidency. (USAID Greenbook) See footnote 3, Document 307.
He went on to say that he thought the bilateral assistance sought by his government was not grants or loans, but training for Barbadians in engineering and mid-level technology in U.S. institutions.

**OASGA—Grenada**

Marville said that the OAS General Assembly, scheduled for June in Grenada, “must go forward” for a number of reasons. He said the main reason was not Caribbean prestige—although this was a factor—but access by West Indians to the OAS bureaucracy. He said he thought the Latins would have to pay more attention to the emerging states of the Caribbean, now that their number would give them more clout in the OAS. Having the OASGA in Grenada would help to “awaken” the Latins to the problems faced by their Caribbean neighbors.

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299. Telegram From the Embassy in Barbados to the Department of State

Bridgetown, May 17, 1977, 1255Z

1101. Subject: Dominica: Independence, Socialism, External Aid.

Summary: During recent visit to Dominica, I conversed with several GOD officials, political leaders and others, with a view toward gaining additional insight into socio-political trends in the island. Based on these conversations, it became apparent that the GOD is determined that independence should be realized on Nov 4 this year;² that both the opposition and leaders of the business community accept independence as inevitable, though they have misgivings as to its consequences; and that the man in the street seems unenthusiastically disposed to follow government’s lead. The majority of members of the government appear to incline toward socialism of one variety or another, and Castro-style socialism is being championed by Roosevelt ("Rosie") Douglass, whose operations are thought to be funded by Havana. Not all Dominicans are socialists, however, and many regard us with favor. Nevertheless, all agree that the economy is in sorry condition and

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¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770179–0346. Confidential.

² In telegram 1244 from Bridgetown, May 31, the Embassy reported that John pushed back the date of independence to “sometime in the second or third week of December 1977 but not later than January 1978.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770195–0200)
external assistance is urgently needed. Most are prepared to have Dominica take aid from any source, without regard for ideological considerations.

Soon, the USG will have to concern itself with conduct of bilateral relations between Washington and Roseau, as well as the government’s position in international fora. Independent Dominica can be expected to be socialist, and the odds are 50–50 it will ultimately become a Cuban satellite. Though Embassy has argued for bilateral assistance to stem the gravitation toward Cuban-dominated independent island governments, the chance of success is conceded to be less in Dominica than elsewhere. Still, we believe the effort should be made. End summary.

1. During recent visit to Dominica, I held informal talks with Premier Patrick R. John and most of the members of his government, leader of the opposition Eugenia Charles, prominent local businessmen and others. Three themes—indepenedence, socialism and external aid—dominated the several conversations.

2. John and his colleagues in government have set November 4 of this year as the target date for independence and are not prepared to brook any delay. Both the opposition and business community accept independence as inevitable; Miss Charles continues to call for a popular referendum on the issue, however, and members of her party, as well as leading businessmen, have misgivings as to the possible consequences of a change in the island’s constitutional status. The man in the street seems disposed to follow the government’s lead, though without enthusiasm. The government’s draft constitution provides for a parliamentary democracy of the Westminster type but with a very powerful Prime Minister. Miss Charles told me, however, that she would prefer a republican form of government with an elected President and Prime Minister, the former having control of the defense and security apparatus.

3. Most members of the government appear to incline toward socialism of one variety or another, and Minister of Communications and Works Michael Douglas has publicly announced that, following independence, Dominica will be a socialist state. One of Douglas’ ministerial colleagues, while agreeing that the island’s future political development will be socialistic, assured me: “we are not extremists and we will not compromise our sovereignty.” Nevertheless, Castro-style socialism is not without its adherents, the most prominent of whom is Roosevelt “Rosie” Douglas, Michael’s younger brother, whose operations are thought to be funded by Havana. The Guyanese system of government also has its admirers. Not all Dominicans are socialist, however, and not a few fervently admire the US, its way of life and its values. In conversation with me, former Deputy Premier Ronald Armour expressed the view that the US should make a much greater
effort to influence Dominica public opinion in favor of free enterprise and democracy. Cuban and other Communist propaganda has been entering the island in an ever-increasing stream, I was told by several Dominicans.

4. The government, opposition and business community all agree that the country’s economy is in sorry condition (though disagreeing on the responsibility for such condition) and that external aid is urgently needed. Some hope that the necessary assistance will come from international organizations, others that the USG or Cuba/Guyana will provide it; most are prepared to have Dominica take aid from any source and would disregard ideological considerations. Minister of Home Affairs Ferdinand Parillon told me: “two million (dollars) would be nothing to the United States and it would make all the difference to us. But if we can’t get aid from you, we will go where we can get it, and inevitably we will regard those who help as better friends than those who refuse.” (When I observed that the US was already furnishing assistance through the Caribbean Development Bank, he replied that such aid was of little or no help to Dominica.)

5. What I learned in the course of my visit to Dominica was not new in its essence; press and other reports reaching the Embassy had indicated the way things were going politically and economically, but my talks and observations served to make the picture clearer. What emerges is a series of interrelated developments with clear—and, on the whole, unfavorable—implications for US interests. First, it is apparent that independence is imminent, and that the USG will have to concern itself shortly not only with the conduct of bilateral US-Dominican relations but also with the Dominican position in the UN and OAS. There will no doubt be difficulties in both respects. Second, it is evident that an independent Dominica will be socialist, though whether on the British, Guyanese or Cuban model remains to be seen. Given the island’s economic problems, the growing influence of leftist elements, and increasing Cuban propaganda and other activities, the odds that the Cuban model will ultimately prevail are 50–50. What the creation of a Cuban satellite in Dominica would mean for US interests in the area does not need to be spelled out. Finally, the government’s expectation of bilateral aid from the US, and the thinly veiled threat that, if none is forthcoming, Cuba may be invited in, suggest that US aid policy in the Eastern Caribbean be re-examined. The Embassy’s PARM submission

3 There is no record of Dominica receiving bilateral economic aid from the United States during the Carter administration. (USAID Greenbook)
dealt with the issue of bilateral versus regional aid at length. The arguments adduced in favor of a change need not be repeated here, but it should be noted that what we see as desirable for the area as a whole seems to us to apply with even greater force in Dominica, one of the two poorest states in the Eastern Caribbean. Admittedly, a bilateral program may have less chance of success in Dominica than in any of its neighbors, but we believe the effort should be made. To continue present policy and leave the people and government with the impression that the US has no concern for their problems is to tip the scales even further against democracy in that hapless island and perhaps in the Caribbean generally.

Simms

4 In its annual Policy Analysis and Resource Management submission for the Eastern Caribbean for FY 1978–1979, the Embassy advocated a change from the Carter administration’s plan to give solely regional assistance to the Eastern Caribbean. The Embassy argued for a policy of mixed bilateral and regional aid. (Telegram 723 from Bridgetown, March 31, and telegram 735 from Bridgetown, April 1; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770113–0914 and D770113–0688) See also Document 347.

300. Telegram From the Embassy in Barbados to the Department of State

Bridgetown, June 6, 1977, 1431Z

1297. Subj: St. Lucia Independence Update.

1. We have reported previously that St. Lucia Premier John Compton appears to doubt the ability of his United Workers Party (UWP) to win a general election and therefore wants independence from Britain without first going to the polls. But the opposition St. Lucia Labor Party (SLP), both still convinced of its ability to win an election and unconvinced that post-independence polls will be fair, remains determined to force a general election prior to independence. (Apparently fearing less than the required two-thirds vote, Compton does not want a referendum, the only other means provided by the Constitution for

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770201–0543. Confidential. Repeated for information to London.
demonstrating popular support for independence. The SLP is also opposed to a referendum because approval would mean independence under Compton, while a negative vote now would complicate going for independence later should they gain power.)

2. In recent discussion of HMG–GOSL consultations in London (April 27–28) the British Govt Rep to the Associated States2 (resident in St. Lucia), Eric Letocq (protect source), told an EmbOff on May 31 that HMG is not yet prepared to agree to independence for the island and that the British Govt’s request to Compton to prepare a “green paper on the benefits anticipated from independence” is basically a delaying maneuver on HMG’s part. However, Compton on his recent return from London, publicly portrayed this request as signifying that the road is clear for early independence. Letocq says that his gov’t—as much as it would like to be rid of the island—cannot go before Parliament requesting independence for St. Lucia without some concrete indication that the step is the will of the people. Compton’s Senior Minister, George Mallet, obliquely acknowledged to same Embassy officer that independence is not to be expected soon, but rather that it is more likely to occur up to a year in the future.

3. Based on a June 1 conversation with the opposition SLP’s deputy political leader, George Odlum, the opposition seems confident—as now seems to be the case—that HMG will not agree to independence without a general election.3 However, the SLP, while still reasonably confident it could hand the UWP an electoral defeat, is increasingly worried that Compton’s moves to improve the island’s economic outlook could make him a more formidable opponent than its leaders had thought. Odlum stated that a quick call for a general election by Compton is now a real possibility.

4. Comment: Premier Compton is an astute, if not very popular politician, and it is hard to understand his continued posturing on independence unless (A) he thinks the British, wishing to strengthen his hand against the leftists in SLP, will give in and grant independence without an election or (B) he has plans to call a sudden general election as soon as he has chalked up a few more economic development coups.

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2 The West Indies Associated States was the collective name for islands in the Eastern Caribbean whose status changed in 1967 from being British colonies to states in free association with the United Kingdom. These states included Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Christopher-Nevis-Anguilla, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent.

3 A summary of Odlum’s meeting with Political/Economic Officer Bruce F. Porter is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P830077–1906.
to actually materialize. Another possible explanation for Compton’s behavior is that HMG’s recent stiffening in its position on the electoral precondition for independence caught him out on a limb, unable to back down gracefully and save face. Based on the recent conversation with Letocq, we now see it even less likely than before that the British Govt will agree to St. Lucia’s independence without a general election. Thus if Compton decides not to gamble on an election, the island’s break with Britain could conceivably be delayed until as late as mid-1979, the date a general election is constitutionally required.

Simms

4 In telegram 1004 from Bridgetown, April 12, 1978, the Embassy reported that Hess Oil had begun construction of an oil refinery in St. Lucia. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780159–0112)


301. Memorandum of Conversation

Grenada, June 14, 1977

PARTICIPANTS

US
- The Secretary
- Mr. Habib
- Ambassador Todman
- Frances Armstrong, L/ARA (notetaker)

GRENADA
- Prime Minister Eric Gairy

Prime Minister Gairy welcomed Secretary Vance by stating that he wanted pictures but no handshakes. He explained that the last time he had shaken hands was with President Ford who promised assistance but didn’t come through and that he had followed that experience by making a speech in the UN in which he said it was bad enough for the developed countries not to help developing nations but it was even worse for them to make promises and not keep them.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770138–1310. Confidential. Drafted by Armstrong; approved by Twaddell on July 12. Vance was in Grenada June 14–16 to attend the OAS General Assembly session. In telegram 14 from Grenada, June 15, the Delegation reported on the June 14 opening of the OASGA. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770214–0079)
He noted that Grenada was a small but vibrant island which made important contributions in international fora but that, as a former British colony, it needed everything from pins to airports. He mentioned he had met with Assistant Secretary Todman in Washington and given him a shopping list. He also noted that President Carter favored giving economic assistance to democratic countries and that Grenada surely qualified under that criterion. In his view, the way to help was not through the Caribbean Development Bank, which was full of bad bankers and bad businessmen, but through bilateral assistance. He described Grenada as the smallest and poorest of the countries in our backyard—as a special case, in which a small amount of assistance could make a big difference.

Secretary Vance then asked him to comment on the dimensions of Grenada’s fiscal problems.

Gairy responded that they were grave. He noted that after 150 years of British rule, Grenada had been left without revenue or ongoing projects. He said that each month they collected a certain amount of money from import duties, etc., but that they never had enough to pay salaries. Noting that they were strong believers in God, he lamented the fact that they were always short some EC$500,000 monthly.

He then went into the subject of development assistance. He noted that Canada had given Grenada some assistance, explaining his reference in the morning to Canada as Grenada’s bigger brother in the Western Hemisphere, and said that, while they had received some assistance from OAS countries, they had also gotten ugly comments from the OAS. He singled out the United States as the first country to say it wouldn’t give Grenada any special assistance for the OASGA as it already paid 60% of the OAS budget and couldn’t have a conference in a small place like Grenada. Gairy was quick to declare that they had met all their commitments to the OAS and had provided a conference room as good as any. He then noted that God had endowed Grenada with the natural qualifications for a tourist industry, that Grenada always voted with the United States in international fora (except on the Israeli question, which, he explained, got tangled up with women’s rights), and that Grenada was the strongest in the Caribbean against Communism. (As an example of the last point, he mentioned the problems he had with the Communist Youth movement, which had tried to close down the port, and pointed out that he had won 8 of 10

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2 Gairy presented Assistant Secretary Todman with “a long shopping list” of requests for U.S. assistance. Todman offered no firm commitments. (Telegram 104270 to Bridgetown, May 7; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770166–0222)
He then asked what he got for his support of the US internationally. His answer: passive resistance in the State Department. He noted that the last time he went to the Department, there had been a feeling of understanding and cordiality for the first time in twenty years, but nothing more.

Gairy then made a plea for Grenada to be considered a special case. He described all the other independent countries in the Caribbean as having substantial natural resources and being highly industrialized and he stressed again his view that Grenada would have been taken over by the Communists if his political party had not been strong. He then asked for special consideration, for some immediate economic cooperation, noting that the United States has on occasion run to the assistance of countries whose ideologies were far removed from its own. He pointed to Grenada’s bad roads and bad water facilities and commented that Canada was giving some assistance and that Great Britain was not in a position to do much.

The Secretary asked what he was doing to combat Grenada’s fiscal problems. Gairy responded that he was trying to get a loan but that it was taking some time to implement. He then spoke of his fight for the disadvantaged people. He said that when people were working in Grenada for US 16¢ a day, he put up a fight for $1.00 a day and that some questioned his wanting to raise the wage. Gairy described his long fight against the British as bitter but noted with satisfaction the wage was now up to $6 a day. He commented that what Grenada needed was a good economic shot in the arm.

The Secretary responded by saying he could not make any commitments, but that he was sympathetic and wanted to learn. He asked what Gairy was doing to solve the economic problem. Was he borrowing from the Caribbean Bank? What were the fiscal dimensions of the problem?

Gairy replied that they were borrowing but that the Caribbean Bank had not been very responsive to Grenada’s problems. He said he had asked that money in the Caribbean Development Bank be placed at the disposal of the eastern Caribbean countries, but nothing had come of this. He also mentioned that the United States has taken out money.

Gairy then briefly described Grenada’s development priorities. He began by noting that Grenada’s second industry was the tourist industry, but people couldn’t get here at night. In his view, an international

3 Shortly before and immediately after Grenada achieved independence on February 7, 1974, a series of strikes shut down Grenadian ports. Prime Minister Gairy tried to link the strikes to Communist subversion efforts. The ports reopened after the government acceded to most of the workers’ demands on March 1, 1974. (Telegram 568 from Bridgetown, March 1, 1974; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D740072-0710)
airport is the most vital concomitant to development. He said that at one time there had been a recommendation that St. Lucia, Antigua, and Grenada have international airports, and that the first two now have them but Grenada doesn’t. He also said he was interested in developing light industry to absorb the unemployment and that Grenada’s agriculture, its first industry, needed intensification and diversification. Gairy commented that Grenada’s lands were fertile, that anything could grow here, but that they needed money.

He also made a plea for technical assistance, saying he had had a lot of promises from his Latin American brothers and from leaders in Africa, but nothing had ever come of them. He spoke of a conversation he had had with Dr. Williams of Trinidad and Tobago, who expressed the opinion that some people wanted to recolonize the Caribbean. Gairy said he had disagreed and that he believed the Latin Americans were genuinely interested in Grenada. However, he went on to describe a bad experience he had had with the Venezuelans. On one occasion, the President of Venezuela had invited him and even sent a plane for him. Perez promised to give Grenada $5 million at that time—actually $2 million in cash and $3 million from the emergency fund in the UN; but it took four months to get approximately $770,000. Gairy went up to New York to investigate and learned that there was no money left in the emergency fund. He went again the next year, and the Secretary General told him that Venezuela had earmarked funds in the emergency fund for Honduras but the UN wouldn’t accept earmarked funds and had sent them back. Later UN officials told him the fund had been converted into an agricultural fund. Consequently, Grenada never received either the $2 million or the $5 million promised.

Gairy summarized his experiences of unfulfilled promises by noting that while the grass was growing, the horse was starving. He said countries had come and made surveys, but nothing had happened, and Grenada has had difficulties in meeting its most urgent commitments. He characterized the people of Grenada as hard workers, willing to undertake self-help projects.

The Secretary then asked Asst. Secretary Todman whether he had information on all this in Washington.

Ambassador Todman replied that Gairy had presented complete details when they met, including the idea of someone coming down to Grenada.

The Secretary noted again that he was not one to make promises, that he would like to take what Gairy had said and study the details of various projects.

Ambassador Todman then suggested it would be helpful if Gairy had something in writing.
Gairy replied that he had anticipated this request. (He presented a document\(^4\) and illustrated his point with a story about a fellow who went to a bank to borrow money but left his account number, paper, and pen at home.)

At this point, the Secretary asked Gairy what he saw as the balance between agriculture and light industry in his development program.

Gairy allowed that there was more room for light industry, but said there was little more Grenada could do in agriculture. With regard to light industry, he commented that Grenada had many young people unemployed, dexterous people, who could do things for export. He said he would definitely give thought to more light industry on the island.

The Secretary then asked if he had any idea how much it would cost to expand the airport.

Gairy replied that they had done several surveys but that costs had been increasing over the years. He remembered the last survey—for two airstrips—was in the region of US$ 17–18 million. He mentioned that the Arab League countries took a look at this and voted $14 million. Gairy said he didn’t want to go around us, that he would like assistance from us and would use this offer only as a last resort.

Ambassador Todman asked Gairy for the name of another agency outside the CDB which Grenada could use for development assistance.

Gairy said he had previously mentioned the ECCA, Eastern Caribbean Currency Agency, but that the best way to do it was bilaterally. He stressed that nothing was wrong with bilateral assistance in special cases, and Grenada was a special case.

The Secretary closed by saying he would take a hard look at what Gairy had given him and see if he needed to present anything else.

Gairy commented that Grenada had failed in the past when promises were made and not kept, but that he couldn’t see how his country could fail when no promises were made.

\(^4\) Not found.

1. At end of two-hour-long meeting with Under Secretary Habib yesterday (June 22), Minister of External Affairs Henry Forde raised question of US naval facility in Barbados. (Other subjects discussed being reported by memcon.) Forde observed that he—and he believed his colleagues in the Cabinet—accepted the continued operation of the facility, provided mutually acceptable terms could be agreed upon. He also said that, pending conclusion of new agreement, GOB was prepared to extend present one for periods of six months at a time.

2. Forde pointed out, however, that GOB still believes compensation is due it for past use of base. Barbados has made significant contribution to Western defense and has been loyal friend of US, he added, and USG cannot simply dismiss its claim on basis that no action ever taken to implement promise made in 1961 to provide economic assistance and other benefits.

3. Comment: Department will readily recognize that present GOB position is considerably more forthcoming than position stated by Forde in conversation with US negotiating team leader Heavner on May 13.

Simms

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770225–0896. Confidential; Priority.

2 In telegram 1403 from Bridgetown, June 16, the Embassy reported that the renewal of the lease for the U.S. naval facility in Barbados was complicated by an agreement between Barbados and Great Britain involving the transfer of land from the British Admiralty to the Government of Barbados. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770215–0364)

3 Not found. Habib visited Bridgetown June 21–22.

4 Negotiations for extension of the lease began on May 13. The State Department authorized the Embassy in Bridgetown to offer a one-time payment of $200,000 to the Government of Barbados as a negotiating strategy. (Telegram 109396 to Bridgetown, May 13; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770169–1039)

5 Barbadian officials alleged that American officials had reneged on a promise made in 1961 to provide Barbados with economic aid in return for the establishment of a U.S. naval facility on the island. American officials stated that no such promise was ever made.

6 On May 13, Forde informed Heavner that Barbadian officials had not yet decided whether “continued US military presence in Barbados is desirable.” (Telegram 1081 from Bridgetown, May 14; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770171–1236) A six-month extension of the lease was granted on July 29. (Telegram 1788 from Bridgetown, July 29; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770272–1151)
303. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, August 9, 1977

SUBJECT
Call by Dominican Attorney General Leo Austin on Deputy Assistant Secretary
Bill Stedman

PARTICIPANTS
ARA Deputy Assistant Secretary, William Stedman
ARA/CAR Desk Officer Dave Pierce (notetaker)
Attorney General Leo Austin of Dominica

During the course of a 45 minute discussion, Deputy Assistant Secretary Stedman and Attorney General Austin made the following points.

1. Dominican Independence

Austin said Dominica would probably become independent January 31, 1978. He said the date was not final, but he expected it to be no later than the end of January. After Stedman offered the Department’s best wishes for independence, Austin said Dominica intended to invite the U.S. Ambassador Frank Ortiz as well as ARA Assistant Secretary Todman to the independence celebrations.

2. U.S./Dominican Relationships

Austin said he would like an understanding of U.S. policies and interests in the Eastern Caribbean. Dominica did not want to create any problems for the U.S., to which Mr. Stedman replied that he did not expect Dominica to cause us problems.

3. Training of Dominican Diplomats

Austin said Under Secretary Habib had told him he would look favorably on a request to train Dominican diplomats. Mr. Pierce, recalling that Habib promised to look into the possibilities of training, said the USG was unable to provide direct training for foreign diplomats. He provided a list of U.S. universities offering training in public diplomacy and offered to arrange appointments for Austin with some of

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P830077–1919. Confidential. Drafted by Pierce; cleared by Wheeler.
2 See Document 310.
3 After accompanying Secretary Vance to the OAS General Assembly session, Habib visited Port of Spain, Georgetown, and Bridgetown. No record of a meeting with Austin was found.
the schools while he was in Washington. (Austin called on Dean Wolfe, American University, on August 10)

4. Security

Austin said Dominica had a difficult security problem and that the police were not adequately trained or equipped. He repeated Patrick John’s June 7 request to Under Secretary Habib for a launch and electronic security equipment for the police and the defense force. Stedman replied that the executive branch wanted to be helpful to governments needing police assistance, but that Congress has made it impossible for the U.S. to provide equipment or training for police forces. He said that some governments had been able to buy surplus security equipment from local police forces in the U.S., but that the Federal Government could not be involved. He also gave Austin a catalogue listing firms which supply police equipment commercially.

Mr. Pierce added that F.A.A. is willing to offer a two week course to a Dominican in aviation security some time in 1978, and said Austin should be in touch with Embassy Bridgetown about the time of independence. (F.A.A. has reserved a space for one Dominican at a date to be determined in calendar year 1978 under terms similar to 76 State 266432).

5. Treaty Relationships

Austin said Dominica wanted U.S. views on whether simple succession to the U.K. double taxation treaty under which it is now covered would be appropriate, or whether the U.S. would want any modifications. Stedman said in general we had no problems with present treaties, but we would ask the tax experts and get back to him.

6. Dual Nationals

Austin asked if there would be any problem of dual nationality for Dominican-born naturalized U.S. citizens. Stedman said that naturalization as a U.S. citizen required renunciation of all other allegiances, but it was up to the Dominican government to determine whether such renunciation would lead to loss of Dominican citizenship.

7. Membership in International Organizations

Austin indicated that Dominica would want to join a number of international organizations on independence and asked for U.S. sup-

4 A summary of Premier Patrick John’s June 7 meeting with Habib is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P830077–1908.

5 In telegram 266432 to Bridgetown, October 28, 1976, the Department reported that there was enough funding from the FAA to allow foreign nationals to train at the FAA Transportation Safety Institute in Oklahoma City. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760403–1214)
port. Stedman said the U.S. would be glad to support Dominican membership applications, and asked that the Dominicans send the U.S. a formal note naming the specific organizations. In response to a question by Austin, Stedman said the U.S. would not be able to help Dominica pay its international organization dues.

8. U.S. Assistance

Austin indicated that a new airport was Dominica’s highest development priority, but they had been unable to raise the funds from international sources. When asked if the U.S. could help, Stedman replied that in recent years A.I.D. has been unable to assist with such infrastructure projects. He said A.I.D. hopes to expand its assistance to the Caribbean and had embarked on a new effort to encourage economic development in the Caribbean.

Stedman said there was new heightened interest in the Caribbean and that a new Deputy Assistant Secretary had been brought on primarily to focus on the Caribbean. Finally, he indicated that most U.S. aid would come through regional and multilateral institutions but that we were looking at all possible ways to assist development efforts in the region, within the limitations imposed by Congress.

9. O.P.I.C.

Austin said that a construction cost overrun from a port expansion project financed by the CDB had led to a problem with O.P.I.C. Austin said that CDB President Demas had refused initially to loan Dominica the $235,000 to cover the cost overrun, but had indicated that he would visit Dominica in September to discuss the matter with Premier John.

10. Meeting with LA/CAR, ARA/CAR and EB/OIA Offices

In a subsequent meeting with Bill Wheeler (LA/CAR), Dave Pierce (ARA/CAR), and Bill Black (EB/OIA), Austin discussed the O.P.I.C. problem in detail. He indicated that the CDB had initiated the port development project and had provided the initial feasibility studies which later proved faulty and led to the cost overrun claim. Austin confirmed that he had personally reached agreement with the contractor, Construction Aggregates, on settlement of the overrun but Dominica did not have the resources to make the payment. Dominica wanted to increase their loan from the CDB to cover the overruns. The CDB was willing to lend additional funds for other port facilities (sheds, lighting, etc.) but to date had been unwilling to finance the overrun.

In response to inquiries from Mr. Austin, Wheeler indicated that AID is prepared to consider additional assistance benefiting Dominica and the other LDCs in the Eastern Caribbean. Under its current legislation, A.I.D. is directed to concentrate on programs benefiting the lower income groups with specific emphasis on agriculture, health and educa-
tion. A.I.D. no longer financed major infrastructure such as airports but was prepared to consider such things as feeder roads or marketing facilities supporting small farmer agriculture.

A.I.D. had tentatively programmed for FY 1977 and FY 1978 new loans totalling approximately $20 million to the Caribbean Development Bank for relending primarily to the LDCs and Barbados and was prepared to provide certain other technical assistance and training primarily through regional mechanisms. While A.I.D. anticipated continuing to use the CDB as the primary channel for capital assistance, it was prepared to work with other regional institutions and consider alternative approaches, particularly in sectors such as health where the CDB is not active.

Wheeler also reported that A.I.D. is willing to send survey teams in agriculture, education and health to Dominica and other LDCs of the Eastern Caribbean within the next few months to review with local officials what they consider to be priority needs as the initial steps in developing additional assistance programs.

304. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 9, 1977, 1:30 p.m.

SUBJECT
President Carter/Prime Minister Gairy—Bilateral

PARTICIPANTS
GRENADA
Sir Eric Gairy, Prime Minister and
Minister of Defense, Home, and
External Affairs, and Minister of
Information Services, Public
Relations, Tourism, Lands and
Surveys, and Natural Resources

U.S.
The President
The Secretary of State
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
Assistant Secretary Todman
Ambassador Frank V. Ortiz
Mr. Robert Pastor, NSC

Panama Canal Treaties

The President thanked Sir Eric for his presence at the treaties signing ceremony which was a demonstration to the American people of

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 23, Grenada, 1/77–2/79. Confidential. Drafted by Ortiz. The meeting took place at the White House.
the support in Latin America for this important step. The President also expressed his appreciation for Sir Eric’s support for the U.S. human rights initiatives at the meeting in Grenada of the OAS General Assembly. As the host government, Grenada’s support was particularly helpful.

O.A.S. General Assembly

Sir Eric said he wished to reciprocate by thanking the President for the support of the United States for holding the conference in Grenada. Despite doubts expressed earlier by some, the conference had been a success. The position taken by the U.S. was a key factor in this outcome.

U.S. Economic Assistance

The President advised the Prime Minister that very shortly three A.I.D. survey teams would go to Grenada. The teams hoped to work harmoniously with Grenadian officials to see what steps could be taken to assist in agriculture, public health, and education. The President said our sending the teams showed our interest in finding ways to assist Grenada, but at the same time we should not raise expectations too high.

Grenadian Needs for Assistance

Sir Eric said Grenada made no bones about being a friend of the United States. Despite this, Grenada had in the past encountered a negative response in the United States. He believes the United States should help Grenada, the smallest and the friendliest of the states in the hemisphere. Sir Eric said he wanted the United States to treat Grenada as a separate entity and not lose it in a mound of nations. Grenada wants direct assistance, not through regional entities. Although Grenada is the smallest country in the hemisphere, Sir Eric said it is a country which does not flirt with communism, nor does it try impractical socialist experiments as do other Caribbean countries. However, he said there is a small group of young Grenadians trained in foreign universities who were beginning to agitate, spread communist literature and be otherwise disruptive. However, the Grenadian people had strong religious beliefs and spiritual fortitude and thus far were immune.

Sir Eric said that God was especially good to Grenada. Each month since independence the national government had just barely been able to collect enough money to pay the salaries of government employees. Grenada has no resources; it just depends on agriculture and tourism. A good geological survey might find oil. Grenada’s infrastructural system needed considerable investment. Work is needed on roads, schools and airports. Grenada needs assistance to remain politically
stable. After recounting the electoral history of his political party (hasn’t lost an election in 26 years), he said he was concerned with the great number of unemployed young people who might be susceptible to extremist solutions. He said there is outside support for the Marxists, either from Cuba or China. His young people need jobs. Grenada needs funds to close the door to communist penetration. The President said that he hoped the A.I.D. survey teams could recommend what steps would be most effective. The first team will leave in early October.

Unidentified Flying Objects (UFO’s)

Sir Eric then alluded to a resolution he has introduced on the agenda of the U.N. General Assembly proposing an international study of UFO’s, as well as a study of psychic and other related phenomena. He asked whether the President could support the resolution. Sir Eric addressed a special congress held in Acapulco, Mexico on these matters and considers he has a mandate to attempt to clarify up to now inexplicable events. He mentioned cases of UFO sightings in Grenada.

Secretary Vance recalled that the U.S. Air Force a few years ago had issued a report on its review of reported sightings of UFO’s. He recalled that in about 5% of the documented cases no explanation could be found for the occurrences. The President requested that Ambassador Ortiz make the report available to Sir Eric if it has been declassified. Sir Eric said he thought it was important that an international study of UFO’s be made and that is what he is pressing for in his resolution. He is convinced the planet earth was not the only thing God created.

Psychic Phenomena

Sir Eric also cited his interest in having an international gathering of philosophers, scientists, theologians, and political leaders convened to arrive at a common concept of God. He considered no subject to be more important, and noted differing concepts of God. He felt a serious effort to arrive at a consensus on the nature of God would contribute to world concord. Sir Eric also said that there was a yearning for mystical experiences. There followed a discussion of a charismatic movement in the Christian churches indicative of a widespread interest in greater spirituality.

U.S. Military Facilities

Sir Eric said that there was no U.S. military base in Grenada and he believed there should be. When asked the reason for his desire for a base, Sir Eric said that an American presence would be a good thing for Grenada which has a good location, close to the South American continent.

Sir Eric gave the President copies of his speeches, for which the President thanked him.
On taking leave, Sir Eric said he hoped to see the President in New York during the U.N. General Assembly.\footnote{2}

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnote{2 For another account of this meeting, see Ortiz, \textit{Ambassador Ortiz: Lessons From a Life of Service}, p. 120.}
\end{footnotesize}

\subsection*{305. Telegram From the Embassy in Barbados to the Department of State\footnote{1}}

\textit{Bridgetown, October 6, 1977, 1918Z}

2415. USUN for Amb Young; NSC for Pastor; ARA for Todman and Shelton. Subject: Why Barbados Sulks: Understanding and Working With the Barbadians. Ref: Georgetown 2123.\footnote{2}

1. It now should be abundantly clear that Barbados may be one of our more difficult neighbors. This proud island almost alone would not send a special representative to Washington for the Panama Treaties ceremonies. Aside from Cuba it is the only Western Hemisphere country not to sign the Declaration of Washington. Furthermore, there is firsthand evidence (Georgetown 2123) that Barbados attempted to dissuade Guyana from participating in the ceremonies and from signing the Declaration.

2. The behavior of Barbadian leaders for several months can be described as bordering on the perverse. It is externalized by adherence to the strictest possible protocol code. Only after persuasion did Prime Minister Adams agree to receive Ambassador Andrew Young.\footnote{3}

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnote{1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770365–0954, Confidential; Limdis. Repeated for information to Georgetown, Kingston, Port of Spain, and USUN.}
\footnote{2 In telegram 2123 from Georgetown, September 5, Blacken described overhearing a telephone conversation between Guyanese Foreign Minister Wills and Barbadian Foreign Minister Forde, in which Forde urged Wills not to send a delegation to the Panama Canal Treaties signing ceremony or sign the OAS Declaration of Washington. A delegation from Guyana attended the event. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770321–0645)}
\footnote{3 Andrew Young visited Barbados from August 15 to 17. Prime Minister Adams did meet with Young. (Telegram 2643 from USUN, August 18; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770299–0287)}
\end{footnotesize}
ously he would not see Under Secretary Habib. The Foreign Ministry advised that while Adams would be in Barbados during the previously projected visit by Assistant Secretary Todman it “is not known” if he could receive Mr. Todman. Earlier it was made clear that Adams expected to have a long talk with President Carter in September. Word that he would not see the President, but that Jamaican Prime Minister Manley would, was resented here. Throughout this period of stiff-necked behavior Barbados demanded rather than requested substantial bilateral assistance from the U.S. and was acid in its comments on our assistance to Jamaica and Guyana.

3. The Barbadians must be among the most correct, most pleasant, and most well-disposed of peoples anywhere. What could explain their near-churlish behavior? This cable is my assessment.

4. Barbados is accustomed to having a “special relationship” with the U.K. For centuries it basked in its image as the “brightest jewel” in the British crown. Aptly this island is called a little England in recognition of its profound attachment to most things British. It is a cause for special pride that soon the Queen will visit Barbados for the third time, a mark of distinction few other members of the Commonwealth can claim. For generations Barbados enjoyed a favored place in the British world. Its highly-educated and efficient civil servants were long employed in positions of responsibility throughout the empire. There is a touch of self-satisfaction and a sense of superiority bordering on arrogance in the governing circles of Barbados. Many have “old boy” connections dating from university days in Cambridge, Oxford, the University of London and other elite British institutions.

5. Prime Minister and Minister of Finance Adams, a product of British elitism, is a personage of note and is accustomed to special treatment within the Commonwealth. He has just been host to his Commonwealth Finance Minister colleagues and acted as Commonwealth spokesman in Washington. Unusual courtesies are extended him by the British. When he goes to London he is invited to Buckingham Palace and 10 Downing Street. His father was knighted by the King and his mother and his wife are English. He finds the American style somewhat strange and not altogether pleasing. Many of his top Ministers share Adams’ general background and orientation. Foreign Minister Forde quipped to a close friend that he considers himself an “Afro-Saxon.” It is such men who formulate Barbadian policy towards the U.S.

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5 Assistant Secretary Todman visited Barbados from November 25 to 27 but did not meet with Prime Minister Adams. (Telegram 2890 from Bridgetown, November 28; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770440–0698) See Document 307.
6. With the decline of British power Barbados finds itself able to rely less and less on the heretofore always available British support. Barbados leaders speak of this phenomenon with a surprising lack of recrimination. It is simply a fact that Mother England no longer can provide the support Barbados requires to maintain its relatively high standard of living at a time when this island is experiencing economic difficulties.

7. Enter the U.S. which Barbados sees in the role of a new metropole with which many important links are already forged. Barbados is stunned, outraged, and perplexed to discover that in U.S. eyes there is no “special relationship” for Barbados. Barbados with one of the oldest Parliaments in the Western Hemisphere; some of the deepest-rooted democratic institutions; and unbroken series of free, democratic elections; a literacy rate higher than that of the U.S.; a human rights record second to none and a tradition of friendship and loyalty to the U.S., is incredulous that the U.S., 1) seems to overlook all these attributes and 2) bestows its favors on such undeserving countries as Guyana and Jamaica having none of them. Almost as bad in Barbadian eyes is the tendency of the U.S. either to lump Barbados with the impoverished island states of the Eastern Caribbean or with the Spanish-speaking Caribbean Basin states. In short Barbados suffers from an acute sense of unrequited admiration, isolation and rejection.

8. Exasperation over the disinclination of the U.S. to enter into a “special relationship” leads Barbadian leaders into tactical errors in judgment which make the situation worse. Convinced that to gain our attention they must be a Peck’s Bad Boy among nations, Barbados adopts perverse positions at variance with its tradition of moderation and cooperation. The excessive demands by Barbados for the renewal of the agreement for the small naval facility on the island is a good example of the attitudinal problems we face here. The GOB seeks to escalate almost any problem with the U.S., be it a civil aviation question, U.S. surveillance of a Russian naval force off Barbados or even consular matters, into a vital question of relations between the two countries.

9. Understanding the problem here is not the same thing as dealing with it. There are disturbing paradoxes. I find it notable that the U.K. and Canada can restrict immigration greatly and the UK can pare back its assistance, and these steps are understood and accepted. On the other hand actions by the U.S. not wholly in accord with Barbadian desires are resented and openly berated by Barbadian leaders in unrestrained terms. A case in point is the incident off Barbados on July 22 of this year. 1500 Soviet seamen and only 24 American airmen were involved, yet we were castigated publicly for showing “utter contempt” for Barbados (Deputy Prime Minister St. John) and as being guilty of
“reprehensible” behavior (Prime Minister Adams). No public criticism of the Soviets was heard. Do Barbadians perhaps believe we are more responsive to abuse? Do they admire us so much that they will always expect more of us than from others?

10. I believe sound relations between the U.S. and Barbados will come only when both sides have a more realistic appreciation of the relative significance that each country has for the other. Arriving at this stage will be a long and, at times, mutually painful experience; but in the end the coincidence of the basic interests of the two countries will prevail. I am convinced we shall attain a sound relationship with this very special island.

11. Other countries in the area have even more difficult leaders and are far more antagonistic to the U.S. than Barbados. Yet through sympathetic understanding we make headway in our relations with them. With skillful moves we should be able to move Barbados out of the doldrums.

12. My experience to date fortifies my earliest impression that generally we should cut the rhetoric and let our deeds speak for us. However, there are public actions we can take to reassure Barbados that we appreciate its special status. In the process of taking them we learn to appreciate Barbados’ unique worth. In the short term I recommend we consider the following steps:

A. We should focus a favorable spotlight on Barbados: at an early date a leading U.S. spokesman, the higher the better, should in a public statement draw attention to such Barbados attributes as those listed in para 7 above. The President’s message on the November 30 National Day is one opportunity. U.S. statements in the human rights context or in public discussion of “Third World” nations in which company Barbados is a star would be other opportunities. I shall do the same here but it’s not the same thing.

B. We should support Barbados as the site for international meetings and for meeting by U.S. groups. I would hope the next Caribbean U.S. Ambassadors’ conference could meet here.

C. An early visit to Washington by Prime Minister Adams with calls on the President and the Secretary is desirable. Perhaps this would

6 This incident, involving a number of vessels and two aircraft near the Barbadian coast, led Barbadian officials to request American assistance to identify them. It was determined that the ships were Soviet and the aircraft were American, surveilling the Soviet ships. Barbados’s daily newspaper, The Advocate-News, reported the Government of Barbados was “annoyed” with the United States “from the supposition that US authorities had long known of presence of Soviet vessels and failed to notify GOB.” (Telegram 1700 from Bridgetown, July 25; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770264–0890)
be best arranged after the Barbadians’ more unreasonable expectations on the naval facility renegotiation and on economic assistance are laid to rest. We’re making fast progress on both counts.

D. High level U.S. officials should make it a point to visit Barbados but only after there are assurances they will be appropriately received here. These visits would help lead Barbadians to a more realistic appreciation of U.S. policies.

E. We should consult more often with Barbados in Washington, New York and here.

13. These steps would be helpful mainly in assuaging Barbadian pride, but they would support Barbados’ growth in international stature and as a role model for Third World nations to emulate.

14. The basic question remains as to whether or not we want or could sustain a “special relationship” with Barbados. I use the word sustain because Barbados must understand that we are not prepared to pay a high price for a “special relationship” and that we have a plethora of friendly nations to which we are already closely bound. Our goal should be to reassure Barbados of our appreciation of its unique worth, but to assure that a mutual sense of realism be the single most characteristic element of our relationship.

Ortiz

306. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Barbados

Washington, October 31, 1977, 2320Z


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1 Source: Department of State, INR/IL Files, Transfer Identification Number 98064300018, Folder: Bridgetown 1967–79. Secret; Roger Channel. Drafted by Pierce; cleared in INR/DDC/OIL and ARA/CAR; approved by McAfee.
Henry Forde, Barbadian Minister of External Affairs, said recently that officials of the Government of Barbados (GOB) plan to use the results of the base rights negotiations for domestic politics. If the U.S. Government (USG) decides to give up its naval base in Barbados, the GOB will say that the USG refused to offer adequate compensation and will take credit for standing up to the USG and for getting rid of the foreign military base. However, GOB officials would prefer to obtain an agreement, within reasonable limits, and then GOB spokesmen will point out that the previous administration was not able to get anything for the use of the base. Another incentive for the Adams’ administration to work toward reaching an agreement with the USG over the base lease is that, if the USG does not renew the lease, opposition forces in Barbados will claim that while the Barrow administration did not obtain money for rental of the base, at least the base provided employment for Barbadians.

According to Forde, the central point of the negotiations from the GOB view deals with payment for the use of Barbadian facilities by USG personnel at the Navy base, such as the use of roads, airports, and ports. GOB officials are requesting 20 million U.S. dollars as a one-time payment for past and current use of these facilities. They believe that, since the lease is still current and under operation, this payment can not be termed as retroactive by the USG.

End quote.

Vance

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Errol Barrow served as Prime Minister of Barbados from 1966 to 1976. He was defeated by Adams during the 1976 national elections.
307. Telegram From the Embassy in Barbados to the Department of State

Bridgetown, November 28, 1977, 1830Z

2894. For the Secretary from Assistant Secretary Todman. Subj: Barbados Visit Highlights.

1. A three day working visit to Barbados has done much to get our relations with Prime Minister Adams and his government back on the tracks, though base negotiation and some other issues remain unresolved. Caribbean cooperation, bi-lateral aid, Belize, and the regional security situation also discussed.

2. Belize: ForMin Forde and others were unequivocal in their support for PM Price of Belize and his refusal to consider a territorial cession to Guatemala in order to achieve early independence. Forde said neither GOB nor the Caribbean governments would lean on Price to accept cession. Forde also said that the GOB has reliable information that Cuba does have possible ambitions in Belize, and wondered whether Price might not decide to accept Cuban military and security assistance as a desperation measure, though GOB and other Caribbean governments would continue to advise him against it. Forde and others also made plain that they believe USG influence in Guatemala is strong enough to force a solution without cession if we wish. I assured them we are in no position to force a solution on either party. Our only wish is to see a peaceful, negotiated settlement along lines that would permit Belize to enjoy fullness of independence without having to live in constant fear of attack. Proposed arrangement with small territorial cession seems best way to achieve this but final decision not for us to make.

3. Caribbean cooperation and bi-lateral assistance: In a three hour discussion on Caribbean cooperation I clarified our proposals and corrected some misconceptions. GOB stresses critical balance of payments problems in the region but recognizes attention must be given to long run development lest BOP problems perpetuate or repeat themselves. GOB will participate fully in the December IBRD meeting at the Ministerial level. GOB distress over the absence of any bi-lateral aid program in Barbados also emerged during discussions. Forde pointed out that per capita income in Barbados is about the same as Jamaica where we are assisting and, while BOP problem in Barbados is not so serious

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770441-1215. Confidential; Immediate.

because of the careful management of their resources, they have other critical needs. Even a small US bi-lateral program would be greatly appreciated.\(^3\) He indicated belief that GOB is being discriminated against precisely because it is responsible. I reminded him of recent visit of AID teams and promised to look into the possibilities based on their findings.

4. Naval facility: GOB is not yet ready to settle for our offer of $750,000 annual rent. However, it has backed off from its earlier excessive demands, and in the course of our discussions, which were quite amicable, GOB agreed to allow the facility to continue operations for an additional year while we seek a solution.\(^4\) It was obvious they would settle tomorrow for $1 million annual rental. I made clear that this is more than the marginal value of the facility to DOD. However, I promised to look further into question in effort to find a solution to this thorny issue. Barbadians expressed interest in having US military presence continue but stressed that, as politicians, they must show there is reasonable return to the country.

5. Security. ForMin Forde expressed real alarm over the potential security problem in the Eastern Caribbean when the UK finally pulls out, given the recent tendency of Cuba to extend its influence in the region and the complete vulnerability of the small island states as they become independent. He said that his own government had repeatedly turned down requests from the USSR and the PRC to establish permanent missions in Barbados because they simply could not afford the resources to monitor those missions. He asked what we could do to help fill the security vacuum in the area, perhaps in cooperation with others, when the British leave. I told him this kind of issue was extremely tricky, but that I appreciated his concern. I said that I would hold consultations with other USG agencies on my return and eventually with other governments.

Ortiz

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\(^3\) Barbados received $576,000 in bilateral economic aid in FY 1978, a drop from $730,000 in FY 1977. In FY 1979 and 1980, Barbados received $286,000 and $268,000 in bilateral economic aid, respectively. (USAID Greenbook)

\(^4\) In a note dated January 5, 1978, Barbados agreed to a 12-month extension of the lease. (Telegram 33 from Bridgetown, January 6, 1978; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780010–0858)
Visit of Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs

Terence A. Todman, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, has requested a meeting with you at 1500, 4 January 1978, to discuss Barbados military facilities negotiations. He will be accompanied by Ms. Sally Shelton, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Caribbean Affairs, and Ashley Hewitt, Caribbean Country Director.

The Issue. Ambassador Todman will try to persuade you that DoD should increase the amount of money it is willing to pay for retention of the Naval Facility on Barbados.

USG Position. In direct talks with the Government of Barbados (GOB) on 12 October 1977, and by aide-mémoire of 25 October 1977, the USG has requested an eleven year agreement for an annual rental payment of $750,000, plus payments for both past and future operation and maintenance (O&M) costs at Grantley Adams International Airport. Navy has offered $100,000 for past O&M costs, and future costs are to be determined, but will not exceed $20,000 per year.

Discussion. We do not know for sure how much additional money Mr. Todman will request but we think he will probably settle for an annual rent of $1 million. Since this is a relatively small amount of money to be quibbling over, particularly when Mr. Todman is sure to frame his request in terms of salvaging relations between Barbados and the United States, it may appear we are being unduly parsimonious in failing to accede to his request. However, we do not believe this is the case—there are good and sufficient reasons why we should hold the line.

The Barbados situation cannot be considered in a vacuum and should be looked at in the context of our overall Caribbean negotiations. What we do in Barbados will have repercussions in Antigua where we have recently signed an agreement; in the Turks and Caicos where

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2 In telegram 240825 to Bridgetown, October 7, 1977, the Department transmitted the aide-mémoire. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770393–0585)
talks are temporarily suspended; and, most significantly, in the Bahamas, where we have our most important negotiations resuming after a two year hiatus.

—Our best estimates are that a simple raising of the annual rental from $750K to $1M for the Naval Facility in Barbados would escalate costs to us from $2.5M on the conservative side to $7M on the high side annually in our overall Caribbean negotiations.

—NAVFAC Barbados has only marginal value to Navy. The Navy has determined $750,000 to be the maximum it is willing to pay to remain in Barbados, and is content—indeed prefers—to close down and move out rather than pay any more. Since the Navy no longer needs NAVFAC Barbados, strict logic is on their side.

—The positive negotiating impact of the Navy shutting down in Barbados would not be lost on the other governments with which we are negotiating.

—We have officially told the Government of Barbados (GOB) twice that $750K rental is our absolute maximum for retention of the facility and that we will close down and move out rather than pay more. If we go back on our position now, our credibility as negotiators will be seriously impaired and will indicate that a hard line approach with us will cause us to come up with more. We can quickly expect the same tactic elsewhere.

—We promised the Premier of Antigua, as an inducement for him to sign, that we would pay Barbados no more for its one facility than we paid Bird for each of the two facilities on Antigua. Our signed agreement with him is for $750M per facility each year. If we renege now, we are bound (at least morally) to somehow make up the difference in Antigua; we also could cause political problems for Bird. Our credibility would assuredly be called into question.

—The Bahamas negotiations are by far our most important in the Caribbean context. Our offer has been tabled there for over two years and we are preparing to reopen talks commencing on 14 January. If we show weakness in Barbados where we have the option of closing down, we definitely will have serious difficulties in meeting Bahamian escalating demands where we cannot afford to move out.

—Mr. Todman’s request represents a reversal of positions in the fundamental debate between State and Defense over Latin American policy. Traditionally, State has accused DoD of inflexibility in desiring to retain our military relationships with Latin America as the paramount element in our bilateral relationships, whereas State has preferred aid or trade relations to be paramount (Alliance For Progress, etc.). Todman’s request, therefore, that we retain the facility—for which we have only marginal needs and increase the rent amount as a means
of funneling funds to the GOB—is really a manipulation of DoD to serve State’s interests.

—Acquiescence in Todman’s request will tend to make the continuance of the Naval facility a symbol of continued strong US-GoB relations. DoD’s worldwide interests lie in treating these small technological facilities as apolitically as possible; in view of our intention in any case to close the Barbados station in the near future, we should be especially careful not to allow State to make the station such a symbol.

In order to amplify these points, Tab A\textsuperscript{3} provides you with a series of recommended questions to pose to Mr. Todman. Each question is followed by our position.

FYI. You should know that Mr. Todman recently completed a swing through the Caribbean during which, by admission of the State Department officials who accompanied him, he fueled expectations that he could get “more” for both the Barbadians and the Bahamians.\textsuperscript{4} In the case of the Bahamas, he opened the door for economic assistance being linked to our military facilities agreement (despite long-standing and specific policy by State and AID that this is not possible). We are told the Barbadians also gained this impression. We are told that Mr. Todman was exceptionally well received each place he visited in the Caribbean; the governments concerned were flattered that he spent so much time with them. He is, in the estimation of some, a “genius” in public relations, and is very concerned with creating the proper “atmospherics.” He is honestly concerned that the U.S. has ignored the Caribbean for too long and that the time has come to reverse the tide. We think he is concerned that even if we force an agreement for $750,000 rent, that Barbadian/US relations may suffer at least for the short term. This sentiment, along with the challenge to his personal credibility, will undoubtedly cause him to make the point that DoD can surely justify an additional $250,000 in terms of preserving and fostering our bilateral and regional relationships. End FYI.

Notwithstanding the above, there is a possibility of partially accommodating Mr. Todman; you may want to consider approaching the Navy to come up with an additional $150,000 to add to their previously tabled offer of $100,000 for past O&M costs at Grantley Adams Airport for a combined first year offer of $750,000 rent and $250,000 O&M cost payment—a total of $1 million. Future year payments would be $750,000 rent and O&M costs not to exceed $20,000—the specific latter figure to be determined at the negotiating table. This would permit

\textsuperscript{3} Attached but not printed.

\textsuperscript{4} See Document 307. Regarding Todman’s discussion with the Bahamians, see footnote 6, Document 251.
Mr. Todman to reach his $1 million figure for at least the first year and would show he made good on his alleged promise to get “more.” The Navy will probably resist this approach, since, by its reckoning, past O&M payments by world-wide standards should only total about $70,000; therefore, it considers that it is already being magnanimous in its offer of $100,000.

In summary, it is recommended:

—That you resist Ambassador Todman’s request to increase the annual rental offer to the GOB to $1 million.

—That you suggest that State pursue other non-DoD avenues to increase the offer.

—If you wish to be responsive to Mr. Todman’s request, that you offer to try to increase the Navy’s one time payment for past airport O&M costs to $250,000 to make a first year total proposal of $1 million.5

G.J. Schuller6

RADM USN

Director, Inter-American Region

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5 No record of the meeting between Todman and McGiffert has been found. The U.S. negotiating strategy in 1978 indicates that McGiffert followed Schuller’s suggestion of “partially accommodating” Todman. The Department’s July 27 offer to the Government of Barbados consisted of $750,000 in yearly rent, plus a one-time $250,000 payment for past airport operation and maintenance. The Barbadian negotiators, however, requested a $5 million annual payment, along with $20 million in retroactive rent. (Telegram 2080 from Bridgetown, July 28; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780310–1052)

6 Schuller signed “Dutch” above this typed signature.
309. Telegram From the Embassy in Barbados to the Department of State\(^1\)

Bridgetown, September 22, 1978, 1320Z

2689. Subj: British Plans for Granting Independence. Refs: A) London 14922; B) Bridgetown 1968; C) Bridgetown 2232.\(^2\)

1. Summary of British positions re independence for various of its Caribbean dependencies contained ref A is an update of those given to us and reported in our refelts B and C. A new element is that contained para 3 ref A. We were not aware HMG considering “cutting loose” British Virgin Islands. However, it should be said there is not much difference in doing so and in cutting such impoverished units as Dominica and St. Vincent adrift.

2. It seems clear HMG is now implementing a policy decision to cast off the last remnants of empire. Hopefully adequate provision for the material needs of the inhabitants thereof can be assured. The UK is certainly active in the Caribbean Group and continues making grant financial infusions but since the breakup of the West Indian Federation there is a notable and I believe censurable absence of serious British efforts to meld these small political entities into larger, more viable ones.\(^3\)

3. The UK in addition to responsibilities in almost all corners of the globe is aware of the high cost to the French and U.S. taxpayers of Martinique, Guadeloupe and Puerto Rico. Who can blame the UK for wishing to “cut loose.” The future of the new states therefore is not promising.

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780390–1263. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated for information to London and USUN.

\(^2\) Telegram 14922 from London, September 15, described British efforts to move most of their Caribbean possessions toward independence. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780377–0672) In telegram 1968 from Bridgetown, July 19, the Embassy stated that the “movement toward full independence of the West Indian Associated States is probably irreversible.” It also cautioned that “we shall have to navigate very carefully to assure we are not willy-nilly saddled with the burdens the British are laying down.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780298–0941) In telegram 2232 from Bridgetown, August 9, the Embassy reported on British plans for granting independence to several Caribbean mini-states, noting that constitutional talks with officials in St. Lucia were moving forward and negotiations with officials in St. Vincent were soon to begin. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780327–0801)

\(^3\) The West Indies Federation was a union of British colonies that sought independence as a single political entity. It consisted of Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Christopher-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago. The Federation was formed in 1958 and dissolved in 1962.
4. When I met with Richard Stratton, Supervisory Under Secretary, West Indies and Atlantic Department in London in late August he stressed that HMG considered the islands of the Caribbean were of far more significance to the U.S. than to the UK. This may well be so. Nevertheless we should not hasten to hang what some hardnosed veteran observers consider a chain of tropical millstones around the neck of the U.S. alone. The forthcoming independence of the Associated States makes it more important than ever that our approach to the economic development of the Eastern Caribbean be in concert with other interested nations and that we intensify our efforts towards the building of adequate regional institutions.

Ortiz

310. Telegram From the Embassy in Barbados to the Department of State

Bridgetown, November 6, 1978, 1731Z

3225. Subj: Dominican Independence.

1. The wild, lush island of Dominica became an independent nation on the stroke of midnight, November 3. Its impoverished inhabitants estimated to number 80,000 clearly expect their new estate will greatly improve the chances of finding new external sources of assistance. Such assistance will be required indefinitely if not permanently.

2. On hand were reps of some thirty countries and scores of international organizations; some came thousands of miles. Most foreign and many Dominicans expressed private misgivings but independence was the occasion for many days of the festivities which gladden West Indian hearts. The British reps also appeared pleased. Leaders of St. Vincent, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Antigua were close observers as they finalize plans for their own independence celebrations.

3. Dominica’s independence starts a chain reaction having far-reaching consequences not confined to the trustful, decent folk living on the Windward and Leeward Islands. An early and spiny problem will arise in the Organization of American States. Should all the new

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Caribbean states be admitted as full members, the English-speaking Caribbean bloc will have sufficient votes to assure that the OAS will never again be the organization it was until now. OAS Secretary General Orfila, present in Roseau foresees a particularly difficult if not fateful time for the OAS just ahead. In the UN which was represented by Under Secretary General Tang Ming Chao the new states may have less impact. While friendly to the West they will identify with the “Third World”.

4. For the U.S. an independent Dominica presents new challenges. Dominicans generally are well disposed towards us. PriMin John’s inaugural address quoted from our Declaration of Independence and from Franklin Roosevelt. Dominican leaders appeared genuinely pleased with the President’s message and gift. The public members of our delegation were outstanding and made an excellent impression. Our delegation was shown special deference and a warm welcome. PriMin John told me he seeks close and friendly ties. We are off to a good start and expectations appear realistic on both sides.

5. In a sharp departure from previous neo-Marxist rhetoric, John defined Dominica’s economic system as that of a “mixed economy consisting of the private sector, cooperative sector and the public sector,” with incentives for foreign investment. State ownership, capitalist monopoly and a welfare state are equally eschewed. Progress, John affirms will come by evolution rather than revolution. Both reactionary and revolutionary groups are to be “seriously monitored.” Politically Dominica is to be a constitutional, parliamentary democracy with respect for the rights to life, liberty and property. The new nation is also committed to the observance of human rights. Rigid and dogmatic political philosophies John said, will be avoided.

6. John placed special stress on relations with the UK and France, the historical rivals in Dominica. The UK, John said, has given public assurances that it will not abandon Dominica and has provided an economic cushion for the first years. France which was well represented by high officials from Paris and the leaders of the neighboring French Department of Martinique and Guadeloupe as well as naval vessels and jet warplanes, clearly will loom large in Dominica’s future.

7. Our major policy goal of fomenting effective regionalism faces new obstacles. It will take much patient and long term effort to help assure the political and economic stability of this region.

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Ortiz

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2 Dominica, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines all joined the OAS as member states.

3 In telegram 3261 from Bridgetown, November 8, the Embassy reported on economic problems in Dominica, focusing on “real or threatened strike actions” from both public and private unions. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780463–1045)
311. Telegram From the Embassy in Barbados to the Department of State

Bridgetown, December 19, 1978, 1620Z

3735. Subject: Conversation With Foreign Minister Forde. Ref: State 316395.2

1. I had a lengthy conversation with Foreign Minister Forde December 18. He is under heavy fire over the navy facility (NAVFAC) closure and is keeping a low profile. Forde told me he probably will not make his statement to the Parliament on the NAVFAC closure until sometime next year. We maintain our close and cordial personal relationship but I did not consider it useful to raise with him the points contained in ref tel. These points will be raised by DCM with Permanent Secretary Symmonds soon.3

2. I instead listened to Forde as he told me of his concern for the security of Barbados. The Alleyne invasion plot is very much on everyone’s mind.4 (To many of course, the threat of such an invasion makes another point for the utility of the NAVFAC to Barbados). Forde tells me he will soon go to Martinique to attempt to interest the French in contributing to Barbados’ security. He said the French warship in Bridgetown at the time the planned invasion was to have occurred was an encouraging sign. He believes that France would be interested in helping Barbados. While I personally doubt this will be the case, Forde’s security worries and grasping at straws are common to many in the upper levels of the Barbadian Government. Forde also told me that Barbados was attempting to interest Trinidad & Tobago, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent in joint security measures. He believes that Dominica and Antigua are points of political instability which threaten the welfare of the entire area.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780527–0529. Confidential. Repeated for information to Martinique, Nassau, and Port of Spain.

2 In telegram 316395 to Bridgetown, December 15, the Department transmitted instructions on how to inform the Government of Barbados that arrangements for the final payment of rent on the U.S. naval facility would be completed by December 31. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780518–0963) The facility closed on December 31.

3 A record of the December 20 meeting is in telegram 3759 from Bridgetown, December 20. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780526–0643)

4 In telegram 3509 from Bridgetown, December 1, Ortiz described Sydney Burnett-Alleyne as a “Barbadian radical of various political stances.” He reported that Prime Minister Adams had been told that Burnett-Alleyne might try to seize the island of Barbados with a force comprised of mercenaries. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780496–0666) The suspected invasion never occurred.
3. Forde makes a valid point. These weak island nations are vulnerable to even small bands of determined adventurers. Their concern for their security is an important element in demonstrating the advantages of regionalism and of the importance of having powerful friends. I mainly listened to Forde but did note the interest of the U.S. Virgin Island National Guard in maintaining professional contact with the Barbados Defence Force.

Ortiz

312. Letter From President Carter to St. Lucian Prime Minister Compton

Washington, February 22, 1979

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

The American people join me in sending best wishes to you and the people of St. Lucia on the occasion of your independence. I am pleased to take this opportunity to inform you of the extension of United States Government recognition. We hope that, with your agreement, diplomatic relations can be established between our two countries.

We look forward to continued growth in friendly, productive relations between the United States and St. Lucia, nurtured by our mutual regard for economic progress, human rights, and democratic government.

The Government and people of the United States share your aspirations and concern for the advancement and welfare of the people of St. Lucia. We look forward to working together with you in your efforts to achieve those goals and to contributing to peace and prosperity for men and women everywhere.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P790031–1260. Confidential.

2 St. Lucia became independent on February 22.
313. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter

Washington, March 15, 1979

SUBJECT
Mini-SCC Meeting on Grenada

The NSC chaired a mini-SCC meeting today which included representatives from State, DOD, JCS, DIA, and CIA. The consensus of the group was that Maurice Bishop, who is head of the New Jewel Movement, has successfully seized control of the government in Grenada. He is encountering no resistance, even in the countryside where the ex-Prime Minister, Sir Eric Gairy, was supposed to have had so much support. The Foreign Ministers of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) are meeting in Barbados to discuss the events. Yesterday, they issued a statement expressing hope that the leaders of the regime in Grenada would “hold fair and free elections . . . without delay.” The Foreign Ministers also pledged their help “if requested.” They are meeting tomorrow as well.

The leadership of the New Jewel Movement (NJM) is young (25–35), idealistic, and socialistically-inclined. Their principal motivations appear to be hatred for Gairy (Bishop’s father is alleged to have been killed by Gairy’s police in a demonstration in 1974) and nationalism. Cuba and several other countries have supported this movement since its beginning, but while the leadership spans the ideological spectrum, most of them appear to look to Jamaica and Tanzania as their model.

It was the consensus of the SCC that Bishop and his group could probably be co-opted by the U.S. or perhaps by Cuba. They are sensitive to international reaction to their coup, and eager to obtain international legitimacy, but if we are not sensitive to their overtures, it is conceivable that they could turn to Cuba. However, our current evaluation is that

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 23, Grenada, 3/16/1979–3/31/79. Secret. Attached is a cover sheet from Pastor which states that Brzezinski requested that the minutes of the meeting be held until March 19 and then forwarded to the President. Handwriting on the cover sheet indicates the action was carried out.

2 The coup began on March 13, while Gairy was in New York. (Telegrams 850 and 856 from Bridgetown, March 13; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790115–1257 and D790116–0267)

3 In telegram 956 from Bridgetown, March 16, the Embassy transmitted the March 15 CARICOM statement. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790121–0734)
they do not intend to either shift their government towards social revolution or towards alliance with the Cubans.

It was agreed that we would await the outcome of the current meeting of CARICOM Foreign Ministers, and then try to obtain the support of the British and the Canadians for a simultaneous public statement indicating support for CARICOM’s request for early parliamentary elections. In this public statement, we will draw attention to several points made in the CARICOM statement of March 14—that we are unhappy with the way the government was changed, but hope that the regime will continue to act responsibly—and also to the assurances which Bishop has given our Ambassador in Barbados—that they will respect private property and human rights. At the same time, we will also go privately to Bishop to make this statement and signal to him our concern about the direction of his movement and about the importance we attach to the Caribbean. We will also continue to have discussions with CARICOM on ways to proceed in ensuring the possibility of supervised elections.

In addition, State was tasked to look into concrete inducements which we could consider at an appropriate time to ensure that the New Jewel Movement and its leadership will remain directed to a more stable and democratic future; the intelligence community will examine the connections between this group and the Cubans; and State will also begin consultations with the British on what we should do if the elections strategy does not succeed.

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4 Ortiz and Bishop met on March 13. No record of the meeting has been found. The statement announcing the continuation of relations with Grenada was released at the State Department press briefing on March 22. The text was transmitted to Bridgetown in telegram 71202, March 22. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790132–1109)

5 Ortiz met with Bishop on March 23 and presented the Department’s statement on continuation of relations, emphasizing the importance of “prompt and fair elections.” Bishop expressed his pleasure with the statement and his desire to have friendly relations with the United States and vowed to protect U.S. citizens and property. Regarding elections, he said “it would take longer than 3 months or 6 months to do.” (Telegram 1108 from Bridgetown, March 26; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790139–0912) See also Document 314.

6 See Document 361.
314. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)

Washington, March 27, 1979

SUBJECT
Update on Grenada (C)

As you know, on March 22, we recognized the new government in Grenada, following the lead of several countries and the U.K. One of the major considerations which led to our decision was the early promise made by the island’s new leader, Maurice Bishop, to conduct free and fair elections soon. Besides being concerned about the unconstitutional means the New Jewel Movement used to take power, we were concerned about the political orientation of the new government’s leaders, who were variously termed “Marxists,” “Socialists,” or “Cuba-oriented.” (C)

Frank Ortiz, our Ambassador to Barbados accredited to Grenada, called on Bishop last Friday and his interview sheds some light on these questions. Bishop indicated that the new government:

—was pleased with the speedy recognition by the U.S.,
—wants to have friendly relations with the U.S.,
—is interested in the continuation and expansion of U.S. aid to Grenada through the Caribbean Development Bank,
—wishes the Peace Corps to remain, and
—will assure the protection of U.S. citizens and property on Grenada. (C)

On the issue of the timing and nature of elections, however, Bishop was less forthcoming. He said that general elections would not be held soon, and that an election of a constituent assembly would probably come first. He confided that the new government was considering two options: (1) to continue with the current governmental model (which he termed “farcical” and implanted by a foreign culture), or (2) to adopt a new system of “peoples’ assemblies”, patterned after what he called the ancient Greek model. He totally opposed outside observers.

2 See footnote 4, Document 313.
3 See footnote 5, Document 313.
to the elections, though he promised to consult with his colleagues on the issue and give us an answer. (C)

It is apparent that the new leader of Grenada is very idealistic, if not ideologically molded. He admits to being a “socialist,” but acknowledges the virtues of “pragmatism.” We have reports that he may be more moderate than some of his colleagues. He is obviously trying to maintain a good relationship with the U.S., but his proclivities to “revolutionize” the political system in Grenada may lead him toward a “Cuban model,” which in turn may lead to closer ties with, if not dependence on, Cuba. (C)

I am concerned about Bishop’s talk of “peoples’ assemblies,” and have spoken to Vaky and his deputy, Brandon Grove, about it. He will send cables to our Ambassadors in Barbados, Trinidad, and a separate one to Jamaica, suggesting that we begin an on-going dialogue with these countries in order to encourage them to take the lead in approaching Bishop. (C)

If David shares my concern, I would recommend that he convey it to Newsom.4 I am not sure that Pete5 is moving on this issue as quickly as he should.

4 At the top of the first page, Aaron wrote on April 4, “I will call. We should warn against Cubans going into Grenada.”
5 Vaky.

315. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Vaky) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Newsom)1

Washington, April 9, 1979

Grenada: Views of CARICOM Governments

Last week I sent ARA/CAR Director Ashley Hewitt to meet with Prime Minister Manley in Kingston on recent events in Grenada. Hewitt has a good rapport with Manley from his time as DCM and Charge of our Embassy at Kingston from 1973–75. I had two purposes. One

was to send a message to the new government in Grenada that we really do want to be cooperative and helpful by means of a channel they are likely to trust. The second was to send a discreet message to the Cubans and the Soviets that we are concerned about the situation in Grenada and keeping an eye on it, lest they be tempted by our apparent indifference. While Hewitt was in the area, he paid a brief visit to Trinidad and Barbados and met with the Foreign Ministers of those countries. Simultaneously, we sent our Ambassador to Guyana in to see their Foreign Minister, drawing on the same talking points Hewitt used in his conversation with Manley.2

In his various conversations, Hewitt focused on two aspects of the Grenada situation; the likely consequences of recent events for Grenada itself, and their significance for the region as a whole. As might be expected, assessments of the New Jewel Movement (NJM) and its intentions varied substantially depending upon the perspective of the observer. Unsurprisingly, Manley regarded the NJM as consisting for the most part of idealistic young reformers who should be given encouragement and assistance, while Trinidad’s Foreign Minister Donaldson and Barbados’s Foreign Minister Forde regarded Grenada at least potentially as a source of communist infection and possibly Soviet influence.

Aside from differences in interpretation arising from differing ideological perspective, however, there was an interesting congruence of views on a number of points. For example, it was generally felt that:

—the Grenada coup is symptomatic of growing instability in the Eastern Caribbean, and may have some ripple or demonstration effects;

—the repressive character of the Gairy regime made Grenada unique in a way, but that underlying economic and social problems had more to do with bringing about the coup than political factors;

—recent events will contribute to the divisions which already trouble both the West Indies Associated States (WIAS) and CARICOM as a whole;

—what the new government needs now are friends and assistance, and that those who help most now are likely to be most influential later;

—the entire Leeward and Windward island chain needs more economic assistance and security support if future Grenadas are to be avoided.

While Manley clearly regards the new government in Grenada almost as a protege of his, he was nonetheless more concerned about

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2 Burke reported on his meeting with Guyanese Foreign Minister Wills in telegram 1570 from Georgetown, April 6. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790157–0789)
instability in the Eastern Caribbean and divisive forces within CARICOM than we expected. Forde and Donaldson took an even stronger line, Forde saying that he had information that Maurice Bishop and other NJM leaders had received training in both Cuba and the Soviet Union, and that he feared Grenada might constitute a site for Soviet presence in the Eastern Caribbean. The strong line taken by Donaldson was particularly surprising given the “hands off” attitude of Trinidad to date. Although reiterating his government’s policies, Donaldson indicated strong concern over the security implications of the coup in Grenada saying that it threatened to “draw the great powers back into the Caribbean and return the area to the kind of relationships that prevailed in the 17th and 18th centuries”. Specifically, Forde indicated a need for a regional coast guard for the Leeward and Windward Islands plus Barbados; increased training and assistance for police and security forces in the region; and much improved intelligence coverage.

We are looking at ways we can be helpful to Grenada and the other WIAS States in the economic area in the relatively short run, and we are also looking at what can be done in the security and intelligence areas. We propose to have talks with the British and perhaps the Canadians on what we might jointly do within a few weeks.\footnote{The Department of State held consultations in Washington with U.K. and Canadian officials May 2–3. See Document 361.}

Cables summarizing Hewitt’s conversations are attached.\footnote{Telegram 1223 from Port of Spain, April 6, and telegrams 1306 and 1315 from Bridgetown, both April 6, were not attached.}
316. Telegram From the Embassy in Barbados to the Department of State

Bridgetown, April 9, 1979, 1540Z

1321. Subject: Grenada: Request by Revolutionary Government for U.S. Arms. Ref: A) Bridgetown 1303; B) Bridgetown 1318.2

1. (C) Entire text.

2. We believe Revolutionary Government’s request for U.S. arms to repel alleged invasion by Gairy or other adversaries, while possibly based on real expectation that such U.S. arms would be forthcoming, may mask real RG intention to elicit U.S. rejection, thereby freeing RG to obtain arms from countries more ideologically compatible. We believe RG may in fact already have approached Cuba or been offered arms by Cuba.

3. In this elementary game, USG like RG must concern itself with record. We recommend Department should draw out consideration of the RG’s request as long as possible. I shall attempt to get more details of request. When and if we decide to turn request down we should make public statement. Bishop gave us opportunity to do so by his own advance publicity (ref A) that he would seek U.S. arms. We consulting with UK and Canadians here. UK will also draw out consideration of GOG request for arms. UK High Commissioner Stanley is suggesting that UK offer to send military or police experts to survey Grenadian needs. Canadians thus far have not received arms request.3

Ortiz


2 In telegram 1303 from Bridgetown, April 6, the Embassy reported an April 5 press conference held by Bishop, in which he discussed an alleged plan by former Prime Minister Gairy to seek assistance from Cuban exiles and seize the island of Grenada. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790157–1117) In telegram 1318 from Bridgetown, April 9, the Embassy reported on Bishop’s April 7 request for U.S. arms. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790163–0508)

3 In telegram 89103 to London and Ottawa, April 10, the Department instructed the Embassies to contact the host governments and urge them to “reassure Bishop and his government and perhaps give him minimal levels of protection and assistance.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Freedom of Information/Legal, Kimmit, Box 9, Grenada, 4–6/79) The British offered to send one police and one military adviser to Grenada. (Ibid.)
317. Telegram From the Embassy in Barbados to the Department of State

Bridgetown, April 11, 1979, 1843Z

1368. Subject: Grenada: Meeting with Prime Minister Bishop. Ref: State 87104.2

1. (C) Entire text.

2. Summary: Accompanied by Consul Laroche I saw Prime Minister Bishop April 10. We discussed extreme anxieties prevailing in Grenada and what U.S. could do to help tranquilize the situation. We discussed provisions of U.S. Neutrality Act. Bishop gave greater specificity to his arms requests to U.S. He denied Cuba has offered assistance and indicated any such offer would only be accepted in extreme circumstances. Bishop was exhausted and not very responsive. End summary.

3. In compliance with instructions contained reftel I called on Prime Minister Bishop April 10. I was accompanied by Consul Laroche. Bishop was accompanied by Vincent Noel, who appears to act as Bishop’s Chief of Staff. Meeting lasted one hour.

4. I opened by thanking Bishop for his visit to the medical school.3 I believed it would help calm unreasoned fears. As Bishop knew I had important instructions from my government which I would pass to him formally but I said I wanted to speak informally first. Bishop understood the distinction. I said he probably knew of Office Director Hewitt’s visit to the region.4 (Bishop previously mentioned he learned of it from Jamaica.) Now I was going to Washington on personal business for a few days. Thus new insights on developments in Grenada would be available to high Washington officials who were following matters closely.

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2 In telegram 87104 to Bridgetown, April 7, the Department instructed Ortiz to meet with Bishop and transmitted talking points to reassure Grenadian leaders that Eric Gairy would not be marshalling a mercenary army. One of the talking points transmitted in the telegram notes that “it would not be in Grenada’s best interests to seek assistance from a country such as Cuba to forestall such an attack. We would view with displeasure any tendency on the part of Grenada to develop closer ties with Cuba.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790159–1150) Grenada and Cuba established diplomatic relations on April 14.

3 In telegram 1361 from Bridgetown, April 11, the Embassy reported on a visit by Bishop to St. George’s University Medical School on April 10. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790172–0232)

4 See Document 315.
5. I wondered what views I should convey particularly as regards the great anxiety I perceived in Grenada over the possibility of an invasion to reestablish Gairy. I was sure all interested in Grenada’s future would want to know exactly what could be done to help mitigate the extreme uncertainty which prevailed in Grenada which was obviously harmful to the economy, the rule of law and relations between Grenada and its friends. I wondered if publicizing the fact that Gairy was probably in San Diego and certainly not on a neighboring island might not have a calming effect. I conveyed the suggestion of American residents that visits of warships from Grenada’s traditional friends might help. Certainly if he could provide us with leads establishing Gairy’s contravention of U.S. laws we could take helpful action. I mentioned the rumors in town alleging the fears of an imminent invasion were being artificially stimulated. Bishop said that was not so. The PRG is genuinely concerned that an attack is coming. The PRG has no proof of Gairy’s machinations but has established that Gairy is in contact with people who could raise mercenaries. I asked Bishop for photocopies of the famous Frank Marberry, Jr. letters for investigative purposes in the U.S. Bishop said he would try to get them for us but I consider it unlikely we will have them. Bishop is fully informed of the April 7 Miami Herald interview as well as a radio interview given a New York station by Gairy both from San Diego. He could not explain why Gairy’s known whereabouts were not being publicized in Grenada. Bishop said one would have to know Gairy to realize how certain it is that he is plotting a comeback. The PRG had to be ready for this. Security was the over-riding consideration. A visit by a Western naval vessel “would cause confusion. We don’t want that.” The PRG expected the economy would suffer as a result of the greater need to assure the safeguarding of the revolution.

6. I raised the subject of arms. I said on Saturday he had mentioned arms to junior officers of the Embassy (see Bridgetown 1318). I wondered if there was to be a followup. Bishop said no, that the PRG’s request had been made. I said I had no information at all on the numbers and types of weapons. After prodding Bishop said he needed 500 semi-automatic weapons and 200 machine guns. I reminded him that guns needed ammunition. He thought a while then said about 1,000 rounds for each gun to allow for practice would do. Training, he said, would be only by other CARICOM states which I took to be Guyana.

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5 Gairy made several statements in April 1979 about his desire to return to power. An article in *The Los Angeles Times*, for instance, quotes Gairy as “watching and waiting” for his opportunity to come back to Grenada. (*The Los Angeles Times*, April 10, p. A1)

6 See footnote 2, Document 316.
7. As Bishop was obviously very tired and not very responsive, I then told him I would be speaking formally on instructions. I read and then gave him a non-paper containing talking points conveyed retel as authorized by Grove/Ortiz telcon. I asked him if he wanted to know a little about the U.S. Neutrality Act. He did and I described it in detail.

8. I then said our position on Grenada’s ties with Cuba was a very significant statement. Bishop reacted by saying his government had been in power one month and had received no assistance from its traditional friends. There was urgency in PRG’s request. It therefore would turn wherever it could to get assistance. The Grenadian revolution was irreversible and independent. It could not be compromised either by what it disliked in the West or by the Soviet and Communist bloc. I asked him point blank if the Cubans had offered assistance. He firmly said they had not. I asked him what his response would be if they did. He answered that depends on the circumstances. I asked what he meant by that. He replied if mercenaries invade, PRG would get help wherever it could. I told him Grenada was a fully independent country and could take whatever actions it wished. However he should have no doubts that developing close ties with Cuba would greatly complicate relations with Grenada’s neighbors and with friendly countries like the U.S. I reminded him that we had only been aware of the details of his arms request for about ten minutes and that his government has steadily declined to go into the details of possible contributions by the U.S. to Grenada’s economic development. I said I didn’t understand what he meant by a lack of U.S. response. He said that was so, but he was working 22 hours a day and security was his overriding concern. We would have time to talk later. He said he had a positive response from an English-speaking CARICOM country which was providing security equipment and training. Bishop then said if Jamaica were attacked he knew Jamaica would call on Cuban assistance. I asked him if an attack on Jamaica seemed likely. He acknowledged it was not.

9. Although conversation was cordial and Bishop would have given me all the time I needed, he seemed so utterly exhausted, his responses were so desultory and he showed so little inclination to expand on any subject I decided to leave him with a concentrated message from

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7 The non-paper (likely the talking points in telegram 87104 to Bridgetown) caused some controversy. On April 13, Bishop referenced the paper in a speech in order to attack the Department’s Caribbean policy. (Telegram 1427 from Bridgetown, April 16, and telegram 1448 from Bridgetown, April 18; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790175–1999 and D790179–0160)

8 See footnote 2 above.
us and try to catch the next plane out. He accompanied me to the street
to help me hail a taxi and said he hoped we would meet again before
my departure.

10. Comment: Statement of U.S. position on Grenadian ties with
Cuba had a visible impact on Bishop. Bishop is obviously under great
stress as he discovers that it is easier to oppose a government than run
one, but he remains very cool and controlled and his strong leadership
qualities are apparent. I am prepared to discuss implications of all this
during my consultations.

Ortiz

318. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security
Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, April 14, 1979

SUBJECT

Time to Reassess US Policy to Grenada and the Caribbean: Second-Generation
Surrogates?

I. Current Policy

Since the overthrow of Grenadian Prime Minister Gairy, on March
13, our policy to the new Revolutionary Government of Grenada under
Maurice Bishop has been relaxed but concerned. We premised this
posture on the belief that Bishop and his followers were of the Manley
“socialist democratic” school, but that they were pragmatic and could
be co-opted by us or, for that matter, by the Cubans. The feeling was
that as time passed, the realities of governing a little country like
Grenada would steer Bishop towards working with us. We should
therefore stay relaxed. A more confrontational strategy by us could
perhaps push the Grenadians in the arms of the Cubans. We have
worked with Canada, the UK, Venezuela, Trinidad, and Barbados, and
we only took steps to recognize the Bishop government after CARICOM

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South,
by Richard Brown of the NSC Staff reads, “DA: Think you should move on these issues.”
did. At this time, we appear to be encouraging potential donor countries to give aid to Grenada.

The key point was our belief that Bishop and his group were manipulable. They were of the Left but would be pragmatic enough to keep Grenada in our camp and to keep the Cubans at a distance. In the past week, we received new evidence to suggest that these premises may be faulty.

II. New Direction in Grenada: The Cubans Arrive

The Cubans are now directly involved in trying to help “consolidate” Bishop’s revolution. 8 Cubans arrived covertly last week. A large shipment of arms was flown from Cuba to Guyana where it was transshipped to Grenada. Bishop has suspended the constitution, suggested indirectly that he will abandon the Governor General at an appropriate time, locked up 83 political prisoners, issued ten “revolutionary decrees,” and suggested that the new constitution should be modeled on the people’s assemblies of Cuba. While telling us (and Canada and UK) of his interest in obtaining military support, he was already receiving covert military support from Cuba. The non-resident Cuban Ambassador to Barbados (stationed in Guyana) has been very aggressive and appears to be coordinating most of the operations. A Cuban merchant ship (Vietnam Heroico) with 200 cadets on board is apparently on its way to Grenada. Radical Jamaicans have also been helping Bishop.

Our Ambassador Ortiz conveyed to Bishop our concern over possible ties with the Cubans. Bishop dodged Ortiz’s questions about whether he requested aid from the Cubans, though he did make an unintended revealing comment when he noted Jamaica’s ties with the Cubans and said that Jamaica would probably request aid from Cuba if there were a threat of attack.2

I believe that Bishop has lost interest in free elections. He fears he may not be able to win. By trying to play-up a foreign invasion threat (by Gairy), he is seeking justification for inviting the Guyanese to defend him and to provide his followers with training and arms. The more he builds up his “people’s militia,” the more likely he will frighten tourists (about 50 percent of Grenada’s export earnings) and the more dependent he will find himself on the Cubans.

In the end, it looks as if he might try to create a one-party state. It is conceivable he could have his closest ties with the Cubans. Grenada could become a training camp for young radicals from the other islands.

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2 See Document 317.
III. Time for a New Strategy

We have tried to avoid the hard decisions, but I think the longer we wait, the more difficult it will be to take any steps that will be effective. Is a quasi-Communist mini-state in the eastern Caribbean a cause for sufficient concern that we need to more clearly communicate our seriousness than we have thus far done? Should we adopt a different strategy to try to counter Grenada’s drift toward the Cubans? Should we be more relaxed about Grenada and concentrate our energies on preventing similar kinds of coups on neighboring islands?

Because all of these questions are interrelated, let me try to describe an overall strategy and specific steps rather than answer each question separately. First of all, it’s clear that we are going to have to be the catalyst if we are going to be able to reverse the drift toward Cuba in the region. We will need to clearly articulate our concern and also demonstrate that we are serious. On the other hand, I believe we will be most effective if we are not in the frontlines, but rather are in a supportive role behind Trinidad and Barbados and working in concert with the Canadians and British.

Instead of trying to calm the nations of the region, as we are now doing, we need to explain the seriousness of the situation and begin to convey intelligence and information we receive on the Cuban connection. As soon as we do that, I suspect we will find ourselves dealing with a much more concerned and eager-to-act Trinidad and Barbados (T & B). Clearly, these two nations need to take the lead, but we should make it very clear to them that we will provide them full support. What should we do?

IV. Specific Steps

1. Tactically, it would be a mistake to focus exclusively or primarily on the Cuban connection. With respect to Grenada, we should encourage T & B to define and pursue four objectives: (1) early and free elections in Grenada; (2) stop the arms and the militarization of the country; (3) free the political prisoners; (4) de-legitimize the Cuban connection, in part, by connecting the Cubans to the arming of Grenada and the failure by Bishop to carry out his pledge for free elections. We should indicate to the leaders of Barbados that we are prepared to help them in achieving these objectives almost by whatever means they view as necessary—which could range from support for another CARICOM conference to sending a warship to Grenada, to raising the issue in the O.A.S. and the U.N. It should be clear that we are unwilling to

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3 The CARICOM Foreign Ministers had met in Bridgetown March 15. See footnote 2, Document 313.
accept the ending of democracy and the arming of Grenada and the establishment of a second-generation Soviet surrogate in the Caribbean.

We should convey this message to Bishop as well.

2. Both Barbados and Trinidad feel that we have given undue attention to Jamaica, and they are right. We need to strengthen the leadership capabilities of B & T in the area. We should help them to establish a regional police force which could provide stability and prevent violent seizures of power. We should also consider a high-level visit to the region, perhaps by Mrs. Carter, Vance, or Newsom. We should try to build up regional S & T efforts by using one of these two countries as a base. Frank Press should visit one or the other during his Latin America S & T trip.

3. DOD is currently closing down a naval oceanographic facility in Barbados, and DOD’s extraordinary stinginess has not only harmed our relations with Barbados, it has also created a security vacuum. Just at the time when we should be injecting security into the region, we are extracting it.  

4. Totally absurd. Neither State nor Defense seems interested in doing anything about the Barbados facility now, but I think we should go back in with a serious proposal for transforming the base into something which could help to promote regional security and prevent the Grenada example from spreading. (We should also examine the Bahamas’ bases, which we are considering leaving.)

4. We should try to expedite FMS availability to the governments in the region. State is working on this now, but we should expedite it.

5. We should consider sending a number of naval vessels to the region—perhaps using the volcanic eruption at St. Vincent as a cover. We should ask permission from Grenada to use their port at Georgetown as a way to help the people on St. Vincent. They would be in a difficult position to refuse; its presence couldn’t help but have an impact, however, on the new revolutionary government.

6. We should also ask [less than 1 line not declassified] Grenada. There is little question that Bishop has been in continuous touch with Jamaica, Cuba, Guyana, [less than 1 line not declassified] could be helpful in improving our understanding of what direction Bishop is heading.

7. The British and Canadians are considering talks with us on Grenada at the professional level on April 27. We should accelerate the schedule of that.  

4 See Documents 308 and 311.
5 See Document 361.
8. We should strongly encourage the World Bank to hold its June Caribbean Group meeting in Barbados instead of Washington. This will strengthen Barbados’ hand as a leader in the region, and it will encourage an awareness in the region of the concern and interest of the industrialized democratic countries. It will provide a good demonstration to the region’s leaders that the US and other democracies are interested in development, while the Cubans are interested in coups and politicization. (NAM Summit).

9. In addition, we should send a clear message to the Cubans to stay out. I will prepare a longer memo on this subject this week.

RECOMMENDATION

That you call an SCC meeting to discuss these steps and the strategy, or alternatively, that you call Newsom and Vaky over to discuss them informally.

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6 The Caribbean Group meeting was held in Washington June 4–9.
7 The Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement was held in Havana September 3–9.
8 An NSC Staff member checked the approve option and added an asterisk. At the bottom of the page, the staffer wrote, “In discussions on April 15, 1979, D.A. told Pastor to set up a mini-SCC meeting.” On April 23, Pastor wrote an options paper for Aaron about Grenada, ahead of the SCC meeting. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Box 16, Grenada)
319. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter

Washington, April 30, 1979

SUBJECT
U.S. Policy to Grenada and the Eastern Caribbean (U)

David Aaron chaired a mini-SCC meeting today with representatives from State, Defense, JCS, CIA, AID and OMB to discuss the situation in Grenada and how the US should respond to it. The group addressed three questions: (1) What should we do with respect to Grenada to keep it from becoming a Cuban client state? (2) How can we reduce the likelihood of Grenada-like coups occurring elsewhere in the Eastern Caribbean? and (3) What are the implications of Grenada for the Caribbean as a whole, and what should our reaction be? (S)

The Problem. After seizing power in Grenada, Maurice Bishop promised free elections, but since then, he has taken few steps in that direction. Instead, he has sought and received Cuban and Guyanese military support and Jamaican technical assistance to “consolidate his revolution.” It is clear that the Cubans and probably the Jamaicans and Guyanese had advance knowledge of the coup, though they probably didn’t know exactly when it would occur. An opposition has begun to form within Grenada, but it still is embryonic. (S)

At the same time that he has strengthened relations with the three Caribbean governments of the left—Cuba, Jamaica, and Guyana—he has tried to maintain ties with the more moderate states. In fact, he has recently invited members of the West Indies Associated States to visit Grenada for talks, but these states are very worried that they could be the next victims of violent coups. Bishop has also shown a certain eagerness to criticize the US for trying to “bully” him. In the future, it is quite likely that Bishop will try to retain control of the island by whatever means necessary and will look increasingly to Cuba for support. (S)

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Files, Chron, Box 11, El Salvador 3–10/80. Secret. Sent for action. A cover sheet attached by Dodson reads, “David/Les, Pastor tells me you expect this and that he will, instead of a Summary of Conclusions, do a decision memo to the agencies after the President’s approval, OK?” At the top of the page, Aaron wrote, “ZB—I do not believe this has to go to the P. Pastor should do a one paragraph evening note on our strategy.” Pastor’s note is attached but not printed. Another attached note reads, “return to I.L.—make copy for me. Instead one paragraph evening note sent. Subsequently, cables were cleared. No further memo necessary.”
Objectives. With respect to Grenada, we have two sets of objectives which relate to its internal political development and its external relations. Internally, we would prefer a Grenada that (1) observes basic human rights and releases its political prisoners; (2) permits free, preferably Parliamentary, elections soon and also permits the emergence of an opposition party and press; (3) respects private property and promotes a climate that will permit foreign investment and encourage tourism; and (4) does not excessively arm or militarize the island. With respect to Grenada’s external relations, we would prefer: (1) that its ties with Cuba be primarily diplomatic and not very warm (more like Barbados’ ties with Cuba than Jamaica’s or Angola’s); (2) that it not be used as a military or political training base for radicals in the Caribbean; and (3) that it maintain its closest relations with the Commonwealth Caribbean (and within that, with Barbados and Trinidad) and also with traditional allies like Canada, the U.K., Venezuela, and the U.S. (S)

With respect to the eastern Caribbean, we want to promote their economic development and provide the security support and assistance which will prevent any further coups in the area. With respect to the overall Caribbean, we should continue to promote regional economic cooperation through the Caribbean Group, but we should add a political and security dimension which will mean relatively greater support for the moderate countries like Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago. In pursuing these objectives, we want to encourage Barbados and Trinidad to take the lead while we consult fully and, to the extent possible, work in tandem with the U.K., Canada, and Venezuela. We presume we share these objectives with all three countries, but we should promote an awareness of shared objectives by a continual dialogue with these countries. (S)

Recommended Strategy. It was the consensus of the mini-SCC that:

(1) We should work closely with Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago (T/T), and the West Indies Associated States (WIAS), share information with them, and encourage them to take a firm public position on the need for free and early elections in Grenada. (S)

(2) We should work closely with Canada and the U.K. and encourage increased assistance by them to the region. In consultations on the Caribbean with the British and Canadians next week, we will explore a range of proposals, including a regional Coast Guard or security force, regional training of police and defense forces, naval visits, and FMS credits to increase the security of the region.2 (S)

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2 See Document 361.
(3) We should prepare a statement to be issued at the Department of State which points out that we are in fact providing economic assistance to the region (Caribbean Group), but that we are concerned that the new Grenadian government has not taken any steps to fulfill its pledge of free elections. At the same time, we will try to get some information placed in newspapers in the area on a background, non-attributable basis on the arms and assistance provided by Cuba and Guyana to Grenada and on the fact that it was received before the US, U.K., or Canada had an opportunity to respond to similar requests from Grenada. (S)

(4) We will convey our concern to Jamaica and Guyana about recent developments in Grenada and express our interest that they try to encourage Grenada to have free elections. We should also ask them about their associations with the Grenadian government. If they assist Bishop in the consolidation of a one-party, authoritarian state, that will affect our relations with them. (S)

(5) For the time being, we will approach Grenada through Barbados and other countries in the region. We are also exploring ways we could be helpful to the emerging opposition in Grenada. (S)

(6) We discussed the specific recommendations which were attached to the background paper (and are at Tab A), and there was no objection to the recommendations. With regard to economic aid, IMET, or FMS, OMB suggested, and others concurred, that we begin to plan for FY 1981. In the present, we should seek to re-program funds to the Eastern Caribbean (though not necessarily to Grenada), and to energize existing pipelines, but not to seek any supplementals. (S)

If you approve, we intend to begin implenting those steps. (S)
320. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Director of Central Intelligence Turner

Washington, May 8, 1979

SUBJECT
Cuban Presence on Grenada (C)

The President is concerned about the growing Cuban presence on Grenada and believes it is urgent and important that we move to focus international press attention on this development. You should prepare for consideration at an early SCC meeting a program designed to carry out the President’s request. This program should be available by May 11.² (S)

Zbigniew Brzezinski


² On May 14, Turner sent a memorandum to Brzezinski that reported that CIA had placed articles about the Cuban presence in Grenada in newspapers in [text not declassified]. Turner also stated that the Agency was preparing a “detailed political action program” that would provide support to political and labor opposition in Grenada, pressure the PRG to hold elections, counter Cuban influence in the Caribbean, and discourage other Caribbean leftists. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 23, Grenada, 5/79)
321. Note From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, May 11, 1979

At your request, I called the CIA today and asked them to make sure that the information on the Cuban presence in Grenada was being placed. I was informed that it was being placed in newspapers in [less than 1 line not declassified] but they had no direct way to do it in [less than 1 line not declassified]—as they had originally told us. They said that they expected newspapers in [less than 1 line not declassified] to pick up the articles from the Latin countries. I really wonder whether it wouldn’t make sense for us to look much more deeply into the way they implement decisions like this.2 (S)


322. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Vaky) to Acting Secretary of State Christopher

Washington, May 30, 1979

SUBJECT
The Situation in Dominica

On May 29 widespread rioting broke out on the island of Dominica in the Eastern Caribbean, culminating long-standing differences between the government of Premier Patrick John and the major labor unions. Security forces fired into the air and into the crowd to restore order. At least one person was killed and some seven seriously wounded. The situation on the island is currently reported to be tense.

but quiet. There are approximately 120 U.S. citizens on Dominica, 20 of them Peace Corps volunteers. Most of the remainder are businessmen or long-term residents. Dominica is not a tourist spot and few are tourists. There does not appear to be any direct threat to Americans at the present time. Our Embassy at Bridgetown is sending a Consular Officer to Dominica by the most expeditious means.

Although the situation seems under control for the time being, both our Embassy at Bridgetown and the Agency agree that the weak and inefficient government of Patrick John may not survive this crisis. The five major labor unions and the opposition have issued strident calls for his resignation. The key is probably the 80-man defense force which has no personal loyalty to John, but is strongly loyal to its commander, Lt. Colonel Noel Johnson. We do not believe that Johnson has political ambitions of his own or any desire to be a kingmaker. However, he will probably put pressure on John to resign on grounds that he and his troops can only control the situation for a limited time so long as John remains.

The most probable scenario is a solution negotiated behind the scenes by which John would step aside and the President (Dominica opted for a republican form of government when it became independent last November) asks the leader of the opposition, Ms. Eugenia Charles, to form a government. Charles is not a strong personality, however, and her stewardship is likely to be temporary. The ultimate heirs to the John government are likely to be James Seraphin, a former Minister of Agriculture under the John government, or Michael Douglas, also formerly a member of the John government. Both men were eased out for various sins the greatest of which, in Dominican terms, was competence. Seraphin is believed to be a moderate. Douglas’s views may be more liberal but he is not known to be a leftist.²

There is a small Marxist element led by Roosevelt Douglas, brother of Michael Douglas. “Rosie” Douglas has had extensive contacts with the Cubans, and has traveled to Grenada a number of times since the coup there on March 13. He is likely to try to exploit the current situation of unrest and uncertainty, but he has no political party or movement of his own, and there are no indications that he is preparing to attempt a coup. Thus far, there is no evidence of Cuban or Grenadian meddling in the situation in Dominica.

We will keep a close eye on the situation as it develops, and are preparing to evacuate American citizens should this become necessary.

² In telegram 2459 from Bridgetown, June 21, the Embassy reported the formation of a new government with Minister of Agriculture Oliver James Seraphin assuming the role of Prime Minister, after a vote of no confidence removed Patrick John from power. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790281-0734)
323. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Barbados

Washington, June 16, 1979, 1945Z

156239. Subject: Pastor Conversations With Forde, Fletcher and Coard.

1. (S) Entire text.
2. NSC member Pastor met with Barbadian Foreign Minister Forde, Jamaican Finance Minister Fletcher and Grenadian Finance Minister Coard on June 7. The following is the text of his conversations with these gentlemen:

Begin text:

3. Minister of Foreign Affairs of Barbados, Henry Forde

A. Grenada—Forde was very concerned about the direction of the new government, believing that it was definitely moving toward Cuba. He suggested that we be patient with the government, and distant and cool. He said we should not do anything that makes it look as if we were rewarding the Bishop government. On the other hand, he agreed that we should not discriminate against Grenada at this time.

B. Cuba—He was extremely concerned about the expansion of Cuban influence in the Caribbean. He called in the Cuban non-resident Ambassador to Barbados, Martinez, right after the Grenadian coup for a stern lecture. He rejected Martinez’s request to establish an Embassy in Barbados three times. Forde amusingly recalled that he asked the Cuban whether he would be interested in having Barbados help Cuba to find ways to reduce its dependence on the Soviet Union. Martinez replied: “Are you serious?” He has no intention of letting the Cubans set up an Embassy because he believes it would be a jumping-off point for intelligence operations into the small islands.

C. He said that the Cubans are all over the place in the Caribbean. At a recent Caribbean Foreign Ministers’ Conference in Jamaica, he said that the Cubans took out a large number of rooms in the hotel where all the Foreign Ministers were staying and they even went so far as trying to date the secretaries as a way to get information. They sought interviews with all the Foreign Ministers. In contrast the U.S. was nowhere to be found. Similarly, they used small amounts of money through friendly professors in the University of the West Indies and other institutions to help their groups on each island. Cheddi Jagan,

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790274–1126. Secret. Drafted by McCoy; approved by Hewitt. Repeated for information to Caracas, Georgetown, Kingston, Port of Spain, and Martinique.
the Marxist leader of the Guyanese opposition, often brings money to different groups on his trips to the Caribbean.

He said that the Cuban Ambassador at one point said that Burnham and Manley were “not socialists.” By this he meant that Cuba viewed only Jagan and Trevor Munroe (of Jamaica) as the real socialists in the Caribbean, and they intended to support these two at the appropriate time.

Forde said that he intends to give a speech at the end of the month, and he would like to stress Cuba’s expansionism in the Caribbean. When I volunteered some information on the expansion of Cuban military facilities and armaments in Cuba, he asked whether I would forward some information along those lines to him. I said I would try. He is also interested in working with the Mexicans on the arms restraint initiatives throughout Latin America, and would like to highlight the Cuban arms build-up within that context.

D. Trinidad—He said that in his recent discussions with Prime Minister Eric Williams of Trinidad, he noted that Williams is interested for the first time in playing a much more active role in the Caribbean. Trinidad is giving $1 million to Saint Vincent, and also money to Saint Lucia. He also intends to cut off aid to Guyana because of its involvement with Grenada. Prime Minister Adams of Barbados has also written a stern letter to Burnham, and he believes that Burnham has been “burned” because of his help for Grenada. For the moment, however, Trinidad’s policy is to try to keep its distance from Grenada.

E. The United States—He said he would very much hope that the United States will assist in establishment of a regional coast guard, and he put me in touch with Lee Moore, who is Premier of Saint Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, and is particularly interested in such a coast guard. Both would like the coast guard to be a regional strike force to prevent a repetition of the Grenada coup. I told him that we would try to be very responsive to this and intended to work very closely with him in the future.

He said he hoped that the United States would increase its presence in the area, perhaps sending naval ships from time to time for exercises to work with the Barbadians. He also was concerned that our political intelligence was deficient, and he expressed hope that it would be improved.

Forde was concerned about the outcome of the naval facilities negotiations, and would like it if we could find some political face-

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**Footnote:**

2 On June 23, 1978, at the OAS General Assembly session, the Mexican Government circulated a draft resolution to establish a commission to study measures to inventory and reduce the number of conventional weapons across Latin America. (Telegram 171332 to all American Republic diplomatic posts, July 7, 1978; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780279-0377)
saving way to help him and the Barbadian Government out. He suggested, for example, that we try to make it appear that some of our aid to Barbados (through the Caribbean Development Bank) has been given as a settlement for the naval base. I said that we would be very happy to look into this plus any other alternatives. He said that he believes that the previous Ambassador, Frank Ortiz, had totally misjudged the Barbadian Cabinet’s position, but he is hopeful that new Ambassador Sally Shelton will do better. I assured him that she will be very good.

He expressed concern that certain U.S. organizations were unintentionally giving money to “human rights groups” which were front organizations for leftist groups in the Caribbean. In particular, he pointed to the Inter-American Foundation, and I told him that I would follow up with the IAF, and asked him to convey any information on other organizations to Amb. Shelton.

F. Dominica—We both agreed that Dominica was in trouble, and I was encouraged to learn that he intends to go there within a week to try to convince Prime Minister Patrick John to call for elections in the next three months. He thinks that would solve many of their problems.3

G. Non-Aligned Movement—He said that Yugoslavia was pushing Barbados to play a much more active role in the Non-Aligned Movement, and while he was in favor of that, the Cabinet was significantly divided, and he didn’t expect that Barbados would play very much of a role in the near future.

4. Jamaican Minister of Finance Richard Fletcher said that he is encouraged by the economic progress Jamaica has made since its agreement with the IMF, but he has been extremely concerned over the political setbacks brought on by the attacks on Prime Minister Manley by the Daily Gleaner.4 He said he believed that the attacks from the Gleaner had the effect of pushing Manley to the left, and much closer to Trevor Munroe and D.K. Duncan. However, he said that he believes that Manley now is improving in his public standing. He fears, however, that in order to attract more public support in Jamaica, he would have to shift more and more to the left.

5. Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard of Grenada is a chubby, bearded man in his mid-thirties. Fletcher introduced him to me, and gently and in a friendly manner chided me for the unfriendly actions the U.S. has taken towards Grenada. Fletcher said that he thought Frank Ortiz’s message was a stupid one,5 but he also asked me not to

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3 See Document 322.
4 See Document 189 and footnote 2 thereto.
5 See Document 317.
comment on that point. I didn’t. I, in turn, criticized remarks made by Prime Minister Bishop about U.S. destabilization efforts in Grenada, and turning to Fletcher, asked how such statements could be made. Both he and Coard felt that the CIA is a rogue elephant, and Carter has no control over it. I spent some time trying to disabuse them of that notion, and also tried to explain the origins and the directions of U.S. policy under the Carter administration to the Caribbean.

6. Coard tried to justify everything that was going on in Grenada as a reaction to the harsh repression and corruption and violence that was perpetrated by Eric Gairy. I suggested he turn to the future, rather than blame the past. They asked me why Secretary Vance considers the Eastern Caribbean a “hotbed” of problems for U.S. foreign policy. I said I was not familiar with the use of that word, but we were frankly discouraged about the interruption of the parliamentary and democratic process in Grenada and hopeful that example will not be repeated elsewhere.

Coard laughed at the thought that democracy had existed under Gairy. He described in great detail the election fraud perpetrated by Gairy in 1976, and I said that it was interesting that his opposition group was able to get 48 percent of the vote during such an election. Coard said that Gairy was very subtle. I, in turn, suggested that if the new government were to devote even a small fraction of the resources and energy it has devoted to building up the People’s Revolutionary Army in Grenada, to moving toward free elections, that they probably would have occurred by now. Coard said that I did not understand Grenada, and how terrible Gairy had left it.

Coard asked why we didn’t kick Gairy out of the United States, when we had prohibited the Shah from coming to the U.S. He was obviously extremely obsessed with Gairy’s continued presence in the U.S.

7. Coard did almost all of the talking in a 20-minute conversation, explaining in great detail Gairy’s monstrous behavior as Prime Minister. It was not a pleasant monologue to listen to. Coard came across as arrogant, and somewhat immature, obviously enjoying his new power as one of the rulers of a country and not unhappy that the U.S. was “concerned.”

Robert A. Pastor.

End text.

Christopher

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6 Presumably a reference to Bishop’s April 13 speech in which he criticized the United States and Ortiz. See footnote 6, Document 317.
Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting

Washington, June 26, 1979, 9:00–9:55 a.m.

SUBJECT
Afghanistan and Grenada (S)

PARTICIPANTS
The Vice President
Major John Matheny

State
David Newsom, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
David Mark, Deputy Dir, INR

OSD
Admiral Daniel Murphy, Deputy Under Sec. for Policy

JCS
Lt. Gen. W.Y. Smith, Ass’t. to the Chairman

Lt. Gen. John Pustay, Ass’t. to the Chairman

* Present for Item 2 only.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

[Omitted here is discussion of Afghanistan.]

Item II, Grenada

The DCI described a modest program using CIA assets to try to rally democratic elements in opposition to the New Jewel Movement (NJM). Again a series of options was presented. (S)

The Chairman asked what the United Kingdom’s attitude is toward trying to oppose the NJM. CIA replied that the UK is reluctant to do anything against the NJM as it has not yet decided what its policy toward the Caribbean area as a whole will be. The Vice President asked if the attitudes of other neighboring countries such as Venezuela are known. CIA responded that the attitudes of neighboring countries are not clear as yet. (TS)

Mr. Aaron stated that the real issue in Grenada is whether it will evolve into a Cuban-backed police state or whether a more democratic regime will emerge. Mr. Aaron stated his feelings that if no help is given to those that oppose the NJM, Cuban and Jamaican influence will predominate. (TS)

Secretary Newsom said that State had no problem with CIA’s use of agents of influence but questions whether the thrust of the effort would be to develop a new opposition or split the NJM. Mr. Newsom stated that State preferred an effort which will work directly against Mr. Bishop and the NJM. The Chairman supported this, stated that he favored an effort to promote factionalism in the NJM. It was agreed that factions do exist and that some favor a more democratic position which would lead to an election. (TS)

The final consensus was that the CIA effort would include support to those groups opposing the NJM but that no faction would be given exclusive support. Equal emphasis will be placed upon splitting the NJM while encouraging those groups which oppose it. (TS)

Secretary Newsom stated that overt as well as covert means are needed if this operation is to be effective. The Chairman agreed and suggested that a SCC meeting be called to discuss broader aspects of United States–Caribbean policy following the Asian Summit meetings. (TS)

CIA was authorized to present a finding to the President which would authorize use of agents of influence throughout the Caribbean and to support those individuals and organizations opposed to the NJM. Given the undecided attitudes of other countries in the area this operational effort is to be entirely unilateral. (TS)

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2 On May 21, [name not declassified] circulated a covert action proposal involving Grenada to Pastor and Vaky. [name not declassified] proposed covert support for Winston Whyte, a Grenadian political leader, in order to create a political movement in opposition to the Marxist New Jewel Movement. Whyte would receive $100,000 in U.S. funding to expand his organization, the People’s Action Labor Movement (PALM). (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 23, Grenada, 5/79) In a May 31 memorandum to Aaron, Pastor and Henze expressed disapproval of the proposal, stating, “Not only doesn’t [Whyte] need our money, but even the hint that he is receiving it would put him on the defensive.” Pastor and Henze also criticized the CIA, remarking, “of [the CIA’s proposals] few strike us as particularly useful or likely to be effective.” Their views were not shared by their superiors. In a handwritten note on the memorandum, Brzezinski wrote, “DA, tell—by memo—Carlucci, it needs to be done.” (National Security Council, Carter Intelligence Files, Subject Files, Box 26, Grenada, 31 May 1979–29 Nov. 1979)

3 In a June 25 memorandum to Newsom, Bowdler outlined a position against covert action, to be used at the June 26 SCC meeting, stating, “We recommend you take a position against implementation of the CIA plan on grounds that it is both risky and based on a probably unrealistic hope, i.e., that the new Grenada Government will allow free elections.” (Department of State, INR/IL Files, Transfer Identification Number 980643000012, Box 3, Grenada 1979–80)
325. **Presidential Finding**

Washington, July 3, 1979

Finding Pursuant to Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended, Concerning an Operation Abroad to Counter Cuban Influence in Grenada

I find the following operation in a foreign country is important to the national security of the United States and direct the Director of Central Intelligence, or his designee to report this finding to the concerned committees of the Congress pursuant to Section 662, and to provide such briefings as necessary.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCOPE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>Promote the democratic process and assist democratic Grenadian political elements to resist the Marxist totalitarian oriented government and its Cuban advisers by providing them with funds and guidance and by disseminating non-attributable propaganda worldwide and in Grenada in their support and in opposition to Cuban intervention.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

J Carter

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1 Source: National Security Council, Carter Intelligence Files, Subject Files, Box 26, Grenada Finding, 3 Jul 79. Secret; Sensitive.
Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, July 18, 1979

SUBJECT
US Aid and Policy to Grenada (C)

Our Ambassador to Barbados will be presenting her credentials in a couple of days in Grenada, and has requested some changes in the talking points which we sent to her, and has also requested a statement on our aid policy to Grenada. (C)

First, on aid policy, State recommends, and I concur, that we adopt a policy in which Grenada is for all apparent purposes treated like other islands in the Caribbean, but privately, we give somewhat smaller proportionate amounts to Grenada than to the other islands. The cable is at Tab A, and I recommend that you approve it. (S)

Secondly, our Ambassador has recommended a slight alteration in her talking points when she presents her credentials. She prefers not to raise in her first meeting with the Prime Minister past misunderstandings between our two countries. Our original intent was that we should raise these problematic points in order to clear the air and set the basis for a new relationship. Our Ambassador believes that it would be better to establish a good relationship first and raise these concerns—including one on the Grenada-Cuban relationship—later. I accept her points. If you concur, I will clear for the NSC instructions which say

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2 Although the United States did not give aid to Grenada bilaterally, the nation received financial assistance from the United States as part of a larger regional package. The Caribbean received $8.79 million in regional U.S. economic aid in FY 1977, $25.33 million in FY 1978, $28.84 million in FY 1979, and $47.77 million in FY 1980. (USAID Greenbook) The United States also provided Grenada with approximately $2 million per year through investments in the Caribbean Development Bank. (National Archives, RG 59 Central Foreign Policy File, P790165–1170)

3 Not attached. A copy is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 27, Grenada 1/77–1/81 through India 3–9/78.

4 Brzezinski checked the approve option. Telegram 186729 to Bridgetown, July 19, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790329–0758.

5 The original text of the talking points mentioned “that there have been some differences in perception or understanding of events between our two governments since the inception of the NRG on March 13.” (Telegram 153150 to Bridgetown, June 14; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790269–0687)
we should not raise these points, but should be prepared to respond if raised by them.\(^6\) (S)

\(^6\) Brzezinski checked the approve option. Telegram 186802 to Bridgetown, July 19, transmitted the revised talking points. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790329–1085)

327. Telegram From the Embassy in Barbados to the Department of State\(^1\)

Bridgetown, August 6, 1979, 1842Z


1. (C)—Entire text.

2. Summary. Many of Barbados’ foreign policy goals coincide with our own, including containment of Cuban ambitions in area. Yet, U.S. relations with Barbados are not as good as they should be. There is a lingering, bitter aftertaste following closure of the U.S. naval facility.\(^2\) Barbadians see the United States as a skinflint too ready to convert the reality of superior strength into contempt for Barbados’ claims for more compensation for past use of the facility. They say we used Barbadian infrastructure in support of a U.S. naval facility for sixteen years before paying a cent. No legal facts, logic, or ability on our part to show that the Barbadians should have demanded something earlier will diminish their conviction that we have treated a friend poorly. An irony is that while Barbados is a paradigm of what we would like most countries to be, we have not yet been able to find a way to put this issue behind us and look to the future. We believe it important to find a face-saving emolument for this small nation which points out frequently that we have rewarded Jamaica and Guyana whose governments are profligate and much less friendly than Barbados. We believe we must find a formula for dealing with Barbadian resentment before we can move confidently to a constructive, future relationship. End summary.


\(^2\) See Documents 308 and 311.
3. During negotiations for naval facility when Barbados was basing its demands for compensation on tendentious legalistic grounds, it was perhaps right for USG to resist, since to have caved in to ersatz and unworthy legal arguments would have made USG look gullible and been bad precedent for other negotiations. Written agreement did not provide for rent. For years Barbados never attempted to revise agreement despite possibility for doing so. That Barbados might have been successful had it made effort is indicated by fact that for year 1978 during which we tried and failed to renegotiate another lease for the facility, which by then was becoming obsolete anyway, we paid U.S. $750,000 to cover rent plus a pro-rated share for the phase-out months of early 1979. We also paid U.S. $250,000 to cover past use of the airport and any specific damage to roads. We were willing to continue using the facility at U.S. $750,000 per annum rent.

4. Having made our legal point and vacated the facility rather than pay more, we are concerned over the evolution of our relations with Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean. The latter is an area destined to become nettlesome because of economic and social pressures—doubly so if Castro intervenes beyond extent he has already. Meanwhile, Barbados is a fortress of parliamentary democracy, respect for human rights, and belief in sound economic management. As the largest, most developed, and most stable of the countries of the Eastern Caribbean, Barbados is respected by neighboring countries and has a potential—if not actual—leadership role to play in this increasingly troubled area. Island leaders heed the eloquent Barbadian voice of Henry Forde calling for restoration of democratic values and regional cooperation, reinforced by the test of good example. Barbadians are therefore as concerned as we are about political turmoil in the region. They are particularly concerned about the destruction of constitutionality by the March 13 coup in Grenada and by a growth in Cuban interest in the EC, especially the development of ties to elements in Dominica and St. Lucia, among other EC countries.

5. We believe that Barbados is a key to stability in the EC. We further believe that sound US-Barbados relations will be an important element in the protection of U.S. interests in this area. We think it would be extremely useful to find a “face-saving” solution for Henry Forde, who will continue for foreseeable future to be a major shaper of Barbados’ foreign policy, and for the GOB. As Department aware, Forde has been an important spokesman for region in meetings of Caribbean Group for Cooperation in Economic Development. Barbados’ new PermRep to UN has indicated Barbados is giving thought to joining NAM, where it could provide voice of moderation. Barbados generally plays larger role in international councils than its size would indicate.
6. As to what we could offer Barbados as a restorative of pride and as a balm to hurt feelings, Embassy strongly recommends an additional ex gratia payment of U.S. $250,000 on grant basis on top of the U.S. $250,000 already paid to cover past use of airport and any possible specific damage to roads. We recognize that there will be resistance to this recommendation in some quarters but we urge interested parties to consider substantial benefits which would accrue to USG over long-term by the offer of an additional U.S. $250,000 to Barbados. This amount, which we are convinced will be accepted by GOB and will put to rest once and for all Barbadian demands for additional funds, will go far towards eliminating residual bitterness. Barbados will recognize large-mindedness when it sees it. We believe this will be an important gesture towards a potentially staunch friend in a world where such are as scarce as hen’s teeth.\(^3\)

Shelton

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\(^3\) Habib and Vaky presented Shelton’s proposal to Vance. Vance approved the additional $250,000 on August 9. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P790130–2122)

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328. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Carlucci) to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron), the Senior Adviser to the Secretary of State (Habib), and the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Newsom)\(^1\)

Washington, October 9, 1979

SUBJECT

Presidential Finding on Grenada

1. The Presidential Finding on Grenada was signed on 3 July 1979.\(^2\)

As a result of State Department reservations and opposition expressed

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\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 27, Grenada 1/77–1/81 through India 3–9/78. Secret; Sensitive.

\(^2\) See Document 325.
by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, a mini-SCC meeting was held on 27 July 1979 in which the Grenada CA Project was reviewed.³ It was decided that the political action aspect of the project would be put in a holding pattern with minimum dispersal of funds for the time being. It was agreed that the project would be reviewed again after the return of Ambassador Philip Habib from his Caribbean trip in late August 1979.⁴

2. It has been more than one month since Ambassador Habib has returned and presented his report. In the absence of such a review or of new instructions, this Agency feels obliged to implement the finding, including providing financial support [1½ lines not declassified] Should there be members of the SCC who are opposed to the Agency carrying out this operation, we suggest another SCC meeting be called to provide new instructions to the Agency.⁵

Frank C. Carlucci⁶

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³ Minutes of the July 27 mini-SCC meeting were not found.

⁴ Habib visited the Caribbean from August 12 to 23. He did not visit Grenada, although he noted in his report that Maurice Bishop’s government received support from Jamaica. (Telegram 231487 to London, September 1; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790400–0415) See also Document 368.

⁵ The Department of State continued to object to the CIA’s proposed covert action. In an October 15 memorandum to Newsom, Bowdler labeled the planned action as “likely to be detected in a relatively short period” and noted “very strong opposition to [the action] in the Senate Select Committee.” (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Africa, Latin America, Interagency Intelligence Committees, Grenada 1979–80) On October 14, Winston Whyte was arrested by Grenadian officials and linked to a plot to overthrow the government. (Telegram 4597 from Bridgetown, November 5; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790509–0424) INR officials then urged that the CIA’s action be considered overtaken by events. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Africa, Latin America, Interagency Intelligence Committees, Grenada 1979–80)

⁶ Printed from a copy with this typed signature.
329. Letter From President Carter to St. Vincentian Prime Minister Cato

Washington, October 27, 1979

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

The American people join me in sending best wishes to you and the people of St. Vincent and the Grenadines on the occasion of your independence. On this happy occasion, I take the opportunity to inform you of the extension of United States Government recognition. I hope that, with your agreement, diplomatic relations can now be established between our two countries.

Our mutual regard for economic progress, human rights and democratic government provides the foundation for friendship between our two peoples. I am confident that relations between our two governments will be close and friendly.

The Government and the people of the United States share your aspirations and concern for the welfare of the people of St. Vincent and the Grenadines. We look forward to working together with you in your efforts to achieve that goal and to contributing to peace and prosperity for men and women everywhere.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Box 28, Latin America, 10/79. No classification marking.
330. Message From the Embassy of Grenada to the Department of State

Washington, November 9, 1979

The Embassy of Grenada presents its compliments to the Department of State and wishes to inform the said Department that the National Security Service of Grenada foiled an attempted armed overthrow of the Government of Grenada on November 12, 1979. Investigations conducted inside and outside Grenada revealed that mercenaries, vessels, arms and money were to have been provided from sources in Miami to aid in the attempted coup.

The Government of Grenada expresses its grave concern that the territory of the United States appears to have been used as a base for aggression and subversion against the sovereign and independent State of Grenada.

The Government of Grenada requests every assistance the Government of the United States can provide in the investigation of this matter.

The Embassy of Grenada avails itself of the opportunity to renew to the Department of States its highest considerations.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850125–2462. No classification marking.

2 On November 2, Grenadian officials learned about a “counter-revolutionary operation” that involved several former policemen and arrested some of the alleged conspirators. The detainees stated they had planned to receive assistance from three ships from Miami. Grenadian Ambassador to the UN Radix met with McHenry on November 6 to request information. (Telegram 4977 from USUN, November 7; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790512–0623) Two American citizens were among those arrested. (Telegram 4585 from Bridgetown, November 5; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790509–0318) In telegram 292444 to USUN, November 9, the Department authorized USUN to tell Radix that “there was no USG involvement of any kind in this or any previous alleged plots against the PRG.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790517–0214)
331. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Carlucci) to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron), the Senior Adviser to the Secretary of State (Habib), and the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Newsom)\(^1\)

Washington, November 23, 1979

SUBJECT

President Finding on Grenada

REFERENCE

DDCI Memorandum dated 9 October 1979, Same Subject

1. Since we have received no objections as solicited in the referenced Agency memorandum of 9 October 1979,\(^2\) and since the policy concerning Grenada has been reaffirmed in the 13 November 1979 Policy Review Committee meeting, this Agency plans to reactivate its proposed program as approved in the Presidential Finding on Grenada, signed 3 July 1979.\(^3\)

2. Concerned committees in Congress have been briefed on the outline of this proposal and further briefings are not deemed necessary. The imprisonment of [1 line not declassified] will necessitate the development of new channels through which to implement our political action program. The identification, contact and recruitment of alternate channels in the political sphere will result in time delays before we carry out the program. The international covert action infrastructure, how-

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\(^2\) See Document 328.

\(^3\) See Document 325. For the Summary of Conclusions of the November 13 PRC meeting, see Document 371. In a November 16 memorandum to Turner, Jack Davis provided a summary of the meeting. He wrote, “Also regarding Grenada, the DDCI asked for a lifting of the Presidential Finding, which had not been activated because of State resistance. Nobody objected, though it was not clear how the lifting was to be effected.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00112R: Subject Files, Box 16, Folder 10: (SCC) Caribbean)
ever, will continue to be used for implementation of the agent of influence and propaganda aspects of the program.\footnote{In a memorandum to Carlucci, December 9, Newsom summarized a November 26 discussion with Vaky, Bowdler, and Sanchez. He wrote, “At that time it was agreed that it is not possible to proceed with the political action part of the finding because no assets were available with which to do so. It was further agreed that the first task would be to recruit and establish new assets.” (National Security Council, Carter Intelligence Files, Subject Files, Box 26, Grenada, 5/31/1979–11/29/1979)}

\textbf{Frank C. Carlucci}\footnote{Printed from a copy with this typed signature.}

\footnote{332. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Barbados\footnote{Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800137–0218. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted in ARA/CAR; cleared by Bowdler and Pastor and in DOD/ISA, Treasury, ICA, LAC/CAR, OPIC, Exim, CIA, Peace Corps, and S/P; approved by Warne. Repeated for information Priority to London, Ottawa, USUN, Port of Spain, Kingston, Caracas, and the U.S. Interests Section in Havana.} \linebreak Washington, March 18, 1980, 0347Z

71200. Subject: Implementation of PRC Policy Decision on Grenada.\footnote{See Document 371.}

1. S—Entire text.
2. In carrying out the PRC decision that we distance ourselves from the Peoples Revolutionary Government of Grenada (PRG), we propose the following guidelines:

A. Embassy Bridgetown presence/contact: The primary contact between Embassy Bridgetown and the PRG should be in pursuit of the protection and welfare of U.S. citizens on the island. Consequently, visits to Grenada should be conducted primarily by consular officers who should: (A) visit AMCIT prisoners; (B) contact American residents on the island, including Peace Corps volunteers, students and faculty of St. George’s University School of Medicine; and (C) other residents. These visits should be conducted regularly, perhaps every two months. Consular officers should also report on political and economic develop-
ments, particularly the deteriorating financial position of the PRG. Ambassador Shelton or other officers (except consular) should travel to Grenada only as instructed or when the Ambassador considers extraordinary circumstances require sending an Embassy officer there.

B. U.S. assistance: We will provide no bilateral assistance to Grenada under any program, including the Special Development Activities fund.

C. Assistance through the CDB: We should attempt to diminish CDB disbursements to Grenada and slow the pace of CDB loans and disbursements to Grenada by focusing on project development assistance on other Eastern Caribbean islands.

D. Contacts with PRG officials in the U.S.: Contacts with PRG officials in the U.S. should be limited and carried out at the desk officer and office director level, except in extraordinary circumstances. U.S. officials should be correct, but should not go out of their way to meet with PRG representatives.

E. Public statements: U.S. public statements should focus on U.S. support for democratic institutions, constitutional processes, economic development, human rights and respect for territorial integrity and national sovereignty. Those statements should be related to circumstances and events in Grenada, as appropriate. We should speak out on abuses in Grenada such as indefinite postponement of elections, illegal detention of citizens and the lack of a free press. The U.S. should, of course, vigorously deny statements alleging that we are trying to destabilize the country.

F. Extradition of Eric Gairy: The extradition case should continue to be handled in a normal manner by Justice Department officials.

G. Ship visits: No visits by U.S. vessels will be scheduled in Grenada.

H. Security assistance: We will not seek FMS eligibility for Grenada nor will we establish an IMET program for Grenada.

I. OPIC activities: We will not approve applications for OPIC insurance or financing for any projects in Grenada nor will we extend any existing coverage except in exceptional circumstances.

J. Eximbank: We should not provide any new Exim loans to Grenada and will review all requests for FCIA insurance and bank guarantee programs in Washington before approving them. (FYI: Due to lack of reasonable assurance of repayment, Exim does not anticipate approving any transactions in the foreseeable future. End FYI)

K. Other bilateral programs: The U.S. will not provide any other assistance activities to Grenada such as USDA commodity credits, facilitation of private investment, ICA cultural activities and public speakers. Exceptions will be made, however, for programs that deal with nongov-
ernmental organizations particularly opposition groups, such as a limited AIFLD program. ICA informational, outreach and IVP programs will be continued and/or expanded at the discretion of Embassy Bridgetown.

L. Demarches on international issues: The Department will generally not make demarches on international issues unless special circumstances require a demarche to the PRG. Instructions to carry out a demarche to Grenada will be contained in the body of any circular message and ARA will instruct other Bureaus to discontinue use of the caption “Bridgetown for St. Georges.”

M. Demarche to other governments: The Department will develop a comprehensive brief on developments in Grenada to be shared with other interested governments, including Barbados, Venezuela, Trinidad and, perhaps, Jamaica. We will ask these governments to raise with Bishop their concern over the direction of Grenada’s foreign policy.

N. Travel guidance: A travel advisory warning American citizens against travel to Grenada is not called for at this time. However, when asked, we are alerting the public to our concerns over the detention of Americans and others without habeas corpus and the degree of uncertainty there because of the government’s campaign of anti-American rhetoric and charges of U.S. efforts to destabilize the regime. The government, however, has not carried out any systematic harassment of American residents or tourists on the island.

O. PVO activities: To the extent that the PRG is interested in cooperating with private voluntary organizations U.S. PVOs should be encouraged to play a role in Grenada. This role would be similar to the one that PVOs would perform throughout the Caribbean and Central America. However, the USG would give a lower priority to PVO activities in Grenada than elsewhere.

P. Export licenses: No export licenses for arms or military equipment will be granted to Grenada.\(^3\)

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\(^3\) The Embassy’s reply generally agreed with the new policy framework for U.S.-Grenadian relations. The Embassy recommended a few changes, including the continuance of Special Development Activities (SDA) grants on an individual basis and a more flexible OPIC and Export-Import Bank policy. (Telegram 1691 from Bridgetown, April 3; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800167–0541) The Department agreed to permit SDA projects on a “very selective basis.” (Telegram 210535 to Bridgetown, August 9; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800379–1170)
333. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, April 28, 1980, 9:45–10:15 a.m.

SUBJECT
Summary of the President’s Meeting with Barbadian Prime Minister Adams

PARTICIPANTS
President Jimmy Carter
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State
William Bowdler, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, State Department
Ambassador Sally Shelton, US Ambassador to Barbados
Robert Pastor, NSC staff member
Prime Minister J.M.G. Adams
Senator Nigel Barrow, Minister of Information
Brazane Babb, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs
Ambassador Oliver H. Jackman, Ambassador of Barbados

President Carter said that it was a great pleasure to meet with Prime Minister Adams, and that he was delighted and proud of the rich friendship between the Barbadian and American peoples. President Carter said he admired the high regard with which human rights and democratic principles are respected in Barbados. (C)

Prime Minister Adams said that the honor is his, especially because he is aware that this is a time when the President is faced with many major problems. (C)

President Carter said that the difficult time is made easier because of friendships such as that between the US and Barbados. President Carter said that he would be very interested to have Prime Minister Adams’ assessment of the situation in the nations in the Eastern Caribbean. He would also like his analysis of the security and the economic problems in the area. (C)

Prime Minister Adams said that the Commonwealth Eastern Caribbean is composed of countries which are small, with few resources but large social and economic aspirations. The cash economies and ready access to the media of North America and Britain allow the people to see North America as a place of opportunity and to try to duplicate the standard of living and the consumer items that are enjoyed in

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 2, Barbados, 4/77–5/80. Confidential. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. At the top of the page, Carter wrote, “Zbig—Be sure we follow up on all items.”
North America. It is easy to have a crisis of expectations in the Eastern Caribbean because the consciousness there is so different than that of Africa, which is faced with many more difficult structural problems. While Barbados and other nations in the Eastern Caribbean are characterized as higher income developing countries, it is difficult to compare to other developing countries because of the higher expectations there. (C)

Prime Minister Adams said that President Carter is in a better position to judge how the security of the Caribbean relates to the United States. From his perspective, the security problem of the Caribbean refers to the territorial integrity of each country. He said that we share the same democratic attitudes, and we only want to develop these rights in peace without interference by others. (C)

In answer to President Carter’s question about whether the security capabilities in the area are adequate to their needs, Prime Minister Adams said that Barbados cannot defend itself against a major external threat. In this case, Barbados hopes that in encountering any such threat, Barbados would have the help of the US and Great Britain. If this is the case, then Barbados’ security is adequate. (C)

President Carter summarized by saying that he would judge that there is no immediate concern on the part of Barbados to its security. Relationships with its neighbors and with its allies are solid. (C)

Prime Minister Adams elaborated by saying that Barbados is trying to build a small Coast Guard for fishing and for coastal protection, and it is seeking to do this in collaboration with its neighboring islands. (C)

In answer to a question from President Carter about whether progress has been satisfactory, Adams said that although the neighboring islands lack the means to participate, they would like to play a role in this regional Coast Guard. (C)

In answer to a question from President Carter about how many nations are participating in it, Prime Minister Adams said that two were, St Vincent and St Lucia. (C)

In answer to a question from President Carter about whether cooperation is adequate, Prime Minister Adams said that St Vincent has cooperated very closely in a spiritual sense, but it has no means to cooperate in any other way. (C)

President Carter laughed, saying that Dr. Brzezinski had mentioned to him that this relationship is the kind that the US has with some of its allies. (C)

President Carter said that the US is deeply interested in the regional Coast Guard, and we are also deeply interested in democracy in the area. He asked whether tourism is progressing well. (C)

Prime Minister Adams said that it was, with 20% growth in the past year; and previous to that 17%, and 17% again. He said that imports
right now account for 70% of the gross national product of Barbados, and therefore tourism is extremely important. He also pointed out that the US is now Barbados’ major trading partner, having passed Great Britain about three to four years ago. (C)

President Carter asked what was the investment picture like in Barbados, and whether there was anything he could do to help. (C)

Prime Minister Adams said that Barbados welcomes American investment, and already has quite a lot of investments from the United States, particularly in small manufacturing firms, trying to take advantage of the CARICOM market. Also, there is a new electronics firm, Intel, which is putting up a big factory to gain access to the European Community under the ACP-Lome Agreement. This is an area in particular where Barbados is looking for American firms to take advantage of this opportunity. The advantage, of course, is mutual, and while the firm could take advantage of a new market, Barbados has the advantage of more jobs. (C)

President Carter said that he has encouraged the organization of a new group, which is outside of government, under Governor Bob Graham of Florida. This group will seek to involve agriculture, labor, business, education, forestry, health, in many diverse activities so that we can have increased citizen-to-citizen cooperation. He reminded Prime Minister Adams that he had sent a message about that a while ago, and that the new group has made good progress recently. He said that he would hope that the organization would proceed and be helpful to Barbados. He said that the organization is also undertaking an agricultural analysis involving Land Grant Colleges. The group is wholly outside of Government, but he will be supporting it, and the President believes that it can be a good opportunity for our people to be drawn closer together. (C)

Prime Minister Adams said that he hopes that such collaboration would be fruitful. He mentioned that Barbados already had exchanges with a number of universities, including the University of Georgia and another one in New York, on agriculture, and that these exchanges have proven very useful, particularly at the technical cooperation level. (C)

Prime Minister Adams said that the United States has an important message to send to the Caribbean. He encouraged President Carter to

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2 The Lomé Convention was a trade arrangement between the European Community and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States, signed in 1975.

3 In telegram 72370 to Bridgetown, March 19, the Department outlined the goals of the news group. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800139-1093) For Carter’s remarks at an April 9 reception for the Board of Trustees of the Caribbean Central American Action, as Graham named the group, see Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81, Book I, pp. 624–629.
increase the flow of U.S. information to the area. He asked President Carter to let the people in the Eastern Caribbean know more about the United States than what it receives from just television or the press, which has a tendency to focus only on crisis issues. He said that there are a great many Barbadians in the United States, and the picture they present of the United States, for example in Brooklyn, is not hostile in any way. Indeed, it is the opposite. For example, he has an uncle in Bedford-Stuyvesant, who is a strong believer in the American free enterprise system. Prime Minister Adams says that he doesn’t believe his uncle would ever move. Nor is his experience unique; perhaps these Barbadians in Bedford-Stuyvesant represent a stabilizing influence in US cities and their experience contributes to a much greater understanding of the United States by Barbados. (C)

President Carter said that was very good. To summarize, he suggested that perhaps Prime Minister Adams would like to invite Governor Graham to Barbados to sit down with him in a private and confidential manner, perhaps with some of his Cabinet, to explore different ways to increase the collaboration between the US and Barbados. (C)

Acting Secretary Warren Christopher, at the President’s request, asked Prime Minister Adams what would be necessary to make the regional Coast Guard, which we think is very important, successful. He understands that the FMS interest rates may make it difficult for nations to invest in this regional Coast Guard, and for others it may make it impossible. He asked what we can do. (C)

Prime Minister Adams said that if there could be a transfer of vessels, perhaps on a lease or a lending basis, that this would help the other nations equip themselves. He does not think there is any immediate prospect that the smaller islands would be able to purchase these boats in any other way. (C)

Mr. Christopher asked if the FMS were on a more concessional basis, would it be more feasible for Barbados. (C)

Prime Minister Adams said that it would, although Barbados did not receive unreasonable terms from Great Britain for its Coast Guard. (C)

President Carter said that he will explore both ways. He will be talking to his Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, and will ask whether it would be possible for surface vessels to be given or leased to Barbados and to the other countries in the region.4 (C)

Mr. Christopher said that the region is significantly disadvantaged, especially when you consider that each of the islands could be threatened by a force of as little as one hundred. (C)

4 No record of this conversation has been found.
Prime Minister Adams said that a force of just 50 people could, with some internal support, plausibly carry out a coup in a place like Barbados. (C)

President Carter asked whether Barbados could use some communications equipment. (C)

Prime Minister Adams said that his Department of Defense was negotiating at this time, and has this under consideration. He understands that Ambassador Shelton is being contacted on this.5 (C)

President Carter said that he is eager for Prime Minister Adams to remain in close contact, and not to hesitate to contact President Carter directly, and that he reserves the right to do the same. He said both the US and Barbados have a great deal in common, sharing values and democracy, and he said that he hopes that our relations could be bound together even more by the personal relationship between the two leaders. President Carter said that he also enjoyed the opportunity to work with Canada and the United Kingdom to provide overall economic development assistance help. Prime Minister Adams’ guidance on how to do this effectively would be very much appreciated. (C)

Prime Minister Adams said that he was extremely glad for President Carter’s willingness to be helpful. He said that he is constantly told that the real problem in dealing with the Eastern Caribbean is not in the Executive, but in the Congress. For example, he pointed to US participation in the Caribbean Development Bank, in which the US has 14 different funds with different conditions, and that these funds make it much more difficult for investment to take place in an effective manner. He said that he would be very glad if the United States could become a donor in the Caribbean Development Bank, and could be more flexible in other policies toward the area. (C)

President Carter said that was an excellent analysis. He said that while Prime Minister Adams is here perhaps he will have an opportunity to meet with Warren Christopher and with others. For himself, President Carter said that he was very glad that the two leaders had had an opportunity to talk. (C)

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5 In FY 1980, Barbados received $30,000 in bilateral military assistance, an increase from $6,000 in FY 1979. (USAID Greenbook)
Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago

334. Telegram From the Embassy in Suriname to the Department of State

Paramaribo, February 7, 1977, 1313Z

87. Subj: Visit of Prime Minister Arron to Washington. Summary: As Prime Minister Arron prepares to attend OAS Special Session to admit Surinam February 22, Surinam continues to combine economic promise with spotty performance and awaits the coming later this year of the first national elections since independence. Politics are the only topic of conversation as the prognosticators try to ascertain whether Arron’s Creole-dominated coalition can hold on to power in spite of accusations of corruption and a record of only modest accomplishments or whether the opposition Hindustani-dominated VHP will attract enough votes from the discontented to emerge on top. With Surinamers thus preoccupied internally, we can expect continued cautiousness in the conduct of Surinam’s foreign relations regardless of the closer ties with its hemispheric neighbors which might be inferred from its new OAS membership.

1. Although Special Session of the OAS General Assembly was apparently originally suggested by Panama without consultation with Surinam, the latter seized upon the idea and lobbied successfully, with US support, with the result that the Special Session for the admission of Surinam will take place on February 22 in Washington. As Minister for General and foreign affairs, Henck Arron will spend the period Feb 19 to 24 in Washington for attendance at the Special Session and other affairs in connection therewith, but the fact that he is also Prime Minister (and Minister of Finance too) as well as the fact that this will be his first visit to Washington since Surinam became independent on Nov 24, 1975, give this visit an importance in Surinam eyes beyond the OAS aspect.

2. The first fifteen months of independence have not brought any dramatic political or economic changes in Surinam. The country had

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770045–0122. Confidential. Repeated for information to Georgetown, The Hague, Port of Spain, and USCINCSO in Quarry Heights.

2 While in Washington for the OAS meeting, Arron met with Secretary Vance. See Document 335.

3 The VHP (Vooruitstrevende Hervormings Partij) was the Progressive Reform Party.
had self-government for more than 20 years in all areas except defense and Foreign Affairs; the question of defense has been approached gradually, in the absence of any real threat to Surinam’s security, and Surinam’s entry into the field of foreign affairs has also been gradual and cautious. In the absence of any pressing foreign relations problems, the attention of the government and the people has been focussed more on internal political and economic affairs. For the former, the general elections for a new Parliament, the first elections since independence, which will be held in the late summer or early fall of this year, are already the determining factor in what is being said and done in Paramaribo. In economic affairs, the progress of utilization of the massive Dutch aid program, the development of projects, and the ups and downs of the bauxite-aluminum industry are the main matters of concern.

3. After a previous Hindustani-Creole alliance which lasted until the elections of 1973, the Creole-dominated “combination” took over, led by Arron and his National Party of Surinam (NPS) and including prominently the left-leaning black nationalist Progressive Nationalistic Party (PNR) of Economics Minister Eddy Bruma, the (Catholic-Christian Democratic) Progressive Surinam People’s Party (PSV) of Parliament Chairman Emile Wijntuin, and the Indonesian Farmers’ Party (KTPI) of Agriculture Minister Willy Soemita. Recent weeks have seen separate meetings of these party organizations, dealing with the question of whether to go into the elections with the same combination grouping. So far it appears that all parties will want to remain in the combination. Some members of the NPS and the PSV, however, would like to see the PNR dropped. Allegations of corruption against Soemita have also raised doubts about his usefulness to the combination. The consensus, nevertheless, is that the combination will remain intact although the relative bargaining power of Arron and the NPS vis-a-vis the other parties may be greater than it was in 1973, when he needed all possible assistance to come into power.

4. After a long history of association with the government and of supplying a number of Ministers to the Cabinet, the Hindustanis have found the role of opposition less than satisfying in the past four years. The Progressive Reform Party (VHP), which used to be called the United Hindustani Party (using the same initials in Dutch), under elder statesman Jaggemnath Lachmon appears to be making an all-out attempt to end the Creole ascendancy. Lachmon says that he does not want to rule alone, and does not think that the VHP could do so, but at the same time he does not think that the Creoles should rule alone either. His stated aim is to show sufficient strength to prevent the combination from continuing in power, and to force the NPS to resume its former coalition with the VHP to the exclusion of the PNR. In trying to broaden
his base Lachmon has given his blessing to a new Indonesian party under an Indonesian Member of Parliament, Somohardjo, who got in in 1973 as a member of the NPS but later broke with that party. The consensus among observers, including the press, is that as of now the combination would win an election, but there are too many fluid factors which could affect the situation over the next six months to permit a decisive view of what will happen when the elections actually occur.

5. On the economic side, 1976 saw a three-year agreement between the GOS and Alcoa setting a minimum bauxite production rate and a bauxite levy rate for the next three years. Although the bauxite production level remains disappointingly low, the agreements guarantee the government a minimum base on which the levy is calculated, while the rising price of aluminum on the world market results in an increase in the levy itself, thus providing the GOS with a sizeable and steady income from this source. Progress on utilization of the generous Netherlands aid settlement (about $1.5 billion over a period of 1–15 years) has been more spotty, with some friction developing over the planning and evaluation of projects and the distribution of funds between infrastructure, production and social projects. Nevertheless, the availability of this massive aid program for a long period ahead gives Surinam an economic advantage of great importance compared with other developing countries. Inflation took a jump in the last quarter of 1976, and will probably get worse as the aid program pumps money into the economy and takes out labor and materials for long-range infrastructure projects which add nothing to the economy in the short run but an increased demand for imported products.

6. On the international scene, Surinam has entered into diplomatic relations with a wide variety of countries and has real problems with none of them, with the sole exception of neighboring Guyana. While the border problem with Guyana will remain an emotional issue with Surinam until it is finally solved, there is currently no particular attention being paid to this matter, nor is it an internally divisive question. With entry into the OAS, Surinam will be taking its place among the Central and South American (we can’t say Latin American because Surinam is not Latin) nations in their security relationship with the US, a factor that may bring more bilateral Surinam-US contact as well. While Surinam maintains a modest army of under a thousand men, and its army commander has talked desultorily about getting some military equipment from the US, there is little likelihood in the near

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4 Guyana and Suriname have a long-standing dispute over 6,000 square miles of land. Soldiers from the two nations skirmished over the territory in 1969. The dispute remains unresolved.
term of either an expansion in size or in capability of the army or of a significant request to the US for military sales or cooperation.

7. In this context, the task of Arron and his government is less to achieve some kind of startling success than to minimize the chances of some kind of a significant failure. If things can be kept going as they are, with a continuation of the modest successes of the GOS in its relations with other countries and an avoidance of any internal economic or political crisis, then the Arron government’s chances of winning the elections and remaining in power will be enhanced. The dangers lie in the possibility of public resentment of higher prices, unemployment, wildcat strikes aimed at public services, and of the rather inept government performance in the economic field, which has resulted in scarcities of commodities such as potatoes and onions and in the import of sugar for domestic needs while defaulting on sugar export commitments. A further possible source of public discontent could be the allegations of personal corruption which have recently been made. Minister of Public Works Karamat Ali has just won a court case against a journalist who charged him and his Ministry (without naming names) with having received bribes to grant constructions permits; an official of the Ministry of Justice has also just won a suit against a journalist who alleged that he was “crooked”, widespread allegations have been made about corruption on the part of Agricultural Minister Soemita, but no official action has occurred. The possibility of some or all of these factors having an adverse effect on the elections is why Arron wants to keep the boat steady even if it is not traveling along very fast, while the opposition will seek every opportunity to rock the boat and scare the passengers, while at the same time criticizing the fact that it seems not to be going anywhere fast.

Zurhellen
335. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 25, 1977, 10 a.m.

SUBJECT
Bilateral Relations; Cuba; Guyana Border Problem; Surinamese Foreign Relations; Fisheries Boundaries; The Middle East Problem

PARTICIPANTS
Surinam
Prime Minister Henck Arron
Ambassador Roel F. Karamat, Embassy of Surinam
Mr. Deodaat Van der Geld, Director, Ministry of General Affairs

United States
The Secretary
Assistant Secretary-designate Terence A. Todman, ARA
Theodore J.C. Heavner, ARA/CAR (notetaker)

Bilateral Relations

Arron opened by expressing the sincere wish of his government for continued good relations with the United States. Noting that the U.S. has had a Consulate General in Surinam since 1790, he stressed the congruence of Surinamese and U.S. views on foreign policy. Arron several times expressed his agreement and satisfaction with recent statements by President Carter on how the new administration intends to deal with foreign policy issues.

The Secretary responded by expressing his pleasure in greeting Arron and his determination to work toward continuing and deepening our friendship with Surinam. The Secretary also welcomed Surinam’s entry into the OAS, saying that we look forward to working with the GOS in that organization.

Arron commented on the importance of the U.S. role in the OAS and the hemisphere. He observed the general lack of finances and technology in the hemisphere, noting that this is also Surinam’s problem.

The Secretary acknowledged the importance and the difficulty of the problems facing the hemisphere, and in particular those confronting Surinam. He especially noted the importance of the transfer of technology, an issue of concern to the whole world.

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1 Source: Department of State, Records of Cyrus Vance, 1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, 1977 memorandum of conversation for Secretary Vance. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Heavner; approved in S. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office.
Later in the conversation, Arron described his government’s plans for development of hydroelectric power and an aluminum smelting complex in the western part of the country. Noting the need for large funds and ongoing discussions with the IBRD, he stressed that money and energy are major problems for his country. However, he did not ask for any U.S. assistance.

The Secretary commented that energy costs are a major problem for all countries. He said that the Saudi Arabians are trying to keep down oil prices out of concern for the difficulties caused to developing countries. However, the Iranians are pressing for ever higher prices. The Saudis may or may not be able to hold the line, as they are under great pressure.

Ambassador Todman commented that we admire the GOS willingness to say precisely what it thinks in international forums. The tendency of some states to take a common position regardless of their real views is not helpful. Surinam’s policy of looking at the issues objectively and expressing its real views is most desirable. The Secretary concurred fully in this observation.

Cuba

Arron asked the Secretary for a summary of U.S. views on Cuba. (Arron raised Cuba three times in the conversation, indicating the importance he attaches to that problem.) The Secretary responded by saying that we want to discuss with the Cubans the many issues which divide us. We look toward an ultimate normalization of relations, but that will not happen overnight, and the difficulties are such that we may not succeed. Nevertheless, we are ready for discussions with no preconditions, and there are some indications from the Cubans that they are agreeable to talks.

Arron noted that Cuban influences are a matter of concern to his government, particularly as they have been observed in neighboring Guyana and Jamaica. He said that the GOS has no diplomatic ties with Cuba now and is not likely to have formal relations with Cuba in the near future.

Later in the conversation, in the context of the border problem with Guyana, Arron again raised the Cuba question, saying “in the Caribbean I am afraid of the Cuba position”. He noted that the Cubans made use of Guyanese refueling facilities during the Angolan airlift but had not raised the question with Surinam. At the end of the conversation, Arron again returned to Cuba, reiterating concern about

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2 Beginning in November 1975, Cuba began transporting soldiers and military supplies via air to Angola.
Cuban influence in the Caribbean and saying “we do hope the U.S. will pay enough attention to this matter”.

In this context Ambassador Karamat said that the entry of COMECON into “our region” is “highly disturbing” to the GOS.

The Secretary responded to these several observations by noting some of our differences with Cuba. He mentioned the continued presence of Cuban troops in Angola, the Cuban campaign to portray Puerto Rico as an oppressed U.S. colony, human rights problems in Cuba, and confiscated U.S. assets in Cuba. The Secretary also noted some of the problems caused by our severed relations, including split families, shortages of medicines, and the prospective difficulties of negotiating a fisheries boundary. He also mentioned the hijacking treaty as an immediate problem for us.

Responding to Karamat’s observation about COMECON, the Secretary said that he is also somewhat disturbed by this development. He said that there is not much we can do about it, and we will watch the matter closely.

Guyana/Surinam Border Problem

Replying to an inquiry from the Secretary about GOS views on Caribbean issues, Arron raised the Guyana/Surinam border problem. He said that a few years ago Guyana occupied a piece of Surinamese territory. Surinam chose not to fight at the time. Now, the GOS is negotiating with the French for a resolution of their border dispute with French Guiana. Once this is resolved—and Arron expressed confidence that there would be a solution soon—the GOS feels it will be in a very strong position to open negotiations with Guyana on that border dispute.

Arron did not ask for any U.S. support in the border dispute, and the Secretary made no comment on it.

Surinamese Foreign Relations

In a general description of Surinamese foreign affairs, Arron began by noting the importance of the U.S. role in the OAS and reiterating his hope that we will be able “to support each other” in that organization. He particularly noted the problem of human rights in the hemisphere, stressing that “we have no such problems in our country”.

3 The eastern boundary of Suriname was set by Czar Alexander III in 1888, during an arbitration hearing between France and the Netherlands. Ambiguity in Alexander’s language led to an unresolved border dispute between Suriname and French Guiana that lasted for decades. In telegram 169 from Paramaribo, March 4, the Embassy reported that Suriname and France had reached a tentative agreement on their border dispute. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770075-0923)
Arron said that Surinam has developed a special relationship with Brazil, having recently concluded a treaty of friendship with that large neighbor. He expressed the hope that a similar agreement would be concluded with Venezuela. He also expressed the intention of expanding diplomatic relations with other countries in the hemisphere.

Commenting on Surinam’s role in the Caribbean, he said that the GOS is studying the desirability of entering CARICOM. Arron noted that relations between some CARICOM members are not entirely cordial, suggesting this was one reason for GOS failure to take a decision on CARICOM membership. Arron noted GOS cordial relations with Trinidad, and said of Jamaica only that Surinam/Jamaica relations are based on their association in the International Bauxite Association, of which both countries are founding members.

Ambassador Karamat stressed the importance of U.S. attention to hemisphere relations. The Secretary assured the Surinamese of our intention to revitalize our relations with the hemisphere.

**Fisheries Boundaries**

Arron said that the GOS intends to proclaim a 200 mile fisheries zone this year. He noted that Surinamese fishing grounds are being ruined by foreign fishermen. In particular, it is important to protect the shrimp grounds off Surinam, which are being exploited by huge trawlers, including Soviet ships.

**The Middle East Problem**

At the beginning of the conversation, Arron noted the Secretary’s recent trip to the Middle East. He asked for the Secretary’s view on progress in that area.

The Secretary said that there is a reasonable chance for a Geneva conference sometime in the fall. There are very wide substantive differences, but all parties are willing to work on them. Recognition of the PLO is the big question. Before the recognition problem can be dealt with, the PLO must abandon their position that Israel has no right to exist.

Arron commented that Israel’s right to exist must be recognized. He said this is the GOS position, as has been made clear in past.

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4 Suriname did not join CARICOM until 1995.

5 Arron and the Surinamese Parliament established a 200-mile fishing boundary in April 1978. (Telegram 587 from Paramaribo, April 24, 1978; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780177–0323)

6 Secretary Vance traveled to the Middle East from February 15 to February 21, visiting Israel, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria.
The Secretary observed that part of the problem is that there is no agreement among the Arabs themselves. However, all say they will go to Geneva if the PLO question is resolved and they are willing to discuss an overall settlement without any preconditions. There are three core issues: peace, withdrawal, and resolution of the Palestinian question.

336. Memorandum of Conversation

Port of Spain, June 16, 1977

SUBJECTS
Financial Assistance to Jamaica
U.S. Industrial Participation in Trinidadian Development
Proposed LNG Discussions
Cuba
Caribbean Mini-State Problem
Caribbean Integration
Civil Aviation
Human Rights
OAS Membership and Belize
Southern Africa

PARTICIPANTS
Trinidad and Tobago
Prime Minister Dr. Eric Williams
Minister Overand Padmore, Minister in the Ministry of Finance, and Acting Foreign Minister
Minister George Chambers, Minister of Industry and Commerce, and Minister of Agriculture
Mr. Lennox Ballah, Permanent Secretary, Foreign Ministry
Mr. Frank Barsotti, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance
Ambassador Victor McIntyre, Ambassador to the U.S.A. and the OAS

United States
The Secretary of State
Under Secretary Philip Habib
Mr. Robert Rich, Charge d’Affaires a.i. in Trinidad and Tobago
Assistant Secretary Terence Todman

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770122-0262. Confidential; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Rich; approved by Twaddell. The meeting was held in the Prime Minister’s residence. Vance visited Port of Spain June 16–17 after the OAS General Assembly session in Grenada.
The Prime Minister welcomed the Secretary to Trinidad and the Secretary in turn conveyed President Carter’s personal greetings to the Prime Minister.

Financial Assistance to Jamaica

Prime Minister Williams opened the discussion by directly plunging into the financial plight of Jamaica. He said that Prime Minister Manley had sought additional assistance from Trinidad and also Trinidad’s cooperation in forming a consortium of governments to come to Jamaican aid. Trinidad had earlier provided loans of considerable magnitude (U.S. Embassy estimate: U.S. $110 million) and was now considering up to $50 million in additional support in the form of export credits.

Williams emphasized, however, that the Government of Trinidad and Tobago was in no position alone to bail out Jamaica, and the Jamaican requirements appeared to be far in excess of Trinidadian capacities. There was also concern at the structural problems, and whether assistance would be wasted. No such program of help to Jamaica could be successful without U.S. assistance and support, particularly in view of the great weight which the United States carried in the international financial institutions. The Prime Minister sought the Secretary’s views and assessment.

In response, the Secretary acknowledged the acuteness of the Jamaican situation, particularly in the next two quarters of this year. Beyond this short-term question of balance of payments, however, lay the mid-term problems which were partially structural, and without a solution to which the short-term aid would merely be a band-aid which would not stop the hemorrhaging. For the mid-term, Jamaican agreement with the IMF was essential. IMF discussions directed at a $200 million stabilization program had been far advanced until recently, when the new Jamaican budget had been revealed to be excessive to anything considered by the IMF to be tolerable.² The U.S. has urged the IMF to continue the dialogue, however, and we understand that a further attempt is underway to come to an understanding.

In response to questions by the Trinidadian side, the Secretary affirmed that an agreement with the IMF was indeed a condition precedent for U.S. assistance. Both Prime Minister Williams and Minister Chambers subsequently expressed their satisfaction with insistence that Jamaican agreement be reached with the IMF.

With regard to short-term U.S. assistance, the Secretary indicated that the U.S. was thinking of the consortium approach, since we could

² See Documents 179 and 180.
certainly not provide all the funds which Jamaica required. In the short run we might be able to provide approximately $50 million, a large part of which would be food aid under PL–480. This will require a supplemental appropriation from the Congress, however, and therefore it is impossible to give a firm commitment at this stage. Venezuela and Mexico have expressed some interest in helping, and the U.S. assumes that Trinidad and Tobago would also be a part of the consortium. Canada may roll over a $25 million loan coming due soon. Only token funds are likely to be available from the UK. When queried regarding possible German participation, the Secretary stated that he would be prepared to solicit German participation in a consortium after Jamaica had reached agreement with the IMF.3

The Prime Minister expressed considerable satisfaction with this approach, and stressed again that he felt Trinidad and Tobago should not be in the lead, both because the government’s financial assistance resources were limited, and because others such as the USG and the IMF were in a better position to require the Jamaican adjustments which would be necessary to make the financial assistance worthwhile.

The Prime Minister inquired of the Secretary whether the United States was also prepared to assist with a financial rescue package for Guyana, which was also importuning Trinidad for aid. The Secretary responded that he was not yet as fully familiar with the situation in Guyana, but that Under Secretary Habib would be proceeding to Georgetown after the current discussions in Port of Spain and would then report directly to him on his evaluation of the problems there.4

**U.S. Industrial Participation in Trinidadian Development**

The Prime Minister cited the wide American industrial participation in the Trinidadian petroleum industry and in the industrialization program being made possible by the available supplies of petroleum and natural gas. He noted the large Texaco and Amoco investments, as well as new joint ventures with the Trinidad Government for oil exploration which had been entered into by Occidental, Tenneco and others.

Dr. Williams stated that such cooperation was welcomed, although the government sought to maximize the training and developmental aspects of all such investments. In the future, firms would all be expected to contribute significantly to research, education, and development. He foresaw the inevitable breakup of the University of the West Indies (UWI) and the need to expand the Trinidadian campus to

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3 For more information about multilateral and U.S. bilateral economic assistance to Jamaica, see Documents 179 and 180.
4 Habib visited Georgetown June 19–21.
upgrade the engineering school and establish a full medical and dental faculty. Private enterprise would play a dynamic role in this.

Proposed LNG Discussions

The Prime Minister reported the recent discovery of significant new natural gas reserves between Trinidad and Tobago by Occidental Petroleum, adding to the already large reserves found in the southeast by Amoco. The Cabinet had therefore decided to resurrect earlier proposals for an LNG project now that the size of the reserves were clearly sufficient to support both Trinidad’s own industrialization needs (steel, aluminum, fertilizer, and petrochemicals) as well as LNG exports. Multiple proposals were presently before the Government, including a proposal from Occidental for an exclusive LNG relationship.5

The Trinidian experience with U.S. industry was good. An American firm is supplying the technology for the Iron and Steel mill, and Morgan Bank is taking the lead in putting together the $150 million financial package. Delays have been experienced, however, in arranging the ExIm portion of the financing, designed to cover 85% of the US-origin equipment.

The Prime Minister and Minister Chambers proposed that the U.S. and Trinidad and Tobago consider some private bilateral discussions directed at the entire LNG arrangement. As this proposal was explored at some length throughout the evening, it was not entirely clear what the parameters of the dialogue desired by the Prime Minister were. Included definitely were the desire for a reliable and assured market, as well as facilitation of ExIm Bank assistance with the financial package. The Ministers stated that they wished to develop their proposals in more detail and would transmit them to the Secretary through diplomatic channels.

Cuba

The Prime Minister indicated satisfaction that the United States was exploring normalization of relations with Cuba, and noted that he had caught hell a few years ago for advocating such rapprochement in the region. However, he hoped that American fascination with Cuba would not be at the expense of the more conservative governments in the area. Subsequently, he expressed strongly his personal distaste for Castro and his Government.

5 On October 21, the Government of Trinidad and Tobago signed an agreement with Tenneco and People’s Gas to build an LNG plant. (Telegram 3185 from Port of Spain, October 25; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770392-0727)
Caribbean Mini-States

The Secretary asked the Prime Minister’s evaluation and recommendations regarding the proliferation of unviable mini-states in the Caribbean and also regarding the longer-term economic problems of the area. The Prime Minister commented that the problems were economic, political, and human. Chaos and radical solutions were the alternative to positive developments.

Minister Chambers noted that the small islands felt that, as independent entities, they would have greater access to the international financial institutions for development capital. Regional assistance efforts thus far had not been very effective. Proposals for a separate common market of the LDC’s had been stillborn. The Caribbean Investment Corporation, originally funded by Trinidad and Jamaica to help the smaller islands, had languished because the infrastructure to make use of the financing simply did not exist in most instances.

In a unique effort, Trinidad had established a counterpart fund to help the LDC’s provide that portion of CDB project financing which the Bank would not put up. No other nation had put any money into the counterpart fund, however.

Minister Padmore cited the multiplying claims on the Government of Trinidad and Tobago for assistance to the small territories. The Prime Minister noted that in this respect mini-state independence would not change things for Trinidad, which was already beseeched for funds. He expressed frustration, however, at the readiness of the mini-states to beg for Trinidad tax payer money on the one hand and immediately turn around and take actions which were inimical to regional integration or sound fiscal policy (such as abolishing local income taxes).

Civil Aviation

Dr. Williams cited civil aviation as a particularly thorny problem in the Caribbean which had been exacerbated by rivalries and lack of common purpose. While Trinidad had financially bailed out the carrier serving the smaller islands (LIAT), had guaranteed loans for inter-island shipping, and had developed the only viable regional airline (BWIA), others pursued conflicting policies while asking for Trinidadian loans with the other hand. Barbados, for example, was trying to gain aviation rights for a “national airline” which was essentially Canadian and European owned and sponsored. The U.S. CAB had flatly turned down the airline’s application (in 1976), but now Canada was proposing to accept the line and had only given Trinidad until June 30 to show cause why it should not grant routes to this rival—

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6 Leeward Islands Air Transport and British West Indies Airlines.
all at the expense of BWIA and general airline route viability in the area. The eventual prospect was for each mini-state seeking sovereign airline bilaterals for a “national” carrier. This was a source of considerable frustration for Trinidad and Tobago.

Caribbean Integration

Several times in the discussion, the Trinidadian participants indicated that the Caribbean integration movement as represented currently by CARICOM was in trouble. The Prime Minister stated that Trinidad was the only CARICOM member which still adhered to all aspects of the common market, while on all sides others were imposing exceptions and trade restraints. Minister Chambers commented during dinner that the highly respected Secretary General of CARICOM, Alister McIntyre, was resigning to take up a position with the UNDP. There was no candidate of equal stature in sight who would undertake the job at this time with the Community in such disarray. With the expanding problems within CARICOM, it was even more important that Trinidad look to U.S. markets to keep her factories busy and her work force occupied.

Human Rights

The Secretary reported on the human rights discussions at the OAS General Assembly in Grenada and in his bilateral conversations with hemisphere foreign ministers there. He assured the Prime Minister that this concern was not a transient one for the U.S. Government. Dr. Williams expressed his full support and agreement.

OAS Membership and Belize

The Prime Minister expressed satisfaction at U.S. support for changing Article 8 of the OAS charter, which inhibits OAS membership for Guyana and Belize. A brief discussion of the Belize–Guatemala situation followed, and the Secretary stated that he felt either binding mediation or arbitration might provide a mechanism for a peaceful solution. Perhaps Guatemalan-UK meetings in Washington in July would indicate the direction the dispute would take. The Prime Minister suggested that, if either the UK or the U.S. would guarantee Belize’s borders, then there would be no trouble. He advocated that all of the old boundary claims be abandoned throughout the world (excepting

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7 McIntyre resigned in August. A successor, Kurleigh King of Barbados, was not elected until November 1978.

8 Article 8 of the OAS Charter barred nations that had boundary disputes with OAS member states from joining. In his June 14 address to the OAS General Assembly, Vance proposed eliminating the article. For the text of his address, see the Department of State Bulletin, July 18, 1977, pp. 69–72.
20th century problems in Europe) and that existing state boundaries be accepted.

South Africa

The Secretary described current efforts in collaboration with the United Kingdom to reach a solution in Rhodesia, and the somewhat improved outlook for a Namibian arrangement acceptable to the international community as a result of the Vice President’s talks with South African Prime Minister Vorster. Dr. Williams was pessimistic that any British Government would really bite the bullet on Rhodesia, however, since he had seen several successive governments in London make promises, yet fail to come to grips with the issue. Under Secretary Habib commented in turn that David Owen might surprise the Prime Minister, since Owen was indeed working hard to bring about a solution.

337. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Todman) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, July 14, 1977

SUBJECT
Response to Letter from Trinidadian Prime Minister Williams

ISSUE FOR DECISION

How to respond to a letter from Trinidadian Prime Minister Williams which suggests high level bilateral discussions on a variety of economic issues in Port of Spain the first week of August.

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

During your visit to Trinidad following the OAS General Assembly in Grenada, Prime Minister Williams indicated an interest in continuing discussions on technology transfer and possible liquid natural gas (LNG) sales to the United States. In his July 7 letter to you (Tab 2),

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770138-2493. Confidential. Drafted July 13 by Heavner; cleared by Katz. An unidentified hand wrote at the top of the first page, “Tel sent 7/16.”

2 Attached but not printed. The letter contains an invitation from Prime Minister Williams to conduct bilateral economic talks in Port of Spain.
Williams proposes talks in Port of Spain during the first week in August. The enclosure to his letter, characterized as the proposed basis for the talks, does not mention LNG but does touch on a variety of trade and technology transfer matters.

We are inclined to believe that Williams is aiming at a special economic relationship with the United States, based in part on what Williams sees as Trinidad’s special situation as a reliable, nearby, democratic supplier of hydrocarbons.

Because of Trinidad’s important and very helpful role in the Caribbean, we are anxious to be as forthcoming as possible to Williams. His proposals are quite vague, however, and any commitments on LNG will require careful study and important policy decisions.

At this point our best course appears to be further exploration of Williams’ intentions, without making any commitments. A warm but essentially noncommittal reply to Williams’ letter is recommended, while we consider how best to respond to the substantive matters he raises.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That you sign the attached cable reply to Williams (Tab 1), thanking him for his letter and promising an early response to his proposal.3

2. That you direct ARA and EB to coordinate with other interested agencies and bureaus to study Williams’ proposals and form a team to participate in the proposed talks.4

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3 Vance checked the approve option on July 16. The reply to Williams was transmitted in telegram 166516 to Port of Spain, July 16. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770254-0475)

4 Talks were held in Port of Spain from August 3 to August 5, with Arellano leading the U.S. delegation. Ambassador Fox reported, “Over-all reaction of GOTT to talks has been very favorable . . . hopefully it will serve to facilitate closer cooperation from GOTT on a number of issues of interest to us.” (Telegram 2337 from Port of Spain, August 12; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770292-0546)
338. Telegram From the Embassy in Suriname to the Department of State\(^1\)

Paramaribo, December 1, 1977, 1414Z


1. In meetings with Assistant Secretary Todman Nov 30, both President Ferrier and Prime Minister Arron expressed interest in Caribbean development initiative but seemed unsure about form and degree of Surinam participation. Arron said that they were thinking of having Ambassador Karamat represent Surinam at December 14–15 meeting. It would be difficult in any event, he said, to send a Minister since new Parliament meets on December 15 and it is hoped that a new government can be presented on that day.

2. Arron said that Surinam was in a somewhat ambiguous position, being physically located on the mainland of South America but with long-standing ties to Holland and ethnic/cultural links with the Caribbean states. An appropriate foreign policy for newly-independent Surinam was still being defined. In regard to the Caribbean, he noted that Surinam, because of its colonial past, produced many of the same products as the other states. Moreover, the English-speaking countries tended to stick together in international forums. Surinam for example had been isolated on occasion in EC institutions. A further consideration was Surinam’s “special relationship” with Brazil and growing ties with Venezuela.

3. Comment: While Surinam clearly intends to be represented at the December conference, its participation will be low-key and it may still opt for observer status in the Caribbean group itself. Local Dutch development officials have informed us that they are under instruction to urge Surinam to participate in Caribbean initiative.\(^2\)

\(\textit{Zurhellen}\)


\(^2\) The World Bank’s Conference on Caribbean Development was held from December 14 to 15 (see Document 354). Although the Dutch pressed Suriname to participate, the Surinamese delegation was present only as observers. (Telegram 301445 to Western European and Caribbean capitals, December 17; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770471-0328)
339. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Suriname


Quote: Secret Noform Wnintel. Cite CIA 226315. NSA for ZKZK 00 DLS DE (for NSOC); State for INR; DIA for DIA, SWS, CIA/NMCC.

TDFIRDB–315/07085–78
Dist: 19 May 1978

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This is an information report, not finally evaluated intelligence report class Secret-Wnintel-Noform-Nocontract.

Subject: Concern of some middle-level career officials regarding the future and stability of the Surinamese Government (DOI: May 1978)

Source: [5 lines not declassified]

1. There is increasing concern among middle-level career officials that both the executive and legislative branches of the Government of Surinam are weaker and less effective than in the previous governments. ([less than 1 line not declassified] Comment: Similar comments have been reported from other sources. [1½ lines not declassified] For example, one of these sources, [less than 1 line not declassified] said in late April that the new Minister of Finance, Lesley Goede, and representatives of several local business firms, such as Kirstens, the largest retail enterprise in Paramaribo, and the Reli Company, are upset about the government’s inability to pay its bills.) The middle-level officials believe there is a strong possibility that the current government may not survive its full four-year term and that there will be greater instability in the country in the months ahead than at any time since independence. While they agree that Prime Minister Henck Arron is aware of the seriousness of the situation, they believe that he is unsure of what steps to take to resolve the current problems. (Source Comment: should Arron be forced to step down for health or other reasons, the individual most likely to succeed him is Olton Vangenderen, Deputy...

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1 Source: Department of State, INR/II Historical Files, Roger Channel, Paramaribo, 1963–1979. Secret; Roger Channel. Drafted by Tumminia.
Prime Minister and Minister of Internal Affairs and District Administration, who is believed to be very capable.)

2. According to [less than 1 line not declassified] Arron himself is not operating at the level he did prior to his heart attack in February. He frequently stays away from Parliament meetings, both for health reasons and out of disgust over the lack of seriousness which often prevails at the meetings. Public debates continue for hours on relatively insignificant issues while discussions on critical matters are postponed. The tactic of filibustering is fairly new in Surinam but recently has been used with decidedly adverse results. Several of the more capable Cabinet members in the former government are no longer in office and their absence has been felt. For example, Edward Hoost, former Minister of Justice and Police, is believed to have been much more effective than is his successor. Even Edward Bruma, leader of the Surinam National Party (PNR) and controversial former Minister of Economic Affairs, is considered to have been more able than some of the new Cabinet members. In the Parliament, the Hindustani Reformed Party (VHP) had some effective legislators during the term of the last government who are no longer serving.

3. The civil servants federation and the teachers unions, both powerful and both controlled by the PNR, are preparing to cause serious difficulties for the government. (Source Comment: Bruma and other PNR leaders, who in the past government were primarily involved in political activities, now have more time to devote to labor agitation.) ([less than 1 line not declassified] Comment: For information concerning recent competition among labor federations and its potential effects on the political environment in Surinam, see Embassy Paramaribo A–13, dated 3 March 1978.)

4. Another serious problem facing the Arron government is the one involving the border situation with Guyana which continues to be tense and which could lead to open hostilities between the two countries. (Source Comment: A Surinamese security official who recently visited the border area claims that the people on both sides get along very well and that the problem is only between the two governments. This official feels the problem could be alleviated if Surinam would only establish a diplomatic mission in Georgetown. Even though the Guyanese have a mission in Paramaribo, he feels that insufficient communications between the two sides is at the heart of the problem.)

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2 In telegram 260 from Paramaribo, February 17, the Embassy reported that Arron was hospitalized for heart problems on February 14. He resumed his duties as Prime Minister soon afterward. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780076–0105)

3 Not printed. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780039–0929)
than 1 line not declassified] Comment: For the most recent reporting on this issue, see Embassy Paramaribo 0593, dated 26 April 1978.)

5. ACQ: [less than 1 line not declassified]
6. Field Dissem: None.

Report class Secret—warning notice-sensitive intelligence sources and methods involved—not releasable to foreign nationals not releasable to contractors or contractor/consultants classified by recorded reporting officer.

Unquote

Christopher

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4 The brief telegram is actually dated April 25. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780177–0129)

340. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 10, 1978, 2:30 p.m.

SUBJECT
Meeting with Suriname Prime Minister Henck A.E. Arron

PARTICIPANTS
United States
The Deputy Secretary
Ambassador Viron P. Vaky, Assistant Secretary (ARA)
Stephen Oxman, Executive Assistant to the Deputy Secretary
Ashley C. Hewitt, Director, Office of Caribbean Affairs (ARÁ/CAR)

Suriname
Henck A.E. Arron, Prime Minister
Deryck Heinemann, Director of Foreign Affairs
Roel Karamat, Suriname Ambassador to the U.S.

The Deputy Secretary began by expressing appreciation for Suriname’s support in a number of difficult situations recently in the UN and the OAS, particularly in the recent debate in the OAS on Nicara-

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780170–2309. Drafted by Hewitt; approved by Oxman and Vaky. Limited Official Use. The meeting was held in Christopher’s office.
gua. He also complimented the Prime Minister on his recent speech in the UN. He said that we valued our close relations with Suriname and considered the relationship to be one of warm friendship. He asked how much longer the Prime Minister planned to be in the United States. The Prime Minister replied that he planned to stay to hear Prime Minister Manley of Jamaica speak in the UN next week, and also indicated that he had an appointment next week with UN Secretary General Waldheim. Mr. Christopher commented that Manley is a spellbinding speaker, and recalled his presentation at the occasion of the signing of the Panama Canal Treaties which had so much impressed President Carter. He said that we didn’t always agree with Prime Minister Manley, but we were always interested in hearing his views.

Prime Minister Arron asked what the nature of the problems between the United States and Jamaica had been. Was it ideological and connected with Manley’s relationship with Castro, or were there other reasons? Mr. Christopher responded that the main area of difference lay in the North-South dialogue where Jamaica played an important role and was inclined to take advanced positions with regard to the New International Economic Order (NIEO) which the U.S. could not always support. However, he said our relationship was improving and that we might be moving towards the Jamaican position on some issues over the next twelve months. Ambassador Vaky confirmed that view saying that Prime Minister Manley has been concerned with respect to Cuba, but we enjoy broad areas of bilateral cooperation with Jamaica, particularly in the economic field.

Prime Minister Arron said that his country was undergoing a process of integration with Latin America, and indicated that they were approaching a decision point on whether or not to establish diplomatic relations with Cuba. He recalled a conversation with the Secretary a year ago during which the Secretary had reviewed the state of our

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2 In telegram 243423 to all American Republics, September 25, the Department reported that in response to the Sandinista insurrection in Nicaragua, Suriname supported an OAS resolution to “offer their [OAS] services to the Nicaraguan Government in seeking to mediate the current crisis and to help find a peaceful, democratic solution to the current violence.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780392–0315)

3 In telegram 4128 from USUN, the Mission reported that on October 5, Arron addressed the UN, affirming Suriname’s dedication to human rights and condemning apartheid practices in South Africa. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780413–0570)

relations with Cuba at that time.\textsuperscript{5} Arron asked if there had been any significant changes since then. Mr. Christopher said that there had been no fundamental change in our relations with Cuba. He said there had been some recent improvements, and noted the decision of the Castro government to release some political prisoners, and also to allow some people to leave Cuba in order to reunite broken families.\textsuperscript{6} He said that Castro had come to realize the importance of the Cuban community in the United States and their potential influence. He said he viewed our relations with Cuba as being on an upward trend over the next five to ten years. However, he said that we continue to be concerned about Cuba’s African adventures and its possible aspirations for revolutionary leadership in the Third World. He repeated that there had been no fundamental change in our relations with Cuba but noted that we did have improved contacts with the Cubans through our Interests Section in Havana and by other means. Ambassador Vaky confirmed this view noting once again that Cuba’s role in Africa and what it might portend for areas in other parts of the Third World was the area of our greatest apprehension.

Mr. Christopher asked the Prime Minister about the economic situation in Suriname and what problems he was encountering. Arron replied that the most critical problem was the absence of skilled labor. He explained that this was due to the virtual exodus of skilled manpower to the Netherlands on the eve of independence in 1975. He said that Suriname had proved its stability and moderation as an independent nation and he hoped to attract some of these Surinamers to return.

The Prime Minister went on to say that, while the Dutch had entered into a generous program of development assistance over the next five to ten years, the mere existence of this assistance program and its conditions turned out to be a problem in itself. The Dutch program put severe limits on the amounts that could be spent on infrastructure, although infrastructure was what Suriname needed as a base for industrialization. Because of the sizable Dutch assistance program, other lenders did not regard Suriname as a poor nation and would lend it money only at commercial rates. The result was a difficult dilemma for Suriname. Mr. Christopher said ruefully that this was a familiar problem and one we ourselves had to face in dealing with our own Congress which wished to confine U.S. development assistance to the provision of basic human needs.

Prime Minister Arron said that this problem was particularly acute with respect to the development of western Suriname to which his
government gave a high priority. This project required extensive hydroelectric facilities as a base for bauxite, alumina, and ultimately aluminum operations as well as extensive rice growing.

Mr. Christopher said that he didn’t want to appear to be offering a menu from which the Prime Minister could select a meal, but he did want to know how we could be helpful? What specific things could we do? Mr. Arron did not respond directly to these questions, but reiterated the problems his government was facing in financing the western development project, and noted specifically that the World Bank required them to pay the common world interest rate on proposed loans for western development. Mr. Christopher asked Ambassador Vaky if the Bank had discretion on rates. The Ambassador replied that it did on loans that qualify for IDA terms, but otherwise the answer is no.

In closing, Prime Minister Arron said it was the view of his government that one shouldn’t wait for a time of troubles to seek friends. When there is trouble the best you could hope for is to keep the friends you have. He indicated that he considered the United States and Suriname to be very close friends. He asked us not to forget the importance of our influence. In this connection, he noted that Suriname had Guyana right next door which meant in effect that it had Cuba next door. The Deputy Secretary said that we would look for new ways to work constructively with Suriname and that we would make sure not to take our good friends for granted.

COMMENT: Prime Minister Arron’s meaning in his closing remarks concerning Guyana, Cuba, and U.S. influence was unclear, but he may have been seeking assurance of U.S. support should Cuban influence in Guyana grow or should there be further difficulties between Suriname and Guyana, such as the Coryntine River dispute of last spring.\footnote{7}
341. Airgram From the Embassy in Trinidad and Tobago to the Department of State

A–9 Port of Spain, April 6, 1979

SUBJECT
Foreign Policy of Trinidad and Tobago

REF
a) Port of Spain 01120; b) Port of Spain A–7; c) 78 Port of Spain 3268; d) 78 Port of Spain A–11; e) 78 Port of Spain 3338; f) 78 Port of Spain 3691

(C) SUMMARY: Inward-focussed national interests, primarily development, underpin Trinidad and Tobago’s foreign policy. Usually predictable, it nevertheless is highly personalized and thus subject to PM Williams’s recurrent reclusion foibles. Practical issues of economics get close to exclusive GOTT attention. Policies on other issues are determined largely on the basis of precedents. There is skepticism over Caribbean integration. The U.S. retains dominance with respect to trade and investment, but there is fear of U.S. economic hegemony. Our policy options are limited, but where a matter of major importance is involved, a link may be possible though risky. We may be able to draw Williams into Caribbean Group association through a side door. We should follow up on several “Government-to-Government” feelers put to us. END SUMMARY.

II. The Salient Features of a Passive Diplomacy

(C) Opinions of uninformed skeptics notwithstanding, Trinidad and Tobago has a foreign policy. As with other countries, it amounts to an international expression of national (largely economic) goals and interests, as influenced by history, geography, and the internal political structure. Its uniqueness lies in the extent to which all these elements are filtered through the personality and Weltanschaung of Prime Minister Williams.  

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P790050–1476. Confidential; Priority. Repeated for information to Bridgetown, Caracas, Georgetown, and Kingston; passed to Port au Prince, Santo Domingo, and USUN. Drafted by Rickert on April 3; cleared by O’Mahony, Lincoln, and in USICA; approved by Fox on April 6.

2 Telegram 1120 from Port of Spain is dated March 29. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]) Airgram A–7 from Port of Spain is dated February 23. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P790026–2061) Telegram 3268 from Port of Spain is dated November 16, 1978. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780473–0205) Airgram A–11 from Port of Spain is dated March 17, 1978. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780043–1434) Telegram 3338 from Port of Spain is dated December 12, 1978. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780517–0486) Telegram 3691 from Port of Spain is dated December 23, 1978. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780532–0668)
Eric Williams. Indeed, the Prime Minister plays the central role in foreign affairs—he is the chief and unchallenged strategist, interpreter, and principal executor of almost all the nation’s policies. What has resulted is a foreign policy that is:

—**Usually Predictable.** Trinidad and Tobago’s foreign policy consists largely of the body of precedents built up through the decision-making process over the years since independence, rather than from a rigidly-conceived theoretical framework. The general approach is non-formalized and, where external events are concerned, usually is reactive rather than assertive. The GOTT’s attachment to precedent, caution about taking initiative, and heavy emphasis on economic matters all contribute to the policy’s general predictability, although Williams’s extensive personal involvement adds an element of uncertainty.

—**Non-Ideological.** Williams has largely rejected ideology as irrelevant to Trinidad and Tobago’s domestic and foreign policies. Heading a basically conservative regime, he nonetheless has been ideologically colorblind where other countries are concerned, deciding on whom to deal with and at what level on the basis of the national interest rather than ideological criteria. For example, he visited and established relations with a number of Communist states when it appeared that expanded trade and technical assistance could result, but he has effectively barred those countries from gaining influence within Trinidad and Tobago.

—**Nationalistic.** Trinidad and Tobago takes a narrow view of its external interests. It energetically seeks external economic relations that will contribute directly to national development goals but not much more than that. Perceiving its total lack of influence in great power politics, Trinidad and Tobago assumes a modest role on the world stage, speaking up when it considers its own interests are at stake but keeping political posturing and empty rhetoric to a minimum.

—**Non-Interventionist.** Trinidad and Tobago resents and firmly resists any foreign interference in its internal affairs or externally-imposed limitations on its sovereignty. By the same token, it disapproves of such interference in the affairs of other countries (its neighbors in particular), whether the U.S.-inspired imposition of sanctions against Cuba, OAS attempts to facilitate political changes within Nicaragua, or a “deal” worked out by others for the cession of a Belizean territory. In a similar vein, Trinidad and Tobago also considers inappropriate the application of human rights criteria in international economic decisions.

—**Personalized.** While the fundamental lines of Trinidad and Tobago’s foreign policy are based on the national interest as Williams sees it, the applications of policy (i.e., tactics, timing, and atmospherics) bear his strong, if at times enigmatic, personal stamp. Since it is the Prime Minister’s style to be inaccessible and uncommunicative except
when and as he chooses, the motivations behind specific foreign policy actions at times are difficult to discern. Consequently, while the main lines of policy appear consistent (and hard-headedly nationalistic), the Williams factor complicates and often frustrates the efforts of others to influence his applications of those policies.

III. An International Role without Pretensions

(C) Trinidad and Tobago’s foreign policy is strongly influenced by the country’s perception of itself, its interests and its place in the world (most particularly by the way Eric Williams sees them). At present Williams appears to view Trinidad and Tobago as a small, insignificant country, devoid of influence internationally. Since the elephants of the international scene can sleep where they like, the first rule for small fry like Trinidad and Tobago is to keep out from under them. In Trinidad and Tobago’s case, this means maintaining a low profile, staying away from trouble, and concentrating on internal development.

(C) Through a stroke of geological good fortune, Trinidad and Tobago has some oil and gas reserves which, though minuscule by world standards, are highly important to the country’s well-being and prosperity and differentiate it from most of its neighbors. As a market, Trinidad and Tobago generates some interest abroad, but it is not essential to any nation’s trade. Although Trinidad and Tobago requires foreign markets for its exports and extensive imports of goods and technology, it can pay for what it needs to buy or else negotiate commercial loans. In the circumstances, Williams downplays most traditional forms of foreign relations as unsuited to his goals, yet without retreating into all-out isolationism.

(C) At the time of independence and during the brief life of the abortive West Indies Federation, Williams harbored hopes that Trinidad and Tobago could play a significant international role, at least in the region, in association with the other English-speaking territories. The Prime Minister long has championed the cause of Caribbean integration, a subject on which he is expert. However, with the collapse of the Federation and other disappointments in the region which have followed, he has become increasingly skeptical about the viability of integration efforts. Thus Trinidad and Tobago over the years gradually has become more inward-looking under his leadership as far as the Caribbean is concerned, a tendency which has been reinforced by the internal consequences of the post-1973 oil price boom.

(C) Yet despite the GOTT’s somewhat reduced interest in the Caribbean in recent years, the important links of shared history, culture, ethnic origins, colonial heritage, and familial ties between Trinidad and Tobago and the other English-speaking territories remain. Rivalries, jealousies, and squabbles abound and regional institutions have not
Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago

been notably successful, but Trinidadians and Tobagonians feel that they are West Indians and that their fate is somehow intertwined with that of their other West Indian brothers. Perhaps it is this sense of shared destiny, of West Indianness, that has helped keep Trinidad and Tobago’s drift away from intra-regional initiatives and activities within limits. Moreover, regardless of current policies and personalities, it is the view of some here that this same sense may someday be mobilized effectively to help strengthen regional cooperation.

(C) In addition, Trinidad and Tobago is confronted with a number of potentially unsettling strains internally in such areas as the relationship between the government and the private sector; the distribution of wealth and of public services; ethnic group interrelationships, and the pressures, dislocations and rising expectations which usually accompany rapid modernization. Under the circumstances, the Prime Minister looks to foreign policy to facilitate the attainment of important domestic goals, primarily economic, and little more. Achieving those objectives is a task more than large enough to absorb the nation’s energies. National independence, dignity, and self-respect must be maintained but quietly, with the minimum of fanfare. In short, for Trinidad and Tobago tilting at windmills and reforming the world definitely are out.

[Omitted here are sections IV through VI, which discuss foreign policies for domestic development, Trinidadian diplomatic missions, delegations, and unofficial government representatives, and the role of the Trinidadian Cabinet in the making of foreign policy.]

VII. A Compatibility, of Sorts, with U.S. Interests

(LOU) The main lines of Trinidad and Tobago’s foreign policy are fairly consistent worldwide. However, within the broad parameters there are national and regional variations, some of which impact on U.S. interests:

(C) a. Relations with the U.S. As Trinidad and Tobago’s major trading partner and source of foreign investment, the U.S. is an inescapable factor in the country’s life. Largely because of its economic pre-eminence, size, and importance to the region and of existing historical, cultural, familial, and other links, the U.S. is viewed by Trinidad and Tobago with an ambivalence—awe as well as fear—which shows up in its approach to our bilateral relations. Trinidad and Tobago recognizes its dependence on the U.S. as its principal market and as an essential source of technology, capital goods, investment, expertise, training, and other key components of the country’s modernization program. At the same time, the GOTT regards the U.S. with a certain suspicion that at times borders on distrust, fearing that the country will slip under the economic hegemony of the U.S., if it in fact has not done so already.
(C) Williams has been suspicious of U.S. motives and policies over the years, believing, for example, that too often we have ignored Trinidad and Tobago's interests, very often knowingly. This mistrust was heightened by disagreements with the U.S. over the approach to Caribbean economic problems and the delay in consideration of an Export-Import Bank loan for the iron and steel complex.\(^3\) U.S. policies on sugar and rum imports are a minor but continuing example of what he considers to be inconsiderate treatment of the Caribbean. In addition, dissatisfaction with some U.S. contractors on parts of the development program (e.g., Rust Engineering and ITT) have also helped sour the Prime Minister's attitude towards the U.S.

(C) While Trinidad and Tobago knows that it must maintain its existing U.S. markets and gain entry for the products of the energy-based industries now building, increasingly it is seeking to expand alternative markets, as well as to obtain more of what it needs from non-U.S. sources—not only the EC, Canada, and Japan, but also such non-traditional suppliers as Austria, Brazil, Colombia, and Sweden. Under this policy, U.S. firms continue to win contracts in those major project areas, such as LNG, where American expertise, pricing and/or marketing possibilities offer clear advantages to Trinidad and Tobago. Where these advantages are not critical, however, other countries frequently are getting the nod, often under so-called “government-to-government” arrangements (78 Port of Spain 3268).

(C) Given the nature and structure of the U.S., the GOTT obtains much of what it needs and wants for its development program by negotiating directly with the private sector, without any reference to the USG. Obvious exceptions are such matters as license to import LNG into the U.S., various trade and tariff restrictions (i.e., sugar, rum), and Export-Import Bank loans. Whatever else this situation may mean, it gives the GOTT, for the present at least, a considerable degree of freedom in its dealings with the U.S., with the result that the USG has only minimal leverage in many areas of the bilateral relationship.

(C) On political issues of interest to the U.S., most of which arise in a multilateral context (UN, OAS, LOS, etc.), the GOTT frequently chooses abstention and non-involvement unless it perceives that principles of importance to it are at stake (i.e., decolonization, national independence, non-interference in internal affairs, racial equality, etc.). Although even on issues involving such principles the GOTT's

\(^3\) In telegram 2414 from Port of Spain, August 18, 1977, the Embassy reported that Trinidad and Tobago was preparing paperwork to apply for a loan for an iron and steel mill. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770298–1216) The loan was finally approved in November 1977. (Telegram 281110 to Paramaribo, November 23; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770435–1048)
approach may have a large pragmatic element, the GOTT is unlikely to support U.S. positions which, in its view, conflict with those principles. The best the U.S. can hope for in most cases where voting is involved is a Trinidad and Tobago abstention; the fact that a particular issue may be very important to the U.S. is unlikely in itself to influence the position taken by the GOTT.

[Omitted here are sections VII (b) through VIII, which discuss the Caribbean region as a whole, examine the role of the United Nations, and speculate about the future of Trinidad and Tobago after the Williams government.]

IX. Implications for U.S. Policy—Embassy Recommendations

(U) The preceding considerations have a number of implications for U.S. interests:

1. Exports to the U.S. of LNG and Products of the Energy-Based Industries.

(C) The GOTT expects the U.S. market to play an important role in Trinidad and Tobago’s economic plans. It is counting, for example, on exporting liquified natural gas to the U.S., with the income making up for anticipated declining oil revenues. It also expects to sell in the U.S. market at least some of the iron, steel, alumina, fertilizer, methanol, etc., to be produced by the energy-based industries—the projected output of these items will far exceed domestic or CARICOM area requirements.

(C) U.S. import policies on Trinidad’s LNG and the openness of our market to the other products from this country over the next few years will be critical for the viability of Trinidad and Tobago’s energy-based industries and, indeed, its whole economy. At present, the USG has very little leverage with the GOTT on almost any matter, but this situation could change as key decisions are made within the USG affecting such exports.

(C) A negative decision on LNG and/or effective barriers to other Trinidad and Tobago exports to the U.S. would most certainly have a harmful impact on our bilateral relations. Most importantly, the resulting fallout could endanger U.S. investments here. On the other hand, the carrot of reasonable access to the U.S. market especially could be used to encourage the GOTT to give more attention to improving relations with us.

Recommendation.

(C) In the decision-making process relating to an application for approval of the importation into the U.S. of LNG from Trinidad and Tobago, we should factor into the calculations the impact of each of
our options on Trinidad and Tobago’s economy, and the potential that favorable decisions could provide to influence GOTT policies of interest to us.


(C) We must consider what we should do to obtain increased cooperation with respect to the broad range of bilateral and multilateral issues that we constantly raise with the GOTT.

Recommendation.

(C) We do not have the means to revise Trinidad and Tobago’s basic foreign policy posture. We must consider, issue by issue, whether we will benefit from engaging heavy artillery in what usually would be fruitless efforts to induce the GOTT to swing from inaction or abstentions (or “not present”) to the taking of actions or casting of votes along lines we favor. When U.S. interests will not be damaged by typical Williams it’s-none-of-our-businessism, we should limit our pressure to an explanation of our position and the setting forth of the reasons it is in Trinidad and Tobago’s interest to cooperate with us. Our goals in such cases should generally be longer-range than the particular issue at hand. Taking up each issue as it arises, we should apply as much heat as we can without generating a reaction counter-productive to our longer-term campaign.

(C) On individual U.S. objectives of the highest priority where Trinidad and Tobago’s position can make a difference, we should be far less compromising. When we are certain an issue is of such exceptional importance to us to risk a confrontation, we should determine how what we want can be reasonably linked with something Trinidad and Tobago wants. The link should be made clear to the GOTT and, in response to cooperation or non-cooperation, our promises or threats should be carried out in the way that had been indicated.


(C) Despite the GOTT’s continuing—even if somewhat declined—interest in the economic health and political stability of the region, we and the other participants in the Caribbean Group have yet to find a way of inducing this country to participate, other than as an inactive observer.

Recommendation.

(C) We should recognize reality: Williams is not going to take Trinidad and Tobago into the Caribbean Group. We should, however, not let opportunity slide by. For the time being, we should go for second best and endeavor to get Trinidad and Tobago’s cooperation—
more financial input into the region and improved coordination with other donors—by other means. Unilateral U.S. efforts being a highly unpromising approach, the IBRD should be encouraged by us and possibly other Group participants to try to reach Williams through McNamara. A letter from him could take note of Trinidad and Tobago’s growing assistance efforts in the Caribbean, indicate they are a useful contribution, point out that the Bank can provide technical assistance in project evaluation, etc., and suggest that if Williams would like it, McNamara would send a senior deputy to Port of Spain for exploratory discussions on developing an IBRD/Trinidad and Tobago coordination/facilitation arrangement. Williams may see through this approach, but that alone does not make it unworthy the try.


(C) We should decide whether or not to get involved.

Recommendation.

(C) Even granting the facts that one of the GOTT’s reasons for emphasizing “government-to-government” arrangements probably is to reduce Trinidad and Tobago’s dependence on the U.S., and that this approach is somewhat new for us, we think that the U.S. could get a piece of the “government-to-government” action. We should pursue actively those feelers about possible “government-to-government” arrangements that have been put to us with regard to agriculture, small business, industrial management, and technology acquisition.

Fox
342. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, June 5, 1979

SUBJECT
Suriname, Cuba, NAM and the Caribbean; Surinamese Request for U.S. Support of IBRD Loan

PARTICIPANTS

U.S. Secretary Vance
John A. Bushnell, ARA
Richard A. McCoy, ARA/CAR
(Notetaker)

Suriname Roel F. Karamat, Surinamese Ambassador

I. Suriname, Cuba, NAM and the Caribbean

Ambassador Karamat opened the conversation by mentioning recent Surinamese decisions to establish diplomatic relations with Cuba and join the Non-Aligned Movement. He stated that these decisions do not indicate a change in Suriname’s foreign policy, which will continue to be low key, moderate, and pro-U.S. He said Prime Minister Arron would have assured the Secretary personally, had he seen him, that these moves are merely part of a new country establishing contacts and do not change Suriname’s pro-Western, democratic stance.

Ambassador Karamat then expressed his concern about efforts of the Department to link Suriname with the Caribbean. He explained at length that Suriname’s primary interests were not served at this time by linkage with the Caribbean, but rather with countries in Suriname’s immediate region. Secretary Vance responded that he looks on each country as an independent entity with its own individual culture. It is not our intent to force any country into a regional group, although from time to time a situation may arise where it would be advantageous to do so. Nevertheless, it is not our policy to pressure any country to become involved where it does not wish to be.

II. Suriname’s Request for U.S. Support of IBRD Loan

Ambassador Karamat then stated that he wished to ask the Secretary for his support for a World Bank loan for the Devis Falls Hydroelectric Dam in Western Suriname. Karamat then reviewed the project in detail.

1 Source: Department of State, Records of Cyrus Vance, 1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 9, Vance Nodis Memcons 1979. Limited Official Use. Drafted by McCoy on June 14; cleared by Bushnell. The meeting was held in Vance’s office.

2 Cuba and Suriname established diplomatic relations on May 31. Suriname joined the Non-Aligned Movement in July.
He indicated that he had received negative information from World Bank sources that disturbed him, that the Bank might be reluctant to approve the loan because of Suriname’s high per capita income. Karamat thought that such criteria were unfair since this project would develop energy that could assist not only Suriname but also Guyana and Brazil. The Secretary acknowledged that the Bank has followed a policy that the poorest nations should receive the bulk of available loans. He added that there are also other needs to be considered.

Karamat stated that this project will have a tremendous impact on his country’s development. He commented that traces of oil have been found in the country that may fulfill energy needs. However, hydroelectric power is there to provide the necessary energy for development, and Suriname would be deeply disappointed and hurt if the United States would not support it on this issue.

The Secretary responded that we have indicated we would support the loan, if it meets the usual criteria and the Bank moves forward on it. Karamat answered you will support the loan, if it meets the Bank’s criteria, but can we meet the Bank’s criteria, if our per capita income is too high. We removed one obstacle to the loan, he continued, when Prime Minister Burnham of Guyana agreed, at a recent summit meeting with Prime Minister Arron, not to object to the project on environmental grounds.

The Secretary acknowledged Karamat’s remarks and commented that the U.S. has excellent relations with Suriname that we do not take lightly. He asked Karamat what assistance he specifically wanted. The Ambassador replied that he hoped that, with U.S. support, the World Bank would reconsider the criteria it applies to this type of project. The Bank asks questions, such as will we be able to sell the aluminum that will be produced with the new dam, as if it was thinking for Suriname. Actually, companies have expressed interest in this project, and Brazil has indicated it would finance the project, but Suriname would prefer to deal with the World Bank rather than place its future in the hands of the Brazilians and is worried that the Bank will not approve the loan.

Secretary Vance remarked that Karamat appeared to be assuming the worst. Karamat replied that he expected the worst, based upon the

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3 On August 10, World Bank officials announced that they would not be providing additional funding for the Devis Falls dam. (Telegram 208499 to Paramaribo, August 10; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790364–0332)

4 In telegram 1827 from Georgetown, April 23, the Embassy reported that Burnham and Arron held their summit in Barbados from April 11 to April 14, and discussed smuggling, immigration, cooperation across the Caribbean, sanctions against South Africa, and a ferry service to link the two nations. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790185–1198)
negative comments he was receiving from his contacts at the Bank. The Secretary asked “who do you hear this from?” Karamat’s reply was vague. He complained that his inability to get an appointment with Nicolas Barletta, Chief of the Latin American Division of the Bank, until the end of June was indicative of the Bank’s attitude.

Mr. Bushnell interjected that Mr. Barletta probably wanted to hold off on the appointment until the World Bank team going to Suriname this month had an opportunity to review the situation and report to him. Mr. Bushnell said he was aware that the Bank might consider more favorably loans for projects that had more social impact on Suriname than the project being discussed. Karamat challenged that view, pointing out that no project would have greater impact on Suriname than the hydro-power project.

Secretary Vance indicated he understood the Surinamese position and believed the Bank would take a serious look at the project. Mr. Bushnell mentioned that the U.S. was pressing the Bank to do more on energy.

The Secretary agreed that one of the major priorities of the Bank was to help countries develop energy sources other than fossil fuel. The Secretary remarked that he was seeing Mr. McNamara Sunday and would ask him about the project and tell the Ambassador what McNamara thought. The Secretary said that Mr. McNamara might say that he would have to wait until his people in the field submitted their report before he could comment on the project. Ambassador Karamat thanked the Secretary for his offer and expressed appreciation for his interest.
Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Caribbean Affairs (Warne) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Newsom)¹

Washington, February 27, 1980

SUBJECT
Situation Report on Suriname: 7:00 am, 2/27

Last night, the Acting Minister President and Minister of the Interior, van Gendren, announced that the government is being turned over to the ruling junta, the National Military Council (NMC).² The NMC has established a Citizens Council to help govern, which will be led by Bruma, a former Minister of Economics and lawyer for the rebel NCOs, and Leeslang, also a lawyer and local politician.

Bruma has told diplomatic representatives the following: (1) the NMC is capable of assuring safety and public order (this seems to be the case because shops and newspapers have commenced activity); (2) continued cooperation with the Dutch; (3) the constitution has been set aside, but the NMC has no plans for holding elections in the near future (national elections were previously scheduled for March 27); (4) all senior government figures are now in custody, except former Premier Arron, who has reportedly turned himself in; President Ferrier remains at the Palace, but is under guard. Ambassador Ostrander believes that the NMC will probably not harm these officials; and (6) there is no Cuban or other third party country involvement in the coup.

Ambassador Ostrander reports that 22 people have been killed, of whom one was a military officer and numerous others were wounded, including several children. No Americans have been harmed, but many are anxiously awaiting departure. The Embassy believes a special Surinamese Airways flight will be arranged to evacuate American tourists today.

The new government appears to be made up of Nationalist Republican Party members (NRP), a left-of-center, nationalistic, socialistic party. Bruma is regarded as an excellent lawyer, who is an effective planner,

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P808050-0798. Confidential.
² A more detailed summary of the events behind the coup is in airgram A–5 from Paramaribo, March 6 (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800035-0833), and Intelligence Information Cable TDFIR DB–315/05678–80, March 21. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 73, Suriname, 1/77–1/81)
but a poor administrator. Many influential diplomats and politicians are calling for a technocratic government.

Earlier, President Ferrier had instructed his Ambassador here to call an emergency session of the OAS. The NMC has reversed this decision. An instruction is being relayed by our embassy to this effect and we plan to meet with Ambassador Karamat this morning to discuss how to proceed.

We have sought consultations with the Dutch, Venezuelans and Brazilians. We do not plan to take the lead in this matter, but are looking to the border states. Ostrander reports the Venezuelan Ambassador denounced the violent overthrow to Bruma, but essentially recognized the Government. The Brazilians also reportedly recognized the new government. Our Ambassador has not yet been approached, but expects to meet Bruma today. She is letting the border states and the Dutch and Indians see him first.

The NCO coup d’état represents a unique situation in the hemisphere. A newly-independent country with an elected government that has been moderate and cooperative in its foreign policy has been overturned by a dissident group of NCOs. Labor grievances spurred the NCOs to rebel. Their violent action caused them to go beyond seeking redress to their grievances and to form a new government. Its ideological orientation is unclear; indeed, many of the rebel NCOs are not politically oriented, but they have gravitated toward civilian leaders who are more progressive and leftist than the current government.

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3 In telegram 9 from Paramaribo, January 4, 1979, the Embassy reported on unrest within the Surinamese military and civil service. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790006-0008)

4 In airgram A–7 from Paramaribo, March 6, the Embassy stated that the events behind the coup were the result of a “narrow labor dispute, escalated beyond imagination by Government failure to act.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800038–0845)
344. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Bowdler) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Newsom)

Washington, February 29, 1980

SUBJECT
Instructions to The Hague to Make Demarche on Suriname

ISSUE FOR DECISION
Whether we should instruct our Chargé at The Hague to express to the Dutch Foreign Ministry our growing concerns over the situation in Suriname and to suggest that the Dutch take the lead in using their influence to encourage a return to constitutionalism and democracy.

ESSENTIAL FACTORS
The Dutch are painfully slow in deciding on what course of action to take regarding the NCO coup d’état in Suriname. Currently, the Dutch plan to debate the issue in the Parliament on March 4. The Cabinet is to reach a policy decision on February 29. The Dutch have the principal influence because Suriname was a former colony and the Dutch keep the economy afloat with a $1.5 billion aid package. The U.S. does not provide assistance, but has substantial influence because of close, friendly ties and a $500 million ALCOA investment.

Contrary to the junta’s early statements of favorable attitudes toward the democratic process and human rights, recent events indicate backsliding on the part of the National Military Council (NMC). The NMC has imposed local press censorship and has posted guards at media offices. It continues to maintain an all-night curfew and to search vehicles. Recent unverified NMC statements indicate that elections may be postponed up to four years. Suriname previously had scheduled a national election on March 27, at which time it was likely that the current government would have been voted out of office. Previously, Suriname had been the model of democracy, constitutionality and moderation in international affairs.

In view of the Dutch influence and continued responsibilities, we should indicate to them that we look toward the Netherlands Govern-

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800054–0933. Confidential. Drafted by Warne; cleared in L/ARA, HA, EUR/NE, and by Pastor.

2 During the Parliamentary session, officials expressed general disagreement with the coup and urged a return to constitutional government, but vowed that there would be no halt to developmental funds to Suriname. (Telegram 1455 from The Hague, March 5; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800114–0077)
ment to take the lead in encouraging a return to democracy. Dutch officials have expressed their serious concerns, particularly over the apparent civilian leadership of the opportunistic and corrupt former Economic Minister, Eddie Bruma. The situation, however, remains fluid and a broad-based government may emerge. Nevertheless, the Dutch agree with us that the lack of a commitment to hold elections is very serious because of the GON’s public commitment to the continuation of a democratic government in Suriname.

Recommendation:

That you approve the enclosed instructions to our Charge at The Hague to indicate our serious concern over developments in Suriname and to seek a Dutch leadership role in moving the junta toward the democratic process.

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3 On March 12, Warne met with Dutch officials. Warne reported that the Dutch were hesitant to use their aid program as leverage to restore democracy, because the “current Hague government is too weak politically to take such a controversial step.” (Telegram 65267 to The Hague, March 12; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800126-0825)

4 Newsom checked the approve option. The cable is attached but not printed. The final version of the démarche was sent on February 29. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800054-0935)
345. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in
Suriname and the Netherlands¹

73396. Subject: US Policy for Suriname. Ref: A. Paramaribo 509, B. Paramaribo 512, (C) Para. 475.²

1. C—Entire text.

2. Department is now formulating a strategy to meet the new
situation in Suriname. We believe at this time that our policy should
concentrate on the following four areas: (1) support for President Ferrier
and for holding early elections; (2) establishment of a working relation-
ship with the new interim government; (3) continued Dutch military
presence in Suriname; and (4) Dutch leadership to pressure the new
government to hold early elections.

3. For Paramaribo: Reftels were most appreciated.—Your analysis
of the new government was very helpful. We concur in your recommen-
dation made in paragraph 12 refel A.³ We intend to call in the Dutch
Ambassador to make the following points:

—Indicate to him our hope that the GON will continue to take the
lead in pressing the new government to preserve constitutional process
and to seek early elections.

—Inform him of our serious concern over several appointments to
the interim government because of possible past association with Cuba
and the Communist Party.

—Express our continued support for President Ferrier in his efforts
to restore the democratic process.

—Inform him how important we consider the role of the Dutch
military mission in Suriname, especially its ability to influence the

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South,
Pastor, Country, Box 46, Suriname, 1/77–4/80. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated for
information Immediate to Georgetown, Bridgetown, Port of Spain, Caracas, and Brasilia.

² In telegram 509 from Paramaribo, March 15, the Embassy discussed the constraints
on the Dutch military mission. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File,
D800133-0441) In telegram 512 from Paramaribo, March 15, the Embassy informed the
Department of Hendrick Chin A Sen’s appointment as Prime Minister. (National
Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800166-0467) In telegram 475 from Para-
maribo, March 12, the Embassy described the contact between Cuban officials and a
lower-level member of the new Surinamese Government, Under-Minister for Cultural
Affairs Robin Ravales. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File,
D800130-0518)

³ Reference is in error; telegram 509 from Paramaribo does not have a paragraph 12.
new Surinamese military leadership to retain a continued Western orientation.

—Urge the Dutch to continue their military assistance and military mission in Suriname until after its scheduled departure November 1980.4

4. For Paramaribo: Ambassador should see new PM as soon as possible to make the following points, and take stock of situation.

—The PM’s appointment signals a return to constitutional government.

—We trust that the new government will maintain Suriname’s traditional excellent human rights record.

—We will continue to support President Ferrier’s efforts to ensure that the democratic process is restored when elections are held.5

—We hope that our governments will develop the traditionally close ties that have characterized our bilateral relations.

5. Embassy staff should continue to meet with NMC members as appropriate to assess their attitudes and plans and to make the following points:

—The U.S. hopes that the military in Suriname would continue their close relationships with the Netherlands.

—The military would continue to respect civilian leadership in accordance with the Constitution.

—The NMC will support the holding of elections as soon as possible.

6. The Department at this time does not intend to issue a press statement commenting on the formation of the new government. We want to have a better idea of the direction and political orientation of the new government before making a public comment. Addressee posts should draw upon points in para. 4 in stating USG views on current situation. Embassy should follow activities of interim government and NMC closely. Several members have allegedly been affiliated with the Communist Party and have worked with the Cubans. These individuals

4 In telegram 76669 to Paramaribo, March 22, the Department reported that Bowdler had met with Dutch officials, and that the “GON will work with the new interim government and intends to press for a return to constitutional government.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800146–0633) U.S. officials were unsuccessful in their efforts to lobby for a continued Dutch military presence. The Dutch decided to terminate their military mission in 1980. (Telegram 2045 from Paramaribo, November 14; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800547–0010)

5 On August 13, President Ferrier was removed from office by soldiers loyal to Desire Bouterse and the Surinamese Constitution was suspended. Chin A Sen was then appointed President. (Telegram 1510 from Paramaribo, August 16; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800391–0769)
Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago

bear particularly close watching. We should also be alert to third-country activities.\(^6\)

7. For The Hague: Embassy should seek appointment at the appropriate level and drawing upon the points made in paragraph 3 emphasize to the GON the importance we attach to its influence with the new military and civilian leadership in Suriname and its ability to have a positive influence on them.

\textbf{Vance}

\(^6\) Ambassador Ostrander met with Prime Minister Chin A Sen on March 24. The new Prime Minister stated he wished to continue “good, strong relations” with the United States, declaring “Suriname is part of the Western world,” and that the nation would retain “strongest ties with the Dutch.” (Telegram 567 from Paramaribo, March 25; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800151–1038)

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\textbf{346. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Bartholomew) to the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology (Nimetz)\(^1\)}

Washington, undated

\textbf{SUBJECT}

FY 80 IMET Reprogramming

\textbf{ISSUE}

Whether to reprogram $25,000 for Suriname and $18,000 for Ecuador in FY 80 IMET, by utilizing $43,000 from the IMET programs of Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and the Bahamas.

\textbf{ESSENTIAL FACTORS}

\textit{Suriname}

The Surinamese Minister of Defense\(^2\) has requested FY 80 IMET training for five members of the naval arm of the Surinamese Defense

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800109–1266. Confidential. Drafted on July 1 in PM/SAS; cleared in OMB, DOD/ISA, DOD/DSAA, ARA/RPP, S/P, HA, H, L/PM, SC, PM/SAS, and D.

\(^2\) Edward Ruimveld.
Force, which would cost $25,000. Our Embassy in Paramaribo strongly endorses this request.

Since the February 25, 1980 military rebellion which forced the previous government out of office, our policy has been to support and encourage the restoration of the democratic process to Suriname. An interim civilian government was appointed to office on March 15 in accordance with constitutional procedures, and elections are planned in 1982.¹

As part of our policy we are seeking to increase our influence with the young, naive Surinamese NCO’s responsible for the revolt. A small IMET program to assist the Surinamese Defense Force, at this very formative stage when it has no officers and is run by the NCO’s, would aid greatly in this effort. It would also diminish the chances of Suriname accepting training from Cuba and other leftist countries; Cuba has already offered training and has been turned down, but Cuba is likely to persist in its efforts.

Since we did not request any funds for Suriname in the FY 80 CPD, fifteen days advance notification to Congress of this reprogramming would be required. In addition, before any IMET may be furnished, the Secretary or the Deputy Secretary will have to determine, as required by section 620(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (the FAA), that Suriname “is not dominated or controlled by the international Communist movement.” We will proceed with the fifteen day notification to Congress and the section 620(b) determination if you approve this reprogramming.

ARA and PM recommend that the $25,000 be reprogrammed from Dominica, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent. Our Embassy in Bridgetown has recommended that all of the $30,000 allocated to these Eastern Caribbean mini-states ($10,000 each) be reprogrammed. St. Lucia and St. Vincent have no defense forces per se and the restrictions on assistance to police under section 660 of the FAA make it difficult to furnish IMET to these countries as their forces are currently structured. (The Embassy indicates that it would not be feasible to restrict any trainees to internal security or national defense roles for a period following their training, as we require in order to ensure compatibility with the limitations of section 660.) Dominica has a small defense force, but the Embassy feels it would be unwise to offer that country an FY 80 IMET program because of political sensitivities connected with next month’s elections and because of our inability to carry out IMET programs in St. Lucia and St. Vincent.

³ National elections did not occur in Suriname in 1982.
Ecuador

We requested $352,000 in IMET for Ecuador in the FY 80 CPD, but cuts by Congress and its failure thus far to enact an appropriations bill have forced us to fund the Ecuador program under the continuing resolution at a level of $255,000. This reduced funding level has resulted in deferring training for many students in Ecuador, which returned to democratic government last year after many years of military rule. In particular, $18,000 is needed to fund training for a fast-rising Army colonel in the U.S. Army War College’s International Fellowship Program. ($23,000 is actually required, but $5,000 is still available within Ecuador’s current allocation.) The Ecuadorian colonel has been promised the training, which is scheduled to begin July 7, and he has already initiated certain actions such as putting up his house for rent. No notification to Congress of this reprogramming would be required, since it would still leave Ecuador well below the FY 80 CPD level.

ARA and PM recommend that the $18,000 be reprogrammed by utilizing the $5,000 remaining in the Eastern Caribbean mini-states’ programs and by taking $13,000 from the Bahamas’ FY 80 allocation of $60,000. The Bahamian Prime Minister has indicated that his country will only utilize a small portion of the $60,000, so we can reduce the Bahamas program to $47,000 now. It is likely that we will be able to reduce the Bahamas program further and reprogram funds to other countries once we have a firm estimate of FY 80 requirements for that country.

Recommendations:

(1) That you approve the reprogramming of $25,000 in FY 80 IMET funds to Suriname from Dominica, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent. (If you approve, we will proceed with the fifteen day notification to Congress and the section 620 (b) determination.) (Supported by ARA, PM, DOD, S/P, and NSC).

(2) That you approve the reprogramming of $18,000 in FY 80 IMET funds to Ecuador from the residual of the Eastern Caribbean funds and the Bahamas. (Supported by ARA, PM, DOD, S/P, and NSC).4

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4 Nimetz checked the approve option for both recommendations on July 3.
Caribbean Region

347. Telegram From the Embassy in Barbados to the Department of State

Bridgetown, April 25, 1977, 1922Z

922. Subject: PARM Proposal for Bilateral Assistance. Ref State 084733.2

1. In its FY 78–79 PARM, the Embassy proposed that the present US policy of providing aid to the states of the Eastern Caribbean on an exclusively regional basis be altered and that some aid be provided also on a bilateral basis.3 Reftel responds to this proposal by raising questions dealing with five separate areas of consideration. Specifically, AID asks us to comment on:

   A) Types of projects envisaged, economic rationale, and relation to AID’s mandate;
   B) The islands’ ability to plan, implement and absorb bilateral assistance;
   C) Justification for grant aid;
   D) The possible negative effect on regionalism of a change in our aid policy; and
   E) The expected administrative burden and staffing needs.

2. The future of regionalism. Para one and question (D) of reftel express a concern that the proposed policy shift will have a negative effect on “regional cooperation” and “our desire to encourage the maximum participation by other aid donors.” It is true that, if regionalism were alive and thriving, our beginning to provide bilateral aid would to some, probably limited, extent impede its forward progress. Unfortunately, while the rhetoric lives, the substance of regionalism is quite dead (if indeed it ever really lived outside the minds of British colonial officials). Our continuing the present policy of providing assistance

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770144–0130. Confidential.

2 Not found.

3 In telegram 723 from Bridgetown, March 31, the Embassy submitted the first part of its FY 1978–1979 Policy Analysis and Resource Management assessment for the Eastern Caribbean, which stated, “we believe that moderate amounts of bilateral aid, programmed with a view to alleviating the area’s number one socio-economic problem, unemployment, might at least help to halt the slide toward social disintegration and political extremism and buy time for forces that are moderate in outlook and favorably disposed toward the US.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770113–0914) Parts II and III of the PARM were sent in telegram 735 from Bridgetown, April 1. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770113–0688)
exclusively through regional institutions will neither revive meaningful regional cooperation nor prolong the lives or enhance the effectiveness of regional institutions. It will, however, rob us of the possibility of making a limited but realistic contribution to the small islands’ development, as well as the opportunity to forestall political developments inimical to our interests. We do not disagree with the Department’s view that regional integration in the Eastern Caribbean (and elsewhere) is desirable. However, even prior to the recent restrictive trade measures enacted by the Jamaican and Guyanese Governments and the recent attacks by small island leaders on the CDB and CARICOM, disintegration rather than integration was the dominant trend. Nothing we can do will change that fact and, moreover, a continuing futile attempt to do so gains us nothing but risks losing us a great deal. Nor should we believe that our provision of bilateral aid will lessen the commitment of other donors. British aid is phasing out (even more rapidly than we had anticipated) and will eventually be reduced to a minimum irrespective of our actions. Canadian aid, we are told by Canadian officials here, may rise slightly but is basically fixed, and there is no reason to believe it will decrease if we go bilateral.

3. Programs. In our opinion, bilateral economic aid to the small islands should concentrate on projects that will lead to permanent employment. Infrastructure projects should be generally avoided unless correcting a particular deficiency is a necessary pre-condition to increased employment.

(For example, we should consider aid to promote light industry, build factory shells, and recruit investors, but not to construct roads unless transportation improvement coupled with the remedying of other disincentives will clearly increase production and thereby employment.) Social capital projects like housing should be avoided. But not necessarily housing improvement. On the other hand, health improvement efforts would be useful. Our rule should be to avoid seeking to do the “undo-able,” such as trying to make the islands self-sufficient in processed food. Instead, we should take account of their natural advantages (literate labor force, location close to North America, tropical climate, tourism potential) and assist both the governments and the private sector to exploit those advantages. Assistance to agriculture certainly should not be ruled out, but it should be aimed at promoting the production of crops that enjoy some natural advantage such as fruit crops, arrowroot, spices, coffee and cocoa. While it is appealing to concentrate on food production as an import substitution measure, and increasing local food production is an obvious way of reducing the islands’ foreign exchange outflows, we fear that, because of scale limitations, transportation problems and other economic and social factors, this effort can succeed in only a limited way. On balance, it is
probably more rational economically for the islands to continue to import a substantial quantity of their food and to concentrate on producing for foreign exchange goods (e.g., traditional agricultural exports) and services (e.g., tourism) for which they have a natural advantage. Aid to education should be avoided, except for technical training, and even then, only if there is a present or realistically anticipated future local need for those to be trained.

Some of what we have proposed above AID is presently trying to accomplish using regional institutions. However, as we have argued previously (in last year’s CASP and this year’s PARM), it is our conviction that regionalism is on the wane and therefore our efforts—if they are to be effective and at the same time provide us with necessary political leverage—must necessarily be increasingly bilateral in character. The target groups we propose to reach with bilateral assistance are identical with those being addressed through present and proposed regional projects and therefore, in our view, should conform with AID’s congressional mandate.

4. Absorptive capacity and the ability of island governments to utilize aid.

The small island governments are “thin”, with normally a reasonable degree of competence at the top and scanty back-up capability down through the hierarchy. Much of our initial aid effort will require almost “turn-key” projects. Later, with increased competence in the governments derived from training assistance, this problem should diminish. (Training assistance, however, cannot be expected to be overly effective in the local context. The loss rate among those given external training will remain high and over-training should be carefully avoided. In addition, island govt personnel should only be trained for an existing or expected slot, and they should only be trained up to the level of sophistication their govt can effectively utilize.) The twenty-five percent contribution requirement should not prove a serious constraint, given both the islands’ limited absorptive capacities and the modest program levels anticipated.

5. Grant aid. Our rationale for grant aid to the Eastern Caribbean LDC’s is that their small size, economic difficulties, and the further burden about to be imposed on them of providing the trappings of sovereignty will make it difficult for them to service even moderate amounts of aid debt. It is not generally realized how poor these countries really are. Indeed, it may well be that a majority of the rural

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inhabitants of Dominica and St. Vincent (and possibly St. Lucia) enjoy a per capita GDP in Haiti’s class. Since we are not advocating a total abandonment of regional aid, we believe it would be logical in the beginning to provide bilateral aid in grant form while proceeding simultaneously with the more promising of the planned loans to regional institutions.

6. Administrative considerations/staffing. We see a multiplicity of arrangements as possible, but feel that ultimate choices must be deferred until the programs are cast in more concrete terms. Administrative costs will undeniably be high compared to aid delivered but, at the same time, low in absolute terms.

Mini-aid programs in the small islands will, of necessity break new ground and, in order to be effective, both in terms of program design and administration, will often require departures from standard practice. There will be new difficulties as well as the old familiar ones, but we trust that solutions can be found.

8. The independence timetable and our timing.

In the last 18 months, the expected order in which the five Associated States are expected to make the break has changed drastically. However, it now seems likely Dominica will go first (November 1977), St. Kitts-Nevis second (possibly before year’s end but more likely sometime in the first half of 1978) and St. Lucia third, although that island’s date is hard to predict. We are sure the British will interpose no objections to our laying the groundwork for bilateral aid prior to actual independence. The announcement alone of an intention to begin bilateral aid would, we believe, contribute significantly to stabilizing the political situation in the region. However, if we delay unduly and remain unresponsive to the island leaders’ repeated requests for bilateral aid, the political environment is likely to change quickly in ways damaging to our interests. Moreover such changes, if they occur, could preclude our later successful involvement. We understand that under normal programming procedures, bilateral projects could not be instituted prior to FY79. That, in our view, would be too late. We urge the Department and AID to find ways of devising a quicker response to the islands’ needs (even if it requires congressional notification).

Simms
348. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter

Washington, undated

SUBJECT
The Need for a Comprehensive Approach to the Caribbean

I have asked my staff to write brief analyses for your use on issues which they see looming on the horizon. The attached paper (Tab A) on the Caribbean focuses on a region of great importance to the United States at a time of great economic and political uncertainty; it also suggests a way to approach the issue which is different than the bilateral approach, which we would probably turn to instinctively.

Given the importance of the region and the need to approach its problems systematically and comprehensively, a PRM on this subject would probably be useful. We have found PRC meetings most productive when the PRM terms of reference set out relatively clear goals and request options for attaining them from the agencies.

With that in mind, I have restated some of the directions which are suggested in the attached study as a way to solicit your guidance on ways to approach the issue.

If you approve, Mrs. Carter’s trip could provide a good opportunity to float some of these ideas, particularly with the Presidents of Venezuela and Jamaica.

RECOMMENDATION
That a Policy Review Memorandum requesting an interagency study of options to deal with the problems of the Caribbean in a comprehensive manner should be sent out.

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 45, Folder: Latin America, 1–8/77. Confidential. Sent for action. Printed from an uninitialed copy. Although no drafting information appears on the memorandum, Pastor forwarded a draft to Brzezinski on April 26, noting that it had been “written in response to your request for short three-five page, medium to long-term, political and/or economic analyses.” “As you may recall,” he added, “you approved my request to write an analysis on the Caribbean in late-February, but only now have I had the opportunity to write it. In some ways, the time for such an analysis is not only opportune, but urgent. The other day, I heard that Ray Marshall and Griffin Bell are apparently proposing a $100 million plan for the Caribbean to deal with the illegal alien issue in just the piecemeal and haphazard manner which I criticize directly in my paper.” In a marginal comment, Inderfurth suggested circulating the memorandum to “Hormats and Hansen before submission to the President.” Aaron agreed and instructed Inderfurth to “return to Pastor and circulate.” (Ibid.) Hansen’s handwritten comments on the attached paper are provided below.
2. That the comprehensive approach should be multilateral.
   a. Including a multilateral consortium of donors.
   b. And be channeled through a regional mechanism like the Caribbean Development Bank.

3. That consideration should be given to proposing an international conference to deal with the problems of new and small nations.

4. Mrs. Carter could broach these ideas in her trip to Latin America.²

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Tab A

Paper Prepared by Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff³

Washington, undated

THE CARIBBEAN

The nations of the Caribbean present a special problem for the United States:

—Strategically, the prospect of other “Cuba’s” in the Caribbean providing air or naval bases for the Soviet Union is an unsettling one for the United States.⁴

—Politically, many of the governments and a large proportion of the younger leaders are oriented toward a socialist approach to organizing their societies, and are attracted to the Cuban model, particularly to its reforms in health and education. Many view private enterprise—both domestic and foreign—as part of their country’s development problem rather than a solution to the problem. Most are extremely skeptical that the U.S. will tolerate their different political philosophies.

—Economically, the Caribbean is plagued with formidable development problems: chronic unemployment (15–30 percent), a narrow resource and food base (exceptions are Jamaican bauxite and petroleum in Trinidad and Tobago; most countries import food); small internal markets, strong population pressures (one of the highest population

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² None of the items for consideration was checked; however, in the margin, Aaron wrote, “After we do the PRM, we can answer these questions.” No PRM for the Caribbean was written.

³ Confidential. At the top of the page, a handwritten note reads, “Roger Hansen’s comments.”

⁴ Hansen wrote in the margin under this point, “Can the Soviets afford another Cuba? Do they want one? Without some analysis, this ¶ unconvincing.”
densities in the world), and heavy dependence on foreign trade. Many of the newly independent Caribbean states are simply not economically viable. Furthermore, the region’s economic problems are also ours in the sense that they impinge on us in many ways, but particularly by illegal migration.

Traditionally, the United States has responded to these problems in a piecemeal and reflexive way. Because of geographic proximity, substantial U.S. investments ($4–5 billion), the presence of U.S. defense facilities and the sense that the Caribbean is “our lake,” the prospect or the existence of a potentially hostile government in the Caribbean has aroused emotions in the U.S. that are soon translated into political pressure to protect American interests, narrowly defined.

Because of the nature of this three-sided challenge, it is necessary to develop a comprehensive approach which will not only anticipate crises but perhaps preclude them. Such an approach would have to contribute to the economic development of the region while recognizing the political needs for enhanced independence.

This is a dilemma faced by all developing nations—how to reconcile the political goal of reduced dependency and the economic need to obtain external resources. This dilemma is particularly acute in the Caribbean where the economic needs and political aspirations are so compelling, and where the proximity often leads us and them to distort developments.

From the Caribbean, the U.S. is a “colossus,” sometimes oppressive, sometimes benevolently paternalistic, but always telling their countries how to run their own affairs. On our part, we have tended to view the region through a strategic lens, focusing on the Cuban or Soviet threat, and neglecting the very real concerns of the region. (The CIA, however, reports that the Soviet Union has little need for any more air or naval bases than what it has in Cuba.)

To cope with the region’s economic/political dilemma in a way which will improve our relations with individual countries and place our security concerns in a realistic perspective, we should adopt an approach which will be:

—Respectful of ideological and political diversity.
—Capable of mobilizing resources on a large scale.
—Multilateral in its conception, formulation and execution.

A bilateral program of assistance might be effective and might improve our relations with individual governments in the short-term,
but in the long-term, the Congress would probably set conditions on human rights and foreign investments which would irritate rather than improve our bilateral relations. Secondly, by giving more money to country X than to country Y, we are more likely to win the enmity of Y than the friendship of X. And lastly, a bilateral program would not be able to command as much resources as if we encouraged a multilateral burden-sharing approach.6

The approach should be multilateral at both ends. We should seek to establish a consortium of donors, including industrialized governments like Britain and France and middle-level developing countries, particularly those like Venezuela and Mexico with an interest in the Caribbean. Rather than have development funds channelled directly to individual governments, we should adopt the principle of the Marshall Plan, and urge the individual governments of the region to decide on a collective basis the allocation of development funds among them. This would promote economic integration in the region while avoiding duplication of many public sector services.

There are mechanisms for making such regional decisions—for example, the Caribbean Development Bank established in 1970 and the Caribbean Common Market (CARICOM)—and perhaps we should encourage their use and expansion.

The development task that awaits such an effort is considerable. Many of the economies are highly dependent on the same sources of earnings—sugar and tourism. The World Bank has estimated that $1.5 billion of additional public investments are needed in the period 1975–1979 to raise growth levels to five percent per annum.

The problems of the small Caribbean islands are, of course, not unique in the world. Many countries in Africa and in the Pacific are similarly lacking in resources and similarly desirous of political autonomy. Traditionally, a single industrialized country has assumed the role of trustee for these nations, but a more diversified set of relationships with potential donors is more likely to be responsive to the twin goals. In the long-term, we may want to think about calling for an international conference to deal with the specific problem of small economically non-viable states in a global context. In the short-term, while dealing with the Caribbean, we may just want to engage the support of those Latin and European nations which have had a stake in the region in the past.

6 Hansen underlined this sentence and wrote in the margin, “I suspect this conclusion is quite wrong. Where do you envision ‘multilateral burden-sharing’ to come from?”
To summarize:
—The United States needs to focus comprehensively on the region and to take steps to mobilize sufficient external resources for internal developmental and institutional purposes.\textsuperscript{7}
—A multilateral consortium of donors should be organized to allocate resources to a regional mechanism, which in turn will allocate them to individual countries with the purpose of promoting integration, development, and complementarity of the economies and public services.\textsuperscript{8}

\textsuperscript{7} Hansen wrote in the margin under this point, “With Cuba the model? Amount & origin of external resources will reflect domestic choices.”

\textsuperscript{8} Hansen wrote at the end of the paper, “These seem like policy guidelines in an empirical vacuum. Where will $ come from? What will they be spent on? What can be said about appropriate directions for Caribbean development? What levels of intra-Caribbean cooperation are needed? How would they be evolved? A ‘Marshall’ Plan for the Caribbean is really a non-sequitur in so many ways that it highlights more fundamental problems than it serves as an appropriate model. It is both the ‘quick fix’ orientation and the implicit policies in the presentation which I simply don’t agree with. I would only concur in a memo which proposed a study asking appropriate questions but not assuming answers, e.g. ‘mobilize sufficient external resources,’ ‘multilateral consortia,’ etc.”

349. Memorandum of Conversation\textsuperscript{1}

Washington, May 31, 1977

SUBJECT
The U.K. and U.S. Roles in the Caribbean

PARTICIPANTS

\textit{British}
Minister of State Ted Rowlands
Deputy Under Secretary (FCO) Hugh Cortazzi

\textit{United States}
Under Secretary for Political Affairs Philip C. Habib
Theodore J.C. Heavner, Director of Office of Caribbean Affairs (ARA/CAR)
Frank Tumminia, ARA/CAR (Notetaker)

\textsuperscript{1} Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850157–0222. Confidential. Drafted by Tumminia on June 6. The meeting was held in Habib’s office.
Future Role of the U.K. in the Caribbean

Mr. Habib started by asking Rowlands whether the British were walking away from the Caribbean. He added that having left Suez now they appeared ready to leave the Antilles.

Rowlands replied by saying that this was not the case. The U.K. was not leaving the Caribbean; it wanted to complete the inevitable process toward independence and then rearrange its economic support for the area on a regional/multilateral rather than bilateral basis.

Economic Crises in Many Countries

Mr. Habib pointed out that in discussing the problems of the Caribbean it was necessary to differentiate between the dependent territories, the associated states, and the independent nations. In regard to the associated states, there should be some form of regional planning. Countries such as Canada, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela, and The Netherlands, in addition to the U.S. and the U.K., should play a joint role. In regard to independent states, we must focus our attention on Jamaica and then on Guyana. Jamaica was an economic wreck and the U.S. alone could not provide the $200 million that Manley needs to prop up his economy. What Jamaica wants and needs is budgetary and balance of payments support. Our team, which had had a very good exchange with the Jamaicans, has prepared a report (Mr. Habib offered to give a copy to the British) that indicates that the third quarter of 1977 will be a critical period. Jamaica will need money quickly in order to meet its obligations. Guyana also was asking for help to the tune of $100 million.

Consultative Group

Mr. Habib expressed his belief that the best way to approach the economic needs of the area is through a consultative group, along the lines of the one that assisted Indonesia in the past. While some form of bilateral assistance would undoubtedly continue, the trend and the focus should be on multilateral aid. Mr. Habib remarked in this respect that he felt that Trinidad’s Williams may be willing to assist Jamaica, if not Guyana, and that he would talk to him and other Caribbean

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2 The talks were a follow-up to Vance’s March 3 meeting with Jamaican Foreign Minister Patterson; see Document 175. In telegram 109377 to Bridgetown, May 16, the Department transmitted a draft of the report. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770173–1025)

3 Beginning in 1967, questions regarding foreign assistance to Indonesia were discussed by the multinational International-Governmental Group on Indonesia.
leaders when he travelled through the area in mid-June. He suggested that the British talk to the Canadians along the same lines.

Role of Caribbean Financial Institutions

Mr. Habib criticized the role of the various Caribbean institutions, especially the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), which seemed unable to cope with the financial needs of the area. Mr. Heavner remarked that the CDB worked along conservative lines and would support only those projects that were bankable and properly planned by the receiving states.

United States Limited Resources

Mr. Habib pointed out that we have very little to offer to the various Caribbean leaders. For example, he noted that he was visiting Barbados, which wants retroactive compensation for the use of the military facilities there, but that all he could tell the Barbadians was that if they could not accept our offer, we would close the facilities.

Regional Assistance vs. Bilateral Assistance

Rowlands, referring to the Associated States, noted that they all want and will eventually get independence, even though their economic viability is minimal. Until now, because of constitutional limitations, the U.K. has been obliged to provide financial support individually to these States. Once they achieve independence, the U.K. will be able to switch to regional assistance. According to Rowlands, such an approach, even without raising the overall amount of assistance being provided now, will permit a more rational use of available resources and will have a greater impact in the area as a whole.

Timetable to Independence

Rowlands gave a capsule report on the status of the independence movement in the various Associated States. Leading the pack is Dominica. It should become independent within 8 months. St. Lucia wants to go but the opposition party is against it. St. Kitts’ Bradshaw is eager but he has to give up on Anguilla before any progress can be made. St. Vincent’s Cato wants to talk about independence but does not seem in any great hurry. Antigua’s Bird is not anxious but his son may put pressure on him to obtain independence within the near future. Referring to the upcoming visit to the U.S. by Dominica’s John and Antigua’s Bird, Rowlands told the Under Secretary “to stroke” John gently and make him feel wanted while promising nothing. With regard

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4 After the OAS General Assembly session in Grenada, Habib visited Port of Spain, Georgetown, and Bridgetown from June 18 to June 22.

5 See Document 302.
to Bird, Rowlands noted that Bird is “a good fellow” and we should treat him well in negotiating our military facilities in Antigua.

What to do with the Dependent States

Referring to the problem of the dependent territories, Rowlands pointed out that in the Foreign Office there was a split of opinion on what to do with them. One group held that they should be “recolonized”. Another felt that they should be “decolonized” short of independence. The problem with this second approach was that the U.K. would have to bear the responsibility for anything that went wrong in the islands while having no real power to control events. Rowlands made clear that the U.K. did not want to get involved in local fights (Anguilla was the classic case) as long as it could not exercise actual control over internal matters. Rowlands added that dependent territories such as Montserrat, Cayman Islands, and Turks and Caicos were “never never lands”. They were nothing but a burden to the U.K., but unfortunately they were not likely to disappear.

350. Telegram From the Embassy in Barbados to the Department of State

Bridgetown, August 2, 1977, 2153Z

1785. Subject: First Impressions.  

1. Based upon only few hours direct contact with problems Eastern Caribbean as perceived from here, I venture following observations. There is good probability that local picture will never seem clearer to me than now when most qualifying factors are only dimly appreciated.

   A. Local leadership and common folk alike are proud, excited and somewhat confused by unmistakable signals from Washington that US will play larger role in area.

   B. This perception will hasten a turning away from the British metropole—a prospect apparently accepted by all concerned.

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2 Ortiz, Ambassador to Barbados and Grenada (and later Dominica and St. Lucia after independence), presented his credentials on July 29.
C. The anticipation of material improvements and other benefits blowing from increased US role will accelerate already advanced fractionization of the Eastern Caribbean. Most islands have individualized “wish lists” which probably will tend to accentuate rivalries and petty jealousies between islands. I have yet to perceive what I consider any genuine concern by relatively well-off Barbadians for their less fortunate neighbors. Instead I expect Barbadians aggressively to press for full participation in any increase in US assistance to the area.

D. As model democrats and loyal allies inhabitants Eastern Caribbean view our actions in Guyana and Jamaica with concern. They expect us to be at least as open-hearted and openhanded with tried and true friends as with acerbic critics. I expect to convince them that improved US position in Guyana and Jamaica is of positive and very real benefit to Eastern Caribbean.

E. Too many statements of our sincere intention to improve relations with this area ironically could create an atmosphere in which bilateral relations would in fact be strained if not worsened. This because of unfulfilled expectations that would be aroused, increased inter-island rivalries and attempts by governments to create strong bargaining positions to obtain preferential treatment from US.

F. General situation here brings to mind my first-hand experiences with early years Alliance for Progress when our intentions tended to be oversold and our rhetoric mistaken for reality. Result was creation of euphoric atmosphere that inevitably soured into bitterness and resentment as anticipated benefits failed to materialize quickly.

G. These are good, trusting and loyal people. They know we have capability for significantly improving situation here. Any failure on our part rapidly to do so as the result of our sometimes cumbersome constitutional and institutional imperatives could be misunderstood and be seen as mean-spirited power politics.

2. In reflecting on these initial impressions I am more convinced than ever that we have focused serious attention on the Caribbean not a moment too soon. I am also inclined to suggest that as much as possible we let our deeds speak for us. Our rhetoric thus far has been circumspect and measured but even an increase in the volume of prudent comment could lead to some of the pitfalls cited above.

3. In the coming weeks and in line with course set in forthcoming NSC policy review we here shall recommend steps we consider feasible to help assure stability in this complex area. Our recommendations will be based on ascertainable facts more than on intuitive rumination as in present case.3

3 In telegram 2096 from Bridgetown, September 1, the Embassy transmitted considerations to be “weighed in developing specific options for U.S. efforts in the area.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770318–0799)
4. A further thought. I am now inclined to believe actions we might contemplate would be more effective if implemented in consultation with others such as UK, Canada, Dutch, Venezuelans and international organizations all of whom also have important stakes and assets in area.

Ortiz

351. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, September 7, 1977

SUBJECT
Cooperation for Caribbean Development

In preparation for his meetings with Latin American and Caribbean Heads of State, the President decided that the United States should approach the problems of the Caribbean in a comprehensive way, working with other donor countries (possibly including the United States, Canada, Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago, Costa Rica, Colombia, Mexico, England, France and the Netherlands) and international financial institutions.

The approach should be directed at assisting all the island states of the Caribbean, with which we have diplomatic relations, and include Guyana, Surinam, and, at some point, perhaps Belize. Our strategy should be designed to:

—Encourage closer cooperation among donors.
—Provide a better mechanism for focusing on key problems.
—Promote closer integration among the English speaking countries.
—Encourage closer collaboration between them and non-English speaking countries in the region.
—Encourage closer cooperation between them and such countries as Venezuela, Costa Rica, Mexico, the United States and Canada.


2 Reference to the meetings scheduled to take place in Washington after the signing of the Panama Canal Treaties on September 7.
The President is willing to consider an increase in the amount of our assistance to the Caribbean within the context of a burden-sharing formula involving other donor countries. Specific amounts and the bilateral-multilateral program balance should be resolved after consultations among donors and recipients.

The President favors the holding of a meeting this year of governmental and nongovernmental experts of representative countries of the area (e.g., Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela, Costa Rica, the United States, Canada). The meeting could be held at the World Bank under the co-sponsorship of the Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the Caribbean Development Bank, but no prior commitment to any particular institutional arrangement would be made. The purpose of the meeting would be two-fold: to develop a better understanding of the problems of the area, and to determine how these problems can be most effectively addressed in a cooperative and comprehensive way.

The Department of State will be responsible for directing and coordinating an inter-agency Task Force, which would include representatives from Treasury, the Special Trade Representative, the National Security Council, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Agency for International Development, to implement these decisions and prepare monthly status reports for the President.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

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352. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Cooper) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, October 12, 1977

FY–79 Foreign Assistance for the Caribbean

I am uneasy about the attached proposal to increase FY–79 foreign assistance to the Caribbean to $153 million, up from about $65 million this year. The underlying assumption is that to assure political stability we should pump money into the Caribbean at an annual rate over

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770173–2060. Confidential. Drafted by Cooper.
2 Not attached.
twice what we are now doing, together with attempts to get the Carib-
bean nations (1) to work together regionally and (2) to adopt sensible
economic programs. Both of these latter conditions are familiar from
the 1960’s. They resulted then in a mixture of successes and failures,
but also in an almost universal reaction against “outside interference”
in the domestic policies of recipient countries. Furthermore, there is
only an outside chance of ultimate reduction from aid levels on the new
scale. A more likely prospect is that we will find political difficulties
in the Caribbean in four years time similar to those that we find now,
and with pleas for additional help from the U.S.

I also share Governor Gilligan’s concern about the violation which
the proposed program would do to the coherence which he hopes to
give the entire aid program, but I believe that we can legitimately make
a special exception for the Caribbean because of its geographic
proximity.

However, given the predominantly political (rather than economic
development) motivation for this assistance, I wonder whether we
should not start with a smaller increase in FY–79—$120 million, for
instance, rather than the $153 million urged by ARA and EB. The lower
amount would represent a large enough increase to demonstrate our
bona fide interest in the area and to bring other countries to the “Consul-
tative Group” conference table. But it would represent a lower use of
scarce aid money and it would provide room, should that prove desir-
able in the light of our first year’s experience, for subsequent increases.
The $120 million could be made up of $80 million in normal AID
program money (reduced from AID’s proposed $93 million, in line
with your decision on overall AID levels), plus $40 million for a start
on the new programs—encouragement to investment and agricultural
development—outlined in the attached memorandum (reduced from
$60 million proposed by ARA and EB), to be used in conjunction with
aid from other participants in the Consultative Group.
353. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter

Washington, undated

SUBJECT
Cooperation for Caribbean Development

In the light of Mrs. Carter’s trip to Jamaica, Andy Young’s mission to ten Caribbean basin countries, and a speech by Assistant Secretary of State Todman to the House International Relations Committee, there is a need, and there are expectations at home and abroad, for the U.S. to come forward with a general strategy for approaching the economic problems of the Caribbean. The bilaterals offer the opportunity to take this recognized need for an overall approach to the Caribbean another step toward a real program.

Broadly, there are two kinds of economic problems facing the countries of the Caribbean: short-term financial stabilization and long-term economic development. The countries with the most difficult short-term problems are Jamaica and Guyana, and the consensus is that these problems are most effectively addressed by the IMF. At times, we may want to consider supplementing IMF funds, as we, in effect, did in Jamaica, but these decisions need not be a part of the overall package.

The renewed interest in the Caribbean area has not eliminated the differences among the various countries as to how such cooperation should be organized, or on what problems efforts should focus. In June, Perez told you that he thought the Caribbean Development Bank should be the principal mechanism for Caribbean development. More recently, he mentioned to Andy Young that he thought the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) should assume a leadership role. Trinidad and Tobago fear that use of the IDB would tend to strengthen the role of the Spanish-speaking countries; they prefer instead IMF leadership, which would imply stricter conditions on lending and greater discipline by recipient countries such as Jamaica and Guyana.

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory File, Box 71, Folder: Latin America Box 1. Confidential. Sent for action. Although Brzezinski did not initial the memorandum, Carter did, indicating that he saw it.

2 Regarding the First Lady’s trip to Jamaica, see Document 178. Young visited 10 Caribbean nations from August 5 to August 17. During his testimony before a subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee on June 28, Todman requested more resources for the Caribbean. (Telegram 1844 from Port of Spain, June 30; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770234–0237)

3 See footnote 2, Document 180.
In preparation for bilateral consultations, we requested a decision memorandum from State providing options on the nature and the magnitude of the effort which the U.S. might consider in assisting in the Caribbean’s development. The result is attached at Tab A.4

NSC has discussed the paper with Treasury and OMB officials, and we conclude that the United States should not make specific commitments on increases in aid levels at this time. But we need your guidance on the ways that the United States, in coordination with other potential donors and in consultation with the Caribbean countries, should define and implement a strategy for Caribbean development. There are three issues which will arise in the bilaterals which need resolution:

1. To be most effective, it is understood that our effort should be part of a much more comprehensive approach, involving many other donor countries (possibly including U.S., Canada, Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago, Costa Rica, Colombia, Mexico, England, France and Netherlands) and institutions, and directed at assisting all the island states of the Caribbean, plus Guyana, Surinam, and at some point, perhaps Belize. The US approach should encourage closer cooperation among donors, a better focus on key problems, and better use of funds by recipients. It should promote closer integration among the English-speaking countries, closer collaboration between them and such other countries as Haiti and the Dominican Republic, and closer cooperation between them and countries such as Venezuela, Costa Rica, Mexico, the U.S. and Canada.5

2. The size of the US development assistance effort

The United States should indicate its willingness to consider an increase in the amount of its assistance to the Caribbean within the context of a burden-sharing formula involving other donor countries. Specific amounts and the balance between bilateral and multilateral programs can be resolved after consultations among donors and recipients.6

3. Joint determination of development assistance programs

Andy Young’s trip led him to conclude that the first step in initiating a comprehensive approach would be to call an expert-level meeting to determine the economic problems on which cooperative efforts

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4 Attached but not printed is an unsigned decision memorandum, which recommended $125 million in regional assistance to the Caribbean for FY 1979. Also attached is an undated memorandum from Gilligan to Vance on assistance to the Caribbean and Latin America.

5 The President checked the approve option.

6 The President checked the approve option.
should focus and how donors and recipients could best cooperate to ensure a comprehensive assault on such problems.

To develop better understanding of the problems of the area and how we can best approach them collectively, the U.S. favors a meeting of governmental and non-governmental experts of representative countries of the area (to include perhaps Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela, Costa Rica, the U.S. and Canada). The meeting could be held at the World Bank, and be co-sponsored by the Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the Caribbean Development Bank. The venue would not imply that the World Bank would lead a consortium which might emerge from this meeting. The meeting itself would determine how to proceed subsequently. There will be no prior commitment to any particular institutional arrangement. Such a meeting should take place before the end of this year.7

7 The President checked the approve option.

354. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Todman) to Secretary of State Vance1

Washington, December 17, 1977

FY 79 Budget—Caribbean

I am happy to report that the December 14–15 Conference on Caribbean Development was highly successful.2 The discussions were conducted in a friendly, cooperative atmosphere, with agreement reached to establish a Caribbean Group for Cooperation in Economic Development. There was no North/South confrontation whatever but

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780051–1846. Confidential. Drafted by Dozier and Bushnell on December 16; cleared by Hewitt and Shelton. Vance initialed at the bottom of the first page.

2 In telegram 301445 to certain diplomatic posts, December 17, the Department transmitted an account of the conference. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770471–0328) Tarnoff’s January 10, 1978, memorandum to Brzezinski also summarized the conference and stated that only $15 million was allocated for new Caribbean initiatives. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 45, Folder: Latin America, 12/77–7/78)
rather a spirit of donors and recipients wanting to work together. The first plenary meeting of the new group will be held in the Spring.\(^3\)

The conference was attended, generally at ministerial level, by thirty-one donor and recipient countries along with twelve international lending institutions. Trinidad was represented by its Ambassador to Washington. Our delegation was, of course, headed by Ambassador Young and Governor Gilligan. Ambassador Young stressed our concern with the area, our preference for a regional approach to development and the need for the most efficient use of resources. Governor Gilligan mentioned a number of areas where we would be prepared to help and stated that the Administration is prepared to ask Congress for additional development assistance for the area. The Caribbean countries agreed both that efficiency should be improved and that they should cooperate among themselves.

While we are pleased that the conference achieved its primary purpose of obtaining agreement to move ahead with the Caribbean Group, we are now more convinced than ever that a substantial increase in our aid to the region is necessary if this cooperative exercise is to succeed. The main theme stressed by all the Caribbean delegations was the need for substantial additional assistance. Barbadian Foreign Minister Forde summed it up for the Commonwealth Caribbean by stating that “additionality of aid is an essential feature of this whole effort”. The World Bank chairman, Dr. Krieger, estimated in his opening address that the region would need about $600 million per annum in development assistance over the next five years, representing more than a doubling of assistance on a per capita basis. The Commonwealth Caribbean put it in terms of “greatly in excess of $1 billion in additional assistance over the next five years”. Since great stress was also placed on the urgent need for balance of payments and budget support by countries such as Jamaica and Guyana, any shortfall of development assistance will be doubly disappointing.

The British and Dutch stated that their governments are prepared to increase their assistance. The World Bank, for its part, promised to double its assistance over the next five years. We ourselves obviously could not be very forthcoming given the large Presidential cut in our proposed FY–79 budget. However, we will be expected to be responsive at the Spring meeting of the group, in terms of helping to finance Caribbean proposals expected to be tabled at that time.

We will not be able to respond adequately if funds for this purpose are not included in the FY–79 budget. If we wait for the traditional

\(^3\) See footnote 2, Document 356.
detailed presentation of projects for regional cooperation and productive enterprise, as OMB wants, we would not be able to provide funding for almost two years. To the extent Caribbean countries respond early next year to your mid-1977 suggestion that they develop regional projects, we would be able to provide funding only in October of 1979.

The point that we must get across to the President is that this Administration is politically and publicly committed to a turn-around of our policy toward the Caribbean. We must bring our budget levels into balance with our rhetoric. We are convinced that it is essential to our political objectives in the Caribbean, and in particular to the success of the Caribbean Group, to restore the $36 million cut in the proposed Caribbean funding to the level of $123 million.

We are deeply concerned that, if our FY–79 budget request—the first prepared by this Administration—becomes public in early 1978 showing only $87 million for the Caribbean, the multilateral effort will die before becoming operational. We urge the restoration of the full $123 million recommended by State and AID for the Caribbean. That sum provides only $30 million for new initiatives, with the other $93 million representing essentially a return to normal AID funding following years of low programming for Jamaica and Guyana under the previous Administration. The funds for new initiatives will go into support for productive enterprise and regional cooperation, areas which must have the highest priority in attacking the region’s stagnant economies, high unemployment and pockets of extreme poverty.

We would like also to stress the positive human rights aspects of a substantial increase in our Caribbean aid request. So far we have given the Caribbean only a little more aid while appearing to hit these countries hard on sugar. The $123 million is a minimum to maintain credibility for our initiatives. To OMB’s objection that this is a doubling of the aid level, the response is that nothing less would fit with a commitment of this Administration to help actively an area where the previous policy had essentially been one of neglect.
Bridgetown, January 30, 1978, 1658Z

279. Subj: U.S.-Latin American Military Relations. Ref: 77 State 306726.²

1. General overview: In Barbados, Grenada and the five Associated States within this Embassy’s area of jurisdiction the military sector is of minor significance.³ There are few places in the Hemisphere where the military have less weight. Barbados and Grenada are only recently independent and national security was assigned a low priority as the new states faced up to the problems of statehood.⁴ Some of the Associated States may be on the threshold of independence. Until they are free the UK is responsible for their defense.

2. Most of the political entities in the Eastern Caribbean have small, poorly equipped home guard units of varying degrees of efficiency. The police fulfill most security requirements. However the perception of national security needs is changing. Within recent months Cuban military actions in Africa and continuing radicalism in Jamaica and Guyana raised the level of concern in many of the states in this region. They now are showing increasing concern that the requirements of national security be provided for. Legislation establishing a defense force is now before the Barbados Parliament. The Govt of Grenada is seriously concerned by what it perceives as external threats. Both govs clearly would welcome cooperation with the United States in this area. Future cooperation in the military field is therefore a potential area for developing significantly closer relations with Barbados and Grenada and most of the other states in the region should we choose to do so. Our lack of responsiveness inclines Barbados towards regional security cooperation with St. Lucia, St. Vincent and possibly Grenada, under

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¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780048-0756. Confidential.

² In telegram 306726 to all American Republic diplomatic posts, December 24, 1977, the Department instructed each post to comment on the following issues: A) the relative importance of the military relationship between the United States and the host country, B) the present state of the aforementioned military relationship, 3) the current U.S. policy regarding a military relationship with the host country, D) how the military relationship could best be served if arms sales were reduced or eliminated, E) whether personnel exchanges could contribute to the aforementioned relationship, and F) the Embassy’s expectations regarding the host country’s foreign arms purchases. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770480-0887)

³ The five West Indies Associated States were Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Antigua, and St. Christopher-Nevis-Anguilla.

⁴ Barbados became independent in 1966; Grenada became independent in 1974.
the umbrella of British support. Grenada whose leaders are strongly anti-Marxist may be turning to Chile for security assistance.

3. There follow our responses to the specific queries contained reftel:

A. At present U.S. ties with the host countries military are not essential to good U.S. relations here. Eastern Caribbean countries place highest priority on economic assistance. However, a good military relationship would greatly facilitate area responsiveness to U.S. security needs.

B. Governmental, individual and service U.S. military relationships with the host countries' armed units are excellent although necessarily limited by the embryonic nature of the local defense forces. U.S. naval and air force facilities in Barbados and Antigua have excellent personal and professional local contacts.

The host countries attach great importance to those relationships. They want them to be closer. There was strong resentment in Barbados at what appeared to be a reluctant and tardy U.S. Navy response to Barbadian pleas for information and assistance when a Russian naval force appeared off shore in July 77.5

C. The Eastern Caribbean states would welcome port visits, military demonstrations and training films. Some would particularly desire scheduled but not necessarily frequent military intelligence briefings specifically on Soviet-based activities in Cuba and on Cuban activities worldwide. Barbados has specifically requested technical and material assistance to its fledgling coast guard. A U.S. response offering training in functional areas such as sea search and rescue, equipment maintenance and an occasional slot at a U.S. military academy would be well received. The Barbados Battalion initially expected to number about 150 would also be responsive to U.S. offers of assistance. Almost any steps in these directions would contribute toward laying a ground work for future close military relationships in this area.

D. Local military establishments have a high opinion of U.S. military capabilities. These entities would welcome U.S. advice but also would anticipate it would lead to the acquisition of American military equipment in the future. Generalized lack of funds make it unlikely that significant equipment purchases could eventuate on any of the islands. Arms purchases will mostly be made in Great Britain and in minute amounts. Barbados is expected to spend $20,000 on arms in 1978–79 with perhaps $10,000 a year thereafter. These figures are greater than those of all the other islands combined.

5 See footnote 6, Document 305.
E. Because of the incipient state of the military sector in this area any personnel exchange programs, training or any form of personal contact by the U.S. military with their opposite numbers would pay substantial dividends in the future.

F. See D. above.

4. Comment: I believe we must soon begin consideration, preferably in consultation with the UK and Canada, of feasible but low-keyed initial steps which could be taken towards establishing potentially useful relationships with the emerging but weak military sectors in the Eastern Caribbean. It would be better for us to start now and in a low-key rather than to over-react should the Cubans or Soviets step up military activities in the region. There would be some receptivity to our initiation of such a program. Many island leaders fear the return to the area of Cuban troops now in Africa.

Ortiz

356. Action Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Bushnell) to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Cooper)¹

Washington, May 6, 1978

SUBJECT
Caribbean Group

ISSUE FOR DECISION
To identify a means for the U.S. to contribute to a new facility proposed by the IBRD for assisting Caribbean Group recipients and thereby put reality in our new Caribbean policy and assure the success of the Caribbean Group initiative.

ESSENTIAL FACTORS
A number of proposals will be considered at the first meeting of the Caribbean Group for Cooperation in Economic Development now scheduled for June 19–23, and at a preliminary meeting of donor countries to be held in Paris on May 16. However, the proposal of the

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780178–2249. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Hewitt on May 3; cleared by Gower.
World Bank for the establishment of a facility to assist Caribbean Group recipients in meeting local currency costs and cost overruns of important development projects has emerged as the centerpiece of the Caribbean Group effort. The Bank attaches great importance to this fund, and it is supported by the other IFI cosponsors of the Group and, we believe, has the support and approval of recipient country members of the Group. Both the sponsoring IFI’s and the recipients will look to us to take the lead in supporting the IBRD facility at the May 16 donors’ meeting and subsequently at the Caribbean Group meeting in June. If we fail to provide adequate support to the IBRD facility, it is unlikely that other donors will be willing to make contributions. In short, a modest contribution from us to the proposed IBRD facility could be the “horseshoe nail” which eventually decides the success or failure of the Caribbean Group. This memorandum discusses the need for the IBRD facility and suggests the best means for us to support it.

The Caribbean is confronted with a serious conflict between the need to stabilize domestic and external accounts on the one hand and the need to stimulate growth with equity on the other. This not only limits the countries’ abilities to generate public savings with which to finance key development activities but also undermines their absorptive capacity for utilizing external assistance. The result has been a slowdown in economic activity, rising unemployment, serious inflation problems in many countries and a decrease in the quality of life for the poor majority.

IBRD analyses have indicated the need for a special, interim assistance instrument to help the recipient countries during this critical adjustment period. This instrument would be employed to maintain acceptable levels of development expenditures while permitting the recipient governments to execute prudent economic policies directed toward achieving sustained financial stability. The instrument proposed by the IBRD to achieve these objectives is a special facility to provide supplementary financing toward the local costs of development projects. The facility would be administered by the IBRD in conjunction with the IMF, IDB, and CDB (Caribbean Development Bank). A total of about $125 million annually is the estimated requirement for the facility during the first three years of the program.

A financial contribution to the IBRD’s fund is considered essential. A modest amount of $15–20 million will probably be adequate to attract other donor contributions. While the proposed assistance has some features (and effects) common to program assistance, its primary purpose and utilization is at the project level. Nearly half of the projects supported by the facility in the first year would be in the agricultural sector and a further 15% would be in education. As the purpose of our contribution is project assistance, there is no conflict with the Foreign
Caribbean Region 883

Assistance Act prohibition on the use of development funds for resource transfers (program lending).

A decision on this matter is urgent. If Governor Gilligan agrees in principle with the proposed contribution, we would announce at the May 16 meeting our intention to actively consider such a contribution, and, assuming other donors are also prepared to support the facility, we would conduct consultations with the Congress prior to the June meeting of the Caribbean Group. Actual obligation of funds could be concluded by August, if funds are available. If FY 78 funds are insufficient, we would plan to commit a significant portion of the $15 million included in the FY 79 Congressional Presentation for Caribbean Group initiatives for this purpose. An internal A.I.D. memorandum is en route to Governor Gilligan recommending that he actively consider a cash contribution of $15-20 million to the IBRD local cost facility subject to the expression of intent of other donors at the May donors’ meeting.

Recommendation:

That you send the attached memorandum to Governor Gilligan urging him to approve a cash contribution of $15-20 million from FY 78 fallout funds to the IBRD local cost facility, subject to support of the facility by other donors.

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2 In telegram 15743 from Paris, May 17, the Embassy reported that at the May 16 meeting, the United States pledged $37.5 million to the Caribbean Development Facility, on the condition that other nations would fulfill the rest of the $125 million goal. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780210–0389) In telegram 162574 to certain diplomatic posts, June 26, the Department transmitted an account of the June meeting, which it called a “significant success,” with the prospect that the $125 million goal would be met. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780269–0768)

3 Attached but not printed.

4 On May 9, the disapprove option was checked and an unknown hand wrote below it, “Instead of sending memo, RNC [Cooper] called Gilligan. Gilligan agreed to go ahead with ’78 fallout plus some PL 480 funds. Staff is now looking up the amounts.”
357. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts

Washington, September 16, 1978, 1903Z

235978. State/AID From Newsom/Gilligan for Ambassadors. Subject: Caribbean Policy.

Mission Directors and AID Representative.

1. We were encouraged by successful first meeting of Caribbean Group for Cooperation in Economic Development, held at the World Bank, June 19–24, but concerned that more attention and emphasis be given to developing a multilateral and regional approach to problems of the region. While preliminary regional analyses had been undertaken of agriculture, transportation and industry and were discussed at the CG meeting, there was little progress on evolving specific regional programs in these or other areas. The principal topic of discussion was the Caribbean Development Facility, which is essentially a framework under the umbrella of a regional title for donors collectively to assist individual countries to overcome their short term economic problems. We are concerned that the Caribbean Group not become regional in name only, or only a consultative mechanism to coordinate bilateral approaches. This was not the President’s intention when we made decisions in early September for Caribbean policy. U.S. objective is to encourage national governments in the Caribbean to develop, to the extent possible, regional responses to their individual problems. Chances of assistance to the region will be enhanced if this objective is being effectively pursued. Conversely, these chances might be adversely affected if this objective is not effectively pursued.

2. Would appreciate your help, as you develop further projects, first, in identifying and developing potential regional projects or projects that involve cooperation among two or more Caribbean states and, second, in encouraging host country officials to think of local or national

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780378–0852. Confidential. Drafted by Pastor and in LAC/CAR; cleared by Hewitt, Bushnell, Vaky, and in DAA/LAC and AA/LAC; approved by Gilligan and Newsom. Sent to Georgetown, Port au Prince, Bridgetown, Santo Domingo, Kingston, Belize, and Port of Spain; and repeated for information to Caracas, Bogota, Panama, San Jose, Managua, Tegucigalpa, and Guatemala.

2 In telegram 2560 from Bridgetown, September 12, the Embassy discussed the decision to reduce aid for the Caribbean, stating, “understand latest proposed A.I.D. budget in the Caribbean for FY80 has eliminated or largely reduced major projects in support of Caribbean regional cooperation and productive employment in agriculture. Unless Caribbean assistance strategy has been revised to downplay these objectives, we urge reconsideration of proposed budget submission.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780371–0041)
projects within broader regional context, i.e., how a national project could relate to a regionwide sectoral plan. In addition, you may want to encourage appropriate officials to think about developing a cooperative approach to development of the region as a contribution to the next stage of the Caribbean Group’s work. Also, we would appreciate your views on whether a “regional orientation” would be facilitated by the drafting of a regional development plan, or whether this would be an over-ambitious goal at this stage. Should we suggest that the next meeting of the Caribbean Group be devoted primarily to “regionalism”, both regional projects and programs and possibly a discussion of a proposed regional development plan?

3. Would also appreciate Missions’ views as to desirability of periodic meetings of the Caribbean Mission directors and Embassy officers to explore opportunities for regional projects and encouraging regional cooperation. Given the importance of this undertaking, would a fall 1978 meeting be feasible?

4. An important element in the President’s decision on the Caribbean policy was the long-term goal of relating the Caribbean to Central America and to other Basin countries. We do not need to pursue this goal next year, but we should begin thinking of ways to relate the nations in the Caribbean with the nations around the Caribbean, possibly through joint investments or trade arrangements or other means. We would appreciate your views.

5. We would appreciate it if you could send your preliminary views on the merits and means of pursuing a regional approach to Caribbean development by October 15, 1978 to permit us to plan for the next budget cycle.

Christopher

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3 Possibly a reference to Document 351.
4 One month later, Vaky summarized the responses to the telegram in an undated briefing memorandum to Newsom. Although many of the respondents agreed that “there is an inescapable reason and logic in pursuing increased regionalism in Caribbean development,” Vaky reported, they pointed out numerous obstacles in the path to regionalism, such as the geographic fragmentation of the Caribbean, the political differences between Caribbean leaders, the failure of the British to institute a policy of regionalism, and the perception among Caribbean leaders that bilateralism would yield strong benefits in the short-term. The respondents uniformly stated that there were “enough difficulties to achieving regionalism within the Caribbean itself without seeking to involve Central America or establishing some Caribbean basin concept.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 5, Folder: Caribbean, Chiefs of Mission and AID Directors Meeting 1/22–24/79 in Santo Domingo, 1/79) In telegram 293707 to certain diplomatic posts, November 18, the Department concluded that, nonetheless, “there is no real alternative to increased regionalism if foreign assistance flows into the Caribbean are to be maintained at or near current levels.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780476–0652)

1. (C) Complete text.

2. This telegram transmits the text of a paper designed to form the basis for discussion at the forthcoming Chiefs of Mission meeting in Santo Domingo. The paper has received limited circulation in Washington and reflects the ideas and views of those who have read it. However, it is not a cleared document and does not necessarily constitute U.S. Government policy.

3. Begin text:

Basic U.S. interests and objectives in the Caribbean are familiar to all of us and we need not go into details here. It is clear, however, that the Caribbean is passing through a period of very rapid change, both political and economic, creating major strains and serious adjustment problems for its governments and its peoples. The Caribbean was recognized as a major challenge early in the present administration because of the potential impact of these strains and problems on our interests in the area and because the Caribbean is in many ways our third border. As a result a high priority has been attached to initiatives in the Caribbean; the Caribbean Group and the Caribbean Development Facility were the first fruits of these initiatives. We look now to carrying the process a stage further. The purpose of this meeting is to come to grips with the major policy concepts and dilemmas that face us and to chart future strategies in the region.

4. Question: Assuming the Caribbean should rank fairly high in our political and assistance priorities, why shouldn’t we concentrate on traditional, largely bilateral means and mechanisms?

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790037-0908. Confidential; Immediate. Sent to Bridgetown, Georgetown, Kingston, Caracas, Port au Prince, Santo Domingo, Port of Spain, and Nassau. Repeated for information to Paramaribo, Guatemala City, Belize, Curacao, and Martinique. Drafted by Hewitt; cleared by Grove, Bushnell, Einaudi, Feinberg, and in AID/LAC; approved by Vaky.

2 In telegram 12375 to the same posts, January 17, the Department circulated the schedule for the Caribbean Chiefs of Mission Conference held five days later in Santo Domingo. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790023-0651)
Discussion:
There were strong arguments which persuaded the administration to opt for a regional and multilateral approach to assistance in the Caribbean. First, our goals are to increase the long-term viability of the region rather than seek short-term advantages. A more regional approach promises economy of scale. Indeed, some of the smaller newly independent states will be unable to provide even basic governmental services by themselves. In addition, treating the Caribbean as a whole allows a stronger case to be made to potential donors of economic assistance including some distant donors who have not been traditionally involved in the area. The same argument can be made to apply internally in the U.S., and it is unlikely that assistance funds at an adequate level can be obtained while treating potential recipients as individuals. Lastly, it should be noted that the Caribbean countries themselves, and especially the Commonwealth Caribbean countries, have opted for regional approaches in several economic and social areas.

Tentative Conclusion:
Bilateral assistance has an important role to play and will continue to do so. Some kinds of projects simply do not lend themselves to a multilateral approach. In addition, we have commitments which we intend to honor. However, the case for a more regional approach to assistance policy in the Caribbean is persuasive. If we are to obtain additional resources for the Caribbean it will almost certainly be on the basis of the case for regionalism, and these resources will have to be devoted largely to regional programs. Also, we should look for ways to make our bilateral programs and projects serve regional purposes, in addition to achieving their bilateral goals.

5. Question: Assuming that we should focus our efforts on the Caribbean as a region, what region or regions are we talking about?

Discussion:
In the first part of his paper on the Caribbean Development Bank, Ambassador King gives a good description of the different perceptions of the Caribbean.3 Both the peoples of the English-speaking Caribbean and the major European powers see the Caribbean as including only the English-, French-, and Dutch-speaking territories. We on the other hand, tend to regard Hispaniola as the center of the Caribbean because of our historical involvement with its two republics; because the island contains two-thirds of the entire population of the Caribbean, excluding

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3 Not further identified. Ambassador Burke met with Kurleigh King, CARICOM Secretary General, on January 12 to elicit his views on Caribbean regionalism and the role of the CARICOM Secretariat in promoting regional cooperation. (Telegram 215 from Georgetown, January 16; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790022-0555)
Cuba; and because the island simply is the center of the Caribbean geographically. Given these facts together with our new interest in the English-, French-, and Dutch-speaking Caribbean as the metropoles withdraw, seems to constitute a strong argument for trying to combine Hispaniola and the smaller entities of the Caribbean into a single definition of the Caribbean, at least for purposes of future development and trade.

Some observers urge an even broader definition of the Caribbean embracing the entire Caribbean Basin including northern South America, Central America, and Mexico, and the United States. Others, however, have warned against carrying regional definitions too far, pointing to deep historical, linguistic, cultural, and political differences. Some of these observers warn that trying to include Hispaniola and the smaller entities in a single approach is so chancy that it threatens the entire regional concept. They note, however, that there are some subregional units which make some sense both economically and politically and which may be willing to work with one another more closely than in the past on a broad range of problems.

Tentative Conclusion:

We should continue to advance the concept of regionalism and seek support for it as broadly as possible. However, we should avoid appearing to impose any particular definition of regionalism and, indeed, concentrate on seeking workable solutions to real problems and avoid geographic and political arguments which are likely to be sterile. However, we should, in cooperation with others, actively look for potential building blocks—that is, subregional units or groupings which seem anxious to work with one another either in particular fields or in general. We should do what we can to encourage and support these tendencies on the theory that in the long run these building blocks will tend to draw together and, in any event, their sum will add up to more than the various parts. Such subregional groupings might include Barbados with St. Vincent and St. Lucia; Martinique with Guadeloupe and Dominica; Antigua with St. Kitts-Nevis, Montserrat and Anguilla; Grenada with Trinidad and Tobago; Haiti and the Dominican Republic; and, for some purposes at least, Jamaica, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago. A larger sub-group might be the current Eastern Caribbean Common Market (ECCM), or CARICOM or perhaps the Caribbean Group recipient countries.

6. Question: What can be done to improve the political environment for intra-regional cooperation and development in the Caribbean?

Discussion:

Internal cleavages and rivalries of a political nature are among the most serious obstacles to increased regionalism in the Caribbean. These cleavages and rivalries are based on history, ideologies, economics,
and, to a considerable extent, personalities. Two major political tendencies can be discerned in the Caribbean. One is liberal, democratic socialism inclined towards Western values, including acceptance and encouragement on some terms of free enterprise and private investment. The other is Marxist-Leninist, inclined towards the Socialist bloc and increasingly authoritarian in its tendencies. Included in the first group are the Bahamas, Trinidad and Barbados and the small states of the Eastern Caribbean. Guyana is clearly an example of the second tendency. Jamaica stands on a borderline between the two. For a time it seemed inclined in the direction of Marxist-Socialism, but now it appears to be moving in the opposite direction. Both Haiti and the Dominican Republic have long traditions of rightist authoritarianism, but currently at least the Dominican Republic can be placed firmly in the democratic socialist camp.

Underlying this fundamental cleavage, are strong and sometimes bitter rivalries between Prime Ministers Manley, Burnham, Williams and Adams in the English-speaking Caribbean, conflicts which often frustrate regional initiatives even within that linguistically and culturally homogenous subregion. Even the leaders of the small Eastern Caribbean states have strong personalities and are frequently in conflict with one another.

On the other hand, a number of important Caribbean leaders are firmly committed to the concept of regionalism, including Henry Forde, Foreign Minister of Barbados, who served as spokesman for CARICOM at the first meeting of the Caribbean Group. After a hiatus, CARICOM has appointed a new and able Secretary General. And finally, the Eastern Caribbean Common Market remains committed to the idea of common services in the area as expressed by St. Kitts’ Paul Southwell in the first Caribbean Group meeting. Tentative Conclusion:

Obviously, dealing with the political environment in the region and hopefully making it more receptive to regional approaches is going to be both serious and a tricky problem. Clearly, we should attempt to keep the political content of our suggestions and initiatives to a minimum, and should take pains to consult with key leaders both collectively and individually at every stage. We should be careful not to impose, or even appear to impose, our own views or solutions, and

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4 King was appointed in November 1978.
5 Paul Southwell, Premier of St. Kitts-Nevis, at the first regular meeting of the Caribbean Group for Cooperation in Economic Development in June 1978, suggested broadened and strengthened common services in the Eastern Caribbean, a proposal supported by the region’s less developed countries. (Telegram 162574 to Bridgetown, June 26, 1978; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780182-0824)
make sure potential programs and projects are genuinely needed and wanted in the area. Finally, we should be careful not to bruise sensitivities of the leaders of the region with respect both to us and to one another.

7. Question: Other than geographically, what is the meaning of regionalism?

Discussion

Regionalism in the Caribbean is easy to accept as a guiding concept, but it has proven extraordinarily difficult to give it concrete effect. This is because we ourselves have been none too clear about what we meant except in a geographical sense. Regionalism can be given concrete expression in a number of ways. One is through regional institutions, either those that already exist or new ones created for specific purposes. Regional institutions, moreover, may be governmental or may be private. Early in the Caribbean regional effort, it was agreed among both donors and recipients that no new institutions with expensive budgets and elaborate bureaucracies should be created. On the other hand, in the long run regional policies can only be given effect through institutions. Most of the existing institutions, both public and private, exist for special purposes and are not necessarily well suited to be vehicles for seeking broader purposes. In addition, they tend to either overlap geographically or functionally, or to leave serious gaps between their areas of coverage.

Another way of giving expression to regional policies is by programs which may seek to combine or coordinate the work of existing institutions or projects. The Caribbean Development Facility under the Caribbean Group is essentially a program or coordinating mechanism using existing institutions and existing projects. The CDF met a pressing need and has enjoyed a fair amount of success. However, as has been frequently pointed out, while the CDF itself is regional, there is nothing at all regional about the projects it supports nor are they coordinated in such a way so that each forms a coherent part of a regional whole.

A third way of giving effect to regional initiatives is to find projects which are themselves regional in nature. Examples might be a regional shipping line, which already exists, or a regional air transportation system, which does not. A number of other regional projects, such as research in tropical agriculture, can easily be conceived of. However, it is not easy to come up with truly regional projects which would have a major effect on the future cohesion and viability of the region. This is less true when considering subregional units and, indeed, success in developing common services in the Eastern Caribbean may be the cornerstone of assuring the economic viability and continued independence of the micro-states.

Finally, regionalism can be given expression by coordinating individual development programs and bilateral assistance efforts so that they fit into a coherent regional whole. CARICOM has made some
effort to do this already. The Caribbean Food Plan is an example. However, mechanisms do not now exist to do this in an extensive or coherent way and there are no regional or subregional development plans or planning bodies which could successfully play this role.

Tentative Conclusion:

The reluctance to create new and expensive institutions is easy to understand. However, existing institutions may be inadequate to achieve the level of planning and coordination that will be required by genuinely regional development efforts and assistance flows. Some, such as CARICOM, may serve as a foundation for greater regionalism, and might even be persuaded to stretch to accommodate the needs of non-English speaking areas. Other planning and coordinating mechanisms will probably evolve over time as the need for them becomes apparent, but we should encourage and support movement in this direction as much as we can.

8. Question: How can we introduce new dimensions into our regional initiatives in the Caribbean?

Discussion:

Thus far, the Caribbean Group has been a mechanism for the conduct of government-to-government relations. In fact, it has been even narrower than that, engaging principally Foreign Ministries and Ministries of Finance of the various participating countries almost exclusively. Moreover, the focus of the Caribbean Group has been almost entirely on the management of concessional assistance flows. This has been an essential beginning point, especially in view of the critical balance of payments problems which had to be addressed immediately. However, to focus Caribbean cooperation entirely on concessional assistance flows is to ignore three potential levels of activity which may be of much greater long-run significance to intra-regional cooperation and viability. The first level consists of non-concessional forms of public assistance, such as reimbursable aid, housing investment guarantees, and the activities of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), and the Export-Import Bank (EXIM). Other countries have similar mechanisms.

A second level which would be particularly important for fostering intra-regional cooperation is the field of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). There are already a fairly large number of NGOs operating regionally in the Caribbean, embracing the area as a whole or significant parts of it. Organizations such as the Caribbean Tourism Association, and the Caribbean Hotel Association, are examples. There

6 The Caribbean Food Plan was designed to promote agriculture and reduce the exchange drain caused by food imports. (Telegram 6153 to Kingston, August 4, 1978; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780326–1143)
are others in the professional, labor, academic, economic, and voluntary sphere. These organizations constitute a valuable reservoir of experience in regional cooperation.

The third and perhaps the most important level is that of private investment. All of the countries in the Caribbean desperately need private investment. In fact, increased private investment flows are the only real long-run answer to the problem of economic viability and growth in the region. Investment flows might be increased if investors could be given the assurance that particular investment areas or projects have been reviewed and approved by multilateral groups. It is possible that a system of investment guarantees involving donor governments (in our case, OPIC), recipient governments and the IFI’s could be worked out.

For some countries the problem of stimulating and channeling private investment is the immediate one. This certainly applies to the Bahamas and Trinidad, and could also be said of Barbados, the Dominican Republic, and even Jamaica. We may wish to suggest to the World Bank that the individual country subgroup meetings under the Caribbean Group for countries in these categories consciously develop linkages with representatives of the international investment banking community in addition to representatives of donor governments and the IFI’s.

Tentative Conclusion:

Government-to-government arrangements were the essential starting point in seeking to stimulate greater cooperation in economic development in the Caribbean. However, newly independent governments jealous of their sovereignty may be slow to embrace truly regional policies. Moreover, generally high levels of per capita income in the Caribbean place constraints on the use of concessional assistance to the area on the part of ourselves and other donors. Finally, public assistance cannot and probably should not meet the full demand for capital inflows in the Caribbean. Therefore our Caribbean strategy should find ways to build parallel tracks to the government-to-government effort in the Caribbean Group, and to link these various tracks to one another.7 End text.

Vance

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7 Minutes of the Caribbean Chiefs of Mission Conference, which met in Santo Domingo on January 23, are in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 4, Folder, Caribbean, 1–9/79. Telegram 530 from Santo Domingo, January 25, summarized the proceedings. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790040–0304)
Washington, March 22, 1979

SUBJECT

Prospects for Stability in Smaller Islands of the Eastern Caribbean

As you requested, we have reviewed the situation in St. Lucia, Antigua, Dominica, and St. Vincent in light of the apparently successful coup in Grenada, to assess the possibility that similar developments might occur among Grenada’s neighbors. We describe below the current situation in each of the islands, with particular attention to opposition movements. We also examine the Cuban strategy for the area, to the extent this may be determined. We have reached the following conclusions.

On the one hand:

—There is little or no evidence that opposition groups in the islands are sufficiently prepared or determined, nor are the conditions ripe, for a coup like that in Grenada to be attempted in the near term.

—Though it has quickly become a truism, the tradition of democratic processes is strong in the islands; opposition groups would unquestionably prefer to reach power through peaceful means, i.e., elections.

—Outside assistance to the New Jewel Movement (NJM) on the basis of available evidence consisted only of some training, encouragement, and perhaps modest funding.

—Events in Grenada have alarmed its neighbors; the coup leaders (and NJM friends abroad) seem to have been much concerned over international reaction and particularly that of the US.

On the other hand:

—The successful coup in Grenada cannot fail to stimulate radical groups in the other islands to consider a similar attempt, particularly if a group’s prospects for achieving power through peaceful methods are very poor. Outside supporters, e.g., Cuba, will also be encouraged.

—Cuba sees real opportunities in the Eastern Caribbean for developing influence at very little risk or cost. While Havana does not appear

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1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–1981), Box 25, Folder 6: DCI/NIO Meetings. Secret; Noforn; Nocontract.
2 See Document 313.
to be actively promoting leftist coups, it is pursuing programs likely to encourage such tendencies among opposition groups.

—Governments in the other islands will henceforth be more alert against potential coup plotting, gunrunning, and similar threats to stability, but their defense forces are probably incapable of putting up much resistance to well-planned attempts carried out by a well-trained and equipped force with substantial local support or acceptance.

—Once the new regime in Grenada consolidates its position, the island may become a clearinghouse of a sort among radical groups in the Eastern Caribbean.

In short, our conclusion for the near term is that the Grenada coup is not likely to be repeated in a neighboring island. The medium term is less predictable and requires more analysis as further information becomes available. Gairy’s ouster was symptomatic, in many ways, of the unstable balance of forces within these tiny islands. All of them have serious economic problems, and their restricted potential for development may mean that they are not inherently viable. The islands could accordingly fall into political turmoil which might result in increasingly radical regimes, almost certainly of the left.

[Omitted here is a more detailed discussion of the political situation in the smaller islands of the Eastern Caribbean, including Cuban influence in the region.]

360. Memorandum From Richard Feinberg of the Policy Planning Staff to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake) and the Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kreisberg)\(^1\)

Washington, April 20, 1979

SUBJECT

Grenada: Next Steps

Next week, while I am in La Paz,\(^2\) Grenada may be the subject of two meetings, one with the British to discuss regional security issues, and a second within the USG, perhaps at the White House level.\(^3\) Neither

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\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 23, Folder: Grenada, 4/1–22/79. No classification marking. A handwritten note at the top of the page reads, “FYI—Mr. Pastor.”

\(^2\) Feinberg was traveling to Bolivia to attend the meeting of the Economic Commission for Latin America, which was held from April 18 to April 26. (Telegram 91463 to all American Republic diplomatic posts, April 12; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790169–0112)

\(^3\) See Documents 361 and 319, respectively.
meeting is yet firm. Should they occur, I would hope S/P might attend to restrain less cool heads who seem to have been thrown into a panic over Bishop’s recent comments and ties to Cuba. I think S/P should make points along these lines:

—A regional coast guard, to nab mafiosos, smugglers, pirates, revolutionaries and other undesirables, sounds constructive, but a security force sounds dangerous. In the Grenadian case, would such a force have tried to retake the island from the New Jewel Movement after their pre-dawn seizure of power? The British, including Rowlands, seem to doubt the feasibility of a multinational force in a region of strong nationalist rivalries. Moreover, the CIA and others predict that CARICOM nations, under increasing economic pressures, will become more authoritarian politically; the beefing up of security forces, which have a tendency to fall under the influence of evil forces, could, ironically, end up accelerating this trend.

—We should not write Grenada off. Certainly, Bishop’s recent deeds and words are disturbing, but in fact only Cuba was prepared to rapidly provide security assistance, and, as Brandon Grove has observed, some of Ambassador Ortiz’ comments may have left room for misunderstanding. Even if Bishop turns sour, strong centrist forces, untainted with Gairyism, exist on the island to compete with the Jewels. If we turn hostile, Bishop will be given a good excuse to repress political activity in the name of national security.

—Most importantly, we should avoid lumping Guyana and Jamaica together with Cuba, as though they have similar interests or ideologies. Each has very different internal political structures, strong, competitive and egotistical national leaders, and distinct foreign allegiances and policies. Despite the Cuban use of Guyana as a transshipment point for arms, we should see Jamaica and Guyana as counterweights to Cuba, and not discourage their ties to Grenada.

—We should avoid dividing the Caribbean into the good guys (“moderates”) and the bad guys (Cuba, Jamaica, Guyana, Grenada). The Carter Administration consciously undertook to avoid this manichean dichotomy, partly in order to reduce polarization and draw the more nationalist governments toward the center. In fact, this policy has succeeded admirably. Notwithstanding some possible flirtations with the DGI or KGB, over the last two years Manley has steadily become more conservative (and is a spent political force in any case) while Burnham has dropped his previous Third World rhetoric (although he has become more repressive—against a real left-wing

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4 See footnote 6, Document 317.
5 See Document 317.
threat—domestically). If a policy of competition through friendship—and superior financial resources—moderated Manley, Burnham, and before them, the dean of Caribbean black power leaders, Eric Williams of Trinidad, why not Bishop also?

—We can seek to increase cooperation with the “moderates,” although our AID levels are already quite high on a per capita basis, especially considering the islands’ middle-income status. Such increased cooperation should be framed in terms of strengthening democracy and economic development, rather than forestalling radicalism, and remain open for Grenadian participation if Bishop is so inclined.

—While we should compete with the Cubans, we cannot pretend to eliminate all Cuban influence from the region. Cuba is the largest, richest, most highly motivated, militarized, and internally cohesive country in the Caribbean. We need to define, with the Cubans, the rules of the game in the area; but to do that, we need to open a dialogue with Havana, as I gather we have, to some degree, over African issues.6

6 See Document 41.

361. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Vaky) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, May 5, 1979

SUBJECT

Tripartite Consultations on the Caribbean

We held consultations with the Governments of the United Kingdom and Canada on the Caribbean in the Department on May 2–3. Concrete results were limited because both governments are constrained by the proximity of elections. However, the talks were extremely valuable in sharing information on trends in the Caribbean,

clarifying the views of our respective governments toward those trends, and beginning a process of policy and program coordination.

The U.K. and Canada shared our concern about trends in Grenada, particularly the growing Cuban role and Grenada’s relations with Guyana and Jamaica. However, they are not convinced that the situation in Grenada is irretrievable. They see Bishop as essentially a pragmatist who understands the need for foreign assistance and investment as well as cordial relations with his neighbors. They believe elections and a return to constitutional rule are still possible, though these may not happen quickly. While concerned about Cuba, they feel Cuba’s Caribbean policy continues to be one of discreet support for its friends and exploiting targets of opportunity, such as Grenada, rather than an all-out effort to achieve domination in the Caribbean region.

All three governments agreed that the main problem lies in strengthening the states of the Eastern Caribbean to prevent targets of opportunity which can be exploited by Cuba or others from appearing. Our primary emphasis should be on reassuring the states of the Eastern Caribbean, assisting them as required, and enhancing interdependence and mutual support among them. It was further agreed that Barbadian leadership would be essential here, and that we should also encourage a more active role by Trinidad.

While somewhat more sanguine about events in Grenada and the Eastern Caribbean than we, the U.K. and Canada were even more concerned than we about the growing ideological split in CARICOM. They see the split arising from the steady drift to the left of Guyana, and, to a lesser extent, Jamaica. The Grenada coup contributes to the split, in their view, but is not its cause. The U.K. indicated that it may be necessary for it to reduce its assistance to Guyana and Jamaica as a result.

While there were some differences in view on Caribbean trends and their significance, there was little disagreement on what should be done. In the economic area, it was agreed that more assistance should be channeled into the Eastern Caribbean, and concentrated in programs that generate employment and meet basic human needs. It was agreed that the Eastern Caribbean should get a bigger share of funds made available through the Caribbean Development Facility, and that bilateral assistance should also be increased as much as possible. Problems of absorptive capacity and the limitations of the Caribbean Development Bank were noted, and it was agreed these issues should be given special attention. The Canadians indicated that they would continue their assistance program in the Eastern Caribbean at about current levels.

It was also agreed to give a higher priority to security assistance to the Eastern Caribbean. The U.K. acknowledged that it should take
the lead in this field, but indicated support from others, particularly the U.S., would be appreciated.

It was agreed that emphasis should be placed on improving individual police forces of the island states. The U.S. noted its constraints on providing assistance to the police. The possibility of a regional coast guard was also discussed, and it was agreed that such an organization, although expensive, had the potential for meeting a number of real needs. All three governments were strongly negative about the idea for a regional security force or SWAT team. The three governments recognized the danger of strengthening and perhaps perpetuating corrupt or repressive governments by providing legitimate security assistance. The Canadian Government indicated that it did little or nothing in the security field now and probably would not do much more in the future.

In the intelligence field, the three governments agreed increased coverage and improved coordination was essential. Specifically, it was agreed to regularize the process of coordination and exchange of information on the Caribbean that has gone on for some years by holding meetings of intelligence specialists, both collectors and analysts, on a periodic basis. It was also agreed that it might be desirable to include the French and Dutch in at least some of these meetings. The U.K. said it would explore this possibility during consultations with the French and Dutch scheduled for June.

The meeting closed with agreement to resume consultations once the U.K. and Canadian Governments have sorted themselves out, perhaps as early as June.2

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2 Habib traveled to London for another round of tripartite discussions July 5–6. He prepared a paper on the U.S. strategy for the Caribbean, which he sent to Vance in telegram Tosec 60164/169039 to Seoul, June 30. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790296–0708) Vance’s comments on the paper were transmitted in telegram Secto 6120 from Bali, July 2. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840125–1248, D790299–1232) In telegram 13237 from London, July 6, the Embassy reported that the group agreed to: 1) maintain and strengthen democratic institutions in the Caribbean in order to counter Cuban activity, 2) strengthen moderate governments in particular, 3) support each state, individually, to improve defense capabilities in the region, 4) consider the possibility of a regional coast guard, 5) improve British and American diplomatic representation in the region, and 6) allow the British to take the lead in discussing these issues with Caribbean, European, and Central American governments. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790308–0295)
362. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)\(^1\)

Washington, June 11, 1979

SUBJECT
US Policy to the Caribbean (U)

Attached at Tab A is a summary of a number of conversations I had with Caribbean leaders at the Black Music Association.\(^2\) The most interesting was with Henry Forde, Minister of Foreign Affairs for Barbados, and in my opinion, one of the most impressive and intelligent leaders in the Caribbean. We were quite right to put our faith in Barbados rather than to approach Grenada directly. In addition, I spoke with the Jamaican Minister of Finance, and had a rather unpleasant exchange with the Deputy Minister of Grenada, Bernard Coard. My conversation with Coard confirmed my view that we should maintain a cool and distant policy toward Grenada. (C)

Forde is very eager to play a leading role in criticizing Cuba, and I believe we should provide him with as much information as possible, particularly on Cuba’s arms buildup.\(^3\) Barbados has a good deal of credibility in the Third World. Criticism by Forde could in fact be more effective in inhibiting Castro than from the US. Forde also requested that we send the US Navy to Bridgetown from time to time, that we beef-up our intelligence-gathering operations in the Caribbean, and that we look for a face-saving way out of the Naval facility negotiations. I think all of these are good ideas, which I intend to pursue with Vaky.\(^4\) (C)

\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 6, Barbados, 1/77–1/81. Confidential. Sent for information.

\(^2\) Attached but not printed. The Department sent the text of Pastor’s summary of the conversations to Bridgetown on June 16; see Document 323.

\(^3\) Brzezinski marked this sentence and wrote in the margin, “do so.”

\(^4\) In a memorandum to Brzezinski on July 6, Pastor reported that Hewitt had sent the summary at Tab A to several Caribbean posts without Pastor’s permission. Pastor feared that the summary, which had been leaked to the Washington Post, would “unquestionably” hurt Forde’s political standing, adding, “I sent it to State because I thought the information would be very useful to those who spend all their time on Caribbean matters.” He commented, “I do not intend to make that mistake again.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 2, Folder: Barbados, 4/77–5/80)
363. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)\(^1\)

Washington, July 2, 1979

SUBJECT

Aid for the Caribbean (U)

Here are the paragraphs you requested:

OMB opposes the reprogramming of aid to the Eastern Caribbean for three reasons: (1) they fear it will merely fund public service jobs, and AID will find itself plugged in as an international welfare agency; (2) OMB believes that the Eastern Caribbean is a low priority for the US; and (3) OMB opposes aid to Grenada. I agree with them on the last point, but disagree profoundly on the other two. (C)

The $4 million is to be used to invest in essential infrastructure—road building, health facilities, and school repair. Unquestionably, that will create jobs, but AID’s emphasis on the job creation program is inaccurate; they probably did it because they thought that would be a better argument to obtain the money. In fact, the infrastructure investment is essential so that follow-on aid loans for agribusiness and industry, which have already been signed but will require 18 months to be implemented, could be more effective. (C)

Secondly, the Eastern Caribbean is of the highest priority to the US. The coup in Grenada was only a symptom of a more profound problem in the area. Since then, serious instability in Dominica and St Lucia point up the tremendous need for the US to support these islands and minimize the chances of another Grenada. If another island falls to a leftist coup, which could very easily happen, this would have extraordinary political and geopolitical implications for US foreign policy in the region and overall. (C)

$4 million is not a lot, but it goes a long way and could have a very big impact in these little islands. If the US continues to be niggardly and slow to move its money or its support, we will find ourselves continually on the defensive. (C)

\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Box 27, Folder: Latin America, 5–7/79. Confidential. Sent through Rutherford Poats of the National Security Council Staff. Sent for information/decision. At the top of the page, Poats wrote the following message to Aaron, “DA: I am working on Randy Jayne to reverse OMB staff on this. Henry [Owen] now has withdrawn his objection.”
Thirdly, I agree with OMB that we should not pump out extra money for Grenada, but we could make clear in our acceptance of this $4 million reprogramming that Grenada would either get none of it or the least amount. (C)

In summary, I feel very strongly that NSC’s decision on this small amount of money will have a large effect on whether we will be able to pursue an effective policy in the Eastern Caribbean, or whether we will constantly be at the wrong end of the power curve. What startled everybody in the Eastern Caribbean after the coup in Grenada was how rapidly the Cubans were able to send assistance and advisors. Must the US always be so slow? I strongly recommend that we approve the reprogramming of this money for the Eastern Caribbean.² (C)

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² In telegram 3356 from Bridgetown, August 21, the Embassy reported that Forde complained that the $4 million in grant assistance for the Eastern Caribbean had been given to Nicaragua. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790381–1088)

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364. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, August 1, 1979

SUBJECT
Ways to Enhance US Military Presence in the Caribbean

A Special Coordination Committee (SCC) convened on July 20, 1979, to consider various courses of action in response to the Cuban military buildup and increasing interventionism in the Third World.² From that meeting, DoD was tasked to develop, and submit to the NSC, proposals on ways the US can enhance its military presence in the Caribbean in order to promote regional stability and demonstrate US interest in the region.

The current military presence in the Caribbean is as follows:

² See Document 55.
a. **Major Bases:** US military bases are at Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and the Canal Zone. No operational fleet units are permanently based at these locations; however, there are virtually continuous US Navy training missions in the Caribbean and occasional large exercises conducted in the region. Port calls throughout the Caribbean by US Navy ships are limited by operational/training considerations.

b. **US Naval Facilities:** The US has maintained naval facilities in Antigua, Barbados (closed March 31, 1979), Turks and Caicos and the Bahamas. These facilities provide sound surveillance intelligence data on Soviet submarine operations in the Western Atlantic. However, as a result of improved technological developments, these facilities will no longer be required. Closure of the facilities at Turks and Caicos and the Bahamas is programmed for 1980. The Antigua closure is programmed for 1984. The US Navy Atlantic Undersea Test and Evaluation Center (AUTEC) at Andros Island in the Bahamas, which conducts acoustic research and weapons development, will be retained for the indefinite future.

c. **Air Force Sites:** The Air Force Eastern Test Range sites are located at Antigua, Grand Bahama Island and Grand Turk. These sites are involved in supporting ballistic missile test programs. They will be maintained for the foreseeable future.

The options below detail ways in which US military presence and operational readiness can be enhanced in the Caribbean, particularly in the eastern region. These options are feasible for implementation within the Atlantic Command and can be conducted within the constraints of operational tempo, fuel allocation, budgetary considerations and other deployment commitments; e.g., DPQ submitted to NATO.

a. Shift the centroid of fleet exercises from the Atlantic seaboard southward to the Caribbean. Short training periods in home waters can be combined into fewer but longer duration periods of coordinated exercises in the Caribbean. Exercise units can be scheduled for increased visits throughout the Caribbean.

b. Deploy amphibious shipping, with a landing force embarked, to conduct additional amphibious training in the Caribbean. This will provide an opportunity for increased port visits both before and after the exercises.

c. Conduct bilateral maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) operations with Netherlands patrol aircraft stationed in the Caribbean.

d. Renew efforts to encourage Latin American and NATO navies with interests in the hemisphere to expand their participation in the

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3 See Document 311.
annual readiness exercise (READEX) in the Caribbean. This is a follow-on exercise to the previous SPRINGBOARD exercises in which various countries from Latin America, the United Kingdom, Canada and the Netherlands participated. Participation has decreased in recent years because of a variety of factors, but it is believed this can be reversed.

e. Obtain staging rights for periodic surveillance missions of US maritime patrol aircraft out of Barbados and Brazil. Present staging is out of Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico. Staging rights in the eastern region/South Atlantic will increase surveillance area coverage and provide wider US presence in the hemisphere. DoD is proceeding to approach State with a proposal on patrol aircraft staging in this hemisphere as well as other areas.

f. Increase of mid-training break period for ships undergoing training at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base to permit expansion of port visitation program.

g. Provide military support for civic action programs after natural disasters. Funding for operations of this nature would be required from non-DoD sources.

h. The possibility exists for the establishment of a naval reserve unit in Puerto Rico. However, there are a number of factors that need to be addressed before proceeding with this endeavor.

In addition to the above options, DoD is now studying the most effective use for the basing assets of the US naval complex at Key West, Florida (which supports Navy and Air Force TACAIR).

An option on the diplomatic side would be to pursue the establishment of a regional Defense Attache (DATT) accredited to the eastern Caribbean islands. The DATT could be stationed in either Barbados or Trinidad and Tobago.

My own view is that we should proceed with the majority of the above options, selecting them on the basis of their expected diplomatic and perceptual benefits and possible disadvantages.

As related information, US Navy/US Coast Guard Caribbean deployment port calls since 1976 are listed in Appendix I.4 This summary shows that the greatest US military presence has been in US territories. Elsewhere, particularly the eastern Caribbean, the US military profile is quite low. Major fleet exercise activity in the region is summarized in Appendix 2. This list does not include the almost continuous exercise/training activity that is conducted at Guantanamo throughout the year.

Harold Brown

4 Appendices I and II are not attached.
Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter

Washington, September 28, 1979

SUBJECT
Support for U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives: Caribbean Supplemental

I have forwarded to you a supplemental budget request of $145 million for Central America. Every cent of this funding is needed to give a reasonable chance of success with our political strategy in that region which is designed to respond to the Cuban challenge, support moderate political elements and political liberalization.

Recent developments in the Caribbean lead me to conclude that we also require additional resources to meet foreign policy needs in that region. I therefore recommend that we increase the supplemental by $30.6 million to address immediate and urgent requirements in the Caribbean.

—$5 million in Economic Support Fund grants to address balance of payments problems in the Eastern Caribbean. This would in part offset reductions in British budget assistance.
—$10 million in Foreign Military Sales financing to purchase three boats by Barbados for an Eastern Caribbean regional coast guard and to purchase aircraft, helicopters and reconditioned ships for the Dominican Republic and Haiti.
—A one time grant Military Assistance Program of $5 million to St. Lucia and St. Vincent to permit the immediate acquisition of three boats for the regional coast guard.
—A $600,000 International Military Education and Training (IMET) program to begin to train the regional coast guard and to provide additional training for the Dominican Republic and Haiti.
—$10 million in developmental assistance to address the problems of unemployment, in part through the Basic Needs Trust Fund of the Caribbean Development Bank.

The combined Central American/Caribbean supplemental package would consist of:

$120 million ESF for Nicaragua, Commodity Import Program
13 million ESF for Honduras, rural development
12 million ESF for El Salvador, urban development
5 million ESF for Eastern Caribbean, balance of payments support

10 million FMS for Barbados, Dominican Republic and Haiti
5 million in one time MAP for St. Lucia, St. Vincent
.6 million IMET for Eastern Caribbean, the Dominican Republic
and Haiti
10 million in developmental assistance to address unemployment,
in part through the Caribbean Development Bank

$175.6 million

Given the relatively small size of the Caribbean package, Congress
might view the sums involved as sufficiently small to be absorbed in
our FY 80 budget. In view of the budgetary restraints, this is not so, but
it does highlight the desirability of linking the Caribbean supplemental
with the Central American request.

Discussion

In the Caribbean we face challenges similar but distinct from those
in Central America. In the Eastern Caribbean, the southern island
nations of Barbados, St. Vincent, St. Lucia and Grenada are of particular
immediate concern. Additionally, we have an urgent need to assist the
Dominican Republic, hard hit by hurricane damage.\(^2\) The democratic
government there faces both economic and political crises. Restoration
of the economy and replacement of damaged or destroyed equipment
and facilities will severely strain a relatively weak economy.

The economic problems of the newly independent mini-states in
the Eastern Caribbean are causing political radicalization, a trend that
can be checked ultimately only by economic and political development.
The situation has been made worse by the higher price of imported
oil, problems ESF and Developmental Assistance could help address.

There is a sense of vulnerability among the governments which
results from the continuing UK withdrawal from the area. The ensuing
vacuum needs to be filled by an effective Western presence, principally
the U.S. which has the major security interest in the area. The urgency
is heightened by the challenge of Cuba whose leaders are not hesitant
to exploit every target of opportunity, e.g. Grenada.

We require additional resources to deal effectively with the situa-
tion. We are proposing increased security assistance levels for the
region in FY 81 but we need additional resources sooner lest we be
too late to turn around several situations. Massive amounts are not
required nor could they be absorbed into a limited program which
serves our purposes. In addition, the British have indicated they would

\(^2\) See Document 240.
be willing to help fund the cost of a regional coast guard. We will be meeting with them next month for further discussions on this matter.

In presenting this supplemental to the public and the Congress, we will signal U.S. interest and concern in Central America and the Caribbean. However, we should avoid portraying our actions only as anti-Cuban and should emphasize the contribution to long-term economic development needs and the strengthening of democratic institutions.

An additional consideration is the eligibility of the states involved to purchase defense articles and services from the U.S. or to acquire them under MAP. Currently, only the Dominican Republic, Haiti and Barbados are eligible. Establishment of new FMS or MAP programs will require recipient country agreement on matters relating to the use and transfer of USG-origin defense articles and providing (in the case of MAP) for a USG role in monitoring such use. This will be the subject of a subsequent memorandum.

IDCA Position

IDCA does not support inclusion of the $10 million Developmental Assistance component. IDCA notes that DA Caribbean programs have risen significantly in the last years and that additional funding is not justified given world-wide priorities. If a decision is made to provide such funds on policy grounds, IDCA believes it should be included in ESF which exists for that purpose.

I believe that Congress expects a balanced approach in terms of both economic and security assistance and that not to include a moderate amount of developmental assistance would tend to imply a shift to a security emphasis. Moreover, given cuts made by Congress in the FY 80 budget request, this DA funding would do no more than restore cuts.

Recommendation:

That you include a $30.6 million Caribbean package with the Central American proposal, making a total supplemental request of $175.6 million.3

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3 There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation. In a separate memorandum to Carter on September 29, McIntyre countered, “We have just seen Cy’s $30M Caribbean supplemental sent over as an addition to State’s earlier $145M Central American request. As you know, Henry Owen and I feel strongly that only the first $75M for Nicaragua merits your approval. As for this Caribbean request, I find it to be even less justifiable than the Central American request.” McIntyre concluded, “The Nicaragua emergency is the only item which justifies a supplemental, and we should not commit more than $75M.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 45, Latin America, 1-9/79)
366. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)\(^1\)

Washington, October 12, 1979

SUBJECT
British Assistance to the Caribbean—What They’re Doing? What More Should We Ask? (C)

Jim Thomson asked me to prepare a memo for you on what the British are doing in the Caribbean and what more we should ask of them. (C)

The British have just completed a survey of the requirements of Caribbean security forces in 14 countries and political entities. The major element of the package they are recommending is the development of a coast guard in Barbados. The team found that the development of a regional coast guard initially comprised of Barbados, St. Lucia and St. Vincent is floundering because of funding and to a certain extent, political problems. Barbados has decided to go ahead on its own and the UK and Canada have both presented basically commercial sales packages to the Government of Barbados to begin a modest Coast Guard comprised of two patrol boats and three refurbished shrimp boats. Neither St. Lucia nor St. Vincent has the financial resources to purchase patrol boats, even if concessional financing is available, and the UK has no plans to extend grant assistance for the purchase of equipment. Legislation presently limits our ability to provide assistance to police forces of foreign countries including their coast guards. (C)

The UK said it will provide about $1.3 million in military training assistance to the Bahamas, Barbados, Trinidad, Jamaica and Guyana. Assistance to the various constabulary forces in 1979–80 will amount to about $400,000, and the survey team identified further requirements presently unfunded of about $2 million. The Canadians appear to have some budgetary flexibility and may be able to provide some funding for equipment to the police. In addition, the US may be able to provide some assistance from narcotics control funds. (C)

We should urge the British to fully fund the amounts identified by the survey team, especially in view of our legislative restrictions.

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\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Box 28, Latin America, 10/79. Confidential. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Thomson and Blackwill.
on assistance to police forces. Specifically, we would like them to fund the following additional items:

—improvement of police communications $350,000
—provision of transport to ensure mobility including offshore patrol craft for both Dominica and St. Lucia $960,000
—Intensify training of constabulary forces and provide more equipment (to improve the morale and capabilities of police forces on the smaller islands).

We, in turn, are willing to contribute training to the Barbadian Coast Guard for control and interdiction of narcotics traffic. You should also urge them to increase their contribution to the Caribbean Group.² (C)

Phil Habib will be in London next week for talks with the British on security and the Caribbean so you may want to touch base with him to see what more we should ask for.³ (C)

² In telegram 4799 from Bridgetown, November 19, the Embassy reported that the British had agreed to provide Barbados with an assistance package of “a patrol craft, refitting of 3 older shrimp boats, and various elements of support for the police force.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790533–0320)

³ Telegram 257530 to London, Ottawa, and Paris, October 1, transmitted the agenda for the October 18–19 U.S.-UK-Canadian talks in London. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790449–0982)
367. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter

Washington, October 18, 1979

SUBJECT

Some Ideas for Your Briefing on Central America (CA) and the Caribbean (CAR), Friday, October 19—3:00 p.m. (C)

State has suggested Stan Turner begin with an overview. Cy will give a policy overview and Habib and Bowdler will focus on the Caribbean and Central America respectively. (Each presentation would be about five minutes.) (C)

The Problem

The repeated crises we confront in the Caribbean (CAR) and Central America (CA) are, of course, related; they are symptoms of a more perplexing challenge characterized by the following;

—All these nations have rapidly expanding populations and scarce resources. Long appendages of the US or UK they are now asserting their national identities, and their new leaders are eager to play large (and vocal) roles on the world stage. (S)

—The Administration’s human rights and non-intervention policies have helped to bring long-standing contradictions and tensions to the surface. Our desire to replace paternalism with balanced relationships has provided these nations “space” to define themselves. Our continued predominance, however, irritates their nascent nationalism, and its results create problems for us. (S)

—Cuba offers a defiant, assertive alternative, and is now once again trying to profit from these tensions. (S)

Two Contrasting Regions

There is a need to recognize that the problem plays out different in the Caribbean and in Central America. (S)

—In the Caribbean, the parliamentary tradition survives, but has no deep roots. Problems are so immense that utopian, revolutionary posturing is very attractive. Every island has its radical group, and increasingly they are working with each other and with Grenada, Jamaica, Guyana and Cuba. (S)

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 46, Folder: Latin America, 10/15–31/79. Secret. Sent for information. Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote, “This is wrong approach. I’ll speak at meeting.”
With the exception of Costa Rica, Central America (and Haiti) lack a democratic tradition, and are burdened by an authoritarian and inequitable class structure. (S)

Our objectives therefore, have different emphases. In Central America, we have promoted democratic changes; in the Caribbean, we have sought to defend existing democratic institutions. (S)

Recent Developments

The Caribbean is becoming more polarized. Bishop of Grenada may have just made a decisive turn to the left by closing the independent newspaper and arresting some opposition leaders.2 Jamaica’s Manley gave an anti-US speech at the NAM and named a doctrinaire Marxist (D.K. Duncan) as his party leader.3 Guyana joined Jamaica, Grenada, and Cuba in attacking your October 1 speech.4 In contrast, Barbados and Trinidad are strong and successful, and exert some influence on the uncommitted mini-states. (S)

Most of the decisions by Manley, Bishop, and others, which disturb us, are probably made for internal reasons. Bishop in Grenada fears he is losing popular support. Manley has probably shifted to the left to capture the imagination of the radical youth of Jamaica, much as he did before his election in 1976. In Guyana, Burnham is just trying to hang on. (S)

Thus Caribbean politics often produces attacks on transnational corporations and capitalist countries. Even Trinidad’s conservative Eric Williams is convinced that the Caribbean’s plight is caused by Western exploitation. Some Caribbean leaders are eager to test our commitment to “ideological pluralism.” (S)

We should not consider Manley, or even Bishop, as irretrievable; this would unintentionally make them so. There is a potent opposition newspaper and party in Jamaica, and Cubans were thrown on the defensive by recent disclosures there. International public opinion matters in the Caribbean, even to Bishop of Grenada. (S)

In Central America, the recent coup in El Salvador may have turned the worst crisis into our best opportunity. The civilian appointments

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2 The Embassy reported on the closing of the newspaper Torchlight in telegram 4237 from Bridgetown, October 15. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790472–1045) The October 15 arrest of opposition leaders on the suspicion of plotting to assassinate New Jewel Movement leaders was reported in telegram 4246 from Bridgetown, October 16. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790474–0328)

3 See Documents 193 and 194.

4 The President’s speech concerned the Soviet brigade in Cuba; see footnote 2, Document 80. Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, and St. Lucia issued a statement on the speech on October 7. The text was transmitted in telegram 4558 from Bridgetown, October 9. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790463–0882)
to the Junta are encouraging. If we can help Salvador to get on track toward free elections, that will have a very positive impact on its three closest neighbors. We must be very quick and flexible to respond to the new government’s requests, and helpful in dealing with the very real guerrilla threat. The new Junta will have to reach an accommodation with the Christian Democrats (PDC) by sponsoring free elections soon or by co-opting them into the government. We need to make sure that they do this. (S)

If El Salvador has free elections soon, Nicaragua and Honduras will be hard pressed to avoid them. Guatemala will have to reassess its opposition to social reforms. The game is much rougher in Central America than in the Caribbean, and the risks of being heavy-handed (or caught red-handed) are much less. We should use our leverage more. (S)

Issues and Ideas

Let me suggest that you focus the discussion on the following issues: (U)

(1) Precluding A Radical Alternative. How far should we be willing to go to prevent radical take-overs in the region? Should we be willing to provide counter-insurgency support to the new Salvadoran junta? Should we provide support to those who seek to replace Grenada’s Bishop? (S)

My own view is that we should be prepared to help the new Salvadoran junta with military and political assistance if it remains on track toward free elections. We should find all effective means to support centrist groups in the region and to expose Soviet/Cuban activities. (S)

(2) US Presence and Capabilities. Are we receiving sufficient high-quality intelligence? Is our presence adequate to convey the message of US interest and determination? (S)

I believe the answers to both questions are negative. US agencies continue to give the region very low priority in terms of quantity and quality of manpower. Even though we are the largest aid-givers to the region, few realize it because we have tended to give most of our aid through multilateral channels, and we seem reluctant to take credit for it. [3 lines not declassified] We have just begun an inter-agency review to determine ways to increase the quantity and the quality of our manpower in the region, but we will need your strong support if this effort is to succeed. (S)

(3) Economic Policies. Are we doing enough? The Caribbean Group is a successful initiative, and we should maintain our contribution, but we also need to expand bilateral programs and increase the flexibility of our aid-granting mechanisms in order to be able to respond rapidly
to circumstances. We are also encouraging a Central American Development Group modeled on the Caribbean Group, but we are trying to keep a low profile in this, lest it look like our initiative. (S)

If we really want to help the Caribbean, we should reduce US protectionism in sugar, coffee, and meat. No other set of decisions would have as positive an impact on the region. Our rising interest in the Caribbean might make this fly politically here. (S)

(4) Diplomacy/Democracy. How can we effectively raise the costs to those who criticize us and the benefits to those who work with us? How can we better shape public opinion? How can we strengthen the democratic process? We should emphasize rewards for friends. More attention and aid. You may want to consider responding positively to requests for meetings with you by the democratic Presidents of the region: Barbados, Dominican Republic, and Costa Rica. Short meetings with them would send a clear message of our strong support for democracy to the whole region. (S)

I believe we should avoid punitive sanctions against those like Manley who have been insensitive to our concerns recently. Instead, we should gradually but modestly reduce our assistance to these countries; and we should “cool” our relations (fewer visits, less attention). The message will be understood and is sufficiently unobtrusive so as to give these leaders a chance to walk back. (S)

In addition, we should support centrist groups in both areas and continue to encourage the Europeans and Latin democracies to help these groups, and when necessary work with them. Cy should pursue this issue in La Paz. (S)

Finally, you should select a forum soon to speak on the Caribbean and Central America along these lines. The perfect occasion is the Conference on the Caribbean on November 28, 1979, hosted by Miami. If you so decide, I will prepare a draft speech. (S)

5 Vance traveled to La Paz to attend the OAS General Assembly session October 20–23.

6 President Carter did not attend the Conference on the Caribbean, but he did provide a videotaped message. (Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book II, pp. 2159–2161)
368. Summary of Conclusions of a Presidential Meeting

Washington, October 19, 1979, 3:05–4:15 p.m.

SUBJECT
Central America and the Caribbean

PARTICIPANTS
State
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State
Viron T. Vaky, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs
William Bowdler, Director of Intelligence and Research
Lawrence Pezzullo, U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua
Ambler Moss, U.S. Ambassador to Panama
Philip Habib, Senior Adviser to the Secretary of State
OSD
Graham Claytor, Deputy Secretary of Defense
CIA
Stansfield Turner, Director
Frank Carlucci, Deputy Director
White House
The President
Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Adviser
Hedley Donovan, Presidential Adviser
NSC
Robert Pastor, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

Summary of Conclusions

The President asked Secretary Vance to begin the briefing, and he, in turn, asked Phil Habib to make a presentation on the Caribbean. Bill Bowdler would follow with a presentation on Central America.

CARIBBEAN

Habib said the problem we face in the Caribbean is that there are many new states, which are disorganized politically, impoverished economically, and unable to cooperate with each other. It is a jumble of countries, which range from Trinidad, which is prosperous and has oil; to Jamaica, which still has substantial wealth, but is steadily deteriorating economically due to a multitude of reasons, including mismanagement by the government. There is also Barbados and several other mini-states of 100–300,000 people. There is a tremendous variety

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 46, Folder: Latin America, 10/15–31/79. Secret. Drafted by Pastor. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room.
in the English-speaking Caribbean, but only two countries—Trinidad and Barbados—are in decent economic and political condition. There are currently 7 independent countries in the Caribbean; there will probably be 11 countries by the end of next year. (S)

Habib said that a major problem of governments in the region is their inability to satisfy the growing expectations of their people. This is a problem for all governments, but it is particularly troublesome in the Caribbean where the exposure to Western products and values is so great due to travel, tourism, and emigration. These expectations are impossible to satisfy, making the political situation in these islands very fragile. (S)

Habib said there is a new generation of vigorous and radical leaders who were trained in the US and Britain during the 1960’s—a period of social activism and turmoil. The older generation of political leaders are moving out of power, and these younger fellows are on the make. Their energy could be productive if it were channeled through the democratic process, but this may not be the case. These young leaders make up a radical leftist minority, with ties to Cuba and to each other. This is potential danger in the Caribbean. (S)

The Cubans have a sizeable presence in Jamaica, Grenada and Guyana and they have taken advantage of that presence to expand their influence throughout the Caribbean. In certain cases, the Cubans have helped these radical groups to compete politically; in other cases, they have helped them to work through illegitimate channels. Two examples. In recent elections in St. Lucia, the moderate party lost, and the new government with a radical element in it has achieved power. In Grenada, a radical group achieved power by a coup. Other potential trouble spots are St. Vincent and Antigua. In some cases, the radical groups are working against corrupt and inadequate governments. For example, in Grenada the New Jewel Movement fought against Gairy who was not only corrupt and repressive, but also weird. (S)

Habib summarized by saying that our problem in the Caribbean is whether governments in the region can deal with these problems and promote economic development by democratic process or whether the region will move toward one party rule and direct ties toward more radical elements or countries, principally Cuba. There is a strong anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist current which has replaced the anti-colonialism of a few years ago, but anti-Americanism as a political theme does not go over so well in the region because the people there basically

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2 In telegram 2612 from Bridgetown, July 3, the Embassy reported that on July 2, St. Lucian Prime Minister John Compton and his United Workers Party were defeated by Allan Louisy and the St. Lucia Labor Party in national elections. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790303–0734)
like Americans. We have been looking at this region quite intensively and have consulted with the British and Canadians and also with Venezuela, Mexico and others. Habib has just returned from London where he found the British and Canadian assessments of the region remarkably like our own. The British will be very helpful in the security field. They agree with us that it is fundamentally not a Cuban problem but a social, economic and political development problem. However, the Cubans are ready to take advantage of the situation, and they have the ability to act quickly, whereas we do not. The Canadians are a little more cautious than we are. The French, for the first time, are eager to help primarily because Cuba is pressing for the independence of Guadeloupe and Martinique. (S)

[Omitted here is discussion not relevant to the Caribbean.]

President Carter said that he wanted to be frank with the group, and without meaning to be critical, he feels that he has sat in the Presidency for three years and he still does not have a clear idea of what we are trying to do in the region. All he ever gets are last minute requests from Vance and Christopher for a budget supplemental to deal with these problems and this irritates him. There is nothing long-term to deal with the problem. Do we need a conference on this? Andy (Young) could take a group down to the area if this were necessary. Do we need a long-term stabilization program for the region? What are we trying to encourage? (S)

Habib answered by saying that we do need a coordinated and integrated program, and that was one of the conclusions of his report. He also found that there wasn’t sufficient attention given to the region. Since then, the Secretary has set up an interagency group, and it is looking into our policies toward Jamaica, Grenada and Guyana. The group will also examine what kind of coordinating effort could be undertaken in the economic, political and multilateral fields. We look forward to an early decision on these issues. In addition to these long-term programs, we also need to be able to react better to short-term crises. (S)

President Carter said that whenever there is a problem, all the recommendations seem to focus on sending more money. There is no idea what it will be used for. There is no sense of how it will fit into an overall approach. (S)

The President said he received recommendations that we should knock the hell out of Manley and support a moderate group. He said.

3 See footnote 3, Document 366.
4 Presumably a report of his August 12–23 trip to the Caribbean area. See footnote 4, Document 328.
he was going down that path when Andy came to see him.\footnote{See Documents 199 and 200.} He persuaded me that such a policy would be suicide in Jamaica, that Manley will be in power until 1981 and he is too strong to be overthrown. Such an approach would only put us in danger of losing Manley permanently. (S)

The President continued by saying that he felt that in sensitive areas, we are simply not getting sound advice. We need to treat even the small islands in the Caribbean with respect. If it is necessary to have Manley up here for a talk and to stay in the Mansion, he would be prepared to do that or if we wanted to send someone down—like my wife or Andy—I would be willing to do it. (S)

\textit{Secretary Vance} said that a number of months ago he asked Habib to undertake the task of developing a comprehensive strategy for the Caribbean. He particularly asked Habib for suggestions on the way to deal with Jamaica. The Secretary felt that the President might be overreading what he and Dr. Brzezinski had recommended. We are not suggesting that we jump Manley, but rather that we express concern about recent developments. We have to be careful to think of what kind of leverage we have in Jamaica; to exercise that effectively, we need to know the local situation better. Recently, he spoke to some officials from Kaiser, which has long experience in Jamaica, to get a better feel for the situation there. (S)

\textit{Dr. Brzezinski} pointed out that in the memo which he sent the President that morning he wrote we should not view Manley or even Bishop as irretrievable.\footnote{Presumably Document 367.} To do so would only have the effect of pushing them in a radical direction. (S)

\textit{President Carter} said he was not referring to the memo this morning, but rather to the advice he had been getting for the past three weeks. (S)

\textit{Dr. Brzezinski} then tried to put the current difficulties in a broader perspective. The Caribbean and Central America have recently emerged from a colonial or neocolonial legacy. Central America has long been under US domination, while the Caribbean has been under the domination of various European countries. One needs to understand the current problems in the region within this context and also within the more recent context of US disengagement. Our long-term goals are correct. The problem is in the short-term and in the mid-term where it looks as if the US is out of the picture, and people who are hostile to the US are on the offensive. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski recommended that the President make a speech soon, which states that the US has long and enduring interests in the
Caribbean. But these interests are different than they have been in the past. We are interested in the long-term development and democratization of the region. We are interested in letting these countries define their own place in the world. But in the short-term, we should be prepared to assert ourselves, politically, economically, and perhaps even militarily. [2 lines not declassified] In addition, we need to be prepared to provide more economic aid to the region and we need to do more politically. Unless Manley realizes we are in the picture, and we are willing to crack down, he will gravitate to the left. (S)

Secretary Vance said that our technological and economic assistance is our advantage, and we should use it more. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski agreed, and said that our approach should be clearly set in a secure and confident context. We are a major power with major responsibilities, but we are interested in helping the countries in the region achieve their objectives of development and democratization. (S)

President Carter said we may have made an enormous mistake in Jamaica if we had followed the original path, but what really disturbs him is that the discussion seems permeated with an inadequate attitude. We should try hard not to be exploitative. It is wrong to think that we can buy friends, and I think that is our major problem. I don’t think that people in the area think that the US really cares about them, that we are their friends. There are many ways we can demonstrate this interest. We have a thousand major universities in the US and I could call and ask them to participate in a program to help the area. If I called some business leaders and told them we have a problem, and divided up responsibilities, I am sure they would be glad to help. I believe we could really help if we did this. The American people would be happy to establish friendly relations directly with the people of the area. I don’t feel that the people in Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and perhaps even in Costa Rica feel that we care about them; perhaps they think that Cuba does. (S)

The President said that as long as white Anglos sit in the Cabinet Room and think of ways to keep out the Cubans, we will be unable to get at the problems in the area. If we could spend our time thinking of ways we can help the people of Guatemala—to work out a good transportation system or an educational system—I think that would work. We need to get the American people involved—the church, business, labor, etc. When I was in Atlanta, the Baptist Church there sent 30 people into the mountains to help poor people, and I think that helped. We do not have a broad enough outreach and I believe they

7 See Documents 197 and 198.
can sense that. And we ought to do that. They probably feel we have been exploitative and they are probably right. (S)

Habib referred to two examples to prove the President’s point. The Prime Minister of Dominica was recently here and asked for just $200,000 of fertilizer and a few bundles of seeds to begin to reconstruct his country’s agriculture after the hurricane. We were able to respond quickly, and the Prime Minister became a hero when he returned. By and large, we have neglected the area because we thought it was a British responsibility. We need to change that. Our two goals should be democracy and development. Business is not going into the Caribbean because it is not profitable (due to poor transportation, etc.) and because they feel they are unwelcome (rhetorical attacks against international corporations). (S)

Habib said that Manley is a complex person. The British think he is off the wall; they also believe that Bishop is not salvageable. Habib agrees with that. Manley is preparing to win the election and that explains the reason for his radical shift. We ought to continue to press Manley and Bishop to go toward free elections. As to Manley, Habib did judge him on his ability to maintain the democratic process and to make his source function better. He has an affinity for Cuba because he admires Castro and because he wants to play a world role. (S)

In Guyana the alternatives to Burnham are worse. (S)

President Carter said he is not trying to oversimplify, but it seems to him that what we need to do is change our basic attitude. We need to do what we can to give them a reason to like the US. We need to reach beyond the government structure and relate directly to the people. (S)

The President says that he thinks Manley, like him, is a politician facing elections. He wants to do the right thing, but maybe he is constrained. Maybe we can give Manley some help in agriculture. That was Andy’s suggestion. We have Castro beat 10,000 to one in this area, but somehow we cannot compete. If we concentrate on labor and agriculture, we can magnify greatly what we can do in Jamaica. The problem is we have a tendency to hold on to things. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said that we need to break with the paternalistic tradition. (S)

President Carter said that we still have it. Dr. Brzezinski said we must engage the private sector which would involve them and others. Secretary Vance said that the business community is prepared to work

8 Habib and Ambassador Lawrence met with Manley on August 17. Telegram 6005 from Kingston, August 21, reported on the meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790382–0622)
with us. Habib said that the AFL/CIO wants to expand its activities, but to do so requires money. (S)

The President said that he is the only person in the region who can marshal all the resources, private and public. He said that we need a country-by-country analysis, describing in detail what resources are required, and who he should contact, and he said that he would get in touch with these people. (S)

Admiral Turner said that the CIA is considerably more pessimistic than Andy Young about Jamaica. Jamaica has received about $100 million during the last year, but much of this has been wasted. It is possible that Jamaica may have passed the point where we can influence Manley to continue down a Parliamentary path. Turner cited a number of instances of Cuban-Soviet collaboration in Jamaica, including the fact that the [4 lines not declassified] The CIA thinks that it is difficult for him to come back after making such a sharp turn to the left. (S)

[Omitted here is discussion not relevant to the Caribbean.]

Secretary Vance said that we need a contingency fund; otherwise, it is very difficult to respond rapidly to such opportunities. President Carter agreed with him. (S)

Habib said that he had briefed the Congress on the Caribbean, and had found considerably more sympathy there than in parts of the bureaucracy for more money to the Caribbean. (S)

President Carter said that we need to plan ahead and anticipate these changes and developments. He acknowledged that there is a fair amount of attention to the region, but he insisted that we do not have an adequate long-range approach to the region. He said that we are starting to correct that, but we have not thought through what we should do in an extra-governmental way. He wondered whether we had graduated from a neocolonial perspective, but thought that we haven’t. The general tone of the briefings at the beginning of the meeting suggested that we are about to lose these countries from our sphere of influence. He thinks that is the wrong approach. (S)

The President said that we need to focus much more on the preparation of the FY 81 budget as it applies to our concerns in Central America and the Caribbean. We need to build in some flexibility—perhaps including a contingency fund—so that we can respond rapidly to events. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski suggested that we respond to the problems in the Caribbean and Central America in five ways: First, we must respond to the socio-economic needs with an economic assistance plan, and we will provide the President with such a plan. Secondly, we need to develop a strategy to deal with the political-military problems in the region. Third, we need to develop a covert strategy which complements
our overall approach. Fourth, we need to develop an extra-governmental strategy, devising ways to mobilize the resources of the country as the President had described. (The President interjected by suggesting that we examine the example of a group from Georgia who went to Haiti recently to plant one million trees.) And fifth, we need to develop a regional strategy for engaging other Latin American countries in these problems. Secretary Vance can follow this up in La Paz. (S)

Secretary Vance suggested a number of mechanisms we can use, such as land grant colleges. Habib said that the AFL wants to do more. (S)

The President said that he is eager to help. This conversation should help to stimulate our thinking, and he asked the group to come back to him with an analysis of each country individually—not the region—and what we can do. It is surprising what can be done if we set our minds to it. (S)

Habib suggested that a good time to mobilize this effort would be at the Committee on the Caribbean meeting in Miami in November. Secretary Vance said that the President has agreed to see Prime Minister Adams of Barbados.9 (S)

Ambassador Moss agreed that we faced a significant attitudinal problem. There are a lot of suspicions in the area, particularly that the only reason we are interested in it is because of Castro. (S)

The Secretary said that he will mention the need for a new attitudinal approach in his speech in La Paz.10 (S)

The President said that Bob Graham, Governor of Florida, had recently visited three or four countries in the Caribbean and was very excited with the experience. One of the President’s neighbors in Plains had spent a year in Jamaica, and another group from Georgia had gone to an island in the Caribbean and given every person on the island dental work. This is the kind of activity which conveys a genuine feeling of warmth. Georgia had a relationship with the Brazilian state of Pernambuco, and it was a good opportunity to assert our influence in an exciting and enjoyable way. To me, this is one of the best opportunities to relate to other governments, without trying to figure out what we are trying to get out of it. (S)

The President also expressed some skepticism about the quality of our ambassadors. In a country which is black or Spanish-speaking, he wondered whether we are sending our best ambassadors. We should

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9 See Document 333.
10 For the text of Vance’s statement at the OAS General Assembly, see the Department of State Bulletin, December 1979, pp. 65–67.
look very closely at the quality of our ambassadors, and we ought to assess every possibility of upgrading our people in the area. (S)

Vaky said that the U.S. traditionally has difficulty relating to the interests of these countries. Whether it is on sugar or tin, we do not take into account their concerns very well. The IDB is currently having a problem with Ecuador, for example. We need to find a better way to examine the consequences of our global policies. Secretary Vance said that we should also examine the GSP from that perspective. (S)

The President said that there is another opportunity we should examine. Dante Fascell can help us by organizing a group of Congressmen. The region is an attractive place to visit. If they did, we could arrange meetings with good, moderate leaders, but we need to identify with the people. For too long, dictators had identified key members of the Congress and entertained them. By the time we tried to change our policies, it was more difficult. We should involve them early on. We need to work with Fascell, and look for another 20 like him. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said that in about 15 minutes an interagency group would be meeting to examine ways to improve the quantity and quality of our manpower in Central America and the Caribbean, and he said that that was very much consistent with what the President had said. (S)

369. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter

Washington, November 6, 1979

SUBJECT

A People-to-People Strategy for the Caribbean Basin (U)

In order to undertake the kind of comprehensive people-to-people (PTP) approach which you envisage for Central America and the Caribbean, I asked State to prepare a country-by-country inventory of extragovernmental US programs to the Caribbean basin. It will be easier to expand and mobilize these programs than to start from ground zero. (S)
Three key people-to-people programs work in this area: the Partners of the Americas program (which connects US States with Latin American countries and provinces, like Pernambuco), the Sister Cities program (which is worldwide), and the new Committee For The Caribbean (a non-profit, non-governmental organization created to promote Caribbean economic development through private enterprise). This Committee is hosting an important conference on the Caribbean in Miami November 28th; you have been invited by Maurice Ferre, Governor Graham, and Dante Fascell to explain US policies regarding the Caribbean and Central America in a keynote address. A number of heads of state and important political leaders will be in attendance.

These three private groups’ efforts need to be coordinated and reinforced, if they are to achieve the goal you have in mind. This could be done by appointing a high-level Commission, which would serve as an umbrella over the three US organizations noted above and any others that have a presence or could have an impact in the Caribbean or Central America. The head of such a Commission should be a prominent person, such as Mayor Ferre, who knows both the region and US groups interested in the region. Members of the Commission could include leaders from the three organizations noted above and representatives from churches, labor, etc.

The November 28 Miami Conference would provide a unique opportunity to announce and launch such a commission; members of the Commission could make contacts at the Conference, which would make follow-up activities easier. This Commission could be assisted by different government agencies, with a full-time government official in the State Department being charged with these back-up services.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That you approve the setting up of a broad-based Commission on the Caribbean Basin, subject to answering outstanding questions satisfactorily.
2. That I contact Mayor Ferre as possible Chairman.
3. That we prepare a message from you to the Miami Conference November 28 announcing formation of this Commission, if you cannot attend personally.

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3 See footnote 4, Document 367.
4 Although President Carter did not mark any of the recommendations, in telegram 92901 to Nassau, April 8, 1980, the Department reported he was to meet with several “people to people” groups on April 9. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800176-0472) See footnote 3, Document 333.
370. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski), the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron), and Henry Owen of the National Security Council Staff

Washington, November 13, 1979

SUBJECT
CIA Paper on the Caribbean (U)

The CIA has done an excellent paper on the problems in the Caribbean, the Cuban/Soviet response to these problems, and implications for US policy. I attach the summary of the paper because it is good and brief. I also attach the Table of Contents in case you may be interested in reading the full paper. One additional point I would like to make concerns the amount of resources going to the region. The Soviets are giving $3 billion a year to Cuba, and a fair amount of that is being used by Cuba to implement its own aid programs to the region. The CIA estimates that the Cubans have a $32 million aid program to Jamaica, comparable to the size of our own aid program. The Cubans will probably have a larger aid program, and certainly more personnel in Nicaragua than the USG will be able to muster. The French have given about $2.4 billion to its smaller territories—Guadeloupe and Martinique—in the Caribbean, and the Dutch gave about $616 million to Suriname and the Netherlands Antilles. We are giving approximately $1 billion to Puerto Rico in aid, and about $75 or $80 million a year to the rest of the Caribbean. We are currently struggling with the budgetary issue of increasing aid to the Caribbean by about $20 million this year. This will give you an idea of the reason why we are having difficulty influencing developments in the Caribbean. (S)

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 46, Latin America, 11/79. Secret. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Griffith, Brement, and Odom. A stamped notation indicates Brzezinski saw the memorandum.
2 Dated November 1979; attached but not printed.
3 At the bottom of the page, Owen wrote, “Our experience in other regions doesn’t give much reason to believe that a large increase in aid would give us much influence. What aid does at most, is to improve long-term economic prospects. That doesn’t seem to be the main problem in the Caribbean at the moment.”
371. Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting

Washington, November 13, 1979, 5:05–6:15 p.m.

SUBJECT
Jamaica, Grenada, and the Caribbean (U)

PARTICIPANTS
State
Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher (Chairman)
Ambassador Viron Vaky (Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs)
Mr. Philip Habib (Senior Advisor to the Secretary)
OSD
Deputy Secretary W. Graham Claytor, Jr.
RADM Gordon J. Schuller (Director for Inter-American Region)
JCS
VADM Thor Hanson (Director, Joint Staff)
DCI
Deputy Director Frank Carlucci
Mr. Jack Davis (NIO for Latin America)
Treasury
Mr. Arnold Nachmanoff (Deputy Assistant Secretary for Developing Nations)
White House
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
Mr. David Aaron
Mr. Henry Owen
NSC
Mr. Robert Pastor

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The Situation in Jamaica. To understand the political ambience in Jamaica, it is necessary to begin with an assessment of Prime Minister Manley, who is almost totally absorbed with his political career and his re-election. Because of the extremely difficult economic problems Jamaica will face next year and the growing strength of the opposition, the CIA estimates that the odds are Manley will choose an extra-constitutional way to remain in office, and justify it by the economic crisis and the inevitable political confrontation.2 There are increasing signs of this in his anti-Western speech at the NAM; his selection of a

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 26, Folder: Jamaica, 10–11/79. Secret. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.
2 See Document 370.
Marxist to organize his political campaign; and his expanding ties with the KGB and DGI.\(^3\) CIA believes that increased offers of economic assistance will not turn Manley around, although a sharp cutback in aid could be used by Manley to justify his attempt to consolidate power. However, on November 13, Jamaica’s Minister of Finance Eric Bell met with Phil Habib and hinted that Jamaica might be prepared to adjust its foreign and domestic policies in ways which would be more agreeable to the US if we were prepared to assist Jamaica economically next year and, even more important, to support increased multilateral aid to Jamaica.\(^4\)

**US Policy to Jamaica.** The PRC concluded that we ought to send a mission from Washington to speak to Manley and be very explicit about what we would expect from him and what we would be prepared to do in positive terms (economic/political support) if he met our expectations. We should inform Manley that our relationship is at a crossroads, and there would be major changes in US policy toward Jamaica if he should decide not to adjust his policies. We should make clear that we will be judging our relationship according to a number of “litmus tests,” including his rhetoric on issues of high sensitivity to the US, Jamaica’s adherence to the IMF agreement, efforts to restore investor confidence and avoid further radicalization, actions to reduce Soviet/Cuban intelligence activities, etc.\(^5\) The specific details of the approach and who would make it will be subject to interagency clearance. There was no agreement on whether we should threaten or consider the use of force as the dialogue unfolds. This will be considered again later.\(^6\)

**The Situation in Grenada.** State and CIA agreed that the Government of Grenada has turned increasingly to authoritarian measures to consolidate its internal control and toward a militant, anti-Western, pro-Cuban foreign policy posture. Prime Minister Bishop has arrested two Americans for “internal security reasons” but has not brought them to trial.\(^7\) There is an intelligence report suggesting that the Grenadian

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3 Carter wrote in the margin by the paragraph, “We may use VOA, UN, or other means to accuse Manley of planning takeover.”

4 In his meeting with Habib, Bell proposed an economic plan designed to restore private investor confidence in Jamaica. (Telegram 296340 to Kingston, November 14; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790525–0701)

5 The idea to submit Prime Minister Manley to a series of “litmus tests” emerged in a memorandum to Vance from Vaky and Kreisberg. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850174–0326)

6 In the margin, Carter wrote, “If done crudely, this would be counter-productive. McHenry should be consulted.” Habib and Young met with Manley in Miami on November 29. See Document 200.

7 See footnote 2, Document 330.
Embassy in Washington may have assisted two Grenadians, who were awaiting trial here on gun-running charges, to flee to Grenada. The PRC concluded that the Grenada Government is “probably beyond the pale;” it has suppressed the only independent newspaper, arrested all the opposition leaders, and is headed toward becoming a Cuban surrogate. At the same time, criticism of the regime throughout the Eastern Caribbean is increasing, and there are some signs that Prime Minister Bishop is fearful of becoming isolated. (S)

**US Policy to Grenada.** State will first evaluate whether the charges against the two American citizens in prison in Grenada have any justification. If we view the charges as justified, we will press for an early and free trial. If the charges are not justified, we will press for the release of the US citizens and consider various options to attain that objective, including the issuance of a “travel advisory,” which would discourage tourism to Grenada. (S)

The overall approach to Grenada which the PRC recommends is to distance ourselves from the regime, and to look for opportunities effectively to encourage others in the region to criticize and ostracize the government. There would be no new US programs for Grenada, but heightened attention to the needs and concerns of neighboring countries. Contact would be limited and cool. Our criticism of Grenada’s human rights situation would reflect criticism from other governments in the region. There was no agreement on whether we should threaten the use of force or even whether the Defense Department should begin consideration of military contingency plans. This will be explored later. In addition, the Justice Department will be asked to investigate the possibility of involvement by the Embassy of Grenada in the flight of the two gun-runners, Wardally and Humphrey. The CIA asked for guidance on whether it should withdraw the Presidential Finding on Grenada in the light of both Congressional controversy and the apparent inability to pursue a political action plan in Grenada at this time because of repressive measures by the regime and lack of assets. (S)

**Caribbean Guidelines.** An interagency group will review a set of guidelines for US policy to the Caribbean that were prepared for the meeting and make a recommendation to the National Security Council on whether to accept them. (C)

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8 In the margin to the left of the sentence, Carter wrote, “ok.”
9 See Documents 325 and 328.
10 See Document 373.
372. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, December 10, 1979

SUBJECT

Caribbean Chiefs of Mission Conference (U)

Attached is a copy of the conclusions of the Caribbean Chiefs of Mission Conference, together with the President’s comments. Please note his observation that “this is a narrowly focused and inadequate approach—‘more federal government money and staff.’” (S)

Additionally, the President took issue with the implication of the first paragraph that the only alternatives for attaining our objectives are economic assistance and military force. He noted, “These are not the only two options.” (S)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of State

Washington, undated

Caribbean Chiefs of Mission Conference
December 3–4, 1979

CONCLUSIONS:

The Chiefs of Mission agree that we can best attain our objectives by economic assistance programs to meet the needs of its people, rather than by attempting to dominate the region by military force. Display of military strength is useful but must be carefully calibrated to ensure positive impact.

In policy statements, ideological pluralism should be defined as embracing a commitment to democratic processes, human rights, and economic development in the country concerned. We should recognize

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2 Secret. Carter wrote at the top of the page, “Cy, Zbig This is a narrowly focused and inadequate approach. ‘More Federal gov’t money and staff.’”
3 Carter underlined “economic assistance programs” and “military force” and wrote in the left margin, “These are not the only two options.”
that USG credibility is on the line by our own declarations of U.S. interest in our Caribbean “third border”, commitment to economic development, etc.\footnote{Carter highlighted this paragraph in the right margin.}

The Chiefs of Mission agree that the Cuban challenge reflects an ad hoc and alert Cuban response to perceived opportunities in individual countries, rather than a fully-developed strategy of Caribbean subversion. The U.S. must counter these tactics by providing an alternative answer to Caribbean development needs. Both for visibility and as a gauge of our intentions, quick-disbursing, flexible development funds are needed for visibility projects which meet basic needs. In addition, we need economic assistance programs for middle-income countries. Our assistance policy should avoid rewarding our enemies while denying our friends. The Chiefs of Mission underline recipient countries’ desire for improved export markets and for foreign private investment. They conclude:

—that a contingency fund be established for meeting short-term developmental needs of high political priority;

—that development programs be made more visible and bilateral programs be considered for the English-speaking Caribbean. These programs are essential to our security interests because they provide an alternative to the Cuban model. They should be tailored to need, absorptive capacity and the recipient country’s desire to respond to the needs of its people. Close monitoring will be needed;

—that a study be undertaken on the feasibility of arrangements similar to the Lome Convention of the European Communities.\footnote{The 1975 Lome Convention led to trade and assistance agreements between the European Community and African, Caribbean, and Pacific states.} A multi-year agreement might be negotiated with interested Caribbean countries involving the whole range of economic, cultural and social relations, including developmental loans and grants and possibly trade preferences;

—that private efforts be stimulated to meet short and long-term developmental needs and to facilitate private foreign investment. The efforts of private voluntary organizations should be encouraged and AID should strengthen its leadership role with these organizations;

—that multilateral efforts continue to be a major element in developmental policy and programs. The Caribbean Group should be supported and strengthened, especially in the fields of transportation, communications and energy. The Group also serves as a useful framework for consultations between the U.S. and the Caribbean countries;
that stepped-up programs be supported by additional personnel in certain posts who should be provided on a priority basis. The increased backstopping planned by ICA is welcomed, particularly expanded exchange programs and radio broadcasts on the medium bands; and

— that emigration is depleting essential human resources and creating complications in the United States. The Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy should focus on Caribbean immigration and examine the feasibility of a temporary worker program as a possible element of control.

373. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, December 26, 1979

SUBJECT
US Policy to the Caribbean—Guidelines (U)

I have reviewed the “Guidelines for US Policy to the Caribbean” paper which was transmitted by the State Department on December 8, 1979, and while I have no objection to the paper, I do question how useful it is in helping us address the major problems in the region. Perhaps, it would be more helpful if we focused on only the Eastern Caribbean, and addressed three difficult but important issues:

1. How do we assist moderate, parliamentary trends in the area? It seems to me that the best way for us to show both moderates, radicals, and would-be radicals that we support moderate currents is to concentrate our assistance and attention on moderate leaders, groups, and governments. This means, for example, that we would be relatively more helpful to Barbados, Dominica, and St Vincent than to St Lucia, Grenada, Jamaica or Guyana. The message of our support needs to be unambiguous. Everyone in the area should know that the US will be more helpful with moderates than with others. What more could we


2 A copy of the paper is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Box 28, Latin America, 12/79.
do to increase the incentives for moderation in the region? What more can we do in St Lucia to inhibit any undemocratic changes in the government? (S)

2. How should we respond to requests from friendly governments in the area for rapid police or security support to cope with disturbances or political take-overs? In the past, we have deferred to the British. Now, we are probably inclined to let the Barbadians take the lead, and I agree with that. Barbados’ quick and positive reaction to the recent request by St Vincent for police support was commendable, but it’s not clear to me that there is no role for us to play in similar episodes. I am not certain what that precise role should be, but I do not think that our interests in the region were well served by our non-response to Prime Minister Cato’s request. Of particular concern is the possibility of a connection between the rebels and the Grenadian government. We should try to determine whether there was such a connection. If there was, or if there is such a possibility, what steps should we consider? Assuming that we deem it appropriate to respond positively to requests for help such as Prime Minister Cato’s, what capacity do we have, and how long would it take for us to provide support? Should we consider developing a police capability for such episodes? (S)

3. How do we help to shape an environment in the Eastern Caribbean in which the Cubans are on the defensive rather than us? Too often we have found ourselves on the defensive, trying to explain or defend what we were doing. Local leaders were impelled to keep their distance. The recent episode in Jamaica involving the Cuban Ambassador suggested that the Cubans are not immune to this problem, but they are also not as vulnerable because of the controlled press in Cuba. There is not as much information available on what the Cubans are doing politically, and also on the Cuban-Soviet relationship, in the region. Although the strategy implemented by the State Department to heighten international awareness of the Cuban-Soviet relationship is proceeding well worldwide, I wonder whether we should not develop a more specialized mechanism within the US Government for rapidly conveying such information, when appropriate, to friendly governments or even to

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3 Telegram 5109 from Bridgetown, December 7, reported that Prime Minister Cato asked the Embassy for U.S. assistance after the seizure of Union Island by “armed, uniformed men.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790565–0617)

4 In telegram 6893 from Kingston, September 21, the Embassy reported that the Cuban Ambassador to Jamaica, Ulises Estrada Fernandez, “publicly and emotionally attacked Jamaica’s opposition party, the Jamaican Labor Party, and Jamaica’s big independent newspaper, the Daily Gleaner. He accused them both of lying about him and Cuba, and threatened some unspecified retaliation. Opposition leader Seaga was pleased at the outburst.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790436–0435)
the newspapers in the area. How can we do this, and what kinds of information should we disseminate?

Please coordinate with the Department of Defense and prepare a paper on these questions for transmittal to the National Security Council by January 15, 1980.5 (U)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

5 The paper, submitted on January 15, 1980, by Tarnoff, stressed that U.S. officials had supported moderate, parliamentary trends through the expansion of ICA, diplomatic activities, and the Peace Corps; security needs in the Caribbean were being dealt with on a case-by-case basis; Cuba was being marginalized through increased foreign aid and a stronger U.S. presence in the region. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 46, Latin America, 12/79–1/80)

374. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter1

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

US Policy in the Eastern Caribbean (U)

In addition to the people-to-people initiative, which is getting underway slowly, my staff has been working with State to develop a coherent governmental policy to the English-speaking nations of the Eastern Caribbean. It is in this area, which includes ten nations and two territories which will be independent soon, that political tensions are most likely to be exploited by Cuba. Almost all of these nations are small, with populations less than 120,000, and with limited resources. (S)

While we are still fleshing out the details of our strategy, we have agreed on the outlines:

—Economically, we are seeking a balance between bilateral aid programs with each of the islands and the multilateral World Bank-coordinated Caribbean Group, which has sought in the last two years to mobilize additional economic aid to the region, to guide these nations

toward sounder macro-economic policies, and to encourage greater regional cooperation. (S)

—Politically, we are seeking to send a clear message to the region that we will give our greatest support, assistance, and attention to those governments which remain unequivocally committed to: parliamentary democracy; sound and progressive economic policies; non-intervention; and balanced foreign policies. US assistance and attention to each government should be carefully calibrated according to these criteria so that we can be certain that our message is clearly understood. We will not undermine any government in the region, but we also will show much less support for those governments that violate human rights, damage their own economic prospects by radical rhetoric or unsound economic policies, align completely with the Cubans and/or against the US, or interfere in the internal affairs of other nations. We believe this approach is most likely to encourage moderate trends in the area. We will also look for other ways to identify and support democratic, modernizing forces in the area. (S)

—Militarily, we are increasing port calls and exercises in the region in order to enhance the security of moderate governments. We are increasing military training and are working closely with the British to assist in the development of a regional coast guard and a police academy, based in Barbados. We also will be looking at whether to modify existing legislation to permit us greater flexibility to assist police forces in the region, to provide more concessional credits under FMS, and to permit the Seabees to assist more rapidly and more often in responding to natural disasters as well as to other needs. We are also examining whether to develop a quick-response police capability to come to the rapid assistance of any government that is threatened by Cuban or radical, violent groups.  

2 In a January 28 memorandum to Brzezinski, Pastor outlined the security strategy involving the Seabees and a quick-response police force. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Box 28, Latin America, 1–2/80)
The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and recent Cuban activities and statements make this easier to do. (S)

These elements sum to a coherent overall approach to the region which will guide the government as we develop specific policies. Of course, it is important to tailor the overall approach to the unique characteristics of each nation. (S)

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve this strategy for addressing the issues of the Eastern Caribbean and for improving our relationships there.³ (U)

³ Neither option is checked. Owen commented in a memorandum to Brzezinski on January 30, “I have initialed the memorandum, but I want to make clear several caveats,” adding “These four ideas need much more study to say the least.” Owen concluded, “these ideas need more thoughtful analysis, and the President’s sign-off should not prejudge them.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 46, Folder: Latin America, 12/79–1/80)

375. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, June 10, 1980

SUBJECT

US Policies to the Caribbean—The Security Dimension (U)

In a memo to the Secretary of State on April 11 on US Security Assistance Policies to the Eastern Caribbean, you suggested Matt Nimetz to chair an interagency group to develop policy recommendations on a number of issues posed in your memo (Tab III).² State’s response is at Tab II; it is the best one could expect from the bureaucracy

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 46, Folder: Latin America, 6/80–1/81. Secret. Sent for action. Concurred in by Kimmett. A copy was sent to Poats. A stamped notation reads, “ZB has seen.” Aaron also initialed the memorandum. Odom attached a sheet of comments to the memorandum, which favored the scheduling of an SCC meeting and stressed the necessity of maintaining the current number of defense personnel in the Caribbean.

at this time.\textsuperscript{3} As is true of much of US policy to the Caribbean, the issues raised in your memo do not involve large amounts of resources, but they do entail important changes in overall policies, which no bureaucrat would recommend without clear directions from his boss. For example, we are phasing out security assistance grants; we are limited by statute to providing 50\% FMS concessionality only to Israel; and we are prohibited from providing assistance to police forces even though that is the only security force in several little islands in the Eastern Caribbean. To change each of these policies in order to obtain necessary flexibility would involve relatively small amounts of money but important statutory changes. (S)

The Interagency paper is a good one, even though its answers are not satisfactory. We have made a fair amount of progress in this area in the last year. We are setting up a Security Assistance Office in Barbados; port visits have been increased, and Admiral Train (CINC-LANT) and Hayes (Coast Guard) have also visited several countries in the area; we have worked out exchange programs involving the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rican National Guard and the military forces of Barbados and the Dominican Republic; our tripartite discussions with the UK and Canada have been useful.\textsuperscript{4} (S)

But the essential problem of the extreme vulnerability of these nations remains, and there is much that needs to be done. While the concept of a regional Coast Guard has been broached and accepted in several important quarters, thus far all that has been done is that the UK has promised to sell a patrol boat to Barbados. That nation and the others remain vulnerable, as Prime Minister Adams told the President in April, to being taken over by 50 armed men, and there is evidence suggesting that Grenada may be training those men now.\textsuperscript{5} (S)

What more needs to be done? I have prepared a set of 11 questions (Tab I)\textsuperscript{6} and reviewed them with Matt Nimetz and with Frank Kramer of DOD. I believe that both of them are prepared to recommend positive answers to these questions for their principals. Neither of them have strong feelings about whether the high-level meeting for considering these issues should be an SCC or a PRC. Naturally, I would prefer an SCC since the issues are cross-cutting between State and Defense, and you would be the chair, but I assume that you will make that determination after consulting Muskie. (S)

\textsuperscript{3} Undated; attached but not printed.
\textsuperscript{4} See Document 361 and footnote 3, Document 366.
\textsuperscript{5} See Document 333.
\textsuperscript{6} Attached but not printed.
RECOMMENDATION

That you approve an SCC or PRC (circle one) on US Security Assistance Policies to the Eastern Caribbean based on the agenda attached at Tab I. (If so, I will transmit that agenda and State’s papers to the following agencies after we schedule a meeting: State, Defense, JCS, CIA, OMB, Coast Guard, Treasury, IDCA, and ACDA.)\(^7\) (S)

\(^7\) Brzezinski marked neither the approve nor the disapprove option, nor did he circle either “SCC” or “PRC.” Dodson wrote below the recommendations, “ZB: You will be getting today a Muskie memo proposing a series of PRCs. One on the Caribbean is on the list.” Brzezinski replied in a note on June 12, “OK, schedule a PRC on the Caribbean and then an SCC on Security Policy for the Carib.”

376. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\(^1\)

Washington, July 9, 1980

SUBJECT
The Third Annual Meeting of the Caribbean Group—June 23–27

Thirty-one countries and 15 financial institutions participated in the third meeting of the Caribbean Group for Cooperation in Economic Development. Participants regard this meeting as the most positive and well-focused to date. Caribbean countries have accepted the IBRD-led Group as the institution to analyze systematically their development needs and economic programs and to conceptualize and coordinate regional programs in agriculture, energy, transportation, export promotion, tourism, private sector encouragement and a U.S. proposal for regional cooperation on disaster preparedness.

Strong regional support for the Group is particularly encouraging because of the pessimistic outlook for the economy of the region caused by:

1. the deterioration of economic growth prospects;
2. the burgeoning payments gap stemming from oil price increases;

3. economic mismanagement in several countries, especially Haiti and Jamaica; and
4. the apparent inability of most traditional donors to increase aid flows.

Despite these adverse circumstances, this year’s meeting marked a watershed in the institutionalization of the Group. Many recipients believe that substantial progress had been made in areas affecting their long-term development prospects. These include progress in regional cooperation and a consensus on the need to revitalize the private sector in the Caribbean. Attention was also given to two huge hydroelectric projects in Guyana and Suriname which, according to the IBRD, could radically improve long-term development prospects in those countries.

The positive reception accorded the report of the Private Sector Task Force, and the decision to establish a work program to implement the Task Force recommendations may well be the most far-reaching undertaking of the Group. The overview report of the Task Force which was critical of many government policies, as well as its country-specific reports on improving the investment climate are to be discussed with Caribbean governments by representatives of the Task Force. The International Finance Corporation, working with other Task Force participants, is to recommend procedures for establishing a new facility for identification and development of small and medium-sized private sector projects.

The Eastern Caribbean developing countries were generally pleased with their sub-group meetings and exercised a leadership role in representing the recipients. Grenada received a clear message that several key donors were not rendering it added support and was left to “draw its own conclusions” in this regard.

The U.S. and others emphasized the need for recipient countries to take the necessary self-help measures to carry out sound economic programs. Recipients expressed much more awareness of the need for adjustments on their part in order to justify the full support of donors. The Jamaican sub-group meeting set a precedent. This was the first

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2 Brzezinski underlined the phrase “progress in regional cooperation and a consensus on the need to revitalize the private sector in the Caribbean,” and wrote in the right margin, “v. signif.”

3 For information about the Upper Mazaruni Hydroelectric Dam project in Guyana, see Document 296. In telegram 208499 to Paramaribo, August 10, 1979, the Department reported that the Surinamese Government was seeking funding for a hydroelectric dam in western Suriname. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790364–0332)

4 Brzezinski wrote in the right margin, “altho want U.S. bilateral aid.”
time that a country previously eligible for local-cost financing through the Caribbean Development Facility (CDF) was found to be ineligible because of the lack of a medium-term economic program. Jamaica asked for emergency financing, to which a few countries responded, but these pledges fell far short of its request.

The Dominican Republic has not reached agreement with the IBRD and IMF on medium-term economic programs. Consequently, its meeting did not constitute a CDF pledging session. Thus, the two largest recipients—Jamaica and the Dominican Republic—were not incorporated in pledge targets for the time being. Should they reach agreement on economic programs, special subgroups may be held later.

The informal Haiti meeting was restricted to a few donors because the IMF/IBRD wanted to be quite blunt with Haiti: (1) The GOH had undertaken several expensive low priority projects which were not included in its budget; (2) tax receipts had fallen because of poor management while expenditures had exceeded targets; and (3) various fiscal and management reforms were not carried out. GOH officials admitted that there were excesses, but attributed them to pressing social problems and promised to carry out a number of fiscal and administrative reforms. The U.S. delegation said Haiti would have to demonstrate an ability to use its aid effectively before it would proceed with additional assistance, such as a Title III Food Aid Program. The U.S. urged Haiti to reach agreement with the IMF.

The immediate needs of the area remain pressing. The World Bank estimates that foreign assistance of $1.3 billion is required this coming year—nearly twice as much as last year.

The oil-producing countries, i.e., Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago, are becoming key donors through their proposed oil facilities. They were not far enough advanced in developing their assistance programs to outline the specifics and amounts to be provided to individual countries. Nevertheless, these oil-producing countries indicated that they were aware of the adverse impact caused by the oil price increases and would help their Caribbean neighbors.

Traditional donors, the UK, Canada and the US, agree on the usefulness of the Group and are prepared to support regular annual meetings. These donors feel that the recipients recognize the mutuality of their obligations in carrying forward the group process. The UK, however, substantially reduced its pledge. Canada was only able to maintain its lending level. Canada underlined that the Caribbean was being given priority because other areas of the world were being cut back. Similarly, the U.S. commitment was to maintain its CDF financing at about last year's level. In short, U.S. contributions in real terms would be down, i.e. adjusted for price inflation. Recipients were disappointed in the pledges by traditional donors, noting that external financial flows would fall far short of their urgent developmental needs.
The Group addressed the key problems facing the region: (1) economic prospects are grim in many islands because of a dependency on imported petroleum, high levels of unemployment, a shortage of skilled labor, and continued outmigration of skilled people; (2) despite the Group’s efforts, financial assistance will likely not cover the balance of payments gaps of most countries; (3) regional programs are helping to strengthen regional institutions but further attention is needed to develop a cooperative framework among the countries in the region; and (4) divisive forces such as ideological competition and the independent attitude of Trinidad and Tobago have strained cooperation in CARICOM.

The Department is currently reviewing its economic and security assistance programs for the region. We plan to hold an inter-agency meeting shortly to submit our proposals. Once this review process is completed, we plan to submit a series of recommendations to respond to the problems noted above.

Peter Tarnoff
Executive Secretary

377. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter

Washington, September 13, 1980

SUBJECT
The Caribbean Group (U)

You can take pride and political credit in the fact that one of the most significant initiatives of your Administration in the Caribbean area, the Caribbean Group for Cooperation in Economic Development, led by the World Bank, has proven quite successful during these past three years. The group was established in 1977, largely at your initiative, and now includes 31 nations and 15 international institutions. During the past three years, it has: (a) assisted these nations to adjust to severe economic problems; (b) generated more assistance to the area
and made existing bilateral aid programs more efficient by increased coordination; (c) formulated new and important projects for the nations and for the region as a whole; and (d) encouraged the leaders of the Caribbean to become more realistic, to increasingly replace rhetoric denouncing imperialism with sounder economic policies and with new efforts to attract foreign investment. (Caribbean/Central American Action has helped in this area.)\(^3\) The only discouraging aspect of the Third Annual Meeting in Washington in June was that our “real” contribution to the Group declined during the past year.\(^4\) We cannot expect this new initiative to maintain its momentum if we reduce ours. (C)

Politically, while the media focuses on the extreme leftist regime in Grenada, the political winds in the Eastern Caribbean are definitely blowing in a moderate direction. During the past year, elections in St. Vincent, Antigua, St. Kitts, Dominica, and St. Lucia have all resulted in the sharp defeat of leftist parties and victory for moderate and conservative parties. Grenada, which some thought an example for the future of the Caribbean, has become increasingly isolated and de-legitimized. Moreover, although a democratic government was overthrown in Suriname in February, the group, which was more moderate and pro-West, has recently prevailed over those who wanted to tie Suriname to Cuba. (C)

In early October, the heads of state of four or five of these moderate island nations in the Eastern Caribbean will be in Washington attending the IMF/World Bank Annual Meeting. You may want to consider inviting all of them to a luncheon; this would underscore an important point for the American public that many of your long-term developmental and human rights initiatives in the Caribbean have borne good results.\(^5\) (C)

\(^3\) See footnote 3, Document 333.

\(^4\) See Document 376.

\(^5\) Carter met briefly with leaders from Dominica, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent in early October. In telegram 6076 from Bridgetown, October 9, the Embassy described the leaders as “ebullient” and “particularly pleased with the responsiveness and attention shown them.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800483–0627)
Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)\(^1\)

Washington, October 27, 1980

SUBJECT

Mini-PRC on US Policy to Eastern Caribbean—Tuesday, October 28, 1980—10:00 a.m. (C)

It has taken almost a year to drag State to such a meeting, but the last year was not entirely wasted.\(^2\) We have done a lot of staff work and the leaders in the area have been able to articulate their own needs more clearly and in a way which permits us to respond. But the mini-PRC is still essential because the IG cannot resolve any of these issues and has an institutional habit of dealing with each question in the slowest, narrowest and most piecemeal manner; it will not have an impact on the FY 82 budget, which is what we should aim for. An additional purpose of the meeting is to sensitize OMB to the importance of those issues so that we will not have to rant and rave for every penny. (S)

State’s agenda is at Tab A and background papers follow.\(^3\) I have prepared a short summary of State’s positions on the various issues, and their recommended proposals. I have gone over these with Matt Nimetz and with Admiral Hayes of the Coast Guard, and both are in complete agreement. Because State is so internally divided on these issues, Matt will need for you to move these proposals forward, and he will try to maneuver the meeting so that the results reflect these proposals. (At Tab II)\(^4\) (S)

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\(^3\) Not attached. Dodson circulated the agenda and discussion papers in an October 20 memorandum to participants in the upcoming PRC meeting. (Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, 1977–1981, Box 83, PCM 022 [1], Eastern Caribbean 10/28/80)

A Comprehensive Approach

What we have lacked in our approach to the problems of the Eastern Caribbean is a concept. We had such a concept after World War II, when we moved into Latin America to displace the Germans and other Europeans in providing economic and military advice and support. We formalized these arrangements with the Rio Pact and with MAAG groups. (S)

We need as wide-ranging a concept and strategy for the Caribbean today, but it has to be suited to the unique characteristics of those nations and to a different time. We cannot go in in a massive way both because it’s more than they need or could handle and because it would be counterproductive politically. Our objectives are: to enhance the security of the region; to extend our own presence in the most effective and reassuring manner; and to show ourselves determined to help meet their economic concerns. (S)

—To enhance the security of the region, we should ensure that each nation has its Coast Guard and that theirs are all linked with each other and with ours. I have spoken to Admiral Hayes, Commandant of our Coast Guard, several times about this and have encouraged him to visit the area, as he has done. He is enthusiastic about the idea of weaving together a regional Coast Guard, and with our CG playing a leading role. He is only waiting for money and marching orders. We should develop a regional Coast Guard training center in the area—perhaps our old Naval Base in Barbados, which was closed down, but this should be suggested by the nations in the region perhaps at a conference in which the USCG attended. The US Coast Guard is a much better “pointman” than our armed forces as these nations need a CG to stop smuggling narcotics, and arms trafficking, and to defend themselves. Anything more military is inappropriate and unwanted. Our Coast Guard is viewed as “clean” and helpful and not really “military.” But we need to give the boats and the facilities. (S)

—To extend our security presence in the region, I would cut down on port calls by US aircraft carriers and dramatically increase the use of a specialized Seabees battalion that would be trained to work just in the Caribbean and to teach as well as do. The Seabees are in demand in the area, and they give our military a good name. After a couple of years of getting to know the people on the islands, my guess is that the Seabees would be asked to help in a number of other ways, providing added security and assurance to the area and added US presence in an effective way. (S)

—To help meet their economic needs, we need to do a lot more. There are dozens of good proposals on the table as a result of our
pushing and also the York and Weintraub reports,\(^5\) which IDCA commissioned at our initiative at least in part to diffuse our pressure. The latest tack for diffusing the pressure is to consult with the nations of the area about establishing a framework (modeled on the CIEC/OAS of the Alliance) for negotiating the decisions internationally which the bureaucracy is unwilling to take now. The idea is that such a framework would be an action-forcing mechanism; I think it’s an expectation-inflating mechanism and one that confuses the region’s leaders, who are quick to tell us what they need—increase bilateral aid, relax trade barriers, give us a Coast Guard, modify tax provisions, etc.—and wonder why we talk about a framework rather than just do it. They’re right. I would recommend a modest three point program: (1) Establish a bilateral aid fund of $50–$100 million per year for three years for all the nations of the area except Grenada. (They can join when they have free elections.) This would be distinct from our support for the Caribbean Development Bank. (2) Permit all textile and perhaps other import-sensitive products manufactured in the Caribbean Basin to come to the US free of restrictions for a 10-year period (or with fewer restrictions). This would have an enormous impact on employment and industrialization in the region and thus on illegal immigration to the US. (3) Expand OPIC guarantees, establish a special loan window in Ex-Im Bank, and modify the tax law so that it would permit tax deductions for professional conventions in the Caribbean area. (S)

Henry Owen has asked to consider the economic issues in a separate forum, and so the last package above will not be considered at the mini-PRC. But you need to insert in the record the importance of our putting together a package which is weighted in favor of the economic side, rather than the military. After the Administration agrees on all of the elements that should be involved in the package, we should invite a group of Congressional leaders, and ask them how we can most effectively get Congress to approve the package. (S)

I recommend you focus on Tab II in advance of the meeting. (U)

\(^5\) Not found.
Summary of Conclusions of a Mini-Policy Review Committee Meeting

Washington, October 28, 1980, 10:04–11:16 a.m.

SUBJECT
Eastern Caribbean (U)

PARTICIPANTS
State
Matthew Nimetz, Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science and Technology
Dan O’Donohue, Deputy Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
Ambassador William Bowdler, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs
OSD
Frank Kramer, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Frederic Chapin, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, Latin America
JCS
Lt General John Gorman, Director of Plans and Policy, J-5
DCI
Jack Davis, NIO for Latin America
John Gannon, Latin American Division, OPA
OMB
Philip DuSault, Deputy Associate Director for International Affairs
John Eisenhower, Chief, International Security Affairs Branch
IDCA
Leah Wortham, Deputy Associate Director for DCC
Coast Guard
Arva Floyd, Political Adviser to Commandant
Joel Sipes, Special Assistant to Commandant
AID
David Lazar, Director, Office of Development Programs
White House
David Aaron
NSC
Robert Pastor

Summary of Conclusions

1. **US Interests in the Caribbean.** All agreed that the Caribbean is of high priority to the United States because: (a) of its proximity and...
vulnerability; (b) the British are leaving the area, creating a power vacuum; (c) the example of Grenada could repeat because of Cuban support for radical groups in each of these islands; (d) the political campaign has demonstrated again that the American people see this area as one in need of special attention; (e) the area covers our vital sea lanes; (f) the islands are vulnerable to being exploited by narcotics operators; (g) the enormous costs of illegal immigration; (h) the many nations in the area have considerable clout with their votes in the UN; (i) economic interests; and (j) ties among friends and families. (S)

2. Regional Coast Guard. The group agreed that each of the nations needs a Coast Guard for purposes of coastal defense, narcotics interdiction, and search and rescue. The group agreed that the US should play an important role in assuring the minimal security needs of the nations of the Eastern Caribbean, and that each of these nations need one to two patrol boats and regional cooperation. The Coast Guard has developed a proposal that these security needs could be met by providing standardized patrol boats, small patrol aircraft, and appropriate support facilities, and by encouraging regional cooperation. The proposal could cost from $13 to $25 million, over a five-year period, and perhaps could be funded on a grant basis through an amendment to Coast Guard’s authorization and appropriation bills. OMB will chair an interagency group to examine this proposal and alternatives for meeting these security needs, including possible funding by direct FMS credits on concessional terms. The group agreed that if we could develop a cooperative program between Eastern Caribbean security forces and the US Coast Guard, and a means of financing equipment on terms they could afford, that this would help to provide a more secure environment for democracy. (S)

3. Security Assistance Levels. The group reviewed the budget requests for FMS and IMET for the Caribbean for FY 81 and 82, and agreed that because of the terms of FMS guaranteed loans, many of the nations in the area will be unable to use FY 81 funds. All agreed that more concessional funding would be needed in the area. This issue will be developed further. (S)

4. Training. All agreed that we want to encourage the UK and the Canadians to do as much as possible in all security areas, and especially in training of police. Current legislation limits our ability to assist the police, and all agreed that we should consider asking the Congress to change the law so as to permit the United States to train the police in small democratic states, which do not have defense forces. State will prepare a study of the legislative restrictions and assess the possibilities for modifying the law. (S)

5. Seabees. The Seabees do a good job in the Caribbean, and are well liked, but they can only work in emergency situations and on a
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reimbursable basis. The group discussed the possibility of assigning a special Seabees unit for civic action-type projects in the Caribbean. They would be specially trained to be sensitive to the political and cultural currents, and to teach local people. We would start using them in small teams, and build up incrementally if they were proven to be effective. An additional purpose of such a unit would be to encourage the people of the area to look at the US military in a more positive way. This would be another aspect of our evolving security relationship. DOD will draft a proposal and try to take into account the anticipated Congressional reaction to funding it from the DOD budget. (S)

6. Overall Package. The group also discussed the possibility of including these items in an overall initiative for the Caribbean area. Such an initiative would have to have a very large economic component. (S)

7. Long-Term Planning. State was also tasked to write a paper on what we can expect over the next 10 years in the Eastern Caribbean, both as to the viability of the nations and of the dimensions and nature of the US commitment.2 The CIA will also develop a paper, in consultation with State, on what the British and Canadians are currently doing in the area, and what more we can expect of them in the future. We can use this information for trilateral talks we are planning in December in New York.3 (S)

8. Due Date. The papers to be prepared by CIA and DOD, the paper mentioned in paragraph 4, and the results of the interagency meeting mentioned in paragraph 2 are to be made available to all participants in the PRC by Thursday, November 6.4 (C)

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2 Not found.
3 Telegram 326387 to Bridgetown, December 10, provided an account of the December 5 trilateral talks. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800588–0009)
4 In its paper dated November 5, the CIA concluded that, “The UK strongly hopes that the U.S. will take the lead in providing economic aid to the region,” and that “Canada, despite its considerable political influence in the region, seems unlikely to provide substantial security assistance to the Caribbean.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 5, Folder: Caribbean, 10–11/80) The interagency paper, dated November 17, suggested asking Congress to add a new section to the Economic Support Fund chapter of the Foreign Assistance Act. (Ibid.) The Department of State paper called for in paragraph 4 and the Defense Department paper were not found.