

**FOREIGN
RELATIONS
OF THE
UNITED
STATES**

**1977-1980
VOLUME XVII**

**PART 1
HORN OF
AFRICA**



**DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE**

Washington



**Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1977–1980**

Volume XVII

Part 1

Horn of Africa

Editor Louise P. Woodroffe

General Editor Adam M. Howard

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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About the Series

The *Foreign Relations of the United States* series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the U.S. Government. The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, under the direction of the General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.

Public Law 102-138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, established a new statutory charter for the preparation of the series which was signed by President George H.W. Bush on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102-138 added a new Title IV to the Department of State's Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 4351, et seq.).

The statute requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the U.S. Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the *Foreign Relations* series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded. The editors are convinced that this volume meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing.

Sources for the Foreign Relations Series

The *Foreign Relations* statute requires that the published record in the *Foreign Relations* series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government en-

gaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State historians by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. Most of the sources consulted in the preparation of this volume have been declassified and are available for review at the National Archives and Records Administration (Archives II), in College Park, Maryland.

The editors of the *Foreign Relations* series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files ("lot files") of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department's Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and the memoranda of conversations between the President and the Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. All of the Department's central files for 1977–1981 are available in electronic or microfilm formats at Archives II, and may be accessed using the Access to Archival Databases (AAD) tool. Almost all of the Department's decentralized office files covering this period, which the National Archives deems worthy of permanent retention, have been transferred to or are in the process of being transferred from the Department's custody to Archives II.

Research for *Foreign Relations* volumes is undertaken through special access to restricted documents at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and other agencies. While all the material printed in this volume has been declassified, some of it is extracted from still-classified documents. The staff of the Carter Library is processing and declassifying many of the documents used in this volume, but they may not be available in their entirety at the time of publication. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Carter Library include some of the most significant foreign-affairs related documentation from White House offices, the Department of State, and other federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Some of the research for volumes in this subseries was done in Carter Library record collections scanned for the Remote Archive Capture (RAC) project. This project, which is administered by the National Archives and Records Administration's Office of Presidential Libraries, was designed to coordinate the declassification of still-classified records held in various Presidential libraries. As a result of the way in which records were scanned for the RAC, the editors of the *Foreign Relations* series were not always able to determine whether attachments to a given document were in fact attached to the paper copy of the docu-

ment in the Carter Library file. In such cases, some editors of the *Foreign Relations* series have indicated this ambiguity by stating that the attachments were “Not found attached.”

Editorial Methodology

The documents are presented chronologically according to time in Washington, DC. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the *Foreign Relations* series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the Chief of the Editing and Publishing Division. The original document is reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents within the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the documents are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words or phrases underlined in the original document are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the original text, and a list of abbreviations and terms is included in the front matter of each volume. In telegrams, the telegram number (including special designators such as Secto) is printed at the start of the text of the telegram.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount and, where possible, the nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld after declassification review have been accounted for and are listed in their chronological place with headings, source notes, and the number of pages not declassified.

All brackets that appear in the original document are so identified in the footnotes. All ellipses are in the original documents.

The first footnote to each document indicates the sources of the document and its original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than to page numbers.

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the *Foreign Relations* statute, monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation of the series and declassification of records. The Advisory Committee does not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the series, but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and reviews volumes as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory obligations.

Declassification Review

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, conducted the declassification review for the Department of State of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 13526 on Classified National Security Information and applicable laws.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The declassification review of this volume, which began in 2012 and was completed in 2015, resulted in the decision to withhold 1 document in full, excise a paragraph or more in 6 documents, and make minor excisions of less than a paragraph in 19 documents. The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process described above, that the documentation and editorial notes presented here provide a thorough, accurate, and

reliable record of the Carter administration's policy toward the Horn of Africa.

Adam M. Howard, Ph.D.
General Editor

Stephen P. Randolph, Ph.D.
The Historian

Bureau of Public Affairs
November 2016

Preface

Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series

This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the *Foreign Relations* series that documents the most important issues in the foreign policy of the administration of Jimmy Carter. This section on the Horn of Africa is one of three parts of Volume XVII on Africa. It traces the administration's handling of the war in the Ogaden Desert and subsequent Soviet and Cuban intervention. Additional documentation on Africa is in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa, Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Part 2, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, XVII, Part 3, North Africa.*

Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Part 1

The focus of this volume is on the Carter administration's approach to events in the Horn of Africa and includes relations with Ethiopia, Somalia, and Djibouti (before and after its independence). The conflict in the Horn of Africa from 1977 to 1978 was one of the first foreign policy crises for the Carter administration, and as such, served as an early part of Carter's foreign policy education. First, the Ethiopian revolution's leftward turn and a new arms agreement with the Soviet Union tested the administration's stated intentions to not view all African problems as East-West problems. Nonetheless, administration officials were tempted to provide arms to Somalia for precisely those Cold War concerns. Second, the Soviet and Cuban intervention on behalf of Ethiopia in the Ogaden War tested the feasibility of U.S.-Soviet détente. Washington hoped to use the prospects of bilateral agreements, particularly on arms control, as leverage for influencing Moscow's international behavior. The Soviet intervention in the Horn, which occurred at the same time that Washington and Moscow were engaged in Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II), indicated to the administration that détente was not succeeding. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski engaged in some contentious debates on the proper U.S. response to the Soviet and Cuban intervention and the idea of linking progress on SALT to Soviet withdrawal from the Horn of Africa. Vance argued that the importance of achieving an arms limitations agreement far out-weighed U.S. frustration with the Soviet military presence in Africa. Brzezinski argued that the United States could not simply allow the Soviet Union to get away with its intervention in Ethiopia or else Moscow would be further

emboldened to take advantage of other conflicts on the continent. Ultimately, Vance and Carter did raise the issue several times with their Soviet counterparts, exacerbating bilateral tensions.

This volume does not include documents on base negotiations with Somalia in 1979 and 1980. Since the administration treated this goal as part of its overall Middle East strategic planning, these discussions can be found in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1981, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula*.

Acknowledgements

The editor wishes, in particular, to acknowledge the assistance of officials at the Jimmy Carter Library. The editor collected and selected documentation and edited the volume under the supervision of Myra Burton, Chief of the Africa and the Americas division, and Adam M. Howard, General Editor of the Foreign Relations series. The volume was reviewed by Myra Burton and Stephen Randolph, Historian of the Department of State. Chris Tudda coordinated the declassification review under the supervision of the Carl Ashley, Chief of the Declassification Division. Mandy A. Chalou, Rita Baker, and Craig Daigle did the copy and technical editing. Do Mi Stauber prepared the index.

Louise Woodroffe, Ph.D.
Historian

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Sources

Sources for Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Part 1

The files at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, in Atlanta, Georgia, are the single most important source of documentation for those interested in the Carter administration's policy toward the Horn of Africa. In particular, the Institutional Files (also known as the H-files) provide the minutes and summaries of key meetings among the principals as they debated U.S. policy toward the Horn; and the documents in the Horn/Special files of NSC staffer Paul Henze trace the day to day dealings with the Horn. The Central Foreign Policy File at the National Archives and Records Administration contains the cables between the Department of State and posts in Addis Ababa, Mogadiscio, and Djibouti, which nicely contrast the exchanges between Vance and his ambassadors with those between Brzezinski and Henze. The editor also had access to the files of Carter Intelligence Files at the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of Defense.

In addition to the paper files cited below, a growing number of documents are available on the Internet. The Office of the Historian maintains a list of these Internet resources on its website and encourages readers to consult that site on a regular basis.

Unpublished Sources

Department of State, Washington, D.C.

Central Foreign Policy File. These files have been transferred or will be transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland.

Lot Files. These files have been transferred or will be transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland.

Bureau of African Affairs Desk Files: Lot80D85

Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance Lot File: Lot 84D241

National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland

Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State

Central Foreign Policy Files

Entry 9 (Policy Planning Staff, Office of the Director), Records of Anthony Lake, 1977–1981

Entry P–10, Subject Files of Edmund S. Muskie, 1963–1981

Jimmy Carter Library, Atlanta, Georgia

National Security Affairs

Brzezinski Material

Agency Files

Country Files

General Odom Files

President's Correspondence With Foreign Leaders Files

Subject Files

Trip Files

VIP Visit Files

Staff Material

Horn/Special Files

Defense/Security Files

Office Files

Donated Historical Material

Brzezinski Donated Material

Mondale Donated Material

National Security Council

Institutional Files

Plains File

Subject File

President's Files

Staff Secretary's File

Vertical Files

USSR/US Conference 516-9194

Central Intelligence Agency

Center for the Study of Intelligence, History Staff Files

Job 81M00980R

Library of Congress, Manuscript Division

Papers of Harold Brown

National Security Council

Carter Intelligence Files

Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland

RG 330, Records of the Department of Defense

OSD Files: FRC 330-80-0017

Secret Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1977

OSD Files: FRC 330-80-0016

Top Secret Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1977

OSD Files: FRC 330-81-0202

Secret Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1978

OSD Files: FRC 330-81-0212

Top Secret Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1978

OSD Files: FRC 330-82-0205

Secret Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1979 and 1980

Published Sources

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981*. New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983.

Carter, Jimmy. *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President*. Toronto: Bantam Books, 1982.

Congressional Quarterly. *Congress and the Nation, 1977-1980*. Vol. V. Washington: Congressional Quarterly, 1981.

National Archives and Records Administration. *Public Papers of the Presidents: Jimmy Carter, 1977-1981*. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1978-1982.

U.S. Department of State. *Bulletin, 1977-1980*. Washington, 1977-1980.

Vance, Cyrus. *Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983.

Abbreviations and Terms

- ACSI**, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
AF, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
AF/E, Office of Eastern and Southern African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
AID, Agency for International Development
AID-HEW, Agency for International Development, Health Extension Workers
APC, Armored Personnel Carrier
ARA, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
ASAP, as soon as possible
ASW, anti-submarine warfare
- C**, confidential
CA, covert action
CD, Charles Duncan
CE, Corps of Engineers
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
CENTO, Central Treaty Organization
CINCPAC, Commander in Chief, Pacific Command
COM, Chief of Mission
COMIDEASTFOR, Commander, Middle East Forces
CTB, Comprehensive Test Ban
CV, Cyrus Vance
- D**, Office of the Deputy Secretary of State
DA, David Aaron
DAO, Defense Attaché Office
DCI, Director of Central Intelligence
DD, U.S. Navy destroyer
DDG, U.S. Navy guided missile destroyer
D/HA, Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Office of the Deputy Secretary of State
DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency
dip, diplomatic
DirGen, Director General
DJ, David Jones
DN, David Newsom
DNI, Director of Naval Intelligence
DOD, Department of Defense
DOD/ISA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
DOI, date of information
DOJ, Department of Justice
DOS, Department of State
- EA**, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
EDT, Eastern Daylight Time
EDU, Ethiopian Democratic Union
ELF, Eritrean Liberation Front

XVIII Abbreviations and Terms

EPLF, Eritrean People's Liberation Front
EPMG, Ethiopian Provisional Military Government
EPRP, Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party
EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EUR/SOV, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

FBIS, Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FF, U.S. Navy fast frigate
FMS, Foreign Military Sales
FonMin, Foreign Minister
FY, fiscal year

GB, George Brown
GDR, German Democratic Republic
GMT, Greenwich Mean Time
GROG, Government of the Region of the Ogaden
GSDR, Government of the Somali Democratic Republic

H, Bureau of Congressional Relations, Department of State
HB, Harold Brown
HIRC, House International Relations Committee

IG, Inspector General
IIM, Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
ILO, International Labour Organization
IMET, International Military Education and Training
IMF, International Monetary Fund
INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
IO/UNP, Office of United Nations Political Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
ISA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff
JW, John Wickham

MAAG, Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAC, Military Airlift Command
MAP, Military Assistance Program
MBFR, Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions
McG, David McGiffert
MilAtt, Military Attaché
MOFA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

NAM, Non-Aligned Movement
NAMRU, Navy Medical Research Unit
NAVCOMMU, Naval Communication Unit
NEA, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State
NIO, National Intelligence Officer
NSA, National Security Agency
NSC, National Security Council

OAU, Organization of African Unity

OMB, Office of Management and Budget
OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense

P, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
PDB, President's Daily Brief
PDYR, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen)
PL-480, Public Law 480, also known as Food for Peace
PM, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State
PMAC, Provisional Military Administrative Council (also known as the Derg or Dirg)
PMGE, see EPMG
PNG, persona non grata
POL, petroleum, oil, lubricants
POMOA, Provisional Office for Mass Organizational Affairs
PRC, People's Republic of China; Policy Review Committee
PRM, Presidential Review Memorandum

S, Office of the Secretary of State; secret
SALE, Somali Abo Liberation Front
SALT, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SAM, surface-to-air missile
SAWG, Special Activities Working Group
SCC, Special Coordination Committee
Secto, series indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of State
SFRC, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
SIGINT, signals intelligence
S/P, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
S/S-O, Operations Center, Department of State
ST, Stansfield Turner

TFAI, French Territory of the Afars and Issas (Territoire Français des Afars et des Issas), present day Djibouti
TPLF, Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (Ethiopian political party)

U, unclassified
UK, United Kingdom
UNECA, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNHCR, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNITA, União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola)
UNSC, United Nations Security Council
USCINCEUR, United States Commander in Chief, Europe
USG, United States Government
USIA, United States Information Agency
USINT, United States Interests Section
USIS, United States Information Service
USNATO, United States Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
USUN, United States Mission to the United Nations
USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

VP, Vice President

WH, William Harrop
WSLF, Western Somali Liberation Front

Z, zulu time

ZAPU, Zimbabwe African People's Union

ZB, Zbigniew Brzezinski

Persons

Aaron, David L., Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from 1977 until January 1981

Addou, Abdullahi Ahmed, Somali Ambassador to the United States from 1970 until 1980

Albright, Madeleine, Congressional Relations Officer, Press and Congressional Liaison Office, National Security Council, from March 1978 until January 1981

Amin, Idi Dada O, President of Uganda until April 13, 1979

Armocost, Michael, East Asia and China Affairs, National Security Council from January 1977 until July 1978

Ayalew, Mandefro, Ethiopian Ambassador to the United States

Bartholomew, Reginald, National Security Council Staff until April 1979; Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs from July 1, 1979, until January 20, 1981

Bergus, Donald C., U.S. Ambassador to Sudan from 1977 until 1980

Berhane, Deressa, Head of the American Section of the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry

Blechman, Barry, Assistant Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from 1977 until 1980

Bongo, Albert-Bernard (Omar), President of Gabon

Brown, George S., General, USAF; Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, from July 1, 1974, until June 20, 1978

Brown, Harold, Secretary of Defense from January 21, 1977, until January 20, 1981

Brzezinski, Zbigniew, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from January 23, 1977 until January 20, 1981

Byrd, Robert C., Senator (D-West Virginia); Senate Majority Leader

Carter, Hodding, III, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs from March 25, 1977, until June 30, 1980

Carter, James Earl (Jimmy), President of the United States from January 20, 1977, until January 20, 1981

Castro, Fidel, President of the Council of State and Minister of Cuba from December 3, 1976

Chapin, Frederic Lincoln, U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia from 1978 until 1980

Christopher, Warren M., Deputy Secretary of State from February 25, 1977, until January 16, 1981

Clark, Richard C., Senator (D-Iowa)

Clift, A. Denis, Assistant to the Vice-President for National Security Affairs from 1977 until 1981

Denend, Leslie G., Global Issues, National Security Council from July 1977 until June 1979; Special Assistant to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from January 1980 until January 1981

Deng, Francis M., Sudanese Minister of State for Foreign Affairs until 1980

Dobrynin, Anatoli F., Soviet Ambassador to the United States

Dodson, Christine, Deputy Staff Secretary of the National Security Council from January 1977 until May 1977; thereafter Staff Secretary until January 1981

Duncan, Charles W., Jr., Deputy Secretary of Defense from January 31, 1977, until July 29, 1979; Secretary of Energy from August 24, 1979, until January 20, 1981

Erb, Guy, International Economics Affairs, National Security Council from November 1977 until January 1980

Ermath, Fritz, Defense Coordinator, National Security Council from September 1978 until November 1980

Garba, Joseph Nanven, Nigerian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Member of the Supreme Military Council until 1978

Gedle-Ghiorgis, Felleke, Ethiopian Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1977

Giscard d'Estaing, Valery, President of France from May 19, 1974, until May 10, 1981

Gouled, Hassan, President of Djibouti from 1977

Gromyko, Andrei, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs

Habib, Philip C., Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from July 1, 1976, until April 1, 1978; Secretary of State ad interim from January 20, 1977, until January 23, 1977

Hamilton, Lee, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Indiana)

Hannifin, Patrick J., Vice Admiral, USN; Director, Joint Chiefs of Staff from July 1, 1977, until June 20, 1978

Hanson, Carl Thor, Vice Admiral, USN; Director, Joint Chiefs of Staff from June 22, 1979, until June 30, 1981

Harrop, William C., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from until 1980

Henze, Paul B., Intelligence Coordinator, National Security Council from January 1977 until December 1980

Holloway, Anne Forrester, Staff Director to the U.S. Representative to the United Nations until 1979

Houphouet-Boigny, Felix, President of Cote D'Ivoire

Hunter, Robert, member, National Security Council from January 1977 until August 1979; Director, Middle East and North Africa Affairs, National Security Council from September 1979 until January 1981

Inderfurth, Karl F. (Rick), Special Assistant to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from January 1977 until April 1979

Janka, Leslie A., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near Eastern and African Affairs from 1976 until 1978

Javits, Jacob, Senator (R-New York)

Jones, David C., General, USAF; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from June 1978

Kenyatta, Jomo, President of Kenya until August 22, 1978

Kramer, Frank, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs until 1979

Leggett, Robert L., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-California) until 1979

Leonard, James, Deputy U.S. Representative to the United Nations from 1977 until 1979

Loughran, John L., U.S. Ambassador to Somalia until November 5, 1978

Marshall, Anthony Dryden, U.S. Ambassador to Kenya until April 26, 1977

Maynes, Charles William, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs from April 14, 1977, until April 9, 1980

McGiffert, David E., Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Affairs from April 4, 1977, until January 20, 1981

McMahon, John N., Deputy Director for Operations at the Central Intelligence Agency from 1978

- Mengistu, Haile Mariam**, Leader of the Military Committee that ruled Ethiopia from 1977
- Mobutu, Sese Seko**, President of Zaire (Democratic Republic of the Congo)
- Mondale, Walter F.**, Vice President of the United States from January 20, 1977, until January 20, 1981
- Moose, Richard M.**, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from July 6, 1977, until January 16, 1981
- Newsom, David D.**, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from April 19, 1978, until February 27, 1981
- Nimeiry, Gaafar**, President of Sudan
- Obasanjo, Olusegun**, General, Head of the Military Government of Nigeria until October 1, 1979
- Odom, William E.**, Lieutenant General, USA; Military Assistant to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from 1977 until January 1981
- Pastor, Robert A.**, member, National Security Council from 1977 until January 1981
- Petrov, Vasily I.**, Soviet General and military adviser to the Ethiopian army
- Post, Richard**, Office Director of East African Affairs, Department of State until 1978
- Press, Frank**, Science Advisor to the President
- Quandt, William B.**, member, National Security Council Staff until 1979
- Richardson, Henry**, member, National Security Council from February 1977 until November 1978
- Sanders, Edward**, Deputy Associate Director of International Affairs, Office of Management and Budget
- Saunders, Harold H.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research until April 10, 1978
- Schaufele, William E., Jr.**, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs until July 17, 1977
- Seelye, Talcott Williams**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from 1976 until 1977
- Shoemaker, Chris**, Defense Coordinator, National Security Council from August 1980 until January 1981
- Shulman, Marshal D.**, Special Advisor to the Secretary of State on Soviet Affairs from 1977 until 1980
- Siad Barre, Mohammed**, President of Somalia
- Sick, Gary G.**, member, National Security Council from January 1977 until January 1981
- Slocombe, Walter**, Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from January 1977 until November 1979; Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning from November 1979 until January 1981
- Smith, William Y.**, Lieutenant General, USAF; Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff until 1979
- Thomas, Gerald**, Rear Admiral, USN; Director of the East Asia, Pacific, and Inter-American Affairs at the Department of Defense until 1978
- Thornton, Thomas P.**, member, National Security Council from 1977 until January 1981
- Tito, Josip Broz**, President of Yugoslavia
- Toon, Malcolm**, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union until 1979
- Trojanovsky, Oleg A.**, Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations from 1977
- Tuchman, Jessica**, member, National Security Council from January 1977 until June 1977

XXIV Persons

Turner, Stansfield M., Director of Central Intelligence from March 9, 1977 until January 20, 1981

Vance, Cyrus R., Secretary of State from January 23, 1977, until April 20, 1980

Waldheim, Kurt, Secretary-General of the United Nations

Weisner, Maurice Franklin, USN; Commander in Chief, Pacific Command from August 30, 1976 until October 31, 1979

Wickham, John A., Jr., Lieutenant General, USA; Acting Director, Joint Chiefs of Staff from August 22, 1978 until June 22, 1979

Young, Andrew J., Jr., U.S. Representative to the United Nations from January 30, 1977, until August 15, 1979

Zablocki, Clement J., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Wisconsin)

Note on U.S. Covert Actions

In compliance with the *Foreign Relations of the United States* statute that requires inclusion in the *Foreign Relations* series of comprehensive documentation on major foreign policy decisions and actions, the editors have identified key documents regarding major covert actions and intelligence activities. The following note will provide readers with some organizational context on how covert actions and special intelligence operations in support of U.S. foreign policy were planned and approved within the U.S. Government. It describes, on the basis of declassified documents, the changing and developing procedures during the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter Presidencies.

Management of Covert Actions in the Truman Presidency

The Truman administration's concern over Soviet "psychological warfare" prompted the new National Security Council to authorize, in NSC 4-A of December 1947, the launching of peacetime covert action operations. NSC 4-A made the Director of Central Intelligence responsible for psychological warfare, establishing at the same time the principle that covert action was an exclusively Executive Branch function. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) certainly was a natural choice but it was assigned this function at least in part because the Agency controlled unvouchered funds, by which operations could be funded with minimal risk of exposure in Washington.¹

The CIA's early use of its new covert action mandate dissatisfied officials at the Departments of State and Defense. The Department of State, believing this role too important to be left to the CIA alone and concerned that the military might create a new rival covert action office in the Pentagon, pressed to reopen the issue of where responsibility for covert action activities should reside. Consequently, on June 18, 1948, a new NSC directive, NSC 10/2, superseded NSC 4-A.

NSC 10/2 directed the CIA to conduct "covert" rather than merely "psychological" operations, defining them as all activities "which are conducted or sponsored by this Government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and executed that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if un-

¹ NSC 4-A, December 17, 1947, is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1945-1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, Document 257.

covered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them.”

The type of clandestine activities enumerated under the new directive included: “propaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberations [*sic*] groups, and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world. Such operations should not include armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage, counter-espionage, and cover and deception for military operations.”²

The Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), newly established in the CIA on September 1, 1948, in accordance with NSC 10/2, assumed responsibility for organizing and managing covert actions. The OPC, which was to take its guidance from the Department of State in peacetime and from the military in wartime, initially had direct access to the State Department and to the military without having to proceed through the CIA’s administrative hierarchy, provided the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was informed of all important projects and decisions.³ In 1950 this arrangement was modified to ensure that policy guidance came to the OPC through the DCI.

During the Korean conflict the OPC grew quickly. Wartime commitments and other missions soon made covert action the most expensive and bureaucratically prominent of the CIA’s activities. Concerned about this situation, DCI Walter Bedell Smith in early 1951 asked the NSC for enhanced policy guidance and a ruling on the proper “scope and magnitude” of CIA operations. The White House responded with two initiatives. In April 1951 President Truman created the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) under the NSC to coordinate government-wide psychological warfare strategy. NSC 10/5, issued in October 1951, reaffirmed the covert action mandate given in NSC 10/2 and expanded the CIA’s authority over guerrilla warfare.⁴ The PSB was soon abolished by the incoming Eisenhower administration, but the expansion of the CIA’s covert action writ in NSC 10/5 helped ensure that covert action would remain a major function of the Agency.

As the Truman administration ended, the CIA was near the peak of its independence and authority in the field of covert action. Although the CIA continued to seek and receive advice on specific proj-

² NSC 10/2, June 18, 1948, is printed *ibid.*, Document 292.

³ Memorandum of conversation by Frank G. Wisner, “Implementation of NSC-10/2,” August 12, 1948, is printed *ibid.*, Document 298.

⁴ NSC 10/5, “Scope and Pace of Covert Operations,” October 23, 1951, is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community*, Document 90.

ects from the NSC, the PSB, and the departmental representatives originally delegated to advise the OPC, no group or officer outside of the DCI and the President himself had authority to order, approve, manage, or curtail operations.

NSC 5412 Special Group; 5412/2 Special Group; 303 Committee

The Eisenhower administration began narrowing the CIA's latitude in 1954. In accordance with a series of National Security Council directives, the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence for the conduct of covert operations was further clarified. President Eisenhower approved NSC 5412 on March 15, 1954, reaffirming the Central Intelligence Agency's responsibility for conducting covert actions abroad. A definition of covert actions was set forth; the DCI was made responsible for coordinating with designated representatives of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to ensure that covert operations were planned and conducted in a manner consistent with U.S. foreign and military policies; and the Operations Coordinating Board was designated the normal channel for coordinating support for covert operations among State, Defense, and the CIA. Representatives of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President were to be advised in advance of major covert action programs initiated by the CIA under this policy and were to give policy approval for such programs and secure coordination of support among the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA.⁵

A year later, on March 12, 1955, NSC 5412/1 was issued, identical to NSC 5412 except for designating the Planning Coordination Group as the body responsible for coordinating covert operations. NSC 5412/2 of December 28, 1955, assigned to representatives (of the rank of assistant secretary) of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President responsibility for coordinating covert actions. By the end of the Eisenhower administration, this group, which became known as the "NSC 5412/2 Special Group" or simply "Special Group," emerged as the executive body to review and approve covert action programs initiated by the CIA.⁶ The membership of the Special Group varied depending upon the situation faced. Meetings were infrequent until 1959 when weekly meetings began to be held. Neither the CIA nor the Special Group adopted fixed criteria for bringing projects before the

⁵ William M. Leary, editor, *The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents* (The University of Alabama Press, 1984), p. 63; for text of NSC 5412, see *Foreign Relations, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community*, Document 171.

⁶ Leary, *The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents*, pp. 63, 147–148; *Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate*, Book I, *Foreign and Military Intelligence* (1976), pp. 50–51. For texts of NSC 5412/1 and NSC 5412/2, see *Foreign Relations, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community*, Documents 212 and 250.

group; initiative remained with the CIA, as members representing other agencies frequently were unable to judge the feasibility of particular projects.⁷

After the Bay of Pigs failure in April 1961, General Maxwell Taylor reviewed U.S. paramilitary capabilities at President Kennedy's request and submitted a report in June that recommended strengthening high-level direction of covert operations. As a result of the Taylor Report, the Special Group, chaired by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, and including Deputy Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Lyman Lemnitzer, assumed greater responsibility for planning and reviewing covert operations. Until 1963 the DCI determined whether a CIA-originated project was submitted to the Special Group. In 1963 the Special Group developed general but informal criteria, including risk, possibility of success, potential for exposure, political sensitivity, and cost (a threshold of \$25,000 was adopted by the CIA), for determining whether covert action projects were submitted to the Special Group.⁸

From November 1961 to October 1962 a Special Group (Augmented), whose membership was the same as the Special Group plus Attorney General Robert Kennedy and General Taylor (as Chairman), exercised responsibility for Operation Mongoose, a major covert action program aimed at overthrowing the Castro regime in Cuba. When President Kennedy authorized the program in November, he designated Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale, Assistant for Special Operations to the Secretary of Defense, to act as chief of operations, and Lansdale coordinated the Mongoose activities among the CIA and the Departments of State and Defense. The CIA units in Washington and Miami had primary responsibility for implementing Mongoose operations, which included military, sabotage, and political propaganda programs.⁹

President Kennedy also established a Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) on January 18, 1962, when he signed NSAM No. 124. The Special Group (CI), set up to coordinate counter-insurgency activities separate from the mechanism for implementing NSC 5412/2, was to confine itself to establishing broad policies aimed at preventing and resisting subversive insurgency and other forms of indirect aggression in friendly countries. In early 1966, in NSAM No. 341, President Johnson

⁷ Leary, *The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents*, p. 63.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 82.

⁹ See *Foreign Relations, 1961–1963*, volume X, Cuba, 1961–1962, Documents 270 and 278.

assigned responsibility for the direction and coordination of counter-insurgency activities overseas to the Secretary of State, who established a Senior Interdepartmental Group to assist in discharging these responsibilities.¹⁰

NSAM No. 303, June 2, 1964, from Bundy to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the DCI, changed the name of “Special Group 5412” to “303 Committee” but did not alter its composition, functions, or responsibility. Bundy was the chairman of the 303 Committee.¹¹

The Special Group and the 303 Committee approved 163 covert actions during the Kennedy administration and 142 during the Johnson administration through February 1967. The 1976 Final Report of the Church Committee, however, estimated that of the several thousand projects undertaken by the CIA since 1961, only 14 percent were considered on a case-by-case basis by the 303 Committee and its predecessors (and successors). Those not reviewed by the 303 Committee were low-risk and low-cost operations. The Final Report also cited a February 1967 CIA memorandum that included a description of the mode of policy arbitration of decisions on covert actions within the 303 Committee system. The CIA presentations were questioned, amended, and even on occasion denied, despite protests from the DCI. Department of State objections modified or nullified proposed operations, and the 303 Committee sometimes decided that some agency other than the CIA should undertake an operation or that CIA actions requested by Ambassadors on the scene should be rejected.¹²

The effectiveness of covert action has always been difficult for any administration to gauge, given concerns about security and the difficulty of judging the impact of U.S. initiatives on events. In October 1969 the new Nixon administration required annual 303 Committee reviews for all covert actions that the Committee had approved and automatic termination of any operation not reviewed after 12 months. On February 17, 1970, President Nixon signed National Security Decision Memorandum 40,¹³ which superseded NSC 5412/2 and changed the name of the covert action approval group to the 40 Committee, in part because the 303 Committee had been named in the media. The Attorney General was also added to the membership of the Committee. NSDM 40

¹⁰ For text of NSAM No. 124, see *ibid.*, volume VIII, National Security Policy, Document 68. NSAM No. 341, March 2, 1966, is printed *ibid.*, 1964–1968, volume XXXIII, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy; United Nations, Document 56.

¹¹ For text of NSAM No. 303, see *ibid.*, Document 204.

¹² *Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence*, pp. 56–57.

¹³ For text of NSDM 40, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume II, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969–1972, Document 203.*

reaffirmed the DCI's responsibility for the coordination, control, and conduct of covert operations and directed him to obtain policy approval from the 40 Committee for all major and "politically sensitive" covert operations. He was also made responsible for ensuring an annual review by the 40 Committee of all approved covert operations.

The 40 Committee met regularly early in the Nixon administration, but over time the number of formal meetings declined and business came to be conducted via couriers and telephone votes. The Committee actually met only for major new proposals. As required, the DCI submitted annual status reports to the 40 Committee for each approved operation. According to the 1976 Church Committee Final Report, the 40 Committee considered only about 25 percent of the CIA's individual covert action projects, concentrating on major projects that provided broad policy guidelines for all covert actions. Congress received briefings on only a few proposed projects. Not all major operations, moreover, were brought before the 40 Committee: President Nixon in 1970 instructed the DCI to promote a coup d'etat against Chilean President Salvador Allende without Committee coordination or approval.¹⁴

Presidential Findings Since 1974 and the Operations Advisory Group

The Hughes-Ryan amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 brought about a major change in the way the U.S. Government approved covert actions, requiring explicit approval by the President for each action and expanding Congressional oversight and control of the CIA. The CIA was authorized to spend appropriated funds on covert actions only after the President had signed a "finding" and informed Congress that the proposed operation was important to national security.¹⁵

Executive Order 11905, issued by President Ford on February 18, 1976, in the wake of major Congressional investigations of CIA activities by the Church and Pike Committees, replaced the 40 Committee with the Operations Advisory Group, composed of the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the DCI, who retained responsibility for the planning and implementation of covert operations. The OAG was required to hold formal meetings to develop recommendations for the President regarding a covert action and to conduct periodic reviews of previously-approved operations. EO 11905 also banned all U.S. Government employees from involvement in polit-

¹⁴ *Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities*, United States Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence, pp. 54-55, 57.

¹⁵ Public Law 93-559.

ical assassinations, a prohibition that was retained in succeeding executive orders, and prohibited involvement in domestic intelligence activities.¹⁶

Approval and oversight requirements for covert action continued to be governed by the Hughes-Ryan amendment well into the Carter administration, even as the new administration made alterations to the executive branch's organizational structure for covert action.

President Carter retained the NSC as the highest executive branch organization to review and guide U.S. foreign intelligence activities. As part of a broader NSC reorganization at the outset of his administration, President Carter replaced the Operations Advisory Group (OAG) with the NSC's Special Coordination Committee (SCC), which explicitly continued the same operating procedures as the former OAG.¹⁷ Membership of the SCC, when meeting for the purpose of reviewing and making recommendations on covert actions (as well as sensitive surveillance activities), replicated that of the former OAG - namely: the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the Secretaries of State and Defense; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Attorney General and Director of the Office of Management and Budget (the latter two as observers). The designated chairman of all SCC meetings was the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Carter formalized the SCC's replacement of the OAG in EO 11985 of May 13, 1977, which amended President Ford's EO 11905 on "United States Foreign Intelligence activities."¹⁸ In practice, the SCC for covert action and sensitive surveillance activities came to be known as the SCC (Intelligence) or the SCC-I, to distinguish it from other versions of the SCC.

The SCC's replacement of the OAG was reaffirmed in E.O. 12036 of January 24, 1978, which replaced E.O. 11905 and its amendments. E.O. 12036 also reaffirmed the same membership for the SCC-I, but identified the Attorney General and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget as full members of the Committee, rather than merely observers.

¹⁶ Executive Order 11905, "United States Foreign Intelligence Activities," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 12, No. 8, February 23, 1976.

¹⁷ The broader NSC reorganization sought to reduce the number of NSC committees to two: the Policy Review Committee (PRC) and the Special Coordination Committee (SCC). The SCC's jurisdiction included all intelligence policy issues other than annual budget and priorities reviews; the SCC also had jurisdiction over other, nonintelligence matters. Presidential Directive 2, "The National Security Council System," January 20, 1977, Carter Library, Vertical File, Presidential Directives. See also Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor 1977-1981* (New York: Farrar, Strauss, Giroux, 1983), pp. 59-62.

¹⁸ Executive Order 11985, "United States Foreign Intelligence Activities," May 13, 1977, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 13, No. 20 (May 16, 1977), pp. 719-720.

Also in the first days of the Carter administration, the SCC-I established a lower-level working group to study and review proposals for covert action and other sensitive intelligence matters and report to the SCC-I. This interagency working group was chaired by the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (David Aaron), or in his absence, the NSC Director for Intelligence Coordination. The working group was named the Special Activities Working Group (SAWG). The SAWG was active in early Carter administration reviews of ongoing covert action, and remained active through at least 1978. NSC officials in mid-1978 sought to downgrade or abolish the SAWG and replace it as needed with ad hoc working groups. Internal NSC reviews at the end of the Carter administration state that the SAWG gradually fell out of use. By late 1979, the means for debating, developing, and guiding certain covert actions was an interagency working group chaired by Aaron at the NSC. This group was referred to by several names during the late Carter administration, including the Deputy's (or Deputies) group, the Aaron group, the interagency group, the Black Chamber, and the Black Room.

The Carter administration made use of a new category of presidential findings for "world-wide" or "general" (or "generic") covert operations. This continued a practice initiated late in the Ford administration in response to the Hughes-Ryan requirement for presidential findings. The worldwide category covered lower-risk operations that were directed at broad policy goals implemented on a worldwide basis as assets allowed. These operations utilized existing assets as well as existing liaison contacts with foreign intelligence or security services, and in some cases also consisted of routine training or procurement undertaken to assist foreign intelligence partners or other agencies of the USG. A new type of document—known as "Perspectives"—provided more specific tasking guidance for these general, worldwide covert activities. Perspectives detailed the themes to be stressed in furtherance of a particular policy goal. Riskier operations required their own presidential finding or Memorandum of Notification (see below). Perspectives were drafted by the CIA and cleared by the Department of State, so that the CIA could vet the operational feasibility and risks of the program while State could assess the diplomatic risks and verify that the program was consistent with overall foreign policy goals. At least initially, Perspectives did not require further coordination with the OAG, SCC, or the President. Once an agreed-upon Perspectives document was finalized by CIA and the Department of State, it was transmitted to the field, and posts were required to make periodic reports on any achievements under the Perspectives guidelines. Beginning in 1978, actions in this worldwide category were authorized by the President as specific line-item additions to a previously existing "world-wide" finding, though Perspectives were still used to provide additional details.

Another new document used during the Carter administration was the “Memorandum of Notification”(MON). MONs were initially used to introduce higher-risk, significantly higher-cost, or more geographically-specific operations under a previously-approved worldwide or general objective outlined¹⁹ in a Perspectives document. Like Perspectives, MONs had to be coordinated between the CIA and the Department of State, but they also required broader interagency coordination within the SAWG or SCC. MONs subsequently came to be used for significant changes to any type of finding, not just worldwide ones. Entirely new covert actions continued to require new presidential findings. The Hughes-Ryan amendment stipulated that Congress be notified of new findings “in a timely fashion,” but did not specify how much time that meant. During the Carter administration, the CIA typically notified Congress of new covert initiatives within 48 hours, including those outlined in Perspectives or MONs.

In October 1980, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1981—also known as the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980—scaled back the Hughes-Ryan amendment’s provisions for congressional oversight of covert action. While the requirement to notify Congress about presidential findings remained in place, the new Act limited the committees of Congress that had to be briefed to the two intelligence committees, and also explicitly clarified that this requirement to keep the committees “fully and currently informed” did not constitute a requirement for congressional approval of covert action or other intelligence activities. Moreover, the new Act stipulated that if the President determined it was “essential to limit prior notice to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States,” the President could limit prior notice to the chairmen and ranking minority members of the two intelligence committees, the Speaker and minority leader of the House, and the majority and minority leaders of the Senate—a group that came to be known as the “Gang of Eight.” If prior notice of a covert action was withheld, the President was required to inform the two intelligence committees “in a timely fashion” and provide a statement of the reasons for not giving prior notice.²⁰

¹⁹ Executive Order 12036, “United States Foreign Intelligence Activities,” January 24, 1978, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 14, No. 4 (January 30, 1978), pp. 194–214. Since E.O. 12036 governed foreign intelligence activities, all references in the E.O. to the “SCC” were effectively references to what was known in practice as the SCC (Intelligence), or SCC-I.

²⁰ PL 96–450, Sec. 407 (October 14, 1980). See also the description of the Hughes-Ryan amendment and its replacement by PL 96–450 in: Richard A. Best, Jr., “Covert Action: Legislative Background and Possible Policy Questions,” Congressional Research Service, RL33715, December 27, 2011, pp.1–2; and L. Britt Snider, *The Agency and the Hill: CIA’S Relationship with Congress, 1946–2004*, Washington: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 2008, pp. 280–81.

Horn of Africa

1. Editorial Note

By 1977, U.S. policy toward the Horn of Africa had been in flux for several years. Ethiopia's increasing radicalization and anti-U.S. sentiment resulted in decreased U.S. access to bases and airfields, as well as the erosion of a longstanding relationship with an important regional ally. The Ford administration debated the merits of military and economic engagement. The decreased importance of Kagnew Station, a multi-purpose U.S. military installation in Asmara, Eritrea, as a communications base and the development of Kenya and Sudan as more consistent regional allies made the argument for continued engagement less compelling.

However, members of the administration who were concerned about Soviet inroads in Somalia argued that a diminished U.S. presence in Ethiopia would be perceived as a Cold War "loss," and believed that regional instability would result. Contributing to those concerns was the impending independence of the French Territory of the Afars and Issas (Djibouti). Djibouti's port, essential to Ethiopian foreign trade, was coveted by Somali irredentists. The Ford administration feared that war between Ethiopia and Somalia over Djibouti was a distinct possibility.

During the Presidential transition, an interdepartmental group weighed the relative merits of halting or continuing the arms pipeline to Ethiopia, whether to be proactive with economic aid, and whether Ethiopian moderates would benefit from U.S. support. (See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume E-6, Documents on Africa, 1973–1976, Document 170.) The Carter administration entered office with these issues unresolved.

2. **Telegram From the Embassy in Ethiopia to the Department of State¹**

Addis Ababa, February 8, 1977, 1535Z

764. Subj: The New Ethiopian Government—An Analysis.

Summary: Now that Mengistu has openly taken over PMAC reins, his first tasks will be to reconstitute Dirg² more nearly in accord with his own wishes and to implement his obvious desire for more drastic measures against Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP). Although Addis Ababa is calm for moment, new wave of arrests and violence is quite possible before long. At same time, Embassy does not anticipate radical policy departures from existing revolutionary program, despite Mengistu's indications that pace will be accelerated. In foreign policy field, EPMG likely to seek Black African support for Eritrean territorial integrity. For moment, EPMG also soft-pedaling its differences with Somalia for reasons which, though not yet clear, may be related to greater Soviet involvement in Ethiopian domestic and international affairs. End summary.

1. After last week's purge,³ it seems clear that Mengistu is riding higher than ever before. If there is any leading figure who could form new pole of opposition to him remaining within Dirg, he is not yet apparent to this Embassy. Mengistu's first order of business is to put Dirg back together and fill in gaps, most prominent of which is that of Chief of State. PMAC meeting scheduled for Feb 7 probably grappled with that very problem. From what we know of his past preferences, it is not at all certain that he will decide to assume PMAC chairman role himself. In that respect Teferi Bante served useful purpose in relieving him of ceremonial duties and public exposure to those (like Western envoys) Mengistu did not particularly want to see. Thus a new titular head of state makes much sense. In any event, what Mengistu decides is certain at this point to be rubber-stamped by remainder of PMAC, since open disagreement has proven clearly unhealthy.

2. While Dirg top ranks have been decimated in last days, and death of POMOA Vice-Chairman Senaye Likke also no doubt gladdened

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770045–0693. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information to Asmara, Cairo, Jidda, Khartoum, Mogadiscio, Moscow, Nairobi, and Sana.

² The Derg, which means "the committee" in Amharic, refers to the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC), the group that ruled Ethiopia.

³ In telegram 656 from Addis Ababa, February 3, the Embassy reported on the official announcement of the deaths of leading PMAC members, including PMAC Chairman Teferi Bante, which left Mengistu Haile Mariam solely in charge of Ethiopia. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770039–0586)

EPRP hearts, EPRP in long run has most to lose from shake-up. Those in PMAC favoring accommodation with EPRP are gone, and Mengistu will surely launch strong crackdown aimed at hard EPRP core possibly sweeping up in process many non-affiliated sympathizers of EPRP goals and some innocent bystanders. On other hand, some were already counting EPRP out late last fall, only to see resurgence over past ten days of EPRP-inspired assassinations, anti-government incidents, and leaflet distribution. Such activities are bound to continue, and Mengistu must realize that, after his actions of past week he is more a marked man than ever, with Haile Fida also high on most wanted list, and not only in eyes of their enemies in EPRP. At a time when summary justice is being dealt out, however, clandestine activity likely to decline for next week or so, while both sides devise new strategies.

3. Some observers view purge in terms of hardliner versus moderate struggle. We have no evidence that leads us to believe that seven killed were any less dedicated than those remaining to carrying out national democratic revolution program, although in proposing one more attempt to bring EPRP back into fold, they may have been casting about for more pragmatic solutions to current Dirg problems. Purge may also have removed some of brakes on decision-making process, but we doubt that EPMG course will be radically changed as result. Mengistu's first public statements imply that pace of revolution to accelerate, but we do not see national political party emerging any faster for example, and EPMG has no greater means this week than last to step up offensive against its military enemies, despite its brave talk about arming masses and tributes to men in uniform. One likelihood is that Politburo will regain influence it appeared to have lost as result Dec 29 government restructure.⁴ There are also reports that purge may result in thinning of ranks in Cabinet ministries and elsewhere in bureaucracy, but so far only arrests that seem fairly certain are those of Tesfaye Tadessa, Permanent Secretary in Ministry of Information, and Teferra Shawel, Press Chief at Foreign Ministry, whose crime appears to have been their participation in drafting of Teferi Bante Jan 29 speech, which soft-pedaled EPRP.⁵

4. Future role of Second Vice-Chairman Atnafu Abate is likewise not clear. Rumors have always abounded of strong animosity between him and Mengistu. Atnafu is considered a potentially dangerous opponent, but he is not known as ambitious man, and he has served useful purpose of organizing peasants' militia throughout country, a program

⁴ A December 29 proclamation defined the official responsibilities of the PMAC and the Council of Ministers. (Telegram 12642 from Addis Ababa, December 30, 1976; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760476-0354)

⁵ In telegram 535 from Addis Ababa, January 30, the Embassy reported on Teferi Bante's speech. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770058-0828)

which appears to figure largely in Mengistu's thinking on rallying country to oppose enemies of revolution. Fact Atnafu is still alive and going about normal activities indicates that he is obviously not considered in same threatening category as those purged. His presence may thus provide some vestige of respectability to Mengistu's new government, so long as he toes line.

5. Foreign policy references in Mengistu's speech⁶ lead us to believe that he will actively seek Black African solidarity on territorial integrity issue in Eritrea and press Arab conspiracy charges even more actively than heretofore. Mengistu's statement that "except for PDRY, Mother Ethiopia does not have a single revolutionary friend in the region" adopts belligerent stance towards all neighboring countries, including Kenya. This stance, coupled with OAU site problem and EPMG's failure to tend to its fences with Sub-Saharan Africa in general, would tend to weaken Ethiopia's negotiating position. It is also not clear why both Mengistu in his Feb 4 speech and media since have almost entirely eliminated derogatory reference to Somalia and Siad Barre. While this may simply mean recognition on Mengistu's part that Ethiopia has enough immediate troubles in country and to north, without picking yet another fight with Somalia, this aspect nevertheless bears watching, given growing indications that Soviets may have decided to try to play more active role in Ethiopia without disrupting their close ongoing relationship with Somalia. Some Addis observers are already speculating that apparent downplay of relations with Somalia indicates Soviets are doing just that.

6. Craven procession of Soviet, Cuban, and other East European Ambassadors to praise Mengistu's actions and offer support for rump government indicates greater degree of commitment by SovBloc to Mengistu one-man show than to collective leadership of past. Ambassadors may also have been in hurry to dispel any suspicions lurking in Mengistu's mind that they may have had close past contacts with one or another of seven executed PMAC leaders. Although chances of PMAC under Mengistu surviving seem at least questionable, Sovs may have decided that his is kind of government they would like to see in this country and that their support is needed at this juncture if it is to have a chance. On other hand week's events will be viewed in Arab world as graphic confirmation of growing Soviet involvement in, and impetus behind, Ethiopian policy, thereby enhancing Arab resolve to salvage at least an independent Eritrea from an increasingly hostile and pro-Soviet Ethiopia. From this perspective it is surprising that Soviet Union appears to be willing to risk taking on practically entire

⁶ In telegram 686 from Addis Ababa, February 4, the Embassy reported on Mengistu's speech to rally the Ethiopian public for support for national unity. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770041-0078)

Arab world on an issue whose rewards in terms of overall Soviet policy in Horn of Africa are not all that obvious.

7. Recent political events have coincided with relative lull in military operations throughout country. Heavy fighting apparently continues around Elaberet agricultural estates in Eritrea (Asmara 0084),⁷ and 15th Battalion at Nacfa is as beleaguered as ever, but situation along Sudan border has not worsened since loss of Humera to EDU and Om Hager to ELF in January. Incentives for renewed military push on all dissident fronts will probably be greater than ever, however, if purge is perceived as weakening Dirg and having further adverse effect on morale of Ethiopian armed forces.

Tienken

⁷ In telegram 84 from Asmara, February 3, the Consulate reported on the status of the Eritrean insurgency. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770039-0097)

3. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia¹

Washington, February 23, 1977, 1536Z

40108. Subject: Letter From Ambassador Young to President Siad. Ref: Lagos 1461.²

1. Following letter is from Ambassador Andrew Young to President Siad. While we would normally suggest it be delivered through the Foreign Office under cover of a diplomatic note, we wish to avoid it arriving on Siad's desk with Soviet-written addenda attached. Please, therefore, arrange its transmittal in an appropriate channel which will convey the message directly to the President.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770062-1143. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Post and Scott (AF/E); cleared by Helman (IO/UNP), Glassman (EUR/SOV), Young (USUN), and in S/S; approved by Schaufele. Sent for information to Lagos, Addis Ababa, Dar es Salaam, London, Moscow, Nairobi, Pretoria, Paris, and USUN.

² In telegram 1461 from Lagos, February 8, the Embassy reported on Ambassador Young's meeting in Zanzibar with President Siad. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770044-0904)

2. QTE Dear Mr. President:

I consider it to have been fortunate that our meeting in Zanzibar provided an opportunity for contact between our two governments so soon after the installation of the new U.S. administration. I appreciate your willingness to give me the benefit of your forthright views on Somali policy, the situation in the Horn of Africa, and the factors affecting relations between our two nations.

3. I am confident that you will find that the new U.S. administration will not approach African problems with pre-conceived ideas of how they should be solved but will, instead, make an effort to seek out the views of African leaders in the first instance and to give those views full weight in developing U.S. attitudes and policies toward those problems. We recognize fully that solutions imposed by extra-continental powers can have no lasting beneficial effect, and that a proper American role is to support peaceful solutions to African problems acceptable to Africans.

4. In the light of your desire for improved relations with the United States, I want to assure you that friendship between our two nations and peoples need not be obstructed by honest differences of views between us, or by our respective adoption of differing ideologies. It remains our policy to maintain good relations with non-aligned countries, and our friendly relations with a number of non-aligned states bears witness to this fact. Somalia's friendship with the Soviet Union need not in itself be a bar to improved U.S.-Somali relations. However, you acknowledged to me your recognition of the fact that the U.S. has international responsibilities. In gauging the extent to which an improvement can be achieved in U.S.-Somali relations, which the U.S. administration desires, you will surely understand that we have to take into account the degree to which the relationship enjoyed by the Soviet Union with Somalia impinges upon U.S. international strategic responsibilities.

5. I am confused by your mention that the U.S. refused to help Somalia during a serious drought. On my return to the United States, I asked for an investigation of this matter, and I find that, in response to an appeal to our Ambassador by Vice President Kulmiye on December 7, 1974, the United States promptly diverted a vessel bearing 1500 tons of biscuits to Mogadiscio, where it arrived on December 25. The total value of U.S. drought relief aid to Somalia in 1974 and 1975 was almost dols 10 million. In response to your government's request last year, the U.S. shipped another 10,000 tons of drought relief grain at a cost of over dols 2.5 million. The United States Government remains prepared to assist in the relief of natural catastrophes should they reoccur in Somalia or elsewhere.

6. In closing, I should like to thank you again for the time you spent with me in Zanzibar. I hope that our exchange there and through

this letter will be followed by an intensified dialogue between our two governments which will result in better relations between our two countries. Fortunately, an opportunity for a continuation of this dialogue will present itself on March 1 and 2 when Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Talcott W. Seelye will be visiting Mogadiscio. I hope your schedule will permit you to receive him so that the exchange which we have begun can be continued.³ Sincerely, Andrew Young. End quote.

Vance

³ Seelye visited Mogadiscio March 1–3. In telegrams 364 and 365 from Mogadiscio, March 6, the Embassy reported on his meetings with Siad and Foreign Ministry officials. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770077–0408 and D770077–0420)

4. Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC 21¹

Washington, March 17, 1977

TO

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

ALSO

The United States Representative to the United Nations
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

The Horn of Africa (U)

The President has directed that the Policy Review Committee, under the Chairmanship of the Department of State, undertake a review of U.S. policy toward the Horn of Africa with reference to Kenya and the Sudan. Issues of immediate concern that should be specifically addressed include:

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files 1977–1981, Box 2, PRM/NSC 1–24 [1]. Secret.

—Whether to continue, reduce or suspend U.S. military and economic aid programs in Ethiopia and the likely consequences of such actions.

—How and when to terminate U.S. utilization of Kagnew Station.²

—The implications of independence of the TFAI and steps that might be taken to avert a Somali-Ethiopian clash.

—The implications of a closer U.S. involvement with the Sudan.

—Prospects for loosening Somalia's ties with the Soviet Union.

Related problems which should be assessed include:

—The consequences of increased Soviet, East European and Cuban support for the Ethiopian military government.

—Prospects of the principal Ethiopian opposition groups: the Eritrean movements, the EPRP, the Ethiopian Democratic Union.

—The implications and effect of Libyan and Israeli involvements in Ethiopia; of Libyan subversion in the Sudan.

—The effects of developments in the Horn on post-Kenyatta Kenya, and in particular on Kenya's relations with the United States.

—The relationship of all these questions to the problem of keeping the Red Sea route open and to U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean.

The study should review and take into account separate analyses of some of these problems which have been done over recent months. It should interrelate these issues and attempt to identify U.S. interests in the whole Horn-Red Sea area, examining the impact of our actions in each country as they affect the others. In conclusion the study should clarify the choices for action (or non-action) open to us and their likely consequences, e.g.:

—Would withdrawal of our support for the present Ethiopian government cause it to fall?

—Is the Sudan sufficiently stable to merit a major commitment on our part to support it?

—Which are the best strategies for dealing with the Soviets in this region? If they have to choose between Ethiopia and Somalia, which will they choose?

—Should we consider efforts in Kenya to forestall Ethiopian-type deterioration after Kenyatta dies?

—What outside forces should we encourage to play a positive role in the area: OAU/Other Africans? Saudis? Europeans? China? Israel? France? Others?

² For more on Kagnew Station, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-6, Documents on Africa, 1973–1976, Documents 77, 86, 91–95, 125, 132, 147, 148, 150, 154, and 156.

The review should be no more than 25 pages in length.³ It should be completed by 5 April for PRC review.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

³ See Document 10.

5. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, March 21, 1977

SUBJECT

Kagnew Station—Ethiopia (U)

(C) The growing threat to US personnel at Kagnew Station, the US Naval Communications Unit (NAVCOMMU) in Asmara, Ethiopia, has become a matter of serious and increasing concern in the Department of Defense. All US dependents were withdrawn early in 1976 after two US personnel were killed by a land mine and five others were kidnapped by the insurgents, and for over a year US personnel there have lived under the severe curfew imposed by the government in Asmara.²

(S) The Eritrean insurgency has intensified in recent months, with some attacks occurring close to Kagnew. Public statements by the Government of Sudan promising support for the Eritrean liberation movement have added to the tension, as has the sharply negative reaction of the Ethiopian government to our termination of materiel military assistance and our criticism of violations by the Ethiopians of basic human rights.³ The Department of Defense believes that the situation

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special, Box 1, Chron File: 3/77. Secret.

² See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–6, Documents on Africa, 1973–1976, Document 147.

³ In congressional testimony on February 24, Secretary Vance announced that military assistance to several countries, including Ethiopia, would be reduced because of human rights violations. See the Department of State *Bulletin*, March 14, 1977, pp. 236–241.

in Asmara has become unpredictable and, therefore, that the security of our military and contract personnel there can no longer be assured.

(S) In December 1976 the JCS recommended closure of NAVCOMMU, Asmara subject to establishment of a MYSTIC STAR (Presidential communications support) facility at Tehran, Iran, or another suitable location. This recommendation was made to Secretary Kissinger, who agreed in principle, but the decision on where to relocate the facility was never made.⁴

(S) The JCS now recommend that the requirement to establish an alternate, fixed MYSTIC STAR site prior to the closure of NAVCOMMU, Asmara be rescinded for the following reasons:

a. The sole remaining requirement for NAVCOMMU, Asmara, is MYSTIC STAR mission support.

b. Political instability in Ethiopia has increased to the extent that continued operation of NAVCOMMU, Asmara solely in support of MYSTIC STAR requirements is no longer warranted.

c. The MYSTIC STAR functions now provided by the Asmara site can be assumed by other DoD communications facilities to provide interim, although degraded, support and coverage.

d. Diplomatic negotiations with Iran for a permanent alternative MYSTIC STAR site as a precondition to closure of NAVCOMMU, Asmara could cause further unwarranted delay.

(S) I am fully in accord with the recommendations I have received from the JCS and propose to close NAVCOMMU, Asmara as soon as the Defense Department is relieved of the requirement imposed on it at an earlier date by the White House communications staff.

(U) I shall welcome receipt of your views.

Harold Brown

⁴ See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-6, Documents on Africa, 1973–1976, Document 170.

6. **Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of Defense Brown¹**

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Closing of Kagnew Station

I agree with the views expressed in your memorandum of March 21, 1977, that the Naval Communications Unit, Asmara, be closed.² It is my view, and the White House Communications Agency concurs, that the risk to the safety of US personnel created by the situation in Ethiopia outweighs the degradation of communications capability which would accompany the closure of the Kagnew site.

Our final withdrawal from Kagnew Station is bound to have political impact upon the Ethiopian military regime which has just suffered a psychologically debilitating defeat in the surrender of Nacfa to Eritrean insurgents. The whole U.S.-Ethiopian relationship has been deteriorating rapidly and there are further pending actions, such as the downgrading of the MAAG group in Ethiopia, of which we will need to inform the Addis Ababa government soon. Since PRM-21 on Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa is nearing completion,³ I believe it would be best to defer informing the Addis government of these steps, including the closing of Kagnew, until the policy review process is completed.

Meanwhile, I recommend you take all preparatory measures necessary to implement the closing of Kagnew.

Zbigniew Brzezinski⁴

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special, Box 1, Chron File: 3/77. Secret. A copy was sent to Vance.

² See Document 5.

³ See Document 10.

⁴ Printed from a copy with this typed signature.

7. **Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Vice President Mondale**¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Somalia

The pace of events in the Horn of Africa has accelerated greatly during the past few weeks. Fortunately, we have a PRM exercise on this area nearing completion.² Pending the outcome of the PRM process, this is the way things seem to look:

- Somalia is upset about Soviet support for the Ethiopian military regime, feels it may be left in the lurch and is looking for ways to lessen its dependence on the Soviets. Castro's effort to get the Ethiopians and Somalis together seems to have failed and Castro ended up more favorably impressed by the Ethiopians. He found the Somalis, who pressed their longstanding territorial demands on Ethiopia, more irredentist than socialist. The Soviets probably encouraged this Castro reconciliation venture, but unless they do something to assuage Somali feelings, they will lose by it.³

- An interesting measure of whether things have really changed in Somalia will be what happens to the Cubans there, some of whom have been helping the Somalis mount guerrilla operations into Ethiopia.

- The U.S. has on two recent occasions told the Somalis that we are interested in better relations. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Seelye had a three-hour conversation with President Siad early this month.⁴ Assistant Secretary Schaufele last week had a conversation with the Somali Ambassador here (who has just left for Mogadiscio to participate in a policy review) in which he told him we would like to improve relations.⁵ Meanwhile, the Saudis have been talking to

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special, Box 1, Chron File: 3/77. Secret. Sent for information.

² See Document 10.

³ In telegram 1533 from Addis Ababa, March 15, the Embassy reported on Castro's visit to Addis Ababa and his attempts at mediation between Ethiopia and Somalia. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770092–0479)

⁴ See footnote 3, Document 3.

⁵ Telegram 67050 to Mogadiscio, March 25, reported on the meeting between Schaufele and Addou. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770105–0070)

us about what they might do, and we believe they may have offered the Somalis up to \$300,000,000 to break with the Soviets.⁶

- The Somalis are concerned about how to replace the large-scale aid the Soviets have been giving them. With Saudi money, they would have little difficulty on the economic side, for they could hire European and American technicians. Replacing military aid is much more of a problem, since they are totally Soviet-equipped. While we could probably justify some economic aid ourselves and get Congress to go along, I am skeptical about justifying military aid. We intend to look at this in the PRM.

- Even if we find the Somalis warming up to us rapidly, we will have to exercise some caution, for the situation in Ethiopia is very fluid, and we haven't reached the point where we feel we should give up Ethiopia in exchange for Somalia. We should get as many of our friends and allies to help as possible, not only the Saudis but perhaps the Iranians, the Italians, Germans, Israelis and others.

- Finally, there is the fact that Somali irredentism is very deep-seated and affects not only Ethiopia but Kenya. We cannot let the Somalis think we will support their extensive territorial claims against their neighbors, including the TFAI which is slated to become independent in June.

I hope you will participate in the discussion which the PRM will generate.

⁶ In telegram 1357 from Jidda, February 17, Ambassador Porter discussed Saudi assistance to Somalia with the Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister on February 16. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770056-0825)

8. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

IM 76.1–1–77

Washington, March 28, 1977

[Omitted here are the title page and table of contents.]

THE ETHIOPIAN REVOLUTION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

INTRODUCTION AND PRINCIPAL POINTS

Since World War II, Ethiopia has been the centerpiece of US policy in the Horn of Africa. The Ethiopian revolution that began in early 1974 as an army mutiny has moved, stage by stage, through a period of “moderate reform,” a period of dispute between revolutionaries over how radical change should be carried out and who should do it, and a period of collegial military rule, to the present essentially one-man-with-advisers regime of Lt. Col. Mengistu Haile-Mariam. In the process, the Ethiopian government has been transformed from a difficult, occasionally embarrassing, but relatively reliable client of the US into a radical socialist regime struggling to keep control of the country and looking to the USSR, Eastern Europe, Cuba, and China for help.

The analysis that follows has no specific time frame, but generally the analysts have not tried to look beyond the next two years. The memorandum was requested initially by the Department of State, but has been completed with an eye to the Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC–21: The Horn of Africa,² which was issued while this paper was in preparation.

The principal points of this paper are as follows:

—The Ethiopian revolution has produced a serious degradation of political authority throughout the country, but we do not believe that internal resistance in itself will lead to a breakup of the Ethiopian state.

—At the same time, the revolution has made it more possible—we think likely—that Eritrea will have de facto independence within the next 12 months because of the inadequacy of the military means available to the revolutionary leadership and its unwillingness to compromise its unitary political outlook. We think that some territory in the Ogaden would be lost if and when the Ethiopians take military action to preserve their interests in the French Territory of the Afars and Issas (FTAI).

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff Files. Secret; Noforn; Nocontract; Orcon.

² See Document 4.

—With regard to the Afars and Issas, we believe that the odds on a war between Ethiopia and Somalia over this issue are still better than even, despite changes in French policy which appear designed to satisfy Somali demands. The Ethiopians object to these changes, and we think they will make some military demonstration if the postindependence arrangements in the FTAI do not promise to keep the Somalis out.

—Internally in Ethiopia, Mengistu controls the revolutionary council and is accepted by much of the military, but his personal position is not yet stable. He holds this position now primarily because he has physically eliminated rivals; he could himself be similarly removed. The elimination of Mengistu, however, while it would probably produce some changes in tone and rhetoric, would be followed by a military government with generally similar objectives and basic outlook.

—The present leaders, especially Mengistu, believe that the US Government is unsympathetic, and very possibly hostile, to the Ethiopian revolution. They look to the USSR, Eastern Europe, Cuba, and China for the specialized help they need in keeping Somalia at bay, securing the revolution, and organizing their internal support, even while they try to maintain a supply line of military materiel from the US. This attitude will persist at least as long as Mengistu heads the government, and US influence on Ethiopia's actions is likely to be minimal.

—The full extent to which the USSR will be able to capitalize directly on this situation is not easy to forecast. Fundamentally, the Soviets are certainly attracted by the prospect of developing a new relationship with the largest and potentially most powerful country in the Horn region. But this involves careful management of their relationship with Somalia, and we think that this latter, with the facilities Somalia has provided the USSR, will continue to be the focus of Soviet policy in the region.

—The Ethiopian leaders are also reaching out to new relationships beyond the Horn—to South Yemen and Libya, for example—and while these particular relationships may well be ephemeral there is a good chance that, in a somewhat longer term, the Ethiopians will be able and will wish to cultivate understandings with the more radical Arab and Third World governments. Over time, this is likely to shrink the relations between Ethiopia and Israel.

[Omitted here is the Discussion section.]

9. **Intelligence Appraisal Prepared in the Defense Intelligence Agency¹**

DIA IAPPR 109–77

Washington, March 29, 1977

[Omitted here are a cover sheet and a map of the Horn of Africa.]

ETHIOPIA: A MILITARY ASSESSMENT OF THE ERITREAN
INSURGENCY (U)

Summary

(S) The insurgents have seized the initiative in the 15-year-old secessionist war in Ethiopia's Eritrea Province. Guerrilla sieges of government garrisons have resulted in the abandonment of remote outposts and isolation of others. Moreover, morale among Ethiopian troops in the area has deteriorated seriously. The military government's response to these challenges has been to increase the size of its force in Eritrea to more than 25,000.

(S) Insurgent forces are divided into three movements whose combined strength is about 12,000 to 15,000 armed regulars. These groups have grown rapidly during the past two years, due largely to the government's harsh policies. Both internal and external backing appear sufficient to support the growing insurrection, although there are some indications of instability in the flow of resources—funds, small arms, and training—from the major benefactors in the Arab world. In response to Arab pressures, the three insurgent groups are now engaged in unification efforts which, if successful, will enhance their military capabilities.

(S) The outlook for the foreseeable future is for continued deterioration of Addis Ababa's military posture in Eritrea. However, Ethiopia's capacity to defend the main military centers in the province is formidable, so, barring a psychological blow that precipitates a chain reaction among government troops, a sudden insurgent victory is unlikely. While there is appreciable potential for sharp shifts in Ethiopia's political situation, the most probable near-future pattern in Eritrea is a continuation of present trends. The guerrillas are expected to consolidate their hold on the countryside and peripheral towns, and the government forces will concentrate in the larger centers.

[Omitted here is the body of the report.]

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–80–0017, Box 66, E–F–1977. Secret. Drafted by W. Barrows.

10. Paper Prepared by the Policy Review Committee¹

Washington, Undated

[Omitted here are the title page and the table of contents.]

The Horn of Africa

I. Purpose

The purpose of this study is to examine policy options open to the U.S. to advance or protect our interests in the Horn of Africa/Red Sea area. Due to the rapid pace of developments in Ethiopia and the need for early decisions concerning that country, this study will focus primarily on Ethiopia and adjustments in U.S. policy suggested by developments there. The study alludes in general terms to the resultant implications for Sudan, Somalia and other countries in the area, but detailed study of these implications must await decisions on our Ethiopian policy and on our conventional arms transfer policy (PRM/NSC-12).²

II. Nature of the Problem

The competition between the U.S. and the USSR for influence in Africa has been superimposed on the welter of ethnic, religious, ideological, and territorial incompatibilities existing between, among and within the African states of the Horn of Africa.

A. U.S. Interests:

Our interest in maintaining cooperative relations with and promoting stability among countries in any area of the world has acquired the added dimension in the Horn of Africa of big power competition. Moscow's efforts to displace the U.S. as the dominant foreign influence in Ethiopia are causing concern among moderate states in the region, notably Sudan and Saudi Arabia, and disenchantment toward the Soviets on the part of Somalia. We accordingly have an opportunity to advance U.S. influence in the region as a whole by consolidating our position in neighboring countries now friendly to us, e.g., Sudan and Kenya, and in advancing our position in Somalia.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files 1977–1981, Box 40, PRM-21. Secret. Drafted by Richard Post; cleared in NEA, EUR, PM, D/HA, EA, H, ARA, INR, AID, USIA, IO, DOD/ISA, CIA, and NSC. This paper was prepared in response to PRM/NSC-21; see Document 4.

² PRM/NSC-12 called for a policy review of conventional arms transfers. (Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files 1977–1981, Box 34, PRM-12 [2])

Given the unlikelihood that present leftward trends in Ethiopia can be arrested, we must accept over the short term a decreased U.S. influence in that country and adjust our programs accordingly. The instability of the present Ethiopian regime, however, raises the presently remote possibility of its replacement over the medium or longer term by a leadership more amenable to cooperative relations with the U.S. This prospect, plus the fact that Ethiopia is the second-most-populous country in Africa, gives us an interest in so tailoring our policies that we are in a position insofar as possible to capitalize on possible future developments favoring a resumption of closer Ethio-US ties. With that in mind, any improvement in our relations with Somalia and Sudan should stop short of activities perceived as hostile toward Ethiopia as a nation. The same consideration suggests that, while we have no present interest in obstructing Eritrean autonomy or independence, or in opposing dissidents within Ethiopia proper, we equally have no interest in becoming involved with groups in Eritrea or with opposition elements in Ethiopia in ways which would compromise our ability to have a cooperative relationship with a successor regime in Addis Ababa.

Militarily the Horn is not of great strategic importance to the U.S.³ The psychological perceptions of area states aside, interdiction of Red Sea and Indian Ocean maritime routes is not likely short of a limited war situation, although an increased Soviet presence can limit our freedom of action. The Indian Ocean *per se* occupies a low priority in terms of the global strategic balance. Nonetheless, restriction of Soviet military access to the area would be in our interest as contributing to a reduction of major power military presence there. It could also complicate Soviet ability to use naval power to project political influence in the Indian Ocean littoral. We do have an interest in maximizing U.S. access to ports and airfields in the area.

Our concern for human rights gives us an interest in preventing the U.S. from being implicated in human rights violations by recipients of our assistance, which is particularly pertinent in the case of Ethiopia. Our concern for the poor gives us a humanitarian interest in the area. We have an interest in the safety of Americans residing in the area whose welfare could be affected by developments there including actions of ours.

³ DOD disagrees on this point. It holds that U.S. interests in the Horn are chiefly strategic, reflecting the area's proximity to Middle East oil fields, the sea oil routes and the Red Sea passage to the Mediterranean. The DOD views with concern the continuing expansion of Soviet facilities and presence in Somalia and inroads elsewhere in the Horn. The U.S. seeks regional stability and evolutionary developments in an area environment congenial to U.S. goals. [Footnote is in the original.]

B. *Soviet Interests:*

For two years the Soviets hesitated to take advantage of the opportunity which was presented to them by the accession to power of a leftist government in Ethiopia. They had to weigh the risks to their position in Somalia of support for Ethiopia, which offers no military-strategic advantages for their Indian Ocean interests equal to those they derive from their Somali facilities. On the other hand, they had to consider the politico-strategic advantages of replacing the U.S. as the dominant foreign influence in Ethiopia. Hopeful that such a move would be generally perceived as representing a trend of Soviet gains in Africa at U.S. expense, the Soviets might also view it as placing them in a position to exert pressure on Sudan and Kenya. While Soviet pre-eminence in Ethiopia would not substantially enhance their ability to interdict the Red Sea maritime route beyond their Somalia-based capability, it could provide them with some leverage against countries reliant on that route, particularly oil suppliers and consumers.

The Soviet agreement in December 1976 to supply Ethiopia with substantial military equipment, and to encourage other European Communist countries to provide arms aid, presumably represented a Soviet conclusion that the risks to their position in Somalia were manageable.⁴ A token delivery of small arms took place in February, and additional deliveries are reported to have been made in March. However, until significant deliveries have taken place, the Soviets will presumably remain in a position to reverse their course.

The Soviet ability to deploy naval and air units into the Indian Ocean for surveillance of U.S., French and other allied shipping, for projecting military influence along the Indian Ocean littoral, and for exerting some psychological pressure on tanker routes from the Persian Gulf is facilitated by the availability of Somali ports and airfields. These goals could be achieved without use of the Somali facilities, but at some expense. Undoubtedly, the Soviets are now watching the Somali reaction closely and will, in the light of that reaction, review the relative importance to them of Ethiopia and Somalia prior to any large-scale deliveries that commit them to the Ethiopian option and risk Somali imposition of restrictions on Soviet use of military facilities in Somalia.

In addition to their attempts to mollify the Somali reaction, efforts supported by Fidel Castro during his recent surprise visits to Mogadiscio and Addis Ababa,⁵ the Soviets are undoubtedly considering means

⁴ In telegram 12584 from Addis Ababa, December 29, 1976, the Embassy reported on the Soviet agreement to provide military assistance to Ethiopia. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760474-0980)

⁵ See footnote 3, Document 7.

to help ensure that, should they be forced to choose between Somalia and Ethiopia, the choice of the latter will not leave them committed to a disintegrating asset. East European arms offers to the EPMG and Cuban expressions of willingness to help arm and train the Peoples' Militia in Ethiopia and also to be of help in Eritrea are undoubtedly seen by the Soviets as supportive of that option.

Soviet and Cuban support for the EPMG, particularly in Eritrea, could be justified to most African states as an effort to defend the sacred OAU principle of preserving African territorial integrity. Having in mind that the dispatch of Cuban combat troops to Ethiopia could nonetheless cause an adverse reaction in some African and Arab states and in the U.S., could embroil Cuba in another Angola-type situation from which it would be difficult to extricate themselves, and might turn out to be a commitment to a losing cause, the Cubans would probably prefer to confine themselves to an advisory role. However, once involved, they could come under EPMG pressure, and possibly Soviet as well, to introduce combat troops as the only way to bolster sagging Ethiopian troop morale and prevent the excision of Eritrea from Ethiopia.

C. Ethiopian Interests:

The controlling members of the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC), the supreme body in the Ethiopian Provisional Military Government (EPMG) which took power in 1974, view the U.S. with deep suspicion. Our quarter-century of close friendship and of generous support for Haile Selassie make it difficult for the PMAC to believe that the U.S. can sincerely desire a cooperative relationship with those who overthrew the Emperor. Conscious that it lacks widespread acceptance, that it does not have the "right to rule" of the centuries-old Solomonic line it overthrew, and that it relies on force for its authority, the PMAC seeks legitimacy and support through espousal and pursuit of social-reform goals which it attributes to the will of the people. Genuinely grieved at the Haile Selassie regime's favoritism towards the privileged classes and neglect of the poor, the PMAC has adopted what it calls a Marxist-Leninist path for the achievement of its social-reform goals, making it ideologically difficult for the PMAC to trust the motives towards itself of the world's major capitalist power.

Despite receptiveness at various lower EPMG levels to cooperation with the U.S., the PMAC has been reluctant to give its approval to projects which would associate the U.S. with the PMAC's social reform goals. Continued EPMG reliance on the U.S. for its security needs has resulted from necessity, not choice: with an American-supplied arsenal, a sudden switch to another supplier would result in a period of degraded security, and no ideologically acceptable source was, until recently, prepared to become Ethiopia's supplier.

The immediate interest of the PMAC leaders is, of course, survival in a situation where assassination is the favorite means for solving disputes both within the PMAC and between the PMAC and its opponents. Other PMAC objectives, in the order in which they probably demand day-to-day attention, are:

- neutralization of threats to PMAC rule in Addis Ababa;
- sufficient control of the countryside to prevent the build-up of momentum for any group which might challenge PMAC rule at the center, to provide economic underpinning for the regime, and to prevent any successful secessionist attempts;
- progress toward implementing the social reform goals from which the PMAC derives its legitimacy;
- secure access to the sea.

Challenges to EPMG control of the country exist in the form of internal insurgencies in several northern and southern provinces. In addition to the Eritrea secessionists (see next section), two groups pose potential challenges to EPMG control of the center: the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP) and the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU).

The EPRP, whose leadership has Marxist leanings but also includes people of other ideological persuasions who see it as the only viable alternative to the EPMG, is active mainly in Addis Ababa itself where it engages in assassinations and foments student unrest.

The EDU is composed largely of individuals identified with the Haile Selassie regime who, while recognizing that a return to the monarchy is not possible, wish to replace the EPMG with a moderate government. Many EDU members went into exile following Haile Selassie's overthrow but have since been grouped into a fighting force which has operated from the Sudan into the northern province of Begemdir. The EDU has taken one northern town, Humera, and is on the verge of taking another, Metemma. They have sought U.S. support or at least a U.S. indication that it would look with favor on support from other potential sources.

Neither the EPRP nor the EDU seems capable of toppling the EPMG unless they can find support among the Ethiopian military. The February 3 executions of Chief of State Teferi Bante and six others eliminated potential top level PMAC supporters of the EPRP and consolidated the rule of Lt. Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam.⁶ It may, however, have embittered others in the military who might therefore be susceptible to approaches from the EPRP or the EDU.

⁶ See Document 2.

D. *The Eritrean Question:*

Eritrean hopes for at least a return to internal autonomy in federation with Ethiopia, decreed by the UN in 1952 but terminated in 1962 by forced union with Ethiopia, were dashed when the first EPMG Chief of State, Eritrean-born General Andom, was assassinated in 1974. Since then, indiscriminate and brutal counter-insurgency attacks by Ethiopian troops have embittered the Eritreans and swelled the ranks of the secessionists, who have been receiving support not only from Iraq and Syria but also from more moderate Arab states, including Saudi Arabia. Secessionists now control the countryside and Ethiopian forces, confined to the main towns, are forced to rely on air drops and heavily armed convoys to maintain the flow of supplies. Although divided into three different groups, the secessionists' bitterness toward Ethiopia, their battlefield gains, and their widening support are making them less and less inclined to accept a settlement short of independence. While the tide of battle now favors them, leading to the U.S. intelligence estimate that Eritrea will have *de facto* independence within the next 12 months,⁷ the Eritreans' ability to sustain independence seems questionable in the face of Ethiopian hostility and their own inability to reconcile their differences.

E. *Somali Interests:*

Somalia depends on the Soviets for virtually all its military supplies and equipment. It also relies on the USSR for some economic aid. Given the unrest and tensions in the Horn, Somalia is loath to take any step which might weaken it militarily. Somalia's bureaucracy and its military/security apparatus are permeated with Soviet advisors. Like the EPMG, Somalia's leadership has a legitimacy problem, having overthrown an elected government, and has sought a similar method of solving it by espousing "scientific socialism" as the best path for realizing the people's will for a better life. A Leninist-style party apparatus has been created in Somalia, formal links have been established between it and the Soviet Communist Party, a Soviet-Somali Friendship Treaty has been concluded, and Somali President Siad has gone out of his way to praise the USSR and to parrot Soviet policy lines.

All of this would make it difficult for Somalia to effect a dramatic reduction of the Soviet presence there should it wish to do so. However, the prospect of a major Soviet military supply relationship with their Ethiopian foe has caused the Somalis to consider whether it might be in their national interest to readjust their relations with the USSR, and with the U.S., if that can be accomplished without jeopardizing

⁷ See Document 8.

Somalia's military security or President Siad's own leadership position and is otherwise made worth their while.

No Somali leader can disavow the dream of a Greater Somalia—an area including Djibouti, the northeastern portion of Kenya and the Ogaden of Ethiopia, all of which are inhabited by ethnic Somalis. However, particularly since the present Somali Government derives its power not from demonstrated popular consent but from its control of an extensive security apparatus, the survival of the Somali leadership does not require it to work actively, let alone take risks, for the achievement of that dream. Nonetheless, failure to seize opportunities to advance that goal or to retaliate against those seen to be conniving against it could be costly to a Somali leader.

F. Djibouti:

Ethiopia and Somalia could be at loggerheads over the French Territory of the Afars and Issas (FTAI), the French enclave on the Gulf of Aden between Ethiopia and Somalia which is scheduled to become independent this year as the Republic of Djibouti. Opposed to Somali ethnic irredentism is Ethiopia's interest in the port of Djibouti, through which 40% of Ethiopia's dry cargo passes, it being the only port linked by rail with Addis Ababa.

The EPMG must be aware that Djibouti is much more dependent than Addis Ababa on the Ethiopian transit trade and they therefore should be able to count on a cooperative attitude toward Ethiopia on the part of whoever leads an independent Djibouti government. Despite that and Ethiopia's many other military preoccupations, the EPMG might be tempted to launch a pre-emptive strike if they become convinced that Djibouti is likely to fall under hostile Somali control through military or other means, particularly if, at the same time, continued Ethiopian control of the Eritrean ports of Assab and Massawa is uncertain.

Recent French moves have produced a government in Djibouti which is more acceptable to Mogadiscio than its pro-Ethiopian predecessor. If the May 8 referendum and election⁸ return to power a government willing to cooperate closely with Somalia, it will enhance the possibility that Somalia will feel its ambitions with respect to Djibouti are being advanced for the time being. A new Djibouti government, however, might attempt to distance itself from Somalia, forcing Mogadiscio to adopt a more aggressive policy. The Somalis are still more likely to rely on subversion to achieve their objectives in Djibouti.

⁸ In telegram 21 from Djibouti, May 9, the Consulate reported on the Djibouti referendum and elections. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770162-0666)

While the threat of Somali military moves against Djibouti *per se* has thus diminished, there is still a possibility that Somalia will attempt to capitalize on Ethiopia's state of confusion to encroach further into the Ethiopian Ogaden. That region supplies a vital link in the annual transhumance life-pattern of many Somali nomads whose home areas are in Somalia. The Ogaden thus represents a socio-economic prize for Mogadiscio that transcends mere ethnic sentiment. Additionally, it is the home area for President Siad's Merrehan clan. A Somali feint towards Djibouti to draw off Ethiopian forces and thus facilitate a move into the Ogaden, where Somalia-backed guerrillas are already active, cannot be ruled out.

The possibility of Ethiopian-Somali conflict over Djibouti can be lessened to some extent by international focus on the territory. Continued UN and OAU attention could be beneficial in this respect, as will official representation in Djibouti by Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the U.S. If current bickerings among the Djibouti political groups and with the French can be resolved and elections successfully held on May 8, the June 27 independence date may be met. Rapid admission to the OAU at the July Chiefs of State Conference will help the independent government gain legitimacy, as will prompt admission to the UN and the Arab League, the opening of foreign embassies in Djibouti, and the start of foreign aid programs (e.g., by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia) to supplement French aid efforts. While the Soviets retain their use of Somali military facilities and are advancing their position in Ethiopia, it will be in their interest to counsel both these countries against conflict over Djibouti or the Ogaden.

Over the short term, the most effective deterrent to Somali or Ethiopian overt aggression in Djibouti will be a substantial French military presence. Pressure for the removal of French troops will undoubtedly increase after independence. While the French may be able to withstand external pressures, since their continued military presence will be based on the request of the new Republic of Djibouti, domestic pressure in France would mount if French troops suffered casualties either in repelling aggression or, more likely, in terrorist attacks.

It is not certain that an independent Djibouti will want to become part of Greater Somalia, which would risk a violent Ethiopian reaction. The Afars would clearly not be interested in such a move. The Issas, a clan of Somalis, has maintained a degree of aloofness from other Somali clans and might therefore be less inclined than others to respond to the call for ethnic unity. Djibouti's leaders recognize the territory's dependence on the Ethiopian transit trade, may not be attracted by Somalia's "scientific socialism", and might be disinclined to forego the perquisites of office in an independent Djibouti government. Saudi

Arabia would probably be willing to grant economic assistance to a moderate Djibouti Government in order to minimize radical influence and strengthen independence.

G. Sudanese and Moderate Arab Interests

Following a period of flirtation with the Soviets which ended in 1971 as a result of a short-lived takeover of the government by the Sudanese Communist Party, the Sudanese have sought friendship and cooperation with the West and with neighboring and moderate Arab states, notably Egypt and Saudi Arabia. These latter look upon Sudan, with its immense agricultural potential, as the future breadbasket of the Middle East and also as a buffer against hostile advances by Soviet-supported regimes, e.g., Ethiopia and Libya.

Sudan, Yemen Arab Republic, Egypt and Saudi Arabia are all alarmed at the potential threat to their security and to the security of the Red Sea posed by Soviet advances in the Horn of Africa. To contain that threat, they are undertaking initiatives designed to facilitate self-determination—preferably independence—in an Eritrea which would be induced to hew to an anti-Communist path by Saudi money. They are also attempting to use Somalia's disenchantment with Soviet military supplies to Ethiopia, plus the carrot of substantial Saudi financial aid, to woo Somalia away from the Soviets.

Sudanese-US relations, previously cool, have improved markedly in the past year. The U.S. has agreed to provide PL-480 food aid and to resume an economic aid program. In the security field, the U.S. has agreed to provide equipment and training to give Sudan a secure communications net and monitoring capability, Sudan has been declared eligible for FMS, Sudanese military personnel have been accepted for training in the U.S., and a Sudanese request to purchase six C-130 aircraft has been processed and advance notice given to the Congress on January 19. A decision on the C-130's has not yet been taken by the present Administration.

The Sudan's major internal problem, the struggle between the Arab/Moslem north and black African/Christian south, has abated. The north-south division is still, however, susceptible to occasional flare-ups, and the regime's stability is further threatened from within by tribal, ideological and religious dissidence, notably from members of the banned Communist party and the Ansar religious sect, many of whose members were driven into exile primarily in Ethiopia following an uprising in 1971.

Libyan hostility to the Sudan, stemming from a complex of motivations ranging from Qadafi's personal dislike of Nimeiri to his desire to put pressure on Egypt through the Sudan, has taken the form of aiding and abetting dissidents within and exiled from the Sudan, nota-

bly the Ansars. In his efforts to unseat Nimeiri, Qadafi has enlisted Ethiopian help for the arming and training of Sudanese in exile there. Ethiopia's willingness to cooperate with Libya derives both from a desire to halt Libyan aid to the Eritrean insurgents and from anger at Nimeiri for permitting Ethiopian exiles and Eritrean secessionists to mount operations against Ethiopia from Sudanese territory. At the turn of the year, the deterioration of Ethio-Sudanese relations erupted into mutual public denunciations by the two countries' leaders. This led Nimeiri to abandon his previous public neutrality on the Eritrean question, which had placed him in a position to moderate between the Eritreans and the Ethiopians, and he publicly announced Sudan's support for the cause of Eritrean independence.

Given its internal opponents and, especially, its hostile neighbors, Sudan's concern for its security is well founded. In these circumstances, Sudan finds it difficult to reconcile U.S. assurances of friendship and support for the Sudan with the continuation of U.S. arms supplies to Ethiopia, and difficult to understand U.S. hesitation to act favorably on Sudan's request for C-130 aircraft and unwillingness to give consideration to other Sudanese military requests. These views are shared by the Egyptians and by the Saudis, the latter being prepared to finance military purchases to enhance Sudanese security.

H. Kenyan Interests:

The immediate Kenyan concern with respect to the Horn of Africa is the effect developments there may have on Kenya's Somali-inhabited Northeast Province. It is in Kenya's interest for Somalia's irredentism to remain focussed on the Ogaden and Djibouti, since the Kenyans believe that Somali eyes will turn toward Kenya if the Ogaden and Djibouti issues were to be settled to Somali satisfaction. The perceived Somali threat induced Kenya in 1963 to enter into a still valid mutual defense treaty with Ethiopia.

Aside from the territorial threat from Somalia, the Kenyans must also worry about post-Kenyatta threats to the very character of their society and its moderate foreign policy orientation. While all of the likely successors have a stake in the continuation of Kenya's current domestic and foreign policies, virtually all of its neighbors, and the Soviets, hope to see those policies changed. A protracted struggle over Kenyatta's succession will present an opportunity to external elements desirous of altering Kenya's policies. Indeed, realization of this possibility by the Kenyan contenders may well facilitate a smooth transition. But even if the succession issue is resolved quickly and smoothly, any successor government will initially have less self-confidence and authority than the redoubtable Kenyatta and will thus be more vulnerable to outside influence.

In these circumstances, the discomfort Kenya has felt since Haile Selassie's overthrow regarding its association with leftist Ethiopia can only grow as the Soviet position there strengthens and EPMG-Cuban ties increase. The worst case for Kenya would be a successful effort by the Soviets to achieve dominance in Ethiopia while retaining their position in Somalia. Probably the best Kenya can hope for as matters are now moving is that a reduction of Soviet influence in Somalia might make Somalia more amenable to reaching some form of accommodation with Kenya.

I. Israeli Interests:

The Israelis are seriously concerned about developments in the Horn of Africa—specifically in Ethiopia and Djibouti. Their primary interest is to prevent an alignment of Arab strength in this area that could further isolate Israel and place it at a geopolitical disadvantage. They also seek to limit Soviet influence in that area, which they perceive as increasing in strength. Diplomatic relations between Ethiopia and Israel have remained broken since 1973, but an informal link exists in the form of Israeli training for Ethiopian elite divisions and Israeli support for Somali exile groups opposed to the Siad government. The Israeli interest in maintaining this link derives from the centuries-old antipathy between Ethiopia and Arabs in general and Israel's desire for influence with at least one country having Red Sea frontage.

In our view, interdiction of the Red Sea maritime route does not, of course, require control of the entire littoral. Nor, in the absence of an Israeli base in the southern portion of the Red Sea, does a position of some influence in Ethiopia materially enhance Israeli capability to counter a blockade. Furthermore, Israeli oil reserves are sufficient to withstand the effects of a blockade for six months, beyond which a blockade is unlikely to continue.

Nonetheless, the prospect of further hostile influence in the Red Sea area, whether Arab or Soviet, increases the potential threat of a blockade of a route on which Israel depends heavily not only for its Iranian oil supplies but for its important trade and communications with Asia and Africa. Anything which threatens to increase Israeli isolation is of genuine concern to them, and in the context of our relations with Israel and our objectives in the Middle East, to us as well.

Growing Soviet, Cuban and Libyan ties with the EPMG make the Israelis increasingly uncomfortable with the situation in Ethiopia and might force them to alter their estimate of Lt. Col. Mengistu as being a nationalist rather than a dedicated Marxist. They will nonetheless probably still be desirous of keeping a minimal tie with Ethiopia on the theory that an enemy of the Arabs can be an Israeli friend, and will probably continue to urge the U.S. to maintain its ties and assistance

to the Mengistu regime in the hope that a U.S. presence will attenuate Soviet influence. They will also urge the exercise of U.S. influence to lessen the possibility of elements hostile to Israel predominating in Djibouti.

J. Chinese Interests:

The People's Republic of China (PRC) has two major interests in Africa: weakening the Soviet position and enhancing its own role as champion of Third World interests. The PRC would like to see the U.S. function as a counterweight to the Soviets in the region, but it believes that our effectiveness has been diminished by our over-identification with racist white regimes in southern Africa. The PRC has relied on economic assistance as the primary means of enhancing its own influence in Africa, but it has also supplied modest amounts of military equipment and training to certain African governments and liberation groups.

In the Horn of Africa, the PRC has attempted to strengthen its position in Ethiopia and Somalia. For several years, the PRC has been the largest single Communist donor of economic aid to Ethiopia and, although unable to compete with the Soviets in supplying sophisticated military equipment, the PRC has reportedly provided light weapons, ammunition, and training assistance to the peasant militia forces in Ethiopia. The PRC has also supplied lesser amounts of economic assistance to both Somalia and the Sudan. The PRC has increased its influence in the Sudan at the expense of the Soviets over the past six years, but the Soviets clearly retain the upper hand in Somalia, and the PRC's ability to exploit Ethiopian fears of Somali irredentism has been undercut by Soviet moves to play both sides of the fence. The longer-term thrust of PRC policy lies in demonstrating commonality with the Africans on major North-South issues and in defining Third World interests as basically opposed to those of both the U.S. and the USSR. This sharply limits the cooperation which we can anticipate with the PRC, even though we have had a parallel interest in opposing the Soviets in Africa, particularly in Angola. While PRC efforts in the Horn may be helpful to our interests from this standpoint, our motivations are sufficiently different to provide an unsatisfactory basis for coordinating our policies in opposing Soviet moves.

III. U.S. Options

U.S. relations with Ethiopia have been sliding steadily downward since 1974. If presently controlling factors persist (e.g., Mengistu or a like-minded man in power, continued PMAC distrust of the U.S., further implementation of the Soviet arms agreement, inability of opposition groups to shake EPMG control), a further deterioration of the U.S. position seems inevitable. It is no longer a question of whether we can

arrest or even conceivably reverse this downward trend of our position in Ethiopia. The questions we must now address are whether a further reduction of the U.S. presence in Ethiopia will be at our or Ethiopian initiative, what we can do to minimize the adverse effects of a further reduction of our position in Ethiopia, what we can appropriately do to buttress or advance our position in other countries in the region, and whether we can prevent the situation in the Horn from being perceived as a gain for the Soviets at the expense of the U.S. or whether we can emerge from this situation as a nation possessed of the flexibility to turn a losing position in one country into a regional gain. Our options in Ethiopia must focus on our military relationship with the EPMG.

A. Option 1: Hang in there.

We could try to continue to operate our programs in Ethiopia at the maximum level acceptable to the EPMG and compatible with Congressional and policy constraints on our resources. This option would entail:

- approval of the full \$47 million ammunition purchase request outstanding from the Ethiopians;

- renewal of our offer of a \$10 million FMS credit using FY 1977 funds;

- continue our grant MAP training program;

- delivery of all military items in the pipeline for delivery in 1977 and 1978 (these include 14 M-60 tanks, 49 armored personnel carriers, 20 106mm jeep-mounted recoilless rifles, 8 F-5E aircraft, 6 patrol boats, and radar equipment);

- continued readiness to consider FMS cash and commercial requests for defense articles, consistent with our overall arms transfer policy;

- reiteration of our economic aid project proposals to which the EPMG has not yet responded as an earnest of our willingness to cooperate with EPMG efforts to reach their social reform goals;

- maintaining our information service activities.

This option would put us in the best position either to capitalize on any small changes in the situation operating to our advantage or to place the blame for any further deterioration on the EPMG. Our continued substantial presence might help to sustain the morale of Ethiopians who are oriented toward the West and who oppose the Mengistu regime. It would enable us to claim that we had, for our part, gone as far as we could to maintain our old supportive relationship with Ethiopia despite revolutionary changes and unfounded provocations, thereby demonstrating that we are prepared to work with Socialist regimes in Africa. It could inhibit a completely free hand for the

Soviets and could prevent those opposed to the EPMG from feeling abandoned by the U.S. to a Communist fate. It would continue some Ethiopian dependence on the U.S. for arms and give us, particularly with the option of phasing deliveries against good behavior, some potential leverage on EPMG performance. The Kenyans might see it as mitigating the pressure which might otherwise be exerted on their post-Kenyatta situation and the Israelis would applaud it.

Choice of this option would not have the effect of maintaining our presence at its present level. Whether or not this option is chosen, we have already pulled out our Peace Corps volunteers and have announced an end to grant materiel military aid, in part because of Ethiopian human rights violations. We are proceeding with plans to close our communications facility at Kagnew Station, reduce our MAAG from 46 to 21, replace the present Brigadier General MAAG chief with a Colonel, and move the MAAG from its present quarters to smaller offices in the Embassy compound. All of these pending actions can be explained as dictated by extra-Ethiopian considerations but will still be interpreted as signalling a downgrading of our interest in Ethiopia.

On the negative side, continued U.S. arms sales to the EPMG would be judged by the Sudanese, other moderate Arabs, Ethiopian opponents of the EPMG, and the Eritreans as misguided if not unfriendly support to their Ethiopian adversaries. The Somalis would view it in the same light and would question whether an improvement in their relations with the U.S. was in their interest. Its major effect on the EPMG would be to minimize any degradation in their military strength and, consequently, their ability to maintain themselves in power while they were in the process of converting from U.S. to Communist arms suppliers. We might well find that the EPMG, after we had approved their full request, would reduce it by those elements they were able to secure from Communist sources, accepting from the U.S. only those items not obtainable elsewhere. It would convince the EPMG that they can with impunity ignore U.S. concerns and still get from the U.S. all they want. The EPMG could continue to ignore our economic aid proposals, leaving us in the position of spurned suitor. Our arms supplies would continue our association with a government which we have publicly identified as a violator of basic human rights and provide them with the wherewithal to continue those violations.

This option may not, in fact, be available to us in this form. Not only may the Ethiopians turn down part or all of our offer because of having found other sources of supply, but also this option is incompatible with stated Administration desires to reduce the worldwide arms traffic and could well meet stiff Congressional opposition.

B. *Option 2*: Terminate our military relationship.

We could inform the EPMG that, as a result of our review of our world-wide arms transfer policy, we are unable hereafter to provide military supplies, equipment or training to Ethiopia. This would best be done after we had established and publicized the criteria which will henceforth govern our willingness to provide arms to foreign countries, enabling us to emphasize those factors which make Ethiopia as well as other countries no longer eligible to receive U.S. arms. If completion of our arms transfer policy review is likely to be protracted beyond the point when we feel action one way or the other must be taken on the year-old Ethiopian ammunition request, we could inform the EPMG that, while our arms transfer policy is still under review, the trend of the review makes it most unlikely that Ethiopia will henceforth be found eligible to receive U.S. arms supplies and they should accordingly make other arrangements for all military supplies, equipment and training which they have expected from us.

—Full implementation of this option would entail reimbursing the EPMG for progress payments already made on pipeline items, cancellation of commercial sales arrangements for which delivery has not been effected, and termination of training already in progress.

—We could indicate that, while our military relationship with Ethiopia is thus coming to an end, we are still hopeful of being able to contribute to Ethiopia's social reforms and economic development through our AID program.

—We could indicate our desire to continue our cultural interchange with the Ethiopian people through our USIS activities.

This option would cause a hostile EPMG reaction. It could lead to a virulent propaganda campaign which might trigger a wave of violent anti-Americanism in Addis Ababa and other urban centers, endangering the approximately 1,000 American citizens living in Ethiopia, particularly those connected with the U.S. military and other USG activities. It would, accordingly, be prudent to reduce the USG official presence prior to such an announcement.

This option would also be likely to result in the termination by the EPMG of other USG programs, possibly even stimulating them to break relations with us. This latter eventuality would deprive us of access to the OAU and ECA headquarters in Addis Ababa. This option would deprive us of useful contact that we now enjoy in such sectors as the military, the academic community and elsewhere. It would cause the EPMG to press the Soviets and other Communist suppliers to accelerate arms deliveries and possibly to undertake other measures to bolster Ethiopian security.

All of Ethiopia's neighbors, with the possible exception of Kenya, would applaud this decision. The Sudan, in particular, would be

pleased. However, once significant Soviet arms had arrived in Ethiopia, the Sudanese would argue that this enhanced the danger to their security and would redouble their efforts to secure from us not only the already formally requested C-130 aircraft but also F-5's, armored personnel carriers and other arms. Kenya might also seek additional arms from us. The Somalis would be encouraged to believe that a sharp reduction by them of Soviet activities in Somalia would merit military and economic rewards for them arranged or blessed by the U.S. The Somalis might also be tempted by such a U.S. decision to move on Djibouti and/or the Ogaden although their assumptions about the extent of Ethiopia's existing arms stocks, their knowledge of their own short supply situation and dependence on the Soviets for logistics and resupply would give them pause. Also, the Somalis know that they can probably dominate Djibouti politically in any case.

Internally, this option would embolden the Eritrean secessionists and further demoralize the Ethiopian troops in that province, possibly leading to, at least temporarily, a successful break-away of Eritrea. It might stimulate additional defections of Ethiopian military personnel to the EDU, enhance EDU prospects for foreign support and for enlarging the area of their control in northern Ethiopia. It might also strengthen the EPRP in Addis Ababa and other urban centers. It could conceivably stimulate conflict between rival factions in the Ethiopian military and could lead to Mengistu's overthrow and replacement by individuals more inclined to cooperate with the U.S.

This option would help to disassociate us from EPMG human rights violations.

C. *Option 3: Middle Course.*

We should also consider an option part-way between Options 1 and 2 under which we would:

- agree to provide up to one-third of the \$47 million Ethiopian ammunition request, indicating that consideration of the remainder would be facilitated by access to top policymakers and evidence that the EPMG will take into account our views on matters of concern to us. Such matters include the desirability of a political settlement in Eritrea, improvement of Ethiopia's human rights record, and Ethiopian restraint with respect to Djibouti.

- renew our offer to continue FMS credits;

- continue our MAP training program;

- indicate willingness to deliver all military items in the pipeline;

- continue to accept FMS and commercial requests for defense articles and services;

- indicate our desire to contribute to the EPMG's development goals;

- maintain our USIS program.

(A variation of the foregoing would be to make further military deliveries *dependent* upon access to top policymakers and improved EPMG behavior with respect to Eritrea and human rights and restraint on Djibouti.)

This option would essentially maintain our present military supply relationship but respond only partially to the EPMG ammunition request. It would buy us time to proceed with an orderly reduction of American citizens resident in Ethiopia in an atmosphere less inclined than Option 2 to generate anti-American violence. It could provide us with some potential leverage on the EPMG and force them to realize that further failure on their part to take account of U.S. interests will not be without cost to them. The Somalis, Sudanese and other advocates of an end to our military relationship with Ethiopia might view it as a half-hearted step but might be prevailed upon to see it as a measured response moving in the direction they desire. The Kenyans would see it as, on balance, serving their interests. The French would see it as a U.S. attempt to preserve some leverage supportive of their Djibouti policy.

On the other hand, it would lack the principled justification of Option 2 and could be seen as a petty, punitive step. Alternatively, since the history of our arms relationship with Ethiopia has been characterized by inflated Ethiopian requests followed by much reduced U.S. deliveries, the EPMG might conclude that it represented nothing more than a continuation of past patterns, and the message and leverage would thereby be lost. It would in any case provide the EPMG with at least a partial cushion for their conversion to Communist suppliers.

Opposition in Congress to this option might be lessened if it were presented as a further step toward reducing our military relationship with Ethiopia and facilitating an orderly phase-down of our operations in that country.

This option would lessen but not end charges of U.S. implication in EPMG human rights violations.

D. *Option 4: Gradual Termination of the Military Relationship*

We should finally consider an option aimed at bringing to an end our arms supply relationship but in a manner less abrupt than Option 2. Under this option, we would acknowledge to the EPMG our awareness of their desire to diversify their sources of arms and their progress toward that goal. We would state that this goal accords with our own desire to phase down our military relationship with Ethiopia, a desire based on our human rights concerns and our distaste at the degree of our association with their efforts to solve the Eritrean problem by force rather than negotiations. We would indicate our hope that our future relationship with Ethiopia will henceforth concentrate on economic development. We would inform them that, to this end, we will:

—be willing to sell them part of their \$47 million ammunition request, but only those items unobtainable elsewhere and in reduced amounts;

—make available, as previously promised \$10 million in FMS credits in FY 77 but indicate that we do not plan to renew the offer in FY 78;

—continue to make MAP training available though on a reduced scale;

—no longer be able to supply them with major defense equipment items, including those now in the pipeline, for which we will reimburse them for progress payments with interest (this will be likely to entail serious legal problems and financial penalties for the USG);

—be willing to continue on-going AID projects, to rapidly implement project proposals already presented to but not yet approved by the EPMG, and be prepared to expand our AID program even further;

—maintain our USIS program.

This option would reduce our military relationship to the lowest level susceptible of acceptance by the EPMG, given the likelihood that some of the ammunition items would be extremely difficult if not impossible to find substitutes for elsewhere. It would lessen the punitive impact of Option 2 by indicating a willingness on our part to cooperate with and facilitate EPMG efforts to shift to more ideologically compatible arms suppliers, without leaving them bereft at a time of difficulty.

This option would, like Option 3, give us time for an orderly reduction of the resident American population. It would lessen the risk in the Option 2 approach of a break in relations, but would, if accepted, leave us with at least a skeleton military aid presence and a substantial economic aid mission. It would be welcomed by the Sudan and Somalia as a substantial step away from a U.S. arms relationship with their Ethiopian foe but would be less likely than Option 2 to stimulate the destabilizing perception of an arms imbalance in the area. It would be less likely than Option 2 to give the Somalis the impression that we are eager to transfer virtually all of our Ethiopian eggs into the Somali basket, giving them an undesirable degree of leverage in the process of readjusting our relationship. It would be welcomed by the Kenyans and the Israelis as designed to maintain a U.S. presence in Ethiopia. It would demonstrate to others dependent on U.S. arms supplies a measure of U.S. reliability despite considerable provocation. It would significantly ease our degree of association with Ethiopian human rights violations and would encourage internal opponents of the Mengistu regime.

Our refusal to deliver major equipment items already contracted and partially paid for would subject us to the charge of bad faith and

would carry the risk, if reduced, of a break in relations and danger to American citizens. It seems unlikely that the EPMG, denied what they most want from us, the major military items, will be any more amenable than in the past to a continued let alone enhanced role for us in their economic development plans. It would be likely to result in the cessation of our USIS program.

IV. U.S. Policy in Other Countries in the Region

Since we have to assume that the U.S. position in Ethiopia will continue to decline over the short term and that our choice among the above options will only either slow or accelerate that process, our actions toward other countries in the regions will be only marginally affected by that choice. However, if the inevitable reduction of our position in Ethiopia is to be turned to a net U.S. advantage in the Horn region, we must consider actions available to us to consolidate and advance our position in neighboring countries.

Sudan's concern for its security (shared by Egypt and Saudi Arabia) will remain high whatever we do in Ethiopia. Our willingness to proceed with the C-130 sale, to go beyond that in the military field and to provide the kind of social and economic development aid which will broaden the support base for the Nimeiri regime could all contribute to the stability of the regime, the confidence of the Sudanese, Egyptians and Saudis, and our position in the area. We will have to decide which of these elements of support, and to what extent, are compatible with our arms transfer concerns and with Congressional and Israeli tolerance, or whether our interests in the Sudan override those concerns and merit a major U.S. commitment of support.

With respect to Somalia, we have to decide whether a relationship with us close enough to end or drastically restrict Soviet operations from Somali military facilities is (a) possible, in view of the degree of Somali entanglement with the Soviets, and (b) important enough to us and likely to be sufficiently durable to warrant a positive response from us to Somali military and economic aid requests.

If convinced that the Somalis are genuinely prepared to reduce their Soviet ties significantly, the Saudis have indicated that they are prepared to make such a move financially worth the Somalis' while. We should consult with the Saudis to determine what specific changes in behavior towards, on the one hand, the Soviets, and, on the other, Western and pro-Western countries, are deserving of what degree of Saudi financial reward. If the Somalis are prepared to move to a point where a cut-off of Soviet military support seems likely, at which point the Saudis would presumably be willing to be generous with finances, we must then determine whether Somali replacement of Soviet by American arms is sufficiently worth our while for a Presidential deter-

mination to be made that Somalia is eligible for the Foreign Military Sales program or for us to agree to permit commercial arms purchases by Somalia.

If it is determined that the politico-military strategic considerations with respect to Somalia are not sufficiently important to warrant a breach of the Administration's policy of limiting U.S. arms transfers, we would have to decide if the use of our good offices on Somalia's behalf with other Western arms suppliers would satisfy the Somali security requirements. In any case, we are preparing an offer of economic aid and we should actively study other ways of improving relations with Somalia.

With respect to Djibouti, in addition to continuing to counsel restraint in both Mogadiscio and Addis Ababa and urging the Soviets to do likewise, we should approach other African states, particularly in Francophone Africa, to suggest that they undertake more active measures to defuse the situation, including considering the possibility of establishing resident diplomatic missions.

While Option 2 could stimulate the Kenyans to seek additional military aid, Kenya's absorptive capacity for such aid is likely to be close to its upward limit with current UK efforts to upgrade Kenya's ground force capability and U.S. provision of F-5 aircraft and related training. It may be more pertinent to consider what U.S. action might be most appropriate and effective in facilitating a smooth succession, thereby reducing the opportunities for Soviet or other mischief, and to enhance Kenyan confidence in the post-Kenyatta period.

We should keep in mind the fact that all of the present contenders are people we can work with comfortably, they all have an interest in a smooth, rapid transition, and the Kenya military is probably the least politicized armed force in Africa and has a stake in the country's stability and prosperity. We should also bear in mind that the major vulnerability of the Kenyatta regime has been the charge of corruption: such charges against a successor to Kenyatta could have politically fatal consequences. Under the circumstances, it would seem desirable for us to avoid political action which, if revealed, would increase the vulnerability of our chosen candidates and add to pressures for repudiation or a reduction of the US-Kenya tie. We should consider whether the most useful action for us under the circumstances might not be assurances to all the Kenyan contenders that we are prepared to be at least as forthcoming with our support for the new Kenya leadership which succeeds Kenyatta as we have been towards his government.

11. Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, April 11, 1977, 4–5:25 p.m.

SUBJECT

Ethiopia and Horn of Africa

PARTICIPANTS

The Vice President

State

Secretary Vance

William Schaufele

Defense

Secretary Brown

William Duncan

Leslie Janka

JCS

General George S. Brown

Lt. Gen. William Y. Smith

CIA

Admiral Turner

William Parmenter

Office of the US Rep. to the UN

Ambassador Young

Dr. Anne Holloway

NSC

Zbigniew Brzezinski

David Aaron

Paul Henze

Thomas Thornton

Purpose of the Meeting

The meeting was called, with Secretary Vance in the chair, to review PRM/NSC–21.² Under discussion were U.S. arms supply policy toward Ethiopia and, in light of the deteriorating situation in that country, actions to strengthen the U.S. position in Somalia, Kenya, Djibouti and the Sudan.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

Current Situation: The meeting reviewed current intelligence on the area which indicates that the military regime in Ethiopia is becoming more brutal and more beleaguered. Ethiopian forces are losing ground steadily to the Eritreans in the north and in the northwest to an exile movement called the Ethiopian Democratic Union. Both elements enjoy Sudanese support. The intelligence community continues to estimate that the military regime can maintain itself in Addis Ababa for an indefinite period of time, but an assassination or coup is always possible. There is some disagreement as to what kind of a government would follow the overthrow of the present military regime.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files 1977–1981, Box 184, PRC 770010–4/11/77–Horn of Africa. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. No minutes of the meeting have been found.

² See Document 10.

Where do we go in Ethiopia? It was agreed that we should not pull out of Ethiopia entirely, because we wish to be in a position to reassert ourselves there if a friendlier and more humane government comes to power. But it was also agreed that we cannot justify further significant support to the present government in view of its moves toward the Soviets, its ineffectiveness in governing its own country and its brutalization of its people. Non-lethal military aid that is in the current pipeline—5T and 2½T trucks and jeeps—will be delivered and military training of Ethiopians in the United States will be continued. All other military aid—ammunition, APCs, F-5 aircraft—even when it has been on order and paid for by the Ethiopians—will be subject to delaying action. We will not tell the Ethiopians we are delaying; we will simply wait and see. Meanwhile, economic aid will continue. This situation will naturally need to be reassessed every few weeks in the light of new developments in Ethiopia.³

Somalia: Our Ambassador in Mogadiscio, who is returning shortly, will be instructed to have a frank talk with President Siad when he gets back and ask for his views on where he wants to go and what he expects from us if he disengages from the close Soviet relationship.⁴ We will also send an exploratory aid mission to Somalia to see what we might be able to do economically. For the time being we will let the Saudis take the lead in offering money for military aid. No conclusion was reached on the possibility of sending a U.S. vessel on a port call. The discussion highlighted some of the problems in rushing into too close a relationship with the Somalis too soon, including the possibility that Siad may be trying to play both us and the Soviets at the same time. More specific are the danger of frightening Kenya and of encouraging Somali territorial ambitions toward Ethiopia and Djibouti.

Kenya: We will offer economic aid for the Northeastern (i.e. Somali-inhabited) Province and talk further about military help. When Kenyatta dies, we will move quickly to show support for the government that succeeds him. It was pointed out that Kenya feels endangered these days not only by Somalia and the growing Soviet orientation of Ethiopia, but by Soviet aid to Tanzania and Uganda.

³ In an April 11 memorandum to Carter, Brzezinski transmitted the decision minutes of the PRC meeting and requested approval to disseminate them for action. Carter checked the Approve option and wrote, "Sounds too easy on Ethiopia. Why just 'wait & see'? Need thorough discussion with Fahd re Horn. J." Vance discussed Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa with Crown Prince Fahd on May 24 during Fahd's visit to Washington. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Document 150.

⁴ Loughran finally met with Siad on May 22, a month after he returned to Mogadiscio. He reported on his meeting in telegram 826 from Mogadiscio, May 23. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770183-0097)

Djibouti: Secretary Vance recounted the promises he had received from Giscard about maintaining a French presence for 1–2 years and we plan to rely on these.⁵ It was agreed that we would encourage the Saudis to help economically.

Sudan: We will move to make our relationship closer and warmer. If additional military equipment (beyond the recently approved C–130's) can be supplied, we will consider it. The possibility of stepping up naval visits to Port Sudan will be examined.

The Committee agreed that a further review of the situation in the Horn will probably be needed in about six weeks in the light of further developments in Ethiopia, clearer information about what the Somali leadership is trying to do and better indications of how fast and far the Saudis are prepared to go. It was agreed that we should keep up discussions with other interested allies, such as the French and the Italians.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

⁵ In telegram 9751 from Paris, April 3, the Embassy reported on Vance's meeting with Giscard and their discussion of French troops in Djibouti. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850070–1725)

12. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance and Secretary of Defense Brown¹

Washington, April 19, 1977

The enclosed note from the President speaks for itself. You will recall that we had decided not to transfer arms to Ethiopia but also not to inform them. The President wishes them to be informed.

You will also recall that at the PRC meeting we agreed that there was political utility—given the instability and unpredictability in Ethiopia—in not informing the Ethiopians of our decision to suspend arms

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 17, State 4/77. Secret.

deliveries.² The consensus was that this leaves the situation more open and is less likely to drive Ethiopia into the hands of the Soviets. My own view, for whatever it is worth, is that that approach is still correct but I will wait to hear from you before raising the issue with the President.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Attachment

**Note From President Carter to Secretary of State Vance,
Secretary of Defense Brown, and the President's Assistant
for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)³**

Washington, April 19, 1977

To Cy & Zbig & Harold

If Ethiopia acts as projected [*less than 1 line not declassified*], we should immediately terminate shipment of all arms—but let them know now.

See me re this if necessary—

J.C.

² See Document 11.

³ Secret. The note is handwritten.

**13. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to
President Carter¹**

Washington, April 22, 1977

[Omitted here are items unrelated to the Horn of Africa.]

6. *Ethiopia*: We have learned from very reliable intelligence sources that the Ethiopians, in retaliation against our decision to reduce the

¹ Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 12, State Department Evening Reports, 4/77. Secret.

MAAG and close down Kagnev,² are planning to tell us within the next few days of their decision to close the MAAG Mission entirely within a week, shut down Kagnev in two weeks, close our Consulate General in Asmara shortly thereafter and reduce the size of our diplomatic mission in Addis Ababa.

We had an earlier hint from the Minister of Defense that the Ethiopian Government might be moving in this direction. We have already stopped delivery of military items in the pipeline but have not so informed the Ethiopians. If the Ethiopians move as we understand they will, we should shut off the remaining non-lethal items in the pipeline and, when we have safely withdrawn our people and decreased the size of our staff, inform the Ethiopian Government that no further deliveries will be forthcoming. I don't believe it would be prudent to inform the Ethiopians until we are assured of the safety of our staffs.³

[Omitted here are items unrelated to the Horn of Africa.]

² See Document 6.

³ Carter wrote in the left margin, "ok, do this."

14. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, April 23, 1977

Ethiopia

As we had anticipated, the Ethiopian Government told us today to terminate the activities of NAMRU (a Navy research facility), MAAG, United States Information Service, Kagnev Station, and the Consulate General in Asmara, which means our evacuating roughly 200 Americans within four days. They did not mention reducing the staff of the Embassy itself.

¹ Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 12, State Department Evening Reports, 4/77. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote, "Cy."

Assistant Secretary Schaufele has organized a Working Group of State, USIA, Defense, CIA, AID and NSC that is functioning around the clock in the State Department. We are working on the following items:

1. We will make a strong protest about the 4-day deadline,² will request an extension and try to enlist the assistance of Tanzania and Kenya to support this request.³

2. We are preparing appropriate guidance for our posts abroad.

3. We are preparing plans for the evacuation of our people and equipment and will probably be requesting Ethiopian Government permission to bring in US Air Force aircraft for that purpose.

4. We may have to destroy some sensitive equipment in Kagnew if we are unsuccessful in getting an appropriate extension of time.

5. We are examining whether to reduce the size of our Embassy staff, on our own initiative, after we have completed the evacuation of other personnel.⁴

6. We are informing leading members of Congress.

[Omitted here are items unrelated to the Horn of Africa.]

² In telegram 92279 to Addis Ababa, April 23, the Department instructed the Embassy to “protest strongly to the Ethiopian Government the unreasonable time frame given us.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770142–1105)

³ In telegram 5050 from Nairobi, April 24, Marshall reported that the Kenyan Foreign Minister would instruct the Kenyan Chargé d’Affaires in Addis Ababa to approach Mengistu on the behalf of the United States, but doubted that it would be effective. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770142–1162)

⁴ Carter wrote “ok” in the left margin.

15. Report Prepared by the Interagency Ethiopia Working Group¹

Washington, undated

Situation Report No. 3

Situation with Regard to Withdrawal of USG Personnel from Ethiopia as of 1800 hours (EDT), April 24, 1977

At 1740 Asmara time (1040 hours EDT) and with only ten minutes prior warning, the Ethiopian military forcibly occupied our communications site at Kagnev Station. Our personnel were escorted out. They subsequently reported that all highly sensitive cryptographic material was destroyed. All US personnel are safe and the communications equipment apparently is being guarded by Ethiopian troops, (the voice key was left open by the departing communicators but NSA reports that no conversations have yet been recorded). Our Charge in Addis Ababa immediately emphasized to the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry the need to avoid compromise of the communications equipment and we have prepared a written protest. (Similar equipment was lost in Vietnam).

If asked, we will tell the press that “we are still awaiting a report on disposition of equipment”.

Status of Airlift As of 1800 EDT April 24, 1977 planned airlift for the withdrawal of personnel from Ethiopia is as follows:

—MAC C-141 scheduled flight enroute to Addis Ababa, April 25, return Athens, 94 seats available. This flight to be used at discretion of Charge for movement of personnel who are ready to leave.

—MAC has contract for charter aircraft (DC-8) for arrival at Addis Ababa on April 27, 1977 to remove remaining personnel from Addis Ababa, approximately 210 seats available.

—USIS personnel are scheduled to depart Addis via regular commercial air as space is available. These personnel will utilize MAC charter if prior reservations are unobtainable.

—Charge was authorized to inform the Ethiopian Provisional Military Government (EPMG) that we plan to schedule military transport aircraft to arrive at Asmara one per day on April 25, 26, and 27. These aircraft, to withdraw personnel and equipment from Kagnev and the

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 21, Ethiopia: Withdrawal of US Government Personnel 4/77. Secret. Drafted on April 25; approved by Steven E. Steiner.

Consulate General, would depart the same day as arrival and return to Athens.

Our Charge met with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' American Affairs officer on the morning of April 24 to request an extension of the four day time limit and to seek assurances for the safety of US citizens and property.² Our Charge was assured that the EPMG: 1) wanted an orderly US withdrawal; 2) would continue to take necessary measures to ensure the security of personnel; and 3) were willing to consider extra time for departure ("time will be no problem"), but did not say how much time. With regard to both Addis and Asmara, the Charge raised the issues of immediate overflight clearances, removal of equipment, the need for an EPMG liaison officer to help with coordination of US withdrawal plans, continued access to US installations, and continued security for US personnel and their property. The Ethiopian official agreed to mention these questions to higher authority and indicated that he will relay the Charge's request for a meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs to discuss reasons for the expulsion as well as the future of US-Ethiopian relations.

Ambassador Schaufele convened a one hour meeting of the Working Group at 1:00 p.m.³ The Secretary of State and Undersecretary Habib attended. Among the decisions made (and not reported elsewhere) were:

1) A strong written protest will be made to the EPMG on the Kagnew takeover, to follow up the oral protest already made;

2) The Consulate General at Asmara will be instructed to implement their planned record and equipment destruction plan tomorrow morning. Destruction of substantive files in Asmara has begun.

3) Ambassador Schaufele will contact appropriate members of Congress, as well as the Speaker of the House and Senator Byrd, to inform them of recent developments.

The Embassy in Addis has informed the EPMG that contact personnel (Westinghouse and Northrop) would be evacuated with MAAG personnel. Although these employees are under FMS contract, and are not MAP or MAAG employees, the EPMG did not demur on this point.

At 1930 hours Asmara time, the Acting Principal Officer reported that the atmosphere had turned "distinctly sour" during the course of April 24.⁴ The Ethiopian hardliners named to participate on the Joint

² In telegram 2512 from Addis Ababa, April 25, the Embassy reported on the meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770246-0034)

³ No record of the meeting was found.

⁴ In telegram 338 from Asmara, April 24, the Consulate reported on the situation at Kagnew. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770143-0103)

Commission concerning the Kagnew closure appeared to be dominant and had placed restrictions on the movement of Kagnew personnel. (A later cable, however, reported that the Kagnew commander had received word through Ethiopian military contacts that the restrictions probably would be removed April 25).⁵ The Acting Principal Officer and the Kagnew Officer-in-Charge will meet with members of the Joint Commission at 8:30 a.m. Asmara time to negotiate the disposal of residual Kagnew equipment.

⁵ In telegram 340 from Asmara, April 24, the Consulate reported on backchannel assurances that Kagnew personnel would regain access the following day. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770143-0104)

16. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, April 26, 1977

1. *Ethiopia*: The Ethiopian Government has agreed to an extension from April 27 to April 30 of the deadline for departure of our personnel.² This decision, plus an overall improvement in the attitude of Ethiopian officials has much improved the chances for a safe and orderly departure. We will carry out the airlift on April 27 by DC-8 of most of our people in Addis Ababa as previously planned, leaving behind only those needed to complete shipping arrangements. We will, however, keep all personnel in Asmara until April 29 to remove as much equipment as possible, especially sensitive communications items.

We are anticipating Ethiopian pressure to cut our remaining 76 man mission, especially the AID staff. In any case, we are considering reducing our staff as rapidly as possible to about 25. I will send you my recommendation as to whether we should close down our embassy completely after I have reviewed the matter further.

In a related development, Somali Ambassador Addou, who is just back from Mogadiscio, called yesterday to say he is bringing a message

¹ Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 12, State Department Evening Reports, 4/77. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote, "Cy."

² See Document 15.

from Siad.³ He has asked for appointments with you and me. We are assuming Siad will indicate his interest in economic and military support in return for loosening ties with the Soviets. As soon as I see the Ambassador, I will let you know my recommendation as to whether you need to see him.⁴

[Omitted here are items unrelated to the Horn of Africa.]

³ See Document 17.

⁴ Carter wrote “ok” in the left margin.

17. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia¹

Washington, May 4, 1977, 0039Z

100279. Subject: Somali Ambassador’s Call on Secretary.

1. In half-hour conversation with Secretary May 3, Somali Ambassador Addou sought assurances that US would be prepared in principle to provide Somalia with economic and military aid. Addou stressed that he was acting under personal instructions from President Siad delivered to him in private meetings and of which only Security Chief General Suleiman might be aware. He emphasized the importance of preventing any leak, noting specifically that MOFA DirGen Abdul Rahman Jama Barre would not be privy to these instructions.

2. Addou said Siad was increasingly concerned at the growing ties between Ethiopia and the USSR, particularly the latter’s supply of arms to Ethiopia. Siad does not believe that Somalia and Ethiopia can be in the same camp at the same time. However, he noted, the depth of Somalia’s relationship with the Soviets makes it very difficult for Somalia to make a change. The Soviets have been pushing hard for Somalia to submerge its differences with Ethiopia in the interests of their common espousal of socialism and had even urged that Somalia join with Ethiopia, Aden and eventually Djibouti in a socialist federation. Addou said that the Somalis see socialism as a pragmatic way of developing economically and socially, but they are also very strong

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770155–0602. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Post (AF/E); cleared in S/S–O and S; approved by Seelye. Sent for information to Addis Ababa, Cairo, Jidda, Khartoum, Moscow, Nairobi, and Sana.

nationalists and deeply religious and have no interest in international socialism. Their talks with the Soviets have been very tough, including those with Podgorny, and the discussions had deadlocked with the Somalis rejecting any compromise of Somali national interests.

3. Addou said that in order to resist Soviet pressures, Somalia had to look for alternatives. Siad had asked him to seek from the Secretary and the President a response to Somalia's request for economic and military assistance. The Somali need for assurances particularly on the military side had gained urgency because of the Soviet deliveries of military equipment to Ethiopia which raised the possibility that Ethiopian leader Mengistu, now in Moscow obviously to discuss military matters with the Soviets, might start something which would jeopardize Somali security. Addou noted that fifteen years ago Somalia had sought military assistance from the United States and European countries, and only when these efforts failed had they accepted a Russian offer. Addou noted that Somali flexibility and the ability to withstand Soviet pressure depended on whether the US response was negative or positive. He added that Somalia was not now asking for a huge supply of arms from the US but did need to know if the US was in principle prepared to supply arms and would be willing to send an initial token shipment.

4. The Secretary said that on the economic side we are prepared to send a group very promptly to Somalia to discuss possible projects, and that Addou could so report. The US is also prepared to encourage others to provide economic aid. With respect to arms, the Secretary noted that we have been trying to formulate our arms transfer policy and hope to have that review completed in a couple of weeks. He suggested that meanwhile Somalia should look at alternative sources. Once we have decided on our overall policy, the US will be in a better position to respond one way or the other.

5. Addou accepted Secretary's offer to send AID team and expressed hope for earliest possible positive response to military aid request.

6. Addou reiterated the importance President Siad attaches to having Addou see President Carter. The Secretary said that he and the President will both be leaving Thursday morning.² They had tried to find space on the President's calendar for Addou but preparations for the trip to Europe, press conferences and other commitments have made it impossible. The Secretary offered, however, to arrange an appointment for Ambassador Addou with the Vice President in the next couple of days.³ Addou replied that he would be glad to see the

² May 5.

³ See Document 18.

Vice President but given the importance Siad attaches to his seeing the President, he hopes that will be possible when the President returns. The Secretary agreed to discuss this with the President.

7. After leaving meeting, Addou again stressed to Acting Assistant Secretary Seelye need for secrecy, specifically urging that Ambassador Loughran discuss these matters only with President Siad.

8. Action requested: We are prepared send AID team ASAP, but prefer confirmation from Siad to Ambassador Loughran that team will be welcome and will receive necessary support and assistance from GSDR unhindered by Soviet advisers.

Vance

18. Memorandum From Vice President Mondale to President Carter¹

Memo No. 408–77

Washington, May 12, 1977

SUBJECT

My Meeting with Somali Ambassador Addou, May 11, 1977

Somali Ambassador Addou called on me May 11, at his request. He also met last week with Cy Vance.²

Addou began by describing Soviet pressures on Somalia to accept Ethiopia's existing borders. According to Addou, the Soviets have as their objective the creation of a cluster of states, including Ethiopia, Somalia, Aden, and Djibouti, under Moscow's influence. Addou stated that Somalia's national interests dictate otherwise: Somalia seeks the self-determination of Somali people throughout the Horn. Because of this divergence, Somalia is turning to us for economic and military assistance. Addou cautioned that only he and President Siad know of this initiative, which is being pursued at Siad's request.

Addou expressed satisfaction that a U.S. economic mission would be traveling to Somalia next week to study specific projects. He is concerned, however, about the vagueness of State's reply concerning

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 69, Somalia: 1/77–6/78. Secret. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Vance and Brzezinski.

² See Document 17.

military assistance. Somalia recognizes our difficulty in supplying large-scale military aid immediately and, since there is no internal military threat in his country, Addou noted, the U.S. could begin its military supply at a low level. Addou insisted, nevertheless, that we give Somalia a formal reply within one month as to whether we will assist with military hardware. Only the U.S. can help Somalia in dealing with the Soviet Union, Addou added.

I encouraged them, as did Cy Vance, to buy military equipment elsewhere and that we would be supportive of that effort. He then indicated that they might be able to buy military equipment funneled through North Yemen. I'm not sure what he meant by that. He indicated a desire for armored personnel carriers and mortars as desired items. He indicated receptivity to arms being purchased for Somalia in Europe, but he repeatedly emphasized the need for the symbolism of U.S. military support, even though on a limited basis.

In reply to my question, Addou said that military assistance from the U.S. definitely would lead Somalia to reduce the Soviet presence. Somalia would end its military arrangements with the Soviet Union. Somalia only had turned to the USSR in the first place, he said, following U.S. and Western European refusal to help. I asked what the Somalis would be prepared to do regarding Berbera, and Addou replied, without specifying a time, that the Soviet use of these installations also might be reconsidered.³ He insisted that the Soviets simply have access to the port and airfield at Berbera and that the communications center there is jointly operated by the Soviets and the Somalis. Addou observed that the Soviets had infiltrated the entire Somali establishment, including the military, and this all was a very touchy matter. I told Addou that, unlike the Soviets, we have no designs on Somalia.

Addou observed that the Soviets have targeted Ethiopia as a model for communist revolution. Moscow, he noted, never was as certain with Somalia because of Somalia's strong religious, regional and nationalist commitments.

I told Addou that I would discuss our meeting with you. Addou also hopes to meet with you personally.

³ Documentation on U.S. concern about Soviet use of the port at Berbera is in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula.

19. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, May 16, 1977

SUBJECT

Military Aid for Somalia

In reference to your request for comments on the Vice President's memo (attached),² let me say that a good way to initiate a relationship with the Somalis on military matters would be for them to agree to let us have a defense attache in our embassy in Mogadiscio again. We have had none since 1970. A good attache could be a source of judgment about some of the fine points of military matters that we lack now—and his presence would be symbolically important and a good test of Somali intentions.

I recommend that, taking explicit note of Ambassador Addou's inquiry, we request that they permit the immediate dispatch of a U.S. military attache.³

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 69, Somalia: 1/77–6/78. Secret.

² Not attached; see Document 18.

³ Carter checked the Approve option and wrote "ok J" beneath the options. A notation in an unknown hand beneath an "Other" option reads, "How about a naval vessel visit to Berbera?"

20. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, June 16, 1977, 2–2:20 p.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting of Somali Ambassador Addou with President Carter, Oval Office,
2:00–2:20 p.m., 16 June 1977

PARTICIPANTS

President Carter
Ambassador Addou
Zbigniew Brzezinski
Talcott Seelye, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Africa
Paul B. Henze, NSC

The meeting opened with Ambassador Addou making a rather extensive statement to the President. He said he appreciated the great honor of being received by the President and wished to convey greetings from President Siad and his admiration for the President's stand on human rights. "There is no political oppression in Somalia," he declared, "and Somalia's people are deeply democratic by nature." He went on to comment that the situation in the region was becoming more complicated: "For social and economic development we need peace and must be able to defend ourselves." He said that his government was grateful for the U.S. economic mission that had just visited Mogadiscio.² "We also want to be able to count on the U.S. for our defense. The USSR is putting enormous pressure on the Somali government to accept its idea of Soviet hegemony in the area. International socialism is supposed to come first and national interests second. Somalia's national interests must come first and other forms of cooperation come afterward." The Ambassador added that Somalis value their independence too highly to be willing to consider joining together with Ethiopia or other countries in the area. He described a "problem of human rights" with Ethiopia—two million Somalis in Ethiopia, he said, want to be free of Ethiopian rule. To protect its interests, Somalia needs both economic and military assistance, he said, and President Siad will be waiting for an answer. In conclusion he summed up his position: "We must either resist Soviet pressure or succumb. We hope not to

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special, Box 1, Chron File: 6–7/77. Confidential. The meeting was held in the White House Oval Office. Paul Henze noted in the upper right corner, "Cy [copy] to Gerald Scott 6–17" and "to H Richardson 6/17 w/note to ck [check] with Christine [Dodson] re procedure."

² The AID survey mission visited Mogadiscio May 24–June 2. Telegram 894 from Mogadiscio, June 2, transmitted a summary of the mission's activities. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770196–0816)

have to succumb, which would be contrary to our national heritage. We appreciate the deep interest you have shown in the Somali people since you came to office. For years we have sought improved relations with the United States, but we were not listened to.”

President Carter asked the Ambassador to convey to President Siad his strong personal good wishes and thanks for his interest, which parallels ours, in having an increasingly strong friendship with Somalia. The President also asked that his congratulations be conveyed to the Ambassador’s daughter and President Siad’s son who will be married shortly. The President then went on to comment that the United States has been concerned about the closeness between Somalia and the USSR which had been a reason for doubt on our part that our friendship could be strong but, he said, “I believe that is now changing—we have watched with care the development of Berbera and the calls of Soviet ships there; we also have the impression that Soviet anti-submarine airplanes have been flying from Somalia. Because of the independent nature of the Somali people, we feel you are well able to take care of your own interests. We are eager to understand your needs more clearly. But it is hard for us to understand the military needs. A military attache would be helpful in giving us more understanding of your military needs. We do not want to compete with the USSR because we want Somalia to be non-aligned and not dominated by anyone. We can move more easily on a unilateral basis to give economic aid than military aid. We are trying to work with the Saudis³ and our European allies⁴ to see that Somalia has adequate defense capabilities without relying on the Soviet Union. We want the Somalis to recognize their own destiny. We hope your problems with Ethiopia can be peacefully worked out, and we are pleased that the TFAI will be encouraged in its independence by everyone in the area. I hope your own people will see an advantage in seeking progress with multinational friends, not by relying just on us but by relying on European countries, too. We are cooperating carefully with them and with the Saudis. In meetings with some of our European friends we have discussed Somalia and how important it is to have it associated with us as a democratic country. We appreciate your own personal friendship with our country and we recognize you as a spokesman for democratic processes and freedom. There is no doubt that you represent your nation well and

³ In telegram 8402 from Cairo, May 18, the Embassy reported on consultations between Seelye and Prince Saud on U.S. cooperation with Saudi Arabia in dealing with the Horn of Africa. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770177–0634) See also footnote 3, Document 11.

⁴ In telegram 15290 from Paris, May 25, the Embassy reported on ongoing discussions with the French Foreign Ministry on the Horn of Africa. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770186–0666)

report our views well to your government and that means a great deal to us.”

The President continued:

“We recognize the strategic importance of your country because of the character and attitude of your people and your insistence on independence of action and thought. You can have a very important influence in your whole region. The degree with which we can communicate freely is important, of course, and we do appreciate the steady but very gratifying trend toward the removal of past doubts and misunderstandings and difficulties. The trends are all in the right direction. We are very hopeful—and the members of the Congress share my hope—that they will culminate in a completely comfortable relationship between our country and yours.”

The Ambassador commented briefly on the fact that Somalis are 100% religious people and took his prayer beads out of his pocket to emphasize that he himself prayed five times each day. He went on to say that the Soviets came to Somalia because the Somalis had had no choice—“but now we see in you, Mr. President, hope and inspiration. We hope your human rights drive encourages other people.” The President at this point rose to say that he would like to step out for a moment to get a small gift he would like the Ambassador to take back to President Siad. Meanwhile, Dr. Brzezinski asked the Ambassador whether President Siad had made any public declarations about human rights. The Ambassador noted that Siad had condemned the killings that were taking place in Ethiopia and had taken Idi Amin to task for his cruelty. Dr. Brzezinski asked whether Siad had said anything publicly about President Carter’s human rights position. The Ambassador indicated that he had not but that he expected he would. The President returned with a volume of U.S. satellite photography which was examined briefly by the Ambassador and the President and then good-byes and good wishes were exchanged.

The Ambassador said he would return from Somalia at the end of August and he hoped there would be good developments by then. Dr. Brzezinski accompanied the Ambassador to his car.

21. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, July 9, 1977

[Omitted here are items unrelated to the Horn of Africa.]

4. *Yugoslav Transfer of Tanks to Ethiopia*: The Yugoslavs have admitted to our Ambassador that they have transferred 70 Korean War vintage M-47 tanks to Ethiopia.² The Yugoslav Foreign Secretary agreed that they have violated their understanding with us but asked that we reexamine our intention to report the matter to the Congress and thereby protect the chance for military cooperation in the future.

I have examined the options available to us under the Arms Export Control Act which requires a report of the violation to the Congress. I recommend we submit a letter from you to the Congressional leadership reporting the information. The letter will also have to address the question of whether we have reasonable assurances from the Yugoslavs that future violations will not occur. I find we have these from the Foreign Secretary. I believe that a Congressional leak is unlikely.³ The Senate and House committees would recognize the cost to our relations with Yugoslavia and the members of both are supportive of our efforts to protect our relations with Belgrade. There is precedent for this approach to the Congress. Recently we reported an Israeli violation in a classified written report. We will make clear to the Yugoslavs, however, that we view their action most seriously and will not tolerate any reoccurrence.

5. *Soviet Mediation in the Horn*: According to a recent Yugoslav report, the USSR is currently trying to promote a “federation” of Ethiopia, Somalia, the Ogaden, Eritrea, and possibly the newly independent Republic of Djibouti.⁴ We have no precise knowledge of such a Soviet proposal. But it is probably an extension of previous Soviet ideas that have combined an increase of local autonomy for the provinces of Eritrea and the Ogaden with retention of at least residual Ethiopian sovereignty over both areas.⁵

¹ Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 12, State Department Evening Reports, 7/77. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote, “Cy.”

² In telegram 4603 from Belgrade, July 8, the Embassy reported on the tank transfers. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770243–0661)

³ Carter underlined this sentence and wrote “You have more confidence than I do” in the left margin.

⁴ See Document 17.

⁵ Carter wrote “If they succeed, we should take some lessons from them!” in the left margin.

The Soviets have almost certainly been led to suggest "federation" as a solution to these disputes because Moscow realizes that its position in both Somalia and Ethiopia could be threatened if some solution to the Ogaden problem minimally acceptable to both is not achieved.

Moscow also probably calculates that the survival of the Mengistu regime could be seriously jeopardized by its failure to hang onto Eritrea in some way.

Prospects for Soviet success in arranging such an agreement are dim. Efforts to negotiate a compromise last spring by both former President Podgorny and Castro were reportedly rejected by the Somalis and Eritreans. These Soviet attempts to mediate foundered on Somali unwillingness to accept anything less than annexation of the Ogaden and on Eritrean demands for total independence. Recent Somali and Eritrean military successes against the Mengistu regime's hard pressed forces have probably only strengthened Eritrean and Somali determination to reject a compromise.

6. *Somali Arms Request*: Somali Ambassador Addou has just returned from Mogadiscio with the message that President Siad was very pleased with your forthcoming attitude towards Somalia and "has made up his mind where Somali policy should be directed." He also brought a request for an urgent arms shipment from the US (see attachment).⁶ Addou made no mention of financing for these items. The Somalis say that after this initial delivery, the US could send a military attache, preferably a General, to discuss Somalia's more sophisticated requirements. Addou is under instructions from Siad to return to Mogadiscio in a week with the US response.

Compared to what the Somalis have requested from the British and French (small arms and ammunition to equip, respectively, 80,000 and 100,000 men), the request to us is relatively modest. It is nonetheless a canard to describe the items listed, as did Addou, as the "minimum needed to fill existing gaps in Somalia's defensive structure:" for instance, the 70,785 semi-automatic rifles requested would give each one of Somalia's 30,000 soldiers two such rifles apiece, with 10,785 to spare.

The Somalis have recently received \$8 million of small arms and ammunition from the Saudis and \$13 million from the Egyptians. In addition, the French have agreed to provide 10% of the request which they have from Somalia, if financing can be arranged. The British have not yet responded. The Iranians are planning to send a military survey mission to Mogadiscio next week and have asked us if we would be willing to permit them to transfer US-supplied arms to Somalia.

⁶ See Document 20. A list of Somali arms requests is attached but not printed.

The Somali effort to accumulate new arms not subject to Soviet control, coupled with increased activity by Somali “irregulars” in the Ogaden, along the Addis-Djibouti railroad, and in the Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia border area, and the mobilization of transport inside Somalia, might suggest that the Somalis are planning to press their advantage in the Ogaden. This is an effort with which we clearly do not want to be identified. We have informed our allies of our view that any Western arms supplies should be limited to filling gaps in Somalia’s defensive structure when such develop.⁷

[Omitted here are items unrelated to the Horn of Africa.]

⁷ Carter wrote “ok” in the left margin.

22. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, July 13, 1977

[Omitted here are items unrelated to the Horn of Africa.]

6. *Somali-Ethiopian Tensions*: We are keeping close track of the fast-moving events on Somalia’s frontier with Ethiopia. Our most recent intelligence indicates that the possibility of armed conflict between the two nations has increased in the past 48 hours. Ogaden insurgents, supported by Somali irregulars, are attacking a chain of key Ethiopian military posts and, unless reinforcements are sent immediately these posts will fall. We believe Siad may be tempted to intervene with his regular forces to secure the insurgent gains.

[less than 1 line not declassified] July 12,² a general Somali mobilization is underway, and at least one of the three Somali army divisions is enroute to an assembly point on the frontier. It is likely that the other two divisions are also on alert and enroute to the frontier. We have no indications that any of the divisions have crossed the frontier. The Ethiopian army is badly outnumbered in the Ogaden; half of the

¹ Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 12, State Department Evening Reports, 7/77. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote “Cy—” in the upper right corner.

² Not found.

Ethiopian army is in Eritrea. Morale is not high.³ A generally reliable clandestine source reports growing concern with the Ethiopian high command about a possible revolt by Ethiopian military units in Eritrea that might spread to the units in the Ogaden.

[Omitted here are items unrelated to the Horn of Africa]

³ In telegram 4172 from Addis Ababa, July 7, the Embassy reported on the state of the Ethiopian army. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770241–0314)

23. Telegram From the Embassy in Ethiopia to the Department of State¹

Addis Ababa, July 25, 1977, 1238Z

4511. Subject: Ethiopia Alleges Full-Scale War of Aggression.

Summary. FonMin convoked entire Addis dip corps seriatim including OAU, but probably less Somali's COM, morning July 25 and handed each Chief of Mission note verbale informing that as of July 23, 1977, at 0300 hours GMT, Somalia's armed forces supported by tanks and aircraft had crossed border and have started full-scale war of aggression against Ethiopia. For several months GSDR has been infiltrating regular troops into Ethiopia for purpose of committing aggression short of full-scale conventional war. Ethiopia had been successful in repelling these troops, therefore GSDR has now resorted to "direct armed aggression using its combined ground and air forces." Chiefs of Mission urgently requested inform their governments. Replying to questions, FonMin said matter had been referred to OAU, that EPMG might bring matter to UN Security Council depending upon developments, and that EPMG did not now plan on breaking diplomatic relations with Somalia. No formal protest to Somalia has been made, nor is a declaration of war apparently intended—"we are (already) in a state of (undeclared) war." End summary.

1. Foreign Minister Felleke Gedle-Ghiorgis summoned all Chiefs of Mission in geographic groups to MOFA morning July 25. To American group he opened meeting by noting that a grave situation had devel-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770264–0773. Secret; Immediate. Sent for information Priority to Cairo, Djibouti, Jidda, Khartoum, Libreville, London, Mogadiscio, Nairobi, Moscow, Paris, USCINCEUR, USUN, and Sana.

oped as result “unprovoked” Somali aggression. Diplomats had been following events connected with Somali armed incursions. Now he wanted us to know that on July 23, 1977, at 0300 GMT, combined armed forces of Somalia had launched attacks on Ethiopia at Deghabur, Kebredehar, Warder and Gode, and that there was “serious fighting going on at this moment.” He then handed each of us note verbale, text of which follows:

Quote. On 23 July 1977 at 0300 hours GMT Somalia’s armed forces, supported by tanks and aircraft, have crossed the common boundary into Ethiopian territory and have started full scale war of aggression against Ethiopia. These forces are now carrying out military operations at Deghabur, Kebredehar, Warder and Gode inside Ethiopia. The situation which is a serious threat to international peace and security, is a culmination of Somalia’s expansionist policy which has as its goal the annexation of Ethiopian territory.

Quote. Over the last several months the Government of the Democratic Republic of Somalia has been infiltrating its regular troops into Ethiopia for the deliberate purpose of committing aggression against Ethiopia short of launching a full scale conventional war. These troops which are heavily armed with sophisticated weapons such as missiles, anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons have thus far carried out systematic and extensive terror and sabotage in eastern and southern Ethiopia. Furthermore, these heavily armed Somali troops had attacked Ethiopian outposts in the vicinity of Dogob, Togochale, Elgersele, Alaibede, Eneguhan, Debeguriale, Ferfer, Elkoren and Dudub. Although such attacks by the Somali armed forces constitute flagrant violations of Ethiopia’s territorial integrity, the Government of Ethiopia, exercising utmost self-restraint and having no desire to escalate the situation into direct military confrontation between the armed forces of the two countries, has taken every precaution to limit the defence of its territory within the confines of its international boundary and had been successful in repelling the infiltrating Somali troops.

Quote. As the aggressive actions it has taken so far by infiltrating troops have thus failed to achieve its expansionist objectives, the Government of Somalia has now resorted to direct armed aggression using its combined ground and air forces.

Quote. In view of the above, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PMG of socialist Ethiopia requests Their Excellencies the chiefs of diplomatic missions to inform urgently their respective government of these grave developments. Unquote.

2. In reply to questions, Felleke said OAU has been informed, that there are OAU procedures to be followed and “OAU will take necessary measures.” Ethiopia might bring matter to UN Security Council depending upon developments. For now, however, EPMG has

approached first forum, i.e., OAU. Asked whether formal protest to Somalia had been made, re replied only that “we are in a state of war—fighting is going on in Ethiopian territory.” This is “undeclared, war, all elements are there.” Finally Ethiopia did not plan to break relations with Somalia “for now.”

3. American group compared notes with Western Europeans immediately afterwards. Presentation and replies to questions were same. Reportedly Somali Ambassador was not included in African group which met earlier.

4. Comment: Substance of note verbale closely paralleled PMAC statement carried over media evening July 24 (see FBIS London 241644Z Jul 77),² full text of which we do not yet have. Immediate reaction of West European and American diplomats was to note seriousness with which Ethiopia is taking Ogaden situation. Convoking dip corps of course also opens up variety of diplomatic possibilities beginning with OAU, but we shall have to wait to see where Ethiopia wants to go in diplomatic terms.

Tienken

² Not found.

24. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia

Washington, August 2, 1977, 0157Z

[Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files 1977–1981, Box 184, PRC 033 Horn of Africa, 8/25/77. Secret; Codeword. 2 pages not declassified.]

25. **Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter**¹

Washington, August 3, 1977

[Omitted here are items unrelated to the Horn of Africa.]

The Situation in the Ogaden. The Somalis now appear to control about two-thirds of the Ogaden. Given existing Somali military deployments, the three major garrison towns remaining in Ethiopian hands are in no imminent danger, although Somali insurgent forces continue their efforts to cut off communications among them. However, should regular troops based in northern Somalia move in force across the border with the objective of taking the towns, all three would probably fall after a period.

The loss of the three towns would not preclude an eventual Ethiopian countermove, but it would delay it and make it more difficult. Politically, it could provide an occasion for a political move by the Somalis, such as the formal declaration of an “Ogaden Republic” by the insurgents or even an annexation by Somalia. The fall of the towns probably would not in itself be likely to cause the overthrow of Mengistu; it would weaken his authority, but his rivals appear fully as committed to try to hold the Ogaden as is he.

At your request, we are studying the consequences of a U.S. decision not to supply arms to Somalia, taking into account the extremely fluid situation in the Horn, the evidence that the Ethiopians are becoming disaffected with the Soviets as arms suppliers, and what we can discern of President Siad’s intentions toward the Soviets.²

¹ Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 12, State Department Evening Reports, 8/77. Secret. In the upper right corner, Carter initialed and wrote, “Warren.”

² Carter wrote in the left margin, “ok—I’m not sure what we should do—best to minimize military aid, probably.” According to a memorandum from Christopher to Carter, August 9, Department officials explained to a visiting Somali military team on August 8 that the United States would have to delay any arms assistance until stability had returned to the Ogaden. (Ibid.)

26. **Memorandum From Paul B. Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)**¹

Washington, August 24, 1977

SUBJECT

Where Do We Go With Somalia?

The Somalis have played a wily game with everybody and, so far, have come out way ahead. They have built up a highly effective army with Soviet equipment and advice. They have put it to use *against Soviet advice* (at least so it seems) and are, in effect, blackmailing the Soviets into continuing military assistance to them. At least we have seen no evidence yet that the Soviets have cut off military aid to Somalia.

Claiming to feel threatened by Ethiopia, the Somalis extracted promises of aid, and some actual aid, from a wide range of countries who would like to see them draw away from their friendship with the Soviets during the very period when they were putting the finishing touches on their plans for invading Ethiopia and seizing nearly a third of its territory.

The Somali operation into Ethiopia is one of the most skillful the world has witnessed in many years. They gradually built up internal insurgent movements (Galla² as well as Somali-based) so that they could be credible as freedom fighters. Then they added their own military forces—efficiently deployed and with clear military objectives. They cloaked the whole operation in a barrage of propaganda and diplomatic maneuvering, alleging Ethiopian atrocities against the Somali population and the presence of large numbers of Cubans and other mercenaries. The camouflage of their invasion has worn thin, but they stick to their cover story and defy the OAU and everyone else. Their propaganda would be admired by Goebbels. They would have had a more difficult time if the Ethiopian forces in the Ogaden had not already been *demoralized* and they would have a tougher time diplomatically if Mengistu's government had not acquired such a *disgraceful reputation* in Africa and in the world at large.

But we should not lose sight of the fact that the Somalis invaded Ethiopia with Soviet equipment and defeated the Ethiopians, who have been using primarily U.S.-supplied equipment; in the process the Soma-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files 1977–1981, Box 184, PRC 033 Horn of Africa, 8/25/77. Secret. Sent for information.

² Galla refers to the Oromo people of Ethiopia.

lis have probably already captured more U.S. equipment and supplies than we could have delivered to them in a year if we had undertaken to support them.

Even if the Somalis take Direedawa, Harar and Jijiga and even if they link up with the Afars and Eritreans and cut off the last remaining Ethiopian lifeline from the port of Assab, *they will be in a precarious position*. To maintain themselves in Ethiopia they must have military support. They cannot now expect to get it from the West—so they must rely on what the Soviets can supply. Even if the Soviets should cut them off while the Iraqis and other remaining friends continue to provide what they can, the Somalis may have to shift to a position of gradual military withdrawal to the purely Somali-populated parts of Ethiopia they can justify some claim to.

Ethiopia, though close to being militarily defeated both in the Southeast and in Eritrea, can never reconcile itself to major Somali territorial gains. A more humane and representative Ethiopian government—if this is what follows Mengistu—is likely to be able to attract much more sympathy and support from the OAU and from countries outside Africa. *It is difficult to envision any circumstances where the Somalis can secure any significant measure of endorsement for their territorial claims against Ethiopia, let alone for the manner in which they have asserted them*. Thus the Ethiopia-Somalia quarrel is likely to fester for years to come. A resurgent Ethiopia, much stronger in terms of population and resources than Somalia can ever be, is bound to reassert itself against Somalia when it has mustered the strength to do so. This will be especially true if the Somalis succeed in capturing Direedawa and Harar, which have great emotional and patriotic significance for Ethiopia. Ethiopians born in Harar or derived from the Harari Amhara ruling group are still prominent in the Ethiopian leadership and are likely to be even more influential in a post-Mengistu government than they are now.

So where do we go with Somalia? We should aim to show as much skill as they have in playing all sides against all sides. We want to continue to maintain friendly relations and, thus, some basis for dialogue and influence. We may want to continue to develop an economic aid program for the same purpose.

Somalia, internally, remains *essentially a police state*. Political strains are likely to develop once the rejoicing over the victories in Ethiopia subsides. The Somalis in the territories taken over from Ethiopia may prove harder to digest than the leadership in Mogadiscio anticipates. There is a great potential for tribal/clan strains. Somalia is a very poor country; it is questionable whether it can offer a standard of life equivalent to the low standard prevailing in the territories it has seized. It will have a difficult time keeping up economic activity in Harar and Direedawa if it seizes and holds this relatively rich area and Djibouti,

deprived of the Ethiopian transit trade, is already approaching a condition of economic crisis. So Somalia will have plenty of problems and will need help and advice. And there will be many ways in which Somalia can be subjected to pressure.

Somalia's relationships with friendly countries are *complex*. Iraq, e.g., cannot go too far in supporting Somalia without encountering objections from the Soviets—if they follow a policy of relative coolness to the Somalis. Iran and Saudi Arabia have a tradition of being relatively pro-Ethiopian and are likely to revert to this position if a rational government replaces Mengistu. Somalia has always been relatively isolated in Africa. It cannot win OAU support for its territorial claims. It can win no friends by threatening Kenya.

Somalia may, in the end, have no recourse but to return to the Soviet embrace. It is far from clear yet that the Somalis have firmly committed themselves to become extricated from dependence on the Soviets. We cannot condone their recent behavior or support their ultimate political/territorial aims. Neither should we push them back into the laps of the Soviets. Instead, we should attempt to exploit the basic weaknesses in their position to persuade and push them into a settlement in the Horn that could ultimately benefit all the countries there. As an ultimate aim, some sort of regional federation makes sense . . .

27. **Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting¹**

Washington, August 25, 1977, 10–11 a.m.

SUBJECT

Horn of Africa

PARTICIPANTS

NSC

Zbigniew Brzezinski

David Aaron

Paul Henze

Defense

Charles Duncan

Walter Slocombe

JCS

Patrick J. Hannifin

State

Warren Christopher, Chairman

William Harrop

Richard Post

CIA

Stansfield Turner

William Parmenter

USUN

James Leonard

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The meeting reviewed the situation of each of the five Horn countries in light of the tensions created by Somali and Eritrean insurgent advances in Ethiopia and the increasing evidence of deterioration of Mengistu's regime. It was decided:

- to accelerate our efforts to provide support to Sudan
- to take steps to reassure and strengthen Kenya
- to try to get as many African leaders as possible to participate in a call to all outside powers to refrain from supplying arms to fuel the Ethiopian-Somali confrontation so that there can be a cease-fire and an effort at mediation.

It was concluded that since the U.S. does not want to supply arms to either Ethiopia or Somalia now but the Soviets are supplying to both, an appeal for an arms embargo would dramatize the destructive role the Soviets are playing in the area.

It was also decided that we should keep up dialogue with the Somalis, even though we do not want to supply arms, and that we should reciprocate the Ethiopians' desire to talk to us about their present predicament, though there is no case for meeting their request that

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files 1977–1981, Box 184, PRC 033 Horn of Africa, 8/25/77. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

we send an Ambassador.² To send an Ambassador to Ethiopia now might lead the Somalis to conclude that we were tilting decisively against them. We will go ahead too with two small aid projects in Ethiopia to show our concern for its people and we will look for opportunities to provide modest economic assistance to Djibouti. We will look into the possibility of some medical aid for both Ethiopia and Somalia.

It was concluded that we want to enhance our longer-range chances for increasing our influence in both Ethiopia and Somalia while doing what we can to ensure that the Soviets gain as little as possible—or in fact, lose—from their current involvement. Meanwhile we want to try to persuade other Africans to feel a sense of responsibility for what is happening between Ethiopia and Somalia.

² After Ambassador Hummel left Addis Ababa on July 6, 1976 (see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-6, Documents on Africa, Document 162), there was no Ambassador at the Embassy until Chapin arrived at post on July 21, 1978.

28. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, August 26, 1977

SUBJECT

PRC Review of Situation in Horn of Africa

The PRC met for an hour yesterday² to review the situation in the Horn of Africa in light of Somali and Eritrean insurgent advances in Ethiopia and increasing evidence of deterioration of Mengistu's regime.

We decided:

- to accelerate our efforts to provide support to Sudan;
- to take steps to reassure and strengthen Kenya;
- to explore means of getting as many African leaders as possible to participate in a call to all outside powers to refrain from supplying

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files 1977–1981, Box 184, PRC 033 Horn of Africa, 8/25/77. Secret. Sent for information. Carter initialed the memorandum.

² See Document 27.

arms to fuel the Ethiopian-Somali confrontation so that there can be a cease-fire and an effort at mediation.³

Since we do not want to supply arms to either Ethiopia or Somalia now but the Soviets are supplying them to both, an appeal for an arms embargo will dramatize the destructive role the Soviets are playing in the area.

We also decided that we should keep up dialogue with the Somalis, even though we do not want to supply arms, and that we should reciprocate the Ethiopians' desire to talk to us about their present predicament, though there is no case for meeting their request that we send an Ambassador. We will go ahead too with two small aid projects in Ethiopia to show our concern for its people and we will look for opportunities to provide modest economic assistance to Djibouti. We will look into the possibility of some medical aid for both Ethiopia and Somalia.

It is my feeling that these decisions represent most of the sensible steps we can take at the moment. We cannot intervene in the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia and we have to let the Eritrean situation take its course.⁴ We want to enhance our longer-range chances for increasing our influence in both Ethiopia and Somalia and do what we can to ensure that the Soviets gain as little as possible—or in fact, lose—from their involvement. We will probably have to reassess the situation again in a few weeks if conditions in the Horn do not stabilize, which seems very unlikely.

If you approve, I will formally instruct State to take the appropriate action.⁵

³ Carter wrote "ok" in the left margin next to each of the three bulleted points.

⁴ See Document 9 for a description of the Eritrean situation.

⁵ Carter checked the Approve option and wrote, "JC."

29. **Memorandum From Paul B. Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)**¹

Washington, September 19, 1977

SUBJECT

Horn of Africa Trip—Final Report

This memorandum completes the observations I sent to you in two cables from Addis Ababa and Khartoum² during the course of my recent trip through the Horn (6–16 September 1977).

As we left *Addis Ababa* shortly before noon on 14 September, Berhane Deressa, head of the American section of the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry (his brother, by the way, is a leading official of the EDU in London), who came to the airport to see us off, walked beside me out to the plane and whispered into my ear an appeal for release of the eight F-5E's the U.S. had originally scheduled to supply to Ethiopia this year. "Our Air Force will consider these more valuable than a hundred MIG's and they will not forget the United States if you supply them—I assure you," he said; "there are people in our Air Force who understand the political factors here very well." I did not have time to ask him what he was really trying to say, but I interpret it as a possible hint that the Ethiopian Air Force might take the lead in pushing Mengistu aside if they could be assured of subsequent American military support. During the early phase of the revolution the Air Force was opposed to Mengistu and his fellow extremists. We might have an option here that we could use in the future, but I should think we would want Mengistu pushed aside first and *then* we could supply the planes.

In *Khartoum*, we found the Sudan in an *acute financial crisis*. The outer world, under the influence of publicity about the Sudan's rosy long-term economic development prospects, is largely unaware that the Sudanese government has used up all its working cash and is suffering an acute balance-of-payments problem which, if a solution is not found, could undermine the enormous development projects

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special, Box 1, Chron File: 8-9/77. Secret. Sent for information.

² In telegram 5433 from Addis Ababa, September 13, the Embassy reported on Henze's meeting with the Ethiopian Foreign Minister. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770331-0687) In telegram 3170 from Khartoum September 15, the Embassy reported on Henze's meeting with Sudanese officials. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770334-1359)

which Arab oil money and western entrepreneurs are underwriting. Our visit to Khartoum came on the Muslim holiday, Id al-Fitr (end of Ramadan) and we stayed only 12 hours; nevertheless, our ambassador arranged good meetings with officials of the finance and foreign ministries.

Acting Foreign Minister Deng (who had visited Washington this spring and is a former ambassador here)³ talked sensibly about the problems between Ethiopia and Somalia which pose dilemmas for the Sudan. The Sudan cannot support the Somali incursion into the Oga-den, because it is still concerned about its own territorial integrity and sympathizes with Kenya. They do not trust Mengistu, however, and find the Eritrean problem (which they feel Mengistu has exacerbated) awkward from every point of view. In the final analysis, Deng made clear, they would like to see the Eritrean question settled by negotiation which would reestablish some form of federation between Eritrea and Ethiopia. I told Deng that I hoped they might be able to encourage a negotiated settlement, drawing other Africans into the effort, even though the process would be slow. He indicated little hope of an Eritrean settlement while Mengistu remains in power.

I had a good talk with [*less than 1 line not declassified*] in Khartoum who are in touch with both *Eritreans* and *EDU* people [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. They are inclined to feel that factionalism among Eritreans will worsen and may even be exploited by the Ethiopians. They had heard that the EPLF was splitting (Marxists vs traditionalists) which would make four Eritrean factions! *The EDU*, they said, while beset by disagreements among its top leadership, is rather well organized at medium and lower levels and has people going in and out of Ethiopia, deep into the interior, all the time. If Mengistu begins to falter, the EDU will in all likelihood assert itself rapidly. But for the moment, the EDU has a problem: in view of the Somali attack, it does not want to appear to be stabbing Ethiopia (as opposed to Mengistu) in the back. It is wavering, therefore, on its plans for an early offensive.

I left the *Sudan* with the impression that it is going to remain an inward-looking country which wishes to concentrate on its own economic development and be involved in foreign affairs only with the purpose of defending its own territorial integrity and freedom of action. The Sudan will pay lip service to Arab causes only to the extent this is absolutely necessary to keep Arab money flowing in for economic development. The Sudanese are still preoccupied with reintegrating their South and are serious in trying to draw the Ansars back into the

³ In telegram 43617 to Khartoum, February 26, the Department reported on Deng's visit to Washington and meeting with Habib. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770068-0004)

main stream of national development. This will not necessarily be an easy task. They want and deserve both economic and military support from us, but we must not overestimate the extent to which they can play an active role in the politics of the area. They are likely to remain strongly anti-Soviet.

In *London* we met with the Foreign Office official in charge of Horn and Kenyan affairs, Peter Rosling, and found that our perceptions of problems and prospects are very similar.⁴ The British plan to work hard to bolster *Kenyan confidence* and stability. They would like to see Kenyan relations with Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia, broaden. There is a good basis for economic expansion. The British are not opposed to Israel's presence in Kenya, but they do not want to see the Israelis drawing the Kenyans into an anti-Arab position.

I also had useful talks with Embassy political officers [*less than 1 line not declassified*] in London who are concerned with African and Middle Eastern affairs. [*1½ lines not declassified*] The British apparently see the EDU in much the same light [*less than 1 line not declassified*] divided and confused at the top, as exile movements always are, but commanding a considerable amount of support and following inside the country and capable of playing a role in northern Ethiopia and perhaps even in Addis if Mengistu falls or if there is further political deterioration in the country.

In conclusion, I would like to note a few things about the Horn I have not otherwise commented upon in my reports so far:

- The Chinese are unimportant as a factor in the area and have no capability for competing with the Soviets. To the extent that they have influence, it tends to be favorable to our (and to general western) interests.

- Djibouti, about which we were so concerned a few months ago, has been eclipsed as a problem by the larger spectacle of Somali-Ethiopian clash and the involvement of the Soviets with both protagonists.

- The Soviets could end up increasing their influence in the area, but they are winning neither love nor respect. Their aims are seen everywhere as self-serving and narrowly materialistic and contrasted unfavorably with our own approach. The large African diplomatic/UN community in Ethiopia, almost to a man, sees the Soviets as crass and opportunistic. Thus, in the longer run, their adventures in the

⁴ In telegram 15520 from London, September 16, the Embassy reported on Henze's meetings with British officials. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770338–0309)

Horn are not likely to increase their prestige or attractiveness elsewhere in Africa.

- With the flight of the ideologues from Mengistu's government, the EPRP is not regarded as a very serious force in Ethiopia. Serious opposition to Mengistu is felt to be most likely to come from within the Dirg or from the Ethiopian military.

- The Horn is an area where everything that happens involves interactions between Africa and the Middle East. The more complex issues in the Horn become, however, the more the moderate states in both Africa and the Middle East are inclined to try to sit on the sidelines. This is not advantageous to our interests, for if the problems of this area are to be settled, there have to be compromises and careful negotiation encouraged by moderate governments with their own interests in stability in the area.

I will prepare a brief summary of conclusions from my entire trip for passing on to the President if you wish.

30. Memorandum from the Vice President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clift) to Vice President Mondale¹

Memo No. 1526–77

Washington, September 27, 1977

SUBJECT

Meeting with President of Djibouti—Additional Background

The State Department has forwarded a draft report on President Hassan Gouled's meeting with Warren Christopher yesterday (Tab A) together with additional suggestions for talking points (Tab B).²

—If President Gouled brings up his request for additional aid, you should say it will receive the most careful attention, that you know we have experts at work on the problem and that you are aware that the subject was raised with Mr. Christopher. Dick Moose can expand on this during the meeting.

¹ Source: Carter Library, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, Box 42, Foreign Countries—Africa, 7–12/77 [2]. Confidential. Sent for information.

² Tab B is attached but not printed. See Document 33 for Mondale's meeting with President Gouled. In telegram 235953 to Djibouti, October 1, the Department reported on Gouled's talks with other U.S. officials. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770357–1040)

Tab A

Memorandum of Conversation³

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Djibouti: Views on Ogaden Conflict; Development Needs; Refugee Problem

PARTICIPANTS

<i>Djibouti</i>	<i>US</i>
Hassan Gouled, President	Acting Secretary Christopher
Foreign Minister Mr. Abdallah	Mr. Moose
Kamil	Mr. Post
Ambassador to Paris Ahmed	Mr. Toumayan, Interpreter
Ibrahim	

Mr. Christopher welcomed President Gouled on behalf of Secretary Vance who was on the way back to Washington and wished Mr. Christopher to convey his welcome. Mr. Christopher was particularly happy to greet President Gouled since we were aware of the long struggle he had been involved in so intimately which culminated in Djibouti's independence.⁴ This must be a source of pride and satisfaction to you. Mr. Christopher said that the United States would do all it could to help Djibouti. He expressed his pleasure that President Gouled would be visiting Vice President Mondale on whom the President relies heavily for a variety of matters, foreign and domestic. Mr. Christopher expressed the hope that President Carter will be able to say hello during President Gouled's call on the Vice President, but Mr. Carter's schedule is very full and Mr. Christopher wanted to emphasize the importance the US attaches to the meeting between President Gouled and Vice President Mondale. He expressed his concern over the fighting in the Ogaden which was causing instability in the area and difficulties for Djibouti at the outset of its independent life. He noted that the US has tried to follow a neutral role by not supplying either party, instead giving support to the OAU in its efforts to reach a solution.

President Gouled expressed his pleasure at being in Washington to greet the leaders and people of the city and looked forward to his meeting with Vice President Mondale, with whom he hoped to discuss a number of problems. He said that it would be an added pleasure to meet President Carter if only very briefly. With reference to the long

³ Limited Official Use. The memorandum of conversation is marked "Draft."

⁴ Djibouti gained its independence on July 27, 1977.

period of struggle for Djibouti's independence. He noted that it is certain that Djibouti will advocate peace in the region and in the world. While the Republic of Djibouti is small and young, it does not lack a certain importance potentially especially with regard to the Bab-e-Mandeb⁵ visit. Djibouti hoped to contribute to equilibrium in the area through neutrality.

However, the Republic of Djibouti is like a new child unable to walk. It needs the material means and support to progress. As for the conflict in the area, Djibouti is certainly concerned, having some 10,000 refugees from the conflict, with the railroad cut off for over three months, and with the port not having been functioning all that time—all of this gives Djibouti social and economic problems in great proportions. For humanitarian reasons, Djibouti cannot refuse access to its territory for the elderly and for children.

As for the Ogaden conflict, President Gouled said that the conflict is serious as Mr. Christopher is aware. It's a problem which must be solved by the great powers. Djibouti did not have the means for solving it, being able to [have] only a moral influence towards equilibrium. On moral grounds, nobody likes war, but certain great powers are fueling the fires by supplying defensive and offensive arms. That he described as the popular opinion.

Mr. Christopher reiterated the US position of neutrality and restraint from supplying arms. He also underscored US support for the OAU in its mediation efforts. He expressed understanding that the most Djibouti could do is provide an example of peace. He asked where the refugees were coming from.

Turning first to the question of neutrality towards the conflict, President Gouled said that the arms involved come from the big powers. There is of course no neutrality among Djibouti's neighbors, and all of Africa has been corrupted by supplies of arms. There is therefore no reason to seek mediation from Africans. He noted that many of the weapons used in Africa come from the West. He asserted that there [are] too many arms in Africa. Therefore there is a need for a high level decision to cut the flow of arms to Africa. He expressed his awareness that the United States is not supplying arms in the conflict in the Ogaden, but rather the Soviets are to both sides. He expressed a conviction that big power intervention to end the conflict was more likely to succeed than efforts by the OAU.

As to the refugees, most came by rail from the area between Djibouti and Dire Dawa. When he left Djibouti he understood the number to be 6,500. The day before yesterday he telephoned to Djibouti and

⁵ The Bab-el-Mandeb Strait connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden.

learned that there were an additional 3,000. They all enter from Ethiopia. If there were any coming from the Somali side, President Gouled said that Djibouti would not have accepted them.

Mr. Christopher said the mention of the refugees called to mind Djibouti's need for economic aid. He noted US awareness of Djibouti's historic ties to France. He said that the US understands that a number of Arab states are interested in helping. He said that the US also wants to be of assistance. He said that the AID people in Washington are considering the matter and the Food for Peace people have recently visited Djibouti. Concerning refugees, the US will work through the UNHCR, being conscious of the burden the refugees place on Djibouti.

President Gouled expressed his thanks and added that the Djibouti delegation had several formulations to present on refugees, on the country's agricultural potential and sub-soil potential, rather than being just a service-oriented country as in the past. President Gouled observed that the fact that Djibouti has French and Arab friends and has chosen neutrality and has signed agreements with France leaves no doubt as to Djibouti's orientation. He thanked Mr. Christopher for US willingness to share in the friendship that Djibouti offers to all.

The Foreign Minister, Kamil, who is also Minister of Cooperation, produced some papers on the problem of refugees and development needs of Djibouti and said that Djibouti's needs were urgent. Mr. Christopher noted that it would be most appropriate to discuss these matters in detail with Mr. Gilligan. Minister Kamil noted that their presentation did not go into any detail as to what mechanism should be used to meet their needs, that is PL-480, budgetary assistance or whatever, but was simply a presentation of their problems. He hoped it would be possible for them to have answers before they leave on Wednesday.⁶

⁶ September 28.

31. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, October 12, 1977

1. *The Ogaden*—David Owen found Gromyko to be pessimistic concerning a possible UN initiative on the Ogaden in the UN since whoever raised it would incur the enmity of both Ethiopia and Somalia. Gromyko, who strongly supported the inviolability of borders in Africa, saw no hope for successful mediation by the OAU or any other mediator, such as Yugoslavia. His only suggestion was that if the US, France, the UK and others were to call on Somalia to end the fighting and withdraw its forces, it would be useful.

Otherwise, our soundings are mixed.²

—Iran's Khalatbary thought Security Council action would be a "good thing";

—Nigeria's Garba thought an SC resolution would be "quite helpful" if designed to prevent big power interference;

—Egypt's Fahmy favored UN action (though Ambassador Eilts feels we should consult Sadat directly before proceeding);³

—Tanzania's Mkapa was non-committal, doubting that anything useful could be done in the UN because of opposition from both the Ethiopians and the Somalis;

—Kenya's Waiyaki has not yet been sounded out, but lower level Kenyan officials were cool to the idea, apparently fearing that it might lead to Somalia enjoying at least some of the fruits of aggression;⁴

—The Ethiopian Foreign Minister was quite firm in telling me that he felt the UN to be an "inappropriate" forum for discussing the Ogaden situation, an African problem which should have an African solution via the OAU.⁵

¹ Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 13, State Department Evening Reports, 10/77. Secret. The President initialed in the upper right corner and wrote, "Cy."

² In telegram Secto 10060 to Cairo, Tehran, Dar es Salaam, and Jidda, October 7, the Secretary's delegation reported on consultations at the U.N. in New York with key European allies and instructed the posts to explore with the respective Foreign Ministers the idea of a U.N. or OAU peace initiative for the Ogaden. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840072–2606)

³ In telegram 16750 from Cairo, October 8, the Embassy reported on Fahmy's and the Egyptian Government's position. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N770006–0271)

⁴ In telegram 3664 from USUN, October 10, the Mission reported on the Kenyan position. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850067–1527)

⁵ Carter wrote "W_t [Why not] call for peace, Somalia withdrawal, and OAU mediation?" in the left margin next to these points.

We are still waiting for: British soundings of the Saudis and Mozambicans, plus a more definitive reading of the Kenya viewpoint (Owen sees Waiyaki October 14); a German report of the views of Sudan, Zaire and Zambia; and French soundings in Gabon, Ivory Coast, Senegal and Cameroon.

[Omitted here are items unrelated to the Horn of Africa.]

32. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, October 20, 1977

[Omitted here is an item unrelated to the Horn of Africa.]

2. *US Response to Somali Proposal.* Yesterday afternoon Phil Habib gave to Somali Ambassador Addou our agreed response to the Somali proposal.² In brief, after congratulating Addou on Somalia's statesman-like cooperation with the Lufthansa hijacking incident,³ Phil turned down the Somalis, but gently. He said that Somali relations with the Soviets were for Somalia to decide, though we would hope they would not compromise our relations with Somalia and would permit Somalia to pursue a non-aligned policy; that no formal agreements were needed for us to cooperate in the military, economic and political fields to the extent that circumstances permitted; we already have a program of cooperation in the economic field; however, circumstances did not permit cooperation in the military field as long as the Ogaden fighting continued. Phil made it abundantly clear that we were aware of the full extent of the Somali Government involvement in the Ogaden fighting. He urged the Somalis to pursue a peaceful solution through the

¹ Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 13, State Department Evening Reports, 10/77. Secret. In the upper right corner, Carter initialed and wrote, "Cy."

² In telegram 252186 to Mogadiscio, October 20, the Department reported on Habib's October 13 meeting with Addou during which Addou delivered a written proposal for Somalia to end military ties with the Soviet Union, including ending the 1974 Soviet-Somali friendship treaty; request the withdrawal of Soviet military and civilian advisers; conclude military, political, and economic agreements with the United States; and provide port facilities to the U.S. Navy. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840081-2299)

³ On October 18, West German commandos freed hostages aboard a hijacked West German airliner that had landed at Mogadiscio airport. The West German Government issued a statement praising the cooperation and help of the Somali Government. (Henry Tanner, "German Troops Free Hostages on Hijacked Plane in Somalia; Four Terrorists Killed in Raid," *New York Times*, October 18, p. 1)

OAU mediation effort which Nigeria is seeking to revive. He stressed that we were not and would not become involved on either side in the Ogaden.

Addou said the US position would be fine if the USSR did the same, but instead they were arming Ethiopia to the teeth so that within six months Somalia, cut off from both Soviet and US arms, would be defeated and would have to accept Soviet terms. Phil noted that Somalia did not seem to lack for arms suppliers, but in any event if Somalia foresaw such a dim future that was all the more reason for pursuing a peaceful solution now through OAU good offices. Addou put in the usual Somali pitch for third-country transfers from Iran and Saudi Arabia, which Phil turned aside.⁴

[Omitted here are items unrelated to the Horn of Africa.]

⁴ Carter wrote "good" in the left margin.

33. Memorandum From the Vice President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clift) to Vice President Mondale¹

Memo No. 1655–77

Washington, October 27, 1977

SUBJECT

Aid to Djibouti

When President Gouled of Djibouti met with you on September 27,² he asked for immediate US help in dealing with the growing refugee problem caused by the Ogaden war. The State Department has reported that it is taking the following steps to meet his request:

—The State Department is preparing a request for a Presidential Determination to use \$150,000 from the emergency refugee fund to purchase tents for use by the refugees.

—An AID–HEW team arrived in Djibouti October 7 to determine what health and other emergency needs are most acute. The team will recommend appropriate US assistance measures.

¹ Source: Carter Library, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, Box 42, Foreign Countries—Africa, 7–12/77 [2]. Limited Official Use. Sent for information.

² See Document 30.

—State has authorized PL 480 Title II assistance on an emergency basis. The initial Title II package will include rice, soy-fortified sorghum grits, and vegetable oil. AID's Office of Food for Peace expects to procure 35 percent of the 4,060 metric ton total within the week.

—In carrying out our relief activities for Djibouti, State is cooperating closely with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The UNHCR is submitting to its executive committee a budget for Djibouti operations of \$900,000 for FY 79. We intend to contribute an appropriate amount to any appeal the UNHCR makes.

34. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, November 12, 1977

[Omitted here is an item unrelated to the Horn of Africa.]

2. *Consultations on the Horn.* The quadripartite Africa group meeting in London November 10 agreed that the heavy Soviet arms support for Ethiopia, coupled with the increasing number of Cuban military advisers (now estimated at 400), seems likely to tip the scales against Somalia in coming months.² The Soviets could then be in position to mediate the dispute and to gain substantial additional influence in the Horn.

Despite this situation, none of the four powers appeared prepared to respond to Somali appeals for arms (nor to Saudi requests on Somali behalf) as long as the Ogaden conflict continues. In addition, representatives at the London meeting agreed that the time is not ripe for a Western mediation effort or a Security Council resolution.

President Siad has again repeated his appeal for American arms and has asked for your "advice."³ I suggest that we have our Ambassa-

¹ Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 13, State Department Evening Reports, 11/77. Secret. Carter initialed in the upper right corner and wrote, "Cy."

² In telegram 18627 from London, November 11, the Embassy reported on the quadripartite meeting. The group, which included U.S., U.K., French, and West German representatives, met to discuss a coordinated position on the Ogaden dispute. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840081-2454)

³ In telegram 1901 from Mogadiscio, November 11, the Embassy transmitted a report of the Chargé's meeting with Siad during which Siad requested a decision from Carter on U.S. assistance. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770418-0165)

dor return to Mogadiscio early next week with a letter from you along the lines of the attached draft.

[Omitted here are items unrelated to the Horn of Africa.]

Attachment

Draft Letter From President Carter to Somali President Siad⁴

Washington, undated.

SUGGESTED LETTER TO SIAD:

Dear President Siad:

Ambassador Loughran has passed me your message and your request for my views about the difficult situation which you face.

I share your deep concern about the present large-scale supply of foreign arms to Ethiopia, and the implication for your country. In this respect, I urge you to take advantage of the good offices of the Organization of African Unity. General Obasanjo, during his recent visit to Washington, discussed with me his strong interest, as Chairman of the OAU Mediation Committee, in seeking a negotiated solution in the Ogaden. In the last few days, we have again been in contact with the Nigerians regarding their renewed efforts to this end, and I would recommend that you cooperate with their initiative. We will, when appropriate, give public support to this effort.⁵

In regard to your request for American military support, I must repeat my Government's view that while the conflict in the Ogaden persists, the United States cannot supply arms to either side. I reaffirm our willingness to cooperate with others, and to discuss the sale of defensive weapons to Somalia when the conflict in Ogaden has been resolved.

I would also hope that it might be possible for you further to reassure your Kenyan neighbors of Somalia's respect for their territorial integrity, as they are deeply concerned.

⁴ No classification marking. In the upper right corner, Carter initialed and wrote, "ok." In telegram 277991 to Mogadiscio, November 19, the Department transmitted Carter's approval of the message and his decision that it be delivered by Loughran orally, rather than in a letter. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840081–2305) In telegram 1987 from Mogadiscio, November 23, Loughran reported on his meeting with Siad when he delivered the message. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770436–0774)

⁵ The President added this sentence by hand.

I feel it is important that our two governments continue to communicate through our respective Ambassadors about developments in the very delicate situation in the Horn of Africa.⁶

Respectfully,

Jimmy Carter⁷

⁶ In telegram 2021 from Mogadiscio, November 28, the Embassy reported on Siad's response to President Carter's message, in which he refused to consider relinquishing his goal of liberating the Ogaden. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840081–2308)

⁷ The draft letter bears this typed signature.

35. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, November 28, 1977

[Omitted here are items unrelated to the Horn of Africa.]

3. *Ethiopia: Soviet Airlift and the Military Situation*—The Soviets began an airlift of foodstuffs and military-related technical items to Ethiopia on November 28. The airlift is scheduled to continue through December 3. [1½ lines not declassified] 12 cargo aircraft will be involved. In addition, aircraft, tanks, and other military supplies have been arriving in Ethiopia at a rate faster than the Ethiopians can assimilate them. The airlift is evidence of the depth of Soviet support for the Mengistu regime.²

Ethiopia's overall military situation has deteriorated. In Eritrea, we have clandestine reports that the Ethiopian government's position has worsened, and that Asmara is wracked by severe supply problems that gravely affect the daily life of the civilian population. We also have reports of indiscipline in the Ethiopian military forces there. In the Ogaden, we cannot confirm Somali claims that Harar has fallen, but it appears that the city is besieged on three sides by mixed Somali

¹ Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 13, State Department Evening Reports, 11/77. Secret. Carter initialed in the upper right corner and wrote, "Cy."

² For the CIA's report on the Soviet airlift, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 66.

insurgent and regular forces. We think the Somalis have an even chance of taking the town. If they do, the nearby town of Diredawa will probably fall to the Somalis and its fall would delay Ethiopian plans for an early December counterattack against Somali forces in the eastern Ogaden and northern Somalia.

[Omitted here are items unrelated to the Horn of Africa.]

36. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McGiffert) to Secretary of Defense Brown¹

Washington, December 20, 1977

SUBJECT

Ethiopia

Attached are a “think-piece” (Tab A), an analysis of alternative overflight/transit routes (Tab B), and a summary of regional attitudes toward the Ethiopia/Somalia conflict (Tab C).² None have been reviewed outside ISA.

My comments are:

(1) Tab A does not analyze consequences. If any of the more militant ideas have threshold merit—which I doubt—a lot more analysis will be necessary.

(2) The idea that we should directly confront the Soviets/Cubans over Ethiopia is misbegotten: (1) The Horn is a poor part of the world in which to operate; (2) Direct confrontation ignores the logical preliminary step of establishing a military supply relationship with Somalia in an effort to keep the confrontation on a proxy basis; (3) It is difficult to perceive a degree of US interest in the area sufficient to gain support of the US public for direct action; (4) Quite possibly, Ethiopia will turn out to be a quagmire for the Soviets; in short, it may be in our interest to let them wallow.

David E. McGiffert³

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Harold Brown Papers, Box 8, Horn of Africa. No classification marking.

² Tabs B and C were not found.

³ Printed from a copy that indicates McGiffert signed the original.

Tab A

Memorandum⁴

This memo addresses hypothetical courses of action to further our policies on the Horn, including the full range of military options to serve our objectives. It only *lists possibilities*; it does not purport to discuss feasibility, risks, or advisability.

We assume US policy continues to be to promote an end to fighting and a peaceful resolution of the dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia, i.e., to remain neutral in the dispute and not support either Ethiopia or Somalia. (We would need to assess the continued validity and viability of maintaining this neutrality at the same time we greatly activated our resistance to Soviet efforts.) At the same time we seek to end Soviet and Cuban military support—arms and personnel—to Ethiopia. Moreover, we assume that direct use of Soviet or Cuba personnel in a combat role is something we especially want to prevent.

We further assume we would continue (and expand) our diplomatic efforts with other African states rallying their active support to resolve the conflict and oppose Soviet counter intervention either individually or collectively as part of the Organization of African Unity. However, the receptivity of key nations to those appeals has been limited so far, and their ability directly to stop either the fighting or Soviet intervention is limited. It is therefore further assumed that these “African” initiatives fail.

Political/Diplomatic means to end Soviet/Cuban support

1. *With the USSR itself*, we could protest far more strongly than we have⁵ and make the issue of further military supply to Ethiopia a matter of serious concern and a potential threat to continued good relations in other areas, particularly if Cuban or Soviet combat forces were introduced. The US could go so far as to threaten to terminate ongoing arms control negotiations (SALT, Indian Ocean, CTB); to restrict further Soviet-American trade, etc. We could also threaten to abandon our neutrality and support Somalia militarily unless the Soviets stop their aid to Ethiopia.

2. *With Cuba*, the US has very little leverage and limited access, but we could make an improvement in relations dependent upon an end to Cuban military support for Ethiopia.

⁴ No classification marking.

⁵ Toon met with Gromyko on December 12 to discuss Soviet actions in the Horn of Africa. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 65.

In each case, we could stress that direct Soviet or Cuban combat involvement would be a step of the utmost gravity.

3. *With the "overflight states,"* the US could go beyond our previous relatively low-key, factual presentations and seek to put strong pressure on the countries over which the Soviets must fly to refuse overflight rights, notably Yugoslavia and Turkey. In that context, we would want to seek Arab support for similar pressures on Syria and Iraq. To block the cross-Africa route, we would need to be prepared to use similar pressure methods on African states, notably Zaire, Kenya (most likely to resist), and Tanzania. Our pressure resources obviously vary greatly from case-to-case. The Egyptians, Saudis and Iranians would presumably back us up. Turkey is a difficult case, given their dependence on Bulgaria for overflight rights, since their dispute with Greece.

Military measures to cut Soviet/Cuban support

Generally, the US could move naval forces into the Red Sea and Indian Ocean to demonstrate the seriousness of US interest in the resolution of the conflict and the end of Soviet and Cuban support—and to provide forces in the area for later actions. Moving air or ground forces would require land bases not immediately available, except perhaps for the 3000 man Marine Amphibious Unit embarked with the Sixth Fleet.

—We could also or alternatively expand the scope of the problem for the Soviets and Cubans, e.g., by actively backing UNITA in its continued resistance to the increasingly troubled Neto regime in Angola.

Anti-Aircraft: (Currently by various overflight routes, often through Aden, to Addis for the Soviets, through Africa for the Cubans.)

—The US could unilaterally or through third countries act with military force to close the Addis airport, the Aden staging airport, or other airports being used for Soviet or Cuban refueling. However, other fields may be available.

—Assuming US aircraft assets are moved so as to be available, the US could attempt to force down or, in the extreme, shoot down Soviet aircraft enroute to Ethiopia—or indicate a willingness to back third country efforts at an air blockade, e.g., by providing intelligence.

—There may also be more limited covert (or overt) options, e.g., interference with refueling operations enroute.

Anti-Sea Lift: (Assab, just north of Djibouti, is the only available Ethiopian seaport for Soviet and Cuban military aid by sea.) To prevent further supply by sea, the US could

—put pressure on Egypt to deny the Soviets use of the Suez canal.

—unilaterally or through third countries seek to deny the Soviets the use of the part of Assab—through mining, blockade, or the introduction of military forces to occupy the town or routes from it.

With respect to Cuba, the US could seek to interdict the logistics support to Cuban forces in Ethiopia, either coming from Cuba or Angola.

—We could use naval forces to seek to stop Soviet vessels headed for Assab at sea.

—Finally, there may be feasible covert/sabotage actions.

Caveat: As noted, we have only sought to *list* the logical possibilities, not to evaluate them. Most are no doubt infeasible.

All involve risks of direct military confrontation with the Soviet Union that may not be commensurate with possible benefits. For all there would be problems of coordination with:

—Our Arab (and Iranian) friends who support Somalia—especially to maintain any distinction between the US opposing the Soviets and backing the Somalis.

—Israel, which continues to back Ethiopia.

—European friends, who, broadly if uneasily, support Somalia.

—Other African states, who broadly support Ethiopia. (Kenya is a special problem here.)

Finally, close consultation with Congress would be essential, as would clear exploration and justification of our actions to press and public.

37. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, December 21, 1977, 3:30–4:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

Summary of Conclusions, SCC(I) Meeting, 21 December 1977, 3:30–4:45 p.m.,
White House Situation Room

PARTICIPANTS

State:

Cyrus Vance
Warren D. Christopher
Richard Moose

Defense:

Harold Brown
David E. McGiffert
General George Brown (JCS)
Lt. Gen. W.Y. Smith (JCS)

CIA:

William W. Wells
Robert Bowie
William Parmenter

Justice:

Frederick D. Baron
Kenneth Bass

NSC:

Zbigniew Brzezinski (Chairman)
David Aaron
Paul B. Henze (Notetaker)

The meeting was devoted entirely to discussion of the current situation in the Horn of Africa and its implications for U.S. policy. During the first 25 minutes CIA representatives summarized currently available intelligence on the Soviet Airlift, the military situation in Ethiopia, Ethiopian and Somali military capabilities and the Ethiopian political situation. At the end of this presentation, Dr. Brzezinski directed the intelligence community to give high priority to collection of information on all these subjects and to analysis deriving from it—in particular Somali capabilities and foreign support.

The next 40 minutes were devoted to discussion of the implications of Horn developments for U.S. policy, their potential impact on larger issues in U.S.-Soviet relations, and possible courses of action the United States could consider to keep the situation from deteriorating further and cause developments to move in directions more favorable to our basic interests. In anticipation of a more focused meeting on these subjects in January with, hopefully, more information available, Dr. Brzezinski suggested that several subjects be further studied, with discussions meanwhile at Working Group level if necessary:

- the stability of the Mengistu government and the character of alternate leadership groups.

¹ Source: National Security Council, Carter Intelligence Files, Box 20, Minutes–SCC Intelligence Working Group 1977. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. No minutes of the meeting have been found.

- the current and projected military balance between the Ethiopians and the Somalis.
- the role of PDRY and ways of influencing it.
- possibilities for promoting serious negotiations between the Ethiopians and the Somalis.
- new diplomatic initiatives in Africa and Europe.
- means of denying the Soviets an opportunity to consolidate their position in Ethiopia.
- possibilities for direct, frank talks with the Soviets.

During the final ten minutes of the meeting, the CIA paper on “Proposed Covert Action Regarding Ethiopia”² which was discussed at the SCC/SAWG meeting on 15 December 1977 was reviewed.³ It was decided that the Agency would go ahead with a low-key media placement campaign in Africa calling attention to the problems which Soviet and Cuban involvement are causing for Ethiopia but that other aspects of the CIA proposal would be deferred until the whole Horn situation was reviewed again in January.

² Not found.

³ The Summary of Conclusions of this meeting indicate that the Working Group discussed covert action proposals. (National Security Council, Carter Intelligence Files, Box 20, SCC Special Activities Working Group 1977)

38. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, December 23, 1977

[Omitted here are items unrelated to the Horn of Africa.]

5. *Ethiopia*: I believe we must take all possible steps to maintain access to the Ethiopian regime, and thereby remind the Ethiopians that

¹ Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 13, State Department Evening Reports, 12/77. Secret. Carter initialed in the upper right corner and wrote, “Merry Christmas—Cy.”

they have an alternative to complete reliance on the Soviets. Accordingly, we should name and send an Ambassador as soon as possible to Addis Ababa and I will submit shortly to you a candidate. We should also maintain our limited humanitarian aid relationship with Ethiopia but will have to proceed carefully, since there will be opposition in the Congress to providing assistance to the Ethiopians. As soon as the Congress reconvenes, we will begin consultations.²

[Omitted here are items unrelated to the Horn of Africa.]

² Carter wrote “Good—expedite—also do you think a message to Mengistu might be advisable, perhaps delivered personally by an emissary?” in the left margin. On December 28, Vance advised Carter that the prospect of an imminent break in relations with Ethiopia had receded and an emissary was no longer necessary. (Memorandum from Vance to Carter, December 28; Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 13, State Department Evening Reports, 12/77) Nonetheless, Carter sent a message to Mengistu in January. See Document 42.

39. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Train from Bayeux to Paris, January 5, 1978, 2–4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Summary of the President’s Meeting with French President Valery Giscard d’Estaing

PARTICIPANTS

President Jimmy Carter
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Arthur A. Hartman, U.S. Ambassador to France (Notetaker)
President Valery Giscard d’Estaing
Foreign Minister Louis de Guiringaud
Secretary General Jean Francois-Poncet
Ambassador Francois de Laboulaye, French Ambassador to the United States

Horn of Africa

The President began by recounting his conversation with Prince Fahd in Saudi Arabia² who said that Siad Barre had just been there

¹ Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 36, Memcons: President, 1/78. Secret; Sensitive.

² Carter met with Fahd on January 3. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, Document 184.

and had expressed a desire for peace. He wants us to ask the Soviets to restrain their activities there. The President said we are concerned about Cuban and Soviet actions but we are reluctant to act because Somalia is in the position of being the invader. We have already asked the Soviets to be restrained and, while their actions have not changed very much, Gromyko has told us that the Ethiopians will not cross the border into Somalia.³ In addition, we have talked to the Nigerians to urge some African help in seeking a solution but frankly we are looking for advice about what can be done.⁴

De Guiringaud said that he had discussed the problem with Vance and that in his view little could be done now. Somalia is the aggressor and the French are refraining from sending arms. We should continue to press the Ethiopians and the Soviets not to move into Somalia and we should speak to the Somalians to persuade them to negotiate. Perhaps they could agree to something like self-determination or just consultation with the population of Ogaden. De Guiringaud did not think the Nigerian effort would amount to anything.

The President thought it would be useful for the French to approach the Soviets as well.

Dr. Brzezinski said that was only one half of the problem, i.e. how to get some negotiations started; the other half of the problem is what happens if the Cubans and Soviets remain in Ethiopia and use it as a base of operations. Perhaps it would be better to show the Soviets that their continued presence there would be costly by making some effort to get other States in the Middle East and Africa to aid Somalia.

Secretary Vance thought the first thing was to move toward negotiations and that might help with the second problem but we certainly have to keep in our minds that our objectives are to dislodge Soviet and Cuban influence from the area.

President Giscard then gave a rather general and philosophical statement of his concern about Africa similar to the one he had made in

³ See footnote 5, Document 36. Vance and Shulman also met with Dobrynin on December 28, 1977, and were assured of the Ethiopian pledge not to use Soviet arms outside Ethiopian territory. Shulman's memorandum for the files is in Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/M5) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77—Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 3, CV—Dobrynin, 12/28/77. Vance informed Carter of the Soviet assurances in a December 28 memorandum. (Carter Library, Plains Files, Subject File, Box 13, State Department Evening Reports) In another meeting with Dobrynin on January 14, Vance again expressed the continuing U.S. concern with Soviet actions in Ethiopia. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 72.

⁴ In telegram 14354 from Lagos, December 12, 1977, the Embassy reported on approaching the Nigerians to speak out against Soviet intervention in Ethiopia. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770462–0352)

London.⁵ He said we need to have a general view of the African situation. He believes it to be a zone of danger. He said that we must convince the Soviets that some things which they would like to pursue with us, such as defense and disarmament matters, could be menaced if the situation to the south becomes difficult. By and large, these countries in Africa are unstable and conflict there could lead to difficulties in the whole world. Basically, President Giscard does not believe that the Soviets really desire to intervene in Africa but they tend to be called in by the more radical States and then they cannot resist the temptation to take advantage of a favorable situation. We must convince the Soviets that this kind of irresponsible behavior on their part is not compatible with detente.

He continued that there is also a problem of the psychology of African leaders. They now see a situation where they can get arms easily from the Soviets but all they get from us are rather vague statements of problems but no immediate response. Therefore, these African leaders, even the moderate ones, begin to feel that they have no support from the West in the face of very real dangers, particularly with the activity of as many as 25,000 Cubans in various places. It was for this reason that Giscard decided to intervene in Zaire—to show moderate African leadership that they could resist these Soviet inspired efforts. He also said that Algeria gets what it wants but Mauritania has difficulty in getting support from us. Giscard said that he understands why it is difficult for us to countenance intervention—it is also difficult for the French—but we must find a way to restrain the Soviets and to give aid, not just military aid, but economic and political support. Otherwise, we will not be able to change the mental attitude.

With respect to the Horn, *President Giscard* said that Somalia is a very unstable place—a few years ago they told us they were not getting aid from the Soviets and that there was no base at Berbera. Now they admit it. Ethiopia is a perfectly horrible place—if one talks about human rights they don't exist there. If the conflict goes on for a long time, eventually Ethiopia will win because they have 40 million people but Somalia is basically on our side. But if we support Somalia we are probably supporting an aggressor and a loser. If we do nothing there will probably be a bad result as well so we need some initiative to try and get peace and some fair solution to the Ogaden problem. We must avoid a crushing defeat for Somalia. We need a diplomatic move. The Saudis are giving some limited support but we have refrained while hinting to the Soviets that we may have to act in time.

⁵ See footnote 2, Document 34.

The President asked whether France had discussed this with the Soviets because he felt French interests, particularly in Djibouti, were important. President Carter mentioned in this connection that he had heard from Sadat that Siad Barre had offered Berbera to Egypt. He asked what French reaction would be to that.

President Giscard replied that he felt there was mainly weakness in the African States—in Morocco, in Algeria and in Egypt and, therefore, he couldn't really see that Egypt would be a very powerful force there. He thought it more profitable to examine what the next steps should be diplomatically, not militarily. He thought it hopeful that Siad had indicated he wished to have better relations with Kenya.

Dr. Brzezinski asked about Eritrea and *President Giscard* indicated that the Eritreans were good fighters and probably would gain ground, although Masawa was held with Soviet help against the Eritreans.

Secretary Vance indicated that Siad Barre had written a letter to the President of the Ivory Coast expressing a willingness to enter into a treaty with Kenya so that Kenya would be less nervous about its border with Somalia.

President Giscard said he knew of this move and, in fact, Siad Barre had asked to meet with him secretly in the Ivory Coast later this month.

Dr. Brzezinski said that two things were necessary—first, a diplomatic move to prevent a victory of either side; second, some move to prevent a Soviet-Cuban presence in Ethiopia.

The President asked if *Giscard* had approached Castro and *Giscard* replied that he had but that the response was largely negative. He offered to show us the account of Poniowski's conversation with Castro.

M. Francois-Poncet said that he wished to differ with certain of the views already expressed because he believed some action must be taken or else the Saudis and others are going to feel that we cannot act.

President Giscard indicated a lack of enthusiasm for any military moves and said that even if these should be contemplated it always ought to be through African States.

Dr. Brzezinski said that we should encourage African States to help out.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Horn of Africa.]

Djibouti and the Horn

The President asked if the French intend to keep their troops in Djibouti and *Giscard* replied that they do although obviously it is expensive and they would like to withdraw. President Carter welcomed this assurance because he thought it was a restraining influence on the situation. He said that the Saudis had told him that if the Soviets

establish a presence in South Yemen they would have to act and we know from our intelligence that the Saudis are building up forces along the border.

President Giscard concluded that the French were in very close contact with the Saudis on the problems in the Horn of Africa but eventually the French would want to get out of their force commitments in the area.

Secretary Vance asked what the next steps should be on the diplomatic side. First there could be a diplomatic initiative coming from the Ivory Coast. Second, there should be a cease-fire and some diplomatic negotiation but who is in the best position to initiate such a move—an African country?

The President thought that Nigeria was willing. He also mentioned that Gromyko had asked to consult with us on this.

President Giscard thought that the African countries were too weak and, therefore, we perhaps should look to the Permanent Members of the Security Council plus any African Members of the Security Council.

Secretary Vance mentioned Yugoslavia and India as well.

De Guiringaud again raised the question of the Soviet presence and asked if they wish a permanent base in Ethiopia from which they could influence events in East Africa and the Middle East. That is the key problem. He thought if that was their objective the United States would have to use its leverage because of all the things the Soviets want from us; but perhaps this was not a good idea.

The President said that it would still be useful for the French to explain their concerns to the Soviets.

Dr. Brzezinski said we should make clear to the Soviets that their staying in Ethiopia would be costly. We, therefore, ought to see whether not ending the conflict might also be in our interest until the Soviet position changes. Iran and Saudi Arabia might help.

De Guiringaud thought this was dangerous because it might lead the Soviets and Cubans to put more effort into Ethiopia but *Brzezinski* thought that would just be making the situation more costly.

President Giscard concluded that we must find a way to support Somalia to show the Soviets that this will be costly. He mentioned some of the indirect actions France had taken in this direction.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Horn of Africa.]

40. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹

Tehran, January 11, 1978, 1039Z

364. SecState pass USCINCEUR. Subj: Shah Discusses Horn of Africa in Aswan and Riyadh.

1. Upon his return from visits to Aswan and Riyadh, Shah told me he had discussed Horn of Africa in both places. He said he found both Egyptians and Saudis gravely concerned by Soviet activity there, and considered Saudis “petrified” by prospect of Soviet presence across Red Sea.

2. Sadat told him that Numeiry had undertaken to send Sudanese brigade to Berbera. Troops would be picked up by Egyptian ships and entire expedition would be funded by Saudis. Sadat also said that Egypt would send crews to Somalia to man SAM II missile sites, which Somalis were unable to handle.

3. Shah got impression that Sadat is very preoccupied with idea that Soviets are seeking to retaliate against him by seizing control of territory of vital interest to Egypt. He mused on thought that Sadat might have been impelled to his dramatic overtures in the Middle East and his generous offers to Israel because he wishes to tidy up his eastern front in order to concentrate on more pernicious dangers elsewhere.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Box 45, Horn of Africa/Cubans in Ethiopia 1–3/78. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent for information Priority to Cairo, Jidda, Khartoum, Mogadiscio, Addis Ababa, Nairobi, and Moscow. Carter initialed in the upper right corner.

41. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, January 19, 1978

SUBJECT

Meeting with Ethiopian Ambassador

I spent an hour with Ambassador Ayalew this morning. He had sought the meeting, he said, because he feared that events in the Horn could take a fatally wrong turn *by default*. He wanted to think out loud with me to see if we could find a way of preventing this. I found him serious, highly articulate and seemingly entirely sincere.

He expounded Ethiopia's view of the current conflict, stressing territorial integrity, and argued that the U.S. position seemed equivocal to Mengistu and negative to pro-Russian extremists in the Derg. As long as U.S. condemnation of Somalia's aggression was done "whisperingly" (his word), he said Mengistu could not take any risks against these extremists who wanted Ethiopia to sell itself totally to the Soviets. Mengistu he characterized as an intense and dedicated nationalist who sooner or later was bound to clash with the Russians.

I took time to stress that our position was not and never had been anti-Ethiopian and then read your message to Mengistu to him while he took notes on it.² Our main problem, I said, was to know whether there was any real possibility of talking intelligently with Mengistu. Did he realize the danger of tying Ethiopia so closely to the Russians that the United States would have no choice—because of pressures from important friends in the area such as Iran and Saudi Arabia—but to back the Somalis against Ethiopia? Could we discuss this dilemma honestly with Mengistu? Was he prepared to accept the truth: that we had given the Somalis neither encouragement nor any support of any kind and that we did want good relations with Ethiopia and always have?

Ayalew was clearly moved by your message and said he had something else very important to discuss with me which he had told no one: he had just been recalled to Addis Ababa for consultation and was debating whether to delay or not go at all. He said he feared

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Box 2, Ethiopia/Horn of Africa. Secret; Sensitive; Outside the System. Sent for action.

² See Document 42. In a memorandum to Brzezinski, January 23, Henze summarized the meeting with Ayalew and the Ambassador's promise to deliver the President's message to Mengistu immediately through special channels. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special, Box 1, Chron File: 1/78)

something was afoot in Addis because the ambassadors to the UN and to France had also been recalled. He made clear he feared for his life and recounted an attempt on his life that was made just before he departed for Washington. His car was machine-gunned as he drove up to the Foreign Ministry. This was done by pro-Russian elements who had pressured Mengistu to remove him as Minister of Defense but who resented his being sent to the U.S. as Ambassador. He asked whether he could have a written text of your letter to take back with him if he went. I said I would get him an answer as soon as possible; he said he could leave early next week.

Comment: Ayalew appears to believe we have a chance of appealing to Mengistu's nationalism to draw him away from total dependence on the Soviets. He welcomes our effort to assert ourselves in the Horn and try to improve relations with Ethiopia. He looks upon our initiative as protection—he can risk returning to Addis. He is obviously a courageous man and says he has a relationship of mutual respect with Mengistu.

I do not believe we have anything to lose by sending your message to Mengistu via Ayalew. I believe the chances for success of our approach to Mengistu would be enhanced if it were publicized at the appropriate point, but I am not sure we should rely on the Ethiopians themselves to publicize it. If there is a struggle in the Derg between Mengistu and pro-Russian extremists, it is in our advantage for the time being to help Mengistu strengthen his position.

RECOMMENDATION

That I receive Ambassador Ayalew as soon as convenient and give him your message in writing for delivery to Mengistu.³

³ Carter checked the Agree option and wrote "J" beneath the options.

42. **Message From President Carter to Ethiopian Chairman Mengistu¹**

Washington, January 19, 1978

TEXT OF ORAL MESSAGE
FROM PRESIDENT CARTER TO CHAIRMAN MENGISTU

I am surprised at the misunderstanding by your government of my recent remarks about the conflict in the Horn of Africa.² The United States has never wavered from its long-standing position of support for the territorial integrity of all African countries and condemnation of use of force as a means of settling differences between nations. This has always been and continues to be the basis of our policy toward Ethiopia. We neither encouraged nor approved of the Somalis' incursion into the Ogaden, and we have told the Somalis that they can expect no military support from the United States as long as they are in Ethiopian territory.³ We would like to see all Somali presence in Ethiopian territory withdrawn. We would also like to see a cease-fire in Eritrea so that a peaceful accommodation could be worked out in that region. We would like to see peace in your country so that you can proceed with the economic and political development of your country.

It troubles me that there is misunderstanding between your government and mine. I would like to send a senior emissary to talk to you, or meet with your representative, privately, in confidence, and at greater length to see if we cannot find ways of helping you deal with the present difficulties. If you believe this would be beneficial, please let me know when you would be prepared to receive my representative or send one to me.

Jimmy Carter

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Box 2, Ethiopia/Horn of Africa. No classification marking.

² Carter's answer to a question on the Soviet involvement in the Horn of Africa at a press conference on January 12 failed to condemn the Somali invasion of Ethiopia. Instead, he had focused on the Soviet role in arming both Somalia and Ethiopia. See *Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book I, pp. 56–57.

³ See Document 32.

43. Memorandum From Paul B. Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency (McMahon)¹

Washington, January 19, 1978

SUBJECT

Covert Action in Ethiopia

Dr. Brzezinski has asked that a series of ideas for covert action in respect to Ethiopia be passed to you for initiative. These ideas would support certain overt initiatives which we are now developing.

Within Ethiopia we would like to build and exacerbate tension between the Soviets and Cubans and the Ethiopians. We would like to enhance Mengistu's doubts about the totality of the Soviets' commitment to him and to feed suspicions, which he reportedly already has, that they are grooming men more amenable to doing their bidding with whom they could replace him. There may be other members of the PMGE and the Derg whose suspicions of the Soviets and Cubans might also be enhanced.

On a broader scale, we would like to exacerbate tensions between Russians/Cubans and Ethiopians at all levels of government and society. Russians always have difficulty relating to foreign cultures. Ethiopians are perhaps the proudest and most culture-conscious of all Africans. Strains with Russians seem inevitable. As their numbers increase and their direct intervention in military operations becomes more frequent, Soviets and Cubans would seem especially likely to develop strained relations with enlisted men and officers in the Ethiopian armed forces.

We are primarily interested in impact in Ethiopia as far as the kinds of action mentioned above are concerned, but the actions themselves could be initiated abroad as well as within the country.

As another facet of this effort, we would like to see greater covert exploitation abroad of the problems the Soviet/Cuban involvement is causing in Ethiopia and more negative analysis of the Soviet actions. Suggested themes include:

- The Soviets are recreating Mussolini's African Empire, in the wake of already having taken over the Portuguese Empire; in other words, the Soviets are the only colonial power left in Africa.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special, Box 1, Chron File: 1/78. Secret; Sensitive. The memorandum was also sent to the attention of [name not declassified].

- Disdain for African sensitivities is shown by the Soviets' crassly setting the Somalis against the Ethiopians and their encouragement of the genocidal policies of the Derg in Eritrea.

- The Soviets are encouraging Mengistu and extremists who are even more radical than he is to brutalize their own people and fan tribal and regional hatreds which will cause problems for years to come.

- The cost of Soviet intervention to the Ethiopians is high—and includes not only the bill for the arms which they are expected to pay for, but economic disruption and the destruction of normal life.

- The Soviets are pouring in weapons but show much less interest in providing economic aid. Instead, the effort to pay for the weapons will bankrupt Ethiopia.

It may be that some aspects of this effort could be accommodated under existing Presidential Findings. If the effort as a whole requires a new Presidential Finding, it should be prepared as soon as possible.

Since an SCC meeting on the Horn of Africa is scheduled for 25 January,² it would be desirable to have a paper implementing the above suggestions ready for review at that time.

Paul B. Henze

² The meeting actually took place on January 26. See Document 46.

44. **Note From Paul B. Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)**¹

Washington, January 24, 1978

SUBJECT

State's 5-Power Horn Meeting

Attached is State's outgoing cable summarizing its much publicized 5-power Horn Meeting this past weekend.² It is a remarkable testimonial to the poverty of real thinking in State on this key problem. You will notice that the U.S. side never raised the key issue: *how to get the Soviets out of the Horn* and keep Ethiopia from locking itself into a relationship of dependence upon the USSR (I did raise it, but I get no credit in this cable) and there is *no discussion of the Cubans at all!* Everything centers on circular discussion of negotiations (how diplomats love to negotiate!) and there is no realism about how one can establish any preconditions for negotiation. There was also no discussion about Eritrea (again I raised it but get no credit in this cable) and its important relationship to the Ogaden conflict and the problem of Soviet and Cuban presence. —I am extremely skeptical about the so-called "Dobrynin initiative". State seems lusting to draw the Soviets into discussion of the Horn, just as they earlier rushed to invite the Soviets into the Egyptian-Israeli talks. —I have underlined other noteworthy sections of the report and made a few marginal comments which I believe are worth your noting because I suspect Vance will be setting forth this plan at Thursday's SCC meeting as a basis for action of some sort.³

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special, Box 1, Chron File: 1/78. Confidential.

² In Document 34, Vance reported on an earlier meeting on the Horn of Africa of the quadripartite Africa group; Italy had since joined the discussions.

³ See Document 46.

Attachment

Telegram From the Department of State to Selected Diplomatic Posts⁴

Washington, January 24, 1978, 0233Z

18370. Subject: Five Power Meeting on the Horn of Africa.

1. Begin summary: Representatives of five Western states met in Washington on January 21, 1978 to discuss the conflict in the Horn of Africa. The senior participants were Assistant Secretary Richard Moose for the United States, Assistant Under Secretary Philip Mansfield for the United Kingdom, Director of African and Malagasy Affairs Guy Georgy for France, Deputy Assistant Secretary Helmut Mueller for the Federal Republic of Germany, and Counselor of Embassy Giancarlo Carrara-Cagni for Italy. Group concluded that time had come to press for a negotiated solution based on an autonomous Ogaden to reflect interests of inhabitants, combined with Somali Government withdrawal from Ethiopian territory. Group noted recent Soviet approach to French along these lines, and participants agreed to explore this possibility with concerned states. British expressed interest in pursuing UNSC resolution. Consensus was that peaceful resolution of crisis depended on departure of GSDR forces from Ogaden. End summary.

2. Present military situation: It was agreed that during the present relative battlefield lull the Somalis were preparing for at least one more attack on Harar and perhaps Dire Dawa. The Somalis were credited with high morale, but their air defense capability was weak. They had probably less than a fifty percent chance of success. While it was believed that Government of the Somali Democratic Republic (GSDR) had had some success in arranging for light arms, no participant believed GSDR had been able to obtain quantities of heavy or sophisticated weapons needed to counterbalance longer term Soviet supplies to Ethiopian Provisional Military Government (EPMG).

3. EPMG has established general air superiority and succeeded in carrying out air raids on Hargeisa and Berbera, but troop morale remains low and discipline and command/control structures are weak. According to US analysis, Ethiopian Air Force, with Cuban and Soviet support and possibly some degree of participation, will be able to

⁴ Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent to Addis Ababa, Bonn, London, Lagos, Mogadiscio, Paris, and Rome. Repeated for information Priority to Antananarivo, Cairo, Damascus, Djibouti, USINT Havana, Islamabad, Jidda, Khartoum, Moscow, Nairobi, Sana, Tehran, USUN, Amman, and USNATO. Another copy of the telegram is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780035–0227.

launch an expanded air offensive by early February, and launch counterattacks of less than full scale between now and May. It is unlikely EPMG can launch a successful general counterattack before June. (Mueller pointed out that air attacks against Somali population centers might have a serious effect on President Siad's position. Germans have been told that a number of young Somali military officers had opposed Siad's anti-Soviet moves.)

4. Probable objectives of an Ethiopian counter-offensive: US representatives have been assured by Mengistu that EPMG does not consider Somali territory to be a military objective and Soviets have said that EPMG has pledged not to use Soviet equipment outside of Ethiopia. Although these assurances might be worth little in the heat of battle, EPMG might be deterred from crossing into Somalia by knowledge that such a move would cost them the diplomatic advantage gained as defenders of OAU principle of territorial integrity, and might, in addition, bring other countries (such as Iran) to reverse their present position of holding back moral and material support from GSDR. However, it was also noted that difficulty of retaking Ogaden might bring EPMG nonetheless to strike into northern Somalia in order to bargain for Somali withdrawal from Ogaden. Concern was also expressed over possibility that EPMG might carry out grave reprisals against Ogaden population during reconquest.

5. Status of current mediation efforts: Somalis are publicly pledged to negotiate in any suitable place (i.e. anywhere but Addis Ababa or Moscow), and without preconditions, but we have no indication that they have begun seriously to think about the outlines of a negotiated solution. It was agreed that the Ethiopian position remains that negotiations must be preceded by withdrawal of all GSDR forces from Ethiopian territory. However, EPMG representative has said his government was studying ways to implement the policy of autonomy for the various "nationalities".

6. While Nigerian/OAU effort has made no progress, Nigerians are now canvassing the eight nation OAU commission to see if there is agreement on inviting Somalia and Ethiopia to meet in Lagos in February. The Madagascar negotiation initiative seems to have foundered, although Ethiopian and Somali delegations have both (separately) visited Antananarivo. The French representative said that Ratsiraka had reportedly succeeded in arranging a meeting between Siad and Mengistu, but that the meeting had failed because of Soviet opposition to Mengistu's participation.

7. Elements of a possible negotiated solution: While admitting that the prospects for a negotiated solution were not good, it was agreed that a basis for compromise might be found between the Ethiopian stated policy promising the various Ethiopian "nationalities" the right

to self-determination and self-government in autonomous regions, and the Somali Government's assertion that all it seeks is self-determination of the Ogadeni-Somali people. The establishment of a largely autonomous government of the region of the Ogaden which maintained a continuing link with the Addis regime might satisfy the Ethiopian desire to preserve its sovereignty over the area while providing the Ogadenis sufficient control over their affairs to induce Somalia to abandon its goal of incorporating the Ogaden. The arrangement would presumably require some form of guarantee, whether by the UN, the OAU or a joint OAU/Arab League undertaking. Before any negotiation of the form of government could take place, the fighting would have to be stopped, by ceasefire or perhaps by recognition of a stalemate. Ethiopia would not agree to a simple ceasefire in place, but insists that Somalia's forces be withdrawn. Somalia would not agree to withdrawal of its forces, at least until it was confident that the members of the Western Somali Liberation Front and, indeed, the non-combatant Somali inhabitants of the Ogaden would be protected from Ethiopian reprisals. It would therefore appear necessary for a neutral peacekeeping force supplemented by a neutral administrative body to monitor the withdrawal of Somali Government forces and to administer the Ogaden until a negotiated settlement had been reached.⁵

8. French rep reported on January 20 luncheon conversation between French Ambassador and Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin during which Dobrynin outlined his "personal ideas" on how a peaceful settlement might be achieved. Dobrynin proposed 4-point approach:

(A) Somali Government to announce its willingness to withdraw troops from Ogaden in two weeks;

(B) Ethiopia and Somalia undertake thereafter to sit down to work out a settlement;

(C) Settlement would affirm respect for existing borders;

(D) Settlement would provide for an autonomous state for the population of the Ogaden in "confederation" with Ethiopia. In response to question, Dobrynin did not rule out possibility that a neutral peacekeeping force such as UN could be inserted between contending sides to ensure against Ethiopian reprisal attacks on Ogadeni population. Meeting noted that Dobrynin intervention obviously planned with quinquupartite meeting next day in mind and might be a ruse to keep West off balance, but was nonetheless worth probing, since under Dobrynin formulation Somali troop withdrawal would take place only following an Ethiopian undertaking to negotiate a settlement that

⁵ Henze wrote "Unacceptable to Ethiopians" in the margin.

would include an autonomous Ogaden, meeting agreed that Dobrynin proposals, if genuine, represented an advance of Soviet position.⁶

9. Soviet (and Cuban) presence: French representative Georgy noted that the problem of the Horn was primarily a geopolitical one—Soviet penetration of an area of importance to the West and to the Arab world from which the Soviets have been almost entirely excluded. Soviet military supplies are being furnished Ethiopia in amounts in excess of what would be needed for the Ogaden war, and will serve Soviet strategic advantage in consolidating a position first in an Ethiopia where the old elites—the Westernized intellectuals, the clergy, and the bourgeoisie—have been dispossessed, later in destabilizing Kenya following the death of Kenyatta, and even regaining a position in Somalia where many Soviet-formed cadre in the military must be assumed to be ready to take power if the opportunity arises.⁷

The solution to the Ogaden conflict, if one could indeed be found, would not solve the problem of the Horn from the Western and moderate Arab point of view. However, it was generally agreed that a solution to the Ogaden conflict would at least remove the principal pretext for the expanding Soviet military presence.

10. British representative Mansfield said Foreign Secretary Owen believed that the time was ripe for further efforts to promote negotiation.⁸ Mansfield circulated a draft Security Council resolution which might be submitted to express the support of the international community for a negotiated solution. The suggested text was as follows:

The Security Council, expressing its concern over the present hostilities in the Ogaden region of Africa, concerned at the loss of life and human suffering, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter of the United Nations open square brackets concerning the peaceful settlement of disputes, as well as close square brackets particularly the various provisions of Chapter VI concerning procedures and methods for the peaceful settlement of disputes, commending the efforts made by the Good Offices Committee of the Organization of African Unity to seek a settlement of the conflict,

1. Calls upon the parties concerned to cease hostilities and to end the conflict in the Ogaden.

2. Calls on the Governments of Ethiopia and Somalia to enter into early discussions aimed at securing a negotiated settlement.

⁶ Henze wrote “Soviets pressing the Ethiopians to do this?” beneath this sentence.

⁷ Henze wrote “At least the French have a concept! Not bad” in the margin next to this paragraph.

⁸ Henze wrote “total misconception!” in the margin next to this sentence.

3. Requests the Secretary General of the United Nations to appoint a special representative to visit the area and enter into contact with the parties concerned in order to promote a negotiated settlement.

4. Calls on the Governments of Ethiopia and Somalia to cooperate with the special representative in the execution of his task and requests the Secretary General to report to the Security Council as appropriate.⁹

Mansfield believed this might be acceptable to both the GSDR and the EPMG.¹⁰ If the Nigerians and President Bongo favored a UNSC resolution, Western powers could support the effort. Meeting stressed necessity to avoid actions which gave appearance of upstaging OAU efforts. (The US and other participants had doubts that British proposal as drafted would attract sufficient support to be passed.)

11. All parties further agreed that it would be in Western interest to maintain pressure for negotiations and explore possibility of a settlement as discussed above. The Italian representatives felt their government, when they had one, might agree to approach the Ethiopians to test their reaction to the outlines of a negotiated solution. The UK representatives agreed to speak to Nigerian Foreign Minister Garba during his January 22 London stopover to discuss the outline of a suggested negotiated solution and to raise the possibility of a Security Council resolution as a means of support for the OAU mediation effort. The UK representative also agreed that they might be a logical choice to approach the Cubans. The German representative agreed to discuss negotiations with OAU President Bongo during his visit to Bonn January 23. French representative Georgy agreed to encourage the Madagascar initiative in conversations with Ratsiraka.

12. The US side agreed to raise the Horn question with the Soviet Union in the context of the bilateral relationship,¹¹ although the US side was not in a position to say what weight would be given the Soviet role in the Horn in the over-all US/Soviet context. The US would also consider raising matter in context Indian Ocean talks as suggested by Mr. Georgy. The US would also consider discussing the matter with the Yugoslavs, a state with some hope of influence in Addis Ababa, and to continue discussion with Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Iran.

13. Reply to Siad's request: The British, Germans, Italians and the US representatives all said their governments would not give military supplies to either side so long as the conflict continued. The French

⁹ Henze wrote "will lead nowhere" in the margin next to the numbered paragraphs of the proposed resolution.

¹⁰ Henze wrote an exclamation point in the margin next to this sentence.

¹¹ Carter pointed out the "worrisome concern" of the Horn of Africa in U.S.-Soviet relations in a January 25 letter to Brezhnev, and Vance discussed it with Dobrynin on January 31. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Documents 77 and 79.

were willing to consider providing some light arms, but the GSDR had rejected a previous offer and presumably remained uninterested in anything but heavy or sophisticated military equipment. It was agreed by all that the replies to Siad's most recent request for troops would be that the Western states could not provide the military assistance desired because of the GSDR presence in Ethiopian territory. Siad should be encouraged to negotiate a solution and reflect on conditions under which he would withdraw Somali forces from the Ogaden, a move which would facilitate Western aid. It was further agreed that the replies would be given individually (the US and the UK having already conveyed a public refusal to send troops). Some of the Western powers would perhaps be more willing to consider military assistance after a GSDR withdrawal. Georgy made it clear that because of Djibouti, France would not give more than light defensive arms, even in the event of a Somali withdrawal.

14. Italian representatives stated that they could not commit GOI to a joint Western approach to Garba, Bongo or others. It was therefore agreed that all approaches discussed would be made in a bilateral context.

15. A press statement was issued at the close of the meeting affirming support for a negotiated solution and the efforts of the Nigerian-chaired OAU mediation committee (State 17279).¹²

Vance

¹² Telegram 17279, January 22, circularized the text of the press statement. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780033–0318)

45. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Murphy) to Secretary of Defense Brown¹

Washington, January 25, 1978

SUBJECT

On-Site Inspection of Former Soviet Facilities in Somalia—ACTION
MEMORANDUM

Over the past few years, the Soviets have built an extensive network of military installations in Somalia including airfields, communication sites, missile storage and handling facilities, logistic sites, and other military structures. With the precipitous departure of the Soviets,² we now have an opportunity for on-site inspection that could yield important intelligence information on the design and structural vulnerability of high interest Soviet military facilities. On-site inspection would permit direct acquisition of data which might resolve a number of unknowns involving Soviet military construction standards, materials, and techniques. This could have a significant impact on present assessments of functions and vulnerability of Soviet military facilities.³

DIA advises that a task force of four experts including structural and civil engineers, [*1 line not declassified*] could be dispatched on short notice. About three or four weeks would be required to complete a meaningful inspection. The following Soviet-built installations would be accorded highest priority:

1. Possible missile-related fuel facilities at Daraweina, Ischia Baidoa and Mogadiscio

2. Mogadiscio SAM support facility

3. Berbera missile storage and handling facility

4. Airfields at Uanle Uen and Berbera

5. Berbera radio communications facility

We have examined other alternatives including collection by sensitive human intelligence sources. [*3 lines not declassified*]

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Harold Brown Papers, Box 50, 1978 Africa, Horn of Africa. Secret; Noforn. Approved by McGiffert. A stamped notation indicates that Brown saw this memorandum on February 1.

² On November 13, 1977, Somalia abrogated its 1974 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union, ended Soviet use of naval facilities at Berbera, and announced that all Soviet military and civilian advisers in Somalia must leave the country.

³ Brown wrote in the right margin, "DM—Except as part of a package of US assistance which we are not now ready to provide, there is no point in requesting anything like this. HB."

While recognizing the sensitivity of current situation in Somalia, we should explore with State the possibility of gaining access now before major modification or removal of structural components. The facing memorandum to the Secretary of State requests his reaction to this proposal and invites him to seek views of the U.S. Chief of Mission in Somalia.⁴

Recommend signature.

Daniel J. Murphy
Admiral, USN (Ret.)
Deputy

⁴ Not found attached.

46. Memorandum for the Record of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, January 26, 1978, 7–8:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

Summary of Conclusions, SCC Meeting on Horn of Africa, 26 January 1978, 7:00–8:45 p.m., White House Situation Room

PARTICIPANTS

<i>State:</i>	<i>CIA:</i>
Cyrus Vance	Stansfield Turner
<i>Defense:</i>	<i>NSC:</i>
Harold Brown	Zbigniew Brzezinski (Chairman)
General George Brown (JCS)	Paul B. Henze (Notetaker)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files 1977–1981, Box 184, SCC 055 Horn of Africa, 1/26/78. Secret; Sensitive. Prepared on January 27. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. No minutes of the meeting have been found.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of the meeting was to review the latest developments in the Horn, consultations with friendly governments² and recent contacts with the Soviets³ and Cubans. Possibilities for U.S. initiative in the political, diplomatic, and military spheres were reviewed. The adequacy of intelligence available was discussed and opportunities for improvement in collection were considered. The problem of publicity was discussed. Congressional interest was also discussed. The Chairman noted that the President had recently sent messages to Brezhnev and Mengistu.⁴ It was the consensus of the group that the U.S. Government should be cautious about taking actions that would in themselves encourage a sense of crisis or confrontation with the Soviets or that would commit us prematurely to positions that could limit our flexibility. It was agreed that the following principles should guide actions during the next few weeks:

- We will continue efforts to impress upon the Soviets the seriousness with which we look upon their involvement in the Horn and the political problems which it causes for us.

- We will endeavor to broaden contact and dialogue with the Ethiopians in hope of encouraging them to reserve some freedom of action.

- We will continue to seek advice from our allies and other friendly governments to enlist their aid in impressing upon the Soviets & Cubans⁵ our serious concern, but we will be cautious about encouraging those who are inclined to help the Somalis to make commitments that they would expect us to back up.

- We will accelerate study of our own capabilities and those of other governments to intervene in the situation in ways that could complicate or make more costly the Soviet/Cuba intervention, but we will underwrite no action at this time.

- We will consider underscoring our concern by military movements designed to have psychological and political impact.

The following specific requirements were set for study/action with results to be reported back as soon as possible:

² See Document 44.

³ See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Documents 72, 74, and 75.

⁴ For the President's message to Chairman Mengistu, see Document 42. For the President's letter to Brezhnev, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 77.

⁵ Henze added "& Cubans" by hand.

- Presidential letters to Giscard, Tito, Obasanjo, Perez and Desai will be sent. Messages to other Heads of State/Government will be considered later.⁶

- Measures to improve intelligence collection through SR-71, U-2 and/or a SIGINT collection ship will be studied urgently and recommendations prepared.

- The JCS will prepare plans for deployment of a naval task force in the Red Sea as soon as possible.⁷

- Through military [*less than 1 line not declassified*] the Iranian, Saudi, Egyptian and Sudanese governments will be sounded out on their capabilities and intentions for providing support to Somalia. We will not go beyond these discussions until we again talk to Sadat.

- CIA's covert action proposals for internal Ethiopian initiatives will be deferred for later consideration; the proposals for action outside Ethiopia were endorsed.⁸

- An ambassador to Ethiopia will be dispatched in the near future.

- No action will be taken to inform the Ethiopians that pipeline military items will be held up.

- A determined effort will be made to avoid unnecessary publicity about the Administration's stance and actions in respect to the Horn.

⁶ See Document 48.

⁷ Henze wrote, "study only" in the right margin.

⁸ See footnotes 3 and 6, Document 52.

47. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, January 30, 1978

Ethiopia. Ethiopian Ambassador Ayalew delivered a letter to us this morning announcing his decision to resign as ambassador. He informed his government January 29. Ayalew said that after careful soundings with friends in Addis Ababa, he did not dare return home

¹ Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 13, State Department Evening Reports, 1/78. Secret. Carter initialed and wrote, "Cy."

as instructed. He will not announce his resignation and will cooperate with us in keeping it quiet as long as possible.²

Ayalew has confirmation that your personal message has been delivered to Mengistu.³ He says the message will spark a fierce debate between pro-Soviets and remaining moderate elements in Addis. He has no hint of Mengistu's reaction, although the Foreign Minister—who is not a member of the ruling military group—felt it was “a positive letter.” He also believes that a request for agreement of an American Ambassador now would support our position. We are cabling this request tonight.

However, Ayalew is convinced that an announcement that we are suspending the pending shipment of military spare parts would seriously undermine the possibility of progress on the basis of your letter and could force a break in relations. There will be no shipment before February 13, at the earliest, and the freight forwarder will notify us before any movement occurs, so we have a little time. We plan tomorrow to instruct our Charge to inquire of the ruling military group about a response to your letter.⁴

[Omitted here are items unrelated to the Horn of Africa.]

² In telegram 24567 to Addis Ababa, January 31, the Department reported on Ayalew's reasons for resignation and defection. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780045–0167)

³ See Document 42. Carter underlined “Mengistu” and wrote in the left margin, “He made a bad public statement.” In Mengistu's public statement on January 30, he accused President Carter of a conspiracy against Ethiopia. (Telegram 468 from Addis Ababa, January 31; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780046–0199)

⁴ Carter wrote “good” in the left margin. In his response to Carter's message, Mengistu welcomed the idea of a visit by a senior U.S. Government emissary to Ethiopia. (Telegram 538 from Addis Ababa, February 3; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850104–2364)

48. Letter From President Carter to Nigerian Head of State Obasanjo¹

Washington, January 31, 1978

Dear General Obasanjo:

Thank you very much for your letter of January 16 on the death of Senator Humphrey. I have conveyed your gracious sentiments to Mrs. Humphrey; we mourn his loss, but we will remain buoyed by his spirit and his example.

We are disturbed about the continuation of the conflict in the Horn and particularly about the implications of present Soviet and Cuban action in Ethiopia. Information has reached us that heavy shipments of weapons and military personnel are being sent to Ethiopia and that large numbers of additional Cuban troops are expected soon and may enter active fighting.

As you and I discussed in Washington,² the United States supports the principle of territorial integrity, and I have so stated publicly. We do not question the right of Ethiopia to call for assistance in self-defense against an attack on its soil, but Soviet and Cuban support, which seems excessive, is not being provided in a way that encourages settlement of underlying issues; instead it exacerbates them. This is especially true in Eritrea, where the prospect of full Soviet backing discourages Mengistu from seeking a negotiated settlement that could preserve Ethiopian sovereignty and bring this long, bloody conflict to an end. Not only are we concerned that Soviet and Cuban involvement is encouraging Africans to go on killing Africans; we fear that the Soviets and Cubans are trying to establish themselves permanently in Ethiopia.

The United States is prepared to support a significant political initiative to find a just and peaceful solution to the problems of the Horn. I understand that you may soon be in direct contact with Ethiopia concerning a possible settlement, and that you also will make more

¹ Source: Carter Library, Staff Office, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, Box 14, Nigeria: Obasanjo, 1/77–5/78. No classification marking. Similar letters were sent to Giscard on January 27 (Carter Library, Staff Office, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, Box 6, France: President Giscard, 2/77–11/78); Tito on January 31 (Carter Library, Staff Office, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, Box 21, Yugoslavia: Tito); Pérez on February 1 (Carter Library, Staff Office, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, Box 21, Venezuela: Perez, 2/77–5/78); and Desai on January 31 (Carter Library, Staff Office, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, Box 8, India: Desai, 1-7/78).

² Obasanjo visited Washington October 10–13, 1977. Documentation on the visit is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XVII, Part 2, Sub-Saharan Africa.

forceful efforts through the OAU towards establishing a basis for mediation or negotiation. Your efforts have been and will be valuable in establishing a climate for peace. I have publicly urged negotiations under OAU auspices and will continue to do so.

We consider it highly desirable for this conflict in Africa to be resolved by African procedures and principles, and not by the actions of outside governments, particularly the superpowers. There are pressures on us from many quarters to be more active. We do not want to act in any way that is not in harmony with basic African interests and perceptions. We will exert ourselves to support your initiative.

I regard your initiative and leadership as crucial. I very much look forward to my forthcoming trip to Lagos when we can discuss these matters at length. In the meantime, please let me have your personal advice and counsel.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

49. Memorandum From Paul B. Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, February 2, 1978

SUBJECT

Cuban Troops in Ethiopia—President's Desire for Publicity

I had calls from both State and CIA today on the initiative you asked for in the attached memorandum² and both raise valid points that I suggest you may want to ask the President to consider:

a. When we keep attacking the Cubans and Soviets for sending more troops into Ethiopia—especially when we do so in *official* statements and declarations of *high-level U.S. officials*—we make it possible for the Ethiopians who want to think the worst of us and the Soviets who are advising them to claim that we are against Ethiopia's defending its own territorial integrity. We also give them reason to suspect that

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special, Box 2, Chron File: 2/78. Secret; Sensitive.

² Not attached, but see Document 43.

we are utilizing our presence in the embassy in Addis primarily to gather intelligence which we then immediately use against them—this fortifies the argument that it would be best to kick us out entirely.

b. Furthermore, on the concrete topic of source protection—our sources, when they hear their information coming back so directly get wary and concerned about giving us more.

CIA suggests that we could be more effective publicizing such information covertly from various places abroad—it calls attention to the same problem without implicating the U.S. Government directly in the action. State would like to see the publicizing of this information stretched out over a longer period of time but also points out that statements such as this seem to go contrary to the conclusions reached in last Thursday's SCC³ about not giving each increase in numbers of Cubans or Soviets so much publicity that the press continually concentrates on this subject and dramatizes the problem of the Horn in ways that can generate pressures on the Administration that may eventually become very uncomfortable.

As you know, I am not normally inclined toward passivity on topics such as this, but here I think both CIA and State have a point and the President's tendency to want to see this sort of thing publicized needs to be tempered by more careful consideration of the unintended consequences as well as the longer-range results we wish to achieve . . .

³ See Document 46.

50. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, February 2, 1978

SUBJECT

SCC Meeting on Horn of Africa, 26 January 1978

Two of the specific requirements set forth for action in your memorandum of 27 January 1978,² subject as above, differ somewhat from my recollection of what it was decided to do. The first has to do with planning for deployment of a naval task force to the Red Sea as soon as possible. I believe we were talking about the Indian Ocean and not the Red Sea. Additionally, I reported that we had a naval task force about to deploy on a normal routine deployment to the Indian Ocean. That deployment is currently scheduled for the period 20 February to 18 April. The task force will be made up of one cruiser, two frigates, and one oiler. I suggest for the time being that is all we will want to do in the way of actual deployment of a naval task force in the area, though we will continue to examine further options for possible later use.

The second concern I have is of lesser importance. It calls for going through military [*less than 1 line not declassified*] to sound out the Iranian, Saudi, Egyptian and Sudanese governments on the support of Somalia. It should, I assume, read military intelligence channels. I propose to carry out this action through defense attaches, although I am not optimistic that they will obtain much useful information.

Harold Brown

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files 1977–1981, Box 184, SCC 055 Horn of Africa, 1/26/78. Secret; Sensitive.

² See Document 46.

51. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of Defense Brown¹

Washington, February 3, 1978

SUBJECT

Your Queries re SCC Meeting on Horn of Africa, January 26, 1978²

REFERENCE

Your Memorandum to Me of February 2, 1978³ (SecDef control no. X-0291)

The record of the SCC meeting shows that we talked about naval movements in *both* the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. It was noted that there were already plans for naval movements into the northwestern sector of the Indian Ocean in the next few weeks. George Brown also stated that it would be relatively easy to move some vessels from the Mediterranean down the Red Sea. I think we should *study* movements we could make both in the Indian Ocean (especially the Gulf of Aden) and the Red Sea. We do not want to decide now, however, what to do—we simply want to know what is feasible and how much time it would take.

As to your second point, you may well be right that little will come of our queries. How, exactly, they are made ought to depend on the local situation in each case. I should not think we would want to confine them to *military intelligence* channels *if* they could better be made by MAAG personnel.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files 1977–1981, Box 184, SCC 055 Horn of Africa, 1/26/78. Secret; Sensitive.

² See Document 46.

³ See Document 50.

52. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, February 3, 1978

SUBJECT

Status Report on CIA's Covert Action Operations on Issues Relating to Soviet-Cuban Intervention in the Horn of Africa

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to provide you with a status report on where the Agency stands in its efforts to provide covert action support on issues relating to Soviet-Cuban intervention in the Horn of Africa. As you know, this matter was discussed at the Special Coordination Committee (SCC) meeting on 26 January 1978² in regard to a draft "Perspectives" dealing with the situation in Ethiopia.³ The SCC endorsed covert action on sections of the "Perspectives" dealing with actions outside of Ethiopia.

2. As you know the Department of Justice (DOJ) has questioned the legal sufficiency of "Perspectives" under the Hughes/Ryan amendment⁴ and has recommended that henceforth "Perspectives" be approved by the President. Our past practice has been to coordinate these guidelines with the Department of State only. In order to remedy this problem the Agency has prepared and submitted to you, for approval by the President, two new Presidential findings covering our international covert action infrastructure and the "Perspectives" tasking procedure.⁵

3. Under the DOJ opinion we are now in a period of legal limbo insofar as current tasking of the infrastructure under the "Perspectives" procedure. Briefly, the situation now is that we may only task the

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special, Box 2, Chron File: 2/78. Secret; Sensitive.

² See Document 46.

³ The draft Perspectives detailed ideas for exploiting low morale in the Ethiopian Armed Forces, exacerbating tensions between Ethiopians and the Soviets/Cubans, and advertising Soviet interventionism. (National Security Council, Carter Intelligence Files, Box 20, Minutes-SCC Intelligence Meetings 1978)

⁴ The Hughes/Ryan Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-559) requires the President to notify Congress of all CIA covert operations within a set time period. It also stipulates that appropriated funds may not be used for covert operations without a Presidential Finding.

⁵ These Presidential Findings are attached to a December 15, 1977, memorandum from Wells to Turner. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Congressional Affairs, Job 81M00980R: Subject Committee Files, Box 27, Folder 13: Covert Action)

infrastructure under “Perspectives” guidelines previously approved under the old procedure.

4. In this regard, there are aspects of the Ethiopia/Horn situation which we are exploiting in the interim under policy authority contained in two currently valid “Perspectives”: (1) “Drawing Attention to Soviet Activity in the Horn of Africa” (approved 20 September 1977)⁶ and (2) “Expanding Cuban/Soviet Presence in Africa” (approved 27 April 1976).⁷ These “Perspectives” allow us to pursue two of the five objectives stated in the draft endorsed by the SCC, namely:

a. “Mobilize international criticism against the interventionist role of the Soviet Union and Cuba in the Horn of Africa, particularly citing problems this is creating in Ethiopia,” and

b. “Encourage states, particularly in Africa, to pursue energetically a ceasefire and mediation of the Ethiopian/Somali dispute.”

5. Even here, however, the covert action authority is cramped because the two valid “Perspectives” were written before events in Ethiopia loomed so large. For example, we can discuss Ethiopia only in connection with earlier developments in Somalia. We have no policy authority for covert action involving the other three external objectives cited in the draft Ethiopia “Perspectives,” namely:

a. “Support the U.S. role of impartial but concerned party who is seeking to establish a climate conducive to a negotiated settlement,”

b. “Stimulate foreign governments to deny use of local facilities and passage privileges to the Soviet Union and other powers engaged in transferring military equipment and troops to the Horn region,” and

c. “Promote a greater public awareness in Cuba of the political and economic consequences of Cuba’s African adventures.”

5. In addition to the currently valid “Perspectives” guidelines on issues in the Horn, we also have a Presidential finding covering covert action on the issue of Soviet-Cuban military intervention in Angola in response to which our infrastructure assets have been very active since November 1977.⁸ It seems clear, however, in order to carry out the decision of the SCC on 26 January 1978, we need to obtain expanded and updated “Perspectives” guidelines. For this purpose, we are pre-

⁶ This Perspectives deals with publicizing the Soviet role in arming both Somalia and Ethiopia and fueling the conflict in the Horn of Africa. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Congressional Affairs, Job 81M00980R: Subject Committee Files, Box 27, Folder 11: Covert Action)

⁷ This Perspectives is attached to a December 15, 1977, memorandum from Wells to Turner. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Congressional Affairs, Job 81M00980R: Subject Committee Files, Box 27, Folder 13: Covert Action)

⁸ Not found. For a summary of the finding, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, Southern Africa, Document 18.

paring a new consolidated “Perspectives” on Ethiopian/Somali issues, which I will forward to you shortly for inclusion in the “Perspectives” tasking finding now awaiting approval by the President. When approved, this new “Perspectives” will permit the Agency to address fully the Soviet-Cuban role in the Horn.

Stansfield Turner

53. **Briefing Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Saunders) to Secretary of State Vance¹**

Washington, February 4, 1978

Combat Assistance to Somalia

In this memorandum we review briefly the capabilities (not the intentions) of Egypt, Iran, Sudan, and Saudi Arabia to provide combat assistance to Somalia and give some indication as to the impact that various levels of assistance would have on the military balance in the Horn.

Capabilities

The *Egyptians* undoubtedly have the best troops available for an expeditionary force. Egypt’s Army is combat seasoned and displayed unexpected flexibility in moving from its normal Suez Canal positions to the Western Military District in the fighting against Libya last July. It is also large enough to spare a few brigades without jeopardy.

The *Iranian* Army is well-equipped and trained but has had less combat experience than the Egyptian. Iran is, however, in a far better position than any other state in the area to provide a wide range of air support. It would need, however, to use its American equipment.

Sudanese forces are less capable in all aspects than either the Egyptians or the Iranians. The small Sudanese forces are poorly trained and marginally equipped.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 21, Ethiopia: Aaron (David) trip, 2/78. Secret; Noform. Drafted by Randall T. Elliott (INR/PMT).

Any *Saudi Arabian* forces would be strictly symbolic. Saudi support would probably be restricted to political, financial, and material assistance.

Impact of Advisors and Technical Assistance

—*A few hundred technical and military advisors from Iran and/or Egypt with special emphasis on air defenses, communications, and security.* Such a force would be mainly symbolic, with little military impact.

—*A specific, well-qualified technical support package from the same states to perform tasks such as defending Berbera from air attacks or providing air defenses for several important installations.* Such a force would require possibly as many as a thousand advisors.

—*A larger number of technical and military advisors covering a wide spectrum of activity, such as training and assisting the Somalis in using air defense weapons.* Together, Egypt and Iran have significant numbers of trained, reasonably qualified personnel. The Egyptians would be best in areas such as air defenses and defensive tactics. The Iranians would probably perform better in supply, communications, and other non-combat roles. An advisory group of such a magnitude would release Somali troops for front-line service, raise the quality of training throughout the Somali armed forces, and provide a timely psychological boost.

Impact of Air-Related Expeditionary Units

—*SAM forces to protect major Somali towns and installations from Ethiopian air attacks.* While these could protect Somalia, they would not provide air security for their forces in the Ogaden.

—*SAM forces with mobile elements, such as the SA-7 and ZSU-23/4 radar controlled gun.* A dozen or so such units could make Ethiopian/Cuban air attacks so costly that they would no longer play a significant role in the fighting.

—*A similar SAM force, but backed up by a few squadrons of combat aircraft.* This would give the Somalis air superiority. Egypt, Iran, and possibly Saudi Arabia could embark on such a venture. However, the deployment of even two-three squadrons would seriously erode Egyptian air defenses and have serious logistics and support restraints. Iran could provide a squadron or two of highly effective combat aircraft for operations in Somalia and has had experience in limited deployment operations. Saudi Arabia could provide aircraft for operations in Somalia but only a dozen or so because of its limited support infrastructure.

Impact of Ground Combat Units

—*Introduction of a commando brigade or mechanized brigade.* Egypt has a commando brigade, six or seven mechanized brigades, and several

infantry brigades that would be well-suited to such a task. Egyptian forces have significant combat experience and would probably at least match an equivalent number of Cuban forces—and be clearly superior to Ethiopian forces. It would require 5,000 men to support a combat brigade adequately.

—*Introduction of Egyptian brigades and of combat forces from Iran—totaling about 20,000 men.* Support and logistics for such a large force would be a nightmare and would require enormous investments. If these problems could be solved, the well-equipped Iranians and the experienced Egyptians would give the Somalis clear superiority over their opponents for some months, even if Ethiopian mobilization and re-equipment continued at the current high pace, and of course assuming that the Cuban build-up does not go beyond 5,000–10,000 men.

Airlift Assets

Both Egypt and Iran have adequate transport aircraft to ferry men and equipment to Somalia and could start deployments very quickly. Sudan has no real airlift ability, and if it were to participate would require airlift assistance. Airlift assets available to the Egyptian, Iranian, and Saudi Air Forces include:

<u>Egypt</u>	<u>Iran</u>	<u>Saudi Arabia</u>
6 C-130 (100 troops or 75 tons of cargo)	51 C-130	24 C-130
20 An-12 (75 troops or 40 tons of cargo)	6-747 (400+ troops or 125 tons of cargo)	

Between the air forces of Iran, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, the resources for a successful airlift are present. With the augmentation available from their national airlines and from charter air cargo companies, there is no reason to doubt their capability to get men and material to Somalia expeditiously, should the political decisions be made to do so.

54. Record of a Special Coordination Meeting¹

Washington, February 10, 1978

Near-verbatim record of portion of SCC Meeting on Horn of Africa,
10 February 1978

HB: A problem: does the U.S. regard this as a serious enough threat to itself or to its friends so that we are going to risk trying to stop an invasion? If the answer to this is no, we should be playing this down, not up. —We must be careful—we must not cast what we say in a way that raises the importance of the question of possible American intervention.

ZB: We want to continue to emphasize that this is an issue of Black Africans settling conflicts themselves. This does not prejudice or preempt the Giscard initiative.²

ZB: Now what do we do about those who are really concerned but clearly want encouragement from us in order to go through with any aid?

CV: They want visible support. They want military equipment and they want money.

HB: They would also want military equipment to replace what they might put in from their own stocks.

CV: With the Iranians we would have to go to Congress.

GB: I would hope the Iranians would ship Russian equipment.

ZB: Ambassadors are going to ask them what they are doing or planning to do.

HB: But we have to decide if we can get this through the Congress. Then we have to consider what happens if we put things into Somalia and the Cubans come across the borders.

¹ Source: National Security Council, Carter Intelligence Files, Box 20, SCC Meetings, 1977–1980 Minutes. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. According to the Summary of Conclusions, which includes a list of participants, the meeting was held from 2:45 to 4:30 p.m. (Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional File, 1977–1981, Box 184, SCC 056 Horn of Africa, 2/10/78)

² Reference is to French President Giscard's proposal for a conference of interested regional states, in order to lodge a formal protest of outside powers' intervention in the region, appeal to the OAU to propose a peace settlement, provide Somalia with defensive arms to insure its protection, and elicit a promise from Somalia to evacuate the Ogaden. (Memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter, February 7; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Box 45, Africa: Horn of Africa/Cubans in Ethiopia, 1–3/78)

CV: I asked Dick Clark what is the feeling of Congress. “Until they cross the border, Congress will say no,” he said; “once they cross the border, then we may think differently.”

GB: We should alert the people in the Pacific that we might want a carrier so that they can put together a task force and hold it in the Subic Bay area.

HB: Will that leak? If it leaks out, it has a serious effect.

CV: I agree.

GB: I am going to Hawaii tonight—I want to talk to Wiesner about it.

ZB: My impression is that there is both a high degree of concern, some pre-disposition to do something and no organized effort and no serious planning and a great deal of waiting to see what kind of signals they will get from us. If we want to do anything, we have to get someone to organize it and come up with an estimate of what we would have to do to encourage it. —We have to make a fairly fundamental decision whether this is worth doing. If this is important enough to us we have to go ahead to plan to do the necessary things. If we do not take this effort, nothing much will happen.

GB: If we tell the Shah to send in a brigade and they get in a fight, what do we do then?

HB: A carrier task force will not be enough for taking care of that.

DA: Air power is the unique area where we can make an impact.

CV: I am not willing to use airpower.

GB: If we want to help the Somalis, we need to get into their hands surface-to-air missiles.

ZB: A marginal note by the President may be of interest to you: “Egypt and others need to move strongly—France and others need to back them.”³

HB: In specific terms that means that you encourage and help—but to do that you have to promise them that you will replace the equipment that they will use or transfer—and then you have to ask what happens if they start to get beaten by the Cubans.

DA: What about the fighting forces that these people might send in?

CV: If the Egyptians were to put any of their regular brigades in, they would be good fighters—but Sadat says that he is not willing to do this.

HB: To what extent is Sadat using all this as a Mideast lever on us?

³ Not found.

CV: Sadat told us that if they start moving toward the Sudan then he will go to war. But he is not willing to go to war for Somalia.

ST: We give the Sudanese a D rating on military capability.

CV: I see nothing wrong if Sadat wants to send down crews to man anti-aircraft weapons.

HB: That does not provide much political or military stiffening for the Somalis.

ZB: What are the international and domestic political implications of Somali defeat?

HB: Loss of Somali gains in the Ogaden does not cost anything. If Siad falls that may mean temporary Soviet hegemony in the Horn. The real problem is our unwillingness to stop a Soviet effort of this sort and our unwillingness to help other people.

CV: What is this going to do to the Saudis?

HB: It will make them conclude that the U.S. is a less reliable partner than they had hoped. They might raise the oil price. This would have a bad effect on NATO. But I think that 3–4–5 years from now, it will not have made any difference.

ZB: It will create a situation where there appears to be momentum for radical forces. In some places it will underline the feeling that the United States is not an active associate—if it is accompanied by lack of progress on the Middle East it would be a serious setback for us.

ZB: Domestically it is going to be very costly to the President. Angola was costly to Ford.

HB: But if we start down this road and the Congress will not allow us to transfer arms, then it will be much worse.

ZB: We must have consultations with Congress before we do anything dramatic.

CV: What are the consequences if what we are doing is to get ourselves involved in a war in Somalia? They are just as large if not larger than the consequences you outlined before.

ZB: But we must not be so traumatized by past experiences that the other side feels it can exploit situations of this sort to our disadvantage. I am not arguing for American ground involvement or air involvement. I think we should be willing to tell Sadat that we will be willing to replace equipment that he sends.

HB: I am willing to talk to the Iranians and Egyptians about what they would be willing to send if we were ready to replace what they use up.

ZB: We must tell them that we are not willing to enter a war. We want to complicate the Soviet planning, too.

HB: The Soviets will be unlikely to attack Iranian aid on its way to Somalia.

ZB: How long are the Soviets willing to bleed? If we do nothing, we are going to have Cubans next in Rhodesia.

HB: Why do we respond to the Cubans only in East Africa? Why don't we cause them difficulties closer to home?

ZB: How about Angola?

CV: The Tunney Amendment prevents our doing anything there.⁴

ZB: My strong feeling is that we are buying ourselves a real can of worms if we let the Soviets and Cubans prevail politically and internationally.

HB: I think the Egyptians and Iranians are going to ask for too much.

GB: How high is the price for the U.S.?

HB: If they ask for more than replacing equipment and a naval presence, then the price is too high.

GB: If the price is too high, we simply say no and back away from the whole situation.

ZB: We will stick to our diplomatic initiatives.

HB: Ethiopia will regain the Ogaden and the overthrow of Siad seems inevitable.

CV: I want to know more about what we are really suggesting when we say we will coordinate what is going on—if this doesn't work we will have lost a lot more than we would have done otherwise.

HB: If we merely begin this process, we take on some obligation to continue on with it . . .

ZB: We should send in our ambassadors to talk to these heads of government⁵—if there is a tangible enough response, then we should send someone over to talk about coordination and joint effort—and at the same time we tell them we would be prepared to put in a naval task force.

HB: Your first step requires that we have a judgment in respect to the Congress.

CV: I am willing to have our ambassadors go in and then I want to see what the next step would be. We don't want to get ourselves committed to anything without thinking it through.

⁴ The 1976 Tunney Amendment to the 1975 Defense Appropriations Bill (P.L. 94–212) limited U.S. involvement in Angola to intelligence gathering.

⁵ In telegram 37063 to selected diplomatic posts including Tehran, Cairo, Jidda, and Khartoum, February 11, the Department transmitted an outline of a possible basis for settlement in the Ogaden and instructed the addressees to inform the host governments of the U.S. plan. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780064–1201)

GB: I think the approach you have outlined guarantees defeat: consider our experiences with CENTO, and these are some of the same countries. CENTO can never work together on anything . . .

ZB: You would have to give them advice in order to get much coordinating action underway.

DA: I think it is very important to call what may be a bluff on the part of our friends. It is one thing for them to lay it all off on us. They will then get away with their fantasies and blame it on us.

CV: There may be other fora to do this in—we should use the UN to reinforce our diplomatic actions. We say we want the Somalis out and the Soviets and Cubans to go home. Why not use the UN for this?

CV: Perhaps the basic initiative should be limited to an Afro-Arab conference.

ZB: Do you want to consult with Andy Young?

CV: Yes.

ZB: Is it not in our national interest to make sure that there is not a Soviet-Cuban victory?

CV: What, precisely, does that mean? That's what we used to say about Vietnam.

ZB: We must not let the memory of Vietnam dictate paralysis on every issue we face.

HB: It could be very similar to Vietnam in that you would get in a step at a time and not be able to turn back.

ZB: We should put in naval force to offset Soviet naval presence.

CV: If I were an Iranian, I would be very explicit on what I would expect from the U.S. in the form of support and backing for contingencies.

HB: If the Cubans overrun Somalis, we are not going to put in planes or troops to prevent it, are we? When do we go to the Congress on this?

CV: Until you have some better idea of what these countries say they are prepared to do and are convinced they are really going to do, it is unwise to go to Congress. I think we are trying to reach too far today—to reach conclusions for which we do not yet have enough facts.

HB: The only purpose is to examine what we have in the background.

ST: I think the problem is going to be settled in the next few weeks—Siad's future depends on how fast he is defeated.

ZB: Can't we find a way to give more support to UNITA?

ST: We are giving absolutely none; the Tunney Amendment prevents it.

HB: Are you saying we should tell the French to do it?

ST: The French could act as catalysts for Saudi and Iranian money.

ZB: Is there anything else we can do to make it more costly for the Cubans?

HB: Send the South Africans against them in Angola? That sounds politically impossible.

ZB: What about gestures toward China?

HB: What the Russians are doing in the Horn should influence what we do with China. But we cannot expect that China will do anything in the Horn. Isn't there something we can do economically to make life more difficult for the Cubans? What carrots and sticks do we have here?

ST: All these things depend on how rapidly the Somalis are rolled back.⁶

⁶ According to the Summary of Conclusions (see footnote 1 above), the committee agreed to: improve intelligence-gathering capabilities; initiate outreach to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the Sudan to assess their willingness to aid Somalia; keep a carrier task force near enough to the Horn in case deployment became desirable; discuss the Giscard initiative with Nigeria and Gabon; assess possible UN action; send David Aaron to Ethiopia; and ready shipments of spare parts to Ethiopia, pending events.

55. **Memorandum From Thomas P. Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski), the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron) and Paul B. Henze and Henry Richardson of the National Security Council Staff¹**

Washington, February 10, 1978

SUBJECT

The Horn

Attached are some thoughts that I have put together in the process of trying to think constructively about the Horn. I hope you find them of some use.

I have discussed this general approach with my North-South colleagues and some others. I have profited from the discussion but would not suggest that they fully support what I have written.

Attachment

Paper Prepared by Thomas P. Thornton of the National Security Council Staff²

Washington, undated

POLICY TOWARD THE HORN

1. Personally, I am quite willing to let events take their course as regards the Soviet role in the region. I think they will gain little from their efforts in the short run and probably be heavy losers in the not distant future (i.e., less than five years). As long as Mengistu is not desperate, he is not going to be a Soviet toady. Also, I dispute the idea that the Horn is of notable strategic value unless you are going to fight World War II over again. I do not believe that any likely US policy course will result in the Finlandization of Saudi Arabia, and think that we have quite a bit to gain internationally by standing above the battle.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files 1977–1981, Box 19, PD/NSC–32. Secret. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Armacost, Bartholomew, Erb, Hunter, Pastor, Sick, and Tuchman.

² Secret.

2. These views may not be universally held (although they find substantial support among those of us involved in North-South matters). Whether or not they are accepted may not matter all that much; the constraints imposed by our capabilities to act decisively may lead us to much the same courses of action as would a relaxed attitude.

3. We do not have domestic support for a dramatic involvement in the Horn. Most of those who would berate us for our weakness vis-a-vis the Soviets will quickly get under the table if the question of personnel or large-scale military assistance arises. The *worst* thing that can happen to this administration, abroad and at home, is to be seen as ineffective—i.e., talking big and not being able to follow up.

4. We seem to have two principal goals:

—Increase the cost the Soviets and Cubans will have to pay to enhance their position, and keep them from enhancing it to the extent possible.

—Prevent a Somali collapse, either through invasion or subversion. Note that a Somali victory is not among our interests.

5. We need to define a rhetorical and political position that will help us achieve these ends with minimum involvement on our part. We should stake out the high ground clearly by saying:

—We do not and have never supported Somali territorial aspirations.

—We stand by the principle of inviolability of African borders—and this includes the Somalis' own border.

—We urge great power restraint; preferably this means non-involvement. When there is involvement it must be proportionate. We reluctantly accept the fact of the Soviets helping the Ethiopians. We do not accept, however, the massive scale of the involvement which raises questions as to ultimate Soviet intentions.

—We should emphasize the role of regional responsibility; in the first instance the OAU mediation responsibility; in the second instance, the role of neighboring states to assist Somalia if it is attacked.

6. A prerequisite to any effective action along the above lines is the withdrawal of Somali forces from Ethiopia, or at least a general perception that withdrawal is about to be effected by one means or the other.

Tactics

7. A major difficulty in pursuing our propaganda line will be to convey an adequate picture of Soviet involvement without creating unnecessary pressures here at home or among allies. The matter should be approached with calm and dignity—more sorrow than anger. The danger is not to us or to our interests but to Africa, to the states of the

general region and to world stability. For domestic consumption we point out that the President is determined not to get us bogged down.

8. While we have an interest in raising the cost of involvement to the Soviets, this should not entail attempts to prolong the fighting in the hope of getting the Soviets enmired in a mini-Vietnam. The main cost of such a policy would be in terms of the lives of Ethiopians and Somalis, and there is no US interest at stake that would permit us to do that in good conscience.

9. In addressing the international audience, the cost to the Soviets can be raised by a vigorous propaganda campaign. For example, we should be getting pictures of Soviet ships ferrying troops to Ethiopia and flooding the European and Third World media with them. We would emphasize not the threat to the US but the disproportionate and dangerous nature of the Soviet response. There will be unhelpful playback at home, but this can be attenuated by the same themes. (We need not respond as forcefully to Soviet bad behavior if it is not a direct threat to us.)

10. Overall, our tactics should be aimed for maximum effect when our political position will be strongest—i.e., when the Somalis are out of Ethiopia, which is likely to be sooner rather than later.

11. We should be very receptive to the idea of going to the UN Security Council. Our hands are clean and the Soviets' are not. Even the Somalis will look good once they have pulled back. (There is a certain similarity to the role of North Korea before and after it was driven back behind the 38th Parallel.) There is a threat to the peace and this is just the kind of thing that the Security Council should be discussing. Obviously it should look to the OAU as its instrument *if* the OAU could be effective. "Meddling" by the UNSC plus a Somali withdrawal might provide the context to galvanize the OAU.

12. If we are going to help the Somalis, it should be through third country transfers. Indeed, the current situation raises questions as to whether our self-imposed limitations on third country transfers make sense. There are certain things that we should help other people to do that we would not be willing to do ourselves. We should not unduly tie their (and our own) hands. Quite aside from the immediate situation, this is a policy that we should review.

13. Finally, we should design policies that will give Ethiopia a maximum amount of incentive and flexibility in the short and mid-term to shift away from the Soviets. Pressure is one aspect of this, but it must be accompanied by clear indications that we are not unalterably opposed to vital Ethiopian interests. In other words, we must not become totally identified with the Somali cause. (The Arabs were able to diversify only after it became clear to them that we were not committed to Israel 150 percent.)

56. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 14, 1978

SUBJECT

Middle East, Horn, Belgrade CSCE, SALT

PARTICIPANTS

US

The Secretary

Marshall D. Shulman

USSR

Amb. Anatoliy Dobrynin

Ambassador Dobrynin came in at our request February 14. The discussion covered the following matters:

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Horn of Africa.]

2. *Horn*. The Secretary spoke of the mounting US concern over the course of events, and the need for prompt movement toward a ceasefire and a negotiated settlement. He expressed the belief that the time had come to work through the UN Security Council, and reported that he had asked Andrew Young to talk about this with Ambassador Troyanovsky in New York.² In response to a question from Dobrynin about the results expected from a Security Council discussion, the Secretary listed the following: ceasefire; recognition of international boundaries; withdrawal of the Somalis from the Ogaden; withdrawal of all foreign troops, including Soviet and Cuban, from Ethiopia and Somalia; and the beginning of steps leading toward a negotiated solution. Dobrynin expressed the view that there should be an immediate appeal for a Somali withdrawal, since this was, in the Soviet view, a precondition for the other steps. Dobrynin asked who should take the initiatives in calling for an SC meeting. The Secretary said it would be best if Nigeria or Gabon did so, since an African initiative would not make it appear that the UN was taking matters out of OAU hands, but that we would do so if necessary. Dobrynin said it should not appear to be a Soviet-American confrontation, and the Secretary agreed that an African initiative would be better from this point of view as well.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P860029–2278. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Shulman; approved by Anderson (S/S). The conversation took place at the Department of State. This memorandum of conversation is printed in full in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 81.

² In telegram 527 from USUN, February 15, the Mission reported on Young's discussion with Troyanovsky. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780068–1107)

The Secretary emphasized the importance of a firm commitment that the Ethiopians and the Cubans would not cross into Somali territory, and the serious consequences that would follow if they did. Dobrynin repeated the assurances of the Ethiopians on this point, and added that Raul Castro had also made it clear during his visit to Moscow that the Cuban forces had no intention of moving into Somali territory. Dobrynin did not dispute the assertion that the Cubans were participating in the fighting, but insisted that Soviet personnel were not doing so.

Dobrynin said he would transmit the message to Moscow, and could not anticipate what its reaction would be to the Security Council move.³ He pointed out, however, that it had been negative up to this point and the USSR had insisted upon prior Somali withdrawal as a prerequisite to negotiations. He ventured his own opinion that a declaration of Somali intention to withdraw might suffice to start the process, if it were given without conditions, and if the withdrawal were to be completed within a definite time period, such as two weeks.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Horn of Africa.]

³ In a meeting with Vance on February 18, Dobrynin delivered a “non-paper” on the Soviet position on Security Council action, which was to first ascertain the possibility of OAU action. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 82.

57. Telegram From the Embassy in Ethiopia to the Department of State¹

Addis Ababa, February 17, 1978, 1759Z

807. Pass to White House for Brzezinski. State for Vance. From Aaron. Subj: Meeting with Mengistu.

1. I had two-and-one-half hour meeting with Mengistu afternoon 17 February with Foreign Minister Felleke, PMAC Foreign Relations Chief Berhanu Bayehn, Foreign Ministry PermSec Dawit and American Desk Chief Berhane present on Ethiopian side. None of Dirg members currently considered as hardliners present. Mood of meeting was temperate and serious with recognition of Ethiopian side of its high-level

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850104–2323. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

nature and expressions of appreciation for President Carter's initiative. Much of the ground covered was as anticipated on both sides. Ethiopian criticisms of U.S. past position toward revolution were extensive but familiar and not particularly vindictive in tone. My responses were direct as planned. The concluding portion of the meeting was clearly upbeat and positive.

2. Main highlights: Mengistu asked that I personally convey to President his assurances that Ethiopia has no intention of crossing Somalia's borders, nor has Ethiopia any intention of interfering in other countries' affairs, that Cuban and Soviet forces had come only to help Ethiopia and Ethiopia would not permit them to use Ethiopia as a base for intervention in neighboring countries.

3. In response to my strong characterization of destabilizing effect of Cuban and Soviet combat forces remaining in region and my stress on fact that this caused deep concern to US and other countries of the area, he said he understood this concern and wished to reassure US that Ethiopia did not regard these forces as a permanent feature of the area, but as temporary though necessary forces to enable Ethiopia to overcome the effects of Somali aggression. Mengistu's purpose was clearly not to further strain relations but to keep open channels of communication and to balance Soviets to some extent. Key at this point is clearly to get Somalis out of Ogaden. Otherwise Mengistu determined to push them out despite risks of wider conflict. He appreciated clarification that our approach is ceasefire linked with withdrawal and negotiation aimed not at leaving Somali forces in place but at stabilizing situation after withdrawal. From his reactions, there may be some possibility of negotiation along these lines.

4. Prior to departure tomorrow, I will meet with Foreign Minister² and visit former AID project (JFK Library) as well as Rural Development Association.

Matheron

² In telegram 822 from Addis Ababa, February 18, the Embassy reported on Aaron's meeting with Feleke and Dawit. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780076–0763)

58. Minutes of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, February 21, 1978, 3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

The Horn of Africa

PARTICIPANTS

State

Cyrus Vance

Richard Moose, Assistant Secretary
of State*Defense*

Harold Brown

Charles Duncan, Deputy Secretary
of Defense*CIA*

Admiral Stansfield Turner

JCS

General David Jones, Acting Chairman

White House

Zbigniew Brzezinski

David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security
Affairs*NSC*

Robert Gates (notetaker)

MINUTES

Dr. Brzezinski asked David Aaron to review his mission to Ethiopia for the members of the SCC.²

Mr. Aaron said that his visit and talks in Addis Ababa had been fairly fruitful and had maintained communication with the Ethiopian Government. His conversations had been very frank yet cordial. The Ethiopian strategic objective in receiving him had been to hold open a channel of communications and to work both sides (the United States and USSR). Their tactical objective was to keep the United States from supporting Somalia in the Ogaden. Also, he believed the Ethiopians were reluctant to see the Soviets regain their position in Somalia and noted that the Ethiopians had in the recent past rejected a regional confederation under Soviet auspices.

Mr. Aaron said he told Mengistu that the Soviets will become part of his problem and that their presence will cause other countries to react. At the same time, Mengistu had said that Ethiopia has no intention of crossing into Somalia. In this connection *Mr. Aaron* said he believes *Mr. Mengistu* understands the advantages to Ethiopia of being the victim in this situation.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files 1977–1981, Box 184, SCC 059 Horn of Africa, 2/21/78. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. There is no indication when the meeting ended. The minutes are incorrectly dated February 22, but the Summary of Conclusions indicates that the meeting occurred on February 21. (Ibid.)

² See Document 57.

Secretary Vance inquired whether Mengistu had meant “any crossing of the border” to which Mr. Aaron replied he believed that was exactly what Mengistu had meant. Mr. Aaron said he believed the Ethiopians would try to destroy Somali forces in the Ogaden so there would be no cross border problem. He also said that Mengistu wanted us to persuade the Somalis to withdraw and thereby peacefully resolve this issue.

Mr. Aaron reported that Mengistu said Ethiopia would not interfere in other countries and would not become a base for Soviet operations elsewhere in the region. Mengistu tried to leave the impression that once the conflict is over and Somali forces are withdrawn from the Ogaden, the reason for Soviet and Cuban forces would be eliminated.

Mr. Aaron added that while he had told Mengistu we had not helped Somalia by providing military equipment, the Ethiopians countered by offering to provide serial numbers of U.S. equipment.

Mr. Aaron said that he had told Mengistu the U.S. would provide nonlethal equipment for which the Ethiopians had paid and added that Mengistu had been much taken by the idea of selling the lethal equipment purchased by Ethiopia back to us and using the proceeds to buy nonlethal equipment.

Mr. Aaron reported that Mengistu repeatedly emphasized that the U.S. should not “corner” the Ethiopians, and accused the U.S. of “being taken in” by the Arabs. Mengistu gave little impression of strict ideological belief but rather referred to Ethiopia as a Christian country surrounded by Arabs. Mengistu charged that the “Red menace” is being used against his country.

Mr. Aaron concluded that the Soviets are in Ethiopia deeply and pervasively and that we face a long term problem. If we can help settle the Ogaden problem and dampen the Eritrean insurgency, we will help create conditions for diminution of the Soviet role. But we should be aware that the Soviets will be there as long as it takes the Ethiopians to learn how to use modern military equipment.

Secretary Vance said that Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin would be coming to see him that afternoon and asked how much he should be told.³

Mr. Aaron suggested that Dobrynin probably has a full report on his visit and should be told mainly that the Ethiopians had confirmed what the Soviets had told him before.

Dr. Brzezinski briefly reviewed the remaining agenda for the meeting and began the discussion.

³ The memorandum of conversation of Vance's meeting with Dobrynin is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 83.

With respect to the Somali-Ethiopian war, he suggested that our UN initiative was not propitious.⁴ The Ethiopians regard it as hostile and other Africans are unenthusiastic. We should instead focus on the OAU.

Secretary Vance said this should be the case up to a point, but added there is nothing promising in the OAU effort either. We should wait and see what happens in Lagos.⁵

Mr. Moose noted that Nigerian Foreign Minister Garba was impressed by our Security Council Resolution but was worried that the Soviets would sabotage it. Nevertheless, Garba remained interested in the UN forum.

Dr. Brzezinski said that this sounded over-stated, that it was his impression that the response to our resolution was not hostile but rather regarded as possibly useful. Also, what is Soviet sabotage?

Mr. Moose suggested that Garba was referring to the Soviets blocking the resolution in the Security Council. He questioned whether it might be useful for the OAU to send a delegation from Tripoli to the Security Council.

Dr. Brzezinski inquired whether the OAU is prepared to do anything on its own?

Mr. Moose said this was unlikely but we might help the Garba effort by facilitating his communications and keeping him encouraged. He added that Obasanjo has a penchant for peace making and that possibly a Presidential letter to him supporting the Garba effort would be helpful.

Secretary Vance said that the Saudis are unenthusiastic about overtures to Siad-Barre on this. Thus, he would be inclined to recommend something outside the Security Council. The French Ambassador, for example, had told him that France could not support the U.S. draft resolution. The withdrawal of all foreign troops from the Ogaden was as far as France could go.

Dr. Brzezinski inquired whether the Arab League—especially Egypt and the Sudan—could help. But *Mr. Aaron* replied that our Ambassador in the Sudan had told him not to count on the Sudanese.

Dr. Brzezinski asked whether we should press ahead with our resolution in the present form and forum.

⁴ Telegram 550 from USUN, February 16, transmitted the text of the draft Security Council resolution, which had been concurred in by the U.K., French, West German, and Canadian Foreign Ministers at a meeting with Vance in New York. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780071-0195)

⁵ In telegram 2181 from Lagos, February 21, the Embassy reported on the Nigerian mediation efforts. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780078-0315)

Secretary Vance said that we could not do that, adding that the resolution requires much further refinement. He added he would not, however, rule out moving ahead in the UN in a week or so.

Dr. Brzezinski summarized the discussion as concluding that the United States should defer action on its UN Security Council resolution to see what the Nigerians might accomplish in the OAU or in the UN. We should encourage the Africans to go forward in the OAU effort and then, if it stalls, to take the issue into the UN. This would be better than for us to take the lead in the UN.

Secretary Brown asked if it was not a fact that the OAU would not produce and that the issue would be dumped in the UN?

Secretary Vance answered affirmatively, adding that this would probably happen in a week or two.

Mr. Aaron noted that the Ethiopians rejected our resolution because it attaches conditions to their sovereignty.

Secretary Vance asked if we should encourage the Nigerians to go to the UN, particularly since they are not self-starters.

Dr. Brzezinski replied that it is in our interest to keep the issue in the OAU and force these countries to face the Soviet problem in Africa.

Secretary Vance said that this would depend upon how fast events move in the Ogaden.

Dr. Brzezinski suggested that no firm judgment is possible on this at this time and that events will guide it. He suggested that a confrontation of outsiders might well concern the OAU.

Mr. Aaron supported the idea of doing something with the OAU, and *Secretary Vance* said this might be done through the French, that is, force the OAU to face the question, let it become apparent that the organization cannot handle it, and then move the issue to the UN.

Mr. Aaron said with respect to our UN resolution that we should get the Africans to peddle it at the OAU—Soviet/Cuban withdrawal for Somalian withdrawal.

Secretary Vance said that the Africans would not go for this.

Mr. Moose suggested that we should perhaps scale back our requirement for simultaneous withdrawal by both the Soviet/Cubans and the Somalis.

Dr. Brzezinski responded that we should let the Africans dilute our position rather than do it ourselves.

Mr. Aaron noted that Garba will need coaching and all the help we can give him.

Secretary Vance again emphasized the importance of getting the French on board.

Dr. Brzezinski said that the situation has changed now and could become more protracted, particularly if the entrance of other Arabs into the conflict meant a confrontation of two different outside forces.

Secretary Brown asked in what way the other Arabs might become involved—by providing arms?

Dr. Brzezinski said this would depend on whether the Somalis could hang on.

Admiral Turner observed that there is not much chance the Somalis can hold on in the North.

Secretary Vance concluded that we should go to the Nigerians and suggest that they raise our Security Council resolution in the OAU and push for its approval there. If this fails, then the Nigerians and perhaps other OAU members should take the issue to the UN. He noted that we would not get much help from Gabon unless the French were helping us.

Secretary Vance asked Mr. Aaron whether Mengistu had offered a position with respect to stationing observers in the Ogaden?

Mr. Aaron said he proposed to Mengistu a scenario involving a cease fire, prompt withdrawal of Somali forces and a stabilization of the situation and recognition of the frontier. They had not discussed observers and it was his impression that we could test that proposition with Mengistu only with a Somalian commitment to withdraw.

Mr. Moose suggested that we go to Ethiopia and Somalia and try to persuade them not to oppose our UN resolution.

Mr. Aaron responded that Ethiopia would not support the resolution without a Somali commitment to withdraw.

Mr. Moose inquired whether that would be the case if the OAU approved the resolution, to which Mr. Aaron replied that it “might work.”

Illicit Arms Transfers

Secretary Vance said that Ambassador West had talked to the Saudis about their providing U.S.-origin weapons to Somalia and had given them the serial numbers of this equipment. He said West had also spoken about Somali withdrawal.⁶

Mr. Aaron reported that the Ethiopians had given us additional serial numbers as well. He added that there was a need for a high level approach to the Saudis indicating that the illegal transfer of arms could prejudice the sale of F-15s to Saudi Arabia.

⁶ In telegram 1313 from Jidda, February 19, the Embassy reported that West had raised the issue with Al-Mansouri. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850033-0092)

Secretary Brown noted that this was particularly true inasmuch as the transfer undercuts our pledges to the Congress and others that Saudi Arabia would not use or transfer U.S.-origin weapons.

Dr. Brzezinski said that there were actually three arguments that should be made: (1) the transfer would prejudice the F-15; (2) it would provoke an outcry here in the United States; and (3) we do not oppose the Saudis transferring arms that are of non-U.S. origin.

Mr. Moose advised that legally we must inform the Congress of the diversions of U.S. origin weapons to Somalia, to which *Dr. Brzezinski* replied that we should tell the Saudis first.

Mr. Aaron said we should not rule out the possibility with respect to these weapons, that the Soviets might be making trouble. He said that while this was unlikely, we should take steps to nail down for sure whether there have been transfers and if they are illegal.

Dr. Brzezinski said that it was important to put this approach in context and to assure the Saudis that the United States is not bugging out or washing our hands of the Horn. In fact, we should encourage the Saudis to send Somali non-U.S. origin arms.

Secretary Brown endorsed that view and *Dr. Brzezinski* said that Egyptian or French equipment might be available.

Mr. Aaron cautioned against giving the Somalis too much, to avoid giving the impression that we want them in the Ogaden. He added that we should say that if the Somalis withdraw from the Ogaden, we would not oppose the transfer of U.S. equipment if approved by the Congress.

Mr. Moose explained that the transfer of U.S. arms would be complicated legally. First, depending upon the agreements, our bilateral agreements would need to be amended (which is possible by Executive action). Second, we must then make the recipient country FMS eligible. Third, we can sell directly.

Dr. Brzezinski summarized the view of the group that the United States should go to the Saudis and make the following points:

—To provide evidence that U.S. origin arms have been provided by Saudi Arabia to Somalia and to express our concern about such transfers which are contrary to our bilateral agreements.

—To emphasize that such transfers could have a seriously adverse impact on F-15s for Saudi Arabia.

—To explain that we have no objection to supplying non-U.S. origin equipment to Somalia (particularly anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons).

—To advise that if Somalia is threatened with invasion after withdrawal from the Ogaden, the Administration would initiate action to provide third country arms transfers.

Mr. Aaron observed that the F-15s give us leverage with the Saudis. We should enlist their help in getting Somalia to withdraw, after which we would arrange arms transfers. He added, however, that all of this must happen very fast.

Secretary Brown asked whether we can be encouraging the transfer of non-U.S. origin weapons without Somali withdrawal from the Ogaden.

Dr. Brzezinski replied that we do not want to oppose the Saudis politically on the Horn.

Secretary Vance emphasized that we should provide no help to Somalia until it has withdrawn from the Ogaden. Further, we should tell the Saudis to stop their arms transfers until the Somalis are out.

Secretary Brown said that the Saudis may conclude in that event that we are totally uncooperative with respect to Somalia.

Dr. Brzezinski said we and the Saudis should make the Soviets and others think that victory will be difficult for them. Saudi money for arms will help in this regard.

Secretary Brown asked how fast new equipment could be bought and delivered to Somalia.

Dr. Brzezinski emphasized that speed would be important and that some equipment—particularly anti-tank equipment—could be flown in. He also noted that it would be unwise to give the impression that our only concern in the Horn is to prevent Somalia from getting U.S. arms.

Mr. Moose suggested that the best protection against invasion of Somalia would be world opinion, particularly in light of assurances by Mengistu and the Soviets.

Dr. Brzezinski replied that we must not create the impression in Saudi Arabia that we are isolating Somalia.

Secretary Brown suggested that we tell the Saudis that U.S. arms cannot now be transferred legally but we will not object if they buy non-U.S. arms elsewhere.

Dr. Brzezinski added that we should also say that if Somalia withdraws from the Ogaden, the U.S. would consider third country transfers to stabilize the situation.

Admiral Turner pointed out that the Somalis primarily need spare parts, instruction, logistical help, and leadership. He noted, in an aside, that Soviet General Petrov is directing brigade-level operations.

Dr. Brzezinski said that the message to the Saudis outlined above should also be conveyed to the Iranians, Egyptians, and Pakistanis.

Secretary Vance noted that with these countries the first point would need to be altered inasmuch as there is no evidence now of illegal transfers.

U.S. Carrier Task Force

Secretary Vance noted that his view remained as before (opposed).

Secretary Brown said that sending a special task force without a specific purpose has likely negative consequences outweighing the advantages.

Dr. Brzezinski asked *Secretary Brown* what a task force could accomplish.

Secretary Brown replied that it could produce a presence which, when events turned out favorably, will be seen as contributing to that favorable outcome. On the other hand, if the outcome is unfavorable, the presence of the task force will be seen as a failure, thereby lessening the credibility of such task forces in other situations in the future. He added that the other use would be to prevent Soviet attack on arms transfers shipments to Somalia.

Dr. Brzezinski suggested that it might also have a confidence building role and suggested that if the Ethiopians do not cross the border, the task force will be viewed as having been successful.

Secretary Vance said he did not agree that the Ethiopians would not cross the frontier.

Dr. Brzezinski asked what if they did cross?

Secretary Brown said the task force could attack them but that he did not favor attacking forces crossing the border with the U.S. task force. He suggested that one alternative would be to go to Iran, Saudi Arabia and Egypt and suggest that they put a force into Somalia to deter Ethiopia from crossing the border and to support Siad-Barre politically. We would send a task force to keep the Russians from attacking arms transfers shipments. He added, however, that there are two problems. If the countries in the region put forces into Somalia and then the Ethiopians come across the border and “kick the shit out of those forces,” what do we do? Also, we will be asked about equipment. Do we authorize the use of U.S. equipment? The Secretary indicated that he would have said yes, until Mr. Moose spelled out how complicated that is. He would, however, favor replacement of equipment sent to Somalia but this would require the permission of Congress. He concluded that as long as Somalia is in the Ogaden there will be no support. With this truth, no one will send help.

Dr. Brzezinski said that a task force would have two purposes. The first would be to help Arab forces in Somalia but he added that this would appear to be a non-starter. Second, we could encourage Saudi Arabia to provide equipment, emphasizing that we are concerned and share their interest in not having Somalia overrun. They and others might deter the Ethiopians, once victorious in the Ogaden, from spilling over into Somalia. In these circumstances, a task force could be a

confidence building measure, encouraging countries in the region that the U.S. is present, stands with them, will protect the flow of arms, and will provide protection from the Russians.

Secretary Brown commented that the Russians do not worry the Saudis, that the invasion won't be a Russian action. Thus, if Siad-Barre is overthrown or there is an invasion, all will say the task force failed.

Secretary Vance noted that we would be playing a bluff we cannot carry through.

Secretary Brown pointed out that the arrival of the U.S. aircraft carrier *Enterprise* in the Indian Ocean during the Indo-Pakistani war had been denounced by both sides.

Dr. Brzezinski said that the two situations are not parallel. In this instance, the purpose of the task force would be clearly anti-Soviet.

Mr. Aaron observed that the main thing Somalia needs is the wherewithal to cope with the air threat, that is, the Cuban-flown MIGs. Thus, we might consider a carrier in the context of asking Siad-Barre to withdraw from the Ogaden and defend his country from the border. In this event, we would move a carrier into the Indian Ocean and tell Siad-Barre that we would guarantee his territorial integrity and fight the Cubans.

Secretary Brown said he opposed this approach for both political and military reasons. In the latter case, the task force would make no difference; the former was politically indefensible.

Dr. Brzezinski said the task force should be there for political reasons, to make clear the serious consequences of an invasion. Also, it would provide military support if the Iranians or other outsiders provide air cover for Somalia. We should not engage the Ethiopians or Cubans directly. This would give confidence of U.S. support.

Secretary Vance said he opposed this politically. He added that we should emphasize a political settlement that would make it easier for Siad-Barre to withdraw. Then, if it were necessary to allow third country arms transfers, that would be okay. But we should keep our forces out.

Dr. Brzezinski asked Secretary Vance if he meant that the U.S. should do nothing in the event Ethiopia crossed the frontier?

Secretary Vance replied "yes."

Dr. Brzezinski suggested again that we go to the Saudis and Iranians and ask what they were prepared to do with us in the Horn.

Mr. Aaron added that the key is to link any action with withdrawal and reiterated that timing is important.

Admiral Turner observed that all of this could be academic in a very short time because there is likely to be a rout of Somali forces and there will be no Somali force to defend Somalia.

General Jones suggested that there would be heavy pressures on the Ethiopians to keep going once they reach the border. He added that once a task force is sent in, there will be much harder decisions afterward.

Dr. Brzezinski speculated that the President would decide against sending in a task force.

Secretary Brown again stated that if events came to a bad end in Somalia, the task force would have failed even if it had deterred the Soviets. He added that we should go ahead with the consultations and find out what our friends are prepared to do in the area.

Dr. Brzezinski suggested that we then put in the task force and give assurances to our friends with respect to the Russians.

Secretary Brown said the question was still how to use the task force, a question we would be asked by our friends.

Mr. Moose noted that the best defense of Somali borders would be to advertise widely the assurances given by Mengistu and the Soviets.

Dr. Brzezinski said he was concerned about the effects of seeming U.S. passivity on Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Secretary Brown stated that no one in the Department of Defense supports fighting Cuban or Ethiopian aircraft. He added that what you (*Dr. Brzezinski*) want to deter—the Russians—do not need to be deterred.

Dr. Brzezinski emphasized that it is in our interest to get the Saudi Arabians and the Iranians into Somalia if it looks like the Somalis will be defeated.

Mr. Aaron added that the package for Somalia must include U.S. muscle.

Secretary Brown said he agreed with helping the Iranians and the Saudis if they are willing to go into Somalia. Then he would be willing to put in a carrier to protect them against the Soviets.

Dr. Brzezinski suggested that we go to these countries and ask whether, in the event of a Somali withdrawal, they would go in and provide air cover. In turn, we would say that the U.S. will go in and deter the Soviets.

Secretary Brown expressed the view that if we take this approach, Saudi Arabia and Iran will say no.

Secretary Vance said he was concerned about U.S. ships already in the Indian Ocean and going to Mombasa, Kenya.

Dr. Brzezinski said we should consider alternative plans for the ships already there.

Secretary Brown observed that if we go down the consultations path, the friendly countries will say we did not do enough and that the collapse of Somalia was the fault of the United States.

Secretary Vance suggested that we would be worse off with these friends if we encourage them to go in but refuse to answer their hard questions about our role.

Dr. Brzezinski said that our position would be that we will fight only the Soviets. The Saudi Arabians and the Iranians will have to match the Cubans.

Secretary Brown and General Jones jointly expressed the view that the Saudi Arabians and the Iranians, in fact, could not match the Cubans.

Secretary Vance said that Sadat would not put ground forces in Somalia.

Dr. Brzezinski stated that it is better for the record to get the negative response of the countries in the region and general agreement that nothing is to be done.

Secretary Brown noted that in the aftermath, these same countries will take a very different position.

Dr. Brzezinski again expressed his concern at the consequences both domestically and abroad of doing nothing.

Mr. Aaron commented that the presence of Arabs in Somalia would make the withdrawal of the Cubans even harder.

Other Responses to Soviets and Cubans

Dr. Brzezinski asked what might be done to raise the cost of involvement for the Soviets and Cubans?

Secretary Vance suggested that President Sadat might be persuaded to put surface-to-air forces into Somalia, but Admiral Turner pointed out that Sadat could not just provide men. He would also require air control systems, etc.

Dr. Brzezinski inquired whether there was something in the U.S.-Soviet bilateral area that might be done.

Secretary Brown said there might be some further negative action in the Indian Ocean talks.⁷

Dr. Brzezinski asked whether something might be done in the areas of space and technology.

Secretary Brown said that cooperation in the future space shuttle might be used but that he felt this was really a different compartment.

⁷ The United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in talks on arms control in the Indian Ocean. On February 21, Brzezinski approved a recommendation to suspend the talks because of the Soviet Actions in the Horn of Africa. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Document 121.

Mr. Aaron said that the only item in the political agenda that might deter the Soviets would be SALT.

Dr. Brzezinski asked if we might be more flexible on technology transfer to China?

Secretary Brown said that would certainly get their attention.

Dr. Brzezinski said he thought the Soviets would be indifferent to the SALT price and that if they were going to be indifferent to our sensitivities, we should do likewise vis-a-vis China.

Secretary Brown indicated that he was moderately favorable to that idea.

Secretary Vance emphasized that he disagreed with *Dr. Brzezinski* on the final implications of an Ethiopian crossover to Hargeisa.

Secretary Brown said he agreed with *Dr. Brzezinski's* analysis of the consequences in the short run but with *Secretary Vance* in the long run.

Mr. Aaron advised that we be cautious about what we say in the event of Ethiopia's crossover of the border in hot pursuit. We must face the danger of the Soviets going into southern Africa as a result of the internal settlement in Rhodesia.⁸ We need contingency planning.

Secretary Vance said he hated to see Somalia characterized as a friend that we are letting down.

Secretary Brown responded that we could not, however, let the Soviets fish in troubled waters.

Secretary Vance said we should take each case on its own.

Dr. Brzezinski said that he foresaw immediate regional and international consequences to an invasion of Somalia and that this action would contribute to uncertainty and destabilization in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. The lesson they would learn is that if they are in a contest, they should not get caught relying on the United States. Further, a successful invasion would be an example of yet another time that Cuban forces were decisive.

Secretary Vance replied that he would not put any U.S. troops in Africa.

Dr. Brzezinski said we should get the regional powers to act and "make the Soviets and Cubans bleed."

⁸ Reference is to the Internal Settlement between Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith and Bishop Abel Muzorewa, which led to a new government in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Documentation is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XVI, Southern Africa.

Mr. Moose cautioned that a huge train of legislative action would be required to get help to Somalia, adding that we in fact have almost no options.

Dr. Brzezinski said it will be important to have tried to help.

Mr. Aaron added that this situation might help us to get the law on third country transfers changed.

Dr. Brzezinski then summarized the recommendations of the SCC, including:

—We should rely on the OAU to press for some sort of negotiated settlement but not exclude the United Nations.

—We should approach the Saudis, Iranians, and Pakistanis to point out that arms transfers of U.S. origin are illegal, that such illegal assistance could have a serious impact on future U.S. arms sales, that we do not object to their providing non-U.S. origin equipment to Somalia and that we would consider authorizing third country arms transfers if Somalia is threatened with invasion after withdrawing from the Ogaden.

—We are disagreed whether to recommend deployment of a U.S. carrier task force but agree that we should proceed with consultations with regional powers; and

—With respect to other actions against the USSR and Cuba we see no direct linkage with other bilateral matters but are willing to consider further steps with respect to space cooperation and technology transfers to the Chinese. (Secretary Vance reserved his position on the latter.)

Mr. Aaron added at the conclusion of the meeting that the United States should be as forthcoming as possible with a Kenyan delegation coming to the United States. All agreed with this view.

Mr. Moose said that we should tell the Somalis and the Arabs what we are planning to do with regard to providing Ethiopia with nonlethal spare parts.

Secretary Vance noted that we will provide two C-130 aircraft to Somalia and asked whether this should be announced. All agreed with *Mr. Aaron's* recommendation that we let ride for a while any publicity relating to this.

Secretary Vance recommended that *Mr. Aaron* call Senator Sparkman and Congressman Zablocki to report on his trip to Ethiopia.

59. Current Reports Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research¹

Washington, February 22, 1978

1. HORN OF AFRICA

A. Role of Soviet Generals in Ethiopia

Soviet General Petrov is “almost entirely” in control of military planning for Ethiopian and Cuban forces in the Ogaden, according to a generally reliable clandestine [*less than 1 line not declassified*] source. Petrov reportedly controls a joint military planning group (Soviets, Cubans and Ethiopians) and does not have to coordinate his decisions with, or seek approval from, Addis Ababa. According to the source, Petrov personally gives orders to Ethiopian division and brigade commanders and decides when Cuban units should be committed to combat. He does not, however, have command of Ogaden air operations, which remain under control of Ethiopian Air Force headquarters in Addis Ababa.

Another clandestine report, meanwhile, indicates that Soviet General Vorokhov recently accompanied high-level Ethiopian military officials to the Eritrean port of Massawa to plan a break-out from that besieged city. The plan will reportedly include an amphibious landing of troops outside the port if a suitable site can be found. (Recent [*less than 1 line not declassified*] *imagery* showed an amphibious force of brigade strength being loaded on landing ships north of Assab, presumably intended for Massawa.)

INR notes that these clandestine reports, if accurate, indicate a type of Soviet military involvement in Ethiopia significantly different from earlier Soviet military activities in either the Middle East or Angola and diverge significantly, in spirit at least, from Moscow’s public and private assurances that its personnel are not involved in combat operations. Moscow’s deepest involvement in active military operations in the Third World heretofore was in Egypt during the 1969–1970 War of Attrition. At that time, Soviet air units operated under Soviet command against Israeli deep penetration raids, but there was no real question of Soviet control over Egyptian ground forces. Nor in Angola was there evidence that Soviet military personnel played more than an advisory and supportive logistic role in what was overwhelmingly a Cuban-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special Files, Box 2, Chron File: 2/78. Top Secret; Exdis; Codeword. Carter wrote at the top of the page, “We might go public on this. J.”

Angolan military operation. (TOP SECRET RUFF/NOFORN/NO-CONTRACT/ORCON/EXDIS)

[Omitted here are items unrelated to the Horn of Africa.]

60. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, February 22, 1978

1. *The Horn*—Ambassador Addou of Somalia called on me this afternoon with a “critical” message from Siad Barre. He said that a majority of Somali military officers had called upon Siad Barre to open a dialogue with the Soviet Union in view of the military situation. Siad Barre had refused and said this would never happen while he was President.

Addou made two requests: One, that the United States authorize third country transfer of U.S. arms urgently to Somalia. Second, that President Siad Barre be invited to the U.S. in order to show he had some moral support. I asked if Siad Barre was prepared to withdraw his troops into Somalia or to state that he was going to do so in conjunction with requesting arms. Addou replied indirectly that the arms request was without reference to a Somali withdrawal.

Addou said a senior Minister and the Somali Ambassador to the U.S. had been dispatched to Lagos to request that Obasanjo urge Bongo to call an emergency OAU meeting. He was unclear as to whether this delegation was authorized to enter into talks with an Ethiopian delegation also expected in Lagos.

2. *Ethiopian Intentions Toward the Somalian Frontier*—Mengistu has conveyed to you his assurances that Ethiopia does not intend to cross the Somali frontier.² Such assurances would appear to be fairly strong; however, there have been several recent clandestine reports which refer to joint Ethiopian-Soviet planning of military operations that would involve incursions into Somali territory, including the occupation of areas of northern Somalia. One such report in particular, from a source with reportedly excellent access, has informed us that if the Somalis

¹ Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 13, State Department Evening Reports, 2/78. Secret. The President initialed the memorandum.

² For Mengistu’s assurances, see Document 57.

do not withdraw from all Ethiopian territory the Ethiopians are prepared to move into Somali territory, with Soviet concurrence.

There are several possible explanations for such reports of Ethiopian planning for a frontier crossing. They could be, but are not necessarily, in conflict with Mengistu's assurances, for various reasons. Moreover, the phraseology "with Soviet concurrence" may not necessarily mean that the Soviets have already given their agreement to an Ethiopian move into Somalia, but rather "provided that the Soviets gave their concurrence".

At this time, our judgment is that Mengistu would prefer not to cross the Somali border if he could achieve the withdrawal of the Somalis from Ethiopian territory by some other means. Nevertheless, Mengistu's decision will probably depend on whether or not he believes such a move would be necessary to get Somali forces out of *all* of the Ogaden. If there appeared to be no other way to achieve this objective, we believe that he probably would be prepared to cross the border.

[Omitted here are items unrelated to the Horn of Africa.]

61. Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense¹

Washington, undated

THE HORN OF AFRICA: ETHIOPIAN/SOMALI CONFLICT

1. *Current Military Situation*

A. Somalis continue to hold some 80 to 90 percent of the Ogaden Region.

B. Ethiopians on the offensive and have driven Somali forces back in the Northern Sector.

C. Ethiopian military successes are likely to continue.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Harold Brown Papers, Box 8, Horn of Africa. Secret. This paper was forwarded to McGiffert, all DASDs, Slocombe, Kramer, and Hanson on February 23 under a covering memorandum from Thomas. He wrote, "The attached briefing memo is for the discussion on the Horn of Africa which will take place tomorrow, February 24, in Mr. McGiffert's office at 1000. The first three items in the memo are for your reading prior to the meeting. This will provide material for the discussion that is given on page 3." (Ibid.)

2. Possible Outcomes to the Ogaden Conflict

A. Outcome A:

Somali forces driven from Ogaden, first in the North (2–6 months) and then in the South (six months or longer). Ethiopians do *not* cross Somali border.

B. Outcome B:

Somali forces driven from Ogaden in Northern Sector and Ethiopians invade northern Somalia, seize a large area, and call for Somali withdrawal from the southern Ogaden in exchange for Ethiopian withdrawal from Somalia.

C. Outcome C:

Cease-fire arranged under UN/OAU auspices and with UN/OAU observer force to supervise withdrawal of Somali forces from Ogaden as preliminary condition for joint Somali/Ethiopian talks on political solution.

(1) Ethiopians would seek to limit their concessions to granting a measure of “self-determination” to Somali nomads in Ogaden under Ethiopian confederation;

(2) Somalis would seek full self-determination for an independent Ogaden nation.

3. Current Preferences of Players

A. Ethiopia:

Addis prefers Outcome A—military solution achieved within Ethiopian borders. Given the increasing levels of Soviet and Cuban aid, this outcome appears probable. Ethiopia would maintain its sovereign right as a nation seeking to repel invaders and inviting Soviet/Cuban aid to achieve that goal. Should Ethiopian forces cross the border, however, this argument by Addis would be less defensible.

B. Somalia:

Outcome C(2) is probably the only solution acceptable to President Siad, who would prefer a military defeat (e.g., a “retreat” under military pressure) and the expulsion of Somali forces from the Ogaden (which he can pin on Soviet/Cuban intervention) rather than any concession to continued Ethiopian domination of the Ogaden Somalia, whether or not they were granted greater local autonomy. Any negotiated solution other than C(2) would be viewed as a political defeat for Somalia and for Siad personally, who would then be vulnerable to the charge of leading Somalia into a war which led to a formal surrender to Ethiopia of Somali claims in the Ogaden.

C. Soviet Union:

Outcome A—a military solution achieved within Ethiopian boundaries, would be the most advantageous to the Soviets, who could con-

tinue to justify its aid to Ethiopia as the aggrieved nation. Soviet support for an Ethiopian invasion of Somalia, whether legitimized by military tactics or not, would turn African opinion against Moscow and could bring Arab and Iranian intervention, escalating the conflict and possibly sanctioning UN intervention. If the majority of African states were opposed to the Soviets' role in any Ethiopian invasion of Somalia, then the Soviets would not want to risk UN consideration of the matter.

D. United States:

Outcome C(1)—a negotiated solution, which reconciles the competing principles of “territorial integrity”—supported unequivocally by the OAU (Somalia is the only dissenting nation)—with our less vigorous support for the right of self-determination under the UN Charter, is the solution sought by the United States, first in its backing of the OAU initiative led by Nigeria, and more recently, the UN initiative. Our recent UN initiative seeking UN sanction for a negotiated solution has been resisted by the principal actors for a number of reasons:

(1) The African nations are opposed because (a) they are not convinced that their OAU effort has failed; and (b) because such an initiative might show African divisiveness (i.e., a pro-Western *vs.* pro-Soviet alignment) at the UN.

(2) The Ethiopians have resisted because (a) such an initiative might result in a call for a cease-fire before their military victories are secure; and (b) might focus world attention on the rights of the Ogaden peoples for self-determination.

(3) The Soviets are opposed because (a) they might have to veto a resolution which calls for a peaceful resolution to the dispute and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the Ogaden (including Soviet and Cuban); and (b) would inhibit the consolidation of their position in Ethiopia, which at present is based upon their military commitment to help Ethiopia regain its Ogaden territory by force of arms.

(4) The Somalis appear to be opposed because a UN Resolution might call for the withdrawal of their troops from the Ogaden and the renunciation of Somali claims to the territory.

4. Discussion

What solution serves US interests best and how can it be achieved?

A. What actions might we take to strengthen our position in Somalia? In Ethiopia? In Djibouti?

62. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, February 23, 1978, 11–11:45 a.m.

SUBJECT

The Horn of Africa

PARTICIPANTS

The President

The Vice President

State

Cyrus Vance

Warren Christopher, Deputy
Secretary of State*Defense*

Harold Brown

*JCS*General David Jones, Acting
Chairman*CIA*

Admiral Stansfield Turner

White House

Zbigniew Brzezinski

David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security
Affairs*NSC*

Robert Gates (notetaker)

MINUTES

At the President's request, Admiral Turner began the meeting with an intelligence briefing on the military situation in the Horn.² [3 lines not declassified] there is no Ethiopian military activity in the southern Ogaden now. [less than 1 line not declassified] Ethiopia's [less than 1 line not declassified] advance was slowed in the last ten days, and the Somalis have executed a reasonably organized withdrawal.

The President inquired why the Ethiopian advance had slowed, and Admiral Turner replied that the Ethiopians had outrun their logistics and that the Somalis were better organized than expected. The Admiral continued that the main battle now is developing around Jijiga [1½ lines not declassified]. He advised that [less than 1 line not declassified] we can expect a major push within a week to ten days by the Ethiopian forces. Further, the Cubans will be deeply involved. Admiral Turner said there was no indication that the Somalis have yet made a decision to withdraw and that in fact it was too late for them to withdraw and protect all their forces. Thus, the key question becomes what they will lose in the battle at Jijiga. If the Somalis fight to the death they may be able to withdraw 5,000 of the 20,000 men now deployed at Jijiga,

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files 1977–1981, Box 55, NSC 8, 2/23/78. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room.

² Not found.

but without armor. Admiral Turner admitted that the chance of a successful defense of Jijiga is slim, as is the chance of withdrawing more than a token force of Somali armor. After the battle for Jijiga and withdrawal of Somali forces, the Somalis may try to build on the present core of defense around Hargeisa, but they will be no match for the Ethiopians if the latter are accompanied by Cubans. The Intelligence Community believes that the Soviets will counsel restraint with respect to crossing the border, but there will be great pressures on the Ethiopian leadership to go into Somalia. Militarily, they may not want to be in a position of facing a Somali army in front of them with Somalia forces at their rear in the Ogaden or in southern Somalia.

Secretary Vance inquired about the credibility of clandestine reports that the Ethiopians will in fact invade Somalia. *The DCI* said that the Intelligence Community places considerable credence in these reports, but that it is hard to tell what the Ethiopians will do if the Somalis withdraw from the southern Ogaden.

Secretary Brown said that from the military perspective, the Ethiopians and Soviets would be unwise not to have a plan to invade Somalia and proceed to Hargeisa.

Mr. Aaron noted that the Ethiopians in fact have such a plan and that it was prepared for them by the United States' military assistance group several years ago.

Admiral Turner said the question is whether the Soviets are willing to spend the political capital to hold Mengistu and the Cubans back and noted that the Intelligence Community believes that the Soviets will pay that price.

The President asked whether the Iranians and Egyptians would do anything to stop such an invasion, as for example, by sending in aircraft.

Admiral Turner replied "no". He added, however, that the Shah has discussed what he would do in the Horn and has said he would send help if the border was crossed.

Secretary Vance observed that the Shah would need US permission to use his planes in Somalia.

The President asked whether there would be a shift in the region toward Ethiopia because of their military success.

Admiral Turner replied that there is in the region a sense of coming to terms with the Ethiopians, particularly in view of US inaction. He noted that a Soviet General is directing the Ethiopians in battle and that the Ethiopians were even making progress in Eritrea.

The President asked who is helping the Eritreans, to which Admiral Turner replied that all Arabs are providing assistance, including the Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq.

Mr. Aaron noted that the Sudanese are letting the Eritreans use Sudanese territory for moving small forces from place to place.

Admiral Turner advised that flights carrying Cubans from Angola to Ethiopia are continuing and that nearly 10,000 Cubans are in Ethiopia now. The Cubans now have a mechanized infantry brigade in action, and 40 Cuban pilots are playing an important role. Meanwhile, Soviet supplies are continuing to flow to Ethiopia with seven ships having arrived this month, and 12 last month.

The President asked Secretary Vance how much information should be made available to the public with respect to Soviets and Cubans in Ethiopia, including their command role.

Secretary Vance said that this might be done when we have hard information.

The President said that the more publicity we make available, in the form of complaints or statements to various African countries, France and the UN, the better off we will be.

Dr. Brzezinski advised that such information would leak out whether we put it out or not, and it could have a negative impact if the US was playing a passive role.

Secretary Brown suggested that releasing such information would in itself raise the stakes in the area.

Dr. Brzezinski referred to the recommendations of the SCC on next diplomatic steps, illicit transfer of US-origin weapons and other responses to the Soviets and Cubans.³

The President said he had no objections to any of the measures unanimously recommended by the SCC.

Secretary Vance said he would like to raise the issue of arms transfers to regional powers. He said that Somali Ambassador Addou had been in touch with him yesterday with a request that the United States begin supplying weapons to Somalia now and that we invite Siad-Barre to Washington.⁴ The Secretary added that when he inquired whether these measures would be in the context of a Somali withdrawal from the Ogaden, Ambassador Addou would not say. The Secretary expressed the view that there should be no authorization of third country arms transfers unless the Somalis state their intention to withdraw from the Ogaden.

Secretary Brown asked if that would apply even if the Somali border was crossed, to which *Dr. Brzezinski* said that such transfers should be authorized in that event with or without a Somali commitment to withdraw from the Ogaden.

³ See Document 58.

⁴ See Document 60.

Mr. Aaron said that the United States faced two decision points. First, to advise the Somalis that if they withdraw we will provide them with support. Second, in the event of no withdrawal, a decision will have to be taken later on about what we will do.

Secretary Vance said if we get a commitment to withdraw now we would give arms in return.

The President asked whether delivery of arms should be consummated before actual Somali withdrawal, to which *Secretary Vance* replied in the negative.

Secretary Brown observed that if we were to authorize such third country transfers, we would need to notify the Congress which would then pass a resolution.

Dr. Brzezinski added that such notification should be accompanied by consultations.

Admiral Turner said that the Somalis primarily need logistical support, maintenance, and leadership.

Secretary Vance commented that even if weapons go in, the Somalis can't use them—that such weapons would in fact be a face-saver.

Admiral Turner suggested that even with arms support the Somalis could not stand up to the Cubans.

The President said we must look to what we want in the area. We want peace there, we want to get the Soviets and Cubans out, and we want the Somalis to withdraw from Ethiopia. These are our basic desires. "The most important of these is to get the Soviets and Cubans out. This is compatible with third country arms transfers if Somalia withdraws or if the Cubans cross the border. We should make this clear to the Congress now."

Secretary Vance asked, "Is that the case even if the Somalis are still in the Ogaden?"

The President responded, "that is my inclination".

Secretary Vance said it was his view that Siad-Barre would refuse to withdraw.

Dr. Brzezinski suggested that we should exploit the assurances of Mengistu and of Ambassador Dobrynin that the Ethiopians would not cross the border.⁵ We should get the Congress and all regional powers to initiate consultations with respect to the transfer of arms if the Somalis withdraw or the Cubans go into Ethiopia.

⁵ For Dobrynin's assurances, see Document 56.

The President said, “don’t rule out direct US aid,” for example 2½ or 5 ton trucks and food. We need to be forceful without prolonging the conflict.

Secretary Vance said that if we assume this position and notify Saudi Arabia and Iran that we want arms transfers to Somalia, they will certainly ask whether the United States will help with fighters and troops if they get in trouble. We would say no, but we need to face up to this question now.

Dr. Brzezinski observed that if such a question were discussed, we should say that if the Iranian or Saudi arms deliveries or forces were attacked by the Soviets we would respond. This in itself would communicate an important message to these regional powers. We would in effect tell them that they would be in Somalia to match the Cubans and we would be there to match the Soviets.

General Jones advised that in the view of the Joint Chiefs, Ethiopia, with the Cuban and Soviet help, could overcome whatever aid from regional powers might go into Somalia as long as the United States was not involved. Third country or even direct US materiel assistance might prolong the conflict but it would not stop the Ethiopians. In response to *Dr. Brzezinski’s* question whether the Ethiopians alone might succeed against the Somalis and regional powers, *General Jones* said he thought so although the participation of the Iranians would give the Somalis a good chance to stop the invasion.

Dr. Brzezinski said that our principal role should be to deter the Soviets.

Mr. Aaron said that air power is particularly important.

Dr. Brzezinski observed that up to now we have been in an impossible position in the Horn because Somalia is the aggressor. He noted, however, that once Somalia is invaded, the picture will change dramatically.

The President asked what kinds of forces the French have in the area.

Secretary Brown responded that they have some troops and aircraft, and also have a carrier in the Mediterranean that they could bring to the area.

Dr. Brzezinski said that if the US and France each put in an aircraft carrier it would certainly cause the Cubans to think twice about participating in the invasion of Ethiopia.

Secretary Vance advised that the United States should not put in an aircraft carrier unless we are prepared to use it.

Secretary Brown seconded this view adding, however, that if we know the situation will come out all right in Somalia—that there will be no invasion—then we might deploy the carrier and take credit for successfully preventing the invasion. On the other hand, if we don’t

know how the situation will come out, or we do not intend to use the aircraft or the carrier in Somalia, then we should not put it in. There is a great danger that our bluff will be called with serious implications for the successful use of carriers in the future.

Dr. Brzezinski said that while he agreed on the advisability of using a carrier if in fact the Ethiopians were likely to stop at the border, he was also concerned about the larger consequences of such an invasion succeeding and overrunning Somalia. This would be destabilizing for Saudi Arabia and Iran, and would also affect our allies in Europe. He continued, "I am prepared to put in a carrier to use against Cubans participating in an invasion of Somalia if other countries in the region are also prepared to go in." If the countries in the region will not help, then we certainly should not put in the carrier.

Secretary Vance disagreed with *Dr. Brzezinski*. He said, "We are getting sucked in. The Somalis brought this on themselves. They are no great friend of ours, and they are reaping the fruits of their actions. For us to put our prestige on the line and to take military steps is a risk we should not take."

The President inquired where the aircraft carriers are presently stationed, to which *Secretary Brown* replied that the *Kitty Hawk* is at Subic Bay. He added that it would take 12–14 days for it to reach the Horn.

Secretary Brown said that it has 100 F-14s on board, and that if they engaged the Cubans it would be "quite a fight".

Dr. Brzezinski, referring to *Secretary Vance's* above stated position, said he had no quarrel with the Secretary on the moral issues or the history of this conflict. Rather, he expressed his concern about the consequences of the Soviet and Cuban role. If we by deploying a carrier could deter the Ethiopians and Cubans from invading, this would retrieve the situation.

Mr. Aaron suggested that we should focus more carefully on how to obtain Somali withdrawal from the Ogaden. Siad-Barre needs an incentive or, rather, assurances of security should he withdraw. The deployment of a carrier as a response to the withdrawal would provide an incentive to that withdrawal, and give Siad-Barre confidence that the security of Somalia would be preserved.

Secretary Brown objected, noting that you have to be prepared to fight the Cubans. He added, "there are bad consequences either way we go".

Dr. Brzezinski referred again to the consequences elsewhere in the area of the Cubans crossing the border, noting that this would cause problems for us throughout southern Africa. If other countries agree to help us, then we should send in the carrier. He commented, "If the United States is afraid to take the Cubans on now, what will this do to the confidence in us of other countries?"

Secretary Brown asked if it would not be unclear whether the Somalis had in fact withdrawn from the Ogaden.

Dr. Brzezinski said that if there were an invasion, then not only Mengistu would have lied, but the Soviets in the person of Ambassador Dobrynin, would have lied directly to the Secretary of State. This would have grave consequences for our relationship with the Soviets.

The President commented that the "Congress would react with horror" at the prospect of American military help for Somalia. He added that there is no support here for Somalia, and that Americans consider Somalia to be a communist country and an ally of the Soviet Union. He continued by expressing his concern that the extent of US involvement would grow. The Shah's desire for a carrier might be related to his belief that the presence of such an American force would subsume his own obligations. He expressed his agreement with *Dr. Brzezinski* that the regional powers should meet the Cubans and the US meet the Soviets if necessary. He asked whether we should move a carrier into the Indian Ocean to stand by, perhaps at Diego Garcia.

Dr. Brzezinski asked if we should not tell the countries in the region that if the Soviets interfere we would act.

The President said we should reaffirm the historic position of this country, that if the Soviet Union becomes involved then we would act. The President said he had no doubt about the reaction of the Congress if the Cubans invade in the face of Soviet and Ethiopian assurances, and the reality of a very serious situation in the Horn. He added that firmness was certain to prevail vis-a-vis the Soviets.

Secretary Vance expressed the view that the Soviets will not get involved.

The President said we should point out publicly about a Soviet General being in command in Ethiopia, and about the number of Cubans there. He added that we should get our allies and the OAU to understand the situation and collectively deplore it.

Secretary Vance noted that we are attempting to do just that in the OAU.

Dr. Brzezinski inquired whether we should say to the countries in the region that we will support and protect them against the Soviets if they are willing to help Somalia.

The President said he would not express it that way, but rather we should initiate consultations and inquire of the countries in the region whether they would be willing to face the Cubans if we permit them to use and transfer US materiel. We should state our historic position with respect to countering the Soviets. We should also begin consultations with the Congress.

Dr. Brzezinski inquired whether the President wished to defer action on the carrier.

Secretary Brown inquired what the United States would say if countries in the region asked if we would help them if they were being overrun by the Cubans in Somalia. The Secretary said he was confident our reply would be “it’s up to you to counter the Cubans”. He added, however, that he had no doubt what the countries in the region would do in response to this—they would do nothing and blame us.

Secretary Vance said he shared Harold’s view, and could assure everyone that the countries in the region would ask that very question.

Mr. Aaron said that in his recent trip to the Horn in both Cairo and Khartoum he learned that the US is being blamed for not doing anything.⁶ Others believe we have tilted to the side of Somalia and given the impression that we are interested in what happens there, but that we are not acting. If we decide to take a passive role, then we should say so and emphasize that it was a conscious decision to do so. If we accept Harold’s analysis, then we probably will not proceed with consultations with countries in the region because of the hard questions they will ask. This will leave us only with the OAU.

The President asked *Mr. Aaron* if he was saying that the only alternative for this country is to go to war if the Cubans cross the border.

Mr. Aaron said that was not his point, but that he favored proceeding with the consultations.

Secretary Vance noted that the other alternative would be to go to Congress and discuss the transfer of weapons, but not Iranian or other troops in the region. Then there would be no questions posed about what the US would do if the Cubans began overrunning Somalia.

The President indicated it was his impression that Iran and Egypt might provide airplanes to help Somalia. Also, Sadat seems eager to send forces into Berbera.⁷ He added, however, that Sadat has taken a step back in the absence of encouragement from the United States and Saudi Arabia.

Dr. Brzezinski suggested diplomatic initiatives in the region in which we would express support for arms transfers, providing Somalia agrees to withdraw or in the event of an invasion of Somalia. He said this point seemed to be agreed, but wondered if countries in the region send in forces to help Somalia whether we would say that we would offset the Soviets.

The President asked what the Soviets could do, to which *Dr. Brzezinski* replied that they not only could interfere with supply ships and

⁶ See Documents 57 and 58.

⁷ See Document 40.

aircraft, but also exert very strong diplomatic pressure and make threats.

Secretary Vance and Secretary Brown both said the US position should be to protect against the Soviets.

Dr. Brzezinski added that we would not take on the Cubans.

The President said he did not envision the Saudis or Iranians sending in ground troops, but rather fighting in the air against the Cubans or providing anti-aircraft support.

General Jones expressed the view that the Iranians could handle the Cubans in the air specifically in terms of having superior equipment. Nevertheless, the Iranians are not particularly good in organizing their forces or in command and control. He continued that it was his view that our problem now is that we are on the side of an aggressor. Militarily it would make sense for Ethiopia to invade Somalia to force the Somalis to get out of the Ogaden. The key, therefore, is for us to get the Somalis out of the Ogaden. Once they are out, then we should support third country transfers.

Secretary Vance emphasized that we must get the Somalis to agree to withdraw, and the President agreed.

The Vice President asked if there was some way to arrange withdrawal that would allow Siad-Barre to preserve some measure of prestige and not be totally humiliated.

The President concluded the meeting by noting that this should not be difficult because Siad-Barre has up to now denied that Somali forces are in the Ogaden.

POST NSC MEETING

(The principals continued to discuss the issues of the NSC meeting after the President left, and reconvened in the White House Situation Room to discuss preparation of the Summary of Decisions memorandum for the President.)

Dr. Brzezinski outlined the memorandum noting that except for the question of arms transfers, the decisions were the same as stated in the SCC Summary of Conclusions.⁸ With respect to arms transfers, the memorandum should state "Should Somalia agree to and announce a decision to withdraw from the Ogaden, the US would be prepared to authorize action for third country transfers." While this point would be made in consultations, *Dr. Brzezinski* said it should be noted in the minutes that the President was prepared to authorize third country arms transfers if Ethiopia invaded Somalia. He added that a second

⁸ See Document 58.

point to be made in the consultations would be “If they decide to deliver equipment, provide air cover or other assistance in the event of an invasion, the US would stand by them and protect them against Soviet interference.”

Secretary Brown said it should be clear that by protection against the Soviets we mean interference with flights or ship movements bringing aid to Somalia. In such an event, the US would respond.

Secretary Vance said he would express it somewhat differently, that the US should take the position that if the Soviets take military action, we will interpose ourselves.

Dr. Brzezinski said he thought there was no difference between Secretary Vance and him on this.

Mr. Aaron noted that even if the Soviets are directing the Ethiopian attack in the Ogaden, or in Somalia, the US would not act.

Dr. Brzezinski added that we should tell the regional countries we will stand by them even in the face of diplomatic threats by the Soviets, to which Secretary Vance replied that such a blanket statement troubled him.

Secretary Brown agreed with *Dr. Brzezinski* that if the Soviets take military action we will have to stand by the countries helping Somalia.

Mr. Aaron said that the Soviets were most likely to rely on diplomatic threats to stop aid to Somalia.

Dr. Brzezinski suggested that if the Soviets even do this, fundamental decisions will be required of this government.

Secretary Brown said that the dividing line is in fact conflict between proxies and principals.

Secretary Vance expressed concern where this will lead us, and *Dr. Brzezinski* replied that there will only be a confrontation if the Soviets impose one.

Secretary Vance said his preference would be to let the situation ride without volunteering to the countries of the region that we would react to the Soviets.

Secretary Brown disagreed, saying that the President wanted us to do something to make clear to the Soviets, Cubans and Ethiopians what is being invited by their action.

Dr. Brzezinski suggested that this would be an unavoidable question—that the regional leaders have great anxieties about what the Soviets might do, and will certainly ask what we will do. Our answer should be that if the Cubans attack the regional countries they will have to counter it; if the Soviets interfere, we stand by to counter them.

Mr. Christopher said there was a danger of misunderstanding of this by our friends. He said there is a very real chance that if Saudi

Arabia and Iran get involved and get beaten, they will say they thought we would help them against the Soviet threat.

Dr. Brzezinski said he agreed that it is important to clarify this point, and that we are not talking about indirect Soviet involvement.

Secretary Vance suggested in this context that we say we would "offset" the Soviets. This could include diplomatic means.

Dr. Brzezinski said that he would check back with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense on the exact language being sent to the President.

Mr. Aaron said the commitment we are making is actually a modest one because all of this will take place only if the Somalis withdraw from the Ogaden.

Secretary Brown added that it would also have relevance in the event Somalia is invaded.

Mr. Aaron agreed with Secretary Brown, but noted that this would not be mentioned in our consultations with countries in the region. They will be told that our commitment to offset the Soviets applies only if the Somalis withdraw.

Admiral Turner expressed the opinion that none of the countries in the region will provide forces. Even the Shah is unlikely to send air power.

Dr. Brzezinski admitted that the DCI probably is right, but that it is important to establish a record that we went to the countries in the region and they declined to help. If they do not go in, there will be no US involvement.

Secretary Vance suggested that we will have major problems with the Kenyans with respect to third country arms transfers to Somalia. He advised that we be very careful with the Kenyan delegation due in the United States in the near future. He added that their concerns might be alleviated by noting that such arms transfers would be "only for defensive forces within Somalia".

Dr. Brzezinski raised the issue of other responses to the Soviets and Cubans, and noted that the President favored some additional aid to Savimbi in Angola. Also, we should stop telling other countries not to help Savimbi.

Secretary Vance asked where this stands in the Congress, and *Admiral Turner* replied that the specific restrictions, according to the letter of the law, applied only to FY 76 appropriations. He noted, however, to general agreement of the participants, that he would not want to try taking this position on the Hill.

Dr. Brzezinski said this would require continuing review, and that we would not do anything in the meantime. We should also consider other responses.

Mr. Aaron expressed the opinion that Ethiopia wants to win its war, and that they will go to the border and then turn south to clear out the rest of the Ogaden.

Secretary Brown wondered what the effect of this would be on Siad-Barre, and whether it would lead to a pro-Soviet replacement.

Secretary Vance said that Ambassador Addou had told him that the Somali military council, led by military leaders who had opposed the break with the Soviets, had recommended that Siad-Barre admit his decision to expel the Russians had been wrong, and that he should swallow his pride and go back to the Soviets. According to Ambassador Addou, Siad replied, “as long as I am President that will never happen” and he carried that particular meeting.⁹

Secretary Vance noted that this report was interesting, but highly unreliable.

⁹ See Document 60.

63. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, February 24, 1978

SUBJECT

NSC Meeting on the Horn of Africa

At the National Security Council meeting on February 23, 1978, you approved the following measures:²

Next Diplomatic Steps

The United States will temporarily defer pressing our U.N. Security Council resolution on the Horn,³ while encouraging the Nigerians to undertake a diplomatic initiative at the OAU summit in Tripoli based on our resolution. Should the OAU approach stall, we will encourage

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files 1977–1981, Box 55, NSC 8, 2/23/78. Top Secret; Sensitive. Carter initialed in the upper right corner.

² See Document 62.

³ See footnote 4, Document 58.

the Africans to bring the issue back to the United Nations as their own initiative.⁴

Illicit Arms Transfers

The United States will seek consultations with the governments of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt and Pakistan with the following objectives:

—To inform them that transfer of US-origin equipment to Somalia without US authorization would be contrary to our arms sales agreements.⁵

—In the case of Saudi Arabia also to present evidence of the transfer by Saudi Arabia of US origin weapons to Somalia, and to underscore our concern about such transfers as contrary to our bilateral arms sales agreements.

—In the case of Saudi Arabia also to advise that such illegal transfers could have a seriously adverse impact on Congressional approval of the sale of F-15s to Saudi Arabia.⁶

—To inform them that we have no objection to their supplying non-US origin weapons to Somalia (particularly anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons). However, we would emphasize the importance of their pressing Somalia to withdraw from the Ogaden and to use such weapons only for the defense of Somalia, as opposed to the continued occupation of the Ogaden.⁷

—To state that should Somalia agree to announce and implement a decision to withdraw from the Ogaden, the United States would be prepared to initiate Congressional consultations to authorize third country arms transfers of defensive US-origin weapons to Somalia for the defense of Somalia's territorial integrity.⁸

—To state* that, in the event of an invasion of Somalia, should the countries of the region decide to deliver military equipment to Somalia, or to provide air cover or other units to counter Ethiopian or Cuban air capability, the United States would be prepared to offset Soviet threats or actions directed at such assistance measures.

* The above could be qualified by adding the phrase "only if asked"⁹ . . .

⁴ Carter wrote "Try to expedite" in the margin.

⁵ Carter put a checkmark in the right margin.

⁶ Carter wrote "once is enough—already done?" in the margin with arrows pointing to this and the preceding paragraph.

⁷ Carter put a checkmark in the right margin.

⁸ Carter added "and to supply some items of our own (trucks, etc)" at the end of the sentence and put a checkmark in the right margin.

⁹ Carter changed this to read "The above could be qualified by adding the phrase if asked" and checked the Approve option.

Although no final decision was reached, you also indicated your willingness to consider authorizing third country arms transfers to Somalia in the event Ethiopia aided by the Soviet Union and Cuba invades Somalia, even in the absence of a Somali commitment to withdraw from the Ogaden.¹⁰

US Carrier Task Force

You did not approve at this time the deployment of a United States aircraft carrier into the area, but you indicated willingness to consider moving a carrier closer to the area—for example, Diego Garcia.

Publicity and Congressional Consultations

The United States should undertake efforts to publicize more widely the Soviet and Cuban role in Ethiopia including, for example, the command responsibilities of Soviet General Petrov and the number of Cubans in Ethiopia. We also should ensure that key US allies and members of the OAU understand the situation in the Horn and collectively deplore the Soviet and Cuban role in Ethiopia.

Consultations with the Congress are to begin to ensure complete understanding on the part of the Congress with respect to the role of Soviets and Cubans in Ethiopia, and the strategic and political implications of their role and of an Ethiopian-Cuban invasion of Somalia, and regarding possible US third-country transfers.

This summary of decisions has been cleared with the Secretaries of State and Defense.¹¹

¹⁰ Carter made this paragraph another decision point and crossed out “Although no final decision was reached, you also” and changed “Soviet Union and Cuba” to “Soviet Union or Cuba.”

¹¹ Carter put a checkmark in the right margin of this and the preceding two paragraphs. In this last paragraph, he underlined “State” and “Defense” and wrote, “Zbig—inform me of any further objections. J.”

64. Presidential Directive/NSC-32¹

Washington, February 24, 1978

TO

The Vice President
 The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of Defense

ALSO

The Director of Central Intelligence
 The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Following the National Security Council meeting of February 23 regarding U.S. policy towards the Horn of Africa, the President has directed the following:²

1. Diplomatic Steps

The United States will temporarily defer pressing our U.N. Security Council resolution on the Horn, while encouraging the Nigerians to undertake a diplomatic initiative at the OAU summit in Tripoli based on our resolution. Should the OAU approach stall, we will encourage the Africans to bring the issue back to the United Nations as their own initiative. This matter is to be expedited.

2. Illicit Arms Transfers

The United States will seek consultations with the governments of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt and Pakistan with the following objectives:

—To inform them that transfer of U.S.-origin equipment to Somalia without U.S. authorization would be contrary to our arms sales agreements.

—In the case of Saudi Arabia, also to present evidence of the transfer by Saudi Arabia of U.S.-origin weapons to Somalia, to underscore our concern about such transfers as contrary to our bilateral arms sales agreements and as posing a potentially adverse impact on Congressional approval of the sale of F-15s to Saudi Arabia.

—To inform them that we have no objection to their supplying non-U.S. origin weapons to Somalia (particularly anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons). However, we would emphasize the importance of their pressing Somalia to withdraw from the Ogaden and to use such

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files 1977–1981, Box 19, PD/NSC-32. Secret; Sensitive.

² See Documents 62 and 63.

weapons only for the defense of Somalia, as opposed to the continued occupation of the Ogaden.

—To state that should Somalia agree to announce and implement a decision to withdraw from the Ogaden, the United States would be prepared to initiate Congressional consultations to authorize third country arms transfers of defensive U.S.-origin weapons to Somalia for the defense of Somalia's territorial integrity, and to supply some items of our own (trucks, etc.).

—To state if asked that, in the event of an invasion of Somalia, should the countries of the region decide to deliver military equipment to Somalia, or to provide air cover or other units to counter Ethiopian or Cuban air capability, the United States would be prepared to offset Soviet threats or actions directed at such assistance measures.

—To indicate U.S. willingness to consider authorizing third country arms transfers to Somalia in the event Ethiopia aided by the Soviet Union or Cuba invades Somalia, even in the absence of a Somali commitment to withdraw from the Ogaden.

3. U.S. Carrier Task Force

The President did not approve at this time the deployment of a United States aircraft carrier into the area but indicated willingness to consider moving a carrier closer to the area—for example, Diego Garcia.

4. Publicity and Congressional Consultations

The United States should undertake efforts to publicize more widely the Soviet and Cuban role in Ethiopia including, for example, the command responsibilities of Soviet General Petrov and the number of Cubans in Ethiopia. We also should ensure that key U.S. allies and members of the OAU understand the situation in the Horn and collectively deplore the Soviet and Cuban role in Ethiopia.

Consultations with the Congress are to begin to ensure complete understanding on the part of the Congress with respect to the role of Soviets and Cubans in Ethiopia, and the strategic and political implications of their role and of an Ethiopian-Cuban invasion of Somalia, and regarding possible U.S. third-country transfers.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

65. Record of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, March 2, 1978, 12:50–2:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

<i>State</i>	CIA
Cyrus Vance	Stansfield Turner
<i>Defense</i>	<i>White House</i>
Harold Brown	The Vice President (during first part of meeting)
Charles Duncan (Deputy Secretary of Defense)	Zbigniew Brzezinski (Chairman)
JCS	David Aaron
General David Jones (Acting Chairman, JCS)	NSC
	Paul B. Henze (Notetaker)

Near-verbatim transcription follows:

ST: There is additional information available now which was not included in the PDB this morning: the Somalis appear to be planning a counterattack.

ZB: I suggest we try to adhere to the following agenda for this meeting:

1. Strategy for political settlement.
2. Measures designed to convey our displeasure to the Soviets.
3. Measures designed to convey our displeasure to the Cubans.
4. Moves toward Ethiopia.
5. Our military posture.
6. Status of our consultations with other governments.

(Before the meeting proceeded to the agenda, there was a brief discussion of the question of assignment of a military attache to Mogadiscio. It was agreed that there was no objection to the assignment of a *military officer*, but that he would be assigned as an *Embassy officer*, not as an attache; [1½ lines not declassified].

ZB: (Summarized the President's and his meeting with the visiting Kenyan delegation);² The Kenyans have agreed to go to the Ethiopians with a 4-point package: (1) Somali withdrawal; (2) An African presence in the Ogaden; (3) Soviet and Cuban withdrawal; (4) The Somalis will not be provided with external military assistance so as to prevent them

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files 1977–1981, Box 184, SCC 061 Horn of Africa, 3/02/78. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

² In telegram 57496 to several posts, March 7, the Department reported on Carter's and other U.S. officials' meetings with the Kenyan delegation, which included Vice President Moi. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780102–0027)

from asserting territorial claims. The Kenyans feel that the Ethiopians will not be able to accept the third point without qualifications but we hope that the principle could be established in some fashion. The Kenyans will pursue this. The Kenyans also made arms requests. The President will want recommendations from the Secretaries of State and Defense before deciding exactly how we will respond to these, but the President wants a positive response. We would like to have a military mission go to Kenya within a matter of days.

HB: We will do that.

CV: I want you to know what I said in hearings before Congress yesterday. I was asked, 'Is there linkage between what is going on in the Horn and SALT?' I replied, 'There is not.' I did have to recognize that what is happening could affect the political atmosphere. I made a speech for about two minutes on the importance of SALT.³

ZB: The President said in response to a question this noon that there is no linkage but Soviet actions may impose such linkage.⁴

HB & CV: That is wrong.

CV: I think it is wrong to say that this is going to produce linkage, and it is of fundamental importance.

ZB: It is going to poison the atmosphere.

CV: We will end up losing SALT and that will be the worst thing that could happen. If we do not get a SALT treaty in the President's first four years, that will be a blemish on his record forever.

ZB: It will be a blemish on his record also if a treaty gets rejected by the Senate.

CV: Zbig, you yesterday and the President today said it may create linkage and I think it is wrong to say that.

VP: How would you see that playing out, Cy?

CV: It will toughen the Russians' position. What is more, we are getting ourselves in a problem here at home. The problem is that people will say that if the Russians are good, are we going to give in to them on something in SALT?

HB: There is going to be linkage—but we should not encourage it.

³ Vance and Brzezinski testified before a closed meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 1. ("U.S. Links SALT Fate, Horn of Africa," *Washington Post*, March 2, p. A1)

⁴ For the text of Carter's remarks on Soviet involvement in the Horn, including his denial of linkage between that involvement and SALT, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book I, p. 442.

ZB: What we are saying is that if there is an aggravation of tensions because of what the Soviets are doing in the Horn, there is going to be linkage. That is a statement of fact.⁵

HB: Not all statements of fact should be made.

ZB: The Soviets should be made aware of the fact that they are poisoning the atmosphere.

HB: We should find something else to beat the Soviets with.

CV: I do not think there is much leverage anyway on this issue.

ZB: We have the four points that the Kenyans will carry with them to Addis Ababa. But what kind of arrangements and consultations need to be undertaken to carry out a withdrawal? What kind of cease-fire? What happens to the Soviets and Cubans in this process? What about responses from the concerned Arab countries?

CV: The Iranians are very much on board.⁶ They think Siad is getting what he deserves and should get out of the Ogaden. The Saudis still look on this as a holy war. They have indicated that they will say something to Siad—I am not sure they will. I do not know the latest on the Egyptian position. The Sudanese have made their peace with the Ethiopians and are no longer in the picture. As far as I can figure out, there are very few Black Africans who are going to support Siad's position. The best we can hope for is something along the lines of our four points and we have to work on how we can get the Black Africans to go along with us.

ZB: Have we heard from the Nigerians?

CV: They are trying to get the Ethiopians and Somalis to sit down together but they will not do it.

DA: The problem with Siad is that he has to know first of all that he won't get any arms as long as he occupies the Ogaden. I fear the Saudis are still helping him.

ST: The Saudis *are* still helping. There is a report this morning of a shipment of ammunition.

DA: Our position implies that if they invade northern Somalia we will change our tune. That does not help our diplomatic posture. He is willing to give up Hargeisa to get help. We are holding out the possibility of negotiations but implying to Siad that if he gets invaded we will come to his assistance. This is not consistent.

⁵ In a March 1 memorandum to Brzezinski, Henze explored possible actions, including suspending SALT, to convince the Soviet Union and Cuba to moderate their intervention in the Horn. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 86.

⁶ In telegram 2038 from Tehran, February 27, the Embassy reported on the Iranian position. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153–2067)

HB: That is a good point.

DA: We really ought to talk to the Arabs about Eritrea.

CV: I think we can put that off for a minute. We should focus on how we can go back to Siad and make it clear to him that by dragging his feet he is only making his position worse.

ZB: Can we get the Saudis and the Iranians to join us in doing that?

CV: The Iranians, yes; perhaps the Egyptians, but I do not know about the Saudis.⁷

ZB: We have to give Siad some assurance that he is not being abandoned.

CV: We cannot get any arms there in time. We can save his face. Even third-country transfers have to lie before Congress for 30 days.

HB: We would also have to do this with our own stocks—unless our own forces were engaged.

ZB: Just what legislation applies?

DA: Let us look at this again.

ST: My memorandum stated that there was an expectation of a 50-day waiting period.⁸

ZB: So we will go back to Siad and we will try to get the Iranians to support us. We have the Kenyans going in to the Ethiopians. But what encouragement can we give to Siad?

CV: Not a helluva lot.

HB: It would have to be third-country with non-U.S. equipment.

CV: The Iranians will not do it. The Shah said that under no circumstances would he send his troops or airplanes in there. He will send people to Saudi Arabia if they will send their people in.⁹

HB: What about the Egyptians?

CV: They blow hot and cold.

HB: The Egyptians could put Soviet equipment into Somalia.

CV: Sadat says one thing one day and changes his position the next day. If we are trying to predict, at this point I would predict that he will be so cautious that you can give no assurance to Siad.

DA: We are feeding a situation where Siad thinks he has some reason to stay in the Ogaden.

⁷ Telegram 125 from Riyadh, February 20, reported on the Saudi position. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840139–2445)

⁸ Not found.

⁹ The Shah and Ambassador Sullivan discussed the Horn on February 14. (Telegram 1614 from Tehran, February 14; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, D780069–0124)

ZB: We are not creating a situation where Siad has an incentive to pull out of the Ogaden.

CV: The Kenyans recommended that everybody cut off supply of arms.

DA: Our whole policy is premised on the notion that Siad will withdraw.

CV: I can think only of a face-saver that once he withdraws we will consult with the Congress about some arms.

VP: Do you think our pumping up the press on the Russians and Cubans is encouraging Siad to think that he has some hope? It bothers me that we are pumping up this in public view—it exposes us as impotent and Siad thinks that if he hangs on a while he has some hope.

HB: Maybe we should assure him that he won't be overrun in return for a promise that he will pull out. The statement that he will pull out is worth something politically.

ST: Let us look at what pull-out means. It looks as if he is going to be pushed out in the Harar-Jjigga area—he will be defeated there. Then there will be the whole southern problem. He may take the position that he has no forces there. We will have a problem defining what pull-out means.¹⁰

CV: If we could get advisers there to see that there would be no reprisals, they could also do some other monitoring. We have to get word to Siad very quickly and very clearly what it is that we are going to do here.

ZB: Should we go in alone or with others?

CV: Alone—quickly and then try to get others to do it.

ZB: Won't we repeat the same four points to him that we have asked the Kenyans to carry to Addis Ababa?

CV: But we also tell him that he is going to get the hell beat out of him if he stays there and he loses any chance he has of getting protection from reprisals.

DA: I believe his strategy is to get into a negotiation by losing Hargeisa. If we are not going to go for that then his only chance of getting anything is to withdraw.

CV: What do we tell him about what we would do if his border is crossed?

DA: We should go back and tell him we won't do anything unless he pulls out.

¹⁰ Message 68173 from USNATO, March 2, reported on the war in the Ogaden. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Defense/Security: Ermath, Box 37, Horn of Africa 4-7/78)

ZB: I am for that.

ST: May I read an important message that bears upon the Ethiopian desire to invade—[2 lines not declassified] Mengistu made favorable remarks about David Aaron's mission and Mengistu was hopeful that the U.S. would behave in a better fashion following this visit. Mengistu said he believed that he convinced the Americans that Ethiopian forces would not cross the border and that the Americans have a better understanding of the situation in the area. [1½ lines not declassified]

ZB: We are going in with the four points.

CV: We will also tell him (i.e. Siad) our military assessment of the situation. We tell him that time is of the essence, that this way he may get some protection against reprisals . . .

ZB: Because of African presence in the Ogaden . . .

CV: . . . which he would not get otherwise.

ZB: He will want some assurances concerning his military situation as he withdraws.

CV: We will tell him if he withdraws and does it now, we will be prepared to consult with the Congress—but only if he withdraws from the whole Ogaden.

HB: How much consultation has there been with the Congress about what we are telling the Saudis and others?

ZB: Very little. Shall we go to the Nigerians?

CV: Yes.

ZB: Anything else on strategy for political settlement?

CV: I want to go back to the Egyptians and we need to be sure that the Shah is going to do what he said he would.¹¹

DA: Have we had anything from the Saudis on those mortars? Asking them helps to remind them and underscores our concern.

CD: The HIRC was very interested in this subject when I testified this morning.¹²

DA: Where do we stand on the other serial numbers we were having checked?

ZB: Let's go to item no. 2: showing our displeasure to the Soviets.¹³ Frank Press has developed a memorandum on bilateral relationships—

¹¹ In telegram 1764 from Tehran, February 19, the Embassy reported that the Shah had told U.S. officials that he would instruct the Iranian Ambassador in Mogadiscio to encourage Siad to withdraw from the Ogaden and begin negotiating with Ethiopia. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780077–0395)

¹² Duncan's testimony before the House International Relations Committee has not been found.

¹³ See footnote 5, above.

space, transportation and housing seem to be the areas in which we have the least interest . . .¹⁴

HB: It most favors them and these are the ones we want to find.

ZB: I am convinced about the moondoggle.

HB: I think we should consider cancelling the meeting—not just postponing it.

VP: It is all pretty puny.

ZB: None of this amounts to much by itself except to convey displeasure on the Horn.

HB: The Salyut one they will feel.¹⁵

DA: Any message on this needs to be accompanied by an indication of what we want them to do in the Horn as opposed to what we do not want them to do.

CV: We have told them that if the Somalis withdraw we expect them and the Cubans to get out and there should be an OAU advisory group that would protect the Ogaden population against reprisals. There should obviously be a ceasefire and an agreement to respect the boundaries and consideration should be given to how the ethnic problem might be dealt with. They say that their interest will not be to stay if the Ogaden is settled.¹⁶

DA: We ought to link this up and get a commitment from them. We should short-circuit the Ethiopians on this.

CV: If we can feel assured that the Somalis are going to get out of the Ogaden then we can do business with the Soviets.

HB: Can we do anything without long negotiations?

ZB: The Soviets are demonstrating a predisposition to exploit a local conflict for larger purposes. They are frightening more countries in the region and they are creating a precedent for more involvement elsewhere. The Cubans are offering 800 men to ZAPU. If the Cubans and Soviets are going to get massively involved in Rhodesia, we are going to be in a worse bind there. If we allow the Soviets to send expeditionary forces to resolve territorial conflicts in ways that are beneficial to them, then we are going to have more and more problems.

VP: You are right but our remedies are all theoretical. We only strengthen their position. The conundrum in the Somali problem is that they are fighting an aggressor.

¹⁴ The February 27 memorandum from Frank Press to Brzezinski is in the Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Box 2, Ethiopia/Horn of Africa.

¹⁵ The Salyut was a proposed U.S.-Soviet space station.

¹⁶ See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Documents 81–83 and 85.

ZB: And in the south they will be fighting apartheid—that will be even more advantageous to them.

HB: I have an idea re China. The Chinese are less concerned about the aggressor. Why don't we get together with the Chinese in Warsaw and issue a joint statement of concern about the Horn and append to it a statement that we will consult on other areas where we have a joint interest? That would get the Soviets' attention.

CV: That would get their attention but we are at the point where we are on the brink of ending up with a real souring of relations between ourselves and the Soviet Union and it may take a helluva long while to change and may not be changed for years and I think that is a very important step to take—we should examine it carefully before we go down that road.

HB: It is an important step—it is not like postponing or cancelling a meeting on space. I am struck by the approach the Chinese ambassador made the other day to our ambassador in the Sudan. They want to be in close touch with us.¹⁷

ZB: On this business of souring relations with the Soviets, the real question is why are they being soured? Do the Soviets want to sour these relations? If they can do what they want in the Horn without getting evidence of concern from us, we are going to have major problems with them in the south. We should communicate to the Soviets that they do not have a free hand and that what they do entails risks. Otherwise, what will they think?

DA: I think it is time to have a very thorough discussion with the Soviets on all this. We should include southern Africa in this discussion. We should give it this one crack before we take some steps.

ZB: Not *before* we take—as we take. Otherwise, this is going to be a continuation of our pattern of behavior of the last few months: noise but no follow-through.

HB: The Chinese one is different.

ZB: And the space one is different.

CV: I think the key still remains SALT. If we make progress on SALT, then a lot of things will fall into place that do not fall into place otherwise.

HB: I do not think a SALT treaty would make any difference—if we had it now, they would be reacting in the same way.

¹⁷ In telegram 911 from Khartoum, March 1, the Embassy reported that the Chinese Ambassador indicated that China was prepared to offer military aid to Sudan if it was the victim of any outside aggression. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780094–0300)

ZB: They must understand that there are consequences in their behavior. If we do not react, we are destroying our own posture—regionally and internationally and we are creating the conditions for domestic reaction.

CV: This is where you and I part. The consequences of doing something like this are very dangerous.

HB: Small steps are neither very risky nor very helpful.

CV: If they come back and ask what we were doing in the UN, how can we answer that?

ZB: It is not a question of fixing blame; it is a question of our relationship six months from now.

VP: I haven't heard any remedies which I think will change Russian policy one bit. By trying to pressure this issue, we underline our impotence on the Horn. Our remedies are hollow.

ZB: Some remedies we reject because they go too far and others we reject because they do not go far enough . . .

VP: They have us by the short hairs. That is our problem. I do not think the joint space agreement makes much difference.

DA: I think it would be worthwhile to begin to discuss these questions with the Chinese—no declaration yet. Then you start getting some leverage on the situation. I am less worried about leverage on the Russians than leverage on Siad.

CV: A year ago the Soviets were in Somalia and in Ethiopia as well—now it has become a daily crisis. We are stirring it up ourselves.

HB: There is a difference: there are now 10,000 Cubans in Ethiopia and a billion dollars worth of Soviet equipment that was not there a year ago.

DA: The key to the question is what happens to those Cuban combat forces.

ZB: Where do they go next? But moves to be effective must have some real credibility behind them.

DA: To get attention we ought to move the carrier into the Indian Ocean and we tell Siad that if he withdraws, we will move it up. We should try Siad one more time and then tone the whole thing down.

HB: If you move and it turns out to be a bluff, the next time you move nobody will believe it.

DA: If the carrier is put close and we start to get this package working, then we have some means of protection. Our point is to guarantee the peace, not fight the war.

HB: Maybe Siad would understand that but I doubt whether many other people would. If you put it there, it will be understood that it is there to fight. We can get it closer by moving it to Singapore.

DA: I do not want to fight the war with the carrier—I want it to guarantee the peace.

VP: Let's send it to Singapore.

CV: That does not bother me.

HB: The Joint Chiefs say that this will not even attract attention because Singapore is not in the Indian Ocean.

ZB: Where do we stand? Shall we decide to move the aircraft carrier to Singapore?

CV: If it is regarded only as a routine move with no public announcement and fanfare . . .

ZB: Do we do anything about any one of the bilateral relationships with the Soviets?

CV: I would say no—but I would like to follow up on David's suggestion of a very serious talk with the Soviets. Gromyko is out, though—we would probably have to do it here with Dobrynin.

HB: I suggest that we do that only if we have parallel consultations with the Chinese.

ZB: How about cancelling an agreement?

HB: Press says we could easily postpone this space meeting indefinitely.

ZB: It seems to me we have three elements in this approach:

Serious talks with the Soviets;
Consultations with China;
Suspension of the space meeting.

HB: I recommend we talk about the Horn of Africa and other general questions with the Chinese.

DA: Let us even discuss southern Africa.

ZB: What about space suspension?

CV: It is a very great signal.

DA: The main argument for it is that the Soviets' [interest?] in it is not technical and scientific—it is political.

CV: Are we going to make it public? The more things we make public the more difficulty we make for ourselves. I would like to reflect on this possible suspension . . . as long as it is not public . . .

ZB: Does anyone oppose this?

HB & DJ: No.

VP: I do not feel strongly about it one way or another. I do not consider it very important.

ZB: Approach to the Chinese: political or talk about technology?

CV: I favor talking to the Chinese about science and technology.

HB: . . . abandon political consultation with China? Cy, I disagree with this.

ZB: How about Cuban activities in Angola? I have a memo from Stan Turner's people.¹⁸

CV: What is the law?

HB: It only applies to the 1976 act and the 1976 project. There is an open question as to whether the Tunney-Javits amendment reflects continuation of congressional limitation . . .

CV: What do we know about the attitude of Congress?

ZB: We have to consult.

DA: It is important not to put this thing only in the context of the Horn but to consider the situation in southern Africa as well.

CV: Suppose we start helping Savimbi and he takes back a few more towns. Are the Cubans not going to send more people in then? Doesn't this just drive them to do more? Savimbi is doing quite well now. Why do anything that will increase the likelihood of more Cubans there?

ZB: Only if it increases their casualties and the costs of their involvement. Consider the fact that they are offering 800 people to ZAPU. If it does not cost them anything, they are likely to do it.

CV: I would rather put my money in Zambia to discourage them from taking in the Cubans.

ST: Savimbi is certainly holding his own . . .

DA: We should be helping Kaunda and giving him some military assistance, too.

CV: The biggest problem is an economic problem. Kaunda needs help with debt rescheduling. This is his most pressing problem. He has talked with us about the Soviets and his concern that they are getting stronger in the area.

ST: We think it is getting out of Kaunda's hands whether he can let the Cubans in or not. If he does resist, the Soviets may topple Kaunda to get a situation more favorable to them.

ZB: Stan, is it your judgment that aid to Savimbi would increase his capabilities?

CV: I would like a better analysis of what the effect of these various steps is going to be.

ZB: The issue is not whether we get more Cubans in Angola. There are going to be as many there as is necessary to keep Neto in power.

¹⁸ Not further identified.

CV: But Stan's analysis is that they can go up to 50,000 and still contain it.

ZB: But why not make them increase their involvement in Angola? Let them be pinched by it. The Soviets and Cubans want not only to stimulate the conflict but to decide the outcome of the conflict.

CV: Another alternative would be to open up some discussions with Neto. We should think of this. He has no place to turn but to the Soviets and Cubans. For the same reason that it is a good idea for us to have an ambassador in Ethiopia—this is worth thinking about. We should think of all sides of these problems. I would like to have an analysis of the items that are checked on Stan's Angola paper and their effects.

ZB: Let us have an analysis of the effect of these actions, Stan. State will help. Meanwhile, we will stop advising friendly countries *against* aid to Savimbi. —Next topic is our relations with Ethiopia. We should make a greater effort to use Tito and others to stress our desire to maintain a reasonable relationship with Ethiopia and our interest in a peaceful solution. Is there anything else? —Why don't we see if Tito can convey the 4 points to the Ethiopians? —Shall we ask the Italians to discuss the 4 points with the Somalis? —Next, our military posture: I doubt whether we need to do anything more about that now.

DA: But there is the question of allowing aid to go to Siad.

CV: If we really want Siad to withdraw, do we want to encourage others to support him? Do we want to encourage the Saudis?

DA: I do not think that Siad is ever going to get the message unless we discourage the Saudis. The Kenyans are right.

ZB: I am afraid we will look foolish if we go back to the Saudis now. Let us wait and see if the 4 points will go. Let us then put pressure on the Somalis. —Should we talk more firmly with our NATO allies?

CV: We should keep their ambassadors up to date on what is going on and what we are thinking. I will have George Vest give the ambassadors a rundown on these things.

ZB: On the situation and on the 4 points as well. An assessment of the military/political situation—the implications of this and the approach we are developing.

ST: I have considerable concern on the impact of forcing Siad to withdraw from the Ogaden on Siad's ability to remain in power. Whether it is in our interest or disinterest to have him toppled remains to be seen.

ZB: Is this something on which you could develop more analysis?

DA: That is a very important point. If I were Siad I would not want to give up. Should we send an emissary to Somalia?

CV: Let us talk about this—or do we just send in the ambassador to do this?

DA: What about disinformation? Perception management?

ST: I have had some suggestions in since November.¹⁹

ZB: We will hold up the decision recommendations as either unanimous or with your dissent.

CV: We are going to have to move fast on this.

¹⁹ Not further identified.

66. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, March 3, 1978

SUBJECT

The Soviet Union and Ethiopia: Implications for U.S.-Soviet Relations

I enclose with this memorandum the recommendations of Thursday's SCC regarding the African Horn.² In my judgment the recommendations do not go far enough and they are not responsive to the real problem.

In my judgment, that problem is the Soviet insistence on defining detente in a purely selective way, retaining for itself the right to use force in order to promote wider political objectives. I do not believe that anyone serious can accept the argument that the Soviet Union is in Ethiopia for the sake of protecting Ethiopia's frontiers; it is there because it has a larger design in mind. To start thwarting that design, we have to increase the costs to the Soviet Union of its engagement in Ethiopia.

In the memorandum which follows, let me state as concisely as I can how I see the Soviet motives; how I interpret the possible implications

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files 1977–1981, Box 184, SCC 061 Horn of Africa, 3/02/78. Top Secret; Sensitive. Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote, "I'm concerned, but we mustn't overreact."

² Not attached, but see Document 65.

of Soviet/Cuban success; and what in my judgment should be our response.

1. *Soviet Motives*. There are two possible interpretations:

(1) Soviet leadership is divided. As a consequence, each bureaucracy does “its own thing.” The diplomats and others are pursuing SALT negotiations; the secret police is cracking down on dissidents; and the military-ideological sector exploits any available opportunity to promote Soviet influence. I do not find this interpretation persuasive because a decision of this magnitude, involving such major possible consequences, is not likely to be undertaken simply on the basis of a condition-reflex.

(2) The second interpretation is that the Soviet Union is pursuing deliberately a policy on which it embarked some fifteen years ago: to structure a relationship of stability with the United States in those areas that are congenial or convenient to the USSR, while pursuing assertively every opportunity for the promotion of Soviet influence. In promoting that influence the Soviets are becoming bolder. There is thus a striking contrast between the Angolan operation—conducted entirely through proxies—and the Ethiopian affair—in which the proxies still carry the major burden but the Soviet presence is more self-evident (see the attached intercept).³

What is even more disturbing is that the Soviets apparently have concluded that they can run such risks and get away with them. Brezhnev has simply brushed aside your earlier and quite frank expression of concern (see attached excerpts).⁴ He apparently expects us to posture, to make noises, and then to do nothing.

I believe it is unwise, potentially very dangerous, to reinforce them in this conclusion. This brings me logically to the discussion of the likely consequences of the foregoing.

2. *Implications*. Three different sets of implications should be considered.

(1) *Regional*. Soviet success in Ethiopia, even if limited to the defeat of the Somalis but not involving the penetration of Somalia as such, will have a significant demonstration effect elsewhere in Africa. It will encourage radical African states to act more assertively; it will also free the Cubans, perhaps even with more overt Soviet support, to become engaged in the struggle against Rhodesia.

Our position in the Somalian-Ethiopian conflict is ambivalent enough, because of Somali aggressiveness. Our position regarding Rho-

³ Not attached and not found.

⁴ Not attached. For Brezhnev’s letter to Carter, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 84.

desia would be even more difficult because any opposition to Soviet/Cuban involvement will put us, de facto, on the side of apartheid.

(2) *International*. I fear that the impact on Saudi Arabia and Iran will be significant. It will not be felt immediately but it will contribute to the gradual "finlandization" of their outlook. No one in the region will fail to notice that the Soviet Union acted assertively, energetically, and had its own way. This will have a significant effect on Soviet neighbors; I do not think anyone here appreciates the degree to which the neighbors of the Soviet Union are fearful of the Soviet Union and see themselves as entirely dependent on American resolution.

I also do not believe that it is beating the drums of alarm to suggest that in the longer run there will be a ripple-effect in Europe as well.

(3) *Domestic*. It is only a question of time before the right wing begins to argue that the above demonstrates our incompetence as well as weakness. This will have a negative impact politically, and it will also complicate any attempt at a reasonable negotiation with the Soviet Union on matters of mutual importance, such as SALT. Whether we like it or not, there is thus a linkage. To pretend that it does not exist is simply to evade reality; moreover, the Soviets do want SALT and in some respects they may need it even more than we. We can already see from their sensitive reactions to any suggestion of linkage that they are concerned about this aspect. However, the important point domestically is that it will strengthen the right wing, and make the conduct of a reasonable and flexible foreign policy more difficult.

3. *Our Response*. Our response should be comprehensive and should fall into several categories.

(1) *Strategy for Political Settlement*. I believe this one has advanced the furthest and we do have a good four-point approach:

- A. Somali withdrawal;
- B. Some African presence in the Ogaden to prevent retribution as the Ethiopians return;
- C. Soviet-Cuban withdrawal;
- D. No further arming of Somalia.

The above is likely to be appealing to some African countries and we already have obtained the support of Kenya. We are now working on Nigeria. The above will require, however, considerable pressure on the Somalis to withdraw and greater assurance to the Somalis that, if they withdraw, they will not become vulnerable. (This is where American assurances and even physical presence become pertinent, as per #5 below).

We are now in the process of developing more specific proposals regarding the modalities of Somali withdrawal, regarding a cease-fire arrangement during such withdrawal, and post-withdrawal provisions.

(2) *Measures to Convey to the Soviet Union U.S. Concern.* We have been quite weak in this regard and so far essentially passive. I think we should consider suspending a number of bilateral programs, starting with space. Frank Press has identified transportation and housing as areas in which either not much is happening or as areas in which the Soviets are the greater beneficiaries.

We should also continue to reiterate the point that we are not imposing linkages but the Soviets are creating them, including SALT. The Soviets have already shown sensitivity to this argument, and we should not back down.

However, the area of greatest Soviet sensitivity is China. We have neglected this dimension entirely. Developing more cooperation with the Chinese in science and technology will be a useful opener (and we should encourage—not discourage—West European arms sales to China). We also need to develop deliberately political consultations and perhaps even cooperation. The Chinese are worried about the Middle East and the African Horn, and they could even help us more directly (for example, they do have a direct relationship with Mugabe). In any case, the Soviets are willing to operate on several levels in their dealings with us; we should not be unduly sensitive to Soviet concerns and similarly operate on several levels towards them.

In addition, I think it would be useful to engage in direct high-level talks with the Soviet Union in which your emissaries would talk both constructively and toughly about their African adventures and their implications for SALT, etc. If the Soviets do not conclude that we are prepared to stand up to them, you can only anticipate worsening difficulties in the years ahead.

(3) *Measures to Convey U.S. Concern to Cuba.* I have proposed at the SCC more direct assistance to Savimbi in Angola. Cy has asked for more systematic examination of the specific proposals, and we will be taking this issue up again in the next SCC meeting. I believe we ought to try to enhance the cost to the Cubans of their involvement anywhere in Africa.

In addition, I am developing now proposals designed to put greater pressure on Cuba in the various non-aligned bodies with which Cuba is associated. Non-aligned countries ought to be sensitized to the fact that Cuba fights Soviet wars of intervention.

In addition, some of our trilateral friends are lending money to Cuba. Given Cuba's role, I feel we ought to approach them and ask them to desist from what is tantamount to economic aid to Cuba.

(4) *Relations with Ethiopia.* Here I believe we are now on the right course. We will try to maintain a relationship with Mengistu, warn him whenever possible of the dangers of his becoming excessively

dependent on the Soviets, and we should in addition take advantage of such neutrals as Tito and Desai to encourage Mengistu to terminate, as soon as possible, his dependence on the Soviets and Cubans.

(5) *Military Posture.* We have provided assurances to concerned countries that we will not permit the Soviets to interfere with their aid to Somalia. However, do we have the capability to deliver on this promise? I doubt it.

Moreover, if Somalia is to withdraw, it has to have a higher sense of assurance that such a withdrawal will not be followed either by invasion or by some internal disruption. Our military presence in the area would provide such assurance. Such military presence is also preferable to further arms supplies to Somalia, because these frighten our friends, the Kenyans. In fact, a proximate U.S. naval presence, especially an aircraft carrier, would have a pacifying effect on the Kenyans, provide reassurance to the Somalians, and some deterrent to the Soviets and the Cubans in Ethiopia. If they do not cross the frontier, we could later assert that it was thanks to our presence and resolution. We should move the carrier into place and announce that it is there to guarantee that the war does not spread after the Somali withdrawal.

A final point: The Soviets must be made to realize that detente, to be enduring, has to be both comprehensive and reciprocal. If the Soviets are allowed to feel that they can use military force in one part of the world—and yet maintain cooperative relations in other areas—then they have no incentive to exercise self-restraint. The conclusion to be drawn may be unpleasant and difficult, but I see no other alternative: in brief, our limited actions in regard to the specific conflict must be designed to convey our determination, while our broader response must be designed to make the Soviets weigh to a greater extent the consequences of their assertiveness for detente as a whole.

67. Intelligence Memorandum¹

Washington, March 6, 1978

Possible Repercussions of a Soviet Win in Ethiopia/Somalia

In response to the request of the NSC,² the following assessment of the possible impact in the near term on the attitudes and actions of the principal countries or regional groupings of countries concerned with the Ethiopia/Somalia situation is submitted:

I. *Saudi Arabia*: The Saudis have expressed the greatest concern with the trend of events. They are the single nation that appears to be willing to continue substantial support to Somalia without a clear US commitment to do so also. Their concern is founded in a basic fear of the radicalization of the Arab world which would endanger their monarchy and in an historic concern with Russian aspirations in the Middle East. [1½ lines not declassified]

A. [12 lines not declassified]

B. [5 lines not declassified]

C. [14 lines not declassified]

II. *Arab Confrontation States with Israel*: Egypt alone feels threatened from a Soviet position in the Horn, through the possible impact on Sudan and the southern access to the Red Sea. In recent weeks, however, the Egyptian position has become much less resolute in supporting Somalia in the absence of a clear US commitment and in view of military developments on the ground. The Egyptian government has little opportunity to distance itself from the US, however. Jordan expresses general concern with US inaction, although the Horn issue does not bulk large there; Lebanon is too preoccupied to be concerned; and Syria is still adjusting its policies to the change of Soviet relationships in the Horn—the Syrians have not yet swung around to support Ethiopia. The reinforcement of the Soviet position in the Horn is unlikely to alter the positions of any of these States any time soon.

III. *Iran*: The Shah's public warning that Iran supported the territorial integrity of Somalia has been eroded in recent weeks by the lack of US commitment. Iran probably feels too exposed in its contiguous location to challenge the Soviets without firm US backing. At the same time, it is clear that the Shah has never intended to be dependent on

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special, Box 2, Chron File: 3/78. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Prepared in the National Foreign Assessment Center, Central Intelligence Agency.

² See Document 62.

US support in the long run and hence it is unlikely that the US position in this Horn of Africa issue will alter his policies.

IV. *Soviet Union*: In embarking late last year on greatly expanded support for Ethiopia, the Soviets probably estimated the military risks as negligible and the political costs as modest and manageable. They have probably not substantially revised this estimate. They have seen signs of US concern mount in recent weeks, but probably perceive it as lacking focus, expressing frustration more than a determination to act. They see the US as divided on the extent to which pressures should be brought to bear on the USSR outside the Horn. They probably believe the US has for several weeks accepted a Soviet/Cuban backed Ethiopian victory as a *fait accompli* and that Washington now regards a possible invasion of Somalia as a watershed event. They are almost certainly persuaded the US will not take action itself or mobilize others to act locally if there is no invasion of Somalia, and even if there is an invasion, they probably doubt that the US could put together a countervailing effort in timely fashion.

The Soviets probably prefer an outcome which does not include such an invasion, believing that without accepting any additional risks they will have already succeeded in achieving their local objectives and in reviving the credibility of their capacity to act as a global power in distant areas. Should large-scale fighting be ended in the next few weeks without an invasion of Somalia, the Soviet leaders probably think it most likely that there will be no serious further consequences for SALT or other major aspects of the bilateral relationship. They will continue, however, to watch carefully the impact of their Horn behavior on the public and Congress and on the correlation of forces inside the US government, which they see as now engaged in internal debate about US-Soviet relations. Meanwhile, they will look upon their Ethiopian achievement as advertising to revolutionary forces in southern Africa their readiness and capability to act, and as providing a springboard from which to seize other opportunities to expand their role in armed struggles should they appear.

V. *Ethiopia's Neighbors*: Kenya is driven by its concern about a Somali invasion, though there is clearly an underlying concern at a continuing Soviet presence next door.

Sudan's opposition to Mengistu, expressed in material support for the Eritrean rebels and expressions of intent to support Somalia, has cooled in recent weeks; Nimeiry has reestablished contact with Mengistu. Having found it necessary in July 1975 to reduce the Soviet presence in Khartoum, Sudan clearly must be apprehensive at the sizeable Soviet presence next door, but is accommodating to the power realities.

VI. *Southern African States*: Very little is heard from these states that would indicate that events in the Horn will influence their policies.

The Soviets, however, have reinforced the example of Angola in demonstrating their readiness and ability to provide effective military support to revolutionary movements.

VII. [5 lines not declassified]

68. Memorandum¹

Washington, March 6, 1978

SUBJECT

Somalia: Implications for President Siad of a Somali Withdrawal

President Siad probably believes his political survival would be jeopardized if he withdrew Somali forces from the Ogaden without gaining either concessions from the other side or promises of military support for Somalia. In the absence of offsetting gains, Siad probably calculates that his political position would be better served by having his army pull back only under heavy military pressure.²

Siad realizes that Somalia has almost no chance of halting the Ethiopian offensive. In his view, however, he must be seen to yield only in the face of an overwhelming force of Ethiopians, Cubans, and Soviets. Siad's strategy has thus been to stand and fight. This does not mean that he would allow the Somali army to be destroyed in the Ogaden. He might at some point order a withdrawal, but only when he can justify it as necessary on military grounds.

The serious Somali reverses at Jijiga over the weekend may make moot any option of a voluntary Somali withdrawal from the northern

¹ Source: National Security Council, Intelligence Files, Box 27, Somalia 1/25/77–8/12/80. Secret. Prepared in the National Foreign Assessment Center, Central Intelligence Agency. In a covering memorandum to Brzezinski, Turner wrote, "This note on the implications of the Somali withdrawal is the second of four memos on Africa you requested Friday. The memorandum on the internal settlement prospects in Rhodesia was sent down with the PDB Monday morning, and the other two are in preparation."

² In a March 7 memorandum to Brzezinski, Henze agreed with the CIA assessment and wrote, "The key point is that for Siad—in terms of his own political situation and psychology—it makes more sense to keep fighting in the Ogaden than to withdraw." Henze added, "Like the Germans then, the Somalis have never been persuaded to give us their national aims—Siad has taken great risks, as Hitler did, to pursue the cause of reuniting all Somalis (and like the Germans, even went well beyond areas actually inhabited by Somalis)—the gamble has failed—but, like Hitler, Siad is not moved by any idea of compromise." (Ibid.)

Ogaden and force Siad soon to decide what to do with his forces in the south. He is unlikely to unilaterally withdraw his forces in order to improve Somalia's legal and political position before international opinion. For Siad to pull his forces out of the Ogaden simply to remove the stigma of aggression from Somalia would be viewed by his governing colleagues and his countrymen as a betrayal of the Ogadeni Somalis and would give Siad's potential domestic opponents a strong weapon to use against him.

If Siad ordered a unilateral withdrawal, he would also be vulnerable to charges of tacitly admitting that Somalia had no right to pursue its irredentist claims—an admission no Somali leader can afford to make. The Somalis will be unwilling to renounce permanently the "Greater Somalia" concept or to make a formal commitment not to sponsor future military operations in the Ogaden.

Fear of domestic political repercussions is therefore likely to prevent Siad from ordering a voluntary withdrawal of Somali forces from the Ogaden. To overcome these fears even partially, and thus make a voluntary pull back possible—but still not certain—Siad would have to receive assurances on some major points. At a minimum he would demand guarantees, supported by international agreements, of no reprisals against the Ogadeni Somalis. He would also demand—in return for Somali withdrawal—the withdrawal of Ethiopian, Cuban, and Soviet forces from the Ogaden, although he might be satisfied with an ultimate withdrawal rather than an immediate one.

Although he would not demand assurances of substantial foreign military support to resupply the Somali army, an offer to do this would be an inducement, since Siad could then present it to his domestic audience as evidence that Somalia would be able to fight another day. He would probably make this argument, at least privately, even if potential foreign donors stipulated that their assistance could be used for defensive purposes only.

69. Telegram From the Embassy in Ethiopia to the Department of State¹

Addis Ababa, March 6, 1978, 1407Z

1054. Subj: Ethiopian Forces Recapture Strategic Ogaden Town of Jijiga. Ref: Addis Ababa 1025.

1. French MilAtt was informed March 5 by Soviet MilAtt that Jijiga had been recaptured that morning. Soviet also confirmed that Kara Mara Pass had fallen to Ethiopians. French MilAtt believed that major thrust toward Jijiga was from NNW and was combined Ethiopian-Cuban operation. French MilAtt further stated that Ethiopians took heavy casualties. (This was reflected in original Ethiopian announcement of capture of Jijiga calling on broad masses to be prepared for further recruitment of militia and donations and contributions of blood and revolutionary equipment.) French MilAtt personally thought Ethiopians would not cross Somali frontier and would turn south toward Gode. He also believed reopening of railroad would be priority military objective.

2. Comment: Atmosphere in Addis is one of euphoria following most significant Ethiopian victory in Ogaden since beginning of war. With Jijiga recaptured, it will be particularly significant to note in which direction Ethiopians press their current advantage, especially in light of public assurances that they do not intend to cross Somalia's frontier. Large public rally had been previously scheduled for March 8 in Addis Ababa to commemorate International Women's Day. Dirc Chairman Mengistu had also planned to deliver speech at rally. Undoubtedly, he will use occasion to extol Ethiopian victory at Jijiga.

Matheron

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780100–0814. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information to Abu Dhabi, Amman, Bonn, Cairo, Djibouti, Jidda, Khartoum, Kuwait, Lagos, Mogadiscio, Moscow, Nairobi, Paris, Rome, Tehran, USNATO, USUN, London, USINT Havana, USINT Baghdad, COMIDEASTFOR, CINC-PAC, and USCINCEUR.

70. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia¹

Washington, March 7, 1978, 1740Z

57913. Exdis—Distribute as Nodis. For Amb only from Secretary. Subject: The Secretary's Message to Siad. Ref: Mogadiscio 0398.²

Please seek an immediate appointment with President Siad to convey to him the following points:

1. The United States and Somalia share certain basic objectives concerning the situation in the Horn. It is imperative that we work together to achieve a peaceful resolution of the conflict. We understand your sympathy for the people of the Ogaden and their strong desire for self-determination. However, we believe that this goal cannot be achieved through the use of force. We share your view on the importance of reducing Soviet influence in the region. An Ethiopian/Cuban/Soviet victory in the Ogaden fighting could entrench them in the Horn of Africa. However, we believe such an outcome can only be avoided through a negotiated settlement.

2. In the past we have outlined principles which we believed took sufficiently into account the interests of all parties as to be an acceptable basis on which to build a negotiated settlement. These principles called for a Somali withdrawal from the Ogaden, the concurrent withdrawal of all foreign combat forces, the placing of neutral observers in the Ogaden during withdrawal to ensure no reprisals are taken against the inhabitants, and a commitment to begin discussions with regard to the political future of the Ogaden.

3. The United States still subscribes to these principles as the best foundation for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. We believe that they are in the interest of Somalia. However, it is clear to the United States that the longer Somalia refuses to accept them as a basis for negotiation, the more difficult it will be for Somalia's friends to exert their influence on other nations to negotiate on the basis of these principles.

4. The best intelligence available to the American Government indicates that the Somali military position in the Ogaden is gravely imperiled in the face of the current Ethiopian offensive. Somali troops now face Ethiopian forces bolstered by well-trained Cuban combat

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840176–1588. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Spiegel (S/P) and Post (AF/E); approved by the Secretary, Moose, Christopher, Harrop, and in S/S–O.

² In telegram 398 from Mogadiscio, March 1, Ambassador Loughran discussed Siad's dilemma over withdrawal from the Ogaden. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850070–1702)

troops of division strength aided by substantial Soviet logistical support and Cuban and Ethiopian air support of considerable magnitude. It is our assessment that the Somali troops cannot survive this offensive without unacceptable losses of men and materiel. It is also our view that Somalia's military defeat could force it to negotiate on the basis of principles which are totally detrimental to its interests.

5. The President believes that the only way to achieve your objectives and the only way to enlist the active diplomatic support of the United States and other friendly nations in the region is to announce and implement a withdrawal of Somali forces from the Ogaden. This must be done in the very near future if you are to avoid a destruction of your forces and a possible invasion of your homeland. You may say publicly that your announcement was in response to a personal appeal from President Carter to take action to bring the human suffering to an end now when we appear to be engaged in a new round of violence of a scale unprecedented in the Horn of Africa involving active participation by outside powers.

6. With Somalia's agreement to withdraw, the United States is prepared to initiate a broad diplomatic initiative in support of the above principles designed to marshal the force of world opinion in deterrence of an Ethiopian/Cuban invasion of Somalia.

7. Once you have taken the necessary steps to implement your withdrawal, the President will commence consultations with the Congress to seek authority to provide Somalia with some defensive weapons and discuss with other nations the possibility of their also supplying such weapons. You may state publicly that the President is also willing to ask the Congress for additional economic assistance to Somalia under such circumstances. You may also state that the US has indicated that it is prepared to contribute to efforts which might be organized to bring about the recovery of the war-ravaged areas of the Ogaden. But we must repeat that US assistance to Somalia will only be forthcoming after you have publicly announced your intention to withdraw Somali troops from the Ogaden and they have returned to the Somali side of its internationally-recognized frontiers.

8. You should be under no illusion that if you do not take the necessary steps to withdraw your forces from the Ogaden, the United States will come to your assistance if you are invaded. As long as Somalia's forces remain in Ethiopia, American law prohibits the provision of aid to Somalia, even if Somali territory were invaded.³

Vance

³ In telegram 458 from Mogadiscio, March 8, Loughran reported on his meeting with Siad during which he delivered the message. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850070–1710)

71. **Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to
President Carter**¹

Washington, March 7, 1978

[Omitted here are items unrelated to the Horn of Africa.]

Somalia. I have instructed Ambassador Loughran to convey a strongly-worded message to Siad Barre containing our judgment that the Somali forces in the Ogaden face the prospect of imminent defeat.² The message urges him to announce and implement a withdrawal, holding out the prospect of humanitarian aid to people of the Ogaden, development assistance for Somalia, and defensive military assistance if he does so. It also promises our diplomatic support for a negotiated settlement, including the placement of international observers in the Ogaden. Finally, to disabuse Siad of the notion that we will come to his aid in any event, the message cautions that unless he takes the necessary steps to withdraw his forces, U.S. law prohibits our coming to his assistance even if Somalia's territory is invaded.

[Omitted here are items unrelated to the Horn of Africa.]

¹ Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 13, State Department Evening Reports, 3/78. Secret.

² See Document 70.

72. Telegram From the Embassy in Somalia to the Department of State¹

Mogadiscio, March 9, 1978, 1533Z

476. Somali Intention To Withdraw From the Ogaden. Ref: Mogadiscio 0475 (Notal).²

1. The Western Ambassadors were called to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at 1400Z this afternoon, March 9, where the following statement was read by Director General Mohamed Sharif: Begin text. The Government of the Somali Democratic Republic (GSDR) would like to communicate to you the latest developments in the Horn of Africa. There has been fierce fighting between the western Somali liberation fronts on the one hand and the Ethiopians and the unholy alliance of the Soviet Union and its foreign allies on the other. The international community has been following with growing dismay the massive deployment of destructive and sophisticated weapons. Friendly countries have proposed on many occasions the withdrawal of our (GSDR) units in order to create an atmosphere conducive to a negotiated settlement. The GSDR has decided to effect such a withdrawal. Friendly countries are requested to exert all diplomatic influence in order to realize the following:

- (1) Withdrawal of all foreign troops,
- (2) A cease fire,
- (3) Negotiations for a settlement on the basis of self determination,
- (4) Placement of observers to ensure the avoidance of genocide or reprisals against the Somali people living in the area.

The GSDR hopes that all friendly countries will exert the necessary influence toward finding a just negotiated settlement of the problem. End of text.

2. Questioned on the timing of the withdrawal, Sharif said the orders have been issued and it is now taking place. He added that Somali troops were not now engaging in combat. The Director General

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780106–0570. Confidential; Flash; Niact Immediate; Priority. Sent for information Niact Immediate to Addis Ababa, USUN, and Nairobi; sent Priority to Cairo, Jidda, Sana, Lagos, London, Paris, Rome, Bonn, Moscow, and USINT Havana; and to Khartoum and CINCPAC.

² In telegram 475 from Mogadiscio, March 9, 1344Z, the Embassy reported that the Ambassador had been summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (National Archives, RG59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780106–0374). In telegram 459 from Mogadiscio, March 9, 0020Z, Loughran reported that he had met with Siad at 2 a.m. local time. Siad asked him to inform President Carter that he accepted the proposals Carter made in his March 8 message. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850070–1713)

said the announcement had not been made public, but was being communicated first to the American, British, French, Italian and West German Ambassadors since their countries had urged withdrawal of Somali forces. He said other chiefs of friendly missions would be informed immediately, but he could not say when a public statement would be made. In the interim, he requested the information be treated as confidential.

3. Comment: We cannot believe the GSDR will delay the public announcement much longer. With all friendly mission chiefs informed, the word is bound to leak within hours if it has not done so already.³

Loughran

³ Christopher informed Dobrynin at midnight on March 9 of Siad's decision to withdraw Somali forces. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 88.

73. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, March 10, 1978, 3–4:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

Horn of Africa

PARTICIPANTS

<i>State</i>	<i>CIA</i>
Cyrus Vance	Stansfield Turner
Warren Christopher (Deputy Secretary of State)	William Parmenter (NIO/Africa)
Richard Moose (Asst. Sec./African Affairs)	<i>White House</i>
James Leonard (USUN)	Zbigniew Brzezinski (Chairman)
	David Aaron
<i>Defense</i>	<i>NSC</i>
Harold Brown	Paul Henze (Notetaker)
David McGiffert (Asst. Sec/ISA)	

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files 1977–1981, Box 184, PRC 064 Horn of Africa, 3/10/78. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. No minutes of the meeting were found.

JCS

General David Jones (Acting
Chairman, JCS)

General W.Y. Smith (Asst. to
Chairman, JCS)

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

Discussion focussed around three principal topics:

- Problems relating to the ongoing conflict and the Somali withdrawal

- Measures to reinforce regional security, stability and self-confidence

- Measures and initiatives vis-a-vis the Soviets and Cubans

The following decisions relating to current matters were taken:

- SR-71 missions will be flown only with permission of the British, and the Somalis and Ethiopians in respect to their own territory, and State will secure the necessary authorizations. Admiral Turner pointed out that as of now SR-71 missions cannot be justified on the basis of intelligence need. The group recognized this fact but felt that SR-71 flights could be politically advantageous and both Ethiopia and Somalia could be offered briefings on the status of the withdrawal/ceasefire from information derived from them.

- Everyone agreed that we should encourage the OAU to take initiative in respect to ceasefire arrangements, observers, measures to protect the civil population and related matters and that we should stay in close contact with the Nigerians and Gabonese. In respect to UN initiatives, it was agreed that this would be desirable but that it would be unlikely to succeed unless it could be done at OAU request or with OAU concurrence.

- The President's 9 March statement, it was noted, conditions future economic and military aid on a Somali commitment to respect its neighbors' territorial integrity.² It was felt that this condition should not be applied to a PL-480 agreement about to be signed but that any further economic aid should be reviewed in the light of this condition. The idea of providing economic aid to facilitate rehabilitation to be administered by the OAU was advanced and will be further investigated.

- The group saw too many potential pitfalls in a Siad visit to Washington but felt that a special emissary to Siad, who could also visit some of the other capitals in the area, would be a very good idea, and a more specific plan will be developed.

² For the text of Carter's statement, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book I, p. 490.

- The idea of a regional conference was discussed at length. It was felt that it would have to be very carefully put together to bring in Africans and not appear hostile to the Ethiopians. The idea will be examined further in connection with the special emissary's mission.

- The group agreed that more briefings and consultation with the Congress was desirable. It will be done soon.

- Everyone felt it was too early to consider a port call in Somalia.

Discussion of measures that could be taken to demonstrate to the Soviets that there is a price to pay for their intervention in Ethiopia brought out one new idea: the possibility of tightening port security regulations as a retaliatory measure against Soviet shipping; but the group tended to feel that no new actions should be taken until Secretary Vance took serious soundings with Ambassador Dobrynin on several immediate issues:

- Soviet support for a ceasefire and a neutral observer group.

- Halt to inflow of Soviet and Cuban combat personnel.

- Suggestion that Soviets urge Cubans to begin planning withdrawal of combat presence from Ethiopia.

- Warning to Soviets against redeployment of Cubans against Eritreans because of the unsettling effect this would have on the Sudanese and other Muslim supporters of the Eritrean insurgency.

- Urge Soviets to take other measures and gestures to reduce tension in the area and promote settlement; also urge them to press Mengistu to do the same.

Secretary Vance will talk to Dobrynin as soon as possible on these matters.³

In respect to Cuba, the group felt that the possibility of bringing pressure by limiting economic credits which Cuba is seeking from a great many Western countries should be further examined. CIA will do a study. Since the analysis of questions relating to the possibility of support for Savimbi was not completed, this question was deferred to the next SCC Horn meeting.

It was decided that we should prod Mengistu on *agrément* for our Ambassador. David Aaron will send a thank-you letter for his visit and bring up the issue in it.

The group was informed of the President's desire to have the Eritrean problem thoroughly examined. Everyone agreed that this was now likely to become a key issue because of its implications for Ethiopian-Sudanese relations and the interest of key Muslim countries in

³ Vance met with Dobrynin on March 11 to discuss the Horn of Africa. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 89.

the Eritreans. CIA will prepare a briefing for the President and Eritrea will be discussed in depth at the next SCC meeting.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

74. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, March 14, 1978

[Omitted here are items unrelated to the Horn of Africa.]

3. *Situation in the Ogaden*—The military situation in the Ogaden is as follows:

—The Somali troop withdrawal is virtually complete;

—We have no evidence of Ethiopian or Cuban attacks on withdrawing Somali troops, insurgents or Ogadeni civilians;

—No invasion of Somali territory has occurred, and there is evidence that the Cubans have orders to respect the border.²

4. *The Horn*—There were a number of developments bearing on the Horn:

—The Somali Ambassador told me this evening that there has been a Soviet offer to Somalia and that it is important for Siad to have a better idea of our intentions.³ I informed him of your desire to send an emissary—Dick Moose—to discuss these matters directly with Siad.⁴ The Ambassador seemed highly pleased by this proposal.

—We do not yet have agreement for our Ambassador to Ethiopia, and have requested early action through a letter to Mengistu from David Aaron. The Yugoslavs have also intervened in our behalf.⁵

—Waldheim has informed me that the Ethiopian Permanent Representative in New York recommended to his government that it respond

¹ Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 13, State Department Evening Reports, 3/78. Secret. The President initialed and wrote “Cy” in the upper right corner.

² Carter wrote “good” in the left margin.

³ In telegram 67382 to Mogadiscio, March 16, the Department reported on the details of this meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780116–0474)

⁴ Carter wrote “Expedite” in the left margin.

⁵ In telegram 1176 from Addis Ababa, March 13, the Embassy reported that the Yugoslav Ambassador had met with Feleke and delivered Aaron’s letter. Feleke claimed that “bureaucratic” delays were holding up the agreement for a new U.S. Ambassador. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780112–0076)

favorably to a request by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees for access to the Ogaden. We are informing the High Commissioner that we will assist his efforts in every way possible.

—The Military Survey Team to Kenya departs for Nairobi tomorrow to follow-up on the Kenyans' request for our security assistance.

[Omitted here are items unrelated to the Horn of Africa.]

75. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, March 16, 1978, 5–6:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Horn of Africa

PARTICIPANTS

State

Secretary Vance
Assistant Secretary Moose
William Harrop

Defense

Secretary Brown
Deputy Secretary Duncan
Robert Murray

JCS

Admiral Holloway
Lt General Smith

CIA

Admiral Turner
William Parmenter

USUN

Ambassador Young

White House

Dr. Brzezinski
David Aaron

NSC

Paul Henze
Rick Inderfurth (Notetaker)

OMB

Bowman Cutter

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The Special Coordination Committee met on March 16, 1978, to discuss Assistant Secretary Moose's mission to Somalia. The *principal* topics on the agenda were:

- The message Moose would convey to President Siad Barre.
- Possible military and economic assistance for Somalia.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files 1977–1981, Box 184, PRC 065 Horn of Africa, 3/16/78. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. No minutes of the meeting were found.

- Congressional consultations.
- Further steps the U.S. should take with the Soviets and Cubans.

Message to Siad Barre

Secretary Vance stated that U.S. objectives with respect to Somalia are:

1. To consolidate our political position with Siad and Somalia.
2. To restrain Somalian irredentism.
3. To prohibit the Soviets from restoring their influence in Somalia.

The SCC agreed that in order to further these objectives Moose would:

- attempt to obtain a *public* statement from Siad reaffirming Somalia adherence to the principles of the OAU charter—particularly as they relate to territorial integrity;
- attempt to obtain further private assurances from Siad with respect to the principle of territorial integrity and non-aggression;
 - if asked, inform Siad that we are seeking parallel assurances from Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti;
 - try to determine Siad's intentions toward the Soviets;
 - inform Siad that continued Somali assistance for the Ogaden insurgents will have an adverse impact on favorable Congressional consideration of assistance to Somalia;
 - indicate that we support negotiations between Ethiopia and Somalia within the context of the OAU while, at the same time, avoiding any implication that we wish to serve as a mediator in the conflict;
 - visit Jidda after Mogadiscio.

Military Assistance

The SCC agreed that:

- we will tell Siad that we are prepared to help meet his legitimate defense needs but no offer of a specific military package or level will be made;
 - Moose is authorized to offer a non-lethal package to Siad;
 - Siad is to be informed that the U.S. is only prepared to consider the provision of defensive equipment, e.g., anti-tank weapons, ground surveillance radar; we will not provide either aircraft or tanks;
 - the Saudis should assist in the financing of U.S. military assistance;
 - we should encourage the Arabs, Iranians and Europeans to provide defensive equipment to the Somalis, although we will not play a coordinating role;
 - if asked we could indicate that we would consider replacing a reasonable amount of defensive equipment supplied by the Arabs and

Iran to the Somalis, but we would have to make clear the Congressional realities for Egypt and Saudi Arabia;

- Moose will inform Siad that the U.S. is prepared to send a military survey team to determine his needs.

Economic Assistance

The SCC agreed that:

- no specific offer of assistance for Siad will be made without the assurances referred to above;
- Moose is authorized to sign a \$7 million agreement while in Mogadiscio and to inform Siad that additional PL 480 assistance may be available. In addition, State is to inform Moose prior to his meeting with Siad whether refugee assistance is available;
- the U.S. will encourage other nations—the Arabs, Iranians, Germans, British, French, Canadians—to economically assist Somalia, but will *not* serve in a coordinating role;
- the U.S. will seek to secure multilateral humanitarian assistance for the Ogaden and Somalia. Moose will so inform Siad.

Congressional Consultations

Informal consultations with members of Congress on Somalia will continue.

The Soviets and Cubans

Secretary Vance reported on his recent conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin.² It was agreed that no further action was necessary at this time given the recent discussion with the President, Secretary Vance and Dr. Brzezinski.

Secretary Vance will report to the SCC next week on the question of credits from western nations for Cuba. A paper will be circulated before the meeting.³ In addition, the possibility of resuming reconnaissance flights over Cuba will be discussed.

Other Decisions

The SCC agreed to:

- inform the Ethiopians immediately about Moose's mission and the purpose of the trip;
- lethal pipeline items for Ethiopia will *not* be released at this time;
- a multilateral approach for aid to the Ogaden should be pursued initially;

² See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 92.

³ Not found.

- State will consult with the French tomorrow on how best to maintain Djibouti's integrity. If asked, Moose may discuss Djibouti with Siad;

- the U.S. will continue to encourage OAU action on the Horn.

Next Meeting

The next meeting of the SCC on the Horn will take place next week. Agenda items, in addition to the above, will include:

- CIA's South Yemen proposal
- Cuba (and Savimbi)
- Eritrea

76. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, March 27, 1978, 4–5:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

Horn of Africa

PARTICIPANTS

State

Cyrus Vance
Richard M. Moose, Jr.
(Ass't. Sec./African Affairs)
Donald McHenry (USUN)

Defense

Harold Brown
Charles W. Duncan, Jr.
(Deputy Secretary of Defense)
David E. McGiffert
(Ass't. Secretary/ISA)

CIA

Frank Carlucci
(Acting DCI)
[*name not declassified*]
(Chief, Africa Division)

White House

David Aaron (Chairman)

NSC

Paul B. Henze (Notetaker)

¹ Source: Carter Library, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, Box 11, Meetings: SCC 68 3/78. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. No minutes of the meeting were found.

JCS

General David C. Jones
(Acting Chairman, JCS)

LTG William Y. Smith
(Assistant to Chairman, JCS)

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

Somalia:

Assistant Secretary Moose reported on his recent mission to Somalia and recounted the 12 hours of talks he had with President Siad in considerable detail, stressing their *equivocal outcome*.² He also reported on his mission's talks with Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister Al-Mansouri in *Jeddah*.³ Discussion of where we go next in respect to Siad and Somalia produced a consensus that we should make a further effort to develop a defensive military support relationship with Siad but that the letter Siad had given to Mr. Moose was not an adequate guarantee of Somalia's acceptance of limitations on use of military aid that might be provided. (The USUN representative dissented from this consensus, advocating that we restrict our support of Somalia to humanitarian and economic assistance.) Secretary Vance cautioned the group to think *strictly in terms of defensive* weaponry, citing the President's comment on his latest evening report: "Defensive only; be strict re honoring borders."⁴ The following steps were recommended, subject to Presidential approval:

- We will make urgent efforts to get OMB to act on the refugee assistance supplemental request;
- We will request a more binding letter from Siad which clearly commits the Somali *government* to our conditions;
- We will press to send at least a small *military* presence to assess Somalia's immediate defensive needs and, to make this more palatable to Siad;

² In telegrams 577, 598, 600, 618, and 629 from Mogadiscio, March 20, 21, 22, and 23, Moose described his meetings with Siad, during which they discussed an exchange of letters concerning Somali assurances and the conditions under which the United States would furnish "defense articles and services." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850070-1692; P850070-1676; D780125-0043; P850070-1666, and P850070-1663, respectively) Also, in a March 27 memorandum to Brzezinski, Henze provided his impressions of the meetings. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Country Files, Box 69, Somalia, 1/77-6/78)

³ Moose met with al-Mansouri in Jidda on March 23 to brief him on the meetings with Siad. He reported on his meeting in telegram 534 from Naples, March 24. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N780004-0155)

⁴ On a March 22 report from Vance, Carter wrote "Be firm" and underlined the phrase "international recognized territory," referring to the area where U.S. defensive arms could be used. (Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 13, State Department Evening Reports, 3/78)

- We will restructure the \$10 million non-lethal package to include items with more appeal to Siad such as trucks, and

- We will put together a \$5 million lethal package which could be delivered in 45 days. Secretary Brown will prepare realistic options on what this might include.

- We will talk to the Egyptians and possibly the Jordanians about supplying Siad with air-defense weapons;

- Depending upon Siad's response to our request for a firm commitment, we will ask the Saudis to help with financing.

- We will consider a later \$50 million package for later delivery if the Saudis are willing to finance it.

DOD and JCS representatives expressed certain cautions which the group endorsed:

- We will have to be cautious about offering the Somalis items that would have to be drawn from active units of our own forces or which are already committed to other countries.

- We should be cautious about offering items that have a long production lead-time. We will have to emphasize the production lead-time factor where it is applicable so that the Somalis do not get the impression immediate deliveries will be made.

- Some items that we are also going to be providing to Kenya should be delivered to Kenya before any deliveries to Somalia take place.

- We can be concrete about the 45-day package but we will not discuss specifics until we have a letter of commitment. Progress on a larger program will require a survey and minimally acceptable U.S. military presence.

Eritrea:

There was a general feeling that we should not be very active on this issue and a consensus that it would not be desirable to become involved in supporting the rebellion ourselves. It was agreed that the United States Government should take a *public stand in favor of a negotiated solution* and that we should continue to speak out against Soviet and Cuban support of an Ethiopian military solution. There was some variation of view among principals on the degree to which the United States should encourage the Saudis and others to continue or increase support for the insurgents. It was agreed that these options should be laid before the President.⁵

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Horn of Africa.]

⁵ See Document 78.

77. **Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McGiffert) to Secretary of Defense Brown¹**

Washington, April 6, 1978

SUBJECT

The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and Cuban Military Involvement in the Horn of Africa; an Opportunity for U.S. Action—ACTION MEMORANDUM

Following up on your idea that the NAM could be used to exert pressure on Castro, I have done some quick preliminary analysis and have concluded that we should pursue this. While DoD has a limited role in developing this option, I recommend that you discuss it with Secretary Vance at the earliest opportunity. The schedule of NAM meetings dictate rapid consideration on our part.

U.S. Objectives

We want to make it difficult for Castro to expand his military involvement in Africa. While more precise objectives—deterrence of Cuban involvement in Eritrea or invasion of Somalia—might be desirable, we will miss opportunities if we focus too sharply on the specific situation which exists today. It is also clear that direct means, like military or covert action or economic sanctions, which are necessary for achieving a specific objective, are not viable options domestically. We have been through them on several occasions to no avail. (A summary of all the options that have been considered is attached.)² We have neither the public support nor the political consensus to engage in such major actions. We must therefore look to the more general objective of lowering Castro's propensity for military involvement. One possible way of doing so is to try to make Soviet support of Cuban overseas military involvement conflict with Castro's aspirations to leadership of the third world.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Harold Brown Papers, Box 50, 1978 Africa; Horn of Africa. Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation indicates that Brown saw this memorandum. Beneath the notation, he wrote, "4/6, Save for meeting on Horn of Africa on 4/7. Ask D McG to transform with a memo to CV/ZB as he suggests in this written note. HB." See footnote 3 below.

² Attached but not printed.

What Castro Wants

Castro clearly wants to establish himself as a third world leader. His involvement in wars of national liberation, his heavy commitment of personnel to his African programs, his rhetoric as defender of third world countries against imperialism, his virulent anti-U.S. campaign, and his diplomatic efforts to woo third world countries bear witness to his ambition. While he knows Soviet support in Africa is vital to his success he is very sensitive to the criticism that he is a Soviet stooge. These charges threaten his third world credentials. He must appear to be operating outside of the Soviet orbit.

Thus far criticism of Cuba's role as a Soviet surrogate has been muted, in part because of the causes that Castro has supported. Little criticism has come from third world countries and these have been largely ineffective. The OAU will not condemn Cuba so long as the territorial integrity of member states is not threatened. The Arab League, while recently denouncing Cuban military involvement in Ethiopia, was only able to do so after its more radical members boycotted the meeting. U.S. charges of late have been very mild and have had little impact. In the absence of strong third world criticism, Castro has concluded, and will continue to conclude, that military involvement in Africa, far from jeopardizing his drive for leadership of the third world, has actually enhanced his position.

The NAM has been silent. However, there are rumblings of dissatisfaction within the NAM; this undercurrent may form a basis for a real setback for Castro.

The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)

Preparations have begun for the 1979 NAM Summit Meeting. The Non-Aligned Coordinating Committee (NACC) will meet in Kabul, Afghanistan, 6–10 May 1978, to develop a preliminary agenda. The foreign ministers will convene 25–29 July 1978 in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, and the Summit Meeting is scheduled for some time in 1979 (traditionally August) in Havana, Cuba. The Cubans are putting great effort into this meeting.

In recent discussions between Afghan President Daoud and Yugoslavia's Tito an important segment dealt with Cuba's overseas military role and the need to see that the NAM remains truly non-aligned. The two leaders are bothered by Cuban behavior. Tito, who has historically enjoyed a strong position in the NAM, is particularly concerned. He may also be concerned that his own leadership role in the NAM may be jeopardized by Cuban strength. Nevertheless he knows that a viable non-aligned movement requires more internal unity than exists today and surfacing the Cuban problem would not help in this regard. He is thus in a quandary. He must promote unity; he needs to deal with

the potentially divisive issue of Cuban credentials. Other NAM members are aware that the issue of Cuba's credentials will have to be either addressed or deftly swept under the rug. The Afghans seem to be leaning toward the latter. Afghan Foreign Minister Abdullah departed 24 March for a three-week visit to a number of NAM member capitals. Apparently he is trying to ensure a NACC meeting free of confrontation. Cuba's role in the NAM is one of the issues he would like to settle before the meeting.

We would like to see the NAM address the issue and Cuba's credentials as a non-aligned state be brought under concerted attack. Indeed failure to address this issue would be a setback for us. Castro would likely take such failure as an implied endorsement of his military involvement in Africa. Since Cuba hosts the 1979 Summit and the host exercises control over both procedure and substance, Castro will probably be able to turn the meeting to his favor.

We do not know whether the current concern within the NAM over Cuba's role is sufficiently strong to achieve what we want. We are also not sure that U.S. involvement in the issue will help our cause or be counterproductive. These points will have to be addressed by State in consultation with our embassies abroad. We do believe, however, that what happens at the 1979 NAM Summit and its preparatory meeting can have a significant impact on Castro's future plans in Africa. This issue is also one we have a strong common interest with the PRC. Their relations with Havana are virtually non-existent and they have attacked Cuban intervention in Africa. There may be an opportunity for common action with China.

An Approach to the NAM

We could try to capitalize on NAM concern over Cuba by the following course of action:

- As soon as we can, approach friendly NAM members to express our views (Yugoslavia, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Liberia are possibilities).

- Approach the PRC and see if they are willing to engage in parallel efforts with NAM members against the Cubans.

- Employ the following rubric:

- The credibility of the NAM is seriously threatened by Cuba's actions as the Soviets' military surrogate.

- Cuban link to Soviets is pervasive. (Offer to provide intelligence briefing on Soviet-Cuban military cooperation in Africa.)

- Silence on Cuba's actions implies support.

- This would bring into question NAM's role in larger issues and in the end could endanger public support in the U.S. for progress on North-South issues.

—Request NAM members consider this as they prepare for upcoming summit.

—Suggest that Summit Conference consider putting Horn of Africa on the agenda, indicate its disapproval publicly, reconsider Cuba's credentials to be a member of the NAM, or reevaluate having the 1979 summit in Havana.³

David E. McGiffert

³ McGiffert wrote below his signature, "I suggest we translate this into a memo from you to CV and ZB which could then be discussed at a subsequent lunch. Dave."

78. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, April 7, 1978

SUBJECT

Eritrea

The SCC discussed our policy on Eritrea on March 27, focusing on three options:²

1. Keep our distance from the whole problem—essentially a continuation of what we have been doing for a long time.

2. Work actively for a negotiated solution, encouraging the Saudis, Sudanese and others to reduce their support for the insurgents.³

3. Encourage greater support for the insurgents so as to make the Ethiopian/Soviet/Cuban fight more costly and increase tension between the Ethiopians and the Soviets/Cubans.

The Secretary of Defense favors Option #1; the Secretary of State favors Option #1, too, but with more active encouragement of a negotiated solution or at least a strong declaration on our part that we favor it. The current CIA view is that a military solution in Eritrea will not

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files 1977–1981, Box 184, SCC 068 Horn of Africa, Cuba's Role in Africa, 3/27/78. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Carter wrote "C" in the upper right margin.

² See Document 76.

³ Carter wrote "no" in the right margin.

be easy for the Ethiopians even with Soviet support. I believe that there will only be a negotiated solution if the Eritreans have some leverage by being able to defend themselves. I also believe that the Soviets (and Cubans, if they join in) should pay a high price for support of a military solution in Eritrea.⁴ Moreover, there may be advantages to bogging them down in Eritrea where they are politically vulnerable so as to make more difficult their intervention in Southern Africa.⁵

I agree with both the Secretaries of State and Defense that we should not get involved directly in providing support for the insurgents. That would have to come primarily from the Saudis but we could encourage them.⁶

Your decision:

1. Do nothing more than we have done to date _____
2. Support a negotiated solution more strongly

By public declarations only _____

By also suggesting reduced support for the insurgents _____

3. Encourage the Saudis and Sudanese to continue and increase their support for the Eritrean insurgents to make a *negotiated* solution possible, raise the cost to the Soviets and Cubans and thus make their intervention in Southern Africa more difficult⁷ _____

⁴ Excerpts of the SCC discussion are attached to an undated version of this memorandum. (Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Materials, Box 28, Meetings–SCC 68: 3/27/78)

⁵ Carter wrote “Thus I prefer no. 3.” in the right margin.

⁶ Carter wrote “agree” in the right margin.

⁷ Carter checked none of these options but added and approved a fourth handwritten option, “Support a negotiated solution more strongly. Repeated public statements deploring violence and foreign military involvement. Let any foreign assistance to insurgents continue without our involvement.”

79. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, April 7, 1978, 2:30–3:20 p.m.

SUBJECT

The Horn of Africa, Angola and Rhodesia

PARTICIPANTS

<i>State</i>	<i>CIA</i>
Cyrus Vance	Stansfield Turner
William C. Harrop	[<i>name not declassified</i>]
(Dep. Ass't. Sec./African Affairs)	(Chief, Africa Division)
<i>Defense</i>	<i>White House</i>
Harold Brown	Zbigniew Brzezinski
Charles W. Duncan, Jr.	(Chairman)
(Deputy Secretary of Defense)	David Aaron
David E. McGiffert	<i>NSC</i>
(Ass't. Secretary/ISA)	Paul B. Henze (Notetaker)
<i>JCS</i>	Thomas Thornton
General David C. Jones	
(Acting Chairman, JCS)	

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

Somalia:

The group agreed that we should seek a written clarification from Siad,² on behalf of the Somali *Government*, of his commitment to respect borders and in return offer a \$10 million non-lethal package and a \$5 million lethal package of *defensive* military material. Communications equipment may form an important component of the non-lethal package. We will also tell Siad that we will not hinder transfer of *defensive* equipment by other friendly countries disposed to help. Care will be taken to supply the Kenyans first with any items the Somalis might be receiving. In view of DOD cautions about sending a general-purpose military survey team which might generate extensive Somali expectations and requests, it was decided that a survey group should confine itself to areas in which we would be likely to supply material, such as the communications field.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files 1977–1981, Box 184, SCC 069 Horn of Africa, 4/07/78. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. No minutes of the meeting were found.

² Carter wrote in the left margin, "Be firm."

Kenya:

DOD was requested to report at an early date on the results of the military aid survey mission to Kenya.

Eritrea:

The Chairman read the President's directive to the group: "Support a negotiated solution more strongly. Repeated public statements deploring violence and foreign military involvement. Let any foreign assistance to insurgents continue without our involvement."³ In implementation of these instructions the group agreed on the following actions:

- Ambassadorial demarches in capitals of countries significant in the non-aligned movement pointing out the fact that all-out Cuban support for a military solution in Eritrea is contrary to non-aligned principles.

- Consultation with the Yugoslavs, Algerians, Indians, Indonesians and Libyans on Eritrea with an aim to bringing pressure on the Cubans to desist from involvement (as inconsistent with their status in the non-aligned movement) and perhaps to develop a mediation effort to promote a negotiated solution.

- Periodic statements by U.S. government spokesmen expressing concern for continued bloodshed in Eritrea and hope that Africans might exert themselves to bring about a negotiated solution.

- Consultation with the Egyptians, Saudis and Sudanese on their support for the Eritrean insurgents and their perceptions of how negotiations can be encouraged.⁴

[Omitted here are items unrelated to the Horn of Africa.]

Ethiopia:

What appears to be a downturn in our relations with the Ethiopian government was discussed briefly. The group agreed with the Secretary of State's view that for the immediate future we should avoid aggravating actions deriving from human rights complaints and compensation for nationalized property so as to keep open the possibility of an aid program and acceptance of an ambassador. The Chairman suggested that covert efforts might be made to encourage Mengistu to worry about Soviet support for rivals. It was agreed that CIA would generate media speculation and agent-of-influence actions along this line.

³ See footnote 7, Document 78.

⁴ Carter wrote in the left margin, "good."

80. Telegram From the Embassy in Somalia to the Department of State and the Embassy in Kenya¹

Mogadiscio, April 9, 1978, 0932Z

751. Dept also pass Horn of Africa Collective. Subj: Attempted Coup d'Etat in Mogadiscio.

1. It appears now that Siad has been successful in countering the attempted coup against him this morning. The attempt seems to have been started by some low-ranking officers at a camp north of the city. They attempted to seize control of key points in Mogadiscio but were routed by forces loyal to Siad. Embassy observer reports it is now quiet west of Mogadiscio on the Afgoi road where earlier there was fighting and a number of casualties.

2. Egyptian military attache just returned (0800Z) from a circuit of the military camps and Ministry of Defense hqtrs north of the city and reported remnants of the mutinous units are now being mopped up by loyal forces. Halim also told us he saw the Soviet Ambassador this morning coming from a meeting with Siad and looking very gloomy.

3. Presidential aide Omar Salim phoned DCM at 0830Z and said President Siad was in firm control of the govt. Salim said that Siad was in good health, and the govt was functioning.

Loughran

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780159–0562. Confidential; Niact Immediate.

81. Intelligence Memorandum¹

Washington, May 8, 1978

The Coup Attempt in Somalia: Background

Somali President Siad may have provided the catalyst for the abortive coup attempt of 9 April² when he ordered the arrest and execution of a large number of officers who fought in the Ogaden campaign. Siad was apparently attempting to head off potential troublemaking by officers embittered over the Somali army's defeat in the Ogaden.

The purges began in earnest shortly after the withdrawal of Somali regulars from the Ogaden in early March, and reportedly involved officers primarily from clans in northern and central Somalia. Siad had long viewed these clans as contentious, disloyal elements. The clans, for their part, had for years bitterly resented the domination of Somali affairs by Siad's own clan—the Marehans.

Many of the officers targeted for elimination by Siad were said to have been convinced that the Somali president used troops under their command as cannon fodder in the Ogaden while deliberately keeping officers from his own clan out of dangerous combat zones. The leaders of the 9 April coup, the most important of whom were field grade officers and veteran Ogaden troop commanders, came from these very same clan elements; they were motivated at least as much by long-standing ethnic animosities toward Siad as by disenchantment with Siad in the aftermath of the Ogaden debacle, although they clearly hoped to capitalize on broader anti-Siad feeling. There is no evidence that Soviets or pro-Soviet Somali elements were involved in this coup attempt, but the logic of the situation, as well as open Cuban broadcasts, argues that the Soviets and Cubans are working to overthrow Siad.

The coup collapsed quickly; it was ill-organized, and Siad apparently had advance knowledge of it which permitted him to move against the instigators and thereby force them to show their hand prematurely. [2 lines not declassified] the uprising was supposed to have begun in the northern city of Hargeisa where disgruntled Ogadeni military returnees were assembled in strength.

Instead, the first action was taken in Mogadiscio, where pro-Siad loyalists were deployed in considerable numbers and in strong defen-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special, Box 2, Chron File: 5/78. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Prepared in the National Foreign Assessment Center, Central Intelligence Agency.

² See Document 80.

sive positions. As a result, pro-Siad troops were able to put down the revolt—which on the dissident side may have involved as many as 10–12 officers, 2000 troops, and 65 tanks—in less than 24 hours, although mopping-up operations continued for some time thereafter.

There have been no major disturbances in the Mogadiscio area since the abortive coup attempt, and President Siad has taken a number of steps to strengthen the impression that he is in control of the government. His departure for a scheduled week-long visit to China only four days after the revolt had been quashed argues either great confidence or fatalism; he is currently in Cairo on another official visit.

Siad's security forces appear to have rounded up most of the coup plotters, including the Mogadiscio-based ringleader of the uprising. Siad is also [*less than 1 line not declassified*] using the coup attempt as a pretext to move against potential challengers and political enemies in the Somali government and security apparatus who, largely because they belong to the same clan elements that instigated the coup, are being accused of sympathizing with its objectives.

On balance, however, the Somali leader is conducting his post-coup inquisition at a carefully measured pace, apparently out of fear that mass arrests and heavy-handed treatment of suspects might spark a major outbreak of clan warfare. Indeed, there have been reports of a series of disturbances in north-central Somalia in recent weeks that on the surface largely involve banditry, isolated shootings, and general unrest, but may stem from ethnic rivalries.

82. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, May 15, 1978, 3:03–4:23 p.m.

SUBJECT

Horn of Africa

PARTICIPANTS

<i>State</i>	<i>JCS</i>
Secretary Cyrus Vance	Lt. Gen. William Y. Smith
Richard Moose,	<i>CIA</i>
Asst Scy for African Affairs	Frank Carlucci, Deputy Director
<i>Defense</i>	[name not declassified],
David E. McGiffert, Asst Scy for ISA	Near Eastern Division, DDO
<i>OMB</i>	<i>White House</i>
Randy Jayne,	Zbigniew Brzezinski (Chairman)
Assoc Dir for Ntl Scy and Intl	David Aaron
Affairs	<i>NSC</i>
<i>USUN</i>	Gary Sick (Notetaker)
Ambassador Andrew Young	

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

Somalia:

The SCC felt that the present levels of economic assistance were about right. There was agreement that we should move cautiously in establishing a military supply relationship with Siad in view of reports of renewed support for Ogaden separatism. However, Secretary Vance and Dr. Brzezinski felt that we should send the military survey team in order to retain our bargaining leverage and to avoid sending negative signals to the regional states. It was agreed to proceed with the survey team but not to go forward with other steps leading to a Presidential Determination on FMS at this time. The DoD recommendation to limit the survey team to discussion of communications, transportation items and light anti-tank weapons was accepted. It was agreed that prior to the survey team visit the Ambassador should go in one more time to Siad to express our concerns about what is happening in the Ogaden.²

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files 1977–1981, Box 185, SCC 077 Horn of Africa, 5/15/78. Secret. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. No minutes of the meeting were found; however, a detailed draft description of the meeting is in the National Security Council, Carter Intelligence Files, Box 20, Minutes/SCC/1978.

² Loughran met with Siad on May 18 to deliver a note proposing a military survey mission to Somalia. “The Somali leader expressed considerable disappointment with the delay in the development of the military relationship.” (Telegram 1122 from Mogadiscio, May 18; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780209–0758)

Kenya:

At Ambassador Young's request, it was agreed that our Ambassador in Mogadiscio would also raise our concerns about Kenya when he sees Siad, since there is a danger that Somalia might shift its attention at some point from the Ogaden to Djibouti and Kenya. We should also prevent any appearance that our aid to Somalia is getting out ahead of our program for Kenya. Our aid levels to Kenya will be considered when the results of the survey team are reviewed in the next few days and Secretary Vance will raise the question of financing the Somali and Kenyan packages with Prince Saud later in the week.

Eritrea:

All agreed we should continue to maintain our non-involvement in supporting Eritrean insurgency. Secretary Vance noted that the list of non-aligned states which are prepared to take a strong position on the Cuban issue is not encouraging. It was decided to target 10–12 countries where an approach could be most beneficial in bringing pressure on Cuba. State would prepare this list with inputs from CIA and the U.S. Mission at the UN.

Sudan:

The need to be responsive to Sudan's economic plight was recognized; however, all agreed that there was little the U.S. could do until the Sudan qualifies for an IMF loan, which means devaluation. In view of the importance of Sudan and the implications for Sadat of any setback there, it could be helpful to raise the problem privately with the IMF, particularly if the Saudis could be persuaded to increase their offer of assistance as an incentive for prompt remedial action by the Sudanese. It was proposed that this subject be raised with Saudi Foreign Minister Saud in his forthcoming visit. With regard to the F-5s for Sudan, there was little we could do to accelerate delivery short of diverting from other countries. Defense is still looking at it, however.

Ethiopia:

The approaching deadline for reprogramming AID funds may provide some pressure on the Ethiopian Government to sign the pending AID projects agreements. The Ethiopians will be notified in the very near future that Secretary Vance will raise with the Foreign Minister in New York the implications of the Hickenlooper and Gonzalez amendments with respect to Ethiopian actions on expropriation and human rights.³ This should remove some of the pressure for Treasury

³ In telegram 135964 to Addis Ababa, May 27, the Department reported on Vance's May 24 meeting with Feleke. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780225-0019) The 1962 Hickenlooper Amendment was a rider on the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act that denied foreign aid to any country that expropriated U.S. property without compensation. The 1972 Gonzalez Amendment was a rider on three bills that authorized funding to international lending institutions in 1971. It required that the United States delegate to these international institutions vote against loans to any country that expropriated U.S. property.

to invoke either of those amendments in the immediate future while serious discussions are underway. Our new Ambassador will not arrive in Ethiopia until late May or early June.⁴

Political Situation in Eritrea and Ethiopia:

There is no evidence to date of Cuban participation in combat activities in Eritrea, although they are doing some planning. Ambassador Young suggested raising this subject directly with the Cubans. He was willing to take it up with the Cuban mission in New York, but felt that it would be more effective to approach the Cubans at a high level in Washington. The possibility of a limited covert action program in Ethiopia was considered but was rejected as being of only marginal significance.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Horn of Africa.]

⁴ Ambassador Frederic L. Chapin presented his credentials on July 21.

83. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 18, 1978

SUBJECT

Horn of Africa

PARTICIPANTS

UNITED STATES

The Secretary (portions)

David D. Newsom, Undersecretary for Political Affairs

John C. West, U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia

Richard M. Moose, Assistant Secretary, AF

Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary, NEA

William Crawford, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA

Richard St. F. Post, Director, AF/E (notetaker)

SAUDI ARABIA

Prince Saud Al-Faisal, Foreign Minister

¹ Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 21, Horn of Africa: 1-5/78. Secret. The meeting took place at the Department of State. Drafted by Post; cleared by Crawford, Moose, and Forbes; and approved on June 13 by Frank G. Wisner.

Sheikh Abdallah Alireza, Deputy Minister for Economic and Cultural Affairs
Ali Abdullah Alireza, Ambassador of Saudi Arabia
Dr. Nizar Madani, First Secretary, Embassy of Saudi Arabia

Mr. Newsom invited Prince Saud to provide his perspective on the Horn of Africa.

Prince Saud said that the Saudis see the threat in the area stemming from Soviet intervention through the use of several states, including Cuba, PDRY, and several East European countries. The Saudis see their intervention, which is not just material aid but direct intervention with personnel, as a new and dangerous element threatening the peace and security of Saudi Arabia, Africa, the Middle East, and ultimately even Europe. Saudi Arabia is against foreign intervention in principle. Involvement of foreign countries complicates problems. Soviet policy is clear in aim, intent, and motivation. What is lacking is a response. Many countries in the area are worried for their integrity and for their internal security, but they have seen no response to the Soviets. No single country or group of countries in the area can see their way to provide such a response because they cannot stand up against the USSR unless they have help from the United States—not troops but many other forms of help are needed. People might argue that countries unable to stand up should fall, but even when groups do try to stand up, such as in Angola, there is no response to help them.

Mr. Newsom said that the US understands the Saudi concern and disappointment that the US response seems inadequate and slow. This should not lead the Saudis to feel that the US is not concerned; the US is concerned. The US acknowledges that the Soviets have made gains with Cuban aid, but in large part this has resulted from opportunities being presented to them such as in Ethiopia and Somalia.

Mr. Newsom said he knew that Saudi Arabia had tried to urge Haile Selassie to deal with the problems that were looming in Ethiopia but that Haile Selassie paid no attention and as a consequence Ethiopia now has a leftist regime. Then the Somalis led themselves to believe that they would succeed in the Ogaden and as a consequence the Ethiopian regime called in the help of the Soviets and the Cubans. Unfortunately, this was consistent with the African principle of territorial integrity and therefore we did not find African support in opposition to the Soviet/Cuban intervention there. Mr. Newsom also referred to Prince Saud's awareness of Congressional limitations on the US ability to intervene in such situations. The US tried to influence the Somalis to get out of the Ogaden when the fighting was going on there since we felt that as long as the fighting continued it provided a justification for the Soviets and Cubans to be in Ethiopia. We have discussed the whole question of security in the region with the Somalis, the Sudanese and the Kenyans—the latter are so concerned about the

Somalis that they make common cause with radical Ethiopia in a manner which one would not expect from such a moderate regime.

Mr. Newsom said that the US does not believe that it can give substantial arms to Somalia unless the Somalis give assurances that they will not support the insurgents in the Ogaden. He asked if Prince Saud felt it to be realistic to expect Siad to give such a pledge. He asked if Prince Saud saw any solution to the Ogaden problem through mediation, through the OAU, through outside good offices?

Prince Saud asked if the US was not willing to help Somalia first and then see if the Ogaden problem could be solved. He noted that the Ogaden problem has been there at least since independence. Asking them to do something that is against their national dream is difficult. The Somalis claim that the Somalis in the Ogaden are part of Somalia. If the US says that it will only help if Somalia abandons the Ogaden, the US is putting forward an unacceptable condition. Tribal issues like the Ogaden exist all over Africa. But the Ogaden problem did not become an issue until the Soviets made it one. Nobody except Ethiopia and Somalia can solve the problem between them. Saudi Arabia does not say that one is right and the other is wrong. Saudi Arabia has had no policy of encouraging Somalia to take the Ogaden and Saudi Arabia did not help Somalia with arms until the Soviet and Cuban intervention threatened them. Saudi Arabia does not involve itself in the Ogaden problem. But Saudi Arabia faces a threat from a superpower which is willing to send in vast quantities of aircraft, ships, tanks and men to intervene in a situation near to Saudi Arabia. He said that the US must choose the real problem to confront. The US should not take the position of facing up to the Soviets only if the Somalis abandon the Ogaden.

Mr. Moose expressed the view that the US and Saudi Arabia shared substantially the same strategic objectives of limiting, reducing and hopefully eventually removing the Soviet influence from the Horn of Africa. As far as helping the Somalis, the US is prepared to do so. As we get to looking into how we can go about helping Somalia, then the US has to look at the distinctive characteristics of the situation. It is not enough to say that we must oppose the Soviets. There is the question of Congressional concerns. We must also take into account tactical considerations having to do with Somali internal politics, the position of Siad, Somalia's neighbors, Africa-wide considerations. At the end of the Ogaden affair, we felt that the immediate problem was to keep Siad in power and to keep him oriented towards the West and towards his traditional friends in the area, such as Saudi Arabia.

Prince Saud said: "A very new tradition."

Mr. Moose went on to say that the US hoped to keep Siad from going in the wrong direction. We told him that Somalia's defensive needs would obviously be great if Somalia continued its aggressive

policy with respect to its neighbors. However, if Somalia wanted to concentrate on development and to live in peace with its neighbors then the US could help.

Prince Saud asked rhetorically why Siad says he cannot renounce Greater Somalia. Stating that it is impossible for Siad to do so, Prince Saud said that if the United States said to Siad that he must destroy himself in order for the US to help him, then Siad would have to look elsewhere. Greater Somalia is not a goal peculiar to Siad; all Somalis think that way. The US cannot ask Siad for something he cannot do. Since Saudi Arabia lives in the region, it feels the problems must be solved there. But the only problem is the Soviet role. The basic problem is not the Ogaden. That has been there forever. The only problem arose when the Soviets involved themselves on both sides of the dispute.

Mr. Newsom said that the US wants to help Somalia in ways which recognize the realities of their politics. We are pleased at the help that Saudi Arabia has provided to Somalia. We have indicated to Siad our desire to help Somalia and we have received from Siad his assurances that he will not use force against his neighbors. It may be, however, that we cannot give Siad what he feels he needs to defend Somalia and to maintain his position. Mr. Newsom said that we would be interested in knowing what Saudi Arabia proposes to do in this situation and he wondered if the US military relationship with Somalia is in any way a condition for Saudi aid to Somalia.

Prince Saud said that Saudi Arabia has helped Somalia acquire arms already. This help has been based on Somali requirements, not because of any arrangements they may have with others. Saudi Arabia has never associated itself with Somali claims on the Ogaden. Some Arabs did associate themselves with those claims and now find themselves on the other side. This is not true of Saudi Arabia which has followed a constant policy. When Saudi Arabia helped Somalia militarily it was because of the Soviet threat to Somalia. Normally, Saudi Arabia will only give countries economic help. But Somalia was threatened militarily by the Soviet Union and is important to Saudi Arabia. If it can maintain its sovereignty and independence and integrity with help from Saudi Arabia, that is fine. If the US is also going to help, that is also fine.

Mr. Moose said that we are continuing to have contacts with President Siad. We have told him that we are prepared to send a military survey team which will place emphasis on the fields of anti-tank weapons, transport and communications. We can go forward on that basis. But as we go forward in Somalia, we must keep in mind that we are dealing with a very complex set of variables in the area and that what one does with one variable will affect others. What we do in Somalia, for instance, has an immediate impact on Kenya, which is a very fragile

entity and a vulnerable target for the Soviets. We wish to help Somalia in a manner which will not increase Kenyan fears.

Prince Saud asserted that the danger for Kenya is not Somalia but Ethiopia. Mr. Moose acknowledged this but said that it is difficult to make the Kenyans realize that. Prince Saud said that there are many factions in Kenya, and some are prepared to throw in their lot with Ethiopia and the Soviets. They see where the strength lies. He agreed that Kenya is very important and it is important to strengthen that country.

Mr. Moose said that he hoped that the US could proceed in Somalia in a way which will bring the Kenyans to realize that Ethiopia and not Somalia represents the danger to them. It is difficult to get this subject going with the Kenyans. We believe that we can manage our relations with Somalia in ways which will be acceptable to the Kenyans. The problem with Kenya is that it is virtually defenseless. Even with Somalia in straitened circumstances militarily after the Ogaden war, Somalia is still well ahead of Kenya militarily. If the Kenyans felt a degree of security in the Northeast Province, such as with a helicopter reconnaissance and anti-tank capability, then the Kenyans would not be so paranoid and it would be possible to talk more rationally with them. In July of 1977 they accepted our rationale about the desirability of assisting Somalia and of lessening Somalia's dependence on the Soviets.² They lost that rationality when the Ogaden situation blew up. But we still believe that we can deal with these two together.

Prince Saud said that the Saudis had told the Somalis that the best way to proceed was to patch things up with the Kenyans. However, the Kenyans didn't want to sign the non-aggression pact offered by the Somalis. He said that all the Kenyans are maneuvering and many are looking where they should go and they see the strength of the Soviets. But it is best to identify the real threat: it is not Somalia or its claims; the threat is the Soviet Union. Somali claims won't change the region but the Soviets might. Get the Soviets out and then the problems can be tackled. Mr. Moose observed that, as we build a stronger position for ourselves, that will enable us to gain against the Soviets.

Prince Saud said that if the Somalis had been helped to inflict a defeat on the Cubans then the Cubans wouldn't have felt emboldened to move elsewhere. Referring to Zaire, he said that it would only take 1,000 Cubans to take the whole of Zaire. He asserted that the Cubans would have no trouble controlling Africa. They even picked black

² In telegram 9450 from Nairobi, July 26, 1977, the Embassy reported on this conversation between Ambassador LeMelle and Kenyan Foreign Minister Waiyaki. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770267-0331)

Cubans to send to Africa. Who knows, he asked, whether the blacks attacking Eritrea aren't Cubans?

Mr. Newsom asked what Prince Saud felt could be done about Eritrea? He noted that it was a conflict that had been going on for 17 years, that had involved the United Nations in the past, that many people had tried mediation and that there is the problem of the divisions among the insurgents.

Prince Saud observed that Eritrea is an entity all by itself which has existed in the past and was then given by the UN to Ethiopia. He said that it is a mistake to refer to it as Moslem. The percentage of Moslems to the total population in Eritrea is less than the same proportion in Ethiopia proper. All of the liberation movements, he asserted, have both Moslems and Christians as well as a few pagans. There was an effort made to foment differences between the Moslems and the Christians, but this has been cleared up in both of the main fronts. They have also agreed to join together. Now they have one command entity and they have agreed to have an integrated movement. Asked if this included the liberation movement with which Saudi Arabia has had a traditional relationship, Prince Saud said that Saudi Arabia had no traditional relationship with any single movement. In the past they have helped refugees from Eritrea in the Sudan and that was the extent of Saudi help. They did not supply one or another movement but all. Asked if he felt there was a role for the UN, Prince Saud said that it is in fact a UN problem. If the UN wants to exercise its responsibility, it may clearly do so.

The Secretary, who had only shortly before joined the group, asked if it were possible to deal with the Eritrean situation in the UN or if the OAU would wish to be seized with it. Mr. Newsom observed that the OAU was not at the moment seized formally with the Eritrean problem. Prince Saud observed that the Eritreans will be present at the OAU summit meeting in Khartoum. But since the UN involvement in Eritrea predated the founding of the OAU, there was no OAU decision concerning Eritrea as such. Asked again about Saudi help to liberation movements, Prince Saud said that individually they are not helping movements but giving aid to all of them. He also said that Saudi Arabia did not help militarily until the movements had gotten together and made a joint military command. The military aid is "non-lethal", he said.

Mr. Newsom summed up by saying that both our countries share concern over the Soviet presence in the Horn of Africa. The US understands the Saudi concern is that the Soviet presence itself is the problem in the Horn and that some indication of opposition to their activities is necessary.

Prince Saud said that it is not Saudi Arabia's business to solve the problems. The problems there were long-existent and became critical

after the Soviets got involved. It is not a question of having to send soldiers. Most African countries are worried about the situation. If they receive backing, they would be prepared to act. He noted that Zambia tried to fight against the Cubans in Angola. If there is a challenger to the Soviet activities, then there will be the backing for that challenger.

Mr. Newsom expressed the hope that there will be continuing consultations between the US and Saudi officials. Prince Saud agreed and proposed to send Deputy Foreign Minister Mansouri to Washington for this purpose, a proposal which was welcomed by the US side.

84. Interagency Intelligence Memorandum¹

NI IIM 78-10010

Washington, May 22, 1978

ETHIOPIA: LIKELIHOOD AND IMPLICATIONS OF POSSIBLE OUTCOMES IN ERITREA

NOTE

This paper is the product of an informal interagency working group, chaired by CIA under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for Africa. The paper has been coordinated at a working level.

This memorandum addresses the Eritrean situation from the perspective of the involved countries and weighs the possible outcomes of the imbroglio. Owing to the fluidity of the situation, we have tended to focus on developments over the next three months, although in looking at the possible outcomes we have gone beyond this time frame. We also would point out that there are gray areas between the various possible courses of development.

[Omitted here is the table of contents.]

KEY POINTS

There are markedly different perspectives among the key groups concerned with the Eritrean situation.

—The Soviets, Cubans, and Arab states clearly would prefer a negotiated settlement in Eritrea.

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff Files. Secret; [handling restrictions not declassified].

—The Ethiopian regime and the insurgents are not now interested in negotiations except on their own extreme terms. The prospects for negotiations at this time are nil.

—The Soviets and Cubans are not prepared to jeopardize their strong position in Ethiopia by exerting heavy pressure to force Addis Ababa to the bargaining table.

—The Arab states also are unwilling to cut off their aid to the insurgents to force them to negotiate.

—If the fighting went extremely badly for either the Ethiopians or the insurgents, a chance for some type of negotiated arrangement would improve only marginally.

The Ethiopians are well along in their preparations for the opening stage of the major Ethiopian military push against the insurgents and the opening stages of the offensive may already have begun.

—The degree of Cuban support for this effort is unclear, but at this time it appears to be limited to support activity.

—We strongly doubt that the Ethiopians will succeed in suppressing the insurgents, although they may recapture some major population centers and open up some lines of communication.

—In favorable tactical situations the insurgents are likely to stand and fight, despite the firepower Ethiopia now possesses. Beyond this, the insurgents are prepared to retreat to the countryside and wage a protracted guerrilla campaign.

As time passes, we believe that the Cubans and the Soviets will become increasingly involved in the Eritrean fighting.

—Ethiopian leader Mengistu will press for this if the Ethiopians are unable to defeat the insurgents, and we believe that Havana and Moscow will feel compelled to be responsive.

—Their initial involvement is likely to consist of advisory and support activities, but if this kind of support does not bring success to the Ethiopian campaign, we believe that the Soviets and Cubans will commit Cuban combat forces.

—Even then they would still hope that at some point a negotiated solution would be possible.

—With Cuban combat participation, the Ethiopians would be more successful on the battlefield, but they would probably not be able to defeat the insurgents decisively.

—The Arab states supporting the insurgents would view Cuban combat involvement as further communist expansion in the Red Sea area, and they would press for some US response.

—Independently they would probably increase their support to the insurgents, though none of them would be willing to become directly

involved in the fighting. They also would continue to hope for a negotiated settlement.

There is a possibility that the fighting will spill across the Ethiopian border into Sudan—a development that might under some circumstances lead Egypt to invoke the Mutual Defense Treaty.²

—The Arab states would continue their support to the Eritreans.

—Somalia might take advantage of the Ethiopian and Cuban concentrations in Eritrea to step-up guerrilla activities in the Ogaden.

I. PERSPECTIVES ON ERITREA

A. *The Ethiopian Perspective*

1. A number of practical and psychological considerations influence Ethiopian thinking on Eritrea. In practical terms, geographic and economic factors have encouraged Ethiopia's determination to maintain control of the province. Eritrea has Ethiopia's only coastline, its only ports, its only petroleum refinery, and its most active portion of the modern sector of the economy. Without the ports of Massawa and Assab, Ethiopia would be dependent on Djibouti for access to the sea.

2. Because of Eritrea's location on the Red Sea and its large Muslim population, the province figures prominently in Ethiopia's historical fear of "Arab encirclement," a concern that has increased because of the military regime's belief that conservative Arab states are supporting the Eritrean insurgency in an attempt to weaken or destroy Ethiopia's socialist revolution. While some of the rhetoric on this subject is deliberately exaggerated, the Ethiopian leaders genuinely believe that a guerrilla victory would allow Eritrea to be used as a base of operations by the government's opponents.

3. Government leader Mengistu and his supporters also share the previous regime's fear that making concessions to the Eritreans would encourage many of Ethiopia's ethnic groups to assert separatist demands. For all the regime's Marxist rhetoric and assertions about granting ethnic minorities local autonomy, Ethiopia's rulers are nationalists and determined to maintain the country's territorial integrity.

4. Emotional factors also have probably influenced the intensity of Ethiopia's desire for a purely military solution to the conflict; to back down after so many years of fighting would be a blow to its pride. The military rulers would be compared unfavorably with Haile Selassie in terms of their ability to hold the Ethiopian empire together.

5. [4 lines not declassified] The Ethiopians—even if they were willing to consider compromise—would be unwilling to open talks at present,

² Egypt and Sudan had signed a Mutual Defense Treaty in 1976.

while they are at a military disadvantage. Optimism in Addis Ababa following the successful routing of the Somalis in the Ogaden is also encouraging the Ethiopians to proceed with an offensive in Eritrea.

6. Ethiopian leaders probably have some doubts about how successful the military will be in Eritrea without direct Soviet and Cuban involvement, but they are confident they will gain ground against the guerrillas—and also confident that the Soviets and Cubans will come to their aid if the offensive runs into trouble. They believe that without Cuban troops they will face a difficult struggle, but they are willing to pay the price in men and resources.

7. After achieving initial military objectives, the Ethiopians might offer a figleaf of autonomy to the Eritreans—a deal that the insurgents are most unlikely to accept under any circumstances. In any event, the fighting will continue—at a reduced level—but the situation will remain basically unchanged.

B. The Soviet Perspective

8. The USSR sees considerable potential for gain from its involvement in Ethiopia, including important local opportunities in East Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, as well as a chance to advance the USSR's status as a great power with an expanding presence on the world scene. Moscow wants to replace air and naval facilities that were lost in Somalia—particularly in light of US-Soviet negotiations on forces in the Indian Ocean—and to intimidate Somalia's Arab and potential Western backers with the warning that Moscow has permanent interest in the area of the Red Sea. The Soviets thus far have perceived few external deterrents to their course of action, and they apparently judge the political risks of US reaction as tolerable and the military risks as negligible.

9. Against the background of these overall Soviet goals in Ethiopia, the Soviets are committed to helping Mengistu resolve the Eritrean issue on terms acceptable to him. Nevertheless, from the Soviet perspective the Eritrean insurgency is a less tractable problem than the Ogaden conflict. The Eritreans are generally perceived as a genuine "national liberation movement," and Soviet involvement against the insurgents will be harder to justify politically than was support against Somali aggression. To the degree that the Soviets become involved in the counterinsurgency effort in Eritrea, they will antagonize a wider circle of Arab and possibly African states that view Eritrea as an internal affair. There are military constraints as well, particularly the Kremlin's wish to avoid involvement in a bloody and protracted guerrilla affair, as well as the difficulty—even with Cuban help—of reconquering Eritrea.

10. For these reasons, the Soviets would like to mediate the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict and may try to limit and, in any event, will

certainly make less conspicuous their military support for the approaching military campaign. The Soviets and East Germans have already had contacts with all three guerrilla factions in an effort to forestall a military confrontation. [2 lines not declassified] Both Brezhnev and Castro would like Mengistu to provide some form of autonomy for Eritrea that would preserve Ethiopian sovereignty over the region.

11. These efforts to mediate the conflict have produced no visible progress so far, and neither the Soviets nor the Cubans have ruled out an expanded military involvement, including the commitment of Cuban combat troops if necessary. The Soviets presumably realize that Ethiopian success in Eritrea without Soviet involvement would greatly strengthen Mengistu's confidence in his ability to act independently. Moscow may very well believe that the Ethiopians would then be in a better position to defy Soviet entreaties on the need for Ethiopia to create a "vanguard" Marxist-Leninist party, which Moscow is fostering to consolidate Mengistu's revolutionary regime as well as Soviet influence in the country.

12. To protect their equity in Ethiopia, therefore, the Soviets have already assumed a key role in the logistics for the Ethiopian buildup in Eritrea. The Soviet-Ethiopian supply channel is functioning smoothly, and Moscow will certainly continue to funnel military equipment to Ethiopian forces. [5 lines not declassified]

13. If the Ethiopians begin to encounter difficulty on the ground they will demand more from Moscow, and the Soviets will then be placed in a position of having either to support more actively a war that they are hesitant to endorse or—by refusing further support—undermining relations with Mengistu. Confronted with that choice, Moscow's gradual—but deeper—involvement in the war would be highly probable, perhaps in time resembling what it did in support of the Ogaden campaign.

C. The Cuban Perspective

14. The Castro regime is trying assiduously to avoid a major combat role in Eritrea. Havana has temporarily shelved Mengistu's pleas for a combined assault on the secessionist guerrillas and has urged the Ethiopian leader to make a sustained effort to achieve a solution through negotiations. The Cubans—who see possibilities in some form of Eritrean autonomy short of independence—are also using diplomatic channels to smooth the way for a negotiated settlement, but prospects for success appear exceedingly dim.

15. *Constraints on Cuba.* Castro has long been alert to the negative domestic reaction that is sure to be generated by heavy Cuban casualties on African battlefields. A recent report indicates that as casualties have mounted in Angola, Castro has become disenchanted with the

continuing military burden there and would prefer to avoid becoming entrapped in a similar protracted conflict elsewhere. Moreover, the Cubans have a healthy respect for the ability of the Eritreans to sustain a guerrilla war. The level of casualties Cuba sustained in the Ogaden—reportedly higher than first indications—has probably also given Castro pause about further Ethiopian combat. In addition, Castro acknowledged recently that he would prefer to turn his attention to southern Africa, where the colonial “villains” are more readily identifiable and the risk of antagonizing close allies is less.

16. Havana is aware that Cuban combat involvement in Eritrea could jeopardize key elements of its foreign policy. Motivated by ideological affinity and in many cases by a desire to cultivate additional sources of financial assistance, Cuba has given high priority in recent years to broadening its ties with such radical Arab states as Iraq, Syria, Algeria, and Libya. All of these have provided varying degrees of support to the Eritrean separatists, however, and they have all sought assurances that Cuba will not join with the Mengistu government to suppress the Eritreans.

17. Cuba covets a leadership position within the nonaligned movement and hopes to take a significant step toward furthering that goal next year when it hosts the nonaligned summit conference. Among the more moderate nonaligned members, there is concern over Cuba’s military involvement in Angola and Ethiopia; some countries have even talked of shifting the venue of the summit. Cuba’s desire to limit the damage to its nonaligned position has doubtless intensified in response to specific warnings by Yugoslavia that Havana should stay out of Eritrea.

18. Havana’s commitment to the “world revolutionary struggle” has caused the Cuban leadership to value highly the respect of Third World liberation movements. Many of these movements are sympathetic to the Eritrean cause, and they, as well as the Cubans, realize that the separatists not only command wide popular support at home but that some espouse a Marxist ideology. The Castro regime is keenly aware that, after having helped to train Eritrean guerrillas in Cuba in the 1960s and in South Yemen in the mid-1970s, Cuban participation in the quelling of the separatists would leave Havana open to the accusation of failing to pursue a “principled” foreign policy.

19. *Forces Impelling Cuba To Intervene.* The Cubans have a heavy stake in the Mengistu government, and we do not believe they would stand idly by if it fared badly against the guerrillas. The Cubans clearly hope to avoid a full-scale combat commitment, but to protect their investment they are likely to find themselves drawn gradually into deeper involvement in Eritrea if the Ethiopian offensive flounders. Havana would probably worry that by refusing to help the Ethiopian

leader at that point it would open itself to the criticism that it was knuckling under to US pressure. From his earliest days as a revolutionary leader, Castro has acted boldly and impulsively even when the odds were stacked against him. He would be inclined to follow a similar course in Eritrea while trying to minimize the diplomatic costs.

20. *The Cuban-Soviet Relationship.* In the final analysis, Cuban policy will be linked closely to Soviet guidelines. The Cuban and Soviet positions—in some cases for different reasons—are essentially identical at the present time. Moreover, Havana is so deeply dependent on the USSR economically and militarily that Castro is compelled to pay close heed lest his policies deviate too much from those of his benefactor.

21. Realizing how difficult it will be to avoid getting sucked into a combat role, the Cubans have already begun building a rationale to justify such an involvement should it become necessary. Cuban officials have taken the line that the “reactionary” Arabs and Western powers are aiding the Eritrean separatists in order to weaken the Mengistu government and have warned that if this external assistance increases Havana will be forced to respond. By advocating a political settlement and by emphasizing Cuba’s willingness to serve as a broker between Addis Ababa and some of the Eritrean groups, the Cubans have also set the stage for blaming Eritrean intransigence for undermining prospects for peace. In short, the Cubans probably would conclude that if negotiations are not possible and the Ethiopians are unable to suppress the insurgents, they would have little choice but to increase the level of their military involvement in Eritrea.

D. The Insurgent Perspective

22. Addis Ababa’s preparation for an offensive and the Soviet and Cuban presence in Ethiopia has caused no weakening of the insurgents’ determination to continue their military resistance and to adhere to their demand for independence. The guerrillas realize the Ethiopians will deploy a more formidable force than in the past, but—like the Ethiopians—they are optimistic about their prospects and confident they can withstand the Ethiopian drive.

23. The guerrillas are probably still heady from their successes of the past three years, during which they greatly expanded their forces and mounted an offensive that drove the Ethiopians into a few enclaves and left the insurgents in control of 90 percent of Eritrea. The guerrillas for almost a year have failed to capture any more government garrisons, despite several major attempts, but their severe mauling of government troops in recent battles has undoubtedly encouraged their confidence about being able to blunt the Ethiopian offensive.

24. The insurgents seem realistic about their military capabilities now that Ethiopia has vastly superior firepower. They are probably

reconciled to Ethiopia's reopening some of the major roads and regaining some of the towns now under insurgent control. The guerrillas may engage in some major conventional battles in order to test the Ethiopians' mettle, but they are preparing over the long term to wage guerrilla warfare that they believe will prevent Ethiopia from pacifying the province. The guerrillas are well entrenched in the countryside and can count on strong support from the local population.

25. The guerrillas' demand for independence, despite the price the Eritreans are likely to pay in pursuit of that goal, is a measure of their antipathy toward the Ethiopians. The Ethiopians and many of the Eritreans share a common ethnic and religious background, but these links have been submerged by the Eritreans' belief that they are politically and culturally more advanced than the Ethiopians. The government's ruthless military tactics of the past few years have reinforced Eritrean hostility toward the Ethiopians. Like the Ethiopians, the guerrillas may eventually think more seriously about compromise, but a shift in policy would require a serious decline in their military position, concessions from Ethiopia, and probably strong pressure to negotiate from the guerrillas' Arab supporters.

26. The guerrillas are probably reasonably confident about their arms situation. They may be uncertain about the willingness of Arab states to meet all insurgent arms requests, especially in the amounts necessary to wage large-scale warfare, but they probably are satisfied they have enough supplies on hand and will receive enough resupplies in the future to conduct guerrilla operations.

27. The insurgents realize that division within their ranks prevents the most effective use of their forces, and there are efforts under way to try to form a more unified movement. Whether this succeeds or not, the insurgents will probably paper over their disputes sufficiently to continue the fight against the Ethiopians.

E. Arab Perspectives

28. As long as Haile Selassie ruled Ethiopia, most Arabs—albeit for diverse reasons—supported the Eritrean rebellion. The military takeover led Libya, South Yemen, and Algeria to switch sides, convinced that a “progressive regime” had been established in Addis Ababa.³ Iraq and Syria remained committed to the Eritrean cause. Alarmed by the increasingly radical stance of the Addis Ababa government, the Saudis stepped up aid to the guerrillas and grew more supportive of Eritrean political aspirations.

³ Typically, the position of Libyan leader Qadhafi is somewhat anomalous in that he has recently resumed some degree of support to the insurgents. [Footnote is in the original.]

29. Despite signals by Moscow and Havana that they intend to avoid a combat role in Eritrea, most Arab governments are unconvinced, and the radical Arabs have been trying to persuade the Soviets and Cubans to refrain from military involvement.

30. Iraq, probably the staunchest backer of the Eritrean cause, has made it clear that despite its close ties with Moscow and Havana, Baghdad would take a very dim view of a significant Soviet and Cuban combat role. In its approach to Moscow (and probably also to Havana), Baghdad has warned that “progressive Arab forces” would not react to Soviet support of Ethiopia in Eritrea in the same way as they did to the Soviet-Cuban role against the invading Somalis in the Ogaden. This also seems to be the position of Libya and Algeria.

31. The Saudis are appalled by the idea that Moscow or Havana might succeed in getting Ethiopia and Eritrea to agree on a solution based on something short of Eritrean independence. Such a development would enable the Soviets and Cubans to pose as the peacemakers in the region. The moderate Arabs fear that Eritrea eventually will come under Marxist control—either through a compromise settlement or a Soviet- and Cuban-backed offensive against the guerrillas. The Saudis’ worst case scenario envisages Soviet-backed radicals going on to threaten Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia, and Kenya, as well as putting pressure on the moderate governments of the Arabian Peninsula.

32. This pessimistic assessment has not led the Arabs to abandon the rebels. Both moderate and radical Arabs, for example, continue to send aid to the insurgents and keep trying to broaden the number of players by raising in various international forums the issue of possible foreign military involvement in the fighting.

33. Sudan is particularly fearful of developments in Eritrea, viewing the situation as a potential threat to Sudan itself. Sudan serves as a major sanctuary for and funnel of supplies to the insurgents and the Numayri government has feared that increased fighting with the rebels will spill into Sudan. He has attempted a rapprochement with Addis Ababa to lessen the chances of involvement in the fighting. There is little evidence, however, of any serious effort to reduce the flow of supplies to the rebels.

F. The African Perspective

34. African states are unlikely to have much influence on the Eritrean problem, which they have long been accustomed to consider an internal Ethiopian affair. During the many years the insurgency has been going on, the Organization of African Unity has not given a hearing to the rebels, and the OAU African Liberation Committee has not recognized them. This stand is primarily in observance of the OAU’s principle of the preservation of the territorial integrity of member states;

in addition, Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie was revered as the founding father of the OAU, and few Africans were willing to listen to his opponents.

35. Some African states oppose a Cuban combat role in Eritrea, and their opposition has been a factor in Soviet and Cuban attempts to limit their involvement in Ethiopian efforts to suppress the insurgency. African reactions, however, are not likely to be strong enough to deter Moscow and Havana from expanding their role. Some Africans would privately express disapproval, but their criticism would be muted by the recognition that the Soviets and Cubans were supporting the OAU's principle of the inviolability of existing borders. Some of the African states or the OAU itself might try to promote negotiations, but they would do so more for form's sake than for real expectation of being successful.

II. POSSIBLE OUTCOMES

A. Negotiations

36. Attempts to mediate the Eritrean problem have failed, and the near-term outlook for any headway is bleak. The major mediation effort now under way is a Cuban one. In recent meetings in Havana, Castro sought Palestinian and Iraqi help in inducing the insurgents to negotiate, but with no apparent results. The Palestinians are divided in their approach to the insurgents and, in any case, have little leverage on them. Iraq, whose role as the insurgents' major arms supplier gives it considerable leverage, is unwilling to pressure the Eritreans or to curtail its longstanding investment in what Baghdad views as an Arab nationalist cause.

37. The apparent Soviet-Cuban strategy in Eritrea is to split off the Marxists from the non-Marxists in the insurgent movement, to bring the Marxists—primarily the EPLF (Eritrean People's Liberation Front), plus Marxist elements in the ELF (Eritrean Liberation Front)—to the negotiating table with the Ethiopian government, and eventually to set up a Marxist front or government in an autonomous Eritrea that will be prepared to work with Addis Ababa.

38. Whatever pressure outsiders may exert for an accommodation, we do not believe that either protagonist will negotiate seriously unless and until the military realities decisively favor that approach. The guerrillas, even if defeated at Asmara, Massawa, and other urban areas, will probably again take to the hills and continue the insurgency, with Arab support. Mengistu, meanwhile, will probably resist any compromise until he has seen whether Ethiopian military power can force the Eritreans to come to terms. If the insurgents remain undefeated but see the military advantage turning decisively against them, they will probably show more interest in negotiations.

39. The insurgents appear to be increasingly polarized between leftists and conservatives, but this development does not seem to have advanced the prospects for a deal between the Marxists and the Ethiopian Government. EPLF leaders so far seem no more inclined than other insurgent leaders to negotiate or to abandon the Eritrean demand for complete independence.

40. Mengistu, a hardliner on Eritrea and the chief proponent of a military solution, has never gone beyond reiterating his support for the Ethiopian nine-point plan offered in 1976 to the Eritreans. The plan was never precisely formulated, and in its literal interpretation provided autonomy for the various linguistic and cultural groups of Eritrea rather than for the province as such—a clear attempt to destroy the concept of Eritrean nationalism. These provisions gave the Eritreans no reassurances that the Ethiopians would not again seek (as in the 1952–62 federation period) to circumscribe Eritrean autonomy and, finally, to impose tight centralized control from Addis Ababa.

B. An Ethiopian Military Push

41. The Ethiopian military is steadily building up its forces in Eritrea and neighboring Tigre and Gondar Provinces for a major offensive against the insurgents. It now appears that this offensive will continue to unfold gradually over the next few months. Air and, to a lesser extent, ground operations will be hampered, however, by the rainy season in July and August.

42. The pace of the fighting in Eritrea has been on the upswing over the last month as government troops, supported by airstrikes, have attempted to loosen the insurgents' grip on the roads around Asmara. The insurgents, for their part, have mounted repeated efforts to eliminate some outlying Ethiopian garrisons in an attempt to solidify their positions before the weight of government forces can be brought to bear.

43. [7 lines not declassified]

44. [6 lines not declassified]

45. The likelihood of Ethiopian success depends, among other things, on how well the Ethiopian troops fight and on how successful they are in sealing off insurgent supply routes from Sudan. On paper the Ethiopian ground and air forces are much stronger than those of the insurgents. However, the combat capability of these forces, in the absence of direct Cuban involvement, has not really been tested—except for that of Ethiopian Air Force pilots, many of whom have shown considerable skill in recent air attacks on Eritrean strongholds.

46. The success of the Ethiopian push will also depend in large measure on Eritrean tactics and the degree of cooperation among the three insurgent groups. If the Eritreans respond in such a way as to

present massed formations for Ethiopian air and artillery forces, they will be seriously hurt. The battles of Barentu and Massawa, for example, are indicative of the high casualties the insurgents incur when fighting from fixed positions.

47. On the other hand, if the Eritreans conduct a mobile, hit-and-run campaign they could make it very costly for the Ethiopians to pursue the war over a period of a year or two. The insurgents would probably not gain any large or decisive victories over the Ethiopians using these tactics, but, given sufficient time, they could wear the Ethiopians down to a point where Addis Ababa might look more favorably on negotiations.

48. On balance, we do not believe that the Ethiopian forces alone will be able to gain a decisive victory over the Eritrean insurgents. They will probably be able to recapture some of the major garrisons now in insurgent hands, and they should open up some lines of communication. Beyond this, Addis Ababa would have to calculate how much more it could accomplish on its own. There would be a concern that the longer term prospect was for a protracted and bloody military struggle in an area where the terrain and the loyalties of the population would favor the insurgents. To make major gains quickly, Mengistu is likely to look rather early on to his Soviet and Cuban allies for help. (See section C, below.)

49. One element of the Ethiopian strategy which could have external repercussions is the closing of the Sudanese-Eritrean border to halt the flow of supplies to the insurgents. An attempt to close the Sudanese border would certainly risk an extension of the conflict into Sudan. The Sudanese are unlikely to be able to prevent Ethiopian incursions, and might in fact turn a blind eye toward limited cross-border forays in order to avoid being drawn into the conflict. The Sudanese have said that, at the most, they would try to defend only military installations if Ethiopian forces cross the border. If Sudan were seriously threatened, Egypt would probably come to its aid.

50. Among the other Arab states (and African states as well), the Ethiopian push—which has long been expected—will not occasion any significant change in current postures. Aid to the Eritreans will continue and might even increase somewhat, and Arab leaders will continue their efforts to try to find some way to encourage a negotiated settlement.

C. Increasing Cuban/Soviet Involvement in Eritrea

51. The Eritrean situation will entail gradually increasing Soviet and Cuban military support for Ethiopia's campaign against the Eritrean rebels as it becomes clear that Ethiopia alone has insufficient military capability to quell the insurgents. Once a decision is taken to

increase support in Eritrea beyond current levels, their participation is likely to expand and intensify in stages, not as part of a plan to phase in military resources in predetermined steps, but rather as the result of ad hoc responses to specific needs as they arise.

52. The early stages of this increasing involvement are already beginning to take place. For instance, the Soviets have stepped up their logistics support [4½ lines not declassified]. There is also a good prospect that the Cubans will provide occasional tactical air support against low-risk targets and fly forward air control helicopter missions. Additionally, Soviet naval units may back up Ethiopian patrols sent to interdict seaborne supply routes to the guerrillas, although Moscow is likely to instruct its Red Sea ships to refrain from firing on vessels or shore positions except in self-defense. Finally, augmented involvement on the part of the USSR is almost certain to entail a greater logistics effort, including more AN-12 transport flights piloted by Soviets, more advisers and technicians assigned to supply and maintenance operations, and perhaps the provision of engineers to airfield, port, and/or road construction projects. The Soviets however almost certainly will not assume a direct combat role.

53. Within the next three months, this kind of increased Soviet/Cuban military support for Ethiopia will not lead to an Ethiopian victory, and the insurgents' basic strength is unlikely to be seriously impaired. In the next three to 12 months, however, substantial and growing Soviet/Cuban involvement in the war would contribute significantly to Ethiopia's military capacity, to the extent that all major lines of communication and most important cities and garrisons would probably come under Addis Ababa's control. Nonetheless, we estimate that the guerrillas would still control large portions of the countryside. Havana and Moscow would continue to urge a negotiated settlement in the hopes of avoiding an interminable entanglement in perhaps an unwinnable war.

54. Although their level of concern and rhetoric might be heightened, the reaction of Arab countries to this course of events would not differ markedly from that described in paragraphs 49 and 50.

D. A Large-Scale Cuban Combat Involvement

55. A full-scale Cuban commitment of combat forces could result from several causes: a dramatic military defeat; the failure of the Ethiopian forces to achieve in a reasonable time the defeat in the field of the Eritrean forces; or sufficient military success in the field to bring the Eritrean rebels to negotiate on Ethiopian terms.

56. A full Soviet/Cuban commitment to achieve the Ethiopian objectives would involve the transfer of Cuban combat troops now in the Ogaden to Eritrea, commitment of Cuban airpower, and the activa-

tion of the Soviet/Cuban battle staff similar to that which directed the campaign in the Ogaden.

57. Transfer of the three Cuban mechanized brigades from the northern Ogaden to Tigre would take about a week. Once at the battle-front, these units would probably be committed to eliminating road-blocks and reopening lines of communication. If more imaginative tactics were employed the Cuban brigades could be used in a flanking attack up the western border in an attempt to isolate the insurgents from their sources of supply in Sudan. Such an option would make better use of the mechanized force and serve to minimize Cuban casualties, a major consideration.

58. Cuban-piloted aircraft could be committed to the Eritrean campaign in a matter of hours but would not be fully effective immediately. At present, airstrikes against Eritrean targets can be flown only from the Asmara airfield. Unless the roads to Asmara were opened or the new airbase at Makele in Tigre Province completed, the need to fly fuel and munitions into Asmara would seriously restrict the scale of airstrikes against Eritrea. In addition, the flying weather over Eritrea will be relatively poor during July and August.

59. Activation of a Soviet/Cuban command center such as the one run by Soviet General Petrov in the Ogaden last winter would obviously improve the overall coordination of the Eritrean campaign. Petrov and his staff demonstrated the ability to integrate Cuban and Ethiopian air and ground units and their logistical support in a highly effective campaign against the Somalis.

60. If the Cubans were willing to sustain the casualties required to overcome the presumably effective Eritrean defense positions, they should be able to open the roads to military traffic and recapture the major towns in relatively short order. After this is accomplished, the Cubans would probably be withdrawn to garrisons. If these Cuban actions did not bring the rebels to the negotiating table or produce a practical dispersal of the rebel forces, we would foresee a prolonged campaign of pacification in which the Cubans would be extremely reluctant to participate directly and in which the burden of Cuban activity would again fall on the Ethiopian forces.

E. Neighboring Countries' Involvement in Eritrea

61. Intensified military action in Eritrea is almost certain to have an impact in neighboring Sudan. As Ethiopia pursues its plan to interdict guerrilla supply routes, limited border crossings and violations of Sudanese airspace will become increasingly likely. The terrain in western Eritrea allows the insurgents to avoid roads, so Addis Ababa may eventually decide that the only way to dry up the flow of supplies is to attack its source. This could entail raids on insurgent logistic centers

such as Kassala, a major Sudanese city, opening up the prospect that Khartoum will request military assistance from Egypt. It is highly unlikely however, that Cubans would participate in operations that involved incursions into Sudan.

62. Were Cuba to redeploy its major combat units from the Ogaden to Eritrea, Somalia would probably be encouraged to step up military activities in the regions in Ethiopia it recently evacuated. There are indications that Somali guerrillas are already intensifying their harassment of Ethiopian forces, and if Cuban forces were no longer available to deter another Somali incursion into Ethiopian territory, Mogadiscio might be tempted to recommit some regular forces alongside the guerrillas.

63. The moderate Arab leaders would almost certainly attempt initially to step up their support to the Eritrean insurgents in the face of increased Soviet/Cuban involvement. This would be coupled with increased emphasis on the need for a negotiated solution to the problem. [3 lines not declassified] For example, we strongly doubt that they would dispatch military forces to Eritrea, although Egypt might be willing to provide some personnel to Sudan as an earnest of Cairo's concern. The moderate Arabs can certainly be expected to appeal to Washington to take a firm stand, [2½ lines not declassified].

64. The problems for the radical Arab states—Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Algeria—would probably be even more acute. At one time or another, all of them have provided support to the Eritrean insurgents, and they still, with the possible exception of Libya, harbor revolutionary sympathy toward the Eritreans. At the same time, however, each of these radical states are linked rather closely to Moscow and Havana. Caught in this dilemma, they would probably try to find some middle way out to avoid having either openly going in a direction different from that of their Communist friends or appearing to buckle under to them. Iraq could be an exception in that its performance to date suggests that it might well be willing to oppose Soviet or Cuban blandishments openly and to continue to provide support to the insurgents.

65. Most Third-World countries would condemn at least privately a sudden escalation of Soviet and Cuban involvement in Eritrea. The countries that have strongly urged the Soviets and Cubans to stay out of Eritrea have not acknowledged the Soviet and Cuban right to intervene under any conditions. Massive Cuban and Soviet involvement in the fighting would be viewed as out of step with the Third World approach to the Eritrean conflict and as intervention in an internal Ethiopian affair.

[Omitted here are annexes A and B.]

85. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 27, 1978, 8 a.m.–12:20 p.m.

SUBJECTS

SALT, CTB, Africa, Human Rights

U.S. PARTICIPANTS

President Jimmy Carter
Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
Ambassador Paul C. Warnke
Ambassador Malcolm Toon
Mr. David Aaron
Mr. Reginald Bartholomew
Mr. Hamilton Jordan
Mr. Jody Powell
Mr. Wm. D. Krimer, Interpreter

USSR PARTICIPANTS

Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko
Ambassador A.F. Dobrynin
Deputy Foreign Minister G.M. Korniyenko
Ambassador V. Makarov
Minister Counselor A.A. Bessmertynkh
Mr. V.G. Komplektov
Mr. N.N. Detinov
Mr. V.M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Horn of Africa.]

Africa

The first of these items concerned Soviet-Cuban intrusion and adventurism in Africa.² We were refraining from having a military presence in Africa, but the Soviet presence there had increased to alarming proportions. We knew that the Soviet Union was in a position to exert a strong influence on the Cubans. The Soviets usually claimed that Cuba was an independent country that made its own decisions;

¹ Source: Carter Library, Vertical File, USSR/US Conference 5/6–9/94, Box 115, USSR–US Conference. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House. Drafted by William D. Krimer (OPR/LS). Other portions of the memorandum of conversation are printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 115, and vol. XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980, Document 204.

² Carter proposed to discuss with Gromyko items that “had now reached serious proportions and were tearing apart the mutual trust and friendship between our two countries which he believed were necessary to assure detente and future peace.” (*Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 115)

we knew, however, of the enormous economic support the Soviet Union was rendering Cuba and could not believe that the Cubans could put 40 or 50 or 60 thousand men into Africa without the Soviet Union's tacit approval or encouragement. Referring to Zaire and the Katangans' invasion into that country, the President said we did not believe it to have been possible without Cuban assistance. As for Eritrea, he hoped that the dispute there could be resolved without Soviet or Cuban presence or involvement. With the United Nations we were trying to resolve the difficult questions involving Rhodesia and Namibia, and were doing so without any support on the part of the Soviet Union. He believed that it would be to the advantage of the Soviet Union and of our country to see all the parties involved come together in order to resolve the Rhodesian dispute by peaceful means. In this regard we were also consulting with Britain and other nations. If the Cubans were to refrain from interfering and if the Soviet Union were to lend its active support to our efforts, the Rhodesian problem could be resolved by peaceful means. Namibia was another instance requiring peaceful resolution. The Soviet Union did have an influence it could exert, all the way from public support of our efforts in Rhodesia and Namibia to exercising restraint in the Horn of Africa. He believed that elimination of Soviet-Cuban involvement in Africa would be a contributing factor to the improvement of Soviet-American relations. We were quite concerned and believed the Soviet Union knew that many other nations were equally concerned over Soviet efforts to increase Soviet influence in Africa by supply of weapons and by encouragement of Cuban involvement. The President wanted to express this concern to Gromyko and ask him to report to President Brezhnev that we considered this to be an alarming development, one that was still in progress.

Gromyko said that the Soviet leadership had certainly noted some of the President's recent statements on African matters, which, whether the President liked it or not, also somewhat exacerbated and heated up the atmosphere as regards relations between our two countries. In this connection he was now talking about the specific matters the President had raised in connection with Africa. There was no increasing Soviet presence in Africa. The Soviet Union did not have a single soldier with a rifle in Africa and did not intend to send any to that area. The Soviet Union had indeed sent some quantities of arms to some African countries, as well as a very small number of experts who were helping the Africans master the use of the arms supplied. Not a single Soviet individual had fired a single shot in the course of the latest clashes in Africa, and not a single Soviet individual had taken part in any operation in that part of the world. The Soviet Union had condemned the Somali invasion of Ethiopia, had called it open aggression and had said so directly to the President of Somalia during his visit to Moscow.

Later on President Siad Barre had acknowledged that he had committed aggression. He had asked the Soviet Union to help him extricate himself from that dirty war. The Soviets had told him by way of advice to withdraw all his personnel from Ethiopia and to settle his dispute with Ethiopia by peaceful means. Quite recently, virtually several days ago, he had admitted that his invasion of Ethiopia had been a mistake and had asked the Soviet Union for help. The Soviet Union had given him some good advice—to withdraw all his personnel and arms from Ethiopian territory. Further, Gromyko had already told Secretary Vance that the Soviet Union had insistently advised the Ethiopians, including Mengistu, to refrain from having Ethiopian troops invade Somali territory.³ The Soviet Union had indeed supplied weapons to Ethiopia since Ethiopia had been a victim of aggression. Frankly speaking, he felt the United States, too, would have been fully justified if it had helped Ethiopia, since under the U.N. Charter a victim of aggression is entitled to receive assistance on an individual as well as a collective basis. That would have been up to the United States, of course, he was just mentioning this in passing.

Gromyko expressed the hope that the President was in possession of authentic information regarding the role of the Cubans in Ethiopia. The Ethiopians had asked Cuba for assistance just as they had asked the Soviet Union and other countries for assistance. It was very hard indeed to speak of numbers, because the numbers of Cubans involved there, as mentioned by the President, were exaggerated at least tenfold. He believed that the Somalis were deliberately exaggerating these numbers and that the United States was not sufficiently critical of the information it received from the Somalis. Incidentally, the Cubans, like the Soviets, had advised the Ethiopians not to cross the border into Somalia. The Soviet Union was indeed consulting with Cuba from time to time, but to speak of some sort of coordinated Cuban-Soviet plan, etc., was absolutely wrong.

As for Eritrea, Gromyko pointed out that the Soviet position was that Eritrea should enjoy a broad autonomy within a united and sovereign Ethiopian state. The Soviets had said this many times to the Ethiopian leadership. This was not the same situation as had been the case with Ogaden. Each of these issues had its own specific aspects which were quite different from case to case. The Soviet Union had called upon the Ethiopian leaders not to permit any bloodshed in Eritrea and to settle the dispute there by peaceful means. The Soviet Union had expressed this position to the Cubans as well, and they in turn had told the Soviets that their position in this respect was identical.

³ Vance and Gromyko met in New York on May 25. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 109.

There was not a single Cuban soldier fighting in Eritrea today. The Soviet leadership had been informed that this was Fidel Castro's firm position. As for further developments in that area, he was not at all sure that there would not be further bloodshed there. After all, there were certain circles outside that area, who urged the Eritreans to resist a peaceful settlement. What was more, Ethiopia, too, was not totally in sympathy with arriving at a peaceful settlement. If the Ethiopians had not been restrained by the Soviets and by the Cubans, blood would have flowed there long ago. Whether or not one could succeed in restraining them over a period of time, Gromyko did not know, but the Soviet Union was working in that direction. In Ethiopia the Soviet Union was a factor restraining hostilities rather than a factor prodding military action. To what extent this would be successful in the future he could not now predict. The Soviets had learned that one could not rely on the word of Siad Barre. If the United States had not learned that lesson yet, he was sure it would reach that conclusion soon. At the time when the Soviet Union had supplied weapons to Somalia, it had been done on the condition that these weapons would not be used against third countries, but only for self-defense. Siad Barre had given the Soviet Union a pledge to that effect, but everyone knew what had happened subsequently.

As for Rhodesia, Namibia and Zaire, he could tell the President firmly that the Soviet Union had no representatives in that area, not even news correspondents, and did not intend to send any representatives there. The Soviet Union knew absolutely nothing about the recent actions of the so-called gendarmes of Katanga. The very word brought back memories of the period when Tshombe had been in charge.

Gromyko noted that the President had spoken of the influence the Soviet Union had in Rhodesia and Namibia. If he had referred to ideological influence, he might have been right, because for many years the Soviet Union had argued against colonialism and racism. That was no secret. He would only point out that ideological influence knew no barriers at all. As for anything else, absolutely nothing was being done. He would guess that the President had received reports to the effect that the Soviet Union wanted to lay its hands on the entire area; he would tell the President, however, that the Soviet Union was doing absolutely nothing in that area, and knew nothing of the developments there except what was reported in the press. The Soviet Union was not sending any people to that area. He could imagine the hue and cry throughout the world that would be raised if any Soviets or Cubans travelled to Rhodesia or Namibia. They did not have a single representative there, unlike the United States.

Gromyko wanted to say a few words about Zaire. Whatever he knew about the recent invasion there, he knew from the reports of

various press agencies and the reports of the Soviet representative in Zaire. The Soviet chargé d'affaires had been called in to see Mobutu recently and had been informed that some Katangan gendarmes had invaded the territory of Zaire from Angola. The Soviet Union had not even known of their presence in Angola. As for the Cubans, not a single Cuban had been caught or even seen in that invasion. Yet, for some reason people had started to blame first the Soviet Union and then the Cubans. He had questioned the Cubans at a very high level about this invasion and had been told that Cuba had absolutely nothing to do with the whole matter. The Soviet Union wanted to maintain good relations with Zaire and the Soviet chargé had said so to Mobutu. After all, what would President Carter want done? If there were some refugees in Angola who subsequently crossed the border into their own country, what should be done with them—should they be shot? They seemed to be running from repression. So much for the situation in Zaire. The President would note that Gromyko had said quite a few things about all these areas. As for Namibia, the Soviet Union was not looking for anything at all in that country and it had accordingly informed the British. On the other hand, the Soviet Union was totally against keeping the blacks in Rhodesia in bondage. 24 out of 25 people there were black, and the Soviet Union had stated that it was in favor of the majority of the people themselves deciding what kind of a government they should have. He could not agree with the thesis that foreigners would know best what should be done in Rhodesia. The Soviet Union was saying this, and that was no secret. That was its position of principle, based on its ideology. Soviet policy throughout the world was based on the premise that people were their own best masters.

In conclusion, Gromyko wanted to thank the President for the great patience he had displayed. Knowing how busy the President was, Gromyko had nevertheless taken a great deal of his time, but this was so because the questions they had discussed were very important. The President had made some statements, as had others, reflecting on the state of our bilateral relations. That, too, was important and therefore Gromyko had provided appropriate explanations. The Soviet Union had no designs on Africa at all. The President could rest assured that the Soviets did not want to lay their hands on Africa; the Soviet Union had a large enough territory of its own with much to do there. He would draw the conclusion that it was necessary for our two countries to consult with each other more frequently, and to explain our respective views of the situation to each other. That should be done in person rather than just by written communications.

The President said he would respond briefly. U.S. assessment of the same situation was quite different from the assessment Gromyko

had provided. We looked at the Horn of Africa with a great deal of concern. From our perspective, the Somalis had invaded Ogaden using Soviet weapons. We understood that the Ethiopian response there had been directed by a Soviet general. While the Soviet Union had not sent troops to the area, the Cubans had sent more than 15,000 men. We recognized that the Soviet Union and the United States had persuaded the Ethiopians not to cross the Somali border once the Somalis had been pushed out of Ogaden. However, Soviet generals and Cuban officers remained, perhaps directing combat against Eritrea. The Cubans had said that they were not involved directly, that they had no troops in combat status in Eritrea. We certainly hoped that was the case. In Angola the Cuban presence had recently increased to 20,000 troops plus service personnel. The Katangans, to whom Gromyko had referred as refugees, had certainly been trained and supported by the Cubans in Angola and perhaps by some East Germans. In Zaire a major military force had appeared, well supplied with Soviet weapons. It had destroyed Kolwezi with major loss of life. The President had no doubt that the Soviet Union could have prevented that if it had used its influence with the Angolans, the Cubans and the East Germans, all of whom depended upon the Soviet Union to a great extent. The President had not claimed that the Cubans had troops in Zaire, but he did not doubt that the invaders had been encouraged and supplied by those allies of the Soviet Union.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Horn of Africa.]

Africa

Gromyko continued his response to the President on African matters. He called the presence of a Soviet general in Ethiopia a myth. Had the Soviet Union been invited to send a general there, it would have refused. There was no Soviet Napoleon in Africa. Evidently the President was being fed completely fantastic information. As for the Cuban presence, the Soviet Union had information that in Angola the number of Cubans was being reduced rather than increased. The President's reference to GDR personnel in connection with Kolwezi could not be regarded as authentic. Even the U.S. press had not alleged anything of the sort. As for the invasion into Zaire, the press had first reported that Mobutu's soldiers in the area were shooting blacks, then that blacks were shooting whites, whites were shooting blacks, and had spoken of certain rebels. The situation appeared to be totally confused, but there was certainly no Soviet or Cuban involvement there.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Horn of Africa.]

86. **Memorandum From Paul B. Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)**¹

Washington, June 2, 1978

SUBJECT

Arms for Somalia, Strategy in the Horn and Elsewhere in Africa; a Role for the Saudis and Iranians

I was disappointed to see a story on the front page of the *Post* this morning to the effect that we are giving arms to Somalia.² It was apparently inspired by State. If we stick to the principles the President enunciated in March,³ we cannot give arms to Somalia in face of hard and mounting evidence that Siad is increasing support for Ogaden guerrillas and willfully deceiving us. A clique in State and the Pentagon who are opposed to practically everything else you stand for persists in trying to demonstrate a dubious toughness and concern about Soviet actions in Africa by trying to justify shipping arms to Siad. There would be a case for a very modest arms relationship with a genuinely peaceful Somalia. Siad is objectively serving Soviet purposes by fanning tension in the Horn and providing a justification for continued Cuban presence to help defend the Ogaden against Somali incursions. Guerrilla activity in the Ogaden is again approaching the level of intensity that prevailed last year at this time. This could lead in the next few weeks to retaliatory strikes by the Ethiopians/Cubans against Somalia itself. Mengistu could see certain advantages in doing this.

In opposing what the Soviets are doing in Africa we have to be careful not to take under our wing everyone who happens to have got into the position of opposition to Africans whom the Soviets are supporting. Siad is fundamentally more responsible than anyone else for the massive Soviet/Cuban presence in the Horn today. Supporting him is not going to further the process of defeating the Soviets and Cubans in Ethiopia. Nor is supporting the Eritreans going to do Soviet and Cuban interests in Ethiopia much harm either. Not that we have done either of these things—but naive arguments for doing so are

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 69, Somalia: 1/77–6/78. Secret. Sent for information. Brzezinski wrote in the upper right corner, "You make a *strong case*—we don't intend to move fast on Somalia. ZB."

² A reference to the article by Don Oberdorfer, "U.S. Revives Plan to Sell Defensive Arms to Somalia," *Washington Post*, June 2, 1978, p. A1.

³ See footnote 2, Document 73.

again being advanced with increasing frequency. And some of our Middle Eastern friends, such as the Saudis and the Iranians, seem to be inclined to think that increased support for the Eritreans and for Somali guerrilla operations harms the Soviets and undermines Mengistu. Ultimately, it does not really have this effect. It only compounds the confusion and complicates pursuit of our policy objectives in the region and in Africa and the Middle East as a whole.

Our ultimate aim in the Horn should be to get the Soviets out of Ethiopia, reestablish our own position there, and, meanwhile, maintain a strong position in the two other key countries in the region, Sudan and Kenya. Somalia is of only incidental importance. Unattractive as Mengistu is, we have to make do with him for the time being. His internal position is strengthened by the Somali guerrilla threat and, to some degree as well, by the Eritrean stalemate. Persistence of both threats forces him into greater reliance on the Soviets and Cubans even though tensions are developing between them and the Ethiopians over Eritrea. Easing of the pressure on Ethiopia, on both the Somali and Eritrean fronts, would lessen Ethiopian dependence on the Soviets and Cubans, permit freer development of tensions between the Ethiopians and their Communist friends, and encourage internal opposition to Mengistu—which is likely to become increasingly third-force or pro-Western as frustration over the Soviet/Cuban connection causes intelligent Ethiopians to realize that the country's problems cannot be settled within the framework of a Soviet-Cuban alliance. The Kenyans, and eventually the Sudanese, can be helpful in encouraging the kind of political evolution in Ethiopia that is in our long-term interest. Somalia has no role to play in this.

The Saudis and the Iranians would be using their resources to much better effect if they invested them in helping people such as the Zaireans, Savimbi, and Kaunda rather than pouring them down the Eritrean and Somali ratholes. They will do much more to frustrate Soviet and Cuban designs in Africa by helping build up countries and leaders who want to orient themselves genuinely toward the West than by supporting Marxists such as Siad and the EPLF. The notion that Saudi/Iranian support for Somalia and the Eritreans serves as a useful substitute for the support we might (but legally cannot) give to complicate the Soviets' and Cubans' problem in Ethiopia becomes more and more dubious as one considers its real political effect and its long-term implications. It leads nowhere.

If my argumentation seems arcane and complex, remember that Africa occupies a position in great-power rivalries today similar to that which Eastern Europe and the Balkans had during the era 1870–1940. Real, often intractable local issues underlay the cross-currents generated by outside political and ideological competition. The powers that lost

most in Eastern Europe were those who became too entangled in pursuit of short-term tactical gains and who failed to avoid the traps and snares of dogmatic nationalism and self-seeking local politicians. The Russians eventually picked up *all* the pieces.

To counter the Russians and the Cubans effectively in Africa, we need to operate in a framework of political principles that will stand the test of time and a strategic concept that can be defended in terms of our own basic national interests.

If we write off Ethiopia as lost to the Soviets and then entangle ourselves and our allies in petty efforts to support anti-Ethiopian forces under the illusion that we are making things more difficult for the Soviets in Ethiopia, we are not serving our purposes well. We will end up keeping the area so destabilized that we will lose out in Sudan and Kenya, too. Rather than being swept along by naive and limited Saudi and Iranian perceptions of where their interests lie, we should take the lead, take advantage of their concerns to draw them into a grander plan for building resistance to Soviet/Cuban encroachments in Africa (and in the Middle East, the soft underbelly of Asia, as well) and help them apply their resources to endeavors that have a positive purpose and a real chance of success, e.g.:

- Get Saudi-Iranian financial backing for Zaire, as well as support for military strengthening of this country.
- Get Saudi-Iranian backing for a pan-African defense force.
- Draw the Saudis and Iranians into more energetic support of Sudan and support of Kenya by convincing them that this will be a much better investment of their resources than support of Somali-backed Ogaden insurgency and the Eritrean rebellion.
- Persuade the Saudis and the Iranians to invest a bit in Zambia, to ease its financial problems.
- Use the Saudis and Iranians as a substitute for the help we seem to be unable to provide ourselves for Savimbi.
- Stop indulging Siad and pretending that we are going to do an arms deal with him. Instead suggest to the Saudis and the Iranians (and anyone else who could help them) that they encourage his replacement by real pro-Western leaders who will devote their energies to developing Somalia's own resources and forget about guerrillas. (The notion that change in Somalia must be back to a pro-Soviet regime is fallacious; Siad, the most pro-Soviet element in Somalia, has tried to go back and they won't have him.)

87. **Memorandum From Paul B. Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)**¹

Washington, July 27, 1978

SUBJECT

Where Do Things Stand in the Horn? What Next?

The purpose of this memorandum is to sum up what seems to be happening in the Horn now, to look at where the future may lead and to consider U.S. policy interests in relation to these developments.

Ethiopia: Mengistu appears to be firmly in control, but he does not have the country as strongly behind him for his Eritrean effort as he did for the fight against Somalia. Rather substantial strains have developed between Mengistu and the Soviets and Cubans but there is no sign of irreparable antagonism. Both sides still see more advantage in cooperation than in permitting a falling out. The Cubans and Soviets have drawn careful lines to preclude direct involvement in Eritrean fighting. The more successful the Ethiopians are in Eritrea (and they have been doing well recently), the less pressure there will be for more direct Cuban involvement. Strains between the Soviets and Mengistu are likely to develop more over questions of consolidation of the revolution in Ethiopia, organization of a leading political party and suspicions on Mengistu's part that the Soviets are scheming against him than over Eritrea. The new Cuban and Soviet ambassadors who will be arriving on the scene shortly are probably going to be charged with working out a new political balance with Mengistu and a basis for longer-term exercise of influence in the country.

Meanwhile, signs that Mengistu wants to keep openings to the West have multiplied. Our new ambassador has been relatively warmly received.² A long-postponed major aid project has been given the go-ahead. There are signs that the problem of compensation for nationalized property may be amenable to settlement. Underlying pro-American sentiment in Ethiopia is stronger than ever, as firsthand experience of Soviets and Cubans results in accumulation of grievances. In much of the country revolutionary changes are at a standstill. Mengistu has bought the backing of the population by permitting life to run its accustomed course. Economic strains, however, are growing, and infla-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files 1977–1981, Box 70, PRC 068 7/31/78, Somalia [1]. Top Secret. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Aaron, Huntington, Thornton, Mathews, Denend, Sick, Quandt, and Bartholomew.

² See footnote 4, Document 82.

tion is becoming a problem, but compared to much of the third world, Ethiopia is still in remarkably good economic shape. A good harvest this year and the ability to export via the railroad to Djibouti will probably prevent serious economic strains in the near future. The problem of payment for massive Soviet military aid, which is still arriving in accordance with earlier commitments, could become a serious issue if Moscow presses it.

We have been on a consistent course in respect to Ethiopia since the Aaron Mission last February.³ Our new ambassador was quickly accepted and indications are that we will now have much more constructive dialogue with Mengistu and other senior officials. Our capacity to influence thinking and events in the country, still extremely limited, should gradually improve. Ethiopia remains the most important country in the Horn. It is in our interest to rebuild our influence there.

The Ogaden: The Ogaden remains in an unsettled state and Cuban involvement there still appears necessary for the Ethiopians. Guerrilla activity has been energetically and imaginatively supported and, in large part, directed by the Somali Government. As long as the Somalis persist in encouraging the guerrillas and as long as they receive sufficient weapons and supplies from abroad to pass on to them, a fair level of guerrilla harassment can probably be maintained. There is no evidence that the Ethiopians have had difficulty re-establishing their control over major cities on the northern fringe of the Ogaden: Dire-dawa, Harar and Jijiga. There is increasing evidence that impatience with the guerrilla situation in the Ogaden is driving Mengistu (and others) to consider more decisive retaliatory moves against Somalia than the minor air attacks that have been carried out in recent weeks. Progress in Eritrea will embolden Mengistu for harsher action against Somalia. The Soviets are apparently discouraging him from considering invading, but they could come to see advantage in permitting him to do so in the expectation that his improved relations with the U.S. and key European countries would be disrupted and the West would be pushed into backing Somalia.

We should continue to point out to Mengistu, as we did last February, that he has more to gain by being patient and resisting the temptation to invade Somalia's own territory than he can ever hope to accomplish by invasion.

Somalia: "Commitments" and "promises" notwithstanding, Siad has consciously developed and expanded his support for Ogadan guerrillas since last March. Some Somali regulars are involved and will

³ See Documents 57 and 58.

probably continue to be needed to maintain the level of destabilization Siad wishes to support. Intercepts prove that Somalia is directing and guiding these operations. During recent weeks Siad has become bolder in his public commitment to the Ogaden guerrillas (e.g. at the Khartoum OAU Summit)⁴ and all available intelligence indicates that he fully intends to continue support for them, employing various forms of prevarication and sophistry to confuse the United States and its friends. It is not clear that the commitment to support Ogaden insurgency is as intense among the Somali people as it is with Siad himself, but nationalism and irredentism remain strong in Somalia and disagreement on this issue is probably over tactics and timing, not the fundamental desirability of uniting all Somalis in one state.

Less has been heard about an immediate Somali threat to Kenya in recent weeks, but no real progress has been made toward reconciliation between the two countries. Kenyans are so suspicious of Siad personally that acceptance of guarantees from *him* may never be possible. A post-Siad leadership might be able to effect reconciliation with Kenya.

The OAU Mediation Committee dealing with the Ogaden dispute has just come out again for the Ethiopian position in its report in Khartoum, but for all practical purposes it has no immediate relevance to settlement of the dispute. African opinion is more solidly behind Ethiopia than ever. As if Somalia were not already sufficiently alienated from African opinion on the territorial integrity question, her dickering with South Africa (about which there have already been accusations on the Ethiopian radio) will make her a total pariah if it becomes publicly confirmed and widely known.

Internally Siad's position appears to be gradually weakening. It has become clear that his main opponents are not, as he has tried to maintain, pro-Soviet officers. They are officers who are united in their resentment that he gambled on invading Ethiopia and failed and officers and civilians who resent what they regard as his discrimination against Northerners and intense favoritism toward his own Marehan tribesmen. Siad himself has made (and continues to make) overtures to the Soviets for a reconciliation; the Soviets have rebuffed him. In spite of repeated public professions of anti-Soviet and pro-Western convictions, Siad has not dismantled the "socialist" police state in Somalia and has kept practically all of the officials once reputed to be most pro-Soviet in office. Siad has shown little enthusiasm for the idea of concentration on economic development, toward which we and our

⁴ At the OAU Summit held in Khartoum July 18-22, Siad condemned Ethiopia for its behavior in the Ogaden and named Cuba as a surrogate of the Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa. ("African Group Avoids a Deep Split By Skirting Issue of Outside Forces," *New York Times*, July 22, 1978, p. 2).

European allies have tried to shift his interest, though our new AID mission in Somalia has developed a number of worthwhile project proposals.

After weeks of delay and argumentation, Siad has recently shown more serious interest in a U.S. military aid commitment. Our own position in Somalia is neither stronger nor weaker than it has been at any time in the past year and a half. The disadvantages of our becoming identified with Siad insofar as the rest of Africa is concerned, the problem of presumed tacit support of his guerrilla operations in the Ogaden if we provide military aid and the prospect of having anything we do or say to Siad misrepresented are even more serious obstacles now than they were six months ago to trying to work out a modest, rational effort for supporting Somalia. It may be more difficult now to offset the adverse effects of support for Siad with Ethiopia and Kenya than it would have been six months ago because Siad's refusal to meet the conditions set by the President in early March is clear.⁵

So what is to be done in respect to Somalia? Bide our time in hope that Siad will be replaced by a leadership more committed to Western values, internally less identified with the failure of the Ogaden adventure, and prepared to moderate its irredentist policies in the interest of making the most of what Somalia has.

Kenya: Reports of deterioration of Kenyatta's health and mental condition persist, but there is no evidence of political instability in Kenya. The Kikuyu leadership that is already running the country appears likely to be able to weather any immediate problems that could arise from Kenyatta's death. The sense of immediate threat from Somalia has subsided but prospects for reconciliation are poor. Having been aroused to concern over their military weakness, Kenyans are unlikely ever to revert to the complacency that prevailed until recently. The Kenyan leadership is realistic about what is going on in Ethiopia, but still sees Ethiopia as a more acceptable ally than any other in the area, though relations with Sudan are good. While our military survey team that went to Kenya this spring may not have been as politically and tactically skillful as we could have hoped and Kenyans may be disappointed by the modesty of our military aid offers, the symbolism of expanding their military relationship with the United States is important to them and prospects for working out a sound military aid relationship are good. It remains very much in our interest to do so.

The Soviets may be tempted to become more politically active in post-Kenyatta Kenya—both making offers for military and economic cooperation and engaging in covert political maneuvering. We need

⁵ See Document 70.

to remain alert to such maneuvering and work closely with the Kenyans to counteract it.

Eritrea: Nothing has changed in respect to the fundamentals of the Eritrean situation. Mengistu is pursuing a military solution with formidable commitments of manpower and materiel. His efforts are now beginning to pay off. There is new evidence of dissension among Eritrean rebel groups. Though substantial aid still flows to Eritrean rebels from Arab sources, the rebels have made no significant gains in support for their advocacy of independence. In fact, they have recently lost ground. The Sudanese, who fear an independent Eritrea, are ready to play a major role in a negotiated solution. If significant victories by the Ethiopians could be followed by more forthcoming offers of concessions that would permit a political solution, something representing a return to the 1952 UN principles, the Eritrean issue could still be settled and conservative Arab support for retention of an autonomous Eritrea within Ethiopia could probably be secured.

Our cautious policy on Eritrea, including recognition of Ethiopia's territorial integrity and of the UN settlement of 1952 as the most practical basis for association of Eritrea with Ethiopia remains sound and we should stick to it.

It remains in our long-term interest to attempt to deny the Soviets permanent bases on the Ethiopian (i.e. Eritrean) Red Sea coast, either at Assab, Massawa or in the Dahlak Islands. Whatever chance we have of achieving this aim will depend on continued recognition of Eritrea as part of Ethiopia and improvement of our relations with the Ethiopian government in the hope that we can encourage nationalistic Ethiopians to see the disadvantages of permanent base rights for the Soviets.

We should not attempt to play anything other than an indirect and peripheral role in a negotiated settlement in Eritrea unless and until (a) there are good prospects that it can succeed and (b) there is a unique role that we can play. Of our allies, Italy is the best suited for a mediating role in Eritrea or, eventually, between Ethiopia and Somalia. Conservative Arab countries—and foremost among them the Sudan, should also be persuaded to contribute to this effort.

Sudan: Everything about our relationship with the Sudan continues to be positive. Our modest military aid effort is going well. Sudan's internal political reconciliation has so far been successful beyond anyone's expectations. Sudan has handled the complex Eritrean problem with remarkable maturity. The Sudan's main problems are economic and recent agreement with the IMF promises to keep these problems from getting worse and set them perhaps, on the road to longer-term solution. We should continue to be guided, when we need guidance, by the Sudan's perceptions of Horn problems, both in respect to Eritrea and Somalia. Nimeiry's grasp of these issues is far more relevant and pertinent than those of most of the Saudi leadership.

Djibouti: The problems of the Horn do not revolve around Djibouti. As long as the French remain militarily and as long as Ethiopia and Somalia can both be prevailed upon to avoid actions that could cause the fragile political structure there to fall apart, Djibouti will remain in a state of delicate political balance for the short term at least, and this is in our interest. The Soviets may have their eye on Djibouti. It has some advantages as a base over the Ethiopian ports. We do not want them to establish themselves there—but it would be a lesser evil for them to end up with a foothold there and none elsewhere in the Horn rather than to see them consolidate a long-term presence in Ethiopia, return to Somalia or gain influence in either Kenya or Sudan. In the medium-to-longer run, Djibouti might be a pawn around which a territorial trade-off and settlement between Ethiopia and Somalia could eventually be contrived.

Summary of U.S. Interests: Ranked in order of intrinsic importance (population, resources, strategic significance), Ethiopia remains the most important country in the Horn, followed by Sudan, Kenya, Somalia and Djibouti. We should aim to reassert ourselves in the most important country, Ethiopia, maintain our increasingly strong position in Sudan and Kenya and look upon Somalia and Djibouti as essentially marginal. During the past year, we have successfully avoided succumbing to pressures from the Saudis, Egyptians, and Iranians to become identified with Siad's Somalia in ways which could preclude reasserting ourselves in Ethiopia. The dramatization of Somalia as a country which defied and broke with the Soviets and therefore deserved Western support was always overdone and the importance of this consideration has waned in recent months as Siad has been increasingly seen for what he is: a military dictator who was very comfortable running a Soviet-style system but could not convince the Soviets that Somalia was more important than Ethiopia when he used their arms to make war. Somalia, as a country, deserves better, but we will not be serving either our own or the Somali people's interests by catering even to the illusion of military support for Siad.

The Horn remains an important area. Its proximity to the Arabian Peninsula, to the "soft underbelly" of Asia and its relationship to the Indian Ocean, all contribute to its strategic significance. Africa and the Middle East meet here. Sixty to seventy million people live in these countries and we have taken a constructive interest in all of them in the past and remain concerned about their economic and social development and their human rights. The fact that this Administration became so concerned about the Horn this past year obligates us to seek ways of asserting ourselves constructively in the region. But we will assert ourselves effectively only if we keep our long-term objectives in mind and avoid tactical pitfalls. We have done well in this respect in

recent months. We can now capitalize on the groundwork we have laid. But we must be patient.

88. Memorandum From Paul B. Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, July 28, 1978

SUBJECT

PRC Meeting on Somalia—31 July 1978

This meeting has been *called at the initiative of Cy Vance*.² Key questions are: Do we send a military survey team to Mogadiscio? Do we still consider military aid for Somalia a likely prospect?

State's paper is attached at TAB A.³ It is rigorously objective and lists the pro's and con's of moving toward a military supply relationship with Somalia. Then it offers six action options:

1. Offer Somalia an impact package of military equipment without sending a survey team.

2. Reschedule the survey team's visit while reiterating to the Somali Government that further evidence of Somali involvement in the Ogaden might again force postponement.

3. Inform the Somali Government explicitly of the conditions under which we would be willing to send the survey team.

4. Defer any decision on the survey team.

5. Cancel the survey team outright and inform Siad that U.S. will not enter into a military supply relationship with Somalia.

6. Take other actions to demonstrate continued U.S. interest in the U.S.-Somali relationship.

(*Note:* The President has approved a ship visit and one is being scheduled in September.)

As you will see, the first five are mutually exclusive; Option Six can be combined with any of the others.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files 1977–1981, Box 70, PRC 068, 7/31/78, Somalia [1]. Secret. Sent for information.

² See Document 89.

³ Attached but not printed.

I recommend we choose Options Four and Six combined. This course would commit us to nothing and give us maximum flexibility in the future.

Les Denend has prepared a brief memorandum on the *availability of military aid funding* (TAB B).⁴ He points out that, in effect, there is no money available. He also cautions about the implications of sending a survey team and argues that it will inevitably be taken as implying some degree of commitment to supply aid.

CIA has provided an interagency update on the Ogaden situation. It is at TAB C.⁵ I have underlined key passages in red.

A copy of my recent comprehensive memorandum on the Horn, sent also to you separately, is at TAB D.⁶

The minutes of the last SCC on the Horn (15 May) are at TAB E.⁷

The President's statement on the Ogaden of 9 March, which remains the basic policy guidance, is at TAB F.⁸

⁴ Attached but not printed.

⁵ Not found.

⁶ See Document 87.

⁷ See Document 82.

⁸ See footnote 2, Document 73.

89. Record of a Policy Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, July 31, 1978, 4:30–4:45 p.m.

PRC on Somalia—31 July 1978—Near-verbatim record

CV: Let us go around the table and see what your preferences are. Zbig?

ZB: I favor a combination of Options 2 and 6.²

CV: Would you schedule or postpone a team visit?

ZB: I would prefer to postpone it without a date. We don't want to give them the feeling that we are dropping it entirely.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files 1977–1981, Box 70, PRC 068 7/31/78, Somalia [1]. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House situation room. The Summary of Conclusions is attached but not printed.

² These options are listed in Document 88.

CV: Maybe you really prefer Option 4 then?

ZB: Four is all right too, but I read its implications as too negative and too passive—we just don't do anything. We should tell the Somalis we are postponing it.

CV: What about combining these actions with assignment of a military attache?

ZB: That is part of Option 6.

CV: But the attache could not discuss a military supply relationship—he should simply be a military attache, have contacts with the military and gather intelligence.

McG: There would not be an exchange of intelligence. But I can think of other things we might do—regularize ship visits, e.g. The IMET program with a couple of officers going to school in the U.S.

DN: Do we have money for that?

McG: We might find \$30–40,000 a piece for that. We could also consider supplying some non-lethal equipment down the line.

WH: We should think about the fact that these people are training the Ogadenis before we go very far with IMET.

McG: That would affect what school you would want to send them to.

ZB: There is a long-term political benefit in training in this country.

JW: I support what Dave McGiffert has already said—we should increase symbolic support without a commitment on a long-term basis, but I am not sure what we should say about the survey team.

CV: We simply say we are deferring it without date—the circumstances are not such that it is appropriate for us to send a team now.

ST: I agree with the same options as the rest of you. The Saudis approached me some time ago about communications support for Somalia and I would like to leave the thought with the group that when we are ready to proceed with something, we consider helping them build a military communications network. This is rather non-lethal.

CV: We can note that without having to do anything about it at this point.

Sanders: We support Option 6.

BB (ACDA):³ We also support Option 6. We should be careful about defining what the attache is going to do.

CV: Barry, before you came in we talked about a modest program under IMET.

³ Barry Blechman, Assistant Director of ACDA.

McG: Let us see how the ship visit goes and then decide what to do next. I wonder if we do not want to move the ship visit up in view of the intelligence we are getting that the Ethiopians are thinking of crossing the border—it would be a warning to them.

CV: Let us go ahead with this first and then see.

DN: What should we do to get examination of the Leggett approach into some form?⁴

CV: Somebody has to sit down with the Corps of Engineers and see if it makes any sense, what the cost would be, etc.

DN: I am not sure that AID is not going to find that they will want to get into it.

CV: Let us have a group work together—DOD and State—and see.

DN: I am seeing Ambassador Addou tomorrow—can I tell him of our intention to assign an attache as well as the ship visit and at the same time tell him we are postponing the team?⁵

CV: As far as I am concerned, yes.

McG: And we will come back with a proposal for IMET.

CV: But let's not tell Addou about that yet. You, Dave, and the Joint Chiefs will come up with a plan for the ship visit.

DN: Do we wish to exclude the possibility that rather than send a team we could go the route of having the attache given the authority . . . ?

CV: I would rather leave that open.

ZB: The team has a certain symbolic significance that is sometimes useful to use and sometimes useful to deny. Meanwhile we are looking at the whole military survey team process. To have things work out as they did in Kenya, with a recommendation for a billion-dollar program—is not exactly desirable. We need to control these teams' activities more carefully in the future. I want to set out some principles.

CV: Anything more? Then the meeting is finished. We must have set a record.

ZB: It has been one of the best meetings I have ever attended.

⁴ After a visit to Mogadiscio in July, Congressman Leggett (D-CA) urged sending a military survey team and proposed a Corps of Engineers managed infrastructure project in Somalia financed by Saudi Arabia. (Telegram 184478 to Rome, July 21; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780299-0460)

⁵ In telegram 194165 to Mogadiscio, August 1, the Department reported on Newson's meeting with Addou. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840140-2343)

90. **Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McGiffert) to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)**¹

Washington, October 4, 1978

SUBJECT

US Army Corps of Engineers Study for Somalia (C)

In response to Dr. Brzezinski's August 4, 1978 memorandum² I am forwarding the preliminary feasibility study on a civic aid program for Somalia which the US Army Corps of Engineers (CE) has prepared with AID's assistance.³ The study does not include cost estimates nor specific details for various proposed projects which you requested due to the unavailability of sufficient information in Washington.

To define the scope and cost of each project, the CE first must complete a survey of the terrain and of construction logistics and materials available to Somalia. The survey would require twelve personnel to remain in Somalia approximately one month. Since AID has funded similar CE survey teams in the past, State is prepared to request they fund this one.

Before we send a survey team to Somalia, however, I believe we should first approach the Saudis to obtain their support in principle for the civic aid program reiterating that it would be a trilateral concept using Saudi financing and Corps management. If agreed, we would then discuss with them financial arrangements for the particular projects. We should also indicate to the Saudis that once the Corps has completed an in-country survey, which we are prepared to finance, we will be able to provide more details, including cost estimates, for the various projects. Corps personnel currently assigned to the Saudi CE program most likely will be used to conduct the Somali survey. These arrangements also should be discussed with the Saudis since salary costs of these people are reimbursed by the Saudi Arabian government.

I therefore recommend that Department of State be authorized, in coordination with DoD, to consult with appropriate Saudi and Somali officials to determine if sufficient interest exists on their part for the

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files 1977–1981, Box 70, PRC 068 7/31/78, Somalia [1]. Confidential. Drafted in coordination with Harrop and Wickham.

² Not found.

³ Not found attached.

CE to undertake a survey to be funded by AID's office of reimbursable development. The survey's purpose would be to provide the Saudis, Somalis, and us with the necessary cost estimates and other data upon which to make judgments concerning projects that they and we might agree to pursue under the proposed trilateral arrangement. It would not commit the Saudis to fund any of the proposed trilateral projects.

I believe this program helps our relationship with Somalia and benefits it economically. Additionally, sending a Corps of Engineers survey team to Somalia would provide us with an alternative for the military survey team which President Siad has requested. Finally the Saudis, who would like us to be more responsive to Somalia's military needs, are likely to appreciate the significance that a US Army Corps of Engineers presence might have in Somalia.

David E. McGiffert

91. Memorandum From Paul B. Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, October 16, 1978

SUBJECT

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Study for Somalia

REFERENCE

Memorandum to you from Dave McGiffert, same subject, dated 4 October 1978 (attached at TAB 1 with related documentation)²

Dave McGiffert reports that their effort (which has been coordinated with AID) to do a feasibility study of possible economic development projects in Somalia which could be carried out by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers with Saudi financing has come up against the fact that serious estimates of what could be done at what cost can be made only if a survey team of 12 people is sent to Somalia to spend a month looking into these projects on the ground.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files 1977–1981, Box 70, PRC 068 7/31/78, Somalia [1]. Confidential. Sent for action.

² See Document 90.

Before we do this McGiffert proposes that we sound out the Saudis to see whether they are really serious about wanting to finance this effort. The proposal originated, as you may recall, with Congressman Leggett (D, Calif),³ who has decided not to run again and who is reportedly interested in going into international management consulting, helping foreign governments develop arrangements like the one proposed for Somalia.

The work the DOD has done on this question to date stems from the PRC meeting of 31 July 1978 (Summary and Conclusions attached at TAB 2, see last paragraph).⁴ McGiffert's memorandum has not been formally coordinated with State. I have sent a copy to State and asked for their reaction. Within the NSC Staff, the memorandum has been reviewed by Quandt/Sick and Les Denend. Quandt/Sick have no comment but Les Denend (comment attached, TAB 3)⁵ takes a very negative view of the entire undertaking, maintaining that sending a 12-man survey team can convey a stronger signal than the military survey team to consider arms supply which was discussed last summer⁶ and indefinitely deferred by the PRC on 31 July.

Informally, the position I have got from State is that they feel unenthusiastic about going to the Saudis now or sending a survey team out to Somalia, as McGiffert proposes. They would like to defer the whole business while finding other gestures to show the Somalis we are still interested in them—e.g. sending Bill Harrop and the commander of the Navy's Indian Ocean Task Force to be present at Somali Revolution Day celebrations on 21 October; and perhaps accelerating our regular AID program.

Internally in Somalia, Siad's position is gradually weakening as dissatisfaction with him grows among all non-Marehan (Siad's tribe) tribesmen. He has antagonized other tribes by trials and executions of the April coup plotters and this process is not yet at an end. Somalis abroad, as well as at home, seem, according to fragmentary intelligence reporting, to be engaging in more active discussion of alternatives to Siad. There is no evidence of serious Soviet involvement in this ferment or indication that any coalition of elements likely to seize power from Siad would be pro-Soviet. Recently, there has even been talk among a few Somali dissidents of the desirability of holding free elections and returning to some form of democratic system.

³ See footnote 3, Document 89.

⁴ See Document 89 and footnote 1 thereto.

⁵ Not attached.

⁶ See Documents 27 and 28.

There remains little justification for U.S. action to bolster Siad, for as time passes, it becomes more and more evident that his demise (though it may well be some distance away) could not easily be represented as a blow to U.S. interests and a successor government might well be more genuinely pro-Western. It might, perhaps, be more willing to enter eventually into a process of working out a *modus vivendi* with Ethiopia. The case for sending out an engineer survey team is, therefore, not one that carries itself along on its own merits. Since the Saudis were lukewarm toward Leggett's proposal when he made it and have not raised it with us since, there is some reason to doubt that they are eager to underwrite it.

So what do we do? I suggest we give ourselves time to look at this whole business carefully (we have lost nothing during the entire past year by not rushing to do anything about Somalia!) and take only two steps now:

a. Get State's formal reactions to McGiffert's memo.

b. Then, if appropriate, ask our embassy in Jeddah what they think of asking the Saudis—sounding the Saudis out only informally as a first step.⁷

Meanwhile, you might want to talk informally about this to Dave Newsom.

⁷ Aaron initialed the Agree option. In telegram 5166 from Jidda, July 14, 1979, the Embassy reported on the technical proposals to the Saudis. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790322–0365)

92. Summary of Conclusions of a Mini-Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, December 11, 1978, 10:40–11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

Horn of Africa

PARTICIPANTS

State

William Harrop, Deputy Asst.
Secretary for Africa
Gordon Beyer, Country Director

Defense

Robert Murray, Deputy Asst. Sec.
NE/Afr/SoAffairs

JCS

General Richard Lawson,
Dir/Plans & Policy/J-5
Colonel Edward Redican,
Pol. Military Planner, J-5

CIA

Robert Bowie, Deputy Director,
Nat'l Affairs Assessment
William Parmenter, NIO/Africa

White House

David Aaron, Chairman

NSC

Paul B. Henze, Notetaker

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The first part of the meeting was devoted to discussion of the present state of affairs in the Horn. It was noted that the consequences of recent Ethiopian gains in Eritrea are not yet clear, but CIA estimates that even without shifting many troops from Eritrea, Mengistu may soon dispose of enough military strength (utilizing large numbers of men who are now completing training) to step up the fight against Ogaden guerrillas. Somali-supported guerrilla forces have expanded. Cubans remain concentrated in the northern Ogaden. Siad faces dissidence at home but his position is not immediately threatened. Discussion of the Soviet posture toward Somalia led to the conclusion that both Siad and the Soviets might see advantages in exploring some degree of rapprochement but that any sharp change of course in the immediate future seemed unlikely. To the Chairman's question whether U.S. policy required readjustment, the group tended toward the consensus that while radical new initiatives were not justified, efforts to generate movement in certain areas were worth trying. Specifically, during the second half of the meeting, the following steps were decided upon: (S)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files 1977–1981, Box 118, SCC 034 12/11/78, Mini-SCC, Horn of Africa. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

Somalia: No aide memoire will be given to the Somali ambassador for the time being since the Somalis are already well aware of our basic positions and policy inhibitions, but to avoid a situation where Siad may conclude that we have decided to let him drift, we will (S)

- consult with the British about generating some movement toward Kenya-Somali rapprochement, introducing a draft treaty text for the two sides to consider if that seems a practical way of breaking the current deadlocked condition of relations between the two countries. (S)

- instruct our Jeddah Embassy to ask the Saudis whether they are seriously interested in financing the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in aid projects in Somalia (i.e. the "Trilateral"/Leggett proposal).² (S)

- explore the possibility of a small IMET grant for Somali military officers to study non-combat specialties, perhaps connected with the trilateral effort. (S)

- [1½ lines not declassified]

- authorize visits by our ambassadors in Nairobi and Mogadiscio to each other's countries. (S)

Ethiopia: We will continue efforts to avoid falling into a situation where either the Hickenlooper or Gonzales amendments³ come into effect and preclude continuation of our aid program. In this connection, the State Department will develop a formula for U.S. espousal of claims. Ambassador Chapin will be encouraged to resume dialogue with the Ethiopians on this issue as soon as practical. Food aid for Ethiopia will be continued. Debt-forgiveness for Ethiopia will not be considered until political circumstances are more favorable. The Department of State will clear all future demarches on human rights in Ethiopia with the NSC before any instructions are sent to the field. (S)

Sudan: In view of Sudanese worry about the security of its borders, we will explore ways of reassuring Sudan of our support, perhaps in the form of additional aid for Eritrean refugees or provision of some specific form of security assistance or advice. (S)

North Yemen: The Department of Defense will see what can be done to be as responsive as possible to the North Yemenis' desire that we expedite our assistance to them. (S)

² The instructions were sent in telegram 319904 to Jidda, December 20. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780526-0145)

³ See footnote 3, Document 82.

93. **Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Vice President Mondale**¹

Washington, December 16, 1978

SUBJECT

Somalia: Relations with the USSR (U)²

When Siad expelled the Russians in November 1977, he permitted a modest Soviet Embassy to remain in Mogadiscio and the Soviets kept an ambassador, rather than permitting relations to sink to chargé level. We took this to mean that both Siad and the Soviets wished to provide for the possibility of warmer relations in the future. On several occasions during the past year Siad has raised the specter of Soviet plotting against him, alleging that pro-Soviet officers were aiming to replace him and rejoin the Soviet camp and arguing that he would fall if we didn't give military aid. There has never been any independent confirmation that such pro-Soviet plotters exist in Somalia, among officers or civilians. In fact, Siad has kept most of the men who were considered pro-Soviet before he broke relations in office, notably Defense Minister Samantar. Siad has maintained the system the Soviets helped him build to control Somalia, based on a large security service and a mass "socialist" party and it continues to serve him well. (C)

The intelligence community came to the conclusion several months ago that Siad himself represented the most likely source of a shift back toward the Soviets. Recent events tend to confirm this judgment, for Siad seems to have taken some initiative to explore this option. What we know indicates the Soviets are not eager to have him back—for the time being, at least. It could put a serious strain on their position in Ethiopia. (S)

Meanwhile, Siad has steadily expanded guerrilla operations in the Ogaden, now estimated to involve 50,000 men. The Somali military system has been reoriented toward supporting them. His continued pleas notwithstanding, Siad is not badly off for arms and military supplies, having been helped by the Egyptians and others with Saudi money. (S)

We have been able to supply economic and humanitarian assistance but the continued Ogaden insurgency and Siad's inability to meet

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 69, Somalia: 7/78–12/79. Secret. Sent for information.

² A notation in an unknown hand below this line reads, "In response to your PDB query."

Kenyan requirements for reassurance on borders makes it difficult for us to do more for Somalia without paying a heavy price with other African countries, from whom Siad has remained totally alienated. There are human rights problems, too, for Siad has more people in jail now than he had before he broke with the Soviets; he executed a group of military plotters a few weeks ago and he has oppressed rival tribesmen in the military and among civil leaders. The human rights situation in Somalia contrasts strikingly with that in Kenya, where the 16 remaining detainees have just been released by President Moi. (C)

In short, Siad has made himself difficult to help and a problem for the countries who would like to be Somalia's friends. We are taking a new look at what we might do now to get a little movement into this situation, but it is not easy. We do not think a move back to the Soviets is imminent. (C)

94. Memorandum From Paul B. Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, May 2, 1979

SUBJECT

Horn Working Group Meeting—1 May 1979

I held a two-hour meeting of the SCC Horn of Africa Working Group today with broad attendance from State, DOD, CIA, and other NSC staff members. OMB was invited but sent no one. Only one topic emerged which requires SCC consideration soon: *the role of Djibouti in planning for expanded U.S. naval presence in the NW Indian Ocean* and this is scheduled to be taken up at the SCC on Middle East Strategy on 9 May.² The consensus of our meeting was that it is desirable to utilize facilities at Djibouti to support naval and related air activities

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files 1977–1981, Box 40, PRM–21. Secret. Sent for information. A stamped notation reads: "ZB has seen." A handwritten notation in the upper right corner reads, "DA has seen." Copies were sent to Funk, Sick, Quandt, Kimmit, Ermath and Odom.

² Brzezinski underlined "SCC on Middle East Strategy on 9 May" and wrote in the right margin, "RG—put into the SCC/ME folder for me. ZB." The meeting was not held until May 11. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Documents 21–23.

but not to provide Djibouti with military aid as a quid-pro-quo and to keep the French out front as the power primarily responsible for Djibouti's security. If we use Djibouti we have no urgent requirement for use of Somali facilities. The group agreed that for the immediate future we should avoid the kind of political entanglement with Siad that any substantial or continuing use of Somali facilities would entail. Using Mombasa, which incurs no political liability, along with Djibouti provides the support we need. (S)

The meeting reviewed our relationship and internal conditions in each Horn country. In view of the President's recent decisions on more aid for *Sudan*³ we agreed that no new actions are necessary in the immediate future. State is trying to reallocate additional economic aid from FY79 funds for Egypt which have not been expended. Ambassador Bergus and Sudanese FM Permanent Secretary Francis Deng will be in Washington next week and we can take a further look, after talks with them, at how things are going in Khartoum. The consensus of the intelligence community was that political trends in Sudan, while not as positive as we would like, do not give cause for immediate alarm. (C)

Kenya is assessed as being in excellent condition. Kenyan-Somali tensions have eased slightly. Kenya is being cooperative about Uganda. The Sudanese are handling well the complications the fall of Idi Amin causes for them. (U)

State argued that the policy we have followed re *Somalia* for more than a year has worked well and does not need changing. There was some disagreement about the level of activity in the Ogaden with the intelligence representatives maintaining that Siad's efforts to distance himself from the guerrillas are largely cosmetic and reveal no decision to stop support.

Ambassador Chapin noted that the Ethiopian government is now permitting diplomatic travel, in groups, to Harar and Diredawa and appears to have made real gains in reasserting control in Bale and Sidama, where Mengistu has recently spent three weeks. But Ethiopians are still convinced of Siad's desire to maintain Ogaden insurgency and will react very negatively to any indications of increased U.S. willingness to consider military support for Somalia. (C)

Siad's internal power base seems to be gradually deteriorating. Ambassador Addou has recently briefed State on upcoming constitutional changes which would—he maintains—permit a return to democracy.

³ In a statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on February 14, Moose announced the administration's request for \$5 million for Foreign Military Sales for Sudan. For the full text of his statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 1979, pp. 9–11.

The consensus of the meeting was that we should let these run their course and react favorably when we are convinced that they are real. I was surprised that none of the military representatives at this meeting argued for naval facilities in Somalia or for a closer U.S. military relationship. This enthusiasm seems to be well under control in the Pentagon. (S)

There was extensive discussion of *Ethiopia*. Ambassador Chapin offered several examples of improved internal security. He sees no serious political opposition to Mengistu at the center. He expects the Ethiopians to continue to move ahead in Eritrea. He sees the Soviets consolidating their position in Ethiopia, increasingly inclined to use the Ethiopians as the “Cubans of Africa” and willing to pay a substantial economic price. He sees little prospect for improvement in our relations and fears further deterioration. State and he are working out plans for a further, last-ditch effort to save the aid program by espousal of nationalization claims and resolution of FMS payment issues. There will be further efforts on these over the next few weeks/months. (C)

The meeting was not the appropriate format for discussing possible covert action initiatives with Chapin. I will raise these at lunch on 4 May, but I expect him to be negative. I am sending you a separate memorandum on a conversation I had with State area director Gordon Beyer following this meeting which you should read in conjunction with this memorandum.⁴ (S)

⁴ Not found.

95. **Memorandum From Paul B. Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)**¹

Washington, August 1, 1979

SUBJECT

Djibouti—CIA Assessment (U)

CIA has produced an assessment on Djibouti which I requested several weeks ago. It strikes me as sane and competent. It provides no real justification for the assertion being made in State these days that the level of our naval visits and utilization of Djibouti has threatened to destabilize the situation there. It does discuss in some detail what is already well known: that Djibouti is a very fragile polity whose relative stability depends on continued French presence. There is no evidence that the French plan to leave soon. It also emphasizes that the Ethiopians, with Cuban and Soviet backing, possess the capability of a fairly high degree of harassment of Djibouti if they wish. The conclusion: if we are going to continue to use Djibouti (and there are good reasons for doing this), we need to be frank with the French about our need for their alertness and support there and we have to warn the Soviets that we will not tolerate Ethiopian harassment or destabilization effort—we will retaliate in other ways.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special, Box 4, Chron File: 8/79. Secret. Sent for information.

Attachment

Interagency Intelligence Memorandum²

Washington, July 31, 1979

Djibouti: Prospects for Stability and Implications of
US use of Facilities

[Omitted here are a title page and table of contents.]

SUMMARY³

The situation in Djibouti is inherently unstable because of:

- Longstanding tensions between the country's generally pro-Somali Issas and the Ethiopian-oriented Afars.
- The unwillingness of President Gouled, an Issa, to delegate real authority to his Afar Prime Minister.
- The alienation and militancy of the Afar community.
- The potential for Ethiopian and Somali meddling and subversion in Djibouti.

The French role and military presence in Djibouti is a major factor promoting stability, particularly as a deterrent to direct attack by Ethiopia or Somalia.

In addition to the strategic importance of Djibouti for their naval operations in the Indian Ocean, the French view their presence as:

- An obstacle to Soviet expansion in the Horn of Africa.
- A beachhead for safeguarding Western interests in the area.

We know of no plans for a French withdrawal within the next year, and present indications are that the French commitment probably will extend beyond 1980. However, because of past differences between French political and military leaders over policy toward Djibouti, it is difficult to assess confidently the firmness of French determination to stay the course in Djibouti.

The French have a military agreement—of uncertain duration—to defend Djibouti against external attack, but responsibility for internal

² Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff Files. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*].

³ Note: This memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for Africa in the Office of Political Analysis, National Foreign Assessment Center. It was coordinated at the working level within the Central Intelligence Agency and with the National Security Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. [Note is in the original.]

security rests officially with the Djiboutians. Despite French training and advisory assistance, Djiboutian security forces remain woefully inadequate and would be unable to control major violence between rival Afar and Issa terrorist groups. If France were confronted with a drastically deteriorating internal security situation and the prospect of heavy casualties, it would almost certainly face negative reactions at home and could well be forced to withdraw its forces.

Paris believes that external aggression against Djibouti is unlikely as long as a French military presence is maintained there. If, however, either Ethiopia or Somalia were to attack, the French would most likely make good on their commitment to defend Djibouti, but they would try to avoid a long-term combat role by seeking a negotiated end to the conflict. If a political settlement proved unattainable, the French would probably attempt to initiate a phased withdrawal of their troops, dependents, and civilians from the area.

Because of its history and location, Djibouti has attracted considerable attention from its neighbors and their friends:

—Ethiopia's interest stems largely from its fear that Somalia might annex Djibouti and take control of the railway terminus and port through which an important part of Ethiopia's trade historically has passed.

—Somalis have long included a significant part of Djibouti in their irredentist ambitions and share an ethnic affinity with the Issas who now dominate the political scene there. Mogadishu also harbors suspicions about Addis Ababa's intentions toward Djibouti.

—The Soviets look upon Djibouti in the context of their regional policies and, consequently, support Ethiopian policy and objectives there. Over the long term, Moscow hopes to see the emergence of a Djiboutian regime that will support Soviet interests and deny naval and air facilities to the West.

—The Arab states see Djibouti as a relatively malleable pawn in intra-Arab contention, and use economic assistance as a lever to influence Djibouti's foreign policy.

There are enough uncertainties in the Djibouti equation to make projection of events beyond the next 12 to 18 months or so hazardous. Nevertheless, we believe that:

—Tribal rivalries and contention for power by disgruntled Afar militants could lead to the unraveling of the regime, and a series of minor incidents or the incapacitation of President Gouled could lead to tribal strife that would encourage intervention by either Ethiopia or Somalia.

—However, as long as the French remain on the scene, we do not expect major escalation of external support for Djiboutian factions that would increase tribal strife and lead to direct military intervention.

—In the event of a French withdrawal, the way would be clear for a major escalation of subversive activity by Ethiopia and Somalia,

working through their sympathizers in Djibouti, probably touching off direct military intervention by Ethiopian and Somali troops.

There has been no significant reaction thus far to the US Navy's use of Djibouti's port and aviation facilities for refueling, bunkering, and crew rest. If the Navy continues its present relatively high level of usage of Djibouti's facilities—four to six ship visits and one P-3 aircraft visit per month—or only modestly increases that level, reactions would probably continue to be generally muted. However, we cannot rule out an effort by Ethiopia, the Soviet Union, or radical Arab states to use US activity in Djibouti as a basis for more active diplomatic maneuvering or harsher propaganda against Washington, should this appear to be in their interests. Nor would we exclude the possibility of a move by these states to make the US activity a pretext for encouraging stepped-up Afar insurgent operations against the Gouled regime. The Ethiopians already have sufficient guerrilla and political action assets to escalate subversive activities with little or no warning.

The US Navy does not at present contemplate seeking permanent basing rights in Djibouti, nor does it plan to lease Djiboutian facilities or to construct facilities for its exclusive use. But, if it should eventually opt for a significant quantitative—as opposed to qualitative—increase in its use of Djiboutian facilities, we would expect reactions along the following lines:

—The Djiboutians would expect increased economic assistance and, perhaps, the provision of military supplies.

—While the French have welcomed recent increased US use of Djibouti, they might become apprehensive that a significant increase in usage levels could destabilize the internal situation and invite foreign military intervention.

—The Ethiopians would condemn such a move as a US-Somali effort to subvert Djibouti and as a plot by the United States and moderate Arabs to undermine the Ethiopian revolution; Addis Ababa could well respond by encouraging increased guerrilla activity in Djibouti by Afar militants.

—The Somalis would welcome the move as a deterrent to Ethiopian military action against either Djibouti or Somalia and Soviet-Cuban adventurism in the region.

—The Kenyans would probably not oppose an increased US presence as long as it did not arouse serious Ethiopian concerns or threaten to generate all-out war in the Horn.

—The Soviets would condemn the move as an effort by the United States to turn Djibouti into a US naval facility like Diego Garcia, and they would try to convince Gouled that US use of his facilities was inconsistent with Djibouti's professed neutrality and dangerous for its continued stability. Moscow might react by increasing its own force levels in the region and by seeking expanded use of military facilities in South Yemen and Ethiopia.

—The Cubans would be quick to mount a propaganda barrage against the US activity and might react by prolonging the stay of

their forces in Ethiopia and by increasing their military presence in South Yemen.

—Among the Arabs, Oman would favor such a move; Saudi Arabia, other Persian Gulf States, and North Yemen would be ambivalent, although more favorable privately than publicly; South Yemen would loudly condemn it.

[Omitted here are sections unrelated to U.S. use of Djibouti's facilities.]

Reactions to and Implications of US Use of Djiboutian Facilities

33. There has been no significant reaction on the part of Ethiopia, Somalia, the USSR, Cuba, France, or concerned Arab states to US naval use of Djibouti's port and aviation facilities since the practice began with P-3 maritime patrol flight visits in 1975. Reactions will probably continue to be generally muted if the US Navy continues its *present* level of usage. This level, in fact, increased significantly over the past three or four months with the deployment of the USS Constellation and Midway task forces to the northern Indian Ocean area.⁴ Another similar isolated surge would be unlikely to generate much of an outcry. But a greater increase would likely cause a variety of reactions in Djibouti and elsewhere.

34. *Djibouti*. If the US Navy were to seek sharply increased use of Djiboutian facilities, the Gouled regime, as a quid pro quo, might increase pressure for the provision of military supplies from the United States. At a minimum, they would expect a significant increase in economic development assistance. Djiboutian leaders have already indicated that they believe their government is benefiting insufficiently from virtually unrestricted US access to their air and naval facilities.

35. *Ethiopia*. The Ethiopians, who have complained of "imperialist activities" in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean, would condemn any major expansion of US naval activities in Djibouti. Addis Ababa would probably portray such a move as part of a US-Somali effort to destabilize Djibouti to Somali advantage and to deny Ethiopia access to the port of Djibouti. Traditionally fearful of Arab encirclement, the Ethiopians might also label such a move as collusion among the Americans, the Somalis, and the moderate Arabs to "undermine" the Ethiopian revolution—an interpretation Addis Ababa has repeatedly placed on Washington's motives for bringing about the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.

36. Mengistu would probably retaliate—at least for openers—by encouraging radical Afar militants to step up guerrilla operations in

⁴ The *Constellation* and *Midway* were deployed to the Indian Ocean off the coast of South Yemen in March. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Document 188.

an effort to intimidate the Gouled regime into at least reducing US activities to previous levels.

37. *Somalia*. Somali President Siad, who has made repeated efforts over the past year or so to draw the United States into a military relationship, would prefer that it use Somali facilities in exchange for military aid. On balance, however, he would welcome a greater US naval presence in the area as:

—A counter to the threat of Ethiopian military action against either Djibouti or Somalia.

—Evidence of US determination to thwart Soviet-Cuban adventurism in the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula.

38. Siad would almost certainly interpret the US move as signaling a new willingness on Washington's part to be more responsive to Somalia's security needs. He would press even harder for the establishment of an arms supply relationship and would renew previous offers to make Somali bases available for US use.

39. An upsurge in Ethiopian-sponsored guerrilla activity in Djibouti designed to counter an increased US presence there would probably not provoke a military reaction by Somalia unless it perceived such activity to be aimed at Gouled's overthrow and the undermining of Mogadishu's vital interests in Djibouti. In that case, Siad would almost certainly encourage pro-Somali elements in the Djiboutian Army to move against the Afars.

40. *Kenya*. Nairobi allows the United States limited access to its airfields and the port of Mombassa. The Kenyans favor the present level of US naval activity in the region, viewing it as a counter to Soviet, Cuban, and radical Arab maneuverings. They would probably not oppose an increase in US use of Djiboutian facilities as long as the expansion did not arouse serious Ethiopian concerns or threaten to generate all-out war in the Horn. Nairobi probably fears that the Ethiopians would react by undermining the Gouled regime and pressuring Kenya to alter its pro-Western policy. Ethiopia and Kenya—despite their ideological disparity—are united in a defense pact directed against Somalia.

41. *The USSR*. Although the Soviets have thus far avoided mention of US use of Djiboutian facilities, they roundly criticized US naval deployments during the Iranian and Yemeni crises, and have repeatedly warned of plans by the United States to increase its military presence throughout the region. If US naval ships began to use Djibouti on a significantly increased basis, Moscow would probably carefully tailor its public statements to place the burden of guilt on Washington. Djibouti—if mentioned at all—would be portrayed as an unwitting dupe or helpless victim of US "imperialism"; the French connection

would also be largely ignored to avoid damaging Franco-Soviet relations. Soviet commentary would:

—Concentrate on the US arms buildup in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf and accuse the United States of increasing tensions in the region to justify its military ambitions.

—Link the increase in US naval activity to the fall of the Shah, the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli treaty, and US oil needs.

—Charge the United States with attempting to turn Djibouti into another US naval facility like Diego Garcia.

—Remind the littoral states that the USSR supported the UN resolution calling for a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean.

—Emphasize that it was the United States, not the USSR, that broke off the Indian Ocean arms control talks.

42. Although the USSR has little influence with President Gouled, it would lose no opportunity—unilaterally and through sympathetic third parties—to remind him that US use of his air and naval facilities was inconsistent with Djibouti's professed neutrality. If Gouled proved unresponsive to such demarches, the Soviets might urge increased Ethiopian/Cuban support for Afar dissidents based in Ethiopia.

43. Because of their traditional reluctance to use naval facilities permanently occupied by a Western power (in this case, France), the Soviets would be unlikely to request regular access to Djibouti for their own naval forces, although they might attempt to establish the right in principle to make occasional port calls. Moscow would be more inclined to react to greater US use of Djibouti by increasing its overall force levels in the region and, possibly, by seeking expanded use of military facilities in South Yemen and Ethiopia.

44. *Cuba.* The Cubans would join the Soviets and the Ethiopians in condemning any sharply increased US military presence in Djibouti and might use it to justify a prolongation of the Cuban military presence in Ethiopia or an expansion of that in South Yemen.

45. *France.* Although the French would probably welcome further opportunities to share responsibilities in the region, their reaction is difficult to predict with certainty. They might argue that significantly increased and highly visible US naval activity in Djibouti would upset the country's fragile political balance, lead to internal strife, and increase the danger of external intervention. The French might also calculate that such a US military profile in Djibouti would focus the spotlight on their own continued major presence, and that this could generate an adverse reaction both at home and abroad. Gouled takes his cue from the French on major policy matters, and their position on increased US naval use of Djibouti could be critical to his thinking on the issue.

46. *Iraq.* As for the Arab states, Iraq—although increasingly concerned about Soviet penetration in the Red Sea and Arabian Penin-

sula—would not like to see a permanent US presence in Djibouti and would certainly oppose the basing of US aircraft there. Baghdad would be inclined to use economic and political pressure to make its point with the Djiboutians. The issue is, nevertheless, several steps removed from Iraq's major areas of concern—Arab politics and the peace process and developments in Iran—and Baghdad might be too preoccupied to do more than protest loudly.

47. *Saudi Arabia.* The Saudis, who usually set the pace for the conservative countries on the Arabian Peninsula, would be ambivalent toward a formal US presence in Djibouti because of the conflicting pressures to which they would be subjected. The Saudis would consider various factors:

—The purpose of the US move (is the United States creating a base? and if so, for what purpose?).

—The context of such a move (when it takes place, the reactions of neighboring states).

—The manner in which Washington explained its purposes to them.

48. If the move were essentially a logistic convenience, we doubt that the Saudis would have any major objection, although they probably would not support it publicly. Because of the potential threat to Djibouti from Ethiopia, and Pan-Arab pressures orchestrated by Iraq in the wake of the Camp David accords, the Saudis would be sensitive to charges or expectations that they supported a US move that could eventually encourage a superpower confrontation in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.

49. *The Yemens.* The South Yemenis would fulminate about American intervention in Arab affairs and would join Ethiopia in condemning American intrusion into the lower Red Sea area, a region where Aden and Addis Ababa assert a joint responsibility. South Yemen and like-minded members of the Arab League (such as Iraq) would take Djibouti to task in that forum, and Aden might also be more receptive to greater Soviet use of its facilities.

50. The Salih regime in North Yemen, worried about its narrow base of support and its need to balance a variety of conflicting relations (with the United States, with the Saudis, with the Iraqis, and especially with South Yemen), would not be able to support the US move publicly, [*less than 1 line not declassified*].

51. *Egypt and Sudan.* The Egyptians and the Sudanese would probably welcome an increased US presence in Djibouti, seeing it as a move designed to restrict Soviet, radical Arab, and Ethiopian activities in the region. It is questionable whether either country—especially Sudan—would publicly argue in favor of substantially increased US activity.

52. *Other Arab States.* The reactions of Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates would follow those of Saudi Arabia. Oman,

concerned with the military threat posed by South Yemen, plus the more general threat of subversion, would look more favorably on the matter. Since the downfall of the Shah of Iran, Sultan Qabus has turned increasingly to the United States for help and advice in obtaining military supplies, and believes that his country's security depends increasingly on the United States. Kuwait, which pursues a more independent foreign policy than the other Gulf states, has strongly opposed any great-power presence in the Gulf, but at the same time has sought US support for Gulf security without indicating how this should be manifested. The Kuwaitis—feeling pressure from Iraq and resident Palestinians—probably would condemn an American presence in Djibouti as an escalation of the risk of superpower confrontation in the region. [2 lines not declassified]

96. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, August 14, 1979

SUBJECT

Increased US Military Use of Somali Facilities (S)

(S) As you will recall, we discussed this topic briefly at our luncheon on August 3. Additionally, in my letter to the President on increased presence in the Indian Ocean, I mentioned the need for cooperation with littoral states and access to regional air and naval facilities to support these operations.² Considering the concentration of Soviet naval activity in the Gulf of Aden, we particularly desire to obtain landing rights in the Horn of Africa for our P-3 maritime patrol aircraft. At present, we have such rights only in Djibouti and, more distantly, in Seeb, Oman to facilitate our aerial surveillance efforts in the Gulf of Aden area. Judging from past experience, I believe it would be unwise to continue to depend as heavily as we have in the past on Djibouti to support our increased presence.

(S) During the March–May deployments of CONSTELLATION and MIDWAY to the Arabian Sea/Gulf of Aden region, a lack of available facilities elsewhere forced us to increase our reliance on Djibouti for

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special, Box 4, 8/79. Secret. A copy was sent to Vance.

² See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Document 27.

P-3 operations and ship visits. While the Government of Djibouti was forthcoming, our increased usage of their facilities led to a request for military assistance from President Gouled—a request to which the USG could not, within existing policy, respond.

(S) In view of the above, I think it would be useful to explore the possible use of other facilities, such as those at Berbera and Mogadiscio, Somalia, to support our broader Indian Ocean strategy. The Somali government has, on several occasions, encouraged us to increase our access to its facilities. A moderate increase in our use of those facilities would enhance our politico-military objectives in the area, reduce our reliance on Djibouti, and contribute to our surge capability in the region.³

(S) Accordingly, I have the following recommendations at this time:

—Plan for US Navy ship visits to the port of Berbera, at the initial rate of one visit per quarter (subject to weather conditions), and the establishment of a limited bunkering arrangement with Somalia.

—Plan for access by P-3 aircraft to Berbera and Mogadiscio, at an initial rate of one flight per month, subject to a technical assessment of the support capabilities at those airfields. (Based on that assessment, some airfield upgrading may be required to support additional usage.)

—Consider improvements to Berbera port. (As I mentioned in our 3 August discussion, the USS DAVIS visit to Berbera in May indicated that effective use of Berbera port would be dependent on some improvement of the facilities, such as upgrading refueling capabilities, breakwater, and navigational aids. Such improvement might be accomplished as a civil development project, perhaps with AID and/or Saudi funding.)

If you agree, I will issue instructions for the development of specific DoD proposals for additional ship visits, a bunkering arrangement and the initiation of P-3 visits to Somalia, and for the coordination of these proposals with the Department of State.

(S) I should note, however, the likelihood that such US requests for increased access may well result in renewed requests for US military arms from President Siad. I am doubtful that the Somalis will be willing to stop their support of the Ogaden insurgents in order to qualify for such military assistance from the US. I therefore suggest that the question of an appropriate substitute assistance package be addressed urgently by State, AID and DoD, with recommendations to be submitted within thirty days for us to consider and perhaps to take up with the President.

Harold Brown

³ For more on U.S. efforts to obtain the use of facilities in Somalia and other countries of the Persian Gulf/Arabian Peninsula area, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Documents 41, 42, 49, and 50.

97. **Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to
President Carter¹**

Washington, October 27, 1979

SUBJECT

Summary of Recent and Projected Ship Visits to Somalia and
Equatorial Guinea (U)

(C) This memorandum provides a summary of actions taken following our discussion on 12 October 1979 concerning visits to Somalia and Equatorial Guinea.

(C) Ship visits to Somalia had already begun to take place as the result of the agreement among Cy, Zbig and myself that Zbig had reported to you earlier. We now have scheduled an increased rate of one visit each quarter. The most recent, past and newly projected visits to Somalia are as follows:

<u>SHIP</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>PORT</u>	<u>DATES</u>
USS DAVIS	DD	Berbera	26–27 May 79
USS BREWTON	FF	Mogadiscio	11–12 Aug 79
USS STEIN	FF	Berbera	20–22 Nov 79
USS VOGUE	FF	Mogadiscio	19–21 Feb 80
USS SELLERS	DDG	Berbera	13–15 Apr 80

An additional visit to Berbera will be conducted in the January to March timeframe. However, details on this visit are not yet firm.

(S) The Defense Intelligence Agency [*1 line not declassified*] unable to confirm the initial [*less than 1 line not declassified*] report that Soviet Marines are present in Equatorial Guinea. Therefore, immediate diversion of a ship has not been directed, but a port call is planned at Rey Malabo, Equatorial Guinea by USS JESSE L. BROWN (FF) about 18–19 November. Actual dates of the visit and the specific ships may change, depending on the response to our request for clearance from the government of Equatorial Guinea.

Harold Brown

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 69, Somalia: 7/78–12/79. Secret.

98. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, October 28, 1979

SUBJECT

Sale of Defensive Arms to Somalia

We believe we should initiate our program of making defensive weapons available to Somalia by offering to sell two C-130's, transportation and engineering equipment and radar.

The most acute Somali military need at present is to replace Somalia's aging Soviet-provided military transport aircraft. They are very interested in the C-130 and have approached the Saudi Government regarding financing. Two C-130's could be delivered relatively quickly. We propose to send a military survey team to Somalia in the near future to pull together concrete proposals for the sale of additional non-lethal equipment.

We will also move ahead with the proposed US Army Corps of Engineers development projects in Somalia to be financed by the Saudis, including the Merca port, (US \$78 million) and Garoe-Bosaso road and port (US \$238 million). Siad has recently told our Ambassador and Dick Moose that he would like to go ahead with these projects and asked our assistance in obtaining Saudi financing support.

Saudi cooperation is essential in financing both the C-130's and Corps of Engineers projects. We therefore need to take this matter up with the Saudis.

Recommendation:

—That we immediately offer, subject to Saudi agreement to financing, the sale of two C-130 aircraft and the Corps of Engineers projects.

—That we send a military survey team to Somalia to put together a package of additional defensive items including transportation and engineering equipment and radar.²

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 69, Somalia: 7/78-12/79. Secret.

² Carter wrote "ok."

99. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, November 9, 1979

SUBJECT

Defensive Arms for Somalia (S)

At last week's meeting, Cy, Harold, and I decided that we should proceed with the sale of engineering and nonlethal military items to Somalia if the Saudis are willing to pay for them. Cy subsequently forwarded a memorandum (Tab A)² which recommends that you approve this proposal. (S)

Specifically, Cy recommends (1) that we offer to sell, subject to Saudi financing, two C-130 aircraft and two Army Corps of Engineers development projects and (2) that we send a military survey team to Somalia to determine what additional non-lethal items might be offered. (S)

When Cy's memorandum was written, he did not yet have word of the Saudi decision not to finance F-5's for the Sudan. Both we and the Sudanese have long thought we had a reasonably firm commitment from the Saudis for these aircraft, while the Saudis have never really committed themselves to the Corps of Engineers project for Somalia,³ let alone to military purchases. Thus, while I agree with Cy that we should proceed with this program, I believe that we should talk further with the Saudis before making any offers to the Somalis. Once we receive firmer assurances on financing, we can then offer the items Cy mentions and consider the dispatch of a survey team. (S)

I recommend, therefore, that we proceed with Cy's recommendations only to the extent of discussing with the Saudis their willingness to finance these purchases, and that we defer talking to the Somalis about these proposals until we have a Saudi commitment.⁴ (S)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 69, Somalia: 7/78–12/79. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum.

² See Document 98.

³ See Documents 90 and 91.

⁴ Carter checked the Approve option.

100. Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Information Cable¹

TDFIR DB–315/01635–80

Washington, January 24, 1980

COUNTRY

Ethiopia/Cuba

SUBJECT

Cuban Decision to Maintain Current Troop Levels in Ethiopia in Face of
Expected U.S. Base Rights in Somalia

SOURCE

[2½ lines not declassified]

1. [less than 1 line not declassified] January 1980, a senior Cuban military officer met with Ethiopian Minister of Defense, Brigadier General Tesfaye Gebre Kidan. During the discussion, the Cuban officer informed General Tesfaye that the Cuban First Vice President of the Councils of State and Ministers, General Raul Castro Ruz, was in favor of withdrawing some Cuban troops from Ethiopia, but had decided to maintain current levels as he believed the United States would gain base rights in Berbera, Somalia. The senior Cuban officer stated that he would have agreed to withdraw some Cuban troops from Ethiopia, but he too recommended that the situation be studied further before any action was taken to withdraw Cuban troops. (Field comment: Source was unable to identify the senior Cuban officer but he believed the officer to be General Ochoa, commanding general of all Cuban military personnel in Ethiopia.)

2. (Field comment: The same source said General Tesfaye made no response to the troop decision announced by the senior Cuban officer.)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special, Box 4, 1/80. Secret; [handling restrictions not declassified]. Sent to the White House Situation Room, Department of State, National Foreign Affairs Center (CIA), DIA, NSC, NSA and Joint Chiefs of Staff.

101. Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Information Cable¹

TDFIR 314/04093–80

Washington, February 27, 1980

COUNTRY

Somalia/Ethiopia

SUBJECT

President Siad's Pledge for Continued Support to the WSLF. (DOI: Mid-February 1980)

SOURCE

[4 lines not declassified]

1. Somali President Mohamed Siad Barre called a meeting of Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) leaders at the Somali militia training camp near Afgoi in mid-February 1980 and assured them that Somali Government support to the WSLF would not be reduced even if Somalia signed a military agreement with the United States. Siad had become concerned by reports in early February that WSLF leaders were worried that Siad might reduce Somali Government support to the WSLF once an agreement with the United States was signed. According to these reports, WSLF leaders for the first time were discussing the possibility of negotiating with the Ethiopians for autonomy rather than continuing the fight for full independence. When Siad heard these reports, he became very upset and ordered leading Somali officials from the Ogadeni tribe, including Commandant of the Police, Brigadier General Adan Abdi Duale, and Brigadier General Adan Abdullahi Nur, Commandant of the Halane Political Indoctrination Institute for the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party, to arrange the meeting with WSLF officials. The meeting was attended by over 100 WSLF and Somali Government officials.

2. (Field comment: Source did not know whether Siad specified that type of support the Somali Government would continue to provide the WSLF.)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special, Box 4, 2–3/80. Secret; *[handling restrictions not declassified]*. Sent to the White House Situation Room, Department of State, National Foreign Affairs Center (CIA), DIA, NSC, NSA, and Joint Chiefs of Staff.

102. Memorandum From Paul B. Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, April 4, 1980

SUBJECT

Ethiopia—A Brief Political Assessment (U)

Mengistu is still very much in charge of the central government. He has consolidated his power at the expense of the PMAC which no longer functions as a junta, but more as a “central committee” staff for *Mengistu*. *Mengistu* has been careful to avoid total dependence upon the Soviets or the Cubans, however, and is clearly his own master in day-to-day governmental operations. In this respect he has been more clever than recent Afghan leaders. It is unlikely that the Soviets/Cubans could oust him easily if they wished. (C)

There are signs of *gradually increasing strains* between *Mengistu* and the Soviets/Cubans, but these appear to be containable. *Mengistu* continues to try to keep the Soviets under heavy obligation to provide at least a substantial share of the military support he needs by showing that he is a good “Socialist”—giving full propaganda support to the Russians, carrying out extreme measures, such as further nationalizations and collectivization of agriculture. These measures are now provoking antipathy, resentment and doubt among important sectors of the population who up until recently supported *Mengistu* and his revolution enthusiastically—the southern peasantry, e.g. (U)

The *economic situation has steadily deteriorated* and will go on gradually worsening. Shortages of many locally produced commodities are developing. Coffee is rationed (in the country where it originated!—and where it is still the major cash-earning export) and imports of food and consumer goods have practically ceased. The Soviets have consistently disappointed *Mengistu*'s high hopes for increased economic aid. Most recently, they have turned down his request for a secure petroleum supply at favorable prices. The high cost of petroleum is hitting Ethiopia very hard, since the country has no oil resources of its own. (C)

Eritrea remains *Mengistu*'s Achilles' heel. The rebels have regained territory and imposed heavy costs on government forces during recent

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 21, Ethiopia: 1/80–1/81. Confidential. Copies were sent to Bremont, Ermarth, Odom, Funk, Sick, and Griffith.

months. The rebel groups are no closer to unification than ever and have recently expended considerable energy fighting each other. Soviet efforts to try to bring about a mediated settlement have produced no results. It is unclear what Mengistu may be aiming to do in his current dickering with the Sudanese over a possible settlement; he may simply be playing for time. It is doubtful whether the Eritreans could ever feel enough confidence in anything Mengistu promised to enter into a settlement. Prospects, therefore, are good that the Eritrean insurgency will continue indefinitely. The longer it continues the greater a source of strain it is likely to become for the Soviets and the Cubans. (C)

The Somalia-supported Ogaden insurgency is a less serious problem for Mengistu. The net result of Siad's policies has been depopulation of large areas of the Ogaden, thus relieving the Ethiopian government of responsibility for these people. The Ogaden situation does not engender tensions between the Ethiopians and the Soviets/Cubans—on the contrary it drives them closer together. And the continued Somali attacks on Ethiopia reinforce nationalism and Mengistu's reputation as champion of Ethiopian territorial integrity. (U)

Mengistu has consolidated his control over the governmental machine and in the center of the country at the expense of losing influence in the periphery. He has alienated much of the population of the north and west to the extent that the central government no longer controls much in these areas beyond a few urban centers and the main roads between them. *Tigre* is largely under control of the TPLF; *Gondar* province is dominated by EPRP and successor elements of the EDU. The highly developed Gallas (Oromo) of *Wollega* have been alienated by persecution of the Mekane Yesus (Protestant) church and by agricultural collectivization. Since national/ideological parties were so viciously suppressed during the period of the Red Terror,² resistance to Mengistu's revolution and rule has taken the form, predominantly, of regional and nationality groups. This does not mean, however, that Ethiopia is fragmenting; national consciousness is still strong. The regional and nationality-based resistance groups have a potential for coalescing and coordinating their resistance activities. (U)

Ethiopia's armed forces are now larger than at any time in its modern history—more than 250,000 and still growing. (At their peak, the armed forces we supported for Haile Selassie totalled 42,000 men! And a favorite leftist anti-American propaganda line then was that we were distorting Ethiopia's development by encouraging the Emperor to devote disproportionate resources and manpower to military pur-

² The Red Terror in Ethiopia refers to the purge of Mengistu's opponents after he took control of the Derg in February 1977. It continued into 1978. See Document 2.

poses!) But Ethiopia's soldiers are not fighting well. This, in itself, is bound to become an increasing source of tension between them and their Soviet/Cuban advisers and there are many signs that mutual resentments are increasing. There are also some signs of independent thinking among officers. The current Minister of Defense, Tesfaye Gebre-Kidan, is believed to be developing some degree of independence from Mengistu. (C)

Nothing the Soviets or Cubans could do could bring Ethiopia under smooth control and restore peace to the whole country. The longer the present disorder and tension persists, the more embarrassing the situation becomes for the Soviets and Cubans, because in Ethiopia they are in full view before all of Africa. Addis Ababa remains the seat of an enormous Pan-African bureaucracy (OAU, UNECA, ILO, etc.) which experiences daily the frustrations of the Soviet recipe for the future of Africa as applied in Ethiopia. (U)

All evidence indicates that *Ethiopians remain*, by and large, *strongly pro-Western* in orientation. Though sizable numbers of trained men have left the country and students and officials continue to escape abroad, the governmental machinery is still manned primarily by American and European trained and educated men and women. Soviet and Cuban efforts to win over Ethiopian youth seem to be having negligible success. Socialism as a lifestyle is no more popular in Ethiopia than it is in Eastern Europe. (U)

If Mengistu should be assassinated tomorrow, the Soviets are not well positioned to intervene to choose his successor. And there is no reason to assume that a successor to Mengistu would have either the ruthlessness or luck he has combined to maintain himself in power for over five years. *Resistance* in a situation such as exists in Ethiopia today is, however, inevitably *a function of what the potential for change is perceived to be*. Ethiopians today see no clear alternative. They fell into fatal disarray in 1974 because they had become accustomed to paternalism and relied upon Americans and Europeans to provide the support and stiffening necessary to bring them through a period of rapid change. No help materialized. No clear picture of the future has yet crystallized. But the misfortunes and strains resulting from the abortive efforts of the Soviets/Cubans to guide Ethiopia to "socialism" will have to intensify substantially before resistance to the present system generates pressures which either push Mengistu from power or force him to change course radically. (U)

There is debate both within Ethiopia and outside as to *whether Mengistu has the potential to become a Sadat* and expel the Soviets, setting his country on a new, constructive course. I am skeptical, inclined to believe that Mengistu has burdened himself with too many mistakes of judgment to be able to save himself: e.g., from the beginning, his

genocidal policies in Eritrea; now collectivization. But it would be a mistake to write him off as hopeless until he proves that he is, or until history sweeps him from the stage. A convincing case that he is merely a Soviet puppet cannot really be made. (U)

There is no reason to conclude that Ethiopia is hopelessly locked in a permanent Soviet/Cuban grip—or that Ethiopians could ever reconcile themselves to such a condition. The Soviet/Cuban relationship, in fact, generates more tensions than Ethiopia has experienced before in its long history—and provides no reliable formulas for solutions. There is every reason to believe that Ethiopians will be responsive to evidence of heightened Free World interest in their situation. The West needs to maintain presence in, and communication with, Ethiopia. It is important for the United States to take actions, steadily and cumulatively, that will encourage Ethiopians to have greater confidence in themselves, to pool their strength to find alternate leadership that can chart a credible course into the future. It is also important for us to reassure potential alternate leaders that support in various forms will be forthcoming from the Free World as they work to disengage their country from its forced marriage to Soviet socialism. (C)

103. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee (Intelligence) Meeting¹

Washington, April 7, 1980, 3:30–4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Covert Action

PARTICIPANTS

State

David Newsom (missed first twenty minutes)

Ronald Spiers

OSD

ADM Daniel Murphy

Robert Komer

OMB

John White

Justice

Kenneth Bass III

White House

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski

David Aaron

¹ Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 30, NSC/SCC Minutes, 3/1/80–4/15/80. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

JCS
Lt Gen Eugene Tighe

NSC
Paul Henze (Notetaker)

CIA
ADM Stansfield Turner
Frank Carlucci
Walter Raymond
[name not declassified]
[name not declassified]

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

Ethiopia: CIA proposed a \$130,000 program with two major features: (a) stepping up propaganda both outside and inside the country to encourage strain between Mengistu and his Soviet/Cuban supporters, and (b) developing exploratory support for opponents of Mengistu, both individuals and organizations. The purpose of the second part of the program is to assess the needs and likely effectiveness of various groups and thus to judge which might be worth more substantial support in the future. Support envisioned is primarily for purposes of improved organization and communications; no arms support is currently envisioned.

The propaganda portion of this program was strongly endorsed by all SCC members. The program for supporting regime opponents was endorsed by all except State, which recommended that contact with regime opponents take place only outside Ethiopia and that it be confined to gathering information. The DCI said that Agency experience demonstrated that contact for information-gathering alone is unproductive because regime opponents are unwilling to risk supplying information without some promise of modest help in furthering their efforts to generate pressures for change in Ethiopia. Limiting contact to people outside Ethiopia is undesirable because the individuals with the greatest potential as opponents of Mengistu were those still in Ethiopia, some of them still in the Government. Finally State proposed that each step in the process of contacting regime opponents be reported back for review by the SCC. Both the DCI and the Chairman considered such a procedure operationally unworkable. It was noted that our Ambassador in Addis Ababa has fully endorsed the CIA program as submitted and, in fact, favors a more ambitious effort.

A vote of the membership revealed full endorsement for the program for support for regime opponents by all agencies except State, which maintained its reservations. The Chairman stated he would recommend approval of the program as submitted to the President.

The Chairman then said he had heard that *State had decided to withdraw our ambassador to Ethiopia* and reduce relations to charge level. There had been no coordination of this decision, which reversed a basic policy action approved by the President two years ago. The chairman

said it was *important to keep our ambassador in Addis Ababa* both for contact and as a symbol of our interest in Ethiopia. The State Department representative said he was unaware of decisions on this matter but would look into it immediately.

Mr. Komer said that it was becoming increasingly clear that our efforts to secure facilities in Somalia entailed the *danger of entanglement in the Ogaden War*.² Before we let this happen, he proposed that we take a longer look at the Horn and decide whether we did not perhaps want to adopt elimination or transformation of the Mengistu regime as our ultimate objective, [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. After some discussion, the Chairman directed CIA to make a *preliminary assessment of the longer-term implications of present trends in the Horn* and then to develop a plan with State and Defense for review of policy options for a more comprehensive approach.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Horn of Africa.]

² The SCC discussed basing rights in Somalia on April 14. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Document 73.

104. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, April 11, 1980

SUBJECT

SCC on Covert Action

The Summary of Conclusions of an SCC on four covert action proposals which I chaired on April 7, 1980, is attached at TAB A for your review.² Considering the urgency of the problems they address, these proposals are all modest, entail little risk and no great expense. If we are to put ourselves in a position to have greater impact on these

¹ Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 30, NSC/SCC Minutes, 3/1/80–4/15/80. Secret; Sensitive; Outside the System. The President wrote in the upper right corner, "Zbig—I need either Cy or Warren to comment. One of them should be present. J." In an undated note to Carter, Christopher wrote, "Mr. President, I approve the findings on Ethiopia, [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. Warren Christopher." (Ibid.)

² Attached; printed as Document 103.

areas in the future, we must nevertheless begin to work on them now. I therefore recommend strongly that you approve the recommendations which the SCC endorsed. Findings covering the programs for Ethiopia, [less than 1 line not declassified] are ready for your signature at TAB B. The Soviet Nationalities program is in effect, an extension of the longstanding Eastern Europe/USSR publication and mailing project and does not require a new Finding.³

I would also like to have your approval of the position I have taken on continuation of our present ambassador in Ethiopia and maintenance of our relations there at Ambassadorial level.⁴

Tab B

Presidential Finding⁵

Washington, undated

Finding Pursuant to Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended, Concerning Operations Undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency in Foreign Countries, Other Than Those Intended Solely for the Purpose of Intelligence Collection

I hereby find that the following operation in a foreign country (including all support necessary to such operation) is important to the national security of the United States, and direct the Director of Central Intelligence, or his designee, to report this Finding to the concerned committees of the Congress pursuant to Section 662, and to provide such briefings as necessary.

SCOPE

Ethiopia

DESCRIPTION

Unilaterally or through foreign governments foster opposition to the pro-Soviet character of the present Ethiopian regime and encourage pro-Western attitudes in Ethiopia by contacting and supporting appropriate elements in the Ethiopian Government, political opposition and other pertinent sectors in Ethiopia and abroad. Utilize covert propaganda, disseminated internally and externally, in furtherance of these objectives.

Jimmy Carter

³ Carter checked the Agree option.

⁴ Carter checked the Agree option and initialed at the bottom of the page.

⁵ Secret; Sensitive.

105. Telegram From the Embassy in Somalia to the Department of State¹

Mogadishu, May 19, 1980, 1140Z

2105. Subj: Facilities Access: Somalia. Refs: (A) Mogadishu 1949,² (B) Mogadishu 1969,³ (C) State 127081,⁴ (D) Mogadishu 2049.⁵

1. (S—Entire text)

2. At his request, I met with President Siad at Villa Somalia this morning (May 19). When he said he had been expecting me to call him, I replied that I had been waiting for him to call me. I said that on the basis of last week's dinner meeting (reftel A), I had understood either he or General Samantar would be presenting to me the Somali Government's latest negotiating position. He laughed and said he had instructed Samantar and the others to meet with me and my staff so that in an informal setting we could come to a clearer understanding of what needed to be done to nail down an agreement. In addition, in Nice he had told Addou to explain the Somali position to Washington (reftel C).

3. He went on to say that the counterproposal had not, as we had interpreted, laid down conditions. The economic and military assistance elements of the counterproposal were intended merely to spell out to us Somalia's needs.⁶ Nor had the Somalis intended to make it appear that the US would have to endorse Somalia's Ogaden policy. When I noted that their written document had conveyed quite a different impression, he responded that for this reason he had set up the dinner meeting to provide a way to dispel any misunderstanding.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800246–0770. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.

² In telegram 1949 from Mogadishu, May 10, the Embassy described a meeting between the Country Team and the Somali Politburo on the Somali Government's wish to reach an agreement on facilities access. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800400–1085)

³ Telegram 1969 from Mogadishu, May 12, corrected the text of telegram 1949. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800234–0631)

⁴ Telegram 127081 to Mogadishu, May 14, reported on Addou's meeting with Siad as related to Bartholomew, in which Addou described the internal workings of the Somali Government and the possibility of facilities access. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800238–0689)

⁵ In telegram 2049 from Mogadishu, May 15, Ambassador Petterson gave his assessment of the internal workings of the Somali Government as it related to facilities access for the United States. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800240–0115)

⁶ See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Document 78.

4. After I had mentioned the need for a decision on the agreement on use and the construction proposals, he said that “in principle” the Somali Government had no problem with these. The Somalis would, as they had indicated, suggest some minor modifications to the agreement on use, but, again, these and the construction proposal were “ok.” Nevertheless, he still needed from us some greater sign that we wanted a true friendship with Somalia. He said, “give me the possibility to win my antagonizers (sic) and not to lose face with the party, the Parliament and the people.” He repeated that he needed to be able to convince them that in coming to an agreement with the United States he would be “bringing them a true friend.”

5. Siad cited some difficulties that agreement with the United States on the facilities would cause Somalia. He said he had no doubt that Iraq would cut the supply of crude oil to his country. The Soviets would press for repayment of the heavy debt Somalia owes them. Moreover, “once we sign,” the Soviets would put added pressures on Somalia.

6. In the face of these and other difficulties, he hoped that Washington would be “more flexible” in its approach to cementing a friendship. Getting down to specifics, he listed the following as suggestions (he emphasized they were not conditions) as to what the US could do in this regard:

A) The US would undertake to provide adequate air defense for Somalia. He said that what he needed was not a specific amount of money, but a clear indication that we will provide him sufficient assistance to meet his most pressing air defense needs.

B) The US should tell its European friends “to pass on to Somalia some ground force defensive weapons.”

C) The US should convince “your Arab friends to act to solve Somalia’s immediate balance of payments difficulties.”

D) In the event the Iraqis do cut off Somalia’s oil, the US “would convince the Saudis to send US crude oil.”

7. He added: “Let us not stick on the \$40 million, but be flexible to overcome this impasse.” He then said that there was one further means by which we would come to an understanding and sign an agreement. He said that because of the past, and because of hostile propaganda, “Washington has all the reason to doubt me.” He wanted to overcome this and to be able to discuss the mutual interests of Somalia and the US face-to-face with US leaders. To do this, “I really would like to go to the US and talk.”

8. Concluding, he repeated that he was making suggestions aimed at seeking a way out of the “current impasse” between us. He said he accepted that what we were offering was a beginning, and in fact

what he wanted most from a long-term relationship with the US was assistance in overcoming the “poverty of my people.” However, he said that, in view of Somalia’s current serious security problems, he had to ask us to give him the means to be able to explain to his people that a close relationship with the US would indeed be highly beneficial to Somalia.

9. Comment: Siad made no mention of a “security guarantee.” The dinner meeting, Addou’s conversation with Bartholomew, and today’s meeting all produce a different version of what the Somalis want from us. The ambiguity could lie in a problem of cross-cultural communications (and with the Somalis this should not be underestimated), in imprecision in Siad’s own thoughts, in changes of mind, or in Somali bargaining tactics. Yet in all of what they have told us, there is a consistent thread: to Siad, our offer is not enough to meet his political needs, and he wants something of more consequence to demonstrate to doubters in the army and the Central Committee that agreement with the US will bring more advantages than disadvantages to Somalia.

10. In this regard, from today’s and previous conversations, it is clear that to Siad an invitation to visit the US has a very high priority. He would view this as something which he could show to Somalis as evidence of US friendship for Somalia. And of course it would add lustre to his position as Somali leader.

11. Siad made no reference to the aide memoire of which General Samantar spoke. To the contrary, he indicated that he will be waiting for our response to what he told me today.

Petterson

106. Memorandum From Paul B. Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, June 3, 1980

SUBJECT

The Horn Conflict

For the third time in the last three years, Siad has unleashed a major military effort in Ethiopia using Somali regular forces. The conflict which is now intensifying in both the southern and northern sectors of the Ogaden has not yet reached the level of the war of 1977 but it already exceeds the scope of the fighting of the fall of 1978. (U)

There are reports of Somali plans to sabotage the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railroad again. If this occurs, it will represent a dangerous threshold of escalation because of the political and economic importance of the railroad to Ethiopia. You will recall the cutting of the railroad marked a crucial step on the way to full-scale hostilities in 1977. (S)

There has been a remarkable similarity in each of these three episodes of Somali attack against Ethiopia. Long-developed preparations (probably at an earlier stage encouraged by the Soviets) brought Siad to the point in the spring of 1977 where, in light of severe political deterioration in Ethiopia, he found the temptation to invest regular Somali forces in a major attack irresistible. The crucial decision seems to have been taken only, however, when the Somalis concluded they had a good chance of securing American military aid. Ambassador Addou probably gave Siad an overly optimistic interpretation of his June 17 meeting with President Carter.² In the expectation U.S. backing had been secured—but with no commitment from us—they escalated their assault on Ethiopia to a full-scale war. It was a daring gamble and almost succeeded. (C)

Again in 1978, the Somalis let their own impatience get the better of them. Had they pulled back and lain low after their defeat in Ethiopia

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 48, Somalia/Horn of Africa: 2–10/80. Secret. Copies were sent to Odom, Ermarth, Funk, Sick, Thornton, Brent, Hunter, Wriggins, and Welch. In the upper right corner, Brzezinski wrote, "I need the reactions of the others to these pts. that Paul makes so forcefully. ZB." See footnote 5 below.

² The meeting took place on June 16, 1977. See Document 20.

in March, we would have inaugurated a “defensive” military relationship with them.³ (U)

In the *expectation* that we would be sending a military survey group to lay the groundwork for such a relationship, Siad decided to rebuild the guerrilla structure inside Ethiopia with a major investment of Somali regulars. This led to renewed fighting on a scale sufficiently intense that sending a military survey team could not be justified and plans for military aid were shelved.⁴ (C)

We have seen a similar pattern over the last eight months. We started the effort to secure facilities in Somalia which is currently continuing in face of a significant level of continuing guerrilla activity in the Ogaden. The level of direct Somali military preparation was rather low last fall, however. Though we hoped (unrealistically) to persuade the Somalis to keep it low and reduce the intensity of guerrilla activity further in return for the prize of an American military relationship, Siad looked at it differently. Intensifying east-west hostility encouraged his wishful thinking: this time, he apparently felt, the Americans could be enticed into accepting Somali operations in the Ogaden . . . (C)

So rather than a reduction in Ogaden operations, we have had a steady expansion with more and more direct regular Somali military participation. This has reached its natural culmination over the past ten days in serious military engagements between regular Ethiopian and Somali forces, with both sides now reinforcing the units already engaged. The prospect is for further escalation, expanded Ethiopian air retaliation against Somali territory and perhaps—there are obviously some on the Ethiopian side urging such action—Ethiopian attacks into Somali territory. (C)

There is also a new ingredient in the present situation, one whose importance is still difficult to assess. The “Somali Salvation Front” which for a long time looked like nothing but an Ethiopian invention, appears to have some potential for attracting disaffected elements in Somalia. Best evidence for this is the increasing concern Siad shows for it. There are other indications that his own political position is weakening and that opposition to Siad in Somalia, partly perhaps as a result of the ferment generated by the refugees, is growing. Some of this opposition has no connection with Somali Salvation Front activity. (C)

Siad, by escalating the confrontation with Ethiopia at this time, is taking a more daring gamble than before. His own expectation must be that the potential U.S. relationship is sufficiently ensured to secure

³ See Documents 69–76.

⁴ See Document 82.

some degree of U.S. involvement in defending himself against Ethiopian air attack, and then more substantial backing. We deceive only ourselves if we prefer to believe Siad would not want full U.S. military support to defeat Ethiopia if he could contrive to get it.

Siad has already had considerable success in gaining humanitarian support for the Ogaden refugees who are—deplorable as their condition may be—largely the creation of his own policy of pursuing the war in the Ogaden to the point where the very people who are supposed to be the ultimate beneficiaries of it have had their home ground rendered uninhabitable. (C)

Siad may, of course, as he periodically intimates to us, be consciously risking *Gotterdammerung*. If his own political base is eroding and he sees no political future for himself within the framework of any policy that would lead to peaceful resolution of the Ogaden conflict—he loses little by gambling on bringing us in to back him. There has never been any evidence that Siad would ever reconcile himself more than temporarily to our desire to limit our involvement in the Somali-Ethiopian struggle. (C)

This is our dilemma. Are our interest in Somalia and our interest in Siad identical? I have always argued, as you know, that they should not be. There is more to Somalia than Siad. He is a good example of the harm that can be done to a country by an authoritarian leader who sells himself first to the Soviets and then to any other bidder and sacrifices the real national interests of his country as his mistakes propel him deeper into the whirlpool of events that outdistance his capacity to control them. A third, unsuccessful attempt to wrest territory from Ethiopia by force cannot—by any reasonable calculation one can make—end successfully for Siad. We cannot let ourselves be drawn into it to the extent that would resolve the issue in favor of Somalia. If the result is some degree of defeat for Siad, or prolonged heightened tension, Siad's own position is likely to be weakened fatally. Some group in Somalia is going to try to rid the country of him. Do we want to find ourselves trying to prop up a discredited Siad whose own internal power base is eroding? Do we want to take the opprobrium of letting Siad fall when he has identified himself with us? We may be closer to facing that unpleasant dilemma than we realize. (C)

I continue to be struck by the fact that the most ardent proponents of a U.S. policy of “damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead!” in respect to Somalia are those who know the least about it and have not studied the lessons of the recent history of the Horn. A serious assessment of our real strategic interests in SW Asia and what we can do to improve our position at a politically bearable cost must underscore the un wisdom of proceeding further with Siad and the desirability of positioning ourselves to cut potential losses from our current degree of entangle-

ment before it is too late. While the Somalis escalate the fighting in Ethiopia, our effort to gain facilities there should be put on the shelf.⁵ (C)

⁵ In a June 4 memorandum to Brzezinski, Wriggins “strongly” supported “Paul’s cautionary view.” He continued, “To be sure, Berbera and Modadishu are certainly geostrategically attractive. But they are not worth the politico-diplomatic and even possibly conflict risk so long as Siad Barre or an equally irredentist successor is in control.” (Carter Library, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 69, Somalia: 1/80–1/81) In a June 5 memorandum to Brzezinski, Ermarth wrote, “What troubles me most about Paul’s argument is that it is a prescription for passivity at a time when we can no longer afford to be passive.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Outside the System File, Box 57, 6/1–12/80) In a June 5 memorandum to Brzezinski, Odom wrote, “We would be better off politically in the region if we signed an agreement and later were thrown out by Siad for not supporting him, than to look too timid to strike a bargain in the first place.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 69, Somalia: 1/80–1/81) In a June 9 memorandum to Brzezinski, Funk agreed with Henze’s analysis, but felt the dangers were understated. He wrote, “My bottom line is this: it would be advantageous to play it mean and tough, but unless we really do have the political guts and the military muscle to engage in a fairly large action in Somalia, we will have our bluff called, and we will get our heads kicked in.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 48, Somalia/Horn of Africa: 2–10/80)

107. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McGiffert) to Secretary of Defense Brown and the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Claytor)¹

Washington, June 7, 1980

SUBJECT

SCC on Somalia—June 9²

(S) There are now large numbers of memoranda on this subject, but the facts really haven't changed:

1. In the long run, Ethiopia is strategically much more important than Somalia; US involvement with Somalia (which to a degree, will be taken as implicit support of Ogaden adventure) will lessen the chances of detaching Ethiopia from the USSR/Cuba over time.

2. From our strategic point of view, the Somali facilities would be militarily useful, but are certainly not vital. Denial of them to the Soviets has no great significance strategically as long as the Soviets have a position in Ethiopia and the PDRY.

3. Siad is weak and unreliable.

4. Although the Egyptians keep pushing us to help Somalia, the health of our relationship with Egypt is not particularly sensitive to whether we do so or not.

5. We should not count on significant Egyptian military assistance in case of an attack on Somalia, even if we were also involved in Somalia's defense. The Egyptian capability is limited and, despite brave words by Sadat, a significant military expedition would be politically unpopular (à la Yemen).

6. Berbera is particularly vulnerable. Successfully to counter an Ethiopian/Cuban ground attack will certainly require ground combat troops from outside. There is no obvious source for such troops except the US.³

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Harold Brown Papers, Box 50, Somalia. Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation indicates that Brown saw this memorandum. He wrote in the margin, "6/9. I discussed this with WGC [Christopher] before the SCC meeting. I disagree with this approach—we can't back out as this suggests. My limitation on commitment would be no U.S. ground troops; I think the Egyptians should be asked to commit on this. But for the moment, in-depth study is the right [illegible—response?]. HB."

² The date was changed by hand from June 10 to June 9. For the Summary of Conclusions of the June 9 SCC meeting, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Document 84.

³ An unknown hand wrote a question mark in the margin and a notation that reads, "This judgment strikes me as wrong based on my looking carefully at it a couple years ago. At any rate there's analysis to support either view. Yet [illegible]."

(S) All of this says to me that the US should not intervene militarily in Somalia and that therefore we should avoid a facility relationship which would, because our interests would be so directly involved, make it very difficult for us not to intervene. Let's limit ourselves to providing some defensive equipment, if we have to. Even for that, I hold my nose. And, as recommended, let's have commissioned an in-depth study of the implications of greater US involvement in Somalia.

David E. McGiffert⁴

⁴ McGiffert initiated "DEM" above this typed signature.

108. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter¹

Washington, July 26, 1980

[Omitted here are items unrelated to the Horn of Africa.]

2. *Ethiopia*. The Ethiopian Charge in Washington, on instructions from his government, yesterday asked us to recall Ambassador Chapin from Addis Ababa within two weeks, and said that if we do not, he will be declared *persona non grata*. The Charge complained that Chapin is hostile to the Ethiopian Government and people and is opposed to good bilateral relations. He claimed that the Government of Ethiopia wants better relations with us and hopes that with the removal of Chapin, relations would improve.

On Monday,² we will call the Charge back in to inform him that Ambassador Chapin will leave as requested. We will stress, however, that the decline in bilateral relations has resulted, not from Chapin's attitude, but from Ethiopia's systematic defense of Soviet positions, its disregard of human rights, and its refusal to provide fair compensation

¹ Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 15, State Department Evening Reports, 7/80. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum.

² July 28.

for expropriated property. We will also release a statement to the press defending Chapin and taking strong issue with the Ethiopian action.³

[Omitted are items unrelated to the Horn of Africa.]

5. *Somalia*. We have sent a message today telling the Somalia government that we will be prepared to receive a small delegation for a low visibility visit during the week of August 18. In reviewing today the full text of the Somalia message to us regarding the proposed facilities agreement, I have been impressed with the ambiguity of their reply.⁴ Although they insist that they want to agree they are not imposing "conditions," I think we must recognize that their signing a facilities agreement remains dependent upon discussions with their delegation about their proposed modifications of the draft agreement, as well as upon our answers to the seven difficult questions they have posed. For that reason, I think we should be very cautious about any public indication that we have reached agreement, to avoid a credibility problem if we are not able to consummate the agreement.⁵

³ Chapin left post on July 29. A Department of State spokesman announced that day that he had been recalled because of growing friction between the U.S. and Ethiopian Governments. ("U.S., at Ethiopia's Request, Tells Envoy to Return Home," *Washington Post*, July 30, p. A17)

⁴ See Document 105.

⁵ On August 22, the United States and Somalia exchanged diplomatic notes that allowed expanded U.S. access to Somalia's air and port facilities. The text of the Department of State announcement and Moose's August 26 statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee are printed in the Department of State, *Bulletin*, October 1980, p. 19.

109. Memorandum From Chris Shoemaker of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, September 5, 1980

SUBJECT

Military Construction in Somalia (U)

Madeline asked that I provide you with some details on DoD's FY81 plan for military construction in Somalia. (U)

The purpose of the FY81 program is to upgrade Somali facilities sufficiently to support increased US presence in the region in *peacetime*. When this phase of the three-year plan is completed, Somali facilities will be able to support P-3 ASW flights, fleet logistics aircraft, and will have limited storage for naval task forces. The FY81 program is an essential first step in improving Somali facilities to support combat operations in major contingencies, but it can be justified solely on the basis of its improvements for peacetime forces as well. This may become an important point because DoD is unsure how much it wants to spend in FY82 and 83 in Somalia. The following is a summary of the FY81 program. (C)

<i>Program Total:</i>	<i>\$10m</i>
<i>Berbera Port:</i>	<i>\$4.2m</i>
—mooring and fuel buoys.	
—small boat landing.	
—administration building.	
—cargo terminal.	
—communication and navigational aids.	
—storage facilities.	
<i>Berbera Airfield:</i>	<i>\$5.1m</i>
—upgrade of power and water utilities.	
—POL equipment and storage.	
—aircraft arresting gear.	
—sweep and seal of runways.	
—prefabricated housing and storage.	
—mobile control tower.	

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 69, Somalia: 1/80-1/81. Confidential. A stamped notation indicates that Brzezinski saw this memorandum on September 10.

Mogadishu Airfield: \$0.7m
—upgrade of runway.
—mobile navigation beacon.
—warehouse construction. (U)

**110. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Operations,
Central Intelligence Agency (McMahon) to the Director of
Central Intelligence Turner¹**

Washington, November 25, 1980

SUBJECT

Revised Memorandum of Notification

REFERENCE

Presidential Finding on Ethiopia Dated 16 April 1980

1. *Action Required.* That you release the attached Memorandum of Notification (MON) to the Members of the Special Coordination Committee.

2. *Background.* The Ethiopian program was originally approved in April 1980. A Finding signed on 16 April 1980 authorized the Agency, among other things, to contact and assess the willingness of influential opponents of the regime to cooperate in an effort to reduce Soviet influence in Ethiopia.² The first months of this effort have provided indications that with financial and other support, direction and encouragement, the disparate elements now comprising the opposition could be molded into an instrument to influence the regime toward a more moderate, nonaligned course. The program's fundamental directive is to influence the regime, not to overthrow it, although we believe that some program assets may well become participants in a future government.

The attached MON is revised to reflect discussions which took place involving CIA, NSC, Department of Justice and Department of

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Congressional Affairs, Job 82B00035R: Committee Files, Box 2, Folder 14: Presidential Finding-Ethiopia 16 Apr 80. Secret. Sent via Deputy DCI Carlucci. An unknown hand wrote "Ethiopia" at the top of the page.

² See Document 104.

State representatives.³ The MON's revision stemmed from the Department of State's concern that an earlier version of the MON appeared to describe the aim of the program to be the destabilization of Mengistu's regime, which was not our intent.

3. *Authority.* Our position is that this operation is covered by the language and consistent with the basic spirit and thrust of the 16 April 1980 Presidential Finding on Ethiopia, which in part authorizes "contacting and supporting appropriate elements in the Ethiopian Government, political opposition and other pertinent sectors in Ethiopia and abroad."

4. *Staff Position.* This MON has been coordinated with OGC, OLC and Director, NFAC.

5. *Recommendation.* It is recommended that you approve the release of the attached Memorandum to Members of the SCC.⁴

All portions Secret.

John N. McMahon

Attachment

Memorandum of Notification to the Members of the Special Coordination Committee⁵

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Expanded Support to Ethiopian Oppositionists

REFERENCE

Presidential Finding on Ethiopia Dated 16 April 1980

1. *Background:* This Memorandum is a revision of the 24 October 1980 Memorandum of Notification to the SCC. The 16 April 1980 Presidential Finding authorizes CIA to use liaison and unilateral assets to "foster opposition to the pro-Soviet character of the present Ethiopian regime and encourage pro-Western attitudes in Ethiopia." This ongoing

³ The Office of Intelligence and Policy Review of the Department of Justice provided a legal assessment, dated October 24. It is attached to another copy of McMahon's memorandum. (National Security Council, Carter Intelligence Files, Box 31, Sept–Dec, 1980)

⁴ According to stamped notations, Carlucci concurred and Turner approved the MON for release to the SCC on November 25.

⁵ Secret.

covert program has had some tactical successes in recent months, and there is growing evidence that key Ethiopian officials are disenchanted with their dependence on the Soviet Union for aid and advice. The aim of CIA's program is to heighten this disenchantment and to try to move Mengistu toward closer relations with the United States Government and other Western countries. The goals of this program do not include Mengistu's overthrow, nor does the Agency seek to confront the current regime in any military sense.

Within this context, CIA proposes to expand its support to Ethiopian oppositionists to provide for dissident activities and sentiment. Several anti-regime and secessionist groups exist, but they are oriented toward maintaining military pressure on the regime to achieve their own narrow goals, e.g., independence for Tigre Province, for the Oromo tribe, for Eritrea Province. Opposition to the regime is severely fragmented. Some opposition leaders are too Marxist, others too ethnic, regional or royalist to attract a significant following. Moreover, since most of the regime's active opponents are secessionists, the nationalist high ground has been yielded to the regime, which acquires some measure of legitimacy as the sole force working to prevent the fragmentation of the country. Ethiopians inside and outside the country who oppose the regime *and* secessionism have nowhere to turn and, as a result, the regime faces no unified, credible opposition.

2. *Operational Plan:* We plan to establish a loose grouping of exiled Ethiopians who are articulating selected moderate programs which they will encourage the present government to adopt. This is not intended as a mechanism to overthrow Mengistu, but instead is designed to encourage moderation of the regime's policies and the inclusion of more moderate voices within the existing government. The collegium would be small (a dozen principals and about 15 staff assistants) and handpicked to include some prominent Ethiopians with proven competence and experience in their fields (former cabinet ministers, diplomats, jurists, professors, economists). The associates will meet infrequently in Europe, and most of their work will be done as individuals where they now reside in the U.K., U.S., Sweden and West Germany. All have been contacted and have agreed to work on this project full time or part time over the next two years. They are prepared to begin working immediately. Only a select few of them will be witting of CIA's sponsorship of their activities which will be coordinated by an Ethiopian with whom CIA has been working closely for the past seven months.

Each member of the group will be responsible for:

- developing a plan to revamp Ethiopian Government policy in his field of specialization;
- spotting potential sympathizers in key positions working in his field inside Ethiopia.

—finding ways to insinuate more moderate, pragmatic solutions to Ethiopians' problems into the regime's programs (using personal contacts, focused publicity and propaganda, etc.)

Members of the group will develop programs to redirect Ethiopia's economic ties to communist countries, revamp its revolutionary justice system; mitigate the effects of six years of Marxist propaganda in its schools; redraft the constitution and social legislation; wean the armed forces and security services away from dependence on Soviet and Cuban advisors and equipment; reorganize the labor union along more democratic lines; relax restrictions on journalists and the clergy; and co-opt certain secessionist leaders into supporting the concept of limited regional autonomy within a unified Ethiopian state.

3. *Goals:*

—Stimulate opposition to Marxist policies and programs within Ethiopia;

—Encourage moderation of the regime's policies and more moderate voices within the existing government;

—Work to disaffect key nationalists in positions of power within the regime by publicizing alternative programs developed by former colleagues with established professional credentials.

4. [*8½ lines not declassified*]

5. *Policy Authority:* CIA believes that this operation is covered by the language and consistent with the basic spirit and thrust of the 16 April 1980 Presidential Finding on Ethiopia, which in part authorizes "contacting and supporting appropriate elements in the Ethiopian Government, political opposition and other pertinent sectors in Ethiopia and abroad." At the same time, it should be noted that the specific recommendation to create an association of exiled Ethiopian oppositionists was not included in any of the political action options CIA submitted for SCC review last March as part of our proposed CA program for Ethiopia at that time.⁶ Furthermore, the estimated costs of the particular operation over the next two years are more than double the combined cost of the rest of our Ethiopian CA program. Given these considerations, CIA is hereby notifying the SCC of this proposed activity prior to implementation.

6. *Subsequent Reporting:* Reporting on this operation will be submitted to SCC as results become available.

7. *Implementation:* Members were notified by memorandum on 24 October 1980 of CIA's intention to move forward with the implementation of this proposal if no objections were perceived by close of business

⁶ See Document 103.

31 October 1980. The Department of State requested that this memorandum be revised to include the clarification of objectives appearing in the first paragraph of the Background section above. On 7 November 1980, representatives of the Department of State, Department of Justice, NSC and CIA agreed in a meeting at the Department of State that the proposal for a grouping of Ethiopian oppositionists could be implemented on the understanding that the objective of the program would be later clarified in this revised Memorandum of Notification. The representatives agreed that the proposal was consistent with the existing finding and represented an expansion of the present program within the scope of the existing finding. This memorandum is provided for record purposes only and represents the agreement concerning the objectives of the program as described herein which the Agency has been authorized by the SCC to implement.

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