

**FOREIGN
RELATIONS
OF THE
UNITED
STATES**

1977-1980

Volume XII

AFGHANISTAN



**DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE**

Washington



**Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1977–1980**

Volume XII

Afghanistan

Editor David Zierler
General Editor Adam M. Howard

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN
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About the Series

The *Foreign Relations of the United States* series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the U.S. Government. The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, under the direction of the General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.

Public Law 102-138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, established a new statutory charter for the preparation of the series which was signed by President George H.W. Bush on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102-138 added a new Title IV to the Department of State's Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 4351, et seq.).

The statute requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the U.S. Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the *Foreign Relations* series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded. The editors are convinced that this volume meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing.

Sources for the Foreign Relations Series

The *Foreign Relations* statute requires that the published record in the *Foreign Relations* series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government en-

gaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State historians by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. Most of the sources consulted in the preparation of this volume have been declassified and are available for review at the National Archives and Records Administration (Archives II) in College Park, Maryland.

The editors of the *Foreign Relations* series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files (“lot files”) of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department’s Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and the memoranda of conversations between the President and the Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. All of the Department’s central files for 1977–1981 are available in electronic or microfilm formats at Archives II, and may be accessed using the Access to Archival Databases (AAD) tool. Almost all of the Department’s decentralized office files covering this period, which the National Archives deems worthy of permanent retention, have been transferred to or are in the process of being transferred from the Department’s custody to Archives II.

Research for *Foreign Relations* volumes is undertaken through special access to restricted documents at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and other agencies. While all the material printed in this volume has been declassified, some of it is extracted from still-classified documents. The staff of the Carter Library is processing and declassifying many of the documents used in this volume, but they may not be available in their entirety at the time of publication. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Carter Library include some of the most significant foreign-affairs related documentation from White House offices, the Department of State, and other federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Some of the research for volumes in this subseries was done in Carter Library record collections scanned for the Remote Archive Capture (RAC) project. This project, which is administered by the National Archives and Records Administration’s Office of Presidential Libraries, was designed to coordinate the declassification of still-classified records held in various Presidential libraries. As a result of the way in which records were scanned for the RAC, the editors of the *Foreign Relations* series were not always able to determine whether attachments to a given document were in fact attached to the paper copy of the docu-

ment in the Carter Library file. In such cases, some editors of the *Foreign Relations* series have indicated this ambiguity by stating that the attachments were "Not found attached."

Editorial Methodology

Documents in this volume are presented chronologically according to Washington time. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the *Foreign Relations* series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the Chief of the Editing and Publishing Division. The original document is reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents within the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the documents are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words or phrases underlined in the original document are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the original text, and a list of abbreviations and terms is included in the front matter of each volume. In telegrams, the telegram number (including special designators such as Secto) is printed at the start of the text of the telegram.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount and, where possible, the nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld after declassification review have been accounted for and are listed in their chronological place with headings, source notes, and the number of pages not declassified. All brackets that appear in the original document are so identified in the footnotes. All ellipses are in the original documents.

The first footnote to each document indicates the sources of the document and its original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related docu-

ments printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than to page numbers.

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the *Foreign Relations* statute, monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation of the series and declassification of records. The Advisory Committee does not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the series, but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and reviews volumes as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory obligations.

Declassification Review

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, conducted the declassification review for the Department of State of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 13526 on Classified National Security Information and applicable laws.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The declassification review of this volume, which began in 2013 and was completed in 2017, resulted in the decision to withhold 3 documents in full, excise a paragraph or more in 12 documents, and make minor excisions of less than a paragraph in 162 documents.

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process described above, that the documentation and editorial notes presented here provide a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of the Carter administration's policy toward Afghanistan.

Adam M. Howard, Ph.D.
Acting Historian

Preface

Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series

This volume is part of a *Foreign Relations* subseries that documents the most important foreign policy issues of the administration of Jimmy Carter. This volume focuses on U.S. policy in response to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, a process that began with Moscow's growing involvement in Afghan politics following the Communist revolution in April 1978 and culminating with the mass influx of Soviet military forces in December 1979. Until the Communist coup that overthrew President Mohammed Daoud Khan, U.S. diplomatic and strategic interest in Afghanistan was minor, and focused largely on stanching the flow of illegal narcotics through that country. Prior to 1978, Washington viewed Afghanistan as a relatively stable and non-aligned country that did not figure prominently in the global Cold War competition. Accordingly, Afghanistan was not a major focal point for the first year and a half of the Carter administration. By 1978, at the first sign that Afghanistan may fall into the Soviet orbit, Washington's interest in Afghanistan increased dramatically.

By the time Moscow launched a military takeover of the Afghan government at the end of 1979, the Afghanistan crisis rose to the top of the President's foreign policy agenda as the administration sought ways to coerce the Soviets to withdraw. In the days following the invasion, the President and his foreign policy team adopted a triple-pronged strategy of diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, and covert aid to the *Mujahidin*, the Afghan resistance fighters, with the help of Pakistan. Carter's policy laid the groundwork for what would become the largest covert operation in U.S. history during the Reagan administration, ending with the withdrawal of the last Soviet forces from Afghanistan nearly a decade after the invasion.

Readers who wish to understand the broader context of the Carter administration's policy in Afghanistan should consult the chapter on Pakistan in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia*. Because of Pakistan's close coordination with the United States to fight against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (due in large part to its leaders' fears that Moscow sought domination of Pakistan), this chapter is indispensable for understanding Washington's strategic interest in limiting Moscow's threat to the region, and its tactical coordination with Pakistan to support Afghanistan's anti-Soviet resistance movement. Readers should also consult *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980,*

Volume VI, Soviet Union for a broader view of U.S.-Soviet relations during this period; the crisis in Afghanistan, coming already at a low point in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, is heavily documented in this volume. Also of interest are *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980, Volume XXV, Global Issues*, which documents the multi-national boycott of the 1980 Olympic Games in protest of the Soviet intervention of Afghanistan, and *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980, Volume XXVII, Western Europe*, which includes material on how the Carter administration coordinated its Afghanistan policy with its closest allies.

Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1977-1980, Volume XII

This volume documents the major foreign policy decisions taken by the Carter administration in response to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Documentation in this volume includes memoranda; records of discussions within the U.S. policymaking community as well as with foreign officials; cables to and from U.S. diplomatic as well as intelligence posts; and papers that set forth policy issues and options and that show decisions or actions taken. The documentation emphasizes both the process by which U.S. policy developed and the major consequences of its implementation.

The most striking feature of this volume's organization is chronological. Until the spring of 1978 and from the standpoint of U.S. foreign policy, Afghanistan was a relatively stable, non-aligned country. Before then, events in Kabul rarely registered in the Oval Office and the National Security Council, and cables to and from the Embassy and the Department of State were relatively few and did not contain much of high-level concern. It therefore follows that only a tiny percentage of this volume's documentation covers the first sixteen months of the Carter White House. But with the communist-led overthrow of President Khan during the spring of 1978, and the obvious implications this had on the Cold War, Washington's concern and interest in the internal workings of Afghanistan grew in lockstep with the Soviet Union's political and ultimately military intervention in that country. Beginning with telegram 3239 from Kabul, April 27, 1978, which reported that President Daoud was "gone completely and forever," the crisis in Afghanistan steadily rose in importance for U.S. policymakers over the next year and a half. With relations improving between the new Afghan regime and the Soviet Union throughout the remainder of 1978, the Pakistani government grew concerned. Pakistan's border with Afghanistan, long a source of tension, now meant that any conflict could draw Islamabad into direct confrontation with a military superpower. In August, Pakistani President Muhammed Zia Ul-Haq sought guarantees from Washington as a deterrent against what he considered

Soviet-backed Afghan encroachments on Pakistani territory. By the end of the year, Pakistan's fears of expanding Soviet influence in Afghanistan were substantiated: Kabul and Moscow signed a "friendship treaty" in December affirming economic, military, and political cooperation. Meanwhile, U.S.-Afghan relations deteriorated sharply, from which they never recovered, in the wake of the kidnapping and death of Ambassador Adolph Dubs, who was abducted in February 1979 by Afghan extremists in Kabul and eventually killed during a botched rescue attempt commanded by Afghan and Soviet authorities. Shortly after this tragic incident U.S. officials considered options to assist Afghan insurgents opposed to the communist regime in Kabul. At this juncture, lethal aid was considered too risky. A revolt against the regime was already underway in the Afghan countryside, and Pakistan was increasingly tolerant of insurgent activity along its border with Afghanistan, and with the destabilization of the central government came increased likelihood that Moscow would resort to military intervention. In July, Washington committed to a covert program to aid Afghan insurgents by funneling communications equipment, non-lethal combat materiel, and cash through Pakistan. It was a modest beginning to an operation that would ultimately become the longest and largest in U.S. history to that point.

By the end of 1979 the insurgency was threatening to depose the central government in Kabul, and the Kremlin had lost confidence in the recently ascended Afghan leader Hafizullah Amin. Citing the Brezhnev Doctrine, which held that once a country had turned communist, Moscow would resolve to keep it in the "revolutionary" camp, the Soviet leadership decided to execute a full political and military takeover of Afghanistan. On December 25, 1979, Soviet forces invaded the country and killed Amin in Kabul at the Presidential Palace. Two days later President Carter approved a new covert action to send lethal aid to the Afghan *Mujahidin* insurgents, rebuked the invasion in a strongly worded letter to Brezhnev, and undertook an array of diplomatic and economic sanctions in consultation with U.S. allies to protest Soviet policy.

Just as the dearth of documentation covering 1977 and the first third of 1978 illustrate the unimportance of Afghanistan along the broad spectrum of U.S. foreign policy, the brief period of the immediate run-up and aftermath of the late-December Soviet invasion quickly became one of the tensest periods of the Carter presidency. The documentation covering the period two weeks prior and following the Soviet invasion accounts for approximately a quarter of the entire volume; this portion comprises intelligence reports, memoranda of conversation, and minutes of meetings which together show Washington's somewhat chaotic and reactive response to the crisis.

As numerous documents in this volume demonstrate, U.S. officials were well aware of the possibility of a Soviet invasion at least a year before the actual event. Documentation in the last half of the volume, covering 1980, is devoted almost exclusively to the administration's multi-layered policy challenging the Soviets in Afghanistan. Although the Carter administration's stated goal was to make the Soviets regret the intervention, and ultimately compel a withdrawal, this policy also had the immediate objective of deterring the Soviets from threatening Pakistan. This portion of the compilation shows close cooperation between Washington and Islamabad and a consequent strengthening of the Afghan insurgency. The Soviets in turn protested that they would leave Afghanistan once the United States ceased "meddling" in that country's internal affairs.

By the end of the volume the documents show that this pattern had become well-established. Following the immediate crisis atmosphere after the Soviet invasion, President Carter's attention was once again drawn elsewhere; notably to the Iranian hostage crisis. Although the compilation concludes with Carter's presidency, U.S. policy in Afghanistan should be seen as a continuum into the Reagan era; two volumes covering the Reagan administration and the first month of the Bush administration (at which point Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan) should be consulted when they are published. Together, readers should ultimately consult this trilogy of volumes spanning three presidential administrations which will show a remarkable continuity of policy and U.S. resolve across a ten-year span.

Acknowledgments

The editors wish to thank officials at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, the National Archives and Records Administration (Archives II) at College Park, Maryland, the Library of Congress, the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of Defense. The editors also wish to give special thanks to Dr. Steve Galpern, a former member of the Office of the Historian and current analyst in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, who coordinated work and storage space vital for the completion of this volume. David Zierler collected and selected documentation and edited the volume under the supervision of David Geyer, Chief of the Europe Division, and Adam Howard, General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series. David Geyer and Stephen P. Randolph reviewed the volume. Kerry Hite and Dean Weatherhead coordinated the declassification review, under the supervision of Carl Ashley, Chief of the Declassification and Publishing Division. The editors wish to thank the Historical Programs Staff/FRUS Coordination Staff at CIA for their assistance in the declassification review of this volume, as well as the Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review (DOPSR), for coordinating the re-

view within the Department of Defense. Margaret Ball, Rita Baker, and Kerry Hite did the copy and technical editing under the supervision of Mandy A. Chalou, Chief of the Editing and Publishing Division.

David Zierler, Ph.D.
Historian

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Sources

Sources for Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

In preparation for this volume, the editors made extensive use primarily of Presidential materials held in the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Department of State materials held in the National Archives and Records Administration (Archives II) in College Park, Maryland; National Intelligence Council Files held in the archives of the Central Intelligence Agency; the papers of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, housed at the Library of Congress; the Carter administration Intelligence Files, held in the National Security Council archives, Washington, D.C.; and the Afghan War Collection held in the archives of the Department of Defense, Washington, D.C. Of the presidential materials, numerous collections proved to be valuable for this volume. As a general matter, the most noteworthy organizational characteristic of Afghanistan-related materials at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library is their wide dispersal throughout the archive's collections. Unlike many other countries or topic areas, whose main holdings are largely confined to a relatively small number of collections, significant documentation on Afghanistan can be found in over twenty distinct collections in the Carter Library. This presents obvious challenges to the researcher, because in many cases it is difficult to ascertain why a particular document appears in one collection and not another. Nonetheless, the broad distribution of Afghanistan materials throughout the library's archives speaks to the importance of complexity of the crisis of the Soviet intervention as a "hot flash" in the global Cold War against the Soviet Union. The intervention in Afghanistan had both strategic repercussions requiring a worldwide diplomatic offensive and a local immediacy that policymakers determined needed a covert response at the tactical level. This guaranteed that broad swathes of the U.S. foreign policy apparatus found itself involved with the crisis.

The following are the most fulsome collections for Afghanistan, although readers should consult below for a complete list of relevant collections at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library. Collections of a general nature which include the greatest amount of Afghanistan material are: the National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File for Afghanistan; the National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Office File, Country Chron; and the Zbigniew Brzezinski Donated Material Collection. The three most important staff collections are: the National Security Affairs, Staff Material Thornton North/South File; the National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR and East-West Bre-

ment Subject File; and the National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File. The National Security Council Institutional Files contain a full record of the National Security Council's cabinet-level meetings on Afghanistan and related memoranda, which together show the development at the highest levels of the Carter administration's multi-pronged strategy to challenge the Soviet intervention. The National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File contains, as the name suggests, material deemed so sensitive that it was to be closely held and not included in the regular framework of the NSC's document transmission and filing system. The National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File contains several important letters to and from the President to international leaders regarding the crisis in Afghanistan. The National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables file contains telegrams which were deemed sufficiently important to warrant Brzezinski's, and in some cases, the President's attention. The National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Trip File contains many memoranda of conversation and related documents covering Brzezinski's diplomatic missions in the months after the Soviet intervention. The Carter Presidential Papers, Plains File, President's Personal Foreign Affairs File contains documentation from which the President drew to write his memoirs. This unique collection offers insight into the issues Carter deemed significant as he undertook to shape his own legacy as President. The National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's CIA Daily Brief File is a clearinghouse for the short intelligence reports the President received every morning. Because of the highly charged and fluid nature of the crisis in Afghanistan, these reports provide a real-time picture of the President's decision making based on the latest and most sensitive intelligence reporting.

The Carter Administration Intelligence Files, officially part of the Carter Library's collection but housed in Washington D.C., are the main source for meeting notes and minutes of the Special Coordinating Committee's (SCC) discussions on Afghanistan. Because the covert action to support the Afghan *Mujahidin* was at the heart of the Carter administration's policy in Afghanistan, this collection is arguably the most vital in the entire volume. Other important documentation originating with the SCC can be found in the Carter Library's collection, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File.

Of the Department of State materials, four collections proved to be especially rich in material for this volume. The Central Foreign Policy File is a repository for telegrams between the Department of State and U.S. diplomatic posts. The cable traffic out of Kabul provides an extensive and oftentimes dramatic narrative of events on the ground there, particularly during two episodes: the death of Ambassador Dubs; and

the decision-making surrounding a disillusioned Soviet soldier who sought refuge, and possibly defection, from the USSR. Embassy Kabul's reporting was also the starting point for the Department's worldwide diplomatic initiative to protest Moscow's intervention in Afghanistan. The lot file for Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs David Newsom contains many important memoranda between the Department's highest ranking officials and their counterparts at other U.S. government agencies; the Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Intelligence Liaison File contains key documents which detail highly sensitive cooperation of the United States with third-party countries to assist the covert action. The Executive Secretariat Sensitive and Super Sensitive File contains key memoranda on Afghanistan involving Secretary of State Vance. Finally, the lot file for Marshall Shulman, Special Adviser to the Secretary of State on Soviet Affairs, offers several important documents which show the complex diplomatic challenges facing the United States in light of the Soviet Union's aggression in Afghanistan.

The donated papers of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown contain several documents included in this volume which show that the Department of Defense was a crucial player in the policymaking process.

Of the documents from the Central Intelligence Agency, two main types of records proved most useful. The general records of the CIA and its offices, including the National Intelligence Council, contain intelligence reporting from the field, as well as related memoranda originating at CIA headquarters. The second type of record is "finished intelligence" meant for distribution outside the CIA based on intelligence deemed sufficiently reliable to be used in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy. Together, these types of records demonstrate that the CIA reported accurately on both the growing political crisis in Afghanistan and consequent likelihood of Soviet intervention, as well as on the impact of the U.S. policy on Soviet decision making.

The Afghan War Collection, housed in the Department of Defense, exists as a matter of bureaucratic happenstance. In the case of certain materials related to Afghanistan, the DOD did not maintain a complete archive of its historic materials in the way other agencies, as is the practice of the CIA or the presidential libraries, for example. What can be found in DOD holdings is a collection of documents which were never transferred to the National Archives. This collection contains a wealth of vitally important documents for this volume—documents which in many cases were not found elsewhere.

In addition to the paper files cited below, a growing number of documents are available on the Internet. The Office of the Historian maintains a list of these Internet resources on its website and encourages readers to consult that site on a regular basis.

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National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland

RG 59, Records of the Department of State

Central Foreign Policy File

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Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Atlanta, Georgia

Brzezinski Donated Material

Donated Historical Materials

Vice Presidential Papers

Mondale Papers

National Security Issues Collection

National Security Affairs

Brzezinski Material

Agency File

Cables File

Country File

General Odom File

Brzezinski Office File

Country Chron File

President's Daily CIA Brief File

President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders

- Subject File
- Trip File
- VIP Visit File
- Staff Material
 - Defense/Security
 - Ermarth File
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Abbreviations and Terms

AAA, anti-aircraft artillery
ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
ACQ, acquired
AD, Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
A/DCM, Acting Deputy Chief of Mission
Af, Afghan
AINTELG, Air Intelligence Group
ALF, Afghan Liberation Front
Amb, Ambassador
Amcit, American citizen
ANLF, Afghan National Liberation Front
ANZUS, Australia, New Zealand, United States
A/O, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Operations
AP, anti-personnel
APC, armored personnel carrier
ASAP, as soon as possible
ASD/ISA, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
ASEAN, Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASW, anti-submarine warfare
AT, anti-tank
AWACS, Airborne Warning and Control System

BMD, ballistic missile defense
BVB, Brzezinski-Vance-Brown

C, Confidential; Carter
CA, covert action
CAT, Civil Aviation Talks (U.S.-Soviet)
CCD, Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
CDE, Conference on Disarmament in Europe
CEMA, Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CENTO, Central Treaty Organization
Cherokee, telegraphic distribution channel for eyes only messages between the Secretary of State and an Ambassador
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
CIA/DDO, Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency
CINCEUR, Commander in Chief, European Command
CINCPAC, Commander in Chief, Pacific Command
CJCS, Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CNO, Chief of Naval Operations
COCOM, Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls
COMNAVINTCOM, Commander, Naval Intelligence Command
ConGen, Consul General; Consulate General
COS, Chief of Staff; Chief of Station
CPSU, Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CSCE, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CTB, Comprehensive Test Ban

XXIV Abbreviations and Terms

CV, Cyrus Vance

CW, chemical weapons

D, Office of the Deputy Secretary of State

DA, David Aaron

DAS, Deputy Assistant Secretary

DATT, Defense Attaché

DCI, Director of Central Intelligence

DCM, Deputy Chief of Mission

DDCI, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

DDO, Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency

DDPMA, Deputy Director, Politico-Military Affairs (Joint Staff)

Depsec, Deputy Secretary

Dept, Department

DI, Directorate of Intelligence

DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency

Dissem, dissemination

DOD, Department of Defense

DOI, date of information

DRA, Democratic Republic of Afghanistan

EA, East Asia

EC, European Community

EE, Eastern Europe

EM, Edmund Muskie

EmbOff, Embassy officer

ER, Office of Economic Research, Central Intelligence Agency

ESF, Economic Support Fund

EST, Eastern Standard Time

EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

EUR/RPM, Office of NATO and Atlantic Political-Military Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

EUR/SOV, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

Exdis, Exclusive Distribution

FBIS, Foreign Broadcast Information Service

FGI, foreign government information

FMS, Foreign Military Sales

FonSec, Foreign Secretary

FRG, Federal Republic of Germany

FSN, Foreign Service National

FY, Fiscal Year

FYI, for your information

GDR, German Democratic Republic

GOA, Government of Afghanistan

GOP, Government of Pakistan

Govt, Government

H and I, harassment and interdiction

HI, Hezbe-i-Islami Afghanistan

IALA, Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan

- ICA, International Communication Agency
 ICBM, intercontinental ballistic missile
 ICRC, International Committee of the Red Cross
 IFI, international financial institution
 IIM, Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
 IMET, International Military Education and Training
 INI, Islamic nationalist insurgents
 INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
 INR/DDC, Office of the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
 INR/EEA, Office of East European Assistance within the Office of Research and Analysis for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
 INR/PMT, Office of Research and Analysis for Politico-Military Research, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
 INR/RNA, Office of Research and Analysis for the Near East and South Asia, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
 INR/RNA/SOA, Office of Research and Analysis for Near East and South Asia, South Asia Division, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
 INR/RSE, Office of Research and Analysis for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
 IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
 IO/UNP, Office of United Nations Political Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
 ISA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
 ISID, Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (Pakistan)
 IWG, Interagency Working Group
- J-5, Plans Directorate (Joint Staff)
 J, Jimmy Carter
 JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- KGB, *Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti* or Soviet Committee for State Security
 km, kilometer
- L/PM, Assistant Legal Adviser for Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State
 LAW, light anti-tank weapon
 LDC, less developed country
 LOC, line of communication
 LOU, Limited Official Use
 LRTNF, long-range theater nuclear forces
 LTDP, Long-Term Defense Plan (NATO)
- MAP, Military Assistance Program
 MBFR, Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions
 MDS, Marshall D. Shulman
 MEA, Ministry of External Affairs
 Memcon, memorandum of conversation
 MFA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
 MFN, most favored nation
 mm, millimeter
 MR, motorized regiment
- NAC, North Atlantic Council

XXVI Abbreviations and Terms

NAM, Non-Aligned Movement
NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEA, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
NEA/PAB, Office of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
NESA, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, Central Intelligence Agency
NFAC, National Foreign Assessment Center
NFI, national foreign intelligence
NFIRA, National Front for the Islamic Revolution of Afghanistan
Niact, Night Action
NIC, National Intelligence Council
NID, National Intelligence Daily
NIO, National Intelligence Officer
NLF, National Liberation Front (Vietnam)
NMRC, National Military Revolutionary Council (Afghanistan)
Nocontract, not releasable to contractors
Nodis, no distribution
Noforn, no foreign distribution
Notal, not received by all addressees
NRC, Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NSA, National Security Agency
NSC, National Security Council
NWFP, Northwest Frontier Province

OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OMB, Office of Management and Budget
OPA, Office of Political Analysis, Central Intelligence Agency
Ops, Operations
OPEC, Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
Orcon, originator controlled

PAB, Office of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
Pak, Pakistan; Pakistani
PD, Presidential Directive; Presidential Determination
PDB, President's Daily Brief
PDPA, People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
PDRY, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen
Perm Rep, Permanent Representative
P.L., Public Law
PM, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State
POL, political
POL/ECON, Political/Economic Sections of the Embassy
POLAD, Political Advisor
PPP, Pakistan Peoples Party
PRC, People's Republic of China; Policy Review Committee
PRM, Presidential Review Memorandum
PTT, postal, telegraph, and telephone

RA, Radio Afghanistan
RDF, Rapid Deployment Force
Ref, reference
refair, reference airgram
reftel, reference telegram

RG, Record Group
RMO, Regional Medical Officer
Roger Channel, channel for communications between the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) and the Chief of Mission
rpt, repeat
RSO, Regional Security Officer
RV, re-entry vehicle

S, Secret; Office of the Secretary of State
SA-7, man-portable, shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile
SACEUR, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
SAG, Saudi Arabian Government
SALT, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SecDef, Secretary of Defense
Secto, series indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of State while traveling
SC, Security Council (United Nations)
SCC, Special Coordination Committee
Septel, separate telegram
SFRC, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
SHAPE, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe
SIGINT, signals intelligence
sitrep, situation report
S/MS, Office of Marshall Shulman, Special Adviser to the Secretary of State
S/P, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
SNIE, Special National Intelligence Estimate
Specat, special category message
S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
SSCI, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
S/S-I, Information Management Section, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
S/S-O, Operations Center, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
S/S-S, Secretariat Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
Stadis, (Department of) State Distribution
SU, Soviet Union
Subj, Subject
SY, Scotland Yard
SYG, Secretary-General

tacair, tactical aircraft
TASS, official Soviet news agency
TDY, temporary duty
TNE, theater nuclear forces
Tosec, series indicator for telegram to the Secretary of State while traveling
TS, Top Secret
TT, Thomas Thornton
Tudeh, Iranian Communist Party

U, Unclassified
U.S., United States
UIA, United Islamic Alliance
UILFA, United Islamic Liberation Front of Afghanistan
UK, United Kingdom
UN, United Nations
UNDP, United Nations Development Program
UNGA, United Nations General Assembly

XXVIII Abbreviations and Terms

UNHCR, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNSC, United Nations Security Council

USAF, United States Air Force

USAID, United States Agency for International Development

USC, United States Code

USDA, United States Department of Agriculture

USDEL, United States Delegation

USG, United States Government

USIA, United States Information Agency

USICA, United States International Communication Agency

USLO, United States Liaison Office

USNATO, United States Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

USUN, United States Mission to the United Nations

VOA, Voice of America

VP, Vice President

WH, White House

YAR, Yemen Arab Republic

Z, Zulu time (Greenwich Mean Time)

ZB, Zbigniew Brzezinski

Persons

- Aaron, David L.**, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Abdulilah, Syed**, Vice President of Afghanistan from February 1978 until April 1978
- Acheson, Dean G.**, Secretary of State from 1949 until 1953
- al-Asad (Assad), Hafez**, President of Syria
- al-Sadat, Anwar**, President of Egypt
- Amin, Hafizullah**, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs from May 1978 until July 1979; Prime Minister after July 1979; and President and Prime Minister of Afghanistan from September 1979 until his assassination in December 1979
- Amstutz, J. Bruce**, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Kabul; Chargé d'Affaires ad interim in Kabul from February 1979 to February 1980
- Andropov, Yury**, Chairman of the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB)
- Arbatov, Georgiy**, Director, Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Science, Moscow
- Arif, K.M.**, Lieutenant General, Chief, Pakistani Martial Law Administration Staff
- Azzam, Salim**, Director, Islamic Conference of Europe
- Baker, Howard**, Senator (R-Tennessee), Senate Minority Leader from March 1980 until January 1981
- Baraz, Robert**, Director, Office of Research and Analysis for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
- Barre, Mohamed Siad**, President of Somalia
- Barre, Raymond**, Prime Minister of France
- Barry, Robert L.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
- Bartholomew, Reginald H.**, Deputy Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, from January until November 1977; member, USSR/East Europe Cluster, National Security Council Staff, from November 1977 until April 1979; Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, from July 1979
- Bazargan, Mehdi**, Prime Minister of Iran from February 1979 until November 1979
- Bell, Griffin**, U.S. Attorney General from January 26, 1977, until July 19, 1979
- Bergland, Robert**, U.S. Secretary of Agriculture
- Bessmertnykh, Alexander A.**, Counselor at the Soviet Embassy in Washington
- Biao, Geng**, Chinese Vice Premier
- Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali**, Pakistani Prime Minister until July 1977; tried and executed in April 1979
- Blackwill, Robert**, member, West Europe Cluster, National Security Council Staff, from September 1979 until January 1981
- Blood, Archer**, Acting Chargé d'Affaires ad interim, U.S. Embassy in Kabul from October 1979 until November 1979
- Bloomfield, Lincoln P.**, member, Global Issues Cluster, National Security Council Staff, from June 1979 until August 1980
- Borel, Dominique**, Representative to the Asian Subcontinent for the International Committee of the Red Cross
- Bowdler, William G.**, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, from April 1978 until December 1979
- Bremont, Marshall**, member, USSR/East Europe Cluster, National Security Council Staff, from May 1979 until January 1981
- Brezhnev, Leonid I.**, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

Brown, Harold, Secretary of Defense

Brzezinski, Zbigniew K., President's Assistant for National Security Affairs

Byrd, Robert C., Senator (D–West Virginia); Senate Majority Leader

Carlucci, Frank C., Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from February 1978

Carrington, Lord (Peter Alexander Carrington), Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom from May 1979

Carter, J. Hodding, III, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and Department of State Spokesman from March 1977 until June 1980

Carter, James Earl, Jr. (Jimmy), President of the United States

Chai, Zemin, Chinese Ambassador to the United State from March 1979

Christopher, Warren M., Deputy Secretary of State from February 1977

Church, Frank, Senator (D–Idaho), Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee from January 1979 until January 1981

Clarke, Bruce, Director, National Foreign Assessment Center

Clifford, Clark M., President's Special Emissary to Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, and India during the Carter administration

Cogan, Charles, Chief, Near Eastern and South Asia Division, Directorate of Operations, Central Intelligence Agency

Constable, Peter D., Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Islamabad from 1976 until 1979; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from July 1979

Coon, Jane, Country Director, Office of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs until May 1979; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from July 1979

Cossiga, Francesco, Italian Prime Minister from August 1979 until October 1980

Cutler, Lloyd N., White House Counsel from October 1979

Daoud Khan, Mohammad, President of the Republic of Afghanistan until his assassination in April 1978

De Leusse, Baron Bruno, French Ambassador to the Soviet Union until 1979

Denend, Leslie G., Special Assistant to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs from January 1980 until January 1981

Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsiao-p'ing), Vice Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China

Desai, Morarji, Indian Prime Minister from March 1977 until July 1979

Dobrynin, Anatoliy, Soviet Ambassador to the United States

Dodson, Christine, Staff Secretary, National Security Council

Donovan, Hedley, Senior Adviser to the President

Dost, Shah Mohammed, Afghan Deputy Foreign Minister until December 1979; thereafter Foreign Minister

Dubs, Adolph (Spike), U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan from July 1978 until his murder on February 14, 1979

Eizenstat, Stuart E., President's Assistant for Domestic Affairs and Policy

Eliot, Theodore L., Jr., U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan until June 1978

Fahd bin Abdul Aziz al-Saud, Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia

Francois-Poncet, Jean, French Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1978 until 1981

Ford, Gerald R., President of the United States from 1974 until January 1977

Gaffney, Henry H., Director, Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Department of Defense

Gailani, Syed Ahmad, leader of the National Front for Islamic Revolution of Afghanistan

- Gandhi, Indira**, Indian Prime Minister from July 1980
- Garrison, Mark J.**, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Moscow
- Gates, Robert M.**, Special Assistant to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs from April until December 1979; Director, Strategic Evaluation Center, Office of Strategic Research, Central Intelligence Agency, from late December 1979 until January 1980; thereafter, Executive Assistant to Director of Central Intelligence
- Turner Genscher, Hans-Dietrich**, West German Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister
- Ghotbzadeh, Sadegh**, Minister of Foreign Affairs for Iran from November 1979 until August 1980
- Giscard d'Estaing, Valéry**, President of France
- Gregg, Donald**, member, Intelligence Coordination Cluster, National Security Council Staff, from June 1979 until January 1981; East China/China Cluster from January 1980 until January 1981
- Griffith, William E.**, Special Adviser on Soviet Affairs to Zbigniew Brzezinski
- Gromyko, Andrei A.**, Soviet Foreign Minister
- Gulabzoi, Sayed Mohammed**, Afghan Minister of Communications until September 1979; Minister of Internal Affairs from December 1979
- Harriman, W. Averell**, Special Adviser to President Carter
- Hart, Gary**, Senator (D-Colorado)
- Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin**, leader of Hezbe-i-Islami Afghanistan, Afghan insurgent group
- Henze, Paul**, member, Intelligence Coordination Cluster, National Security Council Staff, from January 1977 until December 1980
- Hornblow, Michael**, Country Officer, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asia Affairs, Department of State
- Hoskinson, Samuel**, member, Intelligence Coordination Cluster, National Security Council Staff, from January 1977 until May 1979
- Hua Guofeng (Hua Kuo-Feng)**, Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party
- Hummel, Arthur W., Jr.**, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs until March 1977; U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan from June 1977 until July 1981
- Inderfurth, Karl F. (Rick)**, Special Assistant to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs from January 1977 until April 1979
- Javits, Jacob K.**, Senator (R-New York)
- Jones, David C.**, General, USAF, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from June 1978
- Jordan, Hamilton**, Assistant to the President from 1977 until 1979; White House Chief of Staff from July 1979 until June 1980
- Karmal, Babrak**, President of Afghanistan from December 1979
- Kennan, George F.**, historian; Director, Policy Planning Staff and Counselor, Department of State during the Truman administration; U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union during 1952; U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia from 1961 until 1963
- Khalid Ibn Abd al-Aziz al-Saud**, King and Prime Minister of Saudi Arabia
- Khan, Akhtar Abdul Rahman**, Lieutenant General, Director General of the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate from June 1979
- Khan, Yaqub**, Pakistani Ambassador to the United States until January 1979
- Khan, Sultan Muhammed**, Pakistani Ambassador to the United States from January 1979 until December 1980
- Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah**, Supreme Leader of Iran from December 1979
- King, Barrington**, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy in Islamabad until January 1980
- Kishtmand, Sultan Ali**, Afghan Minister of Planning from December 1979
- Kissinger, Henry A.**, Secretary of State until January 1977
- Komer, Robert W.**, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from October 1979

- Korniienko, Georgy M.**, Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister
- Kosygin, Aleksey N.**, Chair (Premier) of the Soviet Council of Ministers until 1980; Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
- Kreisberg, Paul H.**, Deputy Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
- Kux, Dennis**, Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
- Larrabee, F. Stephen**, member, USSR/East Europe Cluster, National Security Council Staff, from September 1978 until January 1981
- Lehman, Richard**, National Intelligence Officer for Warning, Central Intelligence Agency
- Lugar, Richard G.**, Senator (R-Indiana); member, Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry
- Luns, Joseph**, Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- MacEachin, Douglas**, Director of the Strategic Warning Staff, Central Intelligence Agency
- Malikyar, Abdullah**, Afghan Ambassador to the United States until 1978
- Mark, David E.**, Deputy Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
- Mazdooryar, Sher Jan**, Afghan Minister of Foreign Affairs from April 1979 until September 1979; Minister of Transportation and Tourism from January 1980
- McHenry, Donald F.**, Permanent Representative to the United Nations from September 1979 until January 1981
- McIntyre, James T., Jr.**, Director, Office of Management and Budget
- McMahon, John**, Deputy Director of Operations, Central Intelligence Agency
- Mills, Hawthorne**, Charge d'Affaires ad interim, U.S. Embassy in Kabul from February 1980
- Mojaddedi, Sibghatullah al-**, Chairman of the Afghan National Liberation Front
- Mondale, Walter F. (Fritz)**, Vice President of the United States
- Moynihan, Daniel Patrick**, Senator (D-New York), member, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
- Mubarak, Hosni**, Vice President of Egypt
- Murphy, Daniel J.**, Admiral, USN; Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from 1977 until 1980
- Murray, Robert J.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
- Muskie, Edmund S.**, Secretary of State from May 1980
- Newsom, David D.**, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from April 1978
- Nimetz, Matthew**, Counselor of the Department of State from March 1977 until March 1980; Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology from February 1980 until December 1980
- Nur, Ahmed Nur**, Member of the Afghan Politburo from January 1980
- Nye, Joseph S., Jr.**, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology from 1977 until 1979
- Odom, William E.**, Lieutenant General, USA; Military Assistant to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs
- Ohira, Masayoshi**, Prime Minister of Japan from December 1978 until June 1980
- Oksenberg, Michael**, member, East/China Cluster, National Security Council Staff, January 1977 until February 1980

Owen, Henry D., member, International Economics Cluster, National Security Council Staff, from October 1977 until January 1981; also Special Representative for Economic Summits from October 1978 until January 1981

Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza, Shah of Iran until February 1979

Parris, Mark R., Special Assistant, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

Pastor, Robert, member, Latin American/Caribbean Cluster, North/South Cluster, National Security Council Staff

Pavlovskiy, I.G., General, Deputy Chief of the Soviet General Staff and Commander of Soviet Ground Forces

Peck, Robert, Director, Office of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State

Pell, Claiborne, Senator (D-Rhode Island); Chairman, Senate Rules Committee

Percy, Charles H., Senator (R-Illinois); member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Powell, Joseph L., Jr. (Jody), White House Press Secretary

Puzanov, Alexander M., Soviet Ambassador to Afghanistan until November 1979

Qader, Abdul, Afghan military commander from December 1979

Qotbzadeh, see Ghotbzadeh

Reagan, Ronald W., Republican Presidential nominee, 1980; President of the United States from January 1981

Reinhardt, John, Director of the U.S. Information Agency (renamed the International Communication Agency on April 1, 1978) from March 1977 until August 1980

Riaz Khan, Mohammad, Major General, Director of the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate until June 1979

Roy, J. Stapleton, Deputy Director, Office of People's Republic of China and Mongolia Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State from June 1978 until March 1979; Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing and Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Beijing from March 1979

Sakharov, Andrei, Soviet physicist and dissident; recipient, 1975 Nobel Peace Prize

Saunders, Harold H., Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, until April 1978; thereafter, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs until January 1981

Schechter, Jerrold, White House Press Officer and Associate Press Secretary from January 1977 until February 1980

Schmidt, Helmut, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany

Schultze, Charles L., Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers

Shah of Iran, see Pahlavi

Shahi, Agha, Pakistani Foreign Minister from January 1978

Shahnawaz, Sardar, Pakistani Foreign Secretary until May 1980

Shulman, Marshall D., Special Adviser to the Secretary of State

Sick, Gary, member, Middle East/North Africa Cluster, National Security Council Staff

Slocombe, Walter, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning

Smith, William Y., General, USAF; Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Sokolov, Marshal Sergey, Soviet First Deputy Minister of Defense and Chief Commander in Afghanistan

Spiers, Ronald I., Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, from January 1980

Sullivan, Roger W., member, East Asia/China Cluster, National Security Council Staff, from February 1980 until January 1981

Sullivan, William H., Ambassador to Iran from June 1977 until April 1979

Taraki, Nur Muhammad, President of Afghanistan from April 1978 until September 1979

Tarnoff, Peter, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Executive Secretary, Department of State, from April 1977

Taroon, Sayed Daoud, Afghan Police Commandant

Thatcher, Margaret, British Prime Minister from May 1979

Thornton, Thomas P., member, South Asia/UN Matters, North/South Cluster, National Security Council Staff

Tito, Josip Broz, President of Yugoslavia until May 1980

Toon, Malcolm, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union until October 1979

Truman, Harry S., President of the United States from 1945 to 1953

Turki al-Faisal, Prince, Director of the Saudi General Intelligence Directorate

Turner, Stansfield M., Admiral, USN; Director of Central Intelligence

Ustinov, Dmitri F., Soviet Defense Minister

Vajpayee, Atal Bihari, Indian Minister of External Affairs from March 1977 until July 1979

Van Hollen, Eliza, Chief Analyst for Afghanistan, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

Vance, Cyrus R., Secretary of State until April 1980

Vest, George S., Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, until March 1977; Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from June 1977

Waheed, Abdullah, Afghan Minister of Foreign Affairs until April 1978

Waldheim, Kurt, United Nations Secretary-General

Wali, Shah, Minister of Public Health and Acting Minister of Planning until August 1979; Afghan Foreign Minister from August 1979 until December 1979

Watanjar, Mohammad Aslam, Afghan Minister of Internal Affairs until December 1979; Minister of Communications from January 1980

Watson, Thomas J., Jr., U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union from October 1979

Welch, Jasper, member, Defense Coordination Cluster, National Security Council Staff, from November 1979 until January 1981

West, John C., U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia from June 1977

Wolfowitz, Paul, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Regional Programs until 1980

Zablocki, Clement J., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Wisconsin), Chairman, House Committee on International Relations

Zahir Shah, Mohammed, King of Afghanistan from November 1933 until July 1973

Zhang Wenjin, Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs

Zia-ul-Haq, Mohammad, General, President of Pakistan from September 1978

Note on U.S. Covert Actions

In compliance with the *Foreign Relations of the United States* statute that requires inclusion in the *Foreign Relations* series of comprehensive documentation on major foreign policy decisions and actions, the editors have identified key documents regarding major covert actions and intelligence activities. The following note will provide readers with some organizational context on how covert actions and special intelligence operations in support of U.S. foreign policy were planned and approved within the U.S. Government. It describes, on the basis of declassified documents, the changing and developing procedures during the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter Presidencies.

Management of Covert Actions in the Truman Presidency

The Truman administration's concern over Soviet "psychological warfare" prompted the new National Security Council to authorize, in NSC 4-A of December 1947, the launching of peacetime covert action operations. NSC 4-A made the Director of Central Intelligence responsible for psychological warfare, establishing at the same time the principle that covert action was an exclusively Executive Branch function. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) certainly was a natural choice but it was assigned this function at least in part because the Agency controlled unvouchered funds, by which operations could be funded with minimal risk of exposure in Washington.¹

The CIA's early use of its new covert action mandate dissatisfied officials at the Departments of State and Defense. The Department of State, believing this role too important to be left to the CIA alone and concerned that the military might create a new rival covert action office in the Pentagon, pressed to reopen the issue of where responsibility for covert action activities should reside. Consequently, on June 18, 1948, a new NSC directive, NSC 10/2, superseded NSC 4-A.

NSC 10/2 directed the CIA to conduct "covert" rather than merely "psychological" operations, defining them as all activities "which are conducted or sponsored by this Government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and executed that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if un-

¹ NSC 4-A, December 17, 1947, is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1945-1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, Document 257.

covered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them.”

The type of clandestine activities enumerated under the new directive included: “propaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberations [*sic*] groups, and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world. Such operations should not include armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage, counter-espionage, and cover and deception for military operations.”²

The Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), newly established in the CIA on September 1, 1948, in accordance with NSC 10/2, assumed responsibility for organizing and managing covert actions. The OPC, which was to take its guidance from the Department of State in peacetime and from the military in wartime, initially had direct access to the State Department and to the military without having to proceed through the CIA’s administrative hierarchy, provided the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was informed of all important projects and decisions.³ In 1950 this arrangement was modified to ensure that policy guidance came to the OPC through the DCI.

During the Korean conflict the OPC grew quickly. Wartime commitments and other missions soon made covert action the most expensive and bureaucratically prominent of the CIA’s activities. Concerned about this situation, DCI Walter Bedell Smith in early 1951 asked the NSC for enhanced policy guidance and a ruling on the proper “scope and magnitude” of CIA operations. The White House responded with two initiatives. In April 1951 President Truman created the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) under the NSC to coordinate government-wide psychological warfare strategy. NSC 10/5, issued in October 1951, reaffirmed the covert action mandate given in NSC 10/2 and expanded the CIA’s authority over guerrilla warfare.⁴ The PSB was soon abolished by the incoming Eisenhower administration, but the expansion of the CIA’s covert action writ in NSC 10/5 helped ensure that covert action would remain a major function of the Agency.

As the Truman administration ended, the CIA was near the peak of its independence and authority in the field of covert action. Although the CIA continued to seek and receive advice on specific proj-

² NSC 10/2, June 18, 1948, is printed *ibid.*, Document 292.

³ Memorandum of conversation by Frank G. Wisner, “Implementation of NSC-10/2,” August 12, 1948, is printed *ibid.*, Document 298.

⁴ NSC 10/5, “Scope and Pace of Covert Operations,” October 23, 1951, is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1950-1955, The Intelligence Community*, Document 90.

ects from the NSC, the PSB, and the departmental representatives originally delegated to advise the OPC, no group or officer outside of the DCI and the President himself had authority to order, approve, manage, or curtail operations.

NSC 5412 Special Group; 5412/2 Special Group; 303 Committee

The Eisenhower administration began narrowing the CIA's latitude in 1954. In accordance with a series of National Security Council directives, the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence for the conduct of covert operations was further clarified. President Eisenhower approved NSC 5412 on March 15, 1954, reaffirming the Central Intelligence Agency's responsibility for conducting covert actions abroad. A definition of covert actions was set forth; the DCI was made responsible for coordinating with designated representatives of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to ensure that covert operations were planned and conducted in a manner consistent with U.S. foreign and military policies; and the Operations Coordinating Board was designated the normal channel for coordinating support for covert operations among State, Defense, and the CIA. Representatives of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President were to be advised in advance of major covert action programs initiated by the CIA under this policy and were to give policy approval for such programs and secure coordination of support among the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA.⁵

A year later, on March 12, 1955, NSC 5412/1 was issued, identical to NSC 5412 except for designating the Planning Coordination Group as the body responsible for coordinating covert operations. NSC 5412/2 of December 28, 1955, assigned to representatives (of the rank of assistant secretary) of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President responsibility for coordinating covert actions. By the end of the Eisenhower administration, this group, which became known as the "NSC 5412/2 Special Group" or simply "Special Group," emerged as the executive body to review and approve covert action programs initiated by the CIA.⁶ The membership of the Special Group varied depending upon the situation faced. Meetings were infrequent until 1959 when weekly meetings began to be held. Neither the CIA nor the Special Group adopted fixed criteria for bringing projects before the

⁵ William M. Leary, editor, *The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents* (The University of Alabama Press, 1984), p. 63; for text of NSC 5412, see *Foreign Relations, 1950-1955, The Intelligence Community*, Document 171.

⁶ Leary, *The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents*, pp. 63, 147-148; *Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence* (1976), pp. 50-51. For texts of NSC 5412/1 and NSC 5412/2, see *Foreign Relations, 1950-1955, The Intelligence Community*, Documents 212 and 250.

group; initiative remained with the CIA, as members representing other agencies frequently were unable to judge the feasibility of particular projects.⁷

After the Bay of Pigs failure in April 1961, General Maxwell Taylor reviewed U.S. paramilitary capabilities at President Kennedy's request and submitted a report in June that recommended strengthening high-level direction of covert operations. As a result of the Taylor Report, the Special Group, chaired by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, and including Deputy Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Lyman Lemnitzer, assumed greater responsibility for planning and reviewing covert operations. Until 1963 the DCI determined whether a CIA-originated project was submitted to the Special Group. In 1963 the Special Group developed general but informal criteria, including risk, possibility of success, potential for exposure, political sensitivity, and cost (a threshold of \$25,000 was adopted by the CIA), for determining whether covert action projects were submitted to the Special Group.⁸

From November 1961 to October 1962 a Special Group (Augmented), whose membership was the same as the Special Group plus Attorney General Robert Kennedy and General Taylor (as Chairman), exercised responsibility for Operation Mongoose, a major covert action program aimed at overthrowing the Castro regime in Cuba. When President Kennedy authorized the program in November, he designated Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale, Assistant for Special Operations to the Secretary of Defense, to act as chief of operations, and Lansdale coordinated the Mongoose activities among the CIA and the Departments of State and Defense. The CIA units in Washington and Miami had primary responsibility for implementing Mongoose operations, which included military, sabotage, and political propaganda programs.⁹

President Kennedy also established a Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) on January 18, 1962, when he signed NSAM No. 124. The Special Group (CI), set up to coordinate counter-insurgency activities separate from the mechanism for implementing NSC 5412/2, was to confine itself to establishing broad policies aimed at preventing and resisting subversive insurgency and other forms of indirect aggression in friendly countries. In early 1966, in NSAM No. 341, President Johnson

⁷ Leary, *The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents*, p. 63.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 82.

⁹ See *Foreign Relations, 1961-1963*, volume X, Cuba, 1961-1962, Documents 270 and 278.

assigned responsibility for the direction and coordination of counter-insurgency activities overseas to the Secretary of State, who established a Senior Interdepartmental Group to assist in discharging these responsibilities.¹⁰

NSAM No. 303, June 2, 1964, from Bundy to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the DCI, changed the name of "Special Group 5412" to "303 Committee" but did not alter its composition, functions, or responsibility. Bundy was the chairman of the 303 Committee.¹¹

The Special Group and the 303 Committee approved 163 covert actions during the Kennedy administration and 142 during the Johnson administration through February 1967. The 1976 Final Report of the Church Committee, however, estimated that of the several thousand projects undertaken by the CIA since 1961, only 14 percent were considered on a case-by-case basis by the 303 Committee and its predecessors (and successors). Those not reviewed by the 303 Committee were low-risk and low-cost operations. The Final Report also cited a February 1967 CIA memorandum that included a description of the mode of policy arbitration of decisions on covert actions within the 303 Committee system. The CIA presentations were questioned, amended, and even on occasion denied, despite protests from the DCI. Department of State objections modified or nullified proposed operations, and the 303 Committee sometimes decided that some agency other than the CIA should undertake an operation or that CIA actions requested by Ambassadors on the scene should be rejected.¹²

The effectiveness of covert action has always been difficult for any administration to gauge, given concerns about security and the difficulty of judging the impact of U.S. initiatives on events. In October 1969 the new Nixon administration required annual 303 Committee reviews for all covert actions that the Committee had approved and automatic termination of any operation not reviewed after 12 months. On February 17, 1970, President Nixon signed National Security Decision Memorandum 40,¹³ which superseded NSC 5412/2 and changed the name of the covert action approval group to the 40 Committee, in part because the 303 Committee had been named in the media. The Attorney Gen-

¹⁰ For text of NSAM No. 124, see *Foreign Relations*, volume VIII, National Security Policy, Document 68. NSAM No. 341, March 2, 1966, is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, volume XXXIII, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy; United Nations, Document 56.

¹¹ For text of NSAM No. 303, see *ibid.*, Document 204.

¹² *Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities*, United States Senate, Book I, *Foreign and Military Intelligence*, pp. 56–57.

¹³ For text of NSDM 40, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume II, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969–1972, Document 203.

eral was also added to the membership of the Committee. NSDM 40 reaffirmed the DCI's responsibility for the coordination, control, and conduct of covert operations and directed him to obtain policy approval from the 40 Committee for all major and "politically sensitive" covert operations. He was also made responsible for ensuring an annual review by the 40 Committee of all approved covert operations.

The 40 Committee met regularly early in the Nixon administration, but over time the number of formal meetings declined and business came to be conducted via couriers and telephone votes. The Committee actually met only for major new proposals. As required, the DCI submitted annual status reports to the 40 Committee for each approved operation. According to the 1976 Church Committee Final Report, the 40 Committee considered only about 25 percent of the CIA's individual covert action projects, concentrating on major projects that provided broad policy guidelines for all covert actions. Congress received briefings on only a few proposed projects. Not all major operations, moreover, were brought before the 40 Committee: President Nixon in 1970 instructed the DCI to promote a coup d'etat against Chilean President Salvador Allende without Committee coordination or approval.¹⁴

Presidential Findings Since 1974 and the Operations Advisory Group

The Hughes-Ryan amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 brought about a major change in the way the U.S. Government approved covert actions, requiring explicit approval by the President for each action and expanding Congressional oversight and control of the CIA. The CIA was authorized to spend appropriated funds on covert actions only after the President had signed a "finding" and informed Congress that the proposed operation was important to national security.¹⁵

Executive Order 11905, issued by President Ford on February 18, 1976, in the wake of major Congressional investigations of CIA activities by the Church and Pike Committees, replaced the 40 Committee with the Operations Advisory Group, composed of the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the DCI, who retained responsibility for the planning and implementation of covert operations. The OAG was required to hold formal meetings to develop recommendations for the President regarding a covert action and to conduct periodic reviews of previously-approved operations. EO 11905 also banned all U.S. Government employees from involvement in po-

¹⁴ *Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities*, United States Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence, pp. 54–55, 57.

¹⁵ Public Law 93–559.

litical assassinations, a prohibition that was retained in succeeding executive orders, and prohibited involvement in domestic intelligence activities.¹⁶

Approval and oversight requirements for covert action continued to be governed by the Hughes-Ryan amendment well into the Carter administration, even as the new administration made alterations to the executive branch's organizational structure for covert action.

President Carter retained the NSC as the highest executive branch organization to review and guide U.S. foreign intelligence activities. As part of a broader NSC reorganization at the outset of his administration, President Carter replaced the Operations Advisory Group (OAG) with the NSC's Special Coordination Committee (SCC), which explicitly continued the same operating procedures as the former OAG.¹⁷ Membership of the SCC, when meeting for the purpose of reviewing and making recommendations on covert actions (as well as sensitive surveillance activities), replicated that of the former OAG—namely: the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the Secretaries of State and Defense; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Attorney General and Director of the Office of Management and Budget (the latter two as observers). The designated chairman of all SCC meetings was the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Carter formalized the SCC's replacement of the OAG in EO 11985 of May 13, 1977, which amended President Ford's EO 11905 on "United States Foreign Intelligence activities."¹⁸ In practice, the SCC for covert action and sensitive surveillance activities came to be known as the SCC (Intelligence) or the SCC-I, to distinguish it from other versions of the SCC.

The SCC's replacement of the OAG was reaffirmed in E.O. 12036 of January 24, 1978, which replaced E.O. 11905 and its amendments. E.O. 12036 also reaffirmed the same membership for the SCC-I, but identified the Attorney General and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget as full members of the Committee, rather than merely observers.

¹⁶ Executive Order 11905, "United States Foreign Intelligence Activities," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 12, No. 8, February 23, 1976.

¹⁷ The broader NSC reorganization sought to reduce the number of NSC committees to two: the Policy Review Committee (PRC) and the Special Coordination Committee (SCC). The SCC's jurisdiction included all intelligence policy issues other than annual budget and priorities reviews; the SCC also had jurisdiction over other, nonintelligence matters. Presidential Directive 2, "The National Security Council System," January 20, 1977, Carter Library, Vertical File, Presidential Directives. See also Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor 1977-1981* (New York: Farrar, Strauss, Giroux, 1983), pp. 59-62.

¹⁸ Executive Order 11985, "United States Foreign Intelligence Activities," May 13, 1977, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 13, No. 20 (May 16, 1977), pp. 719-720.

Also in the first days of the Carter administration, the SCC-I established a lower-level working group to study and review proposals for covert action and other sensitive intelligence matters and report to the SCC-I. This interagency working group was chaired by the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (David Aaron), or in his absence, the NSC Director for Intelligence Coordination. The working group was named the Special Activities Working Group (SAWG). The SAWG was active in early Carter administration reviews of ongoing covert action, and remained active through at least 1978. NSC officials in mid-1978 sought to downgrade or abolish the SAWG and replace it as needed with ad hoc working groups. Internal NSC reviews at the end of the Carter administration state that the SAWG gradually fell out of use. By late 1979, the means for debating, developing, and guiding certain covert actions was an interagency working group chaired by Aaron at the NSC. This group was referred to by several names during the late Carter administration, including the Deputy's (or Deputies) group, the Aaron group, the interagency group, the Black Chamber, and the Black Room.

The Carter administration made use of a new category of presidential findings for "world-wide" or "general" (or "generic") covert operations. This continued a practice initiated late in the Ford administration in response to the Hughes-Ryan requirement for presidential findings. The worldwide category covered lower-risk operations that were directed at broad policy goals implemented on a worldwide basis as assets allowed. These operations utilized existing assets as well as existing liaison contacts with foreign intelligence or security services, and in some cases also consisted of routine training or procurement undertaken to assist foreign intelligence partners or other agencies of the USG. A new type of document—known as "Perspectives"—provided more specific tasking guidance for these general, worldwide covert activities. Perspectives detailed the themes to be stressed in furtherance of a particular policy goal. Riskier operations required their own presidential finding or Memorandum of Notification (see below). Perspectives were drafted by the CIA and cleared by the Department of State, so that the CIA could vet the operational feasibility and risks of the program while State could assess the diplomatic risks and verify that the program was consistent with overall foreign policy goals. At least initially, Perspectives did not require further coordination with the OAG, SCC, or the President. Once an agreed-upon Perspectives document was finalized by CIA and the Department of State, it was transmitted to the field, and posts were required to make periodic reports on any achievements under the Perspectives guidelines. Beginning in 1978, actions in this worldwide category were authorized by the President as specific line-item additions to a previously existing "world-wide" finding, though Perspectives were still used to provide additional details.

Another new document used during the Carter administration was the “Memorandum of Notification” (MON). MONs were initially used to introduce higher-risk, significantly higher-cost, or more geographically-specific operations under a previously-approved worldwide or general objective outlined¹⁹ in a Perspectives document. Like Perspectives, MONs had to be coordinated between the CIA and the Department of State, but they also required broader interagency coordination within the SAWG or SCC. MONs subsequently came to be used for significant changes to any type of finding, not just worldwide ones. Entirely new covert actions continued to require new presidential findings. The Hughes-Ryan amendment stipulated that Congress be notified of new findings “in a timely fashion,” but did not specify how much time that meant. During the Carter administration, the CIA typically notified Congress of new covert initiatives within 48 hours, including those outlined in Perspectives or MONs.

In October 1980, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1981—also known as the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980—scaled back the Hughes-Ryan amendment’s provisions for congressional oversight of covert action. While the requirement to notify Congress about presidential findings remained in place, the new Act limited the committees of Congress that had to be briefed to the two intelligence committees, and also explicitly clarified that this requirement to keep the committees “fully and currently informed” did not constitute a requirement for congressional approval of covert action or other intelligence activities. Moreover, the new Act stipulated that if the President determined it was “essential to limit prior notice to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States,” the President could limit prior notice to the chairmen and ranking minority members of the two intelligence committees, the Speaker and minority leader of the House, and the majority and minority leaders of the Senate—a group that came to be known as the “Gang of Eight.” If prior notice of a covert action was withheld, the President was required to inform the two intelligence committees “in a timely fashion” and provide a statement of the reasons for not giving prior notice.²⁰

¹⁹ Executive Order 12036, “United States Foreign Intelligence Activities,” January 24, 1978, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 14, No. 4 (January 30, 1978), pp. 194–214. Since E.O. 12036 governed foreign intelligence activities, all references in the E.O. to the “SCC” were effectively references to what was known in practice as the SCC (Intelligence), or SCC-I.

²⁰ PL 96-450, Sec. 407 (October 14, 1980). See also the description of the Hughes-Ryan amendment and its replacement by PL 96-450 in: Richard A. Best, Jr., “Covert Action: Legislative Background and Possible Policy Questions,” Congressional Research Service, RL33715, December 27, 2011, pp.1-2; and L. Britt Snider, *The Agency and the Hill: CIA’S Relationship with Congress, 1946-2004*, Washington: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 2008, pp. 280–81.

Afghanistan

1. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State¹

Kabul, March 5, 1977, 1045Z

1512. Subj: Conversation With President Daoud. Ref: (A) State 41045, (B) Kabul 1186.²

1. Summary: In our conversation on March 5, President Daoud had nothing but favorable comments to make about the principal directions of the foreign policy of the Carter administration. Regarding Afghanistan, he stressed his nationalist, non-aligned position. He said he would visit Moscow for 2–3 days the end of March or early April. End summary.

2. President Daoud received me the morning of March 5. He was attended by Deputy Foreign Minister Abdullah and Foreign Ministry Director General Ghaus. I began the conversation by once again congratulating him on his recent election and on the new Afghan Constitution.³ He said he is tired after forty years of public service but intends to do his best for his country as long as his health permits. He seemed both healthy and vigorous.

3. I then gave him a précis of the principal foreign policy positions and initiatives of our new administration and followed by going through the talking points in para 3(B) of ref B. Regarding narcotics, I added that we would like to have a statement delineating precisely

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770077–0003. Confidential; Limdis.

² Telegram 41045 to Kabul is dated February 24. Telegram 1186 from Kabul, February 16, rehearsed the message Ambassador Eliot was to deliver to President Daoud. The message stressed the importance the United States attached to the development of Afghanistan and regional stability, and identified the trafficking of opium as the only significant problem in bilateral relations. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770063–0488 and D770055–0765, respectively)

³ Daoud declared himself President following the successful coup of July 17, 1973. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–8, Documents on South Asia, 1973–1976, Document 4. In telegram 1128 from Kabul, February 14, the Embassy reported Daoud's election to a sixth term, and that his government ratified its Constitution the previous day. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770051–0976)

what the Afghan Govt will do this year to control the production of opium poppies.

4. In a lengthy response, Daoud began by praising the efforts being made by the Carter administration to promote peaceful solutions of problems like the Middle East and Southern Africa and to reach new agreements on arms control. He said that peace is essential for Afghanistan in order for it to progress. But he quickly added that “honor” is even more important than peace and that Afghanistan would fight if necessary for its independence and would never accept dictation from anyone. To illustrate the latter point, he told me in confidence that the Soviets had at one time tried to dissuade him from sending Afghan military officers for training to India but that he had told the Soviets that this was none of their business.

5. Daoud said that he is most pleased with Afghan-U.S. relations, adding that during the past three and one-half years, we have reached a highly satisfactory higher level of mutual understanding. He said that Afghan-Soviet relations are good and that he plans to visit Moscow in response to a Soviet invitation for 2–3 days at the end of March or early April.⁴ He said that he has been so busy recently that there have been no new developments in Afghan-Iranian relations, and of course the Pak elections have not permitted further progress in Pak-Afghan relations. He said that Afghan-Chinese relations are good and getting better.

6. Regarding narcotics, Daoud said that in his opinion it would be a relatively minor matter for the international community to assist in a development program in Badakhshan. Regarding U.S.-Afghan cooperation in the narcotics field, he said that after his new Cabinet has taken office, intensive studies would be made to determine in what areas the Afghan Govt would like American assistance.

7. Daoud made no comment regarding our economic assistance program, but I did give him a paper summarizing the status of present and potential projects (copy pouched to NEA). He also did not comment when I informed him that we had asked the Congress for substantial additional funds for the FY 1978 military assistance training program (per State 44414).⁵ I told him that if the Congress approves and if his govt desires such additional assistance, our MAP training program could be doubled next year.

⁴ See Document 2.

⁵ In telegram 44414 to multiple posts, February 28, the Department authorized addressee posts to inform their respective host governments of the amount of security assistance that was requested by President Carter. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770069–0212) The referenced paper on present and potential projects that was pouched to NEA was not found.

8. The entire conversation was most cordial, with Daoud several times indicating his desire for close U.S.-Afghan relations. He showed his vigor especially when emphasizing the importance he attaches to Afghan honor and independence. He looked as healthy as I have ever seen him.

Eliot

2. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State¹

Kabul, April 13, 1977, 1100Z

2544. Subject: Daoud's Afghanistan and His Trip to the Soviet Union.

1. Summary: Daoud is not "in political trouble," but the country he left April 12 for his three day visit to the Soviet Union is not quite the settled entity he ruled before the "Loya Jirgah" (Constitutional Assembly), the passage of a new Constitution earlier this year and the appointment of a new Cabinet. As for the visit itself we credit Afghan protestations that it is "routine"—though the intensity of Afghan-Soviet relations and recent political events in this part of the world will offer plenty to talk about. As seems to have become a regular event in Afghan-Russian relations, a Chinese delegation turned up in Kabul just in time to offer counterpoint to the larger theme. End summary.

2. President Daoud left for Moscow April 12, along with his Minister of Commerce (Jalalar), Minister for Planning (Khurrani), Minister of Water and Power (Mohammadi), Minister in Charge for Foreign Affairs (Waheed Abdullah), and a lower ranking staff that included Samad Ghaus (the Foreign Ministry's Deputy for Political Affairs—de facto Deputy Minister).

3. The scene at home. The domestic political scene Daoud left behind was less tranquil, less settled than Daoud has experienced for some time. Discontent about the Cabinet announced March 17 (see Kabul 1921) has broken out in the Afghan "establishment"—and in less prestigious strata, we believe, as well. One influential Mohammadzai

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D7700132-0436. Confidential. Sent for information to Islamabad, Moscow, New Delhi, USLO Peking, and Tehran.

cousin, Sultan Mahmoud Ghazi, has not bothered to mute his disaffection, nurtured by his discontent with Daoud's closest associates. (See Kabul 2530)²

4. Further, Daoud was unable or unwilling to appoint someone to fill the constitutionally required role of Vice President, since the National Revolution Party from which this official (or "these officials," for Daoud may appoint several Vice Presidents) is constitutionally to be drawn has not itself taken shape and been "proclaimed." (De facto Foreign Minister Waheed Abdullah told the Ambassador that during Daoud's absence the nation's affairs would be in the hands of a "collegium"—members unspecified.) In a press conference (septel) given on the eve of the departure Daoud in fact admitted that party formation had gone sour—that, momentarily, the party had been captured by "a number of opportunists—" a number of "saboteurs" working "on their own will."³ From some quarters came hints also of a breaking scandal possibly involving mistreatment—unbeknownst to Daoud, it is said—of political prisoners. (The facts of this are murky and are not yet to be believed—and certainly are not to be mentioned to Afghans. We mention the matter here as allegations likely to affect the regime, true or not.)

5. Perhaps all this is but an inevitable moment of discontent following the high hopes engendered by the Loya Jirgah (Kabul 1188), the new Constitution (Kabul 1379) and the March 21 new Afghan calendar year.⁴ But these negative signals may prove later to have had deeper significance.

6. The external scene. Aside from unpleasantness with Iran (Kabul 2495), Afghanistan's external relations are good—including with the Soviet Union.⁵ A Russian bouquet to Daoud appeared just prior to the

² In telegram 1921 from Kabul, March 20, the Embassy reported on the largely unchanged character of Afghanistan's new Cabinet. In telegram 2530, also from Kabul, April 13, the Embassy characterized Sultan Ghazi's displeasure with some of President Daoud's associates as an apparent "open struggle within the government bureaucracy." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770095–1080 and D770128–0570, respectively)

³ In telegram 2555 from Kabul, April 14, the Embassy summarized Daoud's remarks at the April 10 press conference. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770129–0726)

⁴ In telegram 1188 from Kabul, February 16, the Embassy assessed whether the Loya Jirgah, which ended February 15, was a legitimate effort at constitutional reform or a "cynical" attempt to "legitimize one man rule under constitutional guise." In telegram 1379 from Kabul, February 27, the Embassy emphasized that even with the new Constitution, "power ultimately resides with the President." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770057–0394 and D770068–0026, respectively)

⁵ In telegram 2495 from Kabul, April 12, the Embassy noted that the downturn in Afghan-Iranian relations was disappointing in light of gains made between 1973 and 1975, but that the United States was essentially powerless to change the situation. The dispute stemmed largely over water rights to the Helmand River. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770126–1058)

visit in the Soviet Embassy's "news bulletin" of April 9, assuring Afghans that "our ideals . . . differ from yours but we interfere neither in your domestic affairs, nor do we intervene in the independent actions of your people. We support any phenomenon that plays a progressive role in the development of your people."

7. Officials here in "characterizing" the Daoud visit to Moscow have kept the "correct" (cards held close to the vest) stance they usually take with us when Afghan-Soviet relations are concerned. They have, in fact, told nothing to us (or to anyone, we believe) about the visit. In his April 10 press conference President Daoud presented the trip as no more than a follow-on to President Podgorny's visit to Kabul in December of 1975, just another "leaders of two countries . . . strengthening and consolidating ties" kind of thing. This may be disingenuous, but it may also be the final truth. The mere volume of Afghan-Russian transactions in aid and trade would seem to fill any "working agenda," an expectation confirmed by Daoud's having taken three Cabinet Ministers from the trade/economics/development field. Enough has happened in South Asia recently—things like the Indian elections and the political siege against Bhutto—to give plenty of food for conversation during time that remains.

8. With a regularity that rules out mere coincidence a "Chinese connection" appeared on the eve of Daoud's departure, this time in the form of Mr. Chai Shu Fan, Vice Minister for Foreign Trade, who arrived in Kabul April 9. These Chinese diversions have become a regular event when Afghan-Soviet relations could become a news media preoccupation. We are not certain how these diversionary events get planned, though their taking place clearly coincides with both Afghan and Chinese intentions.

9. Ambassador saw Waheed Abdullah April 10 and briefed him on U.S. SALT proposals presented by the Secretary when he visited Moscow.

Eliot

3. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State¹

Kabul, August 17, 1977, 1050Z

5732. Subject: Conversation With President Daoud: Political Matters.

1. I called on President Daoud the morning of August 17. The conversation was in every respect cordial. It lasted one hour. President Daoud appeared to have fully recovered from some of the minor health problems he had suffered earlier this summer, such as dental surgery.

2. I referred to our pleasure in having Ambassador Karim in Washington and how much we looked forward to welcoming Foreign Minister Abdullah to New York and California in the coming weeks.² Daoud asked me to convey his thanks to President Carter for the warm reception accorded Ambassador Karim. He also asked me to transmit his personal best wishes to President Carter.

3. Following discussion of economic and narcotics matters which are the subjects of septels, Daoud said he is greatly concerned about the large quantity of Communist propaganda publications which are being brought into Afghanistan through the mails and illegally from Western Europe and the United States. He related this propaganda barrage to his concern about the inroads he sees the Communists making in countries like Thailand and Ethiopia. He said he still subscribes to the domino theory. He said Afghanistan is particularly sensitive to developments of this kind in the world because of its long border with the Soviet Union.

4. Regarding Communist propaganda, I told Daoud if there were any specific examples he would like me to investigate, I would try to do so. He agreed with me that most of it is so boring that it doesn't have much effect, but said that nevertheless, people read it.

5. I also mentioned that I do not believe everything in the world is coming up roses for the Soviet Union. In this connection, I mentioned the recent ASEAN meeting and pledges of Japanese and Australian

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770297–0366. Confidential; Limdis. Sent for information to Islamabad, Moscow, New Delhi, and Tehran.

² Abdullah traveled to New York to participate in the United Nations General Assembly meeting and to California on a cultural exchange mission. On October 1, he met with Vance in New York to discuss a range of bilateral issues; the meeting resulted in mutual affirmations of improved U.S.-Afghan relations. Vance also extended President Carter's invitation to Daoud to visit the United States. (Telegram 238361 to Kabul, October 3; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770360–1051)

support to the ASEAN countries.³ I also mentioned Soviet problems in Somalia and the defeat of Soviet-controlled Communists in India and Sri Lanka. I said our political efforts in Southern Africa and the Middle East will, hopefully, bring about conditions in those areas which will limit opportunities for the Soviets. At the conclusion of my remarks, Daoud commented that the Soviets no doubt are having problems.

Eliot

³ The ASEAN Summit was held August 4-5 in Kuala Lumpur.

4. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Health Issues (Bourne) to President Carter¹

Washington, August 19, 1977

SUBJECT

Specific Recommendations: Afghanistan

1. Our existing intelligence capability in Afghanistan is miniscule as compared to the like-sized producing region in the "Golden Triangle".² The Central Intelligence Agency's mission in Afghanistan has been essentially limited to activities regarding the Soviet Union. [7 lines not declassified]

2. The Afghan Minister-in-Charge of Foreign Affairs, Waheed Abdullah, will be attending the upcoming U.N. General Assembly in New York. We have suggested that Secretary Vance meet with him to express our deep concern over Afghanistan's increased opium production. This is the next logical step in a series of demarches to Afghanistan, which have included U.N., as well as U.S. initiatives.

3. Our Ambassador to Kabul has suggested that President Daoud would like to visit you, and recommended that such a visit could have impact on our narcotics effort. In Afghanistan, nothing happens

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 1/77-3/79. No classification marking.

² A reference to the area of Asia, comprising parts of Burma, Laos, and Thailand, that produces opium.

without Daoud's approval and direction. We cannot expect further progress in the narcotics field without his personal interest, and continuing surveillance. While Afghanistan is not a priority country in the context of global affairs, in addition to being one of the world's poorest countries it is the single most significant threat to our long term narcotics efforts, and meeting Daoud could in fact move him to take a more active role in containment of the illicit narcotics of the region. We would therefore suggest acceptance of a Daoud visit early next year. The timing of such a visit is important and would be most beneficial during the early Spring, since late Spring is harvesting season and Daoud could, in fact, cause the interdiction and destruction of large amounts of opium on his return to Kabul. Such a meeting would also be a logical follow-up of the Vance-Abdullah meeting this Fall.

4. By far the most important decision to be made in support of our efforts is on selection of our next Ambassador to Kabul. In order for us to be able to follow through on our devised strategy and escalate anti-narcotics efforts at the earliest possible moment, it is important that in addition to a firsthand knowledge of Afghanistan and its political constraints, our next Ambassador should be competent in the narcotics field and have an existing relationship with the leaders of Afghanistan at the Ministerial level.

An individual with these qualifications is available. He is not, however, a career Foreign Service Officer, and consequently a determination must be made that the appointment to Afghanistan should be considered by the Ambassadorial Review Commission, which it has not been up to this point. The Commission has the name of the individual before it, as well as Congressional recommendations and would in all likelihood include that name in any list submitted to you. I would therefore suggest that Afghanistan be considered a country to which a non-career assignment would be appropriate. With your approval, such a suggestion will be made to Secretary Vance.³

³ Carter wrote: "OK" and initialed "J" in the right margin next to this sentence. The Ambassador to Afghanistan, Theodore Eliot, had been in that position since November 1973 and did not leave the post until June 1978, when he was succeeded by Adolph Dubs, a career Foreign Service officer. The individual referred to by Bourne was Charles O'Keefe, Deputy Director for International Affairs in the White House Office of Drug Abuse Policy.

5. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

ER M 77-10790

Washington, undated

THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN

Introduction

Soviet economic assistance and trade have become dominant external forces in Afghan development, and military assistance is virtually the exclusive province of the USSR. In the 23 years since Moscow's first commitment to Kabul—also its first to an LDC—the Soviet presence has become pervasive and the Soviet role in Afghan development critical. Despite Kabul's efforts to maintain a non-aligned position by balancing Western and Communist interests, we see no major change in Afghanistan's reliance on the USSR for military or economic aid in the short term. This is particularly true for the military supply relationship, since Kabul would be hard put to find alternate sources for modern weapons on terms as favorable as Moscow's.

The Soviets have given Kabul aid on unusually easy terms to ensure a special Soviet-Afghan relationship which Moscow believes is important to its security interests. This assistance has always been far more concessional and has included more grant aid than Moscow's aid to its other clients. Moscow also has agreed to frequent rescheduling of Kabul's debt and has covered most of Afghanistan's local project costs, a concession rarely allowed other aid recipients. Soviet military contracts generally have allowed a 75 percent discount from list prices and are payable over 15 to 25 years at two percent interest. Large economic credits have allowed up to 25 years for amortization, after as much as 25 years grace, with interest at 2–2.5 percent. These compare with the usual Soviet terms of 10 years repayment at 2 percent for military contracts and 12 years at 2.5 percent for economic aid.

Military Aid

Afghanistan's 1956 border dispute with Pakistan led to the signing of a \$100 million arms agreement with the USSR, the first of a series of accords that have made Moscow responsible for all modern arma-

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Office of Support Services, Job 80T00071A: Production Copy Files (1976–1979), Box 6, The Soviet Presence in Afghanistan. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Attached but not printed is a covering memorandum from Cooper to Limberg, December 6, in response to Vance's request for information on Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. Vance's request was not found.

ments in Kabul's inventories.² Soviet deliveries of more than \$600 million of military equipment since 1956 have supplied over 95 percent of Afghanistan's total military receipts. Deliveries have included MIG and Sukhoi fighter aircraft, medium tanks, surface-to-air missiles, helicopters, and armored vehicles. Even though the USSR has not signed a major new arms accord with Afghanistan since 1975, deliveries are continuing under the \$50 million of orders still outstanding. Thus far in 1977 Afghanistan has received AN-26 transports, SA-3 and SA-7 missiles as well as field artillery, radar and ground equipment.

Moscow also has borne almost sole responsibility for support and maintenance of Afghan weapons systems. Despite more than 20 years of Soviet technical assistance, Kabul still is dependent on Soviet advisors and training. The number of Soviet technical personnel in Afghanistan has varied with the flow of arms. In 1967 their number peaked at 525, and in 1977 about 350 Soviet military personnel were present. By the end of 1977 the USSR will have trained 3,700 Afghan military personnel in the Soviet Union, of which about 650 will still be in training. We expect the number of Soviet technicians and trainees in the USSR to increase next year to service and instruct Afghan's military on the new, more technically advanced equipment now being delivered.

Economic Aid

Despite US assistance of almost half a billion dollars and Afghanistan's recent success in attracting almost \$900 million of OPEC pledges (only \$65 million of which has been disbursed) the USSR continues as Afghanistan's single most important source of economic aid and its principal trading partner. A \$425 million credit, extended in 1975 for Kabul's current Seven Year Plan (21 March 1976–20 March 1983) accounts for one-third of Moscow's total \$1.3 billion commitment to Kabul and is the largest single Soviet commitment to Afghanistan to date. If the ambitious Fifth Plan is actually carried out, Kabul probably will turn to Moscow for additional aid. In the meantime, Soviet deliveries will continue under \$600 million of credits still outstanding.

The Soviet program—on which Moscow has already delivered \$700 million of aid—has provided about one-half of the foreign exchange component for projects under Afghanistan's four five-year plans. With this assistance, two-thirds of Afghanistan's roads and one-half of its

² A reference to the Afghan-Pakistani dispute over the Durand Line, named after the British diplomat Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, who negotiated with the Amir of Afghanistan a border demarcating the territories of British India and Afghanistan in 1893. Following the independence of Pakistan in 1947, the Durand Line became a contested boundary dividing the Pushtun tribal lands of Afghanistan and Pakistan. See *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, vol. VIII, South Asia, Documents 103, 112, 114, 117, and 120.

electric power capacity was built. The USSR constructed major airfields, developed an extensive power transmission network, and put some 100,000 acres of land into cultivation. Moscow also built several small industrial plants and developed Afghanistan's natural gas industry, which now provides the USSR almost 3 billion cubic meters of gas a year through a Soviet built pipeline.

We see no diminution in the Soviet economic presence over the near term. The 1,000 Soviet technicians are presently employed in mineral, oil and gas exploration, fertilizer production, and power, irrigation, and transportation projects. Additional technical personnel probably will be requested as work progresses on two power projects and a \$600 million copper-smelting complex, now on the drawing boards.

6. Letter From President Carter to Afghan President Daoud¹

Washington, March 15, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

I have been following with great interest reports of your recent trip to Yugoslavia, Libya, India and Pakistan and was particularly impressed and heartened by your statements in Islamabad and Lahore about relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan.² Peace, stability and growth in South Asia are important concerns of my administration.

I know both our countries share a desire to strengthen the very cordial ties which already exist. Afghan-U.S. relations are very important to me personally, and we highly value your friendship. It was for this reason that I asked Secretary Vance to discuss with Foreign Minister Waheed Abdullah the possibility of your visiting the United States this coming summer.³

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, Box 1, Afghanistan: President Mohammed Daoud, 3/78. No classification marking.

² An overview of Daoud's trip to Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia, February 21-March 6, was relayed by the Embassy in telegram 1281 from Kabul, February 14. Daoud's remarks in Islamabad emphasizing the importance of good relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan were reported in telegram 2382 from Islamabad, March 8. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780069-0578 and D780105-0788, respectively)

³ See footnote 2, Document 3.

However, I now find, much to my deep personal regret, that I must ask your understanding in postponing your visit. I am sure you realize that I make this request with the greatest reluctance. Much of the critical legislation which I had hoped would be enacted before the end of 1977 remains before Congress. These concern issues of vital importance, such as energy and economic growth, which require my personal attention. In addition, major foreign policy questions, such as peace in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa, and arms control negotiations, remain unresolved. Finally, the United States will be having Congressional elections this Fall that will make heavy demands on my time.

I sincerely hope that this delay will not cause you inconvenience. I do very much look forward to meeting with you and hope that we will be able to arrange a mutually convenient date in the future.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

7. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State¹

Kabul, April 10, 1978, 1025Z

2715. Subject: After Daoud: Is a Peaceful Succession in the Cards?

1. This cable constitutes the summary chapter of an Embassy study of the succession question in Afghanistan. The final study is being transmitted by airgram.²

2. Introduction: Afghanistan's President Mohammad Daoud appears to enjoy good health, and he has five more years remaining of his constitutionally mandated term of office. Nevertheless, Daoud's age (69), the quickening implementation of his political program for this country, and Afghanistan's long tradition of coups and assassinations, suggest that political change could occur with little warning. Thus, the succession issue is a germane one.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780154–0796. Confidential. Sent for information to Islamabad, New Delhi, London, Moscow, Tehran, and CINCPAC for POLAD.

² Not found.

3. The relative dearth of prominent political figures who could readily step into any vacated Presidential shoes indicates that Afghanistan may experience a succession struggle whose outcome will ultimately be decided by the interplay of various interest groups rather than by any single individual able to dominate events. Prominent among such groups—and their currently leading contenders for Daoud's mantle—are: the "centrist" military, represented by National Defense Minister Ghulam Haider Rassuli; the Mohammadzai clan "establishment," represented principally (within Afghanistan) by Daoud's brother Mohammad Naim; and, the conservative military, possibly represented by the exiled Mohammadzai ex-General Abdul Wali, who might also forge a candidacy based on some centrist support.³ Daoud's own apparent choice, Vice President Syed Abdulilah, appears to possess little independent political support, but his chances should improve the longer he is in the number two position.

4. Neither the organized Left nor the reactionary, religious, and landowning Right appears to have identifiable candidates at this time, and neither element will probably furnish Daoud's successor. However, the organized Left, due to its relatively greater efficiency and experience, could conceivably play a significant role in the succession contest, with or without Soviet backing. The reactionary Right constitutes the country's single interest group, and, even though the Right probably will not unite behind any specific contender, this group's role will be crucial nonetheless, because, in all likelihood, no candidate can attain or maintain leadership in the face of rightist opposition.⁴

5. The immediate post-Daoud period. Were Daoud to die in office, we would anticipate a brief caretaker government under the leadership of Daoud's brother Mohammad Naim, whose prestige and Mohammadzai credentials make him acceptable to almost all competing groups, but whose age (approximately 68) excludes him as a likely long-term successor. A Naim government might be forged in partnership with General Rassuli, the present dominant military leader and a Mohammadzai, whose ambitions are unclear but probably include the Presidency. Aside from the patrician Naim, no other individual appears to represent the interests of the in-country Mohammadzai clan.

³ The Mohammadzai tribe had dominated Afghan politics since 1826.

⁴ An intelligence memorandum produced in the Central Intelligence Agency, March 3, also assessed the factors influencing Daoud's eventual succession. The memorandum predicted: "the ability of foreign powers to influence the result" of the succession "will be limited, however, barring a massive and highly unlikely Soviet effort. At most, foreign support might give one candidate or another a slight edge, but given the Afghans' deep suspicions of foreign intentions, indications of foreign backing would do an individual more harm than good." (Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Office of Support Services, Job 80T00634A: Production Case Files (1978), Box 2, Document 8)

Nonetheless, given the prestige and educational/career advantages the Mohammadzais enjoy, we anticipate that the eventual successor will have some familial links to the clan.

6. The increasingly prominent political figure is 33-year old Vice-President Abdulilah, himself a Mohammadzai, Daoud's de facto adopted son, and seemingly the person chosen by the President as his successor. Abdulilah's chances should improve significantly the longer Daoud remains in office and grooms him as his protege and successor. Abdulilah also needs a few more years under his belt to become more acceptable as a leader in this society where age is respected.

7. Forces of the Right. The reactionary Right poses the greatest immediate and potential threat to Daoud's regime, as it has to Afghanistan's previous "reformist" governments. Even though the reactionary religious and landowning elements will probably not supply Daoud's successor, these factions will affect the outcome of the succession struggle by creating significant obstacles to the accession of a candidate deemed ideologically or politically unacceptable to the mass of the Afghan populace (which is very conservative).

8. At the moment, we discern little support, even among rightist elements, for a restoration of the pre-coup monarchy, headed by exiled King Zahir.⁵ However, it is conceivable, though not likely, that ambitious, tough, exiled ex-General Abdul Wali (a first cousin of Daoud) could attain power as a compromise candidate with Mohammadzai credentials, or on the shoulders of a semi-royalist military movement. In either case, it would likely be as a "last resort" candidate, called upon by the center or Mohammadzai clansmen, to preclude political chaos or leftist threat.

9. The leftist challenge. The extent to which Daoud temporarily leaned on left-wing forces within and without the military to return to power in 1973 is an important element of any analysis of the post-Daoud period. Although Daoud has virtually eliminated this faction from meaningful positions of influence, these left-wing forces have been very active within and outside the Daoudist "movement" and could still play some post-Daoud role. A few members of this group were, for example, recently appointed to the High Council of the Armed Forces, which could indicate they may still possess an element of power. The recently reorganized pro-Soviet "Khalq" ("Masses") Party is probably the best organized and most experienced political force in the country even though still very small in numbers.

⁵ On the ouster of King Zahir Shah in July 1973, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-8, Documents on South Asia, 1973–1976, Document 4.

10. Nevertheless, we cannot identify any significant leftist candidates who might replace Daoud, either in the near or long-term. While large numbers of Afghan military officers have been exposed to Soviet training in the USSR or have had contact with Soviet military advisors in Afghanistan, it is unknown how many may have become Marxist or pro-Soviet. Given the government's anti-Communist leanings, they are not likely to express left-wing views at the present time. However, one or more of these officers could emerge from obscurity with remarkable rapidity in an unstable political environment, and we, therefore, believe that any post-Daoud succession, which is not quickly resolved in favor of "centrist"—military or civilian—leadership, could lead to a situation wherein the forces of the Left could play a strong role.

11. Impact on United States interests. A prolonged or violent contest for power [would] adversely affect our interest in regional stability by threatening the independence and cohesion of Afghanistan. Conversely, a quick succession by a moderately centrist leader, such as Naim, or Rassuli—the most probable eventuality at this time, would likely pose no problems for U.S. interests. (The Soviets could possibly also live with such a solution.)

12. Conclusions: Given the traditional and conservative make-up of Muslim Afghanistan, as well as the facts of Afghan political life since the 1973 coup and [garble—the elimination?] of the monarchy, the ultimate successor to Daoud will probably emerge from the politically "centrist" groups, such as the military, or the civilian "establishment" (i.e., the Mohammadzai clan). The inherent power of the military—many of whose leaders are also Mohammadzais—not surprisingly gives the military the inside track, although other pressure groups could conceivably field solid contenders, provided they could elicit some military support. Were General Rassuli to make an immediate move to seize power, following Daoud, we question that he has the qualities that would enable him to remain in power. A long-term leader will, in our view, emerge only after a period of pulling and hauling among the many interest groups here.

13. The potential levels of violence which might explode following Daoud's departure could well be determined by actions and choices which Daoud himself takes during the unknown time left to him. An orderly succession will thus depend on Daoud's ability to convince competing groups that the direction in which he has set for Afghan development takes into account the interests of all segments of society, and that violent internecine conflict should be avoided at all costs.

8. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, April 29, 1978

AFGHANISTAN COUP

Our initial assessment is that the coup leaders were principally motivated by a desire to seize power from the Mohammedzai clan/family, which has dominated Afghanistan for 150 years.² The leaders, mostly military officers, appear to be young, leftist and nationalistic. Some elements of the Afghan Communist party are associated with coup leaders, and one party member has reportedly been named Minister of Finance. There are no indications, however, of Soviet complicity in the coup. The coup seems to have been hurriedly planned and the Soviets may have been informed about it at the last moment. The Soviets have traditionally acted with restraint toward Afghanistan. Although they had probably become somewhat disillusioned with President Daoud, we do not think they would have tried to take over this important non-aligned country. Although the Soviets are probably not displeased with events, they may be cautious about exerting overt and conspicuous influence in order not to unduly alarm Afghanistan's neighbors.

Whatever the facts, we will have to deal with the probable perceptions of the Iranians and Pakistanis, as well as the US press and public, that the new regime is little more than a Soviet proxy. Pakistan will be alarmed and its acute sense of insecurity further enhanced if they believe themselves to be virtually surrounded by Soviet-leaning regimes—India and Afghanistan. The Shah will see this as confirmation of his “worst-case scenario”—the encirclement of Iran by the Communists. The US press and public may portray the situation as a new “Horn of Africa”. It is worth noting that the Kabul events will attract

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 1/77–3/79. Confidential. Drafted by Hornblow (NEA/PAB) and cleared by Saunders. Attached but not printed is an April 29 covering memorandum from Tarnoff to Brzezinski. At the top right of the covering memorandum an unknown hand wrote: “ZB has seen.”

² The Embassy first reported the coup in telegram 3239 from Kabul, April 27 (1725Z), which relayed the announcement from Radio Afghanistan that “Daoud is gone completely and forever.” In telegram 3242 from Kabul, sent one hour and 45 minutes later, the Embassy reported that “the coup appeared to have been triggered by Daoud’s arrest of the Khalq leadership.” The Embassy was unsure at that juncture whether or not Daoud had been killed during the fighting. The telegram included the text of a statement by the Revolutionary Military Force of Afghanistan: “The foreign policy is in accordance with the respect and reservation of the Islamic religion, democratic and individual independence, and the progressive development of the country.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780180–0719 and D780180–0882, respectively)

more than ordinary attention in the third world, since a ministerial-level meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement had been scheduled to meet in Kabul May 6–10.³

One immediate task is to share our information and our assessments with the Paks and Iranians and try to dissuade any hasty moves on their part. Our Embassies' initial assessments are that neither will move under present conditions. Such moves might set off a chain-reaction in the area. We will also be closely watching the Afghan/Soviet border for signs of any Soviet troop movements.

Afghanistan had been making slow but steady economic progress. Iran and other OPEC countries had promised the Daoud Government substantial economic assistance and they now may have second thoughts. Our USAID program runs about \$20 million a year and is concentrated on agricultural, public health and educational programs in rural areas. In addition, we have about 95 Peace Corps volunteers in Afghanistan almost all of whom work in Kabul. The only significant U.S. commercial interest is that Pan American has a 49% share of the Afghan national airline.

In the next few days we will have to make decisions on the following matters.

1. *Diplomatic Recognition*—We usually recognize new regimes if they control the machinery of government and the countryside and if they agree to honor international commitments made by the previous regime. It is still too early to know whether or not the new government is in full control. If there are public perceptions that the new regime is Communist, there may be political pressures to withhold recognition. The Soviets may extend recognition very soon.

2. *Safety of Americans*—There are about 1,000 Americans in Kabul. There are no reported American casualties and the foreign community in Kabul has not been threatened. If heavy fighting resumes, we will have to consider whether or not to try an evacuation.

3. *The Soviet Angle*—There have already been speculative press reports describing this as a "communist coup". As mentioned above, we have no evidence of Soviet involvement, although the new leadership may include leftists. However, the public and Congress may perceive this as another Soviet victory and there may be pressures to do something about it.

³ The meeting was rescheduled for May 15–20 in Havana.

9. **Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State**¹

Kabul, April 29, 1978, 0905Z

3300. Subject: Daoud's Last Hours.

1. According to what appears to be a reliable eyewitness (one of the only two survivors of the horror scene described), President Daoud, his brother Mohammad Naim, and approximately 29 other persons, including Daoud's three sons, their wives and some of his grandchildren, were executed in their house within the palace grounds on the morning of April 28. (We presume that the wives of Daoud and Naim were also in the group.) According to this report Daoud was repeatedly urged to swear loyalty to the National Military Revolutionary Council (NMRC), but he refused.

2. To exert maximum pressure on Daoud the coup forces made him and Naim witness the execution of their families by submachine guns at about 0400 or 0430 on the morning of Friday, April 28 (the report did not contain information on exactly when Daoud and his family had actually fallen into the insurgents' hands). At 0800, a military officer arrived and made a last offer to Daoud and Naim, but the former President still refused. He and his brother were then summarily executed by submachine gun fire.

3. According to a separate report from a Canadian doctor, Daoud's wife, Bilqis (who was also the sister of exiled King Zahir Shah) was brought into Jamhuriat Hospital during the night of April 27. She had massive chest and abdominal gunshot wounds, and passed away shortly after admission. Two of Daoud's grandchildren are still being treated in the orthopedic ward for gunshot wounds.

4. The first report contains an additional enigmatic detail: during the final confrontation with Daoud at 0800, a "diplomatic car," a phrase which most Afghans would interpret as "belonging to a foreign Embassy", was standing outside the Daoud residence. We have received several reports—all unverified as yet—of Soviet personnel being sighted with coup officers.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Daily CIA Brief File, Box 2, 4/28/78–5/5/78. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Priority to CINCPAC for POLAD, Islamabad, Moscow, New Delhi, Rome, and Tehran. Printed from a copy received in the White House Situation Room on May 1. Carter initialed "C" in the upper right corner of the telegram.

5. Comment: This version of Daoud's death tracks with the new regime's subsequent formal announcement that the former leader had to be killed because he would not submit to the authority of the NMRC. The bloody details, however, will probably never be officially acknowledged. If this story is true—and we have no reason to doubt it considering the nature of this violent society—we are provided with a vivid illustration of how venomous was the hatred of the coup leaders against the “Nadir Shah” Yahya Khel clan of Mohammadzai family. Also, this is the stubborn way we would have expected Daoud to resist to the end.

Eliot

10. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Departments of State and Defense, the National Security Agency, and the United States Pacific Command¹

Kabul, April 30, 1978, 1430Z

3372. CINCPAC for POLAD. Subject: Afghan Communist Leader Becomes Ruler of Afghanistan.

1. On April 30, Radio Afghanistan announced at 1700 local time that pro-Soviet Communist Khalq Party leader Nur Mohammad Taraki has been named President of the Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) and Prime Minister (the same information was conveyed officially to the Embassy at 1825 in a circular notice, delivered by a member of the Foreign Ministry's Protocol Department). As the top Afghan Communist becomes head of state and chief of government, the true political character of the coup leadership is now nakedly apparent to all.

2. Taraki, who was born on July 15, 1917, in Maimana Province in Northwestern Afghanistan, is a Pushtun. He has been a prominent Communist leader since 1965. Among the significant positions he has held are: Director-General of Publications in the Ministry of Press and Information (1950–51); editor-in-chief of the official Bakhtar news

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780185–0099. Secret; Flash. Sent for information Niact Immediate to London, Moscow, Islamabad, New Delhi, and Tehran (also for the USDAOs in the last three posts).

agency (1951–52); Press Attaché at the Afghan Embassy in Washington (1952–53); translator/interpreter for the ICA USOM/A Mission at Kabul (ca. 1958); translator for the American Embassy at Kabul (1962–63); became General-Secretary of the Communist Party of Afghanistan (ca. May 1965); editor of “Khalq” (“Masses”), the far-leftist newspaper (April–May 1966); General Secretary of the Taraki group of the Communist Party of Afghanistan (April 1967); chairman of the Central Committee of the Unified Khalq-Parchamist Party (June 1977).

3. Taraki was married in 1942, but has no children. He has been described as “a shaven-headed, bulky man of almost commanding ugliness.” He visited the Soviet Union for medical treatment in 1965 or 1966, travelling extensively in the USSR during his 42-day sojourn. Taraki speaks Dari and English, in addition to his native Pushtun. Fuller biographic details will be reported later.²

4. Upon announcing the appointment of Taraki, the Radio Voice of the new DRA has proclaimed that tomorrow, May Day, will be a national holiday. Embassy officers have noted the appearance of some red flags throughout Kabul this afternoon.

5. Comment: Many Afghan and foreign observers at Kabul were surprised that the Communists have taken over complete power openly, discarding so early in the game their initial veil of “Islamic nationalism”. This could represent a serious miscalculation on their part however. The devout traditionalist majority of this society hardly seems ready to accept the leadership of what is, relatively speaking, a minuscule Communist elite. This reaction could also include those elements of the rebelling armed forces who thought they were fighting for broader nationalist and progressive goals. Additionally, the regional security implications will undoubtedly be clear to the Iranian and Pakistani Governments. With reference to the latter, we note that the long collaboration between Afghan Communist leaders and Pushtunistan nationalists appears to be continuing into the coup era. The red, black, and white flag of Pushtunistan still waves today over Pushtunistan Square in downtown Kabul. During coming days we will be able to provide a more thorough analysis of these events as we see the new Communist regime become established. The discipline we saw displayed during the anti-American demonstration before our Embassy only a few days ago, on April 19, has already translated itself into

² Not found and not further identified.

political power. We shall be interested to see what the first Red May Day in Afghanistan will look like tomorrow.³

Eliot

³ In telegram 3019 from Kabul, April 19, the Embassy reported that the assassination of Mir Akbar Khaibar, characterized as a "prominent Afghan Communist leader," triggered an anti-American demonstration in front of the U.S. Embassy. The Embassy noted that this demonstration "revealed for the first time since the establishment of the Republic in 1973 the sizable, well-organized nature of the Communist movement in Afghanistan." In telegram 3416 from Kabul, May 1, the Embassy described the mood in the city as subdued. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780167-0764 and D780185-0592, respectively)

11. Analysis Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research¹

Washington, May 2, 1978

1. *IMPLICATIONS FOR MOSCOW OF THE AFGHAN COUP*

The Soviets almost certainly are ambivalent about the coming to power of a seemingly pro-Soviet government in Kabul headed by a known Communist because of the damage it is likely to do to the USSR's position in Iran and Pakistan, and possibly in India. Nevertheless, the Soviets apparently are doing what they can to improve its ability to remain in power, in hopes of securing greater influence with it.

The Soviets welcome the advent of a leftist government in Kabul, but they know its Afghan Communist component has very little support domestically. Their major concern over the short-term is that the new government's naming of Communists to top positions will not only galvanize local opposition but perhaps also invite outside meddling. They also recognize that, in any event, there almost certainly will be severe complications in their own relations with other neighboring states.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Program Files for Soviet-Asia Relations, 1960-1978, Lot 90D320, Afghanistan, January-June 1978. Secret; Noforn.

There is no hard evidence that the Soviets had foreknowledge of the coup, but they apparently have been in contact with coup leaders since shortly after it got under way. An American official in Kabul observed a meeting between a Soviet Embassy officer and a coup leader outside the Soviet Embassy last Thursday night, and the Soviets reportedly were sounding out influential Afghans last Friday on the advisability of appointing Taraki as Prime Minister. Moscow has not yet confirmed Kabul Radio's account of the Sunday meeting between Taraki and the Soviet Ambassador at which Soviet recognition of the new government reportedly was conveyed. The TASS replay on May 1 of the "Democratic Republic of Afghanistan's" May Day pronouncement certainly implies Soviet recognition, however.

Moscow presumably has been in regular contact with Afghan Communists, but the evidence suggests that relations have not been particularly close. Until last June, the party had been split into two factions, both of which vied for Soviet recognition and both of which had relations with other Communists and Communist parties in the region. Suggesting that the Soviets lacked confidence in the prospects of the newly merged party, Moscow never formally recognized it and reportedly was instrumental in persuading it to adopt a policy of accommodation with the Daoud government.

The Afghan Communists presumably will be more inclined than Daoud has been in the last two years or so to press the Pushtunistan cause in relations with Pakistan. The Soviets in Kabul have complained about Daoud's muting of this issue in recent years presumably because it lessened his need for Soviet support. They probably would oppose a revival of the issue by the new regime before it has had a chance to consolidate its [power?].²

² The last word of the paper is missing in the original.

12. Memorandum for the Record by Thomas Thornton of the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, May 3, 1978

SUBJECT

SCC Working Group Meeting on Afghanistan

This morning I chaired an SCC Working Group Meeting on Afghanistan. In attendance were NIO, David Blee, Rear Admiral Thomas from ISA, with Commander Zwart, and Peter Lande of State who was acting as Deputy Assistant Secretary.

I used the agenda attached as a focus for discussion.²

Most of the discussion was operational. The principal substantive matters that arose were:

—Diplomatic Recognition. Vance apparently wants to go ahead routinely with diplomatic recognition unless the Iranians urge strongly otherwise and even then he may rather keep in step with the OECD countries than with Iran. I said that you would want to have a voice in this and decide whether the matter needs to go to the President. Most of us at the meeting thought it would be wise to take fuller account of Iranian concerns and, if they felt strongly, attempt to slow down our OECD colleagues.

—Covert Action. There was no great enthusiasm for covert action, particularly on the part of CIA, which felt that it would be pointless. Blee's informal estimate was that the greatest period of weakness would come in 6 to 12 months because of deteriorating economic conditions. We discussed this at some length and much against his will I instructed him to prepare a paper which looks at the possibility of covert actions in the short term.

—General Attitude. There was a general consensus that this regime will be bad news for us but that we should not take the initiative in breaking ties. We decided that personnel should not be withdrawn from Kabul on an accelerated schedule as proposed by the Ambassador.³

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Office File, Country Chron File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 1978. Secret; Sensitive. Printed from an uninitialed copy. Copies were sent to Brzezinski and Hoskinson. Attached but not printed is a covering memorandum, May 3, from Thornton to Brzezinski which characterizes the memorandum as a "run-down" of the meeting Thornton chaired earlier that morning.

² Attached but not printed.

³ Eliot's proposal was relayed in telegram 3453 from Kabul, May 2. Eliot cited "the emergency situation" in Afghanistan as justification for his proposal, although he emphasized that a drawdown of U.S. Government personnel should not be characterized as an "evacuation" because of the negative connotation the new regime might attach to that word. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780186-0713)

The one exception was the Station Chief whose life was considered to be in danger. The general consensus was that the new government should commit the first overt action. Our recommendations in this regard would of course change if we came to the conclusion that effective short term action could and should be taken against the regime. We also decided to resist Peace Corps who apparently have asked for permission now to increase their presence in Afghanistan as a result of the new situation.

The following assignments were given out:

1. A paper on recognition which could if necessary be sent to the President.⁴ If the Iranians are willing to move quickly on recognition this paper will not be necessary and we will go in step with them.

2. State is to ensure that all concerned agencies have current guidance on our attitude towards the new regime (for instance we want to avoid conjuring up a red menace). State will also meet with USIA to ensure that they have proper guidance.

3. State is to undertake more active diplomatic contacts, notably with the FRG and China.

4. CIA will prepare a paper on prospects for Afghan-Soviet relations.⁵ This will be a quick look at the subject to be followed later probably by a SNIE.

5. CIA will prepare a paper examining the prospects for successful covert action and the utility of black propaganda.⁶

⁴ No paper was found. Instructions regarding de facto recognition of the new Afghan Government were relayed in telegram 110057 to Kabul on April 29: "In brief, the basic thrust of the Dept's present approach is to play down question of recognition as much as possible with a view to avoidance of seeming to approve or disapprove the new government. Generally, once the situation has clarified, the new regime is effectively in control of the machinery of government and of the territory of the state in question, and other governments have begun to recognize or formally continue diplomatic relations, we find an appropriate opportunity to advise the new government of our intention to maintain diplomatic relations. Recognition is not mentioned but may be implied by USG continuing to deal with new government." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780184-0669) The Embassy presented a note to the Afghan Foreign Ministry on May 6 stating "the intention of the Government of the United States of America to maintain diplomatic relations with the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan." In telegram 3601 from Kabul, May 6, the Embassy reported that the protocol officer of the Afghan Foreign Ministry received the note "with a smile, and seemed relieved." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780193-0987) In his first conversation with the new Afghan President, May 6, Eliot informed Taraki that "we do not extend formal recognition but indicate, as we have done, that we want to continue normal diplomatic relations." (Telegram 3619 from Kabul, May 6; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780193-1106)

⁵ See Document 13.

⁶ See Document 25.

6. DOD will ensure that some contact is made with Afghan military trainees in the United States. We will not be encouraging them to defect but need to show some interest in their welfare. In some cases their commanding officers are probably not even aware of the problem.

7. The intelligence community will revise its list of priority intelligence targets in Afghanistan. Particular attention will be given to information on possible Coup plotting in the Army. This will be done through Sam Hoskinson.

8. CIA will prepare a list of indicators that we should look for to determine the orientation of the regime (e.g. calling in East Germans to manage security operations).⁷

The first six items on this list are to be completed by Friday.⁸ The remaining two are of lower priority.

Based on the discussions we had I do not see any need for an SCC meeting in the near term. My main concern is that CIA is so unwilling to consider covert action that we will not get a fair paper out of them on this subject.

⁷ Neither a list of priority targets nor a list of indicators was found.

⁸ Friday was May 5.

13. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

RPM-78-10208

Washington, May 5, 1978

SUBJECT

The New Afghan Government's Relations with the USSR

Principal Judgments

1. The Soviets welcome a Communist dominated government in Afghanistan, but probably will be cautious in attempting to capitalize on the advent of the new regime because of its internal fragility and the delicate equilibrium of regional tensions in South Asia.

2. Moscow will work actively to keep the Communists in power in Kabul and to influence the new government's decision-making process. The Soviets probably will offer increased economic and military assistance.

3. Because the new Afghan Government could face serious domestic threats in the near term, Moscow's major immediate interest will be to help the regime consolidate its power. The Soviets in the near term probably will counsel restraint regarding any adventuristic policies at home and abroad.

4. Limited Iranian meddling in Afghanistan seems likely, given the Shah's perception of a serious threat to Iran from the USSR via Afghanistan. Although Pakistan shares these worries, it is less likely to become involved unless the Afghan Government revives the Push-tunistan dispute over Pakistan's western provinces.

5. The chances of a direct confrontation between the USSR and Afghanistan's anti-Communist neighbors remain low, although they have increased slightly. Both Tehran and Islamabad will use the prospect of such a confrontation as an argument for increased US military and political support.

Introduction

On April 27, leftist military officers overthrew former President Daoud and installed a largely civilian government controlled by the leadership of the pro-Soviet Khalq Party (the Afghan Communist

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Office of Support Services, Job 80T00634A: Production Case Files (1978), Box 13, Folder 39: New Afghan Government's Relations with USSR. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. A typed note on the first page reads: "This memorandum was prepared by the CIA's Office of Regional and Political Analysis in consultation with the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the Department of State."

Party). The coup was executed in reaction to the government's arrest of Communist leaders. Given Soviet contacts with Afghan leftists and the armed forces, it is possible that the Soviets learned of the coup in advance, although perhaps by only a matter of hours. There is no evidence to suggest that the Soviets tried to encourage or discourage the leftists, but Moscow and the Afghan Communists have been pursuing the long-term goal of establishing a Communist government in the country.

The New Government: Communist Background

The present movement dates from the early 1950s, when Afghan Communists aided by Communists in the USSR, Iran, Pakistan, and China, began a serious attempt to organize. The major impetus for its growth and organization clearly came from the Soviets, who trained civilians and military personnel in the USSR and Eastern Europe, and introduced Soviet military and technical advisers into Afghanistan. Soviet clandestine activities and propaganda also played a role.

Aside from a small faction that broke with the majority and formed a small pro-Chinese party, there has never been any significant ideological differences between Afghan Communists and the USSR. Afghan Communists, however, were never happy with the fact that Moscow considered its relations with the Afghan Government as more important than supporting the interests of local Communism. Kabul's arrest of Communist leaders, purges of leftist officials, and restrictions on Communist political activity, for example, never interfered with Soviet-Afghan relations.

Infighting among the Afghan Communists themselves—on the grounds of personality rather than ideology—added to tensions, with rival Afghan factions vying for Moscow's support and the Soviets attempting to resolve disputes. The present party is the result of the union last year—under Soviet pressure—of two competing Communist parties, and there apparently is still considerable tension between the two groups.

Consolidating Power

Afghanistan's new rulers, despite their quick seizure of power and the absence of any current significant resistance, not only inherit the weak institutions that permitted the overthrow of the last two governments, but lack some of the assets that helped keep their predecessors in power. Central government authority is almost non-existent in some parts of the country, and even in those areas where Kabul exercises limited control, the government's laws and policies have little impact on the lives of most of the people. Although most Afghans would not be favorably disposed to a Communist-controlled government, they

have little interest in who rules in Kabul. Politics, including coups, involves only a small part of the population.

The popular reaction—either positive or negative—to a change in government has never been a critical factor in Afghanistan; control of key military units has been far more important. The last two successful military coups depended initially on the control of armored units and the air base near the capital. Neither coup was particularly well planned or executed, but in both there was little opposition once the city of Kabul was in the hands of the coup leaders. The new government will need to ensure the loyalty of key units. The process may be difficult.

A hastily organized attempt to overthrow the new government with a small force opposed to the new regime cannot be ruled out, but somewhat more likely would be a gradual buildup of anti-government activities among the tribes or among religious conservatives. Some increase in such activities seems almost inevitable; the seriousness of the threat from the tribes will depend largely on the actions of the new government and the extent to which the conservatives win support in the military.

Several potential problems could affect the new rulers' ability to govern the country and cope with its fundamental social and economic ills. For example, a split could develop between the military and civilian leaders. In the civil sector, the probable removal of experienced bureaucrats in a purge of rightists and officials belonging to or closely connected with the family that has ruled Afghanistan since the 19th Century could quickly erode the regime's ability to cope with unfamiliar problems.² Within the ruling party itself, longstanding rivalries between its two factions could resurface, causing tensions or struggles that would deflect the leaders from government business.

The mechanics of this coup were similar to those of the one in 1973, but the result may lead to a much more fundamental change in Afghan political, economic, and social life. The killing of Daoud and members of his family and the immediately stated intention of the new rulers to eliminate "every member of the family of the autocratic demagogue" are ominous signs. Even if further violent reprisals are not envisioned by the government, the removal of traditional elites from official positions will adversely affect the operation of the bureaucracy and government.

The new government lacks the legitimacy derived from tribal status that reinforced both the monarchy and the republic. Since the early 19th century—except for a short-lived government overthrown in 1929—Afghanistan has been ruled by the acknowledged leader of the domi-

² A reference to the Mohammadzai family.

nant family in the dominant tribe of the Pushtun ethnic group. Although some of the leaders of the new government—including Prime Minister Taraki—are Pushtuns, they have no claim to prestige and respect on the basis of their position in the tribal hierarchy.

This lack of experience and tribal status need not be fatal, but will make it more difficult to deal with other problems. The new rulers are trying to overcome this weakness. Their slaughter of Daoud's family and their denunciations of misrule by Daoud and his ancestors and relatives is designed both to eliminate rivals and to discredit the entire concept of selecting rulers on the traditional basis.

Probably more important will be the policies of the new government. Their initial pronouncements, especially support for Islam and national independence, are a clear indication that the new leaders are aware of the risks of running counter to the xenophobia and deeply religious sentiments of most of the population. Some observers believe that the Communist leaders are basically nationalists despite their long-standing ties to Moscow. If so, they might pursue a policy aimed at preserving at least some opening to the West.

Any direct attack on religion in Afghanistan would be risky. Right-wing Islamic groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, may increase their activities and further assassination attempts are likely. Although the government denies that it is Communist, popular suspicion of the government will grow as word spreads that the Communists—i.e., the atheists—are in power.³ Past efforts at modernization have brought strong reactions, and any major effort by a Communist government to tamper with tradition or institute strong central government control could bring widespread popular unrest, despite the normal lack of interest in politics by most of the populace.

Iran and Pakistan

The probability of at least limited foreign meddling in Afghanistan is high. The Shah of Iran has long argued that the Soviets are attempting to encircle Iran, and to use their position in Afghanistan to break up Pakistan, thereby allowing them the use of southwestern Pakistan as an outlet to the Indian Ocean. The Shah sees the recent coup as confirmation of his worst fears, and it is highly likely that he will order some kind of clandestine operation against the new government. Iranian capabilities are limited, however, and probably would become a threat to Kabul only if the government already faced significant resistance

³ Reporting from Kabul described the new regime's self-identification in more moderate terms. For example, in telegram 3311 from Kabul, April 29, the Embassy noted that the new regime was "still avoiding the use of obvious Communist claptrap." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780184-0066)

from the tribes or the religious conservatives, or had become embroiled in a confrontation with Pakistan.

Although Islamabad would be less inclined than Tehran to intervene in Afghanistan, an Afghan-initiated confrontation with Pakistan appears more likely. Moscow, however, would try to discourage Afghanistan from embarking on any confrontation at least until the Taraki government consolidates its power. The Afghan Communists may well see a revival of the Pushtunistan dispute, which involves the status of western Pakistan, where Pushtuns predominate, as a way to win domestic tribal support or distract attention from any increasingly repressive measures introduced in Afghanistan. Moreover, the Communists have tended to press the issue, and have been critical of Daoud's accommodation with Islamabad. As Communists they would expect stronger support from Moscow against Pakistan than previous Afghan governments, and probably would receive it. There already have been a few indications—such as the flying of Pushtun flags in Kabul after the coup—that the new government does see Pushtunistan as an issue it can use. Moreover, a few of the leading supporters of Pushtunistan in Pakistan are Communists.

Pakistani reaction will depend on how hard Kabul pushes the issue. The Pakistanis are capable, in the absence of more aggressive action, of putting up with propaganda on the issue although they would reciprocate in kind. If the Afghans become too strident or too active, Pakistan can close the main roads across the border, interrupting a large part of landlocked Afghanistan's foreign trade. Such a move would increase Afghan dependence on the USSR for a trade route. There is some evidence that a serious tribal rebellion in 1975 was instigated by the Pakistanis when they decided Daoud had gone too far in supporting separatists in Pakistan. Should the Afghans become too active in support of separatists, Pakistan might resort to punitive and preemptive raids into Afghanistan. The possibility of a Soviet reaction, however, would probably deter the Pakistanis from a full-scale invasion of Afghanistan.

The Soviet View

The Soviets welcome the establishment of a pro-Soviet, Communist-controlled government in Afghanistan. In itself a major gain for Moscow, this development is significant also as the first leftist victory in a year otherwise marked by the establishment of moderate and conservative governments in South Asia.

Moscow's interest in Afghanistan predates the Bolshevik revolution. Over the last quarter century, the Soviet Union has made a considerable investment in its southern neighbor. Afghanistan was the first recipient of Soviet aid, and is still among the 10 largest recipients

of Soviet military and economic assistance. The Communist victory protects this investment and ensures that at least for the near future, Moscow will remain—and probably improve—its position as the most influential foreign power in Kabul. The Soviets applauded Daoud's coming to power in 1973, but in recent years had grown concerned over his efforts to rid his government of leftists and achieve greater independence from Moscow.

Since Moscow's relations with Afghanistan's Communists have not always been close, the Soviets will move to strengthen their ties to the recently re-united Afghan Communist party. The Soviets will exploit these ties to influence any reorganization of Afghanistan's party, military, and administrative institutions. They will proceed cautiously, however, in order to avoid creating undue anxiety in Afghanistan.

Although Daoud's removal will calm some Soviet concerns, it will also cause alarm about Soviet policy elsewhere in the region, particularly in Iran and Pakistan. The Pakistanis and Iranians suspect that the Soviets engineered the coup, and the Pakistanis are again fearful of a "Delhi-Kabul-Moscow" axis, noting that India and the USSR quickly recognized the new regime.⁴ Both nations will use the events in Kabul to try to elicit increased US military and political support.

The Soviets profess to favor a calm and stable subcontinent with governments friendly to the USSR. Tensions and instability—the Soviets allege—create openings for greater Western or Chinese influence. However, Moscow's previous successes in South Asia have been largely due to its exploitation of these same regional rivalries.

Moscow would favor the eventual creation of a Marxist state in Afghanistan along the lines of a Cuba or Vietnam. At this point, however, the Soviets are probably more concerned with the new government's stability in power and with minimizing the damage to Soviet interests elsewhere in the region than in the ideological and institutional purity of the new regime. The Soviets probably would be satisfied with a left-leaning, strongly pro-Soviet government with distinct nationalist colorings. Moscow almost certainly will press for greater support of Soviet positions on international issues, such as the Asian collective security system, and will expect the new government to refrain from any new initiatives toward Peking. However, it probably will not in the near term press the government to launch any far-reaching, radical reforms that run the risk of alienating large segments of the population.

Moscow likewise will counsel caution regarding Kabul's regional initiatives. Aware that several members of the new government have

⁴ The Soviet Union was the first country to recognize the new Afghan Government on April 30. India recognized the new Afghan Government on May 2.

identified themselves in the past with Pushtun or Baluch causes, Moscow is almost certainly worried that the new regime might too quickly seek radical solutions to its border disputes with Pakistan and Iran. Moscow's hesitation would be based on its fear of jeopardizing its attempts to improve its relations with India, Pakistan, and Iran. Moscow probably would not approve any Afghan attempt to use the Pushtunistan issue before the Taraki government consolidates its power at home.

Should Kabul nevertheless become embroiled in the Pushtunistan issue or other foreign entanglements, however, Moscow would support it. Particularly in the event of internal or external threats to the stability of the new Afghan Government, Moscow would increase military aid, including the number of Soviet advisers in the country. It is highly unlikely that Moscow would introduce Soviet troops. In the event of a successful counter-revolution in the near term, Moscow probably would be restrained in its reaction, trusting that Afghan dependence upon Soviet military and economic aid would eventually convince any new government of the need for a continuing close relationship with Moscow. Moscow can be expected to continue and very likely increase its sizable economic and military aid programs in Afghanistan.

[Omitted here is an annex, "Past and Present Soviet Policy," which traces Soviet interest in and influence over Afghanistan from 1921.]

14. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, May 6, 1978, 1447Z

10030. Subject: Soviet Perspective of Afghan Coup.

Summary: Soviet reaction to Afghan coup has been cautious but increasingly positive. It is extremely hazardous to predict Moscow's future policies toward Afghanistan as a result of the coup. Much will depend on such unknowns as Soviet assessment of (A) the internal Afghan political situation and (B) Indian sensitivities about "outside" threats to Delhi's efforts to "regionalize" and "normalize" inter-state relations in South Asia. Based on past experience, we believe the Soviets will work to help insure the survivability of the new regime and, in the longer run, its consolidation of power. At the same time, Soviets will be alert to broader strategic/regional considerations (e.g., relations with India) and need to weigh these in assessing how far they should go in assisting the Kabul regime. In the end, the durability of the new pro-Soviet government in Afghanistan will depend chiefly on indigenous factors and not primarily on the Soviet Union. End summary.

1. The public Soviet reaction to the Afghan coup has been cautious, primarily limited to straight news items, but increasingly positive in tone. The caution is undoubtedly based on a Soviet intention to deflate widespread suspicions that Moscow instigated, had prior knowledge of or directly participated in the coup, and may also reflect genuine Soviet uncertainty about the new regime. The Soviet press on May 5 gave special prominence to Taraki's condemnation of allegations in the international press that "foreign interference" contributed to the success of the coup. We expect to see progressively more favorable coverage of the Afghan coup in the Soviet press, with emphasis on foreign and domestic support for the Afghan regime and the enhanced prospects for social-economic progress produced by the "revolution".

2. Moscow of course can only be pleased by the sudden seizure of power in Afghanistan by men who have long been avowedly "socialist"

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Program Files for Soviet-Asia Relations, 1960-1978, Lot 90D320, Afghanistan, January-June 1978. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information Priority to Kabul. Also sent for information to New Delhi, Islamabad, Tehran, Colombo, Dacca, Kathmandu, Karachi, Lahore, USLO Peking, Hong Kong, Ankara, Jidda, USUN, USNATO, Geneva for the U.S. SALT delegation, and CINCPAC for POLAD.

and pro-Soviet. In deciding its course of action, Moscow will have to bear two main considerations in mind:

—The Soviets will not want their activities in Afghanistan to set back the USSR's broader strategic-political interests in South Asia, which center fundamentally on good Indo-Soviet relations. The Soviets realize that Delhi's main foreign policy goals are to "regionalize" and to "normalize" inter-state relations in South Asia, while minimizing the potential for involvement in the region by outside powers.

—Moscow will not want to encourage, through excessively overt Soviet identification with the new Kabul regime, a "marriage of convenience" of potentially anti-Communist/anti-Soviet elements including nationalist, anti-Communist and Islamic forces in Afghanistan, which could coalesce and threaten the new regime with a "counter-revolution."

3. What will be Soviet short term objectives? It is hazardous to attempt to predict shifts in Moscow's policies as a result of recent events in Afghanistan. Much will depend on the Soviet assessment of the internal Afghan political scene, the degree to which the new regime turns out to be pro-Soviet and/or genuinely non-aligned. Past experience leads us to conclude that in the short run Moscow will mainly be interested in helping to insure the survivability of the new leftist regime and its consolidation of power. Moscow knows that this will be no mean feat for the new rulers in Kabul, given the background of recurring coups and violence in Afghan political history, and the degree of conservative and anti-Communist sentiment prevalent in Afghanistan. We anticipate that the Soviets will continue and probably increase economic and military aid, and work behind the scenes to bolster the new regime through material support and political "advice". The Soviet "advice" probably will stress the importance of continuing unity among the leftists and military factions that have seized power as the only hope to establish the permanence that has eluded all Afghan regimes in recent history. We believe that the Soviets will also encourage the new regime to move quickly and dramatically to show economic and social "progress" (e.g., confiscation of Shah dynasty property). Internationally, the Soviets will seek to "consult" closely with New Delhi on the Soviet reading of events in Afghanistan in order to reassure the Indians of Soviet bona fides and to dispel possible Indian apprehensions of excessive "outside" involvement in Afghanistan. Soviet propaganda will selectively highlight the recognition and welcoming of the Afghan regime by other countries, particularly those in the Third World and the Non-Aligned Movement. Moscow will work through international organizations and its bilateral relations with other (particularly non-aligned and fellow "socialist" countries) to mobilize aid for Afghanistan. We agree that the Soviets are not likely to encourage the

Afghans to heat up the Pushtunistan issue in the short run, unless of course, this would be viewed as helpful in assisting the regime to consolidate its control internally.

4. What will be Soviet long run objectives? If survival and consolidation are the short run imperatives, we believe that in the long run the Soviets will hope to encourage a steady strengthening of the Khalq Party's base in Afghanistan so that the party and not individuals will provide a firmer foundation for future continuity and control. We anticipate that the Soviets will also encourage the institutionalization of state-party control mechanisms down to the grass roots level which are characteristic of all Communist regimes. As this process builds, the Soviets will tout developments in Afghanistan as a triumph of "progressive forces" and the "world revolutionary process." In this long run perspective, the Soviets may also see Afghanistan as a regional "model" for other "progressive" forces in the region seeking to capture power in their respective countries (this is a role which Soviet party theoreticians like to attribute to Angola and Ethiopia in Africa, Vietnam in Asia and Cuba in Latin America).

5. More on the Indian angle: Embassy New Delhi is, of course, in a far better position to assess India's sensitivities to a more direct Soviet participation in the consolidation efforts of the new Afghan regime.² We would note that the Soviets have willingly and quickly sacrificed short term losses in relations with the U.S. and other countries to reap what they see as long term gains through direct and massive support to new "progressive" regimes in Angola and Ethiopia. It seems from this vantage point, however, that the Indians would be very irritated if Moscow attempted in the long or the short run to involve itself in Afghanistan (as it has in Angola and Ethiopia) in a way that would indicate a Soviet intention to draw Afghanistan into its own sphere of influence. It is noteworthy that the Desai government's moves to improve relations with the U.S. and China have made nature of Indo-Soviet relations all the more delicate. By irritating Delhi through "over-involvement" in Afghanistan, the Soviets would risk harming Indo-Soviet relations and increasing the possibility for better Sino-Indian and Indo-U.S. relations: a result which would be viewed here as most detrimental to Soviet strategic interests in South Asia and in Asia as a whole. In our view, the degree to which the Soviets directly assert

² Reporting from New Delhi, the Embassy suggested that India was not well informed regarding the political orientation of the new regime in Afghanistan. For example, in telegram 7475 from New Delhi, May 11, the Embassy paraphrased Indian Foreign Secretary Jagat Mehta's hope "that the new Afghan Government means what it says about non-alignment and good relations with its neighbors." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780200-0473)

themselves will therefore be significantly influenced by Soviet perceptions of possible Indian objections.

6. In sum, in our view, the durability of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul, particularly in the short run, will depend chiefly on indigenous factors in Afghanistan and not primarily on the ability of the Soviet Union to influence directly events on the unpredictable Afghan political scene.

Toon

15. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, May 8, 1978

SUBJECT

US Policy Toward Afghanistan

The President has noted a report on Ambassador Eliot's weekend conversation with Prime Minister Taraki.² According to the report, Taraki said that the climate of bilateral relations will depend on US willingness to provide economic aid to his government. He said he will be asking for new aid from both the US and USSR.

In response to the above, the President stated that we should build a good relationship with the new Government of Afghanistan, but

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 1/77–3/79. Secret.

² In telegram 3619 from Kabul, May 6, Eliot reported on his first conversation with Taraki. He characterized the meeting as friendly and expressed the U.S. desire to help Afghanistan retain its independence. Taraki emphasized that what had transpired in late April was a "revolution," not a "coup," and that Daoud was killed because he shot at his attackers, who otherwise would have taken him captive to be court-martialed and possibly executed. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780193–1106) Carter may have read a condensed version of the telegram in the May 7 "Current Reports" compilation disseminated by INR. (National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Program Files for Soviet-Asia Relations, 1960–1978, Lot 90D320, Afghanistan, January–June 1978)

we should proceed in a cautious manner with respect to economic assistance.³

Zbigniew Brzezinski

³ Subsequent Embassy reports also noted the challenges of maintaining economic assistance programs with Afghanistan. For example, in telegram 5982 from Kabul, July 24, the Embassy reported that while the DRA wanted the U.S. aid program “to continue in all the areas which were involved before the revolution,” this would have to proceed slowly because the new government “did not have its act together.” The Embassy further explained that among the new government officials there was a deficit of experience and reliability required to manage assistance programs, an assessment shared by other Western powers and international aid organizations. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780303–1012)

16. Letter From Pakistani General Zia to President Carter¹

Islamabad, May 9, 1978

Dear Mr. President,

Your interest in the possible implications of the recent coup in Afghanistan and in my personal assessment of this event, has been conveyed to me by Ambassador Hummel.² The correct assessment of the change of regime in Kabul and of its wider ramifications is, indeed, essential to enable us to determine our response to it. Your personal awareness of the importance of the new situation that has arisen and your keenness to have the right answers, are most welcome.

As soon as the events began to unfold in Kabul, we took the initiative to consult Ambassador Hummel and have remained in close touch with him ever since. We have in the course of these consultations

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, Box 15, Pakistan: President Zia-ul-Haq, 2/78–7/79. No classification marking.

² In telegram 4264 from Islamabad, May 1, Hummel outlined a proposed Presidential message to Zia regarding the situation in Afghanistan. The message emphasized that the United States remained committed to the stability of South Asia and recognized the centrality of Pakistan toward that end. In telegram 112361 to Islamabad, May 3, Vance authorized Hummel to deliver the message orally on the basis that a letter from Carter “might enhance Pakistan’s concerns, as well as raise unrealistic expectations.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780188–0749 and D780185–0567, respectively)

also briefed him in detail about these developments and our perception of their wider repercussions in our own region and beyond. Ambassador Hummel, no doubt, has communicated to you our views which I hope have been of some interest.

Neither are the facts of the latest turn of events in Afghanistan obscure nor is their interpretation a difficult exercise. The leftist coup in Kabul has replaced a 200-year old monarchic tradition in Afghanistan with a communist-oriented, if not communist, Government which was immediately recognised by the Soviet Union and has its full backing. India joined Bulgaria, the most subservient Soviet satellite of Eastern Europe, to follow the Soviet lead without any hesitation or delay whatsoever. The collapse of Daoud's regime with which we were making good progress towards a settlement of our differences, may have been welcomed in New Delhi. India is allied to the Soviet Union under the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of 1971 and acts in tandem with it, at critical moments, despite the illusion of a shift in its policies.³

The facts of how the coup was engineered are not in dispute. Soviet trained pilots in Soviet supplied MIGs and Soviet trained officers in Soviet supplied tanks joined together to wipe out President Daoud and his family, in a swift and bloody operation, closely following the pattern of events in Addis Ababa not long ago.⁴ The Afghan Police Force which was exclusively West German trained, was also eliminated.

The Khalq party which has formed the new Government is composed of leftists known to have been closely associated with the Soviet Union and the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party over a period of many years. President Taraki also served for a while in the Afghan Embassy in Washington where his denunciation of the Afghan ruling family resulted in his removal from office.⁵ He is now not only President of Afghanistan but also the head of the Khalq Party with which an extremist faction called Parcham merged in October 1977.

³ The Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation was signed in New Delhi on August 7, 1971.

⁴ A possible reference to the Ethiopian revolution of 1974, during which Marxist military leaders brought down Emperor Haile Selassie. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-8, Documents on Africa, 1973–1976, Document 122. However, the more likely reference is to the assassination of Teferi Bante, Chairman of the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC), along with five other leaders of PMAC on February 3, 1977. The assassination of Teferi Bante and his associates, all enemies of Mengistu Haile-Mariam, cemented Mengistu's role as leader of the Ethiopian revolution.

⁵ In telegram 3372 from Kabul, April 30, the Embassy noted that Taraki served as the press attaché in the Afghan Embassy in Washington, 1952–1953. In telegram 4262 from Islamabad, May 1, the Embassy reported that Taraki made "anti-monarchist speeches" during his tenure in Washington and consequently requested asylum in the United States, which was turned down after "intense pressure" from King Zahir Shah. Taraki subsequently returned to Kabul where he was arrested. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780185–0099 and D780185–0561, respectively)

The leader and founder of the extremist Parcham faction is now the Vice President and Deputy Prime Minister in President Taraki's Government. The overwhelming majority of the remaining members of the Government are all of the same hue.

Paragraph 8 of the ruling Khalq Party's manifesto issued in October 1977, specifically mentions the Durand Line, the recognised international frontier between Pakistan and Afghanistan, as a "colonial imposition" and pledges support to the so-called "national movement of the people of Pakhtoonistan" in our territory. In his very first press conference on May 6, 1978, the new Afghan President raised the matter of the Durand Line saying, of course, that he wanted a peaceful settlement of this border issue with Pakistan.⁶

The entire flavour and rhetoric of the new regime in Kabul conform to classic communist norms. The country itself has been re-named the "Democratic Republic of Afghanistan" on familiar lines. The regime's lip service to Islamic values and non-alignment is transparent enough. The need for such camouflage to gain time for the regime to consolidate its position, is evident.

If we go along with these professions in an effort to ensure the continuity of the dialogue we had initiated with President Daoud, this does not mean that we are under any illusion or have been lulled into a false sense of security by the regime's protestations. We know that the Afghan barrier has been breached and our country lies directly in the path of the flood which rolled out of Czarist Russia in the last century and is now flowing in full force towards the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf.

It is the nature of the response to this situation which is the subject of controversy among our friends and allies. This is unfortunate because time is running out. Nothing will stop the Soviet Union from pursuing its expansionist policies if events encourage it to believe that smaller countries are expendable in the overall context of America's global strategy.

In our estimation the advent of the leftist regime in Kabul is an event of historic proportions. The change is of a fundamental nature which will have a profound impact on the balance of power in our region and beyond. Its consequences for Pakistan are incalculable. These and related matters are receiving our urgent attention. I am convinced that these are of deep concern to you also and hope that you will be able to spare some time to give attention to the measures

⁶ The press conference was reported in telegram 3697 from Kabul, May 8. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780194-0927)

needed to meet an entirely new situation which has materialised earlier than we had expected.

We are also in the process of comparing notes with our other friends. My Adviser on Foreign Affairs is at present in Iran and will be meeting the Shahanshah. For Iran the situation could be as grave as it is for us. It may not be empty rhetoric to say that unless timely action is taken to block the Soviet avalanche, the oil resources of the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula may be lost to the West with consequences that need no elaboration.

I am unable, Mr. President, to say in greater detail what I have to say in a short letter. It is not possible to convey to you in this communication the exact nature of the forces that may have been released by the transformation of the Afghan scene. A fuller elaboration of this theme which is of vital concern to us and I hope also to you, can better be undertaken through a personal exchange of views at a mutually convenient time.

With profound regards,
Yours sincerely,⁷

M. Zia-ul-Haq
General

⁷ General Zia added the two closing lines by hand.

17. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State¹

Kabul, May 17, 1978, 0956Z

4018. Subject: Implications for U.S. Policy of Coup in Afghanistan. Ref: A. Tehran 4547, B. Kabul 3419 (Notal), C. Kabul 3666 (Notal).²

1. All the hard evidence that we have about Soviet activities in Afghanistan since the April 27–28 coup and about past relationships between the new Afghan leaders and the Soviet Union lead inescapably to the conclusion that under its new leadership, Afghanistan has fallen into the Soviet orbit. So far, we have only the words of the new leaders that they intend to pursue a nonaligned policy. Their growing acceptance of Soviet involvement in their political and military infrastructure does not support their words.

2. Moreover, I remain convinced that having achieved such a long-standing goal of incorporating Afghanistan into the Soviet sphere of influence, Moscow will do everything it can to keep it there. And, I see no internal or external factors at the moment which could thwart Moscow's intention.

3. The psychological-political effects of this development are naturally being felt in other places, especially Pakistan, but also in Iran, China, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere. I note a common theme in these other countries that they cannot count on the United States to prevent further Soviet advances in this part of the world. This despondency itself contributes to an atmosphere from which the Soviets can benefit, and which can encourage them to exploit further their bridgehead here.

4. Vital interests of the United States, especially in Iran and the Persian Gulf region, are involved in this situation. I would think that our credibility in Peking is also involved.

5. In the light of these considerations, I warmly second the recommendations made by Ambassador Sullivan (ref A).³ I think it is essential

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780207–0796. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Sent for information to Ankara, Islamabad, London, Moscow, New Delhi, Paris, USLO Peking, Tehran, Tokyo, USCINCEUR (also for POLAD), CINCPAC (also for POLAD), and Jidda.

² Telegram 4547 from Tehran, May 14, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780209–1069. Telegrams 3419 and 3666 from Kabul are dated May 1 and May 7, respectively. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780185–0714 and D780194–0609, respectively)

³ In telegram 4547 from Tehran, May 14, Sullivan called for the United States to make a concerted and systematic effort to demonstrate to its allies in the region its commitment to their integrity and stability, lest the Soviets be further encouraged toward adventurism beyond Afghanistan. (See footnote 2, above)

that we undertake a careful review of our policy towards this region, especially toward the regional CENTO countries, with a view to bolstering their political, psychological, and military positions. I also agree that we should consult with our European and Japanese allies, and with the Chinese, on what they, as well as we, can do in these regards. An early resolution of the nuclear reprocessing dispute with Pakistan is of fundamental importance.

6. I am certain we can devise ways for shoring up our friends in this region which will not be incompatible with a strategy of maintaining a relationship with Afghanistan which will provide the Afghans with some alternative to reliance on the Soviet Union, should they wish to have and/or be permitted by the Soviets to have such an alternative.

Eliot

18. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Islamabad, May 18, 1978, 1148Z

4980. Subject: Pakistan and the U.S. Following the Kabul Coup. Ref: A. Islamabad 4727; B. Islamabad 4630; C. State 119925; D. Kabul 3836; E. Islamabad 4348; F. Kabul 4018; G. Tehran 4547.²

1. As all of our contacts tell us, from General Zia on down, the abrupt change of government and orientation in Afghanistan is an historic event, pregnant with immediate security implications for the nearby countries of the Middle East and South Asia and with important ripple effects on the strategic interests of the great powers in this area. Embassy officers travelling around Pakistan since the coup in Kabul have found a sense of gloom and trauma prevalent in most of the

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780210–0657. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent for information to Ankara, Dacca, New Delhi, Kabul, London, Moscow, Paris, Tehran, Kathmandu, and Colombo.

² Telegrams 4727 and 4630 from Islamabad, dated May 12 and May 10, are in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780204–0665 and D780197–1239, respectively. Telegram 119925 to Tehran is dated May 11 (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780199–0650); telegram 3836 from Kabul is dated May 11 (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780199–1023); telegram 4348 from Islamabad is dated May 3 (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780188–0733); and telegram 4018 from Kabul is printed as Document 17. For telegram 4547 from Tehran, see footnotes 2 and 3, Document 17.

comments now being offered by Pakistanis of all walks of life, and indeed, the nation—or at least its opinion molders—appears to be in a state of shock.³

2. To fully understand the meaning for Pakistanis of the change in Afghanistan it is important to recall that for most of the history of this part of the world—at least until the Europeans came by sea some 400 years ago—Afghanistan has been both the military and cultural route into South Asia. As the British Empire in India took shape, British policy sought to seal off that route by fostering a classic buffer role for what was to become Afghanistan. The replacement of the czars by Bolsheviks and the British Raj by swaraj (self-rule) did not fundamentally change this situation, and Afghanistan remained a buffer in a cold war context.

3. This is not simply an historical digression. Rather these are fundamental facts which underly the thinking and the relationships of the peoples and the states of this region, predating the Dulles and Ayub Khan eras but incorporated, essentially intact, into our earliest security relationship with Pakistan. When opinion leaders in this country now turn to us to express their concerns and anxieties about Pakistan's future in view of the apparent loss of that buffer against Soviet Central Asia, they have in mind these widely perceived historical realities and are reacting with gut concern for national survival. Turning to the U.S. for reassurance at this moment is also something of a reversion to earlier principles, since it was as an anti-Soviet alliance, focused on the USSR (and Afghanistan), that the post-war U.S.-Pakistan relationship was strongest.

4. If it were the uncertainties in the Afghan situation alone in their minds it would be disturbing enough for many Pakistanis. But the change in the role of Afghanistan may also have destroyed—for now at least—whatever slender prospect there was for continued warming Indo-Pakistan relations, described now by Foreign Advisor Agha Shahi as “back to square one.” The quick Indian recognition of the new regime in Kabul—however warranted in Delhi's eyes and welcome in Kabul's—has rather quickly resurrected all the old shibboleths about the Indo-Soviet relationship (based on their 1971 agreement).⁴ At the official level, and even more widely in the country, there is renewed suspicion about what the wily Hindus are up to this time combined

³ In telegram 4727 from Islamabad, May 12, the Embassy reported that Foreign Affairs Adviser Agha Shahi told Hummel that recent events in Afghanistan threatened Pakistan and CENTO existentially: “While you wait to see how things develop in Afghanistan, we will be gone.” (See footnote 2, above)

⁴ India recognized the new Afghan Government on May 2. For the 1971 agreement, see footnote 3, Document 16.

with a presumption that it bodes ill for Pakistan. Even those Paks who perceive their own paranoia point out that paranoids can have real enemies.

5. There is great disappointment among our Pakistani contacts that the U.S. has not said more in criticism of the bloody events in Kabul at the end of April. Officially, we have been pressed, bilaterally and in the CENTO context, for some concrete evidence of what we propose to do about the change that has come about in Afghanistan to ensure that the pox let loose there in April does not spread to Iran and Pakistan in the months and years ahead. While as a practical matter, the Pakistan Government has publicly adopted a wait-and-see attitude much like our own and Iran's, Pakistan's leaders feel let down that even in private conversations we have had nothing more to offer than a willingness to consult and an assessment which Ambassador Sullivan has correctly termed "thin gruel."

6. Many Pakistanis want a close and continuing U.S.-Pak relationship of trust, cooperation, and confidence, so our reaction thus far has been doubly disappointing. Some will, of course, see it as but the latest U.S. let-down of Pakistan, going back to our support of India in 1962, our failure to aid Pakistan in 1965 and 1971, and our pressure now to deny Pakistan the nuclear reprocessing plant it feels it needs. Many also see it as part of a wider lack of resolve on the part of the U.S., and outgrowth of our Watergate, Angola, and Vietnam traumas; U.S.-Pakistan differences on policy toward the Horn of Africa will also be cited as evidence of this lack of U.S. resolve. And this comes from those who are still friendly to our interests here.

7. Those Paks who actually oppose our interests here and who have long sought to cut Pakistan loose in a sea of non-alignment accommodationism may well see an opportunity in the current situation to demonstrate conclusively that the U.S. is, in fact, an unreliable partner which has lost its zest for the struggle. They will argue, as [*less than 1 line not declassified*] notes the Foreign Secretary already has, that Pakistan must stop looking to the U.S. (and CENTO) for reassurance, but rather must accommodate to the rise of Soviet and the decline of American influence in the world.

8. Policy implications: I do not suggest or recommend that we streamrollered by events in Afghanistan into taking steps in Pakistan or in this region to resurrect an earlier era of U.S.-Pak relations. The world is a different place than it was in the 1950s and early 1960s, and besides, nostalgia has a way of making that earlier relationship appear better than it probably was. We have substituted for the earlier objective of containment of Communism the more realistic formula of promotion of regional stability. Events in Kabul have undermined that stability, and so far we seem unable to think of actions to shore it up.

9. There has been a fundamental change in the South-Asia-Middle East region, nevertheless, and whether the Soviets prompted the Kabul coup or are merely the beneficiaries of it, the perception is that the Soviet Union has scored an important gain in this part of the world. That should be a matter of concern to us.

10. Our friends, in whose territorial integrity and independence we have frequently expressed strong interest, and who rightly interpret that interest, and our previous relationship with them based on our 1958 bilateral as testimony to our concern for their security can legitimately expect a more visible sign of our concern than they have seen thus far.⁵ As I see it, we are now very much in danger of letting our tactical posture vis-à-vis the new Afghan regime be a substitute for policy toward the region as a whole. Our friends will not be to blame if they begin to draw the conclusion that our assurances of the past lack practical effect.

11. It seems to me that we must find a way of acting in this region which can serve to reassure our friends in Pakistan, Iran, and even India, while not unduly disturbing the new relationship we are attempting to foster with India, or challenging the Soviets frontally to our disadvantage perhaps, in other forums. And we must somehow persuade Iran, and India, and Pakistan that they now have more in common regarding the new situation in Afghanistan than they have interest in their continuing mutual suspicions of each others' motives and activities.

12. The big hurdle for U.S. policy in this—at least the most obvious one at the outset—is our nuclear non-proliferation face-down with the GOP. I do not imply any diminution of the importance of this global goal of reducing the spread of uncontrolled nuclear technology, any more that I would suggest we abandon our human rights concerns here or in Afghanistan or in Iran (or even in India) in the interests of regional security. What I do suggest, however, is that we not hold our entire bilateral policy relationship hostage to any single or multiple strands of our global foreign policies, however important and worthy. To continue to mortgage our entire relationship with Pakistan to the non-proliferation question—despite what has happened and may happen in the wake of the Kabul coup—will be to promote the erosion of our last remaining instruments of influence and prestige here in Pakistan while the GOP—this government or the next one or two or three—decides it must trim its sails to the new wind blowing from Central Asia.

⁵ A reference to the bilateral Agreement of Cooperation signed on March 5, 1959, pursuant to a declaration signed on July 28, 1958, by the Baghdad Pact nations. The Baghdad Pact was the precursor of CENTO.

13. If we are going to have influence in this region, it is because we are relevant to its interests and because we are presumed to share some of its deepest concerns. Part of our problem with Pakistan, even before the Kabul coup, has been this perception of relevance. We press them hard on nuclear non-proliferation, as we must; we express concern over their human rights record; we expect them to make changes for the better in their administration of aid projects [garble—and in their] handling of the economy. At the same time, we deny them access to new and replacement military equipment in some critical areas, and we refuse to commit new assistance or to sign agreements for which funds have already been obligated. If, now, we prolong these largely self-imposed shut-downs, Pakistan (and its neighbors) will draw their own conclusions. If, on the other hand, we can be more responsive to their concerns, we may—in fact—use this period to repair some of the damage in our relationship while at the same time exercising greater influence on the GOP to set its own affairs aright.

14. We are waiting, and must no doubt continue to wait for answers and for events:

- A solution to the reprocessing plant problem;
- the settling of Bhutto's fate;
- the formation of a civilian government;
- clarification of Afghan intentions.

But let us not postpone all action until all of these and other questions are settled to our satisfaction. To do so will further undermine, perhaps fatally, our ability to influence events and achieve our policy goals. We would like to see a stable, civilian government here, but in present circumstances there is very little we can do to promote that result, and we are losing the capability to have meaningful influence on human rights, narcotics control, and economic development. All of these are high on our list of goals and objectives, but unless we can soon find some areas of middle ground between our hopes and the realities of the situation, it is hard to see how we can make any progress toward our goals.

Hummel

19. Intelligence Information Cable Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

[*cable number not declassified*]

Washington, May 20, 1978, 2117Z

COUNTRY

Afghanistan

SUBJECT

Continued Soviet Concern Over new Afghan Regime, [*1 line not declassified*]

SOURCE

[*2 lines not declassified*].

1. On 16 May [*1 line not declassified*] observed that the new Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) was already suffering from poor administration and confusion amongst its leadership. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] noted he was particularly distressed by the new regime's lack of bureaucratic efficiencies and that each individual leader is preoccupied with the task of bringing loyal members of the party into key governmental positions. The party members are being appointed more or less randomly and usually lack the necessary skills or background to carry out their assigned responsibilities. [*6 lines not declassified*]

2. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] also expressed concern that the new regime was experiencing continuing tension between the Parcham and Khalq factions; he lamented that these old antagonisms should have been long forgotten.

3. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] said that Ambassador Puzanov was finding it somewhat tricky to deal with the new regime. President Nur Mohammad Taraki had apparently laughed at some of Puzanov's advice and had stated that we will take decisions ourselves taking into consideration the desires and benefits of the Afghan people.

4. The durability of the Afghan regime was also a concern of [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. He noted that there could be Western agents within the ruling Khalq Party and that after revolutions there were usually subsequent upheavals until a viable regime was finally established. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] observed that a continuing series

¹ Source: Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 7, USSR in Afghanistan (1978). Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*].

of revolutions had occurred in Iraq and Bangladesh, and Afghanistan might not be any different.²

5. ACQ: [1 line not declassified]

6. [less than 1 line not declassified] Dissem: [3 lines not declassified]

² A likely reference to the July 1968 revolution in Iraq, after which the Ba'ath Party took control of the country, and the assassination of Bangladeshi President Mujibur Rahman in August 1975. Both cases involved the seizure of power by military officers.

20. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, May 22, 1978

SUBJECT

Status of Our Relations With Afghanistan

We have resumed normal diplomatic relations with Afghanistan and your decision on our overall posture has been communicated to the relevant agencies.²

In more specific areas, these are the principal actions taken by the Working Group that we set up under the SCC.

—*Covert action* is not appropriate at this time; we are, however, reviewing our *intelligence collection* priorities and capabilities.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton, Subject File, Box 97, Chron: 1–5/78. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Drafted by Thornton. Aaron initialed the memorandum for Brzezinski. Carter also initialed, indicating he had seen it. The memorandum is attached as Tab B to a memorandum from Thornton to Brzezinski, May 11 (not printed), which identifies Brzezinski's memorandum to Carter as a "much shorter version of the same material" of a paper attached at Tab A to Thornton's memorandum (and also not printed). That paper, entitled "SCC Working Group on Afghanistan: Summary of Actions," noted the following: 1) there was no possibility at the time of a covert action against the Afghan regime due to lack of resources and a regional political atmosphere not conducive to such action; 2) there were no current plans to approach Afghan military trainees in the United States about moving against the regime [*text not declassified*]; 3) USAID in Kabul was carrying on its operations as normal; and 4) it was decided to allow the UN to take the lead in ongoing efforts to deal with the problem of narcotics in Afghanistan.

² See Document 12.

—*Aid projects* underway are being continued; any new programs will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis in terms of your guidance. We hope to avoid a decision, but if pressed State will find that Afghanistan is not “under the control of international communism” and hence remains eligible for aid.

—*Military and other trainees* will be received routinely. So far indications are that the Afghans want to keep this channel open.

—We are in appropriate degrees of consultation with all concerned *third countries* (including China).

—A follow-on study is being prepared that will provide *options for our posture and actions* within the guidance you have given.³

³ Not further identified and not found.

21. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan¹

Washington, May 29, 1978, 2026Z

136041. Paris for Dr. Nye. Subject: Secretary’s Conversation With Agha Shahi, May 25.

Summary: In bilateral discussions with the Secretary on May 25, Pakistan’s de facto Foreign Minister Agha Shahi painted a grim picture of the Soviet/Afghan threat to Pakistan.² He said pressure is building in Pakistan for accommodation with the Soviet Union and withdrawal from CENTO. The Shah is also perturbed and is urging cooperation among Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and India. Pakistan remains deeply suspicious of quote Indian designs unquote and feels it now stands alone. Pakistan needs a security guarantee as well as military and economic assistance. The Secretary said Shahi had raised very serious issues and they should get together again, perhaps on June 2 after

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780225–0373. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Coon, cleared in S, and approved by Saunders. Sent for information Priority to Paris, Kabul, New Delhi, Tehran, Ankara, Moscow, London, Jidda, and USUN.

² Vance and Shahi met in New York during the UN Special Session on Disarmament.

the Secretary had a chance to consult with the President and others.³ End summary.

1. The Secretary met with Pakistan Foreign Affairs Advisor Agha Shahi in New York on May 25. Shahi was accompanied by Pakistan's UN Perm Rep Akhund, Ambassador Yaqub-Khan, Additional Foreign Secretary Niaz Niak and Minister-Counselor Hayat Mehdi. Also present were Counselor Matthew Nimetz, Assistant Secretary Saunders, and Ambassador Leonard. PAB Country Director Jane Coon was notetaker.

2. Shahi opened the discussion by noting that there had been an exchange of views in Islamabad with the U.S. Embassy but he was disquieted because our perceptions varied so much.⁴ Pakistan believes there has been a profound qualitative change in the regional situation; the USSR is on Pakistan's borders. Pakistan is following a correct policy toward the new regime in Kabul but that government has served notice of its intentions with respect to the Baluch and Pathan problems. In this connection, Shahi cited the Afghan Foreign Minister's statement in Havana calling for settlement of these problems in light of their quote historic antecedents unquote.⁵ The new regime says it is non-aligned and it may choose to consolidate its position first, but then it will begin subversion against Pakistan.

3. Pakistan has taken a quote independent attitude unquote toward the Soviets, e.g., the refusal of the overflight permission for Soviet planes to Ethiopia. Now Pakistan faces the external danger of having the Soviets use the Afghan regime as a tool against Pakistan. In addition, there is also the internal danger from leftist elements in Pakistan who may try to follow the Afghan example. He claimed Pakistan already had information on subversion by Afghan/KGB agents in Iran and it may reach as far as Saudi Arabia. If Pakistan's intelligents see the USSR as the stronger power in the region he fears for the future of Pakistan.

4. Agha Shahi referred to his May 7–10 visit to Iran. The Shah, he said, is perturbed and wants to initiate closer cooperation among Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and India. Agha Shahi, however, has great reservations about the Iranian tendency to go over Pakistan's head to India and equal difficulty in accepting the U.S. and Iranian perception that we can loosen Indian ties to the USSR. Indeed, the Delhi-Moscow-Kabul axis has revived. Pakistan, according to Shahi, is a front line

³ Vance and Shahi met again on June 2, as reported in telegram 141229 to Kabul, June 3. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])

⁴ See Document 18.

⁵ The text of Afghan Foreign Minister Hafizullah's speech in Havana during the Ministerial meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement was relayed in telegram 4225 from Kabul, May 24. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780218–0877)

state and needs help. But as far as the Paks can understand, the Shah is not prepared to give aid. The Saudis have promised but are slow.

5. In this situation, Pakistan stands alone. It may have to make some gesture to the Soviets such as quitting CENTO. If the people perceive that Soviets can act adventurously and get away with it, then there will be increasing pressure for Pakistan to follow an quote appeasement policy unquote. However, Pakistan has not yet taken this decision.

6. The Secretary, referring to Shahi's remarks on Pakistan's standing alone, asked what kind of assistance it needed and from whom. Shahi cited the 1959 bilateral agreement with the U.S. and asserted that the Soviets were threatening Pakistan by proxy as they did in 1971.⁶ Pakistan thinks there should be a security guarantee. If the Soviets have an alliance with India, the only remedy lies in quote another super power supporting its friends and allies unquote. When CENTO was created, America had the will to act, but today this is questionable. He noted that Pakistan was not getting military or economic aid and claimed that all countries with sole exception of the U.S. were willing to reschedule Pakistan's debt (sic). He reverted to the Indian threat and said if the Shah wants to take the leadership, he should enlist Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf countries but Pakistani public opinion will not allow any approach to India.

7. Finally Agha Shahi remarked that the Pakistanis had heard that Daoud had wanted to come to the U.S. and that we had turned him down.⁷ Quote some people unquote thought this was a clear signal that Daoud was expendable and that the U.S. was no longer willing to support Afghanistan as a buffer state. He noted that this was speculation but quote it makes a difference in popular opinion unquote.

8. The Secretary responded that Shahi had raised a number of serious issues. He would like to consult with the President and his colleagues because Shahi is entitled to a clear answer. We will be back in touch and perhaps meet again on June 2 to carry on the discussions.

Vance

⁶ See footnote 5, Document 18. In the agreement, the United States pledged its commitment to the "preservation of the independence and integrity of Pakistan" and to taking "appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon . . . in order to assist the Government of Pakistan at its request." The full text is in the Department of State *Bulletin*, March 23, 1959, pp. 417-418. The allegation of Soviet "threats" to Pakistan during the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971 may refer to Soviet support for India during that conflict and for the creation of an independent Bangladesh. See *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, vol. XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971, Documents 187, 241, 242, and 252.

⁷ See Document 6.

22. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State¹

Kabul, May 31, 1978, 1201Z

4422. Subject: Is the New Afghan Regime Communist?: Evidence to Date.

1. Summary: Although the top leaders of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) have Marxist-Leninist backgrounds and their People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) possesses a typical Communist structure, members of the revolutionary leadership continue to claim that they are not Communist and that their government is democratic, nationalistic, and respectful of Islam. Thus far, their actions have not significantly belied their words, although these may be short-term tactics, while the regime consolidates its grip on the country. On the foreign policy side, the new Afghan Government has not taken any stance on non-aligned issues appreciably different from those of the Daoud regime. On the other hand, Afghanistan's special relationship with the Soviet Union is very clear.² Economic agreements with the USSR are announced almost daily (about 15 so far), while the only others signed so far have been one each with Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, and Yugoslavia. Like its predecessor regimes since the 1950s, the DRA is clearly dependent on the USSR for most of its economic and military support. However, Soviet presence and influence in Afghanistan has appreciably increased since the coup. On balance, while it is clearly in the Soviet sphere of influence, there still is not enough evidence available to call Afghanistan a "Communist country" or a satellite of the Soviet Union, although these could

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780227-1122. Secret; Priority; Noforn. Sent for information to Islamabad, London, Moscow, New Delhi, Ankara, Tehran, USLO Peking, CINCPAC (for POLAD), and CINCEUR (for POLAD).

² In telegram 11903 from Moscow, May 26, the Embassy described the desk officer for Afghanistan in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs as "defensive and reluctant to discuss nature and orientation of new Afghan Peoples' Democratic Party. He downplays Soviets' links with and support for the new Afghan regime and emphasizes Afghan view of India as model for Afghanistan to emulate in its development efforts." (National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Program Files for Soviet-Asia Relations, 1960-1978, Lot 90D320, Afghanistan, January-June 1978) Conversely, in telegram 4559 from Kabul, June 6, the Embassy reported that the Iranian Ambassador to Afghanistan "sees the Taraki regime as an intermediate regime between that of the Daoud regime—which destroyed the monarchy—and a full Soviet-backed Communist takeover." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780242-0104)

well become the eventual fate of this country.³ Our best strategy appears to be one of encouraging an independent and truly non-aligned Afghanistan. End of summary.

[Omitted here is the body of the telegram.]

Eliot

³ The Embassy reported in telegram 4946 from Kabul, June 19, that it recently obtained a copy of a document entitled "Constitution of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA)," which clarified the new government's ideological foundation. The Embassy noted that "the document, if valid, would leave little doubt that the PDPA is a Marxist-Leninist body and is pro-Soviet. We believe that the 'constitution' is a genuine Party document, but we are unsure of its date. We are fairly certain the document predates the coup two months ago, and conceivably it is the PDPA's founding document dating from 1965. Whatever the case, it constitutes one further indication that the organization now wielding political power in this country is a pro-Soviet Communist type political party." (National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Program Files for Soviet-Asia Relations, 1960-1978, Lot 90D320, Afghanistan, January-June 1978)

23. Letter From President Carter to Pakistani General Zia¹

Washington, June 9, 1978

Dear General Zia:

Your letter of May 9 was very helpful in sharpening my understanding of Pakistan's position in South Asia.² I have also profited from the valuable insights that Ambassador Hummel has gained from his talks with you, and that Secretary Vance has added from his meeting with Mr. Agha Shahi.³

Both you and I view events in Afghanistan with a similar concern for the effect that they may have on the region's security. I share your concern with the political antecedents of the new Afghan leaders, and am equally disturbed by their past statements concerning the Durand line. We agree fully that Soviet domination of Afghanistan would be

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, Box 15, Pakistan: President Zia-ul-Haq, 2/78-7/79. No classification marking.

² See Document 16.

³ See Document 21.

a development of great seriousness for South Asia and the entire free world. Those of us who share this view must cooperate closely over the coming weeks and months.

We are under no illusions about the difficulties that may arise. We must be careful to avoid actions which could seemingly provide justification for those who seek to worsen the situation and limit the government's chances of maintaining independence. When faced by changes that may indeed be of a historic scope, it is important that we all act with forethought and determination.

The new Afghan government has declared its intention to remain non-aligned. Your decision to maintain contact in order to test its willingness to continue constructive foreign policies is a wise one. I, too, intend to pursue this course as a first step, and hope we can work together in trying to hold the Kabul leadership to its promise. Given these similarities in our approach, I will value continued close contact so that we can most carefully assess what the next steps should be.

There are a number of other matters on which I feel we can both profit from a further exchange of views. I know that you too have been troubled by issues which have arisen between our two countries. Secretary Vance has explained to Mr. Agha Shahi the real legal and political hurdles placed in our way by Pakistan's plans to acquire a reprocessing plant.⁴ While recognizing these difficulties, I urge that we both keep clear in our minds the long-range interests and concerns which underlie our relationship.

For my part, I share the conviction both of my predecessors and yours that our relationship is important to each of our nations. With this lasting perspective in mind, we will be better able to solve the immediate problems that stand between us, and build upon the fundamental consensus that binds us. I am determined to do everything within my power to continue developing our historic relationship of cooperation and friendship.

I believe, as you do, that a personal meeting would be helpful.⁵ It would be especially fruitful after we assess the exchange of ideas between Secretary Vance and Mr. Agha Shahi, and after we have some clearer knowledge of the attitude of the new government in Afghanistan.

In the meantime, I suggest that we keep in touch through Ambassador Hummel and, as needed, through direct correspondence. Once

⁴ Documentation on U.S. objections to Pakistan's plans to build a reprocessing plant is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XIX, South Asia.

⁵ Zia and Carter did not meet face to face until October 3, 1980, when they met in the White House. See Document 326.

again, I thank you for sharing your thoughts with me; I hope you will continue to do so on this and other matters.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

24. Interagency Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

NI IIM 78-10015

Washington, July 1978

Afghanistan: Orientation and Policies of the Taraki Government

[Omitted here are the cover page, title page, and a map.]

PRINCIPAL JUDGMENTS

The government of President Taraki that came to power in April 1978 is much more closely oriented toward the USSR than have been previous regimes in Afghanistan. The new government will attempt to preserve Afghanistan's basic independence from Moscow, but it is not clear that it will be able to control the growth of Soviet influence in the country.

We have no evidence that the USSR was directly involved in the coup that brought the new government to power, but Moscow has strengthened significantly its historically strong position in Afghanistan. The Soviets' near-term aim is to solidify the new government's control of the country and the expanded Soviet presence in Afghanistan—both steps to ensure against any backsliding in the bilateral relationship. Over the longer term the Soviets will seek to guide the new regime in the implementation of domestic and foreign policies compatible with those of the USSR.

President Taraki's strength derives from his control of the Marxist-oriented Peoples' Democratic Party and the support of critically placed leftist Army officers. The new government, like its predecessors, has no widespread popular support, however, and government control is

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 80R00779A, Box 25, NI IIM 78-10015, July 1978. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. A typed note on the memorandum reads: "Note: This memorandum was drafted by [less than 1 line not declassified] of CIA's National Foreign Assessment Center. It has been coordinated by working level representatives of the National Foreign Intelligence Board."

very limited in parts of the country. The new regime faces rebellion from some Pathan tribes and strong opposition from Islamic conservatives.

The survival of the Taraki government will depend almost entirely on the military, and its loyalties are uncertain. One or more attempted counter coups are probable, but it is not clear that any will have organized the degree of military support necessary for success. The Soviets' expanded presence in Afghanistan and the establishment in Kabul by the Soviets of a secure communications facility will provide the USSR with an increased capability to intervene militarily on short notice if it should decide to do so in the future to protect a pro-Soviet government in Kabul.² We believe, however, that the USSR will seek to avoid sending its own troops to Afghanistan.

The domestic policies announced by the new regime, if implemented, would increase substantially the role of government throughout the society, but they would not turn Afghanistan into a Soviet-style state. Priorities include the redistribution of land and water rights, nationalization of industry, and basic reforms in education and health services.

Afghanistan's relations with its anti-Communist neighbors, Pakistan and Iran, will deteriorate under the Taraki government, but in the near term probably not to the point of armed conflict. The Afghans and Soviets will exercise restraint with these states to avoid jeopardizing the security of the Taraki regime; the Iranians and Pakistanis for the time being will seek continued correct relations in the hope of limiting the growth of Soviet influence in the area. Iran and Pakistan will remain prepared to provide covert assistance to dissident elements in Afghanistan, however, if they see a reasonable chance to undermine the Taraki government or in response to any future Afghan involvement in Iran's or Pakistan's own tribal problems.

US-Afghan relations are likely to remain correct but cool for the foreseeable future. The Afghans will want to preserve some tie to Washington as an appearance of balance in their relations with the USSR, but Soviet influence and the certainty that US assistance will

² Unconfirmed CIA reports led to this assessment. On June 7, the CIA passed along source reporting that "the 160 Soviet military advisors who arrived in Afghanistan in mid-May 1978 have been deployed to Afghan military units throughout the country." The report further noted that "the Soviet advisors have considerable authority; no Afghan commander, department head, or staff officer will take any important action without first consulting with his assigned Soviet advisor." (Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 7, USSR in Afghanistan (1978)) Another field report, June 10, elaborated: "the total number of Soviet officers now in Afghanistan is approximately 320." Further, "of the approximately 65 general officers serving in the Afghan military before the 27 April 1978 coup, only 9 are still actively serving," a development that the source surmised would lead to "increasing dependence on Soviet advisors for military expertise." (Ibid.)

remain modest compared with that of the USSR will preclude a closer relationship.

[Omitted here are the Discussion section and an Annex.]

25. Editorial Note

By the summer of 1978, U.S. officials began to assess the viability of various Afghan opponents of the Taraki government and whether or not the United States should assist their attempts to overthrow the current regime. The issue arose as a result of telegram 5047 from Kabul, June 22, in which J. Bruce Amstutz, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim after the departure of Ambassador Eliot until the arrival at post of Ambassador Adolph Dubs, sought guidance in responding to a "highly sensitive matter." Amstutz reported, "I have been approached by a major anti-Communist group, led by no less than the number 2 in the Afghan military, to seek our advice on how best to proceed against the present pro-Soviet, pro-Communist government. This group is considering a military counter-coup and believes they can secure power in a matter of six hours—if it were not for the Soviet presence. They fear the Soviets will intervene à la Czechoslovakia unless the U.S. (and perhaps Iran and Pakistan as well) are willing to stand up to the Soviets." Amstutz went on to discuss in detail his meeting with Dr. Mir Ali Akbar, Chief of Jamhuriat Hospital, who claimed to speak for the Chief of Staff of the Afghan military, an Afghan military officer, and a senior retired officer, who together directed an unnamed anti-Communist organization with significant popular support as well as military manpower and clandestine "penetration" of the ruling Khalq Party. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Office File, Country Chron File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 1978)

Amstutz surmised that Akbar, in taking the dangerous step of approaching the U.S. Embassy, was primarily seeking advice on how to proceed with a coup clandestinely, so as not to trigger a massive and rapid Soviet response. The group for which Akbar spoke, in Amstutz's estimation, was genuine and "not a Taraki-regime frame-up" and "represents the only significant non-Communist opposition and alternative to the Taraki regime." On the question of the extent to which the United States should advise and encourage this group, Amstutz offered an historical lesson: in the early 1960s, Washington rejected Prime Minister Daoud's request that the United States become Afghanistan's major arms supplier; subsequently, Daoud turned to the Soviets. "I am con-

vinced," Amstutz wrote, "that had we not spurned him, the Taraki regime would not be in power today nor would Afghanistan have fallen within the Soviet sphere of influence." Amstutz counseled a middle ground "of providing encouragement and advice to this organization without getting involved in another Korea." (Ibid.) The telegram was attached to a covering memorandum from Peter Tarnoff, Executive Secretary of the Department of State, to Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, dated June 22. The memorandum informed Brzezinski: "We are consulting with CIA on this message with a view to formulating recommendations on how the approach should be handled." President Carter initialed "C" in the upper left-hand corner of the memorandum. (Ibid.)

The following day, Amstutz received a response in telegram 160507 to Kabul, instructing him that the issue was being actively considered and that Amstutz "should take no initiative to contact the anti-Communist group." (Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Intelligence Liaison Files, TIN 98064300018, Box 14, Kabul, 1965–79) On June 28, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Frank Carlucci sent a memorandum to Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs David Aaron, spelling out the CIA position on aiding the anti-Taraki group, which was "that no official encouragement should be given the coup plotters." But, Carlucci wrote, "we do recommend that contact be maintained for intelligence collection purposes, and that the CIA be given responsibility for this." Carlucci reasoned that this middle course could help the United States "influence events" and, while acknowledging that the "Soviets will react very vigorously to any counter coup; it behooves us to have as much advance knowledge as possible in order to better manage U.S.-Soviet relations in the wake of such an event." (National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I-047, Afghanistan: 8 May 1978–7 Dec 1978)

The possible value of maintaining contact with the coup plotters implicitly acknowledged the poor state of intelligence collection in Afghanistan at the time. In a May 25 memorandum to Brzezinski, National Security Council Staff member Thomas Thornton summarized an attached CIA report entitled "Collection Coverage of Post-Coup Afghanistan," stating, "it simply points out that things are pretty tough in Afghanistan collection-wise." (Ibid.)

Two weeks later, the CIA produced two detailed evaluations on the state of Afghan opposition groups, both dated July 14, which Thornton attached as Tab A and Tab B to a memorandum to Aaron and Brzezinski, also dated July 14. The memorandum at Tab A referenced Amstutz's latest assessment that Taraki retained control both of Kabul and the Afghan countryside, but that violence posed a threat to the current government, and the influx of Soviet advisers to Afghanistan (totaling

approximately 2,000, including the 1,600 advisers stationed there before the coup) was eroding support within the Afghan military for the Taraki government. The evaluation also summarized reports from numerous sources regarding a tribal insurgency in southeast Afghanistan, and from the CIA Station Chief in Islamabad who had been informed by Pakistani military intelligence that approximately 2,000 Afghan tribesmen had crossed into Pakistan in late June as a result of the fighting. The evaluation counted a total of six occasions in which Afghans approached U.S. officials claiming to represent groups opposed to the Taraki government, including one made up of Afghans and Saudis known as the Afghan Liberation Front. The memorandum concluded that while intelligence collection in Afghanistan was improving, the United States might not have advance notice should a counter-coup develop over the next several weeks, nor could U.S. intelligence ascertain Soviet intentions vis-à-vis threats to the Taraki regime. Thornton noted that the analysis attached at Tab B “goes over some of the same ground in more detail,” and concluded, “I guess the question of giving a helping hand is out of the question and am doubtful that we should in any event; the result would likely be an invitation for massive Soviet involvement.” Brzezinski drew a line in the margin next to that sentence and wrote “yes.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Office File, Country Chron File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 1978) Only the cover page of Tab B was attached to Thornton’s memorandum. The full text of the evaluation at Tab B was found in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 1/77–3/79.

On July 27, Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner sent a memorandum to Brzezinski reviewing the decision made by the Department of State, the National Security Council, and the CIA that the United States would remain in contact with Afghan counter-coup operatives, but would not assist their efforts [*text not declassified*]. The plan hinged on the “quick elimination” of Taraki, Amin, Qader, Watanjar, and Sakhi—which would effectively decapitate the leadership of the ruling Afghan Government. Having taken advantage of the confusion caused by the death of Khalq leaders, the report noted, “the counter-coup plotters believe they have nothing to fear from the presence of Soviet advisers and can overcome pro-regime forces within 24–48 hours but are concerned that the USSR will intervene on behalf of the Taraki regime.” (National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I-047, Afghanistan: 8 May 1978–7 Dec 1978)

On July 30, the Embassy in Afghanistan, now headed by Ambassador Dubs, added its analysis to this discussion in telegram 6128 from Kabul. In the telegram, the Embassy emphasized that, although the reliability and identity of the Afghan opposition groups remained an

ongoing question, “we cannot exclude the possibility that a coup will be attempted in the immediate months, if not weeks, ahead if the opposition groups believe themselves to be adequately prepared or should their existence become known to the regime and extinction become a threat.” Dubs also believed that concerns of the opposition groups regarding possible Soviet intervention were valid: “the Soviets would come to the assistance of the present regime should there be a call for help, should they perceive that the countercoup is ‘reactionary,’ and should time permit effective intervention.” From a military infrastructure perspective, Dubs noted that the Soviets were well prepared to take such action should they deem it necessary. He further agreed with the consensus in Washington that the United States should not encourage the counter-coup plotters, which “would raise unwarranted expectations among the coup leaders about our ability to influence events decisively in an area where our options and leverage are, unfortunately, minimal.” Still, Dubs concluded, a policy of non-interference need not prevent the United States from independently deterring the Soviets from intervention, or condemning intervention should it occur. (Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Intelligence Liaison Files, TIN 980643000018, Box 14, Kabul, 1965–79) Dubs noted, in telegram 6159 from Kabul, July 30, that while there were many potential threats to the Taraki regime, from both leftist and rightist groups, a “paucity of hard information” hampered accurate assessments about the real viability of the Afghan Government. “Only the wildest rumors can be disregarded completely,” Dubs commented. “Matters are clearly simmering and could quickly boil over at any time.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780312–0956)

The viability of internal threats to the DRA was downplayed by the CIA later that year, when again rumors of an impending coup proliferated in Kabul. On December 5, an intelligence information cable representing the views of the CIA’s “senior officer on the scene,” reported: “we doubt if there is a workable coup plan in existence,” and that the “loose talk” of a coup around Kabul was not a secret to the Afghan Government, which was taking proactive measures by arresting dissidents and promoting loyalists. Noting that opposition to the DRA was no more organized than it was in May, and that the Soviet Union remained committed to supporting the revolution that ushered in Taraki’s rule, the December 5 cable concluded that “the longer this government stays in power the stronger it becomes. It is sinking in its roots.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 1/77–3/79)

26. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State¹

Kabul, July 14, 1978, 0505Z

5670. Subject: Under Secretary Newsom's Discussions in Kabul.

1. Summary: Under Secretary Newsom called July 13 on President Taraki, Foreign Minister Amin and Deputy Foreign Minister Dost. Afghan leadership emphasized desire for friendly relations with all countries and preoccupation with internal reform and development as hallmark of new government. They stressed intention to preserve Afghan independence and need for economic assistance from major powers. GOA does have differences with Pakistan and Iran over the Durand Line and the Helmand waters but desires peaceful solution and must study issues thoroughly before opening any negotiations. They expressed genuine desire for good relations with U.S. and want U.S. economic assistance to continue. Newsom thoroughly explained factors affecting U.S. ability to continue to provide help and conveyed U.S. desire that close relations continue as well as U.S. support for sovereign and independent Afghanistan. Taraki said GOA will follow policy of genuine non-alignment and will not allow foreign troops in Afghanistan. Puerto Rico, prisoners and narcotics also raised.

2. U.S. views: In all of his calls, Newsom explained that there were many questions in the U.S. about the policies of the new Afghan Government and he was here to obtain GOA views first-hand and to determine whether there would be any barriers to good relations with the U.S. in the future.² He wished to convey U.S. desire to continue close relations and U.S. support for the sovereignty and independence of Afghanistan. U.S. hopes the GOA will follow a policy of genuine non-alignment, otherwise, there could be difficulties in our relations.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780288-0783. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent for information to Bonn, Islamabad, Jidda, London, Moscow, New Delhi, Paris, and Tehran.

² Newsom visited Afghanistan as part of a regional trip, July 9-22, undertaken at Vance's request. The trip included stops in Iran, India, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. He reported on his trip during a Presidential Review Committee meeting, July 27. Newsom noted that he had explained in meetings with Amin and Taraki that the United States wanted to maintain good relations with Afghanistan, including the maintenance of aid programs, but that the increasingly close ties between the Afghan Khalq Party and the Soviet Union could jeopardize ongoing aid because U.S. legislation prohibited aid to Communist countries. According to notes from the meeting on this problem, the committee members "agreed that there was not a feasible alternative to the course we are following." (Carter Library, National Security Council Institutional Files, 1977-1981, Box 70, PRC 067, 7/27/78, Newsom's Trip re: South East Asia Issues) 22 USC 2370 (f) prohibits any assistance to Communist countries.

3. Regarding economic assistance, Newsom said the U.S. hopes to continue its long-time help for the development of Afghanistan. He noted legislative restrictions on aid to countries which are determined to be Communist and to countries which do not respect human rights as well as importance to our assistance programs of narcotics control and projects meeting basic human needs. There would be questions in Congress about continuing U.S. assistance to Afghanistan and we would have to be prepared to defend our projects. U.S. provides support to IFIs which sponsor large infrastructure projects. U.S. willing to pursue its assistance programs in Afghanistan provided USAID personnel are treated the same as others in terms of access to government, travel and general support. If GOA desires, U.S. is sympathetic to continuing its assistance in Helmand River Valley and could go forward with \$3.8 million for this project. Newsom said U.S. is willing to discuss other projects in agriculture, health and education and noted possibility wheat project in Baghlan Province in northern Afghanistan. IMET and Fulbright program also mentioned.

4. Major elements of DRA foreign policy: All three GOA leaders stressed Afghanistan's independence and its desire for friendly relations with all states, particularly the Soviet Union and the U.S. and Afghanistan's immediate neighbors. Taraki said Afghanistan will follow policy of genuine non-alignment although this does not mean GOA will be silent on important international issues nor will it fail to react to "attack" from any quarter. At same time, Afghanistan has long history of independence and will not rpt not become subservient to any country nor allow any nation to interfere in internal affairs of Afghanistan. No country will be allowed to station troops in Afghanistan. Dost and Amin assured Newsom that Afghan revolution was internal event and that even Soviets were taken by surprise. GOA would be non-aligned and its long history of independence from foreign domination was example for other Asian countries. For its development programs, Afghanistan looks forward to receiving assistance from its friends abroad, especially the Soviet Union and the U.S.

5. Relations with U.S.: Taraki and others expressed genuine interest in continued friendly relations with U.S. (it was noted that three members of DRA Cabinet are Columbia University graduates). On assistance, Taraki repeated preference for commitment of large Soviet-style lump sum, commitment from which GOA could draw for projects of its choice. However, he indicated understanding of congressional appropriation process and asked for list of areas in which U.S. could assist so that GOA could compare with its requirements under five-year-plan now being prepared. Taraki said he would instruct his people to discuss details of aid program with Embassy Kabul. Taraki appeared uninformed on IMET program and said he would ask Minister of

National Defense for briefing. He complained that Fulbright program requires "hundreds" of applicants for only five positions and said GOA prefers to name the scholarship recipients. Amin welcomed any possible U.S. assistance and expressed GOA willingness to discuss details with U.S. technicians. Regarding wheat project in Baghlan Province, however, Amin said that project would have to be reviewed in the light of the new land reform program.

6. Relations with Pakistan and Iran: Newsom expressed U.S. desire for continued peace in the region. While not wishing to appear as an intermediary, he noted Iranian concern over GOA attitude toward Helmand waters agreement³ and Pakistan's concern over GOA intentions re Durand Line and Pushtunistan problems. He added that U.S. hopes to resolve problem with GOP over reprocessing plant, and, since U.S. provides assistance to both countries, we are interested in good relations between the two.

7. GOA leaders followed line that they want friendship and cooperation with neighbors and seek understanding of their revolution and technical and economic support for their development plans. Taraki said Afghanistan would not bother its neighbors (and commented sarcastically that if he must pray in a mosque or church to get help for his country he would do so). Amin said U.S. need not worry that GOA would cause tensions in area. Afghanistan would attack no rpt no state and would seek to solve problems through negotiation. Since regime is new, it will take time for GOA to develop its positions on Helmand waters and Durand Line, latter being historical problem between Afghanistan and Pakistan. He recognized, however, that problem does exist between the two countries over Pushtunistan and Baluchistan issues. This would have to be solved by realistic negotiations but Afghanistan's domestic priorities for the moment are more important and it premature for GOA to raise this delicate subject with GOP at this time. On Helmand waters, GOA also needs time to study agreement and has asked GOI to observe status quo. Taraki also said these issues under study. He jokingly said after only two months in power that he has to study everything before deciding what to do. For example, he said he had never in his life been in the elegant room in which our meeting took place and he needed to learn way around it and then gradually acquaint himself with the issues facing his government.

8. Party-to-party relations: Newsom carefully explained to Amin that U.S. legislation contains prohibition on aid to Communist countries. While term Communist not precisely defined, Congress generally assumes that if a party in power considers itself to be part of the

³ Iran and Afghanistan signed the Helmand waters agreement on March 13, 1973.

international Communist movement then that country is Communist. He noted that Khalq Party had not so considered itself in past but wanted to point this out as potential problem to U.S. assistance should PDPA (People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan) establish party-to-party relations with CPSU in future. Noting history of close Afghan relations with Soviet Union, Newsom asked Amin whether he expected party-to-party relations to develop. Amin said GOA will have relations with all political parties in power all over the world, such as the Democratic Party in the U.S., on the principle that parties in power should deal with other parties in power. He could not provide a further clarification at this time but stressed that what U.S. should consider is "what we are doing for our people not what we are."

9. Domestic priorities: GOA leaders consider their principal tasks are to serve needs of the common man in an impoverished country previously exploited by aristocratic rulers. To meet their internal goals they need peace within Afghanistan and with neighbors and substantial foreign assistance. GOA is preparing five-year development plan which it hopes to have ready by first anniversary of revolution. GOA plans programs which will bring about basic economic and social reform, and GOA considers land reform to be its first priority. Both Taraki and Amin were asked whether cooperative or collective farms were envisaged. Both replied that small farmers would retain their land (up to two hectares) and would be organized into cooperatives. As first step in land reform, Taraki said GOA was about to announce program for graduated abolishment of debts owned by tenured farmers who had mortgaged their land to moneylenders and usurers.

10. Prisoners: Noting Borel visit, Newsom raised subject of possible release of imprisoned women and children related to officials of former government. Taraki bluntly replied that this was Afghanistan's own affair and said "why shouldn't I ask about the prisoners in your country?" However, Amin said they could not be released yet because their safety could not be guaranteed; he again indicated that there was possibility these prisoners could leave Afghanistan. When ICRC representative Borel visited Kabul in early July he visited prison but did not suggest release or departure for abroad. Borel was in Kabul again but Amin was unfamiliar with his activities.⁴ As for imprisoned officials of the Daoud regime, Amin said no decision on their future had yet been made by the Revolutionary Council.

11. Puerto Rico: Newsom noted to Dost that in 1977 Afghanistan voted with India, Iran and others in the Committee of 24 to set aside

⁴ The outcome of Afghan leaders' July 3 meeting with Dominique Borel, a representative of the International Red Cross, was reported as unknown in telegram 5452 from Kabul, July 5. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780275-1071)

the Puerto Rican issue and explained the U.S. position.⁵ He asked that GOA give sympathetic consideration to continuing its policy on Puerto Rico. Dost replied that the GOA would study and discuss the U.S. request.

12. Exchange of new Ambassadors: Newsom expressed appreciation for the rapid agrément and presentation of Ambassador Dubs as the first new Ambassador since the change of government. Taraki warmly expressed his appreciation for the quick USG agreement for the appointment of former Interior Minister Noor to Washington.

13. Message to President Carter: At conclusion of meeting with Taraki, the President asked that Newsom reassure President Carter that GOA is a friend of the U.S., wishes to maintain normal political relations and to receive American assistance to help achieve its domestic development targets. Newsom told Taraki that he would describe the GOA position to President Carter as seeking genuine non-alignment, concentrating on the welfare of its population, and regarding international issues from standpoint of Afghanistan's best interest. Taraki agreed, but added, we will, however, react to attacks from any quarter, would not accept any ultimatums and hoped GOA would not rpt not be "pushed" from its non-aligned course. If Afghanistan were, for example, attacked by Soviet Union, GOA would seek assistance from U.S. and any other friends. He had previously noted, however, that Soviet Union had had good relations with Afghanistan for sixty years and had not rpt not interfered in Afghan internal affairs. Meeting ended with Taraki firmly shaking Newsom's hand in both of his and saying "our hearts and minds are for good relations between Afghanistan and the United States."

Dubs

⁵ A reference to the UN Special Committee on the Situation With Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. For U.S. policy regarding the Committee of 24, see *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, vol. E-14, Part 1, Documents on the United Nations, 1973-1976, Document 49.

27. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State¹

Kabul, July 22, 1978, 0350Z

5882. Subj: Soviet Ambassador's Views on Present Situation in Afghanistan.

1. During my initial courtesy call on Soviet Ambassador Alexander M. Puzanov July 16, he provided the following answers and observations to my questions:

A) Soviet-Afghan relations: Puzanov stated that there had never been any serious bilateral problems between Kabul and Moscow during the sixty years since diplomatic relations were established during the time of King Amanullah and V. I. Lenin. He observed that the Soviets had enjoyed friendly, productive relations with the royal and Daoudist regimes which had preceded the current Taraki government, and expected to continue this positive relationship with the new regime.

B) Soviet military advisors: Puzanov explained that the recent increase in the number of Soviet military advisors here has been necessary in order to train the Afghans to use armored, air force, and communications equipment being supplied by the USSR. He claimed that the rate of increase of advisors is not so high as that which followed Daoud's 1973 overthrow of the monarchy.²

C) Soviet economic assistance: Puzanov explained that the forty-odd Soviet-Afghan economic assistance agreements signed since the April 27 revolution were already in the pipeline. Although most are related to the basic assistance commitment made to former President Mohammad Daoud during his 1975 State visit to the USSR, some date back to the pre-1973 monarchical era. Puzanov stated that negotiations for these proposed projects had become stalled during the Daoudist period for "a number of reasons."

D) Projected bridge over the Amu Darya (Oxus): Puzanov predicted that the projected Hariatan Bridge should be ready to convey vehicular traffic over the river frontier between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union in "four and one-half years."

E) The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA): Puzanov did not think that Politburo-Secretariat-Central Committee organiza-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780301-0595. Confidential. Sent for information to Ankara, Moscow, New Delhi, USLO Peking, Tehran, CINCPAC for POLAD, and CINCEUR for POLAD.

² On the question of the Soviet role during the 1973 revolution, see *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, vol. E-8, Documents on South Asia, 1973-1976, Document 8.

tion of the PDPA necessarily related the Afghan party to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). He thought that "all parties in the world" have similar organizational structures. In reply to a question, Puzanov said there are no party ties between the PDPA and the CPSU. He explained that, after its 1967 split, the Afghan party had dissolved into "political groupings" which could not be regarded as parties. Since the Khalqists and the Parchamists only recently reunited, i.e., in mid-1977, there has not been sufficient opportunity for the CPSU to react to this event. The Afghan party had never participated in any international Communist meetings.

F) Membership of the PDPA Politburo: Puzanov thought that there are "either nine or eleven members." During a recent conversation with Chairman Noor Mohammad Taraki, he got the impression that the latter had not yet decided what to do about the Politburo positions which had been occupied by (the diplomatically exiled Parchamist leaders) Babrak Karmal and Noor Ahmad Noor. It is possible, he conjectured, that these two might retain their Politburo seats.

G) Government decision-making: Although arguing that the governmental decisions of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) are being made by the Revolutionary Council, which he initially defined as the country's "state and legislative organ," Puzanov acknowledged that the Central Committee of the PDPA provides overall political guidance. Puzanov went on to describe the Afghan Cabinet as the "executive organ" and the Revolutionary Council as the "legislative element" of the government.

H) Regional security: Puzanov noted with satisfaction that there were no "border problems" between Iran and Afghanistan. Observing that Afghanistan requires peace in order to be able to resolve its domestic challenges, he asserted that the USSR endorsed the Afghan regime's stated intention to negotiate peacefully Kabul's major "political difference" with Pakistan (i.e., the "Pushtunistan" issue). Puzanov welcomed warmly India's willingness to expand its political and economic contacts with Afghanistan. He noted benignly that Kabul's relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) are "normal."³ Puzanov recalled that the PRC had offered the Daoudist regime a 60-million-dollar line-of-credit which had not yet been fully committed. He cited as Chinese accomplishments here: Irrigation projects in Parwan Province, textile-making assistance, and a hospital at Kandahar.

I) Afghanistan's future: Puzanov noted that impoverished Afghanistan was now working on a five-year-plan which will require help

³ China recognized the new government in Afghanistan on May 7.

from as many friendly foreign donors as possible. He was optimistic that the regime's goals will be met.

2. Comment: Although Puzanov was obviously dissembling on some points, such as the influx of Soviet military advisers and the structure of the PDPA, it was clear that he was trying hard to portray post-revolutionary Afghanistan as a country in need of outside assistance, as a nation which needs peaceful relations with its neighbors, and as a non-destabilizing factor in this region.

Dubs

28. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State¹

Kabul, August 16, 1978, 1205Z

6649. Subj: Foreign Minister Amin Accuses Pakistan of Providing Support for Subversion in Afghanistan. Ref: A) State 204821 (Notal),² B) State 203315 (Notal),³ C) Islamabad 7625 (Notal),⁴ D) Kabul 6240,⁵ E) Kabul 4802.⁶

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780335–0359. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Sent for information to Ankara, Dacca, Islamabad, Moscow, New Delhi, USLO Peking, Tehran, and CINCPAC for POLAD.

² Telegram 204821 to Islamabad, August 13, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780331–0555.

³ In telegram 203315 to Islamabad, August 11, the Department provided guidance following a meeting in Islamabad between Newsom and Zia, July 16, in which Zia "stated that Pakistan needed firm USG support with unmistakable guarantees of territorial integrity that would be credible as a deterrent against Afghan encroachments." The telegram instructed the Embassy that it was authorized to advise Zia that the "U.S. position with respect to Pakistan's border with Afghanistan remains unchanged from that set forth in the SEATO Council communiqué of March 8, 1956. The relevant portion of that communiqué reads as follows: 'Insofar as these (Soviet) statements referred to 'Pakhtoonistan', the members of the Council severally declared that their governments recognized that the sovereignty of Pakistan extends up to the Durand Line, the international boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan.'" (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780328–1136) The telegram, which was also sent to Moscow and Kabul, stated that it was not necessary to repeat the assurance to Zia either to the Soviet Union or the DRA.

⁴ Telegram 7625 from Islamabad, August 6, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780322–0413.

⁵ Telegram 6240 from Kabul, August 1, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780314–1010.

⁶ Telegram 4802 from Kabul, June 13, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780246–1035.

1. Summary: Afghan Foreign Minister Amin claims that he has evidence that Pakistan is providing cross-border support for subversive operations against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA). End summary.

2. During a call on Foreign Minister Hafizullah Amin on Aug 14 to discuss multilateral issues, I informed him that I had conveyed to Washington and Islamabad the concern he expressed on July 31 over the state of Afghan-Pakistani relations (ref D). I told him that Amb Hummel had discussed this matter with Minister of State Agha Shahi, who stated that Pakistan was following a definite policy, rigidly applied, to restrain and naturalize [*neutralize?*] any elements or individuals who might want to make trouble in Afghanistan (ref C).

3. Amin retorted that Pakistan was “not putting that policy into practice.” He claimed that Kabul has evidence of Pakistani complicity in a large number of anti-Afghan cross-border operations to support subversion against the DRA Govt. Amin explained that his gov't was not making this evidence public at this time because it does not want to bring out into the open any conflict with Pakistan if it can avoid it, and, besides, the Afghan Gov't had contained such threats. If pushed too far, however, warned Amin, the Afghans are prepared to publicize their complaints and take necessary countermeasures.

4. When I asked what part of the Afghan-Pakistani border was involved in this alleged infiltration, Amin retorted, “all of it—from China to Iran.” He hurriedly added that Afghanistan was not making similar charges against Iran, which, he noted, has been controlling its side of the Afghan-Iranian border “in a friendly fashion.” I observed that there are many regions along the international boundary over which neither Islamabad nor Kabul appear to exercise complete control. Amin responded that his gov't could easily allow trouble to exfiltrate over into Pakistan from its side, but, until now, has ensured that this has not happened.

5. When I described the recent Pakistani return of the Afghan MIG-17 as a cooperative, friendly gesture of good will, Amin acknowledged that Islamabad had indeed handled that affair well, and commented, “we appreciated it.” However, this single act did not, in his mind, outweigh the Pakistani machinations of which he complained earlier.

6. While on the topic of Afghan-Pakistani relations, I reminded Amin that, as Amb Eliot had informed him earlier, the USG “recognizes the existing boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan as the legitimate international border” (ref E). This, I explained, was implicit in our initial recognition of Pakistan in 1947. Without making any specific reference to the information conveyed in ref B, I alerted Amin to the possibility that he might see this USG position reaffirmed publicly. Amin made no comment. I also once more suggested that the best way

of discussing concerns which he expressed was through discussions with the Pakistanis.

7. Comment: Amin is continuing to use us to convey Afghanistan's tough line to Pakistan while his govt apparently avoids any direct confrontation with Pakistani officials at Kabul or Islamabad. Perhaps this is to establish Afghanistan's case with us, should Kabul eventually elect to undertake some countermeasures. In spite of everything the Pakistani Govt might be trying to do, anti-DRA operations are probably still being supported through the traditionally porous frontier. Such activities as exist may well be undertaken by Afghan dissident elements who might, from time to time, seek sanctuary in Pakistani territory. The Afghans presumably want to hold Islamabad accountable and force the Pakistanis to increase their control efforts.

Dubs

29. Memorandum From Thomas Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, September 11, 1978

SUBJECT

Afghanistan

As you are probably aware, things in Afghanistan are deteriorating rapidly: the regime is devouring its children with amazing speed; its base of support is narrowing; Soviet influence is probably growing; and there appears to be quite a bit of spontaneous opposition outside of Kabul (not enough, presumably, to topple the regime). We don't know what kind of coup plotting is going on; previous attempts ended in disaster, but certainly some Afghans must be giving thought to it.

There is a serious possibility of Soviet intervention in case things unravel too badly. Toon's view, reflected in the recent INR assessment,

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Office File, Country Chron File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 1978. Secret. Sent for action. Initialed by Blackwill in the upper right corner. At the top of the first page, an unknown hand, likely Thornton's, wrote: "No meeting necessary per DA." The reference is to David Aaron.

seems too sanguine.² I think the Soviets are likely to assert their position in Afghanistan forcefully if they see a counter-coup coming; they would be too fearful that a reactionary take-over would be anti-Soviet and put a regime friendly to the US right on their borders. Given the composition of the population on their side of the border, this is an especially distressing thought.

State, with NSC clearance, has done some modest contingency planning in terms of demarches to be made, etc., should the Soviets intervene. Nobody has been able to come up with ideas on what we should or could actually do in that contingency. Short of that, we can move cautiously to capitalize on the one bright spot in the picture—India's recognition that the Kabul regime means trouble for them too. (A separate memo is enroute on this.)³

Another issue also arises: how long can we, in good conscience, continue AID programs on the assumption that Afghanistan is not a Communist-controlled state? I hope that we can continue to do so since, if there is to be a break, I would like Kabul to bear the blame. If I were asked about this under oath, however, I would be very uncomfortable.

I have no recommendation that you do anything at the present time. Mainly, I want to make sure that you are keeping this unfortunate situation in mind.

You could, however, decide that you want to have an inter-agency meeting (mini-SCC?) to consider two points:⁴

—How close are we to a situation where Taraki's control breaks down and the Soviets intervene? Are there any more imaginative ways of responding than we have come up with so far? (The responses will almost inevitably be negative since State and CIA claim to have been giving serious thought to this.)

—How close are we to a situation in which we have to accept the fact that Taraki is beyond redemption and for one reason or another we should begin to pull back? (This, however, would be a dangerous

² Not further identified and not found. No cables from Moscow were found conveying the Ambassador's "sanguine" view regarding the possibility of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

³ Not further identified.

⁴ Inderfurth drew a line under "mini-SCC" and wrote in the margin: "good idea."

question to ask; we could find ourselves morally and probably legally bound to stop our AID programs.)⁵

⁵ Two handwritten comments appear at the end of the memorandum. Blackwill wrote: "Question is the forms Soviet intervention might take—are we talking regular units crossing into Af.? Direct combat air support? Those *are* hard. But there's more available if it's heavy supply/advisors. I personally doubt intervention by regular units and don't think Soviets would feel that they could not work out an acceptable position without it." Under Blackwill's comment, Gates wrote: "I agree. The Soviets have been extraordinarily cautious for three decades about use of their troops outside the USSR. Outside the Soviet 'bloc' they have not used regular units to intervene in the internal affairs of another country since the late 40s. Afghanistan isn't worth *that* much to them. But expect *every* means of intervention short of combat units if they see this friendly regime in real trouble. RG."

30. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Islamabad, September 25, 1978, 1010Z

9262. Subject: Assessment of Evolving GOP Attitudes/Policy Toward Afghanistan. Ref: (A) State 240411 (Notal), (B) Kabul 7370, (C) Tehran 8927 (Notal), (D) Islamabad 8841, (E) Islamabad A-98 (Notal).²

1. Pakistan's attitudes, and consequently its policies toward the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) are in the process of subtle revision. The state of shock and alarm which we found (and reported) during the spring, in the immediate aftermath of the Kabul coup,³ is giving way to a more measured assessment and concern over the long-term threat. Indeed, it would have been difficult to sustain the fever pitch of May and June in the absence of direct Afghan (or Pakistani) provocation.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780393-0458. Secret; Limdis. Sent for information to Ankara, Colombo, Dacca, Jidda, Kabul, Karachi, London, Moscow, New Delhi, USLO Peking, and Tehran.

² Telegrams 240411 to Kabul, September 21; 7370 from Kabul, September 14; 8927 from Tehran, September 18; and 8841 from Islamabad, September 13, are in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780387-0192, D780377-0326, D780379-0810, and D780372-0313, respectively. Airgram A-98 was not found.

³ See Document 18.

2. We do not suggest there has been any lessening of anxiety about the future course of relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan among policy-makers and opinion molders on this side of the Durand Line. Most Pakistanis we meet expect the future of the relationship to be one of tension, even struggle. Concern over more recent events in Iran has done little to lessen the long-term Pakistani sense of foreboding about the Russian threat to this part of the world and the evident (to them) weakening of Western resolve to meet it. But no immediate crisis has come, and events suggest more of the same.

3. The evolution of Pakistani attitudes is perhaps best illustrated by General Zia-ul-Haq's decision to stop off briefly in Kabul earlier this month enroute to Tehran to meet personally with DRA's Taraki.⁴ As best we can determine, this was a typically spontaneous Zia move. Accepting that there would be little gain on substance, the General appears to have over-ruled [garble—his?] MFA advisers in order to have a chance to take the personal measure of the new Afghan leadership as well as perhaps get for himself a little breathing room in the relationship. On both fronts, he appears to have been successful. He came away from the visit—according to a senior member of his personal entourage—with a new appreciation for Taraki's abilities and the regime's toughminded deputy, Foreign Minister Amin; and he is exploiting the exchange of peaceful homilies to take a bit of the edge off the tensions in the state-to-state relationship.

4. We know, from the Foreign Secretary, for instance, that the visit reinforced Pakistan's conclusions about the Communist character of the regime; we know also, however, that the Paks came away believing that Taraki and company have their hands full at present with the difficult job of sorting out their own leadership problems and of establishing their writ inside the country. GOP officials thus do not now anticipate an early crisis in their relations with the DRA.

5. This also suits General Zia's political imperatives. Pakistan also has domestic preoccupations in the short term, foremost among them a resolution of the Bhutto situation.⁵ The new President must also cope with the pressures of a re-awakened political system, the byproduct of his gradual relaxation of martial law restrictions on press, assembly,

⁴ The meeting between Zia and Taraki was reported in telegram 7312 from Kabul, September 12, which characterized the meeting as a friendly first encounter between the two leaders that did not delve into pressing bilateral problems. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780371-0979)

⁵ A reference to the fate of former Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was overthrown in a military coup by Zia on July 5, 1977. He was sentenced to execution on March 18, 1978, and was hanged April 4, 1979. Documentation on U.S. policy regarding Bhutto's ouster and execution is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XIX, South Asia.

and political activity, his formation of a political government, and his fostering thereby of a political opposition (refair). Pent-up pressures are slowly being released, among them concerns over the erosion thus far of the 1973 Constitution and concerns also about resurgent regionalism. The verities of martial law are slowly giving way to the uncertainties of a less ordered political process which may be the harbinger of promised elections. These concerns—plus a difficult economic situation—must engage his full attention over the next few months, making more than ever welcome the prospect of at least a pause in Pak-Afghan relations.

6. There are, of course, potential pitfalls which could undo the current desires on both sides for a period of tranquility. One of these is the refugee situation; we have commented (septel) on reports of a recent rise in the number of refugees coming across, especially in areas not tribal.⁶ Continuation of such a flow, or a marked increase, could strain Pakistan resources and patience and become a matter of public concern despite GOP efforts for now to downplay the issue. This is an area of the world where memories of large refugee flows are painful and have been volatile. Continuing unrest on the Afghan side could encourage tribal brethren on the Pakistan side—especially in tribal areas where GOP control is less than perfect—to join in, creating the specter of border clashes and bringing the confrontation to more immediate crisis proportions.

7. For the moment, however, we see the GOP willing to join in the apparent desire to avoid an early crisis which they sense among the Afghans and to do whatever is in their power to minimize frictions and to restrain their forces and the tribals in the border areas from undertaking actions which could move the confrontation to the front burner.

Constable

⁶ In telegram 9243 from Islamabad, September 25, the Embassy reported that the number of Afghan refugees in Pakistan was growing, but that Pakistan was reluctant to publicize the situation so as not to further disrupt relations with Afghanistan. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780391–0802)

31. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, September 29, 1978, 1848Z

23479. Subject: Soviet Policy and Attitude Toward Afghanistan. Ref: State 240411 (Notal).²

Begin summary: Soviet policy toward Afghanistan continues to be directed toward drawing Afghanistan into ever-increasing dependence on the USSR. Brezhnev's September 22 Baku statement that Moscow intends "to develop and deepen" Afghan-Soviet ties suggests a hope for more formal links at some future stage.³ While Moscow is assisting the Taraki regime in consolidating and widening its power base, we doubt that Soviet support for Taraki personally is irrevocable.⁴ That support could be switched to others if dissatisfaction and opposition to his leadership should mount in the future. End summary.

1. While the Soviets no doubt have the evolving situation in Afghanistan under constant review, we see no evidence that Soviet policies toward the DRA are in the process of revision. These policies continue to fall broadly into two categories: (A) assisting the pro-Soviet Afghan regime to consolidate the "revolution" and to eliminate its opponents; and (B) drawing Afghanistan into closer dependence on the Soviet Union in economic, military, administrative, and other areas while maneuvering to reduce Western and Chinese presence and influence in Afghanistan. As expressed by Brezhnev in his September 22 Baku statement, the Soviet Union—like the DRA—intends to "widen and deepen" Soviet-Afghan relations.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780400-1081. Confidential; Limdis. Sent for information to Ankara, Bonn, Dacca, Islamabad, Jidda, Kabul, Leningrad, London, New Delhi, Paris, USLO Peking, Rome, Tehran, and USNATO.

² See footnote 2, Document 30.

³ Brezhnev's speech, which touched on a number of issues, was summarized in telegram 243631 to Moscow, September 25. Regarding Afghanistan, the telegram noted that Brezhnev's decision to single out the country "can probably be taken as an expression of support for the new Afghan regime, which is beset by problems on several fronts." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780392-0429)

⁴ On August 24, the Embassy reported in telegram 20305 from Moscow that it had picked up "unconfirmed rumors" from a Pakistani Embassy Minister in Moscow who was in contact with a "Soviet Afghan specialist." The Minister relayed that Taraki was unable to foster a "true" Afghan revolution and that it was "inevitable" the Parcham faction, rivals to the ruling Khalq Party, would "return to power." Conversely, the Embassy also reported that, according to an Indian Embassy official, the Soviets considered Taraki "as best situated to guide the Afghan 'revolution' between the extreme Left and Right poles in Afghan politics." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780346-1069)

2. The sensitivities of regional powers, particularly India, concerning Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, the constant drumbeat of PRC charges that the Soviet Union is attempting to spread its hegemony in the world, and the potential for instability in Afghanistan will influence some degree of caution in Soviet decision-making on tactics. The Soviets would prefer to see the Taraki regime's support base broadening rather than (as seems to be the case) narrowing, and would not like to become over-committed as the only benefactor and protector of a leadership whose domestic political situation is worsening and not improving.

3. Nevertheless, barring a real turn for the worse in the Taraki regime's domestic political position, the widening and deepening process in Soviet-Afghan relations will continue apace. It will presumably include exchanges of high-level delegations and an expansion of trade and aid, perhaps leading eventually to an umbrella agreement with CEMA similar to those concluded with Finland and Iraq.⁵ At some future stage, it is also conceivable that the DRA may sign a "declaration of principles," followed by a peace and friendship treaty. This pattern was followed with Angola, for example.⁶ (We note, however, that the Afghan desk officer in the Soviet Foreign Ministry carefully avoided responding to questions from EmbOff last month on possible consideration of a Soviet-Afghan peace and friendship treaty. He observed merely that the 1921 Soviet-Afghan Friendship Treaty and 1931 Neutrality and Non-Aggression Treaty provided an ongoing foundation for Soviet-Afghan relations.) Meanwhile, we expect that the Soviet presence and advice in Afghanistan will also be directed toward institutionalizing and progressively strengthening the DRA and PDPA's organs of administration and control in Afghanistan.

4. As Brezhnev did in his Baku speech, the Soviets will also seek to assure other regional powers, particularly India, that the growing Soviet involvement in Afghanistan will be beneficial rather than harmful to regional peace and security. At the same time the Soviets will overtly and covertly play up threats from external "reaction" (the U.S., China, Muslim interests based in Pakistan and Iran) in order further to buttress Soviet-Afghan ties. Soviet diplomacy toward Afghanistan's South Asian neighbors will encompass:

—stressing to the Indians the common aspects of New Delhi's and Moscow's policies toward Afghanistan;

⁵ The USSR created the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance in 1949, originally to oversee economic activities in Eastern Europe.

⁶ Angola signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union in October 1976.

—exploiting Pakistani and Iranian fears by urging them to accommodate to the new realities in the region and to forge closer relations with the USSR;

—insisting to all three that Soviet-Afghan relations pose no threat to their own interests or to regional peace and security (a point Brezhnev also emphasized in his Baku speech).

5. Under present circumstances, we believe that the Soviets consider that a rekindling of the Pushtunistan issue could be potentially unhelpful and possibly dangerous to the DRA's most important mission—consolidating and broadening its domestic power base.

6. Our Soviet contacts have been very close-mouthed on Moscow's attitude toward the domestic performance of the Taraki regime, including the purge of Parcham leaders and the pace of socio-economic programs in Afghanistan. As previously reported, some of our Soviet sources and Soviet press articles have implied that Taraki's "cocktail socialism" (perhaps like Allende's reforms) lack decisiveness and drive, and that Taraki should not have purged Parcham leaders. In general, it appears from here that currently the Soviets intend to stick with Taraki "for better or for worse" as the best bet to preserve and widen the over-all course of the Afghan "revolution." This situation could change if opposition to his regime reached serious proportions and his personal position became increasingly tenuous. In such event, we believe that Moscow would not hesitate to abandon Taraki and to look for other leadership options.

7. If the Afghan "revolution" survives the consolidation period, the Soviets will probably then move more boldly to make the direction of Afghan-Soviet relations irreversible. Over the long run, if Afghanistan should move onto the "Socialist path," Moscow will conceive of Afghanistan increasingly as a state entitled to Soviet protection, consistent with the Soviet Union's self-proclaimed duty to use its power in the common defense of "Socialist gains."

Garrison

32. Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

[assessment number not declassified]

Washington, December 1978

[Omitted here are a title page, cover page, map, and list entitled "The Afghan Cabinet Announced on 1 May 1978."]

The Afghan Revolution After Six Months
(*[classification marking not declassified]*)

Key Judgments

President Taraki has consolidated his position in the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and in the government. Foreign Minister Amin has emerged as the second most important person in the country.

Working through Amin, Taraki is attempting to control the military through the small minority of completely loyal officers. They may be in a position to keep him better informed than any of his predecessors about coup plotting.

Control of the military remains the key to Taraki's survival. His government, like its predecessors, is weak, and his sudden overthrow by a small group of military officers cannot be completely discounted.

There is nothing to indicate that distrust of his government on religious grounds has abated. Tribal rebellions are spreading, and should antigovernment activity increase significantly, the willingness of the military to carry out the government's orders could be seriously affected.

In foreign policy and their public statements the Afghan leaders have moved closer to the Moscow line. They have, however, done little to implement domestic programs that could be labeled Communist, presumably to avoid risking adverse popular reaction but also in part because they lack the resources to do so.

The degree, if any, to which Taraki is independent of the USSR has not so far been tested by significant differences between Moscow and Kabul. Taraki may believe he needs Soviet backing to survive and the Soviet role in Afghanistan continues to increase.

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Office of Support Services, Job 80T00634A: Production Case Files (1978), Box 11, The Afghan Revolution After Six Months (An Intelligence Assessment). Top Secret; [*codeword and handling restriction not declassified*]. According to a typed statement on the cover page, "the author of this paper is [*name not declassified*] South Asia Division, Office of Regional and Political Analysis."

Taraki has not been able to allay Iran's and Pakistan's deep suspicions of his and Moscow's intentions, and poor relations with both are likely to continue.² [*classification marking not declassified*]

[Omitted here is the body of the assessment.]

² Highlights of the remainder of the report include CIA's assessment that Taraki's major achievement since taking power "may have been to survive;" that "there is no good evidence of a rift" between Amin and Taraki; "the degree to which Taraki has maintained his independence from Moscow is unclear, perhaps even to Taraki and the Soviets;" and "religious and tribal groups in Pakistan are aiding Afghan rebels, and Afghan dissidents are allowed to operate fairly openly in Pakistan, but at this time the Pakistani Government does not appear to be encouraging this activity."

33. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State¹

Kabul, December 6, 1978, 0435Z

9599. Subject: Afghan-Soviet Relations on the Eve of Taraki's Trip to Moscow.

1. Summary: Noor Mohammad Taraki, Afghanistan's President and Prime Minister, departed Kabul on December 4 to visit the Soviet Union. In many ways it is fitting that Taraki's first trip outside Afghanistan since the April 27 revolution should be to Moscow. The pro-Soviet views of the Afghan leadership have become increasingly apparent recently, a development which may stem from deep ideological convictions, as well as this regime's genuine and increasing need for Soviet support in several fields. Aside from the symbolic and public relations aspects of the trip—which are significant in their own right, the Afghan delegation will probably raise a number of issues, which, if Moscow is reasonably forthcoming, could solidify the already close bilateral relationship, especially the link between the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The capstone of the visit could be the signing of a new bilateral

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780502-0817. Confidential. This telegram repeated, for the Department's information, the telegram of the same number sent December 5 to Moscow, and for information to Ankara, Islamabad, London, New Delhi, Peking, Tehran, and CINCPAC for POLAD. A copy of this telegram was also found in the Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 7, USSR in Afghanistan (1978).

treaty—a step which would, from the DRA's vantage point, represent a complete break with past Afghan regimes and would codify the two countries' special relationship.² We have no firm evidence, however, that this subject has been under active consideration by either party. The Afghans are also expected to ask the USSR for food and increased economic assistance. We anticipate that Moscow will not want their guests to go away empty-handed, and that the visit will, therefore, produce some concrete results which would help to identify the future direction of this rapidly developing relationship. End of summary.

2. Departure of the Afghan party: Taraki was accompanied by the following Cabinet officers (names are in the order listed in the official media): Hafizullah Amin, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister; Dr. Shah Wali, Minister of Public Health and Acting Minister of Planning; Dr. Saleh Mohammad Ziri, Minister of Agriculture and Land Reform; Professor Mahmud Sooma, Minister of Higher Education; Mohammad Mansoor Hashimi, Minister of Water and Power; Eng. Mohammad Ismail Danesh, Minister of Mines and Industries; and Sayed Mohammad Gulabzoi, Minister of Communications. With the exception of the last three men, all members of the travelling party are members of the PDPA Politburo. The "pecking order" of the top officials bidding farewell to the Taraki party was: Dastagir Panjshiri, Minister of Public Works; Abdul Karim Misaq, Minister of Finance; Major Mohammad Awlam Watanjar, Minister of Interior; Abdul Hakem Shar-ai-e Jauzjani, Minister of Justice and Attorney-General; Mohammad Hassen Bareq-Shafiee, Minister of Culture and Information; Abdul Qudus Ghorbandi, Minister of Commerce; and Dr. Abdul Rashid Jalili, Minister of Education. Panjshiri and Misaq are known members of the Politburo. When the Ambassador asked one protocol official who has been left in charge, the reply was "Watanjar." The Chief of Protocol later told the Ambassador that the Revolutionary Council was in charge of Afghanistan collectively—and that any urgent important problems would be forwarded to Moscow for decisions. (We find this version more credible; Watanjar appears to lack sufficient presence or intelligence for the "charge" role.) In trying to set up top-level appointments

² The Soviet-Afghan Friendship Treaty, signed by Brezhnev and Taraki in Moscow, December 5, was reported in telegram 30123 from Moscow, December 7. The Embassy noted that the treaty covered "cooperation in the military, political, economic, scientific, and cultural fields" and committed both countries to "open-ended" consultations on security issues. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780504-0924) A Voice of America report, December 7, quoted Brezhnev's speech at a Kremlin dinner for Taraki on the significance of the treaty: "The traditional good relations between our two countries have assumed, I would say, a qualitatively new character." (National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I-47, Afghanistan: 8 May 1978-7 Dec 1978)

for visiting USAID official Wheeler, the Embassy's protocol officer has been told that the Afghan party will return to Kabul on December 7.

3. The Afghan view of the Soviet connection: The pro-Moscow mind set of Taraki and his closest advisors, particularly his two principal lieutenants, Foreign Minister Hafizullah Amin and Acting Planning Minister Dr. Shah Wali, has been well documented since the April 27 revolution, both through domestic pronouncements and by high-level speeches before international fora. In the initial post-revolutionary period, however, the leadership generally tried to camouflage its pro-Soviet views with explanations that the USSR and Afghanistan have had good and friendly relations for decades, and that the new regime in Kabul was merely carrying on in the same tradition. The Khalqi leaders publicly denied that their PDPA was "Communist," "Socialist," or "Marxist-Leninist," although they admitted its Marxist-Leninist character in private fora.

4. In recent weeks, however, a deeper pro-Soviet attitude has emerged from the PDPA closet; the Afghan leadership has made no effort to disguise its belief that Kabul's relationship with Moscow is of overriding importance, not only in the foreign policy field, but also probably domestically as well. Amin's November 7 speech, which portrayed Afghanistan's Saur revolution of April 27 as an historical extension of the "great October revolution" (Kabul 9145) was typical of the obsequious degree to which Taraki and his colleagues are willing to reveal their political convictions.³ In this connection, Taraki himself took the unprecedented and well-publicized step of attending (with virtually the entire Afghan Cabinet) the November 7 Soviet National Day reception, a far cry from the regime's standard practice of sending one minister to the similar celebrations of other countries. Most recently, Taraki, in his lengthy speech to the plenum of the Party's Central Committee echoed the Soviet line of international issues, ranging from the inevitable victory of socialism over imperialism to support for Vietnam in its struggle against intrigue by its neighbors.⁴ The presence of the Afghan Minister for Higher Education in the Taraki party might indicate a desire to involve the Soviets more intensively in the tertiary education field to ensure ideological purity and harmony in a critical area which has heretofore been an arena for extensive American participation and influence.

³ In telegram 9145 from Kabul, November 15, the Embassy characterized the speech as "obsequious and effusive." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780471-0343)

⁴ In telegram 9531 from Kabul, December 3, the Embassy reported on Taraki's November 27 speech. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780499-1007)

5. Reasons for the DRA's pro-Soviet attitudes: The primary well from which the strong leftist views of this regime's leaders spring is their long-held beliefs in the tenets of Marxism-Leninism, and a probably more recently acquired conviction that the world correlation of forces and events is evolving in such a way that the ultimate victory of Marxism-Leninism cannot be denied. Although the Afghan leadership's grasp of many of the arcane principles of this doctrine has come under polite fire by a number of visiting Third World officials (e.g., Indian Foreign Minister Vajpayee), in our assessment Taraki and his colleagues are sincere in their devotion to this ideology and in their belief that Marxism-Leninism contains the ultimate answers on how to modernize Afghanistan's feudal society. They also display full trust and confidence in the Soviet Union as their sole support and defense at this vulnerable stage of consolidation. There is no indication that they see any unacceptable risks to their independence in this relationship. Indeed, an ideologue like Amin would probably describe Outer Mongolia as an "independent" state. The Khalqi perception of Afghan independence is different from the classical stance taken by other Afghans.

6. Afghan security needs: Simultaneously, there is a practical side to Taraki's and Amin's view of politics, and this element of the equation may account, to a greater extent, for the recent pro-Soviet developments noted above, and may also determine the primary significance of Taraki's trip to Moscow. Although the accession of a leftist regime in Kabul has undoubtedly served a number of important Soviet foreign policy and ideological interests, one could make a strong argument that, at this stage of the game at least, the Afghan leadership needs the Soviets more than the latter needs Kabul's possible contributions. The security of the Taraki regime has not yet been fully established, despite the Afghan leader's confident remarks in his November 27 address to his party colleagues. Active opposition, especially in the eastern tribal areas, appears to be inadequate to overcome the military force and ruthless determination of the Khalqi regime. Nevertheless, it refuses to go away or be stamped out. Rightly or wrongly, it is widely perceived here that Moscow has undertaken a bottom-line commitment (some believe to the extent that it would provide para-military forces if necessary) to the survival of a leftist regime in Kabul, a perception that probably serves to intimidate somewhat any potential domestic opposition—or any Pakistani inclination to contribute to this subversion. Thus, in the crucial security field the possibility that the Taraki regime might at some point be able to exercise the "Soviet option" is from Kabul's point of view an indispensable factor in Kabul's bilateral relationship with Moscow—and, for that matter, with Islamabad, as well.

7. Regional politics: On the broader foreign policy front, Moscow's presence in the wings is probably a comforting one for the DRA leader-

ship, especially as it formulates its policies toward Pakistan and Iran. There is a trade-off here, however, as the Afghans conceivably could find themselves not completely free agents should Moscow, for its own purposes, decide to exercise a restraining hand over possible irredentist Afghan tendencies vis-à-vis the Pushtun and Baluch regions of Pakistan, or any Afghan inclination to reheat the Helmand waters dispute with Iran. Nevertheless, the Afghans could well use a commitment from Moscow that the USSR would extricate Afghan chestnuts in the event Taraki might overplay his hand and provoke a strong Pakistani reaction of some sort. Many observers here believe that such a commitment has already been given, even if only tacitly. From the Soviet viewpoint, the Afghan potential for making trouble for Iran and Pakistan in Baluchistan remains an important card in Moscow's hand. Moscow might, therefore, consider some statement of support for Afghan concern for its "Pushtun and Baluch brethren."

8. Economic needs: Also of immediate concern to the Afghan leadership is the extent to which Moscow would be willing to underwrite Afghanistan's economic development should Kabul's stand on international issues and its approach to bilateral programs provoke a reduction of Western or Arab-Iranian assistance. The presence of several "economic" ministers in the Taraki party signals a long Afghan shopping list. Although no non-Communist country has as yet significantly cut its operations here, radical or rigid Afghan policies could create a situation in which Moscow and its Socialist colleagues would be the only donor countries willing to invest economic resources in Afghanistan, a possibility which could well have provoked the Afghan leadership's recent pro-Soviet displays. A Soviet diplomat in Kabul recently told an Indian diplomat that the Socialist Bloc is prepared and able to shoulder the entire development burden in Afghanistan should the West elect to quit the field (Kabul 8970).⁵ Taraki's delegation might also ask the Soviets to support Afghanistan's food needs during the current testing period when oppositionists are successfully withholding key commodities, such as flour, from the market. Although Moscow may be unwilling to satisfy each Afghan request to the letter, Taraki and his colleagues will probably not come away empty-handed. It is possible that the Soviets might utilize this occasion to announce another large credit for Afghan development. We presume that the Soviets are fully cognizant of the crucial supporting role they play here, and that they will want to reassure, to an extent consistent with their own assessment of the relationship, the Afghan leadership that Taraki and his colleagues can count on Moscow's backing on several fronts.

⁵ Telegram 8970 from Kabul is dated November 8. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780461-0225)

9. Increased Afghan-Soviet ties: The Afghans will also possibly seek the establishment of some sort of “official” tie between the CPSU and Kabul’s ruling PDPA. Taraki strongly alluded to this possible development in his November 27 speech to the PDPA Central Committee plenum when he said that during the Soviet [visit] the Afghans would “study and take decisions on the relations between the parties of the two countries” (septel).⁶ Taraki will also probably seek some sort of Soviet public endorsement of the DRA’s policies to date, undoubtedly including some nice words regarding the Afghan leadership’s performance. General Soviet expressions of support for the regime’s domestic policies and reform measures are probably the minimum the Afghans expect to emerge from the trip.

10. The potentially critical Soviet role in guaranteeing this regime’s security will unquestionably be high on the agenda of these talks, but we anticipate that the substance of these discussions will be closely held and that the issue may not arise in public statements or reports. Both parties may be content with the current magnitude of Soviet presence in Afghanistan (best estimates are that approximately 600 Soviet military advisors are serving here, while about 2,000 Soviet civilians are employed throughout the government’s bureaucracy), and that further augmentations are unnecessary to deal with the present level of Afghan needs.

11. Finally, the visit conceivably could produce a new bilateral treaty of some sort to replace the current 1931 Treaty of Neutrality and Mutual Non-Aggression which was most recently extended for ten years at the time of Nikolai Podgorny’s visit here in December of 1975.⁷ Although both sides, especially the Soviets, could probably live with the legal status quo governing their relationship, the Khalqis may raise the subject because, in their minds, the 1931 treaty could represent a “relic” of the past, it does not commit Moscow to protect Afghanistan’s security in the event of aggression by some “foreign power,” and a new accord would constitute a dramatic symbol of the “new relationship” which the Afghan leadership is so eager to flaunt. The timing of this visit may find the Soviets in a treaty-signing mood, although for a number of reasons (e.g., reluctance to endorse too fully this particular leadership, concern about alarming unduly the other countries of South Asia—especially India, and a general hesitance to modify legal relation-

⁶ The Embassy commented further on the November 27 speech in telegram 9616 from Kabul, December 6. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780504–0134)

⁷ In telegram 18473 from Moscow, December 29, 1975, the Embassy reported on Podgorny’s December 9–10 trip to Afghanistan, the main purpose of which was to renew the 1931 agreement. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750449–0163)

ships unnecessarily) the issue, if in fact it is raised by the Afghans, may be quickly squelched.

12. Conclusions: Taraki's first visit abroad as the leader of a revolutionary Afghan regime could produce results which would have far-reaching impact on this government's ultimate survival and ability to deliver on many of its reforms and promises. The trip undoubtedly will be utilized to symbolize the new "special relationship" between the two countries, a relationship which has already gone well beyond the close ties developed under previous Afghan regimes. How far the Soviet leadership will go in meeting the genuine needs of Taraki and his colleagues remains to be seen, but we anticipate that Moscow will probably choose to err on the generous side, since this regime, and the type of revolution it represents, serves a number of Moscow's ideological and security interests.

Dubs

34. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Carlucci) to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, January 26, 1979

SUBJECT

Covert Action Options Paper on Afghanistan

1. Forwarded herewith (Tab A) is a first cut of a covert action options paper on Afghanistan, which outlines alternative programs of varying costs and risks.

2. The Chief, Near East and South Asia Division, who has been advised of the National Security Council's interest in Afghanistan, is

¹ Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I-047, Afghanistan: 8 May 1978-7 Dec 1978. Secret. Attached but not printed is a covering memorandum from Inderfurth to Brzezinski and Aaron, February 1, which forwarded Carlucci's memorandum and attachments. Inderfurth asserted that the CIA paper's call to expose Afghanistan's problems and its status as a Soviet pawn would be "counterproductive" because it contradicted another part of the paper that noted the negative psychological impact of Soviet influence on the region. Bringing more attention to the situation, he argued, would only exacerbate the problem. In response, Henze wrote at the bottom of Inderfurth's memorandum: "Well you have to generate some waves to make progress." Brzezinski wrote at the top of Carlucci's memorandum: "Let planning proceed. ZB."

currently in the field, conferring with concerned station chiefs regarding their capabilities to implement the programs described in the attachment. We intend to draft a formal proposal for submission to the Special Coordination Committee when he returns on 12 February. On the other hand, if a paper is desired more urgently, we can solicit his views by cable and submit our proposal within the next few days.²

3. You may have already noted State 014844 (Tab B), which reports a request by the Afghan National Liberation Front for U.S. support of its activities against the Afghan regime:³ and Kabul 0528 (Tab C), which warns that overt contact with Afghan dissidents would be harmful and recommends that CIA therefore handle such relationships. We are working with State on this.⁴

All portions of this document are SECRET.

Frank C. Carlucci⁵

² See Document 38. Brzezinski underlined “returns on 12 February,” and wrote: “OK” and initialed “ZB” in the left margin.

³ Tab B is attached but not printed. In a memorandum to Brzezinski, January 22, Henze responded to Brzezinski’s January 19 request for comment on telegram 14844 to Kabul, January 19. Both the request and the telegram are attached to Henze’s memorandum. In the telegram, the Department stated that former Afghan Ambassador to the United States Karim met with Saunders on behalf of the Afghan National Liberation Front, during which Karim requested U.S. support for the Front’s activities against the DRA. Karim also asked if the United States would consider receiving former Afghan General Abdul Wali. Henze described the political situation in Afghanistan as “very fluid” and urged that maintaining contact with groups opposed to the Taraki government was in the interest of the United States. On the question of how the United States might assist such opposition, Henze noted both difficulties and opportunities: “Without some adjustments in the procedures for reporting this sort of thing to just about everybody in Congress, I doubt whether we could mount a program of any size or duration that could have an impact. CIA’s NE division chief, Alan Wolfe [*text not declassified*] knows Afghanistan well—the least we could do would be to charge CIA with learning as much as possible about opposition attitudes—I am intrigued by the Islamic aspect of all of this—it could prove to be Achilles heel for the Soviets, for I am coming across increasing evidence of a real Islamic underground in the USSR and resurgence of Islamic cultural/political identity beyond what we have already known.” (National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I-047, Afghanistan: 8 May 1978–7 Dec 1978) Telegram 14844 is also in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790027–0586)

⁴ Tab C is attached but not printed. In telegram 528 from Kabul, January 23, the Embassy assessed that “we stand to lose more than we might gain by receiving Abdul Wali in the U.S.” The gesture would “inevitably be read by the Taraki regime as U.S. Government support for the Afghan National Liberation Front (ANLF).” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790033–0855)

⁵ Carlucci signed “Frank” above his typed signature.

Tab A**Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency⁶**

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Some Covert Action Options in Afghanistan

Background:

On 27 April 1978 leftist military forces staged a successful coup in Afghanistan, replacing the government of President Daoud with a Soviet-oriented "Democratic Republic". Prime Minister Taraki and other government leaders all are members of the "People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan", which is Soviet-style communist party in a Stalinist mode. The new regime has placed a high priority on consolidating its control of government organizations and the armed forces, and has had considerable success in this. It has been greatly aided by an influx of Soviet advisors who have been placed in almost all departments of the government and throughout the armed forces. The situation in the countryside is different. Afghan governments traditionally have had little control in the rural, tribal areas; this government is no exception. Its problems stem particularly from its pro-Soviet, communist orientation, which offends many deeply religious, conservative Afghans. Afghans tend to be nationalistic, and many are conscious of, and resent, the growing dominance of the USSR in their affairs.

A tribal rebellion has been underway for several months in Afghanistan's eastern provinces, and the government is finding it increasingly difficult to maintain public order in other outlying areas of the country. Outside Afghanistan, emigre dissidents claim to have several thousand trained fighters, including a few hundred former military officers, in and around Peshawar and the Pakistan frontier. The principal Afghan rebel group in this area is the Afghan National Liberation Front (ANLF), although there also are other significant groups which rival the ANLF. Thus far the Government of Pakistan (GOP) has turned a blind eye to this Afghan dissident activity. The rebels are reported to be receiving support from individual Afghans living abroad, and also from Saudi Arabian sources (The latter is not confirmed nor whether the alleged support comes from private or official sources.).

⁶ Secret.

Assumption:

Afghanistan's importance lies in the destabilizing effect its communist government could have on the region—particularly on Pakistan. Further afield, the Afghan situation is having an adverse psychological impact on many Third World countries. It tends to bolster the thesis that the Soviet way is the wave of the future, and that the U.S. will make no effort to stem Soviet encroachments in the Middle East. Therefore, it is in the U.S. interest to have the Taraki Government fall and be replaced by a non-communist regime. Currently the USG is seeking to influence Afghan policies by conventional diplomatic means, including the continuation of AID programs. Our ability to exercise economic and political leverage is limited, and efforts to date have been largely successful. Conversely, given its geographic proximity, existing close economic and military relationships, and common political philosophy, the USSR has been able to move quickly to consolidate and strengthen its already considerable influence.⁷ Nevertheless, an anti-communist coup d'état is still possible, and the Soviets would probably feel obliged to accept such an event without resorting to military intervention, assuming it was carried out quickly and decisively. On the other hand, a gradually accelerated insurgency would carry a greater risk of countermeasures, both overt and covert.

Our intelligence indicates the insurgency is going to continue, no matter what position the U.S. adopts in respect to it. We cannot at this time predict how it will develop, nor whether it will succeed. But we do see it hurting the Taraki Government and, in particular, having a divisive impact on the armed forces. The soldiers, mainly rural draftees, are being required to use their weapons against their fellows from the countryside. The officer corps, although purged of suspected anti-Taraki elements, could well become increasingly embarrassed and angry at being obliged to impose an unpopular regime on their own people. A possible scenario: the continuing insurgency would lead eventually to the active disaffection of a sufficient number of officers into blaming the country's problems on Taraki, who would forcefully overthrow his regime. Finally, there is the fatigue factor. The Taraki Government is narrowly based and thinly staffed. A sustained insurgency would undoubtedly drain scarce managerial and leadership resources the government can ill afford. While it is possible that the government will fall very quickly (*viz*, in a lightning coup), it seems more likely that Taraki will be overthrown as a result of his continuing inability to deal with the insurgency. We also believe that the Afghan

⁷ Henze drew a line from the word "close" and wrote in the top margin: "unsuccessful!"

rebels will need some outside assistance if they are to sustain the insurgency at its present level. The USG could increase the prospects of the Taraki regime being overthrown through a variety of covert action techniques, ranging from propaganda support to clandestine arms supply. The risks to the U.S. would be largely dependent upon the type of techniques adopted.

Covert Action Options:

(1) Generate a worldwide media campaign publicizing the regime's problems, exposing Taraki and his colleagues as pawns of the Soviet Union. Condemn Taraki for attempting to force an atheistic philosophy on a sincerely religious population, and for violating their basic human rights. Such a campaign would be virtually risk free, but probably would have little impact within Afghanistan itself. It would, however, establish the groundwork for additional CA proposals, including influencing Saudi Arabian and other prospective donors of aid to the rebel cause.

(2) Expand the above program to include radio broadcasts in Dari beamed into Afghanistan from neighboring countries. This would almost certainly require the cooperation of the Governments of Pakistan and/or Iran, either of which might be difficult to secure. In the past the GOP has beamed propaganda into Afghanistan from a radio station in Quetta. If relations between the two countries deteriorate, the GOP might resume such broadcasts. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] shortwave broadcasts also reach Afghanistan, and we could explore the possibility of putting our message on this medium.

(3) Encourage and assist Afghan rebel groups with representation outside of Afghanistan to oppose the regime. CIA officers currently are in contact with a small number of Afghan exiles who at this time are being exploited only for intelligence collection purposes. Other potential exile leaders have been identified and could be approached in due course. One of these is an Afghan, long resident in the U.S., who already is believed by emigre leaders to have some form of secret U.S. support. Some of these individuals could be used as conduits of funds and material support to rebel groups operating from the Peshawar area. We also might establish connections with a member of the ruling family of Chitral, the Pakistan princely state which lies just across the border from Nuristan where most of the guerrilla activity is taking place. This could give us the possibility of utilizing the natural smuggling routes through Chitral to support the rebels directly, thus bypassing the emigres. Saudi Arabians, who may have some connections with the dissidents, might be asked to front for us in supporting the insurgency. Any proposed material assistance to dissidents would have to be carefully weighed from the policy standpoint. Aside from

spending funds for intelligence collection, and supplying material aid on humanitarian grounds (viz, medical supplies), selection of this covert action option would indicate a clear-cut U.S. Government decision to attempt to overturn the current Afghan Government.

Risk vs. Gain:

An intensified propaganda program against the Afghan regime, particularly one which involved radio broadcasting, would come to Afghan and Soviet attention. It might be blamed on the USG, or CIA in particular, although it would technically remain nonattributable. However, in view of the current volume of Soviet propaganda against the U.S., particularly with regard to neighboring Iran, we doubt that Soviet reaction to such a program would adversely affect U.S. interests in the area. It would increase the hostility of the government towards Americans in Afghanistan, but this is not a vital consideration. A successful propaganda program would make the world more aware of the nature of the Afghan regime, but it probably would do little to weaken it. On the contrary, it might induce the government to tighten its grip and become even more dependent upon the Soviets. Propaganda of the type envisioned could provide marginal encouragement to the insurgents, but overall would have little effect on them.

Although thus far we have refrained from doing so, we have the capability to explore with Afghan exiles the possibility of joint action against the regime. If, however, there is no intention to follow through, it would be inadvisable to embark on such a course of action. Raising the expectation of these exiles and then refraining from taking any action, would do more harm than good.

GOP support, or at least quiet acquiescence, would be almost essential for the success of any program designed to assist the Peshawar-based rebels. Although we could smuggle small quantities of material to them unilaterally, tacit GOP agreement would be required if larger quantities are involved. We have one unconfirmed report that Saudi sources are sending equipment to the rebels via Karachi, and that the GOP has turned a blind eye to this. If true, this suggests that should we become involved in a supply program, we might consider working with the Saudis in view of the influence they can bring to bear on the GOP.

There are several competing factions among the rebels. Some are royalist, some are Islamic fundamentalist and some are both. If we elect to support the dissidence, considerable care will be needed to ensure that our aid gets to the proper place; that it is not squandered on political infighting. We believe this is a manageable problem, because we should be able to keep fairly close track of activity in the dissident movement through a number of separate, compartmented sources.

35. **Memorandum From Thomas Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)**¹

Washington, February 1, 1979

SUBJECT

Afghanistan—Possible Covert Action (S)

We took up the subject of covert action in Afghanistan at the meeting with Saunders yesterday (CIA was present).² Bill Griffith's memo to you (log #700-XX) has also just come to me and I will cover both at once. First, Bill's memo. (S)³

The Griffith Memo

I agree with most of what Bill says. His analysis is correct except for the claim that the Pakistanis are supporting the Afghan rebels. CIA says that they have no information to confirm this. I would not exclude the possibility (and certainly the Paks are keeping a weather eye on the situation) but just because some of the dissidents claim they have support is not evidence that they actually have it. (S)

As far as the recommendations go, I have some reservations about how active we should be in supporting the insurgents (see below) but am otherwise on board with the caveat that we should not get into an extensive arms supply relationship with the Pakistanis because of Indian considerations. And, there is of course the general question as to how we supplement what we do in terms of meeting short term Saudi and Pakistani problems (arms supply) with other measures that go to the issue of their potential instability. In the Pakistani case, this is first of all promoting a modus vivendi with India and secondly economic assistance. (S)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton, Subject File, Box 98, Chron: 1-5/79. Secret. Sent for information. A copy was sent to Griffith.

² No record of this meeting was found.

³ Griffith's memorandum to Brzezinski, January 31, was entitled "The Arc of Instability: What is to be Done?" The "arc" referred to three crisis points which created a geographic arc: Yemen, Iran, and Afghanistan. Griffith identified the policy problem as two-pronged: 1) instability in this arc threatened U.S. access to petroleum sources in the Arabian Peninsula; and 2) regional allies would have diminished expectations about what the United States could do to restore stability. With regard to Afghanistan, Griffith counseled that the United States should engage in consultations with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia (and to a lesser extent, India) [*text not declassified*] and that the United States should endorse arming rebels in Afghanistan and, if necessary, increase arms shipments to Saudi Arabia and Pakistan toward that endorsement. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Meetings File, Box 82, Sensitive XX: 1/11-31/79)

Covert Action in Afghanistan

The discussion with Saunders and CIA was inconclusive but raised important questions. The current insurgency (and even any likely extension of it) will not directly threaten the Kabul regime. The Khalq represents, to be sure, only one ethnic element in Afghanistan, but it is by far the most significant. If, however, there is enough blood-letting, it is conceivable that the Army could tire of taking the losses and move to oust the Taraki regime. However, the Khalq has moved quickly to get political control over the Army. It is not sure that the Army even now has the capability of mounting a counter coup and whatever ability they have will be steadily eroded as the Army is further politicized. (S)

Another argument for supporting the insurgency is that it will keep the Afghans preoccupied on their side of the border and hence less able to stir up trouble on the Pakistani side. A further argument is this: as the regime gets more embroiled, it will turn more to the Soviets for help. Some argue that this is against our interests since we would like to see the Afghans be more independent of the Soviets. If you believe as I do, however, that this is a vain hope, then there might be some advantage in getting the Soviets deeply involved. As long as our hand was not evident, this would work to our favor by scaring the Indians, Iraqis, etc. (S)

Lastly, there is a humanitarian issue. Would we be stimulating a lot of killing to no good end? Pathans are said to think that getting killed while fighting the central government is not all that bad, especially if the central government is godless.⁴ I have never been able to determine the views of a Pathan who had been killed as to whether he thought it was worthwhile; that would, I guess, depend on whether the Koran makes good on all of its promises. It bothers me, however, especially if there is no significant gain made. (S)

The issue is, then, whether much will be gained. Most of those present thought that the answer would be no. There will be a lot of fighting, the government will be distracted, the Soviets will get more involved, but overall the odds are against it having much effect on the strategic outcome. If that is the case, and given the problems we might have “consulting” with Congress on this, the consensus was to keep hands off. (S)

What we should do, however, is make sure that we keep channels open to the insurgents and keep the matter under review. Also, there is no need for us to discourage the Pakistanis or the Saudis from keeping their hand in to the extent they see desirable. On that there was general agreement. (S)

⁴ Pathan is another word for Pashtun, the major ethnic group of Afghanistan.

36. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State¹

Kabul, February 14, 1979, 1440Z

1098. Subj: Death of Ambassador Dubs.

1. (C—Entire text)

2. Here follows our account of the kidnapping and death of Ambassador Dubs. This should be read in conjunction with the sitreps.²

3. At approximately 0845, February 14, the Embassy was informed by the Ambassador's chauffeur, Gul Mohammad, that the Ambassador had been kidnapped by armed persons, one of whom was wearing a uniform. When the Ambassador's car had approached the traffic intersection near USICA, a man who appeared to be a uniformed traffic policeman halted the car. He pointed a pistol at the driver and ordered him to open the car's electric door locks. Four armed men then entered the Ambassador's vehicle and ordered the driver to drive to the Kabul Hotel. They entered the hotel with the Ambassador as a prisoner after ordering the driver to return to the Embassy and inform the Embassy about what had happened.

4. The DCM immediately phoned Foreign Ministry Chief of Protocol and the RSO telephoned police commandant Sayed Daoud Taroon for information and assistance. Both Mandozai and Taroon appeared surprised, and this appeared to be the first word they had received of

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office Files of Marshall D. Shulman, Special Advisor to the Secretary on Soviet Affairs, 1977–1981, Lot 81D109, Communications with Soviet Union Re: Death of Dubs. Confidential; Niact Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Islamabad.

² Only situation report number 1, prepared in the Operations Center of the Department of State, February 14, was found. (Carter Library, Donated Historical Material, Mondale Papers, Box 42, Foreign Countries—Afghanistan, 1979) A full report, entitled "The Kidnapping and Death of Ambassador Adolph Dubs, February 14, 1979, Kabul, Afghanistan," prepared by the Special Assignments Staff, Office of Security, Department of State, was found in the Department of State, M/CT—Office for Combatting Terrorism, Country and Functional Files, 1980–1982, and Terrorist Incident Files, 1973–1976, 1976, 1980–1981, Lot 83D135, Box 12, Dubs, Adolph Amb—Afgh, Kidnapping Death—Feb 14, 1979–1980. The 17-page report includes: a summary; background on the security situation facing Dubs prior to his death; accounting for the actions taken by the United States during the standoff with the terrorists; actions of Soviet officials in Afghanistan before and during the standoff; demands made by terrorists and their possible identity; and requests made by the Embassy to the Afghan Government in the wake of Dubs's death. Key conclusions of the report include: the Department of State had no prior indication of any threat facing Dubs; the DRA excluded U.S. officials from all decisionmaking during the standoff; the Soviet Union denied any role in assisting the Afghan officials during the standoff; both the terrorists' demands and identity were not fully known at the time of writing; and that the DRA had been wholly uncooperative with U.S. authorities' attempts to gain a fuller picture of the events surrounding Dubs's death.

the incident. Taroon insisted that the Ambassador's driver repeat the story to him over the telephone. (At this time, it was not yet clear to the Embassy whether the Ambassador had been taken by Afghan officials or someone else.) Mandozai called back almost immediately and informed DCM that he had informed Foreign Minister Amin, that this was not the work of the government, and that they were in touch with the police.

5. Events at the hotel: Some EmbOffs immediately went to the Kabul Hotel, arriving at approximately 0900. At the same time, the first police arrived, pushing through the people in the lobby toward a small room off the hotel desk. The EmbOffs heard loud scuffling and angry noises in the room.

6. At about 0915 Political Counselor Flatin established contact with a plainclothes police officer, who appeared to be in charge of the operation. He was a former Air Force officer known by Americans to be one of Taroon's closest aides. We do not know his name.

7. At about 0920, the first Soviet police advisor, a tall, balding man, with a black overcoat, arrived on the scene and immediately went into consultations with the Afghan officials.

8. At about 0930, at the request of the American side at the hotel, there was a small conference among the Americans, the Afghan police, and the Soviet advisor. All then available information about the incident was exchanged at that time. We were told that the kidnappers had refused to answer the room telephone and were refusing to respond to any attempts to communicate with them. The American officers stressed their concern for the safety of the Ambassador, and were assured by the Afghan and Soviet participants that they shared this concern. Following this meeting the American officers began to find it more difficult to deal directly with the Soviet advisors and therefore began to negotiate directly with the senior Afghan police officials at the scene.

9. At 0950, under the instructions of DCM Amstutz, Political Counselor Flatin repeated the strong concern of the USG for the safety of Ambassador Dubs to both the Afghan police and Soviet advisors (at this time another two Soviet plainclothesmen had arrived on the scene, carrying with them several green canvas bags) and requested that no precipitous action be launched. They were told that in the American view this would greatly endanger the Ambassador. The Americans requested that the Afghans wait for the advice which the Embassy had already requested from Washington. The Afghans and Soviets clearly acknowledged and understood this U.S. request and indicated that they agreed with the wisdom of following a patient course of action, but they declined to make any commitments. About this time, the Embassy's ambulance and medical staff arrived at the hotel and were permitted to position themselves in the lobby.

10. At about 1015 Sergei Bakhturin, the Soviet Embassy security officer, arrived on the scene. He assured the Americans of a strong Soviet interest in the Ambassador's safety.³ At the same time, Taroon's aide also assured us that all possible precautions were being taken to prevent any harm from coming to the Ambassador, and he promised that he would personally defend the Ambassador with his own life. It was at this time that we gained additional details about the entry into the hotel. The Afghan police said that the kidnappers had moved Ambassador Dubs through a crowded lobby and up the stairs to the second floor (second top) to room 117. One of the three kidnappers had returned to the lobby to ask the desk for the key to the room. Not recognizing him as a hotel guest, the hotel people were suspicious and sent a hotel employee up to the room with him. At the door to the room, he ordered the employee at gunpoint to unlock the door. The other kidnappers entered the room with the Ambassador and the third returned downstairs with the employee and at gunpoint ordered the hotel desk personnel not to allow anyone to go upstairs or to enter the hotel. It is not clear to us how he subsequently was overcome. From the nature of the 0900 police rush on the office near the desk where the terrorist presumably was, it is possible that he was disarmed and subdued at that time.

11. At 1115 a Ministry of Interior official asked RSO Boles if we had a security plan for this type of situation. Boles replied that to this point we had left the situation in charge of the Afghan police and the Soviet advisors, but that we felt that taking precipitous action would

³ In telegram 3716 from Moscow, February 14, the Embassy reported a conversation between Toon and Gromyko regarding Dubs's death. Gromyko expressed his regret, pledged Soviet cooperation, and identified the perpetrators as agents of a "right extremist reactionary provocative group." (National Archives, RG 59, Office Files of Marshall D. Shulman, Special Advisor to the Secretary on Soviet Affairs, 1977-1981, Lot 81D109, Communications with Soviet Union Re: Death of Dubs) A memorandum from Bowdler to Christopher, February 14, relayed INR's conclusion that "the Soviets share responsibility with the Afghans in precipitating the assault on the kidnappers which produced the death of Ambassador Dubs." INR based its conclusion on two analyses of Soviet behavior during the incident: 1) "failure to adequately inform official Americans on the scene of the terrorist terms (conditions and deadline) and about the Afghan plans to assault the room where Dubs was being held;" and 2) "disregard of repeated U.S. pleas for patience and restraint." (Ibid.) In telegram 38921 to Kabul, February 15, the Department stated that Vance called Dobrynin to inform him that "highly reliable" eyewitness reports indicated "Soviet advisers were intimately involved in carrying out the ill-advised assault which resulted in Ambassador Dubs's death," and that "this incident may well cause serious damage to our relations." (Ibid.; printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 171) Telegram 3933 from Moscow, February 16, relayed Gromyko's categorical refusal to accept blame for Dubs's death. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840176-1026) In a condolence message from Taraki to Carter, transmitted in telegram 39443/Tosec 10033, February 15, Taraki emphasized that "every effort" was made by Afghan security authorities to save Dubs's life. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790073-0061)

greatly endanger the Ambassador's life. Boles then outlined the American strategy of waiting in such cases. Boles then told the police that we had our medical staff ready for all emergencies and were prepared to move the Ambassador to the dispensary, if necessary. Boles was then assured that the police would provide an escort.

12. At about 1115 a.m. Mr. James E. Taylor, Political Officer, and Embassy employee, Jalal Talibee, arrived at the Ministry of Interior. They asked to see police commandant Sayed Daoud Taroon and were asked to wait in Taroon's outer office by his secretary, for a few minutes. Earlier in the morning, Taroon has met Admin Officer Bernie Woertz and a local and had said that an American officer was welcome to sit in Taroon's office and act as a contact point for the USG. What Woertz and his local picked up by way of info was transmitted by sitrep no. 5.

13. At 1120, Afghan police were observed moving ladders against the outside of the hotel in such a way that the kidnappers could see the action. Troops with what appeared to be commando badges also arrived at that time. By this time, the entire hotel and neighboring streets and buildings were filled with police and other security forces. At 1125, RSO Boles notified the Embassy that it appeared that a police action against room 117 may be pending immediately. At the Embassy's request, American officers at the hotel once again asked the Afghan police for patience, advising that time is usually on the side of the authorities. The Americans then saw several commandos enter the hotel lobby, cock their weapons, and rush upstairs.

14. At 1128, the Embassy told American officers at the hotel that DCM Amstutz was trying to get in touch with police commandant Taroon. This information was passed to the Afghan police at the hotel and they were asked not to do anything drastic until these negotiations took place.

15. At 1130 Bakhturin told American officers that the men in the room demanded the return of the man whom the police had caught in the lobby. He said that this request had been conveyed to Hafizullah Amin. The terrorists said that after their comrade had been returned to them, they would be willing to talk further with the police. An Afghan police official told us that security forces had talked to Ambassador Dubs, but did not know what his condition was. He reportedly confirmed in English that he was all right. They also reported that a policeman across the street had viewed him through a window and he appeared to be all right. Bakhturin indicated that he thought it would be at least an hour before anything could be done.

16. Also around 1130, Bakhturin asked Flatin what languages the Ambassador knew besides English. He was told the Ambassador's best foreign language was Russian. Bakhturin did not appear satisfied with this, and asked what other languages he knew. When told German, Bakhturin asked if Flatin knew German, and was told yes.

17. At 1140, a police security officer asked Flatin to accompany him upstairs. On the second floor, Flatin met Azizi, a plainclothes police official that he had by chance once met in Badghis Province in 1977. (This police official, who speaks perfect English, had at that time told Flatin that he served one and a half years as a special police bodyguard for Ambassador Newmann when he was under a PLO terrorist threat in Kabul in the 1960s. He gave the impression of being a secret police official at that time.) Azizi, who also spoke apparently perfect Russian with the Soviet advisors, asked Flatin if he could do a favor for the police. He asked whether he would mind talking to the Ambassador in German so that the kidnappers would not understand. The police seemed to think that the kidnappers knew English.) Flatin asked whether this would endanger the Ambassador in any way, and was assured that the police had already made arrangements with the terrorists. (They were talking with the terrorist named "Najib" through the keyhole.)

18. The police asked Flatin to ask the Ambassador what type of weapons the terrorists had. Speaking through the door, Flatin identified himself in German and asked the Ambassador how he was. The Ambassador replied that he was all right. His voice sounded strained, but strong. Flatin, upon the repeated requests of the police, then asked the Ambassador what types of weapons his kidnappers had. The Ambassador began to reply, but after saying the word "revolvers", he was silenced by the people in the room, who by that time were probably aware that a language other than one they understood was being used. The police requested the captors to permit the conversation to continue, explaining that the Ambassador should be permitted to speak to his own Embassy officials. The kidnappers retort was, "We are in charge here and it isn't necessary."

19. Flatin was then asked to tell the Ambassador that ten minutes from that moment he was to try to go to the bathroom or drop to the floor. Flatin requested an immediate conference elsewhere with the police. Flatin commented that such an instruction to the Ambassador obviously meant that the police were poised to strike, and, as the police already knew, the Americans had officially requested a delay. Flatin explained that DCM Amstutz was trying to discuss the situation at the very moment with police commandant Taroon, and requested that nothing be done until the American Embassy had had a chance to discuss onward tactics further with the police. Meanwhile, Amstutz talked again twice with Deputy Foreign Minister Dost, and attempted desperately to reach Foreign Minister Amin by phone (and dispatched Woertz to try to enter Palace.)

20. The Afghan police officer, who at this stage had apparently taken over charge of the operation, a youthful and tough-looking plain-

clothes man, became very upset over this request for a delay, and insisted that he was under orders to strike immediately. Flatin then talked with Bakhturin who had in the meantime come upstairs, and stressed our strong American interest in the delay. Bakhturin said that he agreed time was also a good idea. He then talked with the senior Soviet police advisor. The situation then became temporarily calm on the second floor. It was at this point that Bakhturin revealed that the Afghan police were working under time deadlines which had been imposed by the kidnappers. The original noontime deadline had already passed, and the police now thought they had an extension until 1300.

21. About this time, firemen with picks and axes arrived on the scene and joined the police. Then at this time, a photograph of the Ambassador was displayed to all members of the security strike forces. One of the commandos then asked, "Is that the terrorist?" He was told that it was the Ambassador whom he was to avoid shooting.

22. Events at the Interior Ministry: At 1145, at the Interior Ministry, Mr. Taylor again asked the secretary to remind commandant Taroon that he was waiting to see him. Mr. Taylor told the secretary, a police captain, that it was important that the U.S. Embassy representative see Taroon in order to know what the Afghan Government was intending to do. The secretary came from Taroon's office and Mr. Taylor was told to continue waiting.

23. For some reason the strike plans were apparently again relaxed and the American officers were able to again consult the Embassy. At an earlier stage in the morning's operation the Americans had recommended that the police bring the third terrorist, as demanded, to his colleagues in order to elicit further demands from them. The police decided to bring the third man up to the room but this gesture was not sufficient; the terrorists wanted the return of his weapon too.

24. At 1207 the Afghan police requested that the American medical personnel and stretcher be brought upstairs and placed in readiness near the corridor of room 117.

25. Immediately thereafter the third terrorist was brought up the stairs hooded. It was clear to EmbOffs that a strike was being prepared. The Embassy was informed and again DCM urgently requested that EmbOffs seek further delays. The EmbOffs repeated their earlier advice to the Embassy that nothing could evidently be done with the police officials at the scene, as they were repeatedly arguing that they were already under orders from high officials elsewhere. At one time the Americans were told they were under orders of the "Prime Minister" himself. This was in response to the Embassy officer's statement that Mr. Amstutz was still trying to reach Mr. Taroon.

26. At this stage, the Soviet Embassy security officer and three Soviet police advisors were all present, but hanging back, trying to

look only like “advisors”, and allowing the Afghan police to be in charge. Flatin talked to the man who appeared to be a senior Soviet advisor and asked whether he spoke English. He did not, but he did speak a little German. Flatin tried to secure his understanding of the urgent need for a delay. He replied this was an Afghan police matter.

27. At about 1215 p.m. Mr. Taylor called the Embassy to inform that he still had not been allowed to see Taroon despite several reminders to Taroon that he was waiting and that it was extremely important to the USG to know what the Afghan Government was intending to do.

28. Back at the hotel: At 1217 additional security forces rushed upstairs and took ready positions near room 117.

29. At approximately 1230 a military officer in the lobby who seemed to be in charge of the operation gave instructions to Taroon’s assistant who returned upstairs. At 1235 Taroon’s aide came downstairs again and went into the room with the officer-in-charge who seemed to be talking on the radio.

30. At 1230 p.m. still not having been allowed to see Taroon, Mr. Taylor again called the DCM to ask if he should remain in Taroon’s waiting room. The DCM advised Mr. Taylor to wait at the Ministry for 30 more minutes but that Mr. Taylor was to insist that the following message be passed to Taroon: “Above all else, the USG did not want any action taken by the Afghan Government which would endanger the welfare of Ambassador Dubs.” That message was given to Taroon’s secretary, who claimed that he had passed it to Taroon.

31. Events again at the hotel: At the hotel, at 1237, Taroon’s aide went outside the hotel but returned one minute later. The officer-in-charge returned to the side room where there was a radio, after which two plainclothes gunmen went upstairs.

32. At about 1245 p.m. Mr. Taylor called the Embassy from the Interior Ministry, again saying that, in spite of repeated requests, he had still not been allowed to see Taroon, and was advised by the DCM that the foregoing message should be stressed again and that the Embassy had information that the Afghan authorities were contemplating action within the next two minutes. Mr. Taylor reiterated the U.S. position to Taroon’s secretary and stressed that that policy had been specifically by Secretary Vance. Mr. Taylor also emphasized that information available to the Embassy indicated that some kind of forceful action was imminent and that absolutely nothing should be done that would endanger the welfare of the Ambassador. The secretary entered Taroon’s office and upon emerging at 1250 said the message had been given to the police commandant. The secretary added that “not all information should be made available, everything is under control, and Taroon is busy with the operation at the hotel.” He claimed

that “all is designed” to “secure the life of the Ambassador and the terrorists.”

33. At about 1245 it was clear to EmbOffs in the corridor outside room 117 that the police had received their orders. Top police officials and other armed men joined the crowd outside the room. One specially armed and armored policeman lay prone on the floor before the door, pointing his weapon at the door, while others stood behind him and to his side also pointing their weapons at the door. The Soviet advisors then stepped forward into operation roles. One Soviet advisor helped to arm an Afghan policeman with what appeared to be special weaponry. Two other Soviet police advisors and Bakhturin went out to the balcony. The tall, senior Soviet advisor then made hand signals from the balcony, presumably positioning the snipers across the street.

34. Before 1250, the police had all non-participants take positions of safety. At exactly 1250 very heavy gunfire broke out in the corridor, in the room, and from across the street. Both single-shot and automatic weapons were heard (several American officers were nearby). The main bursts of firing continued for approximately 40 seconds. The police snipers across the street continued to fire until two Soviet advisors gave hand signals to cut it off. Following that, there were at least three more bursts from inside the room, and then silence.

35. The police then asked the Americans to come immediately with the stretcher. The entryway into the hotel room was a seven foot long hall whose air was filled with dense cordite smoke. When the American party entered the room, they found the Ambassador seated to the right side of the entryway next to a wardrobe. His head was slumped to the right side and he had sustained several bullet wounds, one of which appeared to be a single small calibre shot above the right eye. A heavy calibre round had struck him in the heart area. A third round had hit him in the left wrist. The American party placed the Ambassador on the stretcher. The Embassy doctor’s initial diagnosis in the room was that the Ambassador was dead.

36. At 1253 the party rushed the Ambassador down to a waiting American ambulance which took the Ambassador’s body to the American dispensary. Mr. Flatin remained behind as the two terrorists were removed. The first terrorist was dragged out into the hallway through cascades of water (the radiator pipes in the room had been shot out). The police slapped his head around with a gun butt, but he appeared as probably dead. The second man was still, and possibly dead. The third terrorist, who had been held back in the immediate area of shooting was then badly roughed up by the police. A hood was put back on his head and he was dragged down to the lobby. By about 1258 all three terrorists had been removed from the hotel. The one who had been first captured was definitely alive at that time and on his feet. A

second terrorist was taken from the hotel either unconscious or dead. The third terrorist was on a stretcher very bloody and apparently dead.

37. Police officers then came out of the room with the Ambassador's sports coat and tie. Flatin asked for possession. The nearest police official was prepared to permit this but the tall Soviet police advisor came up and convinced him to rescind his permission, explaining the items were necessary for police examination. (The Ambassador's possessions were later returned to the Embassy.)

38. Events back at the Interior Ministry: At about 1255, Mr. Taylor phoned the Embassy to report that the Afghan police were obviously on the verge of some overt action. Mr. Taylor talked to Mr. Turco who said that whatever the DRA was planning had just happened. At that point, while Mr. Taylor was on the phone with Mr. Turco a Russian civilian emerged from Taroon's office and left the waiting room. This man had not entered through the waiting room while Taylor was there so he must have been with Taroon during the entire period Taylor was at the Ministry. About three minutes later, another official entered the waiting room and said to the secretary that he had heard shooting and the secretary informed all of the police stations to search their areas for the source of the shooting.

39. At about 1305 hours Taroon and his bodyguard came out of the commandant's office and Taroon said that it was all over "and that the Ambassador was injured and in the hospital." Taroon quickly left the room and went down to the main exit of the building. Mr. Taylor rushed after him down the step and asked for five seconds of his time to explain what Mr. Taylor thought of Taroon's behavior and his handling of the whole affair. Taroon replied he was "too busy" and didn't have time to talk with Mr. Taylor.

40. Taroon with his machine gun drove off in his Mercedes. It was obvious that Taroon refused to have any American representative aware of what the Afghan police were preparing to do. He also deliberately disregarded the American position for delay which was repeatedly made known to him a number of times, and disregarded his telephone promise to the DCM not to take action without consulting us, and that after the incident he did not want to hear any questions or statements from the American representative. It was equally clear that a civilian Soviet advisor was intimately involved with the Afghan police preparations in Taroon's office.

41. Back at the hotel, Flatin subsequently discussed the incident with the police plainclothesman in charge of the operation, and asked why the action had been launched so precipitously. The police official said he was under higher orders and claimed that the Afghan police did not start the shooting. He explained that the terrorists had told the police that the ultimatum time had elapsed and that they did not want

to wait any further. The police then pleaded for a further delay, but upon hearing a shot within the room, opened fire and rushed the room in an attempt to save the Ambassador. When told that the American Ambassador was dead the police officer expressed his sympathy.

42. Some American officers then went back to room 117. They looked for signs of shooting in the room. No bullet holes were observed in the corridor door to the room, which looked as though it had been struck near its lock by a heavy object. The glass door at the end of the hallway leading directly into the room was shattered. The wall against which the Ambassador's body was found had at least five bullet holes at an elevation of approximately five feet higher and on the wall opposite the window were a number of bullet holes above the door frame, presumably from the snipers across the street. No bullet holes were observed in that part of the wall immediately behind the Ambassador's body's location or in the wardrobe cabinet next to this spot. The police then asked Embassy officers to leave before they could finish their inspection of the room.

43. According to Dr. Rotz, our RMO, Ambassador Dubs officially died at 1305 hours. Our report on this follows septel.⁴

Amstutz

⁴ A likely reference to telegram 1605 from Kabul, March 1, which transmitted the autopsy report on Dubs. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])

37. **Memorandum From Paul Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)**¹

Washington, February 26, 1979

SUBJECT

Afghanistan

REFERENCE

Your memorandum of February 21, 1979, same subject (attached)²

The state of our knowledge of Afghanistan and of Afghan groups abroad opposed to the present regime is so fragmentary that it is impossible to develop "a coherent and systematic plan." Remedying this deficiency must be the first step. Beyond this, we need a more coherent framework within which to plan. Covert action only makes sense within the framework of a broader set of policy goals toward which covert action contributes. I am not sure we have these in respect to Afghanistan. Do we simply want to harass the present regime and prevent its consolidation? Do we want to replace it with something else? What? What kind of resources in what amounts are we willing to commit to supporting a regime more to our liking? Dissidents with whom we would have to work to do anything about Afghanistan will want to know this. So will the Pakistanis or anybody else we might want to work through. (TS)

Recent statements of the President and the Vice President leave me with the impression that they are unwilling to support serious intervention in Afghanistan or any similar situation.³ CIA's capacity

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special, Box 3, Chron File: 2/79. Top Secret. Sent for action.

² Not attached. The memorandum from Brzezinski to Henze stated: "Please outline for me a coherent and systematic plan for Afghanistan. Should we help any insurgents? What would be required? With whom would we have to work? How likely are the Pakistanis to be effectively helpful? What will be the chances of success, and how would success be defined?" (National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I-047, Afghanistan: 8 May 1978-7 Dec 1978)

³ An apparent reference to Carter's public reaction to the death of Dubs. The President, who attended a ceremony at Andrews Air Force Base, February 18, marking the arrival of Dubs's remains to the United States, characterized Dubs's killing as "senseless terrorism." (*Public Papers: Carter, 1979*, Book I, pp. 295-296) A news report of the ceremony noted that Carter "stopped short of repeating criticism of the Soviet Union by name for its role in advising Afghan forces to storm the kidnappers' stronghold." (John MacLean, "With 'Sadness, Outrage,' Carter Eulogizes Dubs," *Chicago Tribune*, February 19, 1979, p. 2) On February 20, Carter gave a speech on foreign affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology upon receiving an honorary degree. Prefacing his condemnation of Dubs's killing, Carter made an apparent reference to Vietnam: "The United States cannot control events within other nations. A few years ago, we tried this and failed." (*Public Papers: Carter, 1979*, Book I, p. 301) No statements by Mondale were found.

to plan and implement covert action in a challenging environment such as Afghanistan, where U.S. influence is widely perceived as declining, is extremely limited. In the face of declared lack of desire for such action from highest authority, one cannot expect more than a half-hearted planning effort from CIA. This is unlikely to result in plans in which one can have much confidence. CIA's recent covert action effort in Iran was totally illusory. (TS)

CIA/DDO's NESAs Division Chief, Alan Wolfe [*less than 1 line not declassified*] recently visited the area and assessed the situation firsthand. His conclusions are going to be reflected in the paper CIA is preparing for consideration at the SCC meeting scheduled for this coming Friday, 2 March 1979.⁴ I recommend that we ask Stan Turner to bring Wolfe along for this phase of the discussion so that you can get the direct benefit of his knowledge and thinking. (S)⁵

⁴ For the CIA paper, see Document 38. No record of an SCC meeting on March 2 was found, although there was an SCC meeting that covered Afghanistan on March 6, which was possibly a reschedule of a meeting originally planned for March 2. See footnote 5, Document 38.

⁵ Brzezinski did not indicate his approval or disapproval on the memorandum.

38. **Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency
for Members of the Special Coordination Committee¹**

Washington, February 28, 1979

SUBJECT

Covert Action Options for Afghanistan

Attached is a paper outlining Covert Action (CA) options in Afghanistan. It is circulated in order to obtain your views for the forthcoming Special Coordination Committee (SCC) meeting regarding the appropriateness of the options described. It is our present intention to draft a formal CA proposal for SCC consideration and a Presidential Finding based on your reactions.

However, if our CA program is to include support to a possible insurgency, the acquisition of additional operational intelligence on the various rebel groups will be necessary before a proposal can be submitted.

On the other hand, if the decision is made simply to publicize the Soviet role in Afghanistan through our international network of media assets, agents of influence and liaison contacts, the General Finding authorizing us to "expose and counter Soviet interference in other countries' affairs" already provides us with policy sufficiency.

The options presented vary in degree of risk and cost, but are not mutually exclusive. For example, a program of support to an insurgency would also include some or all of the less risky options, such as a worldwide propaganda campaign on both Soviet involvement in Afghanistan and the abuses of the Taraki regime.

¹ Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I-047, Afghanistan: 8 May 1978-7 Dec 1978. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. Attached but not printed is an undated covering memorandum from Inderfurth to Brzezinski, which characterizes the attached CIA paper as "not a set of concrete proposals," but rather an offering of options ranging from propaganda "through sponsorship of large-scale insurgency to bring about a change in government in power in Kabul." Inderfurth noted the paper's "principal deficiency" was that "it gives only a vague impression of CIA's capabilities," which meant that the CIA was unprepared to implement some of the options laid out in the paper. Inderfurth recommended that Brzezinski "step up operational intelligence collection as an essential first-step toward planning more concrete programs." Also attached but not printed is Brzezinski's February 21 memorandum to Henze. See Document 37.

Attachment**Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency²**

Washington, undated

*COVERT ACTION OPTIONS AGAINST AFGHANISTAN**INTRODUCTION:*

The communist regime of Nur Mohammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin appears to have established itself in effective control in Kabul.³ It possesses the essential mechanisms of central government and, if left to its own devices, should eventually be able to lay to rest the tribal insurrections it continues to face, principally in the eastern border area of Nuristan. No central Afghan government has ever been in total, absolute control of all parts of the country, and the center traditionally faces periodic tests of its authority from parochial interests in the more remote provincial areas. In this respect the Nuristan insurrection follows a familiar pattern, but it is taking place on an order of magnitude considerably in excess of what recent Afghan regimes have faced, and with a professed ideological content not usual to such events.

The Afghan army, its leadership already debilitated by arrests and purges, is disadvantaged in Nuristan by terrain which singularly favors guerrilla activity. The admittedly limited intelligence available on the insurrection suggests that regular forces have not fared well and that word-of-mouth awareness of Nuristani success may be stimulating recalcitrant tribal elements in other areas to assume equally belligerent postures towards Kabul's control. The latter point is largely speculative however; little reliable intelligence now exists. To the extent that current army leadership is embarrassed by its performance in this matter, turning on the political leadership which ordered the confrontation, is one possible course open to it. While tribal insurrection cannot directly bring down the central government, its continued success could spur politically uncommitted army officers to such an effort. The insurrectionists are poorly armed and lack money, medical facilities and ammunition; nor do they now appear to be receiving more than token assistance from external sources. Left to its own devices, the insurrection

² Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. No drafting information appears on the paper.

³ Inderfurth underlined the sentence and wrote: "ZB, see addendum. Rick" in the margin, a reference to the field appraisal from the Chief of Station in Kabul.

will probably peter out. Actively stimulated, it conceivably could spark the reaction suggested above. Unilateral and bilateral mechanisms appear to exist to provide this support; each has singular advantages or disadvantages attached.

PURPOSE:

Covert Action (CA) could be undertaken against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) with objectives ranging from harassment to the actual overthrow of the present communist government. The principal purpose would be to demonstrate to the Soviets and the Third World that the U.S. is not willing quietly to acquiesce in the absorption of another country into the Soviet orbit. The main risk in undertaking such a CA program would come from the Soviet Union. In the event of a lightning, and successful, coup d'état in Kabul, it is unlikely that the Soviets would intervene militarily. A gradually intensified insurgency could lead to escalating Soviet military countermeasures. While the Soviets would be unlikely to introduce line troops into Afghanistan, they could easily provide virtually limitless supplies of military equipment, military "advisors," pilots, etc.

UNILATERAL VS. MULTILATERAL CA:

Limited CA activities can be undertaken unilaterally. For example, we can intensify our propaganda campaign and supply funds to insurgent groups without collaborating with other countries. Unilateral CA has security advantages, but would be far less effective than programs undertaken jointly. Because of geographical considerations, the cooperation—or at least tacit endorsement—of the Government of Pakistan (GOP) would be almost mandatory if we were to provide significant material support to the insurgents. Such cooperation is by no means assured; the GOP would be likely to demand a high price in return for its cooperation—viz. greatly increased military and economic assistance. This would involve us in supporting the political status quo in Pakistan. The GOP would run the risk of its actions boomeranging, leading to serious instability in Pakistan. The Afghans have the capability of stirring up Pakistan tribals—particularly in Baluchistan. Some insurgent leaders have good connections with Saudi Arabia, and there have been reports that aid from that country already has been sent to exile leaders in the Peshawar area. In view of the influence that Saudi Arabia has had on Pakistan, the Saudis could usefully front for us with the GOP and serve as a conduit for aid to the insurgents, probably via exile elements. Other countries might play lesser roles. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] are willing to cooperate in an anti-DRA propaganda

campaign, and [less than 1 line not declassified] are willing to provide some intelligence. The head of [1 line not declassified] said his organization would be willing to provide training for the dissidents, although it is doubtful he was speaking for [less than 1 line not declassified] Government when he made this comment.

CA OPTIONS—PRO'S AND CON'S:

1. *Propaganda—Outside Afghanistan.* We could generate a worldwide media campaign publicizing the DRA's problems, exposing Taraki and his colleagues as pawns of the Soviet Union. We could condemn Taraki for attempting to force an atheistic philosophy on the religious population and for violating civil rights. Such a campaign could be conducted unilaterally or with the cooperation of friendly governments such as [less than 1 line not declassified]. It would be virtually risk free, but probably would have little impact within Afghanistan itself. It would, however, establish the groundwork for additional CA activities, including influencing Saudi Arabian and other prospective donors of aid to the rebel cause.

2. *Propaganda—Inside Afghanistan.* Propaganda material could be distributed inside Afghanistan. Afghans have a tradition of employing "night letters"—clandestinely produced leaflets—to register protest. CIA could produce such material for non-attributable distribution in Kabul and elsewhere in Afghanistan, but this obviously would entail considerable risk for those involved. We cannot predict in advance the success of an internal propaganda campaign or the overall effect it would have on the regime. It probably would have the greatest impact if it were undertaken in conjunction with a broader program of support for the insurgents.

3. *Propaganda—Radio.* Radio broadcasts in Dari and Pushtu in the standard broadcast band beamed into Afghanistan from neighboring countries would require the cooperation of the Governments of Pakistan and/or Iran.⁴ In the past the GOP has transmitted propaganda into Afghanistan from a radio station in Quetta. If relations between the two countries deteriorate, the GOP might resume such broadcasts. Some existing shortwave broadcasts, [less than 1 line not declassified], also reach Afghanistan, and we could explore the possibility of putting our message on this medium. Again, cooperation of a third country would be essential. An airborne radio station also is possible, but this too would have to be supported from a nearby country. Satellite broadcasts theoretically could be arranged, but only at great expense

⁴ Inderfurth circled "/or Iran" and drew a line to the bottom of the page, where he wrote: "I doubt the Ayatollah (or Bazargan for that matter) would go along with this. *Maybe* later."

and not in the near term. If the radio propaganda option is being seriously considered, a technical study would be required to determine the best way to reach the Afghan radio audience. Assuming the broadcasts are fairly widely heard, they could have a significant impact. If the broadcasts originated from a neighboring country such as Pakistan, this would be considered a serious hostile act and the DRA could be expected to take countermeasures.

4. *Insurgency Support—Non-Lethal.* The easiest way to support the insurgents is to furnish them with money on a unilateral basis. We have identified a number of Afghan exile leaders through whom such funds could be channelled, although our ability to monitor how the money actually is spent would be limited. A possibility also exists to establish direct contact in Pakistan with Nuristan leaders, via discreet, unilateral Pakistani intermediaries. If we wanted to remove ourselves a step from such transactions, we might be able to get Saudi Arabia to front for us, but this would further reduce the element of control. Small amounts of non-lethal material such as medical supplies, rations and low-grade communications equipment, might be furnished unilaterally through Pakistan territory, although obviously this could be done more easily with GOP cooperation, or possibly by having the Saudis broker the deal with the GOP. U.S. assistance to the insurgents, whether in the form of money or non-lethal supplies or both, could be expected to encourage the anti-regime movement, but its ultimate effect would be difficult to predict. If significant quantities of aid were involved, this could not be kept secret. The USG probably would be accused of supporting the rebels by the Soviets and the Afghan press, whether or not concrete proof was available. Nevertheless, plausible denial could be maintained, or the USG might even admit to supplying "humanitarian aid" to the exiles. Pakistan's attitude would be critical. The GOP could be seriously embarrassed if it developed that an increasingly creditable insurgency movement was operating from its Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and might take steps to restrict activities of the insurgents.

5. *Insurgency Support—Lethal.* Funds could be provided to the insurgents to purchase lethal military equipment, as in the non-lethal insurgency support option outlined above. Likewise, the Saudis could be asked to front for us on this. Small amounts of lethal equipment probably could be introduced clandestinely, but GOP cooperation would be required if significant amounts were involved. Equipment which could upgrade the insurgents' combat capabilities might include small arms, sniper equipment, light to medium crew-served weapons, unconventional demolitions, and anti-aircraft weapons such as the Soviet SA-7 missiles. Training also would be required, and with full GOP

cooperation, a small CIA team could handle this in NWFP. Alternatively, Afghan rebel cadres could be brought out of the area and trained in a third country such as Saudi Arabia. From the standpoint of efficiency, the closer the training team can operate to the scene of action, the better. Efficiency would be lowered, but security enhanced, if American staff did not operate in Pakistan. The results of modest but across-the-board support for the insurgents would be hard to estimate. It could greatly improve the insurgents' military capability, sap the managerial resources of the thinly staffed DRA leadership, and eventually lead to a revolt in the Army which would overthrow the Taraki regime. It also could lead to increased Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, as we believe they will take strong measures to ensure that the communist regime is not displaced. A long drawn-out insurgency would result in great suffering for the people involved, with no guarantee that a satisfactory outcome would be achieved.

6. *Coup d'etat*. It is possible that the Taraki regime could be brought down the same way it came to power—in a lightning coup d'etat. This would have to be carefully planned and organized, and executed with precision. As in the April 1978 coup, the aim would be to obtain support of key military units and then move quickly to eliminate the DRA leadership. If successful, such a coup would cause minimal bloodshed, and would be over before the Soviets had time to react. A number of Afghans already have been arrested by the regime on charges of coup plotting. At this point we do not know whether there are viable anti-regime groups attempting to organize a coup such as described, and it could well be that there are none. The DRA has not flinched from employing draconian means to maintain internal security; regime leaders are well protected by heavily armed guards and the political loyalty of key military commanders has been carefully investigated. While dissidents both inside and outside of Afghanistan may be discussing the theoretical possibility of mounting a coup, little or no spadework may have been done to prepare for this. Anti-regime exiles seem to have only rudimentary contact with guerrillas operating in the border areas, and presumably even poorer communications with potential dissident activists in the capital. Nevertheless it is possible that a creditable anti-regime underground could develop, and CIA could make contact with it, probably via selected anti-regime exiles. In theory we could then provide specialized support including training, advice, non-attributable sniper rifles, explosives, anti-tank weapons, communications equipment, etc. This material then would have to be smuggled into Kabul—again implying the existence of a well organized underground. The political risks to the U.S. would be great, but probably

not much greater than if we decided to provide quantities of lethal equipment and training for the insurgency as described above.⁵

⁵ The summary of conclusions of the SCC's March 6 meeting was sent under cover of a March 19 memorandum from Dodson to Mondale, Vance, Brown, Jones, and Turner. It noted that the final portion of the meeting was devoted to the CIA paper: "There was a general feeling that internal and external media activity should proceed but that possibilities and channels for support of dissidents and insurgents should be studied at greater depth. The Attorney General suggested CIA prepare much more specific decision proposals than it had submitted to date so that clear yes-or-no answers could be given by the committee. CIA representatives stressed that gathering additional feasibility information will necessitate contacts with regime opponents who may not be entirely forthcoming about providing information on their capabilities and plans until they feel assured that their requests for assistance have a serious chance of being responded to." (National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I-047, Afghanistan: 8 May 1978-7 Dec 1978) The portion of the summary of conclusions concerning Saudi Arabia is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Document 187.

39. Special Analysis Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

[paper number not declassified]

Washington, March 23, 1979

AFGHANISTAN: A Regime in Trouble

The insurgencies faced by President Taraki's government since his leftist faction seized power almost a year ago have now grown into serious threats to the survival of the Soviet-backed regime. The USSR is clearly concerned, and if conditions worsen in Afghanistan the Soviets could face an awkward dilemma. ([classification marking not declassified])

The most damaging recent development has been the spread of fighting to the previously quiet north and west. The causes of the revolt that broke out in Herat last week and smaller outbreaks elsewhere are still unclear, but Islamic opposition to the "godless" government may

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977-81), Box 6, Afghan Crisis—Pubs Pre-Invasion Reporting. Top Secret; [codeword and handling restriction not declassified]. Prepared by [text not declassified] and [text not declassified].

have been the most important factor.² In his first months in office, Taraki appeared to be dealing successfully with the religious communities by avoiding policies offensive to them. When criticism of the government became more open last fall—perhaps encouraged by events in Iran and by exiled religious leaders in Pakistan—Taraki cracked down.³ The arrest in January and February of a number of clerics apparently exacerbated the situation. (*classification marking not declassified*)

Even if the armed forces succeed in suppressing the current rebellions, insurgencies inspired by the Islamic opposition will almost certainly recur, placing further strains on the loyalty of the Muslim soldiers. Rebellion in the tribal areas along the Pakistani border broke out almost as soon as Taraki came to power. The tribes cannot campaign effectively outside their home areas but are holding their own in the mountains. Probably more than half of the Army's combat units are now in tribal areas, and morale is declining because of casualties, tribal loyalties, and the dim prospects for victory. (*classification marking not declassified*)

So far—despite the defection of a large part of the Army garrison in Herat and reports of daily desertions in the tribal areas—the bulk of the military remains loyal to the government. Widespread arrests and dismissals have prevented any successful move against Taraki by disgruntled officers. At the same time, however, the purges clearly reveal the continuing decline in the number of officers the government is willing to trust and, along with the similar removal of suspected opponents in the bureaucracy, have forced the government to rely more and more on inexperienced party members. The few capable senior officials—for example Foreign Minister Amin—seem to have more to do than they can handle. (*classification marking not declassified*)

The economic situation is deteriorating. Poor weather has sharply reduced agricultural production, foodgrain import requirements have increased, and Kabul is shopping in world markets for early delivery of at least 400,000 tons of wheat. The government estimates that the shortfall in wheat production this year will be between 700,000 to 800,000 tons. Foreign exchange reserves are sufficient to pay for wheat imports, but Kabul still faces problems in arranging for delivery. The Afghans have asked Pakistan to expedite wheat shipments through the port of Karachi, but Islamabad has not yet responded. (*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*)

² The uprising in Herat began on March 15 by civilian insurgents, who were joined by resident Afghan Army troops who had mutinied. The revolt ended on March 20 when Afghan Army troops loyal to the Taraki regime entered the city.

³ A reference to the Iranian revolution and the collapse of the Shah's government in February 1979.

Afghanistan's relations with its non-Communist neighbors are becoming more difficult. Although the Pakistani Government is not now giving support to tribal dissidents, it is reportedly making little effort to limit the activities of Afghan exiles in Pakistan and may decide at some point to provide material aid. The new Iranian Government apparently is continuing the Shah's non-interventionist policy, but anti-Afghan statements by Iranian leaders and verbal attacks on Iran from Afghanistan have increased tension. The increasingly Islamic character of the insurgency in Afghanistan could lead to a change in Iranian policy. (*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*)

Soviet money, arms, and advisers have been an important factor in keeping the Taraki government afloat, and the implicit threat of a Soviet reaction has been a major deterrent against Iranian and Pakistani meddling in Afghanistan.⁴ As his troubles increase, Taraki will need even greater Soviet assistance, and it is even possible that at some point only open Soviet military intervention could save him. (*classification marking not declassified*)

The Soviet Role

The USSR's dispatch of a high-level delegation to Afghanistan and its planned airlift point to Moscow's willingness to help Taraki meet the challenge. As many as 48 Soviet transport aircraft may be involved in the planned delivery of combat helicopters, which suggests to us the Soviets may also be delivering radar, communications, and other support equipment. The Soviets will probably also initially provide ground crews and pilots. The Soviets may already have delivered additional infantry combat vehicles. Even more noteworthy is Moscow's willingness to jeopardize its relations with the new government in Iran by charging it with complicity in the Afghan unrest. (*classification marking, codeword, and handling restriction not declassified*)

Soviet military advisers in Afghanistan have been helping government forces quell the insurgencies in eastern Afghanistan for several months. There is now an unconfirmed report that Soviet advisers assigned to the Afghan Air Force took part in bombing rebel-held positions in Herat last week. The Soviets reportedly flew bombing

⁴ An intelligence information cable prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, March 26, reported on information shared by [*text not declassified*], who alleged that Brezhnev sent Taraki a letter committing Soviet support to Afghanistan with 10 divisions and 500 aircraft near the Afghan border. According to the cable: "Whether the above information is accurate, it is the commonly held perception of Khalq officers that the Soviet Union is prepared to assist Afghanistan. The leadership of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan may wish to disseminate the substance of this message to its officers to instill a sense of confidence that Afghanistan is backed by a powerful neighbor." (Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 5, Soviets in Afghanistan—General Part #2)

missions for North Yemen in the 1960s and for Iraq against the Kurds in the 1970s. (*[classification marking, codeword, and handling restriction not declassified]*)

The Soviet military advisory mission in Afghanistan has more than doubled since the coup last April. It now numbers between 600 and 1,000, but there is still considerable room for further expansion. The Afghans, for example, probably will be unable to handle their logistics problems if the situation worsens, and Soviet military personnel might be dispatched to facilitate the movement of men and materiel to the various combat zones. (*[classification marking not declassified]*)

Moscow will face a dilemma if—despite expanded assistance—the situation deteriorates to the point where only massive Soviet military intervention could save the Afghan Marxists. This could happen if the Islamic insurgency spreads to other urban areas of Afghanistan and if the military withdraws its support from Taraki. Moscow's decision to publish two authoritative warnings in less than a week about outside interference in Afghanistan is indicative of Soviet concern about a possible replay in Afghanistan of recent developments in Iran. This is also reflected in the current Soviet propaganda effort to portray the current government as respectful of Islam and mindful of the teachings of the Koran. (*[classification marking not declassified]*)

The Soviets would be most reluctant to introduce large numbers of ground forces into Afghanistan to keep in power an Afghan Government that had lost the support of virtually all segments of the population. Not only would the Soviets find themselves in an awkward morass in Afghanistan, but their actions could seriously damage their relations with India, Iran, and—to a lesser degree—Pakistan. As a more likely option, the Soviets probably could seek to re-establish ties with those members of the Afghan opposition with whom Moscow has dealt profitably in the past.⁵ (*[classification marking not declassified]*)

⁵ In a likely reaction to this paper, Brzezinski sent a memorandum to Vance, March 28, indicating that in response to Soviet support and possible participation in the Afghan Government's efforts to destroy the insurgency, "the President stated that we should notify Iran, Pakistan, and India of this and publicize Soviet involvement." (Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Intelligence Liaison Files, TIN 980643000019, Box 3, Afghanistan, Non-Vector 1980–1985) A status report from Tarnoff to Brzezinski, April 5, described the activities undertaken by the Department of State per Carter's instructions. These measures included sending cables with talking points to the Embassies in Tehran and Jidda, a proposed letter to Indian Prime Minister Desai, and a message for Ambassador Hummel to communicate to Pakistani officials. Additionally, Tarnoff reported that the Department issued a statement "denying sharply" Soviet accusations of U.S. meddling in Afghanistan. (National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I-047, Afghanistan: 8 May 1978–7 Dec 1978) The Department's public statement attacking the Soviet allegations of U.S. interference in Afghanistan was issued on April 2. (Don Oberdorfer, "U.S. Blasts 'Baseless' Soviet Charges," *Washington Post*, April 3, 1979, p. A12). See also Document 44.

40. Intelligence Information Cable Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

[*cable number not declassified*]

Washington, March 27, 1979

COUNTRY

Afghanistan/Saudi Arabia

SUBJECT

Saudi Arabian Aid to the Afghanistan National Liberation Front and Possible Saudi Approach to United States Government With Regard to Aid to the Liberation Front (DOI: March 1979)

SOURCE

[*2 lines not declassified*]

1. Senior members of the Saudi Government are very much impressed with the recent military successes of Afghanistan rebel units. They believe that these units have accomplished major victories in spite of a lack of weapons, money and logistical support. They are also impressed by what they believe to be the firm steps taken by the various rebel organizations to unify their efforts under the Afghanistan National Liberation Front (ANLF).

2. Although the Saudis are in sympathetic contact with various members of the ANLF, they continue to withhold any real financial support to the ANLF. Crown Prince Fahd bin 'Abd al-'Aziz has made it clear to Pakistani President Zia-ul-Huq that Saudi Arabia will provide no significant aid to the ANLF unless Zia agrees to the aid. At the moment, Saudi and Pakistan Governments are in continuous contact on this issue. In mid-March Zia informed Crown Prince Fahd that he believed that any kind of Pakistani aid to the ANLF would cause him problems with the Soviet Union, which, at the moment, he perceives to be almost insurmountable. Because of their promise not to aid the ANLF without Zia's approval, senior members of the Saudi Government are considering making a discreet approach to the United States Government (USG) with regard to providing support to the ANLF.

3. ACQ: [*1 line not declassified*].

4. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Dissem: [*1½ lines not declassified*].

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Office of Support Services, Job 97S00360R: Intelligence Document Collection (1977-1981), Box 56, (3150520079-3150678979). Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*].

41. Article in the President's Daily Brief¹

Washington, March 27, 1979

AFGHANISTAN-USSR-PAKISTAN-IRAN: Situation report

According to intercepted Afghan Army messages, the insurgency in north-western Afghanistan has spread to Badghisat Province, and the provincial governor has fled. The government appears to be sending troops to head off an insurgent attack from Badghisat on Meymaneh, the capital of neighboring Faryab Province.

The Soviets may be airlifting additional military equipment to Afghanistan. According to [2 lines not declassified] in Kabul, two Soviet heavy transport aircraft landed at Bagram Airfield on Saturday carrying an unspecified amount of arms and ammunition as well as some SA-7 missiles. We had a number of reports last week indicating stepped-up Soviet military deliveries.

Relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, meanwhile, are continuing to deteriorate. On Sunday the Pakistani Government released a statement accusing the Afghans of shelling a refugee camp in Pakistan; the statement implied that Pakistan might retaliate if there were any more such incidents. Privately, the Pakistanis have hinted to Kabul that landlocked Afghanistan's ability to import key goods—such as wheat—through the port of Karachi could be cut off.²

Iran's relations with Kabul are also continuing to worsen. An [1 line not declassified] indicates that at least some Iranian gendarmerie units along the border have been placed on alert. Iran closed the border last week.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Daily CIA Brief File, Box 18, 3/26/79–3/31/79. Top Secret; For the President's Eyes Only. Carter initialed the cover page in the upper right corner.

² In the left margin, Mondale wrote: "Zbig—Why aren't we pressing this issue? USSR internal interference & fighting Islam. WM." Sunday was March 25.

42. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Islamabad, March 28, 1979, 1200Z

3713. Subject: Soviet Démarche on Alleged GOP Assistance to Afghan Dissidents: GOP Requests U.S. Clarification of 1959 Bilateral.

1. (S) Entire text. FGI throughout.

2. Summary: On March 28 GOP Advisor on Foreign Affairs Agha Shahi passed to me substance of a strongly worded Soviet démarche which was made by the Soviet Ambassador to President Zia ul-Haq March 26. In the démarche, the Soviets accuse the GOP of “connivance” in the activities of the Afghan dissidents against the Kabul regime, and say that they “cannot remain indifferent” to armed attacks on a country with which they are allied by treaty.

3. Shahi also read me Zia’s reply, in which the President strongly denied the Soviet accusation, and challenged Moscow to make the Kabul government show more restraint so that the refugees—who were fleeing “repression”—would no longer be a problem. Zia also told the Soviet Ambassador that Afghan hostility toward Pakistan would not be tolerated, and that the next DRA plane to violate Pak airspace “would be shot down.”

4. Shahi said that the GOP takes the Soviet démarche “very seriously” and asked that we “clarify fully” the USG position on our 1959 bilateral agreement.² End summary.

5. Agha Shahi called me to the MFA mid-day March 28 to “inform” the USG about a Soviet démarche delivered by Soviet Ambassador Azimov to President Zia on March 26. Shahi read carefully from the démarche, which began by referring to the Soviet role in “trying to promote the normalization of Pak-Afghan relations,” and to President Zia’s recent statements that the GOP wants neighborly relations with all states.

6. The Soviet note then went on to say that “groups hostile to the Democratic Government of Afghanistan (DRA) had settled in Pakistan,” and that “armed gangs of saboteurs and terrorists were penetrating into Afghanistan.” The Soviet note described these groups as “counter-revolutionaries,” who “freely roamed up and down the Pak-Afghan border,” and were on the attack because of their opposition to “the reforms” now being carried out in Afghanistan by the DRA. The note

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 1/77-3/79. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.

² See footnote 6, Document 21.

accuses the GOP of “connivance” in this anti-DRA activity, and says such action could lead to “severe aggravation in Pak-Afghan relations.”

7. The note goes on to say that the “Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent to such developments,” especially when “aimed at a country with which the Soviet Union has a treaty of friendship which it values.” Moscow “will not allow” Afghanistan to “become the object of attack no matter what the source.”

8. The Soviet note concludes by saying that the USSR is delivering this message “in a frank and friendly manner,” and that Moscow would “not like to believe that the use of Pakistani territory” for dissident activity “goes on with your knowledge.” The note says that the GOP should consider the *démarche* with “all seriousness which this question deserves.”

9. Shahi then read from what I presume is a written summary of President Zia’s reply to Ambassador Azimov. According to Shahi, Zia told the Soviet Ambassador that:

—he “strongly rejected” the Soviet accusation about the GOP’s alleged connivance with anti-DRA dissidents; and that,

—the GOP has “scrupulously remained tied” to its policy of “non-intervention,” and has “done everything possible to keep the refugees from engaging in anti-DRA activities.”

10. Zia told Azimov that to try to keep the Afghan refugees under control, the GOP has established two refugee camps—one at Warsak and the other at Tarbela—and that Azimov could visit either of them at any time to satisfy himself that no guerrilla training or other military activity is taking place. Zia said that there are now 35,000 Afghan refugees in Pakistan and that they are arriving at the rate of 5,000 per month. The GOP, according to Zia, has been doing the best it can to keep the groups under control, and has warned Pakistani politicians not to make statements that will incite refugee activity, or be construed as anti-Afghan. Zia said that the GOP has ordered the refugee groups to cease holding press conferences, and that the GOP has provided “no arms, no training, and no financial support, other than humanitarian aid” to the refugees.

11. The President told the Soviet Ambassador that the real root of the refugee problem is in the “repression carried out against the Afghan population by the DRA”. Zia told Azimov that Moscow should “impress upon Kabul” the need to avoid creating “the conditions that cause the exodus.” According to Zia, Islamabad would be willing to cooperate with Kabul in preventing the entry of refugees. (When I queried Shahi about this later, he said that Zia meant that, if the Afghans close their border, the Paks would cooperate. Shahi did not think this a “very realistic proposition” because the border is so porous.)

12. On a government-to-government level, Zia said, he would continue to take "all the steps within his power" to see that "no hostile acts against the DRA originated in Pakistan." He said, however, that the Taraki government in Kabul is becoming increasingly aggressive, and cited as examples the recent shelling of two villages in Pakistan, and the "three dozen" violations of Pakistani airspace by DRA planes. One violation occurred less than six weeks ago, when a DRA plane penetrated "thirty miles" into Pakistan. Zia said that he had "so far" ordered his forces not to shoot, and that he has contented himself with protests to Kabul, but he said that the next DRA aircraft to violate Pak airspace "would be shot down."

13. Zia concluded by noting that he was affronted to be accused of complicity in the "half-hearted attempts by the Afghan dissidents" to overthrow the Kabul regime, and that, if the "GOP was really hostile to the DRA" it could make "life difficult" for the Taraki government. Zia decried the "substantial campaign of false allegations against the GOP" carried on by the Soviet media. The Soviet *démarche*, Zia said, "is stronger and more explicit" than anything the GOP has heard from the DRA, and that Moscow's invocation of the USSR-DRA treaty will "only encourage Afghanistan to persist in its hostile attitude" toward Pakistan.

14. Shahi said that the GOP believes this *démarche* came from the "highest levels in Moscow" and that it "perhaps" reflects Soviet Premier Kosygin's personal views. Shahi said that the GOP sees Kosygin's hand behind the recent *Pravda* and *Izvestia* articles, and that the GOP has a report that Kosygin told Indian FonMin Vajpayee in Delhi that "Pakistan is behind all of the dissident activity in Afghanistan."

15. Shahi told me that the GOP is taking the Soviet *démarche* "very seriously" and is not treating it as an "empty threat or bluff." Shahi reasons that Moscow is "nursing its anger" over the GOP's decision to ban Soviet overflights to Vietnam, and Pakistan's subsequent refusal to succumb to Soviet pressure at the risk of harming its relations with China. Shahi noted that Moscow has suffered a "setback" in the Sino-Vietnam conflict and "could be expected" to seek an opportunity to "reestablish its credibility as a superpower."

16. The Advisor said that the GOP labors with a set of contradictions in the matter. The "brutal oppression" of Afghans has caused "real unhappiness" in Pakistan and elsewhere. In fact, Shahi said, when he was in Tehran the Ayatollah Khomeini "asked me to convey a message to the DRA" about its repression of "religious people." Shahi said that he told Khomeini that such a message might "drive the DRA to even more repression," but the GOP delivered Khomeini's message to the Afghan Ambassador in Islamabad anyway. Shahi said he also made a direct appeal to Afghan FonMin Amin to stop oppressing Muslims.

Shahi said that, as expected, the appeals have “incensed the Afghans,” who are having a hard time maintaining control over the country, and now—with both Iran and Pakistan having risked Soviet wrath—Moscow has stepped into the breach.

17. Shahi said that it is in this context that the GOP “seeks a clarification” of USG policy in relation to the 1959 bilateral. Shahi said that both DepSec Christopher and Assistant Secretary Saunders have told the Paks that the bilateral remains in force, although Shahi said that the DepSec had said that the treaty is “twenty years old and needs a new scope of definition.”³ I told Shahi that the bilateral indeed remains in force, and that any “new definitions” mentioned by the DepSec were in the nature of expanding economic assistance to Pakistan (not covered in the bilateral), as a reflection of our desire to be more help to the GOP. I also reminded Shahi of my call on FonSec Shahnawaz, in which I presented the Department Spokesman’s comments that we would regard external involvement in Afghanistan’s internal problems as a serious matter with the potential of heightening tensions and destabilizing the situation in the entire region.

18. Shahi said that a clarification was very important to the GOP at this time because “if we have to deal with this threat alone we will take one policy,” but “if we feel the U.S. is behind us we can be courteous but firm” in a response to pressure from Moscow and the DRA. Shahi said the military situation is “not academic” because Saudi Arabia has asked Pakistan for military manpower, and, while the GOP can provide training and maintenance personnel now, “if they want more” to counter Soviet moves in the Yemen”, then the GOP will have to gauge carefully its own military situation.

19. When I asked Shahi what concrete Soviet action the GOP fears, he said that there is a real concern that “KGB agents” will begin to work in Baluchistan, and this, combined with the “incitement of ethnics” already happening in Iran under Soviet tutelage, could make Pakistan a “target of opportunity for the Soviets.” Baluchistan is an even more likely target, Shahi maintained, because Baluch leaders—“such as Bizenjo”—are already “pro-Soviet.”

20. Shahi agreed that one reason for the Soviet *démarche* may be that things are getting out of hand in Afghanistan, and he suggested that Moscow may be preparing Communist and other international opinion for an intervention along the lines of “Hungary or Czechoslovakia.”

³ Christopher met with Zia on March 1 in Islamabad. The Embassy reported on the meeting in telegram 2569 from Islamabad, March 2. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790095–0655)

21. I told Shahi that I understood the GOP's concerns and appreciated the seriousness of their request for clarification. I said that I would report our conversation fully to Washington.

22. The Advisor said that he would see the Chinese Ambassador evening of March 28 to deliver the same message and that Pak Ambassadors in Beijing, Washington, and Moscow have already cabled full reports. Amb. Yaqub has been instructed to reiterate Zia's response to Kosygin, whom Yaqub had already asked to see.

23. I am sending recommendations on an appropriate response to GOP by septel.⁴

24. Recommend Dept repeat this message to Amb Embassies Beijing, Jidda, Kabul, London, Moscow, New Delhi and Tehran.

Constable

⁴ Telegram 3714 from Islamabad, March 28, outlined Constable's recommendations. He counseled that the United States should "avoid an initial linkage between the 1959 bilateral and the nuclear issue. To tie them together would confirm Pakistan's worst fears about American policy in this area, i.e., that U.S. is prepared to see Pakistan go the way of Afghanistan." Instead, Constable recommended, the United States should inform Pakistan that "we see the 1959 bilateral as precisely intended to provide for Pakistan's security against aggression by a Communist or Communist-dominated power—a definition which includes both the Soviet Union and Afghanistan." The "nuclear issue" referred to U.S. efforts to persuade Pakistan to suspend its nuclear enrichment program. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850040-2669)

43. **Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance¹**

Washington, March 30, 1979

SUBJECT

Soviet Allegations Concerning U.S. Role in Afghanistan (C)

The President has noted the Soviet allegations printed in *Pravda* and carried by TASS on March 29 (attached).² He directed that CIA, ICA and State respond forcefully. He particularly wants emphasized the atheistic nature of the Soviet and Afghan governments.³ (S)

I have sent memoranda today to ICA and CIA reflecting the President's desires.⁴ You will also want to follow up with your resources. Tom Thornton has already been in touch with your NEA bureau on a possible approach to Desai.⁵ (S)

We have also prepared material at the President's direction for the use of Congressional leaders. This material has been sent to Senator Byrd by the Vice President, who worked on it himself, and I am attaching a copy for your information.⁶ (S)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

¹ Source: Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Intelligence Liaison Files, TIN 980643000019, Box 3, Afghanistan, Non-Vector 1980–1985. Secret. A handwritten note at the bottom of the page indicates that the memorandum was received in S/S-I on April 2 at 9:50 a.m.

² Attached but not printed. The article alleged that the United States, Pakistan, China, and Iran were involved in a conspiracy to overthrow the government in Afghanistan. It went on to accuse the CIA of aiding Afghan rebel groups.

³ An unknown hand underlined the second half of this sentence.

⁴ Regarding these memoranda, see Document 44.

⁵ Not further identified and not found.

⁶ Not attached and not found.

44. Editorial Note

On March 30, 1979, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, Zbigniew Brzezinski, informed Secretary of State Cyrus Vance that he had sent memoranda to the International Communication Agency (ICA) and the CIA relaying how President Jimmy Carter wanted to respond to Soviet allegations that the United States was meddling in Afghan affairs. (See Document 43.) Brzezinski's memorandum to Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner, March 30, transmitted Carter's request to strongly rebuke the Soviet allegation of U.S. involvement in overthrowing the Afghan Government. Brzezinski went on: "All information available to us in recent days has tended to indicate quite the contrary: that the Soviet Union is preparing to intervene in Afghanistan to prop up an unpopular leftist regime and is, in fact, already doing most of the things it is accusing the United States and other countries of doing or preparing to do." Brzezinski requested a status report by April 6 in response to Carter's directive. (Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 82T00466R, Box 2, Folder 2)

Turner's response to Brzezinski, April 9, outlined the steps taken by the CIA to counter Soviet allegations: on March 31, the CIA tasked all field stations "to make specific effort to expose the nature and extent of the Soviet role in Afghanistan, and to characterize this interference as a growing threat to regional stability." Turner noted: "this tasking expanded on an earlier requirement sent to the field on 17 February to 'intensify covert action efforts directed at exposing Soviet machinations in Iran and Afghanistan.'" As of April 6, Turner reported, the CIA's messaging had been delivered to 46 governments, and articles "have been placed in the media of 17 countries" with more media placement forthcoming. Finally, Turner noted that the CIA was preparing "a series of black propaganda operations designed to support the tribal revolt in Afghanistan, to encourage uncommitted Afghans to back the dissidents, and to stimulate foreign support for the dissidents," in coordination with the Department of State. (National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I-047, Afghanistan: 8 May 1978-7 Dec 1978)

Brzezinski sent a nearly identical memorandum, March 30, to the ICA. (National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I-047, Afghanistan: 15 Feb 1979-22 Aug 1979) In a log book of policy decisions by country, the National Security Council noted: "ICA reports that it is continuing to provide extensive coverage of Soviet activities in and accusations about Afghanistan especially with the Voice of America and the wireless file." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Unfiled Files, Box 146, Policies . . . Relating to the National Security, vol. III: [Countries: Afghanistan—France]: 1979)

In a memorandum to Carter, April 11, Brzezinski informed him of the CIA and ICA responses and also noted that the Department of State “has taken steps to notify the Iranians, Indians, Saudis, and Pakistanis through diplomatic channels of Soviet plans to support and possibly participate in a major effort against the Afghan tribal and religious rebels and will continue bilateral dialogues on the Afghan problem.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 2, Central Intelligence Agency: 4/78–4/79)

45. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, undated

AFGHANISTAN

INTRODUCTION

On 5 March 1979 we forwarded for SCC consideration a paper on covert action options for Afghanistan.² This paper outlines specific proposals for support of Afghan dissidents and insurgents.

BACKGROUND

In recent weeks Afghan dissidents have stepped up their insurgency against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) and have achieved surprising successes, despite having few weapons and almost no outside support. The rebellion which heretofore has been centered mainly in Afghanistan’s eastern provinces, broke out in Herat, a major city near the western border. Although our information is incomplete, it appears there were large scale defections from Army units in Herat.

¹ Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I-047, Afghanistan: 15 Feb 1979–22 Aug 1979. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. In the top right corner, an unknown hand wrote: “orig to ZB w/Eve Rept. Mini-SCC 3–30–79. SumCon not prepared.” No other record of the mini-SCC meeting was found. A memorandum from Thornton and Henze to Brzezinski, March 22, called for a mini-SCC meeting, tentatively scheduled for March 31. Thornton advocated the necessity of convening such a meeting because the intelligence situation in Afghanistan remained unclear; “the ambassadorial issue is still open” due to Dubs’s murder; the Americans in Afghanistan were at risk; and there was a need for interagency policy coordination with regard to Afghanistan. (National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I-047, Afghanistan: 8 May 1978–7 Dec 1978) Thornton was responding to a March 20 memorandum from Brzezinski that relayed Mondale’s inquiry regarding what the United States could do about the growing rebellion in Afghanistan. (*Ibid.*)

² See Document 38.

The Soviets clearly are concerned about setbacks to the Afghan communist regime, and have airlifted military equipment to help shore it up. Soviet media also has accused Pakistan, Egypt and the U.S. of supporting the insurgency.

The attitude of the Government of Pakistan (GOP) is crucial in considering most CA options. Recently, the GOP has signaled to us that it may be much more forthcoming than we previously believed. President Zia, in an 11 March interview in the Saudi magazine *Ukaz*, implied that Islamabad would like to support the anti-communist, pro-Islamic dissidents, but has not because of Soviet support for Kabul, which might "burn Islamabad's fingers," and doubts as to the real strength of the Afghan dissidents. Zia also said Pakistan cannot act in isolation; it must be backed by other countries in any such move. The Director of the Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID) requested a meeting on 28 March 1979 with the Chief of Station, Islamabad to discuss possible assistance to the Afghan insurgents. He said that the Afghans badly need small arms and ammunition and that the U.S. "surely could find a way to provide some assistance." He added that he would guarantee that anything provided the Peshawar-based rebels would be put to good use. He said it is current GOP policy not to support the rebels "without a firm commitment from the U.S., Pakistan could not risk Soviet wrath."

In a separate development, the head of the Saudi Arabian Intelligence Service raised the Afghan question [*less than 1 line not declassified*] and noted that there was a real possibility that the Soviets would suffer a setback in Afghanistan. He said the Saudi Government was considering officially proposing that the U.S. aid the rebels. This approach indicates the possibility of trilateral U.S.-Pakistan-Saudi cooperation in this area. At a minimum, the Saudis could be expected to provide funds and also use their influence with the GOP to encourage Pakistan assistance to the dissidents. Other countries, probably including China, could be expected to provide at least tacit support for our programs.

Soviet response to various options should be carefully gauged. We already have been falsely accused of aiding the rebels in Soviet media, and such accusations could be expected to intensify as we move forward with various programs. The Soviets easily can resupply the Afghan armed forces and they undoubtedly will step up their military aid to counter guerrilla successes. While the Soviets could provide additional "advisors," pilots, etc., we believe they are unlikely to introduce regular troops. Should they elect to occupy the country militarily, there would be no practical way to stop them. Such a move, however, would cause serious damage to the Soviet image in the region and should serve to undermine Soviet influence and prestige throughout much of the world.

Consideration must also be given to South Asian regional relationships before deciding how closely we wish to involve ourselves with the GOP. Although the question of supporting the Afghan insurgents was originally raised by the Pakistan side, the GOP might later demand a high price in return for its cooperation in terms of security guarantees and economic assistance. Increased cooperation with the GOP must also be considered in light of our relations with India, although there is intelligence which indicates India shares our and Pakistan's concern over developments in Afghanistan.

COVERT ACTION OPTIONS

CIA representatives have been instructed not to delve too deeply with Afghan sources into the theoretical possibility of clandestine support for the rebels, for fear of giving them false signals regarding U.S. intentions. Much specific information is therefore not now available. Listed below are a number of options, rough cost estimates and a summary of pros and cons for each.

1. Radio Broadcasts from Pakistan

Radio Pakistan has several stations which broadcast regularly into Afghanistan. Assuming GOP cooperation, these stations could be used for propaganda purposes, with CIA assisting in the programming.

Costs: [1 line not declassified]

Pros: Communications are very poorly developed in Afghanistan, and radio is the best means quickly to reach a large Afghan audience. Costs would be moderate as we would be using existing broadcasting facilities and existing staff including linguists. The U.S. hand would be hidden.

Cons: GOP cooperation would be required. Pakistan would be openly identified as opposing the Afghan regime; this would provoke Soviet/Afghan wrath and possible retaliation. In extremis, the Afghans might even attempt to bomb or sabotage the radio stations. More subtly, the Afghans could stir up trouble for Pakistan in Baluchistan and Northwest Frontier Provinces.

2. Insurgency Support—Direct Financial Aid

CIA is in contact with a number of Afghan emigres who could serve as conduits for funds to the insurgents. These funds could be used to buy arms, supplies, etc., as the dissidents saw fit. Because a unified military command has not yet emerged, at least initially we would consider providing several groups with relatively small amounts and then evaluate which uses the funds most effectively.

Costs: [1 line not declassified]

Pros: This would be the easiest way to supply badly needed encouragement and support for the anti-communist rebels. Direct funding

could be handled unilaterally. Explicit GOP cooperation would not be required, although tacit approval for the movement of arms and material through Pakistan and the continued use of Pakistan territory for training, etc., would be needed. Nevertheless deniability could be maintained by both the U.S. and Pakistan. Although we would attempt to maintain secrecy, word of our assistance would leak (or we could deliberately leak it). This would demonstrate to informed Pakistanis, Saudis and others that we are willing to underwrite the Afghan fight against communism and stand up to the Soviets. Through our funds, we should be able to exercise some influence over the insurgents, encourage them to put aside their parochial differences and improve their efficiency. Assuming they are ultimately successful in overthrowing the DRA, our contribution to this process should give us some influence on the Afghan Government that subsequently emerges.

Cons: Control on how our funds are used would be difficult. Money could be wasted, stolen or used to support intramural battles among the emigres.

3. *Insurgency Support—Indirect Financial Aid*

Financial aid would be provided as in Option 2, except we would use a third party such as the Saudis or Pakistanis as an intermediary.

Costs: [1 line not declassified]

Pros: This approach should encourage a team effort. For example, if we used the Saudis, they should be encouraged to add their contributions to ours. With this option, the U.S. hand would be better hidden than in the case of direct financial aid.

Cons: We would lose much control over how the funds would be spent, and also much of the influence which would accrue through dealing directly with the Afghan dissidents.

4. *Insurgency Support—Non-Lethal Material*

CIA could provide a variety of non-lethal material support to the dissidents in Pakistan. Full GOP cooperation would be required, however. Under this option we would propose to equip a 2,000-man force for one year.

<i>Costs:</i> [amount not declassified]	—Communications Equipment
[amount not declassified]	—Medical Supplies
[amount not declassified]	—Ancillary Equipment (Pack, web gear, compass, poncho, clothing, entrenching tool and some rations)
[amount not declassified]	(FY 1979–80)

Pros: Same as financial assistance proposals, although by supplying direct aid of this nature we should become more deeply involved with the Afghans and thus better able to influence events. The medical supplies and some of the other equipment could be handled under the rubric of “humanitarian assistance.” Once a supply channel to the rebels is established, it later could be used, if desired, to provide them with other types of material including lethal equipment.

Cons: Full GOP cooperation would be required. Security would be difficult to maintain.

5. *Unconventional Warfare Support—On-Site Survey*

As a prerequisite for direct U.S. unconventional warfare assistance to the Afghans, an on-site survey in Pakistan would be required to develop a detailed operational plan. The team would hold discussions with GOP officials and dissident leaders, survey potential training and support facilities in Pakistan, determine support requirements and control procedures, and finally draft a plan of action. The survey team would consist of approximately five specialists and the survey would take three-four weeks.

Costs: [1 line not declassified]

Pros: Survey results should greatly improve our knowledge of Afghan rebel capabilities and provide essential information needed to make informed decisions on whether, and how, to aid them. Security, or at least plausible denial, could be maintained. However, our commitment to the Afghans would deepen as a result of the survey, but not to the extent that we could not pull back before making a final decision to participate directly in supporting Afghan unconventional war resistance from Pakistan.

Cons: Full GOP cooperation would be required. Although the survey team’s visibility would not be high, absolute security could not be guaranteed, and U.S. involvement would become less easily deniable.

6. *Unconventional Warfare Support—Phase I*

Provide resistance organizational training in Pakistan to 40 Afghan tribesmen from five separate areas. Develop a resistance strategy with clear cut lines of command. Assign autonomous areas. Equip with communications and medical kits. Locate resistance areas and specify potential base and safe areas. Training would include: fundamentals of resistance, mobile guerrilla warfare, psychological ops and propaganda, air reception, intelligence. The training is estimated to take eight-ten weeks [1½ lines not declassified].

Costs: [1 line not declassified]

Pros: Further improve the rebels’ unconventional warfare capabilities, and enhance the possibility of achieving a successful outcome to the conflict.

Cons: Deepens U.S. involvement in the conflict. Possibilities of plausible denial are decreased. May provoke vigorous Soviet countermeasures.

7. *Unconventional Warfare Support—Phase II*

Train 65 Afghan resistance cadre as guerrilla warfare instructors. Skills taught will include: small arms, mortar and recoilless rifles, demolitions, ambushes, raids, small unit tactics, night operations, land navigation, caching, air reception, psychological operations, mobile warfare, night movement, tactical communications, and intelligence collection. Selected members of the groups will be trained in CW communications and others will be trained in anti-air and anti-armor weapons. The training would take 10–12 weeks [*1 line not declassified*].

Costs: [*amount not declassified*] (FY 1979–80)

Pros: Same as Option 6

Cons: Same as Option 6

8. *Unconventional Warfare Support—Phase III*

Provide resistance groups with supplies of arms and demolitions.³ Build up arms stocks in Afghan resistance base and safe areas. Continue Phase II training, employing 15 Afghan instructors selected from the Phase II training course. Develop underground resistance support within the Afghanistan population through the cadres trained in Phases I and II. Arrange air support for delivery of arms and other supplies. Five thousand men would be supported in this Phase over a 4–6 month period, [*1 line not declassified*].

Costs: [*amount not declassified*] —Ordnance, [*1½ lines not declassified*]

[*amount not declassified*] —5 STOL aircraft [*1½ lines not declassified*]

[*amount not declassified*] —Personnel

[*amount not declassified*] —(FY 1980–81)

Pros: Same as Option 6

Cons: Same as Option 6

9. *Unconventional Warfare Support—Phase IV*

Commence coordinated resistance operations in Afghanistan. Expand areas of population and resistance control. Continue training

³ According to an NSA intercept, the first report found to reach U.S. officials on Afghan insurgents' success in obtaining foreign arms came on November 13, 1978 [*text and less than 1 line not declassified*]. The intercept relayed that "rebels in Eastern Afghanistan have succeeded in obtaining Chinese weapons, either from Pakistan or the PRC, and communications between the area and Kabul are cut off." (Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 7, USSR in Afghanistan (1978))

and logistic support. Provide target data intelligence and photo interpreter support. Strike confidence-building soft targets and coordinate the gradual escalation of Afghan resistance activity. Wage aggressive psychological warfare operations in concert with increased resistance activity. This Phase would last 1–2 years [1 line not declassified].

<i>Costs:</i> [amount not declassified]	—Air Support Activities
[amount not declassified]	—Logistic support (5,000 man resupply)
[amount not declassified] ⁴	—Personnel
[amount not declassified]	—(FY 1981–82)

Pros: Same as Option 6

Cons: Same as Option 6

All portions of this document are SECRET.

⁴ Cost in 5,000 men increments. [Footnote is in the original.]

46. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, April 5, 1979, 1547Z

8384. Subject: (LOU) Soviet-Afghan Relations and the Insurgency in Afghanistan. Ref: State 73004 (Notal).²

1. (S—Entire text)

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790156–0069, P850147–1923. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Sent for information to Ankara, Baghdad, Beijing, Bonn, Colombo, Dacca, Damascus, CINCPAC for POLAD, Islamabad, Jidda, Kabul, Kathmandu, Leningrad, London, New Delhi, Paris, Rome, Tehran, Tokyo, Berlin, USNATO, and USUN.

² In telegram 73004 to Islamabad, March 23, the Department assessed the matrix of issues facing Zia with regard to the situation in Afghanistan: "We wonder if the Paks are more and more trying to have it both ways—maintaining a public stance of correct relations with the DRA while permitting increasing insurgent activity from bases in Pakistan. If situation in Afghanistan deteriorates further, Pakistan may be forced to make some hard choices and may no longer be able to have it both ways." To that end, the Department asked a number of questions regarding future Pakistani policy toward Afghanistan, and repeated the telegram to the Embassies in New Delhi, Kabul, Moscow, Jidda, and Beijing. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790135–0773)

2. Summary: Availing ourselves of Department's invitation (reftel) to comment on possible Soviet conduct in the evolving Afghanistan situation, we would note at the outset the obvious fact that the Soviets have a major investment in the Kabul regime which they will go to some lengths to protect. We doubt, however, that the Soviet leadership would seriously consider the large-scale dispatch of Soviet combat troops to Afghanistan under foreseeable circumstances.³ Moscow is more likely to increase its military advice and aid to Kabul while intensifying Soviet propaganda and diplomatic support for the DRA.⁴ Some forms of more direct Soviet military involvement are possible in situations where Soviet personnel or equipment were endangered, if foreign forces were seen as assisting the anti-DRA regime inside Afghanistan, or if fighting approached Soviet borders. We believe that Moscow is not irrevocably wedded to Taraki. In the coming weeks and months, it will be prepared to stick with him or to adopt other options, with the choice depending in large measure on developments within Afghanistan itself. End summary.

3. We continue to see Moscow's policy toward Afghanistan as twofold: (A) to assist the Khalqi regime to consolidate power and eliminate its "counter-revolutionary" opponents, and (B) to draw Afghanistan into closer dependence on the Soviet Union in economic, military, administrative and other areas, while maneuvering to reduce Western and Chinese presence and influence in Afghanistan. The December 5, 1978, Soviet-Afghan treaty served to institutionalize close Soviet-Afghan relations and has been followed by further efforts by both governments to deepen their relationship.⁵

4. The Soviets have made a considerable investment in Afghanistan which they will go to some lengths to protect through additional steps to shore up the Taraki regime. Afghanistan's proximity to the Soviet Union and recent setbacks to Soviet foreign policy interests and perhaps

³ In telegram 2778 from Kabul, April 10, the Embassy reported that the DRA believed that the Soviet Union would, in fact, offer direct military assistance to the Afghan Government, a request for which would not be made "unless the leadership were genuinely desperate in the face of a hopelessly deteriorating domestic security situation—fully beyond the control of Khalqi military and police forces." (Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 7, USSR in Afghanistan (Jan 79–Apr 79)) In telegram 3626, May 9, the Embassy maintained that Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan remained possible but unlikely. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790170–0074 and P850147–1917) The Embassy in Moscow concurred in telegram 13083, May 24. (Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 5, Soviets in Afghanistan—General Part #2)

⁴ In telegram 2710 from Kabul, April 8, the Embassy estimated that the Soviet Union had approximately 800–1,000 military advisers stationed in Afghanistan. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790160–0975)

⁵ See footnote 2, Document 33.

prestige in the Middle East and Asia will reinforce this commitment. So will any Soviet-perceived efforts by other outside powers—particularly China—to support the anti-DRA insurgency.

5. Under foreseeable circumstances, we do not anticipate the large-scale dispatch of combat troops to Afghanistan as an option that would be seriously considered by the Soviet leadership for the following reasons:

—such a move might worsen Soviet-U.S. relations during a delicate period when SALT and a summit are high on our respective agendas;

—the popular opposition to Taraki might only be exacerbated by direct Soviet actions, and would leave open the possibility that Taraki's survivability would require the continuing presence and possible ongoing engagement of Soviet combat troops;

—the spectre of Soviet troops battling Islamic elements would rebound to Moscow's disadvantage throughout the Moslem world, especially in Islamic states which Moscow is currently courting, such as Iran and Saudi Arabia;

—Moscow's chief interest in the region is its ties with India. New Delhi would presumably strongly oppose direct Soviet intervention, which would make clear Moscow's intention to consider Afghanistan—like Czechoslovakia—part of the USSR's "imperium".

6. The provision of various forms of direct Soviet military assistance to DRA forces short of the dispatch of regular Soviet combat units is, however, more of a possibility. Such direct assistance could come as a result of Soviet attempts to protect or defend Soviet personnel or equipment already in Afghanistan, as may have already occurred at Herat. Or, depending on circumstances in combat areas inside Afghanistan, for example, in Badakhshan adjoining Soviet Tadzhikistan where the Soviet press has already reported some fighting has broken out, the Soviets could decide to provide support through the dispatch of Soviet aircraft, helicopter gunships, or increased advisory personnel on the ground to assist the DRA anti-insurgent efforts. The temptation to provide this type of direct if limited military assistance would be heightened if the Soviets believed that foreign forces from Pakistan or Iran had actually joined the resistance inside Afghanistan, or if the fighting approached Soviet borders. Even in these situations, however, we believe that Moscow, for the reasons cited above, would attempt to minimize the scope and visibility of direct Soviet military participation in the fighting.

7. To check what they may see as passive or active Pak support to anti-DRA insurgents, the Soviets, in coordination with the Afghans, may become more direct in warning the Paks about possible retaliation "in kind" through Soviet-Afghan support to Baluchi and Pushtu dissi-

dent elements inside Pakistan. Should the Soviets view the Paks as working with others, particularly the Chinese, in supporting a widening insurgency inside Afghanistan, these warnings could conceivably be translated into actions, despite the drawbacks mentioned in Islamabad 3775.⁶

8. The Soviets will be weighing the relative positions of strength of Taraki and his domestic opponents in making their decisions on providing assistance to the Kabul regime. If a growing domestic challenge to the regime should progressively spread and reach a point where it is poised to overthrow Taraki, or if Taraki is unable to maintain the military's loyalty, we believe the Soviets will be prepared to consider other alternatives to Taraki. Soviet decision-making in such a situation would be guided by a combination of cold pragmatism and opportunism and would be directed at the longer-range goal of establishing a rapport with—or influencing the selection of—the individual, group or coalition most likely to emerge at the top.

9. In this connection we have picked up a number of indications that, behind the froth of public Soviet comments about Taraki, Moscow may not see him as the Afghan wave of the future. Our Soviet contacts occasionally express irritation at his indecisive pace in implementing socio-economic programs and his purge of what are seen here as "progressive" elements, such as the Parchamists. One leading specialist on "Middle Asia" who knows the Khalqi leaders personally once blurted out to an EmbOff that he "felt hatred" for Afghan First Minister H. Amin. In a recent conversation with two EmbOffs, the Deputy Director of Dushanbe's Oriental Institute twice stated that "only time will tell" if the Taraki regime will be able to survive.

10. In sum, we see a range of considerations relating to domestic Afghan as well as regional and international factors—including, of course, the U.S. attitude—as likely to influence Soviet decisions on assisting what may be an increasingly beleaguered Taraki regime. Mos-

⁶ In telegram 3775 from Islamabad, March 30, the Embassy responded to telegram 73004 (see footnote 2, above). Regarding the fear of Soviet aggression, the Embassy laid out three assumptions about Pakistan's policy: "(A) A crisis in Pak-Afghan relations may be unavoidable, in time, if the Afghans continue their present policies; (B) Pakistan would prefer that such a crisis come later rather than sooner; and (C) time may be on Pakistan's side as dissidence inside Afghanistan mounts possibly to levels sufficient to threaten the regime itself or at least to temper the activist naiveté of the DRA leadership." Regarding a question posed in telegram 73004, the Embassy answered that there were "undoubtedly elements within Pakistan's political life which would support a more activist/interventionist policy in Afghanistan," which included the various conservative religious, nationalistic, and tribal factions in the country. But the Embassy noted that such support had its limits: any interventionist policy in Afghanistan would have to be effective to remain popular, and not so confrontational as to provoke a hostile, Soviet-backed response by the DRA. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790146-0118)

cow will very likely be keeping its options under continuing review as events in Afghanistan unfold in the coming months.

Toon

47. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, undated

Possible Soviet Reactions to Specific Covert Action Initiatives

I. *Afghanistan*

General Comments

Consideration of possible Soviet responses to proposed US covert action options is dominated by one large and irreducible uncertainty: How far are the Soviet leaders prepared to go in support of the Teraki regime in the absence of significant and visible external assistance to insurgents?

If successful, US covert action assistance to insurgents would increase Afghanistan's need for Soviet support and, if the Soviets are willing to provide it, would raise the military and political costs of larger and more visible increments of Soviet assistance. If the Soviets are determined to keep the Teraki regime in power, including, if necessary, by committing Soviet combat forces on a substantial scale, even the most extensive covert action programs cannot prevent them from doing so. It is true that external assistance to insurgents, particularly

¹ Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I-047, Afghanistan: 8 May 1978–7 Dec 1978. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. The memorandum was one of several papers prepared for the April 6 SCC meeting. See Document 48. In a memorandum to Brzezinski, April 4, Henze characterized this memorandum and the paper, Document 45, as "serious intelligence papers that provide a basis for realistic discussion." Still, Henze noted, the Department of State was not enthusiastic about implementing the proposals, while CIA personnel were divided as well: "Turner wants to please everybody and avoid controversy; Carlucci is in a Hamlet-like pose; McMahan wants to straddle everybody's position. All this is clearly sensed by the sharp minds that still exist in the DDO. Many DDO officers oppose all these actions because they do not believe the Agency has the capability to carry them out effectively in the field. Others are primarily concerned about what they consider to be inevitable leaks which will cause the Administration to back down, even if it does launch some of this activity, and leave CIA again exposed as well as embarrassed abroad." Henze's memorandum is attached to Document 48, but not printed.

if and when it became more visible, would be exploited by the Soviets to justify their own deepening involvement. But this line will be taken by the Soviets in any case to justify their own increased support for the Teraki regime, whether or not insurgency is substantially aided by covert action. The Soviets are already making such charges.² Successful covert action would however raise the costs to the Soviets of larger and more visible increments in their role. It would inflame Moslem opinion in many countries against the USSR, which would be seen as suppressing a religious-motivated insurgency.

On the other hand, if the Soviet leaders are uncertain how far they are prepared to go to rescue the Teraki regime, and are waiting to see if smaller increments of help will suffice, then a substantial covert action program, particularly if highly visible, could raise their stake in the issue. It is conceivable that some Soviets could view such a heightened US role as enhancing the dangers and uncertainties of more direct Soviet combat involvement, and therefore as additional cause for caution. But it is more likely that a large US-backed covert action operation would be seen as a challenge on their periphery, and would induce them to intervene more directly and vigorously than otherwise intended. While we believe the Soviets are strongly predisposed to aid this Afghan regime—which is ideologically sympathetic, closely tied to them, and most important, geographically contiguous—we have as yet insufficient basis for judging in which direction they are so far leaning on the subject of eventual combat intervention.

Alternative Options

1. *Radio Broadcasts from Pakistan:* The Soviets are already heavily denouncing Pakistan and the US in their own propaganda as responsible for the Afghan insurgency, and they will probably continue to do so, no matter what the US and Pakistan do, so long as a serious security problem remains in Afghanistan. In the event of the Pakistan propaganda counteroffensive with covert US support postulated, the Soviets would probably escalate their rhetoric somewhat more, and would be likely to make additional diplomatic demarches in Islamabad in protest, citing broadcast evidence of Pakistani support for the insurgents.

Beyond this, the main potential Soviet lever in dealings with Pakistan is the possibility that the USSR might retaliate by inciting unrest among Pakistan's Baluchi tribes. So long as a major Afghan insurgency continued, the Afghan regime might hesitate to attempt this itself because of fear that Baluchi separatism in Pakistan might spread to Afghanistan and compound the security problem. The Soviets, how-

² See Documents 43 and 44.

ever, probably have some independent capability to bring pressure upon Pakistan in more measured and insulated fashion by inciting activity by Marxist groups among Pakistan's Baluchis. It is conceivable that the USSR might begin to do this in response to a sustained Pakistani radio propaganda aimed at Afghanistan. The degree of provocation the Soviets would perceive, however, would be considerably less than would be the case in the combat support options below. The US hand would not be very visible, the Pakistanis could claim that their propaganda was a response to that of the USSR, and the Soviets might be reluctant to burn their bridges to Islamabad too quickly. As time went on, however, if Pakistani broadcasts were perceived by the Soviets as having a significant inflammatory effect upon the Afghan population and as worsening the security situation, the Soviets would be progressively more likely to play the Baluchi card.

2. *Insurgency Support—Direct Financial Aid.* Soviets would of course exploit the expected leakage of the fact of such aid in their own already ongoing propaganda campaign, and use this as evidence that the revolt from the start had been US-instigated. The Soviets would use this in the West and in the US in an effort to paint US policy as provocative and reactionary, and thus to generate internal counterpressures on US policy machinery. Likelihood of Soviet attempts to injure Pakistan, however, would not be significantly greater than it is already in absence of such funding, since the Pakistan government position would remain essentially what it is now—one of tacit connivance rather than active encouragement and direction of insurgent use of Pakistan territory.

3. *Insurgency Support—Indirect Financial Aid.* In this case, with the US somewhat less visible and vulnerable and the Saudis and Paks proportionately more so, Soviet incentives to exert pressure on the latter two would be increased. The Saudis already fund a wide variety of anti-Soviet projects in various areas (from the Middle East to Angola), and the additional Soviet incentive for wanting to be able to change these Saudi policies and Saudi regime would be superfluous. There is little that the Soviets themselves can do, in practice, to retaliate against the Saudis; it is other Arabs who possess what leverage exists on the Saudis, and the USSR has only a marginal capability to affect the extent of such pressure. In any case, most Arab governments, including most "progressive" ones, would sympathize with Moslem insurgents seeking to overthrow a communist regime in Afghanistan. The Pakistani government, however, would be considerably more vulnerable to pressure from the Soviets if it followed this option, and the chances that the Soviets would move toward employment of their Baluchi option would rise.

4. *Insurgency Support—Non-Lethal Material.* This would not significantly change the equation spelled out in (3) so far as Soviets are

concerned, except that the scope of the operation would be somewhat enlarged, and with it, the visibility. The distinction between non-lethal and lethal would be believed by nobody, even if it were closely maintained; hence it would not significantly reduce Pakistan-US propaganda vulnerability below that which would otherwise exist.

5. *Unconventional Warfare Support—On-Site Survey.* In view of the unsatisfactory state of present US knowledge of the nature, extent of and potential for support of the Afghan insurgency from Pakistani soil, this option is one which should logically precede all the others. If the Soviets became aware of such a survey, they might interpret it as a possible harbinger of a more active US role both in the Afghan insurgency effort and in providing security backing for Pakistan against Soviet pressure. If the USSR drew this conclusion it would be likely to become more active diplomatically. The Soviets would seek to alarm the Indians about an imminent strengthening of the US security relationship with Pakistan. They would present more demarches to the Pakistanis about the dangers Islamabad was bringing on itself by tying itself to an unreliable and ephemeral US relationship. Beyond this, however, the Soviets would probably wait upon events before taking more vigorous action.

6. and 7: *Unconventional Warfare Support—Phases I and II.* At some point in the sequence between phases I and II, the Soviets would be likely to begin to incite unrest among Pakistan's Baluchis, if they had not already done so. The Soviets in this phase would also become more likely to make a direct demarche to the US, warning Washington against expanding interference in fraternal Afghanistan. The USSR might now add demarches to leaders they might think susceptible in Western Europe, arguing that the US was once again venturing on the same adventuristic line of policy that proved so disastrous in Vietnam, that the US was endangering the stability of detente not only between US and USSR but also for West Europeans, that the USSR had demonstrated its responsibility and restraint during the Sino-Vietnamese war, in contrast to US incitement of that war, but that the USSR could not be expected to stand idly by and see a socialist neighboring state undermined and "destabilized" as in distant Chile by the perfidious CIA. In talking to the Iranians, the Soviets would seek to counter anti-Kabul sentiments in Tehran by playing upon Iranian paranoia about US imperialism left over from the Shah relationship, and by intensifying any efforts which may be already under way to persuade Khomeini that US covert action is responsible for some of Iran's present troubles with its own minorities. Finally, the USSR would seek to alarm the Indians about an imminent strengthening of the US security relationship with Pakistan, and would *inter alia* suggest that the US was about to adopt a more permissive attitude toward Pakistan's acquisition of a nuclear capability.

8. *Unconventional Warfare Support—Phases III and IV.* At these stages, to the degree that this support from Pakistan was seen by the Soviets as becoming critical for the insurgency, this might tip the balance in Soviet thinking on whether to commit ground combat forces to Afghanistan. That is, the Soviet decision on this point would to some extent begin to be influenced not only by the gravity of the insurgency itself, but also by the fact of a perceived US challenge. At the same time, the possibility would rapidly begin to grow that the Afghan military authorities might react directly against Pakistani base areas. If Soviet combat forces were present, they might under some circumstances take part in such a cross-border punitive operation. The Soviets would be particularly likely to move in this direction if the US security relationship with Pakistan remained somewhat ambiguous.

If, on the other hand, the US had in the meantime negotiated a clear and strongly-enunciated security relationship with the Paks which the US had unambiguously communicated to Moscow, the Soviets would be less likely to allow their own forces to respond with raids into Pakistan, but would in any case seek to enhance Kabul's ability to do so. The Soviets would in the meantime vigorously seek to exploit Indian fears and resentment of such an unambiguous US military tie to Pakistan.

[Omitted here is a section on the Arabian Peninsula.]

48. Minutes of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, April 6, 1979, 11 a.m.–noon

SUBJECT

Covert Action and Sensitive Collection Issues (S)

PARTICIPANTS

Vice President*

*State*David Newsom, Under Secretary
for Political Affairs*Defense*

Charles Duncan, Deputy Secretary

*JCS*Lt. Gen. William Smith, Assistant
to Chairman*CIA*Admiral Stansfield Turner
Frank Carlucci, Deputy Director*OMB*Randy Jayne, Associate
Director, Nat'l
Security & Int'l Affairs*Justice*Attorney General Griffin
Bell*NSA*Robert Drake, Deputy
Director*White House*Zbigniew Brzezinski,
Chairman*NSC*Paul B. Henze, Notetaker
Thomas Thornton**

* Present only for first ten minutes.

** Present only through discussion of Afghanistan/Pakistan.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The Vice President's views: The Vice President opened the meeting with a brief discussion of the situation in Afghanistan, underscoring the problems the Soviets are encountering there and the concerted effort they are making to obfuscate them and shift blame onto the United States. He stressed the need to defend our interests and commitments in this part of the world and expressed the hope that the group

¹ Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I-020, Minutes—SCC 1979. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Henze. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Attached but not printed is a covering memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter, April 9, which summarized the meeting. Brzezinski noted: "the Attorney General opined that a Presidential Finding and report to Congress was not required at this stage. It was understood, however, that if the Pakistanis respond positively, you will be asked to execute a Finding that would authorize CIA to implement the most feasible and otherwise desirable options." Carter drew a line in the left margin beside the first sentence and wrote: "Better expression than SCC minutes," and underlined "if the Pakistanis respond positively." Also attached but not printed is Henze's April 4 memorandum to Brzezinski; see footnote 1, Document 47.

would be forward-leaning in its consideration of proposals for dealing with this problem. (S)

Afghanistan/Pakistan: The Vice President then departed and the meeting then turned to a detailed discussion of the problem of providing encouragement or aid for insurgency in Afghanistan. It was agreed that this could be done realistically only through and/or with the assistance of the Pakistanis and in the framework of other recent high-level policy decisions on Pakistan. After review of CIA's proposals it was decided that CIA would have early exploratory talks with Pakistani intelligence officials about

- radio broadcasts to Afghanistan
- financial assistance for selected insurgent groups
- an effort to assess the insurgent movement from the viewpoint of providing training and material assistance.

It was agreed that a Presidential Finding will be required to cover such activity and, unless there is a negative response from the Pakistanis, such a Finding will be forwarded to the President and CIA will be authorized to proceed with the task of working out operations in these fields in cooperation with the Pakistanis.² If the Pakistani response to CIA's exploratory talks is negative, the SCC will reconvene and review the issues anew. (TS)

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Afghanistan.]

Near-Verbatim record of SCC of April 6, 1979

VP: It seems to me that this Afghanistan issue provides a good opportunity for us here. We have the Russians deeply involved in the internal affairs of another country and they are obviously trying to mask it with counterattacks to put us on the defensive. They are supporting a highly unpopular government in Afghanistan; secondly, they are fighting the world of Islam. It is embarrassing to them. It would be nice for us to be seen on the other side. I have been encouraging us to make that point wherever we can. The State Department had made a good statement on it. Senator Pell did a statement on it. We have talked with Zablocki and others and they will be making statements. I think we ought to keep the heat on this. The Russians are jumpy as hell about this. I gather when we say we are not involved that that is accurate. Are the Egyptians and the Pakistanis involved?

FC: We have no evidence that they are; but they cannot control the border.

² An unknown hand underlined "unless there is a negative response," and placed a question mark in the left margin next to the sentence.

ZB: The Pakistanis are not involved except that the insurgency started in three areas across the frontier from Pakistan.

WS: They do not want to get too involved because they are afraid the Russians will step on them.

DN: [2 lines not declassified] he protested to the Russians that they were making irresponsible accusations.³

VP: The Russians are getting away with murder and we should not take it.

ZB: We have a few modest proposals for assisting the Afghans and the Pakistanis. We will be considering these items in the light of your helpful comments. We are sorry you have to leave now.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Afghanistan.]

ZB: In view of the Vice President's comments—which are shared by the President—let us go first to the action proposals for Afghanistan. We have all read Stan's paper—the proposals all involve either some assistance to the Pakistanis or direct financial aid to the insurgents (read summary of proposals). Let's consider CIA's options. We have already spent a lot of time discussing covert assistance to the Afghans. We are aware that a major insurgency is in progress. It is in our national interest that this insurgency continue even if it does not succeed. The question is whether any one of these steps would be helpful. We do not have a national policy that covert activity is to be abandoned. We have a national policy that covert activity should be undertaken when it is warranted.

ST: I want to make the point that covert actions will not turn the tide but they could help sustain insurgency there. Whether we are going to overturn the government or not should not be the main question. This program has to be accompanied by a strong policy of support for Pakistan. Unless the Pakistanis feel we are going to live up to the 1959 treaty, they are not going to cooperate with us. Radio broadcasts are totally dependent upon them. We could not do them without their support . . .

GB: Why can't you just bring a ship up and do them from it?

ZB: We can do only the smallest amount of support for the guerrillas without cooperation with the Pakistanis. I am concerned if we try to get sites for [less than 1 line not declassified] we have to relate these actions to other things we do—it is almost bound to leak. We are going to have to give a degree of guarantee to the Pakistanis in any case. This issue is really a State Department issue—how far we are willing to go in giving the Pakistanis support for the cooperation they give

³ Not found.

us. Then there is the nuclear problem and a lot of other issues with them.⁴ I do not know how to sort it out. In a different context we have settled on a 4-pronged approach to Pakistan which is in the process of being implemented by the Department of State. One element of that involves reiteration of our commitment of the late 1950's without permitting the Pakistanis to engage in hypothetical exercises as to what we might do under certain contingencies. We are trying insofar as possible to separate contentious issues from issues where we have a common interest—one of these being preservation of the countries to the south of the Soviet Union in this part of the world and expressing sympathy for the insurgency in Afghanistan. The question is whether any of these proposed activities would further our policy regarding Pakistan and whether it would have the effect of complicating the takeover of Afghanistan itself—not to speak, perhaps, of the ultimate objective which would be to reverse the takeover and keep the situation boiling the way that they (the Soviets) have kept it boiling for us in other parts of the world.

DN: I would like to raise a more general question. Right now there is an active insurgency going on in Afghanistan. All indications are that the Pakistanis want to maintain a posture that they are now [*not*] involved. If we go ahead with anything that requires a Presidential Finding and reporting to seven committees under Hughes-Ryan procedures, we are running a risk.⁵ The American role is likely to come out—knowledge of the American role could change the prospects as far as the Soviets are concerned. They could react differently. I want to raise this question, for we run the risk of upsetting the Soviets if we undertake these covert activities.

ZB: That risk is there and its implication is that we should not undertake covert activity at all.

GB: Then we would be out of business.

FC: There is considerable concern on the Hill about just that point now. Congress has raised it with us. They say they intend for us to engage in covert action and they feel that they need to do something about cutting down access to sensitive information to minimize the chances of leaks. In a recent SSCI meeting I was asked why we in CIA were not doing something in Afghanistan.

⁴ See footnote 4, Document 42.

⁵ A reference to procedures required by an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974. Also called the Hughes-Ryan Amendment after its co-authors Harold E. Hughes (D-Iowa) and Leo Ryan (D-California), the legislation obligated the President to find that a particular covert action was important to U.S. national security. The finding and "a description and scope of such operation" must be submitted "to the appropriate committees of the Congress" in "a timely fashion." (P.L. 93-559, 88 Stat. 1795)

GB: I believe we should change the law only to report through the select committees on intelligence. I bet we can do that.

ZB: I was on a plane with Chuck Percy the other day—he told me that if we wish to do serious covert activities, the Senate will give us overwhelming support now. The way to get going is to pick a place and to try to do it.

GB: We have to put pressure on the intelligence committees to control the leaks.

FC: I think they are in a mood to do it. That does not meet our immediate problem, however. The law still requires us to brief seven committees.

DN: If what is going on is already causing real problems for the Soviets in Afghanistan, what additional benefit do we gain by getting involved in it ourselves? Especially if we run the risk of having what we are doing leaked and thus changing real perceptions in Moscow?

ZB: Another question that can be asked—if the insurgency is not doing well, why help it? But you then come up again with the conclusion that if you don't do it, you lose an opportunity. You have an important point re Pakistan. My inclination would be to pick from this list those actions that we would only undertake with Pakistan if they are willing to cooperate. If they are not willing to cooperate, we do not do it. I would be inclined to go for the radio broadcasts. This is an important mechanism for influencing political conduct. This can only be done together with the Pakistanis. Then we could consider some financial aid and send in a survey team to examine on-site possibilities for other forms of support—all of these actions would require cooperation with the Pakistani intelligence services. If they come back and say no—then we have to reconsider.

DN: There is one other avenue—through the Saudis and through the emigre groups if the Saudis will provide funds.

ZB: Would you be willing to do that without telling the Pakistanis?

DN: No.

GB: My feeling after reading this was that we should do whatever we can without involving the Pakistanis so that they can say they know nothing about what is going on.

ZB: Is that possible?

ST: We feel that we could only do a little of this and then we would have to tell the Pakistanis.

ZB: This brings us back to David Newsom's point—there may be a leak. If it is a leak about something we are doing without the knowledge of the Pakistanis, then we have a greater problem with them in case of a leak . . .

FC: They have already given us some indications they want to do something.

GB: Then I withdraw my observations.

ZB: What about the package I have suggested?

ST: It will take a survey before we can give financial aid to anybody.

DN: You have to do the survey before you can make a precise recommendation on financial support?

FC: We can engage the Pakistanis in discussion of financial support for dissident groups and then channel the support with their knowledge.

DN: When do we have to make the Presidential Finding?

FC: I strongly recommend that we make a Finding first.

ZB: What do you think, Griffin?

GB: You can talk to them without making a finding.

FC: But that would confront us with the problem of arousing expectations that we could not meet. We would feel a lot better having these discussions after having a Finding.

GB: If you do that, it may leak and then we don't have the chance to do it.

ZB: Can we have a Finding by the President and then not do it?

FC: We have to inform the Congress in a timely manner.

GB: You don't have to tell the Congress until you do it.

ST: You can have the SCC approve the finding and not have the President sign it.

FC: Our people in the field want to have some blessing before they talk about this sort of thing with the people they are dealing with.

GB: If the SCC authorizes you to negotiate that is enough—if they say that they don't want to do that—how will we then unravel this thing that we have started?

FC: If the position of the SCC is clear that if we negotiate and the Pakistanis are interested, then we will get finding and go ahead, then we can do it.

ZB: Is that possible, Griffin?

GB: That is possible.

ZB: Let us say what we will be saying.

DN: I am willing to go along with the radio broadcasting and financial aid subject to agreement from the Pakistanis. I am only in favor of a survey without future commitments.

ST: I fear we may have confused this in the way we have presented it. Unless we find out what is really going on in Afghanistan and among these insurgents, any money we give to the Pakistanis could simply go down the drain.

ZB: For the minutes: the SCC will recommend to the President that he issue a finding involving these three items subject to Pakistani assent.

GB: And we do not have to report anything to the Congress until the President signs the Finding.

ST: I see one possible glitch. As my COS starts talking to the Pakistanis—he will be encouraging Pakistani support of the Afghan rebellion.

GB: There is nothing wrong with a little salesmanship.

FC: We have had a couple of rulings out of your department that didn't recognize that.⁶

ST: You say he is trying to influence the Pakistanis to take a more forward position. This gets to be a very fine line . . .

DN: How would you describe the survey team and its proposals in your report to the Congress?

FC: "Survey team" is too formal a description. We might step up our collection in collaboration with the Pakistanis. We are not going to mass a group of people together to do this.

GB: I suggest you drop the word "Survey team" and say you are going to assess the situation.

ZB: That is highly desirable. We could be dealing with a bunch of frauds.

RJayne: I am worried that the Pakistanis may simply tell us to buzz off. If that is the case, we ought to amend the three items so that we can consider some other avenue of support.

ZB: Yes, but in that case we would have to reassess what we might try. I am not against covert action, but it has to have some relationship to foreign policy in general or it makes no sense.

RJayne: What if the Pakistanis say we do not want to have anything to do with these activities, but we will let you come and do whatever you want—go ahead.

ZB: That would be a different problem.

FC: What is likely to happen is that they will say we will explore this but we want to talk about the 1959 agreement you have with us.

ZB: That has some advantages. Let us sum up what we have decided. Let us say that the SCC has voted to approach the Pakistanis to determine whether they have a positive attitude toward radio broadcasts, U.S. financial assistance of a type yet to be specified as to size and means of conveyance and recipients and on the issue of assessing the nature of the Afghan insurgency . . . and subject to the absence of

⁶ Not further identified.

a negative response from the government of Pakistan, we will proceed with a Finding which will be laid before the President. If the Pakistani response is negative, we would meet again and take up these questions again . . .

DN: Under the instructions we have prepared for Art Hummel, we are authorizing him to say if it is raised by Zia that we will examine these questions—do we want him to initiate discussion under these circumstances?

ZB: What is your judgment?

DN: I am inclined to think that Zia would be aware that this other contact is going to be made and that a Finding coming out of these discussions will require further review in Washington.

ZB: Should Hummel initiate it if Zia asks?

DN: We will leave it on an if-asked basis.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Afghanistan.]

49. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, April 12, 1979, 2012Z

91597. Subject: Secretary's Démarche to Dobrynin on Afghanistan.

1. (S—Entire text)

2. During a meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin, April 11, the Secretary made the following démarche concerning Soviet accusations of U.S. support for the insurgency in Afghanistan.²

3. The Secretary made the following points:

—The United States is not interfering in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and is in no way responsible for the current unrest in that

¹ Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I-047, Afghanistan: 15 Feb 1979–22 Aug 1979. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to London, Beijing, Jidda, New Delhi, Kabul, Islamabad, and Tehran. Printed from a copy received in the White House Situation Room.

² The meeting was summarized in telegram 91469 to Moscow, April 12. Regarding Afghanistan, Vance protested recent Soviet propaganda alleging U.S. involvement and asked Dobrynin if such propaganda foreshadowed Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The Soviet Ambassador denied Soviet intentions to intervene and countered that the Voice of America had broadcast “hostile content” to the Soviet Union. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840176–1006)

country. This was made clear to the Soviet Government in repeated U.S. public statements and in a private *démarche* delivered by our Embassy to the Foreign Ministry in Moscow.³

—At the same time, the United States has made clear that we categorically reject the baseless allegations made by Soviet media of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan's internal affairs.

—Despite this, accusations continue to appear in Soviet media. Given similar statements by high Soviet officials we assume these media reports are inspired by the Soviet Government.

—One particularly objectionable example was the April 10 *Pravda* article by one A. Petrov. This article makes unfounded allegations against Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher and purports to give the names of U.S. experts in subversive activity.

—These reports that the United States is responsible for anti-government activity by various Afghan groups are completely false and do not serve the interests of U.S.-Soviet relations or stability in an unsettled area of the world.

—Our two countries can surely agree that the present period is characterized by various tensions and instability in South Asia and the Persian Gulf. Our respective interests should be directed toward insuring peace and stability in these troubled regions, and we believe that an important step in this direction is the avoidance of provocative recriminations and unfounded allegations of outside interference.

—Continued untrue accusations of involvement of the United States can affect the safety of American citizens in Afghanistan. Moreover, steps which inflame regional tensions can lead governments of the region to call for greater involvement of both our countries, a development which would make the instability of the area more dangerous to international peace and security.

Vance

³ Instructions and talking points for the *démarche* were sent in telegram 69537 to Moscow, March 21. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840148–2586) The Embassy delivered the *démarche* the same day. (Telegram 6958 from Moscow, March 21; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840148–2589) The Department issued public statements denying involvement in Afghanistan on March 23 and April 2. (Stuart Auerbach, "U.S. Cautions Soviets on Interfering in Afghanistan," *Washington Post*, March 24, 1979, p. A12; and Don Oberdorfer, "U.S. Blasts 'Baseless' Soviet Charges," *Washington Post*, April 3, 1979, p. A12)

50. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

[paper number not declassified]

Washington, April 12, 1979

[Omitted here is information unrelated to Afghanistan.]

AFGHANISTAN: Prospects for the Insurgents

The widespread insurgencies in Afghanistan continue to erode the loyalty of the armed forces—the main prop for President Taraki’s regime. Tribal rebels lack the strength and organization to confront the Soviet-supported Army outside their home areas, however, and by themselves have little prospect of overthrowing the government. Unrest in the cities and more settled areas may pose a more difficult problem for the regime. ([classification marking not declassified])

Muslim tribesmen along the Pakistani border took up arms almost immediately after the military coup a year ago that brought the Marxists to power in Kabul. Since then, many additional tribal groups, motivated mainly by religious sentiments, have instigated rebellions in their native areas. A government crackdown last winter against Muslim clergymen critical of the regime gave new impetus to the unrest. ([classification marking not declassified])

The insurgencies seem to be gaining momentum, and the government’s authority is now being contested to some degree in nearly every province. Along much of the eastern border with Pakistan, government control is limited to major towns and main roads. Rebel sources report that two towns in this region—Chiga Serai and Asmar—are surrounded and will soon fall. Farther west, rebels this week seized control of Arjestan and killed the district governor. Fighting continues near Mazar-i-Sharif in the north-central region and also in the northwest, where rebels control one large area along the Soviet border. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])

The Afghan Government has been forced to redeploy most of its available troops from the capital toward the Pakistani border. More than two-thirds of the Army’s infantry regiments are in the east, leaving few units available for deploying elsewhere. [2 lines, classification marking, and handling restriction not declassified]

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 6, Afghan Crisis—Pubs Pre-Invasion Reporting. Top Secret; [codeword and handling restriction not declassified]. Prepared by [text not declassified].

Uncoordinated Rebellions

There is little cooperation among the various rebel groups operating in Afghanistan's tribal areas. Along the Pakistani border, however, there has been limited cooperation between neighboring tribes, [2 lines, classification marking, codeword, and handling restriction not declassified]

Coordination is better among the exile groups in Pakistan, but despite an announcement on 11 March that the three most important factions would cooperate, there has been little indication that they are actually working together. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])

The tribal rebels alone have little immediate prospect of overthrowing the Taraki government. The tribes can hold their own in the mountains and may even win minor victories against the government, but they have little chance of capturing a major city or waging a successful campaign outside the tribal areas. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])

The government was confronted with a different and more threatening challenge in western Afghanistan last month when mobs, aided by personnel from the local military garrison, took over parts of Herat, the country's third largest city. After several days, reinforced government troops regained control of the city, but not the surrounding areas. This appears to have been a largely spontaneous uprising not directly related to the tribal insurgencies. ([classification marking not declassified])

In the cities and those rural areas where the government has traditionally maintained control, the people have fewer arms and are more poorly organized than the tribesmen. Popular unrest could again erupt into rioting as it did in Herat, but sustained resistance will depend on the refusal of government troops to oppose the rebels. A few organizations—such as the Muslim Brotherhood—may still be able to stage isolated terrorist acts in the cities. ([classification marking not declassified])

Foreign Support

Foreign backing for the insurgents is limited. Exile groups in Pakistan claim—and probably have received—some support from Saudi Arabia. They also assert that China has offered them arms. This cannot be confirmed. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])

Pakistan has permitted Afghan exiles, Pakistani religious organizations, and tribesmen to funnel some help to the Afghan tribes. There is little Islamabad could do to prevent Pakistani tribesmen from assisting their Afghan neighbors across the very porous border, and it is not inclined to try. The evidence, however, suggests no significant Pakistani military support for the rebels. Occasionally, when exile groups have been too open in their activities, the government has

asked them to stop.² (*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*)

Soviet backing for the regime has been a major deterrent to Pakistani support for the insurgents. Even clandestine help to the rebels has been limited by fear of Soviet retaliation and of provoking much greater and more open Soviet military support for Kabul. (*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*)

The new regime in Iran is strongly sympathetic to Afghanistan's dissident Muslim tribesmen but its problems at home prevent it from furnishing significant material help. Iran's main contribution has been moral encouragement to the insurgents. (*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*)

The Afghan Military

Tribal loyalties, religion, heavy casualties, suspicion of Soviet motives, and the slim prospects for an early end to insurgency have already seriously damaged morale in the Afghan Army. Purges of suspected disloyal officers have placed inexperienced men in key positions, and desertions occur daily. Some Afghan units reportedly have fled or surrendered after only token resistance. (*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*)

The government is taking steps to limit the impact of these losses. The Army is retaining soldiers beyond their obligatory terms of service and may have begun recalling individuals released from active duty. The Army also is using tribal irregulars to fight other tribes opposing the government. Kabul is undertaking a longer term program to improve command and control in the eastern provinces and to expand the Army as a whole. None of these measures, however, will have any immediate impact on the military's ability to cope with the insurgency. (*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*)

² In telegram 2772 from Kabul, April 9, the Embassy reported that on the previous day Radio Afghanistan alleged that "a large number of Pakistani soldiers in Afghan dress" had attacked camps in the border province of Paktia. The Embassy further noted that the charge, delivered during a high-level Soviet military visit to Kabul, suggested both Soviet endorsement and a "considerable escalation of the propagandist war" that Afghanistan was waging against its neighbors. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790163–0227) A memorandum prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, May 3, noted that Pakistan's decision to aid "tribal rebels" would likely raise border tensions and could possibly lead to increased involvement in Afghanistan by third countries. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 6, Afghan Crisis—Pubs Pre-Invasion Reporting) A field report prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, May 23, forwarded information from [*text not declassified*] claiming that Pakistan commenced a covert aid program on May 18 to support Afghan rebels through material and financial means. (Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 7, USSR in Afghanistan (May 79–Jun 79))

The pressure on the military could eventually become so severe that officers who now appear loyal would advocate the overthrow of the Marxist regime. Both Kabul and Moscow are attempting to meet this danger. Further purges, more Soviet advisers and arms, strengthening the Army, and gestures such as the recent appointment of a popular officer as Defense Minister may help. At the same time, these remedies could intensify the problems in the military by increasing distrust of Soviet intentions, forcing the government to rely even more on inexperienced officers, and further revealing the government's weakness. (*[classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]*)

Soviet Support

Even before Taraki came to power last year, the USSR was Afghanistan's major source of economic aid and almost the sole source of military assistance. Since then, the Soviet role has grown significantly. [3 lines, *classification marking, codeword, and handling restriction not declassified*]

Greater Soviet involvement is likely. Soviet assistance is needed to improve the military logistic system and increase mobility of its forces. Soviet personnel could also become more involved in the fighting in the hinterlands without seriously risking an adverse foreign reaction to their role. (*[classification marking, codeword, and handling restriction not declassified]*)

The Soviets currently are taking pains to conceal the extent of their involvement, and it is unclear how far they are prepared to go to save the present government. The current visit to Afghanistan by the USSR's ranking political-military general suggests that Moscow wants a close reading of the reliability and capability of Afghan armed forces before deciding on its next steps.³ (*[classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]*)

³ A reference to General Alexei A. Yepeshev, Soviet First Deputy Minister of Defense and President of Political Affairs.

51. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, April 26, 1979

SUBJECT

Status of CIA Discussions with the Pakistanis Concerning Aid to the Afghan Dissidents (S)

1. At the 6 April 1979 meeting of the SCC, it was concluded that CIA should explore with the Government of Pakistan (GOP) provisions of U.S. financial and material aid to Afghan insurgents as well as the feasibility of radio broadcasts into Afghanistan.² The following is a status report on the CIA response to this tasking: (S)

a. *Discussions with GOP.* From the two discussions we had with Pakistan liaison, after an initial delay on their part, it is apparent that the matter of aid to the Afghan insurgents has become increasingly politicized. (See attachment for a detailed report on our liaison discussions to date.)³ This perception is based in part on comments by GOP liaison that Pakistan would not risk acting against Afghanistan without firm U.S. backing. Also, at the request of liaison, our discussions with them are now in a "pause" status while they review the situation. We suspect that General Zia is orchestrating this slowdown awaiting developments in his ongoing talks with Ambassador Hummel. If we

¹ Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I-047, Afghanistan: 15 Feb 1979–22 Aug 1979. Secret. Attached but not printed is Brzezinski's handwritten note forwarding the memorandum to Aaron: "DA, Please get on top of this through a mini-SCC. We need action. E.g, give them money. Also *black ops*." At the top of Brzezinski's note, Henze wrote: "Turner will take up formally with ZB 1 May 79." Neither a record of the May 1 meeting nor a record of a mini-SCC on the topic was found. The next SCC meeting that took up the Afghanistan issue was held June 26. See Document 53.

² See Document 48.

³ Attached but not printed. The attached memorandum reported on two meetings the Chief of Station in Islamabad had with ISID Director Major General Mohammad Riaz Khan and ISID Deputy Director Brigadier General Kamal Rabbani. At the first meeting, Riaz proposed that the United States fund Pakistan's procurement and distribution of medical supplies to Afghan rebels and provide non-U.S.-made small arms and ammunition to be distributed to the rebels. The supplies would go to Pathan tribesmen on the Pakistani side of the border who were supporting the rebels based on the Afghan side of the border. The second meeting effectively froze these propositions; in light of Soviet and Afghan charges of Pakistani involvement in the Afghan rebellion, ISID had become wary of commencing direct support. Additionally, Rabbani disclosed that the tribesmen "could not be disciplined to keep quiet about outside aid," and that in any case, the Afghan Government had sufficiently penetrated the rebel groups so that it would learn the source of the aid.

have not heard from liaison by 26 April, we will take the initiative again and request a meeting. (S)

b. *Unilateral Contact with Dissidents.* You should be aware that Islamabad Station is in unilateral contact with a fairly prominent Afghan dissident leader, who, on 24 April requested \$1,000,000 from us to purchase ammunition from unidentified sources in Pakistan. We advised him that we had no policy authority to grant his request.⁴ (S)

c. *Radio Broadcasting.* We continue to explore radio broadcast possibilities, although host country political sensitivities and lead time for acquiring broadcast equipment cast doubts on this option. We believe, however, that radio services such as [1½ lines not declassified] can be utilized indirectly by providing unique news stories to journalists and publications from which [less than 1 line not declassified] often obtains its program material. This effort is underway. (S)

d. *Psychological Operations.* We are readying a senior covert action officer to visit Islamabad and Kabul, to assess and, where appropriate, to initiate psychological operations against the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. The activities which this officer will discuss in the field include: distribution of anti-Soviet propaganda leaflets; production and distribution of cassette tapes; development of spokesmen to project the dissident message effectively; means of getting that message to the foreign press; and black operations (see f. below). (S)

e. *Worldwide Propaganda.* We have already tasked the worldwide covert action infrastructure on Afghanistan and are directing appropriate briefings and propaganda material to our assets. As of 25 April we have obtained media placements in 25 countries and have provided liaison and agent of influence assets with tailored briefings in 51 countries. Some examples of this effort include:

—Senior [less than 1 line not declassified] officials were briefed on 12 and 16 April.

—The President of [less than 1 line not declassified] was briefed by his intelligence service.

—The highest levels of the [less than 1 line not declassified] government have expressed intense interest in material we provided on the Afghan situation.⁵

—A briefing was prepared for the President and Prime Minister of [less than 1 line not declassified].

—The Prime Minister and Cabinet of [less than 1 line not declassified] were briefed by their intelligence service.

⁴ Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the left margin and an arrow pointing to the last sentence of paragraph b.

⁵ In the left margin next to the first three bullet points, Henze wrote: "Indian and Islamic World?"

—Significant new media placements have appeared in [3 lines not declassified].

f. *Black Ops*. Part of our projected program involves dissemination of a strictly limited number of black documents designed to support and enhance the already ongoing gray propaganda program. The SCC meeting of 6 April, however, directed us to develop plans for interfering in Afghanistan, and the SCC meeting of 6 March had already endorsed “internal propaganda.”⁶ This activity has policy approval under the General Finding on “Soviet Interference in Other Countries’ Affairs.” The Department of Justice, however, has ruled that we had to obtain cleared guidelines on a black program from State, as black operations had not been covered specifically in the relevant “Perspectives.” Unfortunately, attempts to obtain such cleared guidelines have been rebuffed. State takes the position that black operations by themselves would have little impact. This argument fails to take into account our gray program, which black operations will complement and reinforce, as well as the propaganda warfare by leaflet and “night letter” already being waged by the dissidents. (We would expect that our black ops would be picked up and exploited fully by the dissidents.) State also argues that since the Soviets might assume the U.S. hand lay behind any fabricated documents, their dissemination would embarrass Secretary Vance in view of the “strong assurances the Secretary recently gave Ambassador Dobrynin, with NSC concurrence, to the effect that we have no intention of interfering in Afghanistan.”⁷

Stansfield Turner⁸

⁶ See footnote 5, Document 38.

⁷ See Document 49.

⁸ Turner signed “Stan Turner” above his typed signature.

52. Intelligence Information Cable Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

[cable number not declassified]

Washington, May 24, 1979, 0512Z

[Source: Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 7, USSR in Afghanistan (May 79–Jun 79). Top Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. 2 pages not declassified.]

53. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, June 26, 1979, 9–9:55 a.m.

SUBJECT

Afghanistan and Grenada (S)

PARTICIPANTS

The Vice President
Major John Matheny

State

David Newsom, Under Secretary
for Political Affairs
David Mark, Deputy Dir, INR

OSD

Admiral Daniel Murphy, Deputy
Under Sec. for Policy

JCS

Lt. Gen. W.Y. Smith, Ass't. to the
Chairman
Lt. Gen. John Pustay, Ass't. to the
Chairman

DCI

Admiral Stansfield Turner
Frank Carlucci, Deputy
Director
[*name and title not declassified*]
*[*name and title not declassified*]

Justice

John Harmon, Ass't AG,
Office of Legal Counsel

OMB

James McIntyre
Randy Jayne, Assoc. Dir. for
Nat'l Security & Int'l
Affairs

White House

Zbigniew Brzezinski,
Chairman
David Aaron

NSC

Donald Gregg, Notetaker

* Present for Item 2 only.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The Chairman summarized previous discussions on aid to Afghanistan dissidents and recalled that CIA had been approved to undertake a probe to determine what support to the dissidents was feasible. He called on the DCI to summarize. (S)

The DCI stated that ties with Afghanistan dissident leaders had been established in Pakistan. It is CIA's judgment that monetary support for food, clothing, and medical supplies is critical if opposition to the Taraki regime is to be sustained throughout the winter. Pakistani

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council Institutional Files, 1977–1981, Box 104, SCC–172, 6/26/79, Afghanistan and Grenada. Top Secret. Drafted by Gregg. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Tabs A–G are attached but not printed.

support to the dissidents appears to be tailing off. The DCI stated that a modest amount of aid can be funneled directly to Afghanistan dissident leaders in Pakistan. (TS)

Discussion ensued as to how the money would be handed out and spent. CIA responded that the money would be doled out incrementally and that accountings would be sought and impact and feedback would be looked for. All the goods (food, medical supplies, and clothing) are to be purchased in Pakistan. (S)

Turning to CIA option 1, the DCI stated that the [*less than 1 line not declassified*] has had an existing radio that sends a strong signal into Afghanistan.² The CIA probe had reached the conclusions that Afghanistan language broadcasts to the largely illiterate insurgents would provide a rallying point now lacking. The broadcasts would soon be attributed to [*less than 1 line not declassified*] and would appear to be commercially purchased time on the [*less than 1 line not declassified*] broadcast. Broadcast tapes would be made in the United States and shipped to [*less than 1 line not declassified*] for playing. The [*less than 1 line not declassified*] have not yet been sounded out as to their willingness to participate in this effort. (S)

Following discussion a consensus emerged to take the following steps:

- 1 To approve Option 2, spending at first the [*amount not declassified*] now in the CIA budget [*less than 1 line not declassified*] as necessary.³ It was agreed that the Pakistan government would be informed of our support to the Afghan dissidents but that the CIA operation would be conducted unilaterally. (S)

² Attached but not printed at Tab B is a memorandum from Gregg to Brzezinski, June 25. Option 1, entitled "Psychological Operations," called first for approval to "establish an international 'Voice of Free Afghanistan' radio capability for the insurgents from a third country," noting that Afghan insurgents needed "regular and dependable" radio access to the general population, which was 90 percent illiterate. The erection of a transmitter facility was estimated to take 18 to 24 months at a cost of [*amount not declassified*] per annum, and with adequate deniability for the United States. Second, Option 1 called for approval to "assist the insurgents to expand and distribute their recorded and printed propaganda," at a cost of [*amount not declassified*] and with minimal risk of linking the program to the United States.

³ Attached but not printed at Tab C. Option 2, entitled "Material Support," called for "cash payments to the insurgents," arguing that cash support might not be as efficient as food and material distribution, "but it should enable them to survive the approaching winter and maintain the momentum of their struggle." The paper further noted that the funds would be used by rebels to ensure tribal loyalties, and that "accountability may be difficult, but it is judged that most of the funds will be expended for needed supplies." At a projected cost of [*amount not declassified*], the option predicted moderate risk of linking cash payments to the United States, given that it was likely the Pakistanis would learn of the program. Pakistan might "overlook" the program, given the "variety of individuals and countries who have been approached for funds by the insurgents and who might locally be the source of financial support." Finally, the paper surmised an element of deniability because all non-lethal goods "could be rationalized on humanitarian grounds."

- 2 CIA is authorized to explore with the [*less than 1 line not declassified*] government its reaction to utilization of its broadcasts into Afghanistan. (Option 1) (S)
- 3 CIA was also given approval to expand psych efforts to support the insurgency and to unite the Afghan dissidents. Authorization was also given to work with an existing Pakistani agent asset with ties to Afghanistan dissident groups. (S)
- 4 Options 4 and 5 (which were defined as alternatives, and not separate options) will be considered after Pakistani reactions and other political fallout are taken into account.⁴ (S)
- 5 It was also agreed to tell the government of Saudi Arabia of the US decision to give covert non-military support the Afghan dissidents. The Saudis will also be encouraged to put some of their own funds into similar covert aid projects. (S)

CIA was asked to draft a Presidential Finding which would cover implementation of the first five options of the CIA proposal on a step-by-step basis, with as much flexibility built into the plan as possible.⁵

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Afghanistan.]

⁴ Attached at Tabs E and F, respectively. Option 4, entitled "Humanitarian Support," called for approval to use "a third country as a front for providing humanitarian aid to the insurgents." The paper proposed that countries such as Saudi Arabia, Oman, or Egypt might act in such a capacity, given that "politically, this may be more acceptable to Pakistan than becoming directly involved with the U.S. in insurgent support." On the other hand, "U.S. control of the program would be reduced" with participation of a third country, "which may intimate the ultimate source of such support to the Pakistanis," which could in turn result in complications that might deprive the Afghan insurgents of support in the time frame they required. At a cost of [*amount not declassified*] (divided among medical supplies, food, clothing, transportation, and cash to insurgent leaders), the option posed moderate risk of linking the United States to the program. The USSR and DRA might take notice of such involvement, but if not, Soviet reaction would be minimal and Pakistan "would be able to maintain deniability." Option 5, also entitled "Humanitarian Support," called for approval to "provide humanitarian supplies to the insurgents through the Government of Pakistan." The objective and cost were identical to Option 4, while the projected risk of Option 5 was slightly lower, and if Pakistan agreed to act as a conduit to the insurgents "this option would likely be the most efficient means of providing such support." Option 6, attached but not printed at Tab G, was not discussed at the SCC meeting. It called for approval "to provide limited military supplies to the insurgents through the Government of Pakistan," at a cost of [*amount not declassified*] and with moderate to high risk of exposure.

⁵ The SCC meeting led to two Presidential Findings on Afghanistan, both signed by Carter on July 3. The first, whose scope covered Afghanistan, provided authorization to "support insurgent propaganda and other psychological operations in Afghanistan; establish radio access to the Afghan population through third country facilities;" and "provide unilaterally or through third countries as appropriate support to Afghan insurgents, either in the form of cash or non-military supplies." The second finding, whose scope was worldwide, provided authorization to "expose the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and its leadership as despotic and subservient to the Soviet Union" and "publicize efforts by the Afghan insurgents to regain their country's sovereignty." (Carter Library, Staff Office, Counsel, Cutler, Box 60, Central Intelligence Agency Charter: 2/9-29/80)

54. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

[*paper number not declassified*]

Washington, July 1979

[Omitted here are a title page, cover page, and security information page.]

Afghanistan: A Regime Besieged (*[classification marking not declassified]*)

Key Judgments

The localized tribal fighting that erupted in the eastern provinces when the pro-Soviet coup group seized power in late April 1978 has since grown into a countrywide insurgency. Faced with the hostility of the devoutly Muslim and traditionally independent population, the regime of President Taraki and Prime Minister Amin has no better than an even chance to complete its second year in power.

Taraki will survive only as long as the loyalty of the military, the security services, and the party remains intact under the heavy pressure being brought to bear by hostile forces. The prevailing instability portends a highly fluid political situation in the next 12 months. A number of outcomes are possible.

The most likely successor regime would be led by, or at least have the backing of, leftist military officers, who are now considered loyal but who might become disaffected. Coup plotters might seek Moscow's tacit approval to seize power and in any case would retain strong ties with the Soviet Union.

Despite the loss to the insurgents of more than half of the country, the government's control of Kabul, the other major cities, and the main lines of communication equates to political control of the country. Tribal forces, lacking a centralized command and deficient in material support, do not appear capable of challenging the Soviet-equipped army's control of the main population centers.

The insurgents' prospects would be enhanced if Pakistan were to provide substantial material support, tactical advice, and training. Barring an improvement in the insurgents' military capabilities, the

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Job 06T00412R: Intelligence Publication Files, Box 1, NESA Research Paper—Afghanistan: A Regime Besieged, July 1979. Top Secret; [*codeword and handling restriction not declassified*]. A statement on the cover page reads: "The author of this paper is [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Office of Political Analysis. The Office of Strategic Research contributed to the report." Another statement on the cover page reads: "This report has been coordinated with the Office of Economic Research, the Directorate of Operations, and the National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia."

outlook is for a prolonged period of inconclusive fighting for control of territory, population centers, and main roads.

The beleaguered Taraki regime's survival has come to depend increasingly, as the insurgency has spread, on Soviet political, military, economic, and technical support. Taraki's nearly total dependence on Moscow has given the Soviets far more say in the Afghan Government's day-to-day decisionmaking process than they have ever had, but Taraki still appears to be setting the main lines of policy.

Kabul has closely associated itself politically with Moscow and has adopted foreign policy positions that are virtually indistinguishable from those of the Soviet Union.

In part because it has accorded the Soviet Union patron state status, Afghanistan shows no interest in improving frayed relations with the United States and other Western powers. Relations with its neighbors Pakistan and Iran are poor and could deteriorate further if Kabul comes to believe Tehran and, in particular, Islamabad are giving substantial backing to Afghan insurgents.

The regime does not yet face a security situation that might prompt a request to Moscow for the direct intervention of Soviet forces, but such an appeal is conceivable over the next 12 months. The Soviets have an important stake in Afghanistan. They will go to some lengths to protect it, but probably not to the extent of intervening militarily. The Soviets would be deterred by the possibility that their forces would be bogged down indefinitely trying to shore up a discredited regime. Soviet leaders also would have to weigh the regional and international political costs of direct intervention.

The USSR might consider other options short of dispatching combat units to protect its interests in specific contingencies. Moscow, for example, might permit more open use of Soviet advisers in ground combat roles to defend Soviet personnel or equipment. If serious fighting broke out in areas adjoining the Soviet border, Soviet leaders might decide to provide increased numbers of tactical ground support aircraft, helicopter gunships, pilots, and advisers on the ground to assist Kabul.

[1 paragraph (1 line) not declassified]

[Omitted here is the body of the paper.]

**55. Memorandum From Thomas Thornton and Marshall
Bremont of the National Security Council Staff to the
President's Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Brzezinski)¹**

Washington, July 19, 1979

SUBJECT

Soviet Feeler on Afghanistan (C)

We convened a meeting this afternoon of Soviet and Afghan specialists from State and CIA to discuss how we should respond to the message conveyed to our charge in Kabul by the GDR Ambassador. (You will remember that he alerted us that the Soviets would try to oust Amin, probably during August, but that they intended to “protect the Afghan revolution.” He also suggested that the situation might become bloody and pointedly said that he was sending his family home.)² (S)

We did not come to any agreed conclusions about what the Soviets really mean by passing this signal—perhaps just to alert us to protect our people since we have been hitting them hard in the aftermath of the Dubs killing, or perhaps they want us to acquiesce in Soviet establishment of a new government. (S)

For starters we decided to move along two tracks:

1. Amstutz will be deciding on Saturday whether to evacuate dependents. (There are other good reasons to do so beside the German's

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Office File, Country Chron File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 1979. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. The memorandum is stamped “ZB has seen.”

² Amstutz reported on his “extraordinary meeting” with GDR Ambassador to Afghanistan Dr. Hermann Schwiesau in telegram 5459 from Kabul, July 18. Schwiesau asserted that it was Amin, not Taraki, who effectively controlled the government, and that Soviet Minister-Counselor Safronchuk was working “behind the scenes” with DRA officials to bring about a “radical change” in leadership through an internal military coup. Schwiesau further noted that it would not be possible for Amin and the exiled Parchamist leader Babrak Karmal to be part of the same government; nonetheless, the current Khalqi-dominated government needed to extend its base and share more power with the Parchamists. (Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 5, Soviets in Afghanistan—General Part #1) According to [text not declassified], March 28, Amin's elevation the previous day from Deputy Prime Minister to Prime Minister (Taraki remained President) “grants recognition of” Amin's “*de facto* control of the country's affairs.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 91T00761R, Box 2, Taraki, Nur Mohammed)

warning.) We will probably accept a positive recommendation from him.³ (S)

2. We will cut out the middle man (the German) and instruct Amstutz to approach Soviet Counselor Safronchuk, who is supposed to be the Soviet point man in the dump-Amin operation and who foreshadowed this entire matter to Amstutz in a previous conversation.⁴ (S)

State will prepare (and we will clear) instructions to Amstutz for the meeting. He is to raise the question of safety of Americans (appropriately, since the Soviets are the dean of the corps in Kabul) and tell him that we expect the Soviets not to make a propaganda issue out of the withdrawal of US dependents. He will then determine whether the GDR Ambassador was in fact speaking with the full sanction of the Soviets. He will also convey these points: We do not believe that any cosmetic changes in the Afghan Government will solve the Soviets' problem; we will not give our blessing to any such government; we believe that a restoration of a truly neutral Afghan Government would be in our mutual interests; and we have no interest in seeing a government in Afghanistan that would pose a threat to legitimate Soviet interests.⁵ (S)

It would be premature to make further decisions about how we will handle this signal until we get a reading on the Safronchuk conversation. We will, however, be giving thought to a number of other questions, not least of all the impact of a Soviet move on the SALT debate. We will also keep our covert action options under review,

³ Saturday was July 21. In telegram 189714 to Moscow and Kabul, July 21, the Department relayed Amstutz's approval of evacuating approximately 100 U.S. dependents and non-essential personnel from Kabul. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790333-0446) In telegram 5631 from Kabul, July 25, the Embassy reported that an Afghan diplomatic note demanded a staff reduction of Embassy Kabul. Amstutz described the note as evidence of the "inept, if not stupid, leadership of the DRA, exemplified by Prime Minister/Foreign Minister Hafizullah Amin, person now desperately trying to survive politically." (Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 7, USSR in Afghanistan (July 79))

⁴ Brzezinski wrote "OK" in the right margin next to this paragraph.

⁵ Brzezinski drew a vertical line and a checkmark in the right margin next to the last sentence of the paragraph. Safronchuk and Amstutz met on August 11. The Embassy reported their conversation in telegram 6152 from Kabul, August 13. According to the telegram, neither the question of the safety of Americans in Afghanistan nor the information passed by the GDR Ambassador arose during the conversation. Safronchuk did acknowledge the possibility that the Soviets would have to deal with a successor regime in the future, but asserted that the USSR "would not under any circumstances" introduce combat troops to support the Afghan Government. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790367-0048) No record of a meeting with Safronchuk was found that might reflect more directly the points Amstutz was to convey per the NSC instructions.

especially since one part of the Soviet motivation may have been to deflect us from anti-regime activities. (S)

CIA will make a special effort to see what they can pick up in Kabul that would confirm what the German told us and they will try to learn if a similar message has been passed to [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. Finally, FBIS will see if there has been a cutback in Soviet propaganda alleging US involvement in the insurgency. (S)

Late note: FBIS confirms that there has indeed been a dropoff—perhaps related to the Summit, but they also note that Soviet propaganda sometimes declines as an issue becomes more critical. (S)

56. Editorial Note

In August 1979, the Central Intelligence Agency issued a number of reports assessing Soviet intentions with regard to Afghanistan and the increasingly precarious position of the Afghan Government. While stopping short of predicting with certitude the ultimate collapse of the Taraki-Amin regime and consequent military intervention by the Soviet Union, intelligence reporting noted two fundamental and interrelated trends: the Afghan Government was weakening in the face of the growing rebel insurgency, and in response the USSR was steadily increasing its efforts to equip and train the Afghan military in an attempt to contain and ultimately defeat the insurgency.

In intelligence memorandum SR M 79–10094, August 1, the Asia Branch of the Regional Analysis Division noted that control of Afghanistan was effectively split: “Anti-government forces control most of the countryside, while the Afghan Army controls the cities and main roads.” Further, the division of control was not necessarily static; the Afghan Army, the memorandum reported, was experiencing high rates of casualties and desertions—a manpower problem exacerbated by political purges of field grade officers from the previous year. The Afghan Air Force was suffering “acute shortages of qualified pilots and maintenance technicians.” The memorandum also observed that the presence of the Soviet military in Afghanistan had “more than doubled” since Taraki came to power in 1978. Soviet military advisers numbered between 1,000 and 2,000, and according to a field report by the Chief of Station in Kabul, July 31, the Soviet advisers have “virtually taken command” of the Afghan military units to which they were assigned. Further, the Soviets expanded the military supplies to Afghanistan, including increased shipments of tanks, artillery, and

ammunition. (Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Office of Support Services, Job 81T00031R: Production Case Files, Box 1, Afghanistan's Military Forces) The Chief of Station report is in the Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 7, USSR in Afghanistan (July 79)

In an August 2 CIA intelligence memorandum entitled "USSR-Afghanistan: The Case for Soviet Military Intervention," the Office of Political Analysis (OPA) provided an overview of the factors that could compel the Soviet leadership to send troops into Afghanistan. In light of the trends noted in the August 1 memorandum (above), and the fact that President Taraki and Prime Minister Amin had already appealed to Moscow "for more direct military involvement," the memorandum asserted "there would be strong arguments for those Soviet leaders inclined to more forceful measures to prevent an anti-Soviet government from coming to power on their southern flank." The memorandum noted the strategic and psychological ramifications the "loss" of Afghanistan would have for the Soviet Union, especially in light of its recent inability to prevent the Chinese invasion of Vietnam. Additionally, those arguing for intervention might see the political and economic liabilities of such an operation as manageable, given Afghanistan's close proximity to the Soviet Union and the fact that Afghanistan's neighbors, Iran and Pakistan, were already anti-Soviet. OPA went on to lay out a number of events that could lead to Soviet intervention. These included: rescue operations of Soviet personnel whose large presence itself already constituted a form of military intervention; tribal violence that embroiled nationality groups on either side of the Soviet-Afghan border; "significant increase in third party assistance" to the rebels from countries such as Pakistan or Iran; and a "serious threat" of rebels overtaking a major urban area such as Kabul. The memorandum concluded with an assessment of the varying degrees of intensity a Soviet intervention could take, ranging from limited operations involving air raids and tank units securing the Soviet-Afghan border, to a "full-fledged intervention" requiring military occupation of strategic areas throughout the country. The latter option, the memorandum asserted, would amount to a "last-ditch Soviet effort" to prevent the fall of the Afghan Government and one that would be complicated by Afghanistan's rugged terrain and an Islamic population that would mount "intense opposition" to the occupation. (Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council Files, Job 93T01324R, Box 4, Afghanistan)

In a more detailed look at the position and mobility of Soviet military forces in the event of an impending invasion, [name not declassified] Chief, USSR/EE Branch, noted in intelligence memorandum SR M 79-10100, August 7, that Soviet military advisers currently stationed

in Afghanistan could not, in their present formation, “conduct any significant unilateral operations” because they were lightly equipped and spread thin among all components of the Afghan military. Soviet military intervention would require an influx of troops from inside Soviet territory, with the closest units located in the Turkestan Military District, which housed 45,000 troops with an additional 50,000 reserves who could be called up within a week to get the District to wartime strength. Another six divisions were located in the Central Asian Military District but, the memorandum prognosticated, the Soviet leadership would probably be reluctant to redeploy those troops “for fear of weakening their position opposite China.” A faster influx of troops could be accomplished with the Soviet military’s airborne divisions. Airlift of “just one complete airborne division and its support units would, however, severely tax the capacity of the Soviet military transport fleet,” the memorandum noted, and it was unlikely any airlift of troops would be executed without “an eventual linkup of ground forces.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Office of Support Services, Job 81T00031R: Production Case Files, Box 1, Soviet Military Forces in and Near Afghanistan)

In a memorandum written three days later, August 10, Director of the Strategic Warning Staff Douglas MacEachin provided the National Intelligence Officer for Warning with three courses of action which the Soviets would likely choose regarding Afghanistan:

“a. Continue the present course of providing material support, advisors and technicians, but refrain from committing Soviet combat units (possibly at the same time continuing to seek a political solution).

“b. Commit a limited number of Soviet combat forces, sufficient to insure at least the security of Kabul and its immediate area, and perhaps a few other key centers.

“c. Commit large combat forces for the purpose of inflicting major military defeats on the insurgent forces and recapturing much of the territory now in rebel hands.”

Speaking on behalf of “most other community analysts,” MacEachin asserted that the third option was the least desirable for the Soviets, given the military and political challenges it would create. Instead, MacEachin predicted with “strong likelihood” that the Soviets would undertake option b, “and probably in the near future.” Without a limited intervention, MacEachin reasoned, the “USSR faces the likelihood of being forced to evacuate its mission from Afghanistan,” a development the Soviets would view as worse than any costs associated with limited military intervention. MacEachin saw the beginnings of a trap: “once having undertaken the increase in their military ante, however, the Soviets are likely to find themselves being drawn into the larger operation despite whatever resolve they might have to avoid it.” Although MacEachin specified that the intelligence community had

no “concrete evidence” that the Soviets had already decided on even a limited intervention, the evidence was, in his view, sufficiently strong to issue an alert memorandum, a vehicle by which the intelligence community intended to warn policymakers in advance of an intervention, rather than a report on a fait accompli. MacEachin based his argument on the fact that the Soviet military posture in Afghanistan “already has gone about as far as it can short of direct action by Soviet combat units,” and that the Soviets viewed some form of intervention, without which the Taraki regime would fall, as the “least bad” option. (Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council Files, Job 93T01324R, Box 4, Afghanistan) For the alert memorandum, see Document 62.

A more historically focused memorandum, drafted August 10 by H.C. Cochran of the CIA’s Strategic Warning Staff, examined the choices the Soviet Union faced in light of Soviet policy toward Afghanistan since tsarist times. Russia’s longstanding interest in exerting control in Afghanistan, coupled with its proximity to Soviet territory, and the socialist revolution in April 1978, made Afghanistan a “special case” in the minds of Soviet leaders, who ranked its priority well above the importance they attached to supporting “liberation movements” elsewhere in the Third World. Together, these factors “would seem to rule out the theoretical option of Soviet withdrawal and cutting of losses,” particularly because the Soviet leadership believed that a successor government to the Taraki regime would inevitably be composed of Muslim “counterrevolutionaries,” allied with Iran and Pakistan and hostile to the Soviet Union. Cochran argued that from Moscow’s vantage point, the situation was both high stakes and lacked any satisfactory low-risk options, presenting “Moscow with one of the most difficult foreign policy decisions since the Cuban missile crisis.” Further, the memorandum observed, the hesitancy the Soviet Union displayed in its Afghan policy over the past several months represented a “delayed recognition that the USSR had seriously miscalculated the strength of the forces opposed to the Taraki regime.” Cochran concluded by noting that the Soviets might still continue to consider all options, but the impending collapse of the Taraki regime—which Cochran calculated would come by the month’s end—would effectively preclude any non-military options the Soviets would consider, no matter the diplomatic and economic consequences. (Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council Files, Job 93T01324R, Box 4, Afghanistan)

The Office of Political Analysis and the Soviet Branch of the Regional Analysis Division each produced memoranda on Soviet options in Afghanistan dated August 17. The OPA memorandum, PA M 79-10378C, noted that despite significant successes mounted thus

far by insurgent groups, their capacity to challenge the Afghan Government remained limited: rebels had “been unable to take and hold any major town;” they had no means of procuring arms beyond “gun dealers” in Pakistan and whatever they could capture from the Afghan Army; and rebel groups were driven more by provincial desires to rid their territory of government influence than a unifying, countrywide effort to topple the Kabul regime. Still, the memorandum noted, these limitations did not mean the Afghan Government would be able to survive the insurgency, and in recent months Soviet political efforts to moderate antipathy toward the Taraki-Amin government had largely failed: Taraki and Amin still refused to broaden their political base; leading members of the Parchamist faction were under arrest; and the regime remained unremittingly hostile toward Pakistan despite the Soviet Union’s attempts to mitigate tensions between the two countries. Further, the memorandum noted, while the Soviets “should have sufficient assets to pull off a coup,” it remained unclear to them what kind of successor government would be preferable to their interests, and therefore “they probably see no alternative at present to trying to tough it out with Taraki and Amin, even though this option will almost certainly require still deeper Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Office of Support Services, Job 82T00267R: Production Case Files, Box 1, the Situation in Afghanistan and Soviet Options)

The second memorandum, SR M 79–10109J, built on Douglas MacEachin’s proposition that, for all intents and purposes, Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan was already underway. According to intelligence reporting, the memorandum noted, Soviet advisers had: accompanied Afghan patrols on the Pakistan border; operated tanks in fighting against rebels in the eastern provinces; coordinated defense plans of major Afghan cities; and might be flying helicopters in anti-insurgent operations. The various options before the Soviets to intensify its military presence in Afghanistan ranged from incremental increases of Soviet advisers to large-scale deployment of ground and airborne forces. The memorandum concluded with the assertion that the Soviet leaders “almost certainly do not believe” that anything short of the “most massive intervention options” would ensure that the Afghan Government was not overtaken by rebel forces. (Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council Files, Job 93T01324R, Box 4, Afghanistan)

On August 20, the Office of Political Analysis issued memorandum PA M 79–1038C, which raised many of the same points stated in previous memoranda, but argued that a full-scale military operation was not yet a foregone conclusion, contrary to Cochran’s analysis. It noted the possibility that increasingly intensive direct military operations

could provoke widespread defections from the Afghan Army to rebel forces, which in turn would require a full-scale military intervention. While “there is no question that the Soviets could install a regime of their choosing with a massive military intervention,” the memorandum argued, a gutted Afghan Army would require an “open-ended” commitment of regular ground force divisions. Thus, “we see few signs that the Soviets are so wedded to leftist rule in Afghanistan that they will undertake an operation of this magnitude. Their unwillingness to label this regime Communist when its leaders clearly view themselves as such, and their willingness to talk to non-Communist figures from old regimes about participation in a new government suggests they have long been mindful of the possibility that the leftist experiment in Afghanistan will fail.” (National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I-047, Afghanistan: 15 Feb 1979–22 Aug 1979)

In a memorandum to Arnold L. Horelick, NIO for USSR-EE, the NIO for Conventional Forces added a military dimension to assumed Soviet considerations that might point away from a full-scale military intervention in Afghanistan: such an operation would “appear to require undertakings, quite unlike the massive armor-heavy thrusts against clearly-defined objectives which have heretofore been the Soviet forte. Seizure of Kabul offers no finality, like that of Berlin, Budapest, or Prague. The Soviet advisors with the Afghan Army have been at it long enough to have reported the frustrations and costs of trying to winkle the will-o’-the-wisp insurgents out of the hills, and to have assessed for Moscow the ephemeral fighting qualities of their Afghan allies.” Even in the event of an “anti-Soviet regime seizing power” in Afghanistan, which might compel such an intervention, it would be unlikely that Soviet planners “would contemplate a swift (large-scale) strike like those into Hungary and Czechoslovakia—nothing much to strike against; no assurance that, having struck, any decisive political or military change in the internal security situation would eventuate; and no threat of external counter-intervention to forestall.” Instead, the memorandum argued, the Soviets would employ “recourse to classic counter-guerilla strategy, *tache d’huile*—seizure of Kabul plus other centers which would constitute a minimal Soviet-controlled Afghan polity, creation of a ‘legitimate’ Afghan regime, and retrenchment of the Afghan Army.” (Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council Files, Job 81B00080R, Box 11, NI IIM 79-100225, [*cable number not declassified*] 28 Sept 79, Soviet Options in Afghanistan)

The CIA ended its August reporting on an equivocal note. Intelligence information cable [*cable number not declassified*], August 27, noted the challenges facing both the Afghan Government and the insurgency. For the former, the only positive development was a “non-event” in that “the government had not lost control of any major urban area

during the month." Still, the cable reported, the insurgents' tactics had grown more sophisticated, and government forces struggled to control major urban areas and the transportation routes connecting them. Meanwhile, the insurgents confronted the same problem that had plagued their campaigns since 1978: while the government enjoyed loyalty from only about 20 percent of the population, the insurgents could claim even less; and politically, rebel leaders had not unified their forces—a fact, the cable observed, that was "part of the reason this regime survives." With the coming winter, the cable concluded, the advantage might shift to the Afghan Government, which would take advantage of the inevitable slowdown in insurgent activity to shore up its support among the Afghan people, of whom more "may come to realize that even an odious government is better than none." (Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 7, USSR in Afghanistan (August 79))

57. Telegram From the Consulate in Lahore to the Embassies in Pakistan and Afghanistan¹

Lahore, August 16, 1979, 0710Z

1098. Subject: Call by Afghan Rebel Leader. Ref State 173258 (Notal).²

1. (C—Entire text.)

2. Summary: Gailani of (moderate religious) National Front for Islamic Revolution of Afghanistan claims that major advances being made against Taraki regime, that it will fall in two months, but that thereafter there may be confrontation among victors, between his "liberal" and ultra-conservative religious rebel groups. Latter group receiving most outside financial support now; their ascendancy would insure USSR entry en masse into Afghanistan to forestall development of "Khomeini-like" force with possible influence on Soviet-Muslim border areas. "Liberal" ascendancy on other hand would be something USSR could live with, and would not stimulate massive Soviet intervention.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790378–1327. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated for information to Jidda, Moscow, and the Department of State. A copy of the telegram was also found in the Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 7, USSR in Afghanistan (August 79).

² Telegram 173258 to Islamabad is dated July 4. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790304–0500)

Gailani asked that U.S. urge Saudi Arabia to provide major material assistance to Front as rebel force favored by U.S. He was informed we play no favorites in current civil war. End summary.

3. August 15, Louis Dupree, American universities field staff/Lahore, requested appointment with ConGen and without indicating he was bringing guest, appeared with Syed Ahmad Gailani, leader National Front for Islamic Revolution of Afghanistan (reftel). To avoid offense to an important rebel religious leader, ConGen had no alternative but to receive him. As expected, he asked for U.S. support but only indirectly, to encourage Saudi Arabia to provide material assistance. Request was duly declined.

4. Gailani reported that his forces, operating from Pakistan and in Afghanistan, now number 70,000 and could be swelled to 200,000 (cf. Afghan army strength of reportedly up to 100,000). Gailani claimed his men now total 90 percent of all rebel fighting contingents. At present, they have adequate equipment but need ammunition and want financial support.

5. In contrast, various ultra-conservative religious rebel elements are getting funds. An unidentified Arab recently appeared in Peshawar with \$3 million, to be distributed through Jamaat-I-Islami. Money to ultra-conservatives attracts peripheral groups to their side, while "liberal" Gailani forces are getting only minor contributions from abroad. Yet former doing hardly any of fighting.

6. Gailani said he had recently met with Prince Fahd, "main power" in Saudi Arabia, and had been assured Saudis support NFIRA over ultra-conservative groups. However, Saudis hesitant to initiate major flow of aid to Front unless U.S. indicates latter is its favorite among dissident forces. Gailani also has met with ex-King Zahir Shah, who similarly favors NFIRA. (Zahir wants to return to Kabul but "not as King"; relatives are more ambitious, Gailani said.)

7. Both Gailani and Dupree emphasized that now was critical period for support for NFIRA, as liberal vs. ultra-conservative confrontation growing. It was important that former win out because if latter does, USSR will move into Afghanistan in force. Moscow not willing to stand idly by as a "Khomeini-like" movement takes over Afghanistan and spreads anti-Communist, ultra-conservative Islamic influence into Soviet-Muslim border areas. On other hand, USSR might be willing to countenance a "liberal" takeover, returning Afghanistan to status quo ante—nonaligned, with necessary tilt toward traditional friend to north. Gailani urged that U.S. should move now, indicate preference for NFIRA and encourage Saudis to make substantial contribution to cause. In this way, Front would be strengthened against ultra-conservatives, and after overthrow of Taraki regime, Afghanistan would be spared a further war (between liberals and conservatives).

8. Gailani said Taraki regime would be toppled in two months. Most of Afghanistan area along border, from Torkham (near Peshawar) to Chaman (near Quetta), now under NFIRA dominance. Afghan Army brigade (two battalions), which according to press has surrendered to dissidents, actually defected to Front near Abu Kala (70.8 miles east of Kandahar). Urgan and Gardez virtually surrounded by Front (respectively 60 miles southeast and 50 miles east from Ghazni, main town on highway between Kandahar and Kabul). Pincer movement now planned against Ghazni itself, by Front from east, in coordination with Hazara Shias from mountainous area west of town. Combined forces may then move northward toward Kabul.

9. Government troops in area mostly new raw recruits. Officer corps dominated by Khalqi political commissars. Gailani estimates that at present there may not be more than 15 Soviet advisors to government military force in area. Latter however fight to bitter end; NFIRA has no Soviet prisoners—those captured alive are killed. Gailani said professional Afghan Army troops largely concentrated in Kabul area. He described Nooristan as “practically independent” and Paktia almost so.

10. ConGen informed Gailani that U.S. not disposed to provide any support, direct or indirect, to any parties in Afghan civil war. Gailani said he had spoken to American Ambassador in Jidda and might want to make contact with Embassy in Islamabad.

Fuller

58. Intelligence Appraisal Prepared in the Department of Defense¹

[*appraisal number not declassified*]

Washington, August 21, 1979

[Omitted here is a cover page.]

¹ Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I-047, Afghanistan: 15 Feb 1979–22 Aug 1979. Top Secret; [*codeword and handling restriction not declassified*]. The appraisal was attached at Tab E to an August 22 memorandum from Henze to Denend, not printed, that responded to Mondale’s request for information on Afghanistan. Henze did not specify when Mondale made the request.

AFGHANISTAN: TRIBAL REBELLION (U)

Summary

(C) Afghan tribal and religious leaders have historically resisted government encroachments. Central authority has always been weak in the provinces except when tied to local leaders. With the encouragement and support of disaffected elements of the ruling elite, serious opposition by traditional forces has invariably resulted in political change in Kabul. Only in 1929, however, did tribal rebels manage to take the capital and then were unable to hold it.

([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]) The present rebellion began within a month of the April 1978 coup by the leftist Khalqi group. Almost immediate implementation of far-reaching reforms, degradation of Islam, alliance with the USSR, and extension of close government control into the lowest levels of society produced strong and steadily escalating opposition in the countryside. The government managed to contain dissent through much of 1978 but not suppress it, largely because of the depth of discontent and its own preoccupation with consolidating the revolution.

([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]) No distinct pattern of tribal opposition is evident, nor are the numbers of rebels known. Violence has occurred throughout Afghanistan and has involved elements of all five major ethnic groups and many minor ones. The fighting is generally confined to tribal valley homelands. Islam and hatred of the Soviets and godless leftists serve as unifying motives for rebellion, but they are not strong enough to produce a coordinated rebellion. Despite much publicity, calls for a holy war, and inflated claims, most exile groups play a very small role in the fighting or its support.

([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]) In the past several months rebel forces, aided by army defectors and captured equipment, have demonstrated improved capabilities in some areas and continued to expand the rebellion. Rebels are now able to operate freely in 20 of 28 provinces, and the recent outbreak of serious fighting in three major areas is severely taxing government forces. Nevertheless, without some additional catalyst, such as a military collapse, the rebels lack the capability to remove the regime.

([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]) The threat to the government stems less from rebel strength than Army weakness. The Army has never been tested in battle nor trained in counterinsurgency. Despite extensive Soviet support and the presence of about 2,000 military advisers, Army capabilities continue to decline. The Army holds only the major towns and provincial capitals, but increasingly it has been unable to secure the roads between them.

Frustrated at fighting a no-win struggle, poorly trained, dependent on tenuous air resupply, and badly overextended, some units have refused to fight. More important, at the recent rate of losses and desertions major units may be unable to maintain organizational integrity and combat effectiveness through the winter.

(*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*) As the government's power base has narrowed, the Army's role as the primary national-level stabilizing institution has become critical. Neither non-Khalqi officers nor the Soviet advisers are likely to allow the Army to collapse or be sacrificed. Before such a development, key military units in Kabul are likely to turn on the government. Such a struggle could result in anarchy, and the outcome is far from clear. In the event of a power vacuum in Kabul, a tribe or combination of rebel tribes might seize the capital, but this would only aggravate the bloodshed. In any case, serious violence in Kabul and political change seem almost inevitable and could occur at any time.

[Omitted here is the body of the appraisal.]

59. Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, August 22, 1979

SUBJECT

CIA Covert Action Activities in Afghanistan

1. Since the signing by the President on 3 July of Specific and General Findings on Afghanistan (attached), CIA has initiated action to implement this policy.² The following provides a status report on such action.

2. *The Specific Finding*: This Finding tasked CIA to carry out three options approved at a meeting of the Special Coordination Committee on 26 June. Those options and related actions follow.

¹ Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I-047, Afghanistan: 15 Feb 1979–22 Aug 1979. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. The report was attached at Tab C to an August 22 memorandum from Henze to Denend, not printed, that responded to Mondale's request for information on Afghanistan. Henze did not specify when Mondale made the request.

² Attached at Tab B to Henze's August 22 memorandum to Denend, but not printed. For the Presidential Finding approved at the June 26 SCC meeting, see footnote 5, Document 53.

A. Option 1: Provide International Radio Capability and Expand Insurgent Propaganda

—Initially, the possibility was explored of using [*less than 1 line not declassified*] radio facilities for a “Voice of Afghanistan” program. This was rejected for political considerations. CIA is considering use of [*less than 1 line not declassified*] radio for such broadcasts.

—A special team of propaganda and linguistic experts has been assembled and is producing both broadcast and printed material for distribution inside Afghanistan. Six leaflets have been produced and two of these have been circulated in Afghanistan, including Kabul. Four tape cassettes have been recorded with two of these distributed in Afghanistan. Radio material is being produced regularly for a low-power insurgent radio now operating near the Afghan-Pakistan border.

B. Option 2: Provide Cash and Nonlethal Support to the Insurgents

The amount of [*amount not declassified*] was established for this purpose. The following actions have been taken:

—[*amount not declassified*] has been handed to a Nuristani asset in support of that tribe’s unique insurgency effort.³

—A principal Afghan asset with excellent ties to the Peshawar insurgent leadership is enroute to Pakistan to provide [*amount not declassified*] to aid a coalition of dissident Afghan leaders.

—Pakistan liaison has agreed in principle to serve as a channel for CIA aid to the insurgents. We have not as yet pressed them to convey money. We believe the next week or two will provide a clearer idea as to whom the balance of the funds [*amount not declassified*] would best be given, unilaterally or through liaison.

—Action is being taken to assemble up to 50 medical kits for the insurgents, one kit serving 50 men.

C. Option 3: Establish a Psychological Operations Program in Pakistan

We have discussed with Pakistan liaison their interest in providing to the insurgents a dependable broadcast capability. In judging this local capability by the insurgents to be even more important than the projected international broadcasts of Option 1 above, CIA has taken the following action:

—Located and ordered for immediate delivery a shortwave broadcast transmitter with backup equipment which will permit the insurgents to cover nearly one-half of Afghanistan. This transmitter package, sturdy and lightweight, will be ready for shipment 10 September. Pakistan liaison has agreed to position the transmitter for the insurgents.

3. *The General Finding:* This Finding tasked the worldwide covert action infrastructure to expose the Kabul regime as despotic and subservient to the Soviets, and to publicize insurgent activities. A Perspectives

³ The Nuristani are an ethnic group indigenous to northeastern Afghanistan.

was coordinated with Department of State on 3 August and sent to the field. Under this Perspectives and an earlier one on Soviet Interference in Other Countries Affairs, the following has been accomplished:

- 145 major items have been placed in the media of 35 countries.
- Regular monthly briefings on Afghanistan are being provided friendly liaisons.
- Briefings have been utilized by 23 agents of influence.

All portions of this document are SECRET.

60. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State¹

Kabul, August 25, 1979, 0703Z

6398. Subj: The Future of the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan: Some Thoughts. Ref: Kabul 6396.²

1. (S—Entire text)

2. Summary. I think it very important that those directly concerned with our policy towards Afghanistan read the cable under reference. It is another chilling report about one of our FSNs being tortured. The significance of the incidence however goes well beyond the discomfiture experienced by our employee. It is to that aspect I address this msg. End summary.

3. Our presence in Kabul is, in my view, faced with three perils. The first is, of course, the insurgency and the related possibility of an internal coup, either of which could bring physical harm to members of the small American community.

4. The second danger relates to the brutal intimidation being experienced by our FSNs. Nowhere else in the Foreign Service today, I venture, are our locals being subjected to such gross mistreatment by the host govt. The DRA is obviously bent on penetrating this Mission, regardless of human rights considerations, to develop hopefully “proof” of USG subversive activities. In this they are undoubtedly being assisted by the Soviets. The implications of this DRA policy are

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790388–0115. Secret; Immediate; Exdis; Stadis.

² Telegram 6369 from Kabul is dated August 25. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])

worrisome. Not only does it confirm the enmity which Hafizullah Amin has for the United States (the secret police are under his direct control), but it raises a real concern about the safety of our American personnel. As Langley and SY can confirm, this govt is, quite aside from intimidating our employees, also making an all-out effort to plant listening devices in our residences, and we can only assume they have been successful in many instances. The experience too of the Pakistan Embassy here, wherein its Pak employees have been harassed and one abducted (in somewhat mysterious circumstances) shows that the DRA is not above ignoring diplomatic immunities and international standards of decency. In sum, I worry that at some point Hafizullah Amin may arrest one of our American employees, on doctored or circumstantial evidence, in order to "prove" some point of his or hold us hostage.

5. Third, we have a nettlesome problem with respect to the DRA's apparent determination to reduce the size of this Mission. This is again, I suspect, related to Hafizullah Amin's semi-psychopathic desire to humiliate and revenge himself against the United States.³ In this msg I do not want to prejudge the outcome, but I am not sanguine we can maintain a Mission of some 45 employees. Needless to say, I do not relish the prospect of presiding over a humiliating, forced reduction of the United States presence by a small and one of the most unsavory govts in the world today.

6. Complicating the above scenario is the still unfinished business of who was responsible for Ambassador Dubs's death. I do not want in this msg to get into this subject either, but as the Dept knows, we continue to get disturbing reports about Hafizullah Amin's role in the affair.

7. In sum, I send this msg because I am worried about our presence here, not only for the safety of our Americans but for the honor of the U.S. Govt in the face of Hafizullah's enmity for us. One of the possible recommendations I am turning over in my mind, and the Dept may wish to mull this over as well, is whether we shouldn't reduce our

³ Three days later, the Embassy reported in telegram 6483 from Kabul, August 28, that "anti-U.S. blasts were the order of the day" during the "International Conference of Solidarity with the People of Afghanistan," sponsored by what the Embassy characterized as the "Communist front" World Peace Council of Helsinki. Amin gave the keynote speech on August 24, and the conference proceedings, which were published in the local media and thus suggested official Afghan endorsement, included the charge that "armed intervention from across Afghanistan's borders is entirely the work of the United States" and there was "no support within Afghanistan for this intervention." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790392-1083; a copy of the telegram was also found in the Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 7, USSR in Afghanistan (August 79))

staff further, even at the cost of handicapping our ability to serve as a listening post.⁴

Amstutz

⁴ The United States Mission in Afghanistan had already been reduced the previous month. See footnote 3, Document 55.

61. Memorandum From Marshall Brement of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, September 8, 1979

SUBJECT

The establishment of an Afghan Liberation Front

The more over-extended the Soviets feel, the better off we will be and the less likely that they will undertake reckless future action. Afghanistan has all the earmarks of a situation in which the Soviets could become embroiled endlessly. The only thing that is missing is a sense of unity on the part of the opposition.

I therefore believe that we would derive great benefits if the various Afghan exiles, together with representatives of the tribal groups doing the actual fighting, could get together and proclaim an Afghan Liberation Front (ALF) analogous to the NLF, which was such an effective device for the Vietnamese. Like the NLF, the Front could be across a wide spectrum that would include women's groups, Royalists—even avowed Communists. The stated aim of the ALF would be to rally world opinion behind the Afghan freedom fighters' heroic struggle

¹ Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I-047, Afghanistan: 11 Sep 1979–22 Jul 1980. Top Secret; Sensitive; Outside the System. Sent for action. Attached but not printed is a September 11 covering note from Brement to Henze and Gregg asking "to get together with you on this ASAP." Below Brement's request, Gregg wrote a note to Henze reporting he had met with two CIA officials, September 12, who told him that a liberation front existed outside Afghanistan but was fragmented and not in contact with rebels in Afghanistan.

against the forceful imposition of an atheistic Soviet regime in their homeland.

Like the NLF, the Front should establish links to other similar groups and set up offices throughout the world. It should, if handled correctly, receive support from all the Muslims, from Iran, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, to Algeria, Libya and Iraq. Not least of all, it would offer many people in the United States and in Western Europe the opportunity to demonstrate their consistency in having opposed us in Viet Nam and in opposing a Soviet-backed regime in Afghanistan as well.

Because of longstanding rivalry, it will be very difficult to get some of these groups to cooperate with each other. But with a little effort and a lot of money, it might be possible to bring this about. The one thing that should be avoided in an operation of this kind, of course, is the appearance that this is a US undertaking. I would therefore suggest that we approach the Chinese with this idea and determine whether they would be willing to carry the ball and work together with the Pakistanis and perhaps the Iranians to set up such an organization.

RECOMMENDATION

That I work with David in investigating what it would take in the way of US resources to help in the establishment of an ALF.²

Thornton concurs, but is not optimistic that Joan Baez and Jane Fonda can be persuaded to support the organization.³

² Brzezinski placed a checkmark approving the recommendation and wrote: "Speak also to DG, PH" in the right margin; a reference to Donald Gregg and Paul Henze.

³ An unknown hand, possibly Bremont's, wrote: "at least not together" underneath this sentence.

62. Alert Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

NI IAM 79–10012K

Washington, September 14, 1979

*[additional memorandum number not declassified]***ALERT MEMORANDUM²****USSR-Afghanistan**

The Soviets may have begun to give more serious consideration to the spectrum of possibilities for direct combat intervention in Afghanistan. We are watching Soviet forces near Afghanistan closely but our collection capabilities there are poor, and we cannot confirm or deny reports that the Soviets have introduced or are preparing to introduce small combat units into Afghanistan; however, we do not see preparations for a large scale ground force intervention. There are no indications of changes in the status of the Soviet [1 line not declassified] near the Soviet border. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])

Our judgment of an increased Soviet concern is fortified by the mid-August arrival in Kabul of General Pavlovskiy, Commander of the Soviet Ground Forces, and a high-level delegation which includes several other generals and colonels, reportedly to prepare a detailed report on the Afghan insurgency and the Afghan military. Pavlovskiy is probably charged with assessing the extent of the threat to the Afghan government and preparing contingency plans which will outline the amount and nature of Soviet military support needed to contain that

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council Files, Job 94T00046R, Box2, SWS Products on Afghanistan. Top Secret; [code word and handling restriction not declassified]. Attached but not printed is a September 14 memorandum from Turner to the National Security Council that read: "The Soviet leaders may be on the threshold of a decision to commit their own forces to prevent the collapse of the Taraki regime and protect their sizable stake in Afghanistan. Small Soviet combat units may already have arrived in the country. I am concerned that the Soviets may be underestimating the difficulties of shoring up the regime and may find themselves under growing pressures to escalate the scope of their intervention in the next few months. Moreover, the Soviets may now be more inclined to gamble on a substantial intervention in Afghanistan because of their perception of a downturn in relations with the US and the uncertain prospects for Senate approval of the SALT treaty."

² The Alert Memorandum is an interagency publication issued by the Director of Central Intelligence on behalf of the Intelligence Community. Its purpose is to ensure that senior policymakers are aware of the serious implications for US interests of impending political developments. It is not a prediction that these developments will occur. This memorandum has been coordinated at the working level by CIA, [less than 1 line not declassified], NSA, and State/INR. [Footnote is in the original.]

threat, both in its current stage and if it worsens.³ (*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*)

As opposition to the Afghan government has increased over the past year, the Soviets have gradually augmented their military advisory presence. Early this year, at least five generals and an estimated 750–1000 military advisors were stationed in the Kabul area, assisting newly promoted officers in the Ministry of Defense and training Afghan recruits. Since then, the Soviet presence has grown to at least 2,500. Moreover, the role of Soviet troops has increasingly changed from a mere advisory one to active participation in and supervision of a wide variety of activity including logistics and combat planning functions as far down as some regimental and battalion-level units. They are apparently heavily involved in guiding Afghan combat operations, as well as logistics and administration. Some unconfirmed reports allege that Soviet helicopter pilots, with Afghan co-pilots, have flown strike missions against the insurgents and that Soviet tank personnel have participated in combat operations. In addition, Soviet advisors have reportedly suffered about 80 casualties. If these reports are true, the Soviets are also actively participating in combat on a small and limited scale with Afghan units. (*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*)

[*less than 1 line not declassified*] in early September that the Soviets have moved up to 3,600 troops into Kabul within the past two or three weeks to protect Soviet facilities and personnel there. The information has not been corroborated, but Embassy Kabul has submitted similar reports from two other sources in the diplomatic community.⁴ It is possible that such a force, without heavy equipment, could have been brought into the city from the USSR undetected by the US, particularly if this was done incrementally over a few weeks or so as part of the ongoing airlift of material for Afghanistan. Such a movement of forces by the Soviets would suggest increased security precautions and an escalation of Soviet involvement beyond an advisory role. The Soviets might consider such a move into Kabul to be prudent in view of the uprisings that have occurred in Kabul this year and the continuing

³ The mission of the Deputy Chief of the Soviet General Staff, General I.G. Pavlovskiy, to Afghanistan, August–October 1979, was reported in telegram 6604 from Kabul, September 2. The Embassy surmised that the visit of the high-ranking general possibly signaled a Soviet decision to lay a “detailed contingency groundwork for the future intervention of Soviet forces in Afghanistan.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790400–1145)

⁴ The clandestine source reporting of early September was not found. [*text, 1 line, and citation not declassified*] In telegram 6672 from Kabul, September 6, the Embassy estimated the number of Soviet military advisers at between 3,000 and 3,500. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790410–0099)

possibility of violence in the capital. (*[classification marking, codeword, and handling restriction not declassified]*)

In expanding the level of their own involvement in Afghanistan, there is a danger that the Soviets—consciously or unconsciously—will amplify their own stake in the ultimate outcome, making it increasingly difficult for them to resist raising the level of their participation still another notch should they feel it necessary. (*[classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]*)

[Section heading not declassified]

[2 paragraphs (10½ lines) not declassified]

63. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State¹

Kabul, September 16, 1979, 0502Z

6914. Subject: Hafizullah Amin Takes Over Rule in Afghanistan. Ref: Kabul 6913.²

1. (C—Entire text.)

2. At 2000 hours, Kabul time, on September 16, Kabul television announced that Noor Mohammed Taraki had informed the Politburo of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) and the Revolutionary Council that he was "sick" and could no longer undertake the duties of office. At Politburo and Revolutionary Council sessions chaired on September 16 by Foreign Minister Shah Wali, who had been the third-ranking official of the Khalqi hierarchy, those bodies decided to name Hafizullah Amin as President of the Revolutionary Council and Secretary-General of the PDPA. Amin would also retain his title as Prime Minister.

3. The television announcement also revealed that four persons had been killed at the Arg palace ("House of the People") on September 14th. Among the dead was Sayed Daoud Taroon, Chef du Cabinet of President Taraki—and former Police Commandant of Afghanistan.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790423–0306. Confidential; Flash. Sent for information Immediate to Ankara, Beijing, Dacca, Islamabad, Jidda, Karachi for RSS, London, Moscow, USNATO, New Delhi, Paris, Peshawar, Tehran, USUN, CINCPAC also for POLAD, and CINCEUR also for POLAD.

² Telegram 6913 is dated September 16. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790422–1274)

There are rumors at Kabul, not touched upon by this television announcement, that Taraki was wounded in that same encounter.³ Flags will fly at half-mast on September 17 for "martyr" Taroon.

4. As of 2100 hours Kabul is quiet, but several tanks and nervous troops still guard the streets near the Embassy. The customary 2300 hour curfew has been announced for tonight. We have a staff at the Embassy who will continue to monitor events throughout the evening.

5. Comment: Amin now takes over undisputed control of the party and the government, having already exercised undisputed operational control since the revolution. Many of the victims of the past several days (through death and through purges), such as former Interior Minister Mohammed Aslam Watanjar and Taroon, were persons who were considered supporters of Taraki, rather than Amin. The Embassy will be analyzing these developments further in subsequent messages.⁴

6. Taroon's passing will go largely unmourned. This brutal, psychopathic killer was second only to Amin in the amount of blood on his hands.

Amstutz

³ A message, September 17, [text and 1 line not declassified]. According to the report, Amin's guards attempted to kill three high-ranking Afghan Government ministers, whose fate at the time of reporting was unknown. The following day, Amin and Taroon were shot at while they were walking to Taraki's office. Taroon was killed while Amin "miraculously escaped." Following this incident, military units "besieged" the palace, during which Taraki may have been killed. [text and 3 lines not declassified] The report further surmised that Amin took these actions without "connivance" with Moscow. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 91T00761R, Box 2, Taraki, Nur Mohammed)

⁴ See Document 65.

64. Memorandum From Thomas Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, September 17, 1979

SUBJECT

What Are the Soviets Doing In Afghanistan? (S)

Simply, we don't know. Speculation is, however, intriguing. (S)

There appear to be three possibilities:

1. The entire sequence over the weekend (dismissal of the military in the cabinet; retirement of Taraki; Amin's announcement of the end of one-man leadership) was stage-managed by the Soviets as a way of getting a more acceptable government installed in Kabul. This doesn't seem likely. The Soviets made quite a fuss over Taraki last week in Moscow; Taraki would have been a much better figurehead for a national front government in Afghanistan; and the Soviets would not seem to have any reason to do in the military faction. This would seem to be the least likely explanation.² (S)

2. Amin is doing the whole thing in defiance of the Soviets, facing them with a *fait accompli*. This would be a high-stakes game for him, but he is capable of it. It is not clear, however, why Amin would now be calling for broadened leadership unless that is solely window-dressing or nothing more than a gratuitous slap at Taraki. (S)

3. Amin started out on his own, but after the dropping of Taraki, the Soviets stepped in, called his bluff, and are now forcing him to accept a collective leadership—something the Soviets have probably been looking for for quite a while. (S)

We have no evidence that proves or disproves any of these. High levels of Soviet [*less than 1 line not declassified*] before the ouster of the military men may denote foreknowledge, but not necessarily complicity.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton, Country File, Box 91, Afghanistan: 5/78–12/79. Top Secret; Codeword. Sent for information.

² In telegram 21969 from Moscow, September 13, the Embassy reported that Taraki was in Moscow September 9–11, during which he secured an "authoritative reaffirmation" of the Soviet Union's commitment to the Afghan "people," which the telegram noted was vague, as opposed to a more specific commitment to the Afghan Government. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790418–0686)

ity.³ As between the second and third explanations, I like the second one since I think that Amin would have held out longer in his bluff against the Soviets, and will doubt his vague professions of future collegiality until he starts implementing them. That, however, is only a guess. (TS/Codeword)

It is hard to see how the Soviets can come out winners no matter which is the case. They tried before to put a national front together and failed, probably because nobody else would play. Why would anybody be more willing to sign on now—unless the Soviets could give credible guarantees that there would be a genuine sharing of power? That doesn't seem too likely. And, given the growing weakness of the regime, why would anybody want to share power now when they might get the whole thing shortly? (There may be in fact reasons that would impel people to do so, arising perhaps from inter-tribal considerations. But I don't understand these and know nobody who does.) (S)

Most likely, the Soviets have just been pushed a big step nearer to their moment of truth in Afghanistan. In this game of "Ten Little Afghans," there is now only one left. (S)

Whatever the Soviet role in this, they should be made to look as if they had a hand in the operation. Taraki was something of a Lenin figure and had a degree of foreign respect. Amin is the Stalin of the drama and the Soviets should have him hung prominently around their necks. (S)

Bremont concurs.

³ This uncertainty was reflected in a September 17 intelligence note for the Secretary of Defense, which stated that on the one hand [*text not declassified*] "possibly reflected" Soviet foreknowledge; on the other, Soviet facilities and residential areas in Kabul only received extra protection in reaction to the fighting that broke out at the palace, thus suggesting Amin's move took the Soviets by surprise. (Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 4, USSR in Afghanistan (September 79)) In telegram 7063 from Kabul, September 22, the Embassy reported that Vasily Safronchuk, Minister-Counselor of the Soviet Embassy, denied that the Soviets had any advance knowledge of the takeover. (Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 5, Soviets in Afghanistan—General Part #1) A situation report prepared in the CIA, September 18, found "no evidence" of Soviet complicity in Taraki's ouster, and cited the unlikelihood that Brezhnev would have met with Taraki during his visit to Moscow had Brezhnev known Taraki's fate. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 6, Afghan Crisis—Pubs Pre-Invasion Reporting) A CIA intelligence information cable, September 19, quoted Aleksandr Puzanov, Soviet Ambassador to Afghanistan, who allegedly told the Yugoslav Ambassador to Afghanistan that Brezhnev and Taraki had discussed replacing Amin as Prime Minister. According to this report, Amin learned of the discussion and was consequently prepared for the "power play" of September 14. (Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 4, USSR in Afghanistan (September 79))

65. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State¹

Kabul, September 18, 1979, 1149Z

6978. Subject: Some Reflections on the Afghanistan Political Crisis.

1. (C—Entire text).

2. I think it must be quite evident to the Dept and addressee posts that we are witnessing a very significant political crisis in Afghanistan. In this regard, I would like to highlight some aspects and share some personal thoughts:

—The crisis is not over. At this point in time the loyalty of the DRA military units in such areas as Ghanzi, Kandahar and Kunduz is not clear, and there are widespread reports (and some evidence) that the three deposed military figures in the Cabinet (Watanjar, Gulabzoi, and Mazdooryar) have managed to escape the city and are at large. It is quite possible that civil war among major DRA military units could ensue, led by pro-Taraki or otherwise anti-Amin elements. Here in Kabul, we are very much aware that the political situation remains tense. Major streets adjacent to important ministries remain blocked off to regular traffic, and here at the Chancery, manned Soviet-built tanks are stationed astride the three streets bordering the Embassy property. We can't enter or exit by the front gate because the street is closed, so we are using our emergency back gate, but do so under the barrel of a large T-62 tank. It is all a bit unnerving, but something certainly to write home to mother about.

—For 18 months now we have watched this Marxist party (PDPA) devour itself. An Afghan official last night quietly described the leadership to an Embassy officer as a "bunch of scorpions biting each other to death." By way of illustration, there have been 25 Cabinet changes since the original list was promulgated in April 1978. The number of Deputy Minister changes has been even more: 34. Purge after purge has occurred, and one can't help wonder how the regime manages to survive. Part of the answer is, of course, brutal suppression of perceived opposition. The number of political prisoners killed may have reached 6,000, and probably more than four times that number have been in and out of political jails.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790426-0729. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis. Sent for information to Islamabad, Moscow, New Delhi, and Tehran.

—The insurgency during this crisis period has been inept and quiescent. It has not taken advantage of the political crisis to push its advantage.

—I don't know what the future will bring. Amin has amazingly survived plot after plot against him. Surely the law of averages should catch up with him someday. But then Stalin died in bed. Personally, I would give him no better odds than 50 per cent to survive in power this calendar year. I give his chances of dying in bed of old age as nil. I would though, lay higher odds that the party itself (PDPA) will survive in control in some form.

3. It is an interesting time to be in Kabul. Let's hope nobody gets hurt.

Amstutz

66. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Murray) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McGiffert)¹

Washington, September 21, 1979

SUBJECT

Afghanistan

NSC staff member, Tom Thornton, used a meeting in his office yesterday afternoon to produce a list of options on Afghanistan for the President to consider on Friday morning at the "Breakfast of Champions"—with Zbig and Cy. Thornton said the list would not be presented as a cleared agenda of action but as a guide to discussion.

Thornton said that [*less than 1 line not declassified*] it was predicted the Soviets were on the verge of a large scale military intervention which had produced in the White House staff a feeling that intervention would doom SALT, and strong U.S. diplomatic action would be required to prevent such intervention or try to counter it. Thornton proposed to work out options on the basis of what we might do if

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Donated Material of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, Box 82, Afghanistan. Secret; Sensitive.

such an intervention does not occur and, alternatively, if it does. (See Tab A.)²

DIA is skeptical [*less than 1 line not declassified*] that there is a battalion of Soviet airborne already in Kabul, with a full division getting ready to follow. [*1 line not declassified*] made the point that in the first instance our concern should be with SALT. Thus, while we might want to deplore Soviet presence in Afghanistan, we do not want to create expectations of actions on our part or concessions on the Soviet part if neither was likely to materialize. This could contribute to the defeat of SALT in the Senate. The other argument [*less than 1 line not declassified*] was that, notwithstanding the importance and difficulty of our discussions with the Soviets on removal of the Soviet brigade from Cuba, we should not pass up the opportunity to tell them that intervention in Afghanistan could doom the treaty just as surely as continued problems on the brigade in Cuba.

Thornton and others did not accept that we should add the Afghanistan item to our talks with the Soviets tomorrow (I knew nothing about them) but said the item would be taken up by Vance with Gromyko in New York on the 27th.³

On the other point, however, a consensus emerged on demarches to regional and other capitals which would avoid overstating our interest, our need to react, and our demands on the Soviets in a way that would box us in with SALT critics here. The demarches are to focus on the—

—Soviet-South Asia relationship, not the Soviet-U.S. relationship.

—Possibilities of further expansion of the Soviet role in a civil war in Afghanistan.

—In this way we could get the publicity we sought for Soviet action—perhaps inspiring a wide and adverse public and diplomatic

² Tab A, a paper dated September 20, is attached but not printed. The paper, organized in two parts, outlined actions the United States could take before and after a Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and called such an action a “watermark event of global import.” The paper emphasized that the United States could not be perceived to be responsible for Afghanistan’s security and that Afghanistan must not be understood as a Soviet-U.S. bilateral problem. Prior to a Soviet intervention, the paper argued that the United States should remain in strong consultation with its regional and strategic allies and must raise public consciousness to foster global condemnation of any Soviet moves into Afghanistan. The paper also argued against military assistance to rebel forces in Afghanistan or military moves in the region. Following Soviet intervention, the United States should consider closing down the Embassy in Kabul, complaining to the Soviet leadership that the intervention posed a danger to the U.S.-Soviet relationship, and giving “open assistance to the rebels.”

³ Vance and Gromyko met during the UN General Assembly meeting on September 24 and 27. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Documents 226 and 227. They did not discuss Afghanistan.

reaction in the Arab world, Iran and the subcontinent—without taking on Amin directly or aligning ourselves with the rebels. This is essentially a non-interventionist view, and most held it to be compatible with our military capabilities, both direct and indirect in the region, and with our limited interests. It means that we will reject the strong suggestion which the Chinese have apparently made to us to provide weapons for the rebels through the Pakistanis. In fact, most parties were cool to the idea that such aid might be useful even if the Soviets do intervene in great force. The State, NSC, and CIA view was that we want to “wring our hands like mad” and “make them pay a price” but not be drawn into the melee inside Afghanistan.

Constable of State, however, advanced the view that if there was a large scale intervention we would want to:

—Deploy forces (tactical air) to Pakistan and accelerate the deployment of a carrier task force to the Arabian Sea.

—Condemn Soviet action in UN as a threat to peace.

—Consult with the Indians about defense of the Subcontinent.

The meeting did not really come to grips with the problem that an enlarged U.S. role in defense of the Subcontinent probably means arms for Pakistan and a reduction, if not end, of our pressures on the Pakistanis in nuclear matters.

Also, given our wholly diplomatic posture on the current increased Soviet presence in Afghanistan—5000–6000 people, propping up another hateful radical regime—we can expect another chorus of discontent from the Saudis, Israelis, Jordanians, Pakistanis, Chinese, Egyptians and others about an America which is unable or unwilling to act. While we may be constrained in acting in the public arena at the moment—by the precarious position of the SALT treaty and our limited interests in Afghanistan and limited resources which can be brought to bear, we should consider a more active clandestine effort in both propaganda and support for rebel groups. Iran would probably be sympathetic. The Paks would cooperate. The Iraqis would not object. The Saudis would be mollified. The stakes would be raised for the Soviets near our most crucial and vulnerable overseas resource region—the Gulf.

Robert J. Murray⁴
Deputy Assistant Secretary

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

67. Interagency Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

NI IIM 79–10022]

Washington, September 28, 1979

[Omitted here are a cover page and a security warning page.]

SOVIET OPTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

KEY JUDGMENTS

Moscow probably views the situation in Afghanistan as even more unstable after the fall of Taraki. While the Soviets may have previously decided to implement new military measures to support Taraki against the rebels, the uncertain tenure of Prime Minister Amin's regime makes it likely that Moscow is deferring major new initiatives to expand the counterinsurgency effort pending a decision as to whether Amin can consolidate his position. (*classification marking and codeword not declassified*)

The Soviets, however, have imposed an increased readiness posture on airborne forces in the Turkestan Military District, evidently as a result of concern over regime stability in the wake of the Amin coup. They may fear that this coup might fragment the Afghan Army and lead to a breakdown of control in Kabul. In this event, they would be likely to deploy one or more Soviet airborne divisions to the Kabul vicinity to protect Soviet citizens already there as well as to ensure continuance of some pro-Soviet regime in the capital. Although we might not receive prior warning, we believe it likely that we would promptly detect a deployment of Soviet forces on this scale once it began. We do not believe that Moscow would intend such a deployment for use in fighting against the Muslim insurgency, although, once in Afghanistan, such Soviet airborne forces could eventually be drawn into such fighting. We have not seen indications that the Soviets are at the moment preparing ground forces for large-scale military intervention in Afghanistan. (*classification marking and codeword not declassified*)

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff Files. Top Secret; [*codeword and handling restriction not declassified*]. A typed statement on the first page reads: "This memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for USSR and Eastern Europe, National Foreign Assessment Center. It was coordinated within the Central Intelligence Agency; with the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; [*less than 1 line not declassified*] with the National Security Agency; and with the intelligence organizations of the Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. Information available through 27 September 1979 was used in the preparation of this memorandum."

In the months before the coup, as the insurgency in Afghanistan intensified and spread, the Soviets increased the numbers and expanded the counterinsurgency role there of what now are at least 2,500 of their military personnel, who are heavily involved in guiding combat operations. Moscow may also have permitted direct participation of Soviet helicopter pilots, and possibly some tank personnel, in combat alongside the Afghans. In addition, we believe that one lightly equipped Soviet airborne battalion has been quietly deployed in Afghanistan since early July to provide security at Bagram Air Force Base.² Meanwhile, also during the summer of 1979, the Soviets have apparently tried and failed to induce the regime to admit other political elements to the government to broaden its base.³ All these measures have proved inadequate to halt the deterioration of the regime's position. (*classification marking and codeword not declassified*)

Amin's seizure of sole power within the Khalqist regime in mid-September has further complicated these Soviet problems in dealing with both the regime and the insurgency. We believe that the Soviets probably did not instigate or foresee this move by Amin. Moreover, they probably also evaluated it as rendering the counterinsurgency task more difficult, at least in the short term, because it further narrowed the regime's base of support, and, in fact, threatened to divide the ruling party itself. (*classification marking and codeword not declassified*)

If Moscow, within the next few weeks, concludes that Amin has consolidated his position and that no effective challenge from within the regime and the Army is likely, we believe the Soviets will probably increase their counterinsurgency role over the next few months, albeit incrementally rather than dramatically. In this case, Moscow may further increase the number of Soviet advisers and expand their combat activities, and may gradually bring in additional special battalions or regiments to provide security in key cities. In addition, Moscow could bolster the counterinsurgency effort by providing Soviet-manned combat support and combat service support units, such as attack helicopter, logistic, and maintenance units, to enhance Afghan combat reach and effectiveness. (*classification marking and codeword not declassified*)

We believe the introduction into Afghanistan of additional Soviet battalion- or regiment-size units for security purposes, like the forces already at Bagram, could be accomplished without immediate detection if this were done gradually, along with the ongoing airlift of materiel.

² [*less than 1 line not declassified*] believes that there is insufficient evidence to determine the role or function of the Soviet unit deployed at Bagram Air Force Base. There is no evidence that this unit is equipped with crew-served weapons. [Footnote is in the original.]

³ See Document 56.

Our ability to detect promptly the incremental introduction of Soviet combat support and combat service support units is similarly limited, although time would increase the probability of our learning that such units had entered Afghanistan. (*classification marking and codeword not declassified*)

The Soviets are probably well aware of the open-ended military and political difficulties that could flow if such limited intervention were allowed to grow into a larger and more visible commitment. They are also aware of the adverse political consequences this would entail for them in South Asia and the Middle East. On the other hand, it is clear that the Soviets' sense of their interests in Afghanistan is now more ambitious than it was before the advent of the Marxist regime in 1978. They see the maintenance of a Marxist state in Afghanistan as important to their strategic and political interests in the region. This perception has increasingly supplanted the Soviets' earlier and less ambitious goal of simply maintaining a friendly buffer state on their southern border. If they do decide to provide some additional military support to Amin, they are likely to do so in the hope of bolstering the anti-insurgent struggle sufficiently to avoid facing a decision as to whether to use Soviet combat units on a large scale. (*classification marking and codeword not declassified*)

In the event that Amin does not consolidate his position but that an acceptable and viable Marxist alternative emerges, the Soviets are likely to shift their political and military support accordingly. If no such viable leftist alternative appears, and the Khalqi regime fragments, the Soviets would promote installation of a more moderate regime willing to deal with them, rather than accept the political costs and risks of a massive Soviet invasion to fight the insurgency. Nevertheless, we can foresee contingencies under which the chances of large-scale and long-term Soviet intervention would become substantially greater:

- Prolonged political chaos.
- The prospect of advent of an anti-Soviet regime.
- Foreign military intervention. (*classification marking and codeword not declassified*)

[Omitted here is the body of the memorandum.]

68. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan¹

Washington, September 29, 1979, 2201Z

256809. Subject: Newsom Meeting With Afghan Foreign Minister.

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. Summary: During lengthy, businesslike session in New York, Under Secretary Newsom and Afghan FonMin Shah Wali traded mutual expressions of interest in improving bilateral relations, but agreed on little else. Discussion touched on the Dubs assassination and the DRA approach to acceptance of foreign assistance. Shah Wali endorsed good relations with Pakistan, but complained that Afghan “fugitives” were being trained there. He minimized the Soviet presence in Afghanistan and defended his government’s independence and non-alignment. We expressed appreciation for the DRA’s interest in controlling narcotics. End summary.²

3. At U.S. initiative, Under Secretary Newsom called on Afghan FonMin Shah Wali for a general hour-long exchange of views Sept 27 in New York. Assistant Secretary Saunders and NEA/PAB Director Peck sat in. Shah Wali had only a notetaker with him.

4. Newsom opened by noting that when he was last in Afghanistan he had met with then-President Taraki and Fon. Minister Amin.³ He wanted to use the opportunity of the FonMin’s visit to extend his best wishes to Amin and to Shah Wali as they assumed their new responsibilities. Newsom said Chargé Amstutz had reported that he had a cordial conversation earlier the same day with President Amin.⁴

5. In response Shah Wali said the DRA had from the beginning wanted to have good relations with all countries without exception. Afghanistan had traditionally friendly relations with the U.S. and the DRA had been desirous of maintaining these ties. Referring to the Dubs assassination, Shah Wali said “certain events” had occurred which the

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790446-0947. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Priority to Islamabad, Moscow, New Delhi, and Tehran. A copy of this telegram was also found in the Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 4, USSR in Afghanistan (September 79).

² Newsom and Wali were in New York for the UN General Assembly meeting.

³ See Document 26.

⁴ The meeting between Amin and Amstutz was reported in telegram 7218 from Kabul, September 27. Amstutz described the meeting as “amicable” and reported that he followed Department orders to keep the meeting short and avoid substantive discussion beyond sharing Amin’s “oft-repeated request” to improve relations between the United States and Afghanistan. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790442-0582)

DRA did not want. The DRA had done its best to prove that these events had been outside its control.

6. Newsom noted that the reaction in the U.S. to the Dubs assassination had been very strong and led to the congressional action which reduced somewhat our cooperation. We have tried to extend our assistance programs as long as we could under the law, and are phasing out our programs in an orderly fashion. The U.S. was always ready to discuss steps which might be taken to put our relations back on a more normal basis. We welcomed word that President Amin wanted better relations. When the time came when better relations could be discussed, we were willing to explore how the conditions laid down by Congress might be met.⁵

7. In reply to Shah Wali's suggestion that "false propaganda" on this issue had unduly influenced U.S. political leaders, Newsom said it was the events surrounding the assassination that were responsible, not newspaper reports. We also felt that we had not gotten as much cooperation in the investigation as we could have expected. In defense, Shah Wali pointed to the serious doubts still remaining about the Kennedy assassination and reiterated that the DRA believed it had done its best.

8. Reminded of previous USG assistance to Afghan development projects such as the Helmand Valley,⁶ Shah Wali said that it was because of the previous friendly relations between our two countries that the DRA considered the present situation to be "abnormal." He saw no hindrance or problem which could not be solved. He denied that the DRA was turning away from the prior Afghan practice of drawing on multiple aid sources and advisers in putting together cooperative projects. Shah Wali pointed to the continuation of World Bank, German and other projects, and argued that Afghanistan's actions in some "specific cases" (read U.S.) had arisen from a feeling that individuals

⁵ A reference to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee amendment to the International Development Assistance Act of 1979 signed by the President on August 14. The amendment, inserted at the end of Chapter 1 of Part III of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, reads: "(A) None of the funds authorized to be appropriated under this act may be used to furnish assistance to Afghanistan nor may funds authorized to be appropriated under this act before October 1, 1979, be expended for assistance to Afghanistan until the President certifies to the Congress that (1) the Government of Afghanistan has apologized officially and assumes responsibility for the death of Ambassador Adolph Dubs; and (2) the Government of Afghanistan agrees to provide adequate protection for all personnel of the United States Government in Afghanistan. (b) The provisions of subsection (a) shall not apply if the President determines that it is in the national interest of the United States because of substantially changed circumstances in Afghanistan." (P.L. 96-53)

⁶ On U.S. assistance for Afghan development of the Helmand River Valley, see, for example, *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-8, Documents on South Asia, 1973–1976, Document 28.

did not have proper qualifications. He added that Afghanistan had asked for more personnel in certain cases, citing their request to Care-Medico (which had a large U.S. personnel component) for more medical specialists. He added with apparent regret that Care-Medico had been unable to comply, and that he had learned shortly before departing Kabul of Care-Medico's decision to withdraw all of its personnel from the country.

9. Shah Wali replied in the negative when asked if he expected changes in basic DRA policies following recent leadership changes. He expected continuity since the policies were laid down by the party, and the party still existed. Newsom said we had noticed President Amin's stated desire for good relations with Afghanistan's neighbors Pakistan and Iran. Shah Wali said this reflected the sincere desires of the Afghan people and the party. He said Deputy FonMin Dost's visit to Pakistan had resulted in "fruitful talks," and that he had met with Agha Shahi in Havana and former President Taraki had also talked with Pakistani President Zia there. He was careful to point out that the latter meeting "reflected the desire of our government." He indicated that both Agha Shahi and Zia had been invited to Kabul, but that it was understood Zia would come only after an Agha Shahi visit had taken place.

10. At another point in the conversation, Shah Wali took a mild swipe at Pakistan when discussing the underlying causes of the insurgency. He said the rebels were mostly those who had lost their former feudal privileges, but added that part of the problem was created by Afghanistan's neighbors. He pointed to the camps in Pakistan where Afghan "fugitives" were trained. He added that Pakistan also sent some "militia" into Afghanistan. Asked about the refugee situation, Shah Wali argued that Afghanistan's borders were very porous and that 2.5 million nomads crossed the frontiers every year. The explanation, he concluded, was that "they have detained our nomads."

11. On the subject of relations with the Soviet Union, Shah Wali said Afghanistan's traditional good relations with its northern neighbor had changed little with the change of governments over the years. Asked if he saw any contradiction between Afghanistan's profession of non-alignment and the presence of Soviet troops in the country, Shah Wali said the numbers of Soviet advisers had been exaggerated. A mountain had been made out of mole-hill. He pointed out that Afghanistan had had Soviet advisers before the revolution, and said the number had not changed much. He declined to be pinned down as to exact numbers there now, and said there were advisers from other nations such as India. In apparent contradiction of his earlier statement, he concluded there had been no qualitative change in the situation, just a quantitative one.

12. Shah Wali also declined to be pinned down as to whether the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was a Marxist-Leninist party. He said we could judge ourselves from the program of the party. The PDPA, he added, reflected the Socialist structure of the country. Newsom recalled his earlier discussion with then Foreign Minister Amin on the nature of the PDPA in light of U.S. legislation bearing on relations with nations dominated or controlled by the international Communist movement.⁷ Did Shah Wali consider the PDPA a part of the international socialist movement or as a purely Afghan entity? Shah Wali said the PDPA wanted relations with all parties, not just those in Socialist countries. He assured Newsom that his was a sovereign government not under the influence of another government or party. Afghanistan was faithful to the Non-Aligned Movement and wanted to have a policy of its own. Newsom commented that the U.S. respected “true non-alignment,” but that we had philosophical differences with some countries’ definition of non-alignment—specifically that of Cuba.

13. Saunders said we appreciated the DRA’s interest in controlling the flow of narcotics. Describing narcotics as a major national problem in the U.S., Saunders said we were prepared to work with Afghan authorities and would appreciate any cooperation the DRA might give. Shah Wali brightened visibly in thanking us for mentioning this matter. He said the DRA had burned a cache of hashish last year worth \$25 million, but the Western press had paid this no heed. Newsom regretted the lack of publicity but said we in the USG had noticed. We recognized the difficulties countries faced in interfering with traditional narcotics culture and trafficking, particularly since narcotics could be an important source of income for poor farmers. It was an act of courage for a government in a country such as Afghanistan to take a strong stand, and we appreciated this. He added this was a positive element in our relations.

14. In closing, Newsom said he wanted to keep the lines of communication between our two countries open. He had asked a lot of questions, but this had been in the interest of finding a basis on which we could improve our relations. He had been encouraged by the reception President Amin had given to our Chargé earlier in the day and hoped this would signal continued improvement in our relations.

Vance

⁷ See Document 26.

69. Intelligence Information Cable Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

[*cable number not declassified*] Washington, October 2, 1979, 1652Z

COUNTRY

Afghanistan/USSR

SUBJECT

General Contents of a Personal Note From President Amin to Soviet Head of State Brezhnev. [*1 line not declassified*]

SOURCE

[*5 lines not declassified*]

1. After the ousting of Nur Mohammad Taraki from the Afghan Presidency in mid-September 1979, Hafizullah Amin sent Dastigar Panjshiri, Minister of Public Works to the Soviet Union with a personal message from Amin to Soviet Head of State, Leonid I. Brezhnev. In the message, Amin made the following points:

A. Amin claimed that he was not responsible for the 14 September crisis which resulted in the removal of Taraki and the three military members of the Cabinet. The events of that day had been forced upon him.

B. Taraki's fall has not affected the relationship between Afghanistan and the USSR; Afghanistan continues to require the full support of the USSR in order to carry out Afghanistan's revolution.

C. The fall of Taraki has not affected the historical outlook of Afghanistan, an outlook that is shared by the USSR.

D. The message concluded with Amin sending his personal regards to Brezhnev.

2. (Source comment: Since the 14 September episode, relations between the Afghan Government and the Soviet Union do not appear normal. Contacts between Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) officials and officials from the Soviet Embassy have decreased sharply since 14 September.)

3. ACQ: [*2 lines not declassified*]

4. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Dissem: [*2 lines not declassified*]

¹ Source: Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 4, USSR in Afghanistan (October 79). Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*].

70. Memorandum from the Secretary of State's Special Adviser on Soviet Affairs (Shulman) to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, October 3, 1979

SUBJECT

Afghanistan: Intelligence and Policy

Our confrontation with the Soviets over Cuba arose because of the premature release of intelligence into a highly charged, domestic political atmosphere. While Afghanistan is not Cuba, both countries receive substantial Soviet military assistance. In Afghanistan, even more than in Cuba, Soviet policy is dictated by security concerns and, therefore, is less susceptible to arguments that it should be altered for the good of US-Soviet relations. Of immediate importance, however, is the fact that in both cases the findings of the Intelligence Community can have a serious effect upon our relations with the Soviets.

The events of the last two weeks provide a graphic illustration. On September 16–17, Amin's takeover in Kabul coincided with intelligence reports that a Soviet airborne division designated for service in Afghanistan was in heightened readiness.² The intelligence implied a threat of Soviet intervention and created a perceived need for a US response. In rapid order, we launched a campaign of high level press backgrounders, spokesman's statements and diplomatic demarches which noted "increased Soviet military activity north of the Oxus" and repeated US opposition to Soviet intervention.³ Although the Intelligence Community admitted it had no direct evidence linking the unit's activity with the Afghan power struggle, we acted because we could not take a chance that the Soviets might move.

Since the airborne unit was not deployed and now has apparently stood down, it might be argued that our action may have done some

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat (ES), Sensitive and Super Sensitive File, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, Box 2, 1979 ES Sensitive, Oct 1 thru 16. Secret; Nodis.

² See Document 67.

³ See, for example, Harold Saunders's September 29 statement before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the situation in Afghanistan in the Department of State *Bulletin*, October 1979, pp. 53–54. See also the Department of State *Bulletin*, December 1979, p. 43, which reprinted a Department statement to the news media, October 29, that "we are opposed to intervention by any country in Afghanistan's internal affairs." The reference to a diplomatic demarche is likely to instructions in telegram 250400 to multiple posts, September 23, to inform host governments of "disturbing signs of increased Soviet military activity north of the USSR-Afghanistan border." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790435–0449)

good and, at least, did no harm. However, this conclusion would ignore the impact on US-Soviet relations and on US credibility in general.

If the Soviets were not planning to use those forces in Afghanistan, they probably view our actions as yet another propaganda campaign and not as a serious initiative. Further, having raised the possibility of Soviet action with our friends, we have risked being accused of “crying wolf” or, worse, of being clearly aware of “the Soviet threat” without doing anything about it. With both our friends and the Soviets, we cannot raise the spectre of Soviet intervention too often without having our statements discounted.

In our consideration of the Afghan problem, we have had a sliding definition of “Soviet intervention.”

—In the beginning, we simply talked about “Soviet military intervention”; *however*, with a \$275 million military assistance program in process and 3,000 or more advisors in the country, this has already occurred.

—Subsequently, we talked about “the introduction of Soviet combat units”; *however*, with the introduction in June 1979 of a security force of 400 Soviet troops at Bagram airbase, this has already occurred.

—Lately, we have talked about “large scale Soviet intervention”; *however*, with an earlier report of 3,600 Soviet military personnel in Kabul and a more recent report of 500–1,000 Soviet advisors arriving at two Afghan armored divisions nearby, this may also have occurred or be in progress.

Unless we are treated to a spectacular show of Soviet airborne units being airlifted *en masse* into Afghanistan, we may not know that large scale transfers of personnel have occurred. The Intelligence Community readily admits that it cannot monitor incremental increases and might not know of the existence of a large Soviet force until it was already in place. Should this occur, the parallel with the situation in Cuba would become obvious.

In response to a belated US discovery of a large concentration of Soviet forces, the Soviets would say that their personnel were simply advisors, not different in “kind or purpose” from those we had previously noted. It would then again be our word against theirs that the situation had changed.

An inter-agency working group has recently decided that “prevention of large scale Soviet intervention” is our primary goal in Afghanistan.⁴ Since we have no definition of “large scale” and have difficulties in monitoring Soviet activity, we may not know with any precision

⁴ Not further identified.

when and if this occurs. It would, therefore, be in our interest to begin thinking about how we will handle this situation in terms of US-Soviet relations, SALT, and the Congress in advance. Otherwise, an intelligence “breakthrough,” plus a press leak, or a Congressman’s statement about “Soviet brigades in Afghanistan” could put us right back in another US-Soviet confrontation.

At a minimum, we should try to ensure that any public announcement of such an intelligence finding be placed in the proper context. This would suggest an official spokesman’s statement that while we deplore Soviet intervention we see it as a sign of the failure of Soviet policy and not as a success.

Moreover, I recommend that you discuss with Stan Turner how to ensure that intelligence reports on Soviet military actions are not allowed to reach persons who might make them public in a sensational manner. In particular, we should consider ending our present practice of treating this subject in the NID and other publications which receive wide distribution. Instead we should work with CIA to develop a means of providing this information only to a carefully selected list of officials under stringent controls over further dissemination. We should also consider similar restrictions on cables from Embassy Kabul which deal with Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan.

71. Editorial Note

Following an October 4, 1979, meeting with the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner wrote in a memorandum for the record:

“We discussed the Afghan situation and reported that we have disbursed the funds authorized.” Brzezinski “suggested we come in for more. I said no. I said that all the signs were that only arms were really wanted at this point. He then indicated that he was really the one who advised Mubarak that he would try to get the Paks to buy Russian arms from the Egyptians to give to the Afghans. I didn’t make any real progress on where that left us from a legal point of view.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00112R: Subject Files, Box 15, DCI/DDCI Memrecs/Memos, Agendas of Brzezinski/Aaron Meetings, January–December 1979)

The disbursement of funds mentioned by Turner was approved at the Special Coordination Committee meeting of June 26 and subsequently authorized by the Presidential Findings of July 3. See Document 53.

72. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State¹

Kabul, October 4, 1979, 0410Z

7326. Subj: Some Disturbing Signs Affecting Afghanistan's Independence and the Position of Amin: Part One of Two.

1. (S—Entire text)

2. Summary. Much concern has been expressed in Washington over Soviet troop movements on the Soviet side of the Oxus, but more significant and ominous may be the growing Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. The number of troops and military advisors—totalling perhaps 7,000—and the role the latter are playing, makes it moot whether this or any other Afghan regime can again exercise full independence. End summary.

3. While a great deal of concern has been expressed in Washington about the possible positioning of Soviet airborne troops just north of the Oxus, I think a more dangerous and significant development has been the continued build-up of Soviet equipment and forces in the country, and the recent appointment of Soviet generals to direct the counter-insurgency operations in the troubled Provinces of Paktia, Ghazni and Konar.

4. To recapitulate the situation:

(A). Soviet troops are now known to be stationed in the following two strategic areas:

—Bagram Air Force Base, located about 25 miles north of Kabul, the single most important air base in the country. The number of Soviet troops guarding the base is modest: about 600. More significant is that the Soviets have apparently been given control of the base. It together with Kabul Airport (partly an Air Force base as well) are highly strategic points for control of the capital and surrounding areas.

—Kabul itself at probably three locations: Kabul Airport (at the Air Force area), Pol-i-Charki tank base, and the Microrayon apartment complex where many Soviets live. These troops, numbering perhaps 3,600 are probably here for several purposes, such as guarding the Soviet community in the event of civil war and chaos. The troops would also be in a position to try to secure Kabul Airport and the principal tank base (over 150 tanks) if necessary.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790458-1129. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information to Islamabad, Moscow, and New Delhi.

(B). The amount of military equipment continues to arrive in impressive amounts. The large number of military tanks at Pol-i-Charki tank base appears to be well in excess of the number of Afghan troops able to operate them.

(C). The number of Soviet military advisers seems to be always increasing and may now number about 3,000.

(D). Perhaps just as important is the fact that the role of these military advisers seems to have been enhanced over the last some weeks. This may be connected with the 6-week-long visit of a contingent of 13 Soviet generals in country. The growing role of the Soviets is noticeable in two ways. One is the elevation of three Soviet generals to positions of, in effect, directing the counter-insurgency operations in the three most troubled Provinces: Paktia, Ghazni and Konar. The other is growing evidence of more sophisticated counter-insurgency tactics in at least the Ghazni area, pointing to a Soviet hand.

5. I think the expanded Soviet role in the country raises some fundamental political and policy questions for us. One is whether the Soviets are not now in such an influential position that they have a controlling influence over the regime and the country's future. While I do not suggest that the country has totally lost its independence, I wonder whether the Soviet presence and influence here are not now such that Afghanistan should be classified as a Soviet satellite state akin to most of those in Eastern Europe and Mongolia. Certainly, Hafizullah Amin, or any other party successor, is very beholden to the Soviets to stay in power. The leverage and influence the Soviets can now exert is tremendous, and given the unpopularity of the Khalqis, no Khalqi regime could last a week here were the Soviets to withdraw their support. Hafizullah Amin and senior party officials must know this.²

6. I also see no likelihood that the Soviets intend to diminish their military presence or their special position in this country. Were Hafizullah Amin, or a successor, to desire to expel the Soviets, I doubt they could now do it. The Soviets would likely respond by putting forward

² An October 7 CIA intelligence report, [*text not declassified*] listed numerous reasons for Amin's unpopularity among Afghans. [*text not declassified*] asserted there was widespread belief that Amin killed the more popular Taraki; that he was "openly prejudiced in favor of Pashtuns;" that he was an "avowed Communist infidel;" and that Amin "has given considerable authority to the Soviets in return for their support, and is selling out Afghanistan to the Soviets." (Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 4, USSR in Afghanistan (October 79))

some amenable Khalqi “leader” who would “request” the continued Soviet presence, and there are probably enough in the party who would go along with a change.

7. By septel (part two), I discuss Hafizullah Amin, his likely vision of the Soviet role, and where the U.S. might fit in.³

Amstutz

³ See Document 74.

73. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, October 4, 1979

SUBJECT

Growing Soviet Involvement in Afghanistan

In view of General Pavlovsky’s extended presence in Afghanistan and the gradually growing character of the Soviet involvement there, the President feels that we face the prospect of an evolutionary intervention. Accordingly, he wishes the two following steps to be undertaken:

1. This situation should become subject to more frequent public comment;

2. Our allies and the countries more immediately concerned in the region of Afghanistan should be promptly informed on the pertinent facts available to the U.S. Government.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs David Newsom, Lot 81D154, Afghanistan. Secret. A handwritten note at the bottom of the page indicates that the memorandum was received in S/S-I on October 5 at 12 p.m.

Please undertake the above, and inform the President on implementation.²

Zbigniew Brzezinski

² Attached but not printed is Newsom's October 10 covering memorandum to Saunders, forwarding Brzezinski's memorandum. Citing Brzezinski's memorandum as indicative of the President's interest in the situation in Afghanistan, Newsom observed: "with the changed circumstances and some of the indications which we have had of Amin's desire to improve the contact with us, the time has come for a further review of our basic approach to Afghanistan." Newsom further noted that recently Amin had sought to improve communication with the United States and, with Amstutz due back in Washington for consultation, his presence could be a "focal point" for a review of current U.S. options regarding Afghanistan. Newsom contributed to that review in the SCC meeting on October 26. See Document 76.

74. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State¹

Kabul, October 9, 1979, 0835Z

7392. Subj: The Position of Amin and Afghanistan's Independence: Part Two of Two. Ref: Kabul 7326.²

1. (C—Entire text)

2. Summary. Though the dominant position of the Soviets in Afghanistan is probably due more to Hafizullah Amin than to any other Khalqi leader, Amin is a nationalist. His vision for Afghanistan may be a Marxist one—but it is for an independent state. Amin is probably sincere in professing a desire for friendly relations with the rest of the world, but he has made clear too that he sees Afghanistan as belonging naturally to the pro-Moscow camp of "Socialist" countries. Though claiming that his country will not meddle in the internal affairs of other countries, he speaks of supporting progressive and liberation forces everywhere, and the Pakistanis are worried about Amin's frequent abstruse references to the Afghan peoples between the Oxus and

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790462–0311. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Islamabad, Moscow, and New Delhi.

² See Document 72.

the Indus. As for U.S. relations, I think they will remain difficult, if for no other reason than VOA's Persian-language broadcasts which the DRA finds irritating. If the insurgency starts to ebb—and it has shown few signs of intensifying—we may have to come to terms with Amin. Of fundamental interest to us will be whether the U.S. can woo, to any degree, Afghanistan away from Moscow's orbit and can discourage any inclination by Amin to be irredentist. I am not sure we can. End summary.

3. Though Hafizullah Amin has welcomed the massive support of the Soviets, I believe him nonetheless to be a nationalist—and the only strong Khalqi leader around. Amin has shown himself to be intelligent, decisive, and extraordinarily energetic. He is also ruthless; otherwise he would not be where he is.

4. While in part one of this message, I expressed concern that the Soviets may now have a commanding influence in this country, I believe also it would be a mistake to characterize Amin as a Soviet toady. We have lots of evidence that he wants to run his own show, and that Moscow is less than ecstatic over the successive purges which have caused division in and depleted the ranks of the "progressive forces." In this respect, Foreign Minister Shah Wali made a remarkable series of disclosures this week. On Oct 6, he invited all the "Socialist country" Ambassadors (excepting the Chinese) for a briefing. According to the Yugoslav Ambassador who was there, Shah Wali spent most of the time telling about the Sept 14 Palace shootout when Taraki was removed, and made the following startling disclosures:

—Soviet Ambassador Puzanov was with Taraki on Sept 14 when Amin was called over to the latter's office to be arrested. The inference is that the Soviets knew about the anti-Amin plot.³

—After the shootout, Amin's departing car was fired on in the Palace complex by a rooftop sniper, apparently pre-positioned, but Amin had left Taraki's building by another way.

—Interior Minister Watanjar, together with the two other military-officer Cabinet ministers plus the secret police chief, fled to the Soviet Embassy but later allegedly left there.

—At the Soviet Embassy, Watanjar placed a phone call to the Kabul Central Military Command ordering immediate action against Amin. But the commander refused to act unless so ordered by the Politbureau. Thus ended the anti-Amin plot.

5. Though the above Sept 14 account shows that Amin may not be Moscow's first preference as the DRA leader, Moscow has now

³ For discussion of alleged Soviet foreknowledge of Taraki's ouster, see Document 65.

seemingly accepted Amin and reached a *modus vivendi* with him. Last week, when I asked the Hungarian Ambassador about Moscow's alleged unhappiness over the purges of Taraki and Watanjar, and the reported coolness between Amin and Moscow, he cautioned against reading too much into this. He said, "As long as Afghanistan does not change its basic policies (read Communism and a pro-Moscow foreign policy), Moscow doesn't care who is in charge." From Moscow's and Amin's behavior since September 14, I think the Ambassador may be right.

6. This is not to say that the Amin-Soviet relationship has been or will be an easy one. Before Sept 14, there was tugging and pulling on both sides—and now there may be distrust. A few days ago, an Asian Ambassador here aptly described the situation when he said: "They are like a husband and wife who don't much care for each other but nightly keep climbing into the same bed, because each has compelling needs and no options."

7. If Amin survives, a relevant concern for the U.S. will be whether, in shaping foreign policy, he will keep a low profile such as did Hungary's Kadar or be bent on playing an active international role like Fidel Castro. The departing Pakistani Ambassador (to be Pakistan's Foreign Secretary) fears the latter. He sees Amin as irredentist, and told me that during his farewell call on Amin, the latter's evasive answers on Pushtunistan and Baluchistan heightened rather than assuaged his fears. This is notwithstanding assertions, like Foreign Minister Shah Wali made to me last week, that Afghanistan has "no territorial ambitions."

8. As for U.S.-Afghanistan relations, if Amin and his Khalqi Party survive (and I fear time is working in their favor), we will have to give thought as to what kind of presence and role we can have here. Can we exert a moderating influence? I am not sure we can, though the Sept 14 incident involving the Soviets gives some grounds for cautious hope. Certainly Amin would welcome resumption of U.S. economic aid—on their terms—but I am doubtful this would necessarily give us leverage. When we had a \$17 million aid program here, we enjoyed almost no influence.

9. I doubt, too, that Amin would ever sincerely turn to us (or to the Chinese or Yugoslavs) as a political alternative to the Soviets. For one, our political ideology is so different from his. I also don't think the Soviets would allow it, and Amin must realize this. Yet, I cannot ignore that in years past, nationalism has been a powerful force in Afghanistan, rejecting foreign influence. It is conceivable that over the next year or so it could assert itself in ways which would diminish the Soviet presence. The insurgency is one manifestation of this. Though so far the rebellion has disappointed many well wishers, and does not immediately threaten this regime, it may gain momentum.

10. What should our posture be during this period of uncertainty? I think our best strategy is to continue what we have essentially been doing: maintaining a low profile, trying to avoid disputatious bilateral issues, and waiting to see what happens.

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75. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State¹

Kabul, October 10, 1979, 1138Z

7421. Subj: (U) DRA Announces Death of Former President Taraki.

1. (U) Kabul Radio announced last night in a brief news item that Noor Mohammad Taraki, recently deposed President of Afghanistan, had died that morning (October 9) after a severe illness. The announcement added that he was buried in the family graveyard the same day. We have, thus far, not noted any particular signs of mourning in Kabul. Government flags remain at full mast and there have been no public demonstrations of regret at Taraki's passing.

2. (C) According to a source with wide-ranging contacts in Afghan circles, a Cabinet official had disclosed two weeks ago that Taraki had died during or soon after the September 14 shootout at Kabul's Presidential Palace, which brought Amin to power. Amin and his government's official public line since that time has been that Taraki was under a doctor's care because of a severe illness. A DRA official had recently insisted to an officer of this mission that Taraki was paralyzed on one side and that that was why he had had to relinquish the Presidency to Amin.

4. (C) Comment: Whatever the manner or timing of Taraki's demise, we have reason to believe that some Khalqi stalwarts remain disgruntled that Amin so unceremoniously ousted Taraki, the Khalqi Party's founder, last month, and consider Amin and his crowd to be nothing more than opportunistic usurpers. Amin is undoubtedly aware of such resentment and is presumably plotting to neutralize those die-hard

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790463-1021. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Islamabad, Moscow, New Delhi, and Tehran.

Taraki supporters who could pose a threat to his regime, whether among the military or civilian elements.

Amstutz

76. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, October 23, 1979, 4:30–5:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Covert Action

PARTICIPANTS

State

David Newsom, Under Secretary for
Political Affairs

OSD

Secretary Harold Brown
W. Graham Clayton, Jr., Deputy Secretary

JCS

Lt. Gen. John Pustay, Assistant to the
Chairman

DCI

Admiral Stansfield Turner
Frank Carlucci, Deputy Director
[*name not declassified*] Deputy Chief/LA/
DDO
[*name not declassified*] Deputy Chief/NE/
DDO
[*name and title not declassified*]

Justice

Attorney General Benjamin
Civiletti

OMB

Dr. John White, Deputy
Director

White House

Zbigniew Brzezinski,
Chairman

Donald Gregg

Hedley Donovan

NSC

Paul B. Henze, Notetaker

¹ Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I-047, SCC (I) on Covert Action, 23 Oct 1979. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The summary of conclusions was attached at Tab B to a memorandum (not printed) from Brzezinski to Carter recommending the President sign the Presidential Findings (attached together at Tab A, not printed). The Presidential Finding with the scope of Afghanistan stated: "provide support, either directly or through third countries, to the Afghan insurgents in the form of cash, non-military supplies, communications equipment and procurement advice." Under the description, Carter wrote: "My preference is that we have the consultations with the Saudis (& perhaps Paks) first, to see what we can do to help them with covert action. Expedite, and report back to me. J." Under Carter's note, an unknown hand wrote: "Finding signed 11-7-79." [*text not declassified*] Tabs C and D were also attached to Brzezinski's memorandum but not printed.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Afghanistan.]²

The proposals on *Afghanistan* were discussed in detail.³ CIA representatives pointed out that they followed naturally on the actions that had already been undertaken as a result of the Presidential Finding of 3 July 1979.⁴ The State Department representative suggested that all further actions supporting the Afghan rebels be deferred until spring so that we could see how the insurgency fared through the winter months, but all other members of the committee felt the need to act now was urgent. The Chairman stressed the political importance of demonstrating to Saudi Arabian leaders that we were serious in opposing Soviet inroads in Afghanistan and the likelihood that a substantial commitment of assistance on our part would result in increased Saudi willingness to provide support. CIA representatives pointed out that delays of various kinds were bound to occur even under the best of circumstances but that decisions made now greatly improved the possibility that some of our aid could reach rebel forces in time to help them through the strains of the winter. (S)

The committee concluded by endorsing unanimously a proposal for [amount not declassified] of additional aid for Afghan rebels, to be provided primarily through Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in the form of cash, communications equipment, non-military supplies and procurement advice. No more than [amount not declassified] of this sum will be for communications equipment. An amendment to the Presidential Finding of 3 July 1979 will be prepared. The Chairman directed CIA to undertake at an early date a briefing of senior Saudi leaders (specifically Prince Sultan and Prince Fahd) on Afghanistan and our decisions on aid for the insurgents. (S)

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Afghanistan.]

² For discussion of El Salvador, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XV, Central America, Document 396. Regarding the discussion of Jamaica, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXIII, Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean, Document 199.

³ The detailed proposals were attached at Tabs E, F, and G to Brzezinski's memorandum to Carter (see footnote 1, above). They are printed below.

⁴ See footnote 5, Document 53.

Tab E⁵**Option No. 1**

Washington, undated

OPTION NO. 1

Provide additional funds to the Afghan insurgents, jointly (with the Saudis and Pakistanis) and unilaterally, for the procurement of non-military supplies; and provide additional funds for the continuation and expansion of propaganda activities.

1. A 3 July 1979 Presidential Finding authorized CIA to expend up to \$695,000 to support the Afghan insurgents, either unilaterally or through third countries, by providing cash or non-military supplies; and also authorized CIA propaganda operations in support of the insurgency. At the time the SCC discussed this proposal, it was agreed that consideration would be given in the future to increased support should circumstances indicate additional funds were warranted.

2. Since receiving this authorization, CIA has expended or obligated \$575,000 in FY 79, and has programmed the remaining \$120,000 for FY 80. These funds have been or will be expended as follows:

—[*amount not declassified*] in cash payments to the insurgents and the provision of a limited amount of medical supplies.

—[*amount not declassified*] for propaganda operations.

Pakistani liaison has begun to disburse some of these funds and medical supplies to insurgents inside Afghanistan. Unilateral assets have separately transferred funds into Afghanistan, and to insurgent leaders in Pakistan. Propaganda activities have included the procurement of two complete radio broadcasting stations which are now in Pakistan awaiting onward shipment into Afghanistan. A support mechanism to produce propaganda material, including tapes for broadcast on insurgent radios and for hand-to-hand passage inside Afghanistan, has been created and is in operation.

3. The Afghan insurgency has intensified and spread, and Afghan Government forces are increasingly stretched thin in their efforts to suppress it. At the same time, it is clear that the insurgents continue to lack funds and as yet are uncoordinated. The Soviets appear to have stepped up their support to the Afghan Government. It is likely that this winter will see something of a hiatus in military operations by

⁵ Secret; Sensitive.

both sides—a result of the insurgents' shortage of supplies and the DRA's likely desire to reorganize in the wake of both a long spring/summer campaign and recent political changes in Kabul.

4. It is too early to estimate precisely what effect the limited funding may have had on the insurgency. Indeed, some of the funds are still in the pipeline and have not yet reached the insurgents. The creation of a production mechanism to prepare propaganda materials, and the delivery of two radio transmitters to Pakistan to give the insurgents their "own radio" are significant steps. However, the effect of a propaganda operation is incremental and is part of a larger effort. The intensification of the insurgency will be abetted by these support efforts.

5. The insurgents have a continued critical need for funds. Timing is important. The current need is particularly relevant in view of both the expected hard winter, which will impede any resupply efforts, and an anticipated increase in Afghan Government pressure on the insurgents—possibly this winter, almost certainly in the spring.

Specific proposals on expending this sum are:

—An approach to the Saudis stating that we have already provided aid to the insurgents—citing funds, medical supplies, and radio broadcast transmitters. We would tell the Saudis that we wish to provide additional aid—[*amount not declassified*] for non-military support—and would inform the Saudis of our interest in discussing what support they may wish to provide in concert with our efforts. (This step is intended to accomplish several ends: to spur significant Saudi contributions, thus increasing the total amount of aid provided; to give evidence to the Saudis of the U.S. Government's determination, expressed in concrete terms, to oppose communism; and to meet a recent Pakistani liaison request for our assistance in coordinating external support for the insurgents.) [*less than 1 line not declassified*] informal discussions with the Saudis indicated Saudi receptivity.

—Depending on our discussions with the Saudis, we may subsequently participate in joint discussions with the Saudis and Pakistanis on coordinated support to the insurgency.

—[*amount not declassified*] would be reserved for unilateral passage to insurgents or for subsequent passage to liaison.

—[*amount not declassified*] would be utilized to continue and expand propaganda activities, including support for insurgent clandestine radio broadcasts.

Risk: Operational risks are low. However, the insurgency has placed great strain on the Afghan Army and challenges the continued survival of the Government. To counter this, the Soviets have gradually augmented their military advisory presence, and the role of Soviet troops has increasingly changed from an advisory one to active partici-

pation in and supervision of anti-insurgent military operations. It is possible that further insurgent successes might prompt still greater Soviet involvement, which could range from still more advisors and equipment to the use of Soviet combat units. (TAB D)

Cost: [*amount not declassified*] (for breakdown, see above)

Tab F⁶

Option No. 2

Washington, undated

Option No. 2

Provide tactical military communications equipment to the insurgents

1. *Discussion:* Prince Turki Ibn Faysal, Director of the Saudi Arabian General Intelligence Service, recently recommended to [*2 lines not declassified*].

Prince Turki expressed concern at what he perceived as U.S. failure to defend its own (and by implication, Saudi Arabia's) interests in such areas as Zaire, Iran, Somalia and Afghanistan. At the same time, Turki recognized the difficulties which the U.S. would have encountered in intervening in these areas overtly. He implicitly recognized that U.S.-Saudi collaboration could provide a means for masking U.S. support of friendly elements in Middle East crisis areas.

2. Turki suggested a number of areas for such collaboration, including Afghanistan. He stated that his government was providing limited support to the insurgents. In addition, he mentioned that their insurgent contacts reported that lack of radio communications was seriously hampering the coordination of their military activities.

3. It is believed that approaching Turki with a proposal that CIA provide communications equipment to the insurgents, possibly through Saudi channels and attributable to the Saudis, would allow us to propose that the Saudis, in addition to our radios, provide significant funds from their own resources to support the insurgency. If the Saudis agreed to the proposal, but indicated that they would prefer—for logistical or other reasons—not to act as “middle-men,” we would give the radios directly to the Pakistanis, and advise the Saudis of our action.

4. In addition, this proposal would have the following benefits:

⁶ Secret; Sensitive.

- a. It would reassure the Saudis of the USG's interest in resisting the spread of communism in the Middle East;
- b. It could develop a precedent for using the Saudis as an intermediary, concealing U.S. involvement, to support friendly political elements or other covert assets elsewhere in the area.

5. The lack of radios to coordinate their activities has placed the insurgents at a tactical disadvantage vis-à-vis the DRA. It compels the insurgents to operate on a piece-meal, local basis, and consequently the DRA is able to deal with their raids one at a time, bringing preponderant strength to bear on the area of the insurgent attack. Coordinated simultaneous attacks in several areas would force the DRA to stretch its forces much more thinly in dealing with these attacks and significantly improve insurgent chances of success. Radios would also permit rapid transmission of intelligence on DRA activities from one insurgent unit to another, and could also be used to spread propaganda.

6. To establish a basic communications net for the insurgents, we would provide 16 transceivers with power supply and related equipment: 12 to serve as active units, and four to be held for spare parts; We would also provide 100 walkie-talkies for tactical use. All equipment would be of foreign manufacture or sterile U.S.-made equipment.

Risk: The provision of foreign-made (or marked) radio equipment should involve relatively little risk of exposure.

Cost: 16 transceivers and related equipment (including delivery)
 100 Walkie-talkies [*amount not declassified*]
 [*amount not declassified*]

Tab G⁷

Options 3-a, 3-b, and 3-c

Washington, undated

Option No. 3-a

Broker Saudi agreement to pay for munitions for the insurgents, with the Pakistanis actually making the purchases abroad

1. *Discussion:* The Saudis, once made aware of our willingness to expend significant sums of money aiding the insurgency (See TABS C & D), could be asked to provide funds for use by the Pakistanis to purchase munitions. If the Saudis are amenable to this, we could

⁷ Secret; Sensitive.

attempt to broker meetings between a foreign arms dealer and the Pakistanis (who would make the actual purchases), and attempt to monitor Pakistani purchases through this arms dealer.

2. The bulk of the purchases would be ammunition for Soviet-made weapons captured by the insurgents from Afghan Government forces, although it may be deemed wise to purchase some ammunition for vintage weapons in the hands of the insurgents.

3. In addition to ammunition, a small amount of explosives, and perhaps a limited number of Soviet-made anti-aircraft weapons, be purchased.

4. The insurgents are critically short of weapons for use against Soviet-supplied helicopters and aircraft and are beginning to suffer significant losses to the weapons systems, which they cannot counter. Shortages of both light small arms/ammunition and heavier weapons, in the face of increased pressure from the DRA, may cause the insurgents to lose heart and result in their being destroyed piecemeal.

RISK: Brokering Saudi payment for lethal military supplies should involve relatively little risk of exposure.

COST: -0-

Option No. 3-b

Provide the Pakistanis with funds to purchase munitions abroad for subsequent passage to the insurgents

1. *Discussion:* The Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence Directorate (ISID) has advised the CIA Chief of Station that, in ISID's opinion, despite the fall of Asmar and other recent favorable developments, the insurgents remain very much in need of weapons, ammunition and demolitions. According to an ISID representative, President Zia endorses this view and is anxious that CIA provide this equipment through the ISID. We have thus far advised the ISID that we do not have authorization to provide weapons or ammunition. Nevertheless, the ISID asserts that there are areas in Afghanistan where the insurgents' weapons needs are very real. Reporting indicates that the insurgents are trying to secure new weapons. Moreover, the insurgency continues to spread, involving a greater number of irregular forces, while, correspondingly, Soviet aid to the DRA is steadily increasing.

2. If the Saudis do not indicate a willingness to pay for weapons for the insurgents (Option 3-a), we would attempt to place the ISID in contact with a foreign arms dealer, and, *[less than 1 line not declassified]* monitor Pakistan purchases to verify that funds provided are properly used. Funds to cover the purchases of ordnance supplies would be provided by CIA to the Pakistanis. Comments on the types of munitions involved are noted above and in Option 3-a.

RISK: While the risks of exposure are somewhat higher than in merely brokering Saudi funding of these arms/ammunition purchases, the Pakistanis are the ostensible purchasers, and thus the USG can plausibly deny involvement.

COST: The cost of ammunition/weapons would be approximately [amount not declassified].

Option No. 3-c

Provide the Pakistanis with munitions from CIA stocks, and with munitions purchased by CIA from foreign arms dealers, with CIA arranging delivery of these munitions to Pakistan

1. *Discussion:* CIA can provide, from its own stocks, ammunition for Soviet small arms. The advantage in supplying this ammunition is the speed with which it can be assembled and delivered (in approximately two weeks). In addition to stocks on hand, supplies of specialized Soviet-made ammunition and weapons can be purchased by CIA and shipped to Pakistan, possibly within two months. CIA could also provide supplies of demolitions, suitably disguised as to origin, from its own stocks.

2. Supplies from CIA stocks could be moved with relative speed to Pakistan and turned over to the Pakistani service for transfer into Afghanistan.

RISK: This is somewhat more risky than either of the above options in that CIA is directly involved in providing the equipment.

COST: [amount not declassified].

77. **Memorandum From the Director of the Strategic Warning Staff, Central Intelligence Agency (MacEachin) to the National Intelligence Officer for Warning, Central Intelligence Agency (Lehman)**¹

[*memorandum number not declassified*] Washington, October 26, 1979

SUBJECT

USSR-Afghanistan

1. We are concerned that in the month that has elapsed since the *USSR-Afghanistan Alert Memorandum* and the *IIM Soviet Options in Afghanistan* were issued,² the Soviets appear to have put themselves in position to move a larger ground combat force into Afghanistan in less time and affording less advance warning than was believed possible at the time those papers were written. [*classification marking not declassified*]

2. Activity at the Soviet ground force installation at Kushka, some five kilometers from the Afghanistan border, indicates that the readiness of the motorized rifle division whose units are located there has been substantially increased. Indeed, the evidence suggests that through the last month at least some elements probably have been fleshed out with reservists to full combat strength. This division sits on the best surface route into Afghanistan. With full manpower and equipment, it could move by road in armed convoy from its present location to as far as, for example, Kandahar in Afghanistan in about 24 hours. [*classification marking and codeword not declassified*]

3. The Soviet motorized rifle division units at Termez, also located directly adjacent to the Afghanistan border at a major crossing point, have been unusually active recently. The activity there has not been as extensive in either scale or duration as that at Kushka. This division would not be able to move by surface routes into Afghanistan as easily as the one at Kushka because it would have to cross the Oxus by barge. Nevertheless, if the division is at increased manning and readiness, as the evidence suggests, at least major elements could move into the Mazar-i-Sharif area of Afghanistan in 24–48 hours. [*classification marking and codeword not declassified*]

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council Files, Job 93T01324R, Box 4, Afghanistan. Top Secret; [*codeword and handling restriction not declassified*]. Attached but not printed are an October 29 covering memorandum from MacEachin, a map of Afghanistan, a distribution list, and a memorandum from [*text not declassified*] to MacEachin, October 30, registering INR's endorsement of MacEachin's memorandum.

² See Documents 62 and 67.

4. In sum, if those two Soviet motorized divisions located on the Afghanistan border are now manned at higher states of readiness, as the evidence suggests they may be, the Soviets would be able, within about a 48 hour period, to insert an airborne division (the 105th at Fergana) into Kabul, a motorized rifle division into Kandahar, and at least major elements of a motorized rifle division into Mazar-i-Sharif. A major ground force intervention along these lines would not need to be preceded by much if any visible mobilization of army and front level support elements. *[classification marking not declassified]*.

5. At the time the IIM *Soviet Options in Afghanistan* was being drafted the consensus of community analysts was that the Soviets could insert an airborne division and possibly some individual combat units of battalion or regimental size while affording us little warning but that any major military action beyond that probably would have to be the kind of multi-division action that would be clearly indicated well in advance. While that judgement may have been consistent with the situation at the time, we do not believe it remains valid. *[classification marking not declassified]*

6. Adding to our concern in this regard is information we recently obtained *[less than 1 line not declassified]* indicating that activity seen in imagery of Kushka and Termez, in the spring of this year, and which was interpreted to be exercise activity of the units normally garrisoned there, actually was an augmentation—albeit apparently of a temporary nature—with additional forces originally located several hundred kilometers from the Afghanistan border. This evidence points to the difficulty of interpreting *[1½ lines not declassified]* the significance of activities of ground force units in and around major garrisons. *[classification marking and codeword not declassified]*

7. Another factor that bears on the Soviet ability to quickly move larger forces into Afghanistan is the extent to which major terminals in Afghanistan, particularly the air terminals, have been improved. We do not know, in fact, the full extent of what has taken place in the two months that the Pavlovskiy mission has been in Afghanistan. Recent imagery, however, does show that at Bagram airbase parking areas are being blacktopped and a new heightfinder radar now is operational there. Both of these improvements raise the traffic handling capacity of the airfields. We also have unconfirmed information *[less than 1 line not declassified]* that the Soviets have virtually “taken over” Kandahar airport, which already has been the best equipped in Afghanistan in terms of air traffic capacity. According to *[less than 1 line not declassified]* the cargo of much of the extensive airlift that has been underway in the last two months has been construction materials. *[classification marking and codeword not declassified]*

8. Adding to the ominous nature of these military developments are:

a. The recent mutiny of at least elements of an Afghan army division near Kabul. Based on reports of the duration and scale of the measures to suppress it, this latest mutiny appears to be the most serious break yet in the cohesiveness of the Afghan army. Whether and where another uprising might take place must concern the Soviets. The worst case they probably envisage is a *defection* (as opposed to a mutiny) of one or two whole divisions to the Muslim insurgency. A military coup could be accommodated by the Soviets, but a major defection could cause the entire situation to become unravelled, making the Soviet options even more unpleasant than they are at present. [*classification marking not declassified*]

b. Information that on 17 October, shortly after the mutiny, a meeting of the highest [*less than 1 line not declassified*] was held to discuss Afghanistan. [*classification marking and codeword not declassified*]

c. Information that Pavlovskiy was still in Afghanistan on 19 October apparently awaiting some decision or orders. [*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*]

Activity at Kushka and Termez

9. Beginning in [*less than 1 line not declassified*] imagery of the Kushka ground force installation began to show substantial amounts of ground force equipment in the nearby rail transshipment area. Initially, it was difficult to ascertain whether equipment was coming in or going out. By early September, however, it appeared that the entire garrison had been vacated. While a full interpretation must await a detailed imagery analysis, the types and amounts of equipment suggest that at a minimum a motorized rifle regiment, an artillery unit, an anti-aircraft unit, and some combat support units had moved out. The destination was unknown at the time, but later evidence indicated that a major field training exercise was underway. About [*less than 1 line not declassified*] later, the same types of units appeared to have begun returning to the garrison. By [*less than 1 line not declassified*] all units apparently were back. [*classification marking and codeword not declassified*]

10. [*1 line not declassified*] SWS cannot make any firm judgements as to what transpired. While the activity appears to be only exercise-related, we also believe the evidence suggests the forces at Kushka may have been augmented. [*classification marking and codeword not declassified*]

11. In any event, the units at Kushka were believed to be in a Category III (or Cadre) manning status prior to the recent activity. To undergo a field training exercise of the scale and duration of what appears to have taken place in the last month would have required the call-up of a substantial number of reservists. In a sense, the units were in a “mobilized” status at least for the past month. We believe a

detailed study of imagery should be undertaken in an effort to see if the overall status of the division has been upgraded on a permanent basis. [*classification marking and codeword not declassified*]

12. At Termez, a motorized rifle regiment appeared to be vacating its garrison on [*less than 1 line not declassified*] in a convoy headed towards a railroad loading area. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] the activity at the garrison seemed normal, with the vehicles *apparently* returned to their sheds. However, a camp of 110 tents was still set up in a training area some seven kilometers away. As is the case with the units at Kushka, a major field training exercise probably would require some call-up of reservists. Moreover, we cannot determine whether the tent camp belongs to the motorized rifle regiment that apparently came out of the Termez garrison on [*less than 1 line, classification, and codeword not declassified*]

Evidence of Previous Augmentation of Border Divisions

13. [*3 lines not declassified*] After one week, the regiment was transferred by railroad via Alma Ata to Termez where it remained for about two weeks, then transferred to a tent camp in Kushka. The reasons for the mobilization type call-up and move, according to [*1 line not declassified*] was the unsettled situation in Iran and Afghanistan. [*classification marking not declassified*]

14. From information furnished [*less than 1 line not declassified*], the MR was at Termez during the period 13–27 March and at Kushka from 27 March to 15 April. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] the Kushka Army Barracks installation during this timeframe revealed a high level of activity at the installation and in the surrounding training areas. Equipment was observed in four bivouac areas north, south, east and west of the installation from [*less than 1 line, classification marking, and codeword not declassified*]

15. There was no reason on the basis only of imagery to identify this activity as involving elements that were *not* drawn from the motorized rifle division normally based in the Kushka area. [*1 line, classification marking, and codeword not declassified*]

16. We believe this information also is significant in that it reveals that divisional combat units were fleshed out with reservists and moved several hundred kilometers to the Afghanistan border in one week with no clear indication of what had transpired. [*classification marking not declassified*]

Douglas J. MacEachin³
Director

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

78. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State¹

Kabul, October 28, 1979, 0728Z

7726. Subj: Meeting With President Amin. Ref: Kabul 7645.²

1. (C—Entire text)

2. Summary. Except for the expression of a strong interest in U.S. development assistance, I did not succeed in soliciting from President Amin any specific suggestions of steps the DRA or the USG might take in the interest of improving our bilateral relationship. Amin did, however, emphasize his personal desire for an improvement of U.S.-Afghan relations and in this connection referred to the DRA's forbearance in not making any public criticism of the U.S. He claimed the DRA's foreign policy decisions, e.g., rupture of relations with South Korea, had been taken completely on its own, without any consultation with the Soviets; maintained that aid from the Soviet Union was given without strings or preconditions; and disavowed any intention of aggression against neighboring countries. Amin defended the DRA on human rights grounds by attacking the record of the Zahir and Daoud regimes. I left with the impression that Amin welcomed the current, less confrontational relationship with the U.S.; that he was not seriously pressing for any early concrete steps by the USG, as in economic assistance; and that he would be content for the time being with a polite but limited relationship which both countries would refrain from exacerbating by word or action. End summary.

3. U.S.-Afghan relations. I had forty minutes alone with President Hafizullah Amin on the morning of Oct. 27. After the photographs were taken, we got down speedily to business. Following the talking points proposed in reftel, I mentioned those recent areas (Ariana DC-10, narcotics control, etc.) where we had found we could work cooperatively with the DRA in our mutual interest and with a view to improving our bilateral relationship. Amin did not comment on any of the examples I cited, but merely nodded his assent. He then went on, with considerable eloquence, to stress his personal commitment to improving U.S.-Afghan relations, expressing his affection for the U.S.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790493-0792. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Archer Blood was serving as Acting Deputy Chief of Mission.

² In telegram 7645 from Kabul, October 23, the Embassy responded to guidance from the Department on the topics to cover during Blood's proposed meeting with Amin. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790485-0511)

acquired during his residence in our country.³ Amin made a particular point of drawing my attention to the DRA's forbearance in refraining from public attacks on the U.S. Even when Afghanistan is attacked by VOA, he said, we have deliberately resisted the temptation to respond in kind. The DRA does not want to do anything to "blacken the name or fame of the U.S." He said that each country must act in its own interest but was confident that the U.S. and Afghanistan could continue to find ways and means that could serve their own interests but be of mutual benefit.

4. The DRA customarily publicizes the courtesy calls of foreign diplomats on Amin. My call was the first item on the English and Dari TV newscasts Oct. 27.

5. Development assistance. Amin made a strong pitch for U.S. "material assistance." Afghanistan, he said, is in desperate need of foreign aid. Even a small portion of the development assistance which the U.S. provides worldwide would be of very great help to Afghanistan. The DRA would be grateful for any assistance, no matter how small. Amin said he would be happy to publicize U.S. aid to Afghanistan, adding that he would like to see more buildings in Afghanistan with plaques denoting that they had been built through U.S. aid. He allowed as how "your philosophy" can make it difficult for the U.S. to help in some areas and "our philosophy" makes it difficult for Afghanistan to accept some kinds of aid. Still, he said, we could doubtless find areas where we could work together.

6. Amin pretended to express bewilderment as to why more U.S. aid is not forthcoming. Referring to U.S. commercial investment in the Soviet Union, he said that surely the U.S. has more problems with the Soviet Union than with Afghanistan. Somewhat slyly he said the U.S. Congress is prepared to give ten million dollars to so-called Afghan refugees in Pakistan but is not willing to contribute to alleviating the root cause of the problem, poverty and underdevelopment in Afghanistan itself.

7. When I noted the practical barrier posed by the Pell-Stone Amendment to the continuation of U.S. development assistance, Amin said he had felt great animosity on the part of the Americans with whom he had talked in the days after Ambassador Dubs's death.⁴ It was unfortunate, he said, how much misunderstanding had arisen,

³ Amin's desire to improve U.S.-Afghan relations was also conveyed to Peck during a meeting with Victor Trifonov, Political Counselor of the Soviet Embassy, October 25, in Washington. This meeting was reported in telegram 277944 to Kabul, October 25. (Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 4, USSR in Afghanistan (10-31 Oct 79))

⁴ See footnote 4, Document 68.

implying that the misunderstanding was primarily on the U.S. side. Neither Amin's words nor demeanor suggested that he was prepared to consider any formula which would recognize DRA responsibility for the Ambassador's death. As for the security of U.S. personnel in Afghanistan, said Amin, you have nothing to fear. "Nobody is out to kill Americans."

8. Non-alignment. After saying that the USG hoped to be able to maintain a frank and open dialogue about the differences between our countries, I noted our concern that Afghanistan's previous genuine non-alignment now appears to have gone by the board and merged into positions which to us seem virtually indistinguishable from those of the Soviet Union and Cuba. As examples, I cited the DRA's rupture of relations with South Korea and the DRA position on Puerto Rico.⁵ In reply, Amin said that the DRA's decisions with respect to South Korea, its suspension of relations with Egypt and its recognition of the Polisario had been taken without consultation with any country. In fact, Amin said, the Soviet Union had been taken unawares by these decisions.

9. Following up on the mention of South Korea, I asked Amin if he heard the news that President Park had been killed the previous night. Amin said he had not heard of it. I described the shooting in a way to suggest to him a parallel between the shoot-out in Kabul on Sept. 14 which had left him the undisputed ruler of the Saur revolution. If Amin felt any collegial association with Park, he did not show it. He merely said that "terrorism is to be deplored wherever it occurs."

10. Amin said Soviet aid to Afghanistan was given without strings or preconditions. The Soviet Union has never asked Afghanistan to take any action which would adversely affect Afghan relations with any other country, whether it be the U.S., India, Pakistan, Iran or China. If Brezhnev himself should ask him to take any action against Afghan independence, said Amin, he would not hesitate "to sacrifice even one second of his life" in opposition to such a request.

11. Extent of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. When I said that another of our concerns was the growing Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, Amin replied that Soviet aid was increasing and necessary

⁵ In telegram 7538 from Kabul, September 19, 1978, the Embassy reported the Afghan Government's decision to sever its relations with South Korea in protest of the ongoing presence of foreign troops in South Korea and out of a desire to see the reunification of Korea under the control of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780383-0515) In telegram 7858 from Kabul, September 28, 1978, the Embassy noted that Afghanistan was "firmly wedded" to the Iraqi-Cuban resolution on Puerto Rico at the United Nations Committee of 24 session of 1978, which called for the independence of Puerto Rico. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780395-1068)

because the DRA could not maintain itself very long against foreign interference without this Soviet aid. He did not challenge my assertion that the USG was not aiding the insurgents.

12. Human rights.⁶ In response to my citation of the DRA's record on human rights as one of the problems impacting on U.S.-Afghan relations, Amin attacked the human rights record of the previous Zahir and Daoud regimes. The Saur revolution, he said, had overthrown a regime which had existed for the profit and well-being of one family. Ninety-eight percent of the people had been sacrificed for this one family. Under Mohammedzai rule many people had been imprisoned, tortured and executed, but not once had the VOA raised its voice in protest. Amin said he could categorically assert that not one person would be imprisoned or executed if foreign interference in Afghanistan would cease. With a twisted grin, he said he found it surprising that the U.S., a staunch believer in religious freedom, would be concerned about the so-called non-Islamic nature of the Afghan regime which was only trying for the first time in history to permit all Afghans to practice any religion or non-religion they chose.

13. Impressions. The man is impressive. His survival to date is by itself impressive, as is the air of quiet self-confidence he exudes. Clearly, he is aware of the mortality rate of Afghan leaders; several times he said "even if I am killed tomorrow." He masks his ruthlessness and toughness quite well by his soft-spoken manner. In remarkable contrast to his turgid public speeches, his private discourse is refreshingly free from Marxist cant and clichés. His English is quite good and very easy to understand. Only once did he seem to have difficulty in expressing himself and that was when, perhaps in an attempt to convey great sincerity, he was declaiming how he could never sacrifice Afghan independence to any foreign demands, including from the Soviets.

14. I think he wants an improvement in U.S.-Afghan relations. His reasons could be varied: Soviet coaching; a long-range hedge against over-dependence on the Soviet Union; concern over the trouble which open U.S. animosity can create for his regime; conversely, an interest in bringing about the doubts and confusion which friendlier U.S. relations could sow among the supporters of the insurgency, the Pakistanis, Iranians and Saudis; a genuinely felt need for economic assistance.

⁶ The Embassy's draft of the 1979 Annual Country Report on Human Rights Practices for Afghanistan was relayed in telegram 5923 from Kabul, October 9. The report painted a grim picture of the state of human rights in Afghanistan, noting the commonplace practice of torture and atrocities visited upon Afghan villagers by the Afghan military. (Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 4, USSR in Afghanistan (10-31 Oct 79))

15. I do not think that in the near future Amin realistically expects any substantial forward movement in U.S.-Afghan relations, such as the resumption of aid. My guess is that he will be content for the time being with the less rancorous discourse we are having with his government, agreeing to avoid confrontational actions provided we do the same. In this connection he seconded with some alacrity my observations that sometimes two countries can work toward a better relationship simply by refraining from doing each other mischief. Perhaps, this is all we should strive for, as we assess Amin's staying power both vis-à-vis the Soviets and the insurgents and as we try to maintain a limited presence toward the time when there might once again be some scope for a larger and more active U.S. role in Afghanistan.

Blood

79. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, November 2, 1979, 1655Z

25153. Subj: (C) Démarche to Soviets on Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Ref: (A) State 285130.²

1. (S—Entire text.)

2. I made the démarche on Pakistan and Afghanistan, using the talking points in para 3 of reftel, when I called on First Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko this morning (November 2).

3. In responding, Korniyenko first said that the Soviets favored normal and improving relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan and had in fact said so to the leaders of both countries. For their

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office Files of Marshall D. Shulman, Special Advisor to the Secretary on Soviet Affairs, 1977–1981, Lot 81D109, Watson-Korniyenko, 11/2/79. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent for information to Leningrad, Bonn, London, Paris, Islamabad, Kabul, and New Delhi.

² Telegram 285130 to Moscow, November 1, summarized discussions between Vance and Shahi October 16–17. Vance pledged: "in the event of aggression from Afghanistan against Pakistan the United States would consider the 1959 bilateral agreement to be relevant." Shahi in turn requested that the United States "assert to the Soviet Union our interest in Pakistan's security and our concern that the USSR not interfere in other countries' internal affairs." The telegram further reported that Shahi suggested that the U.S. assertion refer to the 1959 agreement. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790503–0073 and D790500–0228)

part, the leadership of Afghanistan, as is known, had also expressed readiness to improve relations with Pakistan and had taken concrete steps in that direction; he had in mind the visit to Pakistan by Deputy Foreign Minister Dost and the invitation for the President of Pakistan to visit Afghanistan. From the other side, however, although the Pakistani leadership had earlier expressed interest in a high level meeting, it subsequently was avoiding such a meeting.

4. Korniyenko did not directly address the question of charges of Pakistani interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs, but spoke instead of the use of Pakistani territory for hostile actions against Afghanistan. That this was going on was not something invented by the media. It was openly admitted by leaders of the insurgents, who made public statements about their activities and made no secret of the fact that they were operating against Afghanistan from Pakistan territory.

5. As for the question of the "involvement" of the USSR in Afghanistan, Korniyenko continued, the Soviet Union had even earlier provided aid—and was now doing so on an even larger scale—to the Afghanistan people and state; all forms of aid were included—economic and scientific and technological, and other forms, including military. But all this assistance, regardless of type, was being given at the request of the Government of Afghanistan, and there were no political conditions attached. It did not constitute interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. The questions which the U.S. was raising about this aid, by referring to the presence of Soviet specialists and advisers as though this raised concerns on the part of the U.S., were not legitimate questions. In essence, this amounted to interference in the relations between two sovereign states, since Soviet aid was given at the request of the legitimate Afghan Government.

6. Picking up the reference to the nuclear issue, Korniyenko said he could confirm what had been previously said by the Soviet side, that Pakistan activity toward the development of a nuclear device was also of concern to the Soviet Union. The Soviets had put questions to the Pakistani leadership on this score, and they would be prepared to continue to cooperate with the U.S. in this matter, on the basis of our mutual interest in preventing proliferation.

Watson

80. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, November 5, 1979

SUBJECT

Saudi Arabian and Pakistani Views on the Afghan Insurgency

On 30 October you directed me to take soundings with Pakistani and Saudi intelligence agencies on their intentions for covert action in Afghanistan. I understood that you wanted to know what the degree of their commitment would be were we to join with them in such endeavors. We have taken such soundings. The results are summarized below:

Pakistan:

There is no question that Pakistan—without waiting for us—is already supporting the Afghan tribesmen. The head of Pakistani military intelligence has made it clear that President Zia holds the continuation of the tribal insurgency to be vital to his country's security and that support in the way of weapons, ammunition and explosives is essential to sustain the insurgency. (The Pakistanis have been pressing us for weapons and ammunition since early August.)

Our relations with Pakistan are not warm enough for us to elicit details on what type and how much support they are providing or would provide in a joint effort. Clearly they do not have large financial resources for such an undertaking.

Opinion: Pakistan will cooperate in covert action against Afghanistan. It will be anxious that U.S. involvement not invite strong Soviet responses. It will be nervous that U.S. cooperation might be terminated abruptly if U.S.-Pakistan relations should deteriorate over other issues. Overall, Pakistan can be counted on for operational support for joint efforts, but cannot be looked upon to take the lead or to supply resources.

Saudi Arabia:

The Saudi chief of intelligence states that his government is committed to assisting the Afghan insurgents and that some monies have been disbursed to refugees resident in Pakistan. The Saudis, however, are

¹ Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I-047, Afghanistan: 11 Sep 1979–22 Jul 1980. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Carter initialed "C" in the top right corner.

confused as to the relative merits of the various tribal groups and have requested a briefing from CIA so that they can gauge the field situation and make a judgment as to the strengths and weaknesses of the tribesmen.

On three separate occasions the intelligence chief said that his government would react positively to secret CIA proposals on support to the insurgents. The Saudis, however, are concerned about what they perceive as a lack of U.S. will to engage in political action and they are not sanguine that we will become involved to any significant extent. As a result of this attitude we were unable to obtain an estimate of how much money the Saudis would likely commit to such a program.

Opinion: I think we have pushed the Saudis as far as we can push them at this point. The Saudis lack general intelligence capability, so their confusion is understandable. As in many other areas, it will be necessary for us to lead the Saudis by the hand in getting them to make a firm decision. Nevertheless, the Saudis appear willing to put up resources once we make a firm commitment. I therefore suggest that the finding be signed and that we be authorized to tell the Saudis we will put up [amount not declassified] (less the amount for communications equipment) and expect them to put up at least as much.² We will then work with them and the Paks in assessing the capabilities of the various groups and the degree of support which should be given to each.

Should the Saudi's delay too long or back off for one reason or another, we can then reconsider whether to continue our unilateral program.

Stansfield Turner³

² The Finding was signed on November 7; see footnote 1, Document 76.

³ Turner signed "Stan" above his typed signature.

81. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning (Slocombe) to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Murphy)¹

Washington, November 21, 1979

SUBJECT

Afghanistan

I appreciate your asking my views on this issue. I don't share Bob Komer's reservations:

1. It is, I think, very much in our interest that we keep the Afghanistan insurgency going. It would be a major blow if heavier Soviet involvement led to a clear Kabul victory and the petering out of the resistance. Indeed, it would mean that the Soviets had been able to do for Amin what no one had ever been able to do for a Kabul government. On the plus side, if the insurgency keeps going, the various rebel factions may be persuaded to get together. Clearly they won't if things go badly. Even if they don't, they may be able to make life difficult for Moscow's Kabul clients even disunited if they have reasonable outside support.²

2. It is the Soviet backyard, but it is also an area where the status quo ante is *not* having a puppet regime. Our objective is certainly not the unattainable one of installing people in Kabul we can control, but of continuing a situation in which the Soviets, having installed (or more likely connived at installing) a friendly regime find it's not much more than the Kabul garrison instead of a strong central government.

3. I'm all for saving assets for promising opportunities, and that would be decisive against larger scale actions, but I think a modest US investment of funds (and some arms) would be more likely to pay off here than elsewhere (see para 4 below). (Having written that, it occurs to me that Bob may mean the SecDef should save his assets for more

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Donated Material of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, Box 82, Afghanistan. Secret; Sensitive. A copy was sent to Komer. Attached but not printed is a November 20 memorandum from Sullivan to Murphy that contained comments on a Department of Defense paper characterized by Sullivan as "calling for a more aggressive covert action policy on Afghanistan." Sullivan defended the paper, in response to Komer's comments, noting that the paper's objective was not to "win" in Afghanistan by attempting to "install a pro-U.S. western style democracy," but to "ensure that the Soviets do not win and to ensure the fall of the Amin regime" by increasing monetary aid to the insurgents to \$5 million. Sullivan recommended that the paper go forward "even if we do not succeed in overcoming opposition at the SCC level." The DOD paper with Komer's comments was not found.

² In the left margin beside this paragraph, an unknown hand, likely Murphy's, wrote: "All true but . . . question is whether [illegible]."

promising interventions with the White House. Since I don't know why the SCC (I) turned down the original proposal, I can't assess how much of a reopening the issue requires.³ I think he could raise it noncommittally at a BVB lunch, without risking much.)

4. The fact that the Paks and the Iranians are already helping seems to me an argument for some modestly increased US effort, rather than the reverse. We have learned over the years that we can't easily affect complicated distant local conflicts operating from here—but that we can have some impact when we can reinforce local concerns. (In current circumstances, being on the same side as the Ayatollah seems strange, but someday we may want to be able to remind them that the Shah wasn't opposed to the Soviets as a way of being nice to the US but because the US can be a helpful ally against Soviet adventures.) In the current state of our relations with Pakistan, being able to cooperate in this is a useful way of making clear that we have—and can follow through on—some common security concerns. *In fact, in my view a principal argument for somewhat increased US support is the beneficial impact on other countries (Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, even China) rather than our impact on events in Afghanistan itself.*⁴

In short, I think we should adhere to the policy that I believe was adopted some months ago: Do what is appropriate to keep the insurrection going, working with others in the region. I can't comment on specific plans because I don't know enough about what's been proposed, but if it's feasible, I'd favor funds for arms and facilitating services to locate them and get them there.

Walter Slocombe⁵

*Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(Policy Planning)*

³ See Document 76. The Presidential Finding did not include a provision to support the Afghan insurgents with military supplies. In the left margin beside this paragraph an unknown hand, likely Murphy's, wrote: "Also my points."

⁴ In the left margin beside this paragraph, an unknown hand, likely Murphy's, wrote: "True."

⁵ Slocombe signed "Walt" above his typed signature.

82. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State¹

Kabul, December 2, 1979, 1154Z

8271. Subj: (S) Party Document Suggests Real Strains in Soviet-Amin Relationship May Have Flowed From September 14 Shootout.

1. (S—Entire text.)

2. Summary: The leadership of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) has been circulating an "official" version of the events of September 14 for use in briefing party cadre. We have no doubt concerning the document's authenticity, and its contents, therefore, should be regarded as current strongman Hafizullah Amin's view of the "truth" surrounding September 14. The document's clear condemnation of the Soviet role—in the person of now departed Ambassador Puzanov—in the affair tends to confirm widespread rumors here that there may be strains in the Soviet-Amin relationship resulting from the September 14 shootout. Moreover, the fact that Amin is virtually openly circulating the document among his party cadre suggests he wants to get a message to his Soviet mentors that he is wary of their past (and presumably future) intentions toward him.

3. On the domestic scene, various themes within the document echo theses which the current leadership has repeated often since September 14, most notably that it was the late President Taraki and his henchmen, and not Hafizullah Amin, who were primarily responsible for the repressive policies of this revolutionary government. Few Afghans appear to swallow this particular line, however, and Amin remains the generally perceived villain and despot. In fact, the picture of the Khalqi leadership which emerges from this party document resembles a group of thugs who could shame the Mafia, rather than an enlightened leadership attempting to establish "security, legality, and justice" in Afghanistan. End of summary.

4. The extraordinary and lengthy document (almost thirty pages in translation) essentially recounts the background leading up to the September 14, 1979, shootout between supporters of current President Hafizullah Amin and the late Noor Mohammad Taraki, as well as some details surrounding that event itself. Beyond this, however, the document's direct charges that now departed Soviet Ambassador Alexander Puzanov (and his senior advisors) was instrumental in luring

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790556–1065. Secret; Priority; Noform. Sent for information to Ankara, Beijing, London, Moscow, New Delhi, USNATO, and CINCPAC.

Amin into a potentially fatal trap, that the Soviet envoy was at the scene of the gunfight, and that the men allegedly plotting Amin's death found a safe haven in the Soviet Embassy at one point during the drama, underscore why any existing tensions in the Amin-Moscow relationship may need some time to be dissipated.

5. Highlights of the document's remarkable tale are:

—Taraki and his group of "henchmen" (former Defense Minister Mohammad Aslam Watanjar, former Interior Minister Sher Jan Mazdoor, former Communications Minister Sayed Mohammad Gulabzoi, and former secret police chief Assadullah Sarwari; all military men now either dead, incarcerated, or at large) had hatched a plot to kill Amin. Ostensible reasons behind the plot were that Amin, from the beginning of the revolution, had resisted their plan to build a "massive cult of personality" around Taraki, and because the late Afghan President had become upset at Amin's "growing popularity" among the people;

—Amin's "repeated warnings" to Taraki about the anti-revolutionary machinations of the "Watanjar gang" went unheeded because Taraki wanted Amin eliminated permanently;

—Amin loyalists among the PDPA cadre learned of the plot to kill him, and Amin began arguing within the party that Taraki's plots, spying, and repression were having adverse effects on the progress of the revolution;

—Amin was supposed to be killed at Kabul's airport upon Taraki's return from the nonaligned summit in Havana in early September, but an Amin informer, Aziz Ahmad Akbari (recently appointed Ambassador to Iraq) was a member of the Taraki entourage, and Amin, notified of the danger, was able to avoid the supposed assassins;

—a Taraki-Amin confrontation on September 12 led to heated exchanges, with Amin calling for a Central Committee plenum to mediate matters, and Taraki claiming that Amin had made a mess of the revolution;

—by September 13, Amin was afraid to go to Taraki's office, since he believed the Watanjar gang and Taraki would kill him. On the evening of September 13, Amin received word that the Watanjar "gang of four" had been sent by Taraki to seek refuge in the Soviet Embassy, and Amin, with his heavily armed bodyguards, went to Taraki's office where further accusations and threats were exchanged;

—Soviet Ambassador Puzanov and "three high-ranking advisors" arrived at the September 13 evening shouting match bringing an "oral message" from President Brezhnev stressing that "unity among Afghan leaders was in the interest of the revolution";

—after Puzanov and his entourage left the meeting, Watanjar ordered the army to move against Amin in order to protect Taraki, but unit commanders refused to obey such orders;

—on the morning of September 14, Taraki and Amin engaged in another shouting match, this one by phone, over who controlled the military, Taraki as Commander-in-Chief, or Amin as Minister of Defense. Taraki ordered Amin to come to the President's office, but Amin's closest advisors (the "martyred" Seyed Daoud Taroon, then police commandant, and Lt. Col. Yaqoub, now Chief of the General Staff) warned Amin it was not safe for him to go to Taraki's office;

—on the fateful afternoon of September 14, Puzanov and his three advisors arrived in Taraki's office and Taraki told Amin by phone that our "Soviet comrades" wanted Amin to come to the Palace for talks. Taroon advised Amin that the presence of the Soviets in Taraki's office precluded Taraki and his men from opening fire on Amin;

—shortly thereafter, Amin, accompanied by his own guards, arrived at the Palace, was met by Taroon, and they proceeded up a staircase toward Taraki's office. Taraki's guards immediately opened fire killing Taroon, who was in front of Amin, instantly, while Amin rolled out of the line of fire leading Taraki's men to think he had been hit. Amin and some of his guards successfully made their escape;

—on September 15th, Amin convened meetings of the party's Politburo and the Cabinet, and on the 16th meetings of the party Central Committee and the Revolutionary Council. These meetings took the "necessary decisions" expelling Taraki from the party for hatching the plot to kill Amin and for other "unprincipled acts." Watanjar, et al., were also expelled and Amin was elected to Taraki's posts;

—the above decisions ended the era of "one-man rule and personality cult," and opened a new chapter in the development of the party and the revolution.

6. Comment: Aside from giving some fascinating insights into the bloody ways "democracy" operates in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, this party document possesses other nuggets of potential political value. The fact that it is being circulated among party leaders with instructions to brief their cadre about its contents, indicates clearly that this version is the officially-sanctioned Amin version of what happened on September 14, and why. In this regard, the allegations that Puzanov and his senior advisors indirectly summoned Amin to Taraki's lair in order to be gunned down, that the Soviets were unable or unwilling to prevent Taraki's men from opening fire, and that the Soviet Embassy sheltered the men who were leading the plot aimed at Amin, tend to substantiate widespread post-September 14 rumors here that definite strains exist in Amin's relations with the USSR, and that these strains will not be easily dispelled. Amin's willingness to

circulate a document containing charges along these lines strongly suggests that he wants Moscow to get the message that he is wary of their past (and presumably future) intentions toward him. Whether those strains led directly to Puzanov's transfer is not yet known, but that possibility should not be discarded. Whatever the case, Puzanov's newly-arrived successor, for several reasons, will have his hands full.

7. On the domestic front, the general themes of the story track with Amin's overall theses he has espoused since his accession to power. For example, Taraki's cult of personality and abuses of office had brought the revolution to the brink of collapse, Taraki's excessive repression was in direct contrast to Amin's alleged desire to adopt a legal constitution in order to guarantee "security, legality, and justice," and the end of one-man rule paved the way for a "golden revolutionary future" in Afghanistan. Although Amin and his closest cohorts have played these themes repeatedly since September 14, few Afghans apparently discern much substantive difference between the goals and tactics of Taraki and Amin, and the latter, despite his loudest protestations, is still viewed by most as a cruel despot who has been the principal architect of this repressive regime. In fact, the picture of the Khalqi leadership that emerges from this particular party document resembles a group of political thugs using tactics that would shame Chicago of the 1920s in their high-stakes struggle for political survival.

8. For complete text of party document, see [1 line not declassified]. This document parallels in many ways the version of the September 14 affair which Foreign Minister Shah Wali reportedly gave to Eastern European Chiefs of Mission, and which this Embassy reported some six weeks or so ago. Having eliminated most of our files, we cannot give a reference number.

Amstutz

83. Intelligence Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

[paper number not declassified]

Washington, December 4, 1979

AFGHANISTAN: Opposition to Amin

President Amin's hold on power remains tenuous nearly 12 weeks after he seized control. ([classification marking not declassified])

Amin has skillfully outmaneuvered ruling party members who had supported the ousted President Taraki. His political enemies are numerous, however, and some may be desperate. Amin is vulnerable to an assassination attempt, perhaps by relatives or friends of the several thousand victims of the regime's firing squads. ([classification marking not declassified])

More important, signs continue that the loyalty of the military, the regime's mainstay, is weakening. The uprising of the 7th Division in Kabul in mid-October has been followed by more arrests of officers suspected of plotting against Amin. Military units in the field, mired in a seemingly hopeless counterinsurgency campaign, are susceptible to more mutinies. The Army's drive against rebels in eastern Afghanistan is hampered by breakdowns in discipline and supply problems. It seems to be making no headway, and Army casualties appear to be fairly heavy. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])

[4 lines not declassified], Moscow seems resigned to working with Amin as it supplies the Army with as many arms as it can absorb. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 6, Afghan Crisis—Pubs Pre-Invasion Reporting. Top Secret; [codeword and handling restriction not declassified].

84. Intelligence Information Cable Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

[*cable number not declassified*]

Washington, December 13, 1979

COUNTRY

Afghanistan/USSR

SUBJECT

Appraisal of Situation in Afghanistan (12 December 1979)

SOURCE

This is a field appraisal. It presents the views of this Agency's senior officer on the scene. It is an interpretation based on previously reported information. Prepared primarily for internal Agency use, it is disseminated in the belief that it may be useful to others in their own assessment of the situation.

1. We believe the current buildup of Soviet forces reflects a continuing deterioration in the situation for the Afghan military and Government. The Afghan military has suffered a series of reverses in the last several weeks. Additionally, the government's successful October offensive in Paktia has largely now been negated by recent events there. Badakhshan is in a precarious position. The situation elsewhere between Kabul and the northeast border is deteriorating. The rebels are again active in Paktia and Qandahar areas. Nightly, both Herat and Qandahar cities are the scenes of rebel activity and assassinations and the fighting is creeping closer to Kabul. Additionally, the DRA is no longer able to meet its manpower requirements and continues to experience desertions from its forces. We would assume that, given the above, there is a note of desperation at the People's House and a general fear among the Khalqis and their Soviet supporters that the DRA military position could quickly crumble, leaving Kabul exposed to a successful insurgent attack and/or a general breakdown in the law-and-order situation.

2. Another possibility and only partially connected to the above is that the Soviets are getting ready to remove Amin.

3. It seems evident that the Soviets are committed to supporting the revolution here. Our sources tell us that they will forward whatever supplies are needed to do this. Increasingly, we are receiving rumors that the Soviets are directly engaged in combat operations. On 11 December, a third-country diplomat told us that he has a senior Khalqi

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton, Country File, Box 91, Afghanistan: 5/78-12/79. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*].

source who says that Soviet combat troops are involved in combat operations. Previous reporting from Paktia Province during the October offensive supports the premise that Soviet troops were involved.

4. It is clear that the Soviets are actively, aggressively engaged in suppressing the insurgency; that they will take whatever steps are necessary to do this. While we do not know whether they will be successful, we do know that the insurgents, in the past, have been unable to exploit favorable opportunities their successes have presented to them.

5. We believe the Soviets have undertaken the resupply of Afghan troops by air because they perceive that they are in an emergency situation.² The road connecting the Soviet port of Termez to Kabul, while occasionally interdicted, is open. The road system from the Soviet border to Herat is open. Therefore, if there were no emergency, the Soviets could augment and resupply forces here by road. We believe the Soviet decision to send troops in by air and to resupply Afghan forces by air is a reflection of their evaluation that the situation is deteriorating. The number of resupply flights to Kabul and Bagram between 29 November and 4 December was 17, of which 13 were AN-22 flights and 4 were AN-12 flights. (An AN-22 carries 176,000 pounds of cargo or about 400 men when modified and an AN-12 carries 44,000 pounds of cargo.) Subsequent to this, additional AN-22 and AN-12 flights have arrived in Afghanistan. The exact number is unknown at this time. Also, there has been an increase in the TU-154 flights into Kabul. We are witnessing a major Soviet military/civilian airlift into and out of Afghanistan.

6. Chargé's comment:³ Given the importance of the comments made in this appraisal, I have asked the Defense Attaché, and A/DCM, and POL/ECON section officer Taylor to add their own views to the above report. My own comments follow theirs.

A. DATT [*less than 1 line not declassified*] comment: I share the view that the present insurgency situation in-country gives grounds for Soviet alarm. The Afghan Army has been unable to successfully

² The Soviet airlift was first reported in [*text not declassified*] December 7. The report surmised that the airlift "may have been prompted by a major rebel offensive in the valley north of Kabul," and would "probably be viewed by many as an intervention" and "provide a focus for religious outrage over a perceived Soviet move against brother Muslims, perhaps led by Iran," or even the Afghan military. The airlift constituted a "serious escalation" in Soviet involvement in Afghanistan and it demonstrated that the situation was more dire than current intelligence reporting suggested. "Most importantly," the report concluded, the airlift "demonstrates Moscow's resolve in pursuing its interests in Afghanistan despite the obvious pitfalls and at a time when the Kremlin might consider the U.S. preoccupied with events in Tehran." (Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 4, Afghan Situation Folder, Start 14 Sep)

³ The Chargé was Amstutz.

achieve its objectives in its recent large counterinsurgency operations, and it now appears to be struggling to maintain the status quo. Were DRA forces to experience a significant setback, such as the fall of Feyzabad (capital of Badakhshan Province), this could well trigger large-scale desertions and unit defections, not only in the north, but elsewhere. The Soviets are most certainly aware of the poor state and low morale of Afghan troops. Actual troop strength in many units appears to be below that of three months ago. Thus, I believe the recent action to augment the airlift of cargo and personnel to Afghanistan is a reflection of their concern about this worsened situation.

B. A/DCM and POL/ECON section chief (Freres) comment: I agree that the Soviets are probably worried about the Amin regime's ability to cope with the insurgency, notwithstanding all of the Soviet logistic and advisory support given heretofore. I do not believe, though, that the buildup of Soviet forces in Afghanistan reflects a Soviet estimate that the Amin regime is about to fall, nor do any of those commenting here believe that the regime's collapse is imminent. Rather, in my view, the Soviets' objective is primarily to safeguard its interests in Afghanistan by enabling themselves to intervene promptly and physically with troops should they perceive that this is required. Secondly, the Soviets may be looking beyond Afghan borders for targets of opportunity, such as in Iranian and Pakistani Baluchistan. If so, it would seem prudent for them to strengthen their position in Afghanistan now.

C. POL/ECON section (Taylor) comment: In the short run, the recent upsurge of direct Soviet involvement could be designed to insure the survival of the regime in Kabul and other key areas until the arrival of winter. Cold weather and heavy snows will presumably dampen military activities in general, and could provide a respite for the regime to prepare for next spring's campaign. A crucial unknown factor, however, will be the magnitude of Soviet "emergency support" necessary to buy the DRA some breathing space.

D. Chargé's comment: I don't fully share the Agency senior officer's and DATT's conclusion that the current buildup of Soviet forces reflects a recent deterioration in the position of the DRA military and Government. I appreciate, however, that this is the most plausible reason for the buildup. I also appreciate that there has recently been some evacuation of Soviet dependents from Kabul, and that Soviet UN personnel have evinced nervousness about their dependents. On the other hand, the insurgents have in recent weeks not scored any dramatic success in the field except in the sense that they have held DRA forces at bay in several areas, turned back DRA forces near Bamian and relieving columns approaching Feyzabad (Badakhshan) and Taqab (Parwan), and reestablished their previous countryside dominance in Paktia. But the overall situation does not seem much different from

that of three months ago except in DRA Army unit strengths. Furthermore, there has been no real military threat posed yet to Kabul, the political heart of the country. My own surmise about the Soviet buildup is that it was decided upon a month or so ago as a precautionary contingency measure to bolster the regime and protect Soviet personnel in Kabul should there be a major DRA military force collapse in the field.

I don't share the Agency senior officer's surmise that the buildup is related to possible Soviet plans to remove Hafizullah Amin. The Soviets must appreciate that there is no Afghan Communist waiting in the wings who seemingly can match Amin's abilities, and that Amin ostensibly fully supports the Soviets special position in Afghanistan and Soviet foreign policy.

As to the A/DCM's surmise that the Soviet troop buildup in country may be related to events in Iran, Baluchistan, etc., I am not sure. I believe it is solely related to events in Afghanistan itself.

Whatever the case, we are in the midst of an interesting and potentially critical stage of the insurgency. Were the insurgents to bring about the surrender of a provincial capital or major town, this would be a major psychological blow to the DRA. This bears on what could well be the Achilles Heel of the DRA: lack of military manpower. Most DRA units are already far understrength. Since 85 percent of the country's population is rural, were the regime to lose control of almost all of that countryside (which is now mostly the case), they will be hard-pressed to overcome the insurgency. End Chargé's comment.

7. ACQ: [1 paragraph (1 line) not declassified]

8. [less than 1 line not declassified] Dissem: [1 paragraph (5 lines) not declassified]

85. **Memorandum From the Director of the Strategic Warning Staff, Central Intelligence Agency (MacEachin) to the National Intelligence Officer for Warning, Central Intelligence Agency (Lehman)**¹

S-0086/SWS

Washington, December 13, 1979

SUBJECT

Soviet Actions in Afghanistan

1. I left the meeting on Afghanistan yesterday with the feeling that we had not accomplished much in the way of sharpening the Community perception of what the Soviets may be about in Afghanistan.² Other than myself, most of those present seemed to continue to hold the view that the Soviets are moving tentatively with regard to their options in Afghanistan. E.g.,

—They are setting up an enclave at Bagram to ensure that they have a base through which to either evacuate their advisors or insert more troops and material, whichever move is dictated by the evolution of a situation which is now uncertain.

—They have decided to bolster the defenses of Bagram in response to increased insurgent probes.

—They need some troops to protect their people against a massacre if the situation suddenly deteriorates.

—Etc.

2. None of these actions, however, is likely to change the course of events in Afghanistan that is causing the Soviets grief. Yet there seemed to be a glimmer of consensus among those at the meeting that the act of sending their own combat units into another country in the midst of an insurgency reflects a significant political decision on the part of the Soviets. Why then should we shrink from believing that the Soviets—having crossed this threshold—will employ these troops in some way to tangibly impact on the situation that caused the threshold to be crossed.

3. The decision in this case was made with the benefit of a thorough (60 plus days) on-the-scene study of all aspects of the situation by a mission of high level authorities. (The Pavlovskiy mission.)³ We know from the composition of the study group and the activities in which

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council Files, Job 93T01324R, Box 4, Afghanistan. Secret.

² The meeting was not further identified and no record of it was found.

³ See footnote 3, Document 62.

they were engaged while in Afghanistan that their review went into the logistics of the situation, the effectiveness of such organs as the police, intelligence, the ministerial level offices, and communications security. A main feature of this study certainly must have been an assessment of the course of the insurgency and the ability of the DRA forces—military and political—to deal with it.

4. Our own assessment shows an Afghan army which is having great difficulty in maintaining its manpower strength, experiencing erosion of morale leading to desertions, mutinies, and outright defections. The DRA forces have produced no lasting gains against the insurgents. They have been able to win most pitched battles—when the insurgents permit a pitched battle to occur—but cannot consolidate gains. Among the reasons for this inability are (a) the shrinking strength of the armed forces, which forces them to be constantly shifting forces to meet the various outbreaks and thus allowing rebel forces to seep back into areas from which they had been driven, and (b) the deterioration of morale in DRA forces left to hold the positions gained by military action. At the heart of the problem is a regime rent by factionalism, for which mutiny is a constant problem, and which is demonstrably unable to promote the kind of cohesion and efficiency in its own military and political machinery that would be needed to deal effectively with the insurgency. What all this adds up to is a situation that could fly apart at any time, with a revolt of the armed forces being the most serious potential problem.

5. Moreover, the prognosis is that things will continue to go downhill. During last winter, a mild one, the insurgency gained strength. This summer, analysts both in Embassy Kabul and here in Washington forecast that if the regime could survive until winter the insurgents would have to pull back and the DRA forces could pull themselves together. The reverse appears to be happening. It is the DRA forces that seem to be pulling back and the insurgents who are gaining. The largest DRA offensive of the insurgency has recently been completed, yet the DRA forces ultimately pulled back and the rebels seeped back into the areas from which they had been driven by the offensive. The action must clearly be seen as proof that advisors and technicians, logistical support, and tactical guidance is not going to turn the situation around.

6. The Pavlovskiy mission had ample opportunity to study the situation first hand, and in all likelihood came to the same conclusion. The decision which led to the actions we are beginning to see would have been made on the basis of a dismal assessment of the present situation and of its likely course if something were not done about it, together with an evaluation by a team of high level authorities as to what would have to be done if the USSR wanted to solidify its politico-strategic objectives in Afghanistan.

7. We believe that the Soviet actions since Pavlovskiy's departure indicate that Moscow decided to act to save its position. Steps such as securing an enclave against future contingencies for evacuation and providing protection to Soviet citizens could not be perceived by the Soviets as "doing" anything about the situation. Indeed, such actions are more consistent with a lack of decision. In view of the prognosis, they amount to conceding to the probability of losing out and merely covering the exit. Even if the enclave were for the purpose of ensuring an entrance point for troops, merely holding an enclave would not change the deteriorating situation which created the potential need for troops. In effect, doing nothing more than holding an enclave against the potential need to land troops would make it likely that sooner or later the enclave would have to be used for just that purpose. "Wait and see" does not appear to be the objective of the course indicated by the recent Soviet actions.

8. "Doing something" about the situation means, in effect, ensuring that the next time the DRA forces, with Soviet help, undertake a large offensive against the insurgents they will not be forced to give back their winnings. This requires more military forces than the DRA can muster at present. Someone must hold the cities, main centers, airfields, and keep the roads open. Military forces are required to ensure the security of Kabul, both from revolts from within and from attacks by the insurgents. One of the reasons for the military failure and eroding morale of the Afghan armed forces to date is that they cannot accomplish all these things and to the Afghan troops there must appear little prospect that they ever will.

9. Another step toward rectifying the situation would be to produce a more effective, cohesive regime in Kabul. If nothing else, this would alleviate somewhat the drain on Afghan military strength in the countryside caused by the need to keep a large "Praetorean Guard" in Kabul. This suggests that ultimately Amin will have to go. His replacement, however, is unlikely to be chosen on the basis of his acceptability to the insurgents. He would still be "Russian-installed." What the Soviets are likely to seek is someone who can pull together the Marxist factions and various groups among the political and military leadership. This would enable the Afghan Marxists and their Soviet allies to concentrate on the insurgency.

10. For undertaking these objectives, the immediate need is efficient military forces. By their actions, the Soviets have indicated they are willing to take the large political step of putting their own combat units into a foreign country. Why should we shrink from estimating that they would be willing, once having taken this step, to use their troops in a way and in an amount that could benefit their long range position?

11. [1 line not declassified]

Douglas J. MacEachin⁴

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

**86. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Adviser
on Soviet Affairs (Shulman) to Secretary of State Vance¹**

Washington, December 14, 1979

SUBJECT

Possible Conclusions of a Soviet Policy Review

Assuming that the primary purpose of Dobrynin's return to Moscow is to participate in a high level review covering foreign policy, defense and economic planning with emphasis on US-Soviet relations, I want to give you some thoughts on how such a review may come out.² Our conclusion is that Dobrynin will return prepared for a further limited deterioration in US-Soviet relations.

What follows is our best effort to delineate the picture from Moscow's standpoint.

General Outlook

The "holding pattern" Moscow had expected to follow Vienna pending SALT ratification has been eroded by a series of bilateral controversies for which the Soviet leadership does not consider itself primarily responsible. The sheer number of these controversies has

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office Files of Marshall D. Shulman, Special Advisor to the Secretary on Soviet Affairs, 1977–1981, Lot 81D109, CV Meeting 12/15/79 (MDS re U.S.-Sov rel.). Secret. Printed from an uninitialed copy. Drafted by Parris and cleared by Barry.

² Dobrynin informed Vance during a meeting, December 5, that he would depart for Moscow later that day and expected to return to Washington 10 days later. (Telegram 313797 to Moscow, December 6; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840131–1897) In his memoirs, Dobrynin refers briefly to his trip to Moscow for high-level consultations that, according to his account, were dominated by concerns over the deployment of Pershing II missiles by NATO and SS-20 missiles by the Soviet Union. (Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, pp. 432–433)

had a multiplier effect, each magnifying the significance of the other, and causing both sides to react with greater stridency and rigidity than might otherwise be the case. Heightened tension has affected each side's media treatment of the other. The Soviets probably see themselves as victims of officially-inspired US press accusations—just as we see ourselves as the injured party in an escalating public dialogue.

Faced with these trends, the Soviets are concerned that US-Soviet relations are moving inexorably toward a continuing downslide, in which the whole range of our cooperative activities, including arms control, would come into question. We believe the Soviets would see such a development as contrary to their interests, and that they would hope to avoid it. Developments since Vienna have given them cause to doubt this will be possible, however, and there is a good chance that the review now under way is designed to develop concrete policy options for dealing with a bilateral relationship they may conclude will continue to deteriorate. This would be reflected in their approach to the following specific issues.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Afghanistan.]

87. Editorial Note

By mid-December 1979, U.S. intelligence reporting indicated that the military buildup on the Soviet-Afghan border and in Afghanistan was quickly intensifying. This prompted Secretary of State Vance to order both Marshall Shulman, his Adviser on Soviet Affairs, and the Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Thomas J. Watson, Jr., to seek an explanation from Soviet diplomats regarding the ultimate Soviet objectives in Afghanistan.

Analysis [*text not declassified*] detailed the military buildup in several reports and memoranda. The Strategic Warning Staff of the CIA issued memorandum [*text not declassified*] December 14, which reported on military activity involving air transport, ground forces, [*text not declassified*] which [*text not declassified*] indicated "Soviet intent to deploy additional combat forces to Afghanistan." [*text not declassified*] these developments included an increase in the number of aircraft and airfields involved in airlift operations to Afghanistan; significant movement of heavy ground equipment, including convoys of cargo trucks, armored personnel carriers, anti-aircraft guns, howitzers, and tanks: [*text not declassified*]. The report concluded by noting that a recent TASS commentary marking the anniversary of the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of

Friendship and Cooperation referred to the military aspect of the treaty, which called for “conducting joint measures to insure the security, independence and territorial integrity of both countries.” (Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council Files, Job 94T00046R, Box 2, SWS Products on Afghanistan)

[*text not declassified*] reported on developments over the past 24 hours, which “suggest that the USSR is rapidly expanding the size of its military force in Afghanistan,” including the operational deployment of the [*text not declassified*] to the Soviet-Afghan border at Termez; movement of approximately 45 aircraft to Afghanistan or the Afghan border; and the arrival of 34 armored vehicles, 47 helicopters, and “a large number of personnel and tents” at an airfield north of Termez. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 12/14–22/79)

This information was brought to Brzezinski’s attention by NSC Staff member Stephen Larrabee on December 15. Referring to the comments made by the Deputy Chief of Mission in Kabul, quoted in Document 84, Larrabee disagreed that the escalating Soviet presence in Afghanistan was “a direct response to targets of opportunity the Soviets see elsewhere, i.e., Iran, Baluchistan, etc., but rather is related *primarily* to the situation in Afghanistan itself.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 8–12/79)

That same day, [*text not declassified*] issued an intelligence cable that noted many of the military movements described above and reported that imagery analysis “provides the first indication that the Soviets are setting up a communications network in that country.” The cable concluded that “establishment of a Soviet communications network in Afghanistan would facilitate combined Soviet-Afghan operations if they should become necessary.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 12/14–22/79)

In telegram 323556 to Moscow, December 15, Vance directed Watson to “seek an urgent appointment with Gromyko or highest available MFA official and ask for an explanation of the significant continuing deployment of Soviet military units outside the borders of the USSR into Afghanistan which has come to our attention.” Vance further directed that this request, which would also be presented to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, should be made “in the context of the 1972 Principles of U.S.-Soviet Relations and commitment therein to consult so that conflict situations will not arise which would serve to increase international tensions.” (National Archives, RG 59, Office Files of Marshall D. Shulman, Special Advisor to the Secretary on Soviet Affairs, 1977–1981, Lot 81D109, untitled folder; printed in *Foreign Relations*,

1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 239) The “Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics” was signed May 29, 1972, in Moscow by President Richard Nixon and General Secretary of the Communist Party Leonid Brezhnev. The second article of the agreement states: “The USA and the USSR attach major importance to preventing the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations” and “both sides recognize that efforts to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly, are inconsistent with these objectives.” The full text of the agreement is printed in *Public Papers: Carter, 1972*, pages 633–635.

Watson responded in telegram 27491 from Moscow, December 15, that the request for an “urgent appointment” with Gromyko or one of his deputies had been made. (National Archives, RG 59, Office Files of Marshall D. Shulman, Special Advisor to the Secretary on Soviet Affairs, 1977–1981, Lot 81D109, Watson-Mal’tsev Meeting in Moscow on Afghanistan, Dec. 17, 1979) Following Vance’s directive, Shulman met with Vladillen Vasev, Chargé of the Soviet Embassy, December 15. Vasev agreed to request further instructions from Moscow, but stated that his personal opinion was that the Soviet leadership would be “disturbed” by the request because they might interpret it as a ploy to divert Soviet attention from “planned U.S. action against Iran.” Telegram 323581 to Moscow, December 15, reported on the meeting and is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol VI, Soviet Union, Document 240.

The Embassy reported in telegram 27530 from Moscow, December 17, that the Soviets had not responded to Vance’s request; moreover, their response to the request “was essentially a rebuff.” Watson summarized his conversation with First Deputy Foreign Minister Mal’tsev, during which Mal’tsev reported that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was “puzzled” by Vance’s request; that Soviet-Afghan relations were “not subject to interference from third states; and that the Basic Principles agreement of 1972 “had no relationship to this situation.” (National Archives, RG 59, Office Files of Marshall D. Shulman, Special Advisor to the Secretary on Soviet Affairs, 1977–1981, Lot 81D109, Watson-Mal’tsev Meeting in Moscow on Afghanistan, Dec. 17, 1979)

[1 paragraph (7 lines) not declassified]

88. Briefing Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Mark) to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, December 16, 1979

SUBJECT

Internal Situation in Afghanistan

Overall Situation and Outlook

The Amin Government (DRA), because of factional feuding and disillusionment within party ranks of both civilian and military personnel, rests on an even smaller and shakier basis than its predecessor, the Taraki-Amin regime. Furthermore, despite its total dependence on the Soviet Union's military assistance for its existence—which should have implied, but has not brought, extensive subservience, rumors persist of Soviet intentions to replace Amin, perhaps with leaders of the rival Marxist group, the Parchamists, in order to get a more pliant and effective regime.

The country-wide insurgency has confronted the government with a steadily increasing threat throughout this year. Although split geographically, factionalized, and thus unable to mount a major coordinated offensive against a large city, the cumulative effect of the pressures of the many insurgent groupings has caused a steady deterioration of the DRA's military strength and of its capability to exert its authority.

The Soviets have clearly hoped that an incremental build-up of military advisory personnel and materiel could turn the tide in favor of the government. But they have been unable to compensate for the major military problem, an increasingly acute manpower shortage. Because of casualties, large-scale defections, desertions, and recruitment problems, the army is, by some estimates, down to a force of 50,000 from a norm of 90–100,000.

It has seemed almost inevitable that, because of the critical military manpower shortage, the USSR would eventually be faced with the choice of bringing in its own troops or of retiring from the scene. The present build-up of a Soviet combat force in Afghanistan may indicate that the Soviets have concluded that that point has now been reached. The very serious situation in northeastern Badakhshan, where rebels

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR and East/West, Bremont, Subject File, Box 46, Afghanistan: 10/79–1/80. Secret; Noform; Nocontract; Orcon. Drafted by Van Hollen (INR). A copy was sent to Packman (INR).

threaten to gain control over a province on the USSR's border, may contribute to the making of such a decision at this particular moment. However, given the tens of thousands of Soviet troops who would be necessary to bring about broad pacification of the country as a whole, the present Soviet build-up seems likely to be an attempt to insure the security of the capital region and perhaps to improve the safety of land transport from the Soviet border to Kabul.

There is also, however, the possibility that the newly introduced troops have a limited function for a limited time span. If the Soviets were to attempt to oust Amin and install a Parchamist government, they would have to contend with resistance from the present military leadership and the possibility that a Soviet-backed coup attempt could back-fire and become also directed against Soviet military advisory personnel. Thus preparations for such a move could consist of bringing in sufficient military force to guarantee its successful execution.

The Internal Political Situation

The Amin government is politically very insecure. Not only is it opposed by the population at large, which is conservative and fundamentally Islamic, but its enemies include former leftist collaborators, the Parchamists, and most recently the supporters of former President Taraki.

Amin has arrested and/or removed from key positions many Taraki loyalists but, according to clandestine reports, many remain in the army in important positions. If given another secular and leftist choice, this group might well move against Amin.

The top Parchamist leadership, headed by Babrak Karmal has been in exile (reportedly in Eastern Europe) since the fall of 1978. Recently several thousand Parchamists were, reportedly, arrested throughout Afghanistan and large numbers were executed. This followed rumors that the Soviets were planning to remove Amin and replace him with Parchamists. Earlier there were reports that Taraki had been in touch with the Parchamists and was planning, with Soviet support, to bring them back into the government, ousting Amin in the process. Rumors that the Soviets would like to replace the DRA leadership first surfaced in June 1979 and still persist.

The Soviets are known to believe that Amin's ruthless and hasty implementation of Marxist "reforms" in Afghanistan was a major mistake, provoking the country-wide insurgency. Most of these reform programs have been halted by the expediency of declaring them "completed." Since the inauguration of the new Amin government, the emphasis has been on "legality, security and justice" and the drafting of a constitution. In this connection, Amin has tried to shift the blame to Taraki for the large numbers of political arrests and executions in

the preceding months. However, Amin is widely regarded to have been the strong man in the Taraki regime and the one responsible for its ruthless policies.

State of the Insurgency and Military Efforts to Contain It

While the insurgency remains uncoordinated and locally led, the number of active rebels has multiplied throughout the year. The rebels' military capabilities have steadily increased owing to captured equipment and the participation of officers and recruits defecting from the DRA forces. Insurgents now control most of the countryside throughout Afghanistan. They have made travel on the major roads extremely hazardous even in heavily armed convoys and have successfully isolated military outposts.

In October, the government was able by assembling massive armored force and air support under Soviet control and direction to mount a successful campaign against the rebels in Paktia province, on the border with Pakistan. However, the actual and psychological effects of this victory appear to have been negated by the subsequent reappearance of the insurgents as the DRA was forced to withdraw its armor for redeployment.

The DRA had apparently been counting on a winter lull to reorganize its forces and train new recruits. However, the lull has failed to materialize as the insurgents continue to press and government forces have suffered a number of recent set backs, particularly in areas surrounding Kabul and in northeastern Badakhshan province.

There are reports that the rebels intend to step up terrorist activities in urban centers during the winter. The situation in Qandahar indicates this is already in progress in Afghanistan's second largest city. Reportedly, the government is preparing for an expected rebel attack on the city. There were reports in October that Soviet military personnel had taken over the control of both military and civilian government of Qandahar.

The most serious problem affecting the government's military capability to contain the insurgency appears to be the manpower shortage and the disaffection among both recruits and officers. Throughout the year, there have been constant reports of defections, occasionally involving complete military units. Troop disloyalty is reportedly rampant in the Badakhshan area.

The extent of the influence of exile insurgent organizations based in Pakistan is unclear. They undoubtedly have played a supportive role in the provinces bordering on Pakistan, while western and centrally located insurgents may be receiving assistance from groups in Iran. The Pakistan-based groups have been plagued by rivalries and have been unable to unite in a common effort. One important role these

groups can play is acquiring funds and armaments from outside sources. A major Soviet intervention might bring in more funds, thus increasing the importance of the exiles.

Reaction to the Soviet Role

The Soviet presence and role in keeping the present government afloat have become one of the major provocations of the insurgency and a unifying factor for all rebel groups. While insurgents may be fighting, in large part, for local goals, they are united by a desire to get rid of both the "godless" communist regime and the Russians.

As the Soviet role has increased throughout the civilian and military establishment, it has provoked a nationalist reaction, even from supporters of Taraki and Amin. Recently, an Afghan pilot, probably flying a mission against Badakhshan insurgents, "accidentally" dropped his bombs on the Soviet side of the border, causing several casualties. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] this incident was a great tonic to the otherwise abysmal morale in the DRA's Ministry of Defense.²

Amin has recently stated publicly that his government is dependent on Soviet support.³ However, there has been no indication of an attempt by Amin to prepare the public for a large-scale introduction of troops.

If the Soviets were to intervene to replace Amin or to fight directly against the rebels, they would be opening a new level of anti-Soviet feelings and actions. That would greatly complicate achieving Soviet goals. Achieving these goals under such circumstances would require a major Soviet effort.

² The report was not found.

³ Amin's statement was reported in telegram 8117 from Kabul, November 21. The telegram quoted two portions of an interview Amin gave to the Soviet news agency TASS: "We are convinced that if there were no vast economic and military aid from the Soviet Union, we could not resist the aggression and conspiracies of imperialism, its leftist looking allies and international reaction, and could not move our country towards the construction of a socialist society." Amin further asserted "there is no limit" to Soviet support of the DRA, and the Soviet assistance level "completely depends on our capacity to absorb and utilize it." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790546-0399 and D790536-0665)

89. Alert Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

[*memorandum number not declassified*] Washington, December 19, 1979

USSR-AFGHANISTAN²

The Soviets [2 lines not declassified] are building up other forces [1 line not declassified] near the Soviet-Afghan border. This indicates the USSR has significantly changed the nature of its military commitment in Afghanistan [1½ lines not declassified].

The buildup [2 lines not declassified] suggests that further augmentation there is likely soon, and that preparations for a much more substantial reinforcement may also be under way.³ ([classification marking and codeword not declassified]).

[1 paragraph (8 lines) not declassified]

Concurrent with the upgrading of Soviet forces at Bagram the Soviets began building up forces near the Afghan border. [1 paragraph (16½ lines) and 1 footnote in the original not declassified]

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council Files, Job 81B00080R, Box 14, [*memorandum number not declassified*] Alert Memo USSR-Afghanistan (19 Dec 79). Top Secret; [*codeword and handling restriction not declassified*]. Attached but not printed is a distribution list indicating the memorandum was sent to the President and Vice President, the Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the President's Assistant and Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Directors of INR, [*text not declassified*], NSA, and the Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury.

² The Alert Memorandum is an interagency publication issued by the Director of Central Intelligence on behalf of the Intelligence Community. Its purpose is to ensure that senior policymakers are aware of the serious implications for US interests of impending potential developments. It is not a prediction that these developments will occur. This memorandum has been coordinated at the working level by CIA, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] NSA, State/INR, Army, Navy, and Air Force. ([*classification marking not declassified*]) [Footnote is in the original.]

³ [*less than 1 line not declassified*] believes it is important to add that these latest actions serve to underline the depth of the Soviet commitment to ensure the preservation of a pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan. ([*classification marking not declassified*]) [Footnote is in the original.]

The pace of Soviet deployments in recent weeks does not suggest that the Soviets are responding to what they perceive as a time-urgent contingency, but rather that they are reacting to the continuing deterioration of the security situation in Afghanistan. The deployments and buildups may reflect the recommendations of the August-October 1979 mission of Soviet General Pavlovskiy to Kabul implemented in the light of an updated assessment of the situation. (*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*)

At a minimum the Soviets have now established a capability to defend Bagram as an airhead. They could hold other key points, engage insurgents in selected provinces, or free Afghan Army units for operations elsewhere if they introduced forces of the size now being built up near the border. To conduct extensive anti-insurgent operations on a countrywide scale would require mobilization and commitment of much larger numbers of regular ground forces drawn from other military districts in a potentially open-ended operation. (*classification marking not declassified*)

Collection Summary

Overall US intelligence collection capability against Soviet involvement in Afghanistan is considered only fair. [6 lines not declassified] But competition for scarce collection resources, particularly for coverage of neighboring Iran, has placed some constraints on overall capabilities. [5 lines, classification marking, and codeword not declassified]

90. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State¹

Kabul, December 20, 1979, 1206Z

8566. Subj: (LOU) Possible Motivations Behind Arrival of Soviet Troops. Ref: (A) Kabul 2778 (Notal),² (B) Kabul 7326 (Notal).³

1. (S—Entire text)

2. Summary: The recent arrival of three battalions of Soviet combat troops at Bagram Air Force Base has raised many questions here, especially since the insurgency does not appear to have dramatically worsened to the point that it threatens the regime of President Hafizullah Amin. To the much asked question of, “Why did the Soviets send the troops in now?”, I can suggest a few answers: Moscow and Amin hope to “preempt” the growth of any direct threat to the regime by injecting an immediate “stiffener” of Soviet troops, particularly should any DRA corps or division disintegrate; the troops are here to protect the safety of Soviet citizens should the security of Kabul collapse; the troops can play a key role in domestic politics should further splits in the leadership occur; and, the troops are merely the vanguard of a larger intervention which will eventually lead to a direct combat role by Soviet forces, a thesis I consider unlikely based on evidence available so far. Motivations behind this move by Kabul and Moscow could well be a combination of these and others, but whatever the case, Afghan claims to “independence” have been further eroded by this development. Moreover, the presence of Soviet troops will undoubtedly heighten domestic opposition to the Amin regime and his Soviet mentors, and in the long-run further destabilize the region. My NATO colleagues here generally accept our assurances that the Soviets have installed combat troops at Bagram Air Base, but they are as puzzled as we, if not more so, as to why the Soviets have taken this step now. End of summary.

3. Why did Soviet troops arrive now? Eight months ago (reftel A), we concluded here that an Afghan SOS to Moscow for direct military help would probably be sent only in face of a seriously deteriorating security situation. We believed at that time that lack of control of most

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800012–0699, D790585–0980. Secret; Immediate. Sent for information to Ankara, Athens, Beijing, Islamabad, Jidda, London, Moscow, New Delhi, USNATO, Paris, Athens, CINCPAC (also for POLAD), and CINCEUR (also for POLAD). A copy of this telegram was found in the Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 4, folder 1.

² Telegram 2778 from Kabul is dated April 10. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790164–0676)

³ See Document 72.

of the countryside would probably not prompt a DRA cry for Soviet help, because political power here resides in Kabul and the major cities, and because insurgent control of the rural areas would not necessarily constitute a direct threat to the survival of the regime. Moreover, we concluded that for domestic and foreign political reasons, that neither Moscow nor Kabul would want to face the "Soviet troops" decision until other, less dramatic, means to counter the insurgents had been exhausted. Finally, should Soviet troops arrive, we believed they would be used to establish the security of Kabul and the major cities, and would probably not be deployed into the countryside where they could become bogged down in endless fighting over extremely rough terrain.

4. The arrival now of several battalions of Soviet airborne and motorized rifle troops raises a number of questions, especially since the domestic situation here does not quite fit the scenario we envisaged earlier this year. Despite the many headaches and political upheavals of the past few months, there have been no urban uprisings or garrison mutinies in any of the major cities similar to those which occurred in Herat in March or Kabul in August and October. Kabul, by far the key to political control of the country, has remained generally untouched by the fighting in the countryside, although there has recently been a dramatic upsurge in urban terrorism aimed at Khalqi officials and Soviet citizens. The key military units in and around Kabul appear to remain loyal to the regime. Moscow would appear, therefore, to have responded to an Afghan appeal for direct military help in a situation which seems not to include an imminent threat to the revolution or even to the Amin regime in Kabul, and I can arrive at only a few reasons for this development.

5. Kabul and Moscow hope to "preempt" the development of any serious threat to the regime. In my opinion, the regime's overall security situation has gradually deteriorated over the past few weeks, caused primarily by a growing military manpower shortage (e.g., the draft age has been lowered from 22 to 20 years), an increase in urban terrorism in Kandahar and Kabul, indications that morale in the military officer corps may be eroding, and persistent reports that alienations within the PDPA resulting from the Taraki-Amin schism may be worsening. In this situation of gradual, rather than sudden, deterioration, the DRA leadership and Moscow may have decided that an infusion of Soviet combat troops now may provide the necessary "stiffener" for the Afghan military, in order to avoid any abrupt collapse or to protect the key northern approaches to Kabul should DRA units fighting in Samangan and Badakhshan Provinces disintegrate. In this regard, they may have believed that a shot in the arm at this point would be sufficient to bolster the regime until winter weather dampens activities on both sides, something which has not yet taken place.

6. Security for Soviet citizens primary but probably not only concern. Security for the hundreds of Soviet citizens—especially in Kabul where they have been targeted for elimination—was most probably a major consideration in the decision to send troops, although I suspect the move has several goals. This particular thesis, however, would be buttressed should the Soviet troops eventually be sent to Kabul to protect the Soviet housing area and Embassy. So far, we have not detected any of the just arrived Soviet combat units in the capital, although Bagram Air Base is only about 40 miles away, and the Soviet decision-makers may elect to leave the troops there, rather than raising their visibility dramatically.

7. The troops may eventually play a role in domestic Afghan politics. I assume that the Soviets are very aware that Amin is widely perceived as the cause of much of this country's woes, and it is conceivable they may have concluded that his departure may be necessary to save the revolution. I don't think so. Most of us here are agreed that Moscow's fundamental commitment is to the revolution (and party) and not to specific individuals. Whether or not Moscow may have a hand in any anti-Amin move, there are probably many individuals or small groups gunning for him, and Amin-Soviet tensions flowing from the Taraki affair are widely believed to be serious. By stationing Soviet troops near the capital, Moscow may want to be ready to intervene to back a specific contending faction in the event of intraparty civil war—to preserve the special position of the Soviet Union in the country. I should point out too that these troops represent an impressive argument should the Soviets decide to try and "convince" Amin to leave the scene "voluntarily" for the sake of the revolution's survival, and in favor of a less "tainted" leftist leader—perhaps a currently unknown military man. At this point, however, I cannot identify any Khalqi leader who could come close to filling Amin's shoes, and the exiled Parchamists appear not to hold out much promise as alternate leadership.

8. Direct Soviet combat role strikes me as unlikely, but cannot be ruled out. I doubt that the Soviet troops here will actually take the field against the insurgents, unless some key DRA military corps or division collapses and Kabul is threatened. At most they might man a roadblock to safeguard one of the approaches to the capital—until loyal DRA relief forces arrived.

9. Winter is approaching fast, the countryside is extremely rugged, and, were Soviet units to get spread thin, and engage in search and destroy missions, Soviet combat casualties could well become significant, especially since the guerrilla warfare being waged by the insurgents is not necessarily vulnerable to sophisticated armies. Nonetheless, General Pavlovskiy, Commander of Soviet Ground Forces, may have

concluded during his two-month stay in Kabul from mid-August to mid-October, 1979, that a military solution to this domestic conflict is feasible, and that a certain number of Soviet troops can turn the trick. Pavlovskiy may also have concluded, of course, that a limited number of troops in non-combat roles would be enough to buck-up the Afghans in their own efforts.

10. Afghan independence eroded even further. As I pointed out two months ago in reflet B, growing Soviet influence here, and increasing DRA adherence to Moscow's politics on the world stage, cast doubt on Kabul's protestations that it is master in its own house. The infusion of Soviet troops adds considerably to this doubt, especially if they actually deploy in the field and begin killing Afghans. Even a more passive Soviet role, however, will undoubtedly heighten opposition to the Amin regime among the Afghan masses who generally hate Russians and Communists. In this regard, if I can point to one thing which might unify the heretofore disjointed opposition, it is the arrival of regular Soviet troops. The long-term implications of direct Soviet military involvement here could thus be far-reaching, despite the presumed legality of the move under the 1978 Soviet-Afghan bilateral treaty.

11. Local reaction remains muted. In spite of the international media attention being devoted to this development, there has not yet been any observed reaction among Kabul's residents, excluding the urban terrorism campaign which is probably unrelated. My NATO Ambassadorial colleagues generally accept our word that the Soviet military presence has risen at Bagram, and are even more puzzled than we as to why it should occur now.

Amstutz

91. Memorandum From Marshall Brement of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, December 21, 1979

SUBJECT

The Soviets and Afghanistan

It is hard to exaggerate the importance of what the Soviets are now poised to do in Afghanistan. Essentially, they seem to have made a decision to risk whatever is necessary, including major involvement in armed combat, to maintain a Communist government in Kabul. Given their military capabilities, the terrain and the division of the insurgents, they will almost certainly have considerable initial success if they pull out all stops (as we learned in Viet Nam, the helicopter gunship can be a very successful "pacification" tool). The real military question boils down to the staying power of the insurgents and the attitude of the Pakistanis, and we can play a key role on both counts.

This was not an easy decision for the Kremlin, which realizes that its own "counter-insurgency" effort will inevitably be compared to what we did in Viet Nam. As such, they will be doubly determined to succeed where we failed. They are also far more experienced in this area than we are, and their ruthlessness will not hurt them either. Equally important is the fact that this is the first time since World War II that the Soviets are using their own forces in a combat situation outside the borders of the USSR and Eastern Europe. This therefore seems to complete a chain of events which began in Angola in 1975, was continued in Ethiopia (where a Soviet General assumed command of the operation), and now culminates in Afghanistan. If the Soviets manage a successful counter-insurgency effort, it will lead almost inevitably to further "adventurism" in the years ahead.

What is to be done?

Given the current situation, we are not in a position to ignore what is happening in Afghanistan. It is necessary for us to develop both a

¹ Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I-047, Afghanistan: 11 Sep 1979–22 Jul 1980. Secret. Sent for action. Copies were sent to Gregg, Griffith, Henze, Oksenberg, Sick, Thornton, and Odom.

public stance and a series of concrete actions in order to deal with this situation. I recommend that we consider taking at least some of the following specific steps:

1. Use all the means at our disposal to publicize what the Soviets are doing in Afghanistan. Major themes in this campaign should be as follows:

a. This is the first use by the Soviets of their armed forces in a combat situation outside the Soviet bloc since the Second World War.

b. Afghanistan has been a buffer state—in fact, the classic buffer state—for the past 150 years. The Soviets have no legitimate national interest in taking such action.

c. The United States has never made a commitment to the military defense of Afghanistan, which has been outside our defense perimeter for the past 25 years.

d. Nevertheless, we are extremely concerned at this unjustifiable Soviet action, especially in that it might become an unwelcome precedent in other areas. What are the limits to the Brezhnev Doctrine?²

e. We are also extremely concerned at the human toll which this Soviet-supported combat is taking. There are 300,000 refugees now in Pakistan, and we would not be surprised to see that number rise to half a million in the near future.

f. Thus, as in Cambodia and in so many other countries since World War II, the Soviets are creating another enormous refugee problem, this time in South Asia and among an overwhelmingly Muslim population.

g. The United States is prepared to do its utmost to assist the Afghan refugees with humanitarian aid.

h. The Soviet Union is atheistic by doctrine and has published enormous amounts of anti-religious and anti-Muslim literature. (The exhibition at the Museum of Religion and Atheism in Leningrad, for example, would strike any Muslim as the epitome of sacrilege.) The US, on the other hand, firmly believes in religious freedom, and enshrines it in our Constitution. Three million Muslims practice their religion freely in the US. In Soviet Azerbaijan, on the other hand, there are only 24 officially recognized Mosques now operating, whereas before the revolution of 1917 there were several thousand in operation.

² In a speech in November 1968, Brezhnev declared that a threat to socialist rule in any state constituted a threat to all and therefore "must engage the attention of all the socialist states," including the use of military force.

i. In sum, the US deplors the Soviet action in Afghanistan, regards it as reckless adventurism, feels that superpowers should not behave in this manner, is deeply concerned at the human suffering among the Afghan population, and will do everything in its power to deal with this problem in a constructive, statesmanlike manner. It calls on all nations, and particularly nations with significant Muslim populations, to appeal to the Soviet Union to allow the Afghan people to settle its own problems in line with the principle of no interference in the internal affairs of other nations. Hands off Afghanistan!

2. Dispatch a mission to Pakistan to investigate conditions in the Afghan refugee camps there.

a. In line with the mission's (undoubted) shock at the abysmal conditions within the refugee camp, issue a statement publicizing those conditions.

b. Turn loose our refugee apparatus on the problem and call for assistance both from the American public and from other countries and international organizations.

c. Place the blame for this human catastrophe on the Soviets, where it belongs.

3. Explore, directly or indirectly, with the Saudis, the Libyans, the Chinese, and other potential sympathizers with the Afghan Muslim cause, the possibility of stepping up covert assistance to the insurgents and the use of bases and refugee camps inside Pakistan to support the insurgency.

4. Call an SCC to examine our policy toward both Pakistan and Afghanistan. One aim of such an SCC should be to find the correct mix of incentives and guarantees that we would need to stiffen the spine of the Pakistanis to resist Moscow's and Kabul's pressure to help destroy the insurgency. This is an immediate goal and an important one, which might become more important to the President as the election period wears on. (As a Government, we must be in a position to defend ourselves against charges that we are sitting back and allowing the Soviets to add another country to the Communist camp without doing anything about it, as well as charges from the other direction that we are not doing enough to relieve the human misery caused by Soviet action in Afghanistan.)

In sum, major Soviet combat involvement in a long-term insurgency in Afghanistan is something which the US Government must respond to in a concrete way and with both a public position and a private action plan. We should be ready to move on this as soon as possible, but first we need clear-cut overall guidance.

RECOMMENDATION

That you convene an SCC to deal with Afghanistan and with US policy toward Pakistan in the light of events in Afghanistan.³

Unless you indicate otherwise, I would plan to work with Thornton, Henze, Sick and Gregg on this overall subject.

³ Brzezinski and Aaron did not indicate their approval or disapproval on the memorandum. Brent's desire to convene an SCC meeting was echoed in a memorandum from Claytor to Brzezinski, December 21. Claytor questioned whether the current level of U.S. support was sufficient in light of increased Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Citing a need to "keep the Afghan insurgency going," Claytor argued that the United States should "frustrate the Soviets" and demonstrate "U.S. resolve to Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and others in the area." Claytor called for an SCC meeting because "the situation calls for more than just throwing more money at the problem." (Memorandum from Claytor to Brzezinski, December 21; National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I-047, Afghanistan: 11 Sep 1979-22 Jul 1980) The SCC convened a meeting on Afghanistan on December 26; see Document 95.

92. Article in the National Intelligence Daily¹

Washington, December 24, 1979

SITUATION REPORTS

AFGHANISTAN-USSR

[7 lines not declassified] *In Afghanistan, a new rash of desertions and the need to reinforce several endangered provincial capitals have further strained the Afghan Army's ability to handle the insurgency. [classification marking, codeword, and handling restriction not declassified]*

[2 paragraphs (23 lines) not declassified]

[3 lines not declassified] A TU-134 aircraft that is equipped with a satellite communications capability and is normally associated with high-level Soviet military officials was seen at Balkhash on Friday with some 30 IL-76 jet transports that were apparently in an alert posture.²

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977-81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—December 1979, NIDs. Top Secret; [codeword and handling restriction not declassified].

² Friday was December 21.

There were at least 22 additional Soviet military cargo transport flights on Friday into the Central Asian Military District, primarily into the Balkhash and Taldy-Kurgan areas. [*classification marking and codeword not declassified*]

[2 paragraphs (19 lines) not declassified]

Bad weather has dominated the border area for more than a week, and the Soviets may be waiting for it to clear before they undertake further operations. [*classification marking not declassified*]

Soviet Press Statement

Moscow denied Western reports that Soviet combat units have been introduced into Afghanistan in a *Pravda* article yesterday, dismissing them as “pure fabrications” designed to “sow poisonous seeds of mistrust in relations between the Afghan and Soviet peoples.” The article also accuses the US and China of training Afghan insurgents at bases in Pakistan. [*classification marking not declassified*]

Military Situation in Afghanistan

The situation in the northeastern province of Badakshan remains critical, with only the capital under firm government control. [1 line not declassified] a number of soldiers had deserted with their equipment and many others could not be trusted. [*classification marking not declassified*]

The rebels evidently are also threatening provincial capitals in western and central Afghanistan. Fighting has been moving closer to the capital of Badghist Province, and most of Ghowr and Oruzgan provinces reportedly are controlled by the insurgents. A shortage of transport helicopters has evidently hampered reinforcement of critical areas. [*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*]

The government evidently is trying to stem desertions and to increase the manpower pool from which the Army can draw. [1 line not declassified] ordered Army units throughout the country to provide information on the families of deserters, presumably so that action can be taken against them. The Army has also transferred some troops out of their home districts to keep them from returning to their villages. [*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*]

Earlier this month, the government reportedly lowered the draft age from 22 to 20 and stopped issuing passports to draft-aged males. Kabul has also begun to offer good salaries to discharged servicemen to protect their own villages. This program apparently is designed to free regular Army units for combat elsewhere and to discourage former soldiers from joining the rebels. [*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*]

Pakistani Visit

Pakistani Foreign Affairs Adviser Agha Shahi has postponed his visit to Kabul until 30–31 December, ostensibly because of bad flying weather. The excuse may have some validity, but the decision to delay a week because of Shahi's other commitments may reflect a lack of enthusiasm for the trip stemming from the poor prospects for any significant improvement in relations between Kabul and Islamabad. *[less than 1 line, classification marking, and handling restriction not declassified]*

[Omitted here is a map.]

93. Intelligence Summary Cable Prepared in the Department of Defense¹

No. JSI-7

December 25, 1979, 0900Z

[less than 1 line not declassified] Please pass to SecDef eyes only for the Secretary of Defense JSI-7 25 Dec 79

Current Intelligence Summary for the *[less than 1 line not declassified]* (Supplement). (U). Ref: *[less than 1 line not declassified]*.² Current Intelligence Summary Nr Six. (U)

A. (S *[codeword not declassified]*) USSR-Afghanistan Update: Since the referenced message was transmitted several developments have occurred in the Soviet-Afghanistan situation.

—*[1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified]*

—*[1 paragraph (7 lines) not declassified]*

¹ Source: Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 4, 15 Dec–2 Jan. Top Secret; *[codeword and handling restriction not declassified]*. Sent for immediate night delivery eyes only for the Secretary of Defense. Drafted by *[text not declassified]*.

² The referenced message was not found. An Alert Memorandum prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, December 25, from Carlucci to Vance, Brown, Jones, and Brzezinski reads: "As you know, we have been closely monitoring Soviet military activities in Afghanistan and in the USSR itself in the last few days. On 19 December we issued an alert memorandum warning that the USSR appeared to be building up for a major move into Afghanistan. Intelligence received in the last 12 hours convinces me that *[preparations?]* for that operation have essentially been completed and that it probably has begun. If so, it will mark the first significant use of Soviet ground forces outside the USSR and Eastern Europe since the end of World War II." (Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council Files, Job 81B00080R, Box 11, NI IIM 79-10017, *[additional memorandum number not declassified]* Alert Memo USSR-Afghanistan (27 December 1979)) For the December 19 Alert Memorandum, see Document 89.

2. (TS [*codeword and handling restriction not declassified*]) Additional ground force activity also seems to indicate continuing Soviet preparations for operations in or near Afghanistan.

—[*less than 1 line not declassified*] provided the initial identification of an airborne unit at Balkhash airfield located some 650 km northeast of the Afghanistan border. At least 14 BMD airborne assault vehicles and other airborne associated equipment were [*less than 1 line not declassified*] at the airfield and may have been there as early as the 24th.

—Additional fuel storage equipment [*less than 1 line not declassified*] near Termez and Kushka both located on the Afghanistan border. These locations are areas where the 360th Motorized Rifle Division and the 5th Guards Motorized Rifle Division have probably been deployed since 19 December. Stockage of fuel supplies would indicate further preparations for operations by these units.

—Finally, a convoy of at least 60 trucks [*less than 1 line not declassified*] near Termez, probably indicating that Soviet resupply activity into Afghanistan by motor convoy is continuing. Frequent activity of this nature has been [*less than 1 line not declassified*] near Termez.

3. (S [*codeword not declassified*]) From the above evidence, it appears the Soviets are nearing the completion of preparations for a major introduction of new combat units into Afghanistan. [*6½ lines not declassified*] some facets of operations in or near Afghanistan. [*2 lines not declassified*]

94. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State¹

Kabul, December 26, 1979, 0552Z

8592. Subj: (LOU) Massive Soviet Air Operations Into Kabul Continue.

1. (C—Entire text)

2. Summary: Massive Soviet air operations into Kabul began Christmas morning and have not stopped yet. AN-22s, heavy jets, and AS-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 12/23–26/79. Confidential; Immediate; Sensitive. Sent for information to Ankara, Athens, Beijing, Islamabad, London, Moscow, New Delhi, USNATO, Paris, CINCPAC (also for POLAD), and CINCEUR (also for POLAD). Printed from a copy received in the White House Situation Room.

12s have been observed in large numbers, and the total flights may now exceed one hundred fifty to two hundred. (Most of these aircraft have had Soviet Air Force markings.) No information is available as yet regarding what was on those planes, but we have not yet seen any Soviet troops on the streets of Kabul, nor have we observed any significant increase in the Afghan military's alert status in the capital. End of summary.

3. The first of three phases of intensive operations began at about 0400 Christmas morning and continued until just before 0700. These flights are probably all AN-22s, since they were the only aircraft seen after dawn broke at about 0600. Numbers of aircraft involved is very difficult to pin down, but at one point an Embassy officer (a former Air Force intelligence officer) could see five AN-22s stacked over the city, despite his limited field of view caused by nearby buildings and trees. Given this density of traffic, we would estimate that a minimum of twenty AN-22s arrived and/or departed Kabul during this first phase, although the number could have been much higher. Some of these aircraft departed the city beginning at about 1100, while at least four were observed still on the ground at 1500.

4. These operations were just the preliminary, however, as more action appeared to get underway at about 1800 Christmas evening. Heavy jet aircraft were heard arriving in fairly quick succession, but by that hour darkness had fallen and, combined with a low ceiling, it was impossible to determine the exact type of plane. These were definitely heavy jets, however, possibly IL-76 or something somewhat smaller. Again, the numbers of aircraft involved is impossible for us to determine with any certainty but we estimate that about twenty jet transports may have been operating during this second phase.

5. Finally, at about 2200 Christmas evening, operations switched to turbo-prop aircraft (most probably AN-12s, but possibly AN-22s as well). These seemingly unending flights continued throughout the night and have not stopped as yet. One officer counted more than one hundred and thirty flights between 2200 and about 0600 this morning. Since daybreak, we have seen AN-12s and AN-22s in the skies over Kabul.

6. We have no firm information as yet regarding what was on these aircraft, although some credible reports contend that heavy equipment and ammunition was on yesterday morning's AN-22 contingent. We have not seen anything resembling mass movements of any Soviet troops who may have been on these planes, but there are routes leaving the airport which the regime could use which would not be visible to innocent observers. It strikes us that this massive sky train could easily have brought in thousands of personnel, and we will report immediately if any Soviet troops are seen in or around the capital.

7. After the above was written, a State officer arriving from New Delhi this morning saw about 200 Soviet Army troops around some of the planes at Kabul Airport. He also saw a group of APCs deployed at the east end of the runway. This leads us to believe that the Soviet troops are probably being deployed directly from the aircraft to waiting transportation, thereby bypassing the main highway into Kabul.

Amstutz

95. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordinating Committee Meeting¹

Washington, December 26, 1979, 9:30–10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

Summary of Conclusions: SCC Meeting on Soviet Moves in Afghanistan (S)

PARTICIPANTS

STATE

Secretary Cyrus Vance
 Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary
 David Newsom, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
 Harold Saunders, Ass't. Secretary for Near Eastern & South Asian Affairs

DEFENSE

W. Graham Clayton, Jr., Deputy Secretary
 Robert W. Komer, Under Secretary for Policy Affairs

JCS

General David Jones
 Lt. General John Pustay

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director
 Frank Carlucci, Deputy Director
 Arnold Horelick, NIO for Soviet Union
 [name not declassified], Military Analyst

WHITE HOUSE

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
 David Aaron

NSC

Thomas Thornton
 Col. William Odom

The CIA briefed the SCC on Soviet military actions in Afghanistan over the past two days. As many as 215 transports, including AN–22s, AN–12s, and IL–76s, arrived in Afghanistan from the Soviet Union

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 8–12/79. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

during December 25th. Kabul airport appears to be a major reception point. Activity at Bagram airport is not known. This size airlift, it is speculated, could raise the Soviet combat force level in Afghanistan to somewhere between two-thirds and one and one-half divisions. No ground forces at Termez or Kushka have yet crossed the border into Afghanistan. Thus we have an unusually large air movement but no ground re-enforcement. There is command and control intelligence indicating direct politburo supervision of parts of this operation. (S)

The greatest risk that we face is a quick, effective Soviet operation to pacify Afghanistan. This would be extremely costly to our image in the region and to your position here at home.² Our objective, then, should be to make the operation as costly as possible for the Soviets. The covert actions that you authorized have been very slow in getting off the ground. CIA will submit a full status report tomorrow. (S)

There will be a PRC tomorrow to discuss the broad regional impact of the events in Iran and Afghanistan. By that time we should have a more definitive picture of the scope of Soviet activity. At the PRC we will develop options for dealing with the issue, including possible recourse to the UN. In terms of immediate actions, we decided this morning:

1. We will permit information of the newest Soviet actions to reach the media on its own and maintain our current public posture.
2. The new developments will be briefed promptly to concerned countries in the region as well as other interested parties.
3. State will brief the Congressional leadership today in connection with planned briefings on Iran.
4. You should not become personally involved in a further demarche to the Soviets at this time. We will have Tom Watson reiterate our concerns and press for an explanation of recent troop movements; the Soviets have probably passed the point of no return. (S)

² These comments are presumably addressed to Carter.

96. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, December 26, 1979, 2133Z

331394. Subject: Soviet Troop Movements Into Afghanistan. Reference: Kabul 8592.²

1. (S—Entire text)

2. You should seek appointment with Gromyko or highest available level as soon as possible on question of Soviet troop deployments into Afghanistan (reftel). Talking points are as follows.

3. —The United States is fully aware that the Soviet Union has begun introducing large numbers of Soviet military forces into Afghanistan in recent days, with large numbers of flights landing at Kabul Airport.

—The introduction of large numbers of Soviet combat-equipped units into Afghanistan on December 25–26 can only be considered as direct, deliberate intervention in the internal affairs of that country, with obvious consequences for the peace and stability of the region as a whole.

—The U.S. side asks the Soviet Government for immediate clarification of its actions and intentions with regard to the situation in Afghanistan. It is obvious that the U.S. interest is real, legitimate, and urgent, involving not only our interest in the independence of Afghanistan, as a sovereign country, but posing clear implications for the international community as a whole.

4. You should add orally that the United States has the firm expectation that the introduction of Soviet forces into Kabul and elsewhere in Afghanistan will in no way lead to any situation which places the safety of American personnel in Afghanistan in jeopardy.

Vance

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office Files of Marshall D. Shulman, Special Advisor to the Secretary on Soviet Affairs, 1977–1981, Lot 81D109, untitled folder. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to the White House. Drafted by G.L. Matthews (EUR/SOV); cleared by Shulman and in EUR, NEA, S/S, and S/S–O; and approved by Vance.

² See Document 94.

97. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, December 26, 1979

SUBJECT

Reflections on Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan

I will be sending you separately a proposed agenda for the NSC meeting on Friday, and it will focus on both Afghanistan and Iran.² In the meantime, you are receiving today's SCC minutes on both subjects.³ This memorandum is meant merely to provide some stimulus to your thinking on this subject.

As I mentioned to you a week or so ago, we are now facing a *regional crisis*. Both Iran and Afghanistan are in turmoil, and Pakistan is both unstable internally and extremely apprehensive externally.⁴ If the Soviets succeed in Afghanistan, and if Pakistan acquiesces, the age-long dream of Moscow to have direct access to the Indian Ocean will have been fulfilled.

Historically, the British provided the barrier to that drive and Afghanistan was their buffer state. We assumed that role in 1945, but the Iranian crisis has led to the collapse of the balance of power in Southwest Asia, and it could produce Soviet presence right down on the edge of the Arabian and Oman Gulfs.

Accordingly, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan poses for us an extremely grave challenge, both internationally and domestically. While it could become a Soviet Vietnam, the initial effects of the inter-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 4-12/79. Secret. Printed from an uninitialed copy. Prepared for the NSC meeting on December 28; see Document 107.

² The proposed agenda was not found.

³ See Document 95 for the Summary of Conclusions of the SCC meeting on Afghanistan. The minutes of that meeting were not found. The Summary of Conclusions of the SCC meeting on Iran on that date is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979-September 1980.

⁴ The implications of the region-wide crisis were examined more fully in a memorandum prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, December 26, entitled "The Troubles of Southwest Asia." Characterizing the entire region as in "turmoil, albeit from a variety of causes," the memorandum argued that this trend constituted a "net gain" for the Soviet Union. The memorandum further argued that both superpowers were being pushed by forces they could not control: for the United States it was the hostage crisis in Iran; for the Soviet Union it was the insurgency in Afghanistan. (Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Office of Support Services, Job 82T00267R: Production Case Files, Box 2, The Troubles in Southwest Asia)

vention are likely to be adverse for us for the following domestic and international reasons:

Domestic

A. The Soviet intervention is likely to stimulate calls for more immediate U.S. military action in Iran. Soviet “decisiveness” will be contrasted with our restraint, which will no longer be labeled as prudent but increasingly as timid;

B. At the same time, regional instability may make a resolution of the Iranian problem more difficult for us, and it could bring us into a head to head confrontation with the Soviets;

C. SALT is likely to be damaged, perhaps irreparably, because Soviet military aggressiveness will have been so naked;

D. More generally, our handling of Soviet affairs will be attacked by both the Right and the Left.

International

A. Pakistan, unless we somehow manage to project both confidence and power into the region, is likely to be intimidated, and it could eventually even acquiesce to some form of external Soviet domination.

B. With Iran destabilized, there will be no firm bulwark in South-west Asia against the Soviet drive to the Indian Ocean;

C. The Chinese will certainly note that Soviet assertiveness in Afghanistan and in Cambodia is not effectively restrained by the United States.

Compensating Factors

There will be, to be sure, some compensating factors:

A. World public opinion may be outraged at the Soviet intervention. Certainly, Moslem countries will be concerned, and we might be in a position to exploit this.

B. There are already 300,000 refugees from Afghanistan in Pakistan and we will be in a position to indict the Soviets for causing massive human suffering. That figure will certainly grow, and Soviet-sponsored actions in Cambodia have already taken their toll as well.

C. There will be greater awareness among our allies for the need to do more for their own defense.

A Soviet Vietnam?

However, we should not be too sanguine about Afghanistan becoming a Soviet Vietnam:

A. The guerrillas are badly organized and poorly led;

B. They have no sanctuary, no organized army, and no central government—all of which North Vietnam had;

C. They have limited foreign support, in contrast to the enormous amount of arms that flowed to the Vietnamese from both the Soviet Union and China;

D. The Soviets are likely to act decisively, unlike the U.S., which pursued in Vietnam a policy of "inoculating" the enemy.

As a consequence, the Soviets might be able to assert themselves effectively, and in world politics nothing succeeds like success, whatever the moral aspects.

What is to be Done?

What follows are some preliminary thoughts, which need to be discussed more fully:

A. It is essential that Afghanistani resistance continues. This means more money as well as arms shipments to the rebels, and some technical advice;

B. To make the above possible we must both reassure Pakistan and encourage it to help the rebels. This will require a review of our policy toward Pakistan, more guarantees to it, more arms aid, and, alas, a decision that our security policy toward Pakistan cannot be dictated by our nonproliferation policy;

C. We should encourage the Chinese to help the rebels also;

D. We should concert with Islamic countries both in a propaganda campaign and in a covert action campaign to help the rebels;

E. We should inform the Soviets that their actions are placing SALT in jeopardy and that will also influence the substance of the Brown visit to China,⁵ since the Chinese are doubtless going to be most concerned about implications for themselves of such Soviet assertiveness so close to their border. Unless we tell the Soviets directly and very clearly that our relations will suffer, I fear the Soviets will not take our "expressions of concern" very seriously, with the effect that our relations *will* suffer, without the Soviets ever having been confronted with the need to ask the question whether such local adventurism is worth the long-term damage to the U.S.-Soviet relationship;

F. Finally, we should consider taking Soviet actions in Afghanistan to the UN as a threat to peace.

⁵ Brown visited China January 1980. See Documents 149 and 150.

98. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State¹

Kabul, December 27, 1979, 1101Z

8623. Subj: (LOU) Soviet Airlift Could Have Repercussions Beyond Afghan Borders. Ref: Kabul 8566.²

1. (S—Entire text)

2. Summary: The unprecedented Christmas airlift of Soviet combat units into Kabul underscores the qualitative change in political developments here. The ramifications of the Soviet move are chilling, both as regards the future of Afghanistan itself and the region as a whole. Internally, we may soon see Soviet divisions operating side by side with loyal DRA troops to suppress the insurgency—despite the likelihood of widespread genocide. Externally, the success of the Soviets will have an unsettling effect on the region, more likely to lead to a general posture of accommodation than of defiance.

3. On the local scene, the airlift is likely to have as much political as strictly military objectives. Moscow now has its own forces close to the political heart of the country, thereby perhaps insuring that it will have a loud voice should further internal tensions tear the Khalqis' political fabric.

4. Any semblance of Afghan political independence has virtually been eliminated by this massive airlift, and it could well be years, if ever, before a Communist revolutionary regime is sufficiently secure that Soviet troops can be withdrawn. Reaction of those Afghans willing to express their views has been one of despair, as they believe Soviet troops will now guarantee the survival of the hated Amin regime. Even if inaccurate in some respects, one Afghan merchant sadly claimed that "Afghanistan has now become a second Czechoslovakia." End of summary.

5. Massive airlift underscores the qualitative change in events that has taken place here. The injection of Soviet combat forces into Afghanistan to prop up a regime that may not have survived without such help, and the unabashedly public manner in which these forces were deployed, underscore the depth of the qualitative change which has

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 4-12/79. Secret; Immediate. Sent for information to Ankara, Athens, Islamabad, Beijing, Jidda, London, Moscow, USNATO, New Delhi, Paris, CINCPAC (also for POLAD), and CINCEUR (also for POLAD). Printed from a copy received in the White House Situation Room. In the top right corner of the telegram, Carter wrote: "Cy—Get our allies & others to complain officially—J." See footnote 3, Document 99.

² See Document 90.

occurred. The Afghan Government has yet to mention the event publicly, and Moscow has also remained mute regarding the despatch of perhaps two hundred Soviet Air Force planes and possibly thousands of Soviet combat troops to a neighboring country. Whether the USSR will formally invoke the "Brezhnev Doctrine" to justify its action remains to be seen. If so, it will be difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Khalqi regime in Kabul is considered a full-fledged member of the "socialist community of states." On the other hand, the two governments may rely on the December 5, 1978, Treaty of Friendship as justification for "cooperation" between two sovereign states. This would strike us as potentially ominous for other countries with similar treaties, since Moscow has decided to send combat forces to a non-Warsaw Pact country at the request of a clearly unpopular Communist regime hanging on to power by its fingernails and dependent principally on the zeal of a small cadre of dedicated party members, and the loyalty of a few key military units in and around the capital.

6. This particular phase of Soviet military activity may now be completed, and it is unknown if additional forces will be sent to Kabul or to other Afghan cities or military bases. Our guess is they will. The dimensions of the Christmas airlift to Kabul, however, are apparent to all observers here, and it is now clear even to those who downplayed the importance of the three battalions of Soviet troops at Bagram Air Base that political developments have entered a new phase with the arrival of Soviet units in Afghanistan's capital. In this context, we would like to reexamine the analysis in our reftel to set forth the added dimensions which we see flowing from recent events.

7. The impact of the airlift will in time have repercussions beyond Afghanistan's borders. In addition to the effect these events will have within this country, there is sure to be a major impact on regional and international relationships well beyond Afghanistan's borders. In the wake of high-level expressions of U.S. concern at the arrival of the three battalions of Soviet troops at Bagram Air Base, the massive and blatant airlift to Kabul strikes us as a distinct and overt disregard of U.S. interests on the part of the Kremlin. Despite whatever "legality" the move may have under the 1978 bilateral treaty, Moscow has apparently elected to underpin with military force a despotic regime which came to power 20 months ago through a classic military coup d'état, whose human rights record is among the worst in the world, and whose "legitimacy" as the genuine representative of the will of the Afghan people can be seriously questioned, if not completely discarded.

8. Afghanistan's regional neighbors are also likely to take some sobering second looks at the ramifications of Soviet Army forces sitting in Kabul and some probably elsewhere around the country. Pakistan, of course, will probably feel itself most threatened by this development,

and some of our Pakistani colleagues here have already expressed genuine fears that this airlift is merely the initial stage of a larger Soviet "occupation" aimed at dominance in the region. India as well may not welcome a massive Soviet military presence here, despite constant DRA assertions that Indian-Afghan relations rate in importance only behind Afghanistan's fraternal relations with the Socialist countries. We presume that the chaos in Iran will greatly diffuse whatever concern that government would normally have over this development.

9. In sum, not only may the Soviet military airlift—which may by no means be over—have potentially damaging ramifications on our relations with the USSR and with the DRA, but it adds one more seriously destabilizing factor to a region already rife with instability and potential chaos.

10. Within Afghanistan, the airlift is likely to have both political and military goals. Several of the points discussed in our reftel remain valid in the wake of the airlift. These newly arrived forces could clearly provide security for the hundreds of Soviet citizens in and around Kabul, although the forces which have been sent to the capital appear excessive to this particular role. Likewise, these units now deployed at the political heart of the country could constitute the "stiffener" for the Afghan Army in its counterinsurgency fight. The Soviet units may, moreover, take on the added responsibility for the security of the capital, in order to free certain of the apparently loyal and more heavily armed Afghan units for active deployment against the insurgents operating near Kabul. The prospect, however, that is most sobering is that in the year ahead Soviet forces (Army and Air Force) will undertake a direct role in the fighting, side by side with loyal DRA forces.

11. At this point, political considerations rather than strictly military concerns may be at the root of the Soviet move. The mid-December gunfight at the "People's House" in Kabul, which resulted in the probable death of Assadullah Amin (Second Deputy Foreign Minister, a top party official and President Hafizullah Amin's son-in-law) and perhaps Politburo member Abdul Hakim Sahrayee Jauzjani, highlights the instability of the Khalqi leadership. Moscow may, therefore, have decided to move now in order to have its own forces on the scene in the event that the fragile political leadership were to suddenly shatter as a result of an assassin's bullet, or following another intramural gunfight. Since Soviet advice to the Afghans last summer to form a broader political base was apparently ignored by the Khalqis, the Soviets may feel that locally available "muscle" to back up future "advice" is mandatory to protect Moscow's interests and investment in this country. An integral element here, of course, is the flexibility the Soviet forces provide to Moscow should the Afghan political leadership split into contending factions, or should some Afghan military contingent

attempt to replace the Khalqis. In the bigger picture, the Soviet move underscores Moscow's commitment to the revolution, a commitment the Soviets may have wanted to highlight for the benefit of other fraternal parties and regimes.

12. Afghan independence now virtually non-existent. As pointed out in our reftel, the arrival of a few Soviet battalions at Bagram Air Base cast further doubt on Afghanistan's ability to pursue any independent course on the international scene. In our view, the airlift virtually eliminates any question on this issue. Hafizullah Amin has apparently elected to place the security of his revolution in Moscow's hands for the sake of retaining his power. Given the current forces at work on Afghanistan's political scene, it could be years before a Communist regime is sufficiently secure that a Soviet withdrawal would be feasible.

13. Local reaction to the airlift—and what may follow—has been mostly despair. Those few Afghans who have been willing to voice their reactions to these events (a risky step these days) have generally despaired at what the airlift portends for their country. Most believe that the arrival of Soviet combat forces means there is now little, if any, chance of unseating the Khalqis, and that Amin and his followers will now embark on an even more repressive policy of stamping out all perceived opposition. A Kabul flower vendor was not all that wide of the mark when he remarked sadly to an Embassy officer yesterday that "Afghanistan has now become a second Czechoslovakia."

Amstutz

99. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State¹

Kabul, December 27, 1979, 1101Z

8624. Subj: Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan: What To Do About It. Ref: Kabul 8623.²

1. (S—Entire text)

2. Summary: The arrival of Soviet battalions at Bagram Air Base and now in Kabul significantly changes the Afghan political picture, and points to a need for a new policy review. The intervention not only suggests an extension of the Brezhnev Doctrine to Afghanistan, but it also raises the related question of whether the Amin regime has not now lost its legitimacy. Hence, I recommend a new policy review of Afghanistan/USSR by a group of countries, such as the NATO powers, Pakistan, India and China, to try to bring about a Soviet withdrawal; or the U.S. raising the issue of Soviet intervention in the UN Security Council, and our urging the termination of UNDP and World Bank aid to the Soviet satellite; and/or our giving massive assistance to the Afghan insurgents. Were either or both of the latter two options adopted, we would have to break our relations with this puppet regime and withdraw all official American personnel from the country. Our SALT monitoring capability would thereby also suffer. End summary.

3. Whether you call it a “qualitative change” or a new ball game, we have now a different political situation in Afghanistan. By reftel, we have just reexamined the question of why the Soviets chose to bring in troops at this time. We concluded that the reasons were probably multi-purpose, but at heart were to try to make sure the Khalqi party remained in power and the country within the Soviet orbit.

4. The fact that the Soviets, with presumably Hafizullah Amin’s consent and/or invitation, were impelled to introduce combat troops suggests too that both parties had concluded that the Khalqi regime could not otherwise long survive. Counter-insurgency efforts were having mixed results, urban terrorism was increasing, dissatisfaction in the Khalqi party was widespread, and the Soviets were probably painfully conscious that they were expected to meet all the expensive bills for hardware and the ever growing numbers of Soviet advisors.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office Files of Marshall D. Shulman, Special Advisor to the Secretary on Soviet Affairs, 1977–1981, Lot 81D109, untitled folder. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

² See Document 98.

They must have concluded that an intervention of Soviet forces was necessary to save the regime and for Soviet prestige.

5. I suspect that Soviet intervention in Afghanistan is the first occasion since World War II of the Soviets entering a non-Warsaw Pact country to maintain the special Soviet position. In Eastern Europe, when uprisings occurred in Poland and the GDR, Soviet troops were already in place, and in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, Soviet troops intervened to reestablish those governments' "traditional" and proper position within the Soviet sphere. Thus, the introduction of Soviet troops into Afghanistan would appear to represent a blatant power move by Moscow to expand its sphere of influence in the world.

6. What should the USG do? Whether or not the Dept's planned IG meeting on Afghanistan has already convened,³ I think it would be timely for the Dept to consider the implications of the new developments in Afghanistan, I also believe the time has come for us to take some new policy initiatives. The fact that the Soviets have disregarded our verbal warnings of the recent past suggests that they have been ineffective and shrugged off by the Soviets as being all bark but no bite.

7. I would thus like to propose two possible courses of action, the second of which could follow on the first.

8. The first course, this would be to try to mobilize the NATO countries, together with India, Pakistan, PRC, Saudi Arabia, Japan (and perhaps Iran through a third country), to make a harmonized if not joint *démarche* to the Soviet Union.⁴ The *démarche* would consist of a proposal that regional stability required two things: the establishment of a new, broader-based government in Afghanistan, which would include non-Khalqi and oppositionist elements; and the withdrawal of Soviet forces. The Soviets, by their military presence now in Kabul, can now probably influence the shape of any Afghan government; Hafizullah Amin would probably have to go, but the Soviets probably have the power to make him do so. The alternative for the Soviets is prolongation of the expensive civil war, which could drag on for years.

9. This idea of a harmonized joint *démarche* originates with the FRG Ambassador, Karl Berninger. While I see formidable obstacles to trying to galvanize any kind of harmonized *démarche* to the Soviets, and little chance of its succeeding, I see little harm in its being attempted and some advantages to our consulting with the mentioned countries.

10. The second alternative. This course would see us take a tougher stand. It would be based on the reality that Afghanistan is no longer

³ No record of a meeting was found.

⁴ The idea to send out telegrams to U.S. Allies on policy toward Afghanistan was taken up at the NSC meeting the next day. See footnote 4, Document 107.

truly independent and has become a puppet of the Soviet Union. Since most Afghans despise the regime, and the government has at best tenuous control of urban centers, its legitimacy can now be questioned. The fact that Soviet troops have had to intervene to keep it from collapsing makes too its legitimacy moot. A tough anti-Khalqi stand by the U.S. would be widely welcomed by Afghans. I thus wonder whether, were the first option to fail, we should not consider labeling the present regime illegitimate and taking certain follow-up measures. I appreciate that such a course would require our cutting diplomatic relations with the Khalqi govt, and the withdrawal of our official presence in the country. This I realize would end our capability to help monitor Soviet SALT compliance. Follow-up actions which we might take might include raising in the UN Security Council the charge of Soviet intervention and to appeal for Soviet withdrawal. It would also be proper for us to try to terminate World Bank and UNDP aid to this country, which together now comes to \$100 million per year.

11. Last, but by no means least, we should then address the question of whether the time has not come to assist the insurgents on a large scale. I realize the last cannot be done without Pakistani concurrence, and that this would have difficult policy ramifications for the whole unsettled world of U.S.-Pakistan relations (and the Glenn Amendment).⁵

12. I am also not unmindful of other competing considerations, which complicate the Afghanistan situation, such as our attempts to get USSR cooperation to free our Tehran hostages, and to achieve SALT Two. The Dept is in a better position than I to weigh these other factors. In looking though at the big picture, what disturbs me is that almost annually the USSR is succeeding in expanding its power around the globe, and that here in the subcontinent the possible extension of the Brezhnev Doctrine is likely in the long run to be detrimental to regional stability and our interests.

13. In sum, I think the arrival of Soviet troops calls for new initiatives and new thinking about the U.S. posture towards this government.

Amstutz

⁵ Under the Glenn Amendment to the Arms Export Control Act (Section 102), the President can apply sanctions against a non-nuclear state that detonates a nuclear device. The status of non-nuclear states is defined by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, which Carter signed into law March 10, 1978.

100. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State¹

Kabul, December 27, 1979, 1742Z

8627. Sitrept No. 1. Subj: Heavy Fighting Erupts Between Soviet and Afghan Forces in Kabul.

1. At approximately 1930 Dec 27 heavy fighting broke out in Kabul involving the units of the Soviet forces brought into this city over the past two days. There has been heavy fighting at Radio Afghanistan (RA) next to the Embassy, and two tanks have been knocked out and are burning behind RA. The Soviet forces were seen moving quickly to secure RA, and it appears initially that they caught the Afghan units by surprise. It remains unclear, however, whether all Afghan military units are resisting the Soviet forces. There have been signs that fighting may be taking place in or around some of the military bases on the outskirts of the capital. There has as yet been no air activity of any kind over the city. Afghans have been seen as prisoners of Soviet troops at RA. Our preliminary assessment is that although it is possible that the Afghan military has split into pro and anti-Soviet elements as a reaction to the recent massive airlift, we may also be looking at a Soviet attempt to overthrow the present Afghan regime by force.

2. We are in a phase three alert and all Americans have been advised to remain where they are for the night. No Americans have been reported injured in the fighting. The Mission is manned by a skeleton staff, and we are in communication with the community by radio. The city's phone system is dead. The Embassy building has been hit by small arms fire, but no significant damage has been caused.

3. At about 2215, someone broke in to the heretofore regular Radio Afghanistan programming and announced that "Amin is finished, Amin was no good, we support all Afghans and Mullahs." This particular and very brief transmission was not of high quality, but that could indicate that it did in fact emanate from the embattled Radio Afghanistan building next door. The speaker did not identify himself, nor did he apparently extend his wrath to the party or the revolution.

4. We have no idea of the present fate of Hafizullah Amin nor his supporters. What is clear is that the Soviet units control the Radio

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 12/27/79. Confidential; Limited Official Use; Flash. Sent for information Niact Immediate to Moscow. Also sent for information Immediate to New Delhi, Islamabad, Karachi, CINCPAC (also for POLAD), and CINCEUR (also for POLAD). Printed from a copy received in the White House Situation Room.

Afghanistan compound, although they may not fully control access to all microphones. Dance music has now returned to the airwaves.

5. As of 2230, fighting has died down near the Embassy, but sounds of distant firing in various directions continue. Tracer rounds have been seen in the direction of Kabul Airport, and at about 2200 a [garble] turboprop aircraft was heard over the city. It is not sure that it attempted to land.

Amstutz

101. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, December 27, 1979, 1842Z

28030. Subject: Soviet Military Buildup in Afghanistan. Ref: State 331394.²

1. (S—Entire text).

2. Per instructions reftel I called on First Deputy Minister V.F. Mal'tsev on December 27 at 5:30 p.m. to convey U.S. concern over wide-scale introduction of Soviet military units into Afghanistan and to ask for immediate clarification of Soviet Government's actions and intentions. Soviets had obviously anticipated our démarche and Mal'tsev was prepared with a written statement which he said he was instructed to convey to the USG and to President Carter personally. The statement acknowledged that "limited" Soviet forces have gone into Afghanistan at Afghan Government request to repel "external" aggression in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter.³ The state-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office Files of Marshall D. Shulman, Special Advisor to the Secretary on Soviet Affairs, 1977–1981, Lot 81D109, untitled folder. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.

² See Document 96.

³ Article 51 of the UN Charter reads: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security." For the text of the Charter, see *A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941–1949*, pp. 117–140.

ment said Soviet forces would be withdrawn when the reasons for their being sent no longer exist. The text of the statement follows.

3. Begin text:

I am authorized to transmit confidentially for the Government of the United States of America and personally for the President the following:

As is well-known everywhere in the world, including to the Government of the United States of America, for a long time there has been interference from abroad in internal Afghan affairs, including direct use of armed force. It is completely obvious that the aim of this interference is the overthrow of the democratic structure established as a result of the victory of the April revolution in 1978. The Afghan people and its armed forces actively rebuffed these aggressive acts and repelled encroachments against the democratic achievements, sovereignty and national dignity of the new Afghanistan. However, the acts of external aggression continue on an increasingly wider scale; even now, armed units and weapons are being sent in from abroad.

In these circumstances the leadership of the State of Afghanistan turned to the Soviet Union for help and assistance in the struggle against external aggression. The Soviet Union, proceeding from the common interests of Afghanistan and our country in security matters—as set forth also in the Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness and Cooperation of 1978—and in the interest of preserving peace in this region, responded positively to this request by the leadership of Afghanistan and adopted a decision to send to Afghanistan limited military contingents to carry out the tasks requested by the leadership of Afghanistan. In doing this the Soviet Union also proceeds on the basis of the appropriate provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, in particular Article 51, which provides for the right of states to individual and collective self-defense in repelling aggression and restoring the peace.

The Soviet Government, in informing the Government of the U.S.A about this, considers it necessary also to state that when the reasons evoking this action of the Soviet Union cease to exist, it intends to withdraw its military contingents from the territory of Afghanistan.

The Soviet Union again emphasizes that, as before, its only desire is to see Afghanistan an independent sovereign state carrying out a policy of good-neighborliness and peace, firmly respecting and fulfilling its international obligations, including those under the Charter of the United Nations. End text.

4. After hearing Mal'tsev out I proceeded to make the points per reftel and left a non-paper.⁴ In making the oral point concerning the

⁴ Not further identified and not found.

safety of American personnel in Afghanistan, I referred to the loss of Ambassador Spike Dubs in Kabul.

5. Mal'tsev initially refused to address any of the questions I raised and merely stated that the Soviet statement covered all the questions we had asked. He stressed the confidential nature of the information conveyed to the USG and personally to the President. After I pressed him further, Mal'tsev made the following comments. First, my reference to the introduction of "large numbers" of Soviet forces was in contrast to the Soviet statement which refers to "limited" military contingents. Second, the allegation that these actions constitute direct intervention in internal affairs and a threat to the peace does not correspond to the actual situation because Soviet actions are in response to the legal request of the Afghan Government in order to preserve peace in that area. Mal'tsev concluded with the hope that, when I had studied the text carefully, I would find all the answers to the questions we had raised. He then said abruptly this was all he could say on the matter and that he was under instructions only to convey the basic statement he had handed me.

6. I told Mal'tsev I would convey the statement to my government and to the President, but made clear that the Soviet statement did not answer the questions we had raised, specifically regarding the size and suddenness of Soviet troop movements and military equipment to Afghanistan. Also, it did not explain the substantive change in Soviet intentions toward Afghanistan which all these military actions implied. I also made it clear that if I could have had an opportunity to discuss with him the serious issues these actions raise, I would have asked who are these outsiders interfering in Afghanistan's affairs? Mal'tsev repeated that he believed the Soviet statement was responsive and fully covered our questions. I repeated that I considered the Soviet response inadequate.

Watson

102. Minutes of a Presidential Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, December 27, 1979, 4:30–6 p.m.

SUBJECT

Southwest Asia

PARTICIPANTS

STATE

Secretary Cyrus Vance
 Warren Christopher, Deputy
 Secretary
 David Newsom, Under Secretary for
 Political Affairs
 Harold Saunders, Ass't. Secretary for
 Near Eastern & South Asian
 Affairs

DEFENSE

Secretary Harold Brown
 W. Graham Clayton, Jr. Deputy
 Secretary

JCS

Admiral Thomas Hayward
 Lt. Gen. John Pustay
Central Intelligence
 Admiral Stansfield Turner,
 Director
 Frank Carlucci, Deputy Director

WHITE HOUSE

Dr. Brzezinski
 David Aaron

NSC

Thomas P. Thornton
 Marshall Brent

Turner: One unknown at this point is the extent of Soviet activity and their full intentions. They have brought in perhaps an additional 4–5,000 troops. We know that Babrak is a Parchamist who has been in Prague as Ambassador. After his dismissal he remained in Eastern Europe. His father was a Mullah and this is being used to his advantage. Resistance in Kabul has died out for the night.

Brown: Was the Soviet movement designed primarily to force a change in government?

Newsom: Or do they think perhaps that the insurgents can be better dealt with by Babrak?

Brown: The insurgents are not going to buy that.

Turner: They probably felt that they had to replace Amin; we don't know whether they have made a broader commitment. The forces in the Turkestan military district may just be to support this move.

Brzezinski: Who is in charge of the Afghan Army?

Turner: Watanjar was purged and Amin kept the defense portfolio.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton, Country File, Box 102, Policy Review Committee (PRC): Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, and Their Neighbors, 12/27/79: 11/79–1/80. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. For the Summary of Conclusions of this meeting, see Document 103.

Brzezinski: The Soviets have been directly engaged.

Turner: Yes. In Kabul they are engaging in combat. We do not know what is going on in the countryside. There are reports of Soviet flights in Herat and Kandahar.

Brzezinski: What is Radio Afghanistan outside of Kabul broadcasting?

Turner: We don't know.

Vice President: What is the number of Soviet military there now?

Turner: We do not know exactly—perhaps 10,000 men.

Vice President: What are the reactions of other Islamic countries?

Saunders: We have not got them yet.

Newsom: We sent a message last night to the Islamic posts.²

Vance: Let's go to the State paper now.³ Are there any substantial problems with the "objectives?"

Brown: Do we have a long-term interest in the unity of Iran? Is that an agreed objective? I don't think we are ready to judge that yet. A unified pro-Soviet Iran is not necessarily in our interest.

Vance: That is true enough.

Brzezinski: But we still have an interest in avoiding the disintegration of Iran. That would benefit the Soviets.

Brown: Not necessarily—for instance if the Iraqis were to take over Khuzestan.

Brzezinski: But disintegrating Iran is not in our interest.

Vice President: Incipient disintegration is something that we might be able to use as a handle on Iran.

Brown: Perhaps the paper should say "at this time."

Carlucci: Our covert activity, working with the tribals, could contribute to disintegration.

Vance: That is why it is in our interest to look closely at this as we agreed this morning.

Brzezinski: The fear of disintegration would favor us, not the Soviets. Perhaps we could exploit that.

Aaron: But the fear of disintegration must not immobilize us from acting.

Brzezinski: Perhaps the best formulation is that the use of the fear of disintegration could be useful but disintegration itself would not be wise unless the country were coming under Soviet control.

² Not further identified and not found

³ Not further identified and not found.

Aaron: The paper seems to write off Pakistan.

Vance: That is a key issue. We have to get down to that. The paper doesn't suggest writing it off but following a middle course. We recognize however that Zia may not last.

Christopher: Perhaps the point is overstated.

Aaron: The alternative, getting close to India, is extremely difficult.

Brown: What will the Indians say about the Soviet activities in Afghanistan?

Saunders: They would be very concerned but they are in the midst of an election campaign and are not likely to do or say much.

Brown: What if Afghanistan becomes another Czechoslovakia? Will that affect Indian attitudes towards the Soviets and the United States?

Saunders: It will be a cause for concern for them but . . .

Christopher: We think that the Indians won't like it but are not likely to say much.

Turner: We agree with that. They will be concerned but it won't change their policies much nor will it lead to a warming of relations with us. The paper makes the prospect of Pakistan more pessimistic than is warranted. We could probably maintain relations with a post Zia military regime or even with the PPP.

Vance: True enough but that would not last long. There would be an election, then the PPP which would be more hostile.

Newsom: I agree that it is badly written.

Claytor: It becomes clearer later on.

Vance: Let us turn to the "alternate frameworks." Should we go all out with the major program in Pakistan, write them off, or take an in-between position? Some discussion of this would help.

Brown: There are many nuances in the in-between position. For instance we could untie aid from nuclear policy. Then we could have a bigger or smaller program. Under the present framework there is very little that we can do.

Vance: You are wrong. It depends on the kind of equipment that we can offer, as Agha Shahi told us.⁴

Brown: Would or can we sell to them outside of FMS?

Vance: We can sell whatever we want.

Aaron: But what would the Congressional reaction be?

⁴ Presumably during Shahi's October 16-17 visit; see footnote 2, Document 79. Documentation on the visit is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XIX, South Asia.

Vance: At this time Congress will not raise any objections if we can claim that we will be stabilizing the area.

Aaron: What exactly does the non-proliferation problem preclude?

Vance: We can make no military credit sales, no economic assistance except for PL-480.⁵ Let's now discuss the options for Pakistan. We can negotiate promptly with the PL-480 and I think we should.

Vice President: Do we need to open up a fundamental dialogue with Pakistan?

Vance: We did that last fall.

Vice President: But our bag was empty then.

Vance: We could go back with more offers, particularly in the area of military sales. That way we could engage them.

Claytor: Their military was very interested when we talked to them.

Aaron: Is there nothing we can do on nuclear policy?

Brown: We can make a distinction between their present program and testing.

Vance: We tried this. We were told that Zia would not test—at least for six months—that he cannot bind a successor. They also told us that they would continue developing their facilities. They did agree not to transfer sensitive technology or to develop a weapon.

Aaron: Does that relate to India somehow? If they made a commitment would the Indians?

Vance: Bilateral exchanges have always fallen through on this.

Newsom: We haven't asked each side not to test as long as the other didn't. Anyway the legislation, absent of waiver, demands a stop to the enrichment program, not just testing. Some of us have thought about the "Dimona formula." (I.e. not testing but purely having the capability to do so.)

Turner: My Chief of Station in Pakistan says that in all of his discussions with the military they suggest a quiet deal to turn off the enrichment facility. It would be unpopular however if that leaked. We could however justify to Congress moving ahead in cooperation with Pakistan on grounds of the Afghan problem.

Vance: We could also ask for a revision of the Symington Amendment but the President wouldn't want to.

⁵ Public Law 480, signed into law by President Eisenhower as the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, provides U.S. Government financing of sales or donation of U.S. agricultural products to developing countries and/or private entities through congressional credits. Title I of the law provides for government-to-government sales to developing countries on a grant program. Title II provides for direct donation of food by the U.S. Government. Title III provides for government-to-government grants through the sales of donated food in the recipient country.

Vice President: We have poisoned the atmosphere for two years and our policy just isn't working. Shouldn't we review this with the goal of enhancing our chances through a broader cooperative relationship? They obviously cannot buckle under to us for political reasons.

Brown: I agree.

Vance: Do you want to ask for a repeal of the Symington and Glenn Amendments?

Vice President: No. Let us concentrate on this issue.

Aaron: We could try to get an international security waiver written into the Symington Amendment parallel to the one in the Glenn Amendment.⁶

Vice President: Let's tell Congress that it is preferable to use Glenn's formulation. That way at least we will have Glenn on our side.

Brzezinski: How much time would that take however?

Vice President: Perhaps now we could move very fast.

Vance: I think you can go ahead faster by selling material to them outright and asking the Saudis to pay.

Brown: In my experience you can get Congress to act faster than the Saudis.

Vance: We could pursue both tracks.

Brown: What kind of sales would that be?

Vance: There are two ways. First we could sell them sophisticated equipment and just accept the fact that we are going to irritate the Indians. Secondly, we could give them a package related only to frontier defense.

Brown: But what is the threat from Afghanistan?

Vance: Agha-Shahi raised this repeatedly and asked what we would be willing to do.

Brown: But they are worried about the Soviets and machine guns are not going to help them there.

Vance: They are very worried about their tribal troubles.

Brown: Are they really assuming that the Pathans will turn against them?

Brzezinski: Isn't the point one of generating more confidence in Pakistan so that they do not feel they are alone in a deteriorating situation? This means moving ahead on the non-proliferation issue. We should supply them arms. It doesn't matter all that much what the arms are. We should talk to them about covert action to support the

⁶ See footnote 5, Document 99.

Afghan rebels. We share an interest there. This would be our minimum program.

Vance: We should go ahead with the PL–480, provide more help for refugees through the UNHCR, and we should open military sales channel, starting with the Gearing Destroyers.

Brzezinski: We need another top level political dialogue. Somebody should go to see Zia—perhaps Graham Claytor.⁷

Vance: Do we all agree on the general posture?

Vice President: Won't the sale of military equipment bother the Indians?

Vance: I am talking about 155mm Howitzers, Mortars, Vulcans, I-Hawks. They would also be interested in the Hughes 500 Attack Helicopter.

Brown: That package should meet their psychological needs, but it is unclear whether it is useful militarily.

Vance: They also need transportation equipment.

Brown: We will take a look at the list you are giving us. This raises the question of the Saudis. Can we engage them and the Chinese?

Vance: You should talk to the Chinese about that.

Brown: The question is what I should say.

Brzezinski: To recapitulate, we will have a military package; we will seek a waiver in the Symington Amendment language; we will increase money for the refugees and move ahead on PL–480; and we will open up a high-level security dialogue concerning Afghanistan.

Christopher: The waiver is going to be tough on the Hill. Also, we don't have much money.

Brzezinski: What about their no test pledge?

Vance: We should try but we are not going to get it.

Aaron: Couldn't we get a reciprocal pledge with India?

Vance: We can try but it won't work. Pakistan won't buy it in any case.

Christopher: Zia is too weak for that kind of a commitment.

Newsom: But if the new Indian Government pledged not to test, we could make an attempt.

Christopher: That will cool, not warm the atmosphere.

Vance: We should settle for what we have. In practical terms, they are not going to be able to test.

⁷ No record of a visit was found.

Vance: Let us turn to India. I recommend approval of the pending fuel license.

Brzezinski: I have to take note of the fact that ACDA is not here today and we cannot make a recommendation without them. We should have a separate meeting. State should check with them.

Vance: I see no alternative course of action.

Claytor: I agree.

Vance: At least this will maintain the status quo. The NRC has not acted yet; the President can take the pending license from the NRC.

Christopher: We can offer it as an opener with the new government.

Brzezinski: What will we do about selling military equipment to India?

Brown: Let's go to the new Indian Government and point out the problem of the Soviets in Afghanistan in relationship to their role to India as an arms supplier.

Vance: What they want is high technology material from us—guidance systems for the Jaguar, etc.—the kinds of things we have been unwilling to sell under current policy.

Brown: There is a need to revise our arms sales policy for the whole subcontinent.

Vance: Pakistan and India have different needs. (At this point Secretary Vance passed out a list.)⁸

Brown: We have to worry about leakage from India.

Christopher: Will this not cause us trouble for [with?] the Chinese?

Vice President: They think that anybody who helps the Indians are pro-Soviet.

Vance: I propose that we go forward on the first Tarapur sale and open the dialogue with the Indians leading to a possible sale of advanced military equipment.

Christopher: Can't we send the second sale to the NRC?

Vance: Yes. Let's start the clock running.

Newsom: Should we not send a high-level emissary to the Indians also?

Aaron: We have a need to go to the Pakistanis immediately. Let's go to the Indians after the election.

Turner: The following is the status of our covert operations in Afghanistan. We had two Presidential findings, one on August 3 and

⁸ Not found.

one on November 7.⁹ With regard to the first one, we have formed a psychological operations team in Washington which is generating material for covert broadcasting in Afghanistan. A clandestine radio was established in Afghanistan in November and indeed the Amin Government had already complained to the Pakistanis about it. We have also placed 150 articles in the world press. We have spent [*amount not declassified*] under this finding and have [*amount not declassified*] left. In the field of non-military support, we have disbursed \$620,000 of the \$695,000 available. Some of this went through Pakistan and some unilaterally. Under the second finding we have to work with the Saudis. We were doing fairly well with them until the attack on the Mosque in Mecca.¹⁰ I spoke to Prince Turki last week and he seemed less enthusiastic than he had before. Apparently, Prince Fahd wants to see the color of our money before he does anything. Perhaps he wants to see us buy arms for the rebels as well as do it himself. We can go back to Turki and Fahd on the basis of the original understanding that we would supply all facilities short of weapons. Alternatively, we could ask for a different finding. Under this we would be able to move appropriate materiel out of our storehouses [*less than 1 line not declassified*] within a week and get it to Saudi Arabia for further forwarding to Pakistan. The Pakistanis would probably prefer that. We would at that point tell the Saudis that it is up to them to pay for the next load of arms although we would of course help them find it. This is certainly the quickest way to get things moving.

Vice President: What kind of material do you have available?

Turner: [*less than 1 line not declassified*] anti-aircraft guns, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] anti-tank weapons, AK-47 rifles and 82mm mortars.

Vice President: That sounds good to me.

Brzezinski: We will need a new finding.

Vice President: Is that a lightweight anti-aircraft gun?

Turner: It would be effective against a helicopter but not against aircraft. But we cannot deliver any of this material without Pakistani assistance.

Brzezinski: We will have to discuss this in the high-level mission we send to Pakistan.

Brown: Good. We should ask something from the Pakistanis.

Hayward: (Expresses agreement.)

⁹ The first Presidential Finding was dated July 3, not August 3. See footnote 5, Document 53. For the November 7 Finding, see footnote 1, Document 76.

¹⁰ A reference to the seizure of the Grand Mosque by Islamic dissidents on November 20. Documentation on this incident is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XIX, South Asia.

Turner: Actually I like the terms of the last finding which meant getting the Saudis out in front.

Vance: They will still be in on it as you described the present proposal. We will take note of what you say.

You are going to have to have the Attorney General here to sign off on the recommendation for a finding.

Brzezinski: Let us do that at the SCC tomorrow morning.

Turner: We would have to give training on the RPG-7 anti-tank weapon. The way we would do it would be to train Pakistanis who then in turn could train Afghans. We also could provide SA7 anti-aircraft missiles but these are not used in Afghanistan and we are trying to restrict ourselves to equipment that the rebels could have taken from the Afghan Army. We have also set aside [amount not declassified] for communications equipment.

Newsom: Is there any sign of greater cohesion among the guerrilla forces?

Turner: No.

Christopher: Where would you provide the equipment?

Turner: Inside Pakistan. That would keep us out of it.

Newsom: Would this program give us more leverage in dealing with these amorphous rebel groups?

Carlucci: That depends on what your goal is. These weapons won't enable them to take over the country; they will just be making life more difficult for the Soviets.

Turner: One more thing: We can work this first delivery into the money available under the November finding. We have [amount not declassified] remaining. Over the next six or eight months, however, we are going to need \$10 million. We can't go back to Congress and ask for more money until we get a significant Saudi contribution.

Brzezinski: But won't this smoke the Saudis out?

Carlucci: This, plus our Iran program, will clearly exhaust [less than 1 line not declassified]. We will have to ask for a larger [less than 1 line not declassified] and that will mean a debate in Congress.

Vice President: Are we doing enough on broadcasting?

Brzezinski: A recent SCC meeting mandated several steps. OMB is causing trouble however and I hope that you could weigh in with them. I will send a report over to you.

Vice President: Yes, send some information to me.

Turner: Shouldn't we lift the anti-Soviet propaganda prohibition that was laid on us at a recent meeting by Lloyd Cutler?¹¹

¹¹ No record of this meeting was found.

Vance: Let's consider that changed.

Brzezinski: You do not get your instructions from comments made at meetings.

Vance: I want to emphasize that there absolutely must be no leaks from this meeting. There should be no backgrounding without approval at the highest levels.

What do you think about approaching the Security Council concerning Afghanistan?

Brzezinski: The President wants other countries to lead in the protest.

Vance: We will try to see to that. But at the UN we want to keep our focus on the hostage question. We can consider taking the Afghan question there later but I want to urge you now in the strongest terms not to do so at this time.

Brown: Some countries might even welcome the diversion at the UN.

Brzezinski: Maybe other countries will raise it.

Vance: (Secretary Vance invited comments on the draft cable appended to the discussion paper. This cable was to go to Moscow. There was some general critical discussion.) We will send revised instructions to Watson in Moscow.¹²

Brzezinski: Concerning the Soviet talking points, we should remind them of the 1972 Joint Declaration of Principles.¹³

Brown: Shouldn't we draw a parallel between Iran and Afghanistan?

Brzezinski: The other proposed cable should ask our allies and other countries to raise the issue with the Soviets. What are we doing in our own broadcasting?

Newsom: VOA says its main problem is finding pegs from which they can develop themes in their broadcasts. We should all remember to get appropriate themes into our public statements. We will circulate a list of themes tomorrow.

Brzezinski: Are we sure that we are doing enough in this case? This is the first use of Soviet forces outside the Bloc.

Vice President: Wouldn't it be a good idea to have Bob Byrd summon the Soviet Chargé and point out to them the danger to SALT? Byrd

¹² Neither found.

¹³ A reference to one of the basic statements of détente, or relaxation of tensions, forged between the United States and the Soviet Union, and declared during the 1972 Moscow Summit. See Document 87.

seemed to be on good terms with the Soviets and he could point out to them that they are about to lose a friend.

Aaron: What would we want to get them to do?

Brzezinski: We could talk to them along these lines, and convey to them that there would be far-reaching implications for our relationship. This could be similar to the problem that President Johnson faced as a result of the invasion of Czechoslovakia. It completely ruled out for a long period of time any progress in arms limitations. I am not sure how we want to communicate this. Harold Brown is going to China and we do not want to make a threat out of that to the Soviets but they should have to think about the US-Chinese relationship.¹⁴

Vice President: What do we think that the Soviets have decided to do?

Vance: I think they made a decision during the Pavlovsky visit that they had to act or lose out in Afghanistan. They doubt the prospects for SALT anyways; thus, they are willing to take larger risks.

Brzezinski: We also have to keep in mind the Soviet sponsorship of aggression in Cambodia and perhaps Angola and now Afghanistan—and we may also encounter increasing bad Soviet behavior in Iran. This is all going to result in us receiving intense domestic pressure from both the right and the left. We have to get this across to the Soviets most forcefully.

Vance: Your staff has a paper I've sent over on the subject.

Brzezinski: Maybe the Soviets haven't thought all of this through. There is an aging leadership there and they may not have drawn all of the conclusions.

Newsom: Could we send somebody to Yugoslavia and Romania—perhaps also to Poland—for “political discussions?”

Brzezinski: No, we should talk to the Soviets.

Vice President: Brezhnev has sent us a very sweet message on SALT but a very bad one on Iran. Maybe they think we are so desperate for SALT . . .

Brown: The Administration is going to go ahead on the SALT but the Soviets may underestimate the sense of national revulsion.

Aaron: The President will have to decide whether to push SALT. Maybe we should invoke Senator Byrd.

Brzezinski: Perhaps we should send a Hot Line message to Brezhnev. Maybe they would agree to pull out after overthrowing Amin. The President is going to be very loath to give up on his non-proliferation

¹⁴ See Documents 149 and 150.

objectives and also to get excessively close to the Chinese. There could be a lasting chill in our relations and the Soviets may not be aware of the impact.

Vance: I think our position has been made clear.

Brzezinski: They may see some of Watson's protests as purely pro forma.

Vance: We should make fewer protests to the Soviets. We protest too many things too often.

Brzezinski: Let's consider these things overnight for the NSC Meeting tomorrow.

Brown: What about Iraq? This is an important country where attitudes might be changed. Shouldn't we approach them?

Vance: The paper calls for that.

Brown: Is this fast enough? It all seems too long term.

Newsom: The Iraqis will worry but not worry in our direction.

Brown: Maybe. But why not offer them a military dialogue explaining our regional goals?

Vance: We tried that and we were rebuffed. But it is worth pursuing. There is not much progress on the political side but on the military side we might find a basis for consultation.

Brown: Should we perhaps send somebody to Iran?

Vance: Somebody is going there. Perhaps for discussions more in the Defense area. It is a private sort of visit.

Brzezinski: What about with the Chinese?

Brown: We will have to issue a communique at the end of the meeting and we will say that we discussed the international security situation including in South Asia.

Vance: I talked to Chai(?) the other day. He offered no new ideas. Thereupon the meeting ended.

103. Summary of Conclusions of a Presidential Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, December 27, 1979, 4:30–6 p.m.

SUBJECT

Southwest Asia

PARTICIPANTS

STATE

Secretary Cyrus Vance

Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher

Mr. David Newsom, Under Secretary for Political Affairs

Mr. Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs

OSD

Secretary Harold Brown

Deputy Secretary W. Graham Claytor, Jr.

JCS

Admiral Thomas Hayward

Lt. General John Pustay

DCI

Admiral Stansfield Turner

Deputy Director Frank Carlucci

WHITE HOUSE

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Mr. David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs

NSC

Mr. Thomas Thornton, Staff Member

Mr. Marshall Brement, Staff Member

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The PRC met to discuss the situation in Southern Asia, especially in light of recent events in Afghanistan. Admiral Turner briefed on the fast-moving situation in Kabul, noting that the Soviet military presence in the country was as high as perhaps 10,000. (S)

[Omitted here is discussion related to India and Pakistan.]

With regard to *Afghanistan*:

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton, Country File, Box 102, Policy Review Committee (PRC): Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, and Their Neighbors, 12/27/79: 11/79–1/80. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. For the minutes of the meeting, see Document 102.

—The PRC was briefed by CIA on certain covert action programs and discussed these. Official action was postponed until a later SCC meeting. (S)

—Dr. Brzezinski noted that OMB was causing difficulties in implementing a more aggressive broadcasting program to cover the Afghan and related situations. The Vice President asked for additional information so that he could talk to OMB. It was also noted that a recent comment made in the course of a PRC meeting, on the need not to take propaganda initiatives that might cause problems for SALT ratification, did not constitute guidance for the operating agencies. (S)

—Secretary Vance urged strongly that the Afghan situation not be raised in the UN at this moment, lest it distract attention from our efforts to free the hostages in Iran. There was general support. (S)

It was agreed that the possibility of a dialogue with *Iraq* be explored, based on security factors in order to avoid the sterility of political discussions. It was noted that an American emissary was already scheduled to visit Iraq. (S)

The meeting concluded with a discussion of how we should deal with the *Soviets* concerning Afghanistan. There was widespread concern that the Soviets may not appreciate the impact that their actions in Afghanistan, Cambodia, and perhaps Angola, are having on American opinion. A further demarche by Ambassador Watson was authorized on the basis of revisions made in the draft instructions tabled by State.² Beyond that, however, it was felt that the Soviets had to be dealt with more forcefully. The Vice President suggested that Majority Leader Byrd might be asked to read the riot act to the Soviet Chargé; the possibility of a hotline message to Brezhnev was also discussed.³ No decisions were made, pending the outcome of the NSC meeting on December 28. (S)⁴

Secretary Brown will include all of these subjects in his discussions with the *Chinese*.⁵ It will be announced following his trip that security issues of Southwest Asia had been discussed between the two sides. (S)

Secretary Vance emphasized the danger of any leaks from this meeting and said no backgrounding should be done without the highest level authorization. (S)

² For Watson's first demarche, see Document 101. No record of a second was found.

³ No record of a discussion between Byrd and the Soviet Chargé was found. For the hotline message from Carter to Brezhnev, see Document 113.

⁴ See Document 107.

⁵ See Documents 149 and 150.

104. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Islamabad, December 28, 1979, 0700Z

15303. For the Secretary. Subject: Afghanistan: Reassuring Pakistan.

1. (S)—Entire text. This is an action message.

2. Like the rest of us, the Pakistanis are still in the process of assessing the implications of the latest events in Kabul. FonSec Shahna-waz this morning gave me preliminary GOP reaction about as follows: the Soviet troops came in during last few days at request of Amin, but Sovs then doublecrossed Amin. Sovs have now thrown into the political arena the last elements of alternative (leftist) leadership, and it remains to be seen whether these Parchamists can maintain the loyalty of the army, despite their use of the label “true Khalq” to describe themselves. It is “inevitable” that the army will suffer severe splits despite Sov milit pressures.

It is [clear?] the new Parchamists are even more puppets of the Sovs than previous leaders, and will be obedient servants of Moscow. There will likely be an initial period of moderation, as after takeovers by Taraki and Amin, but later on Babrak and co. will revert to their natural Communist extremism. The Pushtoonistan issue, on which Babrak earlier was more militant than Taraki or Amin, will later on become even more of an issue than it has been, and Pakistan expects severe pressures along border and Afghan subversion in NWFP and Baluchistan.

3. Our Pak sources suggest, inter alia, that a 30/31 Dec. visit to Kabul by Fon Advisor Shahi will be scrubbed.

4. USG policy makers should consider advisability very quick message to Paks, in next few days. Obviously broader and longer-term reactions will have to await fundamental USG decisions, but now is the time for giving the Paks whatever can be given to reassure them of U.S. concern and U.S. determination to prevent further Soviet expansion in this, or other, regions.

5. Obviously from my limited perspective I cannot make firm judgments on the elements that might be included in any message, but here are my suggestions.

6. Several avenues are open for us. One would be for me to be authorized, specifically, to reaffirm to the Government of Pakistan, at the highest levels, our continuing commitment to Pakistan’s integrity

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800040-2162, N800001-0001. Secret; Nodis; Niact Immediate.

and sovereignty. I could put teeth in this by reaffirming—in response to Agha Shahi’s now three-month-old query—the applicability of our 1959 bilateral to the present situation in Afghanistan. We have really dithered on this matter far too long, in my judgement—the Iran hostage situation, elections in India, and the 21 November events here notwithstanding.²

7. I could be authorized, perhaps, to take this a step further by formally requesting, on behalf of my government, a consultation as envisaged under the 1959 bilateral; events in Kabul over the last 72 hours would seem to me to merit no less a reaction than this. For the request to originate with us (instead of with Pakistan) demonstrates both concern and initiative on our part to a Pakistani leadership made ever-more anxious about the ominous Soviet presence and blatant “occupation” of a neighboring Islamic country, at a time when they have reason to question the prospects for effective USG support.

8. Such a *démarche* on my part would have even greater impact if at least a portion of what I would be instructed to say could be cast in the form of a letter to President Zia from President Carter, expressing concern about the 25–28 Dec. developments in Kabul and soliciting Pakistan’s views about the meaning of these developments.

9. I could envision a Presidential text that would include the following thoughts: Quote: Dear President Zia: I am deeply distressed at the blatant exercise of Soviet power we have seen in Kabul during the past several days. It is a cruel and brutal violation of the norms of international discourse and relations, and it must not be allowed to go unchallenged by the world community, most especially Afghanistan’s fellow Islamic nations. For my part, I want to convey to you my own sense of deep concern about the events taking place in Afghanistan and to solicit earnestly your appreciation of developments there as we assess in Washington and with our friends what precisely should be the nature and character of the American and free world response. I want also to reassure you, at this difficult moment for Pakistan, of the continuing American commitment to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Finally, I wish to assure you of my desire for the closest of consultations between our two friendly governments as we assess how best to cope with the new threat to the region posed by the Soviet actions in Afghanistan. Unquote.

10. While not attempting to get into longer-range matters for decision within the USG as we come to grips with the USSR’s power grab in Kabul, I nonetheless want to add that we have exhausted the efficacy of oral diplomatic assurances. We have been reassuring the Pakistanis

² See footnote 10, Document 102.

verbally ever since the April 1978 Communist takeover in Kabul. As the waves of 27/28 Dec. events in Kabul wash down the Kabul River into the Indus Valley, Pakistani paranoia and anxiety will naturally rise. Words alone—in the absence of tangible follow-up actions which demonstrate that our interest in the security of the region is matched by a capability to respond to threats—will fall on deaf ears. At bare minimum, we must look for practical steps in the security assistance area which we can somehow pursue despite, and without torpedoing, our non-proliferation policies. (FYI Paks are already aware from Wash leak that we have put a temporary hold on any new military sales, an action I believe was ill-advised when it was taken in early Dec and which now appears ludicrous, as I wrote in a letter to Hal Saunders that should reach him tomorrow. End FYI)

11. Failure to use Pakistan, as one vehicle in our response to Soviet actions in Kabul—will produce a new set of pressures for further dilution of ties with a seemingly helpless United States and for further accommodation with Soviet power, not just here but through the region as a whole.

12. Dept. repeat as desired.

Hummel

105. Situation Report Prepared in the Department of Defense¹

[*report number not declassified*]

Washington, December 28, 1979

Afghanistan: Situation Report (U)

(S/[*handling restriction not declassified*]) Although sporadic shooting continued on 28 December, Kabul is generally quiet following yesterday's violent overthrow of the Amin government by Soviet combat troops and Afghan allies. The city is securely in the hands of Soviet forces and armed civilians associated with the new regime of Babrak Karmal, a longtime pro-Soviet extreme Marxist. The government has wasted no time in projecting a moderate image in public statements.

¹ Source: Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 7, DINS & PROD, Aug–Dec 79. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified; text not declassified*]. A note indicates the report was “as of 0721 EST, 28 Dec 79.” Prepared by [1 *line not declassified*].

Although limited Soviet flight activity occurred late on 27 December, no significant change in Soviet military forces in Afghanistan has been reported.

(S/[*handling restriction not declassified*]) Soviet troops and airborne combat vehicles in company with armed civilians remain on guard at key intersections and buildings in Kabul. Additionally, four MIG-21/Fishbeds have been observed repeatedly overflying the city in a show of force. This is the first air involvement during the past two days. Civilian traffic is light but moving freely in the city.

(S/[*handling restriction not declassified*]) Within hours of the Soviet takeover of the Radio Afghanistan building, the radio broadcast Amin's overthrow and replacement by Babrak Karmal. It subsequently announced Amin's conviction by a revolutionary tribunal of crimes against the Afghan people and his execution as a "fascist" and "agent of U.S. imperialism." Consistent with the excellent planning and execution of the coup, Babrak has hastened to announce a new government and a series of conciliatory statements projecting a moderate image and announcing yet another "new phase" of the revolution. Military officers dominate the new government lineup and include the three military Cabinet members purged by Amin in his September takeover of government. Several have been promoted to colonel and general ranks. Other military members are victims of past purges under the Amin and Taraki governments and are considered popular with the armed forces. All the members identified so far are leftists of varying persuasions.

(C) Among the other statements issued by the government are promises to release all political prisoners, to negotiate solutions to the tribal insurgency, to bring offenders of the past regime to justice, and an appeal for assistance to the USSR, which was almost immediately accepted. Its foreign policy is announced as nonaligned, but with an obvious tilt toward more radical international issues.

(S/[*handling restriction not declassified*]) Although the coup represents a Soviet-inspired attempt to broaden the base of the government so as to nurture a return to stability, the government faces severe obstacles already. Babrak's past reputation as an extreme Marxist, his installation by Soviet troops and ready identification with the USSR are likely to reinforce rather than allay opposition to the Marxist government and the now expanded Soviet presence. Despite the obvious bid for military allegiance, reports of Soviets killing or capturing Afghan troops in the fighting may yet stir military dissidence or opposition, especially in the countryside. A series of purges and arrests with mass rotations of military commanders will be a high priority of the new government. Overall the survival of Babrak's government will hinge indefinitely on the presence of Soviet Military forces, which alone will reinforce his image as a Soviet puppet.

106. Article in the President's Daily Brief¹

Washington, December 28, 1979

AFGHANISTAN-USSR: Situation report

The Soviets have replaced President Amin with a rival Marxist leader, Babrak Karmal, and appear to be in control of Kabul today.²

Some Soviet troops were engaged in fighting yesterday, but major Afghan units stationed outside of Kabul appeared to have stayed out of fighting in the city.

The new government has announced that Amin has been tried and executed, and it has invited additional Soviet assistance.³

The new government is somewhat broader based than Amin's, but all cabinet members and most ruling council members announced so far were ministers in the government formed after the Marxists seized power in April 1978. In addition to serving as Prime Minister, Babrak will head the ruling party and the Revolutionary Council; President Sultan Ali Kistmand—who like Babrak is a member of the Parchamist faction of the party—will probably be largely a figurehead.

Included in both the cabinet and the Council are two leftist military officers, Abdul Qader—who was jailed by former President Taraki and Amin in August 1978—and Mohammed Aslam Watanjar—who has been in hiding since Amin overthrew Taraki in September. Both are more nationalist and less doctrinaire than Babrak.

There is little prospect that the government as now constituted can win significant popular support. Even if the new rulers are able to convince the people that Amin and not the party was responsible for the most unpopular Marxist policies, they will still be regarded as

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—December 1979, PDBs. Top Secret; For the President Only. The full version of this President's Daily Brief was not filed with this collection. The article printed here was found in this form.

² An annex to the December 28 President's Daily Brief, attached but not printed, noted: "there is no reason to doubt that the coup was engineered by Moscow" following a Soviet military buildup that Amin believed "was aimed at bolstering his regime." The annex further noted that Soviet dissatisfaction with Amin became apparent following the coup against Taraki, and that Amin "launched his coup because of Soviet maneuvers to replace him." According to the annex, the Soviet Union had long favored Parcham rule in Afghanistan: [*text not declassified*].

³ The announcement was reported in telegram 8632 from Kabul, December 28. According to the report, the announcement was made over Soviet-controlled Radio Afghanistan at 0300, December 28. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800003–0425)

Communists and atheists. Babrak's call for Soviet military assistance may give the appearance of legality to Soviet military moves, but for most Afghans it will only confirm that he is a Soviet puppet.

[*less than 1 line not declassified*] suggests that the Soviets may be preparing to move forces by air into Shindand and Qandahar. The Soviet airlift to Kabul is continuing. As many as 3,800 Soviet airborne troops equipped with armored personnel carriers and assault guns may have arrived in Kabul since Monday.

107. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, December 28, 1979, 10 a.m.–12:10 p.m.

SUBJECT

Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan

PARTICIPANTS

The President

The Vice President

State

Secretary Cyrus Vance

Defense

Secretary Harold Brown

CIA

Admiral Stansfield Turner

JCS

General David Jones

White House

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Jody Powell

David Aaron

NSC

Gary Sick (joined at 10:50 a.m.)

MINUTES

The President convened the National Security Council and it was agreed that we would begin by discussing the situation in Afghanistan since it would be important to communicate today with our European Allies.

Dr. Brzezinski set forth five issues: (1) our possible response; (2) how to encourage others to speak out against the Soviet intervention;

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council Institutional Files, 1977–1981, Box 57, NSC–025, 12/28/79, Iran/Afghanistan/Pakistan. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Cabinet Room.

(3) the question of raising this issue at the United Nations. He said the United States might not wish to do so because we are pursuing the hostage issue at the Security Council, but perhaps the UK or China would raise the issue at the UN; (4) the question of our support for the Afghan resistance. Dr. Brzezinski said that we have a revised Presidential Finding which will be presented to the President shortly; and (5) the question of our cooperation with Pakistan which is directly related to the situation brought about by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

The President said that he had read the message from the German Government regarding Allied consultation and agreed that the North Atlantic Council would be a better forum for us to pursue this issue in the first instance than the United Nations.²

Secretary Vance agreed and said that George Vest would be talking to the NATO Ambassadors here in Washington emphasizing the importance of our Allies speaking out publicly and to the Soviets on this matter.

The President asked on what basis the North Atlantic Council might be convened. Harold Brown replied that it met on an emergency basis upon the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. He added that it would also be important to consult on a broader basis than just with the NATO Alliance in this particular instance.

² The message from the West German Government was not found. The North Atlantic Council, chaired by NATO Secretary General Luns, met in a special session in Brussels on December 29 to discuss Afghanistan. During the meeting, Luns appealed for solidarity among the NATO Allies in the wake of the Soviet intervention. (Telegram 8974 from USNATO, December 29; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800001-1210) In a meeting in London, December 31, Christopher met with the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain, the FRG, France, Italy, and Canada. The participants reaffirmed Luns's call for Allied solidarity and a global response designed to "discourage further adventurism" by the Soviet Union. The representatives agreed that each of their respective countries needed to review bilateral relations with the Soviet Union, although "most felt that institutional elements of détente such as CSCE, disarmament negotiations, etc., which are in interest of West should not be disturbed." (Telegram 8988 from USNATO, December 31; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840150-2153) In a memorandum to Brzezinski and Aaron, January 2, Brent characterized the London consultations as "useful," and stated: "with exception of the French, who stuck to the line that this should be a Soviet-world community issue rather than an East-West issue, all other allies are looking to us for guidance and seem to be planning to follow our lead." Brent further noted that the NAC meeting "took a considerably tougher line" than the London consultations regarding the question of how to deal with the Soviets and how to support Pakistan following the Soviet intervention. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 1-2/80) See also Document 135.

The President said he had in mind making personal calls to Chancellor Schmidt, Prime Minister Thatcher, President Giscard, Premier Cossiga and President Zia.³ He would suggest to our European Allies that the North Atlantic Council meet on this issue. He was reluctant to push this into the UN when we were dealing with Iran at the Security Council, but he thought the rest of the world will be reluctant to condemn the Soviets.

Secretary Brown thought that more countries might be prepared to act than in the case of Iran, since Afghanistan had no oil. The President pointed out, however, that we have been warning the world for several weeks that there has been a buildup of an imminent threat, and there has been no reaction from anyone.

The President noted that the Germans had been told by the Soviets this morning that they intervened to stop an invasion of Afghanistan, but when asked, the Soviets would not identify which country was committing the “external aggression.”

The Secretary of State endorsed the idea of calling the four European leaders.

Mr. Aaron suggested that, if the North Atlantic Council were to be called into session, it should be done at a high political level since the Council was already planning to meet at the Permanent Representatives level. The President agreed, and the Secretary of State said we could work out the arrangements later. It was also agreed that the President would call the Italian President.

Secretary Brown suggested that we will need to be able to indicate what we want our Allies to do when we talk to them. The President said that we could not go through the night without a public response and contact with the Allies. Otherwise, the Soviets will be out persuading everyone that their action was legitimate, and there would be no response from us.

It was therefore agreed that we should send messages to give groups of countries identified by Dr. Brzezinski—our NATO Allies; the Non-Aligned Movement leaders; other key countries around the world such as China; and key United Nations members. It was agreed that messages should be prepared immediately by a working group

³ Carter’s calls to European leaders are summarized in Document 109. For Carter’s call to Zia, see Document 111.

of State and NSC and to arrange the telephone calls to the Allied leaders and President Zia.⁴

Dr. Brzezinski then recommended that we examine the question of covert assistance to Afghanistan. Stan Turner reported on the proposed Finding approved earlier in the day by the SCC.⁵ It would enable us to accelerate shipment of arms to the Afghan rebels via Saudi Arabia. The President inquired regarding the likely response of the Saudis and Pakistanis, and Turner replied that he expects it will be very positive.

Secretary Brown said that we were all agreed that greater support to the Afghan rebels makes sense. His only question was whether it was enough.

Mr. Powell asked if there were any possibility the rebels could take over the government. Secretary Brown said they would not have any prospect of being able to take over the government. Secretary Vance said they can hang on and make it costly for the Soviet Union. Dr. Brzezinski said the key variables in the success of the Afghan resistance is Pakistani support and our attitude.

The President noted that news analyses said the Soviets would have little hope of putting down the rebellion even if they moved in the 50,000 troops on the Soviet border. Dr. Brzezinski said he had a different view. If we do nothing to help the rebels, then the psychological impact—both on the Pakistanis and on the Afghans—of isolation could be quite adverse and dry up support for their insurgency. Moreover, the Soviets are likely to try to garrison the cities and free the

⁴ The Department sent two telegrams to all NATO capitals and other diplomatic and consular posts, December 28. The first, telegram 333161, described the events of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan detailing the airlift, the military occupation of Kabul, the execution of Amin, and the elevation of Karmal as the new President in order to brief host governments. The second, telegram 333359, cited "first-hand evidence of a direct Soviet role" in the execution of Amin and replacement with Karmal. The telegram also described the Soviet action as a "subject of grave concern for the entire international community and not just those in South Asia." The telegram asked all addressees to share any available information regarding the crisis in Afghanistan and instructed the posts to encourage host governments "to make their profound concern about the Soviet role in Afghanistan clear immediately to the Soviet Union both in Moscow and in capitals and through their public statements." In a concluding section for "Moslem and non-aligned countries," the Department asked the Embassies to reaffirm to their host governments that the United States had long respected Afghanistan's non-alignment; the Soviet invasion limited Afghanistan's independence, that the action raised "grave questions" for the Non-Aligned Movement; and that "we appreciate that Moslem nations in particular would be deeply concerned about Soviet efforts to impose a regime with an alien ideology upon an unwilling Moslem populace, irrespective of the professions of such a regime to respect Islam." Finally, anticipating host governments would cite Soviet insistence that the Afghan Government invited the Soviet intervention, the Department instructed Embassies that the United States has "no evidence" to support that claim. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840130-1453 and P840130-1447, respectively)

⁵ Neither minutes nor a summary of conclusions of the SCC meeting was found.

regular Afghan armies to pursue the rebels in the field, and that might be more effective.

The President said he supported the Finding.⁶

The Vice President said that the new group installed by the Soviets may be as unpopular or even more so than the former one. The Secretary of Defense noted, however, that if only isolated pockets of resistance remain, they may be successful.

Dr. Brzezinski noted that the Soviet Union had been reasonably successful at counter-insurgency efforts. They had had success in Latvia, Lithuania and the Ukraine, with their strategy being primarily the holding of the cities.

Admiral Turner noted in this connection that the more elite Afghan army units now guarding the cities may be released to fight the insurgents. This would provide forces with better morale which are less likely to desert and turn over their weapons to the insurgents. This, in turn, makes our aid all the more important.

On the question of the Presidential Finding, the President said that he hoped that these Findings would be drawn with an eye toward the greatest possible flexibility and generality emphasizing the positive goals we hope to achieve in the most constructive terms.

Dr. Brzezinski then indicated that we should discuss the question of U.S. approaches to the Soviet Union directly. The President indicated that he wishes a very strong message, with no holds barred, sent from him to Brezhnev and an equally tough public statement made.

The President said that this issue transcends SALT. He would not acquiesce to the Soviet action just because it might give comfort and assistance to SALT opponents in the Congress. He said that the message to Brezhnev should point out that their action was a "threat to the peace" which casts "grave doubts upon our relationship" and which was "a direct violation of the principles agreed to in 1972."⁷

Mr. Powell asked what our ultimate aim was in the Afghan situation. The President replied to get the Soviets to withdraw. The Secretaries of State and Defense and Dr. Brzezinski said it was to make it as costly as possible for the Soviets. Secretary Brown added that we want to use the issue as a rallying point for our policies in the area.

⁶ The Presidential Finding, signed by Carter on December 28, listed Afghanistan as the scope, with the description: "Provide lethal military equipment either directly or through third countries to the Afghan opponents of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Provide selective training, conducted outside of Afghanistan, in the use of such equipment either directly or via third country intermediaries." (National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I-047, Afghanistan: 11 Sep 1979–22 Jul 1980)

⁷ See Document 113.

The President concluded that our maximum goal, however, was to get the Soviets out. Mr. Powell noted that this, however, was not likely to be successful.

The Vice President said that the Soviets had created a traditional buffer state into a satellite. Dr. Brzezinski agreed and noted that it was a buffer state that protected a tier of three states along the Indian Ocean. Thus, their action was a very dangerous step strategically, and we must send them a message which reflects this broader concern.

As for SALT, Dr. Brzezinski said that we do not link the intervention with SALT, but we are not going to be silenced by the possible domestic reaction and its impact on SALT. The President agreed.

Mr. Powell said that a private message to Brezhnev would not be adequate from the standpoint of our public position. It was agreed that we would develop a brief public statement for the President's use as well as a more formal statement that could be released by the White House. (Subsequently, the President decided to make only his own statement.)⁸

The Vice President suggested the Soviets were trying to hurt the President's reelection chances with this move. General Jones said that Afghanistan itself is a loss and of no particular help to the Soviets strategically. In his judgment, they were obviously looking beyond it and to cause perceptions of their willingness to use power and are seeking a stepping stone. Secretary Brown said, on the other hand, the Soviets were faced with a hostile Islamic state on their border. Secretary Vance agreed with that view. He said that the Soviets were unwilling to face the political damage if Afghanistan went down the drain.

The President concluded by saying we should push this issue vigorously and be prepared to go all the way with the UN if necessary.

Returning to the question of support for the Afghan insurgents, Admiral Turner said we should be clear that the objective of getting the Soviets out is unachievable and much beyond the program of support he was recommending. That program will ultimately cost only \$10 million and will barely keep the insurgency going.

Turning to Pakistan, the Secretary of State outlined the steps recommended by the SCC: first, a high-level mission to consult with the Pakistanis; second, to resume military sales; third, because we cannot sell on credit to Pakistan because of the Symington Amendment, it

⁸ Carter spoke to reporters at 4:30 p.m. on December 28 about the hostages in Iran and the situation in Afghanistan. For the text of his remarks, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1979*, Book II, p. 2287. He also addressed the nation on the crisis in Afghanistan in a live speech from the Oval Office at 9 p.m., January 4. Text of the speech is printed in *Public Papers: Carter, 1980*, pp. 21-24.

would be necessary to work with the Saudis to help finance Pakistani purchases.⁹ In this connection, the sale of Gerring destroyers to the Pakistanis would not particularly help them against the Soviets but would be of enormous political help in Pakistan.

Secretary Brown said that the House has said that these destroyers should be saved for our naval reserve, but he thought he could get around the problem. The President noted that Sadat was anxious for some destroyers. The Secretary of State noted that these Gerring destroyers were offered to him but, because of their condition, he didn't want them.

On the economic side, the Secretary spelled out the other recommendation: an increase in PL 480 assistance and more relief for the Afghan refugees. On nuclear policy, the Secretary stressed we should reaffirm our present position and seek a reaffirmation of their present position; specifically, that they would not build nuclear weapons, they would not transfer sensitive technology, and there would be no nuclear tests during Zia's regime.

The President asked who would head the mission to Pakistan. The Secretary suggested Deputy Secretary Christopher and someone from the Defense Department.

The President said our emissary should tell Zia that we are bound by law on the non-proliferation issue and can't change it, but let's try to get together on Afghanistan and work out the non-proliferation issue later.

In this connection, Secretary Vance said Pakistani Adviser to the President for Foreign Affairs, Agha Shahi, had asked him whether we would sell military equipment to Pakistan if the situation in Afghanistan deteriorated. Secretary Vance had already assured him we would.¹⁰

Harold Brown noted that the Pakistanis are going to want to buy some equipment, such as A-7 aircraft, which we do not wish to sell

⁹ See Documents 102 and 103. The high-level mission to Pakistan was led by Christopher and Brzezinski. See Document 193. The Symington Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, passed June 1976, gave Congress authority "to deny U.S. assistance to governments involved in the sale and purchase of nuclear reprocessing material unless such transactions are subject to adequate multilateral safeguards against diversion to weapons use." (International Security Assistance and Arms Control Act of 1976, P.L. 94-329; 90 Stat. 729 (June 30, 1976)) Carter found Pakistan in violation of the Symington Amendment and cut off economic and military aid, save food assistance, in April 1979. On the decision of how to support Pakistan in light of the Symington Amendment, see Document 151.

¹⁰ An apparent reference to talks between Vance and Shahi October 16–17, 1979. See footnote 2, Document 79.

them because of India. It was agreed, however, that this issue should not arise in the near term.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Afghanistan.]

108. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State¹

Kabul, December 28, 1979, 1353Z

8665. Subj: (LOU) Preliminary Thoughts on Why Moscow Forcibly Imposed a New Government in Afghanistan.

1. (C—Entire text)

2. Summary: Most observers have consistently downplayed the possibility that Moscow would support—much less back militarily—the overthrow of the Khalqi regime in favor of one led by the former Parcham wing of the Afghan leftist movement. This skepticism flowed from a conclusion that Babrak Karmal and his Parchamists were really no different from their Khalqi rivals, that the great mass of the Afghan population considered both groups equally evil Communists and atheists, and that Babrak himself was probably too pro-Soviet in Afghan eyes to be credible as a genuine nationalist. Thus, the general feeling was that a “Babrak alternative” would not be able to solve any of the problems which the Khalqis themselves had been unable to solve, and that Babrak’s apparent pro-Soviet views would result in an even narrower political base for the Parchamists than the Khalqis had in their worst days.

3. Persuasive reasons for Moscow’s decision to overthrow Hafizullah Amin and install Babrak are, therefore, difficult to discern, since we presume that the Soviets are also aware of the handicaps a Parchamist regime would encounter, especially its total lack of legitimacy in view of the Soviet military action installing them in power. The Soviets may have concluded that a policy of risking potential disaster but also potential success was preferable to the disaster they could see looming if they had continued to back Amin. A demonstration of support for

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 12/28/79. Confidential; Niact Immediate; Sensitive. Sent for information Immediate to Moscow. Also sent for information to Beijing, Athens, Islamabad, Jidda, London, New Delhi, Paris, USNATO, CINCPAC (also for POLAD), and CINCEUR (also for POLAD). Printed from a copy received in the White House Situation Room.

ideological brethren, and a willingness to run risks in order to preclude the demise of a Socialist revolution may also have played a part in Moscow's decision. Whatever the case, an active Soviet military presence here would seem to be a long-term prospect, and we consider it likely that the Soviets will expand their occupation throughout the country. End of summary.

4. In considering future political developments here, one scenario we have consistently considered as plausible yet unlikely has been a Soviet supported (perhaps with direct military force) seizure of power from the Taraki-Amin led Khalqis by some group of "alternate" leftist leadership. Because it was presumed that such a Soviet-supported group would necessarily be ideologically and politically acceptable to Moscow, the exiled Parcham wing of the Afghan leftist movement—including its long-time number one, Babrak Karmal—was viewed as a prime contender for this role. During the years before the Afghan Left seized power in April 1978, the Parcham wing was generally believed to have a larger following among Afghan intelligentsia, and was supposed to be popular among leftist university students. The Khalqi faction, on the other hand, focussed its recruitment on the military, a background which explains why the Khalqis under Taraki-Amin prevailed in their struggle against the Parcham in the first few months following the April 1978 revolution. Moreover, Babrak Karmal and some of his followers were also generally believed to be more pro-Soviet than were the Khalqi leaders, although information on this point was difficult to verify. Thus, some observers had believed that Moscow would quite readily throw its weight behind the Parchamists should the Khalqis falter seriously in their efforts to build a revolutionary Afghanistan.

5. Most observers, however, downplayed the possibility of the foregoing scenario, principally because it appeared to hold little promise for solving any of the serious difficulties being confronted by the leftist party in power. Most Afghans, certainly the mass of the population, see no difference between the two leftist groups, and consider them as equally evil, Communists and atheists. Informed Afghans and foreigners also believed that past differences between the two factions were based more on personal animosities than on opposing doctrinal views, revolutionary zeal, etc. Babrak's perceived pro-Soviet ardor added to doubts that he would represent an any more viable or popular alternative should the Khalqi position become drastically eroded. Thus, this particular analysis, to which we adhered, concluded that the accession of Babrak and the Parcham would have virtually no ameliorating impact on the hostility of the insurgents fighting for the overthrow of a Communist regime in Kabul, nor would it present any broader appeal to the Afghan middle or upper class, with the possible exception of a

small group of university students. This particular advantage, however, would perhaps be counterbalanced by the loss of support within the Khalqi-leaning military which a Parcham accession would entail. Despite the events of the past eighteen hours, we see no reason to alter this analysis, and can only conclude that Babrak will have no better chance to advance the revolution than did his predecessors, and that his base of support could even be much narrower than Amin's in his last days.

6. The means by which Babrak came to power virtually guarantees instability, strife, and bloodshed here. By having ridden to power on the guns of the Soviet Army, Babrak will hardly have many admirers among Afghans, and this episode could conceivably provide the catalyst the various insurgent groups need to form their own united front against the "new" central government. A delayed reaction against the Soviet forces may still explode. The cohesion of what remains of the Afghan Army in the field is also questionable, as we anticipate that many individuals and units may wonder why they should continue fighting fellow Afghans for the sake of a leadership forcibly imposed by Moscow. A collapse of the army cannot be ruled out.

7. Because we must presume that the Soviets are aware of the risks of the "Parchamist option," we have difficulty discerning convincing reasons for Moscow's decision to intervene militarily to overthrow one regime and impose another, a move which hardly enhances Soviet prestige around the world and, in Afghanistan would appear a blunder of great magnitude. It could be, of course, that the Soviets were in a desperate quandary: for example, to continue with Amin represented likely disaster, while forcing a change in the Afghan regime may have been viewed as at least holding out the possibility of improving the chances of the revolution, despite the real potential disaster outlined above. At the same time, the episode may well underscore Moscow's commitment that the world's "correlation of forces" now favors the USSR, thereby demonstrating to the world the risks the Kremlin is willing to run in order to preclude reversal of a socialist revolution, especially on the USSR's borders. Whether or not the Soviet action was designed as some sort of "signal" related to the Iranian or other international situation is for others to assess, but we think it was not, primarily because beating up on the Afghan Army does not necessarily represent a feat of arms that would [garble—concern?] major or even medium powers.

8. Despite the uncertainties surrounding Moscow's decision to undertake this aggressive action—and we assume Hafizullah Amin believed the thousands of Soviet troops airlifted into Kabul were destined to assist him, not put him in his grave—an active Soviet military role in Afghanistan in support of the puppet government of Babrak

Karmal is probably a long-term prospect. In view of last night's actions, we sadly anticipate Soviet troops will now overrun all important cities and strategic areas and will directly enter the fray against the insurgents.

Amstutz

109. Memorandum From Robert Blackwill of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, December 28, 1979

SUBJECT

The President's December 28 Telephone Calls to European Leaders (C)

I will do a full record tomorrow of the President's calls to Thatcher, Schmidt, Cossiga and Giscard d'Estaing, but I wanted you to have a quick summary now.² (C)

The President used the talking points at Tab A almost verbatim except for #4, the one on SALT.³ He put that issue in the following way: "We are going ahead with SALT independently of what happens in Afghanistan, but we are not going to allow our concern about SALT

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council Institutional Files, 1977–1981, Box 57, NSC-026, 01/02/80, Afghanistan Invasion, Christopher/Brown, Pakistan/Afghanistan/China. Confidential. Sent for information.

² Blackwill's full record was not found. The memoranda of conversation of Carter's calls to Thatcher and Giscard are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXVII, Western Europe.

³ Attached but not printed. The talking points are as follows: "1. We regard the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan as an extremely grave development. 2. It has profound consequences for the stability of the entire region. 3. We believe that it is essential that we make this action as politically costly as possible to the Soviet Union and to that end will be approaching a number of governments, particularly the non-aligned and the Muslim countries, to speak out. 4. We are not going to be deterred from making an issue of this because of SALT. The Soviets have clearly made a decision that this intervention is more important than SALT. 5. We also are prepared to carry it all the way to the United Nations; however, because of our own efforts in the UN with regard to the hostages, we would appreciate it if others could take the initiative there. 6. We also believe the North Atlantic Council should meet immediately at a high political level to assess the matter and coordinate allied strategy. (For France: I hope that France can work within the North Atlantic Council and show solidarity on this issue.)" For the approach to other countries (point 3), see footnote 4, Document 107.

to interfere with our strong condemnation of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan." (Schmidt's response to this line was "I think that is appropriate.") The President also told each of the leaders that he was going to send a very strong message to Brezhnev on Afghanistan, and he invited Mrs. Thatcher, but none of the others, to do the same. (C)

As you know, Thatcher, Schmidt and Cossiga all immediately agreed to a meeting of deputy foreign ministers this weekend under NATO auspices, but Giscard said "no." He did not favor the NATO structure for this meeting because Afghanistan was not in the NATO Treaty area. Thus, it was not proper to use the NATO instrument in this case. A meeting in London of the NATO members, but not under NATO sponsorship, was the compromise.⁴ (C)

Incidentally, Giscard made the important point that we must take the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan seriously because of its impact on Pakistan, Iran and the *the Gulf States*. The latter, said Giscard, would certainly feel threatened if there were no Western reaction to the situation in Afghanistan. (C)

[Omitted here is information unrelated to Afghanistan.]

Cossiga will say that the Government of Italy is gravely worried about the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan which is contrary to the policies of detente and which bears the risk of creating a far worse situation in the region and beyond. (C)

In sum, none of these leaders showed the slightest hesitation in agreeing with the President's analysis of the strategic importance of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. We have yet to see what they will be willing to do about it. (C)

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 107.

110. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State¹

Kabul, December 28, 1979, 1628Z

8668. Subj: (LOU) Some Thoughts on Whether To Recognize the Babrak Karmal Regime.

1. (C—Entire text)

2. As the Department considers the question of recognizing the new regime in Afghanistan, I would like to add some thoughts for your consideration. First, it seems to me that the paramount factor in this [garble—equation?] is the means by which the Babrak Karmal regime came to power. Based on the views of our Mission officers, and those too of the French and Italian Embassies who have consulted us, the Soviet forces which had been airlifted into Kabul over the past two days, launched last night a surprise attack on the Afghan Army units guarding DRA installations in the city, and spared no force in destroying them. The struggle was strictly one of Soviet military vs. Afghan units. Thus, Babrak now holds his position solely [due] to the might of the Soviet Army, a consideration which casts doubt on whether this regime has actual or ethical legitimacy or can ever really rule this country. Though the Soviets got away with such tactics in Eastern Europe after World War II, I doubt they can duplicate it here in Afghanistan.

3. Secondly, following the April 1978 revolution, there was some discussion—in the context of “recognition”—of whether the overthrow of Daoud had been launched by Afghans or by connivance of the USSR.² After examination of available evidence, we and the Dept. generally agreed that the Khalqi regime did appear to have organized and launched its own revolution, although the USSR undoubtedly had helped the conspirators clandestinely over the years with advice on subversion and secret training. That conclusion of an indigenous revolution, I think played some part in our decision to carry on business with the Khalqis. That argument hardly holds now with a regime which was brought to power only because of Soviet military intervention.

4. Thirdly, I recall that generally it is U.S. practice with respect to recognition to consider the key factor to be whether the new government exercises effective control over the country. If it does, the U.S.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Daily CIA Brief File, Box 24, 12/15/79–12/19/79. Confidential; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Carter initialed “C” in the top right corner of the cable.

² See Document 11.

Government generally extends recognition and issues a diplomatic note with the appropriate language. As I mentioned in a cable sent two days ago,³ on the eve of the "Babrak Soviet coup," we here had doubts regarding the Amin regime's effective control over the countryside, and particularly its legitimacy in the light of its action of permitting Soviet troops to enter the country, presumably to keep itself in power. After viewing the USSR's deplorable action of yesterday, [we] harbor even greater doubts about the new regime's legitimacy. Moreover, it is by no means clear that the Babrak/Soviet hold on power is firm anywhere beyond Kabul.

5. Finally, as regards the new regime's attitude towards the U.S., we have only skimpy information so far. Babrak's initial speech contained the accusation that the "traitor" Amin was an agent of the CIA and of "fascist American imperialism." Not surprisingly, Babrak threw the usual bouquets at the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries. Babrak also requested further "economic and military" assistance from the USSR. Based on my assessment that there really is little to choose substantively between the Khalqis and their Parchamist successors, I have no reason to believe at this point that the new regime will be any more kindly disposed to U.S. interests and programs than its predecessor.

6. On balance, therefore, I come down on the side of breaking or suspending diplomatic relations with Afghanistan. I think that we may have more to lose in U.S. prestige globally and internally too, were we to maintain a Mission here than withdrawing it. I favor however no hasty action on our part, and would counsel discreet prior consultation with our NATO allies. My surmise is that this regime will not be looking for "recognition" from anybody, as it will probably allege that what has happened merely represents an internal tiff within the party in power and in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

7. By septel, I have recommend a temporary modest phasedown of Amcit personnel.⁴ Were we to decide to suspend or break relations, I must ask that this decision be closely held, and be implemented without fanfare, until almost all personnel and our personal effects are gone. None of us here relishes the prospect of losing our effects as a result of an angry reaction by a fickle, hostile government.

Amstutz

³ Not found.

⁴ In telegram 8653 from Kabul, December 28, Amstutz recommended the temporary closure of USAID and USICA offices at the Embassy. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800001-0186)

111. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation¹

Washington, December 28, 1979, 1:42–1:50 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Carter
President Zia of Pakistan

The President opened the call with an exchange of holiday greetings.

President Carter expressed concern about the latest development in Afghanistan and stressed the importance of strengthening U.S.-Pakistani relations. We should consult at various levels and the U.S. should expedite delivery of the military equipment that Pakistan has ordered. We should put aside differences that have caused concern in the past and move expeditiously to strengthen our mutual resolve against further Soviet intrusions into Southern Asia.

President Carter reported that European leaders had said this is one of the most serious Soviet actions since the take-over of Czechoslovakia. He solicited President Zia's reaction and asked what the U.S. could do to help Pakistan.

President Zia expressed his gratitude for U.S. concern for Pakistan which is now about to face the Soviet onslaught. He confirmed President Carter's assessment of the situation. President Zia had recently completed a detailed discussion of the situation which concluded that, beyond the intrusion of Soviet troops, the overthrow of the Amin regime is a direct involvement of the Soviet Union in a country bordering Pakistan.

President Carter reassured Zia that he has a friend here and we are eager to help in any way possible.² The U.S. wants to continue detente and progress on SALT. But we cannot afford to stand mute and let the Soviets take this very serious action with impunity and without political consequences. We will take our case concerning the hostages in Iran to the UNSC tomorrow. Other countries—Pakistan or others—should raise this issue of Soviet intrusion publicly or even, later on, in the UN.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 37, Memcons: President: 10–12/79. Confidential.

² In an undated memorandum to Brzezinski regarding the United States–Pakistan Defense Agreement of 1959, Thornton noted that Carter “implicitly affirmed” the agreement during his phone conversation with Zia. (Carter Library, National Security Council Institutional Files, 1977–1981, Box 57, NSC–026, 01/02/80, Afghanistan Invasion, Christopher/Brown, Pakistan/Afghanistan/China)

We will probably meet this weekend with our NATO allies to discuss the Afghan situation.

President Zia said it is right to think on those lines. Pakistan considers itself an ally and a great friend of the United States. Our past association contains many instances of mutual respect and assistance according to our capabilities. It is encouraging that the U.S. is still the torchbearer of the free world. We consider ourselves members of the free world and look to the U.S. as a beacon. What has happened in Afghanistan is delicate, tragic and most significant in this part of the world. Tomorrow it could be Pakistan.

President Carter suggested that Warren Christopher could come to Pakistan in the next few days to talk with Zia, if that were desirable.

President Zia recalled the pleasure of meeting Christopher, an old friend, and promised to give his reaction to the idea tomorrow through Ambassador Hummel.³

President Carter invited President Zia to come to visit to discuss matters of mutual concern. When Zia decides that would be advantageous our foreign ministers could work out arrangements.

President Zia expressed his appreciation and said it would be a great honor to meet the President of the U.S. He promised to arrange mutually convenient dates.

President Carter said he would have Secretary Vance tell Hummel to expect an answer on the Christopher trip.

The conversation concluded with best wishes on both sides.

³ In telegram 15326 from Islamabad, December 30, the Embassy relayed the content of a conversation between Hummel and Shahi during which Shahi stated that Pakistan wanted to delay a visit by Christopher for long enough to determine if the Muslim world, following the lead of Iran and Pakistan, would coalesce to condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. According to the telegram, Shahi believed "a visit by Christopher would undermine prospects for Islamic condemnation of Soviets and would provide ammunition to Soviets and pro-Soviet Muslim countries to accuse Pakistan and others of acting at behest of USG in collusion with NATO powers." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850040-2170, N800001-0154)

112. Memorandum From Marshall Brement of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, December 28, 1979

SUBJECT

Response to the Soviets Regarding Afghanistan: A Menu of Possible Actions

To emphasize the outrageous and unprecedented nature of the Soviet coup in Afghanistan would be to belabor the obvious. Any failure to respond adequately on our part would be perceived as glaring weakness by our Allies, by the non-aligned, and especially in the Persian Gulf. The domestic near-consensus on Iran could evaporate over Afghanistan. It is therefore imperative that we not only act to counter what the Soviets have done in Afghanistan, but that we are perceived as having done so.

The speciousness and bald-faced arrogance of the Soviet action can hardly be exaggerated. There was no need, for example, to announce Amin's immediate execution, which gives the lie to the Soviet assertion that they were invited in by the Amin government. Furthermore, the use of the recently-signed Friendship Treaty with Afghanistan as the juridical basis for their actions creates a logical implication that the Soviets could equally undertake the overthrow of any of the ten governments with whom they now have such treaties, e.g. India. Equally to the point, would Sadat and Siad have thrown out the Soviets so cavalierly if they had felt that one serious Soviet option was to fly in an army and set up their rivals in power?

I. The Public Posture

We have no real option of downplaying the significance of the Soviet action. We need a clear, sharp and unequivocal response, which should be given full play by all our communications media. The themes we should stress are as follows:

a. The fact that Amin was assassinated within two days of the Soviet invasion makes a mockery of Moscow's claims that it was invited in by the Amin Government. That Amin's family was killed along with him shows the kind of people we are dealing with.

¹ Source: Carter Library, Donated Historical Material, Brzezinski Collection, Brzezinski's Geographic Files, Box 17, Southwest Asia/Persian Gulf—Afghanistan, 1/5/80–10/1/80: Soviet Union. Secret; Sensitive; Outside the System.

b. The fact that the Soviets cite their Friendship Treaty with Afghanistan as the basis for interference in the Afghans' internal affairs implies that the Soviets have a similar right in all other countries with whom they have friendship treaties.

c. This is the first use by the Soviets of their armed forces in a combat situation outside the Soviet Bloc since the Second World War and is therefore an extremely ominous precedent. Do the Soviets claim such universal rights in all other areas? How can this be squared with the UN Charter?

d. Afghanistan had been *the* classic buffer state for the past 150 years. The Soviets had no legitimate national interest in taking such actions. The fact of the matter was that the Amin Government was, by any reasonable standard, pro-Soviet, as was the Taraki Government which preceded it. Furthermore, the Afghan Government which existed before the April 1978 coup was not anti-Soviet in nature and maintained cordial state-to-state relations with Moscow. All the military needs of that regime, for example, were supplied by the Soviets.

e. Does the Brezhnev doctrine apply to the entire Third World? What are the limits to the Brezhnev doctrine? As Soviet force projection capabilities increase over the coming decades, they will have the capability to mount such an action anywhere in the world. Is this a tolerable situation for the international community?

f. We are extremely concerned at the human toll which the Soviet-supported combat is taking. There are 350,000 refugees now in Pakistan, and we would not be surprised to see that number rise to half a million in the near future. Thus, as in Cambodia and in so many other countries since World War II, the Soviets are creating another enormous refugee problem, this time in South Asia and among an overwhelmingly Muslim population. The United States is prepared to do its utmost to assist the Afghan refugees with humanitarian aid.

g. The Soviet Union is atheistic by doctrine and has published enormous amounts of anti-religious and anti-Muslim literature. The US, on the other hand, firmly believes in religious freedom and enshrines it in our Constitution. Three million Muslims practice their religion freely in the US. In the USSR, Muslims have been persecuted, mosques have been closed, and religion has been discouraged. In Soviet Azerbaijan, for example, there are only 24 officially recognized mosques now operating, whereas before the Revolution of 1917 there were several thousand in operation.

h. In sum, replacement of one government by another through the use of armed force, as done by the Soviets in Afghanistan, is an egregious violation of normal international standards of behavior, sets a very dangerous precedent, and is regarded by the US as reckless adventurism. We call on all nations, and particularly nations with significant

Muslim populations, to appeal to the Soviet Union to allow the Afghan people to settle its own problems in line with the principle of no interference in the internal affairs of other nations.

II. *Other Possible Actions*

1. Dispatch a high-level mission to give the Pakistanis the kind of assurance they need to bolster their confidence and to assist us in our support of the Afghan insurgents.

2. Dispatch a mission to investigate conditions in the refugee camps in Pakistan, which would presumably result in additional US and international assistance to support the refugees.

3. Explore with all pertinent governments the stepping up of covert assistance to the insurgents and in the process commit ourselves to maximizing such assistance.

4. Form a special committee in NATO to examine threats to the peace outside the Treaty area.

5. Liberalize our arms sale policy to the sub-Continent.

III. *Other Possible Actions in the US-Soviet Context*

The above actions might be enough domestically and in world opinion if the Soviets are basically unsuccessful in tamping down the insurgency and thus become mired in a Vietnam-type situation. But if they are successful, these actions will not be sufficient and we will look weak and ineffectual. In any case, the Soviet action in Afghanistan almost demands that we take specific bilateral steps to indicate our abhorrence. Among those steps which the President might consider (and it is too early to make definite decisions on this score) are the following:

1. *Withdrawal of SALT.* If, after consultation with Byrd and others, it is determined that SALT no longer has a chance of early passage, the Administration could consider withdrawing it unilaterally, while waiting for a better climate, although still committed to the fact that the Treaty is in our basic interest and still favoring ratification by the Senate.

2. *Grain Sales.* The Administration could suspend the US-Soviet Grain Agreement² or simply suspend all sales of grain to the USSR for the indeterminate future. This would require Congressional authorization to purchase and store the excess grain.

3. *Technology Transfer and Licensing.* We could announce a much tougher policy regarding technology transfer to the USSR and a closer look at licenses for petroleum-related exports.

² The agreement was signed in 1972 and renewed in 1975.

4. *MFN*. We could announce that we do not intend to introduce legislation giving MFN to the Soviet Union during the current session of Congress.

5. *Postponement of US-Soviet Trade Council*. We could announce the postponement of the next session of the US-Soviet Trade Council, scheduled to meet in Washington April 16.

6. *Tighten Up COCOM Procedures*. We could announce that we are undertaking with our Allies a review of current COCOM procedures with a view to tightening them.

7. *Expulsion of a Large Group of Soviet Agents*. We could identify and arrest 50 to 100 Soviet KGB agents in the US, making clear to the Soviets that any retaliatory action on their part would mean further expulsions by us at a rate of two Soviets for one American, i.e. the current ratio of Soviet Embassy personnel in the US to Americans in the USSR, leaving out the 550 Soviets at the UN (which makes one-for-one expulsion entirely unsatisfactory and unreciprocal to us).

8. *Withdrawal of Ambassador*. We could (and probably should) recall Watson for consultations. (Dobrynin's absence is obviously not entirely medical in nature.)

9. *Broaden Security Relationships*. The US could undertake new security relationships with Oman, Somalia, and Turkey, i.e. three Muslim countries.

10. *Broadcasting*. The US could announce increased broadcasts to Western Asia and to the Muslim portions of the USSR.

11. *China*. In conjunction with the Brown visit, the US could let it be known that we have agreed not only to the sale of certain high technology items to China, but to the sale of over-the-horizon radar and anti-tank missiles—clearly defensive weapons—as well. We could explain that this was done explicitly in light of the Soviet action in Afghanistan.³ Future arms sale to China, we could add, would be on a case-by-case basis.

12. *Removal of Inhibitions on Covert Actions*. The US could ask for revision of all of the legislative inhibitions on our ability to conduct covert actions anywhere in the world.

In sum, Soviet negative reaction to various protests and expostulations, including ours, is completely predictable. These were taken into consideration by the Soviets before they made their move. This is an event of such importance that a strong and vivid US response must be made to it, and not just in terms of Soviet action in Afghanistan itself, but in terms of overall US-Soviet relations. The Soviets must be

³ See Documents 149 and 150.

made to understand that this was a very expensive invasion and that it should not set a precedent for future action. The American people and the Congress should be sympathetic to tough responses by the President, especially if the Soviet actions in Afghanistan are cast in the proper light, i.e. the Soviets have kicked us while we were down, and we do not intend to stand for it.

113. Hotline Message From President Carter to General Secretary Brezhnev¹

Washington, December 28, 1979

Dear President Brezhnev:

I want to insure that you have fully weighed the ramifications of the Soviet actions in Afghanistan, which we regard as a clear threat to the peace. You should understand that these actions could mark a fundamental and long-lasting turning point in our relations. Taken without any previous discussion with us, they constitute in our view a clear violation of the Basic Principles on Relations, which you signed in 1972.²

My Government can in no way accept the Soviet Government's explanation, conveyed to Ambassador Watson on December 27, that Soviet military forces were sent into Afghanistan at the request of the leadership of that country.³ The facts of the matter clearly show that these same Soviet forces were employed to overthrow that established government of Afghanistan and to impose a new government, which has brutally executed the former President and, reportedly, his family.

Large-scale movements of military units into a sovereign country are always a legitimate matter of concern to the international community. When such military forces are those of a superpower, and are then used to depose an existing government and impose another, there are obvious adverse implications both for the region and for the world at large. We note with the utmost seriousness that this is the first time

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Meetings File, Box 70, USSR: Brezhnev-Carter Correspondence: 7/79–2/80. Secret; Sensitive. This message was sent via the Direct Communications Link between Washington and Moscow. In the top right corner, Brzezinski wrote: "Sent 12–28, received by Moscow 29/0153, ZB"

² See Document 87.

³ See Document 101.

since the invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia that the Soviet Union has taken direct military action against another country. In the present instance, the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan—a previously non-aligned country—obviously represents an unsettling, dangerous and new stage in your use of military force, which raises deep apprehension about the general trend of Soviet policy.

We are both pledged to each other not to exacerbate conflict-fraught situations and to consult when threats to the peace arise. If these mutual obligations are to have any meaning, then they must obviously include a refusal by the superpowers to engage in armed combat except as a very last resort and then only in legitimate self-defense. Because our interests are global, we must recognize that actions taken in one area have a spill-over effect in other seemingly unrelated areas, as well as in that area itself.

Neither superpower can arrogate to itself the right to displace or overturn a legally constituted government in another country by force of arms. Such a precedent is a dangerous one; it flouts all the accepted norms of international conduct. Unless you draw back from your present course of action, this will inevitably jeopardize the course of US-Soviet relations throughout the world. I urge you to take prompt constructive action to withdraw your forces and cease interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs. Many years of promoting more stable and productive relations between our two countries could well be undermined if this situation is not resolved promptly. With proper action by your government, it is still not too late to avoid lasting damage to US-Soviet relations.

114. Hotline Message From General Secretary Brezhnev to President Carter¹

Moscow, December 29, 1979

Dear Mister President,

In answer to your message of 29 December I consider it necessary to inform you of the following.

It is impossible to [One can in no way] agree with your evaluation of what is occurring in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. We have already sent through your Ambassador to Moscow in a confidential manner to the American side and to you personally a clarification [an explanation] based on facts of what is actually occurring there, as well as the reasons which caused us to respond favorably to the request of the Government of Afghanistan for the introduction of limited Soviet Military contingents.²

The attempt taken in your message to cast doubt on the very fact of the request itself of the government of Afghanistan for sending our forces to that country seems strange. I am compelled to note that it is certainly not a question of anyone's perception or lack of perception of this fact, or agreement or disagreement with it which determines the actual state of affairs, which consists of the following.³

The Government of Afghanistan during the course of nearly two years has numerous times turned to us with this request. In point of fact one of these requests was sent to us on 26 December of this year.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office Files of Marshall D. Shulman, Special Advisor to the Secretary on Soviet Affairs, 1977–1981, Lot 81D109, Carter/Brezhnev Hotline Afghanis 12/29/79. Top Secret; Sensitive; Specat. Copy received in the Joint Staff of the JCS. This message was sent via the Direct Communications Link between Washington and Moscow. Unless otherwise noted, bracketed insertions in the text and footnotes below reflect alternate translations written on the copy by an unknown hand. Attached but not printed is a covering memorandum from Shulman to Vance, December 31, in which Shulman characterized the Department of Defense translation of Brezhnev's message as a "quick, rough initial translation," which carried the risk "that the President will misinterpret a high-level Soviet communication and respond inappropriately." Noting the importance of Brezhnev's message, Shulman advised Vance: "We also need to sensitize the White House to the importance of having qualified Department Russian language speakers review the translation of all future incoming hotline messages." Also attached but not printed is Brezhnev's message in the original Russian.

² In the left margin at the end of the paragraph, Carter wrote: "The leaders who 'requested' SU presence were assassinated."

³ The alternate translation of the last sentence reads: "I am compelled to note that it is certainly not anyone's perception or lack of perception of this fact, or agreement or disagreement with it, which determines the actual situation. The situation consists of the following."

This is equally known by us and by the Afghanistani Government which sent us these requests.⁴

I want to once more stress that the purpose of the limited Soviet contingent in Afghanistan has only one goal—to provide assistance in repulsing the acts of external aggression, which have been taking place for a prolonged time and have now taken on even greater scale.⁵

It is absolutely impermissible, [Also entirely unacceptable] and not in conformance with actuality, is the claim (accusation) [assertion], which appears in your message that the Soviet Union allegedly did something to overthrow the Government of Afghanistan. I must with all certainty [definiteness] stress that the change in the Afghanistani government was the result of [carried out by] the Afghanistans themselves and only by them. Ask the Afghanistani Government itself [about this].⁶

Also not corresponding to reality is that which is said in your message in relation to the fate of the families of the former leaders of Afghanistan.⁷ We have at our disposal information contradicting [Information at our disposal refutes] the information you have received.

I must further clearly state to you that the Soviet military contingents did not take any military action against Afghanistan and we clearly do not intend to do so.⁸

You have reproached us in your message that we did not consult with the USA Government in reference to the Afghanistani matter before introducing our military contingents into Afghanistan.⁹ Permit us to ask you—did you consult with us prior to beginning the massive concentration of naval forces near Iran and in the region of the Persian

⁴ The alternate translation of the last sentence reads: “We, the Soviet Union, know this; it is known in equal measure by the Afghanistani side, which sent us such requests.”

⁵ The alternate translation of this paragraph reads: “I want to once more stress that the sending of limited Soviet contingents to Afghanistan has only one goal—to provide help and assistance in repulsing acts of external aggression, which have been taking place for a prolonged time and have now taken on even greater scale.” In the left margin beside this paragraph, Carter wrote: “from where?”

⁶ In the left margin, Carter wrote: “SU brought in [illegible] invasion force, the new puppet leader.”

⁷ In the left margin, Carter wrote: “They’re dead or they’re new SU puppets.”

⁸ The alternate translation of this paragraph reads: “I must further clearly inform you that the Soviet military contingents have not taken any military action against the Afghanistan side and we of course do not intend to take such action.”

⁹ The alternate translation of this sentence reads: “You have reproached us in your message for our not consulting with the USA Government on Afghanistani matters, prior to introducing our military contingents into Afghanistan.”

Gulf, about which it would have been necessary as a minimum to notify us?¹⁰

In connection with the content and spirit of your message I consider it essential to again clarify the point [explain that] that the request of the Afghanistani Government and the satisfaction of this request by the Soviet Union are exclusively a matter for the USSR and Afghanistan, which regulate their mutual relations themselves, by mutual agreement, and naturally cannot permit any sort of interference from without in their [these] mutual relations. They, as any member states of the UN, enjoy [have] the right not only to individual self-defense, but to collective defense as well, which is envisioned by Article 51 of the UN Charter, which the USSR and USA formulated themselves. And this was approved by all member states of the UN.

There is, of course, no basis for your assertion that our actions in Afghanistan allegedly threaten the peace.

In light of all of this, the immoderate tone of certain formulations in your message hit us squarely between the eyes [is striking]. What is the purpose of it? Would it not be better to evaluate the situation more calmly, keeping in mind the supreme [higher] interests of the world [peace] rather than, ultimately, the mutual relations of our two powers.

Concerning your “advice”, we already informed you, and here I repeat again, that as soon as the reasons which prompted the Afghanistani request to the Soviet Union disappear, we fully intend to withdraw the Soviet military contingents from Afghanistani territory.

And here is our advice to you: the American side could make its contribution toward ending the armed incursion from without into Afghanistani territory.¹¹

I do not believe that the work to create more stable and productive relations between the USSR and USA can be in vain. Unless, of course, the American side wants this to be. We do not. I think it would not be to the benefit of the United States of America itself, either.¹² It is

¹⁰ The alternative translation of this sentence reads: But permit us to ask you—did you consult with us prior to the beginning of the massive concentration of naval forces near Iran and in the region of the Persian Gulf, as well as in many other cases about which you should, as a minimum, have informed us. Carter wrote in the margin next to this paragraph: “We’ve sent in no invasion forces.”

¹¹ The alternate translation of this paragraph reads: “And here is our advice to you: the American side could make its contribution to cessation of armed incursions from without into Afghanistani territory.” In the left margin, Carter wrote: “The only incursion is from the SU.”

¹² The alternate translation of these sentences reads: “I do not believe that work to create more stable and productive relations between the USSR and USA can turn out to have been in vain, if, of course, the American side does not want this to be the case. We do not. I think that this would not, indeed, be to the benefit of the United States of America itself.”

our conviction that the way relations develop between the USSR and the USA is a joint matter. We believe that they must not be subject to vacillations under the influence of some kink of attendant [chance] factors or events.

Despite disagreements on a number of issues in [of] World and European politics, which we understand quite clearly [accord clear account], the Soviet Union is an advocate of conducting affairs in the spirit of those understandings and documents which were adopted by our countries in the interests of peace, equal cooperation, and international security.

L. Brezhnev

115. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, December 29, 1979

SUBJECT

Daily Report

Information

Watson on Soviets in Afghanistan: Ambassador Watson sees the Soviet move into Afghanistan as marking a major watershed in Soviet policy and constituting an unacceptable extension of the Brezhnev doctrine. Watson speculates that the Soviets opted for Amin's removal in order to broaden domestic political support for the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and hoped to facilitate this with the introduction of Soviet combat troops. Any disadvantages of a military move into Afghanistan at this time, Watson asserts, were minimized by the current slump in U.S.-Soviet relations, and the deterioration of U.S. relations with Iran and, to a lesser extent, with Pakistan. Ambassador Watson expresses his hope that a way can be found to bring pressure on the Soviets and to make the political costs to them so high that they will find a way to withdraw their troops. If the price has been suffi-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Daily CIA Brief File, Box 24, 12/26/79-12/31/79. Secret. Carter initialed "C" in the top right corner.

ciently painful for them, they may think again before undertaking another such adventure.² (S)

NSC Activity

*Follow-up on the NSC Meeting*³

State has transmitted messages on your behalf to the Heads of Government of Muslim countries, key non-aligned countries, key African countries and the Chinese as agreed at the NSC meeting.⁴ (C)

The messages to Muslim countries stress the threat to Islam from Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. (C)

The messages to the non-aligned countries urge that they must stand up for one of their own in the face of a Soviet takeover. (C)

The messages to the African countries emphasize that Afghanistan's peace and friendship treaty is being used as justification for Soviet intervention and notes that several African countries also have such treaties. (C)

The message to Hua concludes by noting that we have parallel interests in the security of Pakistan and calls for close consultation on our policies, stating that Harold Brown will be prepared to discuss this issue during his visit.⁵ (C)

In all of these messages we urge the leaders to speak out and take appropriate action individually or with like-minded countries with which they are associated. (C)

² Brzezinski is apparently summarizing telegram 28119 from Moscow, December 28. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]; printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 247) In telegram 28126 from Moscow, December 29, Watson argued that the United States's "principal objectives should be to (a) undo the Soviet action to the extent it can be done, which would mean the withdrawal of Soviet troops—probably not immediately attainable—and (b) exacting a political price for the Soviet action sufficient to dissuade the Soviets from undertaking other such adventures in the future." He also outlined a number of possible steps including: unilateral actions such as increasing U.S. military alert status, launching a major propaganda program, bolstering the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean; multilateral actions such as consultations with friends and allies, "demonstrative consultations with the Chinese," action in the Security Council, strengthening security ties with key countries in Southwest Asia such as Turkey and Pakistan, working "with the Pakistanis and Chinese to support the insurgency in Afghanistan," leading a global effort to boycott the Olympics; and bilateral actions with the Soviet Union including withdrawal of the SALT treaty from the Senate, "limitation or cancellation of grain sales to the Soviet Union," tightening export controls, reviewing extant trade deals, and cancelling "visits and exchanges" between the United States and USSR. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR and East/West, Bremen, Subject File, Box 61, Afghanistan: 11/79–1/80)

³ See Document 107.

⁴ See footnote 4, Document 107.

⁵ The message to Hua was not found.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the White House⁶

1. *Amstutz Views on Recognition of the Babrak Karmal Regime:* Charge Amstutz believes U.S. interests would be best served in Afghanistan by breaking or suspending diplomatic recognition. In considering whether to extend recognition, his primary consideration is the illegitimate use of Soviet military force in bringing the Babrak regime into power. Unlike the indigenous Khalqi revolution that occurred in 1978, the present coup resulted only through the blatant intervention of the Soviet military. Additionally, a general U.S. practice in deciding on recognition has been whether the government exercises effective control of the country, a dubious proposition with Amin's regime and of even greater doubt with the present regime. Finally, though only minimal information is available, Babrak's press conference gives Amstutz little reason to believe any change has occurred with respect to U.S. interests or programs. While no "hasty action" should be taken in order to prevent any precipitous action against mission personnel by the Babrak regime, Amstutz believes that "we may have more to lose in U.S. prestige globally and internally too were we to maintain a mission." (Kabul 8668, PSN 10651)⁷ (C)

[Omitted here is information unrelated to Afghanistan.]

3. *Chinese Reaction to Soviet-Afghan Situation:* In discussions with DCM Roy today, the deputy director of the Asian Affairs department expressed China's vigorous opposition to what the Soviet Union had perpetrated in Afghanistan and urged the U.S. to offer its assistance to the Pakistanis and the other threatened countries of the area. The Chinese official stressed that the reaction of the U.S. and Western Europe would impact significantly on whether the countries of the region stood up to the Soviet threat or adopted a more accommodating attitude toward the Soviet Union. (Beijing 9475 NODIS, PSN 11236) (S)⁸

⁶ Secret. The author of the paper is not identified. In the top right corner of the page, Carter wrote: "Zbig. C."

⁷ See Document 110. In the left margin beside this paragraph, Carter wrote: "Do not recognize—Have Warren pursue this? In London." See footnote 2, Document 107.

⁸ Telegram 9475 from Beijing is dated December 29. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840150-2539)

116. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State¹

Kabul, December 29, 1979, 1701Z

8680. Subj: Sitrep No. 12: Soviet Occupation of Kabul.

1. (C—Entire text.)

2. As the second full day of the Soviet occupation of Kabul draws to a close, there is one overwhelming fact evident to all observers here. All meaningful authority in this city is exercised by the Soviet Army, with Afghan participation limited to the traffic police, and a diminishing number of machine-gun toting civilians with white arm bands who apparently are supposed to give the current situation some semblance of legitimacy. We hesitate to risk belaboring this point, but we think it is worth emphasizing that heavily armed Soviet troopers and armored equipment are stationed at every important point throughout the city, they control traffic around the important arteries and crossroads, and they continue to move at will individually and in large units to various destinations. In short, the Afghans do not exercise even a modicum of real control over their own capital.

3. Embassy personnel late today observed an almost uninterrupted stream of Soviet armored equipment and troops moving into Kabul from the north over the only paved road heading to the Salang Pass and the USSR. At this point, we are unable to say whether these forces were flown into Bagram Air Base about 25 miles north on the same highway, or whether they came overland all the way from Central Asia. At about 1615 a contingent of twenty-one BMDs, some with towed artillery, and supporting equipment passed the Embassy heading into the center of the city. At 1800, at least twenty BMPs and fifteen BMDs, each with about 6–8 Soviet troopers riding on top, passed the Embassy, also heading in the direction of downtown Kabul. We doubt that these units are ultimately destined for deployment in the city, and presume that they may be on their way to some position on the outskirts to augment the Soviet perimeter now encircling the capital. These movements, however, give some feel for the magnitude of the Soviet Army's activity today as it apparently reinforces and repositions its forces in order to ensure its grip on Kabul.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 12/30/79. Confidential; Niact Immediate; Sensitive. Sent for information Priority to Ankara, Beijing, Islamabad, London, Moscow, New Delhi, USNATO, CINCPAC (also for POLAD), CINCEUR (also for POLAD), and USICA. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

3. One interesting detail is that Embassy officers have seen certain Soviet units digging in on the perimeter around the city, apparently in an effort to safeguard against any attack from the insurgents or from hostile Afghan Army units. Armored vehicles, including tanks, have been seen in makeshift bunkers. Although it is more likely that the Afghan Army in the field that was fighting for Hafizullah Amin will simply vanish into the hills, rather than take on elite units of the Soviet Army, we cannot rule out the possibility that some army units or individuals may attempt to vent their anti-Russian feelings by kamikaze raids or infiltration into the city in hopes of zapping a few of the "Russian invaders."

4. One wrinkle on the political front is that we have no firm evidence as yet that Babrak Karmal and his colleagues are actually in Kabul trying to forge their new government. Babrak's recorded statement first heard the night of the Soviet attack continues to be played intermittently, but there has been no other broadcast by him or any other member of the new leadership.² Under "normal" coup situations, such as April 1978, the new leader usually broadcasts his success as soon as that takeover is apparent. Since Kabul also has a generally functioning TV station, we find it curious that Babrak has not yet trumpeted in person his accession to power.

5. On the operational front, Kabul Airport opened to a couple of civilian flights this afternoon, including an Indian Airlines flight and one from Ariana. We have also heard the story, from a reliable source, that the telephone lines, which have been out since the first minutes of the takeover due to satchel charges or grenades planted at Kabul's PTT, may be dead for another month.

6. Finally, we note the East German news agency statement reported in FBIS Trends (28 December 79 USSR-Afghanistan) that the Soviet units will be withdrawn "as soon as the causes for this action no longer exist." Since the Soviet action was taken to impose a different but still Communist regime on Afghanistan, we anticipate that these Soviet military units and their successors may be in Kabul and the rest of Afghanistan for an extended duration.

7. A late item is that the Intercontinental Hotel is providing 200 preheated meals to Radio Afghanistan for the "old government and the new government." This report is sketchy, but it appears that some officials of the Amin regime are being held next door to us, while some

² Karmal's statement was quoted in telegram 332986 to all diplomatic and consular posts, December 28. In the statement, carried by Radio Kabul, Karmal pledged that his government would guarantee "democratic rights of all classes of society and respect the holy faith of Islam and the clergy." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790595-1188)

unidentified members of the Babrak government may also be biding their time in the Radio Afghanistan complex.

8. This will be the last sitrep for tonight unless events warrant further reporting.

Amstutz

117. Briefing Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Mark) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)¹

Washington, December 29, 1979

SUBJECT

The Impact of Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan on the Afghan Civil War, the Region, and the USSR's Standing

SUMMARY In the current Afghan situation, the USSR has a bear by the tail. It became entangled in an opportunistic and ideologically attractive grab to take advantage of the probably fortuitous emergence of a Marxist regime in Kabul in the revolutionary coup of April 1978. It cannot now let go without suffering damage to its image as a Marxist superpower that poses as a reliable ally of socialist and would-be socialist regimes. It also wants to avoid the risk that a hostile state will appear on yet another—and sensitive—stretch of the Soviet frontier. Yet, as it holds on, it becomes ever more deeply enmeshed in an Afghan civil war, which pits a highly unpopular, fractious, and factionalized minority grouping of leftists against the great rural tribal majority, who hate all that the leftists stand for.

Given this unattractive prospect, Moscow has now begun to escalate its intervention in Afghan affairs in the hope that this will improve its chances to reduce the just mentioned negative aspects of the situation. It is trying to insure that it will gain reliable control over its client regime (which it did not have under Amin) and that Afghanistan will neither sink into anarchy (thus increasing the risk of external intervention) nor become a hostile neighbor to the USSR. Moscow is

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR and East/West, Bremont, Subject File, Box 61, Afghanistan: 11/79–1/80. Secret. Drafted by Mark, Howells, Baraz, and Harris. Presumably prepared for Christopher prior to his trip to London and Brussels.

willing to pay the international costs for its actions, but it probably calculates that its losses will be short-lived. Besides, it may assume that eventual success will bring exploitable dividends in the form of a more respected image as a decisive and powerful actor on the world scene.

To reduce the insurgency, as a follow-up to their drastic moves of this week, the Soviet leadership will heighten military pressures against the insurgents, including some Soviet combat involvement. Thus far, the USSR has brought to bear in Afghanistan a large airborne force, sizable numbers of additional fighter aircraft, helicopters, military air transport, and two motorized rifle divisions. Several other ground force divisions are being readied at least as a backup reserve. These deployed forces can assure the security of Kabul, of the three other largest cities, of several strategically located towns, of roads near the Soviet frontier, and of the land lines of communication from the USSR to Kabul and Herat. If the Soviets were to plan general and large-scale combat actions of their own against insurgent positions throughout Afghanistan, they would need ten to fifteen divisions and major logistical bases. Up to now, we can see nothing initiated in the USSR on that scale.

Accompanying the military moves, it must be expected that Moscow will now start experimenting with new political approaches to lure a respectable proportion of the dissidents away from the insurgent camp. However, we judge that Babrak Karmal's chances of gaining substantial popular support are as poor as Amin's and Taraki's. His words are meant to sound promising to disaffected Afghans, but his predecessors used almost identical language without result. Tribal groups detest the Marxist trappings of the regime, which seems doomed to a very narrow base of followers—and these almost exclusively in urban areas. Political gains for Babrak would require major political concessions and a reduction of the Soviet presence, but neither he nor the Soviets can afford to go far enough to satisfy the opposition.

We do not yet know how the USSR plans to use the Afghan army in the future. For one thing, the army's loyalty to the new regime is highly suspect. For another, it is demoralized and understrength, while its recruitment prospects are poor. Still, if it manages now to hold together as a viable institution after Babrak's further purges, Soviet intervention, together with new training and equipment, could help to rebuild it to a point where, in the spring, it may be able to score some initial successes against the insurgents, provided that there were some Soviet combat involvement alongside.

Regional reaction to the Soviet intervention will be overwhelmingly disapproving. Iran will be very alarmed, but it will remain wrapped up in its own troubles, and will not be distracted from continuing to give priority attention to its confrontation with the U.S. Pakistan will

now feel very exposed to Soviet pressures and will urge America and China to give it political and military support, lest it be obliged to kowtow to the Soviet Union. India will also be negative, but its policy reaction will depend on how the repercussions play themselves out around Pakistan. China will denounce the USSR once again and be ready for closer cooperation with the U.S. The Arab states of the Persian Gulf will show great anxiety at what they interpret as further evidence of a Soviet expansionist plan that envisages Moscow's eventual control over them. Iraq's strong opposition to the Soviet action will lead it to try to bring about greater mutual security coordination among the Gulf Arab states, but without reliance on Washington. *END SUMMARY*

[Omitted here is the body of the memorandum.]

118. Intelligence Information Cable Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

[*cable number not declassified*] Washington, December 30, 1979, 1345Z

COUNTRY

Afghanistan/Pakistan

SUBJECT

Reaction of the Hezbe-i-Islami Afghanistan to the Soviet-Backed Government of Babrak Karmal [*1 line not declassified*]

SOURCE

[*2 lines not declassified*]

1. 29 December 1979, the leader of the Hezbe-i-Islami Afghanistan (HI) Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, was making every effort to make known the HI's opposition to the Soviet-backed government of Babrak Karmal and to emphasize that there are no changes in their policy of armed opposition to the new regime in Kabul. (Source comment: Other Peshawar based Afghan exile groups also appear to be following suit and the general feeling among exile leaders is that "Babrak is more cruel than Amin.") To reinforce their determination, the HI clandestine radio station operated the entire day of 29 December broadcasting in

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 12/31/79. Secret; Immediate; Sensitive; [*additional handling restriction not declassified*]. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

Dari, Pushtu and Baluchi languages condemning the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and calling for the overthrow of the Babrak regime.

2. According to reports reaching HI headquarters in Peshawar, by the evening of 28 December, there has been little military action in the southern and eastern parts of Afghanistan except for a report that a large convoy of tanks and armored vehicles was sighted heading from Kabul towards Jalalabad. (Source comment: The information on the convoy was imprecise and could not be confirmed.) In the countryside the HI describes the situation among the general populace as restive with anti-Soviet sentiment increasing to a new high.

3. On 30 December, HI leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar along with a member of the HI's political committee traveled from Peshawar to Islamabad where they intended to deliver communiqués to various foreign missions asking these governments to withhold diplomatic recognition of the Babrak regime and to ask for immediate material support.² (Source comment: It is not known which missions will receive the communiqué nor how long Gulbuddin will stay in Islamabad; however, it is possible that he might be seeking meetings with Government of Pakistan (GOP) officials in addition to delivering the communiqués. It is the hope of the HI that the GOP will make a realistic appraisal of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and will rally to the HI with immediate material support.) There is definite concern within the HI leadership that as soon as it is practical for them to do so, Soviet ground troops will be introduced into the fighting on a large scale and they are concerned about their ability to defend against massive Soviet military action. However, at the present time the HI plans to keep their mujahiddin in the field and to defend the "liberated areas" wherever possible.

4. ACQ: [1 line not declassified]

5. [less than 1 line not declassified] Dissem: [3 lines not declassified]

² Hekmatyar met with officials at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad. No record of this meeting was found.

119. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

PA 79–10610

Washington, December 1979

[Omitted here are a cover page and a dissemination page.]

Afghanistan: The Babrak Government (*[classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]*)

Summary

The Soviet-installed government of Prime Minister Babrak Karmal is dominated by members of his Parcham faction of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, but leftist military officers who overthrew President Daoud in April 1978 and installed the first PDPA government are also important participants. Many of the Cabinet members and the Parchamists who are helping with security in Kabul have been hiding in the Soviet Embassy in Afghanistan for up to a year. Included in this category are Sherjan Mazduryar, Minister of Transport, and Revolutionary Council member Mohammad Aslam Watanjar, who reportedly fled to the Soviet Embassy after the mid-September coup in which Amin deposed Taraki. (*[classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]*)

There are also several men in the Cabinet who have not been closely tied to either Parcham or the military leftists in the past, and a few who seem to have been closer to the party's Khalq faction—headed by the late Presidents Taraki and Amin—than to Parcham. Almost all, however, seem to have had a good reason to hate Amin and to have cooperated in his overthrow. (*[classification marking not declassified]*)

So far the Babrak government has announced a partial list of the Cabinet and some members of the Revolutionary Council (in theory a supervisory, quasi-legislative body) and publicly designated three individuals as "party members," a term possibly intended to recognize their importance without granting them any authority. (*[classification marking not declassified]*)

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Office of Support Services, Job 80T01330A: Production Case Files OPA (1979–1980), Box 7, PA 79–10610, December 31, 1979, Afghanistan: The Babrak Government. Secret; *[handling restriction not declassified]*. A typed note at the bottom of the page reads: "The author of this paper is *[name not declassified]* of the North East-South Asia Division, Office of Political Analysis. It was coordinated with the Offices of Central Reference and Strategic Research and the National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Afghanistan Task Force *[less than 1 line not declassified]*. Research was completed on 30 December 1979. (*[classification marking not declassified]*)"

The most important Cabinet positions appear to have been given to some of the least important men. The two Deputy Prime Ministers and the Defense, Interior, Finance, and Foreign Ministers.² [2 lines not declassified]. Abdul Qader, Nur Ahmad Nur, and Mohammad Aslam Watanjar have not been included in the Cabinet, although they are members of the Revolutionary Council. [classification not declassified]

[Omitted here is the body of the paper.]

² The memorandum identifies the Deputy Prime Ministers as Assadullah Sarwari and Soltan Ali Keshmand; the Minister of National Defense as Colonel Mohammad Rafi; the Minister of Interior as Sayed Mohammed Gulabzoi; and the Foreign Minister as Shah Mohammed Dost. The Minister of Finance was not identified in this memorandum. Telegram 8730 from Kabul, December 31, identified the Minister of Finance as Abdul Wakil. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800004-0057)

120. Article in the President's Daily Brief¹

Washington, December 31, 1979

USSR-Afghanistan: Situation report

The USSR may now have more than 30,000 troops in Afghanistan, and the total could go even higher.

Elements of a motorized rifle division that began arriving on Friday in the Kabul area from the USSR—probably Termez—are camping at the base of the mountains just north of the capital. The rest of the division evidently is on the way. [1 line not declassified] a regimental-sized unit with over 500 vehicles on the highway between Termez and Kabul.

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977-81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—December 1979, PDBs. Top Secret; For the President Only. The full version of this President's Daily Brief was not filed with this collection. The article printed here was found in this form.

There is also a report that in the west a convoy of Soviet equipment crossed into Afghanistan from the Kushka area on Saturday. The convoy consisted of more than 500 vehicles, including tanks, and was reportedly moving through Herat. Aerial reconnaissance was reported south of that city, and helicopters were evacuating casualties, indicating the Soviets had encountered resistance. At the same time, [1 line not declassified] a motorized rifle division headquartered at Kizyl-Arvat vacating its garrisons and traveling by road and rail in the direction of Kushka.

If the Soviet motorized rifle divisions from Termez and Kushka and the additional airborne unit from Kokayty have indeed all moved into Afghanistan, there are now more than 30,000 Soviet combat troops in the country. If the division from Kizyl-Arvat also crosses the border, the total could jump to between 40,000 and 45,000.

The Kabul area

Soviet forces in Kabul appear to be adopting a less conspicuous profile. Armed Afghan irregulars are guarding many government buildings, but the Soviets have secured key facilities and have set up a defensive ring around the perimeter of the city.

Soviet military flights to Afghanistan are continuing but at reduced levels. Most of the remaining flights are probably transporting supplies. On Thursday and Saturday, several Soviet transports apparently carried Soviet casualties to the USSR. [1 line not declassified] 250 Soviets have been killed or injured in the fighting so far.

Afghan Army units in the capital reportedly have virtually disintegrated and other units southeast of Kabul apparently have turned on Soviet forces. The U.S. Embassy in Kabul reports that there are also rumors of growing resistance to the Soviet presence in other areas of the country.

We have been unable to confirm Pakistani press reports that the Soviets have been involved in counterinsurgency operations in north-eastern Afghanistan. Insurgent activity throughout the country appears to be at a low level.

Soviet commentary

The first major Soviet media commentary on events in Afghanistan, which was carried by TASS yesterday, represents a significant escalation of Soviet rhetoric against the US.

The TASS release, which previewed an article in today's *Pravda* by A. Petrov—a pseudonym indicating high-level government approval—alleges that a "limited Soviet military contingent" has been sent to

Afghanistan at the request of Kabul to help repel “armed interference from the outside.”²

Elaborating on this theme, the article states that the regime in Kabul was threatened by insurgents based in Pakistan who have received “unlimited backing” from the US and China. It even claims that Egyptian “specialists” have joined Chinese and American instructors in training the insurgents.

US involvement with the insurgents, the article alleges, reflects the efforts of “figures in Washington” to shore up a “strategic arc” in the region, which was “cracked” by the Shah’s ouster.

² Text of the December 30 TASS release is excerpted in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXXII (February 6, 1980), pp. 1–3. According to Anthony Austin, “Soviet Says It Sent a Limited Force to Help Afghans Repel Aggression,” *New York Times*, December 31, 1979, p. A1, the TASS statement was not only the first media commentary on events in Afghanistan, it was also the Soviets’ first acknowledgement of the invasion in Afghanistan. The Embassy in Kabul received the first diplomatic note from the new regime on December 31, as reported in telegram 8730. The note read: “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan presents its compliments to the U.S. Embassy in Kabul and has the honor to state: ‘On the evening of Jadi 6, 1358 (December 27, 1979), the usurping and tyrannical regime of Hafizullah Amin collapsed as a result of corruption and anti-Khalq actions. In this sensitive moment, comprehending its grave national and historic responsibility, the Revolutionary Council of the DRA took over the ruling power of government and appointed Babrak Karmal as the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).’” The note stated that Karmal had declared Amin’s rule “obliterated forever” and identified the 11 members of the new Presidium of the Revolutionary Council. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 12/31/79)

121. Memorandum From Stephen Larrabee of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, December 31, 1979

SUBJECT

Soviet Policy in Afghanistan (U)

There is an increasing tendency in the news media and around town generally to make an analogy between Afghanistan and Vietnam. In my view, this is simplistic and dangerous. While the situations do share some similar characteristics—the danger of a protracted involvement, for instance—there are important differences:

—*logistics and transport*: The US had to transport troops and materiel over 5000 miles; the Soviets can move troops and materiel quickly over short distances and across open borders.

—*organization*: The North Vietnamese had been fighting the war for 25 years before the US became heavily involved. They had a well organized, well disciplined army and underground; the Afghan tribes have a history of insurgency, but they are not well organized and many of their actions are uncoordinated—or at least have been until now.

—*leadership*: The North Vietnamese were led by a leader who was generally regarded as a national hero, even in the South; at present no such national leader has emerged in Afghanistan who can rally the disparate tribes and provide cohesive, inspirational leadership.

—*weapons and supplies*: The North Vietnamese could count on outside aid and weapons in large quantities; this is not (yet) the case in Afghanistan.

—*political constraints*: US was constrained by (1) disunity over its goals; (2) its unwillingness to commit the forces needed to “win” the war militarily; (3) a desire to accommodate its South Vietnamese ally. The Soviet Union is under no such constraints. Having overthrown Amin and installed their own puppet, who is completely beholden to them, the Soviets are likely to commit the resources needed to neutralize, if not defeat the insurgents, rapidly and in large number.

—*role of the media*: Vietnam was a “media event” and this had a major impact on US domestic and international opinion, turning much of it against the war and US involvement. This will not be the case in

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 8–12/79. Confidential. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Brent, Thornton, Odom, Ermarth, Griffith, and Henze.

Afghanistan. The Soviets will restrict access to the war by the press, and there will be few film clips of Soviet soldiers setting fire to Afghan huts or mopping up Moslem villages being flashed across TV screens into Soviet living rooms—or for that matter across TV screens anywhere. This will minimize Soviet domestic and international criticism, after the initial furor dies down. (C)

Nonetheless, the Soviets will not have an easy time in Afghanistan. While Moscow will probably attempt to broaden the support for the new government, Karmal is not likely to prove to be any more popular than Amin was; indeed in the eyes of many Afghans he may be regarded as worse, since he is clearly a creature of the Soviets. Moreover, the Soviets

- will face a hostile climate and terrain, which will make wiping out the insurgents difficult;

- have difficulty transporting supplies *once inside* the country; this too will hamper their efforts;

- lack experience in guerrilla warfare;

- will probably need to “Sovietize” the war because the regular Afghan army is in no shape to defeat the guerrillas. (C)

The basic point is that, while the Soviets confront significant problems in Afghanistan and the prospect of deepening involvement, they are not likely to face many of the constraints that the US faced in Vietnam. They can be expected to move *rapidly and in force* to carry out their goals, with little of the vacillation characterized by US efforts in Southeast Asia. This will be a critical advantage. Whether it will be enough remains to be seen and will depend to a large extent on

- the ability of the Afghan insurgents to coordinate their activities;

- our ability to work effectively with Pakistan and other countries to aid the insurgents;

- our ability to keep up public awareness of Soviet actions and to mobilize pressure against them within the Nonaligned and Moslem world. (C)

122. Memorandum From Thomas Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, December 31, 1979

SUBJECT

Pakistan and Afghanistan (U)

The attached cable from Hummel makes some very important points.² They are similar to the ones that I made in my memo to you for last week's PRC³ and need to be borne in mind. I would restate the situation as follows: (C)

1. Whether we like it or not, the Paks do not see the situation as we do. They think that they are doing us a favor in helping with covert action or criticizing the Soviets about Afghanistan. In their view, we are conducting superpower rivalry and they don't think that we really care about them. (S)

2. Certainly up until now, the only way that we could get them mobilized in directions that we think are important has been by providing military equipment and (probably) security guarantees at a level far beyond anything that I think is feasible here. That is why I had hoped the PRC would look very hard at what would be involved. It didn't, and neither, apparently, did the NSC. What Vance offered—

¹ Source: Carter Library, Donated Historical Material, Brzezinski Collection, Brzezinski's Subject Files, Box 36, Serial Xs—(10/79—12/79). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. In the top right corner, Brzezinski wrote to Thornton: "TT, we *need to know* what Pakistan will need in terms of aid—and what it will take to get them to do what is needed. ZB"

² Telegram 15326 from Islamabad, December 30, is attached but not printed. In the telegram, Hummel relayed the substance of his discussion with Shahi, December 29. Shahi again rejected an immediate visit by Christopher (see footnote 3, Document 111) and told Hummel that, in light of the Soviet intervention, Pakistan "needs indication" of the extent to which the United States was willing to support Pakistan through political, economic, and military means. Hummel reported Shahi was "very anxious" that the United States not publicize the Pakistani response to Soviet troops in Afghanistan, and was upset that Carter's conversation with Zia (see Document 111) was publicized. (For example, the conversation was reported by Don Oberdorfer in his article, "U.S. Affirms Commitment to Pakistan," *Washington Post*, December 31, 1979, p. A1.) Hummel commented that the amount of support Shahi would consider sufficient to mitigate risks associated with perceived "collusion" with the United States would be too high; still, Hummel advocated, "I hope we can have Wash decisions that put us in position of offering substantial assistance so that we are seen to have offered support rather than ignored Pak needs."

³ See Document 102.

and what we are still thinking about—is simply inadequate to motivate the Paks.⁴ (S)

3. It is barely possible that the implications of the new situation may sink in and the Paks will start changing their attitudes. But I don't think it is likely. (S)

4. There may be some possibility of getting better results by dealing directly with Zia. This, however, is very hard to do. Even when the President called him, he equivocated until he could consult with his advisers. That means Agha Shahi who, I believe, has permanently written the US off. He will undermine at every step whatever we hope to accomplish with Zia. (S)

5. The main implication of all of this is that our chances of getting Pakistani cooperation in a CIA program are really quite poor. This has major implications for our objectives vis-a-vis the Soviets in Afghanistan, for there is no present alternative to cooperation with Pakistan. Obviously a prime Soviet objective will be to cut off support coming to the rebels from Pakistan. Here, again, if we have any chance, it is through a strong private message from the President to Zia. (S)

6. The only way of getting to Zia directly and forcing him to give his own answers is probably by a visit here. Even then, however, the odds are against us. On foreign policy matters Zia seems to rely on Shahi completely. And that is going to lead him to an accommodation with the USSR. (S)

7. That off-chance would be the one positive value of the visit. Aside from that, I wish the invitation had not been tendered. It is not good for us to be identified too much with Zia, who is in bad trouble politically at home. We may think that we are simply showing our support for Pakistan. In Pakistan, however, it will be interpreted as support for the unpopular Zia. Thus, on balance, I hope that we don't push this question of a visit. The ball is in his court, let it stay there. (S)

⁴ An apparent reference to Vance's suggestion to increase P.L.-480 aid to Pakistan, which he made during the National Security Council meeting on December 28. See Document 107.

123. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, December 31, 1979, 1826Z

28134. USSALTTWO. Subject: Afghanistan: Assessment of Soviet Motives.

1. (S—Entire text)

2. Begin summary. This report, which elaborates the initial thoughts on the Soviet move into Afghanistan which we reported in more restricted channels, attempts to analyze both the immediate objectives and the possible longer-range purposes behind the action.² The obvious immediate aim was to replace Amin with a ruler who might stand a better chance of gaining popular support for the Marxist regime, thus bringing the insurgency to an end. But this objective would not, in our view, in and of itself have justified the Soviet move, given the seeming risk to other Soviet foreign policy interests. We assume, then, that other factors also heavily influenced the decision. Among these, in descending order of probability, would be:

—fear that hatred of Amin and growing insurgency might eventually produce the collapse of the Marxist regime—a development to be prevented at whatever cost because of its potential impact on Eastern Europe;

—similarly, a concern that defeat of the regime by forces of Islamic fundamentalism, which if combined with similar forces in Iran and Pakistan would have potentially dangerous implications for the Soviet Union's own Moslem population;

—a desire to construct a “cordon sanitaire” around China—based on Soviet control over Mongolia, Indochina, and Afghanistan and continuing good relations with India; and

—at a later point in time, the beginning of a drive toward the Indian Ocean through Pakistan, or possibly toward the Persian Gulf through the Baluchi area of Iran.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800004–0424. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to London and USNATO. Also sent for information to Warsaw, Amman, Baghdad, Beijing, Belgrade, Berlin, Bonn, Bucharest, Cairo, Damascus, Islamabad, Jidda, Kabul, Leningrad, New Delhi, Paris, Prague, Rome, Sofia, Tel Aviv, Tokyo, Beirut, U.S. Mission Geneva, U.S. Mission Berlin, and USDel MBFR Vienna.

² Likely reference is to telegram 28119 from Moscow, December 28, which is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 247. See also Document 101.

We find no credible evidence of a split within the Soviet leadership on the decision to move into Afghanistan. They must have agreed that many outside factors combined to make the time propitious for the move: increasing doubt about the SALT treaty, the NATO theater nuclear force decision, the crisis in U.S.-Iranian relations, and the termination of U.S. military aid to Pakistan, among others. While we are not prepared to conclude that the Afghan decision represents a permanent turning away from the policy of *détente*, we believe that, given the present slump in U.S.-Soviet relations, the Soviets concluded that no real progress was to be expected in any case in the months ahead. End summary.

3. There is much which argued against the Soviet armed intervention into Afghanistan. The move seems likely to worsen Moscow's relations with Pakistan, Iran, and other Muslim states, not to mention China. It will seriously strain the very fabric of the policies of *détente* with the West and especially with the U.S., jeopardizing in the process the SALT treaty. There is even the danger of becoming bogged down in an Indochina-type guerilla war (though we recognize that parallels with Vietnam are very imperfect).

4. Why, then, did they do it, when the potential damage to Soviet foreign policy interests was so great? We do not pretend to have the answer, other than to make the perhaps obvious observation that the Soviets must have considered all these risks and concluded that the potential benefits outweighed them.

Soviet objectives

5. The Soviets apparently have multiple objectives. The most immediate one would be related to the situation within Afghanistan itself, with Moscow moving to remove Amin and carry out its long-held plans for broadening the regime's base, installing a leader who can gain more popular support for the DRA in hopes of quelling the insurgency. Their massive troop support suggests that they are prepared to launch a major offensive themselves against the insurgents if Babrak is unable to gain that needed support from the population.

6. Beyond the immediate situation, however, we would imagine several ideological and geopolitical considerations which entered into the decision. While some of them are in the worst-case category, they are perhaps worth mentioning as an aid to analysis:

—Amin's lack of popular support and inability to come to terms with the Muslim insurgency risked the eventual fall of a Marxist-oriented government from power. Once installed in an area contiguous to the Soviet Union, no "Socialist" regime has fallen from power in recent times; the Soviets may have determined not to allow Afghanistan to become the exception, fearing the impact of such an "ideological"

defeat on the nationalist aspirations of the other Communist countries in the Socialist Bloc.

—Potentially more dangerous than a simple defeat of the DRA would have been its defeat by forces of Islamic fundamentalism, which pose a threat to the Soviets not only in ideological terms but also in geopolitical terms. The outcome of the present turmoil in Iran is far from clear, and despite the loss of U.S. influence in that country the present trends are not necessarily favorable for the Soviet Union. The move into Afghanistan could have been intended to forestall similar chaos there. A prevailing tide of Muslim fundamentalism on the Soviet Union's southern borders could well be perceived by the Soviet leadership as providing the catalyst for arousing at some future time nationalistic aspirations in the six Soviet Central Asian republics with their population of some 50 million Muslims.

—The China factor must also be considered, given Soviet paranoia about the long-term threat from China. It seems to us that Chinese fears of a Soviet encirclement strategy are overdrawn, yet the concurrent strengthening of Moscow's position in Indochina with the fresh move into Afghanistan will no doubt strengthen Chinese concerns. Taken together with the existing Soviet military presence in Mongolia and the continued wooing of India, the makings of a "cordon sanitaire" around China are present. We would see the Afghan move, if it is directed against China, as basically defensive, but we cannot exclude the possibility that the Afghan operation is a dry run for an eventual move into Sinkiang. At the moment, however, we would place this as very low on the scale of probabilities.

—A key question is whether the Soviet action will be self-contained in Afghanistan, or whether there are broader objectives. There may be only a plan to help the Afghans seal off the border with Pakistan, to prevent use of Pak territory by rebel reinforcements. But some Pakistani officials have long feared the revival of historic Russian ambitions to move toward the Arabian Sea through Afghanistan and Pakistan.

—The turmoil in Iran, as well as the crisis in U.S.-Iranian relations might even tempt the Soviets to move through Afghanistan and Iranian Baluchistan to the Straits of Hormuz, thus establishing a controlling position on access to the Persian Gulf and Iranian oil. Should Iran begin to disintegrate into autonomous regions, a Soviet move into the Kurdish areas, thereby extending Soviet Azerbaijan, might also be tempting. Again, we consider such moves improbable in the near term, but we are unable to dismiss the possibility altogether.

Timing, decision-making and the leadership factor

7. We assume that the Soviet leadership, in preparing the Afghan operation, considered the overall shape of their foreign relations. We assume further that, while contingency plans may have existed earlier,

planning for the operation began in earnest about a month before it was carried out—i.e., during the latter part of November. At that time, the Soviets may have perceived:

—That SALT II was at death's door anyway.

—That prospects for obtaining MFN treatment from the U.S. in the near future were non-existent.

—That NATO was not going to heed Soviet warnings about the dangers of the impending decision on long-range theater nuclear forces.

—That the U.S. administration was committed to a defense build-up, whether or not SALT was ratified.

—That the U.S. was actively expanding its military presence in the region and, if it succeeded in obtaining basing for the Rapid Deployment Force, would be in a better position later to oppose something like the Afghan invasion than it is right now.³

—That the present slump in U.S.-Soviet relations would last at least until after U.S. elections, with or without Afghanistan.

—That the just-ended first round of Sino-Soviet negotiations showed that relations with China were no better, but also no worse.

—That the crisis in U.S.-Iranian relations would tend to minimize the impact of Iran's negative reaction and, at a minimum, prevent Iran from turning to closer relations with the U.S. in reaction to the move into Afghanistan.

—That the U.S. cut-off of military aid to Pakistan would leave Pakistan little alternative but to accommodate to the Soviet move.

—That the weakness of India's caretaker government would minimize the likelihood of a sharp shift in Indian foreign policy as a result of the Soviet move, while the good prospects for Mrs. Gandhi's return to power give the Soviets hope for continued good relations with India over the longer run.

8. In sum, the world scene as viewed from the Kremlin offered no overriding deterrent to moving now. Action would stave off future dangers, and circumstances combined to minimize the losses. Yet taking this major step still would have been a hard-fought decision, and it is tempting to speculate that one or another constellation of leaders in the Politburo gained the upper hand and decided to move on their own. There is, in fact, speculation in Moscow that runs along the lines that Brezhnev would not have concurred had he been in the thick of

³ Carter established the Rapid Deployment Force under PD/NSC-18, "U.S. National Strategy," August 24, 1977. Carter announced on October 1, 1979, in an address to the Nation, that he would direct the Secretary of Defense to "enhance the capacity" of the Rapid Deployment Force. (*Public Papers: Carter 1979*, Book II, p. 1804)

decision-making in recent weeks, given his presumed concern with U.S.-Soviet relations and SALT.

9. We have no credible evidence, however, that this was not a collective decision wholeheartedly adopted by the entire Politburo. Brezhnev has been active at least on-and-off of late, and so far as we know the ailing Kosygin is the only member of the top leadership who would have been unable to take part in planning for the Afghan operation.

10. If our theory is correct, then along with the Afghan decision the leadership must also have taken some basic decisions on such matters as détente and the shape of U.S.-Soviet relations in the immediate future. While we are not prepared as yet to conclude that this represents a permanent Soviet turn away from the policy of détente, it rather plainly suggests that Moscow does not expect any real progress in relations with the U.S. in the months ahead.

Watson

124. Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

SI 80–10001

Washington, January 1980

[Omitted here are a title page, a cover page, and a security information page.]

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 82M00501R: 1980 Subject Files, Box 12, C-367, 01 Jan–30 Jun 80. Secret. A statement attached to the cover page reads: "Information as of 16 October 1979 has been used in preparing the major part of this report. Information concerning the recent coup is reflected but does not change the basic judgments. The author of this paper is [*name not declassified*], Center for the Analysis of Personality and Political Behavior, Office of Scientific Intelligence. It has been coordinated with the Offices of Political Analysis, Geographic and Cartographic Research, and Central Reference, the Directorate of Operations, and the National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia." Also attached to the cover page is a handwritten note that reads: "[*name not declassified*]: This is super—I want to get it to Pres., etc., ASAP," signed "Stan Turner." Turner forwarded the assessment under a January 3 covering memorandum to Carter, Mondale, Vance, Brown, and Brzezinski, in which he wrote: "I believe it provides excellent background perspective to political events in Afghanistan today." (Ibid.)

Tribalism Versus Communism in Afghanistan:
The Cultural Roots of Instability
(*classification marking not declassified*)

Overview

The execution of Hafizullah Amin and the installation of the more pliable Babrak Karmal as President of Afghanistan, will not significantly alter the prospects for prolonged insurgency. Despite increased Soviet aid, the new regime will be a government under siege, continually attacked by fiercely independent, but poorly organized, Pashtun tribesmen. (*classification marking not declassified*)

The Communist regime in Afghanistan and the Afghan tribesmen have been in conflict since the Communist seizure of power in 1978. Although the tribesmen are not unified, they will continue to keep the countryside in a state of instability. The regime, despite only a thin layer of public support, probably will maintain control of the major cities. Indeed, the Soviets and their puppet regime are likely to face the same long resistance that an earlier generation experienced when the Soviets required a decade to subdue the Muslim populations of Central Asia. (*classification marking not declassified*)

For thousands of years, the topography and Afghan cultural mores militated against the formation of a strong central government and even against a strong union of the tribes themselves. The only characteristics common to the tribesmen are martial values, an egalitarian tradition, a theologically unsophisticated version of Islam, and a distrust for authority. (*classification marking not declassified*)

Successful Afghan monarchs mustered popular support by drawing upon the people's fears of invasion by a foreign power with an alien religion and bent tradition to their side through the skillful exploitation of such traditional values as defense of personal and tribal honor, attachment to religion, and intense dislike of foreigners. (*classification marking not declassified*)

In contrast, the Communist revolutionaries have tried to overturn tradition rather than adapt it, to eliminate local autonomy, to destroy the elite class by confiscating its land, and to undermine the authority of the Muslim religious establishment. These actions have aroused the resistance of the fiercely independent Afghans. The present no-win situation—persistent insurgency and fragile Communist control of urban areas—is expected to continue. (*classification marking not declassified*)

[Omitted here are a table of contents, a map, and the body of the assessment.]

125. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

PA 80–110003C

Washington, January, 1980

[Omitted here are a cover page and a security information page.]

Iran: Views on Afghanistan (*[classification marking not declassified]*)

Summary

The Soviet-supported coup in Afghanistan has further damaged the already badly strained relations between Tehran and Kabul. After a two-month hiatus, Iran has resumed its propaganda attacks on the Kabul government, which it sees as a puppet of the Soviets and an anti-Islamic force in the region. Soviet efforts to allay Iranian concern about the coup apparently have failed; the Iranians have formally condemned the Soviet military intervention.² (*[classification marking not declassified]*)

Iran's pro-Soviet Communist Tudeh Party, on the other hand, is pleased by the changes in Kabul and hopes that the Soviets and Afghans will give greater support to the Tudeh. (*[classification marking not declassified]*)

The secular leadership of the Iranian Government is unlikely in the near term to shift from its policy of not supporting the Afghan insurgents. Over time, however, it will be pressed to give more support to the insurgents by Iran's religious leadership. The religious leadership is already providing some training and arms support for the rebels, and this is likely to increase. (*[classification marking not declassified]*)

The Soviet-inspired coup and the Soviet military intervention will increase Iran's concern about Soviet activities and intentions in Iran. Tehran will avoid a serious strain in relations, however, because it needs Soviet support in the UN. (*[classification marking not declassified]*)

It is unlikely that the recent events in Afghanistan will encourage Iran to be more forthcoming with the United States on the hostage

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 09–00438R, Box 1, Iran: Views on Afghanistan; An Intelligence Memorandum, PA 80–10003C. Top Secret; *[codeword and handling restriction not declassified]*. A typed note at the bottom of the page reads: "This paper was prepared by *[name not declassified]* of the Office of Political Analysis. It was coordinated with the National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia. Comments and queries are welcome and may be addressed to the Chief, Iran Task Force, on *[less than 1 line and classification marking not declassified]*."

² On December 29, the Iranian Government released an official statement declaring the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan "a hostile act against Iran and all the Muslims of the world." (Doyle McManus, "Iran Protests, Tells Soviets to Pull Out Troops," *Los Angeles Times*, December 29, 1979, p. A1)

issue.³ Although some of Ayatollah Khomeini's advisers may be inclined to find a face-saving way out of the crisis because of the Soviet action, Khomeini views both superpowers as anti-Islamic, expansionist forces and will probably see little reason why the coup in Afghanistan should require him to be less hostile to the United States. (*classification marking not declassified*)

[Omitted here is the body of the memorandum.]

³ For a contemporary analysis of the impact of the Soviet Union's intervention in Afghanistan on U.S. policy and the Iran hostage crisis, see, for example, Barry Rubin, "American Relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1979–1981," *Iranian Studies*, vol. 13, issue 1–4, 1980, pp. 307–326.

126. Letter From the Former Afghan Ambassador to the United States (Malikyar) to President Carter¹

Silver Spring, Maryland, January 2, 1980

Mr. President,

As former Afghanistan Ambassador to the United States for more than a decade, I have been troubled a great deal as have the rest of the world over the recent invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union.² I can certainly appreciate the dilemma you are in Mr. President, but as an Afghan, I can assure you sir that only strong retaliatory measures could have any significant effect in stopping further Soviet aggression in that vulnerable region of the world.

If the United States does not act decisively and immediately, there is almost nothing to prevent the Russians from advancing into Iran, Pakistan, India and ultimately the Persian Gulf. I, therefore, Mr. President humbly urge you to take the necessary strong action needed to

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800018–0746. No classification marking. Attached but not printed is a January 2 covering memorandum from Malikyar to Brzezinski. Malikyar wrote: "Your support of this cause which has worldwide implications would be greatly appreciated by the people of Afghanistan. My prayers and thoughts are with the American people for the quick and safe release of the American hostages."

² An unknown hand underlined the first portion of this sentence. Malikyar was Ambassador 1967–1978. He learned in May 1978 that he was being relieved of his duties by the new Taraki government. (Telegram 4271 from Tehran, May 5, 1978; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780192–0015)

force a Soviet withdrawal and a return of independence, neutrality and integrity to Afghanistan.

And if I may also suggest to you sir, it would be altogether proper to form a task force consisting of former prominent Afghan officials now residing in the United States as well as private American citizens who are well acquainted with Afghanistan to assist you in evaluating the current events in Afghanistan.³

Mr. President, I, for one, find it very difficult to idly sit by and not be able to contribute to my country's cause. It is also unimaginable for me to see Afghanistan become another part of the Soviet block. It is this very fear of loss of identity that has forced hundreds of thousands of Afghans to seek refuge in neighboring Pakistan, there to regroup and organize a counter force against the communist regime in their homeland. But now their hopes of success against direct Russian army have diminished, unless they receive substantial assistance and support from the United States.

Mr. President, my prayers are with you and for the quick release of the American hostages in Iran.

Respectfully,

Abdullah Malikyar⁴

³ No record of a task force, per Malikyar's suggestion, was found.

⁴ Malikyar wrote by hand "*Former Afghanistan Amb. to the U.S.*" beneath his signature.

127. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, January 2, 1980

SUBJECT

Relevance of the Truman Doctrine to Current Situation (U)

As you consider options regarding the situation in Southwest Asia, I would like to recall for you an earlier crisis which in my judgment has some striking parallels with the present challenge we face in Afghanistan, in that region and globally. I have in mind the events which led up to the promulgation of the Truman Doctrine, announced by Truman in his message to Congress on March 12, 1947.² (C)

Truman's message responded to what he perceived to be a clear and present danger. It was the threatened collapse under Soviet pressure of two countries which at the time were at the outer limits of American consciousness—Greece and Turkey. Communist governments had been established with the aid of Soviet troops throughout the Balkans. Greece was in the midst of a civil war, instigated in the main by communist-led insurgents. Concurrently, Moscow was putting pressure on Ankara to revise the Montreaux Convention to prevent access of non-Black Sea powers into the Black Sea, and had raised claims of sovereignty against two areas in Turkey. (C)

All this in a region which prior to 1947 had been a British sphere of influence of little or no strategic interest to the United States. Within this country there was strong sentiment for a rapid U.S. disengagement from all of Europe and a return to isolationism. Truman was also under considerable pressure from a number of politicians, especially Henry Wallace, who argued that the U.S. should undertake more strenuous efforts to cooperate with Moscow. (C)

Against this background, the United States received an urgent message in late February 1947 that the British intended to cease aid to Greece and Turkey within six weeks.³ The issue, as Truman, Acheson

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Office File, Country Chron File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 1980. Confidential. Sent for information. Carter initialed "C" in the top right corner. The memorandum was attached as Tab I to a January 2 memorandum from Blackwill and Larrabee to Brzezinski recommending that Brzezinski sign the memorandum to Carter. An unknown hand wrote "1-2-80 ZB signed memo to Pres," at the bottom of the page.

² For the text of Truman's address to Congress, see *Public Papers: Truman, 1947*, pp. 176-180.

³ See *Foreign Relations, 1947*, vol. V, The Near East and Africa, Documents 24 and 34.

and Marshall prophetically realized was not simply the question of aiding Greece and Turkey, although that was a startling enough idea at the time. They also were among the first in the post World War II period to recognize the importance of buttressing regional security and sending Moscow an unmistakable signal that the United States was determined to protect not only old vital interests but new ones as well, and to resist Soviet pressure. (U)

Truman's message was a turning point in U.S. foreign policy. Specifically he:

- announced that it was the policy of the United States to support free peoples who were resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures;

- requested Congress to provide authority for assistance to Greece and Turkey in the amount of \$400 million;

- asked Congress to authorize the detail of American civilian and military personnel to Greece and Turkey to assist in the task of reconstruction and to help supervise the use of U.S. financial and material support;

- asked Congress for authority to provide for the instruction and training of select Greek and Turkish personnel; and

- asked Congress to provide authority to permit the rapid and effective use in terms of needed commodities, supplies and equipment, of any funds that they authorized. (U)

(The relevant excerpt from Truman's speech is at Tab A.)⁴

This speech marked the beginning of one of the most creative periods of U.S. diplomacy. Most importantly, it signalled the intention of the U.S. to abandon its past hesitancy and to assume a more activist role internationally. Without this rapid and resolute action on our part, the Soviet Union would have continued to increase its pressure on Turkey and in Greece, and the evolution of Southern Europe and the Middle East would undoubtedly have been quite different. (U)

Today we face a Soviet challenge in an area of the world which is only a little more unfamiliar to most Americans than were Greece and Turkey in 1947. As in 1947, the West looks to us because only we can provide the necessary leadership and resources to turn back the Soviet threat to our interests in the region and beyond. As in 1947, a U.S. public formerly weary of war and international responsibility is increasingly ready to respond to a call for a more active American role in the world to protect our vital interests, as the President defines them. There are, however, two sharp differences between the present Soviet challenge

⁴ Attached but not printed.

in South Asia and the threat in 1947. The Soviet intervention in the present case is both more blatant and more brutal than in 1947, and the Gulf is unquestionably more vital to Western interests today than were Greece and Turkey 30 years ago. (C)

128. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, January 2, 1980

SUBJECT

Presidential Decisions on Pakistan, Afghanistan and India (S)

The following decisions were made by the President as a result of the PRC Meeting of December 27 and the NSC Meeting of December 28 and should be implemented:²

Afghanistan

1. Our ultimate goal is the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Even if this is not attainable, we should make Soviet involvement as costly as possible and should use the events in Afghanistan as a rallying point for our policies in the area.

2. We should push these objectives vigorously, going to the United Nations if necessary. It would be preferable, however, for other countries to take the lead in the UN.

3. Messages should be sent to our NATO Allies, China and key leaders in the UN and Non-Aligned Movement, drawing their attention to the events in Afghanistan and calling for appropriate responses.

4. We will not link the Soviet action in Afghanistan to SALT. At the same time, however, we will not permit our interest in SALT to deter us from speaking and acting forcefully.

5. We will send public and private messages to the Soviets, citing the unacceptability of their behavior, the threat to the peace posed by

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat (ES), Sensitive and Super Sensitive File, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, Box 4, 1980 ES Sensitive, Jan 1–31. Top Secret. Copies were sent to Brown and Turner.

² See Documents 102 and 107.

their actions, and their violation of the principles of behavior we agreed to in 1972. (TS)

Pakistan

1. We are prepared to send a high-level mission to Pakistan, headed by Deputy Secretary Christopher, to consult on the new situation in the region.

2. Military sales will be resumed and facilitated.

3. We shall ask the Saudis to assist on financing military purchases by Pakistan.

4. Two GEARING-class destroyers will be provided to Pakistan expeditiously.

5. We shall move promptly in providing \$40 million in PL-480 assistance.

6. Additional assistance will be provided to help Pakistan deal with the Afghan refugee problem.

7. We will reaffirm our nuclear policy towards Pakistan and make clear the legislative restrictions. We will, however, urge the Pakistanis to put the problem aside for solution later while we deal with the Soviet-Afghan problem. (S)

India

1. A high-level mission will be sent to India following the Indian elections.

2. Ambassador Gerard Smith should provide a memorandum to the President before we move to approve the pending license for supply of fuel to the Tarapur reactor or submit the second Indian request to the NRC. (S)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

129. Article in the President's Daily Brief¹

Washington, January 2, 1980

USSR-AFGHANISTAN: Situation report

We estimate that as many as 40,000 Soviet troops were in Afghanistan as of yesterday.

It now appears that units from two airborne divisions based in western USSR participated in the coup in Kabul and that a third airborne division at Fergana sent units to the Salang Pass, Bagram, and to major provisional [provincial] capitals in central and western Afghanistan. The motorized rifle division from Termez is still deployed in and around Kabul and elements of the motorized rifle division from Kushka were observed in yesterday's [less than 1 line not declassified] of Shindand Airfield, south of Herat.

On Monday, a motorized rifle division located in the Central Asian Military District was in the early stages of preparations for leaving its garrisons.² This division is normally in a high degree of readiness and could be preparing for deployment to the Afghan border. The motorized rifle division at Kizyl-Arvat that began vacating its garrison on Friday is now probably at Kushka.

[1 line not declassified] yesterday showed Soviet tactical fighter aircraft at two Afghan airfields; a MIG-21 Fishbed squadron was at Bagram and two SU-17 Fitter squadrons were at Shindand.

Meanwhile, about 25 Long Range Aviation TU-16 Badger medium bombers may have flown from the western USSR to Mary Northeast Airfield last Friday, bringing to at least five the number of regiments that have sent aircraft to the Turkestan Military District since early December. A bomber deployment of this magnitude to the southern USSR is unusual and appears related to developments in Afghanistan.

Occupation forces

The government and the Soviets are clearly concerned about the loyalty of Afghanistan's armed forces.

Soviet forces have apparently completely disarmed Afghan soldiers in Kabul, and some Afghan political officers stationed at Bagram Airbase have been ordered arrested.

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977-81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—January 1980, PDBs. Top Secret; For the President Only. The full version of this President's Daily Brief was not filed with this collection. The article printed here was found in this form.

² Monday was December 31, 1979.

[1 paragraph (6 lines) not declassified]

The Soviets have sustained some additional casualties in clashes with Afghan Army forces. Over the weekend, Soviet helicopters evacuated wounded from Shindand back to the USSR.

Some anti-Soviet incidents have also occurred among the civilian population. On Monday, large groups of armed residents burned shops in Qandahar and demonstrated against the government. The Afghan commander there used tanks to disperse the crowds.

Sporadic fighting between the insurgents and the Afghan Army has continued throughout the country, with the rebels exerting heavy pressure on government forces in the northeast and initiating new fighting in the southwest. Soviet forces may have conducted some clearing operations north of Kabul on Monday, but contact between the Soviets and the rebels has apparently been limited.

Foreign commentary

The new Afghan Government has been trying to justify the Soviet intervention by echoing Moscow's charges of US interference in Afghan internal affairs.

Moscow, for its part, has been saying that US offers of military assistance to Pakistan demonstrate Washington's intention to continue supporting Afghan insurgents, but it has issued no additional authoritative statements.

Conservative Persian Gulf states, with Saudi Arabia in the lead, have issued strong condemnations of the Soviet action. Several states have underscored their sympathy for the Afghan insurgents as fellow Muslims.

Although Iraq has not issued any formal response, Baghdad is clearly uneasy over the latest Soviet use of force. *One senior Baath official compared the Soviet action to US involvement in Vietnam and said that ultimately Afghan resistance would lead the USSR to withdraw.* Baghdad's reaction, however, is likely to be colored by its deep suspicion of US intentions in the region and its preoccupation with its deteriorating relations with Iran.

Reactions elsewhere in the Middle East have been along generally predictable lines. Syria, Lebanon, and the PLO have not commented, while Egypt and other moderate states have denounced the Soviets.

China on 30 December issued a government statement—used only infrequently by Beijing—that called the Soviet action a threat to “peace and security in Asia and throughout the world,” and a Vice Foreign Minister told the Soviet Ambassador that the intervention posed “a

threat to China's security."³ The Chinese are probably most concerned about the effect the Soviet action will have on Pakistan, China's ally.

India's acting Prime Minister has expressed "deep concern" about the situation in Kabul but has also voiced "grave concern" over possible new US arms deliveries to Pakistan.⁴ Indira Gandhi, a leading candidate to become prime minister again following elections this week, was even less critical of the Soviets. More authoritative statements can be expected from New Delhi once a new government is installed.

³ The full text of the Chinese statement was relayed in telegram 9483 from Beijing, December 31, 1979. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800003-1280)

⁴ In telegram 23828 from New Delhi, December 31, 1979, the Embassy reported on Indian Prime Minister Charan Singh's meeting with the Soviet Ambassador, December 31, during which Singh asked that the Soviet Union withdraw its troops from Afghanistan. In telegram 55 to New Delhi, January 1, 1980, the Department stated that during a meeting with Coon in Washington, the Chargé of the Indian Embassy delivered an official Indian statement registering India's grave concern over the U.S. decision to lift its arms embargo against Pakistan. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800004-0492 and D800004-0945, respectively)

130. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, January 2, 1980, 9:30-10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

SCC Meeting on Soviet Forces in Afghanistan (S)

PARTICIPANTS

<i>State</i>	<i>White House</i>
Secretary Cyrus Vance	Zbigniew Brzezinski
Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher	David Aaron
	NSC
<i>Defense</i>	William E. Odom
Secretary Harold Brown	Marshall Brent
Deputy Secretary W. Graham Clayton	

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Meetings File, Box 18, SCC Meeting #241A, Held 1/2/80, 1/80. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

CIA
Deputy Director Frank Carlucci

JCS
Admiral Thomas Hayward
Lt. General John Pustay

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

CIA reported that about 40,000 Soviet troops are now in Afghanistan. They are encountering some resistance. The Afghan army is shrinking rapidly through desertions. The rebel tribes will retreat in the mountains and continue resistance, probably increasing in the spring. Thus, the insurgency will continue, and Soviet forces will be the main source of the counterinsurgency effort. (S)

CIA also reported that Egypt is sending equipment to Pakistan to be supplied to the Afghanistan insurgents, and Saudi Arabia has agreed to contribute \$4 million. (S)

It was asserted in the discussion that the degree of resistance in Afghanistan will depend upon two factors: first, the size of the support received covertly through Pakistan, and second, the degree of Soviet pressure on Pakistan to block this supply. (S)

CIA Resources—It was agreed that [*less than 1 line not declassified*] is far too small and needs rapid expansion. CIA was directed to present its request for an increase and also obtain OMB's written objections which may then be forwarded to the President for a decision.² (S)

Aid to Pakistan—Pakistan's ability to support the insurgency and to resist Soviet pressures, it was agreed, will be highly dependent on U.S. assistance and commitment. It was argued that the small support we can now promise Pakistan will be more confusing than reassuring because of the publicity about changing U.S. policy. It is essential, therefore, to address the non-proliferation issue with the Congress and find a satisfactory way to make an exception in the Pakistani case. It was agreed that this matter should be discussed at the National Security Council meeting today and a decision taken on whether to seek an amendment to the law or to seek Pakistani assurances sufficient to certify Pakistan's intentions on nuclear proliferation to the Congress.³ (S)

Christopher's Trip to the NAC—Warren Christopher gave a brief report on his impressions from the NAC meeting.⁴ He added that Japanese participation would be useful. He also argued that we need

² See Document 151.

³ See Document 135.

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 107.

a standing mechanism for coordinating any joint actions with the Allies which may be taken in response to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. States are more likely to support actions as a group than alone without the reassuring presence of other states in the group. (S)

NSC on the larger Strategic Questions Posed by Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan—It was agreed to seek a meeting of the NSC later this week to discuss the larger regional issues arising from Soviet actions in Afghanistan as well as issues concerning our Allies in Europe and Asia. (S)

131. Memorandum From Stephen Larrabee of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, January 2, 1980

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakia Revisited: Patterns and Lessons (U)

While there are obvious differences between the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, in assessing the risks the Soviets were probably influenced at least in part by their experience in Czechoslovakia, particularly world reaction. It may be useful, therefore, to briefly review developments in the post-invasion period for insights into Soviet attitudes and possible diplomatic moves in the future.² (C)

In my view there are several aspects of the post-invasion period which are important in the present context:

1. *The sobering impact on Eastern Europe.* The invasion not only halted the deterioration of the situation in Czechoslovakia but had a sobering impact on all of East Europe. This was particularly true of Romania and Yugoslavia. While they condemned the invasion, they also were more cautious for several years thereafter in undertaking initiatives

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Outside the System File, Box 45, Afghanistan Invasion: U.S./Allied Relations, Olympics, Grain Embargo: 1/80. Confidential; Outside System. Sent for information. Brzezinski wrote: "agree, ZB" in the top right corner, and drew an arrow pointing to the edge of the page. See footnote 7, below.

² For documentation on the U.S. response to the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, see *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XVII, Eastern Europe, Documents 80–99.

that might irritate the Soviets and showed a distinct interest in fostering a *limited* improvement of relations with Moscow. The Soviets probably calculated that the invasion of Afghanistan would have an analogous effect, not just in Eastern Europe but in some other countries bordering on Afghanistan.

2. *The rapid dissipation of public indignation in the West.* While most countries reacted with shock to the invasion, it proved difficult to maintain public indignation over a sustained period of time. “Normalization” and the retention of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia soon became a fact of life, and a year after the invasion the West was actively engaged in detente diplomacy.

3. *Moscow’s continued interest in detente with the West.* Contrary to the expectations of many, the invasion of Czechoslovakia did not sound the death knell of detente, but proved to be, as Michel Debré accurately predicted at the time, only “a detour on the road to detente.”³ In fact, one of the most striking features of the post-invasion period is how quickly Moscow moved to revive the strands of its detente diplomacy left dangling at the time of the invasion.

—In his October 3 speech to the UNGA, Gromyko explicitly called attention to Moscow’s desire for improved relations with the West, especially the United States, and announced his government’s willingness to resume the renunciation of force talks with the FRG.⁴

—In November Kosygin signalled Moscow’s interest in an early start of the SALT talks during a visit to Moscow by former Secretary of Defense McNamara and Senators Gore and Pell.⁵

—By mid-spring 1969, with the publication of the communique at the end of the Warsaw Pact meeting in Budapest (March 17), the Soviet campaign for detente was in full swing.

—In July in a speech to the Supreme Soviet, Gromyko signalled Moscow’s desire to

1. Begin SALT Talks
2. Begin discussions on Berlin

³ Michel Debré was Prime Minister of France from 1959 until 1962. The source of this quote was not found.

⁴ Excerpts from Gromyko’s speech were printed in the *New York Times*, October 4, 1968, p. 14.

⁵ The visit, November 18, was reported by Anatole Shub in “Sens. Gore and Pell Reach Moscow Amid Signs of Shifting Soviet Trends,” *Washington Post*, November 19, 1968, p. A17. World Bank President and former Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, met with Kosygin a week earlier. A report on their meeting is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XIV, Soviet Union, Document 314.

3. Resume negotiations with the FRG on a renunciation of force treaty.⁶

Thereafter, detente was off and running, with the West in hot pursuit.

In short, the Soviet intervention only temporarily set back Soviet detente efforts, while at the same time it allowed the Soviet Union to arrest the deterioration of the situation in Czechoslovakia, which if it had continued, would have had serious consequences not only for Soviet interests in Czechoslovakia, but in East Europe as a whole. (U)

In analyzing the diplomatic costs of any intervention in Afghanistan, the Soviets probably concluded that, as with Czechoslovakia, world indignation would be great for a few months, but that this concern would diminish rapidly and six to eight months later they would be able to conduct business as usual—especially if they moved to stamp out the insurgency swiftly and forcefully. At the same time, they probably calculated that with US-Soviet relations at a low ebb, SALT in limbo, and an election coming up, they had little to lose, and that there was no prospect for a significant change in bilateral relations until after January 1981 anyway. Better to take unpleasant action now, and get it over with than be forced to intervene later, when such action might seriously impede chances for an improvement in relations. (C)

In sum, Soviet actions in the period immediately following the invasion of Czechoslovakia suggest that Moscow will probably not abandon its detente efforts, but rather resume them after a sufficient interval has elapsed. However, as Fritz has argued, their incentive to do this will be greater if we take rapid and resolute action. If we move swiftly and decisively to meet the Soviet challenge, we may be able to preserve the basis for a balanced policy toward the USSR over the long run. If we don't, Moscow's appetite is likely to increase with the eating, regional insecurity is likely to grow to the detriment of US interests, and the chances of any meaningful cooperation with the USSR will be destroyed for years to come.⁷ (C)

⁶ See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XII, Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970, Document 65.

⁷ Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the right margin next to this paragraph and wrote: "agree" beside it.

132. Memorandum From Marshall Brement of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, January 2, 1980

SUBJECT

Will the Soviets Succeed in Afghanistan? (U)

There is a lot of loose talk around the State Department and elsewhere, reflected in the Oberdorfer piece this morning, suggesting that Afghanistan is “the Soviet Vietnam.”² This is whistling in the dark and the motivation for at least some of this whistling is to provide a rationale for tepid action by the US in response to the Soviet invasion. If the Soviets are going to learn their lesson on the ground in Kabul—so goes the logic of the argument—then there is no important reason for us to pay too large a price in terms of overall US-Soviet relations to show them that this was a wrong decision. (S)

However, unless General Pavlovski does not know his business (and I strongly doubt this), the Soviets should have the Afghan situation cleared up in a matter of months. This will require:

- a. Control of Kabul and all major population centers;
- b. Control of major roads;
- c. Control of the major passes between Afghanistan and Pakistan; and
- d. Effective restriction on the ability of the outside world to obtain solid information on the insurgency (control of the press is vital). (S)

Given the above, it will be possible for the Babrak regime to declare the end of the insurgency and to “prove” it by inviting selected outside observers to see for themselves that the country is secure and that “the people” support the government. This should be no trick at all for a major army. It is generally forgotten that the US Army cleared out South Vietnam. In 1971, for example, the entire country was “pacified,” and it was possible to visit every one of the 44 provincial capitals—day or night. If we had shown the ability or inclination to stay in

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 1/1–8/80. Secret. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Thornton, Sick, Odom, Albright, Schecter, Henze, Griffith, Larrabee, Ermarth, and Hunter. Brzezinski wrote: “I agree” at the top right of the memorandum. An unknown hand wrote: “1/3/80” beneath Brzezinski’s note.

² See Don Oberdorfer, “The Making of a Soviet Coup,” *Washington Post*, January 2, 1980, p. A1.

Vietnam with forces roughly the size of that we had there in 1971 for an indefinite period (a commitment of the kind which the Soviets are obviously ready to make in Afghanistan), then we would clearly have "won" in Vietnam. (S)

In sum, the war aims of the Soviets in Afghanistan are clear, limited, and achievable in short order. All decisions that we make have to be based on this supposition. My fear is that Afghanistan will not be the Soviet Vietnam; that it will be the Soviet Entebbe.³ (S)

³ A reference to the successful hostage rescue operation conducted at Entebbe Airport, Uganda, by the Israel Defense Forces against Palestinian hijackers, July 4, 1976. *Time* magazine declared it "one of the most daring, spectacular rescues in modern times." ("The Rescue: 'We Do the Impossible,'" *Time*, July 12, 1976, pp. 21-22)

133. Memorandum From Fritz Ermarth of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, January 2, 1980

SUBJECT

NSC on Afghanistan (U)

Despite the obvious strategic and historic importance of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, there will probably be a tendency to deal with the event in isolation. This will focus debate on such issues as 1) how to impose political costs on the USSR, 2) should we increase support to the Afghan insurgents. (S)

To combat that tendency we need to articulate an understanding of the broader crisis and a strategy for dealing with it. Because it so illuminates the weight of Soviet land combat power in the north *and* Soviet willingness to use it in the most cynical way, the invasion sharply increases the prospect of eventual Soviet military domination of the greater Middle East and US exclusion from the region, except perhaps from Israel. Next we shall very probably see civil strife in Iran with direct Soviet involvement, a PDRY take-over of North Yemen, increased

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Ermarth, Box 1, Afghanistan. Secret; Outside the System. Sent for information.

Soviet efforts to destabilize Turkey and Pakistan, and intense Soviet pressure on other states in the region to line up with Soviet interests. (S)

The result after several years could be a pattern in the Middle East and South Asia in which most of the region's states are either Soviet vassals (on the model of Afghanistan) or willing members of a Soviet-dominated security system because it seems the safer course (a role India has come close to playing in the past). (S)

US policy overall must be guided by the realization that this prospect is now a fearsome probability, but not a certainty. We must therefore combat the probability as effectively as we can while at the same time planning against its occurrence, without making it a self-fulfilling prophecy. (S)

This will require of us a policy of *deeply echeloned containment*. In contrast to the situation in the late-1940s and early 1950s, we cannot credibly draw a defensive perimeter and threaten massive military action if it is crossed. There are many perimeters, and some will inevitably be crossed. (S)

The first layer, or forward echelon, of our policy must be a systematic effort to make Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, Yemen, Ethiopia, and Indochina as costly and painful as possible. This will require extensive support to Soviet opponents wherever we find them, not on the basis of their worthiness or chances of winning, but on the basis of their ability to tax Soviet power. We must proceed in this prepared politically and psychologically for the certain event that some of these clients will fail and that our support may after the fact be regarded as having assured their demise. (S)

The second layer or echelon of policy should be a three-part effort 1) to fortify as best we can the key remaining buffer states of the area, Turkey and Pakistan, with military and economic aid, 2) to win the key "swing states" of Syria and Iraq away from Soviet influence, and 3) to increase our permanent military presence in the area, *on-shore* as well as off-shore. (S)

With respect to the first two elements—fortifying the buffers and winning over the "swing states"—the obvious complications of doing these things become politically tolerable if one simply accepts the necessity of trying to achieve them without a prior guarantee, or even high likelihood, of success. (S)

We need on-shore military presence now mostly for political reasons, to counter the political weight of Soviet military power in the north and to show that we have the nerve to push through the evident political obstacles to get on-shore presence. Over the next year a *minimum* goal should be a tac air contingent and marine presence in Oman. The risk of destabilizing Oman will simply have to be taken. Oman is

no safer in our absence. But we should also start planning for a more ambitious option of inserting the necessary land, air, and naval forces into Saudi Arabia and the Gulf to protect Gulf oil against direct attack or stoppage of oil flow through political side effects of events elsewhere. All this, incidentally, calls for the prompt creation of the greater Middle East command we have talked about. (S)

Another element of this second layer of policy we must examine carefully, but not necessarily decide as yet is: under what conditions of Soviet involvement in Iran would we be prepared to put US forces into Iran? (S)

The third echelon of policy should be a composite of actions to increase the level and tempo of our overall defense effort in the context of more active measures to restore national economic health. It is probably not necessary to revisit the President's FY81 defense budget decisions now. But against the likely picture of the 1980s, the President's conception of adequate spending levels in the out years is almost certainly too low. Instead of 4.5–5.0% annual increases, we shall be forced into something like 6.0–7.0% rates or even higher. What we need now is a major (not a back room, or one-man) planning effort on how to accomplish this acceleration. Undoubtedly other dimensions of this "quasi-mobilization" policy will involve stiff oil import taxes, tax changes to stimulate investment, somewhat looser monetary policy, and perhaps price controls to manage inflation. (S)

The fourth echelon of policy will involve political efforts on a broad front to get our NATO allies and Japan to do likewise in defense. (S)

The fifth policy echelon will involve the way we manage our direct relationship with the USSR. The foregoing may suggest that we will have foresworn any semblance of detente for the next decade. Quite the contrary is the case. If we move swiftly to create the necessary echelons of containment, we may preserve the basis for a balanced policy toward the USSR in bilateral relations and in Europe. (S)

US resolve and effectiveness in the East-West competition will actually restore in Moscow an incentive to try to deflect us by political means, an incentive that has obviously declined in recent years. We must move to place issues of regional stability at the center of our bilateral relationship where the Soviets will be forced to deal with them. Faced with the certainty of stiff competition on all fronts the Soviets will, in time, at least show an interest in damping that competition in some regions. In the meantime, there is no reason why the dialogue on strategic arms stabilization cannot in due course resume. The Soviets will probably have an interest in it. The main obstacle to our pursuing a nuanced or balanced policy now is the lack of confidence at home, e.g., in the Senate, that we are adequately postured for the competitive side of the relationship. (S)

Even at this late date, I doubt that the Soviets fully appreciate the depth of the national about-face taking place here. They seem to believe that US-Soviet relations can be returned to the uncertain mix of the last several years after the elections, that the competitive elements of our policy will be ineffective, and that our allies can be coaxed away from us. Only US actions across all the policy echelons discussed above will sober their outlook. But the chances for peace in the next five years would be improved if somebody were to go to Moscow now, not to negotiate or to debate, but to tell the Soviets exactly how we view the period of struggle ahead. That person should have the absolute confidence of the President and labor under no suspicions that his mission is to rescue detente by acquiescing in Soviet power grabs. You're the only candidate with the credibility to do this. (S)

134. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, January 2, 1980

SUBJECT

Strategy for Dealing with Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

You should seek to accomplish four things in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan:

1. *In Afghanistan*. Make the costs to the Soviets very high, preventing a successful Soviet consolidation of power there if possible.

2. *In the Region*. Accelerate a number of measures and take additional steps to build a security system in the Persian Gulf which can repel Soviet power projection into the region.²

3. *With our Allies*. Assert leadership of the NATO Alliance and Japan which provides a context and a rationale for our allies' supporting actions.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 1–2/80. Secret; Outside the System. Printed from an unsigned copy.

² Documentation on U.S. efforts to build a security framework in the Persian Gulf area in the wake of the fall of the Shah of Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula.

4. *With Broader Groups.* Provide a context and rationale for broader groups, such as the NAM, Moslem states, and the United Nations, to take as much action as they are willing.

If the United States is clearly understood to be providing this leadership, you will not only get the backing of our allies and many non-aligned states, but you will also find an emerging domestic consensus behind you that will support essential legislative and budgetary measures. Anything less will cause vacillation and accommodation by our allies and by states within the Persian Gulf region.

This is not a crisis to be dealt with in a few weeks and with a series of short-term measures. It is a test of the balance of power between East and West. Many states will be forced to adjust their foreign policy to the way in which you exercise the leadership of the West. The major political problem for world affairs in the 1980s is the projection of Soviet military power. Our sensitive intelligence indicates that many political leaders in the world have come to see this clearly. If it appears that the United States cannot stem Soviet power effectively through diplomacy, alliances, and military means, then they will continue accommodating to Moscow.

Afghanistan is not only the first country outside the Soviet bloc which the Soviet armed forces have invaded since 1945. It is also the *seventh* state since 1975 in which communist parties have come to power with Soviet guns and tanks, with Soviet military advisors and assistance (Vietnam, Angola, Laos, South Yemen, Cambodia, Ethiopia, and *Afghanistan*). *Four of these takeovers have occurred since January 1977.* We can expect the number to rise considerably above the present seven unless the U.S. can galvanize effective resistance.

The *basic decision* for you is whether to jeopardize a number of your present policies (arms transfers, nuclear proliferation, and arms control) and make a comprehensive and long-term response to check Soviet power *or* to treat the Afghanistan affair as a minor episode in the competitive-cooperative mix of U.S. Soviet Union relations, chastise the Soviets, take several symbolic measures in retribution, and then begin adjusting to the reality of Soviet power in Afghanistan and the destabilization of the Persian Gulf region it portends. I strongly urge you to make this a turning point at which you begin a sustained and comprehensive strategy for preventing the expansion of Soviet power projection.

The context for a major strategic turn is four classes of actions involving three interrelated regions. The regions are the Persian Gulf, Europe, and East Asia. We have an alliance system and military deployments in two of these regions. We are only beginning to create a significant military posture in the third, the Persian Gulf. Actions in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan should be

taken in the context of first, the specific needs of the Persian Gulf region and second, the interrelation of the three regions. The classes of actions are:

- those with states in the Persian Gulf region;
- those involving our allies and the PRC;
- those purely bilateral in nature;
- those involving other groups of states (e.g. the NAM, the UN).

I. Actions for the Persian Gulf region.

They should be directed at three objectives: (a) a de facto security system for the Saudi Arabian peninsula, (b) restoration of the “northern tier” (Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan), and (c) support of the insurgents in Afghanistan. They should include at a minimum:

- a direct offer of large military assistance to Pakistan;
- speed up of our acquisition of bases and a new unified military command structure for the region;
- covert action in South Yemen and Eritrea as well as in Iran and Afghanistan;
- an aid package for Turkey (funded almost entirely by Bonn and perhaps other European allies) in exchange for Turkish help in Iran and with Pakistan.

II. Actions involving our Allies.

These must provide a structure for allied support. Our well-established NATO programs, the LTDP, LRTNF, and the commitment to three percent increases in defense spending offer a military context. Economic measures toward the Persian Gulf and Moscow offer another context. Political steps provide a third context. The PRC, of course, is a separate but important factor. These actions should include as a minimum:

a. Military

- Belgian and Dutch unequivocal commitment to LRTNF.
- A renewed commitment to increase defense spending by three percent, perhaps four percent for the next two years.
- Renewed efforts to bring Greece back into the NATO command system.³
- Military aid to Turkey.⁴

³ See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXI, Cyprus; Turkey; Greece, Documents 200, 205, 206, 208, 209, and 211.

⁴ See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXI, Cyprus; Turkey; Greece, Documents 148 and 149.

b. *Economic*

—Major German financing for Turkey in exchange for Turkish cooperation in Iran.⁵

—An EC review of East-West trade and credit policy.

—Renewed public commitment to COCOM.

—An early economic summit this spring to discuss coordination of East-West trade and energy policy, particularly Allied support of U.S. bilateral economic measures toward the USSR.

c. *Political*

—Ask all NATO states to reduce their level of diplomatic and cultural relations with the USSR in a demonstrable fashion.⁶

—NATO and other U.S. military allies withhold participation in the Moscow Olympics pending Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

—Ask the North Atlantic Council to recommend other political steps for the alliance such as approaches to the neutrals, to Yugoslavia, tactics in CSCE, and relations with China.

d. *The PRC.*

Harold Brown's trip to China, of course, provides a ready basis for discussing with the Chinese our policy toward Afghanistan. In addition to the agenda he already has planned, Harold should seek PRC views on actions that might be useful in connection with Afghanistan.⁷ The key choice with respect to the PRC is how far to go toward a military relationship with China. I would recommend going no farther now than to let the communique show that Afghanistan was discussed as a threat to peace which may require actions by both parties. We will not be backing off the Vice President's disclaimer about seeking a military tie, but we will make more vivid the specter of such a tie. We can add substance to the specter by degrees later this year.

III. *Bilateral Actions*

They fall into the following categories: (a) political/diplomatic; (b) arms control; (c) economic; (d) military. The following actions should be spread over the next several weeks, maybe months, depending on Soviet reactions:

a. *Political/Diplomatic*

—Reduce social participation at Soviet embassy functions worldwide for the next several months.

—Restrict Soviet diplomatic access in Washington, making it noticeably less than at present.

⁵ See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXI, Cyprus; Turkey; Greece, Document 158.

⁶ See Document 146.

⁷ See Documents 149 and 150.

—Expel a number of Soviet espionage agents within the next few weeks or months.

—Reduce Soviet media representation.

b. *Arms Control*

—Announce that you have directed a major review of arms control negotiations under the criteria of PD–50 to be completed and submitted to you by April. This would put the issue of arms control in question without actually backing away from agreements, as you may be pressed to do in the case of SALT.

—Break off the Indian Ocean Arms Talks and CAT.

c. *Economic*

—Suspend indefinitely all U.S.-USSR Joint Economic Commission meetings.

—Postpone all scientific exchange meetings scheduled this spring.

—Exercise the option you created in 1978 to deny oil production technology transfers. The administrative process for this is already in place and regularly followed.

—Initiate a PRM on the sale of wheat to the USSR and make it public that such a review is in progress. By summer we will be able to judge the political and economic wisdom of denying wheat sales to the Soviets. In the interim, the threat is raised.

d. *Military*

—Re-emphasize to the U.S. public the importance of the FY 1981 defense budget proposal to Congress as essential to prevent Soviet power projection.⁸

—If the political and military climate worsens in the next few months, request that Congress re-instate military registration. Alternatively, your report to the Congress in January on military manpower could ask the Congress to consider military registration.⁹

IV. *Actions involving other groups of States.*

—The Non-Aligned Movement should be called on to boycott the Moscow Olympic games pending Soviet withdrawal from a member state.

—The NAM might be moved to take other states under Yugoslav prodding.

⁸ Carter announced his proposal for an increase of 3.3 percent in the defense budget in his State of the Union Address, January 23. He characterized the increase as “essential if we are to strengthen our defense capabilities.” (*Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81*, Book I, p. 119)

⁹ In response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, President Carter reinstated registration for the draft for all 18-year-old males. (*Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81*, Book I, pp. 289–291)

—Raise Afghanistan in the UN Security Council.¹⁰

It is probably unwise to take all of these actions at once, and as events develop, some might look less attractive. It is wise, I believe, to select several of them in each of the five categories for immediate execution and to begin study and consideration of all the others.

Brezhnev will see two great costs for the USSR as these actions are implemented. First, Moscow will lose the diplomatic attention and appeal it has enjoyed throughout the 1970s from the West and the Third World. Second, the Soviet economy, showing signs of entropy for two decades, has sustained some growth in no small part through interaction with the West. Your actions, particularly if they threaten to include the Europeans and Japan, promise sharpening economic difficulties within the USSR and the Soviet bloc. Brezhnev may not yield to economic pressures, but in the struggle for succession after his death, the issue of economic access to the West will play a large role. The least we can do is make it clear that such access has an unambiguous price. That should strengthen the hand of those in the Politburo who argue that foreign military adventures cost far more than they are worth.

¹⁰ See *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1980, vol. 34, pp. 296–306. The Security Council convened in January 1980, but failed to adopt a resolution calling for the withdrawal of foreign troops stationed in Afghanistan. The United States was one of 52 states to sign the proposal sent to the Secretary General. The General Assembly convened an emergency special session that month, and adopted a resolution denouncing foreign armed intervention in Afghanistan.

135. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, January 2, 1980, 1–3:25 p.m.

SUBJECT

Iran, Christopher Mission to Afghanistan, SALT and Brown Trip to China

PARTICIPANTS

The President	CIA
The Vice President	Deputy Director Carlucci
<i>State</i>	<i>White House</i>
Secretary Vance	Zbigniew Brzezinski
Deputy Secretary Christopher	Hamilton Jordan
<i>Defense</i>	Lloyd Cutler
Secretary Brown	Jody Powell
Deputy Secretary Claytor	David Aaron

MINUTES

The President began by saying that the NSC would first discuss Iran and Pakistan and then reduce the membership to the statutory members for a more private session.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Afghanistan.]

The President then asked Warren Christopher to report on his meeting with the allies in London and at the North Atlantic Council.²

The Deputy Secretary of State said that he had met in London with five countries' representatives and then went on to NATO in Brussels to meet with the permanent representatives. He said that the people he met with were serious and in a somber mood. He would like to cover several points as a backdrop to the specific decisions which the NSC confronted.

First, everyone recognized that the invasion of Afghanistan was a new dimension in Soviet policy. No ally challenged the Deputy Secretary's statement that it was a major departure in Soviet policy.

France apparently toyed with the idea that the invasion of Afghanistan was simply an extension of their "surrogate" activities in Ethiopia, South Yemen and Angola, but they came off this position quickly.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Meetings File, Box 2, NSC Meeting #26 Held 1/2/80, 1/80. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Cabinet Room. A portion of the summary of conclusions of this NSC meeting is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 251.

² See footnote 2, Document 107.

There was general consensus that the Soviets also recognize that this is a major departure and were prepared to run the risks entailed.

Second, the consequences of Soviet action were related to its scope and its persistence. Several of the Allied representatives had experience with the Czech invasion and the Hungarian invasion. They agreed that our response cannot be modest nor short-lived. The allies are willing to consider both positive and negative steps. As to the nature of these steps, the allies were prepared to take "serious steps," steps that would lead back from detente, steps that would hurt themselves even as they signalled to the Soviet Union our displeasure.

Third, the allies emphasized that the TNF decisions reached only a few weeks ago were clearly necessary decisions. They also expressed the hope that the qualifications of Belgium and the Netherlands would now be dropped. However, neither Belgium nor the Netherlands indicated that they would take this step. Nonetheless, there was a concurrence that the U.S. leadership moving ahead on TNF deployments was all the more valid in the light of subsequent Soviet activities in Afghanistan.

Finally, the allies were quite prepared to come to the aid of Pakistan and other countries which might be threatened by these developments.

The President asked whether India was discussed. The Deputy Secretary replied yes. He said that even if the Indians rationalize the invasion and downplay it, down deep they will be worried. [2 lines not declassified]

The Deputy Secretary explained that two groups had been set up: (1) to consider and discuss retaliatory actions towards the Soviets; and (2) to coordinate aid to Pakistan. The Deputy Secretary said that these groups could come under the NATO umbrella or they could be broadened from the six to include Japan. The Deputy Secretary thought that it was important that both in retaliation to the Soviets and aid to Pakistan we could use as many participants as possible.

The Secretary of State noted that Ambassador Hummel in Pakistan said that the aid to Pakistan should not be under NATO. The President noted that the French also were anxious not to coordinate under NATO.

The Secretary of Defense expressed the hope that the Saudis and Japanese could join the group. Dr. Brzezinski said that we may wish to expand it to include Australia. Lloyd Cutler suggested that the Pakistani aid consortium countries might be used for the economic aid coordination.

The President asked what countries in the UN might raise the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, absent U.S. leadership. Mr. Christopher replied that we have had a report that a number of countries want to do it—several Gulf states, four to five ASEAN countries, as well as

several of our allies. Dr. Brzezinski asked whether these countries are willing to go by themselves. The Secretary of State replied no; leadership had to come from others. The UK is holding a meeting with other Western countries to consider drafting a letter to the President of the Security Council.

Dr. Brzezinski asked whether there was a possibility that the United Kingdom, Pakistan and China might co-sponsor an effort to raise this in the Security Council. The Secretary of State said that he did not believe the Pakistanis would participate in something like that.

The President again asked whether any country was prepared to take the initiative apart from the United States. The Secretary of State replied the United Kingdom, France, Portugal—they are on the Security Council, but they will want to join with us. Norway would be with us as a member of the Western group. Dr. Brzezinski asked if the U.S. has to be a co-sponsor of this effort. The Secretary of State replied yes.

The President said that he had read about the experience in the UN during the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.³ It had been a mistake going to the Security Council first. They debated it for a long time and ultimately the Soviet Union vetoed any action. Then, when efforts were made to go to the General Assembly, so much time had elapsed that no action was taken.

The Secretary of State noted that the General Assembly was still in session and that we could go there next week. He said that one advantage of that would be to single out Cuba and force it to take a position in the General Assembly. The disadvantage is that the Soviets, as well as a number of Warsaw Pact nations, will argue that their actions were consistent with Article 51.⁴ The Secretary did not believe that the Warsaw Pact nations would ask to come before the Security Council on behalf of the Soviet Pact position, although the GDR, which is on the Security Council, would undoubtedly be supportive of the Russians.

The Deputy Secretary of State summarized by saying that if we are prepared to join and appeal to the Security Council President to put this issue on the agenda, many other countries would join as well.

The President asked whether we should go to the Security Council when the Soviets would always veto anything we propose there. The Secretary of State responded that we could go under Chapter VI (peaceful settlement of disputes) and since they are involved, they will not have the right of a veto.

³ See *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1968*, pp. 298–304.

⁴ See footnote 3, Document 101.

The President noted that Chapter VI says that an accused state has no vote, but that there were also no punitive actions which could be taken under Chapter VI. He wondered whether we shouldn't go to the General Assembly as well. The Deputy Secretary of State commented that our allies say that this is a Chapter VII, Article 39 issue—a threat to the peace, not a simple dispute among countries.⁵

The President asked what we would get out of a Security Council session in view of the possibility of a Soviet veto. Mr. Christopher said that the Soviets would pay a high political price for a veto. We could then go to the General Assembly. The Secretary of State said that we could go to both at the same time. The President said that he also thought of that possibility. He said the Czech example was disappointing because after a while it was only possible to get NATO support for our opposition to the Soviet invasion.

The Secretary of Defense said that we are likely to have the same experience in this instance. We will not get sanctions nor military action, but we will get a backdrop for individual actions taken by the allied groups set up by Mr. Christopher.

Dr. Brzezinski asked what forum would be best for a punitive public relations exercise. He thought that probably the General Assembly, but that would depend on what the members are prepared to do. In the Security Council, he noted, we can already tell who will support strong action and who will equivocate. The Secretary of State was of the opinion that Bangladesh will not vote against the Soviets in the final analysis.

The Secretary of Defense repeated that, nonetheless, the Security Council debate would provide a positive backdrop for actions to be developed in the groups set up by Warren Christopher.

The Secretary of State said that there was a strong desire by Western nations to take this issue to the Security Council. We do not want to be in a position of blocking this effort. The question is whether we should also go to the General Assembly while it is still in session.

The President said his preference would be to go to both the General Assembly and the Security Council. We should go as far as we can and try to get others to join us. He concluded by saying he was willing

⁵ Article 39, Chapter VII of the UN Charter, "Action With Respect to Threats to Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression," reads: "The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security." Article 41 discusses the non-military measures UN members may take in protest against aggression as defined in Article 39. Article 42 lists military measures UN members may take if the non-military measures described in Article 41 prove inadequate.

to accept going only to the Security Council until he had read about our experience during the Czech invasion.

Dr. Brzezinski endorsed the idea of going both to the General Assembly and the Security Council. Mr. Powell said he thought it would make the price of a veto much higher for the Soviet Union.

Dr. Brzezinski asked whether Warren could do both. The Secretary of State thought the answer was yes. He said we will get arguments against it, but he thought it was possible. The President noted that if the Soviets are on the verge of vetoing this matter in the Security Council, it would hurt them in the General Assembly.

The President summarized by saying that he thought we ought to go all out in the UN and in other respects in regard to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. He said he was convinced that we will not be able to get the Soviets to pull out of Afghanistan, but Soviet actions over the next ten to twenty years will be colored by our behavior in this crisis. The President said that if the Gulf states and others are too timid, we should go with our NATO allies and China to try to do the maximum, short of a world war, to make the Soviets see that this was a major mistake.

Lloyd Cutler noted that if we go forward in the Security Council on Afghanistan at the same time as the Iran discussion, the Soviets could veto our sanctions resolution.⁶ He also thought the Soviets would use the fact that the Security Council would only have 14 members as an excuse for them to veto any resolution on Iran on procedural grounds.

The Secretary of Defense and others thought that this would be true in any event, whether or not we pursued Afghanistan in the Security Council. The President agreed.

The Secretary of State asked whether he could give instructions to Don McHenry to join a letter to the President of the Security Council and to urge others to also address this issue in the General Assembly. The President approved this suggestion but added that Ambassador McHenry ought to tell others that our preference is to go to the General Assembly, unless it would violate the UN Charter.

Mr. Powell asked that whatever we do, we ought to do it as a package. He realized that consultations take time, but if we dribbled out each of our decisions over several days, we would lose the impact of Presidential leadership. The Secretary of State responded by saying

⁶ On January 11, the UN Security Council began consideration of a U.S.-sponsored draft resolution calling for the release of the American hostages being held in Iran and the imposition of various sanctions on Iran. See *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1980*, pp. 309–312.

that we cannot hold back on going to the Security Council. Otherwise we will be dragging our feet. There was a meeting today on this issue.

The President said that we should go forward on the Security Council and should not wait for a package. (The Secretary of State then left to call Ambassador McHenry.)

Dr. Brzezinski said we should now go through the separate steps in the paper prepared by the State Department.⁷

The President agreed and asked that Warren Christopher please indicate what the allied reaction was to each of the specific measures.

Dr. Brzezinski said the first issue was SALT. The President said that he had talked to Robert Byrd and the Majority Leader wanted to keep SALT on the calendar but not bring it up onto the Floor.

The President said that he had been able to persuade Byrd not to make a statement to that effect when he left the White House. It was the President's view that we ought to leave it on the calendar and maintain our approach of working closely with the Majority Leader on this issue.

Dr. Brzezinski said that SALT was important regardless of our relationship to the U.S.S.R., but we will have to accept that at this time it is not advisable to bring it to a vote. Lloyd Cutler agreed. There was

⁷ Carter read the December 31 paper, entitled "Afghanistan: Steps in the Framework of U.S.-Soviet Relations," in advance of the NSC meeting. A copy with Carter's marginalia is in the Carter Library, National Security Council Institutional Files, 1977-1981, Box 57, NSC-026, 01/02/80, Afghanistan Invasion, Christopher/Brown, Pakistan/Afghanistan/China. The first paragraph of the paper reads: "There are three kinds of impacts we hope to achieve vis-à-vis the Soviets in Afghanistan. The first is punitive: we want them to pay a price for infringing on fundamental principles of international behavior. The second is coercive: we want them to withdraw their troops and allow Afghanistan to return to a semblance of sovereignty and neutrality. The third is deterrent: we want to prevent the Soviets from crossing further thresholds, such as hot pursuit of rebels across international frontiers or escalation of the fighting with the rebels to a massive scale." In the right margin beside the paragraph, Carter wrote: "1 & 3 inter-related, 2 unlikely." The second paragraph reads: "We are also interested in the impact of our responses on other international actors, including European allies, nervous Eastern Europeans, nonaligned Third World countries, and Islamic governments. Thus, even actions that may make little impression on the Soviets can be of value for other audiences; some US actions could cause concern to our allies." In the right margin beside this paragraph, Carter wrote: "Maximum initiative & action by others." The second and third sentences of the fourth paragraph read: "Soviet reactions may also take the form of countermoves across a broad spectrum. In choosing one course of action over another, the irrevocability of the action will be one important factor to consider." Carter underlined "Soviet reactions," and in the right margin wrote: "need to assess." The final sentence of the paper reads: "Certain steps affecting US-Soviet relations may have the desired effect on other countries, but the most effective steps in getting our point across to Moscow are likely to be those that strengthen opposition to the Soviets worldwide." Carter underlined "Soviets worldwide," and wrote: "true" in the right margin. The table of contents of the December 31 paper, which lists the proposed actions, is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 249.

no sense to withdraw it completely since it was in our security interest, but that we cannot get the requisite [votes?] as long as Iran and Afghanistan are unresolved. Therefore, he thought we should defer bringing it to the Floor but leave it on the calendar. However, if the Soviets veto sanctions on Iran, we may have to look even at the possibility of withdrawing it from the calendar.

The President said that Robert Byrd had reminded him that the Executive Branch has no control over the Senate's calendar and that he, the President, could not pull it back by himself. However, he indicated that he would be prepared to consult with us and cooperate.

The Secretary of Defense said the most we can do is to keep SALT alive. He thought that as part of our rationale we could explain that SALT was in our global interest, but that since other negotiations, such as the Indian Ocean talks, were affected by the movement into Afghanistan, we would terminate them. We would make clear the Soviets have removed the basis for Indian Ocean arms control which was to reduce great power rivalry in the region. On the other hand, the basis for SALT was to lessen the danger of nuclear war and avoid an arms race in the nuclear area, particularly when our priorities were to increase our conventional capabilities. Therefore, we were not pulling back the SALT Treaty. We were simply not going forward onto the Floor with it.

Dr. Brzezinski said he thought that leaving arms control activities out of the measures of retaliation against the Soviet Union is consistent with the position that had been adopted with our NATO allies. He pointed to the continuation of MBFR in this connection. Moreover, singling out the Indian [Ocean] talks for rejection would be unwise since the Soviets would exploit this with a new Indian government. However, given that it is dead already, he would be in favor of simply leaving it moribund.

Secretary Brown explained that the Indian Ocean negotiations were not concerned with arms control but rather with arms deployments. He said he was tempted to say that this was true for the conventional arms talks as well. Dr. Brzezinski replied that if we are trying to pursue punitive action, this did not help since the Indian Ocean talks were already dead. Moreover, it would not enhance our position or embarrass them because they could turn cancellation of the Indian Ocean talks against us with the Indians.

The Secretary of State agreed with Dr. Brzezinski. As for the conventional arms talks, he felt it should be left on the table. But he would not go forward with the meeting next week between the heads of delegation. On SALT, he thought it was important to leave it on the calendar. He reported that Senator Hart and others had heard that Robert Byrd had urged that we pull it all the way back. The President said no, Senator Byrd did not want to do that.

The Deputy Secretary of State said that the Europeans place great store by SALT. They would like the approach that we are considering. They want to keep other arms control negotiations going. On MBFR, the ball is in the Soviet court anyway. Our action to defer SALT would be widely understood by our European allies.

Turning back to the State Department paper of proposed actions, it was noted that the proposed Presidential statement on U.S.-Soviet relations had already been made by the President as had the recall of Ambassador Watson. The latter would be announced today. The suggestion to restrict social and official contact with Soviet officials was described by the Secretary of State as not effective in previous circumstances and therefore was dropped.

In the discussion of the question of reducing the Soviet diplomatic staff, the President indicated his desire to make the two staffs equal. The Secretary of State commented that in retaliation the Soviets will finger our most important people. Dr. Brzezinski said then we both go down hill and they get the advantage.

The President noted that the Soviet Union placed limits on the number of diplomatic personnel that we may have. We place no such limits on them. He said he was against continuing an unbalanced approach with the Soviets. Dr. Brzezinski added that some greater reciprocity was certainly in order.

The Secretary of State pointed to the fact that the imbalance in representation was due in large measure to the existence of the new Soviet UN Mission. The Secretary of Defense suggested that we separate out the UN Mission as a separate matter. Lloyd Cutler suggested we might freeze the level of Soviet representation at the UN to keep that from being a circumvention of a reduction of the embassy in Washington. Frank Carlucci pointed out that we do not have legal authority to do this.

The President again repeated that he was in favor of cutting back the Soviet Embassy representation.

Dr. Brzezinski recalled that when the British expelled the Soviet intelligence agents, they warned the Soviet Union that if the Soviets retaliated, they would expel additional Soviet personnel on a proportional basis. That deterred further Soviet expulsions. Frank Carlucci added that the British, however, regretted this action because they found that they had a much more difficult time following and identifying the new Soviet agents which were brought back into the country subsequently.

The Vice President asked what the disparity is in numbers. The Secretary of State said two to one. Frank Carlucci said it's 1,240 Soviets versus 164 U.S. in the Soviet Union, including the United Nations Mission.

Dr. Brzezinski suggested the State Department come back with a specific proposal on how to equalize representation. The President concluded by saying that he was inclined to do it. [3 lines not declassified] It was agreed to suspend preparation for the opening of Consulates General in Kiev and New York.

The President was not inclined to raise the level of human rights criticism which he felt ought to proceed as vigorously as the situation warranted. However, it was agreed to step up Radio Liberty, Radio Free Europe and Voice of America broadcasts.

Dr. Brzezinski said we would need a small amount of money from OMB for this purpose. The President asked what the allies were doing and the Deputy Secretary of State said that the British were willing to be very cooperative. In this connection, it was agreed to do all we could to publicize the Soviet role in Afghanistan.

On the question of recognition, Dr. Brzezinski said that we have taken the position that we will not resume normal business. But we have left our personnel there.

The Secretary of State said that he had already taken out all of the AID and ICA personnel and he wants to cut the rest of the staff to a minimum.⁸ He said all we have in Kabul at the present time is the Charge d'affaires. The President said he agreed with that if we can fulfill our requirements with a reduced staff. [4 lines not declassified]

[1 paragraph (2½ lines) not declassified]

The Deputy Secretary of State said that the allies were willing to refrain from political contacts with the new regime. Only two of the countries have the specific policy of recognizing governments, Great Britain and Canada. Neither of them would recognize the new regime. Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany will withdraw their ambassadors. Bilateral aid will be withdrawn or frozen. Multilateral aid through the World Bank—the allies will be prepared to join with us in seeking termination. In this connection, the Deputy Secretary of State noted that the international financial institutions were providing aid for Afghanistan on the basis that it was a non-aligned country. But there was now no such basis since Afghanistan was becoming a puppet of the Soviet Union.

The President was then informed by a message from the Secretary of Labor that the longshoremen were on the verge of enforcing embargo on the shipment to the United States of grain.⁹

⁸ See footnote 4, Document 110.

⁹ On January 9, the International Longshoremen's Association (ILA) unilaterally declared a boycott on all cargo destined to or arriving from the USSR in ports from Maine to Texas. An article in *Time* magazine quoted ILA President Teddy Gleason, who pledged that the boycott would remain "as long as the Soviets insist on being international bullyboys." ("Grain Becomes a Weapon," *Time*, January 21, 1980)

The Secretary of State said that he thought that we will have to cut back on grain shipments to the 8 million tons required by our agreement with the Soviet Union from the 25 million tons that were now projected and for which contracts had been let. Without such an action, we do not believe our allies would do anything in the way of economic restrictions or penalties to the Soviet Union. He knew this would be a high price to pay but it would be necessary.

The President wondered whether the longshoremen were going to do it, it was not simply up to them. Dr. Brzezinski agreed. He thought the President could decide later whether the United States would impose an official embargo.

Jody Powell asked if we would have difficulty selling the grain elsewhere. The Secretary of State said that we would have to buy and store the grain. The President noted that this was a considerable amount of wheat and corn. The Secretary of State reviewed our commitments. Our agreement with the Soviet Union requires that we sell 8 million tons. Moreover, we had approved the sale of another 25 million tons. The Secretary said that the issue was whether we were formally required by law to sell the additional 25–35 million tons.

The Secretary of Defense noted that this was a considerable amount of money, approximately \$5 billion in foreign exchange earnings for the United States. The Vice President said that the market would drop right away. Prices would reflect the fact that the sale had not been made. Storage of this much wheat by the United States would be regarded as cash and corn and wheat prices will drop immediately.

Mr. Powell said assuming this is the situation, is there something we could do to compensate, to buy and store the wheat? The Secretary of Defense said it was a timing question. If the price breaks at the announcement of an embargo, then we will only halt the slide by buying it off the market.

Mr. Jordan said he thought it sounded like the total embargo by the longshoremen, not simply a wheat embargo.

The Vice President expressed strong concern that labor and farmers will split on this issue. He said we could not afford being involved, for we will be dragged into court immediately and we will have to take a position. Lloyd Cutler said that it would be better for the President to do it than to be coerced into it by the longshoremen.

Mr. Jordan said that he would feel more comfortable if Bob Bergland and Ray Marshall could explain all the details of this issue before deciding. The President said he thought we should go on to the proposed list of actions by the State Department and consider this issue separately.

The President then asked about France and what they would do in regard to relations with the new regime. Warren Christopher said

that they would agree on no new contacts. However, it was not a question of recognition for them. They will follow the lead of others and not engage in any political contact at this time. They may go so far as to recall their ambassador. They are prepared to make some strong signal, but they do not want to close their mission.

The President then called Stuart Eizenstat and asked him to check on the longshoremen embargo issue and report to the NSC as soon as he possibly could.

The Deputy Secretary of State concluded by saying that we should follow up on cancelling loans and on making no new loans by the World Bank.

Turning to other bilateral measures, the Secretary of State said that he would stonewall on Consular review talks. They were in recess and would not be resumed.

The suggestion to reimpose the travel ban on Soviet New York advance party personnel had been overtaken by events.

It was agreed that we should refuse and delay visas for official Soviet visitors on a case-by-case basis. The Secretary of Defense specifically mentioned Gregory Arbatov in this connection.

On the question of reducing Soviet media representation in the United States, Jody Powell said that he had a mixed reaction. He felt that like diplomats we should go to the principle of equality but there may, of course, be retaliation and we could end with no one in Moscow. [2 lines not declassified] So on balance he felt we could run the risk. The President approved.

Turning to the question of exchanges, there was a discussion of both the scientific exchanges and the transfer of the magnetohydrodynamic channel as well as certain meetings that had been scheduled. The Secretary of State said that he would urge that Representative Bill Green not take his congressional delegation to Moscow. Also, he would propose cancelling the Joint Committee Meeting in Moscow to be chaired by Hathaway and he would postpone the meeting of the Joint Committee on Health scheduled for mid-February in Washington. On the MHD channel, the Secretary said that transport of that piece of equipment by C-5 aircraft to Moscow would have enormous publicity. Dr. Brzezinski said we could defer that instead of cancelling it. Secretary Brown noted that we had a lot of money invested into it, approximately \$10 million.

The Deputy Secretary of State said that they would review for approval any proposed formal meetings between the Soviet officials in the United States at the Assistant Secretary level or above. The President approved review but said that he would be reluctant to approve such contacts.

Dr. Brzezinski said the next and most delicate issue was that of the Olympics. Secretary Christopher said there was strong feeling in Europe against participating in the Olympics. He said that the West German representative at NATO said that while it was difficult for the German representatives to comment on events in Germany in the 1930's, it was his view that the western nations should not have come to Berlin in the 1930's. He felt the same way about the Moscow Olympics.

Dr. Brzezinski said that we could take the position that we will consider boycotting the Olympics. Mr. Powell said we must strike while the iron is hot if we are serious about boycotting the Olympics. If we could get a few large countries such as the FRG to begin to join us, then we could ask others to go along. But if we are trying to get a lot of others and have to slog it out, he thought that support for boycotting would disintegrate. Lloyd Cutler said that we should only do this if it were combined with other strong measures. It should not be the major step that we take. He thought that we could control participation through our control of passports since the Olympics was a private matter. He also suggested that we organize alternative games so that participants would have an opportunity to still compete.

The Secretary of State disagreed with the latter point. He said we should decide as a country whether we are going to participate and not get involved with the work of the Olympic committees. Mr. Powell thought we needed to publicly call on our allies to participate. If we wait to fight toward a broader consensus, the allies won't be with us.

Deputy Secretary Christopher said that he thought a boycott of the Olympics would take us too far down the road. Taking that one non-political contact and using it in this way would be destructive of international communication and sense of community. And we should consider the athletes who reach their peak every four years and for whom this is a once in a lifetime opportunity. He said he thought boycotting the Olympics would be a very harsh move which the American people will not understand.

The Secretary of State stated that it depended on our decision on grain sales. If we do that we would not need to take the step in regard to the Olympics.

Lloyd Cutler took a contrary view. He felt we could only boycott the Olympics if we took strong economic sanctions; otherwise we would trivialize our actions by only focussing on the Olympics.

Dr. Brzezinski said our position does depend on the others. If we go ahead it will be interpreted as business as usual. But with others we could join them in underscoring the seriousness with which the world community regards the Soviet Union.

The Vice President said that a move like this could capture the imagination of the American people.

The President said it sent cold chills down his spine.

Mr. Jordan said we could, as an alternative, organize some alternative games here.

Dr. Brzezinski said if thirty countries stay out of the Olympics then we will have accomplished something. If only three stay out, we should not do it. The President noted that the winter Olympics will take place here and that they might organize a boycott against us.

Lloyd Cutler repeated that we must not boycott the Olympics without also taking action on grain. Secretary Brown agreed. He said, however, that the Soviets are more concerned about the Olympics than grain. It was designed to show them as acceptable. But he agreed we could not do the Olympic boycott without a restrictive decision on grain sales.

The President concluded by saying that we should take the position that our participation was raised by European countries and we will assess and review this position. He said we should be prepared to make it our public posture that others have advanced the idea of non-participation in the Olympic games and that we are considering it, taking into account the position of other countries.

Turning to the question of travel control, the President said it irritated him that the United States was subject to travel controls that they were not. Dr. Brzezinski said it was not a question of control. We both have controls. It was a question of enforcement and permissiveness on our part.

Deputy Secretary Christopher suggested that their proposals on the level of representation also ought to include recommendations concerning travel restrictions and enforcement. Dr. Brzezinski added that these recommendations point towards more reciprocity.

Turning to military measures, it was agreed that a U.S. military alert was inappropriate. As far as increasing the United States permanent military presence in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf, that was already underway.

Turning to the economic actions, it was agreed that we would not do anything about the Soviet MFN. There was concern expressed by the Vice President and the Secretary of State that the Soviets could retaliate by cutting Jewish immigration.

Turning to the question of credits, the Secretary of Defense asked how much help we might expect from our allies on curbing trade and credit. Deputy Secretary Christopher replied that that depends on what we do about grain. He said that the allies have major credit agreements coming up for renewal and he was of the opinion that they were prepared not to renew them if we were similarly going to take strong action.

The President said that he hoped Warren Christopher was correct and that the French and Japanese would not run in and take advantage of our restraint. He said that we ought to make a maximum effort to get our allies behind us. He suggested that a message be prepared right after the NSC meeting giving the allies a rundown on what we had decided to do.

The planned joint commercial meeting and business facilitation talks were discussed and it was agreed that they should be postponed indefinitely.

It was also agreed to postpone the Civil Aviation Talks. The President also agreed that for the time being Aeroflot would be strictly restricted to two flights weekly as authorized by our existing agreement.

Turning to the question of export controls and possible tightening, the Secretary of State asked what we were talking about in specific terms. The President said that he favored tightening our export controls on a case-by-case basis.

The Vice President said that this gets into the problem that we will have with the farmers if we have a grain embargo. They will feel that the businessmen are left off the hook if we do not make a similar tightening in trade in industrial goods.

The President noted under COCOM we would tighten our restrictions together with the allies. Harold Brown pointed out, however, that this only dealt with sensitive exports and technology and did not deal with lots of other trade.

The President suggested that we send someone to COCOM and to talk with our allies about tightening up on trade with the Soviet Union. He said he was in favor of tightening our trade even more than the allies so long as it did not disadvantage the U.S. businessmen in comparison with our allies. Dr. Brzezinski said that he would instruct Commerce and DOD accordingly.

On the issue of limiting Soviet commercial expansion in the United States, Secretary Vance said that he thought this subject needed additional study. The President agreed but said that on a case-by-case basis he would favor limiting Soviet commercial expansion. However, he agreed that we need a detailed proposal.

On the subject of Soviet fishing in U.S. zones, Secretary Vance was opposed to suspending such fishing because we also benefitted from the fishing agreement.

Dr. Brzezinski thought that if we do not do something in grain we should do something on fishing. The Secretary of State said we could handle this through the allocation and not cancel the agreement itself.

The President agreed that we should not cancel the fishing agreement but tighten allocations. He said this should be done irrespective of the decision to be taken on grain.

Lloyd Cutler cautioned that it would depend on the type of fishing and on the agreement concerned. He said we needed Soviet cooperation on salmon. The President responded that this should be done on a case-by-case basis.

Lloyd Cutler also pointed out that he felt he should point out to the group that the power existed for the President to freeze Soviet assets.

The Council then turned to the question of multilateral actions. The Council approved the suggestion that we urge the UK, FRG and France to increase broadcasts to Muslim countries in Soviet Central Asia.

On the proposal to provide a daily circular to the UN and others in the status of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the President asked whether this could be done in coordination with others. He also questioned whether we should do it daily but rather periodically. He thought that the circulars should also go to all the media and that we should coordinate with the BBC.

The group also confirmed that we should continue worldwide demarches urging others to take actions complementing our unilateral initiatives.

Turning to the United Nations, the Secretary of State said that Don McHenry was checking whether the General Assembly has the jurisdiction for peace and security without Security Council action or consideration. He said that Ambassador McHenry would call back shortly.

Turning to the issue of multilateral economic actions and the question of COCOM restraints, Dr. Brzezinski said that we were prepared to pursue the "Belgian formula" in COCOM and this would involve liberalizing sensitive exports to China on a case-by-case basis thereby creating a *de facto* differential. However, we would not announce formally that COCOM had created such a differential. The President approved this approach.

On the question of consultations with others to reinforce U.S. economic actions, the President said that we should consult particularly on credits. That we should deny Soviet Union credits and urge others to do the same. The Secretary of State pointed out that we do not provide credits to the Soviet Union. The President responded by saying we should nonetheless urge others not to provide further credit.

Returning to the COCOM issue, the Vice President suggested to the Secretary of Defense that he use the fact of the China differential in the discussions with the Chinese next week. The President asked

what the allied reaction was to the concept of a China differential. Deputy Secretary Christopher said the reaction was good. The Secretary of State said that on a case-by-case basis we would look at China differently. The Secretary of Defense added that he would not explain to China how we would do this but only the fact that we would do it.

Dr. Brzezinski summarized by saying that we accept the idea of a differential in practice but do not establish a public principle. Deputy Secretary Christopher thought that the allies would be prepared to go even further and Secretary Brown said that this would be fine, but that he would proceed as indicated with the Chinese.

On the issue of increased economic assistance to countries in the region, it was agreed that we should seek additional economic support for Pakistan. It was also agreed that we will urge the international financial institutions in countries with assistance programs to Afghanistan to terminate such assistance. Deputy Secretary Christopher said that the allies will go along with this.

Turning to arms control, it was noted that the arms control negotiations should generally be left alone to proceed as they can. In particular, it was agreed that CSCE would go forward and that the MBFR ball was in the Soviet court. It was also noted that CTB was moving ahead but slowly and that the chemical warfare negotiations were in our interest.

Turning to the question of other concerned countries, the President asked whether Yugoslavia would join us in protesting the Soviet action. Mr. Aaron pointed out that the Yugoslavs had recently issued strong statements and that our embassy had noted that they had acted with unprecedented speed in doing so.¹⁰

The Secretary of State noted that Matthew Nimetz would be going to Yugoslavia shortly.¹¹ He thought that they should have high on their list an offer to the Yugoslavs in the way of military cooperation.

Lloyd Cutler asked about the legal problem of providing aid to Pakistan. The President asked what the impediments to our assistance to Pakistan are.

The Secretary of State explained that under the Symington Amendment we are precluded from providing FMS credits to the Pakistanis. He then proceeded to read the law. Thus he concluded we cannot give money under the foreign assistance act.

¹⁰ The Yugoslav message denouncing the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was relayed in telegram 9564 from Belgrade, December 31, 1979. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800004-0075)

¹¹ Nimetz discussed Afghanistan with Yugoslav Foreign Secretary Josip Vrhovec on January 10. The discussion was reported in telegram 18528 to Belgrade, on January 22. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800037-1170)

The President said he thought Zia had given us assurance that he would not test nuclear weapons but that he could not bind his successor. The Secretary of State replied that the Pakistanis have pulled back from that commitment to saying only that they would not test a nuclear weapon in the next six months and that was inadequate to provide the President a waiver under the Symington Amendment. He said our choices were to either change it to make it like the Glenn Amendment (changing and to or) but added that if we take this approach we also confront the whole non-proliferation issue head on.¹² Another way under the circumstances would be to have a special provision that simply said that notwithstanding any other provision of law we will go ahead with assistance to Pakistan.

The President then asked what our treaty with Pakistan provided.

The Secretary of State then read it.¹³

Dr. Brzezinski said that if we had a one-time supplemental to provide ESF the Congress might support the idea of the “notwithstanding and other provision of law” approach. The Secretary of State then read such a proposed amendment.

The President asked whether this could be put on the appropriations bill. The Secretary of State said yes or in the defense supplemental. The Secretary of Defense noted that the latter would take a long time. Mr. Aaron suggested that it could be put through separately.

The Secretary of State said that we could consult with the Congress on the best way to do it. Lloyd Culter noted that the provision should not be a one-time lifting of the Symington Amendment but should be country specific. The President noted that putting it in the foreign assistance bill might be one way to get that bill out of committee.

The Secretary of State then [*less than 1 line not declassified*] indicated that the Paks do not want to have any mission to Pakistan until they see what the United States is prepared to do in the way of commitments.¹⁴ The President noted this carefully and acknowledged that the Pakistanis want to know first what we will do before committing themselves.

Dr. Brzezinski asked that before moving to a smaller meeting whether we should try to promulgate publicly the decisions that have been reached in the NSC meeting. The President and the Secretary of State said that they didn’t believe that that could be done today. Dr. Brzezinski suggested that it would, however, be important for the President to play a prominent role and to make a brief statement.

¹² See footnote 5, Document 99.

¹³ See footnote 6, Document 21.

¹⁴ For an overview of U.S. commitments to Pakistan, see footnote 2, Document 122.

Jody Powell said that it depends on how we come out on the tough issues of grain and the Olympics. The issues that had been decided thus far will sound "mighty iffy." He then reviewed the sum of them. He said that restricting further and case-by-case limitations does not sound like much. He personally was inclined to have the President play a role and go to the people on this issue. He thought that the decision to provide additional assistance to Pakistan and lift the Symington Amendment would be a high profile item and would be an opportunity for newspapers to focus on it today. He did not know how much we could do in substance but he thought we should try to make a statement by tomorrow morning.

The Vice President agreed that the list was not too impressive. He said the addition of our decisions on Pakistan would help. He said that the grain embargo would be a major step but he hoped that we would not do it. Jody Powell noted that we would have to tighten up other trade or the farmers will say that big business benefits and then we will have trouble politically.

The Vice President said that trying to curtail food is a loaded dynamite. If the longshoremen go on strike, the Republicans will say we are so pro-union that we will hurt the farmers in the midwest just to go along with the unions.

Mr. Jordan asked whether the government would have to buy the grain if we impose an embargo. The President replied that Stu Eizenstat was trying to find out the answer to that question. Lloyd Cutler said we might want a legislative package to ease the burden on the farmers. In this connection, the Vice President said that if the grain is in storage it is the same as if it is on the market as far as the effect on price is concerned.

Dr. Brzezinski said that if we go forward with the grain embargo, we should try to make it a bipartisan effort and get others to endorse it.

The Vice President thought the idea of the longshoremen taking foreign policy into their own hands was outrageous. If we can talk them out of it before they start it might work. But later there will be ego involved in the embargo.

Secretary Brown said it was a question of sacrifice. We could introduce the sacrifices elsewhere. Such as gas rationing or a plan for resuming the draft, which the Secretary favors. The Vice President said that we had decided not to do things that hurt us. He said that selling the grain was in our interest. It requires the Soviet Union to spend hard currency. It helps the dollar in our balance of payments.

Secretary Brown said that if we cannot do things that hurt us, we cannot get our allies to do things that hurt them. Stu Eizenstat then joined the meeting and explained what our obligations were under the

law. He said our obligation is not to use the authority of the U.S. Government to interfere with the 8 million tons to which we are committed to sell the Soviet Union under the agreement. The President asked what were our obligations if there were a suit against the long-shoremen. Secretary Brown asked what were our obligations in regard to the 13 million tons additional which we had approved. Mr. Eizenstat said he did not know. Secretary Vance said that there was no obligation not to interfere above the 8 million. That means that there should be no control. Mr. Eizenstat questioned that interpretation.

The President said we could wait until we hear from the allies before deciding our own position of law. Lloyd Cutler noted there are limits in our ability to control food.

The President said that we ought to explore with our allies the possible curtailment of both grain and industrial shipments. He asked that the Vice President, Lloyd Cutler and Stu Eizenstat put together a paper for him on this issue. The Vice President suggested that we might turn down the Soviets on the 10 million tons that we were negotiating about now.¹⁵

The President reiterated that he wanted Mr. Eizenstat and the Vice President to get involved in examining the legislation. He also wanted to explore the Congressional leaders—their attitudes. He noted that Robert Dole will shoot at us either way we decide.

Lloyd Cutler noted that we will also need to consult on SALT because others may beat us to the punch. He was not sure that all of these items and in particular SALT could be held for a few days for a package announcement. The President hoped that we could make our announcement within 24 hours. Dr. Brzezinski noted that the allies would be able to respond in that time. The President responded that the allies hope we will get out in front and they will not be involved in it.

Dr. Brzezinski said that we will be ready to go tomorrow on the issues that had been decided. The question was whether we defer the grain decision.

The President said we can decide on how to deliver the package later. The Secretary of Defense said that without grain and the Olympics it won't be much of a package.

The President asked whether the allies are shipping grain to the Soviet Union. The Secretary of State said yes the Canadians, the Austra-

¹⁵ Mondale sent Carter a memorandum the next day, January 3, urging him not to reduce grain sales to the Soviet Union, due to the beneficial impact of the sales on the U.S. economy. The memorandum is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 253.

lians are shipping it and possibly the Argentines. The President said, however, we are the only ones with corn. The Vice President said there are 17 million tons of corn in the sales to the Soviet Union. Mr. Jordan said he wished we might announce it after the Iowa caucuses.

General Jones said that the Soviet reaction to this package of action should be assessed. The Secretary of State said we have a list of possible Soviet reactions which we have considered. The President asked that they be reviewed.

Lloyd Cutler asked whether it included the possibility that the Soviets would terminate or curtail oil and gas shipments to Western Europe. Secretary Brown noted that there was not all that much oil and gas being shipped to Western Europe.

The Secretary of State said that the worst thing would be if the Soviets went ahead and tested 14 RVs on the SS-18 and did not abide by SALT I.

The President asked whether the Soviets might do something on Berlin as a signal. Dr. Brzezinski said that this would provide a big security confrontation he thought they would wish to avoid. The President noted that the Federal Republic had been very courageous on this issue.

The Vice President asked whether we had gone over the list of crucial imports from the Soviet Union: chrome, platinum and so forth. He asked whether we were still importing titanium. The President said no, that the Soviets were not shipping titanium since they are now building titanium submarines.

Jody Powell asked what would be said about this meeting. The President said the general line should be to say that things are being considered; that Ambassador Watson is coming; that we are consulting with our allies; and that an announcement might be made tomorrow.¹⁶

The meeting was then restricted to the statutory members plus Mr. Aaron. Dr. Brzezinski reviewed the alternatives to strengthen Harold Brown's instructions in regard to his China trip. He noted in particular that we had added the idea that we would be prepared to provide China with an over-the-horizon radar.

The Secretary of State said that he had not heard of this issue until this morning. Secretary Brown said that that was true of him as well. Dr. Brzezinski noted that it was the Vice President's idea which had been staffed by CIA and which appeared to be an extremely interesting one.

¹⁶ Powell read a statement at 5:04 p.m. that day, January 2, after the NSC meeting, outlining the President's decisions, including the recall of Ambassador Watson. See *Public Papers: Carter, 1980-81*, Book I, pp. 11-12.

The Secretary of Defense said that we could provide them with something to track and give them an indication of specific actions by the Soviet Union.

The Secretary of State said that if we do this without Congressional approval, we will have a very bad reaction. He said he was against it.

The Secretary of Defense said that he does not need it in his instructions. He felt he had a good package already. The fact that he is going and able to assure the Chinese of our interests in their security and that we were prepared to help the Pakistanis would be adequate.

Dr. Brzezinski said the Secretary of State was correct in that heretofore we would not do something like this either for the U.S.S.R. or for China, but that was before we had an invasion and we now have an increased sense of vulnerability in Asia and China is an important deterrent to Soviet activity.

Dr. Brzezinski asked whether it was in our interest to stand aside. He thought there was a difference between offensive and defensive military equipment, and with Soviet tanks moving towards the Indian Ocean, our unwillingness to provide anti-tank weapons was not a contribution to regional stability.

The Secretary of State said that this is not a decision that the President had to make now and that he should first consult with the Congress. The President said that he did not have to consult Bob Byrd: that we should sell weapons to China, including F-16's.

Dr. Brzezinski thought that the public would not understand why we were unwilling to be helpful to the Chinese in this kind of a situation. Secretary Brown said that this issue did not have to be decided before he left. He could raise the question of intelligence equipment and our willingness to give them early warning capabilities.

The President said that he did not look upon over-the-horizon radar as violating what we have said previously concerning providing arms to China. He thought it was the sort of thing that should be explored. Our policy is not to sell weapons. We approve of the ally sale of defensive arms.

The Secretary of State intervened to say that that was not precisely it. We do not take the position of approving the sale of defensive arms. We simply say that is our allies' own concern.

The President said that the situation in Afghanistan and Iran does add a new dimension. He thought that we should be prepared to modify our position but how to modify it should be further explored. Something along the lines of the over-the-horizon radar he thought should also be explored. In addition, we ought to reexamine COCOM and our restrictions on sensitive equipment. The most important thing he concluded is that we give a strong signal of support to the Chinese and of displeasure to the Soviets.

Secretary Brown said, however, that we also need to leave some room on the ladder of escalation, otherwise there is no need for Soviet restraint. Dr. Brzezinski added that we do need to give enough of a signal so the Soviets know we are serious.

Dr. Brzezinski said we are facing as acute a dilemma as when the British came to us to say that Greece and Turkey were our problem.

The President said that he was not sure that what we had decided today will deter the Soviets from going into Pakistan and into Iran. Both the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense agreed that it would not, but that it would provide a signal. Secretary Brown said that our response must make the Soviets wonder whether the next step will be worth it.

Turning back to China, the President said that the basic memo from Harold Brown on his instructions for China was good.¹⁷ The Secretary of State agreed.

The President then said that before Secretary Brown leaves, he would like to sit down and review his instructions. He suggested that this be done at the Friday breakfast in order to confirm the Secretary's instructions. The Secretary of State noted that there were two other items suggested to be added to Secretary Brown's list and two others that he could not agree with. Dr. Brzezinski said that Secretary Brown's instructions were generally agreed among the three of them along the lines indicated by the Secretary of State. He summarized by saying that Secretary Brown's memo was generally acceptable, but that the final signoff would await the Friday breakfast. The President agreed. He said that we should continue to explore what further might be done for the Chinese.¹⁸

He then commented that since discussing the issue of the kinds of signals that need to be sent to the Soviet Union in this crisis, he was inclined to go ahead on a grain embargo in order to give the Soviets a signal on their behavior. The President asked that there be a further discussion of the grain issue tomorrow morning. He said that we need to get broad-based support for a grain embargo which is what he was inclined to go with at this stage.

The meeting adjourned.

¹⁷ See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XIII, China, Document 286.

¹⁸ The President approved Brown's memorandum, as well as additional instructions for his trip, on January 4. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XIII, China, Document 289.

136. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Vice President Mondale, Secretary of State Vance, and Secretary of Defense Brown¹

Washington, January 2, 1980

SUBJECT

Results of the NSC Meeting, January 2, 1980

The following decisions were reached as a result of the meeting:

1) The SALT II Treaty will be left on the Senate calendar. There will be no effort to bring it to the Floor for a vote. Our public posture will be to reaffirm that SALT is important irrespective of the tone of our relationship with the Soviet Union but, at this time, we do not believe it is advisable to bring it to a vote.²

2) We will make no announcement concerning other bilateral arms control negotiations but, if asked, will take the position that they should proceed. The Indian Ocean talks will remain moribund. We will proceed with CSCE. In MBFR, we are awaiting a Soviet response to our initiative. CTB negotiations will continue at a slow pace. CW/RW negotiations will be pursued since they are in our interest. The proposed meeting next week of the heads of delegation for the Conventional Arms talks should be postponed.

3) The recall of Ambassador Watson will be announced today.

4) The Department of State will forward its proposal for reducing the Soviet diplomatic staff in the U.S., excluding the Soviet UN Mission, to the level of the United States in the USSR.³ This should include measures to tighten restrictions on Soviet official travel in the U.S. to the equivalent of those imposed on the U.S. officials in the USSR.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council Institutional Files, 1977–1981, Box 57, NSC–026, 01/02/80, Afghanistan Invasion, Christopher/Brown, Pakistan/Afghanistan/China. Secret. Also sent to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Brown, and Director of Central Intelligence Turner. Also printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 252.

² Carter's January 3 letter to Senator Byrd requesting that he delay consideration of the SALT II treaty is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XXXIII, SALT II, Document 246. The same day, Jody Powell read a statement to reporters that the President had asked Senator Byrd to delay consideration in light of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. (*Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81*, Book I, p. 12)

³ Vance sent the proposal, in the form of four backup papers, to the President under a January 13 memorandum. The proposal, which called for reciprocity in all U.S. and Soviet diplomatic, media, and commercial personnel, is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 1, Afghanistan: Measures Taken Against USSR After Invasion: 1/9–14/80.

5) Preparations for opening the Consultates General in Kiev and New York will be suspended.

6) Radio Liberty, Radio Free Europe and Voice of America broadcasts will be stepped up along the lines proposed in the State Department's December 31 paper.⁴ The necessary funds will be made available by OMB. Worldwide diplomatic demarches and ICA actions will be increased to publicize the Soviet role in Afghanistan.

7) Our posture toward the Afghan Government will be not to conduct any formal business for the time being. The number of American personnel at the Embassy will be reduced to ten. The question of recognition of the Babrak regime does not arise.

8) The Consular Review Talks which are now in a state of suspension will not be resumed.

9) On a case-by-case basis, The Department of State will reject and delay visas for official visits to the United States.

10) Soviet media representation in the United States will be reduced to the same level as U.S. media representation in the Soviet Union.

11) Shipment by C5A aircraft of the MHD channel will be deferred indefinitely.

12) Negotiations with the Soviet Union on the General Exchange Agreement will not be resumed.

13) We will cancel the following:

—The Agriculture Joint Committee Meeting scheduled for January in the USSR.

—The Health Joint Committee Meeting scheduled for February in Moscow.

—Representative Green will be urged to cancel his Congressional Delegation visit to the Soviet Union scheduled for January 11–18.

14) Any meetings at the level of Assistant Secretary or above will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis with the presumption that they will be cancelled unless there are overriding reasons not to do so.

15) On the Olympics, we will take the following position which may be used publicly: "Our European Allies have questioned whether we should proceed to participate in the Olympic games in Moscow. We will assess this question and review the position taken by other countries in reaching our decision."

16) U.S. travel controls on Soviet officials and the enforcement of these controls will be reviewed to ensure greater reciprocity with the treatment accorded our officials in the Soviet Union.

⁴ See footnote 10, Document 135.

17) We should postpone the following meetings: the Joint Commercial Committee Meeting scheduled for April 14–15 in Washington; the Business Facilitation Talks scheduled for January 9 in Moscow; and the Civil Aviation Talks scheduled for February 13. In addition, Aeroflot's scheduled service will be limited to the two weekly flights currently authorized.

18) The United States export controls on exports to the USSR will be tightened up on a case-by-case basis. The United States should be prepared to restrict export licenses to an even greater degree than our allies if it does not disadvantage U.S. business in comparison with our allies.⁵

19) There should be an examination of Soviet commercial expansion in the United States with a view to restricting it. The Department of State should forward proposals to this effect within one week.

20) Allocations to the Soviet Union under our Fishing Agreements should be restricted.

21) The United States should continue to urge our allies to increase broadcasts to Muslim countries and Soviet Central Asia on developments in Afghanistan. There should also be prepared in conjunction with our allies a periodic circular to be distributed at the United Nations on the status of the Soviet invasion and occupation in Afghanistan.

22) The United States will join in a letter to the President of the Security Council urging that the Afghanistan situation be placed on the agenda. Unless it would be a violation of the UN Charter, Ambassador McHenry will be instructed to tell other nations that it is our preference to also raise this issue at the current General Assembly.⁶

23) We will proceed on a case-by-case basis to implement the "Belgian Formula" for creating a de facto differential in COCOM favoring China in comparison to the Soviet Union. There will be no public statement of this policy.

24) We will consult with other countries to urge them to deny the Soviet Union further credit.

25) We will work with our allies to urge the IFI's and countries with assistance programs to Afghanistan to terminate such assistance.

⁵ A CIA intelligence assessment, FR 80-10037, January 1980, entitled "Impact of Economic Denial Measures on the USSR," is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 250.

⁶ At the request of 52 states, including the United States, the UN Security Council convened January 5-9 but, due to a Soviet veto, failed to adopt a resolution calling for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan. An emergency special session of the General Assembly held January 10-14 adopted Resolution ES-6/2 denouncing foreign armed intervention in Afghanistan. See *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1980*, pp. 296-302.

26) We will seek an amendment in the Foreign Assistance Bill to except Pakistan from the restrictions of the Symington and Glenn Non-proliferation Amendments so that it will be possible for us to provide FMS and ESF.

The Department of State should immediately inform our allies of our intention to take these actions and should urge appropriate allied support.⁷

Zbigniew Brzezinski

⁷ See Document 146.

137. Memorandum From Marshall Brement of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, January 3, 1980

SUBJECT

The Stakes in Afghanistan And How We Should React (U)

The events in Afghanistan are a major historical turning point. The Soviet invasion measurably raises the chances of US armed involvement in an entirely new region of the world. At one stroke, the chances of such involvement have now become far greater in Southwest Asia than they are, for example, in Korea, another possible flashpoint. In this regard we should firmly keep in mind that the two wars we have fought since the Second World War, both of them against Communist nations advised by the Kremlin, resulted from fundamental miscalculations by the other side as to our intentions. (S)

—North Korea would not have attacked South Korea on June 25, 1950, if Acheson had not specifically placed Korea outside the US

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 1/80. Secret. Sent for information. In the top right corner, Brzezinski wrote: "I agree and am pushing for more items. ZB." The memorandum is incorrectly dated January 3, 1979.

defense perimeter and thereby reinforced the Kremlin's belief that we would not become directly involved on the Korean Peninsula. (S)

—The North Vietnamese would not have introduced the 320th and 324th divisions into South Vietnam during the fall of 1964 if they had anticipated a US introduction of 500,000 American troops to meet the challenge. It should not be lost sight of that in the autumn of 1964 we were engaged in a political campaign during which Johnson was tarring Goldwater as a warmonger and was stating repeatedly that American soldiers would not be involved in a land war in Asia. The Vietnamese took Johnson at his word—unfortunately. (S)

Afghanistan points like a dagger at both Iran and Pakistan. Nobody at this point can predict with certitude that the United States would not at some future point get drawn into a war which involved either country. (S)

Furthermore, the Soviets and their Afghan puppets are going to be extremely unpopular in Afghanistan for years to come. They will consequently be looking for a means to consolidate the regime and increase the popularity of Babrak or his successors. One way of doing this, which will certainly occur to them, is the promotion of Afghan national aspirations vis-a-vis both Pakistan and Iran. The impetus to the Kremlin for adopting a high-risk policy will be very great. (S)

The challenge to the United States by the Soviet invasion is a long-range one. It will be something which we will be facing over at least the next decade. It is essential in dealing with this challenge, that we think of it in global terms. We should respond to it by:

a. increasing defense cooperation with the Chinese up to, and including, supply of defensive weapons, training, and intelligence exchanges;

b. making life as difficult as we can for the Soviets and their Cuban and Vietnamese surrogates in such places as Angola, Ethiopia, and Cambodia;

c. moving ahead with our efforts to establish a viable base structure throughout the world;

d. expanding the Rapid Deployment Force;

e. establishing a commission to study our manpower needs in the expectation that the commission will recommend the reinstatement of the draft (General Odom would be my candidate for executive secretary of the commission);

f. establishing a firm security commitment to the Pakistanis;

g. shoring up the Turks;

h. using the invasion of Afghanistan as a means to pressure our NATO Allies to stand firm on TNF, to maintain the three-percent

commitment, and to establish a working group to deal with threats to the peace outside the Treaty area;²

i. establishing as *the first priority* of ICA and our other information disseminators the exposure of the Soviet, the Soviet/Cuban, and the Soviet/Vietnamese threats to world peace;

j. removing various Congressional limitations on our ability to undertake covert action in Africa, South Asia, and elsewhere; and

k. most importantly, increasing the quality of our conventional forces to the point where neither the Kremlin nor any other government could have doubts as to our capability to project conventional power to any portion of the globe. (S)

² A reference to NATO's 1977 decision to undertake a long-term defense program to modernize and standardize conventional and nuclear capabilities. The plan committed NATO members to fund the project, slated for 1979–1984, with a 3 percent annual budget increase. See "Final Communiqué" of the NATO Defense Planning Committee, Ministerial Session, Brussels, May 17–18, 1977. (NATO Press Communiqué M-DPC-2(77)6, May 18, 1977)

138. Intelligence Information Cable Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

[*cable number not declassified*] Washington, January 3, 1980, 1847Z

COUNTRY

USSR

SUBJECT

Soviet Intentions in Afghanistan [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

SOURCE

[*5½ lines not declassified*]

1. [*2 lines not declassified*] discussed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. During the conversation he referred vaguely to the number of Soviet divisions involved, but when pressed on the number, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] stated that the exact number of troops is not now important because the Soviets will use whatever force is necessary to crush the resistance and establish complete control. According to [*less than 1 line not declassified*] the Soviet forces will then withdraw. (Source comment: [*less than 1 line not declassified*] gave the impression that this will be done quickly, and will not involve protracted military involvement.)

2. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] wished to discuss the possible political and economic losses to the Soviet Union as a result of the invasion. He responded to comments on possible economic reprisals by saying the USSR is not concerned about the possibility of trade sanctions nor of a grain embargo. He stated that there are people in the Soviet Union who feel a return to the Cold War is better for the Soviet Union in the long run and Western economic pressures will strengthen that group. He said that some people in the USSR feel détente was a mistake and the invasion was a decisive way to end détente. He pointed to the failure of the efforts to halt the arms race, which had led to more defense spending instead of less. He noted that the U.S. had refused to work with the Soviets on any level and that the U.S. had boxed in the Soviets. (Source comment: [*less than 1 line not declassified*] never stated which people felt boxed in, nor which people wished to end détente.)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Box 2, Afghanistan: 1/3/80. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. Printed from a copy received in the White House Situation Room.

3. He said there are some people in the USSR who wish to act the role of a super power, which means to be “unpunishable”. According to [less than 1 line not declassified] the Afganistan invasion is allowing that group in the Soviet leadership to prove to the world that the Soviet Union is now truly a super power as the West is powerless to interfere.

4. [less than 1 line not declassified] stated he hoped the U.S. would recognize the new government and work with it, as the new government would bring stability to the region.

5. File [less than 1 line not declassified].

**139. Memorandum From Special Assistant [name not declassified]
to Director of Central Intelligence Turner¹**

Washington, January 3, 1980

SUBJECT

Support to Afghan Guerrillas

1. [less than 1 line not declassified] from 1963–1965. Those were the years we started increasing our support to the Meo tribesmen loyal to Vang Pao.² Better armed, the Meo did increase their harassment of the Viet Cong. The increase in activities brought more casualties. We were able to justify the loss of life on the basis that we were contributing to the efforts of our allies in Vietnam. By 1975 several generations of Meo tribesmen in Laos were dead and a substantial part of the tribe had to go into exile.

2. I do not believe any responsible person in the Intelligence Community believes the Afghan guerrillas can oust the Soviets from Afghanistan or even make their stay in the country untenable. At the most the guerrillas will serve as pin pricks in an elephant’s hide. The repercussions for them, however, are probably going to be fierce. Providing them more arms will merely increase the number of casualties the guerrillas will suffer. Can we justify this to ourselves?

[name not declassified]

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00112R: Subject Files, Box 12, [folder title not declassified]. Confidential; [handling restriction not declassified]. Turner initialed at the top of the memorandum on January 15.

² Major General Vang Pao, Royal Lao Army, was the leader of the Hmong (Meo) forces in Laos and Vietnam.

140. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, January 3, 1980

SUBJECT

Strategic Reaction to the Afghanistan Problem

The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan is the first time since 1945 that the Soviet Union used its military forces directly to expand its power. This took place even though we warned the Soviet Union of adverse consequences. Moreover, Afghanistan is the seventh state since 1975 in which communist parties have come to power with Soviet guns and tanks, with Soviet military power and assistance (Vietnam, Angola, Laos, South Yemen, Cambodia, Ethiopia, and now probably Afghanistan). Four of these takeovers occurred since January 1977.

I think it is clear that the Soviets have discounted our likely reaction and that they have concluded that our previous expressions of concern need not be heeded. In effect, because we did not overreact to their previous acts of assertiveness, they have discounted the likelihood of a genuinely punitive reaction on our part to this extraordinary application of Soviet military power.

In the light of the foregoing, I would like to urge you to consider altering our formula on arms for China from "we will not sell arms to China" to "we will not sell offensive arms to China." This shift in formulation would enable you to provide the Chinese with the over-the-horizon radar and perhaps later with anti-tank weaponry. Given the scale and the boldness of the Soviet move, these reactions are both needed and hardly excessive. Moreover, they would communicate tangibly our willingness to support those who are prepared to stand up to the Soviets, and the Chinese are certainly in that category.

More broadly, we have to move deliberately to fashion a wider security arrangement for the region, lest Soviet influence spread rapidly from Afghanistan to Pakistan and Iran. I cannot emphasize strongly enough the strategic consequences of such a development. It would place in direct jeopardy our most vital interests in the Middle East.

¹ Source: Carter Library, President's Files, Plains File, President's Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 1, Afghanistan, 3/78–2/80. Secret. Carter initialed "C" in the top right corner. Next to the subject line, Brzezinski wrote: "(This was drafted before your very eloquent statement this afternoon. But the recommendations still stand.)" This was a possible reference to the White House statement read by Jody Powell on January 3. See footnote 2, Document 136.

The recommended subtle change in terminology, initiating a limited defense arrangement with China, could be the point of departure for a wider security effort in the region. You are already moving firmly on Pakistan, and I believe the Congress will support you. We should implement rapidly your decisions on new bases in the Indian Ocean/Gulf of Oman area, and survey teams will now be going out.

Beyond the above, we will need an aid package for Pakistan, and that could be expensive, though it might be shared with Saudi Arabia. Also, if we can stiffen Pakistan's back, we should be in a position to extend some aid to the Afghani rebels, in order to keep the Soviets bogged down.

Finally, we need to do something to reassure the Egyptians, the Saudis, and others on the Arabian peninsula that the U.S. is prepared to assert its power, and that requires a visible military presence in the area now. You might consider consulting with Sadat about military deployment to an Egyptian base of a U.S. brigade for joint maneuvers. This would be an impressive demonstration of U.S. determination to contest, if necessary, Soviet military preeminence in the region.

The above recommendations require major decisions by you, but I believe that a major historical turning point has been reached. You have the opportunity to do what President Truman did on Greece and Turkey, and I believe that this is desirable both for domestic and international reasons.² The country will respond to a firm call for measured but also sustained action, and I am sure the Congressional leadership will support you.

I would recommend that you raise the above issues at the breakfast, and provide Harold with whatever guidance you think is appropriate for his trip.³

² See Document 127.

³ No record was found of the January 4 foreign policy breakfast meeting attended by Brown, Vance, Brzezinski, Donovan, Jordan, and Cutler in preparation for Brown's upcoming trip to China. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary)

141. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in China¹

Washington, January 5, 1980, 0313Z

3285. Military addressees treat as Specat Exclusive. Subject: Consultations With China on the Afghan Situation. Ref: USNATO 8988.²

1. S—Entire text.

Summary

At the personal request of the Deputy Secretary, EUR Assistant Secretary George Vest and EA Assistant Secretary Dick Holbrooke called in Chinese Ambassador Chai Zemin Jan 3 afternoon for a detailed briefing on the results of our consultations with our allies on actions to be taken in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Vest outlined options for actions affecting U.S.–USSR relations currently being considered by the President. Vest and Holbrooke stressed that we consider this meeting only the beginning of a process by which we will keep the Chinese closely informed of our actions, and said that SecDef Harold Brown would be prepared to go into even greater detail during his visit to Beijing.³ Chai condemned the Soviet Union’s “naked aggression” in stronger language and with more emotion than we have heard him use before. He emphasized: the urgent need to awaken Third World and non-aligned countries to the dangers of close relationships with the Soviets; stressed the essentiality of a campaign to mobilize world opinion to condemn Soviet aggression against Afghanistan; and underscored the importance of taking concrete steps to strengthen Afghanistan’s neighbors. Chai also expressed the hope that the U.S. would not do anything vis-à-vis Iran that might detract from world attention to the gravity of the Afghanistan situation. He said that the Chinese were consulting closely with Pakistan on efforts by Islamabad to persuade Iran to release the American hostages as soon as possible, so as to lower U.S.-Iran tensions and deprive the USSR of a possible target of opportunity. End summary.

2. Vest opened the meeting with an exposition of the information on the Deputy Secretary’s consultations with his British, French, Italian, German and Canadian counterparts at London contained reftel

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Box 2, 1/5/80. Secret; Immediate; Sensitive; Nodis. Sent for information to USNATO, Tokyo, and CINCPAC. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

² Telegram 8988 from USNATO, December 31, 1979, reported on Christopher’s consultations in London. See footnote 2, Document 107.

³ See Documents 149 and 150.

(repeated to Beijing Jan. 3). He also gave Chai a copy of the joint statement to the press issued at the meeting's conclusion.⁴ Vest stressed that all present had agreed that the Soviet actions in Afghanistan could not be regarded as a localized incident, and that they had serious implications for the interests of each country. As such, they justified both special efforts to assist countries on the perimeter of Afghanistan and adjustments in bilateral relations with the USSR to bring home to the Soviets the penalties that must attach to such conduct and to deter further Soviet military adventurism. This sense of urgency, coupled with resolve to display displeasure in bilateral relationships with the USSR and to maintain and enhance our common defense capabilities had been even more greatly in evidence at the NATO Council meeting held in Brussels on New Year's Day. Vest noted that eight of the Ambassadors out of fifteen had cut short vacations to return to Brussels for this important discussion, rather than leave the matter to their Chargés. At both the London and Brussels meetings there had been a sense that the long term behavior of the USSR would be decisively affected by a serious response to the immediate problem of the events in Afghanistan.

3. Vest said that at the London meeting, after an initial exchange of intelligence on the Afghan situation, the participants had moved quickly to the conclusion that none of their Missions at Kabul should maintain political contact of any kind with the new puppet regime. There was a consensus that the new regime was a puppet government, without any claim to legitimacy. The Italians had already withdrawn their Ambassador for consultations; the Germans planned to do so. Both would reduce the size of their Missions at Kabul. The UK, FRG, Canada and Italy were considering reducing or freezing all bilateral aid activities; the FRG and Canada were reevaluating aid to Afghanistan through multilateral agencies as well. At the same time, there was much discussion of the implications of the events in Afghanistan for Pakistan, and the participants considered now to coordinate their respective economic and security programs to reassure Pakistan in face of the highly destabilizing situation in its neighboring states.

4. With respect to the USSR, all participants agreed on the need for strong public condemnation. (All had in fact already issued statements of condemnation, which were exchanged.) All considered it important to encourage attention to and condemnation of the Soviet

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 107, and footnote 2, above. According to telegram 8988 from USNATO, the joint statement was "rather bland at French insistence." The text of the statement and Christopher's remarks to the press was transmitted in telegram 25696 from London, December 31, 1979. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800004-0385)

aggression by other countries, especially Islamic, non-aligned and Third World nations. This would be especially important in bringing the matter before the United Nations, which all agreed should be done urgently, whether before the Security Council or General Assembly. All agreed on the importance of informing China of their deliberations; and actions; and, Vest said, he was pleased to be able to do so.

5. Vest said that a wide range of actions in each country's relations with the USSR had been thrown out for discussion. In no particular order of priority or sequence of implementation, these included:

- cancelling all high level visits of political or military significance;
- cancelling many of the extensive social and cultural activities that have become extensive in West European relations with the USSR;
- increasing the level of restrictions on trade of certain items, especially those embodying advanced technology;
- reconsidering the extension or renewal of credit arrangements (a common element of WE-USSR relations);
- considering cancelling or restricting grain sales, or limiting them to certain levels (a matter primarily concerning the U.S.).

No firm decisions had been made. Rather each country would consider what it could and should do, and continue the process of consultation. Détente activities between Western and Eastern Europe were being revised and the general feeling was to go slow on these, while not cancelling them. (Vest cited the CSCE Review Conference at Madrid as an example.) The NATO decision on modernization of theater nuclear forces of December had been confirmed, as had the firm intention of all to maintain and build-up military forces in the European area.

6. The U.S. had taken these consultations into account in developing its own actions, said Vest. He noted that Afghanistan had already been brought to the United Nations, while our Ambassador to the USSR, Mr. Watson had been recalled for consultations. The President has asked for delay in consideration of the SALT II treaty on the Senate floor in light of the Afghan situation so that he and the Congress could further assess Soviet actions and intentions. The treaty had not, however been withdrawn. As decided by the NATO Ministerial meeting in December, we would go forward with plans to modernize theater nuclear forces in Europe, while continuing to make preparations for the arms control discussions that were integral to the NATO decision. Holbrooke added that SecDef Brown would brief the Chinese in detail on this NATO decision.

7. Vest said he wished to outline a series of actions now being considered by the President on which decisions might be made as early as Jan. 4, these included (again in no particular order):

[Omitted here is a list of specific actions; see Document 136.]

8. Some marginal mention had also been made of cancelling participation in the Olympic Games. Vest personally believed that for sound reasons this, which he wished to mention only because of the wide press attention the idea had received, was most unlikely to come about.

9. Chai pointed out that food imports were crucial to the USSR, which imports 20 million tons of grain per year from the U.S. He asked whether we would be able to reduce this amount or cancel existing contracts? Vest replied that this was something at which we were looking but pointed to the need for agreement of other grain exporters, such as Canada, France, Australia and Argentina. Chai agreed the matter was very complicated.

10. In summary, Vest and Holbrooke emphasized the attention that Afghanistan was receiving from the very highest officials of West European governments, and the U.S. desire to keep China informed of these deliberations and their results. SecDef Brown would wish to continue the discussion and exchange of views begun with Ambassador Chai in this meeting.

11. Chai thanked Vest and Holbrooke for the detailed briefing and expressed appreciation for the efforts Western countries were considering taking to boycott the USSR. The Soviet Union's naked aggression in Afghanistan needed to receive the very strongest condemnation from all countries, he said. What had happened in Afghanistan was part of a pattern of repeated aggression carried out directly or indirectly by the USSR through mercenaries or subversion. If this pattern of behavior is not condemned and halted now, the USSR would continue it and do to other countries what it had done to Afghanistan. "The world will then know no peace." Chai said that unfortunately there were still some countries who looked on the USSR as a "benefactor, their best friend" and a "natural ally" and had not yet seen the true features of the USSR, which was an aggressor nation with hegemonic ambitions. Instead of condemning the Soviets "criminal acts of suppression" in Afghanistan, they tried to whitewash them. Some countries still rested their hopes for peace and security on the signing of "peace and friendship treaties in exchange for Soviet protection." Some still place their hopes of preventing Soviet expansionism in the maintenance of friendly relations with the USSR and the pursuit of *détente*. The Soviet invasion of a sovereign neighboring state shows its true features. Such behavior could never be justified. No one could possibly imagine that a small country such as Afghanistan (that had had rather close relations with the USSR after Daoud's coup d'état) could possibly threaten Soviet security. But, not content with what was after all a rather favorable position in Afghanistan, the USSR had instigated coup after coup to bring the country fully within its control. Afghanistan

had signed a peace and friendship treaty in hopes of securing peaceful relations with the USSR. It had been surprised when the USSR nevertheless invaded it and began carrying out its massacres of the Afghan population.

12. Chai said that he agreed completely with Vest on the need to mobilize world opinion to condemn the Soviet action as much as possible, to discredit the USSR, and to cause all to recognize that the USSR was no one's natural ally but rather an international gangster; not peace loving but hegemonist and expansionist. It was of equal importance to drive home the point that signing peace and friendship treaties did not bring the USSR to treat the signatory state in a friendly way. Rather, to do so was similar to "going to bed with a tiger or a wolf" and to run a constant risk of being swallowed.

13. Beyond this, however, Chai said it was important to mobilize all countries to take measures to boycott the USSR. And it was vitally important to support the nations around Afghanistan and to reinforce their confidence. For its part, China was taking appropriate measures. It had issued a strong statement of condemnation and Chinese newspapers and publications were keeping up a steady barrage of criticism. China was consulting with Afghanistan's neighbors, with the non-aligned and with the members of ASEAN on a worldwide campaign to alert the world to the Soviets southward drive to the Indian Ocean. The Soviet objective was to encircle the Middle East and eventually Europe. Chai agreed with Holbrooke that the Afghan situation and its implications would be a principal issue for discussion during SecDef Brown's visit to Beijing. Vest commented that Chai's analysis and comments on the meaning of the Soviet move into Afghanistan were almost identical with ours and those of the five other countries at the London meeting. All were in agreement that what we did now would decisively influence the rapidity with which the USSR would move on to its longer range goals of encirclement, and reaching the Indian Ocean.

14. Chai said that some Third World countries and members of the Non-Aligned Movement depended on the USSR for money and foreign aid and so "toed the Soviet line," but that Afghan developments will make them see part of the truth. China believed therefore that while the invasion of Afghanistan was a bad thing, it would also have some positive effects. By this act, the USSR has "exposed itself" for all to see, and become, in Chairman Mao's words, a "teacher by negative example."

15. Chai said that, as he had stressed to Secretary Vance at dinner the previous evening, he hoped the U.S. would continue to adjust its policies toward Pakistan and Turkey in order to strengthen, support and assist them, boost their confidence and their capability for resistance. He said the Iranian situation warranted special attention in this

context. The USSR sought to take advantage of the turmoil in Iran. Should that country fall into Soviet hands, the USSR's drive to the south and push to the Indian Ocean would have succeeded. Vest commented that we hoped that Iran's leaders would now realize who their main enemy was and that the U.S. was not their enemy. We hoped a gradual restoration of dialog might take place as a result of what the Soviets had done in Afghanistan. But, he stressed it was important that other countries remind Iran of the perils of having the USSR rather than the U.S. as a neighbor. Chai said that China was consulting closely with Pakistan in the hope that Pakistan could work on Iran to release its American hostages as soon as possible. He expressed the hope that U.S. relations with Iran would not be made "too tense" and that current tensions would, in fact, ease. It was important that nothing be done to distract world attention from the gravity of the Afghan situation. China hoped that Iran's attention could be diverted to Afghanistan.

16. In closing, Chai stressed that what had occurred in Afghanistan was of major strategic importance. It could not be regarded as a localized incident. He hoped the U.S. and China could cooperate effectively on this issue. Vest responded that we would stay in close contact. Holbrooke added that Sec Def Brown would have additional information on what the U.S. and China should consider doing to achieve our mutual objectives in this matter, which he would be discussing in detail with China's leaders in Beijing the following week.

17. For Tokyo: You may draw on this in briefing Japanese.⁵

Vance

⁵ In telegram 594 from Tokyo, January 11, the Embassy reported on the measures being considered by the Government of Japan to protest Soviet actions in Afghanistan. These included cancellation of diplomatic visits and certain restrictions on trade and business agreements. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800019-0271)

142. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Islamabad, January 4, 1980, 0500Z

65. Subject: (U) Afghanistan, Pakistan, the USSR, and the United States.

1. (C) Summary: The Soviet rape of Afghanistan during the last week of December 1979 has qualitatively changed the geo-political situation in South Asia. It has made Pakistan's worst-case analysis come true and produced a profound sense of unease in a nation already wanting in sense of purpose and security. Differences in perceptions in South Asia, fanned by reports of outside military aid for Pakistan, may exacerbate relations between India and Pakistan as well.

2. (C) South Asia can be a fertile area through which to channel our regional response to the Soviet grab; Pakistan, in particular, needs help, and if it is perceived to be adequate, to be funded, and to be carefully orchestrated—with full consultations—such help as we may provide should be welcome here. But the regional and world situation is much more complicated than the environment in which the 1959 bilateral agreement was formulated, and we can be sure that actions meant to reassure Pakistan are in fact reassuring in Islamabad (and salutary in Kabul and Moscow) only if we consult closely, fully, and continuously with Pakistan. Beyond South Asia, the Soviet actions in Afghanistan pose a critical juncture in U.S.-Soviet relations, and it is in arenas other than South Asia that the main U.S. response should be registered. End summary.

3. (U) Background: During all of the last century of the British Raj in South Asia, a dominant theme in British geo-political policy was to make safe the Empire's Indian realm by ensuring that at no time was a power inimical to British interests permitted to determine the destinies of the Kingdom of Kabul at the head of the best land route into South Asia from the west and north. As Czarist Russian influence filled out the vast Central Asian reaches—epitomized by sweeps of swashbuckling Cossacks—the British fought numerous small and several major campaigns in the harsh topography of Afghanistan to underline their determination. In 1880, the issues were significant enough to play a role in the return to power in England of Gladstone.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800009-0322. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis. Sent for information to Colombo, Dacca, Kathmandu, Karachi, Lahore, New Delhi, Moscow, Beijing, London, USNATO, and Kabul.

4. (U) The British aim was to keep Afghanistan a buffer, in the classic sense, and so it remained through the end of April 1978 when a Communist-led, armed forces-mounted coup d'état in Kabul swept aside the traditional power structure and imposed, for the first time, a government subservient to the rulers of Moscow. The buffer was gone, and the heirs to the British Raj in South Asia—Pakistan in particular, India slightly removed—reflected in varying ways their concern over its demise.

5. (C) Still there was hope that Afghan nationalism would temper the Marxism of the new Afghan rulers. The growing strength of a home-grown Afghan insurgency against the rulers of Kabul gave hope that in the short run those rulers would be too preoccupied to meddle farther afield, while in the long run they might even be replaced.

6. (U) All of that has changed with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on 25–27 December and the subsequent installation in Kabul of a puppet government whose power rests exclusively on gun barrels of Soviet armor—the latter-day Cossacks. For Afghanistan, and for the nations of South Asia generally, the Cossacks have finally arrived, and nothing will ever be the same again.

7. (C) Implications: For Pakistan, Soviet actions at end of December 1979 are a worst-case analysis come true. Much has been written, in official and academic circles, about Pakistan's inherent sense of insecurity and inferiority. Born of a negative—a desire to carve out an area for Muslims to live their lives free of Hindu dominance—Pakistan has been dominated by the quest through the 32 years of its existence to preserve its independence through the manipulation of outside forces.

8. (C) Pakistan has successively chosen patrons in hopes of creating a constituency outside South Asia which would remain interested in and committed to Pakistan's integrity and independence. The relationship with the U.S., dating back to 1954, had the USSR as its focus; this remains the core of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship despite the disappointments of the Pakistan side about U.S. "failure" to defend Pakistan against India. The post-1962 Pakistani relationship with China had India, the USSR, and the U.S. as its focus; it remains a shared Pak-Chinese perception vis-à-vis both India and the USSR and has weathered successfully the transformation of the U.S.-Chinese relationship from hostility to friendship.

9. (C) Later Pakistani fascination with the Islamic and non-aligned worlds reflects both a further effort to diversify support for Pakistan from beyond its borders and a distrust of a seemingly unreliable USG. Playing a role on the international Islamic stage gave Bhutto—during a period of national reconstruction following the 1971 Bangladesh debacle—an opportunity to court Arab and Persian oil money as a way of compensating for the decline in American assistance levels. The end

of the Nehru-Nasser relationship enabled Pakistan to crack through India's long blockage of Pakistani efforts to use its Islamic heritage to forge bonds with the Arabs.

10. (C) The decline into irrelevance, and finally collapse, of CENTO in 1979 enabled Pakistan to shed the only substantial block against its entry into the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), a Third World forum valuable in Pakistan eyes, however lame (and pro-Communist) its recent deliberations in comparison with the great NAM days of the early 1960s. A determined multilateralist, with a strong anti-Western bent, Foreign Advisor Agha Shahi has given these multilateral impulses renewed vitality during the present martial law government's 30 months at the helm, adopting for himself the international role—albeit diminished—that Bhutto had sought and expanding Pakistan's influence in the Group of 77, the UN, the Islamic Conference, and the NAM.

11. (C) Pakistan's role in the non-proliferation field since the explosion of an Indian device ended South Asia's nuclear virginity in 1974 has also been an important element of its quest for security. This has featured regular promotion of a South Asia nuclear free zone—opposed by India but supported by a growing number of UN members, including the U.S. In later years, it has also included a decision to develop Pakistan's nuclear capabilities to the threshold of a nuclear device—and consequent nuclear parity with India—as an additional pressure on India to come to terms on a nuclear-free regime for the region. This last has brought Pakistan directly into conflict with American non-proliferation objectives, straining the Pakistan-U.S. tie and depriving Pakistan of most U.S. assistance.

12. (C) Pakistani isolation and weakness: As Pakistan enters the 1980s, it feels weak, threatened, and isolated, notwithstanding its persistent efforts to enhance its security. Its patrons appear unreliable or stretched to their maximum utility. The United States seems less interested in playing a role in the region than it once did, and its energies seem sapped by a failure of consensus within, by its non-proliferation concerns, and by the Iranian distraction. The prospect of an Indira Gandhi government or alternatively continued instability in India is worrying. Whatever comfort Zia and Agha Shahi may derive from solidarity with the Iranian revolution, the Ayatollah is no substitute for a strong and friendly Shahinshah in Tehran. And to the north, the Russian bear gets nastier, more aggressive, and less restrained. In Islamabad, meanwhile, the Soviet Embassy seems bent on a new activist campaign to sow dissent and discord.

13. (C) Domestically, Pakistan's political fabric is fragile, having once again backed away from popular elections which, without PPP participation, would doubtless have produced Janata-like instability in the classic Pakistan pattern. The country has failed to evolve a viable

compact for the self-government of its disparate and dissimilar regions. And despite a renewed commitment by this leadership to the language and spirit of traditional Islam, it has failed to evolve a national ethic to transform the negativism of its founding impulse into a viable and enduring nationalism in positive terms.

14. (C) All of this is made worse by the knowledge that Pakistan's Armed Forces are not what they ought to be. Weakened by obsolescence and financial constraints, haunted by a losing record on the battlefield, and distracted from its military pursuits by its direct involvement in running the country for nearly half its 32 years, the Pakistan Armed Forces have lost considerable effectiveness. They march smartly but appear increasingly afflicted with inefficiency in performing their military duties. While it would be perhaps dangerous to over-generalize, the American Mission's experience on 21 Nov. in awaiting 'rescue' by a Pakistan Army whose ability to move and to communicate any more efficiently than Napoleon's is instructive, and worrying.²

15. (C) A further complication for Pakistan in even responding to likely Western offers of assistance and support is the variegated nature of the interests Pakistan pursues abroad in search of security. Asked on 31 Dec. by a Western journalist how best the U.S. could help Pakistan in the present time, Agha Shahi unhesitatingly replied, "settle its differences with Iran." This would uncomplicate the situation for Pakistan. On the one hand, Pakistan doubtless welcomes the possible new Western embrace events in Kabul may produce; on the other, it finds the prospect of too public an embrace embarrassing and counter to its pursuit of acceptability and support in and from other quarters and sources. Some indeed fear such an embrace will increase Soviet bellicosity.

16. (C) Pakistan's options are limited, however, all talk of accommodation with the Soviet Union notwithstanding. Only the United States, and to a lesser degree, China can provide the hardware Pakistan needs and the international support it yearns for at the present time. But the conservative Islamics—especially the staunchly anti-Communist Saudis—can provide Islamic legitimacy and the bankroll to fund the military purchases and the development projects Pakistan so desperately needs.

17. (C) The heart of Pakistan's problem of insecurity, however, lies deep at home, not abroad. Thoughtful Pakistanis, even in the immediate wake of Soviet actions in Kabul, do not really expect Soviet armored columns to proceed through the Torkham and Chaman checkpoints, down the Khyber and Bolan Passes and onto the Indus Plain. However,

² See footnote 10, Document 102.

the presence of these latter-day Cossacks in Kabul, the ruthless determination with which they were deployed to topple a government, and the expectation that they will in fact fan out through the country, are a source of unease whose full impact has yet to be felt on Pakistan's internal divisions and unresolved domestic pressures. It will haunt the leadership, and it will dominate public attention, forcing much of Pakistan's international and policy focus through a one-issue prism.

18. (C) Sense of purpose: Pakistanis as a whole do not have much faith in their nation or in its rulers. They routinely assume that Pakistan has little control over its destiny as a nation, and there is wide-spread acceptance that everything that happens in Pakistan is the result of maneuvers by forces engaged in a larger game outside the country. They are prepared to credit or blame the United States for almost every development, from the rise of the Islamic Jamaat-i-Islami to the fall of Bhutto and the postponement of elections. Some of this is standard Third World fare, a legacy of anti-Western independence movements in which all flaws were blamed on the former ruling power; independence in this case simply removed the former ruler and replaced his pressures with diversified pressures associated with regional intrigue or super power politics. Some of it is simply a mirror of a South Asian Islamic sense of insecurity in a hostile Hindu world. Some of it is obviously a flight from responsibility, a "cop-out." But a large part of it simply reflects Pakistan's pre-occupation with the search for outside support and a tacit acknowledgement—correctly—that Pakistan cannot go it alone.

19. (C) U.S. response: In our response to the events in Afghanistan, we need to be aware of the limits of the Pakistan ability to stand up to the Soviet threat and even to accept our offers of support. The reserved Pakistani response to our public reaffirmation of the 1959 bilateral agreement and the public hints—unconfirmed by any official notifications or consultations—that we are prepared to do things in the arms aid area which would assist Pakistan is illustrative. Most editorials in the government and the independent press have come out against acceptance of "unreliable" U.S. military aid, counselling a cautious approach to any embrace of the USG, and principal reliance on multilateral organizations including the Non-Aligned Movement and the Islamic groupings. GOP response thus far has been cautious—and skeptical. Pakistan is not the same place it was in 1959, when it would have welcomed warmly such public posturing by the U.S. In 1980, such USG pronouncements, without the benefit of full consultations with the Pakistanis, mis-judge this Pakistani sensitivity as well as the new situation in the region.

20. (C) Pakistan is, of course, a useful channel through which to demonstrate our concern for the situation in the region and our

determination to stand with our friends, but our actions must be substantive—they must go beyond what we might have been willing to do in 1978 or earlier in 1979. Moreover, they must be the result not of unilateral U.S. decisions, broadcast to the world, but rather of close consultation with the Pakistanis. The 1959 bilateral rests on a shared perception of the threat from the USSR, which continues. But we and Pakistan have drifted far apart on our perceptions of other aspects of the world situation, notably (but not exclusively) the Iran situation, nuclear non-proliferation, etc. U.S. actions aimed at reassuring Pakistan can achieve this purpose only if they are perceived to be reassuring in both Islamabad and Washington. They are not apt to be reassuring if they cause alarm in Pakistan or create false expectations here and false fears in India. Confidence in our efforts to reassure can be guaranteed only by close and meaningful and continuous consultations, if not by special emissaries, then by quiet diplomatic exchange.

21. (C) Pakistan and U.S.: As for steps remaining to be done, the agenda is potentially rich.

—We have already reaffirmed the applicability of the 1959 bilateral in public; we need to do it formally, either by diplomatic note or, better, by inclusion of this subject in a letter from President Carter.³ We need quickly to engage in substantive discussions with the GOP on GOP needs, and I would add, we must be prepared to go much further than we have so far indicated if our will is not to be challenged and our aid discounted. Cash sales do not aid make. What we have said in public thus far has confused, rather than clarified, and it raises the prospect of our being wrongly blamed for one thing in Islamabad and for the reverse in New Delhi—to no one's advantage except Moscow's.

—We probably need to consider GOP appeals to support the Afghan exiles in their continued fight against the Soviet-backed Government of Afghanistan. We should be mindful, however, that the exile community in Pakistan increasingly represents little more than itself and controls or is involved in activities only along the border. They have little relationship with or responsibility for the success of anti-regime insurgents operating deep inside Afghanistan. Aid to refugees—now nearing 400,000—is another matter.

—We need also to consider the whole of our support relationship with Pakistan, not just arms sales, however dramatic, symbolic, and relevant they may be. Our focus should be on arms and the means to pay for them, on economic assistance and debt rescheduling, as well as on P.L.-480 and other non-FAA disbursements. And we should not under-estimate the value of political support through consultations

³ The proposed letter is Document 159.

and agreed gestures. But we should, more importantly, look beyond the region to the U.S.-Soviet relationship which it seems to me is brought into a critical juncture by the Soviet rape of Afghanistan and should be the principal forum in which the American reaction should be played out.

Hummel

143. Article in the President's Daily Brief¹

Washington, January 4, 1980

USSR-AFGHANISTAN: Situation report

Despite press reports of heavy Soviet participation in counter-insurgency operations [1 line not declassified] the fight against the rebels is still being left to the deteriorating Afghan Army.²

The Soviets have, however, assumed control of Afghan operations. Soviet advisers were in charge of the efforts to restore order in Qandahar. The air supply of units in the field, interrupted during the Soviet intervention, has been revived under Soviet supervision.

Afghan units in areas such as Herat and Mazar-e Sharif, where Soviet troops have been present for several days, report no serious difficulties. A number of units along the Pakistani border, however, remain under siege. In Konarha Province, a 400-man unit has been wiped out and a regimental commander in the provincial capital has come out against the new government.

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—December 1979, PDBs. Top Secret; For the President Only. The full version of this President's Daily Brief was not filed with this collection. The article printed here was found in this form.

² Reports to this effect include: "Battles Reported in 3 Provincial Afghan Capitals," *Washington Post*, January 2, 1980, p. A1; "Heavy Casualties in Afghan Battle," *Chicago Tribune*, January 2, 1980, p. 2; and "Soviet Force Said to Battle Afghan Insurgents in North," *New York Times*, January 3, 1980, p. A10. An article in the President's Daily Brief, January 5, surmised that the press reports "probably originate among Afghan exiles, who tend to exaggerate rebel successes." [text not declassified] (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—December 1979, PDBs)

[section heading not declassified]

[1 paragraph (19 lines) not declassified]

Pakistan-US

[1 paragraph (12 lines) not declassified]

144. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 4, 1980, 11:45 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Pakistani Ambassador Sultan Khan
Dr. Brzezinski

Ambassador Sultan Khan called on Dr. Brzezinski on January 4th, 1980. Shaikh and Thornton sat in. *Sultan* opened with an expression of gratitude for Brzezinski's public reaffirmation of the 1959 agreement. *Brzezinski* noted that this had been done at the instruction of the President. *Sultan* went on to stress Pakistan's sense of isolation and the questions that Pakistan had about whether the level of interest now visible in Washington will be durable. (S)

Brzezinski confirmed our view of the Soviet action in Afghanistan as one of major and lasting importance, carrying with it a threat to Iran and Pakistan. He emphasized that the Soviet action should not be cost-free and that the Afghan resistance should get widespread support. He reassured Sultan that we will act, preferably in concert with other countries, to meet Pakistan's security needs and we will consult with Congress to reduce impediments to security assistance. Secretary Brown will be discussing the situation fully in Beijing. (S)

Brzezinski stressed that continuation of Pakistani "ambiguity" about its nuclear intentions poses a difficult problem. While we are not making any specific linkage at this point, the Pakistanis must understand that cooperation, especially for the long haul, once the drama of the moment subsides, will be much easier if the "ambiguity" is resolved. The situation has changed in South Asia, and Pakistan should rethink its position just as we have rethought ours. *Sultan* reiterated Pak posi-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton, Country File, Box 95, Pakistan: 1/79-1/80. Secret. The meeting took place in Brzezinski's office.

tions and said that Pakistan could not abandon its nuclear efforts. *Brzezinski* responded that we are not asking abandonment, but a greater Pakistani realization that we must minimize all problems between us. (S)

On the problem of assistance to the Afghan insurgents, which *Brzezinski* again emphasized, *Sultan* said that Pakistani actions would depend on their perceptions of US assistance and reliability. *Brzezinski* said that we are considering what we can do in military and economic terms, in addition to public statements. He said that the President would be stating our initial reaction soon. (S)

Sultan recalled that the Pakistanis had asked Ambassador Hummel whether the US was prepared to talk in specifics, and what the extent and nature of US aid would be. Pakistan needs an answer. *Brzezinski* agreed that the US and Pakistan should discuss this as well as the multilateral support that could be generated, and what could jointly be done for the Afghan rebels. The USG would also continue to consult with other governments and with Congress, and would fashion a tangible response to Pakistan's needs. (S)

Both sides noted that each seemed to be waiting for the other to take the next step. *Thornton* stressed that in order to make a realistic presentation, we need a better general idea of what Pakistan thinks it needs, even if Pakistan is not ready to make specific requests. *Sultan* agreed that a US response that fell far short of Pakistani hopes would be counterproductive. *Brzezinski* pointed out that we cannot generate a massive package instantly, and we will need to talk to others. *Sultan* hoped that this process would not take months. (S)

145. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State and the White House¹

Islamabad, January 5, 1980, 1615Z

79. Dept pls repeat to New Delhi and others as desired. Dept Subject: (S) Afghanistan Reaction: President Zia's 5 Jan. Discussion With Ambassador.

1. (S) Entire text; strictly protect foreign government information. This is an action message.

2. President Zia ul-Haq called me in to his residence at 1730 on 5 January for a chat; with him were Foreign Advisor Agha Shahi, Foreign Secretary Shah Nawaz (both of whom I had seen earlier in the day), and MFA notetaker Farooq Rana. A/DCM Hagerty accompanied me.

3. Subject was Afghanistan, which Zia said he and his advisors had been discussing and would be examining further in next few days when Pak Ambs in Moscow and Kabul would be back in town for meetings. Events of 27 January [*December*], he said, constitute a fateful "moment in history as far as Pakistan is concerned." And Pakistan faces "decision which direction to take." He recapped other major decisions Pakistan had taken during last 32 years, touching on decision to sign 1954 agreement with us,² to enter Baghdad Pact/CENTO, to join SEATO, then to leave those alliances, and to join with the Non-Aligned Movement. Most of these decisions related to Pakistan security considerations, and Pakistan took its decisions to suit its perception of what circumstances and its best security interests required.

4. Now, he said, Pakistan "stands at threshold of decision with only two options: it can either toe the Soviet line, or it can again line up with the Free World. And if the latter, the question is who will support Pakistan and in what magnitude?"

5. He said he "had been pleasantly surprised" by President Carter's very timely telephone call.³ He said he had told Carter that Pakistan had come to feel that U.S. did not "care for this region . . . that you'd written us off." He appreciated President Carter's assessment that a

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Daily CIA Brief File, Box 24, 1/1/80-1/6/80. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. In the upper right corner, Carter wrote: "Cy, Zbig: Pak←U.S. Commitments should be spelled out clearly & approved personally by me. C."

² The United States-Pakistan Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement was signed in Karachi, May 19, 1954. (Department of State *Bulletin*, May 31, 1954, pp. 850-851)

³ See Document 111.

“qualitative change” had taken place in the region with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and said he told Carter he would be discussing with Amb Hummel how to approach Pakistani requirements and how best to proceed from here in light of events in Afghanistan. Zia said he was especially encouraged by Carter assurance that he would do his best “to keep our differences away from this important issue.”

6. He then reviewed recent Afghan-Pakistan events, noting that short of involving itself physically, all concerned had said the USSR would go to any lengths to protect the existence of the regime that overthrew Daoud in April 1978. “But in the end, the Russians have become involved physically” in massive numbers, with three divisions in Afghanistan already and 5–7 divisions poised to enter. He had reports that Soviet troops have been seen no more than ten miles from Parachinar, on Pak-Afghan border; they already occupy Ghazni, Jalalabad, and Kandahar. “We will confront them, no doubt,” he said, “but we must know where we stand.”

7. He recapitulated his discussion with Soviet Amb last week in which Soviet Amb asked for “understanding” of Soviet position. “What understanding?” Zia says he asked; “You have committed aggression against my neighbor. You say the regime invited you in. Who invited you?” When Amb said Babrak, Zia replied that Babrak was not in power when troops descended on Kabul. Soviet Amb fudged, stressing Soviet friendliness for Pakistan and emphasizing gains which could accrue from cooperation between the two countries. Zia says he demurred, citing Pakistan principles and the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. “Will you get someone to call you into Pakistan too?” he asked.

8. Soviets have not issued “threats against us,” Zia said, but the line “is clear. If they can enter Afghanistan, they can enter Pakistan too.” He added his concerns about India to this mix as well, concerns based on presence of Indira Gandhi as either “king-maker or queen herself.”⁴ He noted Soviet relationship with India and Indian noises about possible arms for Pakistan from Pakistan friends. “India,” he said, “can forget that we will ever look east after what has happened in Afghanistan. It would be in India’s interest to share our concern about that.” But, he concluded, Pakistan must know where it stands with the U.S. Brzezinski statement says U.S. will stand by 1959 agreement, even to “defending Pakistan, if necessary.” President Carter’s statement of 4 January “gives impression that nuclear issue need not

⁴ Indira Gandhi became Prime Minister of India on January 14.

be an obstacle;" Pakistan needs to know precisely what America proposes to do to help Pakistan.⁵

9. I described for him in some detail the tough measures in Soviet-U.S. relations Pres Carter announced 4 January citing them as concrete evidences of seriousness with which USG views Soviet actions in Afghanistan. I described for him meetings which have been taking place in Washington and my expectation that I would shortly have the kind of information he sought. I also told him of our conversations, in Delhi and in Washington, with Indian officials in which we told them flatly we do not accept Indian views on the subject of arms for Pakistan.

10. Zia said he is looking forward to visit to Islamabad of Lord Carrington on 14th and has been encouraged by what he has seen and heard of response from other friendly countries in Europe and Asia.⁶ I briefed him on Christopher conversations in London and at NATO HQ.⁷ He also expressed hope that proposed meeting of Islamic Conference would condemn Afghanistan and possibly aid in easing Iran-U.S. dispute. I stressed to him our view—as already expressed to Pak FonAdvisor and FonSec—that Khomeini policy was providing opportunity for Soviets to meddle. Shahi chimed in to say he had made this point to both Gotabzadeh and members of the Revolutionary Council, including Khomeini, but was not sure what effect he had had.

11. Zia reverted to his original point, after a brief discussion of various theories to explain Soviet actions in Afghanistan. He said he hoped to hear from Washington "very soon." He said he did not wish "to create the impression that we are scared or going down the drain" . . . but there is an urgent need to "know who is standing by us." We need "clear-cut assurances and an idea specifically what will be provided. If taken literally, President Carter's statement could mean everything," he said; "we need to know for sure."

12. I said I would convey his message immediately to Washington and expressed the hope that my instructions would not be long in coming.

⁵ In his Oval Office address, January 4, Carter laid out the actions his administration was taking in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. He pledged: "Along with other countries, we will provide military equipment, food, and other assistance to help Pakistan defend its independence and national security against the seriously increased threat it now faces from the North." For the text of his address, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1980-81*, Book I, pp. 21-24. It is also printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 136.

⁶ The Embassy reviewed Lord Carrington's visit, January 14-15, in telegram 379 from Islamabad, January 16. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800027-0342)

⁷ See footnote 2, Document 107.

13. Comment: None of us has yet seen account of Brzezinski conversation with Pak Ambassador Sultan reported in Pak press 5 Jan.⁸ Nor did Zia seem fully conversant with extent of my continuing conversations with Shahi and Shahnawaz this week, or even this noon. Zia made no mention of Shahi proposal (septel) re making 1959 executive agreement into a treaty—a proposal which gives me concern because it could be a Shahi creation designed to produce a negative U.S. reaction which he might then use in arguments against us.

14. There can be no doubt, however, of seriousness of Zia's interest in what we will have to say and what we will propose to do [garble—across] the whole range of assistance—military, economic, and political. There should be no doubt in Washington that in order to remain credible with the Pakistanis and to overcome their resistance to too close a re-identification with us, what we will propose will have to be substantial in volume and composition.

15. I want to reiterate forcefully my recommendation that in our own interests we should find ways to lay aside for the time being the crippling strictures of the Symington Amendment in order to produce an effective local response to Soviet aggression. Now is the time to reorder our priorities, and to decide which of our objectives is most important during the next few months. We obviously cannot pursue all of our objectives simultaneously because they conflict, and in my strong view our longer-range nonproliferation actions should be temporarily subordinated to the more immediate necessity of making an effective response to Soviet aggression.

16. I should add that Zia gave sharp warning—as Agha Shahi had earlier—against any leaks with Western datelines on plans regarding proposed meeting of Islamic Conference. In order to have any chance of success, he said, conference must not be accused of being Western inspired.

17. Zia was in good form, dressed in uniform for the first time in a long time—at least during my visits with him. Atmosphere was friendly but very businesslike.

18. Action requested: Instructions.

Hummel

⁸ See Document 144.

146. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in NATO Capitals, the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Embassies in the Soviet Union, New Zealand, Australia, and Japan¹

Washington, January 6, 1980, 1320Z

4074. Subject: U.S. Response to Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan.

1. (C—Entire text)

2. The following is a catalog of the steps which have been decided upon affecting relations with the Soviet Union. Separate implementing instructions will be provided to Embassy Moscow and other posts as appropriate. This message provides a list which can be used in discussion with host governments of the range of actions decided upon so far. Some additional steps are still under review and may be decided upon at a later date. These measures are being taken in light of President's statement that business as usual with the Soviet Union is impossible in light of their invasion of Afghanistan.² In briefing host governments posts should be careful not to give the impression that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is primarily a disrupting event in U.S.-Soviet relations. Rather, it is a subject of deep concern for the entire international community as evidenced by the fact that 50 nations have signed a letter calling for Security Council action.³ Steps which the U.S. has decided on in its bilateral relations with the USSR are designed to reinforce multilateral action in the UN and in NATO and to complement steps which other nations are taking in their bilateral relations with the Soviet Union. If the international community is to succeed in its aims of seeking a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and preventing similar Soviet moves in the future against small independent nations, the Soviet leadership must be fully aware of the costs of action such as the invasion of Afghanistan in multilateral and bilateral terms. Equally important, the U.S. and its NATO Allies are continuing plans to improve defense capabilities so that they can provide a more effective deterrent to Soviet military moves throughout the world.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800011-0876. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Belgrade, Bucharest, Budapest, Prague, Sofia, Warsaw, Riyadh, New Delhi, Islamabad, Jakarta, Beijing, Seoul, Cairo, Tel Aviv, Buenos Aires, Bangkok, Kabul, and Manila. Drafted by Barry; cleared in A/O, S/REM, NSC, and S; and approved by Christopher.

² In his January 4 address, Carter said that "neither the United States nor any other nation which is committed to world peace and stability can continue to do business as usual with the Soviet Union." (*Public Papers: Carter, 1980-81*, Book I, p. 23)

³ See footnote 6, Document 136.

3. Following is a catalog of steps decided upon which are now being implemented.

[Omitted here is a list of actions; see Document 136.]

11. We will be consulting intensively with our allies in NATO and COCOM and with other concerned countries bilaterally in order to insure a strong and coordinated response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. We are gratified with the response our consultations to date have produced and are confident that other countries will be announcing their own measures, including especially in the field of technology transfer, grain sales and credit policy in the near future.

12. For USNATO: You may draw upon the above in your SPC discussions on January 7 and following.⁴

13. For Ankara: You should make this cable available to Mr. Nimetz for use in his discussions with Turkish officials.⁵

Christopher

⁴ The portion of the Special Political Committee discussion relating to Afghanistan was reported in telegram 102 from USNATO, January 7. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800012–0939) The Mission reported on the North Atlantic Council meeting on Afghanistan in telegram 239 from USNATO, January 11. The telegram noted that the Council endorsed the work of the SPC and the Political Committee on Afghanistan-related matters, and quoted Secretary General Luns: “The Soviet Union must be left in no doubt about the extremely serious nature of its actions and about the possible consequences it will have to face.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800102–0140)

⁵ See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXI, Cyprus; Turkey; Greece, Document 147.

147. Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

[*assessment number not declassified*]

Washington, January 1980

[Omitted here are the report cover, a security information page, and a cover page.]

The USSR in Afghanistan: An Interim Appraisal
(*classification marking not declassified*)

Key Judgments

The growing insurgency that threatened to topple a pro-Soviet Marxist regime and create further instability on Soviet borders was the major factor behind Moscow's invasion of Afghanistan and elimination of Amin. The Soviets thought the Amin regime was incapable of arresting the disintegration and calculated that Soviet troops were necessary both to change the Afghan leadership and to ensure that the new regime held onto power.

The fall of a pro-Soviet government in Afghanistan would have dealt a major blow to Soviet prestige, slowing the momentum behind the broad extension of Soviet influence in the Third World. Moscow probably also thought that dramatic, forceful action would enhance its role as a major regional actor in the Middle East and South Asia and that a Soviet military presence in Afghanistan would place pressure on Iran and Pakistan to accommodate.

From Moscow's perspective, the time probably seemed propitious for the invasion. US-Soviet relations were already at an ebb, and Moscow probably discounted adverse political effects on its international position.

Once they decided to remove Amin, the Soviets acted decisively to ensure that the new regime would retain control in the face of opposition from dissident Afghan military and insurgent elements. On 27 December, Soviet airborne troops moved quickly to seize control of Kabul. Simultaneously, Moscow moved two Ground Forces divisions into Afghanistan to seize key cities and communication routes.

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977-81), Box 6, Afghan Crisis—Pubs Soviet Moves/Options. Top Secret; [*codeword and handling restriction not declassified*]. A statement on the cover page reads: "This assessment was written by [*less than 1 line not declassified*] based on contributions from members of the NFAC USSR-Afghan Task Force, and the Office of Strategic Research. It has been coordinated with the Office of Political Analysis, the Office of Strategic Research, and with the National Intelligence Officers for the USSR and for the Middle East."

So far, there is no reliable evidence that the Soviet forces now in Afghanistan have launched a large-scale offensive against the insurgents. The USSR may first want to see if the new regime can command the loyalty of the Afghan Army.

The 50,000 or so Soviet troops now there are considerably below the number that would be needed to conduct countrywide anti-insurgent operations. Moscow would need a force upwards of three times that number and would have to tailor it to the difficult Afghan environment.

The insurgents are likely to conduct continual harassment of the Soviets, but in view of overwhelming Soviet military superiority, they will not stand and fight against large units. The insurgents are not well organized, equipped or led, but they know the country and have a long history of resistance to foreign domination.

There is little prospect that the Babrak Karmal regime can end the insurgency on its own. Faced with continual guerrilla harassment, the Soviets will be under pressure to engage in aggressive military operations and to commit more troops. It is unlikely that Moscow will be dissuaded from this by the prospect of even more damage to its international position.

The Soviets probably can eventually suppress the insurgency with more troops and ruthless military action. But political costs to the USSR are likely to mount as Soviet forces engage in prolonged combat operations in an Islamic, Third World country.

[Omitted here is the body of the assessment.]

148. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

NI M 80-10001

Washington, January 7, 1980

SUBJECT

Western Europe: Responses to US-Soviet Tension in Wake of Afghan Crisis

Almost from the beginning of the Cold War, detente has been a powerful aspiration for the Europeans. They pursued it earlier and more intensely than did the US—because of their proximity to the Soviets; their individual weakness and hence vulnerability to Soviet threats; their sense of shared social and cultural destiny with Eastern Europe, hence hopes for political reconciliation; their uncertainty that US security guarantees would prove effective in a real crisis; their discomfiture at the dominant role assumed by the US in the West as a result of the Cold War.

All these concerns remain alive in Western Europe. The European stake in detente has grown even larger over time. In particular, since the Soviet Union achieved strategic parity with the US, the Europeans have viewed detente not as a product of assured security but rather as an essential ingredient of it. Chief among the benefits of detente for Europe have been the relaxation of political tensions on the Continent and the framework for arms control negotiations that has been established. Detente has also become an important condition for the effective management of domestic politics in European countries where parties of the left play important roles, because with East-West detente, sharp polarization between left and right is easier to avoid. Europeans count on preserving and extending the trade gains and the freedom of movement between East and West that have accompanied detente. (European Community exports to the Soviet Union grew five-fold from 1970 to 1978; and the number of immigrants to West Germany from the East was over 57,000 in 1978 alone.) The Europeans also hope that in a climate reasonably free of tension, the Soviets will exercise restraint

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council Files, Job 82B00561R, Box 1, Western Europe: Responses to US-Soviet Tension in Wake of Afghan Crisis, NI 80-10001, January 1980. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. A typed note at the bottom of the page reads in part: "This memorandum, requested by the staff of the National Security Council, was prepared by [*name not declassified*] in the office of the National Intelligence Officer for Western Europe. It was coordinated with the NFAC Office of Political Analysis and takes into account comments received from Robert Blackwill, NSC; Jenonne Walker, State S/P; Sandra Vogelgesang, State/EUR; and Paul Cassidy, DOD/ISA."

not only on the Continent but in the Third World, where the Europeans must preserve their access to raw materials.

Therefore the prospect of heightened tension between the US and the Soviet Union creates deep apprehension among the Europeans. They would necessarily share in that tension and in the uncertainties it would create. They would see the interests they have pursued through detente put in jeopardy—their security first of all. The adequacy of means they have to defend themselves against Soviet pressure would be again in doubt. At the same time, a clash between the superpowers would threaten the Europeans' own freedom of action in relation to both the US and the Soviets, and compel them again to rely on US management of the East-West crisis at a time when their doubts about the adequacy and steadfastness of US leadership are grave.

Because they have so large a stake in East-West harmony, the Europeans have often been reluctant to support the US when they believed the issues in question were peripheral rather than central to the East-West relationship from their particular perspective. This view was most dramatically reflected in the Europeans' attitudes toward the Vietnam and even Korean wars. It was also evident in the European reservations about the US alert during the 1973 Middle East war.² It is reflected in Europe's heavily nuanced approach to Africa—the argument that although the West should oppose Soviet or Soviet-sponsored incursions there, it should do so more by means of economic and technical aid to the Africans than by challenging the Soviets or the Cubans directly. Yet the Europeans have firmly stood with the US in cases where they believed the East-West balance was directly attacked—in Berlin, for example, or during the Cuban missile crisis.

How the Europeans interpret the events in Afghanistan will strongly influence their response to the measures the US takes against the Soviet Union. They are likely to view the Soviets' actions as prompted in part by the need to maintain control over the Moslem population within the Soviet Union, by concerns arising from threats to the Soviet role in Eastern Europe, and by obscure internal struggles related to the coming succession. On such an explanation, the Soviet move into Afghanistan might be thought to have rather limited significance in the long run, and to call for only quite restrained reactions on the part of the West.

² A reference to the NSC/JCS decision to place the U.S. military on alert at DEFCON (Defense Condition) III, October 24, 1973, in response to a message from Brezhnev that suggested the Soviets were prepared to take unilateral action to halt the Israeli military from advancing to Cairo. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973, Document 269.

Yet the Europeans also appreciate that Soviet behavior may have major strategic implications, requiring certain kinds of firm resistance on the part of the West in order to ward off any further expansion of Soviet influence in the Third World, to prevent in particular eventual Soviet dominance in the Middle East oil producing region, to deter the Soviets from similar behavior in Europe itself (possibly Yugoslavia), and to discourage Soviet efforts to exert political pressure on the Europeans based on Soviet "successes" elsewhere.

European responses to Soviet behavior in Afghanistan will also be affected by the course the Soviet intervention takes in the longer term, and by the threats and inducements the Soviets pose in the European theater as US-Soviet relations chill. Public opinion will be important too—it may surprise European governments by pressing for a firm reaction to the Soviets.

At this stage of the crisis, however, the Europeans emphasize that the Afghan crisis is primarily a confrontation between the Soviet Union and the Third World—especially the Moslem nations—and that any response to the Soviets must include the participation of such countries. They have stressed that the Western reaction should be directed specifically to the region of Afghanistan, that it should be restrained in any case, and that major elements of detente such as SALT should be preserved as far as possible.

However the Europeans eventually assess the Afghan crisis, the extent to which they will support US actions depends crucially on their own special interests and vulnerabilities in relation to the Soviet Union. The British will probably be most forthcoming. The government of Prime Minister Thatcher, which is uniquely sensitive to Soviet abuses of power and to ideological differences that persist between the East and the West, has already shown a willingness to undertake firm defense policy measures at considerable cost. Moreover, the British are less vulnerable to the Soviets than the Continental countries; they are still protected to a certain extent by a special relationship with the US; and they have rather less to lose economically by trade restrictions. The British also have traditional links to South Asia that allow them to influence events in that region independently of actions the US may take.

The countries on the Continent, however, are highly dependent on continuing oil supplies from the Middle East and would find the prospect of growing Soviet influence on those supplies profoundly alarming. France, in particular, has championed the idea of a special link between Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, and has been willing to intervene in Africa—even militarily—to quell disturbances that might create opportunities from which the Soviets could profit. Yet President Giscard, whose government is already under pressure from

the Gaullists in view of next year's presidential elections, cannot afford to provoke their criticism by taking measures against the Soviets in obvious deference to US wishes; he must maintain a certain distance from US policies. Apart from such domestic considerations, the French government believes that it retains a "special relationship" with the Soviet Union which it would be extremely reluctant to jeopardize. The French have worked especially hard to win Soviet support for the French proposal for a Conference on European Disarmament, and they are most unlikely to take actions that would undermine that effort.

Italy has an interest in supporting US measures against the Soviet Union in order to preserve the status it has lately won in the Alliance for backing theater nuclear force modernization and to enhance its role as EC President and Venice Summit host in the coming months. But the government is especially vulnerable to Soviet economic pressures and inducements—in particular the Soviets are an important natural gas supplier for Italy—and the Italians would press hard for compensation for any costs it might incur in supporting US actions. Domestically, a climate of hostility between the superpowers places the Italian government in an awkward position because of its need for some degree of political cooperation from the Italian Communist Party. Thus, some Italians would be tempted to minimize the crisis, but many others would view it as an opportunity to push the PCI back into a quasi-illegitimate status.

West Germany clearly has the most to fear from revived US-Soviet tension. It is most directly vulnerable to Soviet pressures—for example in Berlin—and it has won, correspondingly, the greatest direct benefits from detente. Chancellor Schmidt's own Social Democratic Party initiated West Germany's reconciliation with the Soviets—the *Ostpolitik*—and has pursued and defended it for more than a decade. The Chancellor must demonstrate enough firmness against the Soviets in crisis to escape unfavorable comparison with his rival in this fall's elections, the conservative Franz Josef Strauss. But at the same time he cannot afford to abandon detente in Europe—and thus the prospects for some continuing improvement in inner-German relations in particular—unless he has no other option. To do so would risk splitting his party, whose vocal left wing prizes detente especially highly. It could also severely strain his close relationship with French President Giscard. The West Germans might well contribute to a stronger Western position in Southwest Asia but they will try to protect their hard-won reconciliation with the Soviets and Eastern Europe—especially East Germany.

Under these conditions, most Europeans will certainly hesitate to reinforce East-West tension. They will try instead to limit and confine it, to ensure that detente in Europe is not damaged at the core. They may be tempted to view their proper role as that of mediator between

the superpowers, as often in the past. While recognizing that they must stand with the US to the extent that broad strategic interests are involved, they will also be tempted both collectively and individually to stand apart a certain distance—to preserve and enhance their own influence over how the crisis evolves.

In any event, their support for US actions against the Soviet Union following the Afghan invasion will depend especially on their confidence that

- their relations with Eastern Europe, and especially inner-German relations, can be insulated to some degree from the US-Soviet confrontation;

- the US intends to preserve the framework of detente in Europe to the greatest possible extent, and in particular to pursue ratification of the SALT agreement and negotiation of further arms control agreements focused on Europe;

- the US will not play the China card so strongly as to encourage an uncontrolled Soviet backlash in Europe or elsewhere;

- the US itself is acting in response to an objectively perceived and substantial external threat rather than to domestic political imperatives, and can maintain firm control and steady management of its policy toward the Soviet Union despite the pressures of an election year;

- such measures will impose real costs on the USSR, outside the European framework, of a kind that will dissuade it from future such actions and that will limit the gains it can derive from its Afghan move (rather than merely signalling the West's displeasure);

- while some costs may be incurred in their own relationships with the Soviets, the position of the West in the Middle East may be improved (by wider base rights, for example) and relations with the Third World generally will at least not be impaired;

- they will not be asked to take actions that will clearly not command the necessary domestic political support;

- they will be consulted fully on the implementation of US actions;

- the US will help compensate for any economic costs the Europeans may incur by supporting US actions;

- to the maximum extent possible they can individually avoid the risk of Soviet reprisals by acting collectively in some multilateral context;

- US-European cooperation in the current crisis might lead to a larger European voice in the broad range of East-West issues.

149. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Beijing, January 7, 1980, 9–11:45 a.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting between Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and Vice Premier Geng Biao, People's Republic of China

PARTICIPANTS

Chinese Side:

Vice Premier Geng Biao
Wu Xiuchuan, Deputy Chief of the General Staff
Zhang Wenjin, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
Zhang Zhenhuan, Vice Chairman of Defense Science Commission
Zhou Jiahua, Deputy Director, Department of Defense Industries
Chai Chengwen, Director, Foreign Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Defense
Han Xu, Director of Department of American and Oceanic Affairs
Ji Chazhu, Deputy Director of Department of American and Oceanic Affairs
Ling Ching, Director of Department of International Affairs, Foreign Ministry
Huang Zhengji, Deputy Chief of Intelligence, Department of the General Staff

U.S. Side:

Secretary Brown
Ambassador Woodcock
Mr. Komer
Mr. Seignious
Mr. McGiffert
Dr. Dinneen
Mr. Holbrooke
Mr. Ross
VADM Hanson
Mr. Armacost
Mr. Platt
BGen Smith
Mr. Oksenberg
Mr. Neuhauser
Mr. Jane
Mr. Stempler
Col Guilliland

[Omission is in the original.]

SECRETARY BROWN: Thank you for this information. It is certainly true that what happened to the Muslims in the USSR will not be attractive to the Afghans. However, it is true that over the last ten

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton, Country File, Box 95, Pakistan: 1/79–1/80. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Great Hall of the People. The original is an extract of the January 7 memorandum of conversation, the full text of which is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XIII, China, Document 290. The omissions in the original are noted in brackets.

years, the Soviets were able to suppress the religious sentiment among the Uzbeks, the Tadzucs, and so on. That is because they obtained little help from the outside. I, myself, visited the area for a few days five years ago—such places as Tashkent, Samarkand, and Bokhara. It was clear to me that the Soviets have been successful in “pacification” and Russification of these Muslim nationalities in the USSR.

Pakistan

Let me follow up on Pakistan. We must also work with others to provide additional support for Pakistan. One of President Carter’s first moves was to call Zia and reassure him of our support. We offered to send Warren Christopher to Islamabad, but the Pakistanis preferred to postpone this.²

—The Pakistanis’ main concern is what might happen to them if the Soviets do gain control in Afghanistan—especially if the Soviets believe that they have grounds for “punishing” the Pakistanis for helping the insurgents. We will do what we can to stiffen the Pakistanis’ resolve to support Afghanistan. What arguments do you think would be most useful for us to use? What do you think you can say to reinforce our representations?

—We are in the process of working out the dimensions of our own assistance to Pakistan. We have decided to seek an amendment in our Foreign Assistance Bill to exempt Pakistan from current restrictions in our law which currently prevent us from extending FMS credits and Economic Support Fund assistance to Pakistan.³ We have already approached Congressional leaders on the subject. While plans are as always subject to Congressional concurrence, what we have heard from Congress is encouraging. We are thinking in terms of providing very substantial amounts of FMS and ESF over the next five years to the Pak’s. We are also seeking additional support for [from?] Western and Moslem countries.

—While we are planning to resume economic and military assistance to Pakistan despite the nuclear problem, it would obviously be easier for us to secure Congressional support for a large program if the Paks reassessed their nuclear activities. We don’t want to let this stand in the way. But what we can do will be influenced by Pakistan’s nuclear program.

India

—India remains a critical element. A strategy that preserves Pakistan but propels India into greater dependence on the USSR is unwise.

² See Document 111.

³ See Document 151.

The key is to get India to recognize that the new situation in Afghanistan poses a security problem for the *entire* subcontinent. It is unfortunate that there has been no effectively functioning Indian government during recent weeks.

—It is important that the most favorable context be created for an Indian policy reassessment. In particular, the Indians must be brought to realize that there is no longer a concern about a threat from China. We think it is important that you renew a dialogue with the new Indian government and seek a compromise understanding on the border issue that would permit India to turn its attention elsewhere. We believe this deserves your serious consideration.

Afghanistan

—The events in Afghanistan are a major historical turning point which increases the likelihood of a major US military presence in an entirely new region of the world. Nobody at this point can predict with certitude what the outcome of these events will be, although the Soviet reaction to various protests and denunciations, including those of both the US and China, is completely predictable. These prospects were taken into consideration by the Soviets before they made their move in Afghanistan. It is therefore incumbent on both of us to exceed the Soviet expectation as to what our response would be.⁴ The Soviets must be made to understand that this decision (to invade Afghanistan) will be much more expensive, much more costly, much more damaging

⁴ In a message to Brzezinski, January 4, Brown noted that in preparatory discussions on the plane trip to China, a question came up for which Brown needed further guidance from the White House: "The Chinese will be extremely interested in what tangible support [*less than 1 line not declassified*] which might involve the Chinese) we are prepared to supply the Afghan insurgents. I believe that telling them of our arrangements with the Saudis, and whatever the Pakistanis have agreed to, would improve the chance that the PRC will join in or, at a minimum, tell us more about what they are doing along these lines." (Message 321 from the Secretary of Defense, January 4; Department of State, Executive Secretariat (ES), Sensitive and Super Sensitive File, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, Box 3, 1980 Super Sensitive I, Jan, Feb, Mar–1980) Brzezinski replied on January 5: "For over six months we have been providing modest levels of humanitarian assistance to the Afghan insurgents. This has taken the form principally of medicines, food and clothing. Contrary to Soviet allegations, we have not provided any training to the Afghan insurgents. After the Soviet invasion, our assistance has taken on an increased urgency and now includes small arms, ammunition, anti-tank and anti-helicopter weapons, and other military items appropriate to this kind of insurgency. Some of this military equipment is probably already in the hands of the insurgents, if not, it will be soon. We would welcome Chinese participation in the support of the insurgency and offer to coordinate what we are doing with them." Regarding Brown's question on Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, Brzezinski answered: "We have no authority from the Saudis or Paks to reveal their participation and believe that, if their participation were made known without their knowledge, it could jeopardize both the current program and our credibility." (Message 90 from Brzezinski, January 5; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 120, Super-Sensitive: 1-3/80)

to them than they had reckoned, and that it should not set a precedent for similar further actions on their part.

—At the same time, we will be increasing our own ability to project military power into the Gulf region. Our Indian Ocean naval capabilities are being augmented; we are expanding our facilities at Diego Garcia; we are undertaking discussions with Oman, Somalia and Kenya on base access rights to various bases there, and we are broadening our discussions on security matters with Gulf states—particularly with Saudi Arabia and Oman.

—By this action, we intend to demonstrate that this region is of vital importance to us, and that the US Government is pursuing these interests with a sense of purpose and commitment.

—That is all that I wanted to say about Afghanistan. I would be interested in hearing what your side has to say on this issue.

[Omission is in the original.]

*Pakistan*⁵

The domestic situation in Pakistan is rather difficult. Zia faces a number of difficulties. If the Soviets' barbarous aggression goes unchecked, the next target is Pakistan. Now Pakistan also thinks along this line. Now Pakistan's leaders are very worried about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

If the new Indian Government should keep on opposing Pakistan, even in a more fierce way, Pakistan will be sandwiched between Afghanistan and India with even more problems on its hands. After studying this question, we have concluded we must boost Pak determination to resist the Soviet Union. Now, after the event in Afghanistan, the US has made a decision to extend military aid to Pakistan. We think that you have made the right decision. We hope your aid will arrive in a timely fashion and that there will be plenty of assistance and that we will not see the restrictions to aid you have placed in the past.

[Omission is in the original.]

Afghanistan

As for Afghanistan, the Soviet's massive invasion warrants attention and concern on our part. In this respect, the Soviet Union's own troops are directly involved in undisguised invasion, like the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Now the Soviet Union has extended its so-called theory of limited sovereignty from socialist countries to a non-aligned, Muslim country of the Third World. If the Soviet Union can

⁵ This and the next section are comments by Vice Premier Geng Biao.

do this in Afghanistan today, the likelihood is that they can do it to Pakistan, or some other country, tomorrow—the first targets would be Iran and Pakistan. While Afghanistan is the first country, the Soviet Union mainly has its eyes on Asia, and the action poses a threat to South Asia and the Gulf area as well. It occurred at a time the US experienced a tense situation vis-a-vis Iran.⁶

—The Soviet Union may gain something temporarily, but in the longer term they will gain the opposite of what they set out to do. Now a new situation has been created. All the Muslim countries and peace-loving countries have risen up in opposition to Soviet hegemonism. Even Iran has registered its protest to the Soviet Union over its invasion. And these factors may help to bring an early resolution to the crisis between the US and Iran. It seems to me to a large extent we should talk to other countries about the matter and do a good job of it.

[Omission is in the original.]

⁶ A memorandum from Holbrooke to Vance, January 31, included the following expanded exchange on Afghanistan between Brown and Geng: "Secretary Brown: I believe we must take action to provide political and material support to the insurgent forces in Afghanistan. And in this regard, I have a couple of questions for you: What support is China currently providing the Afghan insurgents? Do you have plans to expand that support? Vice Premier Geng: We are very pleased to hear the US Government has made the decision to provide assistance to the anti-government forces in Afghanistan and to Pakistan. You know that we have been giving aid to the Pakistanis and they are satisfied with what we have done. As to Afghanistan, we plan to give assistance to various organizations, groups, and peoples in Afghanistan in resistance to the Soviet invasion. We plan to give them assistance via Pakistan. However, our assistance has to be in limited quantity. While Afghanistan is the first country, the Soviet Union mainly has its eyes on Asia, and the action poses a threat to South Asia and the Gulf area as well. It occurred at a time the US experienced a tense situation vis-à-vis Iran." (Briefing Memorandum, January 31; Department of State, Executive Secretariat (ES), Sensitive and Super Sensitive File, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, Box 3, 1980 Super Sensitive I, Jan, Feb, Mar–1980)

150. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Beijing, January 8, 1980, 10 a.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting between Secretary of Defense Brown and Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping

PARTICIPANTS

US Side

Secretary Brown
Ambassador Woodcock
Ambassador Komer
Assistant Secretary McGiffert
Assistant Secretary of State Holbrooke
Deputy Assistant Secretary Armacost
Brigadier General Smith
NSC Staff Member Oksenberg
NSC Staff Member Platt
Colonel Gilliland, Defense Attache to Beijing

Chinese Side:

Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping
Geng Biac
Wu Xiuchen
Zhang Wenjin
Lie Huaching
Chai Chenwen
Han Xu
Ji Chiao Zhu
Huang Zhenji

DR. BROWN: That is what we intend to do, but we must keep our intentions confidential. With regard to Pakistan, aid will be given much more publicly. We are beginning consultations with the Pakistanis about this. We will ask Congress to amend the law concerning military assistance to Pakistan, and we expect Congress to be cooperative. As soon as we have an agreement with President Zia on the amount of assistance, we will start our deliveries. [Omission is in the original.] US and Western Europe countries and how to increase the strength with Western European countries.² I also talked about the need to increase the defense capabilities of the Japanese. On that occasion, I also said that increasing Chinese defense capability will help maintain peace and resist Soviet hegemony. I even went to the point of saying

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton, Country File, Box 95, Pakistan: 1/79-1/80. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Great Hall of the People. An alternate version of this memorandum of conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, Vol. XIII, China, Document 292.

² Printed as in the original.

to one American friend there are one million Soviet troops in the east which we don't think are directed solely against China. But, if they were solely directed against China and if we could pin down two million Soviet troops, what harm would that do? You must be aware of my thoughts.

DR. BROWN: Yes. The question you have raised is in the midst of being implemented. The United States and Europe are each improving their strengths and increasing their cooperation. Japan is increasing its defense expenditure and closely cooperating with the United States. US/Chinese cooperation is also increasing.

DENG: We, on our part, are satisfied with what Japan, Europe, and the United States have done—that this is the correct line of action. If I may say, it would have been better if this could have been done even earlier. If so, some events could have been avoided. Please don't regard this as a critical comment; it is just my analysis.

DR. BROWN: We just should learn from the past to coordinate our actions now and take visible parallel actions. Regarding Afghanistan, we have agreed to follow-on talks and parallel actions. For example, we've agreed to aid the Afghanistan rebels whom the Soviets hope to crush because of their religion and we are also going to help Pakistan.

DENG: As far as Afghanistan is concerned, the only correct approach to Afghanistan is to give aid to the resistance forces, and we should work together on this. But, I'd emphasize that this kind of aid must be more than symbolic. I must note the fact that Soviet aggression involves the fate of the whole nation. Facts in Afghanistan prove that most of the Afghan troops have leaned toward the resistance forces, although some have been disarmed. The Afghan people have been fighting fiercely against Soviet aggression. We must turn Afghanistan into a quagmire in which the Soviet Union is bogged down for a long time in a guerrilla warfare.

Vice Premier Geng earlier assured me that provided aid to Pakistan was more than symbolic, there would be no difficulty in using Chinese overflight as one way of delivering supplies.³ It is also important that the PRC supply the Afghanistan freedom fighters with arms. We would like to know your plans in that regard.

DENG: Since the southward drive strategy of the Soviet Union is to seize warm water ports along the Indian Ocean, Pakistan inevitably becomes the next target on the Soviet list. Personally, I must have said on no less than ten occasions to my American friends that the United

³ See Document 149.

States should aid Pakistan.⁴ With regard to question of South Asia, there is no other way except giving aid to Pakistan. As you know, it has always been our view that the US policy giving more attention to India than Pakistan is not an appropriate policy. Regarding India, we have always felt that the United States should try to cultivate good relations, and this has had a good effect. But India is not a stabilizing factor. Perhaps you already know the general election results.

DR. BROWN: I do not know, but in any case, if no Party gains a majority, it will take some time to settle. Perhaps you can say how that will come out.

DENG: Indira Gandhi has gotten 70% of the vote. It is very difficult to judge at this time how India will go. Even if Indira Gandhi should follow India's previous policy; still India is not the most reliable and stabilizing factor in southern Asia. Let's not talk about Indira Gandhi. The present government is thinking of recognizing the Heng Samrin Regime. Perhaps after Pakistan has been strengthened, India will become a more stabilizing factor. What one should try to achieve is to make Pakistan a genuine stabilizing factor in South Asia. We hope the United States will give earnest and sincere thought to this question. If one does not keep this clear in one's mind, then one's attitude toward India will make one vacillate in one's position toward Pakistan. In the past the United States has refrained from aiding Pakistan. I think in part this is the work of India, probably because of a fear of offending India. Since you now have decided to aid Pakistan, I am sure India will send you one note after another, strongly objecting.

DR. BROWN: There are limits on our ability to aid Pakistan because of their nuclear explosive program. Although we still object to their doing so, we will now set that aside for the time being, to facilitate strengthening Pakistan against potential Soviet action.

DENG: That is a very good approach. Pakistan has its own reasons for developing a nuclear program. We ourselves oppose the Pakistan effort on nuclear weapons because we believe it meaningless to spend money on such a program. Pakistan has its own arguments, i.e., India has exploded a nuclear device but the world has not seemed to complain about this. So now you have decided to put this aside and solve the question of military and economic aid to Pakistan. We applaud

⁴ In a cabled message from Brown to Vance (with the request that Vance pass the message on to Carter, Brzezinski, and Claytor), January 8, Brown noted: "The Chinese are obviously pleased at the change in direction that they feel we are embarking on with regard to Pakistan, although Deng could not resist this morning telling me he had urged such steps on us for a long time." (Telegram 207 from Beijing, January 8; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Box 3, Afghanistan: 1/8/80)

this decision. We give large amounts of assistance to Pakistan. One can say that great amounts of military equipment now in the hands of Pakistani troops come from China. In order to strengthen our links with Pakistan, we have built a highway in the most difficult terrain through the mountains. The question of continuing Chinese aid to Pakistan does not exist. Moreover, Chinese armaments are rather poor in quality. While the United States has decided to give aid to Pakistan, you must now convince Pakistan this is a sincere and genuine US effort and make them believe that they will benefit from modern US weapons. I know that the Pakistanis have many grievances against the United States. This developed to the point that Pakistan withdrew from CENTO. Have you approached Pakistan on the aid question?

DR. BROWN: We have given them some information and will give them more. Pakistan has indicated that they did not wish to have a visit from a survey team until they have received answers to their questions on the magnitude and type of supplies we have in mind.

DENG: You should directly approach Pakistan to raise this question. I would like to cite an episode. It was through the work of Pakistan that Henry Kissinger came to China to talk about normalization and to set the trip of President Nixon.⁵ Since you were able to talk with them about this, you should be able to talk to them now.

DR. BROWN: I am aware of this Pakistani help, and this will help put aside some of our reservations.

DENG: You may recall that I raised the question of aid to Pakistan with President Carter.⁶ He said the US will give aid in proportion to the population of the two countries. I said this was not feasible. The Pakistanis and Indians are afraid of each other. If the population ratio formula should be used, Pakistan will be in an increasingly inferior position. We hope that since the United States decided to give aid to Pakistan, it will really satisfy Pakistan's requirements. We hope your aid to Pakistan will not be affected too much by India's reaction. This is especially important since Indira Gandhi has come into office. We hope the US will not mention the Pakistani nuclear program because India has already said that the United States has supplied them with enriched uranium.

DR. BROWN: We will continue to maintain our opposition against Pakistani nuclear development, but we nonetheless will also provide aid to Pakistan. But we must also remember that Soviet actions are directed not only at Pakistan but also at Iran. The United States is in

⁵ See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, Document 90.

⁶ See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XIII, China, Document 204.

a very difficult position vis-a-vis Iran. Iran is a very complicated question. So long as the hostages are held, we cannot have good relations. We need Chinese support on the United Nations sanctions because if there is no vote for sanctions there will be increasing pressure on the United States to take unilateral action against Iran. That could be damaging but necessary. In that event US-Sino relations would be strained. We were grateful for Chinese cooperation in December in the United Nations Security Council and I hope this will continue. We need an affirmative Chinese vote in the UN Security Council.

DENG: May I return to Pakistan? I believe it is better if US would enter direct discussions with Pakistan. Chinese policy with regard to aid to Pakistan has been consistent for the past twenty years. Regarding Chinese aid to Afghanistan resistance forces, we are supporting the refugees through Pakistan. Regarding how the US feels about giving aid to resistance forces in Afghanistan, you may wish to discuss this with the Pakistanis. There are perhaps already 400,000 Afghan refugees living in Pakistan.

151. Editorial Note

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan created a new urgency in the Carter administration to finalize a military and economic assistance program for Pakistan. This required a balancing act to satisfy several interrelated objectives of U.S. foreign policy in the region: enhance Pakistan's defense capabilities in the event that the insurgency in Afghanistan spilled into Pakistan; bolster Pakistan's economic capacity to manage the swelling Afghan refugee population in Pakistan as a result of the fighting; find a workaround to the Symington Amendment's prohibition on military aid to Pakistan so long as it continued its nuclear enrichment program; and finally, provide military assistance in a way that did not further aggravate tensions with India. A series of memoranda, culminating in a memorandum from the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, Zbigniew Brzezinski, to President Carter, January 8, 1980, put the final touches on the assistance package. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Meetings File, Box 78, Sensitive X: 1/80; scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XIX, South Asia)

In the memorandum, Brzezinski noted to Carter that, with the upcoming visit of Agha Shahi, "we need your guidance on a range of issues so we speak with one voice." He listed three items for Carter's

decision. The first sought Carter's approval to take legislative steps to exempt Pakistan from the Symington Amendment. Carter approved, and wrote in the right margin: "I would still prefer some mention of non-prolif. assurance—not exceeding those we have already gotten." The second item, with several sub-items, summarized an attached memorandum from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) regarding the military and economic assistance package to Pakistan. The issue for Carter's decision included \$100 million in Foreign Military Sales credit, about which Brzezinski noted: "All agencies agree that this is required." Carter approved the sub-item. Next was \$100 million in Economic Support Funds. Brzezinski noted: "All agencies agree in this sum," and the only question was if the aid should be conditional. Brzezinski concurred with the Department of State that the aid package would not be as effective if it was tied to ongoing Pakistani financial reform measures, and that the United States should pledge to rejoin the international aid consortium for Pakistan but not "attach additional strings" to the economic package. At the end of the sub-item, Brzezinski handwrote: "This is really important." Carter neither approved nor disapproved the sub-item, but wrote in the right margin: "\$100 mil ok—I prefer auth. to waive reform requirement if necessary Paks must be under constraint to behave economically."

The next sub-item offered a choice on the level of specificity for the aid package. Brzezinski noted the Department of State "argues strongly" that the United States should present a \$400 million aid package, composed of \$100 million in both economic and military aid per annum over two years. OMB, Brzezinski noted, advocated a looser approach "both for reasons of impact and to concretely demonstrate the enduring nature of our commitment." Brzezinski concurred with the Department of State, and handwrote: "because it indicates a longer-term political commitment." Carter approved the OMB approach, but wrote in the right margin: "I may change. Let me see what Agha Shahi says." Carter also approved the following sub-items: 1) a \$10–20 million increase in P.L.-480 aid; 2) \$600,000 for military training; 3) \$6 million in additional aid for Afghan refugees; and 4) whether humanitarian aid should be sent through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Brzezinski wrote: "it should be bilateral with Pakistan" to which Carter responded: "bilateral, at least as option."

The third item laid out what Brzezinski identified as a "key issue": the kind of military hardware the United States should sell to Pakistan. Brzezinski noted that \$100 million "will not go far," and that a "critical question" was whether or not Carter was prepared to sell Pakistan advanced aircraft such as the F-16. Brzezinski did not recommend one or the other, but counseled that if Carter disapproved of selling the F-16 to Pakistan "we should let the Paks know soon so that India does

not mount a campaign against it and Pakistan does not make it a litmus test of our relationship." Carter rejected selling the F-16 to Pakistan. He expounded on his decision in a handwritten note on an undated memorandum from the Department of Defense with an attached itemized list of military hardware for possible transfer to Pakistan. Both the list and the memorandum were attached at Tab C to Brzezinski's January 8 memorandum. The Department of Defense stated: "we need to keep India in mind as we make military supply decisions for Pakistan. India will be concerned in principle about the resumption of a U.S.-Pakistan supply relationship, and in this sense whatever we supply will be troublesome for India; none of the items proposed for FMS funding, however, would in themselves pose a significant threat to India." In the left margin, Carter wrote: "I agree," and at the bottom of the page he wrote: "we should approve quickly: weapons which can be used to defend both Afghan & Paks as soon as possible—in general, however, not to attack India. J."

On the evening of January 8, Carter briefed Members of Congress on Iran and on the actions his administration had taken and planned to take after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, including his decision to strengthen Pakistan. See *Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81*, Book I, pp. 38–42.

Agha Shahi met with Carter on January 12. For the memorandum of conversation, see Document 163.

152. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, January 9, 1980

SUBJECT

A Long-Term Strategy for Coping with the Consequences of the Soviet Action in Afghanistan

You have stressed—rightly so—that the Soviet action has created consequences which cannot be dealt with in only a few weeks or with a series of short-term measures. The Soviet action poses a test involving

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 1/9–31/80. Secret. Carter initialed the upper right corner of the memorandum and wrote: "cc Zbig."

ultimately the balance of power between East and West. Our response will determine how several key states will adjust their foreign policy and particularly whether they will accommodate themselves to the projection of Soviet military power.

Before outlining for you an agenda of possible responses, let me put the foregoing in a brief historical context, which may also be useful to you when you comment on the subject. We have, in effect, entered the fifth decade in the U.S.-Soviet competition. Each of the decades has had a specific historical character:

1. The 1940's: consolidation of Soviet gains in the context of U.S. disarmament after World War II and probes for Western weakness;
2. The 1950's: lines drawn sharply in the West and in the East (the Iron Curtain, the Korean buffer);
3. The 1960's: premature Soviet global challenge; increasing competition in other areas: economic (we will bury you); space (Sputnik); with the U.S. then becoming bogged down in Vietnam after the respite won in Cuba, with massive Soviet investments in defense.
4. The 1970's: detente and continued buildup of Soviet strength;
5. The 1980's: the danger of conflict in the context of wider global turbulence.

It is both symbolic and significant that Soviet action in Afghanistan occurred in the first week of the new decade of the 1980's. To respond to that initiative, we need to generate a wider domestic consensus behind legislative and budgetary matters. Anything less will cause vacillation and accommodation by our allies and by states within the Persian Gulf region.

The context for a major response is provided by the three interdependent central strategic zones of our concern: Western Europe, the Far East, and the Persian Gulf. We have an alliance system and military deployments in two of these regions. We are only beginning to create a significant military posture in the third, the Persian Gulf. Accordingly, our response to the Soviet Union action ought to deal with the following aspects:

I. Regional Security

A. Unilateral U.S. Actions

1. Covert Assistance. We have in recent months authorized a number of new programs of covert assistance. David Aaron, Frank Carlucci and David Newsom will be reviewing each and recommending necessary additional steps (e.g. YAR, PDRY or Eritrea).²

² In the left margin, Carter wrote: "We should share more with Spain & other countries."

2. Military Assistance to Pakistan (the subject of a separate paper to you).³

3. Bases. Survey teams will depart on January 14 to assess the adequacy of existing facilities for U.S. use.⁴

4. Military Exercises/Deployments. We will review the planned U.S. Marine deployment scheduled for late summer and the possibility of rapidly deploying a brigade to the region in late spring or early summer as a demonstration of our ability and will to project effective military power into the region.

5. U.S.-Saudi Security Consultations. The Saudis have agreed to the deployment of AWACS through Saudi airspace. We will determine if the Afghanistan situation has changed the Saudi view of security cooperation with the U.S.⁵

6. U.S.-Turkish Security Consultations. We will review the possibility of sending a mission to Ankara to consult with the Turks on the situation resulting from the Iran and Afghanistan situations.⁶

7. U.S.-Indian Security Consultations. We will review the possibility of sending a high-level mission to India to consult on the changed circumstances in the region.⁷

B. Multilateral Actions

1. Covert Assistance to Afghan Rebels. We will raise the question whether our European allies, in addition to the Chinese, should become involved in support for the Afghan rebels.

2. Security Assistance Consortium. We will pursue this concept with the allies. We might want to organize along the lines of the old Berlin Task Force (U.S., France, UK and FRG) to implement the lines of action agreed upon.

3. PRC. We will follow up on the Harold Brown mission.⁸

4. ASEAN. We will ask the ASEAN states to talk to the Indians about the appropriate Indian role in the region.⁹

³ See Document 151.

⁴ In the left margin next to this sentence, Carter wrote: "I'm ready to expedite & take a chance on Somalia."

⁵ See *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Document 207. In the left margin, Carter wrote: "Good."

⁶ See *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XXI, Cyprus; Turkey; Greece, Document 147. Carter underlined "mission" in the second sentence, and in the left margin wrote: "a person—to explore Turkish attitudes first."

⁷ In the left margin, Carter wrote: "Goheen assess, then Clifford." Robert Goheen was Ambassador to India. Clark Clifford often served as the President's special emissary. See Document 190.

⁸ In the left margin, Carter wrote: "PRC (Huang Hua) should go to India."

⁹ In the left margin, Carter wrote: "Good."

5. Refugee Assistance. We must examine the question of how assistance to the Afghan refugees in Pakistan can meet the humanitarian need as well as serve other objectives. Multilateral assistance provided outside the UNHCR context (perhaps through Islamic organizations) could allow us to further the resistance effort more effectively.¹⁰

6. Approaching our Allies. We must plan for the desire of our European allies to set the Afghanistan issue aside as soon as possible so as not to do permanent damage to European detente. Our strategy should focus on seeking their assistance in the Persian Gulf region while deferring further direct European-Soviet initiatives (e.g. Schmidt mission to Turkey; French approach to the Iraqis).¹¹

II. U.S.-Soviet Relations in the Wider Global Context

—Soviet actions in Afghanistan, regardless of their motives, have changed the strategic situation in the region; and we must take steps which will restore a balance. The steps outlined under Regional Security began to address this balance.

—This development requires two classes of response on our part.

- First, the actions which you have already taken vis-a-vis the Soviets in the economic and other areas have clearly demonstrated to the Soviets that their behavior will not be cost-free. I think the Soviets were surprised by your actions. Thus, further bilateral steps are not necessary; however, we must follow through with full implementation of the steps which have already been taken.¹²

- Second, to counter growing Soviet aggressiveness, a long-term commitment is required. There are no easy solutions to an increased willingness on the part of the Soviets to use the military power which they have built over the past decade at great domestic cost. U.S. strategic modernization, increased defense spending, improvements in NATO, and the RDF are all steps which will in time work to deter the Soviets, if pursued diligently.

—Because the Soviets underestimated the U.S. response as well as that of the international community, especially the third world, to their invasion, we should expect that as soon as possible—within several months—the Soviets will embark on a peace offensive designed to separate us from our allies and to improve the Soviet image in the

¹⁰ In an apparent reversal of decision from the previous day (see Document 151), Carter wrote: "Paks prefer UNHCR" in the left margin.

¹¹ In the left margin, Carter wrote: "I agree."

¹² Carter underlined "must follow through," and in the left margin wrote: "I agree."

third world. We should anticipate this event and be prepared to counter efforts to deter us from our required course.¹³

These are preliminary thoughts. In effect, they add up to three key propositions:

1. Our response has to be a *sustained one and a regional one*. Success or failure will depend on what we do in terms of the longer run in Southwest Asia. You might want to think of a “Carter doctrine.”¹⁴

2. There is *no need* to freeze the U.S.-Soviet relationship any further, but by the same token we should have no illusions about an early improvement—nor should we strive for one. Any alteration, of course, would look like a zig zag, and it would make the attainment of our first objective more difficult, while undercutting your domestic support.¹⁵

3. Whatever we do in the region, *it will be costly*. The more we can do with our allies, the better, but the major initiative will have to come from us.

These are painful and difficult issues. We will never know whether any of this could have been averted, but we do know one thing: if we do not respond in a timely fashion, the consequences of an inadequate response will be even more horrendous because our vital interest in the Middle East will soon be directly affected.

I will be chairing an SCC meeting on this in the next several days.¹⁶ I will also be discussing these issues with my European colleagues at the Tuesday meeting¹⁷—though, naturally, in a very tentative fashion, without any commitments.¹⁸ Any guidance you could give me for either meeting would be very helpful.

¹³ In the left margin, Carter wrote: “Let’s do it then (see a) below).”

¹⁴ Carter underlined “Carter doctrine” and wrote in the left margin: “No name.”

¹⁵ In the left margin, Carter wrote: “I agree.”

¹⁶ The SCC met on January 14, the first in a series of meetings on U.S. strategy for Southwest Asia and the Pacific. For the summary of conclusions of the meeting, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Document 40.

¹⁷ Christopher, not Brzezinski, met with NATO members on January 15 in Brussels. See footnote 4, Document 163.

¹⁸ At the bottom of the memorandum, Carter wrote: “a) We should probe for more normal relations among friends of SU, i.e., Angola, V. Nam, Cuba, Ethiopia, Syria, Iraq, etc. as feasible. b) A quick move to consult c PM Gandhi is needed. We must leave the door open for her & encourage Pakistan & PRC to do the same. c) Economic consultations c LDCs should be expedited, with rich OPEC & our trading partners involved to discuss food, energy, raw materials, etc. d) Assess how Mid East peace effort is affected.”

153. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

PA M 80–10012

Washington, January 9, 1980

AFGHAN EXILE GROUPS BASED IN PAKISTAN

Peshawar, on the Pakistani side of the Khyber Pass, has for a century been the most important safehaven for Afghans who oppose whatever regime may be in power in Kabul. Following the Marxist coup in April 1978, the number of Peshawar-based dissidents grew and there was a proliferation of marginal and essentially ineffective “liberation groups”. Lacking meaningful financial support, the exile groups have had at best a modest impact on the course of the insurgency. Fragmentary reporting suggests they have provided insurgent groups in eastern Afghanistan with some material assistance, but the rebels’ main source of arms has been stocks captured from Afghan Army units or turned over by deserting Afghan troops and bought from arms dealers in Pakistan. (*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*)

The numerous fragmented and feuding organizations acknowledge no single leader and have made numerous unsuccessful efforts to unify the Afghan exile opposition. An exile leader’s claim to the press after a recent meeting to have united exile organizations to counter the new Soviet threat is probably as insubstantial as earlier similar claims.² Among its leaders there is no figure with religious or political stature comparable to Ayatollah Khomeini who could rally national support against the Soviet-installed Kabul regime or serve as the leader of a new government. The exile groups probably do not have a sufficient number of technically qualified members who could form a new government. It is possible exile organizations could, however, contribute a few cabinet-level officials to a national front government made up of officials from former governments who might have survived Communist purges since April 1978. (*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 120, Super-Sensitive: 1–3/80. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. A typed note at the bottom of the page indicates that the memorandum was prepared in the Office of Political Analysis.

² A likely reference to a statement made by Ali Tabib, spokesman for the Afghan National Liberation Front (ANLF), who promised that major Afghan opposition groups, including the ANLF, the Islamic Society, the Islamic Party, and the Islamic Revolutionary Movement planned to announce their “organizational unification” against Soviet forces. Tabib also stated: “the key will be for us to make this war as costly for the Russians as Vietnam was for the Americans.” Tabib was quoted in David Kline, “Soviet Combat Troops May Unify Afghan Rebel Groups,” *Christian Science Monitor*, January 2, 1980, p. 7.

With the exception of one or possibly two groups that have a small guerrilla capability, the exile organizations do not command forces that have been active in the Afghan insurgency. One organization, the Islamic Party operates a clandestine radio in the Pak-Afghan border area that has probably made some impact in whipping up sentiment against the “godless” Kabul regime. Some exile religious leaders, moreover, are reported to cross the border into Afghanistan occasionally to buoy the morale of insurgent tribes responsive to their religious leadership. (*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*)

The exile groups are likely to continue their infighting and probably will have no more than a marginal effect on the course of the insurgency unless Pakistan takes the lead in trying to unite or at minimum increase the coordination among the diverse groups. Without the assistance of Pakistan, moreover, the establishment of an exile command and control structure that could coordinate insurgent military action on a national scale would be beyond the capability of the Afghan exiles. (*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*)

The exile groups could become a more effective conduit for channeling arms, food and funds to insurgent groups if Pakistan took charge of overseeing logistical arrangements. The Saudis have withheld more substantial financial aid to the exile groups—their payments probably total no more than \$5 million—because they regard their disorganized, and uncoordinated efforts as ineffectual in supporting the insurgency. Some of the Saudi money reportedly has lined the pockets of some exile leaders. If the Saudis suspect that their funds are being misused—and they probably do—this would inhibit them from making further contributions to support the insurgency. They might be encouraged to reopen their coffers if Pakistan took responsibility for overseeing the expenditure of funds by the exile groups. A key factor in any Saudi decision would be their perception of US intentions regarding possible support of the insurgents.

The exile groups are the source of numerous misleading if not false stories that have appeared in the press on various aspects of the insurgency. Some of these stories allege the exiles exert command and control over guerrilla groups operating in Afghanistan. Other accounts have made exaggerated claims of rebel “victories” and, since Soviet intervention, of Soviet offensives against rebel strongholds.³ (*classification marking not declassified*)

There are scores of exile groups based in Pakistan that have political and religious roots in Afghanistan of varying significance. The four

³ See footnote 2, Document 143.

most important, in approximate order of their significance, are the following:

—The Islamic Party (Hizbi-Islami). Probably the best organized of the dissident organizations, the Islamic Party is led by Gul Buddin Hekmatyar, also known simply as Gul Buddin. He commands a group of about 600 guerrillas based in Pakistan that, with the support of the Pakistan Government, carried out some paramilitary operations in Afghanistan against the Daoud government. Gul Buddin's group probably has conducted a few raids in Afghanistan since the Marxists took power in 1978 and it may pass some arms to insurgent groups operating in Afghanistan. It reportedly continues to receive some support from Pakistan. The Islamic Party is somewhat more secular in outlook than other exile groups and Gul Buddin's rejection of the monarchy as a possible alternative to the present regime has tended to isolate him from other exile leaders. The Islamic Party was represented at the recent meeting at which the groups in attendance claimed to have succeeded in their effort to unite their organizations. Gul Buddin's group has roots in the area between Ghazni and Qandahar and is most active there. (*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*)

—The Afghan Islamic and National Revolutionary Council (Jab-bah-Azadibakhsh Islami) also known as the National Front for Islamic Revolution of Afghanistan. The Council is headed by Sayed Ahmad Gailani (also known as Effendi Jan) who is an important *pir* or religious leader who claims to have a following of 100,000 in the eastern provinces. Described by a US Afghan specialist as the exile Muslim leader with the most modern outlook, Gailani's political strength is based on his religious following. He is related to the Iraqi Ambassador to Pakistan of the same name but it is not known whether this personal tie equates to a connection with the Iraqi Government. (*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*)

—The Afghan Islamic League (Jamiat-Islami-Afghani). The League is headed by Burhanuddin Rabbani, a former professor of Islamic Studies at Kabul University. The organization reportedly receives some financial support from a small, conservative political party in Pakistan and is affiliated with another Afghan dissident organization, the Afghan National Liberation Front. Rabbani's group reportedly has a military arm but its mission and capability are unknown. (*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*)

—The Afghan National Liberation Front (Jabhe-I-Negat-I-Melli). The group's leader, Sebqatullah Mojdedi, is a member of an important religious family that has a following in Kabul and other urban centers of eastern Afghanistan. An Islamic scholar, Mojdedi reportedly has good contacts in Saudi Arabia and Libya. He claims to represent the Front's "real" leader Prince Abdul Wali, cousin and son-in-law to King Zahir. (*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*)

154. Memorandum From Marshall Brement of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, January 10, 1980

SUBJECT

A Wrong Signal to the Soviets (U)

I am strongly opposed to Watson returning to the Soviet Union this weekend. It sends exactly the wrong signal to the Soviets—i.e., that we are now ready to return to a “business as usual” posture. It also sends the wrong signal to the Allies and to the general public and will be a difficult public relations problem for Jody to handle. The President recalled Watson as a sign of the seriousness with which we regarded the situation in Afghanistan. In my view, he should not go back to the Soviet Union until we have completed a full policy review of the implications to us of the invasion of Afghanistan and until we have decided on the full range of actions we plan to undertake to deal with it.² (C)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Outside the System File, Box 45, Afghanistan Invasion: U.S./Allied Relations, Olympics, Grain Embargo: 1/80. Confidential; Outside System. Sent for information. A copy was sent to Schecter.

² In the upper right corner, Carter wrote: “He won’t return for now.” Watson returned to his post in Moscow by late January.

155. Article in the National Intelligence Daily¹*[article number not declassified]*

Washington, January 10, 1980

SPECIAL ANALYSIS

PAKISTAN: Reaction to Afghanistan

[less than 1 line not declassified] CIA

The Pakistani Government sees itself today as weak, isolated, and clearly threatened by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Pakistani officials believe that Soviet combat troops will soon be operating in Afghan border regions and that action against the insurgents will spill over into Pakistan. Despite their fears, Pakistan's military leaders are cautious about openly seeking US support. (S [handling restriction not declassified])

Pakistani officials fear that once Afghanistan has been pacified, Moscow and Kabul will turn their attention to Pakistan. They see a possibility of an Afghan incursion into Pakistani areas along the border where Afghan refugees are concentrated, but they have a much greater fear of attempts to assist dissident tribesmen in Pakistan's border provinces. (S [handling restriction not declassified])

Pakistan's sense of isolation has been increased by Indira Gandhi's victory in India, which will rekindle the Pakistanis' fear of a Moscow—New Delhi alliance bent on destroying their nation.² (S [handling restriction not declassified])

Caution Toward US, USSR

In deciding whether to embrace US support, Pakistan's military leaders must take into account anti-US sentiment in Pakistan that they fear may be turned against the government by opposition political leaders. Pakistani leaders, moreover, view the US as undependable because of its termination of military assistance during Pakistan's wars with India and its opposition to Pakistan's nuclear policy.³ (S [handling restriction not declassified])

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—January 1980, NIDs. Top Secret; [codeword, handling restriction, and text not declassified]. The full version of this National Intelligence Daily was not filed with this collection. The article printed here was found in this form.

² Indira Gandhi was sworn in as Prime Minister of India on January 14.

³ President Lyndon B. Johnson suspended military aid to Pakistan in September 1965. See *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XXV, South Asia, Document 190. Carter again suspended aid to Pakistan in April 1979 pursuant to the Symington Amendment. See Document 102.

In the period before the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Pakistani leaders considered attempting to normalize relations with Afghanistan and the USSR. Even now, there is some sentiment in the government for keeping the Soviet option open. Senior foreign affairs adviser Agha Shahi, who is thought to hold this view, may be pressing the government to demand maximum commitments from the US in the hope of demonstrating that Washington cannot be counted on. (S [*handling restriction not declassified*])

President Zia and most military leaders would prefer—in the best of worlds—to return to a close relationship with the US. Zia and other top officers are all anti-Soviet, and few of them believe that better relations with the Soviets would do more than buy time. They recognize that any longer term benefits would founder on the higher priority the USSR will—in a crunch—always give India. (S [*handling restriction not declassified*])

Military Assistance

In recent years, Pakistani foreign policy has emphasized ties with Islamic and nonaligned nations—a policy that probably will continue. For Pakistan to establish close ties with the US again would require Washington's willingness to provide the military equipment Pakistan believes it needs to assure its security. The Pakistanis believe a military aid package must contain sophisticated weaponry, preferably including A-7 aircraft—previously denied them by Washington. (S [*handling restriction not declassified*])

There probably would be little give in Pakistan's position on the nuclear issue. The Pakistanis believe strongly that a nuclear capability is critical for Pakistan to become a secure and important Third World power. There is no dispute over this objective in Pakistan—Zia's opponents also support it—and any compromise on it, regardless of other aid from the US, would meet strong public opposition. (S [*handling restriction not declassified*])

Zia would probably regard a joint Sino-American effort to resupply and reequip his forces as a particularly attractive proposal. The Pakistanis are heavily dependent on their relationship with China. If they are to risk incurring Soviet wrath, they would like to have their two great-power allies united behind them. The popularity of China among Pakistanis would also be a useful counter to their generally critical attitude toward the US. (S [*handling restriction not declassified*])

The conclusion of a US military assistance program with Pakistan would cause a furor in India. Indira Gandhi can be expected to launch a vigorous campaign against new arms deliveries to Pakistan even though India's armed forces are overwhelmingly superior to Pakistan's, both in equipment and numbers of personnel. (S [*handling restriction not declassified*])

156. Draft Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, January 10, 1980

Subject: Letter From President to Prime Minister on Afghanistan. For the Ambassador.

1. S—Entire text.

2. You should request appointment with Prime Minister Thatcher at earliest opportunity to deliver letter personally from the President concerning coordinated Western response to Afghanistan crisis (text at para 4 below). (FYI: Similar messages are being sent to Schmidt, Giscard, Cossiga, and Clark.)

3. In delivering letter, you may draw as appropriate on following points:

—President Carter asked that I request this appointment with you to deliver a personal message from him concerning the situation in Afghanistan and to convey to you his views regarding the Western response to that crisis.

—We completely share your view of the Soviet invasion as a serious threat to peace, and we intend to follow through vigorously on the measures announced by the President on January 4.

—The President has asked that I pass on to you his very great appreciation for the public support you have given to our position.

—We have valued our close consultations with you, both at the London and Brussels meetings last week, and in our discussions together, and we look forward to continued close cooperation. We have been particularly grateful for your vigorous *démarches* in Third World capitals, urging those countries to join in condemnation of Soviet actions.

—Now that the focus of world attention has shifted to the upcoming UN General Assembly debate on Afghanistan, we must continue to

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Office File, Country Chron File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 1/80. The draft telegram was attached at Tab C to a covering memorandum (not printed), January 10, from Brzezinski to Carter. Also attached but not printed are draft telegrams containing similar messages from Carter to Giscard d'Estaing (Tab A), Helmut Schmidt (Tab B), Francesco Cossiga (Tab D), and Joe Clark (Tab E). In the covering memorandum, Brzezinski noted: "The telegrams lay out our appraisal of the strategic consequences of the Soviet invasion and convey our conviction that a strong and united Allied reaction will be necessary both in Southwest Asia and in Europe." Brzezinski recommended that Carter approve the telegrams. Carter placed a checkmark beside "Approve," and wrote "All ok." in the right margin. The message was sent as telegram 8257 to London, January 11. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880030-1295, N800001-0589)

seek a strong, united Western response, both in Southwest Asia and in the context of East-West relations. If we fail to do so, the Soviets may only be encouraged to take similar moves elsewhere.

—The President looks forward to staying in the closest possible communication with you, as our two governments further develop their positions, and he has asked me to be available to you and your government to assist in any way possible.

4. Begin text of letter:

Dear Margaret:

As I know you will agree, the Soviet Union's invasion and occupation of Afghanistan are matters of the gravest concern. In my view, the Soviet action represents one of the most serious security challenges which our countries have faced in the post-war era. This naked aggression has implications in Southwest Asia and the Middle East, as well as globally, in the bilateral relationship between each of our countries and the Soviet Union, and in the multilateral relationships which have developed among the countries of the West and the Warsaw Pact involving European matters in the past decade. A failure on our part to respond adequately to the Soviet challenge in Afghanistan can only encourage Moscow to move in the future even more aggressively. Pakistan, Iran, the Gulf, Yugoslavia, and even Turkey come immediately to mind. By the same token, a strong united Western response can correct Soviet perceptions, restrain Soviet behavior and ultimately advance the cause of détente to which both our countries are dedicated over the longer term. I know that you share my view that in these circumstances, it is imperative that you and I and our representatives in Washington and London maintain close and continuous consultations and coordination.²

You are already familiar with the measures which I announced on January 4 involving our bilateral relations with the Soviet Union, and I appreciate your support for these actions.³ I had previously announced my decision that the SALT II Treaty not be called up for

² An article in the President's Daily Brief, January 10, noted that the British had taken the most "aggressive stance" among the NATO Allies, who so far had been "unable to agree on a strong response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan." The article also noted that France opposed the British call for the Alliance to apply sanctions against the Soviet Union, advocating instead that nations should respond to the invasion bilaterally. Meanwhile, the PDB noted, the West Germans were caught in a "dilemma" because "Schmidt realizes that a weak response would give his political opponents a good election issue, but fears that a vigorous reaction would undermine Ostpolitik, the keystone of 12 years of Social Democratic foreign policy." (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977-81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—January 1980, PDBs)

³ See Document 109. For Carter's January 4 address, see footnote 5, Document 145.

Senate action in light of the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. I did not withdraw the treaty because I believe its ratification would be in the interest of the West, and I hope that circumstances will, in time, make it possible for me to request that the Senate proceed with action on the treaty. Further, I believe that it is important to continue our efforts in MBFR to reach agreement with the East which will lower military forces and tensions in Europe and to pursue vigorously our TNF arms control proposal. In my judgment we should also continue to participate in the CSCE process which if carefully managed promotes Western interests.

However, I feel strongly that we would be making a grave error should we, in the interest of preserving an atmosphere of *détente*, attempt to separate developments in Southwest Asia involving the Soviet Union from the bilateral or multilateral relations which we have with the USSR. The process of *détente* can continue only if we, collectively and individually, make clear to the Soviet Union that actions such as its invasion and occupation of Afghanistan must have serious consequences for the Soviet Union in other areas of the world, including Europe.

The Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan is simply not consistent with *détente* in Europe, and this must be made clear to the Soviet leadership. If Moscow does wish to pursue *détente*, then in the wake of Afghanistan it must give us evidence of such a desire. The most convincing confirmation of Moscow's desire to retrace its steps back to policies consistent with the principles of *détente* would be an early and total withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. To this point, I regret to say that we have seen no evidence that that is Moscow's intention and the continually growing USSR deployment in Afghanistan appears to us to suggest that the Soviet Army went to that small and defenseless country to stay. And in the light of other Soviet activities in the region—especially in Ethiopia and the Yemens—we would have to regard a prolonged Soviet occupation of Afghanistan as part of a calculated strategic thrust against the West's vital interests.

We have already noted a predictable tendency in the Soviet Union's propaganda to try to divide the United States and Western Europe over the matter of Afghanistan. Indeed, I think we can expect the Soviets to launch a "peace offensive" in Europe in the near future. Moscow will undoubtedly hope that by offering various inducements to West European countries they can secure a "business-as-usual" approach by these countries, a tacit agreement to let concern about the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan fade away. I know that you will be particularly sensitive to this Soviet objective and will work with me and our colleagues from the other Western European countries to ensure that this Soviet aim is not realized.

Finally, I want to assure you that I am prepared to commit the United States to take the necessary steps to enhance security in Southwest Asia and the Middle East, not just because of U.S. interests, but because of the broad stakes the West in general has in this region's stability and the flow of oil. In this effort, it will be important for the United States to have the support—and in some cases the direct involvement of our European allies. The challenge to our common and crucial interests in this area is unprecedented; it calls for an unprecedented and coordinated Western response. This includes support for Pakistan, intensified political involvement with specific nations stretching from Southwest Asia to the Eastern Mediterranean, increased security involvement and military presence, increased economic assistance, as appropriate, and arms support to friendly nations. The United Kingdom's role in this effort will be particularly important and I look forward to learning of Peter Carrington's impressions after his visit to the region.⁴

I want to thank you for your support in these trying times. I will be anxious to have your views in the coming period on the posture that we should adopt to convince this Soviet leadership and the following one that they cannot undertake naked aggression such as in Afghanistan without the most serious penalties for them.

Sincerely, Jimmy Carter

End text.

⁴ See footnote 6, Document 145. Subsequently, Carrington visited the region in February. Telegram 3930 from Bonn, February 29, reported on a meeting between Carrington and Genscher. Both men agreed that the European Community should attempt to determine the likelihood of Moscow's intention to withdraw, but they were under no illusions that in fact, "the Soviets are digging themselves deeper every day." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800105-0084)

157. Article in the National Intelligence Daily¹*[article number not declassified]*

Washington, January 11, 1980

BRIEFS AND COMMENTS

USSR-PAKISTAN: Soviet Tactics

The Soviets are trying to deter Pakistan both from moving closer to China and the US and from providing increased aid to the Afghan insurgents. ([classification marking not declassified])

In some of their contacts with the Pakistanis, the Soviets appear to be playing to those who advocate a policy of accommodation to the USSR. *[10½ lines and classification marking not declassified]*

[1 paragraph (9 lines) and classification marking not declassified]

Soviet media treatment of Pakistan after the invasion was initially restrained. As late as last Saturday, Soviet media were commending Pakistan for its alleged lack of enthusiasm for US arms offers and telling the Pakistanis it was “not too late” to respond to Afghanistan’s appeal for better relations. Pakistan’s condemnation of Soviet actions in the Security Council debate, coupled with its dialogue with the US over security reassurances, have since appeared to prompt Moscow to toughen its treatment of the Pakistanis.² On Monday, Soviet media warned the Pakistanis that “no good will come” of closer ties with the US, and on Wednesday *Pravda* reminded them that the US supply of weapons to Pakistan would cause considerable concern among Pakistan’s neighbors, particularly India.³ *[classification marking not declassified]*

Soviet officials in Pakistan have in their contacts with Pakistanis gone further than the media, threatening that if Pakistan does not cease all aid to the rebels, its security position will be “precarious” with Afghanistan and Soviet troops on one side and India under Indira Gandhi on the other. *[classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]*

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—January 1980, NIDs. Top Secret; *[codeword and handling restriction not declassified]*. The full version of this National Intelligence Daily was not filed with this collection. The article printed here was found in this form.

² Pakistan was one of 52 countries to sign the letter to the UN Secretary General condemning the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and requesting a Security Council session. See footnote 6, Document 136.

³ Monday was January 7 and Wednesday was January 9.

158. Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

PA M 80-10020

Washington, January 1980

[Omitted here are a title page, a security information page, and a cover page.]

The Invasion of Afghanistan: Implications for Soviet Foreign Policy
(*classification marking not declassified*)

Key Judgments

Soviet decisions on the scope and timing of the intervention in Afghanistan were dictated largely by the situation in that country, but—once Moscow decided to invade—it presumably anticipated geopolitical gains that extended beyond Afghanistan. The naked display of Soviet military strength, moreover, will generate opportunities and costs that will affect Soviet foreign policy on a global basis.

In moving into Afghanistan, Moscow probably calculated that, in view of the decline in Soviet-American relations in recent years, it did not have much to lose in its relations with the United States. The Soviet leaders knew that they would have to pay a price in their relations with the West and that their actions would create deep suspicions about Soviet policy within the Third World. Past precedents, however, probably gave the Soviet leaders—most of whom participated in the decision to invade Czechoslovakia—ample reason to believe that, over time, their willingness to use military force in Afghanistan would enhance their efforts to extend their worldwide influence.

Moscow will attempt to show that it can wait out any US retaliation by turning to third country suppliers of embargoed or restricted goods. It may also undertake some retaliatory steps of its own, such as increased pressures on dissidents, harassment of US citizens in the USSR, and efforts to isolate the US politically from its allies and from the Third World on the issue of Afghanistan. In the face of increasing US pressures, it might take further steps—in Cuba, Berlin, or on arms control—to exacerbate relations with the United States.

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977-81), Box 6, Afghan Crisis—Pubs Soviet Moves/Options. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. A statement on the cover page reads: "This assessment was prepared by Melvin Goodman and [*name not declassified*] of the Office of Political Analysis. It has been coordinated with the National Intelligence Officer for USSR-Eastern Europe and the National Intelligence Officer for Near East South Asia."

In the near term, Moscow will seek to consolidate its gains in southwest Asia and attempt to minimize the costs elsewhere. To date the Soviets appear surprised by the forcefulness of the US response which, together with the general outrage expressed by most non-Communist nations, may be giving Moscow reason to believe it underestimated the wider effects of its actions in Afghanistan.

There is no reason to believe that foreknowledge of these responses would have altered the Soviet decision to intervene, but Moscow may have to give more attention than it had thought necessary to its relations with the world community. In Europe, for example, we would expect the Soviets to appear to be more accommodating on disarmament issues while portraying the United States as the principal obstacle to progress. In the Middle East, Moscow will attempt to divert Arab attention away from the Soviet attempt to crush a Muslim insurgency and back toward American support of the Egyptian-Israeli peace process. Elsewhere in the Third World, the Soviets will try to counter the damage to their image among the nonaligned states. The Afghan invasion has already embarrassed Moscow's Cuban surrogates and caused Havana's withdrawal from consideration for a seat on the UN Security Council.²

From Moscow's point of view, the most worrisome potential consequence of its Afghanistan adventure is the prospect of closer Sino-American security cooperation. Soviet actions in Afghanistan will make the soon-to-resume Sino-Soviet talks even more difficult. Moscow will also be watching for signs of a more aggressive Chinese stance toward Vietnam now that the USSR has, for the first time, invaded a country that borders China.

The foreign policy fallout of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan will be mixed. A long-term Soviet presence in Afghanistan and continued involvement in the conflict will probably lead to increasingly unfavorable reverberations for Moscow's standing throughout the Islamic world, particularly among Afghanistan's neighbors who are opposed to a change in the balance of power in the area and are apprehensive about the dangers inherent in Soviet-American rivalry being played out in their region. Indeed, the longer the Soviets remain in Afghanistan, the greater the temptation will be for Moscow to take more active steps to influence the behavior of Iran and Pakistan. Similarly, a long involvement in Afghanistan might alter the terms of detente in a way that could tempt the Soviets to challenge US interests in the Middle East and the Caribbean more aggressively.

[1 paragraph (1 line) not declassified]

[Omitted here is the body of the assessment.]

² According to a news report, January 6, Cuba concluded "the Soviet intervention of Afghanistan has started a landslide of votes for Havana's opponent, Colombia." ("Cuba Ends Fight for Seat on Council," *New York Times*, January 7, 1980, p. A2)

159. Letter From President Carter to Pakistani President Zia ul-Haq¹

Washington, January 11, 1980

Dear Mr. President:

The overthrow of the Afghan Government and occupation of that country by Soviet military forces represents a profoundly disturbing threat to the stability of the region and, most directly, to the security of Pakistan.

In these circumstances, it is essential that there be no misunderstanding as to the commitment of the United States to the security and territorial integrity of Pakistan. The 1959 Agreement for Cooperation between the United States and Pakistan represents a firm commitment between our two governments which remains fully valid. Its provisions are directly relevant to a Soviet threat via Afghanistan. I want you to know that the United States intends to stand by its commitments under this Agreement.

I am particularly concerned with the crescendo of charges and threats emanating from certain quarters regarding the presence in your country of hundreds of thousands of unfortunate refugees fleeing oppression and violence in Afghanistan. In these circumstances, the United States reiterates that it considers the Durand Line to be the international frontier between Afghanistan and Pakistan and that our actions under the 1959 Agreement will reflect that fact.²

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Trip File, Box 41, Brzezinski, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia: 2/1-5/80: Briefing Book II. No classification marking.

² On the original U.S. policy regarding the Durand Line, see *Foreign Relations, 1955-1957*, vol. VIII, South Asia, Documents 103, 112, 114, 117, and 120.

160. Response to Request for Intelligence From the Acting Assistant Director for Joint Chiefs of Staff Support (*[name not declassified]*) to the Director of Joint Strategic Plans and Policy (Lyons)¹

Washington, January 11, 1980

SUBJECT

Afghan Paper for DDPMA Trip (U)

REQUIREMENT

J-5 request of 8 January 1980 for information on US sanctions, Soviet tactics, airlift and casualties in Afghanistan

1. (C) *Sanctions*: The principal Soviet reactions to the various retributive measures announced by the President have been twofold. First, military operations in Afghanistan have continued with increasing evidence that the force buildup has not abated. Second, Moscow has launched a propaganda blitz, accusing the US, with Chinese and Egyptian complicity, of meddling in Afghan internal affairs, arming and training the insurgents, and supporting Pakistan in its assistance to rebel factions. Presumably the Soviets will take steps to ameliorate any shortfall in grain, fish, and technology requirements by finding alternative sources of supply or buying through a third country “cutout.” There are retaliatory actions against the US and allies available to the Soviets in such areas as Berlin, Cuba and elsewhere; however, these do not appear too likely in the near term given the operational success of their occupation of Afghanistan.

2. (TS [*codeword and handling restriction not declassified*]) *Soviet Tactics*: The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan began with an airbridge into Kabul on 25 December. When completed on the 27th, the airhead consisted of an airborne force equivalent to two regiments. Another proximate airborne regiment had previously been deployed to Bagram airbase north of Kabul in early December. The airborne forces in Kabul initiated the coup d’état in the capital on the night of the 27th while some Bagram elements may have deployed north to secure the major road leading from the Soviet border.

(TS [*codeword and handling restriction not declassified*]) In Kabul, BMD-equipped battalions apparently moved to secure key government facilities, the Radio Afghanistan compound, and Darulaman Palace in the city’s suburbs where President Amin was staying. Soviet troops

¹ Source: Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 4, Background paper for new DJ5. Top Secret; [*codeword and handling restriction not declassified*].

took Afghan sentries by surprise at most locations and after brief fire-fights succeeded in securing and disarming the troops. In addition, airborne forces moved to secure Afghan army garrisons ringing the capital. Amin and his entourage were reportedly executed that night.

(TS [*codeword and handling restriction not declassified*]) Simultaneously, two Soviet motorized rifle divisions poised on the border apparently invaded on two axes. One division moved south to Kabul along the road previously secured by the Bagram forces and arrived in the city on 29 December. The other division crossed into western Afghanistan and occupied the key Afghan cities of Herat and Shindand. These are the only confirmed ground force divisions in Afghanistan. However, elements of two additional divisions may now have entered the country—one along each of the previously used axes of advance.

(TS [*codeword and handling restriction not declassified*]) Information on the tactics employed in the operation, is sketchy [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. It appears that both divisions conducted a tactical road march south to their respective objectives with the western division reportedly encountering some resistance in Herat. The rise [*use*] of reconnaissance aircraft in support of ground formations' advance along major routes has been confirmed as has the use of helicopters for medical evacuation missions. As yet, there is no reliable evidence of heliborne assaults or air strikes in conjunction with the Soviet campaign and, indeed, no indications of active Soviet counterinsurgency operations have been noted to date. As a footnote, despite the lack of hard evidence, it is believed some airborne elements may have been flown into key outlying cities during the 25–27 December airlift to secure important airfields prior to the subsequent arrival of regular combat units.

3. (TS [*codeword and handling restriction not declassified*]) *Airlift:* Currently, Soviet military transport aviation (VTA) is supporting military operations in Afghanistan with an average of 15–30 flights a day. These flights are bringing in important supplies as well as providing some medical evacuation support.

(TS [*codeword and handling restriction not declassified*]) During the Christmas airlift into Kabul, the Soviets apparently committed 50 percent of their AN–22/COCK and IL–76/CANDID assets to the air operations in addition to 35 percent of their more numerous AN–12/CUB fleet. These aircraft were drawn primarily from the western USSR but some came from the Soviet Far East. The actual airlift was conducted in two phases. The first phase conducted on 24–25 December represented an airlift of 150–200 VTA sorties into bases in the border region from the western USSR. This was the relocation of major elements of an airborne division. The second phase consisted of the movement of these airborne forces into Kabul and possibly other key cities by an

estimated 250 VTA sorties from 25/27 December. During this airlift, at least two airborne regiments were introduced.

4. (S) *Casualties*: There has been no accurate information on Soviet or Afghan casualties incurred during the coup. One report cited as many as 250 Soviet casualties incident to the takeover but this is unsubstantiated. Similarly, there are various reports of conflict between Soviet units and dissident Afghan army troops and insurgents—all of these suffer from imprecise casualty figures. All that can be responsibly stated is that Soviet casualty levels are expected now to be low, resulting primarily from terrorist attacks and various hit-and-run attacks by the rebels. These figures should increase as the Soviet units become more actively engaged in combat operations.

[*name not declassified*]

Assistant Director for JCS Support (Acting)

161. Intelligence Cable¹

[*cable number not declassified*]

January 11, 1980, 0736Z

Subj: [1 line not declassified]

Afghanistan: Status of the Afghan Army. (U)

1. (S [*codeword not declassified*]) The internal collapse of the Afghan Army is gathering momentum.² An engagement on 9 January is the first confirmed Soviet operation against the rebels.

2. (S [*codeword not declassified*]) The Army's desertion problem has become particularly acute in the northeast. Officers and men of the 31st Regiment of the Nahrin-based 20th Division deserted last week following an accidental bombing of their position. Virtually all 20th Division forces in Takhar Province have deserted. Additionally, troops

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Box 4, Afghanistan: 1/11/80 (0000–1599). Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]; Sensitive; Priority. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

² An intelligence memorandum prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, January 9, noted: "rebel forces appear to be making substantial gains in a large number of regions" and "the Afghan military is attempting to assert itself more but to date seems barely capable of holding on to areas that have been under its control." (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—January 1980, SITREPs)

of the 75th Regiment sent from Kabul to reinforce the 20th Division's units in Konduz are deserting. Most of the locally recruited troops of this regiment are returning to their homes in Konduz. As a result, the 20th Division's artillery regiment is being moved from Konduz as a precaution.

3. (S [*codeword not declassified*]) In the adjacent 19th Division in Badakhshan Province, both the 24th and 27th Regiments are suffering from severe combat fatigue, desertions, and dissension spread by disloyal troops and intense rebel pressure. Airborne and commando battalions attached from Kabul since November are also threatening to refuse to fight.

4. (S [*codeword not declassified*]) Evidence of disloyalty has also surfaced in other units. Armored troops of the 17th Division in Herat are spreading antigovernment propaganda. Intelligence and police forces in the city are refusing to work, and the town has been virtually shut down for 3 days. Herat and other large cities have been placed under a strict night curfew to avert the danger of civil disorder. Herat is of particular concern because it was the scene of a bloody anti-Soviet military and civilian uprising last March. East of Kabul, both the 11th Division at Jalalabad and the 9th Mountain Division at Asadabad have experienced severe desertion problems. In each division at least one regiment has bolted or refuses to fight.

5. (S [*codeword not declassified*]) South of Kabul, a mortar company of the 14th Division at Ghazni attacked its battalion headquarters before fleeing. Deserters from the disarmed Kabul garrison have been captured by the Kandahar-based II Corps. That Corps and its sister III Corps in Paktia Province have also experienced desertions but at apparently lower rates than units nearer the Soviet border.

162. Article in the President's Daily Brief¹

Washington, January 12, 1980

**CHINA-PAKISTAN:
Response to invasion of Afghanistan**

In a reversal of its earlier policy, China is now prepared to provide arms to the Afghan rebels.²

The Chinese are seeking Pakistani "approval in principle" for such a move, [1½ lines not declassified].

Beijing reportedly has also told the Pakistanis that it is urging the US to renew substantial arms shipments to Pakistan and to revitalize the 1959 US-Pakistan security treaty. The Chinese, [1½ lines not declassified] fear that a "partial" US response to Pakistan would signal a lack of US determination to confront Soviet aggression. China may also increase its own military and economic aid to Pakistan after Foreign Minister Huang Hua's visit to Islamabad late next week.

Over the longer term, Beijing may try to create a "regional alignment of forces" against Moscow, according to one Chinese official. Some Chinese diplomats hope that the Afghan crisis will lead to increased cooperation between Beijing and New Delhi, but we see little prospect of this in the near term with Indira Gandhi back in power.

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—January 1980, PDBs. Top Secret; For the President Only. The full version of this President's Daily Brief was not filed with this collection. The article printed here was found in this form.

² An intelligence cable prepared in the Department of Defense, January 10, reported on a series of meetings that took place in London starting on January 6 between representatives of Norinco, a Chinese manufacturer of military hardware, and Afghan "liberation leaders." The cable noted that the Chinese "are prepared to accept political risk vis-à-vis USSR of their hardware being picked up on battlefield and being identified as of PRC origin." (Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 5, PRC Support for Insurgents) A news wire item from Islamabad, January 17, reported that China informed Pakistan "that it has no intention of becoming physically involved in any confrontation with the Soviets over Afghanistan," but it pledged to support the Afghan rebels with "moral and material means." ("China to Aid Afghan Rebels with Moral, Material Means," *Washington Post*, January 18, 1980, p. A12)

163. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 12, 1980, 3:30–4:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting with Agha Shahi

PARTICIPANTS

President Jimmy Carter
 Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State
 Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
 Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State
 David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
 Graham Claytor, Deputy Secretary of Defense
 Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of Near Eastern & South Asian Affairs
 Arthur W. Hummel, Ambassador to Pakistan
 Thomas P. Thornton, National Security Council
 Agha Shahi, Foreign Affairs Adviser, Pakistan
 Muhammad Sultan Khan, Pakistan Ambassador
 General Ghulam Jilani, Pakistan
 General Khalid Mahmoud Aref, Pakistan

The President met on Saturday, January 12, with Pakistani Foreign Affairs Adviser Agha Shahi. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room, following meetings that Shahi had had with Dr. Brzezinski and Secretary Vance.² Various advisers were present on each side. (S)

The President opened by welcoming Shahi and noting that he had had a good series of communications with President Zia. President Carter noted that the Soviet invasion is a major adverse development, an ominous change in Soviet practice. He was pleased at the support that he had received from the American people for his responses, and from nations all around the world. The President recalled that we had again reaffirmed the validity of the 1959 agreement, and our recognition of the Durand line as the international boundary between Pakistan and

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton, Country File, Box 96, Pakistan: Presidential Correspondence: 1/80–1/81. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Cabinet Room. The full text of the memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XIX, South Asia.

² Shahi and Brzezinski met in Brzezinski's office immediately preceding this meeting. (Memorandum of conversation, January 12, 3–3:30 p.m.; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton, Country File, Box 95, Pakistan: 1/79–1/80) No record was found of Vance's meeting with Shahi. News reports indicated that the two discussed "possible aid and security guarantees." (Robert B. Cullen, "Vance-Pakistani Talk on Aid Is Termed 'Very Constructive,'" *Washington Post*, January 13, 1980, p. A20)

Afghanistan.³ He pointed out that we had put together with great care a strong military and economic aid package, and that some of our top officials will be going to Europe in the next week to discuss sharing of the economic and military burden.⁴ He said that he believed the European leaders were already positively inclined and he would appreciate Agha Shahi's guidance on the degree to which our efforts in all of these regards should be made public. He noted, of course, that the dimensions of our aid program will have to become public as soon as we present it to Congress. (S)

The President reviewed various measures that we have taken to increase our strength on a permanent basis, including the revitalization of NATO, the establishment of important relations with China, and measured development of Diego Garcia, where the British are now more willing to be forthcoming on expansion. He noted, however, that our relations with India have become difficult following the elections. He told Mr. Shahi that he had had a nonsubstantive telephone conversation with Mrs. Gandhi and that he was disconcerted, although not especially surprised by the speech which the Indian Permanent Representative had made on Afghanistan in the UN General Assembly.⁵ The speech sounded as if it had come from East Germany, Czechoslovakia, or North Vietnam. He told Shahi that we plan to send an emissary to India to attempt to convince Mrs. Gandhi of our attitude towards her country, and to point out that we will be making commitments to Pakistan. (S)

The President said we trust that Pakistan is determined to defend its territory. We will report back on matters of concern to you after we have talked to India and our European allies. The Chinese Foreign Minister will soon be visiting Pakistan and I hope you will share with us, to the proper extent, the results of that visit. (S)

³ See Document 159.

⁴ Christopher visited Brussels, Bonn, Paris, London, and Rome January 14–16. After he met with the North Atlantic Council in Brussels on January 15, he noted that he was "encouraged" by the progress made toward agreeing on the response to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. (Flora Lewis, "Gains Reported at NATO Parley on Anti-Soviet Steps," *New York Times*, January 16, 1980, p. A10)

⁵ Carter's phone conversation with Gandhi took place earlier that day. The January 11 statement by the Indian Permanent Representative was relayed in telegram 714 from New Delhi, January 12. The major points of the statement, as reported in the telegram, included the assertion that the Soviet Union was in Afghanistan "at the invitation of the previous Afghan Government and with the agreement of the present government," that "India has had assurances from the USSR that Soviets will withdraw on request by Afghan Government," and "discussion in the UN of an issue involving the sovereign rights of the Afghan people would not be helpful." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800020–0906)

We are talking not about a transient commitment. We value our relations and are aware of our interest in Southwest Asia. Our position on nuclear explosives is clear and I hope you will relay our concern to President Zia. Movement on this is not a prerequisite for cooperation, but our long-term relations will be substantially affected by the question of nuclear explosives. We hope that you could promise not to test during the administration of President Zia. Such a pledge could be kept confidential; we would share it only with a few Congressmen. It could, however, be a prerequisite to the granting of aid. A future explosion by Pakistan would be a matter of deep concern to the United States. The nuclear question, then, is no longer an insurmountable obstacle, but it remains important. (S)

Agha Shahi thanked the President for taking time to see him, and for reaffirming the American commitment under the 1959 Agreement. Mr. Shahi said that no matter how difficult the situation might be, it was always a pleasure to deal with Secretary Vance. (S)

Mr. Shahi agreed that there was a need to continue the discussion between the two sides. He referred to an Army-Air Force-Navy team which would meet with American counterparts to review the threat to Pakistan and discuss its requirements.⁶ He pointed out that the Pakistani requirements were large because their Western Frontier is nearly undefended. All the troops are in the East because Indian forces are massed along that border. (S)

Mr. Shahi said he had received fairly explicit and satisfactory reassurances about our security guarantee. He noted that in the past there had been some question of the applicability of these guarantees, and wondered if an executive agreement would be as effective as a treaty. He said that Secretary Vance had given him the benefit of his views and that he was glad to hear from the President that the American commitment to the region is permanent. He stressed that if Pakistan does face up to the Soviet threat, and once again is left high and dry by the United States, this would pose a great danger to the very existence of Pakistan. Pakistan is now a front-line state; its concerns are legitimate and its demands are not exaggerated. He hoped for some possible strengthening of the 1959 Agreement, particularly one that would be binding on future administrations. (S)

⁶ A meeting on this topic between senior officials of the Pakistani military and the Department of Defense took place earlier in the Department of State. A cable summarizing the meeting is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XIX, South Asia.

President Carter replied that both he and Dr. Brzezinski had publicly broadcast this commitment to the American people. In addition, it will be possible to send a message to Congress to this effect.⁷ (S)

Secretary Vance pointed out that such a reaffirmation of the 1959 Agreement would be included in the language of the assistance package. (S)

President Carter said that the material included in the legislation would be the same as in the letter that he had written to President Zia. He said it would be impossible to put any treaty to the Senate before the SALT II Agreement was considered, and that was, of course, now deferred. (S)

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Afghanistan.]

President Carter observed that a move of Pakistani forces to the West would be a sign of Pakistani resolve. He said that the United States will be helpful in getting support for Pakistan from other countries and asked that Agha Shahi give Zia exactly the same message that had been given to him. We will stand with Pakistan. Pakistan is vital to United States' security, and the 1959 Agreement is permanent. It is a pleasure to have Pakistan as a friend. We both now have an opportunity to repair the doubtful relations of the past. Please take to heart the American people's concern about the spread of nuclear weapons; this concern is not directed particularly at Pakistan, but also a series of other countries who are at the nuclear threshold. (S)

Thereupon the meeting ended. (U)

⁷ The President's State of the Union Address to Congress, January 23, included the following pledge: "We've reconfirmed our 1959 agreement to help Pakistan preserve its independence and integrity. The United States will take action consistent with our own laws to assist Pakistan in resisting any outside aggression." The full text of the address is printed in *Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81*, Book I, pp. 194–200, and *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 138. Additionally, in a memorandum transmitting Presidential Determination 80–11, Carter sent Vance authorization, pursuant to Section 2(C) (1) of the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962, for the use of \$5.3 million "to respond to the urgent humanitarian needs of Afghan refugees in Pakistan." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800046–2264) Carter signed PD 80–11 on January 28. (45 Fed. Reg. 8539)

164. Memorandum From Marshall Brement of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, January 12, 1980

SUBJECT

Bilateral Responses to Future Unacceptable Soviet Behavior (U)

Leaving ancillary events aside, there are basically only two results possible in Afghanistan:

—Either the Soviets mop up the insurgents in short order, control the passes, and exert sufficient force to seal the Pak-Afghan border; or

—Moscow runs into more difficulties than I presently anticipate and becomes enmeshed in a long-range counter-insurgency war in Afghanistan. (S)

In either case, unless the Pakistanis can be prevailed upon by Moscow to close the Afghan border to the insurgents, it is almost a certainty that at some point the Soviets will feel compelled to conduct cross-border operations into Pakistan aimed at wiping out the military value of the refugee camps. In such an event, the pressures on us to react forcefully will be enormous. (S)

In fact, the Soviets now seem to be laying the propaganda groundwork for future attacks against Afghan rebel bases. As I pointed out in my Evening Report of January 9, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] analysts are convinced that the Soviets will be attacking such bases in the near future.² Certainly Soviet military commanders in Afghanistan will be pointing out to Moscow that allowing the refugee camps to remain untouched would mean that the insurgency could go on, fueled by outside forces, perhaps for decades. There is no country within the Soviet orbit where Moscow has allowed an insurgency to continue. It is extremely doubtful that Afghanistan will be an exception to this rule. (S)

Furthermore, a cross-border operation into Pakistan is only one, and not the most serious, of the contingencies which we will be facing in the next several months. Neither a Soviet move into Northern Iran nor a Vietnamese thrust into Thailand can be ruled out with any degree of certainty. (S)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Meetings File, Box 78, Sensitive X: 1/80. Secret. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Odum, Ermarth, Griffith, Henze, and Welch.

² Not found.

Even without further provocations by the Soviets, the President has called the invasion of Afghanistan the worst crisis we have faced since the Second World War. But—to deal with just one of the post-WW II crises—after construction of the Berlin Wall to provide needed manpower draft calls were doubled and tripled, enlistments were extended, and the Congress promptly and unanimously authorized the mobilization of up to 250,000 men in the ready Reserves and National Guard, including the activation of two full divisions and fifty-four Air Force and Naval air squadrons. Some 158,000 men, Reservists and Guardsmen, mostly for the Army, were actually called up; and altogether the strength of our armed forces was increased by 300,000 men. Some 40,000 were sent to Europe, and others were prepared for swift deployment. Six “priority divisions” in the Reserves were made ready for quick mobilization, and three Regular Army divisions engaged in training were converted to full combat readiness. (U)

Along with the manpower, the Berlin build-up provided enough equipment and ammunition to supply the new troops, enough sealift and airlift to transport them, and enough airpower to cover ground combat. Some three hundred tactical fighter aircraft, more than 100,000 tons of equipment, and several thousand tanks, jeeps, armored personnel carriers and other vehicles were placed in position on the European continent, and still more on “floating depot” ships. (U)

If the Soviets carried on with further objectionable actions in Afghanistan and adjacent regions, unless we reacted with the same kind of vigor that President Kennedy did, i.e., actions stronger than anything so far being contemplated, the press would almost certainly begin to make unfavorable comparisons between our reactions to Berlin and Afghanistan and try to paint the President as weak and ineffectual. (S)

I believe we should be staffing-out the pros and cons of the following specific options which the President could use at some later date, in the face of almost inevitable further Soviet objectionable action:

- Calling up the Reserves.
- Establishing a manpower commission to study the reinstatement of the draft.³
- Increasing our military presence in the area.
- Providing security guarantees for the nations of Southwest Asia, thereby drawing a clear line as to where we see our vital interests in the region.

³ Carter reinstated draft registration, but not conscription.

—Enhancing our base structure; pushing ahead for bases in one or more of the following countries: Kenya, Oman, Somalia, Egypt, Israel.

—Providing a meaningful military and economic assistance package to Pakistan (the current package is entirely inadequate).

—Boycotting, partially boycotting, or moving the venue of the Olympics (no single action by the US would have greater impact on the Soviet people).

—Renouncing the 1972 US-USSR Joint Declaration of Principles, since Soviet actions in Afghanistan are in direct violation of its letter and spirit. (The Declaration never received much attention in the United States—it was a crumb Kissinger and Nixon threw the Soviets—but it has language supporting our position in this instance, and is very important to the Soviets. They cite it frequently and have used it internally to convince the Soviet public that relations with the US are under control.)⁴

—In line with the above, suspending the various exchange agreements initiated in the full flush of the inauguration of detente from 1972–74.

—Suspending the Maritime Agreement (as indicated elsewhere, I think we should do this in response to a Soviet veto of sanctions against Iran).

—Suspending Aeroflot landing rights entirely.

—Reducing Embassy staffing.

—Expelling fifty or more of the top KGB operatives in the United States, just as the British expelled the top 105 in the UK in 1971.⁵ (S)

In any case, I think it is the right tactic to let the Soviets know, and our bureaucracy as well, that we have other actions up our sleeves which we will use should the Soviets engage in further unacceptable behavior. By doing so there is at least a hope that we would inhibit the Soviets from acting recklessly. (S)

⁴ No renunciation of the Declaration of Principles occurred.

⁵ The British expulsion, part of Operation Foot, occurred following the defection of the KGB official Oleg Adolfovich Lyalin, who notified British intelligence officers of the scope of Soviet espionage activities in the United Kingdom. According to Lyalin, Soviet agents were plotting to mount terrorist attacks in London, the United States, France, the FRG, and Italy. See "Operation Foot (1972)," in R.S.C. Trahair, ed., *Encyclopedia of Cold War Espionage*, p. 220.

165. Annex A From the President's Daily Brief¹

Washington, January 14, 1980

PROSPECTS FOR INSURGENCY IN AFGHANISTAN

Whether the disparate Afghan insurgent groups can stand up to the Soviet military occupation forces depends on the degree of Soviet commitment.

The Soviets appear to have three options:

(1) To use Soviet forces primarily to secure urban areas and major roads and to rebuild the Afghan Army for the role of pacification in the countryside.

(2) To use Soviet forces directly in counter-insurgency operations in the countryside as a supplement to the Afghan Army wherever most needed.

(3) To use Soviet forces as the primary element in crushing the insurgents throughout the country.

We believe that the Soviets already have sufficient forces (80,000 troops) in Afghanistan to fulfill option 1, and in fact now control the urban areas and key roads. The longer task of rebuilding the Afghan Army to the point where it can challenge the insurgents in the countryside will be much more difficult. Even before the Babrak coup, the Afghan Army was well below strength due to desertions and low morale. If the Afghan Army cannot regain more of the initiative against the insurgents soon, the Army may continue to disintegrate and rural territory continue to fall to the insurgents.

We believe, then, that the Soviets will be drawn into an active counterinsurgency role as in option 2. *The recent establishment of General Sokolov's headquarters in Kabul and of a tactical air headquarters at Bagram airfield would seem to point in this direction.* The introduction of more airpower, especially transport and gunship helicopters and close air support aircraft, or the availability of the latter from nearby airfields in the USSR, would presage such intentions.

A key question is whether limited Soviet counterinsurgency operations under this option would intimidate the insurgents into at least quiescence. The insurgents have probably not faced the ruthlessness with which the Soviets will destroy their villages, mosques, and farm-

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—January 1980, PDBs. Top Secret; For the President Only. The full version of this President's Daily Brief was not filed with this collection. The annex printed here was found in this form.

lands, and have not been subjected to the massive firepower of helicopter gunships, jet bombers, and tactical missiles that the Soviets have on hand and will use.

We tend to believe that the insurgents are sufficiently mobile, elusive, and determined not to be cowed by such Soviet tactics, at least in the central, northern, and eastern portions of Afghanistan. In most of this area, the base altitude is about 15,000 feet. Helicopter performance is poor and aircraft are inhibited.

In the southern and southwestern areas, however, the terrain is generally flat and accessible. Here even the existing levels of Soviet forces are probably adequate to overpower the insurgents and establish firm control. Thus the insurgency is not likely to prevent the Soviets from establishing a secure base area from which they could conduct covert operations, infiltration, or military operations against either Iranian or Pakistani Baluchistan or both.

If the Soviets and the Afghan Army cannot establish adequate control over the mountainous countryside, the Soviets will be faced with the decision as to introducing substantially larger ground forces. *The Soviets have few troops left in the border area and would have to bring in units from other parts of the USSR.* Once these forces were in place, the Soviets could move against the insurgent strongholds countrywide, relying heavily on airstrikes against rebel concentrations but sending in units on foot against remote rebel bases.

Such actions would probably push tens of thousands of refugees, including insurgents, across the border into Pakistan and Iran and force many others to give up the fight. They would allow the Soviets to reduce the insurgency to nuisance levels, but at a very high cost. Still, we would expect the rebels to return to Afghanistan and renew the fight whenever the Soviets decided to wind down their involvement.

166. Article in the National Intelligence Daily¹

[article number not declassified]

Washington, January 14, 1980

BRIEFS AND COMMENTS

USSR: Brezhnev's "Interview" on Afghanistan

Brezhnev's "interview" yesterday in Pravda is the most comprehensive denunciation of the US by a Soviet leader in many years and signals Moscow's conviction that it cannot reach a modus vivendi with the Carter administration, at least in the near future. ([classification marking not declassified])

In condemning the "latest irresponsible actions" and "the extremist position" of the US, Brezhnev warned his Soviet audience to expect further US efforts to "poison" Soviet-American relations. Although Brezhnev did not announce any Soviet countermeasures, he further warned that US actions would, "like a boomerang," come back to hit the US, "if not today, then tomorrow."² ([classification marking not declassified])

Brezhnev's efforts to separate the US from its West European allies continues a trend in Soviet policy that has been especially prominent since the Afghan crisis erupted. In alleging that the US has shown itself to be "an absolutely unreliable partner" and in assuring the West European governments of Moscow's desire to continue political and military detente, Brezhnev hoped to provide incentives to the West Europeans to dissociate themselves from US actions and to continue

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—December 1979, NIDs. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. The full version of this National Intelligence Daily was not filed with this collection. The article printed here was found in this form.

² In telegram 789 from Moscow, January 16, the Embassy argued that Brezhnev's remarks in *Pravda* provided an opportunity for the United States to challenge the Kremlin's attempts to assure Soviet citizenry and world opinion that the intervention in Afghanistan was the right decision. This endeavor would include demonstrating that the Soviet Union had not acted in a way befitting a "responsible superpower and a fit partner for negotiating major arms issues and for mutually advantageous cooperation;" that the intervention "gravely damaged" Soviet efforts to stymie U.S.-Chinese cooperation, to "pacify" Western Europe, and to continue "neutralizing" regional powers such as Turkey and Iran; that only a significant change in Soviet behavior could prevent a "major new arms race with the U.S.;" and, finally, "to get across that Moscow cannot have it both ways and will have to give up its ideological aspirations to support 'national liberation' if it wants to advance other important Soviet interests." The Embassy further argued that this message should come in the form of a Presidential speech. (National Archives, RG 59, Office Files of Marshall D. Shulman, Special Advisor to the Secretary on Soviet Affairs, 1977–1981, Lot 81D109, untitled folder) The text of Brezhnev's interview is printed in full in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXXII, no. 2 (February 13, 1980), pp. 1–10. Excerpts were printed in the *New York Times* January 13, 1980, p. 16.

economic relations as before. Brezhnev also announced Moscow's position that the stance taken by NATO in December makes negotiations on long-range theater nuclear forces "impossible." (*classification marking not declassified*)

On Afghanistan, Brezhnev characterized the threat that prompted the invasion as a "serious danger" to Soviet security; his failure to repeat earlier descriptions of the intervention as "limited" suggests a decision to prepare the Soviet public for a long, hard campaign. This impression is reinforced by his reference to "tens of thousands of insurgents" in Afghanistan as well as by his claim that the White House has announced "its decision to expand" aid to the Afghan rebels. (*classification marking not declassified*)

One of Brezhnev's major objectives in the "interview" was to assure Soviet audiences on the domestic impact of US measures. He claimed "plans for providing bread to the population will not be affected by US actions," an assertion that will be read by his audience as confirmation that meat supplies will be hurt.³ Brezhnev appealed to Soviet patriotism, recited the failure of past foreign efforts to test Soviet "mettle," and warned that US actions have a "dangerously destabilizing impact" on the world situation. [*less than 1 line and classification marking not declassified*]

³ In telegram 708 from Moscow, January 14, the Embassy reported "the predominant mood of the 'man-on-the-street' in Moscow toward the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan appears to be one of puzzled apathy. Some sources, however, report the existence of grumbling because the invasion occurred at a time of widespread shortages of food and consumer goods." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800024-0718)

167. Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

[*assessment number not declassified*]

Washington, January 1980

[Omitted here are a title page, security information page, and cover page.]

Prospects for Soviet Operations Against the Insurgency in Afghanistan (*[classification marking not declassified]*)

Key Judgments

Through a carefully prepared, massively staged military intervention, the Soviets have imposed a new Communist puppet government in Afghanistan and have occupied the key government and population centers and the main communications facilities with Soviet troops. By early January, the Soviets had six divisions and over 75,000 troops inside Afghanistan—with more apparently on the way—and were rapidly consolidating their control. (*[classification marking and codeword not declassified]*)

We have no direct evidence of the Soviets' expectations for the eventual size, nature, and duration of their military adventure in Afghanistan, but we believe that substantial Soviet forces will remain there for the foreseeable future. The most likely commitment would appear to be a force of some six to 10 divisions and as many as 150,000 men. Such a force could have been made available within a few weeks of the beginning of the invasion, but the deliberate pace of the buildup suggests that it will not be fully deployed until spring, when operations can resume at full intensity. A force of this size could ensure the survival of the Babrak regime, retain control over major population centers and lines of communication, and conduct limited pacification operations. Meanwhile, the Soviets are likely to make efforts to reconstitute the Afghan Army over the next one to three years with the object of making it effective enough to undertake a long-term pacification effort. (*[classification marking not declassified]*)

In the unlikely event that the Afghan insurgency increases beyond the capacity of the force described above to contain it, or if the Soviets

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 6, Afghan Crisis—Pubs Soviet Moves/Options. Top Secret; *[codeword and handling restriction not declassified]*. According to a statement on the cover page: "This assessment was prepared in the Office of Strategic Research and was coordinated with the Afghan Task Force, the Office of Political Analysis, the Strategic Warning Staff, and the National Intelligence Officers for Warning, General Purposes Forces, and USSR-Eastern Europe."

thought they could do the job quickly, they might decide on a major pacification effort. The manpower requirement for such an effort would be open-ended, probably taking far more than 150,000 men. The buildup of such a force could only be accomplished over a period of months. (*classification marking not declassified*)

Soviet operations, which almost certainly will combine carrot with stick, may be able to intimidate or placate the insurgency to quiescence, and they can certainly remove it as a potent threat to the Babrak regime. Indeed, it is unlikely that even a much stronger insurgency could seriously threaten either the Soviets or Babrak's government as long as the Soviets retain substantial forces in Afghanistan. On the other hand, the traditional militancy and fierce independence of the rebels, coupled with the severe difficulties that the mountainous Afghan countryside poses for military pacification operations, probably will make it impossible for the Soviets to eradicate the insurgency. (*classification marking not declassified*)

Thus, the long-term outlook for the Soviets in Afghanistan is for a continued military presence with both Soviet and government forces harassed by at least low-level insurgent operations. The Soviet presence could provoke the insurgency to greater determination and closer cooperation. The rebels could continue harassing operations for the foreseeable future, withdrawing into high-mountain redoubts or to sanctuaries across the border to evade search-and-destroy operations. We can foresee almost no circumstance in which the Soviets will be able to eradicate the insurgency and permanently pacify the countryside, but, with a force of 150,000 men, they probably could reduce the insurgency to an acceptable level of annoyance. (*classification marking not declassified*)

The Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan is likely to be of long duration. The Babrak regime is not likely to be either politically or militarily secure without the Soviet presence, and rebuilding the Afghan Army probably will take from one to three years. Eradication of the insurgency—if it can be accomplished at all—could take some years after that. In the short term, there is the threat of spillover into adjacent areas of Pakistan and Iran resulting from a Soviet decision to attack or pursue insurgents operating out of those countries. Given the dislocation of so many Afghan refugees, the refugee camps' potential as a source of recruitment and supplies for the insurgents, and the Soviets' publicly stated rationalization of the invasion as a response to external threats, the potential for spillover is high. (*classification marking not declassified*)

[Omitted here is the body of the assessment.]

168. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to President Carter, Vice President Mondale, Secretary of State Vance, Secretary of Defense Brown, and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, January 15, 1980

The attached paper sets forth our preliminary views of Soviet options and constraints in Southwest Asia following the invasion of Afghanistan. Its focus is on the major actors in the region from the Soviet perspective; it does not deal explicitly with possible US policies or how those might influence Soviet positions.

Stansfield Turner²

Attachment

Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency³

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Soviet Union and Southwest Asia

1. It is unlikely that the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan constitutes the preplanned first step in the implementation of a highly articulated grand design for the rapid establishment of hegemonic control over all of Southwest Asia. Rather than signaling the carefully timed beginning of a premeditated strategic offensive, the occupation may have been a reluctantly authorized response to what was perceived by the Kremlin as an imminent and otherwise irreversible deterioration of its already established position in a country which fell well within the

¹ Source: Carter Library, Donated Historical Material, Mondale Papers, Box 42, Foreign Countries—Afghanistan, 1980. Secret; NoFORN.

² Turner signed "Stan Turner" above his typed signature.

³ Secret; NoFORN. In an undated, unsigned memorandum to Carter, Brzezinski summarized the CIA memorandum and wrote: "it is thoughtfully argued and deserves your attention." Still, Brzezinski noted, it "does not examine the possibility the Soviets may move more forcefully with their military power against Iran, and possibly Pakistan, in the near future." Brzezinski surmised that a combination of a settlement of the Iran hostage crisis (which, in his view, would increase Iranian anti-Soviet sentiment) and the perception of a growing U.S. military presence in the region could convince the Soviet leadership to make preemptive moves "while the balance is more in their favor." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 82, USSR: 1/16–31/80)

Soviet Union's legitimate sphere of influence. However, there is no reason to doubt that the Soviets covet a larger sphere of influence in Southwest Asia or to suppose that their decision to occupy Afghanistan was made without reference to broader regional objectives. On the contrary, their willingness to incur what they almost certainly anticipated would be serious costs strongly suggests a belief that their occupation of Afghanistan would improve their access to a number of extremely lucrative targets of opportunity and might eventually lead to a highly favorable and enduring shift in the regional and perhaps even global balance of power.

2. The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was probably predicated on a belief that Afghan resistance would prove relatively short lived. Among other things, their historical experience in their own Central Asian republics may have persuaded the Soviets that a strategy combining military intimidation, political conciliation, and economic enticement would quickly reduce resistance and enable their puppet regime to acquire at least a modicum of grassroots political authority and administrative control. If this turns out to be a miscalculation and Afghan resistance becomes or remains persistent and widespread, the Soviets could become so bogged down in guerrilla warfare that they abandon any hopes of further near-term expansion. However, they are unlikely to withdraw their forces from Afghanistan and might well try to alleviate their problems there by intensifying pressure on or expanding the conflict to Pakistan.

3. In the face of intractable Afghan resistance, the Soviets are likely to attribute much of the blame to direct or indirect Pakistani involvement and to take what they deem to be essential deterrent and retaliatory measures. These measures could include not only cross-border raids by loyal Afghan and/or Soviet forces, but also extensive Soviet support for anti-Pakistani tribal insurgents and intimidating demarches on Islamabad by the Soviets' Indian allies.⁴ In extremis, moreover, the Soviets might press a not-too-reluctant India to join them in an all-out campaign of political subversion or even in a concerted invasion. Although the inevitable costs of such a drastic action might give the Soviets pause, their behavior in Afghanistan (as well as the earlier escalatory behavior of the United States in Vietnam-Laos-Cambodia)

⁴ Intelligence cable 5264, prepared in the Department of Defense, January 16, reported that "the Pakistanis are concerned the Soviets may soon initiate military action against Afghan refugee camps located along their common border with Afghanistan. The USSR claimed Soviet intervention in Afghanistan is warranted because of the continuing Pakistani training and support of Afghan insurgents." The cable also reported that the number of Afghan refugees in Pakistan had risen to 400,000 over the past year and could "easily" reach one million in response to Soviet military action. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Box 4, Afghanistan: 1/15/80)

suggests that they might be undeterred by anything short of a credible threat of direct US military retaliation.

4. Unless their position in Afghanistan impels them to take a harsh anti-Pakistani line, the Soviets are likely to give Islamabad time to adjust to the “realities” of its new situation and adopt a more conciliatory approach to the USSR. In this case, the Soviets are more likely to let their presence in and growing control over Afghanistan speak for themselves than they are to underscore Pakistani vulnerabilities by issuing explicit threats. While exercising such self-restraint, moreover, the Soviets are likely to offer the Pakistanis substantial inducements to distance themselves from the United States and the PRC. Although they will have to guard against jeopardizing their close relations with India in the process, the Soviets are likely to try to woo the Pakistanis not only with pledges of noninterference and offers of economic aid but also with offers of at least limited military assistance and promises to use their good offices to keep Pakistani-Indian relations on an even keel. Should India take serious umbrage at such initiatives, the Soviets might temporarily take a less forthcoming line. But they would also be mindful of the extreme improbability of a markedly anti-Soviet realignment of Indian policy and might be willing to expend a substantial amount of the capital they have accumulated in Delhi in order to secure Pakistani acceptance of the Soviet Union’s growing regional influence.

5. If Islamabad were to prove insufficiently responsive to their blandishments, the Soviets would probably use less subtle means to try to encourage greater “realism.” As already indicated, the means at their disposal would include military intimidation, political subversion, and tribal insurrection, as well as the activation of longstanding Afghan and Indian claims on Pakistani territory. If these tactics also fail to produce the desired results, the Soviets might eventually conclude that it was advisable to allow Pakistan an interlude in which to work out its own destiny. A decision to this effect would seem particularly appropriate if attempts to escalate the pressure on Islamabad seemed likely to increase US involvement in Pakistan and to limit Soviet opportunities elsewhere in the region. Such an interlude would not necessarily be long lasting, however, and could come to an abrupt halt if subsequent developments expose additional Pakistani vulnerabilities.

6. Of all of the objectives that their occupation of Afghanistan may have placed within easier Soviet reach, a pro-Soviet Iran is almost surely the most tantalizing. Although the Soviet occupation of an Islamic country has undoubtedly confirmed and strengthened the anti-Communist sentiments of Iran’s fervently religious ruling elite, it has also emplaced Soviet forces on Iran’s eastern as well as its northern border and has created possibilities for direct large-scale Soviet aid

to Baluchi as well as to Azari and Kurdish separatist movements. Furthermore, it has done so at a time when Iran is going through a paroxysm of anti-American hysteria and may be on the brink of political, social, and economic chaos. Since this is also a time when the Soviets are about to encounter significant shortfalls in domestic energy production, it seems probable that the expansion of its influence over Iran will rank at or near the top of the Kremlin's hierarchy of regional priorities.

7. Although the possibility cannot be excluded, it does not seem likely that the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan will turn out to have been a dress rehearsal for an impending gala performance in Iran. Unlike Afghanistan, Iran is clearly too important to the West to make the risk of a counterintervention seem negligible, and the exercised American reaction to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan has probably convinced even the Kremlin's most unreconstructed hawks that a frontal attack on Iran could lead to a full-fledged military showdown with the United States. However, fear of such a showdown will not lead the Kremlin to forsake its ambitions or prevent it from pursuing them by more circuitous means. At the margin, apprehension that any important Soviet breakthrough in Iran would elicit a determined US military reaction may exercise a restraining influence, but the Soviets will probably still have extensive room for maneuver in a situation in which American options are severely circumscribed and Iranian vulnerabilities are very large.

8. At least for the immediate future, the Soviets are likely to make assiduous efforts to improve their relations with the Khomeini regime. Among other things, they will probably signal their willingness to be supportive diplomatically and to provide Tehran with economic and military aid. Such overtures will not prevent the Soviets from entrenching themselves on Iran's Afghan border, cultivating their contacts with anti-Persian nationalist movements, and supporting the Tudeh's efforts to build up its organizational infrastructure and penetrate the country's governing elites. Instead of flaunting these activities, however, the Kremlin will probably try to keep them inconspicuous and take special precautions to neutralize their potentially provocative effects.

9. Although the Soviets can have few illusions about the possibility of altering the fundamentally anti-Communist ideological tenets of the Khomeini regime, they probably do foresee a possibility of growing Tudeh influence over current governmental policy and of a significant Tudeh role in a more secular and "progressive" post-Khomeini regime. The early emergence and smooth stabilization of such a non-Communist but Communist-tinged regime probably represents the Soviets' preferred outcome to the Khomeini succession, since they could then

look forward to the establishment of much more intimate Soviet-Iranian relations which it would be extremely difficult for the United States or other foreign countries to disrupt. Outside powers would be hard pressed for an excuse to interfere with a legitimate and viable Iranian regime, and any credible threat of hostile action on their part could provide the Soviets with a welcome opportunity to extend protection to a friendly neighboring country which also shared a common border with the Soviets' Afghan allies. While the experience of President Amin, et al., would doubtless make many Iranian leaders question the wisdom of signing a Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance with the USSR, the external (and/or internal) pressures upon them might make their position seem too precarious to allow them any choice.

10. Given the extremely remote prospect of an early pro-American reorientation of Iranian policy, the Soviets would probably not attempt to overthrow or subvert a post-Khomeini regime which denied the Tudeh access to position of influence power. However, if they were persuaded that such a regime was developing real durability and becoming so anti-Communist that their potential leverage in Tehran was in jeopardy (e.g., as a result of a credible threat to crush the Tudeh), the Soviets would probably not hesitate to take strong counteraction. Unless it were firmly convinced that such behavior would boomerang, the Kremlin might well resort not only to stern diplomatic protests but also to military intimidation and even, if necessary, to the encouragement and support of intense centrifugal pressure on Tehran by anti-Persian nationalist forces. So long as they themselves stopped short of direct military intervention, the Soviets would probably discount the possibility of US military action to save the incumbent regime. If, as also seems probable, they were highly skeptical about the likelihood and/or efficacy of US nonmilitary responses to a possible request by Tehran for help, the Soviets might well risk the possibility that Tehran could successfully resist their pressure and become militantly anti-Soviet for the sake of the probability that it would bow to their pressure or be replaced by a more accommodating successor.

11. Unless they become convinced that Iran was otherwise almost certain to become a US client or was caught in the throes of an irreversible process of fragmentation and disintegration, the Soviets are not likely to become wholehearted supporters of any of the country's ethno-nationalist secessionist or independence movements. If they were so convinced, however, the Soviets would probably jettison Tehran with alacrity and encourage the formation of Soviet-backed provisional governments in Iranian Azarbaijan, Kordestan, Baluchestan, Khuzestan, etc. Although the Kremlin would recognize that such a patent effort to establish Soviet controlled mini-states could precipitate a US military intervention (presumably to try to preserve the integrity of Iran but

possibly—and in a possible de facto and ad hoc alliance with a severely chastened Iraq—to simply occupy Khuzestan), it might well try to deter such an intervention by a preemptive intervention of its own. Moreover, if they felt that their only other real choice was acquiescence in what they would almost certainly envision as a more or less permanent US military presence on or close to their southern border, the Soviets might not be averse to confronting the United States in an area in which the local population was strongly anti-American and the USSR could benefit from many logistical advantages.⁵

⁵ In a January 18 memorandum to Brzezinski, Odom laid out three strategies for dealing with a Soviet invasion of Iran, none of them “very attractive.” The memorandum is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 258.

169. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State¹

Kabul, January 16, 1980, 1400Z

271. Subject: Afghanistan Sitrep No. 23.

1. (C—Entire text)

2. Summary. Kabul remains quiet but tense as the Soviet profile, while lowered, remains visible. The ruling Parcham faction is trying to broaden its bases of support through a Fatherland Front. There are indications that even the Parchamists are splitting among pro- and anti-Soviet presence elements. The government-controlled media continue to attack the U.S. and President Babrak Karmal has made a strong pitch for Afghan-Iranian solidarity against American “imperialism.” He pledged that the DRA would not permit Afghanistan to be used as a base of operations against Iran (ignoring the presence of over 25,000 Soviet troops near the Afghan side of the two nations’ border) and expected Iran to assume a “reciprocal” stance. The Afghan economy appears to have come to a standstill, at least in regard to development activity and commerce. Although foreign exchange reserves are

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800027–0678. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Ankara, Beijing, Bonn, Islamabad, London, Karachi, Moscow, New Delhi, Paris, USNATO, USUN, USICA (for NEA), CINCPAC (also for POLAD), and CINCEUR (also for POLAD).

high, wheat, the staff of life, is in short supply and is becoming dearer in Kabul markets. End summary.

3. As of mid-afternoon Wednesday, January 16, Kabul remains quiet but somewhat tense. The quietness reflects the absence of noted incidents; the tension reflects widespread unease and anger at the continued Soviet occupation of the country. Although the Soviet presence is not visible on every street corner, the passing of a truckload of armed Soviet soldiers, the presence of a Soviet soldier (military policeman?) at the entrance to an Air Force installation near the Kabul Airport, the increased number of Soviet civilians seen living in Kabul's Karteh Seh and Karteh Chahar areas (near the Soviet Embassy) all serve to remind Afghans and other observers that the Soviets are very much on the scene. (This is to say nothing of the curfew hours when Soviet troopers reportedly take over much of the guard responsibilities at many DRA installations.)

4. The ruling Parchamist faction of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan has made an attempt to broaden its bases of support through the cooption of some non-partisan, prominent Afghans, of some former Khalqi officials, and of officials from the Daoud and King Zahir eras, in an effort to form a "Fatherland Front," presumably at Soviet urging. (The Soviets had reportedly urged unsuccessfully the Taraki-Amin regime to broaden, rather than narrow, its bases of support last year.)

5. Despite the recent Parchamist effort to form its Fatherland Front, there are indications that splits are occurring within Parcham, as well as within Khalqi, circles over the issue of Soviet domination. If such indications prove true, it would appear that Afghan nationalism is a force to be reckoned with, even within President Babrak Karmal's Parcham faction. There are also rumors repeat rumors that Babrak himself is growing unhappy with the degree of Soviet control of his government.

6. Meanwhile, the DRA-controlled *Kabul New Times* maintains its incessant anti-U.S. and anti-Western drumbeats.

7. Babrak has, however, made an overture to Iran's Khomeini in a publicized note to the latter, carried in the *Times'* January 14 edition. Babrak charged that "certain Iranian men and circles . . . have been doing vile propaganda and are engaged in unfriendly and unbrotherly activities at the instigation of American world imperialism . . . against the revolutionary change brought about by the Moslem, freedom-loving and brave people of Afghanistan . . ." Babrak assured Khomeini that the present DRA leadership wishes to have "most cordial relations based on Islamic brotherhood with the Islamic Republic of Iran." Babrak pledged that the DRA "will never allow anybody to use our soil as a base against (the) Islamic revolution of Iran and against the

interests of the fraternal Iranian people. And we expect our Iranian brethren to assume a reciprocal stance." (Comment: We are unaware of any Iranian forces lined up on their side of the Afghan-Iranian frontier, whereas upwards of 25,000 Soviet troops are near that border.)

8. We have been deluged by American (and other) journalists for whom we have given background, unattributed press briefings. One of the issues upon which those representatives have focussed is the Soviet rationale for beefing up their military presence on the Iranian-Afghan border. It is clear that many of them suspect that the Soviets may have designs on Iran.

9. Economically, Afghanistan seems to be more or less at a standstill. There is little or no development activity going on in the country at present. In Kabul, commerce is dead, according to our Afghan contacts. Commercial imports declined sharply in the late summer, owing partially to Pakistani measures blocking re-exports (smuggling) of tires, textiles and other imported commodities to that country, and have reportedly remained down. Foreign exchange reserves stood at about \$420 million as of mid-December, according to a source with excellent contacts in the Finance Ministry, reflecting both the decline in commercial imports and a relatively high rate of exports during most of 1979. We lack data whether there has been a decline in reserves since the December 27 Soviet invasion; we suspect there has not been yet.

10. Wheat, the Afghan staff of life, is becoming both scarcer and very much dearer in the Kabul bazaars. Bazaar merchants attribute this development both to the problem of bringing wheat in from the producing provinces as a result of the Soviet intervention, and to hoarding on the part of Kabulites. There is also a strong rumor that the anti-Soviet protest strikes, which have reportedly occurred in Kandahar and Herat, may spread to Kabul within the next fortnight.

11. Reports continue to reach Kabul sporadically about clashes between insurgents and Soviets in various provincial areas. An Afghan source, who is believed to report accurately what he hears, spoke recently to a merchant who had come to Kabul last week from Doshi (about mid-way between Kabul and Baglan on the road to the north). The merchant swore on the Koran that he had seen a band of rebels near Doshi chanting death to the Russians and carrying the heads of seven decapitated Soviets. Source felt confident that his informant was telling the truth.

Amstutz

170. Article in the National Intelligence Daily¹

[*article number not declassified*]

Washington, January 17, 1980

SITUATION REPORTS

USSR-AFGHANISTAN

Three weeks after the Soviet intervention, insurgent activity remains on about the same level as before the invasion. ([classification marking and codeword not declassified])

The rebels continue to cut vital lines of communication by felling trees, seizing bridges, and opening floodgates on mountain streams. They also are setting up ambush positions to prevent the movement of troops and supplies. Army units cannot move along the main highways without armored or air escort. In addition to harassing troop convoys, the insurgents are disrupting the flow of food and fuel from the countryside to the cities, activity that could bring serious winter shortages unless the Soviets undertake a major resupply effort. (*[classification marking and codeword not declassified]*)

The Soviets evidently have no active plans to pursue rebel forces, but appear satisfied with reacting to flash points of insurgent activity and maintaining control of the key cities—Kabul, Jalalabad, Qandahar, Herat, and Mazar-e-Sharif. Opening of the major roads may require a substantial commitment of additional ground and air support forces to push the insurgents back into remote mountainous regions. (*[classification marking not declassified]*)

Military Movements

A Soviet airborne artillery regiment, which had been at Kokayty airfield for the past two weeks, is no longer there and may have moved into Afghanistan. [*2 lines, classification marking, and codeword not declassified*]

Soviet forces are being airlifted into Ghowr Province to break a rebel siege at Shahrak. The situation in the province is critical, and Afghan units have been unable to move without air support. (*[classification marking and codeword not declassified]*)

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—January 1980, NIDs. Top Secret; [*codeword and handling restriction not declassified*]. Attached but not printed is a map of Afghanistan. The full version of this National Intelligence Daily was not filed with this collection. The article printed here was found in this form.

Military Morale

The installation of President Babrak's regime and its complete dependence on Soviet support has led to increased despondency in the Afghan military, [1 line not declassified]. Many officers resent the role of Soviet forces in the coup and their disarming of Afghan units whose loyalty to the new regime was suspect. [less than 1 line not declassified] all ranks of the military generally believe that the Afghans will be unable to regain control of their country without foreign assistance. ([classification and handling restriction not declassified])

Babrak's Poor Showing

[less than 1 line not declassified] Babrak's inept performance at a press conference for foreign newsmen last week has been ridiculed in Kabul and has further degraded his popular standing. The press conference, aired on local radio and television, reinforced the widely held view that Babrak is a Soviet puppet. The session reportedly was terminated before half its scheduled time had elapsed.² There is speculation in Kabul that the Soviets probably are belatedly aware of Babrak's shortcomings and may soon replace him. [less than 1 line, classification marking, and handling restriction not declassified]

² According to a news report, the January 10 press conference was completely controlled by Soviet officials. Karmal pledged that Soviet forces would leave Afghanistan when the United States, in conjunction with Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and China, halted "aggressive policies" against Afghanistan. (James P. Sterba, "Soviet Lets Press See Afghan Ruler, Then Impedes Reports on Meeting," *New York Times*, January 12, 1980, p. 5)

171. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Islamabad, January 17, 1980, 1415Z

438. Also for Ambassador Hummel (NEA). Subject: Agha Shahi Gives Preliminary Views of Pakistan Government on Aid Package.

1. (S) Entire text.

2. I was called in this evening (Jan 17) by Foreign Advisor Agha Shahi to receive what he described as preliminary reaction of Pakistan Government to U.S. aid offer.² Agha Shahi prefaced remarks by saying U.S. should understand that GOP appreciates firm stand by President Carter over Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and his offer to come to Pakistan's assistance. However, he would like Washington to have his "informal and preliminary" assessment of initial GOP reaction to aid package. Fuller and more formal GOP reaction would be forthcoming.

3. Agha Shahi said that initial reaction of government leaders was one of disappointment. Considering the immensity of the threat, U.S. offer of \$400 million viewed as inadequate to meet the situation in terms of the kinds of military equipment that Pakistan required, \$200 million would not go very far, particularly if one took into account requirements such as high performance aircraft. He had also discussed offer of \$200 million in economic assistance with Economics Minister Ghulam Ishaq, who felt that this amount would not go very far in meeting Pakistan's needs, particularly with questions of debt rescheduling still hanging over their heads. However, Agha Shahi added, aid package more inadequate in regard to military needs.

4. GOP also concerned about degree of American resolve, since already the "liberal" press in U.S. is attacking provision of assistance to "undemocratic" government in Pakistan.³ Certainly Pakistan did not enjoy an ideally democratic government and martial law prevailed,

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton, Country File, Box 95, Pakistan: 1/79–1/80. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

² For the U.S aid package, see Document 151.

³ An apparent reference to an editorial in the *New York Times*, January 15, entitled "The Tilt in South Asia," which questioned Zia's reliability as a U.S. partner. (*New York Times*, January 15, 1980, p. A18)

but such a reaction was disappointing in view of the critical threat posed by Soviet aggression.⁴

5. A further concern, said Agha Shahi, is fear of Indo-Soviet alliance against Pakistan. He had learned on good authority that visit to Moscow by Indian defense team (sent by caretaker government) had resulted in firm Soviet offer of \$2 billion in arms. Pakistan wanted to reach an understanding with Indira Gandhi on response to Soviet expansion, and GOP had authorized Lord Carrington to convey this view to Indian Government.⁵ He felt Soviet military aid offer could go a long way to explain pro-Soviet statement made prior to UN General Assembly vote on Afghanistan which should have dictated a negative Indian vote on resolution. Indian Government now backing down somewhat only because of massive UN vote against Soviets. In any case, overtures to India had been made. Ambassador Bajpai had brought message from Indira Gandhi accepting President Zia's congratulations on her election and proposing visit to Islamabad by Indian Foreign Secretary early in February. Proposal had been accepted.

6. In response, I said that "preliminary reaction" would be immediately transmitted to Washington. In regard to doubts that Foreign Advisor expressed there would be ample opportunity to discuss matters further. Ambassador Hummel would be returning to Islamabad around Jan 21 and as he was aware, Deputy Secretary Christopher would be paying a visit in very near future. There should be no doubt at all regarding American resolve in face of Soviet aggression. Pakistan should not expect unanimity of views in American press on situation. There would, of course, be comments critical of Pakistan Government among reports of huge number of journalists already assembled in Islamabad. More could be expected out of Tehran and we had just had report foreign journalists in Kabul being expelled and many of those would no doubt come here. In long run, however, Pakistan should expect to benefit from world attention being focussed on Soviet aggression, and I thought it would be particularly beneficial to have plight of Afghan refugees given full publicity. In any case, there should be no confusion over what free press may or may not say and U.S. Govern-

⁴ An intelligence memorandum prepared [*text not declassified*] for the Secretary of Defense, January 16, addressed the Pakistani reaction to the U.S. aid offer. The memorandum relayed comments by Pakistani Air Chief Marshall Shamim, a "Zia protégé and supporter," who "welcomed the prospect of US military aid for Pakistan, but cautioned that such assistance would be perceived by the population as a show of support for Zia and the Martial Law Administration (MLA). Since Pakistanis, including the all-powerful army officer corps are 'fed up' with the MLA, Shamim acknowledged that US aid could have a negative impact and would inhibit the emergence of a democratic political system in Pakistan for another 5 to 10 years by bolstering Zia's position." (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-82-0217B, Box 14, Pakistan, 1 Jan-16 Apr 1980)

⁵ See footnote 6, Document 145.

ment position. I had provided Foreign Secretary Shahnawaz with full texts of Hodding Carter's press briefings, which I thought spoke for themselves.⁶

7. Comment: Agha Shahi's expression of disappointment over aid package came as no surprise. In backgrounder yesterday to several American journalists, he was even more critical of U.S. \$400 million aid package (Islamabad 437).⁷ From our contacts we believe there is a continuing debate on this question within the GOP. While Agha Shahi and others may be taking negative view, which we must remember may be largely for bargaining purposes, there seems to be much more positive attitude on part of Pakistani military. We will have better idea of whether President Zia will now modify his original positive public reaction to aid offer after press briefing he quite willingly gives to several American journalists, which will take place this evening.

8. Department may wish pass this message to New Delhi and Moscow.

King

⁶ A news report quoted Hodding Carter as saying: "The Soviet Union has created a destabilizing situation where Pakistan, with good reason, can feel threatened. Our response, in the first instance, must deal with that situation." The report concluded, quoting Carter: "Since we don't know why the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, we can't rule out a second, third, or fourth operation against other countries." (Don Oberdorfer, "Pakistan Offered \$400 Million Aid," *Washington Post*, January 15, 1980, p. A1)

⁷ Telegram 437 from Islamabad is dated January 17. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800029–0032)

172. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, January 17, 1980, 9–10:45 a.m.

SUBJECT

SCC Meeting on Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf

PARTICIPANTS

State

Secretary Cyrus Vance
Deputy Secretary Warren
Christopher

Defense

Secretary Harold Brown
Ambassador Robert Komer

JCS

Chairman General David Jones
Lt. General John Pustay

CIA

Deputy Director Frank Carlucci
Robert Ames
Charles Cogan

OMB

Deputy Director John White

White House

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
Hamilton Jordan
Jody Powell
Hedley Donovan
David Aaron

NSC

Colonel William E. Odom
Captain Gary Sick
Thomas Thornton
Fritz Ermarth

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

Dr. Brzezinski explained that the purpose today is to cover a number of points, not all of them for decision, but as information and recommendations to the President as a backdrop for the decision he will shortly be making about our policy toward Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf region. He noted the agreement about the strategic dynamics of the Soviet military move into Afghanistan expressed at the previous SCC,² the consequences for Pakistan and Iran, and also the importance of Soviet influence in Yemen and Ethiopia.

Dr. Brzezinski also added that the Soviet publication "New Times" has issued a call for all Communist states and parties to seize new

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Trip File, Box 40, Brzezinski, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia: 2/1–5/80: Briefing Book I. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. In the upper right corner, Carter wrote: "Zbig—These are very serious matters. The discussions are necessary but any proposal for contentious action must be submitted to me first. J." For other excerpts of the summary of conclusions and a January 18 memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter transmitting it to the President, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Documents 42 and 43.

² See footnote 16, Document 152.

revolutionary opportunities created by the present political conditions in the world, disturbing evidence of present Soviet policy directions.

Military Assistance to Pakistan

Dr. Brzezinski and Secretary Vance commented that the President's meeting with Agha Shahi went as well as could be expected.³ Secretary Brown asked how we will deal with the situation if the Pakistanis insist they want \$1 billion in aid while we only offered \$400 million. Secretary Vance predicted that they will take our \$400 million and complain, not reject our aid.

Dr. Brzezinski asked about the French willingness to sell the Mirage aircraft to Pakistan. Secretary Vance reported that the French will probably supply the Mirage. As a next step, it will be discussed at the Political Directors Meeting in London on January 24th. State will push France to make a decision by then.

Dr. Brzezinski raised the question of American A-7 aircraft for Pakistan. It was pointed out that the Pakistanis did not ask for them. Rather they asked that they be supplied with aircraft sufficient to protect themselves against the Soviet air threat, implying, of course, for the need for the US F-16 or the Mirage. The A-7, as Dr. Brzezinski pointed out, would be very useful in a ground support role along the Western frontier. Furthermore, because the U.S. has a large number, nearly 700, it can undoubtedly spare 30 or 40. Secretary Brown agreed the Pakistanis might be willing to buy some A-7s.

Military Consortium

Dr. Brzezinski asked for Defense's proposal for a division of labor among the members of the military consortium. Secretary Brown submitted a paper showing which countries can produce what categories of military equipment. The issue of who pays remains to be solved, he added. Secretary Vance noted that according to Agha Shahi, the Saudis promised Pakistan \$800 million for military purchases over a year ago but have not yet delivered. We should press the Saudis to make the promise good.

Concerning Japan, Vance has instructed Phil Habib to ask the Japanese for \$400 million for the consortium. They may give less, but Vance feels we should ask for that much. We will get little from Britain and France, he continued, but the French should be willing to sell them aircraft and the British will certainly be willing to sell tanks and tank guns. Secretary Brown added that the U.S., France, and Germany can provide anti-tank weapons, much needed for insurgency and defense.

³ See Document 163.

It was also pointed out that the Pakistanis want foreign assistance for building a communications infrastructure on their western front.

Dr. Brzezinski asked if we need a big consortium figure for public and political effect such as \$1 billion. Secretary Brown observed that one to one and a half billion dollars for equipment spread over three years could be absorbed effectively by the Pakistanis; therefore, Dr. Brzezinski's figure is about right. Dr. Brzezinski added that we must avoid a figure which is so high that we are open to criticism that we are "saturating" Pakistan with arms the same way we did Iran.

Dr. Brzezinski added that we need a military equipment package and a concept for a division of labor which we can propose to the allies. Secretary Vance suggested that this be done at the upcoming Political Directors Meeting on January 24. Dr. Brzezinski agreed; we must supplement our delegation with technical teams sufficiently competent to make concrete decisions on both funds and equipment.

Agreed action:

—State will press France on the Mirage aircraft.

—The Political Directors Meeting will be reinforced with sufficient staff to discuss military assistance and funding.

—The U.S. will give an exemplary package to the Political Directors as a proposal for a division of labor.

—To fund the consortium, we will press the Japanese for \$400 million and the Saudis for \$800 million which, combined with our \$400 million, should be above \$1 billion.

—Britain and France will be encouraged to supply specific military equipment.

U.S. Assurances to Pakistan

Secretary Vance reported that we are still working out contingency scenarios to define circumstances under which we would come to Pakistan's military assistance against foreign attack. Secretary Vance promised to have a paper by Friday or Saturday which spells these out in considerable detail for the President.

It was agreed, at Secretary Vance's suggestion, that this is the next big decision issue which should be discussed with the President.

Contingency of a Soviet Invasion of Iran

Dr. Brzezinski proposed that the President mention in his speech that the United States has been committed to the independence of Iran for the past 30 years and remains so committed today.⁴ Secretaries

⁴ Reference is to the President's upcoming State of the Union speech; see footnote 2, Document 175.

Vance and Brown wondered if this does not so clearly imply our previous ties to the Shah that it will provoke Khomeini's public rejection and fail to achieve the political effect in the region for which it is intended. Dr. Brzezinski observed that we must simply accept the cost of a possible Khomeini statement because our vital interests in the area are so great. Secretaries Vance and Brown suggested omitting reference to "30 years." They accepted Dr. Brzezinski's alternative language "as we have been" so that a sentence in the speech might read: "The U.S. remains committed to an independent Iran today as it has been in the past."

Agreed action: The record of the meeting should solicit the President's reaction to this proposal.⁵

[Omitted here is a discussion on regional military bases and Yemen.]

Afghanistan Insurgency

Secretary Vance reported that Agha Shahi calls the insurgency in Afghanistan "a dangerous lightning rod" and, therefore, a very difficult decision for General Zia. Dr. Brzezinski commented that a massive insurgency at present is probably not in our best interest. Rather a low-level and enduring insurgency is essential to keep the Islamic states mobilized against the Soviets in Afghanistan.

Secretary Brown added that Agha Shahi's comments were probably not meant to indicate that Zia will be backing out, but rather to keep the option open for the future.

Afghanistan Refugees

State reported that it is possible for the United States to provide bilateral aid for refugees in Afghanistan as well as aid through the UNHCR.

Agreed action: State was tasked to prepare a plan for providing at least a small part of their refugee aid through bilateral channels and present it at the next SCC on refugee support.⁶

Dr. Brzezinski observed that the large degree of consensus on all agenda issues today may negate the need for an NSC meeting with the President on the same topics. All agreed and Secretary Vance added that the next issue we need to discuss directly with the President

⁵ Neither the "Approve" nor the "Disapprove" option was checked, but to the left of the option lines, Carter wrote: "Covered on *Meet the Press*."

⁶ Not further identified.

concerns the contingency scenarios for Pakistan and the assurances we give that government.

Secretary Vance then added two additional items to the agenda.

U.S. Boxing Group to the Soviet Union

Secretary Vance reported that a boxing team is to depart for a competition in the Soviet Union in five days. All agreed that we should discourage them from going.

Agreed action: Secretary Vance and the Vice President, and possibly Lloyd Cutler, will discuss the matter directly with them to discourage their participation.

Backgrounder on Christopher Trip to Europe

All agreed with Secretary Vance's proposal that Warren Christopher give a press backgrounder on his recent trip to Europe in order to prevent speculation and misleading reports. Christopher will emphasize the Afghanistan side of his mission because the allies were more forthcoming on that issue. He will deemphasize the Iranian side because the results were less encouraging.

Agreed action: Christopher will give a backgrounder.

173. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Carlucci) and the Deputy Director for Operations (McMahon)¹

Washington, January 18, 1980

SUBJECT

Conversation of 16 January 1980 (U)

1. Re Afghanistan, I also discussed our first shipment to the insurgents and said we were holding the second one waiting for Pakistani clearance.² (In my meeting with Brzezinski later, he urged me to come back to the SCC quickly for permission to go on with the second

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 95M01183R, Box 1, DCI Turner—Eyes Only Files—Memos and Meetings with Various Officials and Subjects. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. An unknown hand signed for Turner.

² Turner met with Carter, Jordan, and Brzezinski on January 16 from 11:29 a.m. to noon. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary)

tranche. He said that because he felt some people were beginning to waiver in whether and how far we should continue this support. I told him that I wasn't coming back to the SCC; I was going ahead with the second tranche and felt that we had that authority up to \$10 million. He agreed and encouraged us to push the second tranche as rapidly as possible.) (S/Sensitive)

2. I went on in my discussion to point out the dilemma that support to the insurgents created, i.e., the more they succeeded, the more likely the Soviets were to put pressure on Pakistan and that the best the insurgents could hope for was a continual running sore with loss of life. The comment was made that in some sense the fact that we had to funnel through Pakistan was a check valve on this, and that if they thought it was resulting in too much pressure on them they would slow it down or turn it off. (S)

3. There was also a discussion of the possibility of diversion of equipment to Pakistani or other uses. I said I certainly thought that was likely and possible and that we could not hold a real audit on this, but that nonetheless it was all going to be useful. The comment was made that perhaps some of our own military aid would be sent to the insurgents. I pointed out that that was American equipment and we were using Soviet and hoped to keep it that way so the American hand was not as blatant. That point had not been registered before, that is, that we were supplying Soviet equipment. I then asked that mention of thanks for the splendid cooperation of the Egyptians in providing ammunition to match our Soviet weapons be given to Mubarak tomorrow. (S)

174. Intelligence Information Cable Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

[*cable number not declassified*]

Washington, January 18, 1980

COUNTRY

China Afghanistan/USSR

SUBJECT

Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Bulletin No. 9 of 1980, Providing Analysis and Guidance on the Afghanistan Situation [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

SOURCE

[*1 line not declassified*]

1. Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Bulletin No. 9 of 1980, issued on 14 January, contained analysis of the Afghanistan situation and provided Chinese Missions abroad with guidance. The MFA Bulletin summed up major recent developments and presented the following analysis:

A. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was due partially, but significantly, to hegemonistic expansionism. The year 1979 began with the Soviet invasion by proxy of Kampuchea and ended with the direct Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

B. The invasion of Afghanistan revealed on a grand scale the mad adventurism of the Soviet Union. This move again proved that the Soviet Union would be the origin of world war and remained the primary threat to world peace.

C. The Soviet action revealed Moscow's claimed opposition to hegemonism to be false, and it proved the Soviets to be liars. It further proved the illusion of signing friendship treaties with the Soviet Union.

D. The Soviet invasion indicated the serious escalation of Soviet expansionism to a new stage outside the Socialist bloc and into the Third World. The move also represented an escalation from the use of Cuba and other proxies to the direct involvement of Soviet forces in military aggression.

E. Increased vigilance and unity were required on the part of other nations in the world community. These nations should be encouraged to be unafraid of the Soviets.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Office of Soviet and East European Analysis, Program Files for Soviet-Asian Relations, 1960-1981, Lot 90D328, Sino-Soviet (1980). Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*].

2. The MFA Bulletin provided the following guidelines to Chinese Missions on the Afghanistan situation:

A. In propaganda, there should be a minimum of comment on the new Afghan Government. Stress should be placed on support of the Afghan people in their struggle against Soviet invaders. The new government in Kabul should not yet be referred to as a Soviet puppet regime.

B. Work among host governments would vary from country to country.

(1) In Western Europe, it should be pointed out that faith can no longer be placed in détente. Substantive work and measures would be required to defeat Soviet moves toward war. Western Europe required better relations with the Third World.

(2) In the Third World and among nonaligned nations, governments should be alerted to the potential for situations in which they face “the tiger at the front door and the wolf at the back door.” In other words, vigilance was required against a direct Soviet invasion, as well as Soviet invasions by proxy using countries such as Cuba and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

C. The world would also have to be alerted to the possibility of a Soviet peace offensive following consolidation of Afghanistan. Moscow had done this in the past to assuage ill will and lower the guard of the world.

3. ACQ: [1 line not declassified]

4. [less than 1 line not declassified] Dissem: [2 lines not declassified] (ConGen, DPO and Political Counselor only).

175. **Memorandum From the President's Assistant for Domestic Affairs and Policy (Eizenstat) to President Carter**¹

Washington, January 19, 1980

SUBJECT

State of Union Speech

While I have provided detailed comments to Zbig, I feel strongly enough about the State of the Union speech as it now stands to make the following points:²

1. Overall, the speech is not well-organized, is neither tough nor sharp in its focus or language, and lacks coherency. It is in short "mushy".

2. It is difficult to discern what the Carter doctrine or central message is from the draft—is it merely the aid to Pakistan—is it a broader statement that we will intervene militarily if any nation in the area is threatened or only some and if so which ones? The draft uses the phrase you aptly mentioned during our meeting on the speech—that you are drawing the line, but it is unclear where the line extends and what happens if it is breached. It is critically important that this be clearly stated and that we stress we have the staying power to protect the vital interests of the countries in the area in continued independence.

3. You strongly urged during our meeting on the speech that specific bases or facilities be announced and urged Zbig and Cy to expedite the necessary decisions. This would be the most dramatic part of the speech—clearly indicating we are stepping up our military presence in the area. Yet it is stated so obtusely and vaguely in the speech that the point and its significance is totally lost.

¹ Source: Carter Library, Staff Offices, Counsel, Cutler, Box 108, President's Speeches—State of the Union: 11/79–1/19/80. Administratively Confidential and Personal. Printed from an uninitialed copy.

² Carter's State of the Union Address, delivered on January 23, went through several drafts. The particular version Eizenstat referred to was not further identified and not found. Text of the final address is printed in *Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81*, Book I, pp. 194–200, and in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 138. In the speech, Carter pointed out the challenges posed by the situation in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and enunciated what would become known as the Carter Doctrine: "Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."

4. The sections dealing with Iran badly need to be reworked:
 - a. Parts actually seem to embrace the revolution.
 - b. The tone is (even before our hostages are out): We have always liked you and we still do.
 - c. You *must* repeat for the American people the tough steps already taken—cut off oil imports, frozen assets, no spare parts, Allied cooperation, refusal to bend to demands.
 - d. The press has widely reported (front-page *New York Times* yesterday) that we will cut off all trade with Iran within a few days.³ This would be an appropriate time to make the announcement so that we follow through on your promise to continue to turn the economic screws on Iran while our hostages are there.
5. The centerpiece of your new Southwest Asia policy is aid to Pakistan—yet the \$400 million is already being discounted and disparaged by Pakistan. Perhaps we could mention a consortium of western aid which you have organized and pledges from our Allies could be obtained within the next few days to bolster the package. Also, I see no reason for delay in converting the Executive agreement into a treaty. It now appears we are unwilling to give Pakistan the full protection she feels necessary (see front-page *Washington Star* today).⁴
6. Your dramatic decisions to bolster defense spending need to be better emphasized. Having done it you should clearly explain the need and let people know the boldness of your response.
7. The portions on Russia (pages 8–9 of Draft B–5, 1/17/80) seem misguided. It appears that we are saying we are no threat to their interests and that they face a choice they have already made. We should try to steer them back to a cooperative position, but not indicate they have yet to make their choice. The whole point of the Afghanistan invasion is that it is a clear departure from their policies and that they have opted for the wrong path.
8. I am simultaneously sending to you under separate memo my suggested language for the economic/energy portion of the speech. I am also sending Charlie Schultze's suggested version, which incorporates the comments of Secretaries Duncan and Miller.⁵

³ See Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S. Plans Embargo on Iran on its Own as Allies Shun Idea," *New York Times*, January 18, 1980, p. A1.

⁴ The article in the *Washington Star* was not found, but there was a front page *Washington Post* article on the subject that day. See John M. Goshko, "U.S. Forging Ahead on Aid to Pakistan," *Washington Post*, January 19, 1980, p. A9.

⁵ Neither Eizenstat's nor Schultze's memorandum was found.

176. Editorial Note

A status report prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, January 21, 1980, described weapons shipments destined for Afghanistan as part of the early stage of the covert action. The report noted that an unidentified insurgent group had already received 50 AK-47s and 50,000 rounds of ammunition. This information was elaborated on in an attached memorandum, January 6, [*text not declassified*] of the Central Intelligence Agency to Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner, in response to Turner's request for figures on arms deliveries to Pakistan. The report itemized several shipments. One shipment, delivered from [*text not declassified*] to Saudi Arabia and from there to Islamabad, contained 56,000 pounds of matériel, including 50 RPG-7 rocket launchers, 35 12.7mm HMGs, 500 AK-47s, 640,000 rounds of AK-47 ammunition, and approximately 2,000 pounds of explosives. Another shipment, delivered from Cairo to Dhahran, contained another 56,000 pounds of matériel, including 1,000 rounds of RPG-7 ammunition and 210,000 rounds of 12.7mm HMG ammunition. Regarding the first shipment, the memorandum reported that the equipment arrived in Islamabad January 4, and was received by the Pakistani Intelligence Service. The second shipment, the memorandum noted, contained Egyptian arms at a cost of \$1 million to the United States; an additional 32,000 pounds of arms were en route from Dhahran to Cairo, delivered via [*text not declassified*] at Saudi request, so as to conceal Saudi and Egyptian involvement in the arms shipments. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 82M00501R: 1980 Subject Files, Box 12, C-367, 01 Jan-30 Jun 80)

The status report also noted that another load of weapons was in the process of being purchased from Egypt with Saudi money. An attached cable, prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency January 18, transmitted authorization from CIA Headquarters to the [*text not declassified*] to place the following order: 15,000 rounds of 14.5mm HMG ammunition, 250 anti-tank grenades, 1,700 Czech-made anti-tank mines, 4,000 hand grenades, 50 82mm mortars with 2,500 rounds of prepared, and 100 RPG-7 launchers with 500 rockets. The cable noted that the shipment should commence as soon as possible, with pickup in Cairo en route to Islamabad. [*text not declassified*] Regarding the Soviet detection of the source of the weapons, Headquarters advised that its depots contained weapons from several countries, but the operation should ensure that only identifiably Egyptian arms should appear in Afghanistan. (Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 82M00-501R, Box 12, C-367, 01 Jan-30 Jun 80)

Finally, the status report noted that Egypt was willing to sell 15 SA-7s, and referred to an attached cable that authorized Pakistani

acquisition of the SA-7s. That cable was not attached and not found, but a status report for Brzezinski's trip to Pakistan, January 29, noted: "Regarding SA-7s, the Pakistanis would like American instructors to train six to eight Pakistani Pushtu and Dari speaking Paks in SA-7 operations in a secure Pak military area. They would later infiltrate into Afghanistan to work with the insurgents, employ the weapons, and further train Afghans in the SA-7." The report further noted of the arms shipments: "We have some unilateral indications that the weapons are being distributed by the Pakistanis to various insurgent groups. The chief of Pakistan service is confident that under present conditions, these weapons can be infiltrated overland into most areas of Afghanistan, including the Hazarajat. The Pakistanis claim that the availability of these weapons and promise of distribution was instrumental in forcing the insurgents to establish at least a surface unity, which was announced at the recently concluded Islamic Conference." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Trip File, Box 40, Brzezinski, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia: 2/1-5/80: Briefing Book I) On the Islamic Conference, see footnote 2, Document 184.

177. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State¹

Kabul, January 22, 1980, 1218Z

366. Subject: Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan: Some Suggestions.
Ref: State 12427.²

1. (S—Entire text)
2. Begin summary: As the Department ponders over possible next moves to make the Soviet occupation more costly, and how the Soviets

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Box 5, Afghanistan: 1/22/80. Secret; Immediate, Sensitive, Exdis. Sent for information to USUN. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. The telegram was summarized in a memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter, January 23. Regarding Amstutz's recommendation that the UN withdraw its aid missions from Afghanistan, Carter wrote: "Try to do so." In response to Amstutz's suggestion that UN troops replace Soviet troops in Afghanistan, Carter wrote: "ok." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Daily CIA Brief File, Box 25, 1/21/80-1/24/80)

² Telegram 12427 to USUN, January 17, directed the Mission to see Waldheim as soon as possible and urge him to send UN representatives to Afghanistan "without delay." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800028-0481)

might be induced to withdraw, I have two thoughts to throw into the hopper. One is that, if the Soviets and DRA continue to disregard the UN resolutions (as is likely),³ the Department try to persuade UNHQ to withdraw its aid missions from Afghanistan. The other is that, were the Soviets ever to appear to realize their presence in Afghanistan is too costly for them, the Department should consider approaching Waldheim or Indian PM Gandhi to propose a face-saving exodus by substitution of UN troops for Soviet forces, conditional on the holding of new supervised elections. End summary.

3. We at Embassy Kabul have been delighted with the strong response of Washington to the Soviet occupation of this country. We applaud the steps Washington has so far taken and share the widespread view that the Soviets underestimated the degree of Western and world reaction. Suspecting that the Dept is considering what additional steps might be taken, I offer here two suggestions.

4. As we reported last week, the puppet Babrak regime has refrained from telling its people about the Security Council and UNGA votes.⁴ Instead, it has tried to obfuscate the issue by saturating the media with allegations of U.S. and "imperialist" treacherousness and our alleged close ties with "monster" Hafizullah Amin. While suppressing what happened in the UN, the DRA has nonetheless not attacked the institution of the UN itself, and so far as we can tell still holds it in respect. This is important in the context of my recommendations.

5. First recommendation. As of this time, we are unaware of any UNHQ emissary coming to Kabul to investigate whether the DRA and the Soviets are complying with the UN resolutions. But whether any emissaries come or not, the Western Embassies here are unanimous in believing that the Soviets are not about to pull out their forces. (Were they to do so, the Babrak govt would instantaneously collapse.) On the contrary, there are many signs that the Soviets are digging in to stay for a long time. Their forces are building military bastions about Kabul, and their logistic arrangements point to their establishing or taking over permanent lodging quarters.

6. Assuming that the Soviets have no intention of complying with the UN resolutions, it seems to me that the least the UN itself can do is to withdraw its UN economic aid missions here. Were this done, this would be a severe psychological and discrediting blow to the DRA—an action much more effective than all the measures the Western Embassies here in aggregate could do. A withdrawal of UNDP and

³ See Document 136.

⁴ This information was reported in telegram 291 from Kabul, January 17. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800028-0983)

associated economic missions would confirm in the eyes of the Afghan public, in a most telling way, the lack of legitimacy of the Babrak regime. It would be a humiliating blow to the DRA. I hope, therefore, that the Department will give serious weight to this recommendation—and if possible, get it implemented by, say, the end of Feb.

7. Were though the Department to press such a recommendation on UNHQ, it should be aware that there are UN elements here who would resist it. One, of course, would be the Bulgarian UN res rep, Yuli Bahnev, who will use every argument Moscow and Sofia can supply him to oppose it. At the very least he will urge that a UN office be maintained with the flag boldly flying, so as to maintain an unmistakable presence and to honor past contractual aid commitments. I think both arguments should be resisted. The UN office should be made to close and the total UN presence withdrawn. Nothing less than hauling down the UN flag is required to have the kind of political impact this govt and the Soviets deserve. As for other local UN sources of opposition, some among the UN experts would be fearful for their jobs, and for self-serving reasons would oppose the cancellation of their contracts.

8. My second recommendation, as mentioned in the summary, there may come a time when the Soviets appreciate that their involvement here is too costly and they may welcome a face-saving way to exit. If this were to occur—and it would likely only happen if the insurgents can carry on an effective fight against the Soviets and the Babrak government—then the Soviets might be amenable to some face-saving suggestions. One that occurs to me is for either UN SecGen Waldheim or the Indian Government to propose the posting of UN troops in Afghanistan to replace the Soviets. But were this done, care would have to be taken to make sure the UN troops were not here merely to sustain the despised Babrak government. Hopefully, a UN presence would be conditional on its monitoring a relatively free election to choose a new, legitimate government.

9. During a discussion this week with Indian Ambassador Jaskaran Teja (who last served as DCM in Moscow and is suspected among Western diplomats as being pro-Soviet and a Communist sympathizer), Teja said he was sure the Soviets would never accept the idea of the UN replacing its troops here. He could be right. Certainly, the success of the Soviets at the end of WW II in Eastern Europe gives them some reason to think they can get away with it again, but I still think my suggestion worth bearing in mind.

10. Comment: I hope these two basic ideas are helpful.

Amstutz

178. Intelligence Information Cable Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

[*cable number not declassified*] Washington, January 22, 1980, 2340Z

COUNTRY

USSR/Afghanistan

SUBJECT

Comments of a Soviet Diplomat on Factors Leading to the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan [*1 line not declassified*]

SOURCE

[*3½ lines not declassified*]

1. (Headquarters comment: The source made the following remarks in an informal conversation during which he said that he felt that the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was unwise and not in the best interests of the USSR. [*2 lines not declassified*])

2. In early January 1980, officials of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs who, in late December 1979 and early January 1980, were involved in the support of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan said that the Soviet decision to intervene was based on the following factors:

A. The Soviets were humiliated by the outcome of the August 1979 issue of Soviet combat troops in Cuba. They considered that they had backed down on this issue in deference to the right of the United States to dominate events on its borders. The Soviets also accepted an unfavorable resolution of this issue because, at the time, they still had hopes for a treaty from the second session of the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT II).

B. Soviet leaders saw the decision of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to modernize its Theater Nuclear Forces (TNF) as an act requiring a response.

C. The Soviet Embassy in Washington was reporting in November 1979 that there was no chance of the U.S. Senate ratifying the SALT II treaty.

D. Soviet personnel in Afghanistan had been tortured to death by Afghan dissidents and retribution for these acts had become an emotional issue with Soviet leaders.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Box 5, Afghanistan: 1/22/80. Secret; Immediate; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

E. The intervention of the U.S. in the Dominican Republic in 1965 was considered a valid precedent for Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The Soviet view was, “who today remembers the U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic?”²

3. The most important of these factors, according to the Soviet Foreign Ministry officials, was that the U.S. had imposed its will on Cuba in 1979 and that the USSR must demonstrate that its will must be respected in areas close to its borders, as well.

4. The Foreign Ministry officials also said that the possibility of a boycott against the Moscow Olympics had been considered during the planning for the intervention in Afghanistan and that, in fact, it had been planned that Soviet troops would be out of Afghanistan by 1 May 1980 to avoid disrupting the games. The Ministry officials said that U.S. call for a boycott of the Olympics was a sore spot with the Soviets and that Moscow would take a boycott seriously. Valentin Falin, First Deputy Chief of the CPSU Central Committee’s International Information Department and former Soviet Ambassador to West Germany, was quoted as saying that now, because of the U.S. ultimatum, it would be difficult for the USSR to withdraw its troops before the Olympics.

5. According to Falin, Soviet leaders were completely surprised by the coup which overthrew the Government of Afghan President Mohammad Daoud in 1978. At that time, and again in January 1978, Nur Mohammad Taraki, Daoud’s successor, asked for Soviet support, but was refused. The Soviets did not trust Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin and repeatedly warned Taraki to beware of Amin. According to Falin, Taraki’s attendance at the non-aligned summit in Havana in September 1979 was a mistake as it gave Amin the opportunity to plan his coup. Following that coup, the Soviets warned Amin not to kill Taraki. The Soviets held Amin responsible when, after three weeks in prison, Taraki was strangled. In November 1979, the internal situation in Afghanistan had deteriorated to the point where Amin asked for Soviet intervention despite that fact that he realized the Soviets were not his friends. In sum, as Falin explained it, the surprise overthrow of Daoud by a leftist regime had started a chain of events which the Soviets reacted to rather than initiated. The Soviets were prepared to accept the Daoud regime and did not try to replace it, but when a pro-Soviet regime came to power, they could not ignore it nor refuse to support it.

6. ACQ: [1 line not declassified]

7. [less than 1 line not declassified] Dissem: [1 line not declassified]

² For documentation on the U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic in April 1965, see *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana.

179. Annex From the President's Daily Brief¹

Washington, January 23, 1980

USSR: PROBLEMS IN AFGHANISTAN

Four weeks after launching its invasion, the USSR has encountered a range of political and military problems in Afghanistan that portend an even deeper and larger Soviet role.

[*less than 1 line not declassified*] Soviet officials in Kabul indicate Moscow is dismayed over the failure of Babrak Karmal's government thus far to take hold. Babrak has made an effort, at Soviet behest, to try to appear more moderate than his predecessors, but he is so obviously a Soviet puppet that his regime would collapse if Soviet troops were to withdraw. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Soviet officials have complained about the factional and personal rivalries within the regime, and one [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Soviet official in Kabul has even speculated about a successor to Babrak.

The disintegration of the Afghan military has speeded up since the Soviet invasion. Rather than welcoming Soviet support against the insurgents, some units have clashed with Soviet troops and the rate of desertions has increased. The Soviets do not appear to have an effective remedy at hand.

General Sokolov, the USSR's First Deputy Minister of Defense and chief commander in Afghanistan, reacted to ineffectiveness in one Afghan unit by recommending that its Soviet advisers be replaced. But Afghan military dissatisfaction will increase as Soviet advisers—under pressure from their superiors to produce results—take an increasingly heavy hand in Afghan military affairs.

The Insurgency

The introduction of Soviet troops—far from intimidating the insurgents—has probably served to increase popular support for the rebellion. *The insurgents have taken advantage of the demoralization of the Afghan Army and bad weather to maintain a steady harassment of isolated Afghan towns and Soviet lines of communication. In particular, the Soviets have had problems keeping open the Termez-Kabul road, which passes through extremely difficult terrain.*

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—January 1980, PDBs. Top Secret; For the President Only. The full version of this President's Daily Brief was not filed with this collection. The annex printed here was found in this form.

This has led the Soviets to undertake a number of small-scale sweeps and to launch tactical airstrikes and helicopter attacks at suspected rebel concentrations. In the northeastern provinces of Takhar and Badakhshan, the Soviets have undertaken a more ambitious operation to ensure that the besieged provincial capitals do not fall to the rebels. This drive, however, has been hampered by bad weather, poor road conditions, and insurgent harassment.² We have no evidence that Soviet forces have been able to engage the rebels on terms that would allow the Soviets to bring to bear their superior firepower and air support.

We have had several reliable but fragmentary reports of Soviet casualties. One report from a Soviet town near the border reports the recent arrival of a large number of coffins bearing remains of Soviets killed in Afghanistan. We believe the Soviets have sustained as many as 2,000 killed and wounded since the invasion began. We have no information about the number of insurgent casualties.

Prospects

Moscow probably will not find early relief from these problems. The Babrak regime shows no sign of pulling together, and the situation in the Afghan military will be extremely difficult to retrieve. Even under the best of conditions, it could take years to assemble an Afghan military force capable of controlling the country. Thus Moscow almost inevitably will have to take a more direct hand in running and pacifying the country.

An early collapse of the rebellion also seems unlikely. Better weather in the spring probably will bring an increase in insurgent activity.

All of this does not mean that Moscow cannot maintain essential control or keep whatever government it wants in power in Kabul. Nor is there the slightest sign that the Soviets might seriously contemplate withdrawal.

Politically, Moscow probably will intensify its effort to establish a more effective Afghan Government. If Babrak cannot do the job, the Soviets could engineer yet another coup in Kabul, as embarrassing as that might be for them. But they are unlikely to come up with a formula

² A situation report on Afghanistan, January 25, prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, noted that Afghan and Soviet military forces faced a "serious dilemma" regarding the insurgency: "They must carry out orders that state 'the rebels must be destroyed using all resources' and, at the same time, adhere to a government policy of refraining from attacking villages or pursuing rebels who take sanctuary in villages and homes. That policy is part of a propaganda program to reduce hostility toward the Soviet and Afghan armies." (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—January 1980, SITREPs)

that resolves the contradiction between their interest in a government with broader support and their intention of dominating Afghanistan.

Militarily, the Soviets could continue on their present course, under which their military forces maintain control of Kabul and other essential points and conduct counterinsurgency operations necessary to prevent major setbacks. But this seems unlikely since it would allow the insurgents a free hand in most of the country, allow them to prey on extended Soviet supply lines, and present the Soviet leadership with the prospect of continued casualties and a steady drain on resources.

The Soviets now have the forces in Afghanistan to conduct a somewhat expanded counterinsurgency effort. It is unlikely, however, that the forces now there could end the insurgency. If the Soviets seek to end the insurgency—and, as seems likely, cannot rely on effective support from the Afghan Army—they will have to commit more forces.

180. Memorandum From Marshall Brent of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, January 26, 1980

SUBJECT

Getting Our Act Together on Afghanistan (U)

As I noted in my memo of January 7 (Tab A),² the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan offers this Administration a priceless opportunity to begin to speak with one voice on how we deal with and what we say about the Soviets. This is very important from a political (*viz.*, George

¹ Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I-047, Afghanistan: 11 Sep 1979–22 Jul 1980. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Ermarth, Griffith, Henze, Odom, Thornton, and Schechter. In the upper right corner, Brzezinski wrote: “agree→first rate.”

² Attached but not printed. Brent wrote to Brzezinski, January 7, to emphasize “the country wants the President to exercise firm, vigorous leadership in foreign affairs. The crisis in Afghanistan will enhance this desire.” Brent argued that Afghanistan gave the Carter administration an opportunity to reverse a “commonly-held perception” among domestic critics and the Soviets, that U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union lacked focus and resolve. Brent’s memorandum is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 255.

Bush's remarks on the subject);³ from a diplomatic (i.e., relations with the Allies and with the Third World); and from a strictly US-Soviet (Moscow should be getting a clear and simple message from us) point of view. (C)

Unfortunately, this is not happening. There has been a stream of Government-originated analysis and public testimony which has muddied the waters with regard to (a) the motivations that impelled the Soviets to attack Afghanistan, (b) the prospects which the Soviets face in Afghanistan, and (c) the length of time that we are prepared to maintain the current series of punitive actions *vis-à-vis* the Soviets. The line propounded has directly undercut the President's message. Whether this is intentional or unintentional, I do not know. But what is clear to me is that our interests are being damaged in the process. The harmful line which has emerged, and which has been consciously abetted by the Soviets, is as follows:

Why Did the Soviets Attack? According to one school of thought, the Soviets felt impelled to move into Afghanistan because of legitimate defensive concerns to avert chaos in a neighboring Communist state and because the penalties which such a move would normally trigger in terms of US-Soviet relations and world opinion were no longer operative. Moscow was thus, allegedly influenced by the overall downturn in US-Soviet relations, as exemplified by the Cuban brigade crisis, the TNF dispute, friction over Southeast Asian relief and security matters, US defense increases, SALT II delay, etc. The obvious assumption behind this argument is that the Soviet invasion only has implications for Afghanistan itself, is not connected with the strategic importance of the Persian Gulf and Iranian oil, and that making a US-Soviet or East-West issue out of it is a big mistake. The further implication is that if SALT had passed and we had not decided on TNF deployment, the Soviets would not have invaded Afghanistan. Almost all genuine experts on the USSR would argue that this last assertion is highly implausible; that the Czechoslovakia decision in 1968 was a hard one for Brezhnev, but that given his outlook and that of his colleagues, the decision to invade Afghanistan caused little if any internal dissent among the leadership; and that the Soviets would have gone into Afghanistan no matter what the state of US-Soviet relations had been in December 1979. (In fact, it might be useful for Carter partisans to ponder the fact that had SALT passed on schedule in November, and

³ The reference to Bush's remarks likely comes from Robert Scheer, "Bush Assails Carter Defense Strategy," *Los Angeles Times*, January 24, 1980, p. B1. Bush, who was running for President and had recently won the Iowa Republican caucuses, cited Carter's cuts in defense spending and linked that policy with the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

had the Soviets followed-up with an invasion of Afghanistan in December, the President's chances for reelection at this point would be considerably slimmer than they are at present.) (S)

In any case, excusing the Soviet invasion or laying the blame for it on the feebleness of our diplomacy and the lack of wisdom of specific actions taken by the President (*viz.*, Tab B)⁴ undercut the President's leadership, question his judgment, and are not appropriate analyses from high officials of the Carter Administration. We are not, after all, participating in a graduate seminar. If we lay emphasis on US culpability for the worsening of US-Soviet relations and indicate that this is the prime factor, or at least a prime factor, in the Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan, this takes the Soviets off the hook both in the United States and abroad, undercuts the President's position both with the US public and with the Allies, and measurably weakens our chances for getting a satisfactory reaction on the part of others to Soviet aggression. (S)

The line which should be adopted by all authoritative US officials is the one very clearly enunciated by the President, i.e., that this is an unprecedented event, marks a very grave deterioration of the peace, has extremely ominous ramifications for the future, requires concerted international effort to deal with it, demonstrates the callous insensitivity of the USSR to the ordinary norms of international behavior, and is, in short, the gravest threat to the general peace since the Second World War. In other words, this is no time to be "even-handed" in backgrounding Soviet motivations, nor should we downplay the obvious geopolitical factors which influenced the Soviets to take over Afghanistan in the first place. (C)

A Soviet Miscalculation? Other recent background briefings from "high Government officials" have stressed the "miscalculation" that the Soviets have made by moving into Afghanistan.⁵ According to this line of reasoning, the Soviets are now becoming involved "in another Vietnam" and will not be successful in suppressing the insurgency through military means for years to come. My view, on the contrary, is that the Soviet war aims—to control the population centers, the lines of communication and the major passes leading to Pakistan—will

⁴ At Tab B, attached but not printed, is a January 22 memorandum from Brent to Brzezinski and Aaron, calling their attention to a Department of State briefing book prepared for Italian Prime Minister Francesco Cossiga's visit to the United States, which listed a number of issues not directly related to Afghanistan that compelled the Soviet intervention. These included the Theater Nuclear Force (TNF) issue in Europe, SALT II, and Soviet troops in Cuba. Of the Department of State attitude, Brent concluded: "In other words, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is our fault." In the upper right corner, Brzezinski wrote: "Agree! ZB."

⁵ Not further identified and not found.

almost certainly be accomplished by this summer, and that Soviet control of the media will then make it possible for them, without necessarily eliminating the resistance everywhere in Afghanistan, simply to declare victory, a declaration which will be greeted with a sigh of relief by our European Allies, among others (Tab C).⁶ (C)

Whether this is a correct analysis or not really begs the question. The hidden assumption behind the statement that Afghanistan is a “Soviet Vietnam” is that the Soviets are having, and will have, so much trouble in that country that this in itself will be a lesson to them to desist from further actions of this kind. The corresponding message for Americans is that the Soviets will derive the same lessons from Afghanistan that we did from Vietnam. This is not only contrary to fact but also undermines our policy, because it implies that it would be sufficient for the United States and our Allies simply to sit back and observe Soviet discomfiture at the “miscalculation.” Strong actions on our part, in this light, are obviously overreactions. Such analysis consequently undercuts our efforts to ensure that our Allies take, and the general public supports, strong, concrete and punitive measures against the Soviets because of Afghanistan. (S)

The Short Duration of Our Reaction. Some public testimony, in addition to much background briefing, leaves the implication that the pendulum will swing back in due course and that within several months we can expect “business as usual” with the Soviets. This has been evident at several meetings I have recently attended. The primary evidence for such belief is that we have carefully maintained the fabric of our relationship and have not “broken any agreements” with the Soviets. In fact, the Soviets are carefully spreading the myth that they will be withdrawing from Afghanistan in short order. The Singaporeans evidently believe such twaddle and have warned us not to be left holding the bag when this fabled event takes place in thirty days. (The Soviets, of course, spread the same sort of stories and repeated them officially after the invasion of Czechoslovakia.) (S)

Questioning the long-term commitment of the President to the actions we have undertaken undercuts his leadership, puts his judgment in doubt, and is politically very damaging (i.e., if this is the most serious event since the Second World War, then why will we be engaging in “business as usual” in a matter of months?). Furthermore, it is grist for the mill of those Europeans and others who argue against taking precipitate or strong action against the Soviets. (S)

⁶ Printed as Document 132.

The Recommended Line. In my view, all top Administration officials should be speaking with one voice in disseminating the following analysis of events in Afghanistan:

—The Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan was a carefully considered one and grew out of the mission of General Pavlovski to Afghanistan, which began last August.

—The Czars thirsted after ports on the Indian Ocean for centuries. In line with those historical aspirations, Molotov asked von Ribbentrop for a sphere of influence over Afghanistan and Iran in 1940. The Soviets marched into Northern Iran in 1942 and again in 1946. The geopolitical aims of the Soviets in taking over Afghanistan should not be underestimated. Soviet education, doctrine, and outlook would all lead one to believe that the geopolitical factor is an important element in the Soviet design to turn Afghanistan from a buffer state into the Mongolia of Southwest Asia.

—The Soviets are, of course, aware that by introducing their troops into Afghanistan they are measurably escalating the risks of eventual armed conflict. Obviously, they felt the risk was worth taking.

—The elimination of Afghanistan as a buffer state in Southwest Asia, just as the elimination of Cambodia as a buffer state in Southeast Asia, indicates a dangerous, even unprecedented, new adventurism on the part of the Soviets, who have been, ever since 1975, demonstrating a growing willingness to use armed force to settle disputes in their favor in Third World countries.

—Our best forecast is that the Soviets will put enough strength into Afghanistan to prevail militarily and that they will eventually subdue Afghanistan, just as they subdued the peoples of the Baltic and East Europe in the 1940s. Any other conclusion would be wishful thinking.

—While we would welcome being proved wrong, we do not expect the Soviets to withdraw their forces from Afghanistan for the foreseeable future. Our reaction to the Soviet aggression must, therefore, be firm, measured and long-term in nature.

—The United States has no intention of resuming a “business as usual” posture toward the Soviet Union until we are convinced that the Kremlin has absorbed the message that was delivered in the State of the Union address. President Carter is, above all, determined to avoid future Afghanistans. (C)

Trying to shove this message directly down the throat of the State Department would be worse than hopeless. My suggestion is that you proceed as follows:

a) Raise the importance of speaking with one voice on this issue in the SCC, emphasizing the need of those working in the reelection campaign to have clear, simple guidance on Afghanistan and Iran.⁷

⁷ The issue did not arise at the next SCC meeting, February 6. See Document 198. Brent attended the meeting, but Brzezinski did not; he was in Saudi Arabia at the time. See Documents 194 and 195.

b) Task the Schechter policy information committee to come up with such guidance.

c) Disseminate the guidance developed by the committee to the domestic staff for general guidance to all Administration officials.

d) Once we have an official agreed line, make sure that all top officials, and particularly Administration Soviet experts, adhere to that line. (C)

181. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State and the International Communication Agency¹

Moscow, January 28, 1980, 1706Z

1474. Subject: Soviet Reaction to U.S. Policy.

1. (C—Entire text)

2. One of the first authoritative Soviet reactions to President Carter's State of the Union message has come from Leonid Zamyatin, Chief of the International Information Department of the CPSU Central Committee, who appeared, along with Yevgeny Primakov, the Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences, on the January 26 "Studio 9" television program.

3. Zamyatin made the sharpest criticism to date of President Carter personally and of the "turnaround" in U.S. policy—which he said had begun long before Afghanistan.² He also, for the first time to our knowledge by a high level Soviet official, publicly made the charge that Hafizullah Amin was a CIA agent. The Soviet press has printed this charge before, but attributed it to Afghan officials. Also of interest are Zamyatin's claim that the Soviet Union more than once had warned the United States via diplomatic channels to "stop the action against

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Box 6, Afghanistan: 1/27–28/80. Confidential; Immediate; Sensitive. Sent for information to Warsaw, Amman, Baghdad, Beijing, Beirut, Belgrade, Berlin, Bonn, Bucharest, Budapest, Cairo, Damascus, Islamabad, Jidda, Kabul, Leningrad, London, Paris, Prague, Rome, Sofia, Tel Aviv, Tokyo, Tripoli, USBerlin, USNATO, and USUN. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

² An item in the President's Daily Brief, January 29, described an article in *Pravda*, January 29, as "Moscow's initial authoritative reply" to Carter's State of the Union address, and characterized it as "polemical and vindictive" and "replete with abusive language about your administration." (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—December 1979, PDBs)

Afghanistan that you are carrying out from the territory of Pakistan” and Primakov’s charge that the U.S. is planning military intervention in Iran. In this latter connection, Primakov said Soviet declarations had made it clear that the USSR could not stand aside if events took such a turn.

4. Zamyatin was, in effect, elaborating Brezhnev’s claim in his January 12 *Pravda* interview that, if there had not been an Afghanistan, the U.S. would have had to invent one in order to further its policy of destroying détente.³ But Zamyatin did so with all the venom and invective for which he is famous. His analysis was that the U.S. is embarking on the role of world gendarme, and he illustrated the point by quoting James Reston as having told him on his recent visit to Moscow that Washington was “nostalgic” for the days of Truman when the U.S. could carry its will anywhere in the world.

5. Zamyatin also elaborated Brezhnev’s “threat from the south” theme, providing considerable detail aimed at convincing his audience that the U.S. was on the verge of taking over Afghanistan and that, between that and Amin’s machinations with the CIA, the Soviet Union really had no choice but to act. Given the shrillness of his remarks on U.S. policy, the Soviet listener must have been a bit puzzled by both Zamyatin’s and Primakov’s concluding references to the viability of the policy of détente and to CPSU determination to continue in this direction because there is no alternative to détente.

6. Our conclusion, based on programs such as this, as well as Gromyko’s remarks in Damascus⁴ and reports we have received of bilateral Soviet approaches to the French and West Germans, that the Soviets are taken aback by the strength of the international reaction to their invasion of Afghanistan and are now rapidly mounting an all-out propaganda offensive in an effort to shift world opprobrium to the U.S. While many of their “big lie” charges are ludicrous, we fear that continued denials, such as that the Department spokesman has already given concerning the Amin-CIA connection,⁵ will be called for in the days and weeks ahead.

7. Washington will have received excerpts from the “Studio 9” interview via TASS English. We have also pouched a tape of the broadcast to USICA.

Watson

³ See Document 166.

⁴ Gromyko’s remarks on Afghanistan during his visit to Damascus were reported in telegram 662 from Damascus, January 28. The telegram characterized Gromyko as “strongly attacking” the United States during an exchange of toasts at a dinner in his honor, January 27. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800049-0340)

⁵ Not further identified.

182. Intelligence Information Cable Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

[*cable number not declassified*] Washington, January 28, 1980, 2305Z

COUNTRY

Pakistan/Afghanistan

SUBJECT

Discussion among senior Pakistani military officers on how Pakistan military should respond to question of hot pursuit [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

SOURCE

[*2 lines not declassified*]

1. During a series of meetings at GHQ from 21 to 26 January 1980, President Mohammad Zia ul-Haq and a group of senior Pakistani military officers discussed how the Pakistani military should respond if Soviet and Afghan forces cross into Pakistan in “hot pursuit” of Afghan insurgent forces.

2. Martial Law Administration Chief of Staff and General Zia’s personal staff officer, Major General K.M. Arif, led off the discussion by suggesting that a meeting should be arranged between President Zia and the Soviet Ambassador in Islamabad to assure the Soviets that Pakistan will not aid the Afghan insurgents. If this assurance is not made, the question of “hot pursuit” will soon arise and the Soviet and Afghan forces will assuredly pursue the insurgent forces into Pakistan. In such a situation, Pakistan will be the “loser”, according to General Arif.

3. Lt. General Mohammad Iqbal Khan basically agreed with General Arif’s assessment, adding that only if Pakistan receives adequate military aid and assistance from outside sources should the Pak military respond strongly to an incursion into Pak territory.² In the absence of strong support from the outside as well as adequate preparation by

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Box 6, Afghanistan: 1/27–28/80. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

² An intelligence information cable prepared in the CIA, January 29, reported information [*text and 1 line not declassified*] regarding a special report on Pakistan’s defense needs, prepared for Zia by the Pakistani Ambassador in Moscow. The report concluded that Pakistan would be unable to “meet a sustained military attack from the Soviets in the present state of readiness.” This shortcoming, according to the report, could only be reversed by U.S. aid, and the “best possible” way to assure U.S. commitment to Pakistani security would be the establishment of U.S. military bases in Pakistan. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0056, Box 7, Pakistan)

Pak forces, the Pak military should not overreact to any Soviet or Afghan incursion, and that any future skirmishes along the border should be limited to insurgents and Afghan or Soviet forces. (Field comment: This recent position taken by General Iqbal is somewhat different from a more hawkish position he held in early January as reported in [*less than 1 line not declassified*] from the same source.)³

4. Northwest Frontier Province Governor and corps commander General Fazle Haq did not venture an opinion on the question of hot pursuit. He did report, however, that the tribal chiefs in the tribal territories adjacent to the NWFP had given him assurances that the army would have complete freedom of movement in the tribal areas. General Fazle Haq also reported that as of 26 January there had been no confrontations between Pak and Soviet forces along the border.

5. (Field comment: A contrary view was provided by [*1 line not declassified*] who said on [*less than 1 line not declassified*] January that while no specific plans to resist Soviet/Afghan military attacks into Pakistan had been developed, President Zia had instructed senior commanders that if the Soviet or Afghan forces cross into Pakistan in a hot pursuit situation Pak forces must hit them with all possible force. Zia said that Pakistan must hit hard at the first incursion even if Soviets use superior forces. The Pak officer said it is difficult for Pakistan to respond to a Soviet-backed incursion without knowing the extent of U.S. backing but that Zia's order would be obeyed.)

6. ACQ: [*1 line not declassified*]

7. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Dissem: [*4 lines not declassified*]

³ Not found.

183. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Carlucci), the Deputy Director for Operations (McMahon), and the National Intelligence Officer for China ([*name not declassified*])¹

Washington, January 29, 1980

SUBJECT

Conversation with Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, 28 January 1980 (U)

1. We talked about the Secretary's trip to China with regard to [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Afghanistan.² [*8 lines and 1 paragraph (6 lines) not declassified*]

Stansfield Turner

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 95M01183R, Box 1, DCI Turner—Eyes Only Files—Memos and Meetings with Various Officials and Subjects. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. An unknown hand signed for Turner.

² See Documents 149 and 150.

184. Article in the National Intelligence Daily¹

[*article number not declassified*]

Washington, January 29, 1980

BRIEFS AND COMMENTS

AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN: Exile Front

The durability of the exile united front, formed over the weekend in time to participate in the Islamic Conference, will depend on Pakistan's efforts to

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—January 1980, NIDs. Top Secret; [*codeword and handling restriction not declassified*].

hold together the squabbling exile groups. [classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]

The Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan—composed of six exile groups including the four most important ones—was formed only after considerable prodding by the Pakistanis. At the Islamic Conference yesterday it was allowed to discuss the insurgents' position and to appeal for financial support.² The resolution adopted early today calling on Islamic states to withhold recognition of Afghanistan until Soviet troops withdraw declares that a three-nation committee will supervise aid for the "struggle" of Afghans. *[classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]*

Pakistani pressure may help to check infighting within the new organization. The exiles are reportedly on notice that further aid—including antitank and antiaircraft weapons—from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and other sympathetic countries is contingent upon the survival of a unified exile organization. *[classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]*

With the exception of one or two groups that have a small guerrilla capability, the exile organizations do not command forces that have been active in the Afghan insurgency. The exiles have provided the various independent insurgent groups with modest amounts of arms and supplies and could become a more effective conduit if Pakistan should take charge of logistical arrangements. Disclosure of more direct Pakistani support of the Afghan insurgency, however, is certain to elicit a sharp reaction from Moscow. *[1 line, classification marking, and handling restriction not declassified]*

² The Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers convened in Islamabad at Saudi and Pakistani request for an emergency session, January 27–29, to discuss the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. A news report on the meeting quoted General Zia: "An unequivocal message should go forth from this conference conveying to the Soviet Union the grave concern of the Islamic world at the presence of its troops in Afghanistan and calling upon that great power to reverse the course of its military intervention." (William Mullen, "Soviets Warned of Breaking Ties with Moslem Nations," *Chicago Tribune*, January 28, 1980, p. 14) In telegram 1501 from Moscow, January 29, the Embassy reported on the Islamic Conference from the Soviet perspective. In the aftermath of the strong anti-Soviet sentiment of the conference, the Embassy observed that the Soviet leadership "apparently made a serious miscalculation of the Islamic reaction to the invasion of Afghanistan," and that the conference "represents a serious setback to Soviet foreign policy interests in the Muslim world." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Box 6, Afghanistan: 1/29/80)

**185. Memorandum From W. Averell Harriman to
President Carter¹**

Washington, January 30, 1980

In compliance with your request, I state below the high spots of my talk with Dobrynin last night. Pam and Mrs. Dobrynin were present at dinner but not afterwards.

Dobrynin indicated the Soviets would be ready to withdraw their troops from Afghanistan providing we stopped outside intervention, particularly from Pakistan. He did not mention China. He concentrated on Pakistan as the source of greatest danger. He suggested that if necessary the Soviet government would be willing to join in guaranteeing Pakistan's security and independence. He said also we should not establish any military bases in the Persian Gulf but made no mention of the Indian Ocean.²

At a different time, he indicated the Soviet Union would strongly object to any U.S. military assistance to China but said they were not concerned by intervention by Iran.

He had indicated that they were developing a carefully trained communist regime, but in answer to my question he said that he did not rule out the possibility of a neutral government for Afghanistan. He had emphasized their satisfaction with the government under the King, which of course Daoud overthrew. He emphasized the cruelty of Amin and maintained specifically that not a single individual had been executed since their troops intervened and most of the political prisoners had been released from jail.

Dobrynin was deeply concerned because it appeared to him there was no channel of communication between our two governments. This he considers dangerous.

May I suggest, as I indicated yesterday, that you write a letter to Brezhnev in which you emphasize the importance of Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan and that conditions surrounding it might be discussed in an early meeting between Cy and Gromyko.³ I recognize that it will take some time before all of the Soviet troops can be with-

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat (ES), Sensitive and Super Sensitive File, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, Box 3, 1980 Super Sensitive I, Jan, Feb, Mar–1980. No classification marking. In the upper right corner, Carter wrote: "Private—cc V.P.—Cy—Zbig. J."

² Carter drew a bracket along the left side of this paragraph and an asterisk in the margin.

³ Despite Harriman's suggestion, no letter from Carter to Brezhnev was found. Vance wrote to Gromyko on February 8; see Document 202.

drawn, but substantial withdrawals might begin promptly and be completed on a step-by-step basis.

In addition, it may be worthwhile your asking Brezhnev to see our Ambassador, Tom Watson, and in turn indicating that after that you would receive Dobrynin.⁴ I am satisfied that Tom can be of enormous help at this time if he gets entrée to Brezhnev as well as Gromyko.

In answer to my question on Brezhnev's health, Dobrynin told me that Brezhnev had some good days and some bad ones.

Of most importance is getting the troops out of Afghanistan. The Soviet threat in the area would then be vastly reduced. At an appropriate time Cy might indicate to Gromyko that if we agree to have no bases in the Persian Gulf, the Soviets should agree that there would be no communist regime in Iran.

In sum, a complete withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Afghanistan by the autumn, with the installation of a neutral government and an agreement by the Soviets on Iran, would be a good way out of the crisis.

If ratification of SALT II could be obtained, it would be useful. I would hope progress could be made in the negotiations in the arms control field, which I understand are continuing. Progress on MBFR and theatre nuclear weapons would be important.

I will, of course, continue to be in touch with Cy.

Averell

⁴ No record of a meeting between Dobrynin and Carter or between Watson and Brezhnev was found. Watson met with Gromyko January 30; see Document 186.

186. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, January 30, 1980, 2115Z

1670. Subj: Meeting With Gromyko. Refs: (A) State 25675, (B) State 24026.²

1. (S—Entire text.)

2. Summary: Gromyko responded to our démarche on U.S.-Soviet relations and Afghanistan by elaborating the emerging public line that the administration had embarked, long before Afghanistan, on a course aimed at damaging U.S.-Soviet relations and increasing international tension. He ticked off numerous “examples” to illustrate his point, beginning with NATO’s adoption of its Long-Term Defense Program while the UNGA Special Session on Disarmament was in session and including familiar complaints about the LRTNF decision as violating the equality which the President had allegedly acknowledged existed at the time of the Vienna Summit. He also faulted our handling of the Cuban brigade issue and charged that our conduct in the various arms control negotiations indicated that we were negotiating simply for the sake of negotiating, not with any intention of reaching agreement.

On Afghanistan, though he did not refer specifically to threats to Soviet security and only indirectly accused the U.S. of responsibility for events there, Gromyko generally repeated the public Soviet justifications for their action. He flatly denied a Soviet role in the change of government in Kabul, and he just as flatly stated that the Soviet troops would not be withdrawn so long as “external aggression” continued. He tried to dismiss as “not serious” any suggestion that the Soviet Union had designs on Pakistan or the Persian Gulf region, adding that

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P900077–1625, N00002–0517. Secret; Niac Immediate; Nodis; Cherokee.

² Telegram 25675 to Moscow, January 30, concurred with the Embassy recommendation that the United States should refute Soviet allegations of collusion between Amin and the CIA. The telegram offered the following talking point to that effect: “The Soviet charge that Amin was an agent of the CIA is ludicrous. Either your government is completely misinformed or this is a deliberate attempt at disinformation.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P910096–1939) In telegram 29487 to all diplomatic and consular posts, February 2, the Department expanded the effort to combat the Soviet “disinformation campaign” with a series of talking points to be used by U.S. diplomats worldwide. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800058–0925) The other referenced telegram, 24026 to Moscow, January 28, directed the Embassy to seek an appointment with Gromyko to underscore some of the points made by Carter in the State of the Union message. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880025–0688)

anyone who really had doubts on that score should know that Brezhnev had clearly denied it.

The Sakharov case, Gromyko said, was a domestic affair which the Soviets were not prepared to discuss with any outsiders.

The Minister interspersed his basically hard-line response with appropriate indications of indignation, ridicule, and regret, but for the most part he seemed relaxed throughout the lengthy meeting. As was probably to be expected, there was no indication in anything he said of any give on Afghanistan in the near future. There was one conciliatory note at the end of his presentation, when he picked up our reference to the President's willingness to search for areas of cooperation and reduce the risks of conflict. If we were sincere, he said, we would find that the Soviets would not hold back, as this had always been their policy.

Although State 26328, on your meeting with Dobrynin, arrived after I had seen Gromyko,³ I did not receive any clear intimations of interest in providing guarantees with regard to Iran and Pakistan—unless his observation that Brezhnev had already assured the world that they have no designs on other parts of the region could be considered such. As for Soviet withdrawal, his assertion that this would not occur until outside aggression ceased seems more categorical than Dobrynin's hint that limitations on assistance to insurgents might suffice. Yugoslavia did not arise in the conversation. End summary.

3. Gromyko received me at 4:30 p.m. January 30 for a two hour and fifteen minute meeting. I read to him the talking points on U.S.-Soviet relations and Afghanistan from refs A and B and then also made the instructed *démarche* on Sakharov, leaving copies of the talking points on both subjects as non-papers.

[Omitted here is information unrelated to Afghanistan.]

15. Calling it his 7th point, Gromyko took up Afghanistan, noting that I had singled it out for "special treatment" in my statement.⁴ He observed first of all that Afghanistan is not an American province. I might reply, he said, that it is not a Soviet province either. This is true, and the Soviets never claimed that it was. But the Soviets resolutely reject all efforts to deny the Afghans the right to decide for themselves questions of how they are to live, what kind of leadership they are to have, and so forth—and the U.S. is claiming the right to do that.

³ Telegram 26328 to Moscow, January 30, reported on Vance's January 29 meeting with Dobrynin. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P910096-1937)

⁴ Presumably Watson was referring to the *démarche*, not to a separate statement, which was not found.

16. The U.S. Government can be in no doubt, Gromyko continued, that Afghanistan was subjected to outside aggression. It was in that connection that it called for assistance. In accordance with the UN Charter and the Soviet-Afghan treaty it had a firm legal basis and every right to appeal for help, including that of a military character in the struggle against external aggression. Washington, he said, does not like to touch on that question; it pretends not to see how things really are, to be aware of the aggression from the territory of Pakistan. Perhaps, he said, I could advise Washington to pay more attention to that question so it could see the situation better. He then referred to camps in Pakistan where thousands of people were being armed and trained and being sent to struggle against the people and Government of Afghanistan. In answering the President's message sent on the hot line, Brezhnev had stated that there was a great deal the U.S. could do to stop those armed incursions from Pakistan.⁵ But this was not and is not being done.

17. The Soviet military contingents are in Afghanistan, Gromyko continued, and there is no basis for them to be withdrawn. They will remain there until such time as there is no external aggression and the U.S. Government must realize that. The Soviets pointed out in their initial statement to certain governments—without waiting for any propaganda campaigns to develop—that their contingents would be withdrawn if the external aggression ceased. The Soviet Union does not need Afghanistan—its territory or its riches. The U.S. Government and the President are aware of that. And the deeds and the words of the Soviets—unlike those of some others—do not diverge.

18. What Gromyko numbered example no. 8 was that Washington continued to repeat one false thesis, which had also been mentioned albeit softly in my earlier statement. This was that the Soviet Union was somehow involved in the changes in the leadership of Afghanistan. Nyet. That is an invention of Washington's. The Soviet Union was not involved. The change was brought about by the Afghans themselves. The present Afghan leaders did not come from the moon. The Afghans formed their government and it is general knowledge that it is not doing badly. For example, tens of thousands of prisoners have been set free, including large numbers of Muslim clergy. Washington likes to speak of human rights. It should welcome this move, even if it does not applaud it. But it does not do so because this does not interest the administration; it is only interested in "pinching the foot" of the Soviet Union.

⁵ For Carter's message to Brezhnev, December 28, see Document 113. For Brezhnev's reply, December 29, see Document 114.

19. It would be better, Gromyko went on, to stick closer to the facts. Meanwhile, no one should tell the Afghans how to run their affairs. And it is now clear to the whole world what kind of figure Amin was. One can only be astonished at what is being said about him in Washington. Every Afghani damns him, but Washington seems to like him.

20. As example no. 9, Gromyko took up Pakistan and the Persian Gulf, stating in this connection that he found the turn of Washington's thinking on foreign policy questions really remarkable. This was especially true in connection with the aggression against Afghanistan, and also in regard to the statement in my *démarche* which implied anxiety on the part of the administration that the Soviet Union might take some action in regard to Pakistan and the Persian Gulf. In actual fact, he said, he thought that Washington did not actually think that way; there were too many leading figures who knew better, and only the paranoid could believe that the Soviets were intending action against Pakistan and in the region of the Persian Gulf. He asked that I inform my government and the President accordingly. My statement, he said, suggested that the Soviets were sending some sort of challenge. He asked what kind of challenge and to whom. As for the alleged danger to Pakistan and the Persian Gulf region, it was not enough to say simply that this was false; it was fabricated. The thought could only arise in the mind of a person who does not go to the trouble to analyze the situation. Anyone who knows the Soviet Union knows that such action is alien to the Soviet Union's policies, ideology, and foreign policy line aimed at international *détente* and peace.

21. Noting that Brezhnev had made it clear, in his answers to a *Pravda* correspondent, that any such intentions toward Pakistan, Iran and the Persian Gulf were alien to the Soviet Union, Gromyko said that he was thus spared the necessity of speaking in more detail on the matter.⁶ He could only wonder however at the people who posed such questions concerning the intentions of the Soviet Union, and he asked whether I personally, as an Ambassador, and as an important representative of the American business community, could really believe such fabrications. But if there should be someone, somewhere, who has such beliefs, he hoped that his clarification would help them understand the truth of the matter.

22. As his tenth example, Gromyko referred by indirection to the measures taken by the U.S. in response to the Afghanistan action. The administration, he said, is now working energetically in shirtsleeves to increase international tension and sow discord in U.S.-Soviet relations.

⁶ See Document 166.

Brezhnev has clearly pointed out that it is easy to destroy relations but much harder to build them up and develop them. The question arises of how a great power can simply throw aside all of the positive things which have been accumulated over the years by previous administrations. He described the administration as looking around, throwing things overboard rapidly, and if it finds any left throwing them overboard as well. He then mentioned with some forcefulness that the Soviet Union had not come into being due to some external force but through the forces of its own people, in the same way as the United States came into being and exists with all of its social and economic attributes without any external approval. Questions of whether we approve of a social and economic structure or not, it seemed to him, should be set aside in our relations. Meanwhile, he concluded, it was not the Soviet Union but the U.S. side which bears responsibility for the growth of tension and for damage to U.S.-Soviet relations.

[Omitted here is information unrelated to Afghanistan.]

—As for Afghanistan, I said I had heard what Gromyko had said but that I assumed he did not really mean that he thought the U.S. was involved in any aggression against Afghanistan. Nor was I aware from any information which had come to me that Pakistan citizens were involved in the conflict, though he had referred to Pakistan involvement. Gromyko responded that I simply then did not have the facts—that there was no doubt about Pakistani involvement. There was massive evidence about their assistance in training Afghan rebels, about the supply of arms, and about the fact that U.S. arms were also involved.

—I told Gromyko I would like to understand more clearly what he had said about Soviet involvement in the events in Afghanistan, particularly with regard to the change of government. Our information, I said, was that Babrak had arrived in Kabul on a Soviet plane. Gromyko retorted that we put such information into circulation ourselves and then believed it when it comes back to us. I said I didn't think that was where my information had come from and that I had in fact had the impression that Babrak had been living in the Soviet Union.

25. Gromyko then returned to my remarks on theater nuclear weapons to state that the principle of equality does not relate just to strategic arms. When this principle was addressed in Vienna it was understood that it related to the entire military and strategic posture and equilibrium of the two sides.⁷ How else, he asked, could it be? Otherwise there would be the absurd situation of reaching equality in one field

⁷ During the summit in Vienna held June 15–18, 1979, Carter and Brezhnev discussed arms control issues in two meetings on January 17. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Documents 203 and 204.

and having it destroyed in a second or third field. Another aspect of the issue, he added, was that while U.S. medium-range missiles could reach the territory of the Soviet Union, just like strategic missiles, Soviet medium-range missiles could not reach the territory of the United States.

Watson

187. Memorandum From President Carter to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)¹

Washington, January 30, 1980

SUBJECT

Your Visit to Pakistan (U)

The following will be your objectives in your discussions with President Zia and senior Pakistani officials.

—Lay a solid basis for a further mutual understanding of the issues we face as regards Soviet behavior and intentions, global and regional responses, and our bilateral trust and cooperation. An important part of this exchange will be listening to Zia's views.

—To convey to Zia a sense of the breadth and firmness of the U.S. response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. You should draw on my State of the Union message.

—To impress upon Zia that our support for Pakistan's independence and security is enduring, based on our vital interests, and backed up not only by U.S. resources, but by a determined U.S. effort to mobilize broad international support.

—To reaffirm the present level of our proposed bilateral assistance through FY 81 and to convince Zia that it would be unwise, and detract from our central effort, to voice public disappointment with our assistance or to criticize U.S. unwillingness to negotiate a treaty.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Meetings File, Box 80, Sensitive X: 11/80. Secret; Sensitive. Attached but not printed is a covering memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter, in which Brzezinski noted that Vance already cleared the instructions and recommended that Carter approve them as well. Carter approved and initialed "J."

—To begin to define with Zia and his advisers the nature of U.S. responses in various contingencies arising from a Soviet-Afghan threat to Pakistan's security.

—To present our firm view that it is essential to Pakistan's security that Pakistan and India continue to expand their efforts toward normalization of their relations.

—To seek assurances that the Zia government will not test a nuclear device and to impress upon Zia how dangerous a test would be to Pakistan's security and to the new Western relationship we are seeking to develop. And to point out that a satisfactory long-term relationship requires a settlement of the nuclear problem.

—To convey to Zia U.S. interest in a resolution of Pakistan's internal political and economic problems so that Pakistan can address its security problems from a united base.

—To inform Zia of our intention to proceed with: submission of the Pakistan legislation on February 4; military supply talks in Islamabad following your meetings; discussions of the programming of our proposed AID funds; and continuing *mutual* efforts to muster broad support for Pakistan.

You should describe to President Zia why it is not feasible to convert the 1959 Bilateral Agreement into a treaty. You should impress upon Zia the relevance of the 1959 Agreement for the contingencies of a Soviet or Soviet-directed attack on Pakistan. You should also note my letter to President Zia² and point out that we are asking the Congress to affirm the 1959 bilateral. You can assure him that in the event of an attack threatening the independence of Pakistan, we would consider our vital interests to be engaged and we would consult urgently with both the Government of Pakistan and the Congress on steps to be taken, including the use of force. (S)

In discussing contingencies with Pakistan, you should raise (but not press at this time) the possibility of additional U.S. access to facilities or bases on Pakistani soil. However, in addressing possible large-scale Soviet incursions or assaults on Pakistan, you should note that it is in our mutual interest to begin discussions of ways in which U.S. forces, particularly naval and tacair, could be deployed in and near Pakistan in certain situations. You should also indicate that we would be prepared now to make an exercise visit of U.S. tactical aircraft and/or engage in joint air or naval exercises if Pakistan would find that a useful demonstration of U.S. resolve. (S)

² See Document 159.

In responding to President Zia's questions on contingencies involving an Indian attack on Pakistan, you should point out that Pakistan's best security against a two-front war or an Indian attack lies in the normalization process with India, and the strength of its broad-range relationships with China, the United States, the Moslem world and the Non-Aligned. You should make clear that the interests of Pakistan, the U.S. and the West would be injured by closer Indian relations with the Soviets and we should all work to avoid such a course on India's part. (S)

In your discussions of military assistance for Pakistan, you should emphasize that we are prepared to move quickly in providing equipment that can be made readily available and will immediately improve the situation along the Afghan border, strengthening the ground and air defense capability. While we will be willing to assist the Pakistanis in seeking financing from others for high-performance aircraft, these financing requirements should be considered in the context of overall defense needs and the priority for the immediate strengthening of defense on the border. (S)

You should inform President Zia that the amounts of our military and economic support assistance for FY 1980 and 81 are firm. You may also say that in considering our levels for FY 1982 and beyond, we will carefully assess Pakistan's ongoing requirements. President Zia should also be apprised that we are making strong efforts, in support of their own activities, to enhance support for Pakistan from other Western and Islamic donors. On debt rescheduling, you can inform Zia that we are prepared to consider this question in concert with other creditors in conjunction with an upper tranche IMF stabilization program, if an emerging default situation seems likely. (S)

In addressing the nuclear question, you should seek assurances (in addition to the assurances on non-development of weapons and transfer of sensitive technology) that President Zia will not test a nuclear device while he is in office. You should stress that we will continue our dialogue with Pakistan looking forward to an understanding on the scope and purpose of Pakistan's nuclear program. (S)

If you are asked about our objectives in Afghanistan and our view of the insurgents, you should say that our maximum goal is a neutral Afghanistan, free of Soviet forces, and our minimum goal is a protracted resistance that increases the costs to the Soviets and galvanizes world opinion against their aggression. (S)

You should note to President Zia our continuing interest in Pakistan's political development, greater political unity and attention to the needs of minority groups such as the Baluchis. (S)

In your approach to the Pakistanis, you should keep in mind that, despite their assertions to the contrary, Pakistan deeply needs our

support both in bilateral assistance and in mobilizing diplomatic and other resources. You should, therefore, be firm in presenting our actions and program of assistance in a positive light and avoid any sense of defensiveness about our participation in Pakistan's security. (S)

Jimmy Carter

188. Article in the National Intelligence Daily¹

[*article number not declassified*]

Washington, January 31, 1980

SPECIAL ANALYSES

AFGHANISTAN: The Babrak Government's Bleak Prospects
by [*less than 1 line not declassified*] CIA

After a month in power, the Soviet-installed government of President Babrak Karmal has little prospect of becoming more than a transparent cover for Soviet military occupation. There is evidence that Moscow is disappointed in Babrak's performance, and rumors are widespread in Kabul that the Soviets are planning to replace him. In the near term at least, there is little chance that the Soviets could put together any government that would be viewed as more than a puppet and have any chance of staying in power if Soviet troops were withdrawn. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])

Babrak's Problems

Babrak's regime has virtually no popular backing. Dissatisfaction is widespread in all major cities, and in some instances has resulted in public demonstrations. Attacks by individual Afghans against Soviet troops continue as do clashes between Afghan and Soviet Army units. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])

There are numerous reports of passive resistance among Afghan civil servants, and one has indicated that 400 Soviets have been brought in to help keep the major ministries running. Support for Babrak within the ruling People's Democratic Party is attenuated by a continued

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—January 1980, NIDs. Top Secret; [*codeword and handling restriction not declassified*]. The full version of this National Intelligence Daily was not filed with this collection. The article printed here was found in this form.

festering of longstanding divisions, aggravated by the pervasive Soviet role in the country. (*[classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]*)

The government's policies are designed to win wider popular support while pursuing basic goals of the Marxist regime. A major aspect of this effort has been to blame the late President Amin for the past hostility between the Marxist rulers and the people. The government has made much of Amin's perversion of the "revolution" in his alleged efforts to turn Afghanistan over to the US and to destroy Islam. (*[classification marking not declassified]*)

To correct Amin's misdeeds, the government claims it has released 15,000 political prisoners and abolished the secret police. Many Afghans are aware that few prisoners, other than members of Babrak's previously suppressed faction, have been freed. (*[classification marking not declassified]*)

The President's credibility has been further undermined by his appointing as a deputy prime minister the man who headed the secret police until last September.² In fact, executions continue at about the same rate as under Amin, and the secret police have changed little except their name. (*[classification marking and codeword not declassified]*)

Babrak also has tried with scant success to prove that his government is not anti-Islamic. His claim that his is the first government in 50 years to allow religious freedom is unlikely to impress a population that equates Marxism and the USSR with atheism and views many of the reforms the government advocates as antireligious. (*[classification marking and codeword not declassified]*)

The cabinet still represents little more than the various groups that joined the first Marxist government established after the coup in April 1978. The three ministers who do not belong to the party hold minor positions. Moreover, because of their association with Babrak, they are popularly regarded as having been long-time secret Communists or Soviet agents. (*[classification marking not declassified]*)

A recent deemphasis on the role of the party—it is now said to have only the "leading" role in the "revolution"—probably has been too slight to change the popular view of the government. The suppression of opposition by previous governments has left few organizations to join the "Fatherland Front" Babrak reportedly plans to form. (*[classification marking not declassified]*)

There is little chance that nonparty figures of any prominence at any level can be persuaded to support the government unless there is

² A reference to Assadullah Sarwari.

a major shift in its orientation. Most such persons are either in exile or leading insurgent bands. (*classification marking not declassified*)

The Marxists' broad social goals are themselves a major cause of discontent, especially among the Muslim tribesmen and peasants who comprise almost all of the population. They regard programs designed partly to win popular support—such as increased education and land reform—as threats to their traditional way of life. (*classification marking not declassified*)

Alternatives to Babrak

One figure whom the Soviets are said to be considering as a possible replacement for Babrak is Commerce Minister Jalalar, a non-Marxist who also served in the cabinets of former King Zahir and former President Daoud. He has no independent political following, however, and is one of those whose willingness to participate in Babrak's cabinet has only convinced most Afghans he has always been a Soviet stooge. There is some evidence that he has been a Soviet intelligence source. (*classification marking not declassified*)

Major General Qader, who was jailed by Taraki in August 1978, is another possible candidate. Now a member of the Revolutionary Council, he reportedly made a secret trip to the USSR in mid-January. (*classification marking not declassified*)

As a former Defense Minister, Qader might be attractive to the Soviets because he evidently still has some following in the Afghan military and—if given more authority—might be able to stem its decline. Qader's prospects probably have dimmed, however, in light of the anti-Soviet demonstrations in Herat last weekend set off by his public appearances there. (*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*)

No alternative leader would be any more effective than Babrak in attracting domestic support so long as his power is maintained with Soviet troops. The establishment of a government that is both responsive to Soviet security concerns and capable of winning even grudging tolerance from the Afghan people is a process that will take years and require extensive Soviet involvement and support. (*classification marking not declassified*)

189. Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

ER 80-10120

Washington, January 1980

[Omitted here are a title page, security information page, and cover page.]

Afghanistan: The Economy Under Marxism
[*classification marking not declassified*]

Summary

Even before the December 1979 Soviet invasion, Afghanistan's economy was faltering and its minimal economic gains had ground to a halt. Land and credit reforms initiated by the pro-Soviet Marxist government that took power in April 1978 caused major disruptions in economic activity and helped spark the insurgency that has now spread throughout the country. (*classification marking not declassified*)

Kabul's land reform program, coupled with unfavorable weather in 1979, resulted in a drop of 400,000-500,000 metric tons in wheat production. Government attempts to tighten control over commerce produced frequent shortages of essential goods and led to capital flight by bazaar merchants, who are a major factor in overall trade and economic activity. (*classification marking not declassified*)

Since the Soviet invasion, economic activity has slumped further. The insurgents are hampering food and fuel deliveries to Kabul. In the capital, the Soviet-backed Babrak government has imposed price controls on items such as meat and tea and established special distribution centers for essential commodities. (*classification marking not declassified*)

Longstanding Afghan-Soviet trade and economic aid ties are likely to be strengthened in the wake of the Soviet invasion. Soviet economic support is critical for Kabul now that Western aid donors have suspended their small but important programs and multilateral financial institutions have halted disbursements pending a reviewing of their operations. Even with Soviet help, the durability of the Babrak regime is in doubt because it has failed to rally popular support and it is viewed by nearly all Afghans as atheistic and anti-Islam. (*classification marking not declassified*)

[Omitted here is the body of the assessment.]

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 81T00315R, Box 6, Afghanistan: The Economy Under Marxism, ER 80-10120. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. A statement on the title page reads: "The author of this paper is [*text not declassified*] Developing Nations Division, Office of Economic Research. This paper was coordinated with the Offices of Political Analysis and Geographic and Cartographic Research."

190. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State¹

New Delhi, January 31, 1980, 1117Z

2112. Subject: Clark Clifford's January 30 Meeting With Indian Foreign Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao.

1. S—Entire text.
2. Summary

Mr. Clifford conveyed to FonMin Rao President Carter's view of the world situation after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.² Mr. Clifford emphasized the need to take measures that would effectively deter the Soviets from further aggression in the sensitive Persian Gulf area. Projected U.S. arms deliveries to Pakistan would be defensive in character to meet Pakistan's needs arising from the new Soviet military presence on its border. There was nothing threatening to India in this renewed U.S. interest in Pakistan's security, or the further development of Sino-American relations. FonMin Rao focused his remarks on the resumption of U.S. arms supplies to Pakistan, which he requested should not take place. End summary.

3. Mr. Clifford and FonMin Rao met for 20 minutes prior to the larger meeting with MEA officials. Foreign Secretary Sathe and Joint Secretary D'Souza (notetaker) were also present, as was Ambassador Goheen (notetaker).

4. Mr. Clifford opened by speaking of the President's special interest in India. He also described his own close relationship with the President, which had led to the President's asking him to come to India as his Special Emissary. The President, he said, very much wishes to achieve better understanding and closer relations with India, and hopes that the candid exchange of views now and in the future can help the two countries get past some of the misunderstandings of past periods. Mr. Clifford then described the seriousness we attach to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the necessity of not letting such aggression go unchallenged. The President wants India to understand clearly the considered reasons behind his decision to provide assistance to Pakistan, and he wants also, through Mr. Clifford, to have a full understand-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800054–0767. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Kuala Lumpur, Beijing, Colombo, Dacca, Islamabad, Kabul, Hong Kong, London, Moscow, Paris, Tokyo, USUN, Bonn, USNATO, Seoul, Ankara, Athens, and CINCPAC for POLAD.

² Carter asked Clifford to go to India as his Special Emissary to explain U.S. policy in the region. Clifford recounted his trip in his memoirs, *Counsel to the President*, pp. 639–642.

ing of how India views the situation created by the Soviets' move into Afghanistan.

5. The Foreign Minister responded by first expressing appreciation to the President for having sent you (Mr. Clifford) as his emissary. The closeness of the relationship between the President and Mr. Clifford gave the latter's visit a special dimension and assured the authenticity of the views that he expressed. He said also that Indians generally have great respect for President Carter and feel he has a sense of affinity for India. Thus, the Foreign Minister was confident that there was goodwill on both sides and that it could help the two governments overcome friction and setbacks arising from differing perceptions. On strictly bilateral matters, he said, there seemed to be few problems, but, as Mr. Clifford had intimated, there were differences in the way the two countries perceived world events. It was good that there could be candid exchanges of view on these differences.

6. The situation arising from the Soviets' action in Afghanistan, the Foreign Minister said, had indeed serious implications. Rather than speculating about what led to it, or arguing about the rights or wrongs involved, it was a situation that everyone should now be seeking to "defuse." Moreover, while there are no doubt wider implications, for India the paramount concern had to be the new threat of big power confrontation within the South Asia region. India's concern was how it could pursue its critical development objectives free of these tensions, without the impediments that they threaten.

7. Then, speaking very deliberately, the Foreign Minister expressed objection to America providing arms for Pakistan. Any introduction of arms for Pakistan, he said, will not achieve security for that country; it will simply escalate the tensions.³

[Omitted here is the remainder of the telegram, unrelated to Afghanistan.]

Goheen

³ Clifford met with Carter in the Oval Office, February 6, to report on his meeting with Gandhi. He relayed that Gandhi "opposes what the United States is doing in Pakistan. India has no confidence in President Zia; his government is very narrowly based. India is concerned that Pakistan may use arms from the United States against India. Mrs. Gandhi does not like Zia or Pakistan but she did not favor intervention." Clifford reported that he responded that Gandhi "should not worry" that U.S. arms shipments to Pakistan would be used against India. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 38, Memcons: President: 2/80)

191. Intelligence Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

[*paper number not declassified*]

Washington, January 1980

[Omitted here are a title page, security information page, and cover page.]

The Soviet Leadership Balance and Afghanistan (*classification marking not declassified*)

Key Judgments

The decision to intervene in Afghanistan has raised the question—as all major Soviet decisions have in the past—of the degree of consensus that existed among the leadership on this action. It has also prompted speculation that President Brezhnev—the Kremlin’s strongest advocate of detente—is no longer a leading force in Soviet policy-making. (*classification marking not declassified*)

On balance we believe that Brezhnev remains the dominant force within the Politburo and was directly involved in and supportive of the decision to invade Afghanistan. Measuring the level of enthusiasm within the Soviet hierarchy for military action is more difficult. We suspect there were some reservations, but we believe these concerns did not extend to fear for the future of detente, a policy with which the leadership was increasingly disenchanted during the closing months of 1979. (*classification marking not declassified*)

Public statements by Soviet leaders about Afghanistan before the invasion occurred revealed little more than a common concern with developments there. Party ideologist Suslov, who has often spoken out favorably about revolutionary processes in the Third World, implied that Afghanistan was a Communist state worth preserving. This could mean that he was in the vanguard of those favoring intervention. (*classification marking and codeword not declassified*)

Premier Kosygin was removed from the political scene in mid-October by a heart attack and almost certainly did not play an active part in the Afghan decision. His counsel probably would have been on the side of caution, and his absence from office probably facilitated the choice for military action. (*classification marking, codeword, and handling restriction not declassified*)

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 6, Afghan Crisis—Pubs Soviet Moves/Options. Top Secret; [*codeword and handling restriction not declassified*]. A statement on the title page reads: “The author of this paper is [*text not declassified*] USSR-Eastern Europe Division, Office of Political Analysis.”

Because the temper of the Politburo as a whole shifted away from detente, however, it seems unlikely that Kosygin's presence would have altered the decision. Despite this shift, we have not detected a basic realignment of power within the Politburo. In November, an opportunity to replace Kosygin was allowed to pass; he is still being ranked second in the Soviet pecking order. Instead of retiring Kosygin, the Politburo brought in a 74-year-old Brezhnev loyalist, First Deputy Premier Tikhonov. We have no reason to believe that Tikhonov's promotion, in itself, altered the balance within the Politburo on foreign policy issues. (*classification marking not declassified*)

The USSR's leaders must have taken their positions on the intervention with an eye on their relative standing in a post-Brezhnev political environment. To the extent that the intervention has undercut detente policies—with which most Soviet leaders had been signaling their increased discontent—so, too, has it weakened the succession prospects of Brezhnev's protege Chernenko, one of detente's most vocal advocates in the Kremlin. The contender who presumably profited the most is Brezhnev's party deputy, Kirilenko, who in the past has voiced some reservations about detente. (*classification marking not declassified*)

If the invasion is a success, those who might have argued against it probably will remain silent. But if the USSR is drawn into a long, costly military operation that damages Soviet interests on a global basis, the decision will be reexamined. There are already signs of second thoughts surfacing among second-level officials. The outcome of such a debate could have a significant impact on the makeup of the leadership, particularly in the post-Brezhnev era. (*classification marking not declassified*)

A prolonged, costly conflict in Afghanistan might encourage younger elements in the Soviet establishment to press for a rejuvenation of the leadership. Unsatisfactory results in Afghanistan might also make KGB Chairman Andropov and Defense Minister Ustinov vulnerable and subject to removal at or before the next party congress in early 1981. Foreign Minister Gromyko might also be faulted for miscalculating the adverse worldwide reaction to the use of military force in Afghanistan. (*classification marking not declassified*)

[Omitted here is the body of the report.]

192. Article in the President's Daily Brief¹

Washington, February 1, 1980

USSR: Propaganda line on Afghanistan

The Soviets are pushing a propaganda and diplomatic line designed to counter US and other foreign reactions on Afghanistan.

A Soviet journalist has acknowledged to West German officials that Moscow made a major mistake in not laying the political groundwork for its intervention. In their commentaries and remarks to foreigners, Soviet officials are now trying hard to promote their rationalization of the circumstances triggering the coup against Amin and the Soviet invasion. This includes finding more “proof” of foreign support for the Afghan resistance and a better explanation for Amin’s ouster so soon after he reportedly requested Soviet intervention.

The Soviets are also claiming they have no intention of keeping troops in Afghanistan indefinitely. They have told many foreigners that troops will be pulled out when the situation is stabilized. [5 lines not declassified] Ambassador Dobrynin claimed on Tuesday that a phased withdrawal is possible within several weeks or a few months.²

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—February 1980, PDBs. Top Secret; For the President Only. The full version of this President’s Daily Brief was not filed with this collection. The article printed here was found in this form.

² Tuesday was January 29. See footnote 3, Document 186.

193. Summary Record of Talks¹

Islamabad, February 2–3, 1980

PARTICIPANTS

Pakistan

President Zia
 Ghulam Ishaq, Finance Minister
 Agha Shahi, Foreign Affairs Adviser
 Shahnawaz, Foreign Secretary
 General Jilani
 General Arif
 Ambassador Sultan Khan
 Ambassador Yaqub Khan

United States

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
 Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State
 David McGiffert, Assistant Secretary of Defense
 Arthur Hummel, American Ambassador to Pakistan
 Thomas Thornton, NSC Staff Member
 Jane Coon, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
 General Graves, Department of Defense
 Arnold Raphael, Department of State

The meetings began on the morning of February 2, with a briefing of the military situation by the Pakistanis. It followed the customary lines and concentrated heavily on both the Afghan/Soviet and the Indian threats. The main contingencies which the Pakistanis envisioned on their Western border are the following:

(1) Hot pursuit by Soviet or Afghan units pursuing Afghan rebels. The Pakistani objective would be to punish the intruding troops.

(2) A Soviet/Afghan attempt to occupy and hold salients within Pakistan. The Pakistanis would seek to dislodge these salients.

(3) An attack by India as a Soviet proxy. The Pakistanis say they need additional equipment and a stronger commitment from the United States to deal with this.

(4) An attack from east and west with the objective of dismantling Pakistan. Pakistan would require additional equipment to strengthen itself so that it could deter or delay such an attack until the U.S. could come to its assistance. (S)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton, Country File, Box 95, Pakistan: Brzezinski/Christopher Mission: 2–10/80. Secret; Sensitive.

In the course of this military briefing, Dr. Brzezinski asked whether it would be helpful to the Pakistanis if the Chinese were to increase their forces along the Indian border, thereby forcing the Indians to pull troops away from the Pakistan border. The Pakistani briefer replied that this would probably not be very useful since the seasons for military operations on one border are quite different from those on the other. (S)

After the military briefing, the two sides gathered in a smaller group for discussions led on the Pakistani side by President Zia, and on the American side by Dr. Brzezinski and Mr. Christopher. *Dr. Brzezinski* opened by putting out that he had learned much from the briefing and emphasizing the historical significance of the current meetings for U.S. and Pakistan relations. He read Presidential instructions reiterating American support for Pakistani independence and security and said that the U.S. has made an important choice in this regard.² He outlined our attempt over thirty years to build security and stability in Western Europe and the Far East. We have vital interests there which are inseparable from our own security and our actions have demonstrated our seriousness there. We have made clear the threat of nuclear war in Europe and showed ourselves ready to shed blood in the Far East. The President has, in addition now, indicated that American vital interests are engaged in Southwest Asia.³ (S)

In defending these vital interests we have a choice between a purely maritime strategy on the one hand, and on the other an involvement on the mainland. We have chosen not to adopt a purely maritime strategy because we have faith in Pakistan and in the future of the relationship. We are just at the beginning of a new stage with the relationship, not one that is going back to the 1950's, but one in which we will stand by you since we believe you are prepared to stand up on your own. (S)

After some discussion of the global threat and Soviet moves in Afghanistan, Dr. Brzezinski returned to the points made in the briefing concerning the threats to Pakistan. He said there are four areas of response to the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan (leaving aside for the time being bilateral U.S.-Pakistani issues):

(1) The first is a broad, strong and continuing international response.

² See Document 187.

³ An apparent reference to Carter's January 23 State of the Union address and his enunciation of the Carter Doctrine.

(2) It is important to keep the Soviets occupied within Afghanistan so as to raise the cost to them and prevent a quick consolidation of an operating base.

(3) There is a need for a multilateral effort with United States participation to strengthen Pakistani capability to withstand especially the lower levels of Soviet aggression. Dr. Brzezinski added that Iran must be included in this at some time and wondered whether Pakistan could help. He noted that the American people were deeply resentful about Iran but were also mature enough to put this matter behind them once the issue is resolved. (S)

(4) We must convince the Soviets of an American response if they impose a challenge beyond Pakistan's capabilities. (S)

These four considerations in turn define minimum and maximum objectives for Afghanistan itself. The maximum objective would be the establishment of a neutral Afghan government without any Soviet presence. The minimum objective is protracted Soviet involvement in the suppression of the Afghan people. The former of these is harder to obtain; thus it should be made politically and militarily costly for the Soviets to continue on with their actions. On the political front you and other Muslim nations might propose a neutralization by an international Muslim force. This would put the Soviets on the defensive and belie the idea of U.S.-Pakistani collusion. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski went on to discuss the progress which we had made in the four objectives he had mentioned above. He noticed that the Islamabad conference had been remarkably successful in bringing international pressure to bear on the Soviets as had the vote in the United Nations.⁴ He praised Pakistan for its role in both of these. It is important to insure that there is a more intense and more sustained response in this case than there was at the time of the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The United States leadership is determined to make this stick. (S)

On the second point we need to consult more closely. This is a delicate matter that needs to be handled with determination. We have also discussed it with other governments. (S)

On the third issue it is important to strengthen Pakistan's ability to respond to political intimidation or subversion as well as limited military operations (e.g., the first two threats mentioned in the morning briefing). The Soviets must be forced either to withdraw or to escalate the conflict which would precipitate a U.S. engagement under the 1959 agreement. It is necessary to examine concrete ways for strengthening north-west frontier. Turning to other concerned regional nations, Dr.

⁴ On the Islamic Conference, see footnote 2, Document 184. On the UN vote, see footnote 6, Document 136.

Brzezinski recounted briefly some of the results of the Brown visit to China. With regard to India he cautioned the Pakistanis not to prejudge that country in a way that would become a self-fulfilling prophecy. We, too, were disturbed by the Indian statement in the UN General Assembly, but we do not see India as a partner in the Soviet global design.⁵ Perhaps we and our allies can encourage them to realize that the strengthening of Pakistan's security will help them too. We have to be sensitive to India about their concerns in the view of their own role. We do not dispute the dilemma that Pakistan faces, but the United States and Pakistan should not become anti-Indian. With regard to Iran, he reiterated our willingness to re-establish relations and look for a new relationship. (S)

Pakistan and the United States, he went on, are at the beginning of a new relationship which must be based on realistic harmony. It was impossible to satisfy Pakistan's immediate expectations, but this must be seen as a long-term relationship. Pakistani independence is important to the United States, and we know that you will fight even if you are not supported by outside forces. We think of you as Poles rather than Czechs. (S)

A year ago, what we are proposing to do with Pakistan would have been inconceivable. (S)

If the result of our meeting is that our effort is seen as inadequate, this will impact adversely on our historic relationship. (S)

It is hard to mobilize others, but by all means do not characterize what we are doing as inadequate. We have to convince Congress five years after the Vietnam war to become reengaged. The threat is one of great magnitude and we do not want to have to fall back to a maritime strategy. We cannot expect 100% agreement with you, but we should not leave the impression of a dispute. (S)

President Zia responded by mentioning three additional points: This is the first time that the Soviet Union has expanded into Asia; a buffer state has disappeared from the maps; and Peter the Great's will is being carried out. (Dr. Brzezinski intervened at this point to say that the so-called will of Peter the Great is a forgery.) *Zia* continued that the world community's conscience had been aroused in a way that had not been the case previously. A Russian expansionist movement has engulfed Afghanistan and is threatening Pakistani security and U.S. vital interests. There is a qualitative geopolitical change in Southern Asia. (S)

Pakistan, *Zia* continued, has a superpower on its western borders and an unfriendly, if not hostile India on the East. Pakistan is looking

⁵ See footnote 5, Document 163.

for durable and permanent guarantees for its security; thus, they are seeking clarification (assumedly of the U.S. commitment). The Soviets resent the activities of which Pakistan is a focal point. The Indian Foreign Minister demanded a regional discussion of the problem, but Zia responded to him that the problem is global. The Islamic Conference was indeed a victory for the United States and Pakistan, but it leads to further Soviet hostility. Thus we need another superpower as an antidote to the hostility of that superpower. The 1959 agreement must be reconfirmed, especially in light of our experiences in 1965 and 1971.⁶ (Zia at this point went into a fairly lengthy discussion of assurances from Ambassador Oehlert, George Ball, and the quotes in the Kissinger autobiography about 1971.)⁷ In order to remove these lacunae, Pakistan proposes that the 1959 agreement be turned into a treaty, or else give it a Congressional cover, approval or reaffirmation. To write a new treaty is, of course, lengthy and difficult. (S)

How does the U.S. see implementation of the 1959 agreement now? In case of aggression from the West, will it stand committed to Pakistani security? If the threat is agreed on, military assistance should be commensurate with the appreciation of that threat. We have to assure our own security and half-way measures will not be adequate. Certain items will be needed urgently for dealing with hot pursuit, and these will also help to boost army morale. We have to start development activity in the West, and that means economic assistance. How are we going to be able to overcome our problem in the East? Can the Indian threat be neutralized? Can the U.S. approach China to give guarantees to Pakistan? What if the USSR and India attack jointly? We are seeking to improve our relations with India, but what if we fail? If there is collusion and an attack from both sides will you stand by our side? (S)

Henry Kissinger, in the January 21st *Wall Street Journal* interview said it is unlikely that the Soviets would attack Pakistan over an Indian objection.⁸ The danger for us is being dismembered by India. We are trying hard in our relations with India. But don't forget that during the 1970 visit (to Washington) Mrs. Gandhi talked about the congenital

⁶ The dates refer to the previous Indo-Pakistani wars.

⁷ The reference to U.S. assurances to Pakistan in 1971 is from Henry Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 892. On assurances made by George Ball and Ambassador to Pakistan Benjamin Oehlert, see *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XXV, South Asia, Documents 112, 265, 470, and 524.

⁸ For the text of the interview, see Karen Elliot House and Thomas J. Bray, "An Interview with Henry Kissinger," *The Wall Street Journal*, January 21, 1980, p. 18. The paraphrase of Kissinger's remarks is accurate.

defects of Pakistan, its regional weaknesses, etc. This is all in the Kissinger book.⁹ (S)

Therefore, a reaffirmation of the 1959 agreement should address first, proxy aggression from India, second, subversion, and third, it should be free from references to all older documents such as the Eisenhower doctrine, since this poses problems with Pakistan's non-alignment. It should become a purely bilateral agreement against the threat from the West as well as the East. (S)

Our position is similar to that of Poland in 1939, when the Germans and Russians wanted territory and the UK had no power to uphold the guarantees it had given. Agreements and treaties are valid only as long as they can be implemented. (S)

President Carter has said that the United States wants to give Pakistan the ability to repel and deter invasion. Our commitments are permanent, not transitory. We conclude that the United States is serious and will provide the necessary support. If so, you need not be reminded that limitation to any particular armament is not practical. We must assess the needs and find ways to meet them. Dr. Brzezinski has said the U.S. would "become engaged" in case of a hot pursuit. What does that mean in light of the 1959 agreement? Our experiences are bitter. In 1970 and 1971, refugees went to India from East Pakistan and the Soviets accused us of mismanagement. In 1979, the Soviet Ambassador claims that Pakistan is interfering in Afghanistan by accepting refugees. Also in 1970–71, we told Indira Gandhi that if she supports the insurgents it would cause similar problems for India. She agreed, but then did exactly the opposite. The Soviets have a tremendous reinforcement capability. If they can move 50,000 troops into Afghanistan in four weeks, we can imagine what greater things they could do. (S)

Turning to the scope of the Afghan insurgency, when in April 1978, following the coup, we consulted China, we were told that we would get our fingers burned if we became involved. We felt that the United States was not interested in the situation. Even with our meager resources we have alone been helping the freedom fighters. In November 1979, we told Prince Fahd that the Muslims could regain their position if they had help. He, however, said no. But we have been helpful (and with U.S. aid in the last few months). Now the Chinese and Saudis have also agreed in principle. Throughout centuries, the Afghans have never been subjugated. The insurgency will continue,

⁹ Kissinger briefly described Gandhi's visit in his memoirs. For a fuller record of her visit, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, Documents 88 and 89, which document Gandhi's meeting with Secretary of State Rogers in New York in October 1970 and Rogers's subsequent phone call with Kissinger in which Rogers summarized his conversation with Gandhi.

but whether at a high or low level depends on the level of Soviet operations. The Soviets are ruthless. (S)

Since December 27th, up until January 20th, 22,000 refugees have fled to Pakistan, showing Soviet ruthlessness. Therefore, the insurgency has prospects but the freedom fighters need outside support. They will need outside bases, and that means Pakistan and to some extent Iran, and these bases must be secure. An insecure Pakistan would jeopardize the future of the freedom fighters and the situation in Iran is still less favorable. (S)

What is the likely timeframe for the Soviet push further southward? We cannot fix that. It depends on the deterrents at the international level—the United Nations, the Islamic Conference, U.S. resolve and support—and also the strength of Pakistan itself. (S)

U.S. and Pakistan each have interests to watch over. President Carter has talked about vital interests in the Persian Gulf. That is a strong commitment. Is Pakistan included? I gather from Dr. Brzezinski that we are. (S)

There was then some discussion on the exact wording of the President's State of the Union message, and what the Pakistanis perceived as a difference in strength of commitment between the longer and shorter versions. (S)

This new undertaking has a dynamic which we appreciate. Not only the quick U.S. response including steps already taken, but international efforts as well which we appreciate highly. (S)

We had serious differences over a few months ago, and I was deeply ashamed about these. (President Zia was referring here to the burning of the American Embassy.)¹⁰ We have never been ungrateful, we have tried to stand by our friends. We are facing serious decisions and are at a crossroads. No country ever closes its options, and frankly this is the best time for U.S.-Pakistani cooperation. You will find a neglected ally and you will build a dam against the Soviets. Our national interests coincide. We deeply appreciate your visit and hope we will be able to find appropriate answers to all these questions. (S)

Deputy Secretary Christopher then spoke concerning the American security commitment to Pakistan. He noted that the President has recently reaffirmed this commitment publicly, and in a letter to President Zia.¹¹ We are ready to do more. We are ready to make this letter public, and to ask Congress to reaffirm the 1959 agreement. Asking Congress to do this is highly significant. It would define the Soviet threat (at this point Secretary Christopher quoted a sentence beginning

¹⁰ See footnote 10, Document 102.

¹¹ For the letter, see Document 159.

“these extraordinary.” Such a reaffirmation would be enacted in both Houses and thus be more binding than an Executive agreement. Secretary Vance and I have discussed this with Congress and they are prepared to move ahead. The contemporary vitality of this agreement will reassure you and educate our people. This is an unprecedented way for us to go about making such a commitment. (S)

It is also unprecedented that the legislation will provide for assistance “notwithstanding any other provision of law”, thus setting aside the Glenn and Symington amendments and any other obstructions. (S)

We need to see this as a beginning of a process. We have to get it enacted. Congress is chary of such things, but at this time it is willing to do it. Proceeding this way is much quicker, cleaner and more decisive than a treaty. You recognize the delay that would be involved in a treaty, and an in-treaty [*a new treaty?*] would likely incur debate over various conditions such as non-proliferation. (S)

Addressing the contingencies you raised, a Soviet or Soviet/Afghan attack that threatened your independence or integrity would fall under the terms of the 1959 agreement. The President would immediately consult with you under Article I of the agreement, and also consult with Congress. Our response could involve the use of armed force. (S)

In case of a concerted Indian-Soviet attack, the first article of the 1959 agreement would also come into play. (S)

If the Soviets have India attack as a proxy—we see this most unlikely. India is even less willing to do this after the invasion of Afghanistan. The key, though, would be whether the attack was Communist controlled and/or inspired. More important, though, is that the United States and India have good relations. We are pleased that you are consulting with the Indians. To sum up, though, if India attacked as an agent of the Soviet Union, Article I would indeed come into effect. (S)

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Afghanistan.]

You have talked about “keeping the insurgency alive” in Afghanistan. The issue is one of motivation. To accept an injection of arms to the refugees would be dangerous for us unless we are able to defend against the first two strategic contingencies we discussed earlier.¹² (S)

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Afghanistan.]

¹² Text of the full record of the talks is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XIX, South Asia. Zia called Carter, February 4, to notify the President that he thought the talks were “excellent.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 38, Memcons: President: 2/80)

194. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Riyadh, February 4, 1980, 1:45–3:10 p.m.

SUBJECT

Summary of Dr. Brzezinski's and Mr. Christopher's Meeting with Prince Saud of Saudi Arabia

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
 Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State
 U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia John West
 Jane Coon
 Gary Sick
 John Trattner
 Jerry Schecter
 Isa Sabbagh
 Eugene Bovis
 Prince Saud
 Mr. Mansouri
 Ambassador al-Hegalan
 Abdul Aziz Thunayyan

Prince Saud opened the meeting with a brief discussion of his experiences at the Islamic Summit in Islamabad.²

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Afghanistan.]

Prince Saud wondered what are the Soviet interests in Afghanistan.

Dr. Brzezinski said that he was prepared to accept the fact that the Soviet motives were limited to Afghanistan itself.³ The Government there was losing its ability to govern and he thought that replacement was the probable motive for the politburo members. However, the rationale for entering Afghanistan is irrelevant; the results are to create a strategic dynamic which is not limited to Afghanistan. The effects of the invasion are of global significance regardless of their immediate interests. It represented a strategic challenge. They have turned a buffer state into an offensive wedge. These acts are very serious. History shows that acts of limited objectives sometimes lead to general outcomes. After all in World War I the parties began with very limited objectives. The United States has been bogged down with the Iranian hostage issue, with the Arab-Israel question, the Mecca problem, Paki-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Meetings File, Box 84, Sensitive XX: 2/80. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in Prince Saud's home.

² See footnote 2, Document 184.

³ An unknown hand crossed out "interests" and wrote "motives."

stani problems, etc.⁴ The Soviets may have seen this array of problems and decided that this was the moment to act, but we must be aware of the objective consequences of their actions. What the Saudis did in Islamabad is of historic significance. It is the first time that a group of nations has confronted the Soviets apart from the United States. The Islamic states represent a greater challenge to the Soviets than the United States. You represent a revitalized religious renaissance which is on the move. There are sixty million Moslems in the Soviet Union who are increasingly aware of their identity and who are experiencing an intense feeling of Moslem identity. This makes the Soviets fearful.

Prince Saud said that's true. In the region there is a feeling that the Soviets did not act due to reasons of self-defense. These were offensive intentions, not defensive. They are going to try to consolidate Soviet power and gain back lost ground. The timing was determined by their need to capitalize on the present situation. He noted that in Lebanon we may have reason to expect some sort of conflict perhaps like 1967. The Soviet military posture in the Middle East is not an attempt to resolve the Israeli problem but to bring contradictions between United States and the Arab world more to the front. The regional nations see the Soviet aims; even Iran does, though not the students. The regional states want to oppose the Soviets despite the immense dangers, such as Pakistan. It was not an easy decision to help Afghanistan especially since they were not sure of the backing they would have from the United States and others. They took the decision since they are aware that they are next. However, this situation should not be viewed as a crisis rather it is something people in this region live with every day.

Dr. Brzezinski wondered if that same reasoning applied to Iraq and Algeria.

Prince Saud said yes. They see the Soviets as aggressive and imperialistic. Public opinion and government opinion in the region all oppose the Soviet tendency to take what they want by force. The regional states will do what is necessary and they are confident that the US will help. They need to understand how the US will do it.

Mr. Christopher wondered what his views were on the results in Pakistan. On the favorable side, Mr. Christopher thought that recent talks were successful in standing up to Soviet aggression. However, we had presented what we thought was a sound approach which involved going to Congress and getting a firm commitment as well as providing nearly half a billion dollars in assistance. We are not sure

⁴ The "Mecca problem" likely refers to the attack by Islamic dissidents on the Grand Mosque in Mecca, November 20, 1979.

we understand why the Pakistanis would not accept this as a major first step.

Mrs. Coon noted that the Pakistanis were anxious to reaffirm the security commitment.

Mr. Christopher wondered if the aid was too small or too big. We had spent six or seven hours discussing this issue at the highest levels of the Pakistani Government and were still uncertain of what their reasons were.⁵

Prince Saud said that the Pakistanis think the aid is not sufficient to meet the challenge. They fear the Soviets and India. In order to resist they have legitimate defense needs to defend themselves. You said that the United States would oppose the Soviets, however, they do not see the US as willing to enter into a direct conflict in this area. For example, to have troops available to defend Afghanistan. Maybe this was not mentioned by them. But they are looking for a clear view of the extent of backing by the US Government. They have no other source to back them. They wanted to have US aid sufficient to have the capability to resist the Soviets.

Mr. Christopher said to Prince Saud you know our country. When we reverse course sometimes that is done in increments. We have a long series of problems to overcome particularly the nonproliferation issue. We tried to persuade them that a half billion dollars is not insubstantial. We talked ourselves blue in the face and we came away perplexed.

Prince Saud said they are afraid the US will throw them in front of the bear and not help them when the chips are down. They also have a problem justifying their policy internally. They also recognize the turnaround by the United States but they wonder if assistance will come in time and be sufficient in quantity.

Mr. Christopher wondered if they wanted to turn off our turnaround.

Dr. Brzezinski said he thought not. We are able to match their commitment to fight with our willingness to assist them in case of massive intervention by the Soviet Union in accordance with our constitutional processes. Did the Islamic Conference agree to supply aid to Pakistan?

Prince Saud said yes and there will be more when others see the US commitment.

Dr. Brzezinski said if the Soviets intervene massively we will not stand by. They now understand that. If intervention comes in a limited

⁵ See Document 193.

way we want to be able to help on a limited basis. Some suggest that we do not have the power. In fact we have the capacity to do a lot of damage. In Baluchistan, for example, US air power could be quite decisive. Also our conventional capability in the region is substantial. We are not obliged to respond in a way where the Soviets choose the time and place of their own choosing. There are other places in the world where we can do things where we have a preponderance of power. We do not necessarily have to match the Soviets gun for gun in this area. We have the means and our country has the will. We are no longer a country paralyzed by the Vietnam war. We are ready to demonstrate that we mean what we say. Like the Soviets the imperialist Germans said they were trying to avoid encirclement but their diplomacy was so inept they did not succeed and brought the whole world against them.

Prince Saud said they think they can succeed in making the Soviets not succeed.

Dr. Brzezinski said as far as Afghanistan is concerned it requires continuing discussion.

Prince Saud said that if we could help with the Indians that would be a good thing.

Dr. Brzezinski said we sent Mr. Clifford to India and his age was the equivalent of the two of us put together.⁶

Prince Saud said that the Pakistanis worry a lot about the Gromyko visit to India. They hope that the Indians can be persuaded. We the Saudis have no influence. They buy some oil from us and some other Arab countries. Even Iraq sends them some oil. We will do what we can but you must also act.

Dr. Brzezinski said that Mrs. Gandhi feels deeply about the shabby treatment she got from the US press.

Prince Saud said that is the same way that General Zia feels.

Dr. Brzezinski said the press has not paid much attention to General Zia, except during the Bhutto affair and the Bhutto incident was not a beautiful period of Pakistani history. Mrs. Gandhi is a different situation. There was a long love affair with India in the United States and there has subsequently been a disillusionment especially among the Left intellectuals. The conversation continued after the group sat down to lunch. *Dr. Brzezinski* noted that the Afghans are very tough. He had visited a refugee camp. However he feared that the Soviets would be more effective than the British had been a hundred years ago when only one out of ten thousand men returned from an engagement.

⁶ See Document 190.

Prince Saud noted that most of the Afghanistan army is joining the rebels.

Dr. Brzezinski said that we don't have as good information as we need about the rebel situation, however, we have good information on Soviet dispositions. Thus far the Soviets have not engaged in the resistance with full scale fighting, rather they have focused on the lines of communications. This is a good time for weapons to go in before the Soviets launch a counterinsurgency effort in a big way.

Prince Saud said that the people in Afghanistan are capable of using sophisticated equipment. They need training on communication, recoilless rifles. Surface to air rifles [*missiles?*] would take care of part of their problems. He wondered if we have SA7s by chance.

Dr. Brzezinski said by chance we do. The Egyptians also have Soviet equipment. The Algerians are fearful of getting involved.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Afghanistan.]

195. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Riyadh, February 4, 1980, 7:20–9:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Summary of Dr. Brzezinski's and Mr. Christopher's Meeting with Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State
U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia John West
Gary Sick
Arnie Raphel
Crown Prince Fahd
Prince Saud
Dr. Pharaon
Mr. Mansouri
Abdul Aziz Thunayyan
Notetaker

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Meetings File, Box 84, Sensitive XX: 2/80. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Royal Palace.

Dr. Brzezinski noted that there had been many changes in the world during the year since he had last been here in Riyadh.

Prince Fahd said that he hoped the changes were in the interests of the free world.

Dr. Brzezinski said not everything that happened last year was good; however, we were encouraged by the results of the Islamic Conference and hope that this part of the world has been encouraged by the President's State of the Union address.

Prince Fahd said nobody in his right mind would have expected the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan.

Dr. Brzezinski noted that he had visited the refugee camps in Pakistan.

Prince Fahd said that this was a heartbreaking sight. It was the results of the invasion. It was most unconscionable to resort to outright invasion as opposed to other means that were available. He wondered what news the United States had of the internal nationalistic resistance.

Dr. Brzezinski said that every indication we have is that the resistance is growing steadily. Over the last few days there has been an increased number of clashes between the Soviets and Resistance Forces. The Afghan troops have largely been passive and disarmed but recently there have been direct clashes between Afghan soldiers and Soviet forces.

Prince Fahd said this is a very significant development and will give a shot in the arm to the resistance.

Dr. Brzezinski said that our present estimates show that there are 73,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan, perhaps up to 92,000.

Prince Fahd said that these indications suggest that they really got in in force.

Dr. Brzezinski said that some Soviet troop deployment suggests that they might be considering operations against northeastern Iran.

Prince Fahd said that there is nothing that is not likely anymore.

Dr. Brzezinski said we had a good talk with the leaders of Pakistan. The President asked us to lead a delegation there and tell them that if there was a threat to the territorial integrity of Pakistan, we would not let them stand alone. They understand this. We left a military team to examine their needs and we also discussed with the Pakistanis the best way to make certain that the Soviets are not able to consolidate their gains in Afghanistan.

Prince Fahd said that is very good.

Dr. Brzezinski continued I know that some of these matters were discussed with Prince Turki.² We would also like to increase our psychological propaganda to the Muslims.

² No record of this meeting was found.

Prince Fahd said that is very important.

Dr. Brzezinski continued that Ambassador West will talk to Prince Saud about leasing transmitter time because we feel that the indignation of the rest of the world is shared quietly by the 50 to 60 million Moslems in the Soviet Union.

Prince Fahd said that was true. They have the feeling that this Islamic fervor is against any one act of invasion such as that by the Soviets. He had not witnessed a comparable reaction to any other single act. He thought that the Soviets had not imagined that the reaction would be so intense and so deep. This is very important. They have witnessed an international outcry all around the world.

Dr. Brzezinski said that we think this calls for a response on many levels. Most importantly is the level of the Islamic world. We are also prepared to respond in several ways to help Pakistan militarily and economically. We intend to strengthen our military presence in this part of the world. We are not asking for bases from anyone but we are negotiating with a number of countries for the use of facilities so we are able to respond quickly and effectively to any threat. We will respond on the level of psychological broadcasts as well. We are prepared to work with every country in the region to strengthen security. We indicated to the Pakistanis that the 1959 agreement is still valid but we are also planning to work with other countries to organize economic and military assistance for them.

Mr. Christopher said that our trip to Pakistan was better than anticipated but also different than anticipated. The President had announced that he was prepared to go to Congress to seek nearly a half a billion dollars in assistance, including two hundred million dollars in military credits and other economic assistance. Somewhat to our surprise the Pakistanis asked us not to send this until they had a better understanding of what the reaction of their other friends would be. No doubt Saudi Arabia is aware that Pakistan has enormous needs in military and economic fields. Their balance of payments deficit is greater than a billion dollars a year and even more urgently the Pakistan army needs to be reoriented back to the West, since it is now focused mostly in the East. This move requires some change to the Pakistani military and increased infrastructure. So now it is of great importance to know what other nations can do. We would ask your comments on your evaluation of Pakistan's needs and your own discussion with the Pakistanis.

Prince Fahd said that Saudi Arabia had for many years been giving Pakistan very good aid in military and economic fields trying to be as supportive and helpful to Pakistan as they can possibly be. They know that if they buoy up Pakistan economically that people will be able to breathe more easily. Also, they are prepared to do whatever they

can in the military field. They firmly believe that Pakistan should be supported to the maximum possible extent. Psychologically now is the time to rally to Pakistan's support. If friendly states dilly dally at this point future steps will be more difficult.

Mr. Christopher said he agreed. President Carter is prepared to take unprecedented moves to support Pakistan.

Prince Fahd said that they had felt this from President Carter's statements and they are sure that the Pakistani people also feel it. Also it is very important vis-a-vis the Soviets, they did not imagine the response would be so firm and intense. Maybe the Soviets thought they could do this thing and get only some brief reaction then perhaps in the future go on to Pakistan with only a brief outcry. That is why the Saudis have a strong feeling that the people of the world recognize that the US lion has begun to stir. Of course we realize that the aim of the Soviets is to get to warm waters so in fact this aggression makes a later move toward the Persian Gulf more possible. He noted that during Nixon's first tenure he had forewarned the American Administration about this very thing.³ Just to illustrate graphically the Soviets first thought that they would make use of Iraq as a launching pad against this part of the world. Now they have switched and are using the PDRY for this reason. Their failure in Iraq led them to attack Afghanistan.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Afghanistan.]

³ Not further identified.

196. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, February 5, 1980, 1805Z

2027. Subject: Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan: Updated Assessment and Policy Recommendations. Ref: Moscow 2026.²

1. (C—Entire text)

2. Begin summary. This cable updates the Embassy's continuing assessment of the current crisis in U.S.-Soviet relations and recommendations for dealing with it.

My overall recommendation is to maintain a tough stance on the sanctions already announced (without dribbling out minor new ones), while leaving open the door for later redemption; to make clear by our actions that we object only to Soviet behavior and do not seek to overthrow the Soviet system; to proceed carefully in defending areas of vital interest in order to avoid our having forced on us a choice between defeat on the ground and nuclear war; and to explore ways to maintain a dialogue.

Specifically, I recommend:

—continued freeze on most if not all new trade deals while allowing, subject to more stringent strategic guidelines, the completion of contracts already underway and continued delivery of spare parts;

—continued honoring of existing agreements at the government level, including civil air and maritime (with good faith efforts to overcome trade union resistance), Embassy construction, etc.;

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office Files of Marshall D. Shulman, Special Advisor to the Secretary on Soviet Affairs, 1977–1981, Lot 81D109, untitled folder. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis; Cherokee.

² Telegram 2026 from Moscow, sent earlier in the day February 5, alerted the Department to expect telegram 2027. Watson wrote: "The world is beginning to look more dangerous to me. I am sure that everyone recognizes that an error in judgment on either side could elevate finally to thermonuclear war. We are dealing with a monolithic government with top leadership average age of 69. They have badly miscalculated in Afghanistan. We have tried unsuccessfully to understand and predict this government for nearly 50 years with notable lack of success. Furthermore, although Afghanistan is unforgivable, we must recognize that our record does not look lily white to them." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P900077–1641) Watson's characterization of Soviet miscalculation was corroborated in an intelligence memorandum prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, February 19, that noted that many leaders had become "disturbed about the impact of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on Soviet foreign and domestic policy." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 1–2/80)

—continued freeze on scientific and cultural exchanges except for routine academic exchanges and other low-level exchanges on a case-by-case basis;

—stop further moves with China, especially in military-related fields;

—informal explorations on getting the Soviets out of Afghanistan and also on starting up arms control talks, using me and Dobrynin for smoking out the possibilities and possibly by sending an unofficial interlocutor such as Averell Harriman. End summary.

3. I am deeply conscious of the seriousness of the present crisis in U.S.-Soviet relations. My staff and I are continuing to review our assessments and recommendations to be sure that we give you our best advice, both as to Soviet motivations and tactics and as to U.S. actions.

4. We continue to think that Moscow miscalculated the consequences when it went into Afghanistan, but are now inclined to think the miscalculation was more acute with regard to the rest of the world than to the U.S. They probably expected, and possibly intended, a worsening of relations with the U.S., though not of the breadth and depth that materialized. Perhaps the operation in Kabul was botched, and they had expected a smoother change of regime followed by a call for Soviet support, under circumstances in which world reaction would have been narrower and the U.S. could have been more easily depicted as an excitable anti-Soviet warmonger. The line now being purveyed, both privately (including by Gromyko) and publicly—that even before Afghanistan the U.S. had deliberately worsened relations with the USSR—indicates an intent to blacken us before the rest of the world and to undermine our policy at home.

5. The Soviet leaders may actually have convinced themselves that the Carter administration is out to do them in. Their restraint at Vienna—their refusal to go much beyond the signature of SALT, to resolve the Jackson-Vanik problem,³ or to take other steps—signalled their reservations. Their paranoia about China may have been one reason for their mulish attitude throughout 1979. (I have recently read Brezhnev's letter to the President in December 1978 warning against the arming by the West "of a neighboring country which pursues an openly hostile policy toward us . . . we must do what we consider necessary . . . due attention to our defense," and asserting we were at a crossroads, one turning of which threatened "confrontation and increased threat of war.") The standard litany of charges against us

³ The Jackson-Vanik amendment to the Trade Act of 1974 required the relaxation of Soviet emigration restrictions before most-favored-nation status for the Soviet Union would be considered.

also includes many other items including TNF and the Middle East, about which the Soviets also feel strongly. It is odd that our China policy has dropped out of this litany, for example as recited by Gromyko to me last week.⁴ It probably means that they think talking about it may be counter-productive, that we are too far along the road of working closely with China to be deflected by words.

6. Of course the great disadvantage of the Soviet system is that there is no built-in balance, no one to point out emphatically and publicly the fallacies in the skewed views of the old men in the Politburo. If they decide it is right to try to “teach the U.S. a lesson,” to show the U.S. electorate that failure to cooperate with the USSR will lead to a dangerous situation, there apparently is no one to explain to them that such a policy is highly counter-productive if not dangerous. Since they pride themselves on judging others by actions, not words, it is up to us by our actions to get across to the Soviet leadership that they have misjudged us: we are not trying to do them in, but we cannot be stampeded by a show of strength.

7. In these circumstances, the President’s cool but determined approach may have to continue for some time. We will want to show our capability for moving along lines that could hurt their interests on key sensitive points—China, international isolation, a possible new arms race. At the same time we must make clear that we are not trying to destroy the Soviet Union; we are prepared to talk arms control; and we are prepared for the present to move slowly on the above sensitive points to see if the Soviets will change their behavior. We may have to continue along these somewhat limited and constraining lines for several months, if not longer. My guess is that they will not show much desire to talk seriously until they become convinced of the inevitability of President Carter’s re-election. Meanwhile, it will be important not to move too quickly on matters they consider affect their vital interests, particularly China.

8. I want to offer a few thoughts on setting ourselves up for confrontations.

A. There is an obvious danger that one side or the other will make a mistake about the other side’s determination and perception of its own interests. It is of course vital to communicate one’s own perception of vital interests, as the President has done with regard to the Persian Gulf region. A great danger arises however if we assume that the threat of direct military combat between Soviet and American forces will cause Moscow to back away and that therefore only token forces will be required to make the threat valid.

⁴ See Document 186.

B. I can see at least two circumstances in which the Soviets would not eschew local hostilities. One would be that they consider their own vital interests directly engaged, therefore giving them—in their eyes—no choice. The other, less likely but not outside the realm of possibility, is that the Soviet leaders would conclude that the U.S. must be taught a more powerful lesson by being forced to back away from nuclear confrontation as the USSR did in 1962. However misguided, the calculation could be that if U.S. theater forces were defeated in, for example, the Persian Gulf area, the U.S. would decline to go nuclear and that the shock of this decision would reinvigorate forces in the U.S. and the rest of the world seeking an accommodation with the Soviet Union.

C. But I believe it would be a grave error on our part to continue assuming that the Soviets want to avoid at all costs any confrontation which could go nuclear; I can even envisage some Soviet leaders wanting such a confrontation if they expect (however naively) to be able to pre-ordain an American backdown by arranging it at a time and place of their choosing. At the moment they face a new arms race—both strategic and theater—even if SALT II is ratified; the U.S. may be seen as moving toward a military alliance with China; and the Soviet economy is rapidly losing momentum. They may feel that if a confrontation must come, it should be sooner rather than later.

D. My point is that we should not bluff in moving toward confrontation with the Soviets at this stage in history and at a point near their borders: tripwire forces may not deter them, and might even invite their attack; they may not believe any threats to use tactical nuclear weapons; and if we are forced to use them I personally believe the worst predictions about escalation will come true.

9. I also have some other policy suggestions, flowing from the above analysis and in most cases not much different from what we are already doing.

A. A general point is that we should not give Moscow grounds to believe that the U.S. follows a policy of trying to destroy, fragment or overturn the Soviet regime; if the Soviet leadership comes to that conclusion its inferiority complex could result in a “cornered rat” syndrome and a turn toward calculated confrontation.

B. Our remaining “China cards” should not be played this year, particularly those which appear to be intended to build up Chinese military potential, because that too could support any inclinations here to seek a confrontation with the U.S. sooner rather than later. Moreover, once played they lose their usefulness as leverage and become excuses for Soviet counterreaction. And they help unify the Soviet people behind the Soviet leadership.

C. Obviously the various sanctions imposed after Afghanistan must be maintained for an extended period unless Soviet policy gives us

cause to ease off. The lesson we are trying to teach by means of the sanctions will be easily dissipated if we do not assiduously maintain them.

D. A corollary is that having administered the lesson (of which the Olympics boycott is important and deserves determined follow-through), we should stand back and await the results. Continued dribbling out of further sanctions beyond those specified by the President will give the impression of terminal anti-Sovietism rather than a stern lesson. Moreover, we ought to save a few measures for counter-retaliation for any Soviet retaliation against our sanctions and as new sanctions in the event of further Soviet misbehavior.

E. Another point about economic sanctions: Our policy of stern application of sanctions even to the point of self-sacrifice, if it is to have any chance of contributing to improved Soviet behavior, must also leave open the possibility of some day resuming normal trade relations. I would be deeply concerned in this regard if we were to cut off completely the delivery of contracted items and particularly of spare parts. It would be satisfying indeed to see major Soviet projects grind to a halt until they can arrange alternate suppliers or install new machines not dependent on U.S. spare parts. But this would only be a temporary setback to them, while signalling that we have written off U.S.-Soviet trade for decades to come. I believe that would be a dangerous signal to send. Instead I recommend that contracts which are signed and well launched, as well as normal spare parts supplies, should be obstructed only if a good case can be made under revised, more stringent strategic guidelines. I am not concerned about the political consequences of discouraging new deals even in totally non-strategic areas during the coming year; this conveys the proper message and is in tune with our policy on agricultural exports.

F. Scientific, cultural and educational exchanges should be an important part of our long-term repeat long-term strategy, because they can be helpful in gradually opening up this society to the kind of counterpressures against foreign adventurism and domestic repression which we would like to see gain a foothold. But since that internal process will require decades, at the present juncture we can afford to proceed tactically and we should therefore continue to hold down large-scale and visible exchanges (while if possible preserving the basic academic exchanges) until the Soviets give good reason for us to signal that they are worthy partners in this sort of endeavor.

G. The most important and urgent positive signal is the one we have already given, that we are prepared even now to continue the arms control dialogue. Tactics and timing are important and are discussed below.

H. Finally, there is the urgent question of the struggle for the support of the rest of the world in opposing Soviet external aggression. It

is still true that the Soviets, when they think their backs are to the wall, will pursue what they see as their vital interests without regard to world opinion. But it is also true that they have gradually come to place increased weight on their acceptance by the rest of the world. This is a positive development and it is obvious that we should exploit it to the fullest. Without trying to spell out specifics, I would merely comment that it is important that while organizing the power to resist Soviet aggression we also continue the effort to persuade the neutral and non-aligned countries to put political pressure on the Soviets. India and the Islamic countries are obviously important in this regard. How we approach the Third World as a whole is outside my competence, but even from here it seems obvious that simply appealing to them to be anti-Soviet may strike them as self-serving. One of our Western friends here, with much Third World experience, has urged that we approach the developing nations in terms of helping them achieve their own goals and aspirations.

10. Recommendations on mechanics and timing.

A. It is important that we continue to take a tough stance, not appearing to have second thoughts about our present course, even while leaving openings for the Soviets to signal willingness to start talking about some of the most serious issues. This will not be easy but deserves our best efforts.

B. Obviously a key element will be continued dialogue between you and Gromyko through both me and Dobrynin. As we have seen in the most recent exchanges, Dobrynin has begun offering “personal ideas” for a solution of the Afghanistan problem itself; the tactic is to get Washington to venture out on a limb on the basis of Dobrynin’s suggestions. You might wish to respond by feeding me some ideas to give Gromyko, also on a “personal” basis. That way we get some reaction from Gromyko first hand without committing you and the President to anything. This could be done even more unofficially by using Arbatov (who is expected to be back to work soon). I am frankly not optimistic that we could find any basis for an early Soviet withdrawal, but I see an advantage in dangling some ideas for letting the Soviets extract themselves gracefully if they are so inclined. At least we could find out for sure whether they are so inclined. Movement toward an internal regime of “national reconciliation” together with some sort of effort to repatriate the refugees back from Pakistan and pacify the border seems unlikely at this stage, but there would be no harm in exploring it if it could be done unofficially. Perhaps some UN involvement would be feasible. Conceivably we could also discuss some sort of “hands off” agreement regarding Iran.

C. We need to follow up quickly on SALT I and SALT II interim observance (Gromyko did not respond to that portion of my *démarche*)

and, even without waiting for a solution in Afghanistan, to pursue explorations about TNF talks, and about how to prepare for SALT III. Perhaps Washington will conclude that talks could be held behind the scenes at the SCC [CCD?], augmented and kept in continuous session for the purpose, or perhaps you would wish to develop a scheme along the lines of my suggestion for a new joint committee of experts to explore the possibilities for balanced unilateral restraint. In any case I think we should settle on some coherent proposal and then begin to explore it, also in an unofficial way through "personal ideas" which I would float or some other means. (Of course we have to be careful not to appear too eager on interim observance of SALT, lest they decide to shake us up by indicating doubt that interim observance can continue very long.)

D. One other avenue for exploring some of these ideas informally would be to send Averell Harriman over on a private visit.⁵ He would have access to Brezhnev and other leaders and would be taken seriously, but he could also discuss these issues informally and unofficially. If Harriman is too political and too closely connected to the administration, you might consider someone else, perhaps a businessman with good connections here.

E. The measures we have taken thus far have had a three-fold purpose: showing the Soviets that such behavior cannot be cost-free; deterring future aggressive behavior; and, ideally, forcing a roll-back in Afghanistan. The first point we will have made if we stay the course. If we succeed in the second one—deterrence—the effort will have been well worth it, particularly if we were able to gain believable commitments against future such actions. But realistically we must admit, for purposes of choosing our long-range approach to relations with the Soviets, that the third may not happen. We may be faced with a *fait accompli*, the continued existence of [garble—Afghanistan] as an [garble—East?]-European style—or even Mongolian-style—satellite. In our actions and our public pronouncements about the duration of the measures we have taken, we need to balance that possibility against the intractable need for that minimum level of dealings with the Soviets which will head off nuclear confrontation.

F. It is nevertheless just barely possible that the Soviets are having second thoughts, and we should not neglect opportunities to explore the possibility of a relatively quick reversal in Afghanistan. If there is any such opportunity, it might lie in the early deadline created by the Olympics. Therefore if we are going to give the Soviets any prodding

⁵ No record of a visit by Harriman to Moscow was found.

on Afghanistan while offering to drop our opposition to the Moscow Olympics, we should do so quickly.

G. I frankly doubt, however, that it will be successful. It is for that reason, and with an eye to the long-range prospects and dangers, that I think we should begin exploring possibilities for getting back to the arms control table. Some say that it will be impossible to have any serious talks, even on arms control, while contacts are frozen in other areas. But I think we have to give it a try.

Watson

197. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, February 6, 1980

SUBJECT

Summary Report and Recommendations Pakistan/Saudi Arabia

The talks with the Saudis were better than a year ago: franker, more specific and more constructive. There is no doubt that your State of the Union message has had a fundamental impact. *They now take us seriously.* In Pakistan I believe we convinced the Pakistani leaders that you stand foursquare behind the reaffirmation of the 1959 Agreement. As a result, we neither had to up the ante on the \$400 million nor promise a formal treaty.

Subject to your guidance, I believe we should now pursue the following items:

1. Since the Pakistanis have basically decided to stand up to the Soviets, we may need to increase our military assistance, but primarily in anti-tank and other defensive-type weaponry. In addition to whatever we can raise from others (and the Saudis promised to make a substantial contribution), we may then eventually have to go beyond the \$200 million if we want them to be effective in responding to

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Trip File, Box 41, Brzezinski, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia: 2/1–5/80: Briefing Book III. Secret. In the upper right corner of the memorandum, Carter wrote: "Zbig—J." Attached but not printed is a covering note from Brzezinski to Carter, February 6, in which Brzezinski offered to give an oral report of his trip in addition to the "action-oriented" items he provided in the memorandum.

a low-level threat. Their military position is really deplorable: poor equipment, no infrastructure, little effective communications.

2. As a confidence building measure, and also as a way of keeping tabs on the Pakistanis, we should have regular military consultations on possible Soviet-Afghani offensive options against Pakistan.

3. We need to find some formula for a Congressional reaffirmation of the 1959 Agreement, even if for the time being there is no legislative package for Pakistan. This is psychologically very much needed and the timing in Congress [will] probably never be better.

4. To keep India at bay, and especially to prevent the Indians from concentrating all their forces against Pakistan (which makes it impossible for the Pakistanis to build up their northwestern defenses effectively), we should explore with the Chinese the possibility of some Chinese deployments north of Nepal.² This would siphon off Indian forces and keep the Indians honest (though anything along these lines would have to be done very cautiously so as not to precipitate increased Soviet/Indian military cooperation).

5. To mobilize Arab support for our position in the region, and particularly to shore up Islamic opposition against the Soviets, we simply must accelerate our efforts regarding the Palestinians. There is no doubt that this matter preoccupies the Saudis, and they are right in saying that lack of adequate progress on the Palestinian issue would benefit the Soviets quite directly. Either you or Fritz should find occasion to underline our commitment.

6. We should tell Sadat in no uncertain terms that his public polemics against the Saudis are harming *U.S.* interests in the region—and hence we expect him to desist out of deference to our concern with strengthening *U.S.* interests.

7. We should try to be somewhat more forthcoming on some of the military items urgently requested by Saudi Arabia—and John West will be writing to you on this matter shortly. Most involve symbolic issues, yet of considerable importance to Saudi pride and to their feeling that we are not reciprocating for their help with regard to oil production.³

8. If the positive news regarding Yemeni accommodation to Saudi demands proves (as is quite possible) to be false, we should actively cooperate with the Saudis in the implementation of the plan developed by Carlucci. Otherwise Yemen will be your next major crisis—and this time in an area directly of vital importance to us.

² In the right margin, Carter wrote: "No."

³ In the right margin, Carter wrote: "These are not known by me."

9. In our next communication to the Soviets we should tell them unambiguously that continued Soviet/Cuban build-up of South Yemen is unacceptable and that it will precipitate U.S. countermeasures. (Aden is quite susceptible to a blockade and it may be better at some point to seal the place off than to be faced with a genuinely effective PDRY challenge—backed by the Soviets and the Cubans—to Saudi Arabia.)

10. As soon as practicable and welcomed by host Middle Eastern countries, some amphibious marine landings and a joint exercise with a U.S. airborne brigade would provide a credible and impressive display of our ability—and therefore will—to project effective American power into the region.

These summary recommendations will need to be staffed out and more fully considered, but your reactions to them would be helpful. In brief, we must capitalize on the extraordinarily effective impact of your recent speech on an area which is simultaneously vital to us and yet extraordinarily fragile and vulnerable.⁴

⁴ At the bottom of the memorandum, Brzezinski wrote: "(Warren was great, and the spirit could not have been better)."

198. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, February 6, 1980, 9–10:05 a.m.

SUBJECT

Pakistan/Saudi Arabia

PARTICIPANTS

State

Warren Christopher
David Newsom
Matthew Nimetz
Richard Cooper*
Peter Constable
George Vest*

CIA

Frank Carlucci

White House

Zbigniew Brzezinski
David Aaron
Henry Owen
Lloyd Cutler
Hedley Donovan

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council Institutional Files, 1977–1981, Box 108, SCC-269, 2/6/80, Pakistan/Saudi Arabia. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. In the upper right corner, Carter wrote: "Zbig—C."

OSD
 Secretary Harold Brown
 W. Graham Clayton
 William Perry*
 JCS
 General David Jones
 General John Pustay

NSC
 Gary Sick
 Thomas Thornton
 Robert Blackwill

*Present for last ten minutes only

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The meeting was devoted almost entirely to a report by Dr. Brzezinski and Mr. Christopher on their mission to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Dr. Brzezinski noted that the assessment of the situation by both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia is graver than ours. They both see Soviet actions as part of a deliberate strategic challenge to the U.S. and the region. The Pakistanis see four options facing them:

1. Possible Soviet penetration of their borders.
2. Soviet penetration and retention of some territory.
3. Aggression against Pakistan by India, possibly Soviet-inspired.
4. A coordinated Soviet-Indian attack against Pakistan.

The Pakistanis believe they can handle the first contingency. They are worried about the second since it might be intended to humiliate them and they would probably lack the capability to eject Soviet forces. The third is a major concern, since they are convinced that the Indians are aggressively minded and in league with the Soviets. The fourth would be a calamity for them, and only superpower intervention could stave off a major defeat. (S)

The Pakistani objectives in the talks was to upgrade the 1959 Agreement to the status of a treaty, to increase the aid package about [*above*] \$400 million, and to keep their options open regarding possible opposition or accommodation with the USSR. The latter was probably a device to keep pressure on us on the other two points. In fact, they have taken a rather firm position—both at the Islamic Conference and in the final communique of this trip—opposing the Soviets.² Accommodation does not appear to be a genuine option for them. The party was impressed by the evident determination of Pakistan to fight if need be to protect its independence. After intensive discussions, it was agreed that we would not present the aid package to Congress until we had sounded out other powers about the assistance they could provide. It has not been decided exactly how to proceed with Congressional affirmation of the 1959 commitment, but the initial reaction of the SCC was that

² For the text of the joint U.S.-Pakistani statement issued on February 3, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, March 1980, p. 65.

the legislation on the 1959 agreement and waiver of the Symington Amendment should only be presented to Congress in the context of a specific aid proposal, rather than being sent up independently. The Pakistanis were evasive on non-proliferation. In the initial series of talks, there was some indication that a nuclear explosion might be imminent, but this was probably a negotiating tactic and was specifically denied later by Agha Shahi. (S)

Mr. Christopher noted that the Pakistanis appear to be considering an “Islamic option,” which would include a security umbrella from the United States but rely primarily on the Islamic states for the bulk of direct support and cooperation.³ The Pakistanis were very pleased by the degree of support they received at the Islamic Conference, and they may find this an attractive alternative to a total reliance on the U.S. However, they did not seem to have thought this through, and the exact form of an “Islamic option” remains very unclear at this point. In general, the SCC thought that such an option could be entirely consistent with what we are trying to do. The nature of the security umbrella and the exact role of our cooperation would have to be defined much more precisely. (S)

In Saudi Arabia, the mission was struck by the change of mood from a year ago. The Saudi response to our proposals for a closer security relationship was much more positive. Both the Saudis and the Pakistanis seem to have reacted very positively to the President’s State of the Union address and the explicit security commitment which it announced. The Saudis took an alarmist view of the situation in the PDRY, including a report of Soviet and Cuban troop exercising there which we cannot confirm. They asked for more reconnaissance overflights. Mr. Carlucci noted that our overflights along the border had failed to discover any useful information, [2 lines not declassified]. The Saudis complained about the slowness and inadequacy of the U.S. response to their requests for advanced military equipment. They outlined the levels of aid they were prepared to provide to Pakistan but asked that these numbers be very tightly held and, if necessary, that the actual levels be revealed by the Pakistanis rather than us.

[Omitted here is information unrelated to Afghanistan.]

³ In the left margin, Carter wrote: “good.”

199. **Memorandum From William Odom of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)**¹

Washington, February 8, 1980

SUBJECT

Record of your Meeting with Lt. Gen Akhtar

The following are the main points that arose in your discussion with General Akhtar in Islamabad on February 3:

—He explained that he has a very small organization for his Afghan operation which handles everything involved. In the Pakistan government, only President Zia is aware of it.

—To your question about what he is receiving, he gave you a satisfactory answer, noting the same numbers in categories of support as you had in your talking paper.

—He is proceeding very cautiously both in technique of transportation and in quantity of equipment and actions. To prove to you the results are concrete, not phoney, he promised to send through "other channels" some photographs.

—You asked about U.S. debriefing of more personnel. He declined to make them available because it is his policy to allow no one to return to Afghanistan once he has been exposed to U.S. or Pakistani intelligence officials. If some are wounded and unable to return, they could be turned over for a debrief.

—He admitted that some cross-border fire and very small border clashes have occurred.

—He has pulled together the six political leaders from the Afghan resistance and told them that support is dependent upon their cooperation and combined planning. They are obliging.

—When you asked what else we can do to help, he asked for [less than 1 line not declassified] of Soviet formations and movements, particularly on the Soviet side of the Afghan-Soviet border. You promised to look into it upon return to the U.S.

—Akhtar also registered a complaint about our request through Defense channels for the EC-135 flight. Keep it in intelligence channels, he begged!

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 1-2/80. Top Secret; Sensitive.

—Finally, Akhtar expressed disappointment that we had not reached more concrete results in negotiating the modalities of U.S.-Pakistani aid during your visit.

200. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to Secretary of State Vance and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, February 7, 1980

SUBJECT

American Aid to Pakistan Concerning Afghanistan

1. The American offer of US\$200 million in military assistance to Pakistan remains completely unacceptable and personally demeaning to President Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, according to Lt. Gen. Akhtar Abdul Rahman, Director General of the Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID), who spoke privately about the matter on 5 February 1980. Rahman said that when he talked with National Security Advisor Brzezinski, Zia had wanted Rahman to convey the message that the U.S. and Pakistan must keep talking to find a solution to the problem. Rahman quoted Zia as saying that Zia would do whatever the U.S. wanted, including an agreement in writing, to confirm the fact that he has sided with the U.S. against the USSR. Rahman expressed the view that a way must be found to develop a new package. He said he was embarrassed at the failure of the Brzezinski talks because he (Rahman) had urged Zia to look forward to those meetings with the expectation that there would be some improvement in the US\$400 million total package.

2. Rahman commented further that there is a very strong anti-Pakistan, leftist lobby in Iran which is feeding reports to Pakistan officials to the effect that Iran is opposed to Pakistan accepting any U.S. aid. Rahman believes that these reports are encouraged by the Soviets. The reports are being used nonetheless, said Rahman, by some Pakistan officials as an argument against acceptance of American aid.

Stansfield Turner²

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat (ES), Sensitive and Super Sensitive File, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, Box 4, 1980 ES Sensitive, Feb 1–29. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. A handwritten note indicates the memorandum was received in S on February 12.

² An unknown hand signed for Turner.

201. Intelligence Appraisal Prepared in the Department of Defense¹

Washington, February 8, 1980

AFGHANISTAN: THE PARCHAM REGIME (U)

Summary

(S) The Soviets apparently are using the current government to restart the Afghan revolution in the moderate direction in which they had hoped both Taraki and Amin would proceed. Despite numerous conciliatory gestures and the announcement of a "Fatherland Front," members of the new government are leftists and Communists. They do not represent a broad national front and are instead a Soviet puppet government. Lacking credibility, legitimacy, and popular support, the government's authority extends to those areas where it can be backed primarily with Soviet military power, on which it depends for survival.

(S/[*handling restriction not declassified*]) Babrak's regime, installed by Soviet paratroops on 27 December, has been troubled by serious instability. Babrak's Parcham group is engaged in a power struggle to consolidate its control of the new government and consequently has not addressed the nation's problems, which are largely out of control. His Soviet mentors are displeased with the regime they installed, and especially with the incessant factional strife. They, however, rather than Babrak, will decide the outcome of the power struggle, and his tenure is likely to be brief. The Soviets have little to lose in experimenting with the government to find a leadership combination that might be capable of establishing tolerable conditions in the country. Under current conditions, their chances to do so seem very slim. In the short term, the Army officer corps, which is almost the only functioning national-level organization, is likely to assume a larger political role. The Soviets, however, have invested heavily in Afghanistan's future. By the mid-1980s, thousands of Afghans now in Soviet and East European schools will begin to return to their country. These students are the future leaders of a Communist Afghanistan, which will remain under close Soviet guidance if not outright control.

[Omitted here is the body of the appraisal.]

¹ Source: Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 1, Afghan Politics. Secret; [*codeword and handling restriction not declassified*].

202. Letter From Secretary of State Vance to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko¹

Washington, February 8, 1980

Dear Mr. Minister:

I have carefully studied Ambassador Watson's detailed report of his January 30 meeting with you and reflected on my discussions with Ambassador Dobrynin since his return from Moscow.² Clearly there is a high risk of miscalculation between us. In order to avoid this danger, I am writing you privately and personally to make clear our actions and policies.

As the President stressed in his State of the Union message, the relationship between our two countries is the most critical factor in determining whether the world will live in peace or be engulfed in conflict. A series of events culminating in the Soviet actions in Afghanistan have brought us to a critical juncture in our relations. It is vital that both of us give sober and dispassionate consideration to the implications of the current situation for each side's interests and the maintenance of world peace.

Despite the differing political convictions of our two countries, and because of the inherent competition between us, we have sought to establish common rules of behavior which would reduce the risk of conflict, and to search for areas of cooperation which would help produce a more stable world. I have hoped and believed that this might be possible. This will not be possible, however, unless both of us recognize the need to act with restraint in troubled areas across the globe. As events following your actions in Afghanistan make clear, unrestrained actions in any one area inevitably have an impact on our relations as a whole.

Our most serious concern at present centers in Southwest Asia. The presence of Soviet military forces in Afghanistan creates a new and more dangerous situation in that region. We do not know your ultimate aims in sending your forces into Afghanistan. We do know,

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office Files of Marshall D. Shulman, Special Advisor to the Secretary on Soviet Affairs, 1977–1981, Lot 81D109, CV-Gromyko Letters, 2/8/80. No classification marking.

² For Watson's report, see Document 186. Vance's most recent meeting with Dobrynin, January 22, was outlined in telegram 21582 to Moscow, January 25. The Department noted that Dobrynin had no new official messages to communicate to Vance, but underscored that the Soviet leadership felt its Afghanistan policy was "justified" and was "aggrieved" by the negative worldwide reaction to the intervention. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880029–0990)

however, that your action has violated the sovereignty of an independent nation.

The continued Soviet military presence in Afghanistan will inevitably continue to raise concerns about the desire of the Soviet Union to conquer and subjugate the Afghan people and the further possibility of Soviet military action against Pakistan and Iran. Both the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, and the precedent of their use there, are of serious concern to Pakistan and other states in the region. The Soviet action in Afghanistan and increasing Soviet military activity along the northwest border of Iran also generate apprehension about the possibility of Soviet actions to undermine the independence and territorial integrity of that country.

It should be evident that the prompt withdrawal of all Soviet military forces from Afghanistan is necessary to restore stability to this region. The actions of the United Nations and the Islamabad Conference of Islamic States have made it clear that most of the peoples of the world share this conviction.

For our part, we have no interest in seeing a government in Kabul hostile to the Soviet Union. A return to a neutral, non-aligned but genuinely independent Afghanistan would be in the interests of all and we would support such a development.

There are similar dangers in the Middle East and in particular the Persian Gulf. It is essential you understand that the United States has vital interests at stake in this region. We are prepared to defend those interests. But if there is restraint on both sides, as befits our two great nations, and respect for the independence and territorial integrity of the states in the region, our respective interests need not lead to confrontation. In this connection, I must note that the substantial Soviet/Cuban presence in the PDRY is a matter of grave concern to us and perhaps we should search for ways whereby we could reduce the possibility of confrontation.

The US has made clear that it supports the independence, unity, and territorial integrity of non-aligned Yugoslavia. In my discussion with Ambassador Dobrynin, he indicated that the Soviet Union does also. We welcome this position. We and our allies have no intention of interfering in Yugoslavia's internal affairs and would view any effort to weaken Yugoslavia's internal cohesion or undermine its independent foreign policy with gravest concern, as we understand you would.

In his State of the Union message, the President gave particular emphasis to the importance of SALT in the prevention of nuclear war. It is the President's intention to press for the ratification of SALT II at the earliest moment that the political climate permits. In the meantime, as we have said privately and publicly, we believe that observing the mutual constraints imposed by the terms of the SALT I and SALT II

treaties will be in the best interests of both our countries and will help to preserve world peace.

Mr. Minister, I look forward to any response you may wish to make on these matters and any clarification you may care to provide.

Sincerely yours,

Cyrus Vance

203. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State¹

Kabul, February 9, 1980, 0818Z

567. Subject: The Afghan Situation as of February 9.

1. (C—Entire text)

2. Begin summary: We have some strong indications that fierce infighting is taking place within the ruling party's inner circles. It seems quite clear that there is little trust between the party's Parcham and Khalqi factions. The reported intra-party squabbles may well have resulted in the wounding by gunshot of one or more Cabinet members this past week, including the regime's number two man, Vice President Keshmand. There is an unconfirmed report that the Parcham faction may be preparing to go underground if worse comes to worst. There are also indications that disaffection is spreading further in the Afghan military. Afghanistan's foreign trade suffered another blow when Indian banks reported they required full deposit coverage for letters of credit. End summary.

3. The mood in Kabul: Some of our Afghan sources tell us that there is a growing expectation here that the rebel Muslim forces will soon move on Kabul. One such source, who is believed to have good contacts in People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) circles, says that some of his PDPA Parcham faction contacts claim that President Babrak Karmal is fearful that Gulbaddin Hekmatyar's Muslim forces will sooner or later oust him. Some of the source's other contacts say that the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan-ul-Muslimeen), with which

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Box 7, Afghanistan: 2/9–10/80. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Priority to New Delhi. Also sent for information to Islamabad, London, Moscow, CINCPAC for POLAD, and USICA. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

Gulbaddin is reportedly closely associated, is gaining many adherents in Kabul, even to the point that the Brotherhood is “almost openly” issuing membership cards to those who wish to join this anti-Communist, pro-Islamic movement. (N.B. It will be recalled that the Brotherhood was a favorite *bête noire* of the Taraki-Amin era when the DRA media referred to it as the *Ikhwan-ush-shayateen*—Brotherhood of the devils.)

4. Meanwhile, adherents of Karmal’s Parcham faction and the Taraki-Amin Khalqi factions continue to feud among themselves, according to reports from Afghan sources having contacts with both factions. A source with Parchamist connections says that a fierce debate between Parchamists and Khalqis took place this past week when the dominant Parcham faction reportedly bowed to pressure from many of its rank and file who demanded Vice President and Deputy Prime Minister Sarwari’s removal from the government. The Parcham leadership decided to send Sarwari off to genteel exile as an Ambassador (just as Taraki and Amin had done to several Parcham leaders, including Karmal, in the summer of 1978). The Khalqis, however, according to the source, resisted in having Sarwari (linked to the Taraki sub-faction of the Khalqis) removed from the regime’s leadership circles since that would reduce Khalqi representation there. The debate reportedly turned to shooting on Wednesday or Thursday, with Keshtmand and some others falling victims of gunshots. Source was uncertain that Defense Minister Rafie was among the other gunshot victims. (Kabul Radio announced that Keshtmand left for the USSR on Feb. 7 owing to illness).

5. (Comment: Whether or not the foregoing report is true in all of its essentials, we believe that serious intra-PDPA strife is not only going on, but that it is logical to expect that it would take place sooner or later. There are simply too many old scores that various Khalqis and Parchamists have to settle with one another—the Soviet role in pushing for a united front notwithstanding.)

6. A Parchamist informant has provided yet another indication of intra-PDPA differences. He claimed that the PDPA’s Central Committee has instructed that all party offices, down to the ward level, turn in their files on Parchamists. The files reportedly include each party member’s picture, description and other identifying data. The informant said that the Central Committee is compiling a consolidated list of all Parchamists, but is destroying their individual files. The Committee is not doing the same for Khalqi members’ files, the informant said. (Comment: If this report is true—and it has not been substantiated—it might suggest that the Parchamists are preparing to go underground, if necessary, and let the Khalqis bear the wrath of the Muslim rebels should the latter gain the upper hand. It should be noted, how-

ever, that we have seen no convincing evidence that the PDPA's rule in Kabul is about very much in control here and in key provincial areas. We have heard—the bickering, feuding and general incompetence that the present divided PDPA leadership is manifesting.

7. Further indications of disaffection in the Afghan Army: According to an Afghan source with relatives in the military, the commander of the Afghan unit at Karga (just outside Kabul) addressed officers and noncommissioned officers on February 6 and admonished them to support the “new phase” of the great Saur revolution. The commander praised Babrak Karmal's leadership and expressed confidence that the Soviet military, who he said were defending the revolution against foreign imperialist intrigues, would soon leave. A sergeant reportedly spoke up and asked the commander what he really believed about the political situation here since he had earlier praised Taraki and condemned Karmal, then praised Amin and condemned Taraki, and he now praised Karmal and Taraki. The meeting is said to have broken up immediately thereafter, with many officers congratulating the sergeant for voicing a concern common to all. As of yesterday, the sergeant has not yet been disciplined, source said.

8. On the economic scene, Afghanistan's foreign trade has suffered another blow. According to a local banking source, Indian banks have joined Japanese and U.S. banks in requiring a 100 percent deposit before issuing letters of credit to finance Afghan imports or exports. (Comment: This will particularly hurt dried fruit exports, which are Afghanistan's main foreign exchange earner, since most exporters cannot afford such deposits.)

Amstutz

204. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, February 11, 1980

2316. Subj: February 9 Meeting With Korniyenko: Afghanistan, Iran, Aeroflot Flights. Refs: (A) Moscow 2279, (B) State 35391, (C) State 35315.²

1. (S—Entire text.)

2. Reftel A summarized the highlights of my meeting with First Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko on the afternoon of February 9. There follows for the record a fuller account of the meeting.

Afghanistan

3. After Korniyenko had read the Secretary's letter to Gromyko (Reftel B), he said that while I of course did not expect him to give an immediate response he would like to make two or three points.³ He began with Afghanistan, stating that, as Gromyko had already told me and as the Soviets had told us repeatedly both through Dobrynin and publicly, there was only one reason for their having sent troops to Afghanistan, at the request of that government—to repel external aggression. Unfortunately, that reason continued.

4. He said that aggression as defined by the United Nations—and our two countries had participated actively in developing that definition—was not necessarily limited to the violation of the borders of one state by the armed forces of another. That which had happened in Afghanistan, and unfortunately was still happening on an even larger scale—the introduction from the territory of Pakistan of weapons and armed units, not small units but large, armed units—was very real aggression. And it was well known, he added, that the U.S. had a very direct relationship to that aggression. To try, therefore, to make it appear that the U.S. did not understand why the Soviets had sent their troops in and their objective was simply not serious. Their sole purpose was to assist Afghanistan in repelling external aggression. "We have frequently stated this and I can again firmly state it today."

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office Files of Marshall D. Shulman, Special Advisor to the Secretary on Soviet Affairs, 1977–1981, Lot 81D109, CV-Gromyko Letters, 2/8/80. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cherokee.

² Telegrams 2279 from Moscow (Ref A), 35391 to Moscow (Ref B), and 35315 to Moscow (Ref C) are all dated February 9. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P900077–1658 and N800003–0196, N800003–0181, and P880025–0666 and N800003–0172, respectively)

³ Telegram 35391 transmitted Vance's letter. See Document 202.

5. For that reason, Korniyenko went on, all inventions with regard to plans or designs on the part of the Soviet Union vis-à-vis Pakistan or Iran, or concerning a movement to warm seas, were “absolute nonsense.” If the aggression stopped, if the armed incursions into Afghanistan from the territory of Pakistan “or any other territory” stopped, the necessity for the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan would cease. But only in that case—i.e., when the discontinuance of the aggression was guaranteed—would Soviet troops be withdrawn, and not before.

6. Korniyenko said that he must categorically reject the statement in the Secretary’s letter concerning the violation of Afghan sovereignty by the Soviet Union. The right to appeal to another government for help was one of the elemental attributes of sovereignty. The Afghan Government could do so even in the absence of the UN Charter or the bilateral Afghan-Soviet treaty; its right to do so was even clearer, given the reaffirmation in the UN Charter of the inalienable right to individual and collective self-defense. And the bilateral treaty meant that the Soviet Union had not only the right but a direct obligation to afford assistance at the request of the Afghan Government. Thus, he must repeat that any assertion that the actions of the Soviet Union violated Afghan sovereignty was absolutely unacceptable, since it absolutely did not correspond to reality.

[Omitted here is information unrelated to Afghanistan.]

Watson

205. Intelligence Information Cable Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

[*cable number not declassified*] Washington, February 12, 1980, 2353Z

COUNTRY

China/Afghanistan/Pakistan

SUBJECT

Chinese Disappointment Over Pakistani Reluctance To Coordinate With China on Aid to Afghan Rebels [*1 line not declassified*]

SOURCE

[*2½ lines not declassified*]

1. While discussing on 10 February 1980 Chinese views of the Afghanistan situation and the late January visit to Pakistan of Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] stated that his government had been disappointed by aspects of Huang's talks with the Pakistanis. Although the Chinese have established direct contact with Afghan rebel leaders in order to develop some idea of the capabilities and actual needs of the rebels in terms of arms, equipment and other logistical support, the Pakistan Government is not being cooperative regarding timely coordination of a joint position on the level and implementation of such aid and support to the Afghan rebels. Pakistan indicated it wished to consider the matter further, and the Chinese ascribe the Pakistani reluctance to their concern that meaningful support to the Afghan rebels could have negative consequences for Pakistan with regard to possible Soviet actions on the border.

2. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] the Chinese [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Government was attempting to move Pakistan speedily on this issue because the Chinese believe it is essential that the Soviets be engaged militarily in Afghanistan in a way which will inflict personnel losses the Soviets will be unwilling to sustain for both foreign and domestic policy reasons. Thus, in the Chinese view, the Afghan rebels must be provided the training and means to render the invasion of Afghanistan costly to the Soviet Union.

3. ACQ: [*1 line not declassified*]

4. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Dissemination: [*2 lines not declassified*]

¹ Source: Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 5, PRC Support for Insurgents. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*].

206. Intelligence Information Cable Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

[*cable number not declassified*]

Washington, February 12, 1980

COUNTRY

Iran/Afghanistan/USSR

SUBJECT

Comments by President Bani-Sadr on Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan and on Iranian Support for Afghan Rebels [*1 line not declassified*]

SOURCE

[*2½ lines not declassified*]

1. In early February 1980, Iranian President-elect Abdulhassan Bani-Sadr stated in a private conversation that he opposed the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and that he considered an armed Soviet presence there a threat to the security of Iran. Bani-Sadr said that if the Soviets invaded Iran, Iran would fight them with all the means at her disposal. However, Bani-Sadr added, he expected Afghani opposition to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan to increase and to fully occupy the efforts of the Soviets.

2. Bani-Sadr said that because of current internal turmoil, and because of the Iranian-American confrontation, Iran could not afford to antagonize the Soviets. Nevertheless, Bani-Sadr confided, Iran would give arms and funds to the Afghani rebels, who had recently formed a united opposition to the Soviets. Bani-Sadr added that Iran would also undertake military training of Afghani rebels. Bani-Sadr added that Saudi Arabia was also aiding the Afghani rebels, primarily by sending them funds through Pakistan. (Source comment: Bani-Sadr did not elaborate on Iranian plans to assist the rebels, nor did he mention the source of his information concerning Saudi aid.)

3. ACQ: [*1 line not declassified*]

4. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Dissem: [*5 lines not declassified*]

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Office of Support Services, Job 97S00360R, Intelligence Document Collection (1977–1981), Box 84 (3150130080–3150299980). Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*].

207. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State¹

London, February 14, 1980, 1829Z

3468. Subject: (S) Afghanistan: Request For Arms for Insurgents.

1. (S—Entire text)

2. Salim Azzam, head of the London-based Islamic Conference of Europe, and still carried as a Saudi diplomat on the British diplomatic list, asked EmbOff to call February 14.

3. Azzam had just returned from Pakistan where he claimed to have been personally responsible for the formation of the United Islamic Liberation Front of Afghanistan. He said that he had himself announced the Front's formation to the press and recalled earlier conversations with EmbOff in which he had said he had been working toward getting the various groups to agree to a charter.²

4. Azzam claimed also that he had been responsible for having the Afghans accepted as observers at the Islamic Conference where he had personally assisted them in meeting with important Arab Foreign Ministers.

5. Asked if he thought the Front would hold together, Azzam says that he believes it will because money will be supplied not to independent groups but only to the umbrella organization. This he had personally made clear to the leaders when he delivered to them "donations" from "private individuals" in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE.

6. Since he has now come to know the various leaders quite well, Azzam said, he has become certain of their real needs. No weapons, he insisted, have been delivered to them from the Peninsula, and they have expressed an urgent need for particular items:

—anti-tank weapons;

—anti-aircraft weapons for use in shooting down Soviet helicopters from the "sides of deep mountain valleys" as the pilots drop down for low-level reconnaissance and attack;

—small arms ammunition.

7. In summary, Azzam said, it is important to insure that the Soviet stay in Afghanistan is made as uncomfortable as possible; the Afghans

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880029-1590. Secret; Nodis.

² Azzam's activities in Pakistan were reported by James Sterba. See "Moslem Meeting is Urged to Unite Against Moscow," *New York Times*, January 28, 1980, p. A1; and "Afghan Insurgents Fight Among Themselves, Too," *New York Times*, March 2, 1980, p. E2.

want to fight; the new United Front will hold together as long as money and arms are denied to its constituent parts; all that is needed are weapons. Azzam asked that this message be passed to Washington for urgent consideration, implying that he would be the obvious channel for communication between the USG and the Front.

8. EmbOff thanked Azzam for his views but emphasized that any consideration which the Western alliance might give to his suggestion would be complicated by obvious factors, not the least of them being the attitude of the Pakistan Government. Azzam said he had been assured by senior officials in the GOP (he said he had talked to Zia, but did not say he spoke to him on this subject) that Pakistan would welcome arms shipments for the Afghans although Zia would, of course, continue to deny in public that any arms had in fact been delivered. EmbOff reiterated that while we appreciate Azzam's efforts to offer us useful advice, the USG was not in the business of clandestine arms supply. EmbOff did, however, promise to convey Azzam's views to Washington.

9. Comment: Azzam is believed in London to have a Muslim Brotherhood background and the money for his Islamic Council is said to come from his relation by marriage to Muhammed bin Faysal.³ He has in the last year sponsored several expensive conferences in London on Islamic issues (from which the Egyptian Embassy has routinely been excluded) ranging from the recent Jerusalem seminar to an early 1979 effort on behalf of Khomeini. We think he is an ambitious man who reflects Saudi foreign policy concerns—thus he is stridently anti-Camp David and was quick to denounce the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in public and in letters to Mrs. Thatcher and President Carter.⁴ We are obviously unable to judge what if any links he has developed with the various Afghan groups, but judging by his derogatory comments about Gailani, he does not enjoy a good relationship with the latter. Our guess is that Azzam knows he will gain important points with SAG if he can attain U.S. assistance for the new Afghan Front and he will hope for some kind of answer to his presentation to us.

10. Suggest Department repeat to Jidda and to Islamabad and Peshawar.

Streator

³ An apparent reference to the Saudi Prince.

⁴ Not found.

208. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Komer) to Secretary of Defense Brown¹

I-20224/80

Washington, February 14, 1980

My reaction to Tuesday SCC meeting is that in light of Pak response to Brzezinski mission, we should lay off chasing the Pakistanis.² Two broad alternative explanations of Pak conduct are: (1) they genuinely believe it better to rely on Islamic/PRC ties and not get too close to US; or (2) they are playing us to get more aid. Probably elements of both are involved. In either case, why not sit back a while and see if they come to us?

Though some reports (probably planted) talk about a third Pak option of “accommodation” with the USSR, I’d heavily discount this. The Paks have played this card before and found Moscow much more interested in 650 million Indians than in 75 million Paks (as in analogous Ethiopia/Somalia case). Moreover, Pak Army wouldn’t stand for it, and Chinese would be affronted. So basically Paks have nowhere else to go but in our direction, since neither China nor Islamic world can offer them enough security against USSR plus India.

Nor do I see much early military threat to Pakistan. By reaffirming the 1959 “commitment” we have already clearly told the USSR that Pakistan is under our security umbrella. This will serve as a deterrent. In any case, a direct Soviet push into Pakistan seems unlikely (as opposed to hot pursuit across the border or subversion in Baluchistan and/or Pathan areas—don’t forget Kabul’s favorite “Pushtoonistan” theme). Direct aggression (or even large scale military action on the borders) would further harden Islamic and other opinion against the USSR, confirm the US position about Soviet expansionism, and really worry India. Much better for Moscow to play a subtler game exploiting Pak minority problems, economic instability and Zia’s fragile political base.

If above is broadly correct, then a lot of heavy military equipment should not be high on our priority list of what Paks need. A guaranteed supply of Islamic oil at discount prices would be more immediately desirable—and should perhaps be made part of our economic aid

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-82-0217B, Box 14, Pakistan, 1 Jan-16 Apr 1980. Secret. Copies were sent to the CJCS, ASD/ISA, Gaffney, and Wolfowitz.

² The summary of conclusions of the February 12 SCC meeting is in the Carter Library, National Security Council Institutional Files, 1977-1981, Box 108, SCC-270, 2/12/80, Iran, Afghanistan & Pakistan.

consortium package). So too would be light internal security type equipment, not tanks and advanced aircraft.

R.W. Komer³

³ Komer initialed "RWK" above his typed signature.

209. Memorandum From Gary Sick of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, February 15, 1980

SUBJECT

India/Soviet

In an interesting and very frank discussion with Mr. Nathan of the Indian Embassy, he made the following points:

—Although the Gromyko visit to New Delhi was not the "disaster" it was reported to be in the Western media, he said he could assure me that what Gromyko heard from Mrs. Gandhi was the strongest opposition to the *continued* presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan that he was likely to hear from any country outside the U.S.² The Indian line, reportedly, was that they were not prepared to pass judgment on the Soviet motives in sending troops into Afghanistan in the first place, but that they cared very deeply about their continued presence there and the dangers which this posed to Indian security. The Soviets were urged to pull back their forces to about the 6,000–10,000-man presence they had prior to the invasion.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 28, India: 1–3/80. Secret. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Brent and Thornton. "ZB has seen" is stamped in the upper right corner of the memorandum.

² Gromyko was in India February 12–14. The characterization of the visit as a "disaster" is likely a reference to several news stories that reported India's "failure" to convince the Soviet Union to withdraw its military forces from Afghanistan. See, for example, Tyler Marshall, "India Apparently Fails to Sway Soviets on Afghanistan Pull-out," *Los Angeles Times*, February 14, 1980, p. B8; and Stuart Auerbach, "Soviets Reject Indian Plea to Withdraw Troops," *Washington Post*, February 14, 1980, p. A24.

—The Indians have made a comparable approach to Karmal via a special emissary who had known him in the past. Nathan suspected that Karmal's subsequent statement that there were only 10,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan reflected his understanding that that would be a more acceptable level of Soviet force presence.

—In a very delicate reference to the *Post* story about support for the Afghan resistance, he noted that one of the dangers of the Soviet presence was the inevitable temptation to go after rebel sanctuaries.³ That would mean a widening of the war and raise additional fears in India.

—If the Soviets do cross the border, the loudest voice of concern and opposition will be the Indians who do not want to see the Pakistani buffer removed. In their view, however, it is best not to tempt fate by mounting a major and organized resistance effort from Pakistan which will perpetuate the Soviet presence in the name of self-defense and which will eventually draw them into a wider conflict in the Subcontinent. (S)

³ A likely reference to Michael Getler, "U.S. Reportedly is Supplying Weapons to Afghan Insurgents," *Washington Post*, February 15, 1980, p A1. Referring to this and other news stories, telegram 1487 from Islamabad, February 19, summarized a conversation between Hummel and Shahi, during which Shahi conveyed Zia's "very deep concern about these evident leaks," which raised his concern about whether Pakistan "can confide in U.S. officials and leaders and take their word in return for face value." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 59, Pakistan: 2-3/80) In a memorandum to Vance and Brzezinski, February 27, Turner relayed similar comments made by Lieutenant General Akhtar, who was instructed by Zia to convey the following message regarding the Afghan covert action program: "President Zia and I are greatly incensed at leaks by U.S. officials about support to Afghan tribesmen. Our future cooperation will be jeopardized if there are similar leaks in the future. Some advisors close to General Zia have suggested that the U.S. Government has done this deliberately to turn Moscow completely against Pakistan and force Pakistan to accept U.S. aid on U.S. terms. I find it difficult to believe after recent talks with Dr. Brzezinski that this is possible. However, my own position and credibility are being undermined by such leaks and my efforts to improve U.S.-Pakistani relations cannot succeed under such circumstances. President Zia and I request your understanding and cooperation to prevent any further leaks." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat (ES), Sensitive and Super Sensitive File, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, Box 2, 1979 ES Sensitive, February 1-29)

210. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, February 16, 1980, 1001Z

2551. Subj: Ambassador's Meeting With Pakistani Ambassador Yaqub Khan. Ref: (A) State 39978.²

1. (S—Entire text)

2. I had a lengthy meeting with Pakistani Ambassador Yaqub Khan on February 15, following his return from Washington and Islamabad. After commenting favorably on the discussions between Pakistani President Zia ul-Haq and Brzezinski and Christopher, Khan told me in confidence that Zia would probably call him back to Pakistan from his post in Moscow in the next two to three months to assume a post in the government in Islamabad (strictly protect his confidence).³ The most important part of Khan's remarks was his suggestion that the key to the situation in Afghanistan was to have some influential and neutral intermediary talk with the Soviets to get them to accept some idea of an international commission of neutral nations to guarantee Afghanistan's border, which step should enable the Soviets to withdraw their troops from Afghanistan. The main points of our conversation follow:

3. In reference to the Afghan refugee presence in Pakistan, Khan said that this "sanctuary" was basically limited to providing shelter for the refugees and that the refugees were receiving modest amounts of money to sustain themselves. There is no organized military effort and no training. If Pakistan did more than this there would be major consequences. The Soviets, he said, know what we and the U.S. are doing in this respect, but we do [not?] "connive." The Soviets claim that the mainstay of the insurgency in Afghanistan comes from the "sanctuary" and that Pakistan is the focal point of this activity and not merely a subsidiary to the rebellion. In fact, however, only 20 percent of the insurgents in Afghanistan could ever reach the "sanctuary" in Pakistan. Eighty percent of the Afghanistan insurgency is internal and it can not be effectively helped by the "sanctuary." If the Soviets actually

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 1-3/80. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

² In telegram 39978 to Moscow, February 14, the Department, noting that Pakistani Ambassador Yaqub participated in the discussions in Islamabad with Christopher and Brzezinski, directed the Embassy to approach Yaqub informally to get his views on those discussions. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800079-0135)

³ Khan stayed on as Pakistani Ambassador to the Soviet Union through September 1980, after which he was assigned as Ambassador to France.

believe what they claim, i.e., that the "sanctuary" is a major part of the problem, then it would follow that they must destroy the "sanctuary" in Pakistan and would have to attack Pakistan. Khan thinks the Soviets have a more realistic understanding of the situation, however, and therefore considers this a remote contingency.

4. Khan thought the Soviets had three options in Afghanistan. One would be to help Babrak Karmal consolidate his position. The second would be to change leaders. The third would be to continue their military build up in Afghanistan to control the country. Khan thinks that the Soviets would like to follow the second option; namely, to put in the best moderate leaders acceptable to the tribesmen and form a government which could manage these people and eventually establish a political base with grassroots support in the country. Under these circumstances, if there was some proposal put forward by a party acceptable to the Soviets (Khan specified that it could not be the U.S.) for an international commission which would guarantee that there would be no threat to the Soviet Union's southern border, then the Soviets could withdraw their troops from Afghanistan. Khan said that this course was not unknown in Soviet history and that they have withdrawn militarily, while assuring the establishment of a regime friendly to them.

5. Khan commented that the Soviets have seriously miscalculated the local Afghanistan situation. Daoud was removed from the top and there was no grassroots support for the regimes which followed. The situation in Afghanistan was quite different than that which prevailed in Iran where the Shah was hated and where he did not have deep grassroots support. In contrast, the revolution in Afghanistan is stuck in the mud. Tribal resistance can only be broken by working with the tribes themselves. Nevertheless, the Soviets decided to go into Afghanistan, encouraged by the wave of anti-American opinion in neighboring Iran, the shakiness of Saudis and the burning of the American Embassy in Pakistan. All of these factors gave the Soviets the feeling that they could pull it off. They also seriously miscalculated President Carter and felt that the liberal foreign policy establishment in the United States would not act, especially in order to avoid a double crisis situation. The Soviets were surprised by President Carter's sharp turn in foreign policy. They, also, seriously miscalculated the international condemnation of their invasion of Afghanistan. For the past 100 years there has been no real threat from Afghanistan. Now, the Soviets have stirred up a hornets nest. They have accelerated events that they dread. For example, closer relations between U.S. and China and Japan, respectively. When the hostage situation in Iran is settled and there is an improvement in Iranian/U.S. relations, the Soviets will be in an even worse situation. In sum, the Soviet attack on Afghanistan has coalesced many nations behind the U.S.

6. In Khan's view, the key to the situation in Afghanistan is for someone to try to talk with the Soviets and to get them to accept some idea of establishing a commission of neutral nations to guarantee Afghanistan's borders so that the Soviets can withdraw and give them time to build up a stable regime in Afghanistan with which the Soviets can live. The establishment of such a commission would allow the Soviets to save face. The problem here is their belief that revolutionary processes are irreversible, which makes it difficult for them to back out. Khan said "We ought to line up some friend acceptable to the Soviets to help them save their face and pride."

7. It is completely coincidental, but of interest, that immediately after my meeting with Khan, I had a long scheduled meeting with FRG Ambassador Wieck who also floated the idea of an international commission. Wieck, speaking personally, proposed that the U.S. try to structure a commission composed of Third World countries to arrange a "neutral policy" for Afghanistan. Wieck was deviously thinking out loud and indicated that what was really needed was a neutralist scheme for the whole region involving Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan and, possibly, India and other states. Perhaps, he suggested, this would be a very good role for Indira Gandhi to play. In any case, any approach, Wieck suggested, should have Indira Gandhi's support so that we will not be viewed as the perpetrators of the plan. Wieck also referred to Soviet difficulties in Afghanistan. Wieck mentioned that the Soviet Ambassador to the United Kingdom told a group of British Parliamentarians that the Soviets would withdraw, if the West would guarantee non interference in Afghanistan.

Watson

211. Translation of a Letter From Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to Secretary of State Vance¹

Moscow, February 16, 1980

Dear Mr. Secretary,

Having read your letter of February 8 I would like to tell you frankly the following.²

One could only welcome the recognition in the letter of the crucial importance of relations between our countries for the general world situation and the apparent desire to search for ways of overcoming the serious situation prevailing now in these relations.

However, the attempt to evade consideration of the real causes complicating the international situation, efforts to reduce the whole matter to the recent developments in Afghanistan depicted, for that matter, in a completely distorted light, and the raising of various kinds of other far-fetched questions—all this in no way demonstrates a real intention to rectify the current situation.

Indeed, it is impossible, without sinning against the truth, to dispute the fact that the exacerbation of the international situation by no means began at the end of last December, but rather much earlier. We also pointed out to the US side the reasons for this exacerbation much earlier.

Among these is the decision on deployment in the US of the MX mobile ICBM system which was made almost immediately after the SALT II Treaty was signed in Vienna.

There is also the artificially created “mini-crisis” on the question of a “Soviet brigade” in Cuba.

There is also the urgent establishment of the “Rapid Deployment Force” designed for armed intervention in various parts of the world.

There is the long-range program of permanent defense spending increases and arms build-up imposed by the US on its NATO allies.

Finally, there is the decision to deploy new US missiles on the soil of Western Europe, which creates a serious threat to the security of the USSR and its allies.

And what has become of the SALT II Treaty? Incidentally, in taking the decision to develop and deploy MX missiles the US Government

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office Files of Marshall D. Shulman, Special Advisor to the Secretary on Soviet Affairs, 1977–1981, Lot 81D109, CV-Gromyko Letters, 2/16/80. No classification marking. The translated letter is printed in full in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 261.

² See Document 202.

stated that this decision would promote the ratification of SALT II. Without addressing now the substance of the MX missile question—which is a subject for a special discussion—one cannot fail to observe that in fact the decision on the MX missile is being implemented while the SALT II Treaty has not been ratified. In pressing its NATO allies to agree to the deployment on their soil of new American missiles, the US was also saying that this would facilitate the ratification of the SALT II Treaty. Even putting aside, once again, the question of the invalidity of such linkage, the picture remains the same: the decision on the deployment of new missiles in Western Europe has been adopted and is being implemented, but the Treaty has not been ratified.

Try to see all this through our eyes. Can these facts be seen in any way other than as a departure by the US from the principle of equality and equal security which was reconfirmed in Vienna, as evidence of a policy line now pursued by the US to break out of the existing military and strategic parity between the USSR and the US, to rush ahead in an effort to gain military superiority for itself?

No references to events in Afghanistan can conceal this turn in US policy—a turn from detente to a new aggravation of international tensions, to a new round of the arms race.

In your letter you mention the need for our two states to show restraint and moderation in international affairs and in relations with each other. Well, the thought itself is correct. We, on our part, are also in favor of this. It is important, however, for the United States also to adhere to such a course in international affairs and not treat them with such astonishing light-mindedness as it now does.

As for Afghanistan, our position on this question has been set forth more than once with utmost clarity, specifically as you know in the answers by L.I. Brezhnev to the questions of the *Pravda* correspondent as well as in our contacts with the US side.³

Facts do not cease to be facts because the US side does not want to admit that acts of aggression against Afghanistan have been and continue to be committed from the territory of Pakistan. Also indisputable is the fact that in providing assistance to Afghanistan in repelling external aggression, the USSR has acted in full accordance with the UN Charter and the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and the DRA.

We have also spoken on more than one occasion as to when and under what circumstances the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan will be carried out. I would only like to stress that if the US really wanted this to occur sooner, it could, of course, take measures

³ See Documents 166 and 186.

to stop the aggression against Afghanistan. So far, the practical actions of the United States go exactly in the opposite direction: everything is being done to expand armed incursions into the territory of Afghanistan.

You say in your letter that the US has no interest in seeing a government in Kabul hostile to the Soviet Union. In fact, however, the United States is exerting every effort toward uniting counterrevolutionary Afghan groups under foreign auspices and even toward the virtual establishment of an illegal Afghan "government in exile" in the territory of Pakistan.

[Omitted here is information unrelated to Afghanistan.]

So, as you see, there is nothing we must justify before the United States, but the list of complaints which we have the right to present to the US happens to be a rather long and impressive one.

Of course, the serious damage to the international situation and Soviet-US relations already inflicted by the actions of the United States can hardly pass without a trace. But it is alien to us to be guided by emotions in our policies. We would be prepared, if the United States is also willing, to seek opportunities to return to the path of cooperation between our two countries and with other states for the sake of improving the international situation, strengthening peace and universal security.

If, as your letter says, Soviet-US relations are now at a "critical juncture," then the choice of which way to proceed is up to the US. Our choice is clear. We would like to hope that the US will also make the only sensible choice—in favor of detente and peaceful coexistence.

I hope, Mr. Secretary, that you will understand correctly the motives by which I was impelled in speaking in such a frank manner. We would welcome any constructive considerations and ideas in support of detente in Soviet-American relations which you might offer on your part.

Sincerely yours,

A. Gromyko

212. Memorandum From Thomas Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, February 16, 1980

SUBJECT

Afghanistan—What Next?

Background

One of our problems in dealing with Afghanistan is that we haven't really expected a satisfactory outcome—i.e., a Soviet withdrawal. Our secondary objective—making the Soviets pay for their actions—is of considerable value but is certainly not a long-term policy goal. Given the Pakistani reluctance to be very involved with us (and the Chinese), I am concerned that, in some regards at least, we may find that we cannot extract a maximum price from the Soviets. The press leaks will make the Paks even less amenable and may, on their own, undercut our position in general. (S)

From reading the intelligence reporting, I gather that the Soviets are finding the going a lot tougher than they expected. They probably realize that they are in for a long and costly operation but are no doubt determined to do whatever is necessary to secure their border. I have little doubt that they can succeed ultimately. (S)

There is a lot of diplomatic activity going on. The Soviets are dropping hints about willingness to come to a compromise solution. The British are talking about an "Austrian" solution. The President's comment about a Muslim occupation force has stirred interest.² Jayawardene is trying to do something. Most important, perhaps, is the tough line that India is taking in private while still keeping its options open in public. (S)

Evaluation

This all may or may not provide us with something more than diplomatic and propaganda maneuvering space. I continue to believe that all alternatives are going to founder on the Soviet desire to have

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton, Country File, Box 91, Afghanistan: 1/80–1/81. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action.

² In a news conference on February 13, Carter called for Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and a Soviet commitment not to invade other countries, and suggested the use of a peacekeeping force comprised of Muslim troops during the transition period between Soviet withdrawal and the establishment of a neutral Afghan Government. (*Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81*, Book I, p. 309)

absolute security along its borders. But I am no longer as convinced as I have been in the past. They may be looking for a way out. (S)

The odds are, also, that initiatives by the Sri Lankans, Indians, etc., are not going to get off the ground. None of these countries has a very good track record for effective diplomatic work. The Indo-Pakistani rivalry is also a barrier. But neither of these considerations is absolute. India and the other regional states may just be sufficiently disturbed that they could put something together. (S)

RECOMMENDATION

Even if the well is *probably* dry, I think we should put the bucket down. It won't cost much, and we could just possibly find something there. Specifically:

—We should have an intelligence assessment of how much the Soviets are paying for their action and what the chances are that they would settle for some sort of alternative outcome. We should evaluate the Soviet feelers that have been put out.

—We should seriously assess the possibility that the Indians (or somebody else) might be able to play an effective intermediary role. And we should develop an idea of what that role might be and how we should stimulate or otherwise relate to it. (E.g., might the President urge Mrs. Gandhi to take leadership; if so, what would we be willing to concede?)

—We should consider what kind of alternate arrangements would be acceptable to us and staff them out carefully. (E.g., the idea of a Muslim peace-keeping force has its virtues, but it is not likely to be attractive to India—which is inevitably going to be a principal actor.) (S)

I suggest that you bring this complex of questions up at the Tuesday SCC and ask that a working group of State, CIA, NSC and, if necessary, DOD, be established to come up with answers on an urgent basis.³ (C)

Alternatively, I could draft a tasking memo, but I think it is better to get the matter discussed in the SCC and launched from there. (C)

I am attaching a cable from Moscow, quoting the Pakistani ambassador, that you should read.⁴ (S)

³ No record of a February 19 SCC meeting was found. The SCC did meet on February 22. The summary of conclusions of the meeting is in the Carter Library, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box 109, SCC 277, 2/22/80, Security Framework for the Persian Gulf. See also Document 214.

⁴ Attached; printed as Document 210.

213. Article in the President's Daily Brief¹

Washington, February 16, 1980

USSR-AFGHANISTAN: Situation report

The Soviets have stepped up their military operations in northern and eastern Afghanistan over the past week, but they have been unable to stem the crumbling of the Afghan Army and continue to have difficulty maintaining security in Afghan cities.

Soviet ground forces, led by new field commanders appointed last weekend and supported by fighter-bombers and helicopter gunships, are conducting sweeps in several provinces. The operations appear to be most intensive in Baghlan Province. The Soviets have also moved reinforcements, including tanks and helicopter gunships, into Jalalabad and have launched counterinsurgency operations in the area. They have bombed rebel positions in several provinces surrounding Jalalabad.

The Afghan Army, meanwhile, has continued to deteriorate, and there is growing evidence that the Soviets no longer trust the Afghans. Soviet and Afghan units have clashed recently near Kabul, Jalalabad, Nahrin, and other towns (your Brief of Thursday). The Afghan division stationed in Paktia Province has suffered heavy desertions, refused to fight, and may be negotiating to join the resistance.

The continued unraveling of the Afghan Army, together with popular antipathy toward the Soviets, has resulted in a serious breakdown in security in several cities. The situation in Jalalabad reportedly has reached crisis proportions; insurgents control much of the city and also control a checkpoint on the highway linking Jalalabad and Kabul. In Qandahar, a recent Afghan military message said that the city was "lost to the Muslims" and could be secured only by a large-scale attack. Soviet reinforcements have taken up positions on the outskirts of Qandahar but have made no attempt to secure the city. Civil unrest has also been reported in Herat.

The security situation in Kabul has also deteriorated. Soviet soldiers have stepped up their patrols and are enforcing a longer curfew. Many residents believe the Soviets are looting shops during the curfew. The police force in the city appears to have disintegrated, and students at Kabul University recently were arrested because they were planning to demonstrate against the Soviets and the Afghan Government. [4 lines not declassified]

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—February 1980, PDBs. Top Secret; For the President Only. The full version of this President's Daily Brief was not filed with this collection. The article printed here was found in this form.

214. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to the Chairman of the Special Coordination Committee¹

Washington, February 21, 1980

SUBJECT

Additional Funding for Afghanistan Covert Action Program (S/[*handling restriction not declassified*])

1. The Afghanistan Covert Action Program began with a Presidential Finding dated 3 July 1979 which authorized humanitarian aid to the insurgents.² The SCC authorized [*amount not declassified*] in support of this program. A second Finding on 7 November expanded the program by authorizing procurement advice and communications equipment. The SCC authorized [*amount not declassified*] for this phase of the program. Following the Soviet invasion, a third Presidential Finding dated 28 December expanded the program further by authorizing the provision of lethal military equipment to the insurgents.³ The SCC authorized an additional [*amount not declassified*] for the program. As you are aware, Saudi Arabia has agreed to cooperate with us in this program and has contributed [*amount not declassified*] for a total Afghan program budget of [*amount not declassified*]. This amount will soon be exhausted. (S/[*handling restriction not declassified*])

2. At an NSC meeting of 15 February 1980 the President approved continuation of the Afghanistan Covert Action Program for the remainder of calendar year 1980.⁴ We need approval from the SCC to request a release [*less than 1 line not declassified*] which is the amount we estimate we need to maintain our part of this program. For your information, we anticipate that Saudi Arabia will contribute an additional [*amount*

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977-81), Box 13, SCC (I) Meeting, 27 February 1980, Afghanistan. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*].

² See footnote 5, Document 53.

³ See footnote 6, Document 107.

⁴ No record of an NSC meeting on that date was found. Reference may be to a foreign policy breakfast, February 15, attended by Carter, Vance, Brown, Jordan, Brzezinski, Cutler, Donovan, and General David Jones. The meeting was noted, but not elaborated upon, in the President's Daily Diary. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary)

not declassified] million for a total Afghan program budget of \$30 million.⁵ (S/[*handling restriction not declassified*])

Stansfield Turner⁶

⁵ There is no indication on the original of the SCC Chairman's approval. Attached but not printed is a summary of projected expenditures for the Afghan covert action program, divided into three items: covert paramilitary [*text not declassified*], covert action [*text not declassified*], and intelligence collection [*text not declassified*] for a total of \$30 million. This list is further broken down into an itemized list, also attached but not printed. In addition, two intelligence cables updating the Chief of Station in Islamabad on the status of the covert action program and a list of "propaganda themes" for promulgation on Afghan radio are attached but not printed.

⁶ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

215. Analysis Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research¹

Washington, February 21, 1980

1. AFGHANISTAN IN TURMOIL

The Afghan nationalist rebels are steadily expanding their area of influence as the government forces disintegrate. Babrak Karmal, the Soviet puppet, is despised and ridiculed, while increased conflict between Khalqis and Parchamists has created political anarchy. Another change at the top is likely, but another leftist in Babrak's place would not promise to end the drift into chaos.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan may have been intended to establish stability, but it has had the opposite effect. The Soviets vastly overrated the clout of the Parchamist supporters of Babrak Karmal, who rules from an even narrower base than his predecessors.

The key problem, however, is the popular revulsion to the Soviet presence. Soviet forces were probably expected to stiffen the Afghan army and free it to fight insurgents as the Soviets secured the cities, roads, and key installations. But the Soviet presence has caused army units to evaporate as Afghan soldiers join the nationalists in ever

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 2/80. Top Secret; Codeword; Exdis; Noform; Nocontract; Orcon. Carter initialed "C" in the upper right corner of the paper.

increasing numbers. Police too are deserting in droves as the rebels extend their control into provincial centers and major cities.

Disaffection is reaching into the highest levels. According to clandestine reporting, the governor of critical Badakhshan province recently joined the rebels, and the Minister of Defense, sickened by reports of intensive Soviet bombing of provincial villages, has retreated into a military hospital. A high level Afghan intelligence official has stated, according to a clandestine report, that Afghanistan is "out of control." While this is an exaggeration, if the trend continues, the regime might completely fall apart.

The bitter rivalry between Khalqis and Parchamists, whom the Soviets have unsuccessfully tried to bring together into a reunited party, has resulted in at least one shoot-out at the highest levels of government. Babrak appears to have moved off center stage and talk of coup plots and successors is rampant.

The Soviets must be even more alarmed now than when they moved against Amin. Not only is Afghanistan in chaos, but their own forces have not performed well and have sustained significant losses.

The Soviet dilemma is indicated by the widespread rumors of a Soviet deal with the former royal family. For the moment, however, another leftist candidate is probably more likely to be the immediate successor to Babrak. (Secret/Noform/Nocontract/Orcon)

216. Editorial Note

In telegram 2964 from Moscow, February 22, 1980, the Embassy reported on a speech delivered by Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev. With regard to Afghanistan, the Embassy surmised the speech signaled that the Soviets were possibly "looking for a way out" of Afghanistan or, on the other hand, perhaps Brezhnev was making an "attempt to shift the blame to others—especially the U.S.—for a prolonged Soviet occupation of Afghanistan." The Embassy went on to quote Brezhnev: "The United States loudly demands the withdrawal of Soviet troops, but in fact it is itself doing everything to make this possibility remote: it is continuing and building up its interference in the affairs of Afghanistan. I want to state very definitively: we will be ready to commence the withdrawal of our troops as soon as all forms of interference from outside directed against the Government and people of Afghanistan are fully terminated. Let the United States, together with the neighbors of Afghanistan, guarantee this. And then the need

for Soviet military assistance will cease to exist.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR and East/West, Brent, Subject File, Box 46, Afghanistan: 2/80)

In a memorandum to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, February 22, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs H. Allen Holmes analyzed Brezhnev’s speech, noting that it was the latest in a string of Soviet statements to the effect that the Soviet Union would withdraw its troops once “US-supported aggression from Pakistan has terminated.” The memorandum offered four reasons to be “skeptical” of Brezhnev’s pledge: 1) it was possibly a ploy to shift the responsibility for the crisis in Afghanistan to the United States; 2) Soviet offers to negotiate with the United States might have to be focused on bilateral issues outside the Afghanistan issue; 3) the ideological basis for the intervention in Afghanistan would preclude Soviet willingness to withdraw because it “would mean the collapse of the Karmal regime and the establishment in Afghanistan of a government hostile to the Soviet Union;” and 4) the Soviets had recently rebuffed calls by both Carter and the European Community for the establishment of a neutral Afghanistan. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800054–1440)

The conclusion of this memorandum was echoed in a memorandum from National Security Council Staff member Marshall Brent to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski, February 25, suggesting that the string of Soviet statements on Afghanistan “does not represent a genuine negotiating proposal by the Soviets, but is rather a propaganda attempt to shift the blame for the continuing Soviet presence in Afghanistan onto the shoulders of the US and, to a lesser extent, China and Pakistan.” In the upper right corner of the memorandum, Brzezinski wrote: “Basically I agree. But it is important to make the Soviets look as if they were rejecting bona fide proposals for withdrawal.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 2/80)

That same day, President Jimmy Carter sent a handwritten note to Vance about Brezhnev’s speech, stating: “Cy—I do not attach much importance to Brezhnev’s ‘olive branch.’ As I said on the phone, the worst thing we could do would be to waffle. We must respond *immediately* to any allegation by the Soviets that we are involved in or caused the SU/Afghan invasion. Our not answering Brezhnev gave them a propaganda victory for 24 hours, and some of our ‘allies’ are very receptive to this. J.” (National Archives, RG 59, Office Files of Marshall D. Shulman, Special Advisor to the Secretary on Soviet Affairs, 1977–1981, Lot 81D109, Afghanistan: Negotiating Proposals)

Finally, an intelligence information cable prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, April 18, relayed comments on the speech made

by Viktor Komplektov to a U.S. businessman: "it is not an invitation to negotiate the status of the Government of Afghanistan, but it does not exclude a political settlement." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Box 9, Afghanistan: 4/10-18/80)

217. Editorial Note

In the last week of February 1980, a general strike and large-scale protests in Kabul and other Afghan cities posed the greatest challenge to Soviet control of the country since the intervention in late December 1979. Determined to maintain order in Kabul, the Soviet military moved troops, tanks, armored personnel carriers, and helicopters into the center of the city, February 22, in an attempt to break up protesting crowds who were shouting "God is great," and "death to the Soviets." ([*text not declassified*] February 22; Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977-81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—February 1980, NIDs) Later that day, Radio Kabul announced the Afghan Government had declared martial law, blaming the "subversive acts" in Kabul on "foreign agents and mercenaries and British, American, Pakistani, and Chinese lackeys." An intelligence assessment prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, which reported this statement, observed that the protest "further undermines the legitimacy of President Karmal's regime, sets back the USSR's timetable for dealing with the insurgent threat in the countryside, and considerably complicates Moscow's efforts to deal with the negative international consequences of its intervention." ([*text not declassified*] February 23; Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977-81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—February 1980, NIDs)

Four days later, February 23, another intelligence report prepared in the CIA noted that the shopkeepers' strike was still at 80-90 percent of its original strength and that the Afghan Government was reported to have made widespread arrests in Kabul, especially targeting minority Hazara tribesmen believed to be at the forefront of the protests. At the same time, the Soviet military had set up checkpoints "along most of the roads leading into the city." ([*text not declassified*] February 23; Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordi-

nator for DCI (1977–81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—February 1980, NIDs)

[*text and 2 lines not declassified*] (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—February 1980, PDBs) An article in the President’s Daily Brief, February 27, [*text not declassified*] referenced an old adage regarding two of the major Soviet news organs [*text not declassified*]: “There is no news in the *Truth (Pravda)* and no truth in the *News (Izvestia)*.” The Soviet news outlets alleged that the strike was forced upon Afghan shopkeepers by foreigners and that the rebellion was “past its peak.” (Ibid.) An annex to the same PDB noted that the Kabul rebellion had likely hastened discussions in Moscow regarding next steps in Afghanistan. The annex predicted that the Soviets would opt to send in more troops—possibly in conjunction with another change in Afghan leadership—to deter future rebellions. (Ibid.)

In telegram 826 from Kabul, February 27, the Embassy reported: “While the citizens of Kabul remain tense and nervous, the city has returned to a semblance of normality,” and that the “rumor mill doubts” that Karmal was still in charge because of his absence from public view. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800101–0667) In a concluding analysis, a memorandum prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, February 28, noted the strike “demonstrated the ability of anti-Marxists to close down the capital, which previously had not witnessed any previous unrest,” while also illustrating the weakness of the Afghan Government and its complete reliance on the Soviet military to guarantee its position against the Afghan resistance. ([*text not declassified*]; Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—February 1980, NIDs) An article in the President’s Daily Brief, February 28, surmised that the strike went according to plan and more unrest in Kabul could be expected, while Afghan forces would be “increasingly loath to act against their fellow countrymen.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—February 1980, PDBs)

218. **Response to Request for Intelligence From the Acting Assistant for Joint Chiefs of Staff Support (*[name not declassified]*) to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Murphy)**¹

SI-274217/80

Washington, February 26, 1980

SUBJECT

Afghan Update (U)

REQUIREMENT

For use at SCC Meeting²

1. (*TS/[codeword not declassified]*) *SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN AFGHANISTAN:*

—It is estimated 100,000 Soviets troops are committed to the Afghan invasion. About 60,000 ground and air force combat personnel and some 10,000 support and advisory personnel are in Afghanistan. Some 30,000 troops are across the border in staging areas near Termez and Kushka.

—Current analysis indicates the Soviets have completed the first phase of their Afghan invasion. Their lines of communications are relatively secure and their base areas are fairly well established. A second, operational phase is expected in the near future with operations in contested areas, especially in the West and Northeast. As weather conditions improve, and more Soviet forces and equipment are brought in-country, these operations will probably be more extensive.

—Soviet casualties are difficult to estimate. Reports have placed Soviets killed in action as high as 1,500–2,000, with wounded at several times that number.

2. (*TS/[codeword not declassified]*) *AFGHAN POLITICAL SITUATION:*

—As evidenced by growing country-wide urban unrest, especially in Kabul, no major segment of the Afghan populace can be said to

¹ Source: Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 4, Background Paper for new DJS. Top Secret; *[codeword and handling restriction not declassified]*.

² This is presumably a reference to an SCC meeting held the same day in the White House Situation Room. According the summary of conclusions of the meeting, the SCC agreed on two goals with regard to Afghanistan: 1) “to make the Soviets pay a price for Afghanistan and to prevent their driving wedges among the allies;” and 2) “to maintain pressure to gain Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, holding out an acceptable political scenario.” (Carter Library, National Security Council Institutional Files, 1977–1981, Box 109, SCC-248, 2/26/80, Iran & Afghanistan)

accept the legitimacy of the regime of the Soviet presence essential to its survival.³ The rebellion lacks coordination and a leader, but these shortcomings may be corrected with growing urban opposition.

—Babrak Karmal was last seen on 21 February. Rumors abound that he will abdicate, be replaced by another Soviet selectee, or be the victim of yet another coup. A military government is highly likely.

3. (TS/[codeword not declassified]) RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN:

—Following the Islamic Conference's denunciation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan became characterized by arm's length dealings. Relations began to deteriorate with the arrest of Pakistani private citizens and detention of embassy officials. Propaganda directed against Pakistan by Kabul and Moscow has become increasingly hostile. In retaliation, Pakistan has increased surveillance of Afghan diplomats in Pakistan.

—Anticipating the Afghan government will use Pakistan as a scapegoat for recent disorders in Kabul, Islamabad has ordered the closure of Pakistan's Embassy in Kabul and Consulate in Kandahar.

—Severance of diplomatic relations, which is apparently the Pakistani intention, would be consistent with last month's Islamic Conference resolution. It would also be prudent in light of the recent direction of relations, and the increased prospect of Afghan harassment or reprisals against Pakistani's in Afghanistan. Conversely, such a break may confirm Afghan suspicions that Pakistan's intentions are hostile. Should relations be severed, the danger of border clashes is likely to increase substantially.

[name not declassified]

³ See Document 217.

219. Memorandum From Thomas Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, February 26, 1980

SUBJECT

Afghan Muslims (U)

We should be careful in implying blank endorsement to the Muslim forces in Afghanistan. First off, some of the groups are obscurantist at best; most of them are quite literally reactionary. They have some noble aspects and nobody who hates Russians can be all bad; nonetheless, they tend to be a pretty ugly bunch. I shudder to think of the human rights problems we would face if they came to power. Second, by emphasizing the Muslim aspect, we are scaring the Indians—and perhaps the Soviets counterproductively.² Third, there is no reason to assume that these people like us much more than they do the Soviets. They are quite likely to take a Khomeini approach—or perhaps emulate the theology of the fellow who tried to seize the Mecca mosque. Finally, we get more than occasional reports that at least some of the insurgents inside the country are very anti-American because they think we aren't helping them. (S)

Obviously, there is nobody in Afghanistan to deal with except Muslims and we certainly want to support their right to exercise their religion freely (as long as I don't have to be around while they are doing it!). We do not, however, need to convey the idea that we want to see Afghanistan handed over to Muslims *qua* Muslims. If that unhappy land is to regain any kind of order, it is more likely to be from semi-secularists such as the royal family and any of the "modernizers" who are still alive. (S)³

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 2/80. Secret. Sent for information.

² Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the left margin beside this sentence.

³ Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the left margin beside this sentence and wrote at the bottom of the memorandum: "that's half the issue *right now*. The pt. is to mobilize Moslem forces there and elsewhere. ZB."

**220. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination
Committee (Intelligence) Meeting¹**

Washington, February 27, 1980, 5 p.m.

SUBJECT

Afghanistan (U)

PARTICIPANTS

State

Secretary Cyrus Vance

Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher

Mr. David Newsom, Under Secretary for Political Affairs

Mr. David Mark, Deputy Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research

OSD

Deputy Secretary W. Graham Clayton, Jr.

Ambassador Robert Komer, Under Secretary for Policy

JCS

Lt. General John Pustay, Assistant to the Chairman

DCI

Admiral Stansfield Turner

Mr. Chuck Cogan, Chief, Near East Division

Justice

Mr. John Shenefield, Acting Attorney General

Mr. Ken Bass, Counsel for Intelligence Policy

OMB

Dr. John White, Deputy Director

Mr. Randy Jayne, Associate Director for National Security and International
Affairs

White House

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski

Mr. David Aaron

NSC

Mr. Thomas Thornton

Mr. Donald Gregg

Summary of Conclusions

The SCC (I) met to give formal approval to the use of an additional [less than 1 line not declassified] for use in Afghanistan.² This money is

¹ Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I-020, Minutes—SCC 1980. Secret; Sensitive. Carter initialed "C" in the upper right corner. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

² In a memorandum, February 29, Brzezinski notified Turner that Carter approved the SCC(I) recommendation to use an additional [text not declassified] for the Afghan program. (Ibid.)

needed to carry out the program that the President had previously approved for the remainder of 1980. The funds will be matched by another country. (S)

Admiral Turner briefed the meeting on the details of the program; some signs of effectiveness are already being noticed. (S)

All member agencies agreed that the money should be provided. The only reservation noted was OMB's concern that the amount might prove to be insufficient. (S)

Anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons remain the insurgents' greatest need. Soviet-origin equipment is becoming very expensive, however, and SA-7s are in very short supply. It was agreed that CIA would approach Egypt to see if the Egyptians could purchase Yugoslav-built SA-7s and then pass them on to us. Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan should also be asked to seek to obtain SA-7s on our behalf from Algeria and possibly other countries with large stocks. (S)

CIA was also asked to try to increase its intelligence take from the insurgents. (S)

221. Memorandum From the Vice President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clift) to Vice President Mondale¹

Memo No. 907-80

Washington, February 28, 1980

SUBJECT

George Kennan's Assessment of Current Soviet Leadership and the Afghanistan Invasion

You asked me if there was anything to the assertions by George Kennan (article at Tab A) that Soviet actions in Afghanistan were out of character for Brezhnev, Kosygin and Gromyko.² CIA has responded

¹ Source: Carter Library, Donated Historical Material, Mondale Papers, Box 70, Foreign Countries—USSR: 1-2/80. Top Secret; Codeword. In the upper right corner an unknown hand wrote: "VP has seen."

² The article, attached at Tab A but not printed, is George Kennan, "Washington's Reaction to the Afghan Crisis: 'Was This Really Mature Statesmanship?'" *New York Times*, February 1, 1980, p. A27. Kennan asserted that the decision for the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was "abrupt," "bizarre," and "clumsy" which suggested "the recent breakthrough, to positions of dominant influence, of hard-line elements much less concerned for world opinion, but also much less experienced, than these older figures," that is, Kosygin, Brezhnev, and Gromyko.

that Brezhnev still appears to be in charge and, of the others, only Kosygin was apparently not a party to the Politburo's decision to invade Afghanistan. CIA reasons that a gradual disenchantment with Detente (witnessed by the U.S. Congress position towards SALT as of last November and the concurrent U.S. decision to deploy new TNF assets in Europe), together with the fear that Muslim extremism of the type practiced in Iran would spill over into Afghanistan and into the Soviet Union, served to remove most, if not all, concern about unnecessarily harming U.S.-USSR relations by a decision to commit troops.

At Tab B is CIA's initial assessment of Brezhnev's role, as stated in their 16 January daily intelligence report.³ At Tab C is a preliminary CIA assessment of Politburo's decision-making concerning Afghanistan, and at Tab D is a later CIA memorandum on current Politburo thinking on Afghanistan.⁴ Clipped portions of Tabs C and D appear to be especially relevant to Kennan's assertions.

³ Attached at Tab B but not printed is a CIA memorandum, January 16, that concluded Brezhnev "continues to be in the center of things and it seems almost impossible that the decision on Afghanistan could have been made over his objection."

⁴ Attached at Tab C but not printed is a CIA memorandum, February 5, that repeated the initial intelligence assessment of January 16, to the effect that Brezhnev remained "in full political control and was directly involved in and supportive of the decision to use military force against the Afghan insurgents." Tab D is printed as Document 191.

222. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State and the International Communication Agency¹

Moscow, February 28, 1980, 1814Z

3295. Subject: A Revised Brezhnev Doctrine in the Wake of Afghanistan? One Possible Approach. Ref: USICA 7395.²

1. (C—Entire text)

2. Summary. Actions of the magnitude of the Afghan invasion may perhaps be justified to the world at large in terms of Realpolitik or international law. The Soviets are busily attempting that, with a steady

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800108–1081. Confidential. Sent for information to Leningrad, Warsaw, Belgrade, Berlin, Bucharest, Budapest, Munich, Prague, Sofia, and USNATO.

² Not found.

propaganda barrage aimed at proving external aggression, duty-to-treaty obligations, and threats to the USSR's own security. But for the Party faithful, domestically and in the Communist Parties abroad, more important is the need to understand how the invasion comports with Marxist-Leninist ideology. Despite this obvious need, we find, however, that Soviet leaders—perhaps because of Moscow's awareness of the anxieties generated abroad by the Brezhnev Doctrine—have so far made only a few stabs at rationalizing their action in ideological terms. No general theory has yet been articulated. Prompted by *refteel*, which suggests the existence of an "Afghan corollary" to the Brezhnev Doctrine, we have reexamined the post-Afghanistan Soviet leadership statements as well as current and earlier theoretical journals. Thus far, the ideological linkage between the Brezhnev Doctrine—which applies to "socialist states"—and the Afghan invasion has not yet been made, though one prominent ideologist does hint in a pre-invasion article at the need to act when the gains in countries with a "socialist orientation", such as Afghanistan, are in jeopardy. If Washington analysts agree with our analysis of the ideologist's article, it may be worth flagging to interested scholars or the media for their consideration and possible exploitation. End summary.

3. Since the invasion of Afghanistan, there has been speculation about the emergence of a revised or extended Brezhnev Doctrine to explain the Soviet action (e.g., USICA 7395). The speculation is based on the conclusion that the Brezhnev Doctrine, as imputed to the Soviets following the Czechoslovak invasion, falls short of providing a plausible ideological explanation for the latest Soviet invasion, and therefore one needs (leaving aside for the moment why the "need" arises) a revised formulation of the original doctrine or an "Afghan corollary" to it.

4. In what way does the Brezhnev Doctrine fall short of explaining, in Marxist-Leninist terms, the invasion of Afghanistan? Following the August 1968 invasion, students of Soviet ideology relied on various official statements—but especially one by Brezhnev at the Fifth Congress of the Polish United Workers Party on November 12, 1968—to make the case that a new ideological doctrine had been fashioned. Brezhnev stated at the Congress that:

When internal and external forces, hostile to socialism, seek to reverse the development of any socialist country whatsoever in the direction of the restoration of the capitalist order, when a threat to the cause of socialism arises in that country, a threat to the security of the socialist commonwealth as a whole—this already becomes not only a problem of the people of the country concerned, but also a common problem and the concern of all socialist countries.

Because Czechoslovakia was a Warsaw Pact country, "any socialist country" as used by Brezhnev was mainly viewed at the time as encom-

passing the countries of Eastern Europe, including Yugoslavia, rather than those elsewhere such as North Vietnam, North Korea, and Cuba.

5. The key point of the Brezhnev Doctrine in terms of its present-day [garble—relevance?] to Afghanistan is the reference to “socialist country”. No Soviet official has ever argued that Afghanistan has been a “socialist country” (or, for that matter, ever experienced “a capitalist order”), or is presently calling on the “socialist commonwealth”, as was done in the case of Czechoslovakia, to react to Afghanistan. Before the April 1978 revolution which overthrew Daoud, Afghanistan was seen as essentially feudal, and after the revolution as embarking on the path of “socialist orientation”. Soviet ideologists make a sharp distinction between “socialist countries” and those bearing the label of “socialist orientation”: The Deputy Chief of the Central Committee’s International Department, Ul’yanovskiy, writing in the authoritative CPSU theoretical journal *Kommunist* last July, defined the latter group of countries as “those, not yet being socialist, (but) which reject capitalism as a system, carry out fundamental social changes facilitating and hastening their possible transition to socialism.” Among the Third World countries assigned by the Soviets to this category besides Afghanistan (which Ul’yanovskiy last July noted had “recently joined them”) are Algeria, Benin, Burma, Guinea, PDRY, Congo (Brazzaville), Syria, Tanzania, Angola, Madagascar, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Jamaica. Candidate Politburo member Demichev, in discussing the international situation in his February 1 election speech, alluded to both kinds of Soviet allies, stating that “the fraternal countries of socialism, (and) the developing countries which have adopted a socialist orientation, are proceeding (forward) shoulder to shoulder along with us.”

6. If Afghanistan does not fit neatly into the Brezhnev Doctrine as it is usually understood, then is there some doctrine-in-the-making in which it does fit, as some Western observers are speculating? Are there statements by Soviet leaders or ideologists since the Afghanistan invasion which put the Soviet action in a Marxist-Leninist framework of more general applicability? Obviously, here arises a dilemma for the Soviets. Domestically, and for Communist parties abroad, there exists a need to provide some transcending ideological rationalization for the Soviet action in Afghanistan, just as Brezhnev felt compelled to provide some rationalization at the PZPR Congress in November 1968 following the Czech invasion. Since the entire Soviet system derives its legitimacy from Marxism-Leninism, the millions of Party faithful who serve as props for that system have to be served up some such interpretation of events such as Afghanistan. The danger in the absence of such an interpretation is further ideological erosion.

7. At the same time, the very interpretation which the leadership provides can only further heighten anxieties abroad, raising a dilemma.

Just as the Brezhnev Doctrine reinforced skepticism about Soviet intentions in “socialist countries” such as Romania and Yugoslavia, so will any overarching interpretation for Soviet military aid in circumstances such as Afghanistan raise concern among actual or potential countries assigned by Moscow to the “socialist orientation” category, i.e., all countries of the Third World as the Soviets see it. Although Brezhnev, speaking in Belgrade in 1971, denied the existence of any “so-called new doctrine of limited sovereignty,” the label “Brezhnev Doctrine” has continued to stick, and do damage to the Soviet image abroad.

8. Perhaps in part because of the history of the Brezhnev Doctrine, Soviet leaders have so far played down ideological explanations for their rendering aid to Afghanistan. The heavy emphasis has rather been on meeting an Afghan request, in compliance with treaty obligations, and on rights reaffirmed by the UN Charter, with occasional reference to the need to protect Soviet state interests, by liquidating a situation which could have resulted, in Moscow’s view, in hostile bases along the southern border. Soviet leaders and ideologists have made a few random “stabs” at rationalizing their action in terms of stock Marxist-Leninist formulas but nothing approaching a general theory has yet been articulated. Among such attempts, which have sometimes misled a few outside observers to conclude a “new doctrine” is being offered, are:

—“Proletarian internationalism”: Two Central Committee apparatchiks (Kobysh in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, January 23, and Portugalov in TASS, February 6) first used the hoary favorite, “proletarian internationalism”, in addressing the Afghan question. However, with the exception of KGB Chief Andropov, the Soviet leaders themselves have avoided resort to this rationalization in the specific context of military aid to Afghanistan. (Andropov said that the Soviet aid was a “high act of faithfulness to the principle of proletarian internationalism . . .”) We assume Brezhnev and others have steered clear of “proletarian internationalism” for the reason that Afghanistan obviously lacks a proletariat of any significance for which such aid could be justified.

—“International duty” or “international solidarity”: Soviet leaders, including Defense Minister Ustinov, have generally settled for one of these hackneyed formulas to justify their military assistance on Marxist-Leninist grounds. Both recur in the unsigned *Novoye Vremya* article which prompted David Binder to speculate in the *New York Times* that an “extended Brezhnev Doctrine” was in the making.³ Our problem with the *Novoye Vremya* article, however, apart from the “unofficial”

³ The full reference to the article is: David Binder, “Brezhnev Doctrine Said To Be Extended,” *New York Times*, February 10, 1980, p. 10.

character of the journal as a Soviet source, is that it provides too sweeping language for any new doctrine . . . a succession of slogans such as “international solidarity” rather than workable criteria. Both of these slogans did appear in the Brezhnev-Marchais statement issued in Moscow January 10 which International Department head Ponomaryev has strongly recommended to Party members for an understanding of Afghanistan.⁴ Both formulas also are to be found in profusion in the Soviet press immediately following the Czechoslovak invasion, beginning with the August 22, 1968 unsigned statement in *Pravda* entitled “The Highest International Duty.”

9. Although Soviet statements since the Afghanistan invasion therefore provide little substance for a revised Brezhnev Doctrine, the fact that Afghanistan falls into a common stage of development on the Marxist-Leninist road to Communism, along which many other countries are depicted (by the Soviets) as traveling, provides Western analysts with some basis to construct a revised doctrine. It seems to us what is missing from Soviet statements since Afghanistan which would lend itself to such an effort is a description of the circumstances triggering a Soviet decision to render its “aid” to countries of “socialist orientation”. The Brezhnev Doctrine, as cited in paragraph 4, describes the “trigger” in the case of “socialist countries” as the emergence of “internal and external forces, hostile to socialism, seek(ing) to reverse the development of any socialist country . . .” But what circumstances are germane in triggering Soviet assistance to a country of socialist orientation?

10. The deputy head of the Central Committee’s International Department Ul’yanovskiy, writing in the earlier cited *Kommunist* of last July, identifies circumstances which we believe could serve as the basis for a doctrine of general applicability to this category of country. Ul’yanovskiy states that a “socialist orientation” can be sustained “so long as vigilance to imperialism’s schemes is maintained, so long as rebuffs are given to insidious and dangerous neocolonialism.” “Any manifestation,” Ul’yanovskiy continues, “of a lack of confidence, but even more, of hostility to the world of socialism, any manifestation of a tendency to conciliation in relation to imperialist policy, to neocolonialists—beware of these latter day bearers of gifts’—usually serves as a signal of a retreat from the principles of socialist orientation.”

⁴ In telegram 1209 from Paris, January 11, the Embassy reported on a statement made by French Communist Party leader Georges Marchais, January 10. Marchais declared the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was justified in order to defeat the “imperialist threat” Afghanistan faced. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800019–0600)

11. Ul'yanovskiy's statement does not include an explicit warning of the consequences when a "signal" is received by Moscow of a "retreat" from a "socialist orientation". In terms of the translation of theory into practice, the threshold triggering and defining Soviet action obviously is seen to vary from case to case (depending on geopolitical factors, international environment, etc.), even for an ideologist such as Ul'yanovskiy; thus no Soviet "aid" at all was rendered to Somalia although it is cited in the article as a country of "socialist orientation" in retreat. (Besides, Soviet ideologists are not supposed to issue warnings.) But the net result of Ul'yanovskiy's description of what comprises a "retreat", when considered in light of the action the Soviets took against the Amin government, is to suggest a doctrine akin to the Brezhnev Doctrine—but addressed to this category of countries rather than "socialist countries". For the countries of the Third World, assigned now or in the future by Moscow's ideologists to the "socialist orientation" category, Ul'yanovskiy's language adds up to a fairly credible warning—and made more credible as Moscow's capability to project force into the Third World improves.

12. While our purpose has been to focus above on an ideological justification for Soviet intervention in Third World countries, the fact is that—as mentioned previously—in the case of Afghanistan the Soviets have thus far emphasized primarily "legal-political" justifications, especially the 1978 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. It may well be that the Soviets in fact will only feel comfortable engaging in a significant military intervention in a sovereign state in circumstances providing both an ideological explanation for domestic consumption within socialist countries, and a "legal-political" justification for the world at large. This would follow the Czechoslovak pattern where the Soviets had their "legal-political" pretext, given Czechoslovak membership in the Warsaw Pact, and developed their ideological justification in the form of the Brezhnev Doctrine only after the fact of the invasion. In any event, the ideological justifications discussed in the preceding paragraphs in no way contradict Soviet "legal-political" explanations for the Afghan invasion, but are rather hypothesized as a complement to them. All factors considered, there is the suggestion that the states most endangered by the precedent of Afghanistan are those countries which are both "of socialist orientation" and have in addition legal-political ties to Moscow such as treaties of friendship and cooperation.

13. We suggest the above as one possible approach to identifying a Brezhnev-type doctrine in the thicket of the largely non-ideological Soviet statements so far issued in justification of the Afghanistan invasion. Given Moscow's awareness of anxieties in the Third World following its action, it may be some time before a comprehensive statement lending itself to the development of a new doctrine actually

surfaces here. It may be worth Washington's effort, therefore, in terms of our public diplomacy in the Third World in the next years, to flag the approach to interested scholars or the media for their consideration and possible exploitation.

Watson

223. Memorandum From Lincoln Bloomfield of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, February 28, 1980

SUBJECT

Afghan Neutralization—Some Broader Aspects (C)

The Carter Doctrine adds the general area of the Persian Gulf (which I strongly recommend we henceforth refer to as the "Gulf") to Western Europe, Japan and the Eastern Mediterranean as among the vital interests to the United States. Unlike the other areas, the Gulf is unique in having been defined by *both* superpowers as of vital interest (see the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement of 1940).² This makes it essential to elaborate new ground rules for superpower relations to replace those agreed to at the 1972 Moscow summit prohibiting advantage-seeking in peripheral areas, flagrantly violated by the Soviet Union in Angola, Ethiopia, and South Yemen. (U)

Afghanistan is of course more than that. It is a case of armed intervention, but in an area of vital interest to Moscow. (The closest U.S. analogy is the Dominican Republic in 1965.)³ But it is also a third world, "unaligned" country. Any viable ground rules applicable to Afghanistan should respond both to Soviet perceptions of interests, and to third world allergy to superpower military intervention. (C)

The essence of such a rule would be a prohibition not just of advantage-seeking but of *outside armed military interference* in third world conflicts or in the internal affairs of unaligned countries. Such

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Office File, Country Chron File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 2/80. Confidential. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Thornton, Owen, Pastor, and Brement.

² See Document 243.

³ See Document 178 and footnote 2 thereto.

a doctrine would have been explicitly violated by Cuban troops in Africa or Soviet troops in Afghanistan. (It also would have barred our intervention in the DR in 1965, France in Zaire and Morocco, etc.) (C)

Such a doctrine would leave untouched the established military dispositions of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and the United States in Western Europe and the Pacific, and would leave both free to deploy their fleets. (C)

“Guaranteed neutrality” for Afghanistan in exchange for complete withdrawal of Soviet combat forces would serve U.S. interests, but seems a non-starter as it offers nothing to Moscow except face-saving. But its potential value to the larger need for universally-applicable ground-rules requires that it be seriously analyzed. Two things are required: a greater inducement to Moscow to accede; and some imaginative instrumentalities, such as international observation, to make the guarantee effective. (C)

Afghanistan will undoubtedly revert to its historic xenophobic stance, which leads Americans to predict Soviet non-acceptance. But the matter acquires more substance when seen in a larger perspective, particularly in terms of Cuba. Afghanistan and Cuba are symmetrical in unique ways. (C)

A guarantee of neutrality was in effect given in 1962 when Moscow agreed not to make it a base for offensive weapons, in exchange for which we agreed not to invade Cuba. (U)

A comparable agreement should be considered for Afghanistan. In both cases the internal political orientation will probably remain anathema to the neighboring superpower. But a variety of tolerable coexistence becomes possible by virtue of neutralization, meaning: a) *verified guarantees against pursuit of policies threatening to the neighbor*; and b) *absence of superpower military intervention* (including China). (C)

In linking Cuba and Afghanistan, we do not want to generate a new crisis. The point is that President Kennedy’s 1962 agreement could be the obvious model for Afghanistan. U.S. self-imposed restraint after such an agreement becomes the implicit model for Soviet policy in withdrawing from Afghanistan. (C)

(An even broader global perspective is afforded by Palestinian autonomy. A well-developed and implemented doctrine prohibiting armed intervention will undoubtedly have to be an element in the essential neutralization of any Palestinian homeland. The latter case would be characteristic of the settlements which brought long-term peace to Belgium, Switzerland, and Austria. The new rule would be very relevant.) (C)

A final element is an enhanced role for international peace observation. The habitual dismissal of this capability until it is desperately

needed in crisis should be eschewed, and it should be made part of serious planning. (C)

224. Article in the President's Daily Brief¹

Washington, March 3, 1980

PAKISTAN: Position on US aid offer

[2 paragraphs (17 lines) not declassified]

The Pakistanis appear convinced that accepting the proposed aid package would increase Soviet hostility without significantly enhancing Pakistan's ability to respond to the Soviet threat from Afghanistan. Last week, the Deputy Commander of the Pakistani Army criticized the Foreign Ministry for even discussing assistance without a solid US defense commitment, *[1 line not declassified]*. Another influential military officer, the Defense Ministry Secretary General, has reportedly also argued for a stronger defense treaty. Neither General appears to want an accommodation with the USSR, but both have reportedly talked about staying neutral in hopes that the Soviets would leave Pakistan alone.

[1 paragraph (18 lines) not declassified]

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—March 1980, PDBs. Top Secret; For the President Only. The full version of this President's Daily Brief was not filed with this collection. The article printed here was found in this form.

225. **Briefing Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Spiers) to Secretary of State Vance¹**

Washington, March 4, 1980

SUBJECT

Soviet Motives in Afghanistan

In choosing to intervene in Afghanistan, the Soviets were primarily motivated by their own security concerns. In their pre-decision deliberations, they apparently underestimated both the strength of the insurgency and the intensity of the international reaction. Despite their miscalculations, however, we believe the Soviets are not now prepared to alter their course. Present efforts seem primarily aimed at stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan, exploiting differences among the western allies, and limiting the damage which Afghanistan has done to overall US-Soviet relations.

By late 1979, Moscow was faced with a dire situation in Afghanistan. If it did not act, the best it could hope for was prolonged fighting, further regime coups, and political chaos; the worst, the establishment of an anti-Soviet regime that would develop ties with Iran, Pakistan, the US, and China. From the Soviet perspective, such a turn of events would have overturned a long tradition of Afghan dependence on the USSR and would have meant an unacceptable situation on the USSR's southern border. Tolerance of such an outcome would have called into question Moscow's willingness to back its clients elsewhere in the Third World. By early December, the Soviet leadership concluded that the only solution to the problem was military intervention, and that while such action would carry considerable political costs, the benefits of a stable and secure Afghanistan firmly in the Soviet camp were worth the price.

Miscalculation

In its deliberations, Moscow miscalculated. In terms of the military situation, the Soviets seem to have misjudged the strength and capabilities of the insurgents. While the Soviets probably calculated that their own troops would have to secure the major urban areas and lines of communication in Afghanistan until the Afghan army could be reorganized and equipped to fight the insurgency, it probably underes-

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat (ES), Sensitive and Super Sensitive File, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, Box 4, 1980 ES Sensitive, Mar 1-15. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by W. Limberg (INR/RSE). [*text not declassified*]

timated the time and manpower that would be needed even for this limited objective. Originally, Moscow may have hoped that 40,000 to 60,000 Soviet troops would be enough; present force configurations would seem to indicate that the Soviets now believe that it will need at least double that number, and that the Soviet, rather than the Afghan, army will have to bear the brunt of the fighting for the present.

Moscow apparently also miscalculated the intensity of the international reaction to its intervention in Afghanistan. In terms of US-Soviet relations, Moscow was probably ready to accept a bad press and the delay of SALT II ratification. However, the Soviets may not have anticipated the American actions either to curtail shipments of feed grains and export of high technology or to boycott the Olympics. Indeed, clandestine reporting indicates that the Soviets may have believed that the US was too distracted by the situation in Iran to develop a strong response.

The Kremlin also seems to have been taken aback by the strength of the West European response. While it no doubt expected them to denounce Soviet actions, Moscow may not have expected the West Europeans to give the US as much support as they have. Moscow was probably equally surprised by the nearly unanimous hostile Islamic reaction evoked at the Islamabad Conference in January.

In Afghanistan

Resistance in Afghanistan has evidently been stronger than Moscow originally anticipated. The Babrak government has not been more effective than Amin's, and the internal situation has deteriorated since the intervention.

Despite the international reaction and the resistance in Afghanistan, the Soviets are adding men and equipment to their forces, building permanent barracks and are apparently planning for large operations against the rebels. The Soviets have yet to engage in major operations against the rebels, and seem unlikely to conclude that their intervention will not succeed in its limited military objectives of stalemating the insurgency before a spring offensive is tried.

Diplomatic Posture

Although the Soviet media and leadership have been quick to pick up on the theme of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan voiced in the West, there has been little or no deviation from their original position of December 27. Indeed, Brezhnev in his speech of February 22, seemed to add to earlier demands on the question of withdrawal when he said that the Soviets will only withdraw when the US and Afghanistan's neighbors are willing to "guarantee" that all outside interference in

Afghanistan has ceased.² On the face of it, Brezhnev's statement was probably not intended as a signal of Soviet interest in negotiation on the issue. However, Moscow may have been impressed by the subsequent Western reaction to even such a slight shift in the Soviet position and is now attempting to play on this interest to imply reasonableness in the Kremlin.

Similarly, the Soviets have given little public play to the West European proposal for the "neutralization" of Afghanistan.³ They have not, however, dismissed it outright nor have they ruled out the idea of future discussion or negotiations. Indeed, in his discussion with Armand Hammer, Brezhnev reportedly expressed an interest in mutually acceptable solutions.⁴ Thus, it would appear that the Soviets are trying to dangle the prospect of a political solution to the Afghan situation in order, in the short run, to divide western opinion and policy, and, in the longer run, to keep open the possibility of a negotiated agreement that in effect would place a world seal of approval on the Soviet intervention and the resulting permanent satellization of Afghanistan.

At the same time, the Soviets are intent upon limiting the damage Afghanistan has wreaked on its relations with the West and the Third World. Moscow has repeatedly stressed that detente remains its basic policy line. Similarly, one Soviet article has tried to allay West European fears of an increased Soviet threat to the oil rich Persian Gulf by resurrecting its 1976 proposal that the security of the area be internationally guaranteed.⁵ Moscow has also attempted to deflect Arab displeasure by hammering away at the betrayal of the Palestinian cause allegedly

² See Document 216.

³ The Foreign Ministers of the nine European Community nations, meeting in Rome on February 19, issued a statement proposing a neutral Afghanistan under international guarantees if the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw its troops. (Paul Lewis, "Europeans Propose a Neutral Afghanistan With Guarantees to Allow Soviet to Leave," *New York Times*, February 20, 1980, p. A8) In addition, Vance visited Bonn, Rome, Paris, and London February 19-22 to discuss Afghanistan with European leaders. For his February 20 joint press conference with German Foreign Minister Genscher, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, April 1980, pp. 39-40.

⁴ Hammer, the head of Occidental Petroleum, had significant business interests in the Soviet Union. His meeting with Brezhnev in Moscow, February 27, was reported in telegram 3231 from Moscow, February 27. During the meeting, Brezhnev told Hammer that if the United States and Afghanistan's neighbors would guarantee nonintervention in Afghan affairs, "we can come to a settlement," provided that, subsequently, Afghanistan's military capabilities would be limited to defensive needs. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880025-0629) The meeting was also reported in the *New York Times*; see Jane Seaberry, "Hammer Expects Crisis With Soviets to End Soon," *New York Times*, March 4, 1980, p. D6.

⁵ Not further identified.

inherent in the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and longer term at the continuing threat which the US poses for the Middle East.

In the longer term, Moscow probably believes that it can eventually stabilize the situation in Afghanistan, and that, as it does, international pressure will decrease, much as it did in 1968 with Czechoslovakia. The Soviets probably have concluded that continued tensions in the Mideast will eventually allow them to recoup their losses, largely because the radical Arabs have few other options in terms of sophisticated arms and great power support. Moscow also probably believes that the very fact that it has secured its position in Afghanistan will enable it to exert more influence on Iran and Pakistan, and in time to undercut US and Chinese influence. To this end, the Soviets probably will try to refrain from overly antagonizing any of the parties involved. As their involvement in the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan grows, however, this moderate position will become increasingly difficult to maintain both as a result of fighting the war itself (which may inevitably come to involve Pakistan's border areas), and as a result of having to justify that war to a worried home front.

226. Memorandum to the Director of the National Foreign Assessment Center (Clarke)¹

Washington, March 5, 1980

SUBJECT

Station Chief's Assessment of the Insurgency in Afghanistan

1. In reviewing the Chief of Station Kabul's latest assessment on the insurgency in Afghanistan and its prospects for the next six months, we found that we totally agreed with some of the conclusions made by the COS but disagreed with others.²

2. Analysts on the Afghan Task Force have long believed that the insurgents were too weak to topple the government by defeating the Afghan Army in military action. The insurgents can harass and pressure

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 82M00501R: 1980 Subject Files, Box 12, C-367, 1 Jan-30 Jun 80, Afghanistan. Secret. The author of the memorandum was not identified. Attached but not printed is a covering note from Clarke to Turner, stating: "[less than 1 line not declassified] doubts that the Soviets will be able completely to secure the roads in the countryside in six months time."

² The referenced assessment was not found.

Afghan Army units in the field but do not have the leadership, training, experience, or firepower to engage the Afghan Army in set-piece battles. The danger has always been the potential for unraveling from within, and it was that danger that brought the Soviets into Afghanistan.

3. The Soviets have thus far not enjoyed any meaningful successes against the insurgents, but that is likely to change now that the weather is improving and the Soviets can use their firepower more effectively. The Soviets have begun a major new offensive in eastern Afghanistan and the preliminary evidence suggests they are successfully pushing the insurgents back in several provinces. This is not unexpected. We knew the rebels would avoid set-piece battles with the stronger Soviet forces and that appears to be what they are doing. We believe the insurgents will retreat rather than fight pitched battles. They will move deeper into sanctuaries inside Afghanistan and across the border into Pakistan.

4. The Soviets are likely to further intensify their attacks on insurgent bases over the spring and summer months. This will result in their consolidating their control along key roads and around major cities and in pushing the insurgents back. But, it is questionable if these will be lasting successes. We believe the insurgents will avoid the Soviets when they hold the edge but will reoccupy territory as the Soviets withdraw. In short, the insurgents will fight when they have the advantage and not when the other side holds the edge. We doubt that the Soviets can completely secure the roads and the countryside in six months.

227. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, March 6, 1980

SUBJECT

U.S. Aid Reaching Afghan Insurgents

1. Attachment A is a complete list of the arms and ammunition given to the Afghan insurgents by Pakistan as of 26 February 1980.² This list, given to us by the responsible Pakistan liaison officer, tallies with the list of supplies provided by this Agency to Pakistan as of that date. The Pak liaison officer said that his people closely monitor the movement of the supplies to the tribesmen and slow down or stop deliveries to those who cannot move them rapidly. There have been seven groups receiving supplies to date:

- a. The Hezbe-Islami (HI) headed by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar;
- b. The Jamaat-I-Islami-Afghanistan (JIA) led by Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani;
- c. The Harakat-E-Inqalab-I-Islami (Movement of Islamic Revolution—MIR) led by Maulana Muhammad Nabi Muhammad;
- d. The Jahbe-I-Nejat-I-Melli-Afghanistan (Afghan National Liberation Front—ANLF) led by Sebqatullah Mojedidi;
- e. The Afghan Islamic and National Revolutionary Council (AINR) or Surah-E-Melli-Inqalabi-Islami-Afghanistan led by Syed Ahmed Gailani;
- f. The Khalis Faction which is a break-away group from the Hezbe-Islami and led by Yunus Khalis; and
- g. The Hazaras which are a Shi'a minority group.

2. Obtaining independent confirmation of these deliveries is very difficult. An Afghan informant with access to this information reported that during the past three months the Gailani group has been receiving regular supplies of ammunition and military hardware from the Government of Pakistan. The informant stated that during the week of 17

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 82M00501R: 1980 Subject Files, Box 12, C-367, 1 Jan-30 Jun 80, Afghanistan. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified].

² Attachment A, not printed, is a table listing the weapons distributed to the seven resistance groups.

February 1980 the following items were delivered: (See Attachment B for full report).³

- a. 60 AK-47 Assault rifles,
- b. 60,000 rounds of AK-47 ammunition,
- c. 20,000 rounds of .303 ammunition,
- d. 200 magnetic anti-tank mines, and
- e. 3 RPG-7 launchers and no more than 50 rockets.

During the week of 24 February the delivery to Gailani consisted of:

- a. "About" 200 magnetic anti-tank mines,
- b. "About" 60 anti-tank rockets, and
- c. 30 AK-47 Assault rifles and a quantity of ammunition.

3. AmEmbassy Kabul on 20 February 1980 reported on the insurgency in Wardak Province and stated that it might parallel insurgency in other provinces.⁴ Paragraphs 5-8 concern the smuggling of arms from Peshawar to Wardak. Paragraph 9 states: "A caravan reaching Wardak on about January 25 reportedly brought twelve 'shoulder-fired anti-tank guns,' ninety 'long-range' rifles, one 'dah shoba' (phonetic—10 branches?) anti-aircraft weapon, and three 'multi-purpose' weapons usable against aircraft or tanks. The rifles were allegedly 'American made.' The other arms were of Chinese origin, one source's informants say. A 120-man caravan is expected to reach Wardak from Peshawar on about March 5 . . . with more weapons. (Comment: The information about the arms smuggling was provided in early February, before the *Washington Post* and *New York Times* published stories alleging that the U.S. was clandestinely supplying arms to Afghan rebels.⁵ None of our sources has indicated that any of the smuggled arms came from U.S. or Pakistani suppliers.)" (Kabul Embtel 0690, Attachment C).

4. In sum, the weapons and supplies supplied by this Agency appear to be getting through to the insurgents and without the U.S. hand showing.

Stansfield Turner⁶

³ Attachment B, not printed, is an intelligence information cable, March 3, that reported comments made by Hossain Gailani, nephew of Syed Ahmed Gailani, who noted the insurgents' greatest need was for anti-aircraft weapons, because Soviet "helicopter gunships are almost impossible to bring down with conventional arms."

⁴ Attachment C, not printed, is telegram 690 from Kabul, which reported claims made by insurgents in Wardak, a province west of Kabul, that they were preparing a Spring offensive, and that these plans might be part of a broader plan for increased rebel attacks in other provinces. The Embassy concluded that the information was accurate.

⁵ See footnote 3, Document 209.

⁶ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

228. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, March 6, 1980, 9–9:40 a.m.

SUBJECT

Iran/Afghanistan

PARTICIPANTS

State

Secretary Cyrus Vance
Warren Christopher
David Newsom
Peter Constable
Nelson Ledsky

OSD

W. Graham Claytor

JCS

General David Jones
Lt. Gen. John Pustay

Justice

John Shenefield

Treasury

Robert Carswell

Energy

John Sawhill

White House

Henry Owen (Chairman)
Jody Powell
Lloyd Cutler
Hedley Donovan
NSC
Gary Sick
William Odom
Jerrold Schecter

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

[Omitted here is information unrelated to Afghanistan.]

4. *Chemical Warfare*. Admiral Turner said there is growing evidence that the Soviets have used chemical warfare in Afghanistan, but as yet it is not possible to confirm adequately that this has gone beyond the use of riot control agents.² The Soviets have decontamination equipment

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council Institutional Files, 1977–1981, Box 109, SCC–284, 3/6/80, Iran & Afghanistan. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. In the upper right corner, Carter wrote: “Zbig, C.”

² This allegation was first reported in a situation report prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, March 1, based on “credible evidence” received in the U.S. Consulate in Peshawar: “Three separate reports from Afghan refugees who claim to have witnessed the attacks gave similar descriptions of gas canisters, symptoms of Afghan victims, and methods used to avoid contamination. The attacks are said to have occurred in Badakhshan, Vardak, and Takhar Provinces both before and after the Soviet invasion. The victims apparently experienced loss of control, became unconscious, or died. We have received a number of other reports of chemical warfare in Afghanistan, mainly from refugees, but these have been inconclusive and of questionable reliability.” ([*report number not declassified*] March 1; Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—March 1980, NIDs)

in Afghanistan, but we believe that is part of their normal equipment. General Jones said the JCS would like to send a team of experts to Pakistan to debrief refugees who have experienced or witnessed the use of chemical agents. Admiral Turner said the Pakistanis will not permit direct contact of U.S. personnel with the refugees in order to prevent refugees from being tortured and stating that such direct contacts had occurred while they were in Pakistan. However, indirect contacts were possible. It was agreed that CIA and JCS would cooperate on a high priority basis to accumulate the best available information on use of chemical warfare and report back to the SCC next week. We do not want to make any charges which could be disproved and thereby cast doubt on the credibility of future evidence. Mr. Christopher noted that we also have a large body of evidence of use of chemical agents in Southeast Asia, although the Afghanistan situation is the first directly relating the Soviets to use of these agents.³ (S)

With regard to public revelation, it was agreed that State would contact the Red Cross in Geneva and Pakistan, as well as the UN High Commissioner on Refugees, to draw their attention to possible violations and urge them to follow up on reports in the field. In the meantime, a strategy paper by State is being considered on an inter-agency basis.⁴ (S)

³ A reference to allegations that the Soviet Union was supplying Vietnam with chemical weapons for use in its war in Laos.

⁴ For the first news report on the allegation of Soviet chemical warfare in Afghanistan, see "Chemical Warfare Hinted Against Afghan Rebels," *Los Angeles Times*, January 17, 1980, p. A2. No record of a strategy paper or liaison between the Department of State and the Red Cross or UN High Commissioner for Refugees was found.

229. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, March 8, 1980

In reviewing the discussion on Afghanistan which took place at the SCC meeting Friday afternoon,² the President noted that the Soviets might eventually be willing to negotiate seriously, if there is:

- Continuing strong insurgency in Afghanistan.
- Sustained Islam outrage at Soviet actions in Afghanistan.
- Sustained and improved Western solidarity on the issue. (S)

He indicated that he agreed with the SCC's preference for Option 2 (make clear to others the parameters for neutralization which would be acceptable to the United States and seek to shape any proposals before they are launched). He also noted agreement with SCC skepticism about Soviet willingness to negotiate seriously and concern that the uncoordinated Western approach is weakening both our solidarity and prospects for a longer run settlement.³ (S)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat (ES), Sensitive and Super Sensitive File, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, Box 4, 1980 ES Sensitive, Mar 1–15. Secret. "CV" is stamped in the upper right corner, indicating that Vance read the memorandum.

² Reference is presumably to Friday, March 7, on which there was an SCC meeting where Afghanistan was one subject discussed. The summary of conclusions is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Meetings File, Box 20, SCC Meetings: #285 Held 3/7/80, 3/80.

³ For the issue of possible Soviet willingness to negotiate on withdrawing its troops from Afghanistan, thereby leading to the eventual neutralization of that country, see Document 216. Carter's skepticism squared with the dominant view of the intelligence community. For example, an interagency intelligence memorandum, March 13, concluded regarding Soviet intentions in Afghanistan: "The Soviets will continue for tactical reasons to suggest a certain receptivity to proposals for troop withdrawals. In the next two to three months, however, they will probably continue their buildup to a total force of at least eight division equivalents. Following this spring's counterinsurgency offensive, they are likely to conclude that even more forces are needed. Regardless of their success against the insurgents, the Soviets intend to maintain a significant military presence in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future to reinforce their broader regional influence." (Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff Files, IIM 80–10006)

230. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, March 11, 1980, 1613Z

3989. Subj: (C) Ambassador's Discussion With Arbatov on Afghanistan and U.S.-Soviet Relations.

1. (S—Entire text.)

2. Summary: I had a lengthy discussion yesterday with USA Institute Director Arbatov, who provided no fresh insights into how the Afghan problem might be solved other than to stress that the Soviets would never accept an outcome which made it appear that they were being "punished." He said the Soviets were convinced that the U.S. had been providing significant support to the Afghan insurgents, but he also described the excesses of the Amin regime as one reason for the Soviet action. He thought stability could be brought about within a few months if outside interference stopped.

In blaming the U.S. for the deterioration in Soviet/American relations, Arbatov said that after almost all the other aspects of the détente relationship had been dismantled SALT II was left in an exposed position and therefore was also vulnerable. He was not optimistic that a relationship could be rebuilt on arms control alone, though he agreed on the urgency of getting the SALT process started again. While he had no specific suggestions on how this might be done, he mentioned the possibility of a Vance/Gromyko meeting in Vienna as a desirable beginning. End summary.

3. Mr. Arbatov came to lunch at Spaso House March 10 with his associate Mr. Zhurkin. The Acting DCM and I represented the American side. Lunch started on an exchange of pleasantries. I had met Zhurkin at an Airlie House conference which I attended with Marshall Shulman, so the atmosphere was easy and relaxed. Shortly after sitting down at the table, we began to get into matters of substance. I mentioned that we were trying to find means of changing the present very low level of Soviet-American relations and getting the relationship back on track, moving ahead, and improving again. Arbatov expressed the same general sentiments and indicated his clear understanding that if we stayed in the present mode very long, an uncontrolled arms race in the future would be impossible to avoid. He said he thought our relations could not remain even in their present very bad state for long.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880025-0597, N800004-0400. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. The telegram is printed in full in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 266.

If they did not improve soon, they would get much worse. And “many people here in town” he said, are beginning to have doubts about the prospects.

[Omitted here is information unrelated to Afghanistan.]

5. On Afghanistan, I made very strongly the argument that the Soviet press was blaming the whole problem upon the U.S. upsetting the internal situation in Afghanistan and that we had specifically stated that we had not been interfering and had done so many times, most recently in President Carter’s letter to Tito, from which I quoted.² Arbatov’s answer to this was, “I am not disputing your word, but perhaps the Agency has been misinforming the State Department.” He said his government was convinced that the U.S. is in fact training and sending in Afghans from Pakistan to disrupt the internal situation. He said that about three million Afghans moved back and forth between Pakistan and Afghanistan seasonally with their flocks and that the infiltration of 200,000 armed Afghans would be relatively simple to be hidden in this migration—though he added that he had no information that this was actually happening.

6. While he stressed the role of outside interference, by the U.S. and also by China and Pakistan, Arbatov discussed the internal situation in Afghanistan as well as a reason for the Soviet action. He said the Soviets had gotten along very well with the King and with Daoud and then talked about the excesses of Amin, whom he compared with his namesake Idi Amin. He said that the elimination of the Amin regime, while in the Soviet interest, was also somewhat in the American interest because they were attempting to remove a bloody tyrant, installing a more generally popular regime, and bringing stability to the region.

7. As for how long it might take to bring about the stability they were seeking, Arbatov thought maybe only a few months—provided outside interference stopped. He did not dispute my point that the Brezhnev formula seemed like a non-starter, since it was impossible for us to pledge to stop doing something we are not doing. He did not seem much interested in talking about other formulas for getting the Soviets out of Afghanistan, although he thought the idea of having Mrs. Gandhi and a group of nonaligned nations or others work together to find some way to guarantee the Pak/Afghan border was an idea worth exploring.

² Carter’s February 26 letter to Tito addressed how the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had changed the dynamic of détente and offered support to Yugoslavia as an independent and nonaligned country. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 22, Yugoslavia: President Josip Broz Tito, 6/79–2/80)

8. The main point he made repeatedly with regard to an Afghan settlement was that the U.S. seemed intent on "punishing" the Soviet Union and that they would not under any circumstances accept a solution that made them look punished. He said that when the U.S. was willing to cease making Afghanistan a pure propaganda issue the matter could be treated seriously.

[Omitted here is information unrelated to Afghanistan.]

12. All in all, the luncheon which took over two hours was a quiet, unemotional exchange of views with each side claiming to understand the other but with no constructive suggestion on the part of Arbatov or Zhurkin toward a solution to break the impasse. The two points that came through most clearly were that the Soviets will not abide by an indication that they are being punished, and two, that a Vance-Gromyko meeting might be desirable as a departure point for a new relationship.

13. However, since there is no movement in the Soviet position here, I am not hopeful that we as yet have any signal of a direction for sensible movement in the future.

Watson

231. Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹*[assessment number not declassified]*

Washington, March 1980

[Omitted here are a title page, security information page, and cover page.]

Alleged Soviet Use of Chemical Warfare in Afghanistan
([classification marking not declassified])

Overview

We believe the evidence is sufficient to conclude that Soviet forces have used nonlethal chemicals against insurgents in a number of areas of Afghanistan. The chemicals employed almost certainly have included irritants such as riot-control agents, probably mixed with smoke. Continuing allegations of deaths resulting from chemical attacks lead us to conclude that the chances are about even that lethal agents, such as nerve gas, also have been used.² *([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])*

The bulk of the reporting on chemical agent attacks has come from Afghan refugees in Pakistan and from insurgent leaders. *[3 lines, classification marking, codeword, and handling restriction not declassified]*

The Soviets have deployed chemical defense battalions with the three motorized rifle divisions in Afghanistan, and Soviet troops in the Kabul area have been seen carrying what appear to be gas masks in canvas cases, suggesting that Soviet forces in the country are prepared to operate in terrain contaminated by chemical agents. These units and the chemical defense equipment seen in Afghanistan, however, are standard in all Soviet divisions, and we do not consider it unusual that

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 23, folder 9. Top Secret; *[codeword and handling restriction not declassified]*. A statement on the cover page reads: "The authors of this paper are *[name not declassified]* Science and Technology Division, Office of Scientific Weapons Research, and *[name not declassified]* Theater Forces Division, Office of Strategic Research. This report has been coordinated with the Office of Political Analysis, the Office of Imagery Analysis, the Afghan Task Force, the National Intelligence Officer for General Purpose Forces, and the Directorate of Operations."

² The Soviet Union signed and ratified the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting the first use of chemical warfare but took a reservation under which the protocol would be binding on the USSR only with regard to other signatories. Because Afghanistan is not a signatory, the USSR would not be in violation of the protocol if it used CW agents in Afghanistan. *[classification marking not declassified]* [Footnote is in the original.]

these units moved into Afghanistan with their parent divisions.³ In any event, if the Soviets were planning fairly widespread use of persistent chemical weapons and operations in contaminated areas, additional chemical defense units probably would be required. (*classification marking and codeword not declassified*)

Soviet ground and air units operating against Afghan insurgent forces have weapon systems capable of delivering chemical agents. There is no direct evidence, however, that lethal chemical munitions have been issued to Soviet forces.⁴ (*classification marking, codeword, and handling restriction not declassified*)

[Omitted here is the body of the assessment.]

³ *[text not declassified]* "A large, well-equipped and well-trained chemical-biological-radiological (CBR) organization is organic to the USSR Joint Service Structure. Each combat unit down to the regiment level has a sizeable contingent for CBR defense and chemical specialists are assigned down to company level." Noting that the Soviet military was "known to have developed a variety of modern agents, multiple delivery systems, and the tactical doctrine necessary for large-scale use," the cable continued: "According to a former Afghan Army officer who is now a member of the insurgent movement, Soviet forces first used lethal chemical agents on 27 December 1979 against insurgents in Badakhshan and the Northern Hindu Kush area. During the week of 13–19 January additional lethal attacks were reported near Faizabad, Jalalabad, and in Bamian and Takhar provinces. More recently, attacks on 3 and 11 February took place in Badakhshan and Nuristan provinces. Aircraft dropped bombs filled with chemical agents that were dispersed in airbursts. The CW agent was described as a vapor which felt damp against the skin. Inhalation of the vapor resulted in difficulty in breathing, excretion, vomiting, blindness, paralysis, and death." (Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 5, JCS Support Request 80–81)

⁴ Attached but not printed is a memorandum from Zellmer to Turner, March 26, that reported on *[text not declassified]* study, entitled "Evidence Bearing on the Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents by Soviet and Afghan Forces, May 1979–March 1980." Zellmer summarized the study, also attached but not printed: "We have advised *[less than 1 line not declassified]* of the intelligence community's increased concern over the Soviet use of toxic substances in Afghanistan. To date, there is no *[less than 1 line not declassified]* evidence to conclude that the chemical, microbe, or other toxic substances the Soviets employed have been lethal." (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 23, folder 9)

232. Intelligence Information Cable Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

[*cable number not declassified*]

Washington, March 12, 1980

COUNTRY

Afghanistan/Saudi Arabia

SUBJECT

Saudi Financial Aid to Afghanistan Rebel Groups [*1 line not declassified*]

SOURCE

[*4½ lines not declassified*]

1. According to a prominent supporter of the Afghan exile movement, each of the five Afghan political groups which joined together in early February 1980 to form the United Islamic Liberation Front of Afghanistan (UILFA) received 1,000,000 Pakistani rupees (approximately U.S. \$100,000) from the Saudi Arabian Government when the UILFA was formed. UILFA has been promised \$6,000,000 more by the Saudis. (Headquarters comment: See State telegram 035357, 9 February, for background on the formation of UILFA.)²

2. Many leaders of Afghan tribal paramilitary forces fighting in Afghanistan are aware of the sums received by the UILFA groups in Peshawar, and some believe the sums are greater than they really are. The UILFA's failure so far to spend any of the Saudi money in support of the groups fighting inside Afghanistan is creating a credibility gap between the people of Afghanistan and the exiled political leaders greater than has previously existed. This credibility gap has been enhanced by the paramilitary leaders' observations that some of the political leaders in exile are prospering by conducting various forms of trade.

3. ACQ: [*1 line not declassified*]

4. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Dissem: [*1½ lines not declassified*]

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Office of Support Services, Job 97S00360R: Intelligence Document Collection (1977–1981), Box 86 (3150470080–3150639980). Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*].

² In telegram 35357 to USNATO and other posts, February 9, the Department noted that the formation of UILFA "marks an important step forward after more than a year and a half of fruitless efforts to bring unity to the fragmented Afghan nationalist movement." The Department cautioned, however, the UILFA was "still a very fragile organization" whose leaders remained "separated by important ideological as well as personal differences." These differences included varying attitudes toward both the United States and the USSR and the form of government Afghanistan should adopt, ranging from a Western-style democracy to a fundamentalist Islamic orientation. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800069–0479)

233. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, March 14, 1980

SUBJECT

Likely Soviet Reaction to Use of SA-7s by Afghan Insurgency [*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*]

1. The Soviet reaction to the initiation of attacks against their aircraft in Afghanistan by SA-7s will depend on (1) their estimate of the level of military threat that they could anticipate from such attacks (if not terminated); (2) their estimate of the likelihood that the threat could be eliminated (or managed) by in-country military measures; (3) their estimate of the efficacy of threats or retaliatory military actions against Pakistan for terminating the activity; (4) their estimate of the consequences that such retaliatory actions against Pakistan might produce for US/Pakistan relations (e.g. driving Pakistan closer to US). [*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*]

2. We assume that the availability of portable surface-to-air weapons to insurgent forces in Afghanistan will make itself known to the Soviets initially by random and intermittent attacks against its aircraft. We also assume that the Soviets will believe, or will proceed on the assumption that, those weapons were being fed into Afghanistan through Pakistan.² We believe they will proceed on this assumption even in the absence of hard evidence unless they believe they have hard evidence to the contrary (e.g. that the weapons were being introduced through another country). [*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*]

3. A crucial consideration governing the initial Soviet response will be their estimate of the scope of the new threat posed to them. If they

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Daily CIA Brief File, Box 26, 3/13/80-3/20/80. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. Attached but not printed is a March 17 covering memorandum from Turner to Brzezinski. Turner wrote that the CIA memorandum, per his conversation with Brzezinski the previous Friday, March 7 (see Document 229), examined "the most likely Soviet reactions to the use of SA-7s against their forces in Afghanistan. Clearly the existing pressures on Zia can be expected to increase significantly; however it should be noted that he is in control of when these weapons are introduced." Carter initialed "C" in the upper right corner of Turner's memorandum.

² An article in the President's Daily Brief, March 28, reported: "Soviet SA-7 anti-aircraft missiles have reportedly fallen into insurgent hands. An Afghan commando battalion defected on Saturday and took along 24 of its Soviet-made missiles, [1 line not declassified]. The shoulder-fired SA-7 would be particularly effective against helicopters." (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977-81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—March 1980, PDBs)

become persuaded that they are faced with what would at most amount to no more than a low-level nuisance threat capable of bringing down an occasional Soviet aircraft, or embarrassing the Soviets and marginally encouraging the insurgents, but not capable of materially affecting the course and outcome of the counterinsurgency campaign, they might be prepared to confine themselves to harsh threats and minor, or even ambiguous, retaliatory actions against Pakistan designed primarily to discourage an enlargement of the activity in Afghanistan.

a. A possible scenario in these circumstances might take the form of a sharp warning directed to the Paks after several incidents involving the firing of SA-7s in Afghanistan with a clear implication that if the activities were not quickly terminated, unspecified but unpleasant consequences would follow. The Soviets then might wait for a period of time (up to several weeks) to observe the effect of their warning on the level of activity on the assumption that the Pakistan government—even if sufficiently frightened—would probably not be able to control the use of rockets already in Afghanistan, but that it could take measures to prevent the introduction of additional weapons or missiles thereafter.

b. Should the scope and intensity of the use of these weapons against Soviet forces proceed at the same or similar levels beyond the stipulated time, the Soviets would probably take retaliatory actions against Pakistan, e.g. starting low and gradually escalating from more to less ambiguous forms, employing either Afghan ground forces or Soviet aircraft with Afghan markings. [*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*]

4. Should the Soviets either conclude at the outset that they faced a substantial military threat from the rockets, or that the low level of attacks they initially faced was bound to be raised by the introduction of substantial numbers of weapons *unless* the Paks reversed course, we would not be surprised to see the Soviets deliver a virtual ultimatum to the Paks followed thereafter by strong, unambiguous retaliatory attacks against a variety of targets that could directly or indirectly be said to associate Pakistan and the Afghan insurgents (refugee camps, real or alleged training sites, military supply depots). If this did not suffice, the Soviets could step up the pressure by attacking Pakistan army encampments or airfields for the purpose of severely embarrassing if not destabilizing the Zia government, and demonstrating Pakistan's impotence. [*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*]

5. We would rate Soviet preference as follows:

a. The Soviets would prefer to threaten or coerce Pakistan into terminating the activity rather than engage in high-level retaliatory action against Pakistan because Moscow would not wish unnecessarily to accept the risk that the Paks would reconsider the desirability of a closer security relationship with the US.

b. The Soviets might even prefer to accept the low-level nuisance value of a fairly prolonged series of attacks to the risk of a high-level military attack on Pakistan with the attendant risk of driving the Paks back into the arms of the Americans.

c. However, if the Soviets were persuaded that the intensity of the supply activity from Pakistan could not be controlled by means short of severe retaliatory military actions, we believe they would, in the end, take such military actions and would prefer in that case to pose such a severe threat to the Paks so as to drive them to make demands for security guarantees and assistance from the US so far-reaching that the US would be unlikely to comply. [*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*]

234. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 17, 1980

[Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat (ES), Sensitive and Super Sensitive File, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, Box 3, 1980 Super Sensitive I, Jan, Feb, Mar–1980. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. 2 pages not declassified]

235. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 17, 1980, 8–10:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin

The conversation started with Dobrynin expressing considerable pessimism about the longer range trends in U.S.-Soviet relations. He feels that we are on a spiral—that both sides are becoming increasingly

¹ Source: Carter Library, Donated Historical Material, Brzezinski Collection, Brzezinski's Geographic Files, Box 19, USSR—U.S.-Soviet Relations: 7/78–3/80. Secret. Carter initialed "C" in the upper right corner. The meeting took place at Brzezinski's residence. The memorandum of conversation is printed in full in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 268.

antagonistic, and that he does not see much prospect for an early improvement.

I suspect that this was a deliberate line designed to “smoke me out.” I made the point in response that he may well be right but that what happens this year in U.S.-Soviet relations is likely to influence a great deal the next four years. This is why we both have an obligation to see if something could not be done in the near future to reverse the negative trends set in motion by the Soviet action in Afghanistan.

Substance

The discussion then turned more specifically to the question of Afghanistan. Dobrynin spoke at some length, reviewing recent history. He said that the Soviets had no intention of moving into Afghanistan but the deteriorating situation gave them no choice. (Incidentally, he told me that Babrak returned secretly to Kabul in October of last year.)

The Soviets have no intention of dominating the region according to him and will withdraw once a “stable government” has been created. He put a lot of emphasis on organizing a new Afghanistan army which will carry on once the Soviets have left. In response to a question, he indicated that it may be up to a year or so before the Soviets can leave, but he professed great optimism about their capacity to crush the resistance.

He said that the Soviet Union would be willing to give guarantees to us that it has no designs against Pakistan and Iran.

I responded by saying that the key issue is whether the Soviet Union insists on imposing a Communist government on Afghanistan or whether it desires an Afghanistan that is genuinely non-aligned and non-hostile to the Soviet Union. If it is the former, conflicts between us will persist because it will require the Soviet army to maintain such a regime. But if it is the latter, I am sure that we could work out international arrangements, including transitionally some neutral forces from Moslem countries to assure Afghanistan’s genuine neutrality. Communists could participate in such a government, even if they could not dominate it. (I cited Finland as an example.) In effect, the Soviets have to decide whether their objective is to make Afghanistan into a Mongolia or whether they can live with an Asian variant of Finland. In the latter case, there could be a relatively quick upswing in U.S.-Soviet relations.

Dobrynin responded by saying that the above is a “harder” statement than made to Moscow by “some of your allies.” He gave me the impression that my position on this is also harder than he thought the U.S. position actually was. He maintained that his impression was that we would be satisfied with Soviet “guarantees” for the region and with Soviet departure after Afghanistan has become “stable.” Our allies are

more interested in the region than in Afghanistan and the Soviets can assure us about the region.

I responded that the President in his letter to Tito made it clear that we saw neutralization and departure of the Soviet troops as linked, though we are not insisting that the latter is sequentially a precondition for the former.² I drew his attention to the sentence in the letter which said that we would be prepared to enter into guarantees “with the prompt withdrawal of all Soviet troops” and I emphasized that the word “with” implied simultaneity.

I went on to say that the issue is not assurances but arrangements that can endure. If the Soviets insist on a Communist government in Kabul, the Soviet army will have to stay in Afghanistan for a long time and this has objective consequences not only for relations with us but for stability in the region.

At this point, Dobrynin seemed to hint that it is not to be excluded that there could be some change in the Afghani government and Babrak could become non-essential—though he immediately qualified this by saying that he is not in a position to negotiate on this subject with me.

I responded by saying that the creation of a genuine Afghani government need not be the point of departure for a solution because it is not our intention to humiliate the Soviet Union, but we do have to agree in advance on where we will end up (i.e. a genuinely neutral and independent Afghanistan) and then we can work on the steps of getting there. (I have to add that the hint about Babrak’s dispensability was quite vague and I am not certain whether it did indicate some flexibility on the Soviet part.)

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Afghanistan.]

² See footnote 2, Document 230.

236. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, March 18, 1980, 9–10 a.m.

SUBJECT

Iran/Afghanistan

PARTICIPANTS

State

Warren Christopher
Harold Saunders

OSD

Secretary Harold Brown
W. Graham Clayton, Jr.

JCS

General David Jones
Lt. General John Pustay

Justice

John Shenefield*

CIA

Frank Carlucci

Treasury

Robert Carswell*
Robert Mundheim*

White House

Zbigniew Brzezinski
David Aaron
Hedley Donovan
Joseph Onek

NSC

Gary Sick
Marshall Brent

*Present only for Items 1–3

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

[Omitted here is information unrelated to Afghanistan.]

6. *Afghanistan*. The SCC reviewed a State Department paper outlining seven elements of a possible policy directed at achieving the neutralization of Afghanistan (attached).² Dr. Brzezinski said that two addi-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council Institutional Files, 1977–1981, Box 111, SCC–290, 3/18/80, Iran/Afghanistan. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Carter initialed “C” in the upper right corner.

² Attached but not printed. The paper listed seven possible elements to achieve the political neutralization of Afghanistan: “1) Withdrawal of all Soviet military forces from Afghanistan; 2) An Afghan government acceptable to the Afghan people; 3) No interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan by its neighbors or any other state; 4) Non-alignment in Afghanistan’s foreign policy and permanent neutrality for Afghanistan, including the obligation to refrain from entering into any military alliance, and to refrain from allowing any state to have military forces or facilities in its territory except by agreement of the guarantors; 5) Guarantees by Afghanistan’s neighbors and other interested states of permanent neutrality for Afghanistan and of non-interference in its internal affairs; 6) Agreement by the Afghan government and all guarantors on the definition of Afghanistan’s borders; 7) Arrangements apply only to Afghanistan and not to affect the sovereign rights of other countries.” Carter made three notations on the paper. He inserted “prompt” before “withdrawal” in the first item; he bracketed items 6 and 7 and wrote: “I see no reason to include these,” in the right margin; and at the bottom of

tional elements needed to be added: (1) Transitional arrangements on how stability would be maintained in Afghanistan during the turnover period if the Soviets should in fact agree to withdraw; and (2) Graduated steps spelling out how we get from here to there, i.e., how would we present this to the allies and to the Soviets, and how would we avoid getting involved in a negotiating situation on issues we would prefer to avoid. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski noted that when he had presented some ideas along this line to Dobrynin, Dobrynin had remarked several times that that was not what they were hearing from America's allies.³ Who was taking a different view? Mr. Aaron suggested that the original German paper, which had focused on possible concessions to the Soviets to get out of Afghanistan, may have been the source of these reports.⁴ The French, Warren Christopher noted, had contributed to that paper. (S)

The SCC agreed that the word "prompt" should be added to the first element in the paper ("Prompt withdrawal of all Soviet military forces . . ."). (U)

Mr. Christopher explained that the preparation of the attached paper had focused on the basic elements of a policy, and had not addressed a negotiating strategy. That was the reason why the two additional elements identified by Dr. Brzezinski were not included. The objective was to put together a reasonable policy package which would put the onus on the USSR. (C)

Secretary Brown noted that the seventh point was the most dangerous since it opened the possibility of negotiating with the USSR about security arrangements in the region outside Afghanistan. The SCC agreed that we should not initially raise this point with the USSR—at least not in this form—but that the principle was essential. It would be preferable either to redraft the statement or to hold it back for use if and when the Soviets introduced the idea of negotiating rights for themselves in the region outside Afghanistan. Warren Christopher thought it important to include this point in case the package leaked out. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski wondered if the sixth element did not get us involved in a negotiation about the location of the Afghan border.

the page, he wrote: "Presumption must be that Soviets will not withdraw under any circumstances, therefore, how to keep allies with us & win propaganda points." These notations were also conveyed in a memorandum from Brzezinski to Vance, March 19. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat (ES), Sensitive and Super Sensitive File, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, Box 4, 1980 ES Sensitive, Mar 16–31) For the final version of the paper, see the attachment to Document 240.

³ See Document 235.

⁴ Not found.

Although we recognize the Durand line, and we have recently reaffirmed that position, the Durand line is not accepted by the Afghans and some others. The SCC agreed that the sixth point should be made a footnote to the third element concerning non-interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. If asked, in that context, what borders would be guaranteed, we would indicate our recognition of the Durand line as the border we would recognize. (S)

With those changes, the SCC approved the elements proposed by the State Department. The SCC recommended seeking Presidential approval in principle of these elements before proceeding further. (C)

_____ Approve the elements of the policy outlined in the attached paper, with the changes as suggested above.

_____ As amended.⁵

The SCC then discussed how this policy could best be handled with the allies and the Soviets. Mr. Christopher suggested taking it to the other six allies first, getting their acceptance, and then deciding together how best to present it to the USSR. We may not want to seek out the Soviets, but let them come to us. Dr. Brzezinski said he would go over the points informally with Sir Michael Palliser when he met with him today. Mr. Aaron said we needed to think about alternative ways in which we might put the Soviets on the defensive. For example, it might be desirable to call for an international conference on Afghanistan, including the Islamic states, China, and others. Another possibility might be to go to the UN General Assembly. (S)

All agreed that we should take the leadership on this issue, and that we needed to have a well-defined strategy before taking it to the allies. A small group composed of State, Defense, CIA and NSC will meet to work out the next steps. (S)

⁵ Carter did not mark either option.

237. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, March 18, 1980, 1526Z

4364. Subject: (U) Another Look at Soviet Motives and Objectives in Afghanistan. Ref: 79 Moscow 28134.²

1. (S—Entire text)

2. Summary. The Soviet argument that their move into Afghanistan was necessitated by outside interference which threatened Soviet security through the replacement of a friendly regime with a hostile bridgehead on the Soviet Union's southern border does not stand close scrutiny. Nonetheless, the Soviets were genuinely concerned that internal instability in a bordering country, with a Marxist government, if allowed to continue, would damage Soviet interests and prestige. They undoubtedly suspected that the U.S. and China would eventually be tempted to exploit a sustained anti-Soviet insurgency, that Amin's excesses were damaging the prospects for stabilizing the Marxist regime's control of the country, and that Amin's justifiable distrust of Soviet intentions toward him would tempt him to consider a sharp turn away from dependence on Soviet support with a consequent loss of Soviet prestige. They also recognized both the ideological difficulty of explaining the overthrow of a Marxist regime by an Islamic fundamentalist movement and the effect of such an event on Eastern Europe, the Third World and the Muslim population of Soviet Central Asia. We have yet to see any hard evidence that the Soviet thrust into Afghanistan was part of a larger design aimed at the Persian Gulf, warm water ports on the Indian Ocean or the encirclement of China through Pakistan; but Soviet decision-makers were undoubtedly aware of the opportunities that a stable Communist Afghanistan, subservient to the Soviet Union, would create for future Soviet exploitation of targets of opportunity in Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf area.

3. The Soviet minimal objective was therefore to secure a stable pro-Soviet Afghan state. Soviet forces were intended to secure the major population centers and transportation routes in Afghanistan,

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Donated Material of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, 1977-1981, Box 82, Afghanistan Neutralization. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent for information to Warsaw, Amman, Baghdad, Beijing, Beirut, Belgrade, Berlin, Bonn, Bucharest, Cairo, Damascus, Geneva, Islamabad, Jidda, Kabul, Leningrad, London, Vienna, New Delhi, Paris, Prague, Rome, Sofia, Tel Aviv, Tokyo, and USNATO. Printed from a copy received in the Joint Chiefs of Staff Message Center, which included additional handling instructions: "Military addressees handle as Specat Exclusive for Service Chiefs."

² See Document 123.

while the brunt of counterinsurgency operations would remain with Afghan armed forces directed by Soviet advisors and planners. Believing that U.S.-Soviet relations were worsening and U.S.-Chinese relations improving, even without Afghanistan, and that the U.S.-Iranian crisis would minimize the Islamic countries' reactions, they were undeterred by potential damage to their international interests. The Soviets failed to foresee that their flagrant intervention would accelerate the disintegration of the Afghan Army, undermine Babrak's chances of gaining broad public support, and give new impetus to the insurgency. They also seriously underestimated the damage to their relations with the West and the Islamic world, but we believe they would have not changed their decision to go into Afghanistan had they more accurately assessed international reactions. In sum, we see no evidence that the Soviets have abandoned their objective of establishing a stable, pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan through military means or that they are seriously interested at this time, in a political solution that would necessitate withdrawal of Soviet forces. They are keeping alive the possibility of negotiations, however, in order to deflect attention from their pursuit of a military solution, and are watching with detachment the West-West negotiations on neutralization and other political solutions, hoping that splits among the Western allies will widen and the U.S. will stand isolated in its measures taken in response to the invasion. End summary.

4. Two-and-a-half months after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, many questions remain about Soviet motives and objectives in that country. Since submitting our assessment of Soviet motives immediately after the invasion (reftel), we see no reason to alter fundamentally that analysis. Nevertheless, the intensity of Soviet efforts to justify their move in terms of an alleged threat to Soviet security caused by U.S. and Chinese intervention on their southern border, the "signals" they are sending of interest in a political settlement, and the willingness of some third parties, such as India, to accept the plausibility of the Soviet version lead us to take another look at Soviet motives and objectives and to update our original analysis.

5. The Soviets, in public and private statements, adamantly insist that their only objectives in Afghanistan were and are the perpetuation of a stable, friendly regime and preservation of the social achievements of the April revolution. Soviet charges of U.S., Chinese and other foreign instigation of the Afghan Muslim rebels, if not made out of whole cloth, are at the least grossly exaggerated. Nonetheless, the Soviets have been deeply concerned about the steady growth of an anti-Communist, anti-Soviet fundamentalist Muslim and nationalistic insurgent movement in Afghanistan since at least the time of the Herat uprising in March of 1979. Unable to admit publicly the possibility of widespread

spontaneous popular resistance to a Marxist regime, the Soviets at that time began to concoct charges of U.S. and other foreign interference. However, the Soviets undoubtedly did suspect that the U.S. and China could not be counted on to resist forever the temptation to exploit a growing anti-Soviet insurgency and that the Soviet Union, if it failed to act, would eventually find itself faced with a radical Islamic southern neighbor unfriendly to the Soviet Union and susceptible to potential overtures from the U.S. and China.

6. Soviet plotting against Afghan Prime Minister Amin in the months preceding the Soviet invasion has been well documented elsewhere, as has Amin's awareness of Soviet attitudes toward him. The Soviets clearly believed that Amin's excesses were primarily responsible for popular disaffection with the April 1978 revolution, that his removal was necessary to win the war against the insurgents, and that Babrak Karmal could be trusted to follow Soviet advice on broadening popular support for the regime. Moreover, the deep mutual distrust and suspicion between the Soviets and Amin must have caused the Soviets to consider the possibility that Amin, like Sadat and Siad Barre, would suddenly turn against them and order the Soviet advisors out of Afghanistan.

7. Either an insurgent victory or an anti-Soviet turnabout by Amin would have been a serious blow to Soviet prestige and foreign policy interests. Moreover, the Soviets would have had great ideological and political difficulties in explaining the replacement of a socialist regime by an Islamic republic, in contrast to the Iranian revolution which the Soviets portray as a progressive step from monarchy. Not the least of Soviet concerns were the potentially troublesome effects of the loss of a neighboring Marxist state, with which the Soviet Union had a friendship treaty including a security commitment, on Eastern Europe, other pro-Soviet "progressive" governments in the Third World and even on the Muslim population of Soviet Central Asia. Brezhnev has alluded to those concerns in a conversation with a Western visitor.

8. We do not accept the thesis occasionally mooted that the move into Afghanistan was a direct reaction to the NATO TNF decision or to the growing ties between the U.S. and China. But it is certainly true that the international situation at the end of 1979 was more propitious for a Soviet move into Afghanistan than it might be later, if the Soviets had let matters drift until they were faced with an imminent prospect of losing Afghanistan. U.S.-Soviet relations were already worsening as a result of the dispute over the Soviet brigade in Cuba, the U.S. commitment to increase its defense spending and its military presence in the Indian Ocean, the NATO decision on TNF rejecting Brezhnev's initiative to forestall it, and rapidly improving relations between the U.S. and China. The Soviets thus saw poor immediate prospects for

obtaining SALT ratification, MFN, or other forward movement in U.S.-Soviet relations. Believing that bilateral relations were unlikely to improve during a U.S. election year, they were undeterred by the danger of further damage to those relations. The Soviets were also aware that potential damage to their relations with the Islamic world would be lessened by Islamic attention to growing U.S. pressures on Iran, and that the possibility of driving Iran into a close relationship with the U.S. was foreclosed by the hostage crisis. Also, they have made a deliberate effort to deflect attention in the Arab world away from Afghanistan and onto the Palestine issue where the U.S. is singled out as the true “enemy of Islam”.

9. We have seen no direct evidence that the Soviet move into Afghanistan was part of a larger design to expand Soviet military power to the Persian Gulf, to gain a land route to ports on the Indian Ocean or to encircle China. For the time being the Soviets have their hands full in Afghanistan, but the achievement of a stable Afghan Government subservient to the Soviet Union would create future opportunities for expanding Soviet influence in Southwest Asia and toward the Persian Gulf that must have occurred to Soviet decision makers.

10. The minimal Soviet objectives in sending large numbers of Soviet combat forces into Afghanistan were to prevent an insurgent victory, to replace the unpopular Amin regime with a more representative leader, and ultimately to crush the insurgents and establish a stable pro-Soviet regime. Aside from removing Amin and installing Babrak in power, the principal mission of the Soviet forces was to secure the major population centers, roads and airfields. Babrak would thus be given time to broaden the revolution’s political base, while the Afghan Army carried out counter-insurgency operations under Soviet direction and planning. The Soviets handled the affair clumsily and miscalculated the effect of their action on Afghan nationalism. The invasion has accelerated the disintegration of the Afghan Army, increased the unpopularity of the Kabul regime, and given new impetus to the insurgency. The Soviets equally underestimated the long-term damage to their relations with the U.S. and other countries, particularly the Islamic countries.

11. We see no evidence, however, that basic Soviet objectives have changed as a result of their unexpected difficulties or that they are yet willing to withdraw without leaving behind a secure pro-Soviet Marxist regime. It is interesting that some of our official contacts with lower and mid-level Soviet officials have revealed a sense of miscalculation. For example, they have called the Afghan venture a “snafu”, a “mistake”, a move guided by the Soviet Union’s “pretensions”. However, the reasons which convinced the leadership to make its move are no

less cogent now than they were before, even if the damage to their relations with others has turned out to be greater than expected.

12. While the Soviets say they were perfectly happy with their relations with Afghanistan before the April revolution, we see no possibility of turning back the clock. Antipathy to the Soviet Union and its ideology has greatly intensified in Afghanistan since April 1978 and particularly since the Soviet invasion. It is thus difficult to conceive of a regime friendly to the Soviet Union and preserving the gains of the April revolution which could survive without the presence of Soviet forces. Assertions, such as those by USA Institute Director Arbatov, that the Soviet Union could establish a stable, friendly regime within a few months, if outside interference is stopped, cannot be taken at face value.³ The roots of the insurgency are in Afghanistan itself, and the result of a Soviet withdrawal would be a Muslim victory or, at least, chaos and dismemberment of the Afghan state.

13. Meanwhile, the Soviets are keeping alive talk about a political settlement, but our impression is that this is simply a ploy designed to focus attention on alleged U.S. interference, defuse international pressures for a prompt Soviet withdrawal, take the steam out of the Olympic boycott movement, buy time for continuing military efforts to crush the insurgency, and preserve their options for the future. They seem to be watching with a certain detachment what one of our colleagues has termed the West-West negotiations on neutralization and other political solutions, hoping that splits among the Western countries will widen and the U.S. will stand isolated in its measures taken in response to the invasion. Only when, and if, they become convinced that they cannot achieve their objectives through military means will the Soviets seriously consider a political settlement that would bring about a Soviet withdrawal. For now, all available evidence indicates that they will continue to pursue their objectives through military means, even if this requires broader use of Soviet forces than they originally anticipated.

Watson

³ See Document 230.

238. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, March 18, 1980, 1:45 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown
Deputy Secretary of Defense Graham Claytor
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff David Jones
Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner
Zbigniew Brzezinski
Hamilton Jordan
David Aaron

MINUTES

The President began by saying that he wanted to try to keep the meeting short and not go into great detail, but he wanted a general discussion about what is taking place in our foreign and defense policies. It was his sense that the last two weeks were the worst since he has been in office. We are confronted by several important issues which are not directly related but which are tied together in terms of the overall posture of the U.S. and the impression that our country is making at home and abroad. The President said that after a general review this afternoon, he wished to get together again, perhaps at Camp David this weekend, after our subordinates have had an opportunity to clarify the issues and define the options.

The President's analysis of the current situation was as follows: at best we have a stagnant situation in Iran and Afghanistan, as well as in the Israeli/Egyptian peace talks. We have a deteriorating position, and perhaps worse, with our European Allies. Finally, our relationship with the Soviet Union is dormant and perhaps deteriorating as well.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Afghanistan.]

As for Afghanistan, it was the President's judgment the Soviets are going to stay in that country for at least a year. He thought they were making progress against the resistance and they were succeeding in driving a wedge between ourselves and our Allies—with the help of the Allies, particularly the French.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Meetings File, Box 2, NSC Meeting #27 Held 3/18/80, 3/80. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Aaron. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room.

The President said it was important to develop a definition, for ourselves and for our Allies, of a neutralist Afghanistan and try to build world support for it along with a concomitant condemnation of the Soviet military occupation. Such a concept would facilitate enlisting European support for our efforts against the Soviet invasion.²

On the issue of the Europeans, the President thought that now that we have our COCOM proposals, we have an opportunity to test their intentions. The French probably will not accept tighter COCOM rules, but we can put pressure on them as well.

The only bright spot, said the President, is our effort to boycott the Olympics. That seems to be gaining momentum every day.

As far as the USSR is concerned, the President said that he had been toying with the idea of a frank and tough letter to Brezhnev. It would make clear that there would be no resumption of normal trading and commerce so long as the Soviets are invading Afghanistan. At the same time, the letter would make clear that we are prepared to take steps to improve our relationship if the Soviets are prepared to have a neutral Afghanistan.

In the meantime, they must realize that we will take the steps necessary to protect our security, particularly since their actions threaten detente.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Afghanistan.]

The Secretary of State said he was clear in his own mind what we want on Afghanistan neutrality, but he did not know whether the

² In a memorandum to Brzezinski, March 15, in preparation for the NSC meeting, Brent concluded: "The next nine months are going to be the most critical test we have faced with the Soviets since the Korean war." Brent based this analysis on the assumption that the Soviet leadership, despite its surprise at the initial, vigorously negative worldwide response to the intervention in Afghanistan, would likely dig in its troops there and build both international and political acceptance for the intervention as well as tactical gains in Afghanistan. Brent noted that since January a series of missteps in U.S. policy had turned the tide in the Soviets' favor. These included: a split between the United States and its European allies over how to respond to the crisis in Afghanistan; ongoing Pakistani susceptibility to Soviet intimidation; and numerous shortcomings in the U.S. ability to punish the USSR with the Olympic boycott and the grain and technology transfer embargoes. To mitigate these problems, Brent counseled that the United States must strengthen Afghan resistance forces with Chinese and Pakistani help; increase pressure on the European allies for a united front; challenge Soviet adventurism elsewhere through covert means; increase the U.S. military presence worldwide; and explore alternative channels for high-level U.S.-Soviet communication. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 3-10/80) In a memorandum to Brzezinski and Aaron, March 17, Thornton agreed with Brent's basic assumption that the momentum was with the Soviet Union, but doubted the efficacy of attempting to reverse it. Instead, Thornton asserted, the U.S. capacity to defend its "vital interests" in the region were limited: "We cannot, and hence should not, seek to defend them where the Soviets have an overwhelming geopolitical advantage. (Ibid.)

French would go along. He thought it was important that we stay close to the British whom he thought supported our position fully. The President responded by saying that we should be prepared to go public with our views on Afghan neutrality. The Secretary of State agreed and suggested that we could be most effective by staying close to the British. Dr. Brzezinski then reviewed the points elaborating the elements of Afghan neutrality which had been developed that morning in the SCC meeting.³ Harold Brown commented that we should be clear in our own minds whether the Soviet Union would accept these principles. The President said that he assumed that they could not, but he was concerned that the Soviets were getting away with their current activities in terms of world opinion, indeed, in terms of our Allies' opinions, too.

The Secretary of State thought that all the other European Allies would go along with our definition of Afghan neutrality except the French. Harold Brown added that the French may take the same substantive position, but do not want to be linked to a collective position.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Afghanistan.]

Secretary Brown said that we have a good case to present to our Allies on what the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan means to them. When he tries it out on them, they admit that the oil resources of the Persian Gulf are more important to them than to the U.S. and that the implications of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan are more severe for them than for us. He thought it would be useful for the President to give a speech supporting the speeches already given by the Secretary of State and himself on the Afghan issue.⁴ The Secretary of Defense expressed concern that the Europeans may be so afraid of the Soviets that they want to appease them. On the other hand, they may simply be deceiving themselves. He thought that we should rub their noses in the strategic facts of life created by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

As for the Soviets, he did not believe that we needed to change our policy of being prepared to cooperate where possible, and to compete when necessary. When they push, he said, we must push back

³ See Document 236.

⁴ Vance delivered a speech on Afghanistan at the Chicago Council of Foreign Relations, March 3, in which he acknowledged that no quick solution to the crisis was within reach and a U.S. response was required that balanced firmness and "the indiscriminate confrontation of earlier times." The speech was reported in Bernard Gwerman, "Vance Urging a Balanced Response on Afghanistan," *New York Times*, March 4, 1980, p. A3; and reprinted in the Department of State *Bulletin*, April 1980, pp. 12–16. Brown delivered a speech on March 6 to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, that discussed the Afghan crisis in the context of U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf. An excerpt from the speech was reproduced in the Middle East Research and Information Project, *MERIP Reports*, no. 90, *The Vietnam Syndrome* (Sep. 1980), pp. 20–23. The speech is also printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, May 1980, pp. 63–67.

from a position of strength. He added that we also want to move on arms control, but we cannot do this in the face of actions of the sort going on in Afghanistan.

Dr. Brzezinski commented that the Europeans understand the problem. Indeed, Giscard himself had identified the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as a strategic threat. So it is not that they do not understand. The fact is that they are afraid of the Soviet Union and they are trying to preserve detente in Europe, a detente that is divided from Soviet aggressive behavior in the rest of the world. Their second concern, he said, is that the Europeans do not believe that we are consistent. So they do not want to go along with us and then ultimately see us reverse our position. The Germans are particularly concerned that should this happen, they will have to pay a very high price for having supported us and then be left holding the bag.

Dr. Brzezinski thus said he favored a constant, measured and assertive posture. No mixed signals and no radical departures.

As for a letter to Brezhnev, he was against it. Our main problem is that we have not been able to both communicate effectively and convey patience. A letter, he said, is a dead instrument. It does not really convey meanings very thoroughly. He thought that conversations between Cy and Dobrynin were the best avenue. It was a shame that we cannot talk to others in the Soviet hierarchy, but Dobrynin had confirmed to him that Gromyko was now the only interlocutor. Dobrynin said that Brezhnev might have been able to do it in the past, but was no longer able to do so. He thought that a letter to Brezhnev or a meeting with Gromyko that was not well prepared in advance would not be helpful. The key thing was for all of us in all of our contacts with the Soviets to be steady in our position.

Dr. Brzezinski said that the neutralization scheme, as developed by the SCC, put us in good posture. He thought that perhaps the Islamic Foreign Ministers might be induced to put forward such a scheme when they met.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Afghanistan.]

Admiral Turner then said that the major emerging issue from his analysis is whether we are going to stay consistent. Thus he questioned the idea of any neutrality proposals or any letter to Brezhnev. The Soviets feel we are falling apart with the Pakistanis and that the Europeans are beating a path to their door on the neutrality proposal. The Soviets are not suggesting neutrality and for us to do so only undermines the strength and credibility of our position. The Secretary of State disagreed with this analysis. He said that we have to put the monkey on their back about withdrawing. The President added that neutrality must be preceded by the Soviet withdrawal. Admiral Turner replied that he could not see why we had to get into a discussion of

neutrality simply to put the issue of withdrawal first and foremost. Secretary Brown said that there is a connection since the Soviets might withdraw with a subservient regime left behind.

The President said that Soviet withdrawal is not likely within a year. The question is how to hold the Allies together during this period. If we only emphasize withdrawal he thought that the Allies would desert us. He added that Brezhnev had said in letters to himself, to Giscard, to Indira Gandhi that the Soviets would withdraw when their reasons for going into Afghanistan had been eliminated.⁵ That is a ridiculous position, but we still have to put them on the defensive politically.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Afghanistan.]

⁵ The letter from Brezhnev to Carter is likely a reference to the hotline message of December 29. See Document 114.

239. Annex From the President's Daily Brief¹

Washington, March 19, 1980

USSR-AFGHANISTAN: SOVIET PROBLEMS

[8 lines not declassified] provided Moscow with a frank and sober appraisal: they thought the solution lies in improving the effectiveness of the Afghan Government and military rather than in a substantial increase in the Soviet military commitment.

[2 lines not declassified] Moscow was told [less than 1 line not declassified] that the ineffectiveness of the Afghan Government and its lack of popular support was a major problem. The Babrak Karmal regime is "not governing" and has not extended its writ. [less than 1 line not declassified] also indicated there were continuing differences between the USSR and the regime.

The inability of the Afghan Army to carry the brunt of the fighting was also described as a basic problem. [less than 1 line not declassified] labeled the Afghan military "an army in name only" whose loyalty could not be

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—March 1980, PDBs. Top Secret; For the President Only. The full version of this President's Daily Brief was not filed with this collection. The annex printed here was found in this form.

relied on and whose troops were demoralized. The inability of the police and militia to carry out their everyday functions also troubled [less than 1 line not declassified].

[4 lines not declassified] They painted a picture of scattered, small Soviet units who face persistent supply shortages. They reported that flareups could come in any region [2 lines not declassified].

Recommendations to Moscow

[less than 1 line not declassified] stressed that the Afghan Army must be made capable of carrying the main burden of combat. They called for a quick buildup of the Afghan armed forces. [1 line not declassified] called for an increase of two to four divisions. They were concerned that, otherwise, Soviet troops would have to carry the brunt of fighting and perform police functions against "the people." This threatens to involve the Soviets in a Vietnam-type conflict.

Apparently in response to such Soviet thinking, the Afghans earlier this month increased conscription [2 lines not declassified].

Although the Soviets did not urge military action into Pakistan, they did recommend closing the border. We believe they would be hard pressed to do this with the forces now available.

[less than 1 line not declassified] recommended that airmobile and airborne forces be kept in Afghanistan until the situation stabilizes. They also thought one additional Soviet division should be brought into Afghanistan and kept there until order is restored. (The Soviets have had two additional divisions staging on the Afghan border; we have seen signs that elements of one may be entering the country.) They also wanted more transport units to solve the supply problem.

Concern Over Future Role

[4 lines not declassified] voiced particular concern that a large additional Soviet commitment would be a costly drain on resources and have a negative impact on military morale. [1 line not declassified]

Implications

The new evidence confirms our general analysis of the nature and degree of the problems the Soviets have encountered in Afghanistan. It also suggests that [less than 1 line not declassified]. Moscow had not yet decided on how to proceed.

Even if the key recommendations [less than 1 line not declassified] were adopted, they would not be easy to implement. In particular, it seems highly unlikely that Moscow will be able quickly to reconstitute an Afghan military capable of assuming the primary counterinsurgency mission.

Although we had seen signs of reserve and even opposition to the Soviet intervention among some Soviet officials, the pessimism expressed [less than 1 line not declassified] could impact on policy debates in Moscow.

240. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 19, 1980, 6 p.m.

SUBJECT

Discussion with Six Ambassadors on a Neutral Afghanistan and Visit of Chinese Vice Foreign Minister

PARTICIPANTS

Deputy Secretary Christopher
Ambassador Hermes, FRG
Ambassador de Laboulaye, France
Ambassador Henderson, U.K.
Ambassador Towe, Canada
Ambassador Pansa, Italy
Ambassador Togo, Japan

Neutral and Non-Aligned Afghanistan

Deputy Secretary Christopher gave the Ambassadors a paper on “Elements for a Neutral and Non-Aligned Afghanistan” (attached) as a basis for discussion and then retrieved the paper later in the meeting. He said the “Elements” had not been prepared for use at any specific event but as a contribution to the search for a common position among us which could (1) develop ultimately into a sound basis for a constructive Western approach and (2) help develop a structure which might be useful eventually in resolving the problem in Afghanistan. The Soviets appeared to be uninterested but not closing the door. He noted the importance of avoiding the appearance of pursuing the Soviets and the need to watch for shifts in the Soviet line.² He commented on the range of upcoming diplomatic events—the Tito funeral, the EC Heads of Government meeting on March 31, the Islamic Foreign Ministers meeting in Islamabad in late April, the Venice Summit in June and the

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat (ES), Sensitive and Super Sensitive File, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, Box 3, 1980 Super Sensitive I, Jan, Feb, Mar–1980. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Vest. Attached but not printed is a March 20 memorandum from Lake and Tarnoff to Vance forwarding the memorandum of conversation.

² An article in the President’s Daily Brief, March 24, reported Karmal’s New Year’s address which characterized Western attempts to neutralize Afghanistan as “reactionary” and reaffirmed that Soviet troops would remain in Afghanistan until “the smallest signs of aggression” had been “completely uprooted.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—March 1980, PDBs) An intelligence memorandum prepared in the Department of Defense, March 25, reporting on a conversation between a Soviet diplomat and a Polish counterpart in Moscow, relayed the former’s assertion that the Soviet Union “rejected totally” the Western European proposal for a neutral Afghanistan. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–82–0217, Box 2, Afghanistan, Jan–Feb 1980)

preparations for the UNGA.³ We might need a common position at any one of these and hence the value of this exchange. The group then considered the Elements point by point.

Point One was generally acceptable to the group and several called it essential. De Laboulaye described it as "the ultimate aim," apparently thinking that withdrawal might take place sequentially. Mr. Christopher made it clear that all Soviet troops would have to come out first; otherwise we might expose ourselves to a situation in which the Soviets would control the transport lines and communication points with a reduced military force and claim that they had returned the country to Afghan control.

Point Two drew considerable discussion. Hermes warned that the search for a government acceptable to the Afghan people could go on for years and the Soviets would continue to say that nothing was acceptable. De Laboulaye speculated that there could be a new government in place before the Soviet troops all withdrew and it could serve as a transitional government. Henderson said that Point Two should be the outcome of Points One and Three, i.e., withdrawal of forces and non-interference could create a state of affairs which would permit the evolution of a government which would be acceptable to the Afghan people.

Point Three led to a discussion of the Afghanistan/Pakistan boundary. Hermes asked if we thought the Pakistanis would accept the Durand Line. Mr. Christopher thought they would. Thereafter there was some discussion about whether the right words should be "no interference" or "no intervention" since a range of activities such as radio broadcasts could lead to a situation where it would be hard to differentiate between normal contacts and interference. In the end the group preferred the words "intervention by neighboring other states" rather than "by its neighbors or any other state."

Point Four was reasonably acceptable to the group and Henderson thought it would be acceptable to his government.

Point Five. Henderson was worried that the proposal for guarantees was too sweeping and implied that the guarantor powers might have to use force; he did not think Britain would be ready to go to war automatically in such a situation. Hermes as well thought that the countries involved could not give substance to guarantees. Henderson continued that any breach of neutrality or interference would call for the parties to re-establish the status quo. The group were inclined to

³ For the Islamic Foreign Ministers' meeting, see footnote 4, Document 270. The G-7 Summit was held in Venice June 22-23; see footnote 2, Document 281. The U.N. General Assembly convened in New York September 16.

think that Points Five and Three might be brought together with language calling for something along the lines of “respect by neighboring states for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and neutrality and for the principle of non-intervention in Afghanistan’s internal affairs.”

Point Six. There was no quarrel with this formulation. De Laboulaye had some intellectual difficulties, observing that France retained an open mind on neutralization in Southwest Asia.

There was a brief discussion of next steps. Hermes thought that the proposal should be kept in the backyard of the Islamic countries. Pansa reminded that memories are short. De Laboulaye thought we should proceed bilaterally. Hermes stressed that India is the key country in this matter.

China—Vice Foreign Minister’s Visit

Mr. Christopher briefed the Ambassadors on the recent visit.⁴ China had viewed with concern the proposal for neutralization of Afghanistan, fearing it would lead to permanent Soviet domination of the country. He had stressed to the Chinese that complete Soviet withdrawal had to be a pre-condition to any other action and the Chinese gave the impression that they could live with the approach. On the Olympics, China wholeheartedly supported the boycott and the alternative games. On Pakistan the Chinese urged us to be patient as Pakistan decided its strategy towards its neighbors, and they stressed the need for other countries to supplement Chinese efforts to provide military aid to Islamabad. They had expressed a willingness to work toward improved relations with India but were not sanguine about the prospects. The Chinese told us that the Democratic Kampuchians in Kampuchea had done better during the dry season than had been expected, and were pleased with the outcome of the recent EC/ASEAN discussions.

⁴ The visit of Zhang Wenjin, who met with Vance and Christopher March 17, was reported in telegram 75394 to Beijing, March 21. Regarding European proposals for the neutralization of Afghanistan, Zhang emphasized that it would not compel the Soviets to withdraw, that they could distort it for their political gain, and ultimately it was a decision for the Afghan people. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 9, China (PRC): 3/80) See also *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XIII, China, Documents 303 and 304.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁵

Washington, undated

ELEMENTS

1. Prompt withdrawal of all Soviet military forces from Afghanistan.
2. An Afghan government acceptable to the Afghan people.
3. No interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan by its neighbors or any other state.⁶
4. Non-alignment in Afghanistan's foreign policy and permanent neutrality for Afghanistan, including the obligation to refrain from entering into any military alliance, and to refrain from allowing any state to have military forces or facilities in its territory except by agreement of the guarantors.
5. Guarantees by Afghanistan's neighbors and other interested states of permanent neutrality for Afghanistan and of non-interference in its internal affairs.
6. Arrangements to apply only to Afghanistan and not to affect the sovereign rights of other countries.
(This is seen as a responsive or counter-punching point).

⁵ Secret; Sensitive. Lake and Tarnoff in their March 20 covering memorandum to Vance noted that an earlier version of this paper, which was attached at Tab B to their memorandum and seen by the President, omitted the clause at the end of item 4: "except by agreement of the guarantors." They explained "this was originally designed to permit foreign advisors and peacekeeping forces, on a case-by-case basis, but only by collective agreement. With the omission of the concept of 'guarantors,' L believes this clause serves no purpose and that any deployment of peacekeeping forces could be dealt with through over-riding provisions of the UN Charter." An amended version of these elements was sent in telegram 88719, April 4, to all NATO capitals and Tokyo. In relaying the elements, the Department wanted to ensure that posts could "respond coherently" in the effort to find an "acceptable political solution in Afghanistan." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D880029-1390)

⁶ If a question is raised as to the geographical scope of Afghanistan, we would refer to the Durand Line as the international boundary. [Footnote is in the original.]

241. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 20, 1980, 1–3 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Alexander Bessmertnykh, Minister-Counselor, Soviet Embassy
Marshall Brent, NSC Staff Member

SUBJECT

Afghanistan and US-Soviet Relations (U)

Bessmertnykh opened the conversation by insisting on the need to maintain channels of communication between us, a sentiment with which I readily agreed. (U)

It was particularly important for us to understand, he continued, the sour view of the US that is now widespread in the USSR, not only in official circles, but among the general populace as well. He said he was struck during his recent home leave by the fact that most people who specialize in foreign affairs were taken aback by the US “overreaction” to Afghanistan. We, of course, understood that there would be a strong response, said Bessmertnykh. That was unavoidable. But what surprised us was the vehemence of the response, the language used, and the willingness to throw away what had been built up painfully over almost a decade. (S)

This contrasts markedly with Soviet behavior in Vietnam in 1972, Bessmertnykh went on. When the Americans were blockading Haiphong and bombs were falling right next to Soviet ships, the USSR nevertheless went ahead with the first Moscow Summit and the signing of the basic agreements which led to the period of detente, a period which has now ended. There were those who counseled a cancellation of the 1972 Summit, but their advice was rejected. We had a sense of balance and knew what was important. It is that sense of balance which seems to us completely absent in the US reaction to Afghanistan. (S)

The situations are hardly comparable, I replied. The bombing of North Vietnam was in response to a major direct invasion of South Vietnam by mainline North Vietnamese divisions supplied by the USSR. That invasion was planned with the support and foreknowledge of Moscow. It is not the Soviet Union which deserves praise for entering

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs David Newsom, Lot 81D154, folder 2. Secret. The meeting took place at the Soviet Embassy. In a covering memorandum to Vance and Turner (attached but not printed), March 28, Dodson noted that the memorandum of conversation “should be given tight distribution within your agency and be sent to Embassy Moscow ‘Eyes Only.’”

a detente relationship with the US during the Vietnam war, I said, but rather the other way around. American soldiers were, after all, being killed and maimed by Soviet-supplied and Soviet-encouraged armies. Nevertheless, we were willing to conclude the basic arms control negotiations with the USSR which ushered in the period of detente. I pointed out that from 1964–1966 I had served in our Embassy in Moscow as the officer in the Political Section covering Soviet relations with Asia, and could personally attest to the fact that Soviet reaction to the war in Vietnam was far more offensive to my government and far more “unbalanced” than Washington’s reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Furthermore, I continued, I was surprised to hear him allude to Soviet behavior in Vietnam in the context of Afghanistan. Surely he was not proposing that the US model its behavior toward the conflict in Afghanistan on Soviet behavior in Vietnam? (S)

Such was not his intention, Bessmertnykh acknowledged with an icy smile. (S)

In fact, despite the extremely unhelpful Soviet attitude toward Vietnam, I said, both Presidents Johnson and Nixon clearly desired better relations with the Soviets and regarded this as a fundamental aim of US foreign policy. I could assure him personally, I continued, that President Carter had a deep commitment to detente, to improved US-Soviet relations, and to the establishment of viable, reciprocal, and mutually beneficial arms control agreements with the USSR. It was these very goals which had made the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan so disappointing and repugnant to us. (S)

The difference with previous administrations, Bessmertnykh rejoined, was that they placed US-Soviet relations at the center of American foreign policy. The great mistake that this administration had made was to reduce the focus on this vital subject. A supreme irony is the fact that Afghanistan clearly restored US-Soviet relations to the primacy it should have had all along for the Carter administration, and this was clearly shown in the President’s January 4 speech.² (S)

In any case, Bessmertnykh said, many people in Moscow had given up on the idea of trying to establish good relations with the US. There are some, such as Gromyko and Korniyenko, who are genuinely in favor of restoring US-Soviet relations to an even keel. But such people only represent 20–30 percent of the policymakers. Those who maintain that there is no point in going on with such a policy represent 60–70 percent, and this includes not only foreign ministry officials, but people in the Central Committee as well. Many of my colleagues were really taken aback by the pointless nature of the American response, Bessmert-

² See footnote 5, Document 145.

nykh said. It is “a policy of pin pricks.” Nothing you have said or done will have any real influence over us. I hope nobody within the Administration believes that the efforts you have made can accomplish anything. Such is not the nature of the Russian people. In fact, your propagandists made a great mistake in announcing that the grain embargo would affect Soviet living standards. That kind of threat has a very bad effect among the Russians. We do not like to be menaced by foreigners. You have lived in Moscow and you know that Americans are not unpopular there. There is much good will still left over from the war. Even if the government would want to change the views of the Soviet people, it cannot do it. (S)

Another real irony is that despite the differences in our two systems the American government can have a profound effect on public opinion, which can change overnight, whereas my government cannot reshape the basic attitudes of the Soviet population, Bessmertnykh said. Nevertheless, I can assure you in all sincerity that both in Lithuania, where I spent my vacation, as well as in Moscow, quite ordinary people voiced their indignation to me about this American announcement. After all, a great many people in the USSR did not even know we were buying grain from you. They only learned about it when our press carried reports of your statement. Furthermore, we are not in the least concerned about your various economic measures against us. It has not exactly escaped our notice that your allies are crawling all over each other trying to replace the US for commercial benefit, he said. You have been reading our press and you must know the effect this has had. Before Afghanistan, both Dobrynin and I had some influence in toning down the way our journalists treated US affairs. But now they have full freedom to give vent to their bitterest feelings about the United States, Bessmertnykh said. (S)

I had indeed noticed the way our leaders have been treated recently in the Soviet press, I replied, and consider it most unfortunate. Personal attacks on the President or his close associates do not serve any useful purpose. I am not sure what your journalists think they are doing, but they should understand that personal slanders of the President cannot have a good effect on future US-Soviet relations, and this is not just a question of the next several months. (S)

I agree that some of our writers may have gone overboard about some Administration figures and that this really serves no purpose, Bessmertnykh replied. Nevertheless, you should understand that we follow what is said about us very closely, and it is difficult to restrain our journalists. We certainly understand and anticipate that we are dealing with an administration that will be here for another five years.

It is our prediction that President Carter will be nominated and reelected, and our expectation that Dr. Brzezinski will be a part, an important part, of the new administration. Nevertheless, our feeling is that the rhetoric you have used about the USSR has exceeded what was really necessary. You have to understand that we are no longer living in the world of the 1950s and 1960s. At some point we will return to a detente relationship. It may be in two years, it may be four years from now, but we have to live together in this world. We have no choice about that. But it will never be the same as it was. It will have to be an entirely different track, Bessmertnykh said. (S)

Based on a close reading of your press and of what I know about Afghanistan, what is not clear to me, I responded, is whether you fully understand that the current low state of US-Soviet relations is entirely the fault of the USSR. It was, after all, the USSR which invaded Afghanistan and brought about the very dangerous situation which now faces both of us in Southwest Asia. (U)

Afghanistan is only the latest in a series of events, Bessmertnykh rejoined. Relations were on the way down beginning last summer and they have gotten steadily worse ever since then. We had absolutely no choice but to take the action we did in Afghanistan. It was a state along our borders. Our vital interests were involved. Hostile states were disturbing our security. We have no intention of remaining in Afghanistan. We will get out. But we could not let the situation simply fall apart. (S)

You did not use your security needs to justify the invasion, I retorted. You did not say that this was a vital interest of the Soviet Union and therefore you had no choice but to invade Afghanistan. On the contrary, you said you were invited into Afghanistan by the legally constituted government and that you had every right to be there because you have a treaty with the Afghans. That kind of justification can apply anywhere in the world. And if the superpowers arrogate to themselves the right to use combat forces whenever they feel like it, then we will truly be living in a dangerous situation in the '80s and '90s. (S)

You say that Afghanistan involved your "vital interests," I continued. But you do not explain why it involved your vital interests. The fact of the matter is that Soviet vital interests were far better served by the Daoud government, when Afghanistan was a true buffer state. The President has said that this is the most dangerous situation we have faced since the Second World War, and I am firmly convinced that this is an accurate statement. My hope is that the Soviet government will perceive the danger and that a reasonable solution will be worked out to resolve this problem. (S)

But your allies are not in accord with your assessment, Bessmertnykh interjected. They have said so publicly. More convincingly, they

told this to us privately. Nevertheless, I agree with you that the problem of how to define vital interest is a real one. The heart of our problem is that we seem to disagree on that definition. We do not understand how an area halfway around the globe can be a “vital interest” to another country. (S)

I hope it is very clear, I stated, that the United States regards that area of the world as a vital interest. The State of the Union speech is not in the least ambiguous, and I would hope that there was clear understanding about this very important point in Moscow. (S)

Afghanistan was, of course, a buffer state in the past, Bessmertnykh said. We were perfectly comfortable with Daoud—and with the King, for that matter. But one could only seriously regard it as a buffer state when the United States had 40,000 servicemen in Iran, a country that is no longer the same. It has changed and changed for good. So Afghanistan is no longer a buffer state between us. You no longer control either Iran or Pakistan. It is Iran rather than Afghanistan that has perhaps become a buffer state. We are dealing with a changing area, and the United States always finds it difficult to accept change. (S)

You state that the Daoud government was perfectly acceptable to you, I rejoined. Nevertheless, you felt it necessary to support those who had shot and killed Daoud and who had overthrown his government. Your response was to prop up the government of Daoud’s killers by increasing your military personnel and economic assistance tenfold, despite the fact that the new Afghan government was following policies which were highly unpopular and which eventually led to the current destabilizing crisis in the area. (S)

It is true that support for revolutionary movements is a fundamental aspect of our foreign policy, said Bessmertnykh. We have no choice in such situations. For better or worse, we feel we have to support revolutionary movements. “If anyone wants Soviet support, all they have to do is start a revolution.” (S)

While we might not like your various actions in Afghanistan and elsewhere, I replied, we nevertheless can accept that the USSR has a right to assist those governments and political forces with which it is sympathetic. This could even include military assistance. However, where one has to draw the line is armed combat. The introduction of Soviet combat troops, or even the introduction of the troops of Soviet surrogates, such as the Cubans or Vietnamese, creates situations which make a detente relationship between the superpowers impossible to maintain. Furthermore, it makes no sense to view the invasion of Afghanistan in isolation. In 1975 the USSR shipped a Cuban army to Angola. In 1977 and again in 1978, Soviet generals commanded Cuban troops in combat in Ethiopia. Then the Vietnamese attacked Cambodia. Finally, at the end of 1979, you invaded Afghanistan with Soviet

troops—the first time in 30 years that Soviet troops have transgressed the boundaries you achieved as a result of World War II. This is not something which you could expect the United States or its allies to ignore. It sets a remarkably dangerous precedent and is an event to which we have to respond unambiguously, so that your government does not mistake the depth and gravity of our reaction or what our reaction will be if this type of behavior continues. (S)

The fact of the matter is, Bessmertnykh replied, that your allies see the situation entirely differently than you do. Not only do they not regard Afghanistan as endangering them in any way, they rather see it as an opportunity to derive commercial advantage in their dealing with us. Many people in Moscow are aware of this and are trying to take advantage of it. Dobrynin and I have worked very hard to build up US-Soviet trade, and now it will all go to the West Europeans and the Japanese. (S)

More important than trade, I said, is whether the Soviet Union thinks it has the right to introduce armed combat troops anywhere in the world to support “revolutionary movements” wherever they exist. We have the right to do whatever you do, Bessmertnykh replied. There has been a great change in the world. This is no longer the ‘50s or ‘60s, he repeated. And what has changed is that we have achieved military parity with you not only in the strategic field, but in conventional arms as well. You have your troops all over the world, half a million of them. You do not ask our permission to go into places like Korea. Your troops are there not only to defend that territory, but to prop up the local government. There is no reason for you to have any rights which we do not have. We must insist on equality. It is hard for you to adjust to this, but you must come to realize that it is a new fact of life. You have lived many years in my country and you understand very well that we are quite cautious. We do not undertake actions such as those in Afghanistan without fully realizing their implications. We moved only to protect our vital interests. We do not consider that Afghanistan is a precedent for future action. (S)

Although you say this, and might even believe it, I replied, there is no way that you can know for certain that what you are saying is the truth. Events have a way of becoming precedents which can ultimately surprise the people who triggered those same events. It is therefore essential that Afghanistan indeed not be a precedent for future Soviet actions. US-Soviet relations cannot stand future Afghanistans. We therefore must find a viable way to resolve this problem. The President suggested one such way when he indicated that the US is ready to support efforts by the international community to restore a neutral, non-aligned Afghan government that would be responsive to the wishes of the Afghan people. The essence of a settlement must therefore

consist of prompt and complete Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, coupled with agreement by all interested parties that such a government be installed in Kabul. (S)

The key to a settlement must be the stopping of assistance to the rebel forces, Bessmertnykh countered. Once such assistance has ceased, we will be able to resolve this problem quickly and satisfactorily. (S)

The problem does not arise because of outside forces, I rejoined, but rather because of the Soviet invasion. A genuine national liberation movement exists within Afghanistan. In fact, it is not one movement but several, with roots in different regions within the country. Resistance arose through spontaneous combustion, not outside help, and Afghanistan was aflame before the world knew anything about it. There were 300,000 refugees in Pakistan less than a year ago. Today there are more than 600,000. These people left their country because they could not support the government which existed there. It is their determination to carry on the struggle which makes a long and bitter war inevitable unless some means is found of installing a government in Kabul which is to some degree responsive to their wishes. If your aim is to establish in Kabul a government that is completely under the thumb of Moscow, a government similar to the one that exists, for example, in Ulan Bator, then it is difficult to foresee anything other than great difficulty in Afghanistan itself and a downward spiral in US-Soviet relations. And if we are to avoid confrontations, it seems to me essential that we come to some agreement as to rules of superpower behavior in the coming decades. We have signed several agreements on mutual behavior, but the USSR does not seem to abide by such agreements. (S)

The people of Mongolia are very satisfied with the government they have. And you should know that the Soviet Union always abides by agreements which it signs, Bessmertnykh replied. (S)

At that point I read him the following from the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War:

“The parties agree . . . to proceed from the premise that each party will refrain from the threat or use of force against the other party, against the allies of the other party, and *against other countries* in circumstances which may endanger international peace and security.”³

Afghanistan is far away from you, and we do not think that what has happened there may endanger international peace and security, Bessmertnykh replied, smiling faintly. In any case, we have to live with each other and something will be worked out. But I do not see how

³ The U.S.-Soviet Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War was signed in Washington on June 22, 1973. (24 UST 1478, TIAS 7654)

anything can happen during 1980, since it will obviously take some time before we can resolve the Afghanistan question. And 1981 will also be a difficult year when agreements will be expiring. It may take two years, it may take longer, but I am confident that reasonable relations will eventually be restored between us, Bessmertnykh repeated. (S)

At that point I had another meeting to attend. We agreed once more on the importance of staying in touch with each other. (U)

COMMENT: Despite the hard edges, the conversation was entirely non-polemical in tone. Bessmertnykh's performance was, as usual, smooth and affable.⁴ (U)

⁴ Vance and Dobrynin met the following day and also discussed the deterioration in U.S.-Soviet relations due in part to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the U.S. response. See *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 272.

242. Telegram From the Department of Defense to the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe¹

Washington, March 25, 1980, 2323Z

[*cable number not declassified*] NATO Secret to NATO addressees.
 Subj: Request for Information (Afghanistan Rebels) (U). Ref: SY Sec SHAPE Msg DTG 141450Z Mar 80.²

1. (C) Afghan insurgent groups can be divided into two major categories; those groups based and operating within Afghanistan and those groups (exiles) based in Pakistan but operating in Afghanistan. The former represents the major ethnic groups (Pushtu, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek and Aimak). Little is known of their exact numbers of leaders. Afghanistan's tribes, especially the Pushtu tribes, have historically resisted government encroachments. Resistance is generally confined to ethnic or tribal boundaries. Islam, resentment of foreign intervention, and antipathy to Russians serve as unifying motives, however, none are strong enough to produce a coordinated rebellion. The second category, exiles based in Pakistan, is comprised of several major groups whose number changes almost daily with the formation of new groups,

¹ Source: Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 5, JCS Support Request, 80-81. Secret. Sent for information to SACEUR and SHAPE.

² Not found.

groups formed by cross-alliances and membership in more than one group. The major exile groups are: A. (U) the Islamic Revolution Movement, headed by Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi; B. (U) the Afghanistan National Liberation Front (ANLF), headed by Sebqatullah Mojadedi; C. (U) the Jamaat-i-Islami Afghanistan, headed by Burhanhddin Rabbani; D. (U) the Hezb-e-Islami (HI), headed by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar; E. (U) the National Front for the Islamic Revolution of Afghanistan (NFIRA), headed by Sayed Gailani. These groups vary from right-wing professional revolutionaries to Islamic orientation.

2. (U) Exact numbers for members of each category are virtually impossible to ascertain since members of tribes operating in Afghanistan can be claimed, at various times, to be conducting the insurgency either independently or as members of one or more of the exile groups based in Pakistan. However, the NFIRA group, headed by Gailani, has claimed approximately 70,000 members.

3. (S) The insurgents evince virtually no interest, with minor exceptions, in territorial control in a conventional sense. Therefore strongholds in the conventional sense are non-existent. Currently the insurgents hold no major city. However, with territorial control being highly relevant to the government, fighting has gravitated towards towns where government forces are located. The best approach in delineating rebel areas of operation is by province. The provinces where rebel activity is currently most severe are Kabul, Paktia, Laghman, Bamian and Ghowr. Rebel activity has also been severe in Konar and Nangarhar Provinces, however, recent Afghan/Soviet combined army operations and continued presence in these areas has restored a modicum of government control. Conditions suggest that Kandahar, Kunduz and Baglan are now beset with serious rebellion. In other provinces moderate levels of rebellion occur. The rebellion is currently least serious in Faryab, Jowzjan, and Bulk. The arrival of Soviet forces in Takhar and Badakhshan Provinces has tended to stabilize conditions there.

4. (S) Afghan insurgents use a variety of weapons ranging from side arms to artillery, the majority of which were either captured or acquired from Afghan Army units or personnel who defected. These weapons include 76, 82 and 107mm mortars; 76mm mountain artillery; 107mm recoilless; 122mm guns; 122mm howitzers; tanks; APCs; AAA guns; rocket launchers; English .303, Kalashnikov and Dushka rifles; bombs; grenades; mines and various side arms. Tactics range from simple ambushes of convoys to attacks on Soviet and Af Army units and include H and I fire, mining roads, blowing bridges, opening floodgates, sabotaging water supplies, cutting telephone lines, and destroying electric power plants.

5. (U) As stated, the vast majority of the insurgent equipment was obtained in raids or from deserting Af Army units and personnel.

Financial support is more difficult to determine. Obtaining funds is one of the primary aims of the exile groups in Pakistan although their success is unknown. Egypt has publicly stated that it will train and arm Afghan insurgents. Iran has also pledged support however, the form it will take is unknown. Saudi Arabia is allegedly also providing support. Currently we have no firm evidence to confirm or deny support from either Pakistan or China.

6. (C) The tenor of the insurgency during the winter months far exceeded expectations. A lull was expected in both the insurgency and Soviet/Afghan Army operations in order to refit, retrain and plan operations for the upcoming summer months. However, this was not the case and as the weeks progressed the insurgency gained momentum, most recently manifested in the general strike and demonstrations in Kabul. Historically insurgent operations increase in the warmer months. This, in combination with the increasing support of urban populations, continued defections of Afghan Army personnel, innate hatred of the Russians and the relative successes enjoyed to date portend increased insurgent activity during the summer months.

7. (U) [1 line not declassified]

243. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, March 28, 1980

SUBJECT

NSC Weekly Report #134

1. *Opinion*

Afghanistan: An Aberration or a Symptom?

While there is genuinely solid unanimity in your Administration regarding the measures that you have adopted, and this unanimity has been strengthened by regular SCC meetings, you should be aware that in the background there still lurks a fundamental disagreement, which has potential policy implications. I can best summarize it in

¹ Source: Carter Library, Donated Historical Material, Brzezinski Collection, Brzezinski's Subject Files, Box 41, Weekly Reports (to the President), 121-135 (12/79-4/80). Secret. Carter initialed "C" in the top right corner of the memorandum.

terms of two conflicting interpretations of what is basically involved in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan: some see it as an aberration from, and others as symptomatic of, Soviet behavior.

Aberration

Those who see it as an aberration tend to feel that the primary motive for the Soviet action was defensive, that the Soviets do not have longer-term regional ambitions beyond Afghanistan, and that they are likely to consider seriously some mutually acceptable formula for a solution to the problem generated by their invasion of Afghanistan. Proponents of this school of thought do not deny that the Soviet Union occasionally acts aggressively, but see that largely as an expedient reaction to opportunities rather than as a manifestation of a more sustained trend. Because of that, one is entitled to nurture hopes of a relatively early return to more normal East-West relations, including genuine progress on some of the more important bilateral U.S.-Soviet issues.

Symptom

Those who argue otherwise feel that the Soviet Union is currently in an assertive phase of its history, with the acquisition of military power giving its foreign policy both greater scope and more frequent temptations to use its power to advance policy goals. Soviet behavior is still prudent, but it does involve a gradual shift from political encouragement of often geographically remote ideological sympathizers, to more direct support of them through the use of Cuban proxies in the mid-'70s, to even more direct projection of Soviet military power itself currently. In other words, Soviet behavior is symptomatic of a long-term historical drive, with military power supplanting Marxist ideology as its basic dynamic source.

As you can probably anticipate, I lean to the second school of thought. I would also argue additionally that there are certain constants in Soviet foreign policy, and the drive toward the Persian Gulf is one of them. I am struck by the fact that the draft agreement between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, which was being negotiated secretly between Molotov and Ribbentrop in 1940, included the following passage: "The Soviet Union declares that its territorial aspirations center south of the national territory of the Soviet Union in the direction of the Indian Ocean." Moreover, the German Ambassador reported on November 25, 1940, that Molotov told him that the Soviet Union would associate itself with the Axis powers, "provided that the area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf is recognized as the center of the aspirations of the Soviet Union."

The argument between those who think that Afghanistan is an aberration and those who think it is a symptom is not merely an

intellectual exercise. Though we are all in agreement with what needed to be done, I suspect that there are potential differences among us about the future (and these differences could complicate planning for the NATO Summit)² how long should the present policy be maintained; to what extent should the Allies be pressed to recognize the wider and strategic character of the Soviet challenge; how energetically should we try to reinforce the Western presence in the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean area; how important is it to beef up Pakistan; what is the strategic urgency of moving more rapidly on the Palestinian problem; and, finally, how fruitful are likely to be any early efforts to improve relations with the Soviet Union?

On that last point, my view is that in a quiet but persistent way we need to replicate in this new third central strategic zone (southwest Asia) what we have done earlier in Western Europe and the Far East: create a sense of security, and halt Soviet expansionism. Once our efforts are credible, I think we have a very good chance to return to detente and to seek the humane and morally imperative goals with which I hope history will identify you.

[Omitted here is information unrelated to Afghanistan.]

² The next NATO Summit meeting was held in Bonn June 10, 1982.

244. Briefing Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Spiers) to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, March 29, 1980

Moscow's Terms for Withdrawal from Afghanistan

The Soviets have not rejected the notion of negotiation about Afghanistan. But, to the extent that Moscow has developed and elaborated its views, the stated Soviet terms for withdrawal from Afghanistan appear to be even stiffer now than they were on December 27.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs David Newsom, Lot 81D154, folder 2. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Limberg, Schwartz, and Baraz (INR/RSE), March 28.

When the Soviets moved into Afghanistan, they promised simply to withdraw when foreign interference ceased. Moscow is now close to demanding a formally negotiated guarantee by the US and Afghanistan's neighbors acceptable to Kabul as a pre-condition for withdrawal, and has increasingly identified itself with maintaining the current regime.

Willingness to Talk

Both the British and the French came away from their probes in Moscow in early March impressed that the Soviets stopped short of rejecting the notion of negotiations on Afghanistan outright. Gromyko's public use on March 14 of much the same language as Zemskov's March 3 non-paper to the British—which said that the USSR had no objection to political efforts to settle questions about Afghanistan—had the effect of committing Moscow at least to hearing out further Western demarches.²

Moscow seems to have been surprised by the amount of interest which Brezhnev's February 22 reference to guarantees evoked in the West,³ and the Soviets probably decided not to kill off Western speculation about negotiation in the hope that divergent views might emerge thus allowing Moscow greater room for diplomatic maneuvering between the West Europeans and Washington.

What emerged from the French and British contacts was the impression that the Soviets have not developed an initiative of their own for settlement or negotiation. In general, their current position seems to be a piecemeal series of responses to British and French queries on withdrawal of Soviet troops, guarantees and neutralization.

Soviet Terms for Withdrawal

The original December 27 Soviet position was simply that Soviet troops would be withdrawn when the stated reason for their dispatch in the first place—outside interference—had ceased. Over the past

² For Gromyko's March 14 statement, see footnote 5, below. The March 3 Soviet oral note was delivered to the British in both Moscow (by Deputy Foreign Minister Zemskov) and London; the British Embassy in Washington then provided a copy to the Department. The main points of the note were as follows: "above all, one cannot speak seriously about any political solution of the Afghan problem without a complete and guaranteed cessation of all forms of outside interference, including armed interference, directed against the Government of Afghanistan, that is without removing the causes which are that the bottom of the tension around Afghanistan. Thus it is now up to the countries involved in the subversive anti-Afghan activities and in the aggression unleashed against Afghanistan to cease that aggression and to respond positively to the constructive initiatives of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan." (Telegram 62066 to Moscow, March 8; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880025-0607)

³ See Document 216.

month, the Soviets have added the concept of a guarantee that outside interference, once stopped, will not be resumed.

A. Cessation of Interference

According to the Zemskov non-paper delivered to the British on March 3, "one cannot speak seriously about a political solution . . . without a complete and guaranteed cessation of all forms of outside interference, including armed interference, directed against the government and people of Afghanistan." Thus, there can be no discussions of any kind until outside interference is stopped.

During the de Leusse visit in early March, the French inquired as to whether the Soviets expected the US to admit that it was guilty of interfering in Afghanistan.⁴ The Soviets replied that they did not require a formal or public admission of guilt; a *de facto* cessation of interference would be sufficient.

In framing their position this way, the Soviets are basically insisting that the US and Afghanistan's neighbors accept responsibility for the insurgency and the Soviet reaction. They are thus arguing implicitly that the causes of Kabul's problems are entirely external and that the yardstick by which Moscow would measure cessation of interference would be abatement of rebel activity.

B. Guarantee

Cessation of foreign interference in itself would not, apparently, be sufficient to lead to a Soviet withdrawal. Moscow has added that there must be "guarantees" that interference would not resume. The Soviets have not spelled out precisely what they mean by guarantees. Indeed, it seems unlikely that Brezhnev had any plan in mind, when

⁴ During a meeting with the Chargé in Paris, March 6, the Secretary General of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, de Leusse, reported on his recent visit to Moscow. De Leusse recounted his opening statements on French policy toward the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan: 1) France understood the insurgency as "chiefly characterized by the revolt of an entire people against a foreign intervention;" 2) the situation had compelled the Soviets to become further enmeshed in Afghanistan; 3) Afghanistan threatened détente between the Soviet Union and Western Europe, and Soviet leadership "must make a political decision to resolve the situation;" 4) tensions continued to rise as time passed; and 5) France believed only a "political solution" could resolve the crisis. That solution would include three elements: "withdrawal of foreign military forces from Afghanistan," self-determination for the Afghan people, and "Afghanistan should not constitute a threat to its neighbors, and guaranteeing in particular that the country cannot be the stake or the instrument of rivalry of the superpowers." De Leusse relayed the Soviets' point-by-point refutation of his presentation, from which the French concluded that the dialogue with the Soviets over Afghanistan left them "very puzzled" and had reached an endpoint for the time being. (Telegram 7809 from Paris, March 7; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800118-0489)

he first used the term on February 22. The Soviet position which emerged from their talks with the British and the French is still vague:

—The Soviets see the notion of guarantees as the result of some sort of negotiation in which the US and Afghanistan's neighbors would "guarantee" its security. The participants in any such negotiation would be the US, Pakistan, China, possibly Iran, and Afghanistan. The USSR would not be required to give guarantees since—by Soviet lights—it is not interfering.

—When asked about international or UN mediation, the Soviets told the French that the Afghan government alone was the judge of what its security needs were, and that "no international mechanism was needed."

Nyet to Neutralization

Given the Soviet position on negotiations and withdrawal, it is not surprising that Moscow has rejected the notion of the "neutralization" of Afghanistan raised by the British. On the most basic level, the Soviets simply refuse to draw a distinction between neutral and non-aligned or accept the argument that pro-Soviet is not non-aligned.

More specifically, the Soviets have termed the British concept of neutralization "unacceptable" on the grounds that it is intended to undermine the legitimacy of the current Kabul regime and thus constitutes interference in internal Afghan affairs. As the British were told on March 3, questions on the international status and social system of Afghanistan, as well as the composition of its government, cannot be a matter for political settlement. In the Soviet view, the pro-Soviet international alignment and socialist political orientation of Kabul were fixed by the April 1978 revolution and cannot be the topics of negotiations since this would "constitute inadmissible interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state."

This latter point perhaps reflects the most dramatic shift in the Soviet position since late 1979. Moscow has now committed itself more than ever before to the preservation of the pro-Soviet Marxist regime and not just the maintenance of a friendly regime in Kabul. This point was underscored by Gromyko during Dost's visit to Moscow on March 14–15.⁵ Gromyko went out of his way to stress that there was "complete

⁵ The visit of the Afghan Foreign Minister was reported in telegram 4200 from Moscow, March 15. "Particularly noteworthy," the Embassy reported, was Gromyko's statement during a toast at a luncheon on March 14, during which he offered a "limited endorsement of a political settlement" for Afghanistan. The Embassy further noted that Dost, in contrast, took a "much harder line" on the topic of neutralization and quoted him as saying: "Now, when it has become necessary for imperialists to recognize that their calculations have been smashed, they have begun to think up 'plans' for Afghanistan's 'neutralization', etc. In showing our rejection of this interference, we have made it clear to all, and particularly to those circles, that we will not let anyone interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800132–0871)

unity" of views between Moscow and Kabul and promised continued aid and support.

Soviet Tactics

The main lines of Moscow's tactics in response to a further round of Western probing are likely to be:

- not to reject discussion of the Afghanistan crisis;
- to refuse to negotiate over the future regime in Kabul; and
- to emphasize the theme of cessation of outside interference as a precondition to any other moves toward a settlement.

To the extent that the Soviets find they have to elaborate on the theme of guarantees, they may build a position in which a formally negotiated guarantee of noninterference, and Kabul's acceptance of it, becomes an additional precondition for Soviet withdrawal.

245. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

GC 80-10035

Washington, April 1980

[Omitted here are a title page, a security information page, and a cover page.]

The Afghan Refugees: An Irritant to Soviet-Pakistani Relations
(*[classification marking not declassified]*)

Summary

Afghan resistance efforts are receiving support from families encamped as refugees in Pakistan and from related tribes who live in the Pakistani borderlands. Soviet and Afghan military forces may attempt to curb cross-border activity when weather conditions improve in April and May. (*[classification marking not declassified]*)

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 82T00154R, Box 1, The Afghan Refugees: An Irritant to Soviet-Pakistani Relations. Secret. A typed note at the bottom of the page reads: "The author of this memorandum is [*name not declassified*] Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research. This paper was coordinated with the Offices of Economic Research and Political Analysis, the Afghan Task Force, and the National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asia. Information available as of 1 April 1980 was used in the preparation of the text. Comments and queries are welcome and may be addressed to the Chief, East Asia Branch, [*less than 1 line and classification marking not declassified*]"

If retaliatory action is taken against refugee groups in Pakistan, likely danger zones are in the upper Konar Valley in Chitral District, in Mohmand tribal territory north of the Khyber Pass, and in the area of Parachinar in the Kurram Valley.² The Pakistani Government may choose to reduce the strain in Soviet-Pakistani relations by removing refugees from the border area. (*classification marking not declassified*)

More than 700,000 Afghan refugees are located in the border areas of Pakistan; most eventually register with government agencies in order to establish eligibility for relief supplies, and about 650,000 are already registered in camps ranging in size from 500 to 11,000. Almost all the refugees are Pushtun tribesmen. (*classification marking not declassified*)

Cross-border tribal ties, combined with the tendency to travel in extended family units, have enabled the refugees to survive until now without much government support. The need, however, for food, shelter, and sanitation systems is growing. (*classification marking not declassified*)

[Omitted here is the body of the memorandum.]

² An intelligence memorandum prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, March 27, assessed the prospects for cross-border operations into Pakistan conducted by Soviet forces. The key judgments of that assessment were: "a) The probability that the Soviets will conduct cross border operations is low until they determine that present military and political efforts to control the flow of men and material into Afghanistan will not succeed; b) Soviet efforts to seal the border will not succeed. Therefore, when the Soviets reach this conclusion and if they are not able to neutralize the resistance in Afghanistan, the probability that cross-border operations will be conducted will be very high; c) Soviets have the capability militarily to launch cross-border operations at any time; d) Political activities, such as increasingly strong, public, diplomatic demarches protesting Pakistan support to insurgents, are likely to provide the principal indication of impending cross-border operations." (Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 1, Cross-Border Operations—Pakistan)

246. Intelligence Appraisal Prepared in the Department of Defense¹

[*appraisal number not declassified*]

Washington, April 2, 1980

[Omitted here are a title page, a security information page, a cover page, and a table of estimated Soviet forces required to control Afghanistan.]

USSR: POST-AFGHANISTAN MILITARY INTERVENTION CAPABILITIES (U)

Summary

(S) The Soviets have committed some 105,000 troops in support of their military operations in Afghanistan. This force, albeit substantial, amounts to only a small portion of the total Soviet military force structure. Most of the ground and air units involved in the Afghan action have been drawn from the contiguous Turkestan and Central Asia Military Districts.

(S) Despite the already sizable commitment, as many as 50,000 to 60,000 additional troops may be required to achieve Soviet goals in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the Soviets are believed to be willing to gradually commit these forces during the coming months.

(S) We do not believe that the Soviets can initiate and sustain a full-scale invasion of Pakistan with the force structure currently in Afghanistan, or with the projected force structure which may be committed there within the next 3 to 4 months. Nor do we believe that the Soviets would consider initiating such an attack until they have better secured their control in Afghanistan. Furthermore, a major Soviet invasion of Pakistan would require the movement into Afghanistan from the USSR of a much more substantial combat force than is presently near the Soviet-Afghan border. A considerable logistic buildup would also be required to support this force. Nevertheless, limited Soviet ground force cross-border incursions or "hot pursuit" strafing, bombing, or artillery bombardment of "Patriot" sanctuaries in Pakistan are possible during the next 3 to 4 months.

(S) The current and projected level of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan does not preclude a concurrent military move against Iran. Sufficient forces are available in the USSR near the Iranian border to execute either a limited attack, such as the seizure of Azerbaijan, or a large-scale invasion to seize most or all of Iran.

¹ Source: Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 1, Afghan Transport System. Secret.

(S) We do not believe that the USSR's current and projected level of military involvement in Afghanistan significantly degrades its ability to initiate direct, simultaneous military actions elsewhere. For example, presently only 5 of the USSR's 173 ground divisions have been committed directly in support of Soviet operations in Afghanistan. Although there has been some minor siphoning off of troops and equipment from areas not contiguous to Afghanistan, the Soviet force structure opposite NATO, Yugoslavia, and China remains essentially intact and for the most part unaffected by the military incursion into Afghanistan. Furthermore, the USSR's military presence in Afghanistan has not affected the capabilities of the military forces of other Warsaw Pact nations.

[Omitted here is the body of the appraisal.]

247. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

[*memorandum number not declassified*]

Washington, April 2, 1980

The Supply of Weapons to the Afghan Nationalist Forces (*[classification marking not declassified]*)

The Afghan insurgents have been relatively successful in avoiding the Soviet offensive in eastern Afghanistan over the past month. While

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 6, Afghan Crisis—Pubs Insurgents. Top Secret; [*codeword and handling restriction not declassified*]. A typed statement at the bottom of the page reads: "This memorandum was prepared in the Regional Analysis Division of the Office of Strategic Research. Comments and/or queries may be directed to [1 line not declassified]." In a covering memorandum to Brzezinski, April 9, Turner noted: "Pursuant to the tasking arising out of the Special Coordination Committee meeting on 28 March, I am submitting an analysis on the Afghan resistance in terms of its effectiveness and how much aid it is receiving from various sources. As to the question raised at the SCC meeting as to whether it would be advisable to make public the fact that we are providing that aid, I would strongly advise *against* such a course of action; the Middle Eastern countries who are participating in this effort are already increasingly leery about published reports of outside aid to the Afghan resistance, and any open, explicit admission of this assistance, or any allusion to their role therein, could be fatal to the continuation of this assistance." (National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box 1–031, Sep–Dec 1980) The summary of conclusions of the March 28 SCC meeting is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 47, Security Framework: Minutes of Meetings: 1–4/80.

casualties have been high, many insurgents have been able to escape over the border into Pakistan or to fade into the rugged, mountainous terrain. From there, they have mounted successful guerrilla operations aimed at isolated Soviet or Afghan units, lines of communications, and districts not heavily defended by Soviet or Afghan Army forces. In other parts of the country, insurgent activity continues at a high level, and little of the countryside is under government control. (*classification marking and codeword not declassified*)

The nationalists' ability to sustain such operations will depend on the continued availability of weapons and ammunition. Needs for equipment vary widely throughout the country, often depending on the Soviets' ability to disrupt supply links across the Afghan border and on the strength of the Afghan or Soviet forces in the area. Nationalists in the southwestern provinces, who for the most part face undermanned Afghan army and police units, are said to have enough weapons but are short of ammunition. In contrast, in Konarha Province, where insurgents have faced a Soviet assault, they reportedly do not have enough weapons, and those that they do have often have proved ineffective against tanks and assault helicopters. (*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*)

So far, the insurgents have obtained the bulk of their weapons—mostly rifles, mortars, machine guns, and occasionally tanks and armored personnel carriers—from retreating or deserting Afghan troops and by ambushing supply convoys. They also obtain weapons through the local arms market in western Pakistan, where they purchase locally manufactured or imported weapons and arms stolen from the Afghan or Pakistani armies. (*classification marking not declassified*)

Afghan soldiers still with their units have been a continuing source of material, particularly ammunition. Soldiers regularly cache part of their allotment of ammunition and sell it to the insurgents for cash; the Afghan Army has long had difficulty paying its soldiers on time. Local government officials have struck bargains with nationalist groups, providing food, medicine, and other supplies as well as freedom of movement through government checkpoints in exchange for protection for their families. (*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*)

The insurgents also receive small amounts of arms from a variety of outside sources, but so far this aid has had a minimal impact on the capabilities of the nationalist forces. (*classification marking not declassified*)

—*Pakistan* has probably provided the most aid so far, although we have little information on the types or amount of equipment it has given the insurgents. Most of the equipment delivered to date apparently has been ammunition, mines, rifles, machine guns, and hand grenades.

The Pakistanis have promised additional aid if the exile groups form a viable, united resistance effort, and they reportedly plan to support at least one nationalist group that has already demonstrated above-average leadership and fighting abilities. (*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*)

—The Afghan government claims the *Chinese* are providing arms and training for Afghan insurgents, but we have been unable to document such aid. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] some assistance has been moved across the Afghan-Chinese border to insurgents in Badakhshan Province, [*5½ lines, classification marking, and codeword not declassified*]

—The *Iranians* have provided little material aid to the insurgents, although some humanitarian aid has been given to refugees on the Iranian side of the border. Afghan [*7½ lines, classification marking, codeword, and handling restriction not declassified*]

—Aid from other Middle Eastern states has also been limited. The *Saudis* reportedly have provided money for rebel arms purchases, but insurgents inside Afghanistan claim that much of the funds has lined the pockets of Pakistani intermediaries and Afghan exile leaders. The insurgents reportedly have requested arms from *Egypt* [*1 line, classification marking, codeword, and handling restriction not declassified*]

—Exile leaders have apparently purchased some small arms in Western Europe through arms dealers [*6½ lines, classification marking, and handling restriction not declassified*]

The insurgents almost certainly will continue to try to avoid pitched battles with Soviet or Afghan government forces. They have not been deterred by the Soviets, however, and if anything the insurgency may be more pervasive than at any time since it began. In order to achieve a measure of success against any large-scale Soviet assault they require a continuing supply of weapons, mines, and ammunition. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] the single most effective Soviet weapon has been the MI-24 helicopter, and few Afghans have weapons to combat them. A shortage of antitank weapons has also hampered nationalist operations. (*classification marking not declassified*)

To this end, the insurgents would appear to benefit most from the introduction of man-portable, easy-to-operate weapons such as the Soviet SA-7 or the US REDEYE surface-to-air missile, heavy machine guns, antitank weapons such as the French MILAN or the US LAW, and nonmetallic antitank mines. Coordination of insurgent assaults could be improved with the delivery of additional communications equipment; some insurgent groups have set up effective tactical nets when they have had the equipment. (*classification marking and codeword not declassified*)

The insurgents have a continuing need for money, medical supplies, food, and clothing. Gas masks or other antidotes against chemical

weapons might also be useful in combatting Soviet or Afghan chemical attacks. (*[classification marking not declassified]*)

248. Analysis Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research¹

Washington, April 3, 1980

1. AFGHANISTAN: SOVIETS FAIL TO ESTABLISH FULL CONTROL

Three months after coming to power, the Babrak Karmal regime has failed to win significant support from the people of Afghanistan. Soviet military tactics, though often brutal, have failed to discourage popular resistance. Even the introduction of additional Soviet forces may not assure suppression of the resistance during the spring and summer months.

Signs of coup plotting against Babrak Karmal and his Parchamist faction have recently reappeared in both clandestine reporting and [*less than 1 line not declassified*] messages. These indications of a continued intra-party struggle between the Khalq and Parcham factions reconfirm the instability of the Babrak government, as do further military and police defections. Information that Soviet advisors have attended conspiratorial meetings indicates that they may be reassessing the viability of the Parcham leadership.

The constant barrage of government propaganda does not appear to have won converts. The armed resistance to the Kabul government and the Soviet invaders has grown significantly since December 27, as previously passive onlookers throughout the country have been won over to the Mujahedin rebel cause. Increasing supplies of weapons and ammunition from cross-border support organizations may partly account for the escalated nationalist activity in many areas. Participation by experienced Afghan army defectors bringing weapons with them has also strengthened the resistance movement.

Although Soviet forces are now deployed throughout much of the country, the government, which for some time has had little authority in the central Hazarajat region, is on the verge of losing control in several more provinces. Soviet military engagements have failed to

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Daily CIA Brief File, Box 26, 4/1/80-4/4/80. Top Secret; [*codeword not declassified*]; Noforn; Nocontract; Orcon.

produce decisive victories, with the possible exception of Kabul, where severe repression of demonstrations in February appears to have discouraged further anti-government activities. The massive offensive in Konarha province retook one military outpost, temporarily relieved the insurgent siege of another, destroyed many villages and sent thousands of refugees into Pakistan. But the Soviets suffered significant casualties in the process and reportedly continue to do so as the rebels have again assumed the offensive in that region.

Both Soviets and Mujahedin hope to profit, although in different ways, from increased mobility in the spring and summer. The Soviets will be able to move heavy equipment into areas previously blocked by winter snows, while the nationalists will be able to disperse higher up into the mountains.

The Soviets clearly have the advantage of far superior fire power and the dreaded MI-24 helicopters. However, they are spread thin and reportedly suffer from at best indifferent morale and discipline. The nationalists, who can blend into a supportive population, appear to have excellent morale and are dedicated to their cause. Thus, the months immediately ahead promise serious fighting, much suffering for the population, and a continued flow of cross-border refugees.

249. Memorandum From the Chief of the Near East and South Asia Division, Directorate of Operations, Central Intelligence Agency (Cogan) to Director of Central Intelligence Turner¹

Washington, April 4, 1980

SUBJECT

Talking Points for Your 8 April Meeting With President Sadat

1. *Action Requested*: None; this is for your information.
2. The following topics are appropriate for you to draw on in your meeting with President Sadat scheduled for Tuesday, 8 April:²

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 82M00501R: 1980 Subject Files, Box 12, C-370, 21 Jan–30 Oct 80, Egypt. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*] The memorandum was sent through Carlucci and McMahon.

² No record of the first April 8 meeting between Carter and Sadat was found. For the memoranda of conversation of other meetings during Sadat's April 7–10 State visit to the United States, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition, Documents 354, 355, and 356.

—You may tell President Sadat you are pleased that the purchases of arms from Egypt for Afghanistan are proceeding smoothly. Training in the use of the Egyptian-supplied hand held antiaircraft missiles is nearing completion and the missiles should be moving into Afghanistan in the next few weeks. It is quite likely Sadat will ask you for a reading on the present situation in Afghanistan and prospects for the insurgents.

[Omitted here are items unrelated to Afghanistan.]

—You may tell Sadat that we hope the Middle East briefings which have been arranged for him have been satisfactory. A joint CIA/State/DoD team briefed him in October 1979, but another joint team we sent in February 1980 was unable to see him but briefed Vice President Mubarak. FYI: Since the beginning of 1978 we have also sent two other teams to brief Sadat but he was unavailable to receive them.

250. *[text not declassified]* Research Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

CR 80-11069

Washington, April 1980

[Omitted here are a title page, a security information page, and a cover page.]

PREFACE

The opposition to the Soviet-backed government of Babrak Karmal in Afghanistan currently comprises three political elements. The most active is the disorganized collection of independent Afghan tribes currently waging vigorous guerrilla warfare against occupying Soviet troops and their Afghan clients. A second element is the royal family, headed by former King (1933-73) Zahir Shah, who lives in exile in Rome. The third force, and probably the most potentially significant, is a group of six religious leaders, each heading an opposition party based in Peshawar, Pakistan. Collectively they enjoy a wide following among their countrymen, including many of the Afghan refugees in

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977-81), Box 6, Afghan Crisis—Pubs Insurgents. Secret. A statement on the cover page reads: "The author of this paper is *[name not declassified]* Near East/Africa Division, Office of Central Reference. This paper was coordinated with the Office of Political Analysis, the NFAC Afghanistan Task Force, and the Directorate of Operations."

Pakistan and a significant number of the fighting tribesmen. (*classification marking not declassified*)

In the past these six exile leaders have never been able to set aside their deep personal and ideological differences in order to unite into a more forceful opposition against the pro-Communist government in Kabul. Attempts at unification in April 1978 and August 1979 foundered after only a few weeks. A third attempt was initiated in January 1980, when the six leaders united under the banner of the Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan (IALA). This attempt at unity has an important distinction from previous tries; it incorporates a direct agreement between two significant exile figures—Sayed Ahmad Gailani and Sebqatullah Mojadedi—who had hitherto been unable to set aside for very long the historical rivalry of their respective families. This try at unity has also been the first since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. As a consequence of that act, the IALA has come under increased pressure from the Governments of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states to keep itself united as a precondition for military and financial aid. In March 1980, in response to this pressure, the IALA selected a figurehead leader, Abdul Rasul Saif. Imprisoned for the past five years, Saif, unlike the six other exile leaders in Peshawar, is not known to have any political or religious following. (*classification marking not declassified*)

Despite these efforts, the potential for disintegration remains. The IALA was formed in haste to achieve a semblance of unity before the 26 January Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference in Islamabad, so the six leaders had to postpone negotiating any organizational details. The charter was drawn up by Mojadedi and Gailani; under it Mojadedi will be prime minister (head of government) in a government-in-exile or any future post-Communist government, while Gailani will act as chief of a revolutionary council (chief of state). Another council, composed primarily of tribal leaders, is to elect other government officials. The leaders have not yet all agreed to the specifics of the charter. In fact, Gulbuddin Hikmatyar has withdrawn his Islamic Party from the IALA—at least temporarily—because he believes that it will have too small a representation on the revolutionary council. He was demanded a system of proportional representation that will reflect the number of guerrillas that each alliance group has fielded. (*classification marking not declassified*)

The IALA, the Tribesmen, and the King

The view the embattled tribal leaders have of the IALA probably varies from individual to individual. Some no doubt look to it for political coordination of their opposition to the pro-Soviet government and as the channel for external military assistance. Others are most

likely indifferent to its existence and are content to struggle independently. In any case, most tribesmen are discontent with the internal squabbling that depletes so much of the exile leaders' energies and that reduces their effectiveness as a conduit of external aid. The tribesmen also perceive that the exile parties are playing a minor role in the actual insurgency. As a consequence the tribesmen want a greater role for themselves in Peshawar politics so as to obtain a greater share of the arms they think are coming into the area from the outside and to influence the nature of a successor government. Many of the tribal leaders have said that if the IALA members do not make immediate progress in resolving their differences, they will form an alliance of their own as the principal political focus of resistance against the Communists. Participation of the Peshawar-based leaders in such a tribal council would depend on the number of seats each could win in an election among district representatives picked by the tribesmen. Under such circumstances, Gailani, who has the most religious influence among the tribesmen, would have a good chance of being elected president of any post-Communist government. (*classification marking not declassified*)

Some tribesmen support the return of the royal family, regarding it as the last legitimate government of Afghanistan and possibly considering it as having sufficient national stature to rally around in case the Peshawar leaders and the tribesmen fail to develop their own unified opposition to the Communist government. Neither King Zahir Shah nor another important member of the royal family, the King's cousin and son-in-law Prince Abdul Wali, seem likely to gain enough support to reestablish the monarchy, but they may still figure prominently in any post-Communist government because of the respect they continue to enjoy among some tribesmen in Afghanistan. (*classification marking not declassified*)

The return of the monarchy, however, is one of many issues on which the Peshawar leaders differ. The role that Islam will play in a successor government is another key sticking point, with the spectrum of views running from those who favor a Western-style democratic form of government to those who feel that the only constitution their country needs is the Koran. (*classification marking not declassified*)

[1 paragraph (7 lines) and classification marking not declassified]

[Omitted here is the body of the paper.]

251. Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

PA 80–10200

Washington, April 1980

[Omitted here are a title page, a security information page, and a cover page.]

East Asia-USSR: The Impact of the Afghanistan Invasion
(*classification marking not declassified*)

Key Judgments

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan gave added impetus to growing concerns among non-Communist East Asian states that the Soviets, together with Vietnam, represent a serious long-term threat to regional security. It brought new awareness to the USSR's ability and willingness to project its power beyond Soviet borders and pointed up deficiencies in existing East Asian defense arrangements. (*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*)

All East Asian countries are now reassessing their defense and foreign policies. They see the need for a strong US military presence in the region but question the commitment and capability of the United States to project its power overseas; thus they will avoid getting "out front" in opposing the Soviets. (*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*)

East Asian countries do not agree on how to meet the more visible Soviet threat. Many have important economic dealings with the USSR that they do not wish to jeopardize. Some still believe China presents the main long-term danger. Relations with nonaligned countries and commitments to Third World causes also influence their decisions. (*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*)

Japanese leaders now believe Japan must play a more active defense role and that it must use its economic strength to further its international political and security goals. Public attitudes will change more slowly, but the evolution has begun. (*classification marking not declassified*)

South Korea's preoccupation with the possibility of a North Korean invasion influences its view of international affairs. Seoul may believe that the Afghanistan invasion and consequent exposure of Soviet

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 6, folder 20. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. A statement on the cover page reads: "The author of this paper is [*name not declassified*] East Asia-Pacific Division, Office of Political Analysis. This paper was coordinated with the Office of Economic Research and with the National Intelligence Officer for China and East Asia-Pacific."

duplicity will intensify the US security commitment to South Korea. (*[classification marking not declassified]*)

Southeast Asian states see the need to strengthen their defenses but differ about what course to take. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations is unlikely to become an explicit defense grouping in the near future, but bilateral defense cooperation will increase among member states. More cooperation with the United States on a bilateral and limited basis is also likely. (*[classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]*)

Australia and New Zealand recognize that their geographic location no longer isolates them from the effects of Soviet- or Vietnamese-instigated instability in East Asia. Budgetary restrictions and domestic political inhibitions, however, constrain either country from major increases in defense spending. (*[classification marking not declassified]*)

US and Soviet actions in the coming months will largely determine whether the changing perceptions of East Asian states evolve into lasting action. The speed and effectiveness of US responses to East Asian security concerns will condition attitudes about the United States as a durable and consistent deterrent to Soviet expansionism. If Moscow refrains from further provocative acts and embarks on a peace offensive, the fears of some countries may recede. (*[classification marking not declassified]*)

The Afghanistan invasion has opened the way for greater cooperation with US security and other international policy objectives. Future US actions will be the major determinant of whether this happens. Military assistance is an important yardstick, but East Asian states will also measure the US response by Washington's willingness to provide political support and understanding as well as economic aid and cooperation in matters they consider important. (*[classification marking not declassified]*)

[Omitted here is the body of the assessment.]

252. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, April 15, 1980

SUBJECT

The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: Aberration or Symptom?

1. A short time ago we were discussing the implications of the Soviet move into Afghanistan. We asked whether this was an aberration which, when behind us, will see the Soviet Union revert to its previous pattern of behavior; or whether it is a symptom of a new phase of adventuresome policy to which the Kremlin is already committed.² Subsequently, I asked our Soviet experts to look at these two possible explanations for Soviet behavior in Afghanistan. They have written the attached paper which I believe is very helpful in putting these two explanations into perspective. [*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*]

2. It concludes that Soviet behavior in the future will be quite contingent on the conclusions which the Soviet leadership draws from the results of their experience in Afghanistan and US reactions to it. In short, the Soviets are neither committed to returning to detente nor to pursuing an aggressive policy on a global basis. [*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*]

3. I would only add a personal comment that I would be a bit more categorical than the paper in stating that the Soviet behavior in Afghanistan was not an aberration. I agree that we do not have evidence that the Soviets are firmly committed to continuing as aggressive a policy in the third world as was this Afghan example. Yet, I do believe that the Soviet track record over the past five or six years indicates a definitely greater willingness to probe the limits of our tolerance. "Detente" was not a bar to their greater assertiveness in Angola, Ethiopia, Kampuchea, and Yemen. It need not be so again, even if we return to detente. As the paper concludes, how assertive the Soviets will be

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 82M00501R: 1980 Subject Files, Box 12, C-367, 01 Jan-30 Jun 80, Afghanistan. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. In a note forwarding the attached memorandum to Turner, Clarke explained: "Herewith the paper on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan: Aberration or Symptom prepared by Horelick, [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. The paper was requested from you by Brzezinski. It is solely the product of the NIO/USSR office and has not been further coordinated. I recommend that you send this on to the White House." (Ibid.)

² For Brzezinski's analysis on this topic, see Document 243.

in the future will very likely depend upon how “successful” the Soviet leadership views their intervention in Afghanistan to have been. [*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*]

Stansfield Turner³

Attachment

Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency⁴

Washington, April 10, 1980

[Omitted here is a summary.]

SUBJECT

The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: Aberration or Symptom?

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has precipitated a sharp debate over its significance. On one side, some offer Afghan-specific explanations to argue that the move is an episodic aberration in an otherwise generally circumspect pattern of Soviet behavior. On the other side of the debate are those who hold that the invasion represents the opening of a new and more aggressive phase in what promises to be an escalating global competition.

Proponents of the first view concede that the invasion represents Moscow’s first postwar use of combat forces outside the Soviet Bloc. But they emphasize Afghanistan’s status as a Soviet client and ally and suggest that the invasion was the result of a reluctant decision by Moscow that it could not permit the collapse of a proto-socialist allied regime in a neighboring country which was an incipient bastion of anti-Communist Islamic fundamentalism, if not a potential client of the US or the PRC.

Proponents of the second view contend that the invasion is symptomatic of Moscow’s growing willingness to play a worldwide interventionist role and to resort to the direct use of Soviet military force in the pursuit of otherwise unattainable ambitions. As these analysts see it, Moscow is convinced that “the correlation of forces” has shifted to its side, creating a situation in which actions that it would previously have rejected as “adventuristic” can now be confidently undertaken. Some analysts of this persuasion even argue that Moscow’s new found confidence has led it to embark on a calculated plan to fill the unprece-

³ Turner signed “Stan” above his typed signature.

⁴ Secret.

dented vacuum of power in Southwest Asia and consolidate a position of privileged access to Middle Eastern oil and control over oil supply routes. In this way, the Soviet Union would be assured of a solution to its own emergent energy problem, and also win immense leverage against the West—leverage which, among other things, Moscow could utilize to forestall the sort of Western military buildup which could redress the currently favorable “correlation of forces”.

Rather different policy implications flow from these alternative explanations and expectations of Soviet behavior. The first implies that if the Soviet Union can be induced to withdraw from Afghanistan in return for suitable “reassurances” it will revert to a more acceptable pattern of behavior and may even show a heightened appreciation of the value (and fragility) of “detente”. According to this view, the present Soviet predicament is in large part the product of miscalculation which is now recognized as such. This has led to a situation in which the mutual interests of the West and the Soviet Union lie in fashioning a face-saving solution which will permit the resumption of normal relations.

The second view holds that the Soviet Union is determined to maintain a permanent military presence in Afghanistan and will use it to bolster its geopolitical position in the region, to bring pressure to bear on neighboring and nearby countries, to discredit or nullify Western security guarantees, and to highlight Western weakness and irresolution. With reference to detente, this view holds that the Soviets are prepared to write off for the time being what they already perceived before Afghanistan as unsatisfactory levels of US trade, credits and technology transfers. Simultaneously, Moscow will seek to preserve and extend its commercial relations with Western Europe, and Japan through what it believes can be a successful policy of “differentiated detente”.

The relevance of the central and regional military balances for the Soviet decision to intervene in Afghanistan is also at issue in these contrasting views of Soviet behavior. Members of the aberrationist school are inclined to believe that shifts in the military balance over the course of the last ten to fifteen years were essentially irrelevant with respect to the Afghanistan intervention. Given the identical set of circumstances, they contend, the Soviets would have intervened in Afghanistan ten or fifteen years ago, as they did in Hungary in 1956. In contrast, those who view the invasion as reflecting a higher Soviet propensity to take risks hold that it was precisely the shift in the military balances of the past ten to fifteen years that emboldened the Soviets for the first time to employ military force directly against a non-bloc state. As these analysts see it, the shifting strategic balance has created a military environment in which Soviet recourse to force became both physically possible and politically attractive.

We believe that each of these divergent viewpoints captures important aspects of reality, but that each also omits important considerations. If taken alone, each has potentially misleading policy implications. Like those who view the intervention as an aberration, we believe it was triggered by Afghan-specific events and did not in itself stem from or reflect a conviction that the time was ripe for a global offensive, let alone from a belief that it was a necessary (or even a very sensible) first step in the pursuit of warm water ports or control of Middle Eastern oil. Like the aberrationists, we also believe that the timing of the Soviet decision to intervene was critically affected by fear of an imminent, and possibly irreversible, disintegration of the established Kabul regime and its replacement by a regime which might even prove susceptible to hostile external influence. In addition, we share the aberrationists' belief that the invasion of Afghanistan was defensive in the sense that it was motivated by fear that the loss of a country from within the Soviet sphere of influence would have an extremely adverse effect on Moscow's credibility as a power determined to brook no challenge to the integrity of its empire or to the irreversibility of "socialist" gains.

We are also inclined to agree with some of the arguments of those who see the invasion as an expression of a more fundamental shift in global Soviet policy. We believe it is probably the Soviet perception that their enhanced military posture, especially in the strategic area, has created a more permissive political environment for the conduct of foreign policy. It has lowered the perceived risk of Soviet exploitation of political and social instability in the Third World, and of a more assertive foreign policy that has included the use of military force, either directly or through proxies, in some Third World countries. Growing Soviet military aid efforts have served as the main conveyor of Soviet influence—in Angola, Ethiopia, Yemen, etc. The calculations that informed the invasion of Afghanistan, therefore, were not without precedent. Afghanistan involved the crossing of an important threshold, and was recognized as such by the Soviet leadership. But, as we have also pointed out, it was preceded by a gradual, decade-long escalation in Soviet political-military involvement in the Third World.

The decision to solve the Afghanistan problem by an unprecedented massive military intervention in a "Third World" country is a culmination of this process. It reflects a confidence that the shift in the global military balance, as the Soviets perceive it, guaranteed the USSR immunity from Western military retaliation, and has created new possibilities to demonstrate the apparent inability of the West to deter Soviet self-assertiveness. The possibility that Afghanistan represents a qualitative turn in Soviet foreign policy in the region and toward the Third World is one to be taken seriously. The Soviets recognize that the issue

of super-power involvement in a region that stretches from Morocco to the Indian subcontinent remains the vital question informing the posture and policies of the nations in the region.

On balance, we tend to disagree with the argument that ascribes the USSR's Third World involvement and its involvement in Afghanistan largely to Soviet feelings of insecurity. We would argue that such behavior is more the product of confidence in a potentially enduring shift in the balance of power—a stronger sense of being a superpower and being perceived by others as such. This status and self-image has become an important determinant of Soviet behavior; a superpower would not let an "allied" regime in a bordering country go down the drain. At the same time, from the Soviet point of view, Afghanistan probably appeared an extremely low risk venture precisely because it was preceded by numerous ventures which, though they did not involve the direct use of large-scale Soviet forces, did involve an active Soviet military presence in countries remote from the borders of the Soviet Union, and located well within traditional Western spheres of influence. The Soviet ability to carry out these ventures without incurring drastic costs enhanced Moscow's confidence that it could intervene with relative impunity in Afghanistan. Perhaps to Moscow's surprise, this intervention did finally precipitate the sort of Western reaction that the Kremlin may well have feared, but tended to discount in view of the relatively passive reaction to its earlier involvements elsewhere.

Even if those who see the invasion as an aberration were completely correct in their explanation, there would be grounds for skepticism about the policy implications they often tend to draw: namely, that if the USSR can terminate its Afghan adventure in relatively short order and without an undue loss of face, it is unlikely to try to expand its influence elsewhere in Southwest Asia or to challenge Western Third World interests militarily. However, unlike the symptomists, we do not take it to be an almost foregone conclusion that the invasion of Afghanistan will be followed by comparable acts of Soviet military self-assertiveness. Like the aberrationists, we consider it possible that the termination of the Afghan adventure will leave the Soviet Union willing and eager to resume the process of detente. However, as was true before the invasion, the Soviets will continue to interpret detente as permitting active military and quasi-military challenges to Western Third World interests.

The real issue of this discussion—whether the Afghanistan invasion represents an aberration or a trend in Soviet policy—is the degree of restraint which has governed Soviet policy toward opportunities in the Third World, the nature and sources of that restraint, and changes in it. Some would acknowledge that while Soviet policies since the mid-1970's have been more assertive and probing, such policies also

reflect caution and risk-avoidance, imposed in part by Moscow's desire to preserve its detente and arms control relationships with the US. While a combination of these motives contributed to the Soviet decision to invade, one can only explain that decision in the broader context of Soviet perceptions of a more favorable global military position and a greater latitude for risk. If one subscribes to the idea that the Soviet propensity to take risks is higher, however, one must realize that an ongoing cost-benefit analysis will continue to shape Moscow's policies toward the Third World.

While we disagree with those who argue that the Soviets are henceforth irrevocably committed to the direct use of their own military force to aggrandize power in the Third World, we agree with them that Afghanistan could be a precedent if the Soviets conclude it was an appropriate solution to the Afghan problem, if they perceive that it places them in a position from which they can exert pervasive leverage in Southwest Asia, and if they conclude that the West is either incapable or unwilling to frustrate the effort or to oblige the Soviet Union to pay a counterbalancing military or political price elsewhere. In short, the answer to the question of whether or not Afghanistan is a harbinger of things to come will depend importantly on the "lessons" that are drawn from the Afghan experience by the present incumbents in the Kremlin and the successors who will shortly replace them.

In sum, we believe that Afghanistan is neither an aberration which, when behind us, will see the Soviet Union revert to its previous pattern of behavior, nor a symptom of a new phase of adventuresome policy to which the Kremlin is already committed. We believe that future Soviet behavior will be more contingent, the result of conclusions the Soviet leadership reaches after an analysis of the costs and benefits of the invasion. A generally assertive Soviet policy will almost certainly continue, but whether it is more constrained in use of military force or not will depend importantly on the "lessons of Afghanistan": the outcome of the situation in that country, its impact on the region, and on US allies, but, above all, on Soviet perceptions of US reactions.

253. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State¹

Kabul, April 15, 1980, 0838Z

1348. Subject: Coordinating Relations With Afghan Regime. Ref: State 76559.²

1. (C—Entire text)

2. We share Department's concern as expressed in reftel about how long we can continue to avoid diplomatic contact with the Babrak Karmal regime and still expect to function as a diplomatic mission in Kabul. We have already seen the kinds of pressure the DRA can apply to "encourage" us to move towards more normal diplomatic relations: when we were unsuccessfully seeking consular access to two imprisoned Americans we were told that "something might be done" if we took it up at the political level; and we and other Embassies which refrain from diplomatic dealings with the regime are being subjected to a more restrictive visa policy than "friendly" countries, and this could impact on our operations here.³ There are obviously many other similar ways the DRA could try to pressure us into upgrading our relations with it.

3. We have been discussing this problem with selected diplomatic colleagues and on April 13, after a false start or two, I got the UK, French, Italian, German and Japanese Chargés together for lunch to discuss it as a group. While everyone agreed that we are on thin ice here, all seemed to have different (and not very well thought out) notions of what we might be able to do to improve the situation. All are under general instructions to refrain from diplomatic contacts with the DRA. However, except for the UK Chargé, they are unwilling to exercise the slightest initiative in interpreting that instruction without referring back to their capitals. (The four EC Chargés have been meeting

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Box 9, Afghanistan: 4/10–18/80. Confidential; Sensitive; Exdis. Sent for information to Ankara, Bonn, Islamabad, London, Moscow, New Delhi, Paris, Rome, and Tokyo. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

² Telegram 76559 to Kabul, March 22, raised concern over how long the United States could maintain a diplomatic presence in Kabul while avoiding contact with the Karmal government. The Department stated that U.S. policy on this matter should be coordinated with its allies. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800146–0501)

³ In telegram 1103 from Kabul, March 24, the Embassy described the arrest and detention of Charles Brockunier, a U.S. citizen and rug buyer who was detained by Afghan police for alleged suspicious activity. The Embassy advised Brockunier to leave Afghanistan immediately because, as a private citizen, it could offer him no protection. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800149–0733)

regularly twice a week to coordinate their activities in accordance with instructions from home, and some of them resent it if one of their number does something out of step with the others; see Kabul 1340/Notal.)⁴ My initial impression is that regular monthly meetings like Sunday's will have some value in keeping one another informed of current thinking on these matters in our capitals and in coordinating our tactics locally to the extent allowed by national policies but will be of very little use in coming up with innovative ideas to help shape those policies. These meetings could be useful in reinforcing USG policy proposals which are also made in the respective capitals or to the Embassies in Washington, but my guess is that not much would come of trying to use the Kabul Chargés as a means of channeling USG suggestions to their governments.

4. The following summarizes the personal views of those at Sunday's meeting on how we can best maintain our diplomatic presence in Kabul without undercutting our policy of nonrecognition and the avoidance of diplomatic contact. (Please protect the Chargés in any discussions with other governments.) The British Chargé believes that eventually, and probably sooner rather than later, we will have to expand our contacts with the regime somewhat beyond the current administrative and consular areas if we are to protect our interests here. He believes this can be done in an incremental, non-dramatic way and that if necessary enough disclaimers can be built in to assure there is no implication that we "recognize" or approve of the regime. The German, on the other hand, believes we ought not to increase our dealings with the DRA but wait the situation out. He thinks we should be able to find ways to reciprocate and make our displeasure known if the regime does something we can't put up with, but he wasn't able to suggest specific measures when various situations were posed. The French Chargé felt it was important not to do anything to jeopardize future good relations while waiting for the "very awkward" political situation to get better. (Most of the French Embassy staff here, the largest of any non-Communist country, is concerned with maintaining and improving cultural ties with France.) The Italian tended to agree with the British Chargé, while the Japanese didn't offer an opinion.

5. My own view is that for the time being, at least, we can live with the present arrangement in spite of the difficulties we may increasingly face in our day-to-day operations and that it is probably worthwhile doing so for the sake of our overall objectives. (Not everyone in the Embassy agrees; some believe, as the British Chargé does, that if

⁴ Telegram 1340 from Kabul, April 14, reported on the difficulty Embassy personnel were experiencing in obtaining exit visas. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800186-1198)

we want to continue functioning here we are going to have to offer something to the DRA in return.) In my opinion, the DRA and the Soviets need us here so they can continue to maintain that everything has returned to normal in Afghanistan (and the Afghans may also consider our presence a potentially useful hedge against total dependence on the Soviets), but they want us here on their own conditions or as close to them as they can get. They want a very small Embassy so we have a limited capability to do the things they know we are trying to do; they want to make it difficult for us to rotate TDY personnel in and out of Kabul because that increases their problems of surveillance and control; and they want to put obstacles in our way so they can trade the removal of those obstacles for U.S. concessions. But they do not want to push us so far that we pack up and leave, and we can use that knowledge to defend ourselves against their moves. While the Afghans are unpredictable and often illogical, they have shown that they understand and respond to firm counterpressure (witness their back-down when the Pakistani Chargé threatened reciprocal action on visas), and we should not be afraid to play tit-for-tat with them. Where there is no exactly reciprocal action we can take, as there is in the visa field, we should be able to find something else that hurts about as much. Our hole card is the threat to close down our Embassy and encourage others to leave as well, demonstrating to the world that claims of normalcy and legitimacy are pure hogwash. It goes without saying that we should not threaten this action unless we can afford to go through with it, and that is a judgment I cannot make from here. But if, as I believe, the Afghans need us here more than we need to be here, toughing it out is probably our best policy.

Mills

254. **Briefing Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Spiers) to Secretary of State Vance¹**

Washington, April 17, 1980

Afghanistan: The Soviets Settle In

Since their invasion in December, the Soviets have encountered more resistance and instability in Afghanistan than they anticipated. Yet, despite several thousand Soviet casualties and continued international criticism, there are no indications that Moscow is seriously considering any change in its basic policy of preserving a pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. Its words and actions suggest that it hopes to ride out the present difficult situation, slowly—very slowly—rebuild the Afghan army and government, and avoid being forced to commit still larger numbers of Soviet forces to achieve its aim.

Insurgency Continues, Regime Shaky

Three months after the Soviet-engineered coup that brought it to power, the Babrak Karmal regime has still been unable to garner significant popular support and remains in power only because of the presence of Soviet troops. The insurgents continue to threaten major urban areas, while constantly ambushing and engaging Soviet and Afghan troops in the countryside. Within the government itself, there remains a bitter Khalqi-Parchamist rivalry, and recently, new rumors of coup plotting have surfaced. Internationally, the Babrak Karmal regime has failed to win any important recognition outside of the Soviet bloc and its hangers-on.

Although the rebels cannot stand up to concerted Soviet military strikes, their hit-and-run tactics have thus far made any Soviet gains temporary. Soviet forces can pacify an area or province, but once withdrawn, the rebels return. While the Soviets have been able to restore a semblance of order in Kabul after last February's riots and general strike, they have only been able to do so by assuming more and more of the security burden themselves.² Even with this greater Soviet role, however, there is no guarantee that Kabul and other cities will not erupt again.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs David Newsom, Lot 81D154, folder 3. Secret. Drafted by Limberg (INR/EEA), April 16. An unknown hand initialed for Spiers. A stamp on the memorandum indicates Newsom saw it on April 18.

² See Document 217.

The USSR's growing military and security involvement has been necessitated by the continued disintegration of the Afghan forces. The Afghan army currently has little more than 30,000 men; it is questionable whether it could field more than 10,000 at any one time. Soviet military officials in Afghanistan have reportedly complained about the Afghan army's disarray and have expressed grave doubts about its loyalty.

No Change in Sight

The current situation in Afghanistan—and the likelihood that it will continue for some time—raises the question of whether the Soviets are approaching the point at which they will have to decide to increase substantially their military commitment in order to eradicate the insurgency once and for all or pursue some sort of political solution that would allow them to extricate themselves from what is quickly becoming the Afghan quagmire. While there are indications that at least individual officials in the Soviet ministry of foreign affairs and military have grave doubts about the wisdom of the present Soviet course, there are no signs that Moscow is now seriously rethinking its policy. Indeed, the present situation in Afghanistan may well have confirmed the Soviet leadership in the wisdom of its decision to intervene in the first place on the grounds that if the USSR had not, the situation would be far worse.

Despite Moscow's insistence that it is in favor of a political solution to the Afghan problem, the Soviets have rebuffed any initiatives requiring compromises on their part and have meanwhile stiffened their own maximalist position. In discussions in March with the French and British, for example, the Soviets insisted that the US and Afghanistan's neighbors must "guarantee" that all outside interference in Afghanistan has ceased, and would not resume, before Moscow would even consider withdrawing its troops. Lately, they hinted that any solution must include the entire region and that "guarantees" of non-intervention must also include Iran.

Over the last two months, the Soviets have made it clear that the Afghan Marxist revolution is an historical fact and must be preserved and protected. Their public support for the Babrak Karmal regime as the only legitimate government of Afghanistan has been complete, though rumors abound that they are seeking a more effective Afghan puppet than Babrak. In reply to Western and Iranian proposals to discuss the "neutralization" of Afghanistan, Moscow has insisted that neither the "socialist" nature of the Afghan government nor its international status can be open for outsiders to negotiate.

At the same time, the Soviets are attempting to portray the Karmal regime as the effective government if Afghanistan capable of carrying

out its international obligations, in a perfectly normal manner. In early April, the USSR agreed to a \$150 million economic grant for Kabul, and appears to be encouraging the East Europeans to help alleviate the dismal Afghan economic situation and to give the illusion at least of socialist solidarity. Soviet propaganda has extolled the reforms of the Kabul regime and attempted to portray the rebels as, "bandits" controlled by reactionary mullahs and egged on by outside "imperialist" provocateurs. Hardly a week has gone by in which the Soviet media have not highlighted the visit of an Afghan delegation or senior official to the USSR or Eastern Europe. Similarly, the Soviets have given favorable play to the Cuban foreign minister's recent trip to Afghanistan and have used the occasion to re-emphasize Kabul's nonalignment.

Soviet Hopes

Although they underestimated the intensity of international and Islamic criticism, the Soviets certainly anticipated some trouble. However, they apparently expected it to be short-lived and no greater in duration and severity than after Czechoslovakia in 1968. In this they were wrong. But they may be heartened by signs of obvious differences in tactical approach between the US, the West Europeans, and Japan on issues of current political, cultural, and economic relationships with the USSR. Moscow is still probably counting on the stake of America's allies in detente in Europe to lead them to accept the intervention as a *fait accompli*.

In terms of the regional response to the Soviet action, Moscow may also believe it has seen the worst. Relations with Iran appear no worse than they would have been if there had been no invasion, and, in any case, US-Iranian relations remain in shambles. Similarly, Pakistan has yet to embrace openly the rebel cause and is hesitating to align itself with the US. Moscow probably believes that this is a result of its policy of playing on Islamabad's fear of Soviet retribution while offering reassurances and increased aid. Moscow probably also judges that the damage to its relations with India has been negligible because of New Delhi's concern over increased US aid to Pakistan and its suspicions of China. Further afield, the Soviets are probably still calculating that they can eventually refocus Arab attention away from Afghanistan to the Palestinian and Iranian problems and, thus, on the US.

Military Commitment Remains

In any case, Moscow is not backing away from its military commitment in Afghanistan. During Afghan Foreign Minister Dost's visit to Moscow in March, the Afghans and Soviets signed an agreement on the stationing of forces which provides for the "temporary" presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Presumably, this agreement is similar

to those which the USSR has with Warsaw Pact countries. The Soviets have also proceeded with the construction of permanent barracks and garrison areas and are reportedly restructuring some of their units in Afghanistan in order to wage a more effective counterinsurgency campaign.

It can be expected that with the arrival of good weather, Soviets will step up their operations against the rebels. Operations will probably be concentrated in the eastern provinces where the insurgents have been most active. Closing the border with Pakistan to rebel movements will surely be one of the aims. While this offensive will result in considerable bloodshed on both sides, it will probably not be decisive. The resistance may be forced to subside momentarily to regain its breath, but its almost certain revival will continue the attrition of Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

Limiting the Cost

The Soviets seem prepared to shoulder the Afghan burden for some time to come, but there are signs that they hope to accomplish their goals without significantly augmenting their forces. Since late February, Soviet troop levels have not greatly increased and now number 85,000 in Afghanistan and another 30,000 involved in the intervention, but held just across the border in the USSR. While they will probably augment these slowly over the next month or so, there are no indications they plan a massive increase. Unless the Soviets dramatically increase these forces—which they may have to consider if operations this spring and early summer falter badly—they remain unlikely to crush the insurgency quickly. However, for now, they seem in no hurry and appear to prefer to test their capability to do the job with their present forces for a full campaign season. Their current game plan for stabilizing the situation includes the start of a long-term effort to rebuild the Afghan armed forces, as well as limited combat engagements for Soviet troops which are enough to hold the major cities and to prevent general deterioration.

255. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 19, 1980, 11:45 a.m.

SUBJECT

Dobrynin's Call on Secretary

PARTICIPANTS

Secretary of State
EUR—George S. Vest

Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin

SUMMARY: Dobrynin came in to turn down our proposal to have arms control talks in connection with TNF. Other subjects covered were Afghanistan, Iran, the Middle East, SALT, Soviet harassment of our representatives in Leningrad and future travel plans of the Secretary. End Summary.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Afghanistan.]

2. *Afghanistan.*

Secretary asked Dobrynin to clarify what was indeed the Soviet position on Afghanistan. Dobrynin said that the Babrak Government had a good proposal (publicly announced by the Afghanistan Government on April 17).² The first step would be a discussion among the three neighboring countries—Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan—about their borders. The Soviets supported that idea because, after all, there had been historically much trouble about those borders. The decision could create a peaceful atmosphere and if some countries wanted to guarantee the results such as the Soviets, the U.S. or European countries, the Soviets would be prepared for it. A second step would be to enlarge the discussions leading to a pact of non-interference, disarmament, etc., among the three neighbors, and of course there could be guarantees for this as well. A third step, which seemed not likely to be acceptable,

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office Files of Marshall D. Shulman, Special Advisor to the Secretary on Soviet Affairs, 1977–1981, Lot 81D109, CV—AD, 4/19/80. Secret. Drafted by Vest. The meeting took place in Vance's office. The main points of the discussion on Afghanistan were relayed in telegram 107514 to Bonn and other posts, April 23. (Department of State, Files of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, 1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 9, Memcons: April, May, June 1980)

² On April 17, the Afghan Government announced its intention to attempt to normalize relations with Iran and Pakistan. News reports quoted unnamed Western diplomats who characterized the move as a Soviet-directed attempt to mitigate the international boycott of the Soviet-hosted Olympics and to dampen worldwide condemnation of Soviet policies in Afghanistan. See Kevin Klose, "Afghanistan Seeks to Open Talks to Mend Ties with Iran, Pakistan," *Washington Post*, April 18, 1980, p. A26.

might be to enlarge the discussions and to talk about the military presence in the Indian Ocean.

Secretary pressed two questions—would the Soviets be willing to withdraw their forces, and can the Afghanistaneese choose their own government? Dobrynin thought that the Soviet forces would most naturally withdraw after the conclusion of Step I although this might happen in the course of the discussions to Step II as well. (With further questioning, Dobrynin on this point was evasive.) He emphasized that border crossing on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border was and is a large problem, but he thought that once the border was agreed and sealed it would create a situation where the Soviets could withdraw. He then turned to his proposal and urged, what was wrong with discussing the Afghanistan idea? The Secretary responded that the Afghanistan Government in no way represented the Afghanistan people, and returned to his point asking, can the Afghanistaneese choose their own government? Babrak is no real representative. He pressed then the question—does an Afghanistan Government have to be acceptable to the Soviets? Dobrynin responded that obviously the Soviets did not want a hostile government, but otherwise were quite open about the form of government. The Secretary responded then that Dobrynin was insisting on a Soviet-installed government. Dobrynin replied that, you say it so.

Dobrynin gave a long comment on the nature of Afghanistan, the social changes. He said that it is a land that where for decades there has been fighting and discontent. This has been particularly true in more recent years where the landlords' holdings have been exploited after centuries of depression. The Soviets he said had had problems of a similar nature in the Asiatic areas of Russia, which had continued right on through until 1930. There were similarities here—of race, of peoples who move back and forth across borders, of the relationship between peasants and landlords. Today in Afghanistan he recognized that perhaps not many of the people are in favor of the Russians, but they are in favor of the social changes in recent years. A real civil war is going on in Afghanistan between the old and the new, and it is not all that simple to define. If the main U.S. concern is that the Soviets are pushing to the Ocean, the Soviets could settle this by giving guarantees because they don't have that objective. If it is a question of borders and the future of Pakistan, then why not have it talked out along the lines of the Babrak proposal?

The Secretary said of our concerns that Pakistan was a buffer state and we could live with it, but now it is not, and the Soviets have 85,000 troops there.³ The fact is that the Soviets are on the borders of Pakistan—

³ An unknown hand bracketed "Pakistan," and wrote "Afgh" above it and placed a question mark in the margin to the right of the paragraph; a suggestion that Vest had inadvertently confused the two countries.

that much closer to the Indian Ocean and we cannot be certain of what are the Soviet intentions. Would the Soviets accept a non-aligned government in Afghanistan? Dobrynin said yes, but it must not be hostile to the Soviets. The Secretary again questioned, do you accept the concept of a buffer state in Afghanistan? Dobrynin said yes, but remember that over the past 15 years there have been changes in the social structure and land reforms so that a buffer state would not be simply a reversion to the period of Daoud. The Secretary asked whether the 3-step proposal of Dobrynin had to take place step by step, or if some could take place at the same time. Dobrynin replied that it is probably simpler to proceed step by step, but there was no objection to a mixture. Sticking to his primary point, he repeated that the Afghanistaneese are interested in the first step and the Soviets therefore support him.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Afghanistan.]

256. Special Analysis Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, April 22, 1980

PAKISTAN: The Afghanistan Debate

Pakistan continues to insist that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan is a precondition for any improvement in its relations with either country. Islamabad's position is under constant review, however, and President Zia is subject to conflicting pressures from within his government. Some officials favor opposing the Soviets more strongly; others want to appease Moscow. ([classification marking, codeword, and handling restriction not declassified])

Zia and his advisers are worried about Moscow's long-term objectives in the subcontinent and about the serious problems Pakistan faces in the short term as the Soviets try to pacify Afghanistan. Some advisers believe that a continued influx of refugees could soon lead to a serious breakdown of law and order along the frontier. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 8, Central Intelligence Agency: 4/78-4/79. Top Secret; [codeword and handling restriction not declassified].

If the Soviets make punitive raids against refugee camps or even occupy territory on the Pakistani side of the border, the Pakistanis fear they might be forced to choose between a dangerous confrontation with the USSR and acquiescence in a violation of their country's sovereignty. The Pakistanis believe that the Soviets are already encouraging leftists as well as separatists, especially in Baluchistan, to oppose Zia more actively. (*classification marking and codeword not declassified*)

Diplomatic Tightrope

Islamabad has taken a strong diplomatic stand against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, but it is trying to avoid giving unnecessary offense to Moscow. Zia rejected US aid primarily because he believed that accepting it would increase tension with Moscow but would not strengthen Pakistan's security to a corresponding degree. (*2 lines, classification marking, codeword, and handling restriction not declassified*)

Islamabad's desire to avoid confrontation with Moscow is further reflected in its reluctance to back publicly exile groups in Pakistan and its unwillingness to give extensive help to Afghan insurgents. Pakistan also has tended to avoid publicity on border incidents, including Soviet overflights. (*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*)

Zia and his advisers nevertheless are not seeking an accommodation with Moscow. Pakistan's closest allies—Saudi Arabia, Iran, and China—would have serious reservations about any significant move toward Moscow. At home, many Pakistanis—especially the conservatives supporting Zia—would oppose abandoning fellow Muslims in Afghanistan or any “sellout” to the USSR. (*classification marking not declassified*)

Pakistani policymakers doubt, moreover, that any agreement with Moscow would bring more than temporary benefits. There also is considerable sentiment in the military—on which Zia ultimately depends—for a continued hardline on Afghanistan. (*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*)

Pakistani leaders seem to agree on their sense of isolation while facing the Soviets. This has led them to an unprecedented interest in trying to improve relations with India despite longstanding deep distrust of India's intentions and of its relationship with Moscow. The conflicting advice Zia is getting makes Pakistan's policy unpredictable. Some aides—notably Foreign Affairs Adviser Agha Shahi—seem to favor some agreement with the Soviets but most probably would support an accommodation only if they see no other good alternative. (*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*)

Domestic Politics

Although foreign developments and the extent of foreign support will strongly influence Pakistani policy, domestic politics could become

an equally important factor. The near automatic support that Zia received after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan—even from many of his political enemies—is beginning to dissipate. (*[classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]*)

Former Prime Minister Bhutto's widow has publicly attacked Zia for failing to accept the Soviet-installed Babrak government and for allowing insurgents to use Pakistani territory. Many Islamabad officials, on the other hand, believe that any attempt to placate the Soviets could turn many in the Army against Zia. (*[classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]*)

257. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, April 23, 1980, 4–4:50 p.m.

SUBJECT

Followup on Security Framework in the Persian Gulf—IX

PARTICIPANTS

State

Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher
 Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary
 Near Eastern & South Asian Affairs
 Reginald Bartholomew, Director of
 Political/Military Affairs

Defense

Secretary Harold Brown
 Deputy Secretary W. Graham Claytor,
 Jr.
 Robert Komer, Under Secretary for
 Policy
 David McGiffert, Assistant Secretary
 for International & Security Affairs

JCS

Lt. General John Pustay

CIA

Director Stansfield Turner
 Robert Ames, NIO for Near
 East & South Asia
 Charles Cogan, Chief, Near
 East

White House

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
 NSC
 Colonel William E. Odom
 General Jasper Welch

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council Institutional Files, 1977–1981, Box 112, SCC–305, 4/23/80, Security Framework Follow Up. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Carter wrote: "Zbig, J" at the top of the page. The portion of the summary of conclusions on base facilities and military exercises in the Persian Gulf area is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Document 74.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

[Omitted here is information unrelated to Afghanistan.]

Special Intelligence Items: Afghanistan/Pakistan

Turner gave a brief update on the program for Afghanistan. Per the SCC's instructions last week he has offered to help the Pakistanis solve the bottleneck between the Afghanistan border and Islamabad with a C-130. The Pakistani reply has not yet been received. To Harold Brown's question of why they do not use one of their own C-130s, Turner replied that they prefer an outside source to prevent their own military from knowing about the program.² (S/S)

It was agreed to report to the President for his approval the CIA offer of a C-130 if the Pakistanis desire it.³ (S/S)

Dr. Brzezinski next raised the issue of making support for the Afghanistan freedom fighters a publicly respectable undertaking rather than a covert activity which we and other countries feel obliged to deny. He argued that by maintaining the covert posture, we are allowing the Soviets to argue cogently the support for the insurgents as wholly illegitimate while their support for insurgency elsewhere is wholly legitimate. (S/S)

Some argued that Zia cannot politically afford an overt program. The Saudis will also protest abandoning the covert mode. Finally, for the U.S. to take the public lead, the effect would be to "de-Islamicize" the program. It was also argued that the present support programs might be jeopardized. (S/S)

Dr. Brzezinski said that we should not "go public" unless Zia and the Saudis approve, but it might be worth exploring with them. Also, one might encourage other Islamic countries, such as Morocco, to support the public stand that Egypt has already taken. (S/S)

Both Christopher and Harold Brown recommended that we no longer deny support for the Afghanistan insurgents but that we refuse to comment on the matter.⁴ Both have resorted to that answer to queries recently, and they find the no comment line very effective. (S/S)

² Carter underlined the last sentence and wrote: "not logical" in the margin. The summary of conclusions of the April 14 SCC meeting is in the Carter Library, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box 112, SCC 302, 4/14/80, Security Framework.

³ Carter wrote: "I don't favor this—particularly if Pak military" after this sentence.

⁴ Carter wrote: "ok" in the margin.

258. Memorandum From Marshall Brement of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, April 30, 1980

SUBJECT

Assistance to the Afghan Rebels: A Vigorous Dissent

At your suggestion, I have looked into the question of whether our aid to Muslim forces in Afghanistan is effective. I discovered that those involved in this effort seem to be enthusiastic, motivated, and convinced that everything reasonable and possible that can be done is being done. I sharply disagree. The reason that our "operators" in this area are relatively sanguine about their efforts is that they accept two basic restrictions—i.e., supply only weapons of Soviet manufacture and work exclusively through the Pakistanis—which I consider unnecessary and unwise. (TS)

It is literally impossible to exaggerate the significance of the outcome of Soviet efforts to crush the Muslim resistance in Afghanistan. If the Soviets succeed, as seems likely, this action will become a powerful precedent within the bureaucracy which will inevitably ensure that we will be faced with other Afghanistans down the road in the 1980's. Particularly sensitive will be Central America and the Caribbean. Could a United States government, for example, look the other way while a Soviet or a Cuban force of thousands landed in Nicaragua, Honduras, or perhaps even Venezuela, in order to save a self-described progressive government that was going down the drain? Chervonenko, in his recent speech in Paris, said in referring to Allende that the USSR could tolerate

¹ Source: Carter Library, Donated Historical Material, Brzezinski Collection, Brzezinski's Geographic Files, Box 17, Southwest Asia/Persian Gulf—Afghanistan, 1/5/80–10/1/80: Soviet Union. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Thornton, Odom, Ermarth, Welch, Gregg, and Owen. In the upper right corner, Brzezinski wrote: "DA—Hold a meeting on this, use Carlucci/Komer/Newsom. I tend to agree with MB. We should do more. ZB 5/2/80." No record of a meeting per Brzezinski's directive was found. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates Aaron saw it. In a May 2 memorandum to Brzezinski (attached but not printed), Thornton characterized Brement's position as valid but problematic. Arguing against a rapid increase of weapons transfers to the Afghan insurgents, Thornton cited geographic restrictions, increasing (and unwanted) U.S. visibility in the covert action, and the fact that U.S. goals with regard to the Afghan insurgency remained poorly defined. Thornton suggested that Brzezinski hold more meetings to determine the future course of U.S. policy in Afghanistan. Both Ermarth and Welch wrote memoranda to Brzezinski, May 2, supporting Brement's position. Those memoranda are also attached but not printed.

no more Chiles.² The implications of that remark are sobering, to say the least. (TS)

It is therefore crucial for us to do everything that we possibly can to make the Soviet adventure in Afghanistan extremely costly to the Kremlin. The *Mujahidin*, if they had the right kinds of weapons, could considerably impede Soviet mobility and “air-cav” tactics, which give the Soviets an enormous tactical advantage over the resistance forces. Men on horseback are no match for men in helicopters. (TS)

Our efforts thus far have been tentative, piecemeal, and inadequate. The Soviets wiped out 372 insurgents in a single operation the other day. We will be seeing many more such reports in the months ahead if the *Mujahidin* are not adequately supplied. We should keep in mind that SA-7s are hard to get and very expensive and it is for this reason that we are only planning to supply the Muslims with 85 of these weapons, literally a drop in the bucket. (TS)

At the same time, we must also keep in mind that the Pakistanis are not eager to provide weapons to those who could become future security problems. Punjabis have an inbred reluctance in arming Pathans. They know that the gun pointed against Kabul today might be pointed against Karachi tomorrow. (TS)

Furthermore, we have a natural opening in Zia’s public criticism of the US for not providing greater support to the resistance forces. We should take him at his word. This is especially the case in that political opposition to Zia is mounting and opposition leaders are now calling for rapprochement with the Soviets and the cessation of support for the *Mujahidin*. All our eggs should not be in Zia’s basket. (TS)

How to Operate. There are 53 Afghan refugee camps along the Pakistan border. We should have at least three agents in each of those camps; ostensibly for refugee relief purposes, but principally to ensure that the *Mujahidin* are getting the weapons they need. A similar effort should be made in eastern Iran. We should not restrict ourselves to the use of American citizens for this purpose. In addition, we ought to explore and take advantage of traditional gun smuggling routes, which have been used in that part of the world for centuries. There should never be a shortage of the right kinds of weapons in the market-places of Peshawar. (TS)

² Telegram 12604 from Paris, April 17, reported on the speech delivered by Chervonenko, Soviet Ambassador to France. Regarding Afghanistan, Chervonenko hewed to standard Soviet positions that the crisis there was not relevant to U.S. national security and that the Soviet military presence was necessary so long as Afghanistan was threatened by external aggression. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800191–0155)

The Right Weapons. Taking into account Afghan tactical needs, as well as maintenance and delivery constraints, we should make it our business to supply the *Mujahidin* with the following light, easily transportable weapons:

—American anti-helicopter missiles, such as Red-Eyes or Stingers (this would be in addition to the 85 SA-7s. The *Mujahidin* obviously need hundreds of anti-helicopter weapons).

—Disposable anti-tank weapons (LAW).

—Standard caliber (7.62 mm) rifles (we have huge stocks of M-14 rifles which are no longer used by the US Army and which would be ideal for the resistance fighters).

—Light mortars, which can be easily disassembled and used effectively by men on horseback.

—Simple short-wave two-way radios. (One of the greatest difficulties of the *Mujahidin* is that they cannot coordinate their operations).

—Small mines (which could be extremely effective in closing lines of communications, thereby forcing the Soviets to expend additional efforts in defending those LOCs).

The Public Line. We could do the above without changing our public line (i.e., we do not comment about matters of this kind) in the slightest. The Soviets have already accused us repeatedly of supplying the rebel forces and have, in fact, used this as their justification for invading Afghanistan. They and their Afghans will make the same amount of noise, which will have roughly the same propaganda effect, whether we are supplying the *Mujahidin* effectively or ineffectively. I vote for supplying them effectively. How the world turns may ultimately depend on our ability to do so.

259. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, April 30, 1980

The Pakistani Chief of Intelligence has asked for our assistance in providing the support of a C-130 to transport arms from Karachi to the areas inside Pakistan where they are transferred to the Afghan guerrillas. We understand that his reason for asking us for this support lies in the extreme secrecy of this entire operation. Within the Afghan government the army is not knowledgeable of this activity, not even the entire Cabinet is aware of it.

The Intelligence Chief is concerned that utilization of Pakistani Army and Air Force C-130's would blow his cover.²

Stansfield Turner³

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Meetings File, Box 79, Sensitive X: 5/1–11/80. Secret.

² At the bottom of the memorandum, Carter wrote: "OK if I am assured that Pres. Zia approves. J." In a May 1 memorandum to Turner, attached but not printed, Brzezinski wrote: "The President has reviewed your April 30 memo on C-130 support for Pakistan. He has approved this support on the condition that he be assured that President Zia approves the proposed arrangement." In a memorandum to Brzezinski, May 13, Turner reported that a CIA officer had recently met with ISID Director General Akhtar Khan in Islamabad, who relayed Zia's endorsement for the C-130 request. Turner concluded: "After reviewing the Pakistani request in some detail with General Akhtar, we are convinced that the C-130s can make an important contribution in the objectives of our Afghan program. We are therefore taking steps to arrange the transfer of two C-130s from the U.S. Air Force to the Pakistani Air Force in the most expeditious way." (National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I-031, Apr–Aug 1980)

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

260. Spot Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

DDO/CS 80-088

Washington, April 30, 1980

SUBJECT

Recent Upsurge in Land Mine and Anti-tank Rocket Incidents Inside Afghanistan Indicates that Our Weapons Aid to the Afghan Rebels is Having Some Successes

1. *Summary:* Preliminary analysis of [*less than 1 line not declassified*] indicates that circa mid-March 1980 Soviet and DRA forces in Afghanistan began noting significant increases in rebel land mine and anti-tank rocket attacks. This upsurge in such incidents closely coincides with January–February 1980 passage to rebels of land mines, RPG–7 anti-tank rockets and RPG–7 rocket launchers.

2. *Land Mines:* Prior to mid-March 1980 the Soviet and DRA armies encountered very few land mines, but during the first two and one half weeks of April 1980 the Soviets alone had 23 vehicles (including 12 tanks and 8 APC's) damaged or destroyed, with nine Soviets killed and three wounded. This prompted the Soviets to arrange for priority air shipment of minesweeping equipment into Afghanistan. The total land mine incidents suffered by DRA forces is not known (only 10% of the data has been analyzed), but preliminary information indicates that the DRA has suffered even more than the Soviets. Various reports by DRA forces of actual land mine explosions and other indirect evidence show Afghan exile groups infiltrating the land mines all along the Pakistan border. In addition to the 1,000 Czech land mines supplied the rebels by 26 February 1980, the Paks have supplied an additional 700 land mines to the rebels.

3. *Anti-tank Rockets:* Prior to mid-March 1980 DRA and Soviet armies reported few instances of anti-tank rockets being fired by rebel bands. However, beginning mid-March 1980 [*less than 1 line not declassified*] showed a significant increase in rebel anti-tank rocket attacks. For

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 82M00501R: 1980 Subject Files, Box 12, C-367, 01 Jan–30 Jun 80, Afghanistan. Secret. Prepared in the Directorate of Operations. Attached but not printed are Cogan's May 5 covering memorandum to Carlucci and a list of arms deliveries to Afghan rebel forces. The list was divided into four components. The first listed weapons shipments prior to April 1, totaling [*text not declassified*] excluding the cost for the SA–7s that had been shipped. The second listed weapons shipped or scheduled for shipment from Egypt, totaling approximately [*text not declassified*]. The third listed weapons shipped from other unspecified sources totaling approximately [*text not declassified*]. The fourth listed proposed shipment from Egypt (subject to change) totaling approximately [*text not declassified*]. Also attached but not printed are two maps of Afghanistan indicating the locations of rebel anti-tank rocket and land mine attacks against Soviet forces.

example, on 3 April 1980, the DRA 14th Division in Ghazni noted the destruction of two APC's by rebel rocket attack inside the city of Ghazni—a new rebel tactic. On 15 April 1980 the DRA 17th Division in Herat reported its first rebel anti-tank rocket attack; and two days later seven armored vehicles struck by anti-tank rockets were seen in the Herat area. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] traffic has not been scanned for reports of anti-tank rockets used against Soviet armor, but we suspect that the rebels are also using these weapons against the Soviets. By 26 February 1980 127 launchers and 1,404 RPG-7 rounds had been passed to the rebels, with 33 launchers and 1,000 rockets scheduled for current shipments.

4. *Proof of Arms/Ammo Infiltration Success*: Two detailed reports by a source with Gailani's Peshawar exile group on weapons he actually saw being funnelled from the Paks to Gailani closely match with reports from Pakistan liaison on weapons and ammunition passed to Gailani.

5. *Combined Soviet/DRA Armor*: The Soviet and DRA armies in Afghanistan now have over 4,000 tanks and other armored vehicles, plus approximately 20,000 trucks and other vehicles.

6. A senior NSA analyst on 24 April 1980 noted “both a qualitative and a quantitative increase in rebel capabilities during the past five weeks,” thus adding some credence to our preliminary analysis.

261. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

[*paper number not declassified*]

Washington, May 1980

[Omitted here are a title page, security information page, and cover page.]

China and Southwest Asia: The Challenge of Afghanistan
(*[classification marking not declassified]*)

Overview

China sees the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as both a threat and an opportunity. It is concerned that Moscow has embarked on a new,

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Office of Support Services, Job 81T00208R: Production Case Files, Box 4, China and Southwest Asia: The Challenge of Afghanistan. Top Secret; [*codeword and handling restriction not declassified*]. A statement on the cover page reads: “The author of this paper is [*name not declassified*] Office of Political Analysis. This paper has been coordinated with the Offices of Economic Research and Strategic Research and with the National Intelligence Officer for China/East Asia and Pacific and for the Near East and South Asia.”

aggressive global policy that seeks ultimately to obtain a stranglehold on Western oil supplies. (*classification marking not declassified*)

Beijing believes that the outcome in Afghanistan will set the tone in world politics for years to come and that the Soviet action thus poses a fundamental test for the West. In Beijing's view, Western acquiescence in Soviet action in Afghanistan will only embolden Moscow and will also lead to international acceptance of the Vietnamese conquest of Kampuchea, where Chinese security interests are more directly at stake. (*classification marking not declassified*)

For Beijing, the Soviet invasion is an opportunity to advance three key foreign policy objectives: to discredit detente politics in the West; to drive a wedge between the Third World and Moscow; and, most important, to prod the United States into a tougher anti-Soviet stance. With these goals in mind, China is pursuing the same policies in Southwest Asia that it has pushed in the region for several years, although with new emphasis, along the following lines. (*classification marking not declassified*)

Engage the West in the Region. At the heart of Beijing's strategy is its effort to get the United States to renew its close ties with Pakistan. It wants Washington to give Pakistan a strong security guarantee and enough military aid to encourage Islamabad to resist firmly the Soviet presence in the region. (*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*)

Reassure Pakistan. China has given Pakistan constant reassurance of its support since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and has sent separate high-level political and military delegations to Islamabad. Although China has publicly stated its willingness to aid Pakistan, it has not offered a firm security guarantee or given Pakistan any new military assistance. China is known to be concerned about the stability and the anti-Soviet steadfastness of the Zia-ul-Haq regime. (*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*)

Encourage Regional Harmony. Beijing seeks, over the long term, to create an informal, Western-backed alliance of Southwest Asian countries that can firmly resist further Soviet encroachment in the region. As a key element of this policy, China is encouraging Pakistan to improve ties with India while itself attempting to mend its own relations with New Delhi. (*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*)

Bog the Soviets Down in Afghanistan. China seeks to make Moscow pay the highest political price possible for its intervention. It thus opposes any plan to neutralize Afghanistan or any attempts at a compromise solution that would leave the Soviets in control. Beijing is supporting all international measures to isolate the Soviets and is encouraging other countries to aid the Afghan rebels. It is not clear what

assistance—if any—China has given the rebels; Beijing has reportedly sought to assist the rebels through Pakistan, but its effort has met some resistance from Islamabad. (*classification marking and codeword not declassified*)

A number of factors constrain China's ability to achieve its policy goals and limit the role that Washington can play in the region. Long-standing tensions between the major states in the region limit the cooperation Beijing advocates. China has few positive inducements to offer and is still regarded with suspicion by India, which is the key to the success of this strategy. With the possible exception of Pakistan, there is at present no country that is seeking a greater US security role in the region. Pakistan, India, and some Iranian leaders believe, to varying degrees, that a strong anti-Soviet policy is not in their best interests. (*classification marking not declassified*)

Despite these problems, in the months ahead, China will probably persist in its current policy in the region. Over the longer run, however, it may make tactical adjustments to those policies that it believes are not working. One likely area of adjustment is in Chinese policy toward India, where Beijing seems to be willing to go further toward accommodating New Delhi's interests than before. The persistent plea for more US aid to Pakistan, a greater US military presence, and a firm US commitment to meet any new Soviet action in the region is unlikely to change. (*classification marking not declassified*)

[Omitted here is the body of the paper.]

262. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

NIC-M-0001-80

Washington, May 2, 1980

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL MEMORANDUM²

SUBJECT

Soviet Policy Toward West Europe in the Aftermath of Afghanistan

Summary

Soviet policy toward Europe since the invasion of Afghanistan has been characterized by elements of defensiveness and of opportunism. To a great extent, it is a policy of reactive and ad hoc efforts to exploit what Moscow perceives as significant West European concerns about the wisdom and predictability of US policy toward the USSR. Moscow's policy, therefore, is less a "peace offensive" than a combination of blandishments and threats intended to undercut West European support for potential economic sanctions or other retaliatory measures against the Soviet Union. (*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*)

In seeking to influence West European opinion, Moscow has strongly condemned West European endorsement of US policies. Threats of a harsh Soviet response have been conveyed directly—as in President Brezhnev's letter of 2 March to Chancellor Schmidt—and have also been evident in the increasingly acerbic tenor of Soviet media commentaries directed at West Europe.³ At the same time, our reporting clearly indicates that in private the Soviets have taken care to differentiate between the harsher aspects of Moscow's public posture and an underlying flexibility in Soviet policy. (*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*)

Overtures to the West Germans appear to be the most frequent and subtle. Brezhnev has sent two letters to Chancellor Schmidt—the

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977-81), Box 7, Afghan Crisis—Pubs Soviet Moves/Options (May 1980). Secret; *handling restriction not declassified*.

² This memorandum was prepared by the Analytical Group of the National Intelligence Council at the request of the National Intelligence Officer for the Soviet Union and East Europe. It has been coordinated with the National Foreign Assessment Center and within the Directorate of Operations. [Footnote is in the original.]

³ The letter, a response to a letter Schmidt sent to Brezhnev in late January, was described by Schmidt during a news conference as "moderate in tone but hard in content," with a "warning undertone" against West Germany following U.S. policy with regard to Afghanistan. Schmidt was quoted in Bradley Graham, "Brezhnev Warns Schmidt Against Bowing to U.S.," *Washington Post*, March 13, 1980, p. A26.

last containing an unexpected invitation to visit Moscow this summer. By means of private channels, which the Soviets have long believed useful in communicating with the Chancellery, Soviet representatives have indicated Moscow's "interest" in the European Community's neutralization proposal for Afghanistan, and have also conveyed the message to a Chancellery official that West Germany's expected refusal to impose economic sanctions on the USSR was much more important to the Soviet leadership than Bonn's likely decision to boycott the summer Olympics. (*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*)

Although private Soviet overtures to the West Germans and other West Europeans lack specific substance, it is evident that Soviet tactics are based on the assumption that US-West European differences are significant and create openings for the Soviets to exacerbate them. The Soviets may believe that the worst of the European reaction to the Afghanistan intervention has passed or that more serious moves—such as specific economic sanctions—can be attenuated by skillful diplomacy. (*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*)

In either case, the Soviets have opted for a combination of harsh public rhetoric with private hints of a more conciliatory Soviet stance on arms control issues in particular should the West Europeans temper their support for US "hard line" policies toward Moscow. Thus far, however, the Soviets have demonstrated little willingness to make tangible concessions to West European concerns. Nevertheless, West European reservations with respect to US actions in Iran, the implementation of NATO's decision on theater nuclear force modernization, and diplomatic maneuvering leading up to the November 1980 CSCE Review Conference.⁴ All are perceived by Moscow as opportunities to affect adversely US-West European ties. (*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified.*)

[Omitted here is the body of the memorandum.]

⁴ Documentation on the November 1980 CSCE Review Conference is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXVII, Western Europe.

263. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan¹

Washington, May 3, 1980, 1557Z

117572. Subject. Letter From President Carter to President Zia.

1. S—Entire text.

2. Following is text of letter from President Carter to President Zia dated April 30.

[Omitted here is information unrelated to Afghanistan.]

Begin quote: Dear Mr. President: Thank you for your letter following the visit of Dr. Brzezinski and Mr. Christopher.² I welcome the personal attention you have given U.S.-Pakistan relations, and I hope that strengthened cooperation between our two nations will help to show the Soviet Union how seriously we view their ruthless and unprovoked aggression in Afghanistan.

I was deeply impressed by the reports of my emissaries of your country's determination to counter the Soviet challenge. Your leadership at the Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference in January was vital in putting the Islamic world on record condemning the Soviet seizure of a neighboring Muslim country. I hope that Pakistan will exercise equally firm leadership at the Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference in May to demonstrate that the Islamic world remains united in its condemnation of Soviet actions.

One particularly effective way to demonstrate opposition to the Soviet invasion is to boycott the Olympics, and I was pleased to learn privately of your government's decision not to go to Moscow. Making your position public before the beginning of the Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference would increase the likelihood that the moral weight of the Conference will remain behind the boycott.

The struggle of the Afghan people against the Soviet occupation forces is one of the most stirring events of our time. I attach the greatest importance to this struggle and know that you share my admiration for the Mujahidin. Not only does their bravery deserve recognition, their ability to continue their resistance brings home the cost of aggres-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800220-0942. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Hornblow (NEA/PAB), cleared in S/S-O, IWG, NEA, S/S-S, and S/S (by phone); and approved by Saunders.

² Zia's letter to Carter, February 7, is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XIX, South Asia. For Brzezinski and Christopher's visit, see Documents 193, 194, 195, and 198.

sion to the Soviets every day. Such resistance, therefore, is in the interest both of the Islamic world and of the democratic Western countries.

The United States places a particular value on close consultations between our two governments in these critical times. We are always ready to work with you to find mutually acceptable and effective means of dealing with the problems and concerns that we share. We would be glad to hold any further consultations that you think advisable and will also continue to discuss with our allies those matters which are of interest to you. As you know, those discussions have already helped to mobilize some assistance.

[Omitted here is information unrelated to Afghanistan.]

Muskie

264. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization¹

Washington, May 8, 1980, 0145Z

121506. Following repeat Kabul 1521 sent SecState, Ankara, Beijing, Berlin, Bonn, Colombo, Dacca, Havana, Islamabad, Kathmandu, London, Moscow, New Delhi, Paris, Prague, Rome, Sofia, Tokyo, CINCEUR, CINCPAC, USICA, and USUN on 5 May.²

Quote: Secret Kabul 1521. CINCEUR and CINPAC also for POLADs. Subject: Two Years of Leftist Rule in Afghanistan; Status, Prospects and What it Means for the U.S.

1. (S—Entire text) Department repeat as desired.

2. Summary: In the two years since President Daoud was overthrown and slain by some of the same leftists who helped him stage a bloodless coup ousting King Zahir in 1973, the quality of life in Afghanistan and any sense of security and hope for the future on the part of the Afghan people have steadily eroded. Fear, trepidation about the future, and a loathing of the Karmal regime pervade the atmosphere in this strife-ridden, poverty-stricken country. The “great Saur revolution,” cautiously accepted by many Afghans in mid-1978, is fraying at

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800227–0219. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Thomas (EUR/RPM), cleared in S/S–O, and approved by Barry (EUR).

² Telegram 1521 from Kabul, May 5, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800225–0428.

the edges, if not tottering, and is the object of widespread and bitter ridicule. No one in Afghanistan believes the Karmal regime would last 48 hours if the Soviet troops were to pull out now. The failure of Karmal and his colleagues in the regime to win the support of any significant element of Afghan society and the continued crumbling of the Afghan military virtually guarantee a growing Soviet military presence here, no matter what the cost to the USSR in global terms. As they are sucked deeper and deeper into the morass of Afghanistan, the Soviets will inevitably be faced with new points of basic decision and ever-increasing frustration, with the concomitant inclination to try to do everything themselves. No matter what they decide to do, they will find their Afghan adventure increasingly costly. Their task will be made no easier by the ongoing rifts among the Parcham and Khalq wings of the ruling Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan. It is unlikely that they will be able to fashion a broad-based governing group, and there are few bets that Babrak Karmal will die a natural death. In these circumstances, the United States and its allies should continue to treat this regime with circumspection and try to make the Soviet invasion as costly as possible for Moscow. End summary.

[Omitted here is the body of the telegram.]

Muskie

265. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Belgrade, May 8, 1980

PARTICIPANTS

U.S. Side
 Vice President Mondale
 Assistant Secretary of State
 George Vest
 Deputy Assistant to the President
 David Aaron
 Assistant to the Vice President
 Denis Clift

French Side
 French Prime Minister
 Raymond Barre
 French Foreign Minister
 Jean Francois-Poncet
 Notetaker

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 34, Memcons: Mondale: 7/79-5/80. Top Secret; Codeword. The meeting took place in the U.S. Ambassador's residence. Mondale was in Belgrade to attend the funeral of Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito.

The Vice President greeted his French guests and opened the conversation by noting that the Foreign Minister had just met with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko.

Francois-Poncet: Yes, it was one of our regularly scheduled meetings, and we felt it would have been more complicated to try to cancel it. Let me report briefly on the conclusions of the meeting. Gromyko had a general hardness of line, and a harsh tone about US-USSR relations, using vocabulary I have not heard before. We had three long discussions with Afghanistan taking up about two thirds of our time. The Soviet objective in Afghanistan is a diplomatic initiative involving Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan legalizing the Afghan regime and legalizing the Soviet presence. It is clear they want a regional legitimization. When this is done, they then may want to invite outsiders. We told them that we do not see any outside interference, nothing justifying the Soviet invasion, and with this the case, we asked why they did not accept the proposal of having an international body come in. Gromyko said no, how could they, there was fighting going on. It would be too dangerous (laughter).

Secondly, we got into a discussion of Giscard d'Estaing's proposal for a withdrawal of troops and self-determination.² Gromyko did not say this is of no interest. He said he accepted the proposal, but only in as much as it helped to promote the USSR objective. *But* the Soviets say first outside interference must stop. Gromyko balks at a date for Soviet withdrawal. They want a regional approach to "crack the Pakistani nut." They are embarrassed.

Vice President: Did he express some heat about the Pakistanis?

Francois-Poncet: Yes, he was aggressive and insulting about the Pakistanis. He said who does this Zia think he is; he should remember how he came to power.

Vice President: We have just picked up [*less than 1 line not declassified*] evidence of construction of a new 9,000-foot air field in southwest Afghanistan. It has a rationale entirely unrelated to the Islamic problem they say is at the basis of their invasion. It looks to us as it is a base for projection of Soviet air power.

Francois-Poncet: Generally, our reading of the Soviet move into Afghanistan has not been that there was a master plan with the objective of the Persian Gulf. It is not proven at this stage that they have become prone to military adventurism, but this does not mean that once they are there there will not be other military developments.

² Not further identified. Gromyko visited Paris April 24–25 and met with Giscard and Francois-Poncet. Presumably the proposal was made at that time.

I have a question. They must get out. We cannot be starry-eyed about this. It may take a long time, but they have to get out. We feel local and regional factors will determine whether or not they do so. Why aren't the Afghan rebels more effective? Why aren't they shooting down Soviet helicopters?

Aaron: They have shot down about a dozen. They are obtaining SA-7s from defecting Afghan troops. The problem of supply is the narrow Pakistani funnel. The Pakistanis are cautious. A much more promising route would be Iran, but of course we know the problems there.

Francois-Poncet: Our feeling is that the weapons they have are very limited.

Vice President: Our objective is to get the Soviets out.

Prime Minister Barre: It is important that Russians die in Afghanistan. A friend of mine, a businessman, recently visited Kiev, and public opinion there is afraid of the consequences in Afghanistan. They are aware of casualties. They are reading newspapers.

Francois-Poncet: We are making a mistake about how we treat the rebels. They should be treated as a nationalist movement.

Prime Minister Barre: We had an excellent newsreel film on the rebels on fighting in Afghanistan shown just two or three weeks ago. It is worth seeing.

Francois-Poncet: On Islamabad II, our feeling is that it would be rougher than Islamabad I.³

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Afghanistan.]

Vice President: We view the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as a very dangerous development. We are afraid that if the leaders of the industrialized world meet and no mention of Afghanistan is made, it will be taken as a signal that the heat is off.⁴

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Afghanistan.]

³ A likely reference to the Islamic Foreign Ministers Conferences. In a weekly report to Carter, May 9, Aaron noted: "We have found that we have a surprising amount in common with the French in their analysis of the Afghanistan situation and in their position that the Soviet approach is totally unacceptable." (Carter Library, Donated Historical Material, Brzezinski Collection, Brzezinski's Subject Files, Box 41, Weekly Reports (to the President), 136-150 (4/80-8/80))

⁴ Reference is to the upcoming G-7 Economic Summit in Venice June 22-23. See footnote 2, Document 281.

266. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, undated

**AFGHAN FIGHTERS DESTROY SOVIET EQUIPMENT WITH
SOVIET EQUIPMENT**

The Soviet Army is being destroyed by Soviet weaponry in Afghanistan. For many years the Soviet Union provided military aid to the Afghan Army. Although there can be political benefit in providing military equipment to a border state, the sudden change of circumstances in Afghanistan has proved that this can also bear bitter consequences.

After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan last December, the Afghan Army began to dissolve. Rather than fight their fellow Muslims and assist the Soviet invaders, Afghan soldiers, and in many cases full units, began to rally to the tribal forces. When these units changed sides they took with them critical Soviet anti-aircraft and anti-armor equipment, particularly anti-tank rockets which can be fired by one soldier.

Reliable reports reaching Afghan exile leaders indicate that Soviet armor and vehicle losses have begun to mount dramatically as a result of the insurgent use of these Soviet weapons. Sources with access to the rebel forces report, for example, that Soviet units in the Herat area of western Afghanistan in April lost several armored vehicles due to attacks by anti-tank rockets. One rebel source described a particularly successful but simple technique used by the Afghans as they become accustomed to the anti-tank weapons. Some Soviet armored vehicles have rubber tires. The rebel soldiers fire on the tires thereby immobilizing the vehicle. Once immobilized, the vehicle is destroyed by the rebels with their new rocket ability. Soviet vehicle losses have reached rates which reportedly are beginning to alarm Soviet leaders.

Rebel sources also report that the Afghan fighters are beginning to enjoy increased success against the once feared Soviet MI-24 helicopter

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 82M00501R: 1980 Subject Files, Box 12, C-367, 1 Jan-30 Jun 80, Afghanistan. In a May 9 covering letter to Komer, attached but not printed, Carlucci wrote: "Dear Bob: Try this one on for size." In a routing sheet addressed to Carlucci, May 8, also attached but not printed, [text not declassified] Deputy Chief of the Near East Division, Central Intelligence Agency, wrote: "Per your request this morning, suggest the attached might be of use. We can live with the substance of something like attached which contains the guts of the Spot Report (insurgents' effective use of anti-armor and anti-aircraft weapons) but protects our equities (no appearance of government leak and protection of the sensitive ultimate source). Our only suggested caveat is that no US source be identified." The Spot Report is printed as Document 260.

gunship. When first introduced into the fighting, the weapon apparently was very successful in intimidating many of the tribal forces. However, as the more experienced Afghan Army defectors swell the tribal ranks, the fighters have learned the helicopters' vulnerability to anti-aircraft ground fire. Refugee reports increasingly tell of gunships being downed by the simple expedient of the rebels firing down on the helicopters' vulnerable tail rotor from gun placements high in the mountains. The rebels have discovered, thanks to their newly acquired army allies, that while the helicopter is effective firing at the ground, it is vulnerable to fire from relatively immune positions above the aircraft. Rebel sources indicate that at least nine Soviet helicopters have been lost in the past 60 days.

One of the many dilemmas confronting the Soviets in Afghanistan is what to do with the remainder of the Afghan Army. If the Soviets hope to conclude their Afghan adventure successfully, they will eventually need a reliable Afghan force. To build this force, they will have to equip it with weapons which could continue to get into the hands of the rebels.

267. Briefing Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Spiers) to Secretary of State Muskie¹

Washington, May 9, 1980

SUBJECT

Afghanistan Covert Action Program

On December 28, 1979—two days after Soviet troops marched into Afghanistan—we expanded the already initiated U.S. covert action program there to include for the first time the supply of lethal weapons to the insurgents.² Prior to that date, our program had consisted essentially of covert media efforts (radio broadcasts and leaflet distribution

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat (ES), Special Caption Documents, 1979–1989 (Not for the System, Evening Reading, Personnel Sensitive), Lot 92D630, Box 1, Not for the System: Jan–Jun 1980. Secret; Sensitive; Not for the System. Drafted by Mark. Sent through Newsom. The memorandum was presumably meant to brief Muskie, who became Secretary of State May 9, on the Afghan covert action program.

² See Document 107.

within Afghanistan), as well as of the provision of some food, medicine, and tactical radio equipment (for field combat use) to various guerilla groups.

The arms being furnished currently are Soviet-made rifles, submachine guns, machine guns, ammunition, mines, and anti-tank launchers and rockets. These items, at first drawn from CIA reserve stocks, but now bought by CIA on the international arms market, move in USAF C-141 aircraft [*less than 1 line not declassified*] to Saudi Arabia, and then by Saudi C-130s to Pakistan. No American personnel in Pakistan are in any way involved in the logistics machinery or in training Afghans, though a few Egyptian Specialists may be present. The training function is performed by Pakistani personnel, who, if necessary, have received special training from Americans in Saudi Arabia. The CIA Station Chief in Islamabad works out all of the operational details with Pakistani intelligence and President Zia.

The most critical gap in Afghan rebel armament has been the absence of means to shoot down Soviet helicopters and aircraft. Egypt has now donated 15 Soviet-made SA-7 shoulder-held anti-aircraft rocket launchers, with a small supply of missiles. CIA is purchasing additional such weapons on the international market, through devious cut-outs, from a Bulgarian source. As of one week ago, Pakistan had not yet taken the final decision on whether to transfer the SA-7s, because Zia recognizes that this would be a major escalation of outside support to the insurgents, which could trigger a sharp Soviet reaction. However, CIA believes that Zia will bite this bullet too.

Pakistani cooperation in the program has been exemplary—and completely divorced from the troubles that bedevil the US-Pakistani political relationship. However, this collaboration was put into jeopardy in mid-January [*mid-February*] by reports on the program, attributed to White House officials, which appeared in the Washington Post and New York Times. Zia was outraged and has made it perfectly clear that Pakistan will stop all participation if there are any further leaks.³

Background. Interagency consideration of covert action in support of Afghan elements in opposition to the Marxist Taraki regime first took place in the Special Coordination Committee for Intelligence (SCC-I) on April 6, 1979, when the regime was one year old.⁴ The first two Presidential findings and notifications to the Congress under the Hughes-Ryan Act were dated July 3.⁵ One covered media activities, the other propaganda operations and provision of cash or non-lethal

³ See footnote 3, Document 209.

⁴ See Document 48.

⁵ See footnote 5, Document 53.

supplies in a total amount of \$695,000. Further SCC-I reviews on July 31 and in mid-October led to a Presidential finding, dated November 7, authorizing cash, communications equipment and procurement advice worth [amount not declassified].⁶ The December 28 finding on lethal weapons related to another [less than 1 line not declassified] authorization, and an additional [amount not declassified] to be matched by a like sum from the Saudis, was authorized in February.

Notification of Congress. Congressional notifications pursuant to Hughes-Ryan were made for each finding. A Subcommittee of the House Select Committee on Intelligence held hearings on the program on December 20, at which the Department was represented.⁷ The [amount not declassified] authorized after the February 27 SCC-I meeting necessitated replenishing [less than 1 line not declassified] which led to hearings before the Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee at which a Department representative appeared.⁸

⁶ See Document 76.

⁷ Not found.

⁸ Not found.

268. Memorandum From Thomas Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, May 12, 1980

SUBJECT

Afghan "Neutralization" (U)

We don't have much success these days in getting Afghan material to the world's attention. The story is getting old and we, frankly, don't offer much in a positive sense (i.e. we can produce atrocity stories but no clear policy line that might yield a satisfactory outcome.) (S)

We need to seize some high ground, especially after the failure of the rescue attempt in Iran. Fortunately there is some readily available

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 79, Sensitive X: 5/12-31/80. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. In the upper right corner of the memorandum, Brzezinski wrote: "We will keep pushing this—I talked to Commission."

high ground. In fact we are there already, although nobody seems to notice it very much for we are sharing it with some noisy types. (S)

Specifically, we should double track our current strategy (make the Soviets pay heavily) with a strategy that portrays us as the party urging a peaceful settlement on reasonable terms. We should be the moving spirit of a “peace offensive”—and define its terms. At present, we are in the apparent position of grudgingly accepting the idea of a peaceful settlement while harping on things that people don’t like to hear. And, given our evident lack of interest in a peaceful negotiated outcome, when we do say something positive it tends to be discounted. (S)

What is needed is a change in emphasis. We should be talking long and loud about the need for a peaceful settlement in Afghanistan. We should be pointing out at every opportunity that the Soviets are frustrating this outcome not only by their actions on the ground but also because of their unreasonable and unjust refusal to commit themselves to prompt and total withdrawal. (S)

Clearly we would keep up (and if possible intensify) our drumfire of propaganda along the present lines. And we would not yield an inch on our conditions. *But* we would try to become identified with the goal of peace rather than the goal of punishing the Soviets (largely, it might be noted, at the price of dead Afghans and unhappy athletes.) (S)

This theme should also be featured in our talks with the Soviets. From what I have seen of the reporting, we have been growlingly negative. We should be challengingly positive. Put Moscow more and more on the defensive. Sure, it won’t make much difference in bilateral negotiations (and none of this will likely budge the Soviets out of Afghanistan), but the fact of our emphasis on peaceful settlement will leak out, and play back into our public strategy. (S)

The public strategy should be founded on statements by the President, Muskie and you. The Philadelphia speech, for example, should have had an impassioned plea for peace and a truly non-aligned Afghanistan “if only the Soviets would see reason and meet conditions that are universally supported.” It should have stressed that we have no preferred outcome in Afghanistan as long as the Afghans are content.² Incidentally, a strong push by us in this way could generate increased public support in such countries as India. (S)

² Carter addressed the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia on May 9. Concerning Afghanistan, he said: “Our goal is the withdrawal of Soviet occupying troops, the neutrality or non-alignment of Afghanistan as a nation, and the encouragement of the formation there of a government acceptable to the Afghan people.” For the text of his speech, see *Public Papers: Carter 1980–81*, Book I, pp. 873–880. It is also printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 147.

There are a few bureaucratic pitfalls. You and the President may not want this to appear as a big Muskie initiative to correct past mistakes—which it could, since Muskie sounded positive on neutralization in his SFRC hearings.³ Muskie is probably going to pick this one up and run with it anyway though, so the issue for you is how best to shape what he is doing. Obviously, this whole thing should be discussed and coordinated at the highest level. (S)

RECOMMENDATION:

That you raise this subject with the President and Muskie.⁴ If you do, please ensure that there is feedback to me so that I can push this in Brent's committee. (C)

³ Muskie's confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was held on May 7.

⁴ No record of a meeting covering this subject was found.

269. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, undated

OVERVIEW

—The Pakistani and US intelligence appraisals of the Afghan war are remarkably similar. Both sides believe the Soviets have encountered unanticipated difficulties, or as General Akhtar said, "the Russians are stuck." The identity of views is particularly noteworthy because we arrived at our conclusions by different routes. Much of the US judgment is based on sensitive signals intelligence not available to the Pakistanis. The Pakistanis have based their judgment not simply on appraisals we have provided them but on intelligence they received directly from Afghan rebels. The Pakistanis conclude that the Afghan "Freedom Fighters"—as they call them—are doing surprisingly well and will in all likelihood continue to do so.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, For President or Brzezinski Only File, Box 88, PA—Very Sensitive: 1–6/80. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. The author of the memorandum is not identified. In a May 15 covering memorandum to Brzezinski, Turner noted that he was following up on the meetings between a CIA officer and Pakistani ISID Director Akhtar, which he first reported May 13. (See footnote 2, Document 259.) In the upper right corner of the covering memorandum, Carter wrote: "Zbig, p. 3" and initialed "C."

—Neither side had a good estimate of insurgent strength. The Pakistanis feel the Afghan situation is a classic Mao's "Peoples' War." As a Pakistani colonel observed: if an Afghan has a rifle and a bullet he is a soldier; when he loses one, he becomes a civilian. It is therefore not possible to reach a reliable estimate of insurgent strength. Drawing further on Mao, the Pakistanis say the rebels are the fish in this sea. The rebels are careful not to undertake actions which would damage the people's interest and risk weakening the insurgents' link with their mass base. They want to damage a bridge and force the Russians to expose themselves during its repair rather than to destroy the bridge and injure for years the surrounding economy. Thus, explained the Pakistanis, they cannot, and indeed should not, control the insurgency. The Afghans control it and the Pakistanis support it with materiel, which the Afghans accept, and advice, which may or may not be accepted. This fact establishes the parameters within which the covert support must operate.

COVERT ACTION PROGRAM

—Barring a change in the internal or international scene, the Pakistanis are committed to covert support to the Afghans. General Akhtar expressed his concern about lack of US security guarantees but did not pursue the subject and did not make continued support contingent on such aid.

—The Pakistanis are providing unilateral weapons support from their stockpiles to the insurgents, support which predates our involvement. When we offered to provide some of the materiel now being provided by Pakistan (e.g., .303 ammunition), General Akhtar waved aside our offer stating he preferred to use Pakistan money for things available in Pakistan and to use our resources for external procurement.

—The Pakistanis attempt to control any unilateral exile weapons procurement. They do not want weapons entering Pakistan outside their control and have so informed the Peshawar exile leaders. The Pakistanis share our surprise at the vigor of the insurgency in northeastern Afghanistan (Badakshan and Qonduz Provinces). The Pakistanis suggested some aid may be coming over the mountains from China or that Tadzhik ethnic groups resident in the four border area could be providing support.

—General Akhtar described how the support mechanism works. Our weapons arrive at Rawalpindi airport by Saudi C-130 approximately twice a week at dusk. Officers of Akhtar's organization oversee the unloading. Fortuitously we happened to witness one such unloading while awaiting our aircraft departure. A Pakistani Army tank transporter backed up to the C-130 ramp and the unmarked crates rolled on to the transporter. The whole process took less than an hour. From

the aircraft the crates are taken to a warehouse controlled by Akhtar's organization where they are opened and the weapons inspected and inventoried. The Pakistanis have excellent records which coincide with ours; what we are buying in Egypt is being delivered in Pakistan. The munitions are distributed through eight different exile organizations which are responsible for transporting the materiel in Afghanistan. There is no Pakistani distribution system in Afghanistan. Akhtar unilaterally monitors the distribution of the weapons and is confident that most of the materiel is indeed going to Afghanistan. Akhtar is distributing weapons into all parts of Afghanistan, not just the eastern area bordering Pakistan. We said we had noted the appearance of anti-tank rockets and land mines around Herat and encouraged Akhtar to continue to distribute the weapons in western Afghanistan through any means he deemed appropriate (i.e., via Iran).

—The arms mix has been about right. The Pakistanis had a list of 24 items needed by the insurgents. These items divide basically into four categories: anti-armor, anti-aircraft, AK-47 rifles and ammunition, and miscellaneous equipment such as time detonators, gas masks and wireless equipment.

—Akhtar said the present weapons delivery schedule of two C-130's per week is about the right pace. We emphasized we stand ready to increase the flow whenever he can handle it and we are prepared to fly C-141's directly into Pakistan under cover of the regular embassy resupply flight.

—The Pakistanis need two C-130's. Akhtar explained that overland transport is too slow and unreliable. The Pakistan Air Force has been helping but due to the loss of two C-130's they can no longer do so and meet their other obligations. The request for a loan of two aircraft is legitimate.

SA-7 MISSILES

—Akhtar said the Pakistani Government had made the political decision to use the SA-7's, "fully aware of its implications." The Pakistanis forecast three levels of Soviet reaction. The least serious would be no reaction at all; second would be a ground incursion into border areas of Pakistan; and most severe would be a Soviet air strike at Pakistani airfields. We took no exception to his estimate. Soviet retaliation, to a certain extent, will depend on how and where the missiles are used. Akhtar explained that two Afghan groups had been trained in the use of the weapon. Each of these groups will take three missiles and one launcher. The targets will be Shindand and Bagram airfields. Akhtar refused to reveal any timing. The second group is scheduled to complete its training on 17 May.

—In reply to Akhtar's request for more SA-7's we explained the difficulty finding these in the international market. We told Akhtar

that we understood the Chinese may have SA-7's. If the Pakistanis could give the appropriate political signal to the Chinese, we would be prepared to do whatever necessary to purchase and deliver the missiles to Pakistan. Akhtar seemed to like the idea and said he would discuss it with President Zia.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

—The US side gave a one hour slide presentation on worldwide Soviet and Free World psychological warfare activities. Akhtar was obviously interested in what was going on outside his borders and confessed Pakistan was probably not doing enough in the psywar field. We agreed that the issue was beginning to fade from international attention and that we should work both jointly and separately to insure that the Afghan story continues to be told.

SECURITY

—The Pakistanis would vigorously oppose any surfacing of the covert action program and would probably consider it reason for termination. The program is highly compartmented within Pakistan—even within the intelligence service.² Akhtar is particularly anxious that there be no publicity if and when the SA-7's are fired. Akhtar registered the anticipated complaint about Washington leaks.

² Carter placed a bracket in the left margin beside this sentence and wrote: "Zbig."

270. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Muskie's Delegation in Vienna¹

Washington, May 15, 1980, 0105Z

127465/Tosec 30031. For Secretary's party—pass Amb Shulman before 7:00 a.m. local. Subject: March [May] 14, Afghan Statement on Political Solution.

1. (Confidential—Entire text).

2. TASS has broadcast text of March [May] 14 Afghan Government statement on elements of a regional political solution to Afghanistan crisis. You will be receiving text septel.²

3. Analysis: Our preliminary analysis of new proposal is that it contains main points of April 17 "Babrak" plan with embellishments along the lines of Dobrynin's April 19 comment to Secretary Vance (your briefing material contains background on the "Babrak plan").³ Specifically, the statement contains the following "new" elements:

—explicit identification of the U.S. and USSR as guarantor of any political settlement; and

—recognition of the need to resolve "in the context of political settlement . . . the question of withdrawal from Afghanistan's territory of the Soviet limited military contingent."

4. On withdrawal, the statement repeats standard Soviet and Afghan formulation that "an end to armed invasions and guarantees that neither invasions nor any other forms of interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs will be resumed would eliminate the causes which made Afghanistan turn to the USSR." The statement also notes that "in concrete terms, the withdrawal . . . will depend on the resolution of the question of effective guarantees of bilateral agreements" with Pakistan and with Iran. Thus, as in previous proposals, withdrawal is made contingent on a prior end to hostilities in Afghanistan on Soviet/DRA terms and on prior direct negotiations with and hence legitimization of the Babrak regime.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office Files of Marshall D. Shulman, Special Advisor to the Secretary on Soviet Affairs, 1977–1981, Lot 81D109, Afghanistan: Current—7/80. Confidential; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Also sent Immediate to the Embassy in Vienna for Watson, Jidda, Rabat, and Islamabad. Sent for information Immediate to Moscow, Kabul, and the White House. Drafted by Parris and Barry (EUR/SOV); cleared in S/MS, EUR, NEA, S/P, EUR/SOV, S/S, and S/S–O; and approved by Newsom.

² The text was transmitted in telegram 127922 to the Secretary's delegation, May 15. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N800006–0345)

³ See Document 255.

5. The timing of the statement suggests its purpose is to take the heat off Kabul at the Islamic Conference meeting starting today in Islamabad and running through May 21.⁴ The DRA is doubtless aware of the intent of Conference Secretary General Chatti to introduce at the meeting a “new” neutrality proposal along the lines of the Carrington plan previously shrugged off by Moscow.⁵ The Soviets may also intend to push the new Afghan formulation at the Warsaw Pact meeting.

6. Press guidance—Following press guidance is being used by the Department:

Q. What is your reaction to the Afghan Government’s proposal that it hold talks with Pakistan and Iran regarding the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan?

A. We have seen press reports of the proposal. Our initial assessment is that it is not substantially different from previously articulated positions, is aimed at the legitimization of the Babrak regime rather than anything else, and is obviously timed to attempt to influence discussions at the Islamic Conference.

7. We regard this initiative as a propaganda device designed to affect the outcome of the Islamic Conference and prevent condemnation of the Soviet action and the actions of the puppet Babrak government. While we think it important to downplay this new proposal and Soviet efforts to describe it as a means of reaching an acceptable political solution to the problem of Afghanistan, we recognize the importance of allied support for our position. This is particularly true regarding the French, British and Germans who have been discussing possible neutrality proposals with us. We suggest the following talking points which could be used with key Islamic countries by ourselves and allies who have been in touch with attendees at Islamic Conference.

⁴ The Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers, which met May 17–22 in Islamabad, adopted a resolution that condemned the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and established a committee to consult with all concerned parties and resolve the situation on the basis of Soviet troop withdrawal; recognition of the Afghan people’s right to choose their own form of government; respect for the independence, integrity, and non-aligned status of Afghanistan; and creation of conditions that would allow the refugees to return. (Marvine Howe, “Islamic Conference Ends; Afghanistan Talks Proposed,” *New York Times*, May 23, 1980, p. A10) An article in the President’s Daily Brief, June 11, reported that the USSR “quickly rejected” the proposals on Afghanistan arising from the conference. The brief characterized the proposals as calling for the formation of a “broad-based” government that could still be headed by Karmal, followed by Soviet withdrawal to be monitored by an international force; and selection of a national committee of tribal leaders to determine the future form of Afghan government. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 7, Afghanistan Crisis—June 1980, PDBs)

⁵ See footnote 4, Document 225.

—We welcome this first explicit mention of the withdrawal of Soviet troops which in our view must be the central focus of any acceptable political settlement of the Afghan problem.

—Unfortunately, withdrawal element appears to be only cosmetic in nature, following as it does recognition of Babrak government, legitimization of Soviet invasion and an end to the resistance of the Afghan nationalists.

—This first Afghan mention of withdrawal in the context of a political settlement may indicate that they and the Soviets are feeling the costs of their action. If so it is important all concerned countries keep political pressure up to attain prompt and complete Soviet withdrawal.

—In our view this can best be achieved by continuing to emphasize Soviet responsibility for the crisis and by continuing to insist that only proposals which focus on withdrawal deserve discussion.⁶

8. For Jidda, Rabat and Islamabad: You should make available foregoing analysis and draw on the talking points in para 7 in discussions with host governments and suggest in the case of Jidda and Rabat that they may wish to convey our thoughts to their delegations at the conference.

Christopher

⁶ An article in the National Intelligence Daily, May 16, assessed the Afghan statement as follows: "The new plan does not substantially change Moscow's longstanding position that Soviet forces cannot be withdrawn until the insurgency has ended and a government friendly to the USSR is firmly in power. Moscow recognizes that a pro-Soviet regime could not survive after a Soviet withdrawal, and the proposal is little more than a Soviet-sponsored attempt to promote international acceptance of the Afghan regime and Soviet intervention." (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977-81), Box 7, Afghanistan Crisis—May 1980, NIDs)

271. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, May 15, 1980, 9–10 a.m.

SUBJECT

Iran and Afghanistan

PARTICIPANTS

State

David Newsom

Peter Constable

Richard Cooper

OSD

W. Graham Claytor

Frank Kramer

JCS

Lt. Gen. John Pustay

CIA

Frank Carlucci

Treasury

Deputy Secretary Robert Carswell

Justice

Attorney General Benjamin

Civiletti

White House

Zbigniew Brzezinski

David Aaron

Lloyd Cutler

Henry Owen

Ray Jenkins

Joseph Onek

NSC

Gary Sick

Alfred Friendly

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

1. *Afghanistan*. The discussion focused on ways to increase media attention on Soviet activities. CIA is providing cameras to go in with the rebel forces. State will contact major U.S. news organizations to attempt to encourage more U.S. correspondents to cover the story on the ground. The U.S. Consulate in Peshawar can provide assistance to journalists who want to travel with rebel groups. VOA will be instructed by State to increase their interviews with journalists who have been inside Afghanistan, with particular emphasis on foreign reporters such as Indians. ICA will prepare a report on their efforts to publicize the story. The Public Information Committee has been meeting regularly to review material, sanitize intelligence information where possible, and get the material to the press. They have had some success in getting stories out in the past week. CIA will examine the possibility of sanitizing recent SIGINT information on Soviet defeats. The Committee will prepare a paper on the systematic preparation and release of information to the media for discussion at the next SCC

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Meetings File, Box 21, SCC Meeting #313, Held 5/15/80, 5/80. Secret. Carter initialed "C" in the top right corner. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

meeting.² CIA will use its resources to encourage more European correspondents to cover the story on the ground. (S)

[Omitted here is information unrelated to Afghanistan.]

² See Document 273.

272. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Vienna, May 16, 1980

SUBJECT

Meeting between Secretary of State Muskie and Foreign Minister Gromyko

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.: Secretary of State Edmund S. Muskie
William D. Krimer, Interpreter

USSR: Foreign Minister Andrey A. Gromyko
Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter

Foreign Minister *Gromyko* opened the conversation by suggesting that he and Secretary Muskie conduct their talks in compact form since they did not have much time at their disposal. It was his understanding that there was no formal agenda for this meeting; thus they would be free to choose whatever topics they wanted to discuss.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Afghanistan.]

Afghanistan

Gromyko now wanted to turn to the subject of Afghanistan. He would deal with it in the context of how this problem had affected other problem areas between us. First of all, he would like to demonstrate the complete untenability and absurdity of an argument current in the U.S. today. He had not yet heard it from Secretary Muskie in so many words (in this respect being a new man was an advantage), but he had certainly heard many statements on the U.S. side to the effect that the

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 61, Soviet Exchanges: 1/79–10/80. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Krimer. In the upper right corner, an unknown hand wrote: "ZB, The approved version. Muskie has asked that it be very closely held." The meeting took place in Hofburg Palace. For the full text of the memorandum of conversation, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 278.

Soviet Union wanted to dig in in Afghanistan. It was said that the Soviet Union wanted to occupy Afghanistan in order to target the oil-rich regions in the Gulf of Iran, thereby either depriving the U.S. of the possibility of buying Iranian oil, or making it more difficult to produce and to transport oil from the Persian Gulf to the U.S. Gromyko wanted to emphasize as strongly as he could that such a view was possible only as a result of a very low level of understanding of Soviet policy, a very low level indeed. Some people were talking of some sort of "Arc of Crisis" which started no one knew where and ended perhaps in Africa or perhaps even in the Atlantic.² The Secretary should realize that such an "arc" existed only in the thinking and imagination of those who talked in this manner. The Soviet Union did not need any kind of Iranian oil. The very manner of looking at the question from this standpoint could only be regarded as schoolboyish, nothing more. He believed it important to explain the Soviet position on this subject to the Secretary. He did not know whether he would be able to convince the Secretary, but such was the Soviet position nevertheless. He would state it on behalf of the entire Soviet leadership and L.I. Brezhnev personally.

Now to the substance of the Afghanistan question. The Soviet Union had introduced its forces into Afghanistan at the request of the Afghan Government in order to assist it in repelling outside aggression against that country. That request had been made not only by the present Afghan leadership, but had also been made repeatedly earlier by Amin and before him by Taraki. The Soviet leadership had reflected on that request for a long period of time, hoping and expecting that the external intrusion would cease. Under the UN Charter such intervention could only be qualified as aggression. When the Soviet leadership saw that this aggression was being expanded, when it saw that forces were being trained and armed on the territory of Pakistan and then sent into Afghanistan, the Soviet Union had sent in its contingent of troops. The Secretary surely knew that the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan runs through a mountainous region and that there were literally hundreds of passages through the unsecured border. Each year at least 100,000 people crossed through them. When forces crossed from Pakistan, where they had been armed and trained, the Soviet Union had come to the conclusion that it must send in its own forces to put an end to the threat to Afghan independence. At the very outset, the Soviet Union had stated that as soon as the reasons for which it had sent in its forces ceased to exist, and as soon as the Afghan Government was in a position to ensure its country's independence,

² See, for example, footnote 3, Document 35.

the limited Soviet troop contingent would be withdrawn from the territory of Afghanistan. The Soviet Union had stated that on the very first day of its action, and the U.S. Government had the text of the relevant Soviet statement. He would repeat that statement today and add that there was no need for the Soviet Union to say anything else in clarification. There had been no zigzags in Soviet policy. If anyone on the Western side believed that the Soviet Union would comply with the wishes expressed in several capitals, and withdraw its forces as a precondition for a political settlement in Afghanistan, he would have to tell the Secretary very frankly that those who had such expectations were very poorly informed of the actual situation. They had their heads in the clouds and were engaging in fantasy and unrealistic polemics.

Nevertheless, statements continue to be made, calling upon the Soviet Union to withdraw its forces. That is totally ruled out. He would repeat that as soon as aggression against Afghanistan from the territory of Pakistan and to a lesser extent from that of Iran was halted, the Soviet troop contingent would be withdrawn. He was availing himself of the opportunity to clarify Soviet policy for the Secretary.

Gromyko said that the Secretary might want to ask the question (and he had encountered such questions in his talks with others): was it really true that there was a massive invasion into Afghanistan from the territory of Pakistan or Iran for the purpose of fighting against the present Afghan regime? He would ask the Secretary to look into this matter more thoroughly. He would suggest that he ask President Carter and Zia ul-Haq, President of Pakistan, that he ask if there are dozens of camps on the territory of Pakistan where forces are being assembled, trained and equipped, and whether incursions into the territory of Afghanistan are taking place. Even President Carter had recently said publicly: "Yes, we do assist those forces and will continue to assist them." He had called this assistance, but in fact it was a struggle against the regime in Afghanistan. President Zia had confirmed this and said that he was aware that this was taking place, but that he could do nothing to stop it. It was strange, indeed, that the President of Pakistan cannot stop all this, although it was taking place on the territory of his country; that he was unable to put his house in order. Gromyko wondered if the Soviet Union should offer its assistance to Zia to accomplish that purpose. However, he had not heard Zia make such a request of anyone. As for the domestic affairs of Afghanistan, one thing had to be said firmly: questions of the internal leadership of Afghanistan were internal affairs of that country and could only be resolved by the Afghans themselves. No one had the right to interfere in these matters. The President of Pakistan had said that he did not wish to negotiate with the President of Afghanistan, Babrak Karmal. Gromyko wondered whether Zia had asked himself the question of

how many people liked the present leadership of Pakistan. Many people recalled that Zia himself had come to power at the point of a rifle or bayonet; but now Zia did not want to talk to these people, although people did talk to him. Gromyko wanted to emphasize that the core of this problem was that any settlement had to be arrived at in negotiations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, that there must be peace between these two countries. The Afghan leadership agreed with this premise and was prepared to enter into negotiations. Naturally, Iran must be involved as well, but first and foremost this was a matter of relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Just two days ago the Afghan leadership had once again made its proposal, but Zia says that he does not want to sit down at a table with them. Gromyko would urge the Secretary to try and persuade Zia to enter into negotiations. If he genuinely wished to settle this matter peacefully, Zia must be persuaded to enter into negotiations. The Soviet Union was certainly in favor of a political settlement, and believed that such a settlement was necessary and possible. Thus, it was necessary to persuade Zia. As soon as the invasion of Afghanistan was halted and a settlement reached, and relations between Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran returned to a peaceful basis, Soviet forces would be withdrawn and Afghanistan's neutrality would be guaranteed. Of course, guarantees would be required and, as Brezhnev had said, one such guarantor power could be the U.S., perhaps also the Soviet Union and some other countries. That question, too, should be discussed between Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran. Gromyko could not understand why this was not acceptable to the U.S. He had explained his position to the Secretary. He had explained that the Soviet Union favored a peaceful solution, but no one should demand that Afghanistan conduct its affairs to suit some other capital, whether it be London or any other. In conclusion, he would point out that this was an internal matter for Afghanistan. He would urge the Secretary to reflect on this matter. In the Soviet view it was something well worth reflecting on. If such a course is followed and a settlement reached, the question of Afghanistan will simply disappear and disappear completely. It was currently being used in an artificial manner to stop progress on other issues. While the Secretary might not agree, Gromyko was certain that it can and must be resolved in a political manner.

There were two more issues Gromyko wanted to address briefly—China and Iran.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Afghanistan.]

273. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, May 20, 1980, 9–9:26 a.m.

SUBJECT

Iran and Afghanistan

PARTICIPANTS

State

Warren Christopher

David Newsom

Peter Constable

OSD

W. Graham Claytor, Jr.

Frank Kramer

JCS

Lt. General John Pustay

Justice

John Harmon

Judge Charles Renfrew

Treasury

Robert Carswell

Robert Mundheim

CIA

Admiral Stansfield Turner

[*name not declassified*]

Charles Cogan

ICA

Robert T. Curran

White House

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Hedley Donovan

Office of the Vice President

Denis Clift

NSC

Gary Sick

Marshall Brement

Thomas Thornton

Alfred Friendly

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Afghanistan.]

5. *Public Information on Afghanistan.* The Public Information Committee, which is responsible for insuring public awareness of Soviet activities in Afghanistan, presented a report on its activities and some recommendations. It has had more success recently in attracting media coverage. Nine recommendations were considered by the SCC, as follows:

—Strengthening the USG presence in Peshawar, having ICA send back an officer who, while technically charged with running the Cul-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Meetings File, Box 21, SCC Meeting #313, Held 5/15/80, 5/80. Secret. Presumably the Summary of Conclusions was filed in an incorrect folder or the folder was labeled with an incorrect date. Carter wrote: "Zbig" and initialed "J" in the upper right corner. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

tural Center, will be highly competent in helping newsmen obtain stories on Afghanistan and develop their own news networks inside and outside that country. (Approved)

—Systematically encourage editors at home offices in Europe and the U.S. to send reporters to tap the real resources available among the refugees in Peshawar. (Approved)

—White House and State Department spokesmen should repeatedly indict the Afghan Government and their Soviet mentors for refusal to allow in Western reporters. (Approved)

—Instruct Embassies Delhi and Islamabad to give regular background briefings to large U.S. and foreign press corps on Afghanistan, and to locate any local films and still pictures which can be channelled to European and U.S. TV. (Approved)

—CIA to organize having pictures taken on the ground in Afghanistan that can be circulated to the world media through refugee organizations in Peshawar. (Approved)

—The President, Vice President, and Secretary of State include statements on Soviet actions in Afghanistan in public statements (Secretary Muskie's press conference May 20 offers a good opportunity). (Approved)²

—Immediate funding for six new positions for VOA so that within 90 days one-half hour in Dari language can be broadcast each day to Afghanistan. (This will be examined with OMB at a separate meeting tomorrow.)

—Encourage members of Congress and their staffs to make statements, and supply them with same background materials provided the press. (The Congressional Liaison staffs of State, NSC and CIA will cooperate in briefing the Hill.)

—Encourage the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees to hold hearings on Soviet actions in Afghanistan. (The SCC disapproved this recommendation on the grounds that hearings are too uncontrollable and would probably focus on U.S. clandestine activities rather than Soviet activities.) (S)

_____ Concur with SCC recommendations as indicated above.³

_____ Other

² In his May 20 press conference, Muskie said that Gromyko provided no indication of a Soviet military withdrawal from Afghanistan during their meeting in Vienna, May 16. (John K. Cooley, "Muskie Targets Giscard, too," *Christian Science Monitor*, May 21, 1980, p. 2) For the full press conference, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, June 1980, p. A.

³ Carter checked this option.

274. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Islamabad, May 21, 1980, 1150Z

4900. For Secretary Muskie from Amb Hummel. Subject: (S) The Pakistan Dimension in the U.S. Response to Soviet Aggression in Afghanistan.

1. (S) Entire text.

2. I address you directly, Mr. Secretary, to suggest that we need to have a whole new look at our policies and actions in Pakistan, especially as they relate to the Afghan situation. As things now stand, we state publicly, and privately to our friends, that strengthening Pakistan is a central element in our response to the Soviet invasion next door. But we are doing almost nothing to carry out that declared policy.

3. Unless we narrow this gap between our public stance and the concrete actions we intend to take, it will shortly become so conspicuous that I fear sharply adverse consequences for our national objectives and prestige.

4. The Pakistanis have asked us explicitly for economic assistance.² However, we will shortly have to tell the Paks and others (at an aid consortium meeting June 12) (A) that we have no economic help to offer in the current fiscal year, (B) that we plan for none at all in fiscal '81 and (C) that even in fiscal '82 it is doubtful that we will give substantial economic help. The Agency for International Development (AID) has strongly resisted putting any funds at all into its budget request for fiscal '82.

5. The Paks have asked us to give top priority in our economic assistance to re-scheduling their debt repayments to us, which amount to over \$130 million per year. Given present USG attitudes in Washington, it is very doubtful that we will make any meaningful move toward debt rescheduling. Thus our friends, and the Pakistanis, will draw their own adverse conclusions about our real intentions despite what we say our policies are.

6. I am very much aware that we have genuine problems in getting resources with which to carry out our foreign, and indeed our domestic, policies, and that Pakistan is by no means the only country where our objectives are not supported by adequate resources. There are no easy

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870097-0461. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

² Documentation on Pakistani requests for economic assistance is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XIX, South Asia.

solutions, but I hope you and others in Washington will consider whether, and how, a special effort should be made to avoid the predictably adverse results for USG interests if we persist in our present courses with Pakistan. I see these results here and world-wide to be (in priority order):

A. A USG failure to give meaningful support to Pakistan could very well cause the Soviets to conclude that the USG does not have the serious intention to counter further Sov expansionist moves in this region or elsewhere. And a weak Pakistan, without substantial support, would likewise tempt the Sovs to increase their pressures on Pakistan—such as raids on Pak territory—that would pose new challenges for the region and for the USG that would be difficult or impossible for us to counter.

B. A number of our important friends will find it impossible to understand why we withhold support for Pakistan. We placed heavy pressure on the Europeans, Saudis, and Japan to increase their aid to Pakistan, which many have already done. Others, including the PRC, are watching us closely to see whether we will respond effectively to the many global challenges that beset us. No matter how carefully we explain our very real budgetary problems and our domestic economic difficulties, many will conclude that the USG lacks the capability, and perhaps also lacks the will, to play the role in the world that they want us to play and that we say we want to play.

C. More parochially, and of lesser importance, is the severe effect on U.S.-Pak bilateral relations if we withhold support. President Zia and many others will conclude that we are so unhappy with him that we are deliberately trying to topple his government so we can deal with another, perhaps elected, govt more to our liking, and perhaps more responsive to our anti-nuclear views. Many Pakistani leaders will also suspect, bizarre though it may seem, that the USG, the Sovs, and India have some secret understanding that involves keeping Pakistan weak. Whatever the exact content of these unjustified Pak suspicions, we can be sure that there will be a sharp rise in anti-Americanism and an even greater Pak disposition to espouse leftist “nonaligned” positions. These public manifestations of a Pakistani turn away from the USG will in turn have deleterious effects on the attitudes of other countries who will see them as evidence of USG mishandling of relations with Pakistan.

7. Actions that it is possible for us to take to remedy these consequences are few, and at best palliative. I do not recommend that we re-structure our existing security agreement of 1959, because I do not see it in our interest to tie ourselves too closely to this Pak Government, which is hardly a strong and reliable partner, and which has nuclear and other policies [with] which we profoundly disagree. No foreseeable

alternative to Zia would pursue policies any more successful or favorable to our interests than his government at this time. But I believe, and USG policy papers state, that we have important interests here, in promoting regional stability, avoiding conflict, countering Soviet expansionism, and not least in seeing that the USG is perceived as actually carrying out its professed policies. I therefore hope that we can examine anew the possibilities for economic assistance to Pakistan, and come to some better decisions before the aid consortium meeting June 12.

8. I would give top priority to debt rescheduling, which all the other members of the consortium are ready to do, and where we are the only hold-out. Given our very real budget constraints, congressional attitudes, and Treasury and OMB policies, only a directive from the President has any chance of changing the present USG hard-line stance.

9. I have been told that there is no possibility of finding funds, and authorizations, for economic assistance to Pakistan in the upcoming FY 81 budget. I hope that this can be tested out again, to see whether priorities can be rearranged.

10. P.L.-480 sales of agricultural commodities are being projected at low, or very indefinite levels. These should be examined, and raised substantially.

11. A substantial grant of funds for relief of nearly a million Afghan refugees would be useful and logical, and would help to avoid a totally negative USG stance at the consortium meeting. Substantively, too, our interests will be served by helping the Paks avoid the disruptive and destabilizing effects of this large number of Afghans in its border provinces.

12. The FY 82 budget request, now being constructed in Washington, should be carefully considered, to see that economic assistance to Pakistan is adequate to match our policies, particularly in aid inputs, in [garble] and in P.L.-480.

13. None of these suggestions will be new to Washington policy-makers, and none of them will be easy. You will hear strong and cogent reasons why they are impossible or at best difficult. Still, I hope that you will use your influence to see that our important policy goals are not made unattainable by essentially procedural difficulties, real though they are, within our own government.

Hummel

275. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, May 24, 1980, 1103Z

8285. Subject. Soviet Concern About Spill-Over of Islamic Fundamentalism From Afghanistan.

1. (C—Noform—Entire text)

2. During a May 14 reception for members of the Incidents at Sea (INCSEA) Delegations, Acting Political Counselor engaged a Soviet Navy Captain 1/R Valentin Alekseyevich Serkov in a conversation on Afghanistan. After remarking that it was heartening to learn that the INCSEA talks were proceeding well, A/PolCouns referred to the overall state of bilateral relations and commented that the Soviet action in Afghanistan had undermined détente.

3. Serkov responded along the following lines: “You Americans must understand Soviet history in order to understand our actions in Afghanistan. It took the Soviet Government twenty years to suppress the Muslim resistance in Central Asia and to establish the Soviet Republics there. It was a bloody and costly struggle. Accordingly, we were not going to just stand by and see a Soviet-supported government on the borders of the Soviet Union overthrown by the same forces of Muslim fundamentalism which we had conquered in the Soviet Union earlier. This is the major reason we sent our troops into Afghanistan.”

4. Comment: Serkov is the Deputy Head of the Soviet INCSEA Delegation. He has been involved in INCSEA matters since before the agreement was signed in 1972, and is familiar to U.S. members as an extremely serious, dedicated party member. He is thought to be the controlling member of the Soviet delegation, often cowing higher ranking members. His influence appears to far outstrip the rank he wears. Serkov is not given to thoughtless, emotional or inadvertent remarks.

5. It is unusual to hear an official Soviet make so explicit his concern about the possible spill-over of Islamic militancy into Central Asia should the anti-regime forces in Afghanistan not be checked. Periodically Soviet media try to “sell” the intervention in Afghanistan by drawing a parallel between these forces and the “Basmachi” movement which carried on guerrilla war against the Soviet authorities in Central Asia until well into the 1930’s. *Pravda* on March 7, for example, pub-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800259–0354. Confidential; Noform. Sent for information to USICA, DIA, CNO, COMNAVINTCOM, Warsaw, Beijing, Belgrade, Bucharest, Budapest, Hong Kong, Islamabad, Kabul, Leningrad, London, New Delhi, Munich, Paris, Prague, Sofia, and USNATO.

lished a letter from a Frunze resident (probably a Kirghiz) citing his own upbringing in an atmosphere of "Basmachi" violence and his support for Soviet aid to Afghanistan, a "victim of outside aggression" like the Soviet Union in the interwar years.² More recently, during a television broadcast, *Literaturnaya Gazeta* editor Aleksandr Chakovskiy, recalled to viewers the Basmachi movement and, in the next breath, stated that the USSR cannot permit its Afghani border to become a springboard for attacks against the USSR.

End comment.

Watson

² The Basmachi movement refers to the Muslim insurrection against Soviet domination in Central Asia, particularly Turkistan, approximately 1917–1926.

276. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Newsom) to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake)¹

Washington, May 26, 1980

SUBJECT

Approaches to the Afghan problem

Much of the future of our relationship to the Soviet Union and to Europe hinges on the evolution of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. The marker has been laid down by us, by the Europeans, and by the Islamic countries that the Soviets must withdraw their troops.

The Soviets, however, have made it clear that they will not withdraw their troops as long as the Parchamist government is threatened. Some type of compromise will ultimately be necessary if we are to avoid a long-term Soviet presence and a gradual erosion of the policies we have adopted in response to the Afghan invasion.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs David Newsom, Lot 81D154, folder 3. Secret; Sensitive; Not in System. Copies were sent to Saunders, Tarnoff, and Barry.

We should, I believe, be doing more thinking on *how* the Soviet forces can be moved out of Afghanistan. I attach one possible approach, which obviously has flaws. There may be others.

I would appreciate your comments and your recommendation on whether we should get a small group together to look further at this issue.²

David D. Newsom³

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁴

Washington, undated

A Possible Way Out for Afghanistan

Here, for consideration, is a possible approach to resolving the Afghan crisis. It would propose the establishment of a four power commission with two non-aligned Islamic states and two Warsaw Pact states as members, the withdrawal of Soviet troops and their replacement by troops of non-aligned Islamic and Warsaw Pact nations, the establishment of a more broadly-based government under a Parchamist president, and a guarantee of Afghanistan's non-alignment by the states of the commission and the U.S. and the USSR.

Assumption:

—The primary U.S. interest is to get Soviet troops out of proximity to the Persian Gulf in southern Afghanistan and to reduce Soviet influence in that country.

—Sanctions and other measures against the Soviet Union are not likely to result in their withdrawal from Afghanistan. The US faces an erosion of support for Afghan-related sanctions against the Soviet Union and of opposition to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan in the Third World unless there is genuine momentum toward a solution.

—The Soviets would probably like to find a way to reduce their direct involvement in Afghanistan, but they are not likely to withdraw if it means the destruction of the Parchamist revolution. A compromise

² No response from Lake was found.

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

⁴ Secret; Sensitive.

solution which protects Soviet interests as they see them is, therefore, necessary.

—A direct US initiative is likely to be rejected by the Soviet Union. A successful initiative must not have a U.S. label.

—An accommodation between the Parchamists and at least some of the Islamic revolutionary forces in Afghanistan cannot be ruled out. (Intelligence suggests that Babrak may already be in touch with some Islamic leaders.)

Elements of a Solution

1. A four power commission consisting of two non-aligned nations which are members of the Islamic Conference, two Warsaw Pact nations, and, as non-voting members, Pakistan and Iran. All member nations should have diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. (One possible composition: Hungary, Poland, Indonesia, and Sudan.) The functions of the commission would be to:

—Bring about an immediate cease-fire

—Supervise the replacement of Soviet troops by Warsaw Pact troops north of the Hindu Kush and non-aligned Muslim troops south of the Kush with mixed forces in Kabul. Such replacement to be completed within six months.

—Supervise the retraining and reforming of the Afghan army and their replacement of both Warsaw Pact and non-aligned forces; this to be accomplished within one year.

—Supervise the return of refugees.

—Oversee the establishment of and functioning of a broadly-based acceptable government.

—Oversee the resumption of international development aid to Afghanistan.

2. A government under a Parchamist (Babrak or another) as President with a Prime Minister and at least one-half of the cabinet to be appointed from non-Parchamist Islamic elements acceptable to the commission. The nominees for Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Defense Minister, Interior Minister and Minister of Information must be agreed to by all members of the commission.

3. Creation of an Afghanistan rehabilitation fund by the Islamic nations.

4. Guarantee of Afghanistan's non-alignment and neutrality by the powers in the commission, plus the Soviet Union and the United States.

Procedure

1. The United States would float the idea with a friendly power which would then carry it forward without a U.S. label. We could

do this either directly to an Islamic country (Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Tunisia) or with one of our European allies which would, in turn, discuss the question with the Islamic countries directly concerned.

2. The idea would be proposed and adopted by the council of the Islamic nations which would choose a group to present it to Babrak. (Supplementary approaches would be made to the USSR.)

3. When agreement is reached on an approach by all parties concerned, it would then be put before the Security Council for approval. The four-nation commission would report to the Security Council.

Arguments

Pro

—If approved, it would expedite the departure of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan.

—It would remove the Afghan matter as a major obstacle to cooperation with the Soviet Union in other fields. (e.g., arms control)

—It would avoid the almost certain erosion of support for our present policies on Afghanistan.

—It would remove Warsaw Pact military presence to north of the Hindu Kush.

Con

—Communist influence would clearly be established and recognized in Afghanistan by the international community.

—Such a solution would mean the end of the open armed opposition to the Parchamists and of international support for that opposition.

—The proposal contains elements difficult to achieve, such as the introduction of non-Parchamist elements into the government and the agreement of the Soviets to permit non-communist forces to replace theirs in the South.

—A proposal of this kind at this time could conceivably undercut the recent resolutions of the Islamic Conference which called for the complete and unconditional withdrawal of Soviet forces.⁵

⁵ See footnote 4, Document 270.

277. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, May 27, 1980, 1505Z

8339. Special encryption. Subject: Ambassador Watson's Call on Foreign Minister Gromyko. Ref: (A) State 135799, (B) State 137543.²

1. (S—Entire text)

2. Summary: I had a wide-ranging discussion with Gromyko on various issues affecting U.S.-Soviet relations and, drawing on Department's instructions, made a general presentation of our views on these subjects. On the overall state of U.S.-Soviet relations, Gromyko repeated the Soviet position that responsibility for normalization of relations and repairing the damage is that of the United States administration. He took an uncompromising line on the Afghanistan question and urged the U.S. to "be more or less objective" so that "a common language can be found" to resolve this issue. He said the U.S. underestimated the significance of the May 14 Afghan proposal.³

[Omitted here is information unrelated to Afghanistan.]

5. Afghanistan⁴

You emphasize that Afghanistan is the main event which has brought about the deterioration in relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and which is responsible for the general deterioration in the international situation. We categorically reject this. We believe that the problem has been artificially exaggerated. Afghanistan is not the main problem, especially if it is viewed factually. In any event, Afghanistan should not be viewed as a problem resulting in negative consequences for U.S.-Soviet relations and for international relations in general. The U.S. completely distorts the meaning of Soviet actions and the introduction of Soviet forces into Afghanistan. We introduced those

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office Files of Marshall D. Shulman, Special Advisor to the Secretary on Soviet Affairs, 1977-1981, Lot 81D109, Watson-Gromyko meeting, 5/26/80. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cherokee. For the full text of this telegram, see *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 279.

² Telegram 135799 to Moscow is dated May 23. In telegram 137543 to Moscow and other posts, May 24, the Department provided policy guidance for discussions with Eastern European governments in response to a "tough speech" delivered by Bulgarian Foreign Minister Petar Mldanov that was highly critical of U.S. policy. With regard to Afghanistan, the Department emphasized: "There should be no doubt about the cause of the current heightened tension in the world. It is the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which has challenged the premise of international relations and had a profoundly negative impact on U.S.-Soviet relations." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P910096-2034 and D800255-0782, respectively)

³ See Document 270.

⁴ The following is a continuation of Gromyko's remarks.

forces to help Afghanistan repel aggression and did so according to the UN Charter and our treaty with the Government and leadership of Afghanistan. We have not violated anything by that action and have acted in accordance with international law. We categorically reject all these distortions of the situation which are made by Washington. We shall withdraw our forces after we are requested to do so from the Afghan Government and, of course, if there is such a request. Also, our withdrawal is dependent on whether or not interference and intervention cease from Pakistan and Iran and they stop fighting against the legitimate Government of Afghanistan. The withdrawal of our forces will be accomplished also when an agreement is reached and it is guaranteed. The question of a withdrawal of our forces before that is beside the point. Those who raise such questions are wasting not only their time but our time. We have expressed our position publicly and Leonid Brezhnev has done so on more than one occasion. Our position has been explained to the United States and I repeated it the last time in my meeting with Secretary Muskie.⁵ Our position should be clear to you. Why does the U.S. continue to take such an unrealistic position on Afghanistan after all these explanations? We are aware of what Washington and the West wish to see happen (in Afghanistan) but are you prepared to take a realistic position? If the U.S. were prepared to be more or less objective, a common language can be found but, I repeat, only if you are prepared to look objectively at the situation and take an objective position.

Concerning the Afghan proposal which was recently made and which the U.S. has been critical of, it seems to us that the U.S. underestimates the significance of that proposal. If you do wish to settle the situation around Afghanistan, your attitude would be different. The Afghan proposal is aimed at normalizing the situation around Afghanistan, including Pakistan. It is a good basis for normalizing the situation.

[Omitted here is information unrelated to Afghanistan.]

14. Upon the completion of Gromyko's remarks I told him that I would, of course, communicate what he said to my government and that it would be useless at this point to try to address each point he had made, many of which I took strong objection to. I then singled out some of his key statements for rebuttal and made the following comments.

15. Since the beginning of our relationship with the Soviet Union we think there has not been anything that parallels the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan which was recognized as a non-aligned state. I stressed the importance of the historical implications of the Soviet

⁵ See Document 272.

Union's actions and that they had endangered international stability and peace. The Soviet Union must understand this. It is now necessary to find a way to make some progress in removing tensions lest the world situation become even more dangerous. In this respect the Soviet Union must live up to its responsibilities as a world power.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Afghanistan.]

Watson

278. Intelligence Information Cable Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

[*cable number not declassified*]

Washington, May 27, 1980, 1954Z

COUNTRY

Pakistan/Afghanistan/USSR

SUBJECT

Continued Government of Pakistan Covert Support to the Afghan Islamic Nationalist Insurgents [*1 line not declassified*]

SOURCE

[*2 lines not declassified*]

1. During a meeting of senior Pakistani military officers on 24 May 1980, General Zia-ul Haq was given a briefing by the Master General of Ordnance and Lt. General Akhtar Abdul Rahman Khan, Director General of the Inter Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID), on weapons covertly supplied by the Government of Pakistan (GOP) to the Afghan Islamic nationalist insurgents (INI's). Weapons recently supplied were listed as follows:

- A. 300,000 rounds of .303 rifle ammunition
- B. 500 .303 rifles
- C. 50 anti-tank hand-held 75 mm rocket launchers
- D. 30 field radio communications sets
- E. an unknown quantity of plastic explosives and other demolitions

¹ Source: Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 5, Pak Support for Insurgents. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*].

2. Commenting on the method of supply, General Akhtar said that he and the Director of Military Intelligence coordinate these activities through their own agents, that all markings on the equipment were erased and that all ammunition supplied is without markings. All ammunition and equipment is moved into Afghanistan through small groups of trusted agents.

3. Lt. General K.M. Arif, Chief of Martial Law Administration Staff, objected to these activities and said that such actions would provoke the Soviets and invite their retaliation. By undertaking such activities, the GOP was moving into a confrontation policy with the Soviet Union.

4. General Akhtar disagreed with General Arif and commented that the INI's are stronger now and they should receive continued GOP support.

5. General Zia basically agreed with Akhtar's position, commenting that the Saudi Arabian Government had recently asked about the extent of GOP support to the INI's. General Zia closed the discussion by stating that because of the sensitive nature of the issue he told the Saudis at the Islamic Conference that he would provide King Khalid with all the details at their next meeting.

6. ACQ: [1 line not declassified]

7. [less than 1 line not declassified] Dissem: [3 lines not declassified]

8. Washington Dissem:

To State [*handling restriction not declassified*] | for the Director, INR

To [less than 1 line not declassified]

To NSA [*handling restriction not declassified*] | for the Director, NSA

279. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to the Chairman of the Special Coordinating Committee on Intelligence (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, May 29, 1980

SUBJECT

Possible Increased Aid to Afghanistan Freedom Fighters

1. It may be possible to use Pakistan's close intelligence connection with Iran to increase the flow of weapons to the Afghanistan fighters. Pakistani Intelligence Chief General Akhtar has made several veiled references to connections with his Iranian counterparts. He has refused to identify this link or provide any elaborating data, but he recently provided one example of its use. We provided intelligence to the Pakistanis on a bloody Soviet offensive in the heavily Shi'ite areas of central Afghanistan. The intent was to place the material in the Islamabad press at the time of the Islamic Conference. Time factors made this impossible, but General Akhtar, acting on his own, used the material to prepare a report for his Iranian contacts on the suffering of Shi'ites in Afghanistan.²

2. The Pakistanis are presently receiving all the weapons that they can distribute through their mechanisms. It is possible that the Pakistanis, through their Iranian links, could arrange for the delivery of additional weapons to fighters in western Afghanistan. We propose to suggest to General Akhtar that he approach his Iranian contacts and offer to fly Soviet weapons to Iran for onward distribution in Afghanistan. The weapons could be flown directly from Islamabad to airfields in eastern Iran on the C-130's to be loaned to Pakistan. Neither the origin of the weapons nor our role in their procurement would be

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, For President or Brzezinski Only File, Box 88, PA—Very Sensitive: 1-6/80. Secret; Sensitive; [handling restriction not declassified].

² An intelligence information cable prepared in the CIA reported on a meeting between Zia and Qotbzadeh at the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers in Islamabad, May 24. Regarding Afghanistan, Qotbzadeh was quoted as saying: "some appeasement time in delaying tactics" would be required in dealing with the Soviet Union, and that the Soviets had intimated to Iran that they could cause trouble in Baluchistan, which, Qotbzadeh told Zia, neither Iran nor Pakistan could afford. In response to Zia's assertion that the Afghan insurgency was gaining strength, Qotbzadeh said that Iran would increase its support of the insurgents by 30 percent in June. Both Zia and Qotbzadeh agreed that at some point their respective countries would have to talk with the Karmal regime, but doing so should be delayed as long as possible given the possibility that the Afghan Government would collapse within the next two months. (Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 5, Pak Support for Insurgents)

mentioned. We believe Pakistan would honor a proviso not to use our aircraft to deliver embargoed items to Iran.

3. Given the political sensitivity of shipping U.S.-procured arms via Iranian authorities and our inability to control the weapons once they reach Iran, we request your prior approval of this proposal.³

Stansfield Turner⁴

³ In his reply to Turner, June 2, Brzezinski approved Turner's proposal, "provided adequate assurances can be obtained that such weapons will not be diverted by the Iranians to other purposes (including retention by the Iranians themselves)." Noting "the extreme importance of the Afghanistan resistance effort," Brzezinski requested semi-monthly reports on the status both of U.S. involvement and what was known of U.S. involvement by other parties. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 82M00501R: 1980 Subject Files, Box 12, C-367, 1 Jan-30 Jun 80, Afghanistan)

⁴ Turner signed "Stan Turner" above his typed signature.

280. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, May 1980

Afghanistan: Factions in the Ruling Party
(*[classification marking not declassified]*)

Summary

The ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP) of Afghanistan, in which Moscow has a substantial stake, is beset by longstanding divisions. President Babrak Karmal's regime would have fallen apart by now were it not for constant Soviet pressure on the feuding factions—Babrak's Parcham (Banner) and the Khalq (People's) of former Presi-

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Office of Support Services, Job 81T00208R: Production Case Files, Box 4, Afghanistan: Factions in the Ruling Party, An Intelligence Memorandum. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. A typed note at the bottom of the page reads: "The author of this paper is [*name not declassified*] of the Near East-South Asia Division, Office of Political Analysis. It was coordinated with the Offices of Strategic Research and Central Reference and the National Intelligence Officers for the Near East and South Asia and the USSR and Eastern Europe. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Southwest Asia Analytic Center, [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. Research for this paper was completed on 23 May 1980."

dents Amin and Taraki—to work together. (*[classification marking not declassified]*)

Still, personal enmity and the settling of old scores between the more numerous Khalqis and their Parchamist adversaries continue in spite of Soviet attempts at mediation. Moreover, as the intraparty struggle erodes the authority and saps the energies of the PDP's leaders, the Soviets will become even more involved in the regime's day-to-day decisionmaking process. (*[classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]*)

The strains in the regime are the same as those that weakened the governments of Amin and Taraki before the Soviet intervention. Soviet military intervention and political interference, far from bringing the two party factions together, have sharpened the antagonisms dividing them. Moscow could engineer yet another coup, but the Soviets are unlikely to come up with a new leadership that will achieve Moscow's objective of restoring stability under a Soviet-dominated regime. (*[classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]*)

As they try to deal with the infighting, the Soviets are concerned that Babrak's faction in the military is weaker than its Khalqi rival. If the Soviets are ever to disengage from Afghanistan, they must first rebuild the demoralized Army and ensure its loyalty to the regime. Babrak's weak position in the military is a serious vulnerability Moscow must confront and probably will be an important factor in any Soviet consideration of an alternative leadership. (*[classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]*)

Babrak recognizes that he remains in power only as long as Moscow believes he can serve Soviet interests. As he and the Khalqis vie for Soviet backing, Moscow will face difficult choices in estimating the prospects for each faction in holding the regime together and, over the longer term, governing effectively in the absence of Soviet occupation forces. For the foreseeable future, however, Moscow will not be able to look to its clients in Kabul to shoulder the burden of protecting Soviet interests in Afghanistan. (*[classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]*).

[Omitted here is the body of the paper.]

281. Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, June 2, 1980, 9–10:05 a.m.

SUBJECT

U.S. Relations with the Allies (S)

PARTICIPANTS

State

Secretary Edmund Muskie

Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher

Mr. George Vest, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European Affairs

Mr. Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Treasury

Deputy Secretary Robert Carswell

OSD

Ambassador Robert Komer, Under Secretary for Policy

Mr. Frank Kramer, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs

Agriculture

Secretary Bob Bergland

Dr. Dale Hathaway, Under Secretary for International Affairs and Commodity Programs

Commerce

Deputy Secretary Luther Hodges (Acting Secretary)

Mr. Homer Moyer, General Counsel

JCS

Lt. General John Pustay, Assistant to the Chairman

DCI

Mr. Bruce Clarke, Director, National Foreign Assessment Center

Mr. Joe Zaring, NIO for Western Europe

USUN

Ambassador Donald McHenry

White House

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski

Mr. David Aaron

Ambassador Henry Owen

¹ Source: Carter Library, Donated Historical Material, Brzezinski Collection, Brzezinski's Geographic Files, Box 17, Southwest Asia/Persian Gulf—General (William) Odom's File: (6/80–9/80). Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. In the upper right corner, Carter wrote: "Zbig. J."

NSC
Mr. Robert D. Blackwill
Brig. General William Odom
Mr. Marshall Brement

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

In opening the discussion, *Secretary Muskie* asked CIA if our lack of success with the Allies in persuading them to respond vigorously to the Afghanistan crisis was an indication that they disagreed with our strategic analysis of the situation. He noted that our original rationale had been to try to persuade the Soviets to withdraw and to deter repetition of the Soviet invasion. The Secretary asked if the Europeans had in effect accepted a permanent Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. CIA said yes, *Ambassador Komer* thought that was indeed the case, and *David Aaron* added that there was an important train of thought in Europe that argued that we would in the end have to trade Western acceptance of the Babrak regime for eventual Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. (S)

Responding to *Secretary Muskie's* observation that these issues should be discussed at the Venice Summit, *Dr. Brzezinski* stressed that it was important for the leaders of the West to talk together in detail about the strategic challenge, either formally or informally at dinner. Before going to the Summit, the President would have to decide if he wished to pose sharply and directly the strategic issues we confront, or to soft-pedal them. *Dr. Brzezinski* thought that the President should use the Venice forum to portray the Soviet challenge as he saw it and to make clear that palliatives such as a partial Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan would not work. With this approach the President would stress that if we did not act to meet the Soviet threat in Southwest Asia, a fundamental tipping of history would occur. *Giscard, Schmidt* and *Ohira* all had said that they more or less concurred with our strategic assessment, but it was important to get their collective agreement at Venice to our view of the implications of Afghanistan. If we could do that, the individual measures we had proposed would then be easier to achieve. Therefore, the President should make a tough-minded, forceful statement at Venice.² (S)

² A report on the June 22–23 Venice Economic Summit is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. III, Foreign Economic Policy, Document 247. On June 22, the participants at the Summit issued a statement on Afghanistan that called for “a world in which the rule of law is universally obeyed, national independence is respected and world peace is kept.” The statement continued: “We therefore reaffirm hereby that the Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan is unacceptable now and that we are determined not to accept it in the future. It is incompatible with the will of the Afghan people for national independence, as demonstrated by their courageous resistance, and with the security of the states of the region. It is also incompatible with the principles of the United Nations Charter and with efforts to maintain genuine détente. It undermines the very foundations of peace, both in the region and in the world at large.” The text of the statement is printed in *Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81*, Book II, pp. 1170–1171.

Secretary Muskie observed that if we fell back from any of our efforts so far to apply punitive measures against the Soviets, we would inevitably have reduced in European eyes the urgency of our evaluation of the crisis and made it easier for them to minimize their own contributions in meeting the crisis. He thought the President should make a statement in Venice in a way to force the Allies to face up to the issue. The President should ask whether the Allies agreed with our strategic evaluation or not. *Dr. Brzezinski* agreed and said that it was important to set a higher standard for European action than we thought they could probably meet. This would show U.S. leadership and also realistically recognize that we had to ask for more in order to get the minimally acceptable. (S)

In beginning to go through the individual measures we had pursued relating to Afghanistan, *Secretary Muskie* asked *Secretary Bergland* to address the issue of the grain embargo. Bergland observed that this matter would be decided by something over which we had no control—weather. If the Soviet Union could harvest 225 metric tons of grain this year, it could muddle through with minimal grain imports whatever we did. We would not know until late June or July how the Soviet crop would turn out. *Under Secretary Hathaway* added that Argentina would not cooperate with us in this endeavor and that the key to holding at last year's export level to the Soviet Union was Canada. If Canada cooperated with us, Australia would follow. (S)

Hathaway stressed that in order to gain Canadian cooperation, Presidential intervention would be necessary. The Canadian bureaucracy was dead set against our approach. In stressing that the Allies were generally against us on this matter, *Henry Owen* said that the chances of Canadian cooperation were less than 50–50. Moreover, if the Soviets had an average crop year, our efforts to reduce grain exports would not make much difference anyway. In any case, the Canadians would make a decision on this issue in the next week or so and if we intervened, it would have to be soon. *Bergland* agreed and stressed we had only two alternatives—to pressure the Canadians or to abandon this effort altogether. He thought the Canadians could be pressured but we must act now. *Secretary Muskie*, observing that this issue was a centerpiece of our post-Afghanistan measures, said if we dropped it this would signal to the Europeans and the Soviets that we were in effect dropping our anti-Afghanistan effort. We would be saying that the problem was too tough. That would be perceived abroad as a relaxation of our determination to respond to the Soviet invasion. *Dr. Brzezinski* agreed and said that we had no choice except to go to the Canadians. It would be better to fail because Ottawa did not agree than to drop the effort ourselves. The consensus at the table was thus that talking points should be urgently drafted for the President to use in a telephone

conversation with Trudeau asking that the Canadians maintain their grain exports to the Soviet Union at last year's level.³ (S)

Noting that the Allied response to our efforts to restrain export credits to Moscow was very bleak, *Secretary Muskie* asked if we should nevertheless press ahead on this issue. *Dr. Brzezinski* said he thought that tactically we should continue to pressure the Europeans on credits even though we knew we would not get their complete cooperation. To do otherwise would send the wrong message to the Allies. At the same time, *Dr. Brzezinski* stressed that we should keep our efforts private since we did not wish to inflate this matter publicly to a point at which our lack of success became a public defeat for the President. *Secretary Muskie* registered the participants' agreement that we should continue to push the Europeans on credits. (S)

Moving on to COCOM, *Komer* emphasized that this issue had long-range strategic implications and that we should press the Europeans hard. The *JCS* agreed. *Secretary Muskie* thought reduced technology transfer to the USSR had the greatest potential for giving pain to the Soviets over time. The group thought that we should do our best to expand the COCOM list, recognizing that the Europeans would resist. Again, all concurred that this should not be a matter for public discussion. (S)

On the Olympics, it was agreed that we should send messages this week to ensure that there is no slippage among those who had already decided not to go to the Olympics and to try to persuade individual federations not to attend the Moscow Games. Near the time of the Moscow Games, we should also emphasize to those who would be attending that we hoped they would insist on reduced ceremonies (no flags, anthems, etc.) at Moscow. *Dr. Brzezinski* suggested that we try to think of ways to give more credit to those governments which would not be going to the Olympics. *Secretary Muskie* agreed, and thought perhaps the Senate might do something in this respect, as might the UN and public groups in the U.S. *Aaron* wondered whether we might schedule bilateral games—track with the Kenyans, swimming with the Australians, and the like—and it was agreed that these suggestions would be followed-up. (S)

On the remaining issues before the group, it was agreed that we should make clear to the Allies that, aside from political-level contacts, we intended to maintain our basic practice of minimal contacts with the Soviets and hoped they will do the same; *State* promised an options paper on the issue of debt relief for Pakistan; and all thought it would

³ In the right margin at the end of the paragraph, Carter wrote: "OK—An official cable should also be sent." No cable was found.

be useful to press the Allies harder on the NATO defense response to Afghanistan, especially the Belgians and Dutch who were apparently not going to make their three percent defense commitment. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski then reminded the participants that the President had endorsed the following division of labor concepts for coordinating U.S. and Allied contributions to the security of the Persian Gulf region:

1. Most important is that our Allies increase their commitments to NATO's defense. This is the greatest contribution they can make while the U.S. is building a security system for the Persian Gulf region. (S)

2. Facilitating U.S. enroute access for military contingencies in the region is the next most helpful thing the Allies can contribute. They should be pressed to provide that access. (S)

3. On military exercises and deployments, we should encourage our Allies to go through with those they have already planned but not to do more at this time. (S)

4. We should encourage the British, French, and Australians to improve their rapid deployment capabilities, but we should not encourage them to go beyond their current plan. (S)

5. We should encourage the Allies to expand their security assistance to key regional countries, particularly Turkey, but also Oman, Somalia, Djibouti, and Sudan. We should encourage them to maintain at least the same level of economic aid to Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan and to expand economic aid with the smaller countries in the region. (S)

Finally, David Aaron observed that another matter of transatlantic concern in the next months was CSCE and the CDE. It was agreed that there would be a follow-on to this meeting next week which would discuss how this issue might affect our relations with the Allies and, if required, what steps we should take after the President's call to Trudeau on Canadian grain exports.⁴ (S)

⁴ At the bottom of the memorandum, Carter wrote: "We must *convince* the Allies that there will be no business as usual until they help us force the Soviet troops out of Afghanistan. They must face up to this choice. Otherwise, we will all fail, & the Soviets will win this struggle—(They will still have a bear by the tail in Afghanistan). J."

282. Report Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research¹

Report No. 1387

Washington, June 2, 1980

**POLITICAL FEUDING IN AFGHANISTAN:
A DILEMMA FOR THE SOVIETS****Summary**

Intensifying infighting between the Khalq and Parcham factions of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) is significantly complicating efforts to legitimize and popularize the Soviet puppet Babrak Karmal regime. The struggle has its roots in early personal and ideological differences, greatly exacerbated by the events of the two years since the April 1978 coup, which brought the PDPA to power in Afghanistan. Should the present uneasy truce continue to erode, there could be another major upheaval in the Afghan political scene. Already, reports abound that each group is plotting to unseat the other.

The situation presents the Soviets with a dilemma. The continuing feud is paralyzing government operations and strengthening the ranks of the countrywide resistance. But if the Soviets should espouse the cause of one faction to the exclusion of the other, they could further undermine their own base of support. While neither faction could remain in power without Soviet backing, keeping the peace between them may prove to be a goal beyond the Soviet reach.

Importance of a United PDPA

The government installed by the Soviets after their December 27 invasion signaled a reuniting of Khalqis and Parchamis under the leadership of long-time Parcham head, now President, Prime Minister, and Secretary General of the PDPA, Babrak Karmal. The government is a carefully contrived mix of Khalqis and Parchamis. There are two Deputy Prime Ministers—one a Khalqi, Assadullah Sarwari, and the other a Parchami, Sultan Ali Keshtmand. The dominant Parcham faction outnumbers the Khalq in all the government and party organizations—but only by a margin of four to three in the important Politburo.

Collaboration between the two groups, functioning as a united PDPA, is important from the Soviet viewpoint for two reasons. First, it confers legitimacy on Babrak Karmal, the Soviet puppet, as a natural successor to the previous Khalq regimes of Nur Mohammad Taraki

¹ Source: Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 1, Afghan Politics. Unclassified. Drafted by Van Hollen (INR/RNA/SOA) and approved by Harris (INR/DDR/RNA).

and Hafizullah Amin and supports the claim that this is merely a new phase in the natural evolution of the Saur (April) revolution. Second, it helps establish as broad-based a political appeal as possible. The Soviet Union gambled that Babrak would appear more politically attractive than his predecessors and that it could effect a reconciliation between the estranged Khalqis and Parchamis which would provide a base on which to build a broader national front. The building of such a front is considered essential for overcoming the present widespread hostility to the succession of Marxist governments.

The Soviets also apparently believed that the 85,000 troops they brought into Afghanistan to support Babrak would quickly discourage the countrywide opposition to the government, thus giving it time and breathing space to become established and to win support with conciliatory programs. To date, most of the Soviets' original judgments appear to have been in error. The overwhelming popular resistance, which has grown appreciably since the December invasion and is now directed primarily against the Soviets themselves, makes a mockery of any claim to legitimacy. Likewise, the deep-seated hostility between the Parcham and Khalq factions is proving to be irreconcilable.

Early Stages of Rivalry

The rivalry between the Khalqis and the Parchamis has its roots in an early split in the Communist-styled People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan when Babrak led a splinter group out of the party in 1967, two years after it was founded by Taraki. The present organization was then known popularly as the Khalq party after the name of its short-lived publication *Khalq* ("The Masses" or "The People") and the Babrak group became known as the Parcham ("Banner") party from the name of its paper.

The reasons for the original split appear to have been more personal than ideological as both groups were dedicated to the principles of Marxism-Leninism. However, certain philosophical and policy differences separated them from the beginning and are important factors in the current struggle. The Parchamis have always been considered closer to Moscow than the more independent Khalqis. This is currently symbolized by the Parchamis' blatant status as a Soviet puppet. Also, the Parchamis have consistently been more pragmatic and have favored temporary alliances with progressive movements as an intermediate step on the path to socialism, whereas the Khalqis have favored class struggle and a hard line. This approach led the Parchamis to team up with Mohammad Daoud for the coup against his cousin, King Zahir, in July 1973 and for the early stages of his Presidency.² Currently, it

² See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-8, Documents on South Asia, 1973–1976, Document 4.

means that the Parchamis are advocating a gradual approach to political, social, and economic change in order to appease the inflamed populace. This policy appears to have the full support of the Soviets.

Recruitment and organization patterns also differed from the beginning of the Afghan leftist movement and are important factors in the present conflict. The Parchamis, although more in the public eye because of the dynamism of Babrak, were a relatively small and loosely organized group. They were intellectuals drawing their support from the urban middle class, professionals, and students and have been described as Afghanistan's "Communist Aristocracy."

The Khalq group stayed more in the background, but eventually came to be much larger and much better organized than the Parchamis. It recruited primarily among the civil service, the military establishment, and in the countryside. It was also considered to be more Push-tun-dominated than the Parcham party, which, although smaller, reputedly had a broader ethnic base. One member of the Khalq inner circle who was a particularly effective organizer and had special responsibility for recruiting in the military was Amin.

No official current membership figures are available. According to a recent Reuters article from Kabul, there are an estimated 25,000–50,000 Khalqis, while it is believed there were fewer than 10,000 Parchamis at the time of the December coup. These figures give a sense of relative size. They may have been valid for an earlier period, but in light of overwhelming current alienation, they are probably highly inflated.

Feuding Intensified After Successful 1978 Coup

The predominant cause for the current hostility lies in the events of the past two years after the Khalq and Parcham groups, having reunited in 1977 following 10 years of estrangement, jointly overthrew President Mohammad Daoud in April 1978.

The unity which brought them to power proved to be short-lived. The Khalqis quickly outmaneuvered the Parcham group and forced Babrak and his closest associates first into diplomatic exile as ambassadors in July 1978 and later into real exile, when they were dismissed from their posts. Other high-ranking Parchamis suffered an even more disagreeable fate in the summer of 1978 when they were accused of plotting against the government, imprisoned, and tortured. During the course of the Taraki and Amin regimes, most of the Parcham leadership and hundreds of lower ranking members were imprisoned.

When the Soviets invaded in December 1979 and overthrew Amin, who had won out in a power struggle with the subsequently murdered Taraki, they brought the exiled Parcham leadership group with them and reinstated it as the dominant element in the new government. All other Parchamis were subsequently released from imprisonment.

Against this background, it is understandable that the current attempts to reconcile past differences are not succeeding. Parchamis who suffered torture from their current Khalq colleagues cannot forget and forgive. One of the most hated figures is Khalqi Deputy Prime Minister Assadullah Sarwari, who was head of the secret police during the Taraki presidency and who is held personally responsible for the torture of some of the Parcham political prisoners, including the other Deputy Prime Minister, Sultan Ali Keshtmand.

Current reports indicate a good deal of maneuvering by each group to discredit and hopefully eliminate the other. The differences are now becoming so acute that they are breaking out into the open and are being reported in the press with increasing frequency. Recently a prominent Parchami newspaper editor, who is a younger brother of Parchami Deputy Prime Minister Keshtmand, was arrested after his paper ran an article and a cartoon critical of former President Taraki. While former President Amin is now treated as an aberrant and responsible for all the mistakes and suppression of the past two years, Taraki is still honored and the Khalqis in the present government are loyal to him.

The Khalq faction is apparently opposed to the current Parcham policy, which emphasizes moderation and a respect for Islam designed to placate the hostile populace. The Khalqis reportedly were particularly opposed to issuing the new, less inflammatory flag.

Most important of all, it has been reported by the Press Trust of India correspondent in Kabul that the recently signed Afghan-Soviet treaty covering the status of Soviet troops in Afghanistan has caused sharp divisions within the government and the party. Khalqis are now said to be increasingly opposed to the continued presence of Soviet troops.

On the surface it might appear to be in the Soviets' interests to dispense with the Khalq faction altogether and rely solely on the more amenable and beholden Parchamis. However, Babrak Karmal has failed to win popular support and strongman Khalqi Assadullah Sarwari is said to be a Soviet favorite. Even more important, the superior numerical strength of the Khalq group, and particularly its strength in the military, makes this a less appealing option. If the Khalqis were to go over to the resistance *en masse*, it would make the Soviets' job of pacification even more difficult than it already is.

Some lower ranking Khalqis may already be joining the resistance ranks, however, and it certainly appears that the Soviets will find it increasingly difficult to keep the lid on the explosive feuding.

283. Memorandum From Thomas Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, June 4, 1980

SUBJECT

Zia and Support for the Rebels (C)

You know, of course, that we are taking a beating in the press and abroad even (especially France) for our "failure" to support the mujahidin with weapons.² This could easily become a campaign issue (although there are obvious ways to counter it). (C)

You may have noted that Zia is climbing on this band wagon. Beginning in Salisbury and most recently in his meeting with Lester Wolff, he is deploring the failure of the US to provide him with the kind of support that would enable Pakistan to provide a conduit for support to the mujahidin.³ This is a clever approach for him to take of course, and I certainly don't blame him for doing it. It is the best way of covering his tracks in a difficult situation. But it certainly doesn't help us with our public relations problem. (S)

In addition, I am beginning to wonder just what we are getting as a result of our efforts to provide covert assistance to the mujahidin. CIA is confident but coy when I ask them. I haven't heard of any of the SA-7s bringing anything down however, and Kramer's articles in the *Inquirer* suggest that, at least in the part of the country where he was, there is nothing even resembling an anti-tank weapon.⁴ (S)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, For President or Brzezinski Only File, Box 88, PA—Very Sensitive: 1-6/80. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. In the upper right corner, Aaron wrote: "ZB—I agree with this. Every time we push for details we get a limp leg. We should ask for a full-scale briefing for you. DA 6/6."

² See, for example, Daniel Southerland, "France hints US should do more to aid ill-equipped Afghan rebels," *Christian Science Monitor*, May 28, 1980, p. 6.

³ Zia, who was in Salisbury to celebrate Rhodesia's independence, gave a press conference April 17, during which he called on the United States to pursue a stronger military response to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. (Carlyle Murphy, "Pakistan Calls for U.S. To Arm Afghan Rebels," *Washington Post*, April 18, 1980, p. A45) Congressman Wolff, who led a congressional delegation to Pakistan, met with Zia in Islamabad June 1. The Embassy reported on the meeting in telegram 5311 from Islamabad, June 2. Zia was quoted as saying: "we cannot convince the U.S. that Afghanistan should be top priority," and "in superpower terms, we have already been passed over to the other side." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800270-0012)

⁴ A reference to a series of articles by Richard Ben Cramer on the Afghan resistance appearing in the *Philadelphia Inquirer* May 30-June 1, 1980. Cramer won the Pulitzer Prize for International Reporting in 1981 for the series.

This may all be in the nature of things and our program may be moving along quite adequately, given the Pak constraints. Unless you know a lot more about it than I do, however, I suggest that you or David grill CIA pretty exactly on the effect that our program is having. If you want, I could follow this up with the Station Chief in Islamabad when I am there. I have no particular desires in this regard, but if I were to do so to any effect, he would have to have gotten instructions from Headquarters to level with me. And those instructions will not be forthcoming without a push from you. (I do *not*, incidentally, believe it would be advisable for me to meet with Akhtar or his people.) (S)

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That you or David press CIA for exact details of the performance of their CA program in support of the Afghan rebels. I think this should be done in a smaller group, even, than the SCC(I). I would like to sit in, but it might be more effective one-on-one.⁵ (S)

2. *If* you want me to probe in great detail with the Station Chief, that you ask Carlucci to tell Islamabad that they should level with me completely. (S)

⁵ Brzezinski approved the recommendation. In the left margin next to his approval, he wrote: "I will do it," from which he drew a line to the bottom of the memorandum, where he wrote: "Prepare me a memo to ST, asking relevant questions." The reference is to Turner.

284. Letter From Secretary of State Muskie to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko¹

Washington, June 5, 1980

Dear Mr. Minister:

Since our meeting in Vienna, I have given a great deal of thought to your views on the situation in Afghanistan and to our own concerns about events there. I noted your indication of an interest in continuing an exchange on this issue and on the importance of improving relations between our two countries.²

It is the position of the United States that any viable solution to the problem of Afghanistan must be based on the principles of non-intervention and non-interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign nations. Accordingly, with the prompt withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Afghanistan, the United States will be prepared to join in assurances and arrangements to establish a truly independent and non-aligned Afghanistan, administered by a government acceptable to the Afghan people.

The United States has no interest in interfering in Afghanistan's internal affairs. We will not endorse arrangements designed to perpetuate a government imposed upon Afghanistan through foreign arms. Nor could we agree to conditions which affect adversely our own vital interests in the area or those of Afghanistan's neighbors.

If the foregoing approach is accepted by the Soviet Union, the United States would be prepared to explore some transitional arrangement, to be implemented along with the prompt withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Afghanistan, for the purpose of ensuring that peace and tranquillity are restored in Afghanistan. The creation of an international peacekeeping force could be considered in this connection.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 61, Soviet Exchanges: 1/79-10/80. Secret; Sensitive. Carter initialed "C" in the upper right corner. In a memorandum to Carter, May 28, Brzezinski noted that he gave Muskie some proposed language for the letter during a breakfast meeting the previous Friday, May 23. Referring to a draft of the letter, Brzezinski added that he made some changes so that the Soviets could not infer from the letter that the United States accepted the "puppet regime" in Kabul. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 2, Afghanistan: 5/80-1/81) The draft of the letter was not found. In telegram 9449 from Moscow, June 12, the Embassy reported that Muskie's letter was delivered by Watson during his meeting with Gromyko that day. In Gromyko's reaction to the letter, the Embassy noted that he said it "offered no prospects for reaching a settlement, stating that insistence on prior withdrawal of Soviet troops is a dead end." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880025-0493) Telegram 9449 is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 283.

² See Document 272.

It is the US view that a solution based on such principles would facilitate the restoration of more cooperative relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Sincerely,

Edmund S. Muskie

285. Intelligence Information Cable Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

[*cable number not declassified*]

Washington, June 6, 1980, 1532Z

COUNTRY

Afghanistan/USSR

SUBJECT

Developing Situation Within Afghanistan [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

SOURCE

This is a field appraisal. It represents the views of this Agency's senior officer on the scene. It is an interpretation based on previously reported information. It is disseminated in the belief that it may be useful to intelligence analysts in their own assessment of the situation.

1. The security situation throughout Afghanistan continues to deteriorate. Main roads leading south and east out of Kabul city are being interdicted by the Islamic nationalist insurgents (INI). The Afghan military continues to experience desertions, and recruiting drives have been unsuccessful. Kabul city has become the scene of repeated assassinations and other terrorist acts. The population of the city appears to be almost totally disaffected from the regime, and there is the potential for serious civil disturbances. Kandahar, Jalalabad, and Herat are contested cities with the government on the defensive. In these latter cities, party workers continue to be attacked and killed. The Afghan military

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 2, Afghanistan: 5/80–1/81. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. In a June 7 covering memorandum to Brzezinski, attached but not printed, Thornton noted that the situation report from the Station Chief in Kabul was "worth reading." He continued: "It is particularly interesting, incidentally, that the COS's views have changed quite a bit over the past several months. Previously, he was much more bearish about the near term prospects for the insurgents standing off the Soviets. He is now more in the mainstream of analysis."

officers corps is coming under increasing pressure by the INI. Officers are now being targeted for assassination throughout the country, including attempted attacks on senior officers in Kabul. Reports indicate that the morale of the Afghan military is crumbling. The Parchamist clique and the Khalqi clique of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) are attacking each other and are in turn attacked by the INI. Party workers live in constant fear for their lives in Kandahar, Jalalabad, and Herat; this pattern is beginning in Kabul. Mazar-i-Sharif is not as chaotic, but the situation in that city is also tense.

2. Afghan Army units are operating in the field, but with decreasing competence. Increasingly, the Soviet forces have been called on to rout the INI from strongholds they occupy. Soviet attacks on the INI have been militarily successful. The Soviets are taking losses, probably at a much higher level than they originally anticipated. But when the INI elects to confront the Soviets in static battles, the Soviets prevail. When the INI has resorted to more classical guerrilla tactics, they have inflicted significant losses on the Soviets. Ambushes, minings and assassinations by the INI are taking a steady toll of Soviet forces. Once the Soviets leave an area from which they have cleared the INI, the insurgents successfully reinfiltate and cause the returning Afghan Army units considerable grief. The lesson the Soviets must be learning is that if they plan to control an area, they must keep Soviet forces there because the Afghan military cannot handle the job. This leads to the conclusion that the Soviets will have to increase their overall strength levels inside Afghanistan and be prepared to become even more overtly an army of occupation.

Regime's forces.

3. The INI, while demonstrating sophistication in guerrilla tactics, remain disunited and unable to coordinate their sometimes effective actions against the regime and the Soviets. There appears to be little coordination among the groups in Peshawar and those doing the actual fighting; and there appears to be little coordination within Afghanistan among the groups doing the fighting.

4. The INI continue to make good use of the weapons available to them. The average INI soldier is deadly when using an Enfield 303. The INI have been making good use of mines and anti-tank weapons against both the Soviets and the Afghan regime forces. During the last several weeks, there have been confirmed reports that the INI have successfully shot down Soviet MI-8 and MI-24 helicopters with conventional arms.² The MI-24 gunship helicopter has been particularly harmful to the insurgents, however, and it has proved to be a difficult

² An unknown hand underlined "conventional arms."

weapon to destroy in the air by conventional anti-aircraft weapons. If the insurgents can work out a way to destroy MI-24s with some regularity, there is the possibility that the Soviets' effective use of this weapon can be curtailed.

5. The Soviets have been increasingly barbarous in their responses to INI attacks. There are several reports that the Soviets have killed tribal non-combatants and destroyed villages in areas the Soviets see as still hostile. More of this kind of reprisal is beginning to develop and it appears that village destruction, as retaliation, may be Soviet policy.

6. The Soviets appear to be trying to seal the borders of Afghanistan. When Soviet troops are in the border areas, they appear to be relatively successful in this effort. They can only continue to prevent the movement of most supplies across borders, however, by committing additional men so that they have a permanent force in the border areas. Even with an increase in manpower, the total prevention of cross-border infiltration from Iran and Pakistan will be possible.

7. This has been the wettest spring in Afghanistan in twenty years. The rains were to the INI's advantage. The wet weather was almost immediately followed by hot weather in the plains. Because of the altitude of most of Afghanistan, the dust and the heat, helicopter operations are difficult in the summer months. Thus, because of weather, the Soviets have not been able to fully utilize this equipment which gives them an advantage. The Soviets are behind schedule in their pacification operations, we believe, because of these weather factors and their miscalculation of the intensity of the INI's resistance. We have not seen signs that the Soviets have decided to discontinue their pacification plans; rather they have repeatedly gone back into several areas on search and destroy missions where resistance has reemerged.

8. There appears to be little likelihood that the Soviets will agree to a political settlement which includes their withdrawal because if they withdraw, the Babrak Karmal regime will fall and chaos will follow. For the Soviet side, there is nothing to be gained by a withdrawal. The situation would not return to pre-1975; the regime would be destroyed; the Soviets would be isolated from any new government; and the new government would probably be a fundamentalist Islamic government. There is no indication that a compromise government acceptable to both the Soviets and the various factions in the INI could be constituted. The positions of the opposing sides are too divergent at this time; therefore, the Soviets' only course of action is to destroy the INI forces in the field. A military victory in the field will alleviate the need for a political solution. It is not possible for the INI to defeat the Soviets; rather the INI can only hope to conserve their forces' while continuing to make the Soviet forces' situation difficult and painful. To date, the Soviets have not taken unacceptable heavy casualties,

relative to their manpower pool and equipment resources. Probably the most painful element has been that the Soviets' pride has been badly hurt. The Red Army is being hit hard by bands of irregulars and we doubt if the Soviets considered it possible that such groups could operate so successfully against their forces.

9. Given the resources the two sides have at their command, it seems probable that the Soviets will prevail, but the cost will be higher than they calculated both in military and political terms. The longer it drags out, the more painful it becomes for the Soviets.

10. Chargé's comments: I agree entirely with this appraisal's description of the current situation in Afghanistan (paras. 1-7) and with the general thrust of paras. 8 and 9. However, I am a little more optimistic than the COS that the Soviets can eventually be brought to the point where totally destroying the INI forces is not their "only course of action." If the INI can keep enough pressure on the Soviets for a long enough period of time, and if in the meantime the Soviet diplomatic offensive to bring about acceptance of the status quo can be made to fail, the Soviets might reach the point where a compromise solution seems more attractive to them than an endless continuation of the blood-letting. This will probably require that the INI receive more and better military equipment from the outside than it is now getting, and that carries with it the chance that the Soviets might lash out in frustration at Pakistan, Iran or indirectly at the other "aggressors," including this Embassy.

If the point is eventually reached when the Soviets are ready for a genuine compromise solution, I do not believe their prospects are quite as bleak as para. 9 implies. It is not a given, for instance, that "the Soviets would be isolated from any new government;" Gailani and other resistance leaders have publicly acknowledged that any Kabul government would have to be on good terms with the USSR. Through tribal manipulation and bribery, the Soviets could probably ensure that someone minimally acceptable to them takes over when the point is reached that they are willing to withdraw their troops and the INI is exhausted from years of fighting.

11. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Dissem: [*5 lines not declassified*]

286. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Vest) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Saunders) to Secretary of State Muskie¹

Washington, June 7, 1980

SUBJECT

A Political Solution for Afghanistan: Next Steps

SUMMARY

There are a number of proposals being floated for a political solution to the Afghan problem. While the Soviets do not seem seriously interested now, we think it worthwhile to keep alive proposals which are broadly consistent with our own views. Tactically, we recommend that in the weeks immediately ahead we focus attention on the Islamic Conference initiative and encourage the Europeans to do likewise. The purpose of this memorandum is to obtain your approval for a positive approach to the Islamic Conference Committee and your guidance on the posture we should take with our allies as we prepare for the Venice Summit.

ISSUES FOR DECISION

1. Your approval of the attached cable informing members of the Islamic Committee other than Ghotbzadeh of the approach contained in your letter to Gromyko, expressing interest in the Islamic Conference initiative, and suggesting that you would be prepared to meet with the Pakistani Foreign Minister if he comes to New York. (The approach would also be conveyed to the Indians and Chinese.)²

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs David Newsom, Lot 81D154, folder 2. Secret; Sensitive. Sent through Christopher. Drafted by Coon; concurred in by Shulman, Kreisberg, and Barry. A typed notation in the top right corner of the memorandum reads: "*DepSec took action for Secretary. 6/13/80.*" Below that, an unknown hand wrote to Newsom: "DDN—Urgent. See Secretary's decision on p. 4." An unknown hand circled and crossed out both notations.

² The Islamic Conference Standing Committee (ICSC) was established by a resolution of the Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers in May; see footnote 4, Document 270. The cable was not attached, but was found in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870094–0887, as telegram 155761 to Jidda, Islamabad, New Delhi, and Beijing, June 12. The telegram informed the posts that Department officials had

2. Your broad agreement that in preparing for Venice, we seek to encourage the Europeans to focus their efforts on the Islamic Conference Committee rather than push competing proposals of their own in their contacts with the Soviets.

3. Your consideration of a recommendation to instruct Swiss Ambassador Lang to convey to Ghotbzadeh in more general terms the thrust of our approach to the Soviets.

BACKGROUND

There are several initiatives, contemplated or underway, designed to advance a political solution for the Afghan problem. Tom Watson will shortly be delivering your letter to Gromyko.³ The Islamic Conference Committee (Pakistan, Iran and Islamic Conference Secretary General Chatti) has been meeting in Tehran to formulate their approach. Schmidt will be going to Moscow and will be discussing Afghanistan. The British are continuing their dialogue in Moscow despite public Soviet rebuffs and could be slightly softening their position.

The Soviets are evidently not prepared at this time seriously to consider a solution which involves their early and total withdrawal from Afghanistan. On the contrary, the Soviets are seeking to turn the notion of a political solution to their own advantage in an effort to gain recognition of the Kabul regime, to divide the allies and soften Third World condemnation. Nevertheless, there is value in keeping alive the idea of an acceptable political solution in order to keep the door open should the Soviets wish to withdraw from Afghanistan and in the meantime keep them on the defensive politically. The allies place particular importance on this tactic.

notified the Soviet Union of the latest U.S. views on the Afghanistan issue. The Department instructed the Ambassadors to convey the following points: 1) a viable settlement in Afghanistan required the withdrawal of the Soviet military, after which the United States would be prepared to help "establish a truly independent and non-aligned Afghanistan;" 2) the United States "has no interest in interfering with Afghanistan's internal affairs;" 3) the United States is "prepared to explore some transitional arrangement, to be implemented along with the prompt withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Afghanistan, for the purpose of ensuring that peace and tranquility are restored in Afghanistan;" and 4) a settlement in Afghanistan would "facilitate the restoration of more cooperative relations between the U.S. and USSR."

³ See Document 284.

Your letter to Gromyko clearly keeps the door open and lays out our basic conditions for a solution. At this stage, we think our allies should be encouraged to help to shape and encourage the Islamic initiative rather than proposing their own variants which the Soviets can pick and choose among in an effort to escape pressure for withdrawal. The allies are generally sympathetic to the Islamic Conference Committee's initiative. We have already encouraged the FRG to discuss the Islamic initiative with Agha Shahi, who will be visiting Bonn next week.

The Committee's terms of reference are quite close to our own principles, although we cannot be certain how the Committee will proceed in its work and we will certainly have no control over it. There is, however, a good bit of value in having the Soviets confront an Islamic initiative. The Committee may build a record of Soviet intransigence which we could point to later, particularly in the UNGA. However, you should be aware that according to press reports on June 7, the Committee has authorized Chatti to ascertain the views of the Soviets, Afghan authorities and resistance leaders regarding a political solution.

We have not made known our attitude toward the Committee. A public embrace would probably be unwelcome and counterproductive. Unpublicized contact, however, could be useful in indicating our support and perhaps even influencing the process of negotiation.

The President has authorized us to convey to the Islamic Committee members the approach contained in your letter to Gromyko. We propose in addition to express our interest in the work of the Committee and our hope that we could quietly stay in touch at least with Chatti and Pakistan Foreign Minister Agha Shahi. In this connection, we suggest that we tell Shahi that you would welcome an early opportunity to exchange views with him on Afghanistan. (Shahi may be coming to a meeting at the UN in the next few weeks and could come down to Washington for a brief undramatized meeting.) Such a meeting would give you an opportunity to brief Shahi on your conversation with Gromyko, provide an assessment of Soviet intentions and other initiatives for a political solution, and exchange views on the Islamic Committee's work. The meeting with Shahi could also have a collateral benefit in terms of our bilateral relations with Pakistan.

Finally, we realize that Ghotbzadeh is in a different category from Chatti and Agha Shahi, but we think there is some advantage in giving recognition to the important role Ghotbzadeh has played in this issue and the parallelism of U.S. and Iranian interests on Afghanistan. Since Ghotbzadeh is the Iranian official working most vigorously for release of the hostages, to establish this common interest could have some benefits for us.

Recommendations:

1. That you approve the attached cable informing the two Islamic Conference Committee members of the approach to the Soviets contained in your letter to Gromyko, expressing support for the work of the Committee and suggesting a meeting with Agha Shahi. (The cable also instructs Embassies Delhi and Beijing to convey our approach, as suggested by the President.)⁴

2. That in our preparations for the Venice Summit we develop a line which would encourage the allies to focus on the Islamic initiative rather than putting forward new ideas of their own.⁵

3. That we also convey in more general terms via the Swiss to Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh the thrust of our approach to the Soviets. If you approve this recommendation, we will provide a separate telegram for Ambassador Lang. (NEA supports this recommendation.)⁶

⁴ Muskie approved the recommendation.

⁵ Muskie approved the recommendation.

⁶ Muskie disapproved the recommendation.

287. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

NICM-80-10003CX

Washington, June 10, 1980

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL MEMORANDUM² SOVIET CASUALTIES IN AFGHANISTAN

Summary

Overall US intelligence collection capability on Soviet casualties in Afghanistan is considered only fair. Our evidence comes primarily from [1 line not declassified]. These sources rarely agree and often contain conflicting information. In consequence it is impossible to provide

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council Files, Job 82B00561R, Box 1, NICM 80-10003CX: Soviet Casualties in Afghanistan, 10 June 1980. Top Secret; [codeword and handling restriction not declassified]

² This memorandum was prepared under the aegis of the National Intelligence Officer for the USSR and Eastern Europe at the request of the Near East Bureau of the Department of State and was fully coordinated within the Intelligence Community. [Footnote is in the original.]

anything more than a range of plausible estimates. At the bottom of the range we are fairly confident that Soviet casualties to date total at least 4,000. At the top of the range we can find reasonable grounds for entertaining the possibility that these casualties may have been as much as two or three times higher.³ Whatever the number, it is important to bear in mind that a high proportion of injured soldiers are probably returned to duty.⁴ (*[classification marking, codeword, and handling restriction not declassified]*)

Combat Casualties

[*1½ lines not declassified*] These reports provide information on the number of Soviet troops killed or wounded in combat during a specified period, often with a breakdown by individual unit. Although incomplete, these data indicate that Soviet military forces suffered at least 2,031 casualties—771 killed and 1,260 wounded and injured—between late December and mid-May. Among individual ground units [*less than 1 line not declassified*] casualties during this period were as low as 2 percent but generally approached 5 percent and in one instance reached 13 percent. (*[classification marking and codeword not declassified]*)

[*less than 1 line not declassified*] do not provide continuous coverage on all combat units in Afghanistan. [*1½ lines not declassified*] indicate a consistently low level of casualties, perhaps no more than a total of 4,000 from late December to mid-May if the actual figures obtained are doubled. Additional casualties on which we do not yet have a complete assessment [*less than 1 line not declassified*] have undoubtedly been incurred in late May, when combat continued to expand into new geographic areas. (*[classification marking, codeword, and handling restriction not declassified]*)

Other Casualties

There are instances of casualties not specifically covered [*1 line not declassified*] other reporting addresses types of noncombat casualties that are not covered in the [*less than 1 line not declassified*] cited above. This includes casualties among combat support personnel, off-duty troops, and advisers who are killed or wounded by insurgents, by deserting Afghan Army troops, or by angry civilians. These reports

³ The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force; and the Director of Intelligence, Headquarters Marine Corps believe that there is inadequate intelligence data on which to treble the 4,000 minimum Soviet casualty figure. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁴ Army medical intelligence estimates that typically 60 percent would return to duty in about two weeks after hospitalization. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] emphasizes the validity of the World War II experience that in the long term 70 percent of all wounded are returned to military duty. [Footnote is in the original.]

frequently provide details of how and when casualties occurred—for example, that 120 Soviets died at the hands of rebellious Afghan soldiers on 17 January; that 25 Soviets were killed in one part of Kabul during the demonstrations in late February; and that 17 Soviets were killed on 16 or 17 May in a firefight between Afghan and Soviet soldiers around Pol-i-Charkhi prison. These and numerous other similar reports raise the possibility that total Soviet casualties in Afghanistan may be two or three times higher than the 4,000 minimum. (*[classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]*)

288. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, June 11, 1980

1. Since the Presidential Finding of 28 December 1979, which instructed CIA to provide military equipment to the Afghan freedom fighters,² CIA has ordered approximately \$30 million worth of equipment of Soviet origin delivering it at a rate controlled by Pakistan's ability to absorb and distribute it. Approximately \$10 million worth of arms have been distributed through Pakistan to the Afghans. The remaining \$20 million worth will be delivered prior to 30 September 1980. The attachment lists the weapons delivered and those still in the pipeline.

2. The delivery mechanism involves five nationalities. The arms originate in Egypt, are flown on USAF C-141's to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, where they are transferred to Saudi Air Force C-130's for delivery to Islamabad, Pakistan. Finally, the arms are sent into Afghanistan by the Pakistanis primarily through eight Afghan exile organizations headquartered in Peshawar. Until recently the Pakistani distribution mechanism could only absorb one C-130 load approximately every five days. The Pakistanis now are able to distribute the material more quickly. CIA will supplement the existing mechanism with direct C-141 Cairo-Islamabad flights. This will represent about a 40 percent increase in delivery. Supplementary delivery systems via [*less than 1*

¹ Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I-047, Afghanistan: 11 Sep 1979–22 Jul 1980. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. In a June 11 covering memorandum to Carter, attached but not printed, Turner wrote: "Attached is the memorandum you requested on Afghanistan." Carter initialed "C" in the upper right corner of Turner's memorandum.

² See footnote 6, Document 107.

line not declassified] and/or by sea are also under investigation. We can deliver arms as fast as Pakistan can distribute them.

3. There are several indications of the effectiveness of the arms program:

—Sensitive [*less than 1 line not declassified*] and Afghan messages in mid-March 1980 began noting a significant upsurge in rebel landmine and anti-tank rocket attacks against Soviet armor. The [*less than 1 line not declassified*] description of the equipment was in part identical to that being delivered in our support program. [*1 line not declassified*] “A quantitative and qualitative increase in Afghan rebel activity started in late March and early April 1980.” This phenomenon coincides with predicted battlefield arrival dates for CIA-provided weaponry.

—A [*less than 1 line not declassified*] CIA source [*less than 1 line not declassified*] with an exile group actually saw weapons being funneled to the Afghans by the Pakistani military. The number and type of weapons distributed coincided with the report given to CIA by Pakistani liaison.

—The US Consul in Peshawar recently reported from his Afghan sources on the availability to the Afghans of many Soviet-originated weapons.³

—A separate CIA source also saw Egyptian-originated weapons being distributed from Peshawar to the Afghan exile groups.

In sum, independent evidence, plus developments on the battlefield, support Pakistani guarantees that the equipment is being delivered to Afghanistan. There is no evidence of Pakistani siphoning.

4. Our partners in the covert action program, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, are extremely sensitive to this program. The Saudis have commented favorably on the efficiency and security of the program; Saudi Arabia has never been mentioned in any press leak. The Pakistanis are less pleased because they have been mentioned. We have committed to them to protect the security of the program. We have generally briefed [*less than 1 line not declassified*] on the program and they have provided propaganda support. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] is aware that there is a general support program. There has been no discussion with [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. We believe the program can be generally reviewed with [*1 line not declassified*] as an indication of US commitment. We would discourage any discussion of mechanism amounts or partners.

³ The United States Consul in Peshawar was Douglas A. Archard.

Attachment**List of Military Equipment for Afghanistan⁴**

Washington, undated

DELIVERED

AK-47 Rifles	- 3900
AK-47 Ammo	- 6.133 million rounds
12.7 mm HMG	- 115
12.7 mm Ammo	- 547,040 rounds
14.5 mm Ammo	- 15,000 rounds
82 mm Mortars	- 50
82 mm Ammo	- 2500 rounds
RPG-7 Launchers	- 150
RPG-7 Rockets	- 3902 rounds
AT Mines	- 2700
AP Mines	- 1000
Fuse	- 1800 feet
AT Grenades	- 1250
Hand Grenades	- 6000
C-4 Explosive	- 637 lbs
TNT Sticks	- 2000
SA-7 Launchers	- 5
SA-7 Rockets	- 15
Sniper Rifles	- 121
Sniper Ammo	- 36,000 rounds
Lee Enfield Rifles	- 1200
.303 Ammo	- 300,000 rounds
Walkie-Talkie	- 100 units
Base Radios	- 6 units

IN THE PIPELINE

AK-47 Rifles	- 6600
AK-47 Ammo	- 6.6 million rounds
RPG-7 Launchers	- 594
RPG-7 Rockets	- 14,190
12.7 mm HMG	- 88
12.7 mm Ammo	- 316,800 rounds
82 mm Mortars	- 88

⁴ Secret; [handling restriction not declassified].

82 mm Ammo	- 4400 rounds
AT Mines	- 4000
AP Mines	- 4000
14.5 mm AA Gun	- 10
14.5 mm Ammo	- 50,400 rounds
Firing Devices	- 1000
SA-7 Launcher	- 10
SA-7 Rockets	- 50

**289. Memorandum From Acting Director of Central Intelligence
Carlucci to Secretary of State Muskie and the President's
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹**

Washington, June 16, 1980

SUBJECT

VoA Broadcast of CIA Activities

1. The Voice of America recently broadcast a summary of a Philadelphia *Inquirer* article alleging clandestine CIA support to the Afghan Freedom Fighters. A copy of the broadcast is attached.²

2. U.S. Government support of the Afghan Freedom Fighters is an extremely sensitive subject. Our Saudi and Pakistani partners have made it clear that their continued participation is contingent upon the program being kept secret. Periodic leaks in the U.S. press about the Afghan covert action program invariably produce questions from the Paks and Saudis. In response, we can only explain the role of the press in U.S. society.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, For President or Brzezinski Only File, Box 88, PA—Very Sensitive: 7-9/80. Secret; Sensitive; [handling restriction not declassified]. In the upper right corner, Brzezinski wrote to Aaron, June 17: "DA hold a meeting on this with Carlucci & Reinhardt. ZB."

² For the series of articles by Richard Ben Cramer published in the *Philadelphia Inquirer*, see footnote 4, Document 283. The text of the broadcast was not attached; it noted that the CIA "has been secretly supplying modest amounts of foreign manufactured arms to Afghan rebels;" that the arms were of German, Belgian, and Israeli origin, and were funneled through Pakistan; and that the Carter administration rejected plans to supply the Afghan rebels with more sophisticated weaponry due to the possibility that the supply could be traced back to U.S. sources. (Correspondent Report 2-8909, June 9; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, For President or Brzezinski Only File, Box 88, PA—Very Sensitive: 7-9/80)

3. Broadcast of these allegations over official U.S. Government facilities elevates the problem to a new plane. Despite our denials, the Pakistanis and Saudis will probably conclude that U.S. policy is to surface the Afghan support program. It should be understood that any further broadcasting over U.S. Government facilities about CIA activities in Afghanistan can result in the termination of the program.

4. Such official broadcasts also increase the risk that Afghan terrorists could strike at U.S. Government officials abroad.

Frank C. Carlucci
Acting Director

290. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 16, 1980

SUBJECT

US-Soviet Relations

PARTICIPANTS

USSR: Anatoliy Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador

US: Secretary of State Muskie
Marshall D. Shulman, Special Adviser to the Secretary

Ambassador Dobrynin had originally requested the meeting before the Vienna meeting with Gromyko but, because of the press of business, it had been deferred until today.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Afghanistan.]

Afghanistan

The Secretary said he had been disappointed with the reply Gromyko had given Watson to his (Muskie's) letter.² The reply had not been as responsive as we had expected, perhaps because it had been given "off the cuff" on first reading. The Secretary expressed the hope that Gromyko would digest the letter more thoroughly, and might then

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office Files of Marshall D. Shulman, Special Advisor to the Secretary on Soviet Affairs, 1977-1981, Lot 81D109, EM-AD, 6/16/80. Secret. Drafted by Shulman. The time and location of the meeting are not noted on the memorandum of conversation.

² See Document 284.

be in a position to give a more detailed response to some of the elements in the letter.

The Secretary went on to mention two points in particular which concerned him in the report of Gromyko's reply: (1) we continue to have difficulty with the Soviet view that the principal aggression comes from Pakistan. It remains our view that the principal aggression is that created by the Soviet invasion. In any case, we would like to see both the Soviet aggression and any intervention from abroad brought to an end. (2) Gromyko emphasized at length his objection to what he apparently understood the letter to suggest, that a government should be established in Afghanistan acceptable to the neighbors of that country. This was a misunderstanding: what the letter said was that a government should be set up in Kabul which was acceptable to the people of Afghanistan. He added that this could be done "with the prompt withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Afghanistan," emphasizing that the word "with" had been carefully chosen.

Dobrynin asked how the word "with" was to be understood, and whether it could be a significant departure from the word "prior," which he had understood to represent the US position. The Secretary replied that this could be a matter for discussion. [In view of the problem of translating "with," which had arisen at the Gromyko-Watson conversation, Dobrynin was asked what Russian word had been used in the copy of the letter sent to him by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He replied: "nariadu s," which conveys the proper sense of simultaneity.]³

The Secretary emphasized forcefully that so long as Soviet troops continued to occupy Afghanistan, this fact would continue to be a matter that affected our vital interests, and it would also be a barrier to the establishment of an independent and non-aligned Afghanistan. His letter, he said, had been worked out carefully with the President in the hope that it would open the way to a solution of the problem that would meet both Soviet and American interests fairly, and would remove this unfortunate and dangerous problem.

Dobrynin said he thought a solution could be found which would meet both Soviet and American security interests.

Dobrynin said that Gromyko had asked him to obtain any further clarification possible on what the American side had in mind in referring to "some transitional arrangement." The Secretary replied that he had reference to the point in this regard which the President had made at his press conference on Feb. 13;⁴ he did not propose at this stage to

³ Brackets are in the original.

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 212.

assign too detailed a meaning to the term, but to raise a general point which, if accepted, could be worked out in the course of further negotiations. What we were seeking to do, he said, was to find the outside limits within which negotiations might be possible.

Dobrynin made a further effort in behalf of the Afghan plan.⁵ Why, he asked, could not Zia and Babrak sit down together to work things out, as a way of getting things started? The Secretary reviewed the objections previously expressed to the plan, emphasizing that under it, Soviet troops could remain in Afghanistan forever, and this was our main concern.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Afghanistan.]

Other Subjects

Dobrynin said he hoped future negotiations with Gromyko could cover a broader range of subjects than Afghanistan. He asked, as an example, whether the US could not find a way of working together with the Soviet Union on Middle East problems, adding that Soviet and American interests were not as far apart in that area as some people seemed to think. He also suggested, on a purely personal basis, that a compromise solution could be found for the TNF issue. In this context, he repeated his regret that no formal answer had been given to Brezhnev's proposal, other than the decision to proceed with the deployment. The Secretary probed to see whether Dobrynin was implying that the Soviet Union was prepared to postpone its theater deployments, but Dobrynin repeated that this was his personal view, and no more. Both agreed, however, that the Afghanistan issue was an unfortunate barrier to the resolution of many issues between the two countries.

⁵ See Document 270.

291. Memorandum From Thomas Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, June 23, 1980

SUBJECT

Covert Operations In Afghanistan (S)

I will be doing a full trip report shortly,² but want to fill you in on a few points of particular interest on the covert side. (S)

I got an (apparently) good and candid briefing from the Station Chief in Islamabad. He is very satisfied with the Pak performance now; the earlier bottlenecks have been dissolved and now the Paks are prepared to pass through more equipment than we can get to them. The COS claims that he has several unilateral sources who confirm that the Paks are telling him pretty much the truth. (It is noteworthy, though, that the Paks tell him very little. They hold this entire operation extremely closely and I am impressed by their ability to keep it all secret. Wish we could do as well.) (S)

On the SA-7: There are two launchers and (I believe) 15 missiles in country, headed for the Kabul area. The Paks insisted that they *not* be used, initially at least, in areas near Pakistan since that would be too obvious and provocative. That is understandable but unfortunate, since the border area is where they are needed most. If things go well, we should soon be hearing of mysterious downing of aircraft. There is no report-back capability from the people who have the SAMs; we will have to read it out of battle reports. (S)

The Paks are extending the arms flow now to groups operating out of Quetta as well as Peshawar. This is another good step, since the operation should not be too dependent on the faction-ridden Peshawar leadership. (S)

Both Afghans and Paks with whom I spoke (and none of the latter at least would have been aware of the operation) commented very favorably on the increased readiness of the GOP over the past two months or so to provide assistance to the mujahidin. I don't know to what extent this represents our involvement, but it is a good sign. (S)

¹ Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I-047, Afghanistan: 11 Sep 1979–22 Jul 1980. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information.

² The full trip report was not found.

By chance, I sat on the plane to London next to one of the resistance leaders. He made the usual complaints about the lack of US support (I was noncommittal) but then said that they did expect to get some SA-7s soon. Word must be seeping out. He also went on at length about the stupidity of the VOA in carrying the *Inquirer* story.³ I know that there has been an exchange between Zbig and Reinhardt on this. I am writing to Mary Bitterman to add my own cry of dismay and point out that this sort of thing is hurting the people we want to help.⁴ (S)

These were the highlights; if you have any other specific questions, I may have the answers to them since I had a long talk with the COS. (U)

You may want to pass this to Zbig on his return.⁵ (U)

³ See Document 289.

⁴ Mary Bitterman was the Director of Voice of America.

⁵ Brzezinski was in Italy with Carter and Muskie as a member of the delegation to the Venice Economic Summit. No evidence was found to indicate whether Aaron passed the memorandum to Brzezinski.

292. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Barry) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Newsom) and the Special Adviser to the Secretary of State on Soviet Affairs (Shulman)¹

Washington, June 27, 1980

SUBJECT

Soviet Maneuvering on Withdrawal and a Political Settlement in Afghanistan

The Soviets are currently engaged in an increasingly active campaign to spread the idea that their withdrawal announcement demon-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs David Newsom, Lot 81D154, folder 1. Secret; Nodis.

strates a serious interest in a political settlement.² While the odds are very high that this is simply a new tack in their effort to divide us from the Allies, it is barely conceivable that the Soviets might be beginning to look for a way out.³

The campaign to demonstrate the sincerity of their withdrawal is going on in public and private in a way which is very reminiscent of the anti-TNF campaign and the “unilateral troop withdrawal” from the GDR designed to head off the December 12 NATO decision.

—The withdrawal has become a media event in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

—Authoritative Soviet commentaries underline that the withdrawal demonstrates the sincerity of Soviet interest in a political settlement.⁴

—Soviet Press Counselor Kamenev gave John Wallach of the Hearst chain a background interview stressing Soviet sincerity.

² The Soviet statement on a partial withdrawal from Afghanistan, June 22, made through the official news organ, TASS, was first reported in telegram 9988 from Moscow the same day. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P900077–1709) An article in the President’s Daily Brief, June 23, asserted that the statement “seems aimed primarily at influencing the Venice Summit and preparing the ground for Schmidt’s visit to Moscow. The announcement implied a reduction in the overall Soviet troop level in Afghanistan, but was not explicit on this point and did not discuss the possibility of further withdrawals.” The article further noted that the withdrawing troops, numbering approximately 5,000, were “largely ineffective against the guerillas.” An article in the July 7 President’s Daily Brief surmised that the announcement of the troop withdrawals possibly suggested Brezhnev’s interest in assuaging domestic critics apprehensive of Soviet Afghan policy. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—June 1980, PDBs; and Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—July 1980, PDBs, respectively)

³ Analysis in the Central Intelligence Agency concurred with this assessment. For example, a memorandum, July 11, forwarded by Turner to Muskie, Brown, Brzezinski, and General Jones, July 14, asserted that the Soviet troop withdrawals “were largely a political ploy; they do not affect Soviet military capabilities in the country.” (National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I-031, Apr–Aug 1980) The Bureau of Intelligence and Research came to a similar conclusion. A research paper on Afghanistan, July 18, observed: “Moscow’s June 22 announcement that it was withdrawing some forces from Afghanistan appears to be part of a larger diplomatic strategy aimed at giving the appearance of Soviet flexibility and willingness to talk while extracting recognition of the regime in Kabul as the legitimate government of Afghanistan.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR and East/West, Brent, Subject File, Box 46, Afghanistan: 7–12/80)

⁴ In telegram 10223 from Moscow, June 25, the Embassy characterized comments on the Soviet troop withdrawal by USA Institute Director Arbatov as indicative that the Soviet leadership “was anxious to find a way out of Afghanistan which would not appear to be a Soviet capitulation to the U.S., but that they have no idea how to do it.” (National Archives, RG 59, Office Files of Marshall D. Shulman, Special Advisor to the Secretary on Soviet Affairs, 1977–1981, Lot 81D109, Afghanistan)

—Soviet and East European diplomats are coming to us to underline that we're making a mistake by thinking the Soviets don't really want to talk seriously about a political settlement.

—Embassy Moscow has picked up a story that Brezhnev overruled Gromyko on the withdrawal question.⁵

All of these indications are consistent with the interpretation that the Soviet withdrawal is strictly a propaganda move which Moscow hopes to exploit to further divide the US and the West. This interpretation is strongly buttressed by the nature of the Soviet withdrawal and the way they let the French in on the news first.

At the same time, there are a few straws in the wind which suggest that there may be more to this than a purely propaganda move.

—Brezhnev appears to be preparing the way for declaring a victory in the style suggested by Senator Aiken for Vietnam. Brezhnev's statement that the situation in Afghanistan is returning to normal came at a time when the Soviet security situation in Afghanistan appears worse than ever.⁶ Whatever his intention, his statement creates the assumption within the USSR that Soviet involvement is winding down.

—Even the kind of phantom withdrawal the Soviets have announced would seem to indicate that they have abandoned one of the options open to them—doubling or tripling of their force in Afghanistan, coupled with a major effort to defeat the Afghan Nationalists throughout the country.

—Insignificant though the withdrawal might be, it does create the presumption of a lower overall ceiling and possible further withdrawals. Thus, their action creates new constraints for the future.

—It is unlike the Soviets to reverse themselves like this on the withdrawal question. Gromyko told us and the Germans privately that we were wasting our time in talking about withdrawals before there had been recognition of the Babrak government and an end to the Nationalist resistance. He made the same point publicly at a lunch for the Indian Foreign Minister earlier this month.

—The fact that the withdrawal announcement was not made a couple of days before the Venice Summit when it might have had more effect on deliberations there would seem to indicate that it was a subject of internal debate and that the opposition was significant. Such a debate

⁵ The Embassy reported this information in telegram 10147 from Moscow, June 24. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])

⁶ Speaking at a June 23 meeting of the Central Committee, Brezhnev declared: "Life in Afghanistan is now gradually coming back to normal." A resolution passed by the Central Committee approved the December 1979 intervention in Afghanistan. (Craig R. Whitney, "Brezhnev Says His Side Won Afghan War," *New York Times*, p. A6)

would logically occur in any case before a Plenary meeting of the Party which was called upon to set the line for the next Party Congress in foreign policy.

—Embassy Moscow speculates that the uncertainties stemming from US and allied economic countermeasures related to Afghanistan are forcing the delay in producing a new full-year plan as the question on future dependence on technology and food from the West is debated. In the Embassy's view it is barely conceivable that our actions are having more policy bite than is apparent, and that Brezhnev may therefore take his withdrawal initiatives more seriously than is apparent.⁷

Of course, the Soviets can justify their stated interest in a political settlement by clinging to the May 14 Afghan proposals as they have done so far. But they could have had more success in pursuing this line without any withdrawal announcement, following Gromyko's time-tested pattern of complete inflexibility. The kind of iron-pants strategy is at least as effective in stirring up European doubts about the US as Soviet hints of flexibility.

The President's toast at the Yugoslav State Dinner and subsequent discussion of "transitional" arrangements demonstrate our willingness to discuss a political settlement seriously.⁸ Gromyko's response to the Muskie letter is a very authoritative indication that the Soviets are not now ready for such a discussion.⁹ If the situation has changed since the "withdrawal" decision, presumably they will find a way of letting us—or more likely Schmidt—know unambiguously.

However, the passage in the Resolution of the Party Plenum which comes out for "a political settlement of the situation that has formed around Afghanistan which is pursuing the policy of nonalignment" seems to suggest some flexibility in considering a broadly based arrangement without preconditions or assurances that the gains of the "socialist" revolution there will not be reversed.

In the meantime, we will presumably be hearing a lot more from the Soviets about the importance of our making a reciprocal gesture such as relaxing some of the post-Afghanistan sanctions. Were we or

⁷ A likely reference to telegram 10353 from Moscow, June 27. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800310-0006)

⁸ Carter visited Yugoslavia at the conclusion of the Venice Summit. During his dinner toast, Carter deplored Soviet actions in Afghanistan and declared: "We would be prepared to explore a transitional arrangement, to be implemented along with the prompt withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Afghanistan, for the purpose of restoring peace and tranquility in that suffering country." (*Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81*, Book II, p. 1212)

⁹ See Document 293.

our Allies to accommodate them on this, it seems safe to predict that we will hear no more from the Soviets about negotiating a political settlement involving complete withdrawal. If the Soviets are serious, a little stalling on our part should produce additional indications that the Soviets are willing to take the steps which will make real negotiations possible. If not then we will have avoided giving ground in response to a Soviet ploy.

293. Letter From Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to Secretary of State Muskie¹

Moscow, June 27, 1980

Dear Mr. Secretary,

I have carefully read your letter of June 5, which is a continuation of the exchange of views we started in Vienna.² As we agreed at that time the purpose of this exchange is to promote the improvement of Soviet-U.S. relations, to seek solution on a wide range of bilateral and international problems of mutual interest.

Now about the specific problem you raised in your letter: that of Afghanistan.

As you know, a few days ago we withdrew from Afghanistan, in agreement with the Government of the DRA, some Soviet military units. It was done in view of the fact that the present situation does not make it necessary to maintain in Afghanistan our military contingent of previous strength.

It goes without saying that the Soviet Union will continue to render necessary assistance to Afghanistan against any action aimed from outside at depriving it of independence and territorial integrity. You must be well aware of that, though, from the report by L.I. Brezhnev at the recent plenary meeting of the Central Committee of our Party and from the resolution on international questions adopted by that meeting in connection with the report of the Minister of Foreign Affairs on international situation and foreign policy of the Soviet Union.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 61, Soviet Exchanges: 1/79-10/80. Secret; Sensitive. The letter was transmitted in telegram 175021 to Moscow, July 2. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 61, Soviet Exchanges: 1/79-10/80)

² See Document 284.

The substance of our position with regard to a political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan is that it is necessary to ensure the cessation of armed incursions from outside into the Afghan territory, to reach appropriate agreement on normalizing relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, between Afghanistan and Iran, and to guarantee non-recurrence of all forms of outside interference aimed against the Government and the people of the DRA. It is precisely in this context that the question of withdrawal from Afghanistan of the Soviet military contingent, stationed there to help in repulsing outside aggression, could be also solved.

These are the considerations I wish to state in connection with your letter in addition to what has been already said in the conversations with the US Ambassador in Moscow.

In conclusion I deem it necessary to stress the following: in order to place Soviet-U.S. relations into normal tracks, so that they would not be subject to fluctuations of political expediency but develop to the benefit of both our peoples and strengthening peace they cannot be built otherwise than on the basis of equality, mutual respect for each other's legitimate interests, compliance with agreements already achieved.

The Soviet leadership has proceeded and intends to proceed in future exactly from this premise. We would like to hope that the US side will also act likewise.

Sincerely,

A. Gromyko³

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

294. Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

[*assessment number not declassified*]

Washington, July 1980

[Omitted here are a title page, security information page, and a cover page.]

The Intervention in Afghanistan:
Ramifications for Soviet Interests Abroad
(*classification marking not declassified*)

Key Judgments

Soviet interests abroad have suffered because of the intervention in Afghanistan—and especially the USSR's failure to consolidate control. Although things now look better to Moscow than they did a few months ago, the negative reaction to the invasion was greater than the Kremlin anticipated and, though now diminished, remains of considerable concern. (*classification marking not declassified*)

The desire to consolidate control in Afghanistan at any cost may prove overriding, but Moscow has been given important incentives to try to achieve this objective with a minimum of forces. A major escalation that did not produce victory in the field or obtain accommodations to strategic Soviet goals in Southwest Asia would result in further harm to Soviet external interests. (*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*)

The Soviets have made several gains and avoided some potential losses:

- Moscow has derived comfort from West European desires to maintain a dialogue with the USSR and to avoid heightened tensions in Europe; the significance attributed by US allies to normal trade with the Soviet Union; and the uneven Western support of US policies toward the USSR in the wake of the invasion.
- In Southwest Asia, Soviet ability to bring pressure on Pakistan and Iran has been enhanced, although neither country has reacted by accommodating Soviet objectives thus far.
- India, although distressed by the intervention, shows no present inclination to alter its security ties with the USSR; Iraq's dependence

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 6, Afghan Crisis—Pubs Soviet Moves/Options (May 1980). Top Secret; [*codeword and handling restriction not declassified*]. A statement on the cover page reads: "This assessment was prepared by Stephen S. Kaplan USSR/EE Division, Office of Political Analysis. This paper has been coordinated with the Offices of Strategic Research and Economic Research."

on Soviet armaments and other aspects of the alliance with the USSR has deterred Baghdad from abrogating the Soviet-Iraqi treaty and normal working relations. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, has become even more anxious about US capabilities and resolve.

- The nonaligned movement has been unable to condemn the USSR except implicitly within the forum of the UN General Assembly. (*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*)

Nonetheless, Soviet interests have suffered considerable damage:

- The political center of gravity in the West has shifted in ways generally adverse to the USSR; belief in Soviet expansionism has been reconfirmed; openmindedness about Soviet intentions and favorable attitudes about the USSR are voiced infrequently and receive scant hearing.

- US defense efforts have been accelerated, the European allies have pledged to fulfill the NATO Long-Term Defense Plan more rapidly, and a strong impetus has been given to increased Japanese defense spending and military cooperation with the United States.

- The United States has affirmed its readiness to use military force in the Persian Gulf, Western security cooperation with China has increased, and Western willingness to maintain military deployments in the Indian Ocean has been increased. Local opposition to forward US military deployments also has been undermined.

- Western economic sanctions have impaired Moscow's ability to satisfy Soviet consumer demands for meat and dairy products and will probably further retard Soviet efforts to secure sophisticated technology and massive investment credits. Although Western support for the sanctions is eroding, Soviet economic weaknesses have been pointed up anew, both within the USSR and externally.

- The Olympic boycott has seriously damaged Moscow's ability to use the games for propaganda domestically and internationally.

- The Kremlin has received uneven support from Eastern Europe, which has felt a strong identity of interests with Western Europe. Moscow has sensed vulnerability and shown less than full control over the Warsaw Pact states and has new reason to doubt the reliability of these allies.

- The interests of Cuba and Vietnam have been adversely affected by the Soviet move into Afghanistan, and North Korea has been upset by the invasion. Havana's international position has been hurt; acceptance of the Heng Samrin regime in Kampuchea has been at least slowed; and relations between Pyongyang and Moscow have become even more strained. The Kremlin is further concerned about the opening it may have afforded the United States for undermining its positions in Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and South Yemen.

- Finally, the USSR has tarred itself as an imperialist aggressor in the Third World. Most of the Muslim nations have formally condemned Soviet oppression in Afghanistan. The Kremlin's ability to persuade the nonaligned movement to accept the USSR as an ally and to manipulate the movement against Soviet adversaries has been undermined. (*[classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]*)

[Omitted here is the body of the assessment.]

295. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

[*memorandum number not declassified*]

Washington, July 1980

Afghanistan: Iran's Role in the Crisis
(*[classification marking not declassified]*)

Summary

Iran has become increasingly involved in the Afghanistan crisis in the last few months. Tehran has provided important diplomatic support to the insurgents fighting the Soviets. The central government has apparently not lived up to its promises to provide material aid, but Tehran continues to assert its willingness to do so if the Soviets do not withdraw from Afghanistan. The Afghan insurgents have received material aid, however, from the Iranian clergy, elements of the Revolutionary Guard, and local officials—aid that reflects the general consensus in Iran in support of the rebel cause. (*[classification marking not declassified]*)

The Afghans have established a significant presence in Iran. The insurgents train fighters in camps along the border that house more than 100,000 refugees and have offices in Tehran, Qom, and Mashhad. We have reports of training in all three cities, and some Revolutionary Guard units apparently are providing support for cross-border operations. (*[classification marking not declassified]*)

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 09-00438R, Box 1, Afghanistan: Iran's Role in the Crisis; An Intelligence Memorandum [*memorandum number not declassified*]. Top Secret; [*codeword and handling restriction not declassified*]. A typed note at the bottom of the page reads in part: "The author of this memorandum is [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Office of Political Analysis. It was coordinated with the National Intelligence Officer for Near East/South Asia. Research for this memorandum was completed on 27 June 1980."

Iranian involvement with the insurgents seems certain to increase. Domestic pressures will incline the government toward more active support of the rebels. For their part, the insurgents will probably continue to find Iran an attractive base of operations, especially given the small number of Soviet forces located in the border area. (*[classification marking not declassified]*)

Since early June the Soviets have become increasingly alarmed by Iran's role in Afghanistan. They have taken a tougher line toward Iranians who have taken outspoken public positions favoring the insurgents. Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh has, for example, been characterized as an agent of the United States and China, and local authorities in Mashhad have been accused of cooperating with the CIA. But Moscow has avoided direct criticism of the Khomeini government. (*[classification marking not declassified]*)

The tougher Soviet posture is not likely to dissuade Tehran, and the Soviets may be forced to step up their pressure. They could do so—but only at the cost of a significant deterioration in ties with Tehran. (*[classification marking not declassified]*)

[Omitted here is the body of the memorandum.]

296. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, undated

Chinese Aid to the Afghan Insurgents: Why So Little

There are a number of reasons why Beijing, despite its claims to the contrary, might not now be willing to make a serious effort to aid the insurgents:

—Beijing may be disinclined to make a major effort in the absence of a greater effort on the part of the West. China confronts the Soviets directly along its own border and indirectly in Southeast Asia and may not wish to lead the effort in Afghanistan and risk yet another confrontation with Moscow in Southwest Asia. Heavy involvement

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 6, Afghan Crisis—Pubs Insurgents. Top Secret; [*codeword and handling restriction not declassified*]. Attached but not printed is a note [*text not declassified*] to Turner, July 2, which identified the author of the paper as [*text not declassified*] a China analyst in the Office of Political Analysis.

with the resistance now could also retard China's effort to improve ties with India, a major goal.

—Beijing may also believe that, on the one hand, its own resources do not allow a larger effort, and, on the other, the insurgents are not capable of effectively utilizing anything more than small arms anyway. Some Chinese officials have criticized the insurgents as disorganized and unsophisticated.

—It is conceivable China never intended to do more than it is at present. In Beijing's view of "labor sharing" with the West in the global anti-Soviet struggle, China's main effort should be in Southeast Asia. Because of its strained military resources, geographic limitations, and, perhaps, because of Islamabad's failure to cooperate, China may have decided that the task of thwarting the Soviets in Afghanistan belonged to the West and countries of Southwest Asia. Its own frequent expressions of support for the insurgents and assertions that it is rendering aid are thus tactics meant to arouse more tangible support from other sources.

—The Chinese have been discouraged by Pakistan's reluctance to assist them in aiding the insurgents. [3½ lines not declassified] The Pakistanis, however, have recently claimed that they are willing to cooperate with China in aiding the insurgents.

—China lacks an easy direct supply route to the insurgents. The Chinese-Afghan border is extremely rugged and the main trail through the region (the Wakhan Corridor) passes close to Russian border posts. Undetected use of this route would be difficult, if not impossible, and the trail seems ill-suited for the transport of significant amounts of arms.

Comment

On balance Beijing may have been willing initially to make a significant effort to aid the rebels on the assumption that it would do so in cooperation with Pakistan and the West. After signs that Pakistan and the West did not respond as forcefully as hoped, China may have embarked on a small scale program to support groups in the northeast, perhaps by sending supplies through the Wakhan corridor or northern Pakistan. Now, with some experience in aiding the insurgents, Beijing may have concluded that the risks involved in a more ambitious program outweigh the potential benefits.

297. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to President Carter¹

Washington, July 7, 1980

SUBJECT

Report on My Recent Trip Through Four African Countries and Saudi Arabia

[Omitted here is information unrelated to Afghanistan.]

2. Additionally, on 22 June I paid a quick visit to Jidda, Saudi Arabia. I had an excellent two-hour session with Crown Prince Fahd. I reviewed [*less than 1 line not declassified*] the covert action [*less than 1 line not declassified*] on which we are working jointly with the Saudis. Fahd gave his unstinting support [*less than 1 line not declassified*].

The fact of getting him to do that in front of Prince Turki, the intelligence chief, should impart new momentum to these programs. Fahd was particularly strong in his support of our joint program to provide weapons to the Afghan insurgents [*3 lines not declassified*] and to have us provide regular intelligence briefings to him personally.² (S)

Stansfield Turner³

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00112R: Subject Files, Box 16, 80 Saudi Arabia. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*].

² In a memorandum for the record, July 7, Turner reported that he briefed Brzezinski, July 3, that [*text not declassified*] had decided to support arms shipments to Afghan rebels. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00112R: Subject Files, Box 15, DCI/DDCI Memreccs/Memos, Agendas of Brzezinski/ Aaron Meetings, January–December 1980) In a memorandum for the record, September 4, Turner noted that he briefed Brzezinski that the CIA had a prospect to supply arms to the Afghan rebels through Iranian Baluchis. The supply would come clandestinely [*text not declassified*] through the Straits of Hormuz. Turner added: “this seemed all right” to Brzezinski. (Ibid.)

³ Turner signed “Stan Turner” above his typed signature.

298. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordinating Committee (Intelligence) Meeting¹

Washington, July 7, 1980, 10–10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

Summary of Conclusions: SCC (I) Meeting on Pakistan (C)

PARTICIPANTS

STATE

David Newsom, Under Secretary
for Political Affairs

Ronald Spiers, Director, Bureau of
Intelligence and Research

Peter Constable, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Near Eastern-
South Asian Affairs

DEFENSE

Robert W. Komer, Under
Secretary for Policy Affairs

Daniel Murphy, Deputy Under
Secretary for Policy Matters

JUSTICE

Judge Charles Renfrew, Deputy
Attorney General

JCS

Lt. Gen. John Pustay, Ass't. to the
Chairman

DCI

Adm. Stansfield Turner, Director
Frank Carlucci, Deputy Director
Charles Cogan, Chief, Near
Eastern Division

OMB

John White, Deputy Director

WHITE HOUSE

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
David Aaron

NSC

Thomas Thornton

The SCC (I) met to discuss three CIA proposals regarding Pakistan and Afghanistan. (S)

The first proposal was unanimously recommended. It provides for an increase from [*less than 1 line not declassified*] to [*less than 1 line not declassified*] in covert support for the Afghan insurgency.² We and the Saudis would split the costs. The earlier bottlenecks in Pakistan have been overcome and both the Pakistanis and Saudis are anxious to increase the level of support. Admiral Turner noted that this may be needed quickly if the Soviets undertake an expansion of their military activities in Afghanistan after the Olympics are over. (S)

¹ Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I-020, SCC Minutes and S/C, 1980. Secret; Sensitive. In the upper right corner, Carter wrote: "Zbig, J." The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The full text of the Summary of Conclusions is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1977-1980, vol. XIX, South Asia.

² The proposal originated in a memorandum from Turner to Brzezinski, June 30, reporting on Prince Fahd's "unequivocal endorsement" of ongoing Saudi participation in the Afghan program. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, For President or Brzezinski Only File, Box 88, PA—Very Sensitive: 10-12/80) See Document 297.

RECOMMENDATION: That you approve the increase in support for the Afghan insurgents from [*less than 1 line not declassified*] to [*less than 1 line not declassified*], the cost to be shared equally with Saudi Arabia.³ (S)

A second proposal was also unanimously supported, albeit with qualifications. It involves a finding (attached at Tab A for your signature) that would have us share with the Saudis the cost of up to [*amount not declassified*] for Soviet or other hand-held anti-tank and anti-aircraft launchers (100 each). CIA would provide necessary training. The Pakistanis want this covertly because of their earlier problems with our assistance offer. According to CIA, they see this as an integral and necessary part of their ongoing support for the Afghan insurgents. State and NSC expressed concern that the Pakistanis are using this method as a means of increasing our political commitment to them, and noted that there should be no major problem for the Pakistanis simply to buy the equipment. Nonetheless, in view of the urgent Pakistani desire (and the fact that they control distribution of our material and can skim off whatever they want anyway) it was agreed to recommend that you approve the finding. The finding was changed, however, to exclude the provision of US-origin equipment. The Pakistanis do not want it for political reasons and there is a real danger that it might find its way across the border. SA-7s are preferred, but these are in short supply; European equivalents may be available. (S)

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the attached finding.⁴

A third proposal, to provide jointly with the Saudis some [*amount not declassified*] in assistance to the refugee families whose breadwinners are fighting in Afghanistan, was found to have a number of problems and was withdrawn. The same effect can be achieved through other means. (S)

The SCC (I) also further directed that by next week DOD and CIA should come up with specific proposals for the manufacture of SA-7s. It is clear that we need an additional source since the supplies available in Europe are pretty well dried up. There are three apparent options

³ Carter approved the recommendation and initialed "J" in the right margin.

⁴ Not attached. Carter signed the Finding on July 8. Its scope was Pakistan, with the description: "Provide directly to the Government of Pakistan, or via third countries, lethal military equipment of Soviet or other foreign manufacture for defensive purposes along the Afghan border. As necessary, provide cash, procurement advice and weapons training. Encourage other countries to discreetly supply funds or lethal military equipment directly to Pakistan." (National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I-047, Afghanistan: 11 Sep 1979–22 Jul 1980)

for manufacture—in the US [*less than 1 line not declassified*] in Egypt [*less than 1 line not declassified*].⁵ (S)

⁵ In a memorandum for the record, June 17, Carlucci stated that in his view there were only two possible routes to procure SA-7s for Pakistan: Foreign Military Sales or a Presidential Finding. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00112R: Subject Files, Box 15, DCI/DDCI Memrecs/Memos, Agendas of Brzezinski/Aaron Meetings, January–December 1980) In a memorandum to Brown, July 7, Komer noted that during the SCC(I) meeting he had “insisted” that the SA-7 issue be decided “promptly” and that the CIA and Department of Defense provide proposals in a week in which it would be decided if the SA-7s would be of Egyptian or U.S. origin. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–82–0217, Box 2, Afghanistan, Jan–Feb 1980) No proposals were found. An undated memorandum from Turner to Brzezinski reviewed a proposal for a program sponsored by the Department of Defense in which SA-7 clones would be manufactured in Egypt and in exchange Egypt would receive Redeye missiles from the United States. Turner noted that Egypt appeared uninterested in this deal, which remained inconclusive at the end of the Carter administration. (National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I-031, Sep–Dec 1980)

299. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Muskie’s Aircraft¹

Washington, July 9, 1980, 2350Z

180876/Tosec 50009. Subject: Response to Gromyko’s June 27 Letter. For the Secretary From Warren Christopher.

1. (S—Entire text)

2. Below is a revision of the draft which I forwarded to you over the weekend. The paragraph in brackets has been added to take into account suggestions made by Zbig in his memo to the President on Gromyko’s June 27 letter. The revised text has been cleared by Marshall Brent.²

3. Begin text. Dear Mr. Minister:

In the interest of continuing our exchange on Afghanistan and U.S.-Soviet relations, I would like to comment on your letter of June 27.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR and East/West, Brent, Subject File, Box 46, Afghanistan: 7–12/80. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cherokee. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

² The revisions Brzezinski made were not found. For Gromyko’s letter, see Document 293.

We have carefully considered the implications of your announcement of the withdrawal of some Soviet military units from Afghanistan. Your letter indicates that there has been a reduction of the overall number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, although neither your public announcement nor our own analysis indicate that this is necessarily the case. We will carefully watch for evidence of such a reduction.

As the Venice Summit communiqué makes clear, the U.S. and the other Summit participants would regard such withdrawals as a useful contribution to the solution of the Afghan crisis if they are permanent and continue until there is a complete withdrawal of the Soviet troops.³ We would welcome as a significant step an indication of your intention to undertake a process leading to complete withdrawal and a political settlement.

We recognize that the Soviet Union has legitimate interest in the security of its borders and in friendly relations with Afghanistan. In our view, an independent and non-aligned Afghan Government prepared to maintain friendly relations with all its neighbors would be consistent with Soviet interests. Such a government would have to be acceptable to the Afghan people, for otherwise there can be no restoration of peace and tranquility in Afghanistan. Any legitimate concern you may have regarding outside interference in Afghanistan could be met by mutual and reciprocal guarantees of non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan by all concerned parties.

Begin brackets. We have taken note of the Soviet position on a political settlement as set forth in your letter. In our view, that formulation leaves a number of important questions unanswered. For example, it offers no indication of what the Soviet Union would regard as satisfactory assurances of nonintervention, and it does not indicate whether and when all Soviet forces would withdraw if such assurances were provided. In addition, it does not address the problem created by the resistance of the Afghan people to the policies of the present regime. End brackets.⁴

I would like to reiterate our strong interest in an improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations based on reciprocity and mutual restraint. The key to an improvement in this relationship remains a political solution to the Afghan crisis which I believe can be achieved with the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops, pursuant to appropriate transitional arrangements. If you are prepared to discuss such a solution seriously,

³ See footnote 2, Document 281.

⁴ This paragraph was not included in the final text.

you will find us fully and immediately cooperative. Sincerely, Edmund S. Muskie. End text.

4. I am assuming that if the text is approved, you will hand it over to Dobrynin next Monday.⁵

Regards.

Christopher

⁵ In telegram 185645 to London and other posts, July 14, the Department stated that the letter was handed to Dobrynin that day. The talking points included in the telegram indicate that the letter did not undergo subsequent revisions. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800339-0177)

300. Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

[*assessment number not declassified*]

Washington, July 1980

[Omitted here are a title page and cover page.]

The Soviet Military Position in Afghanistan:
Problems and Prospects
(*[classification marking not declassified]*)

Key Judgments

After six months of fighting, the Soviets have not achieved any lasting military success against the Afghan insurgency. A review of operations to date shows that the 80,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan are no more able to control the countryside than the Afghan Army was in 1979. (*[classification marking not declassified]*)

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 82M00501R: 1980 Subject Files, Box 12, C-367, 09 Jul-27 Aug 80, Afghanistan. Top Secret; [*codeword and handling restriction not declassified*]. A statement on the cover page reads: "This assessment was prepared by the Office of Strategic Research." In a memorandum to Turner, August 1, Brzezinski observed that the Soviets could escalate military operations in Afghanistan after the Olympics and requested an analysis of Soviet troops both in Afghanistan and those either supporting the campaign or poised to enter it. (Ibid.) Clarke forwarded this assessment to Carlucci, August 5, noting that it satisfied Brzezinski's request. (Ibid.) Carlucci responded to Brzezinski on August 6, attaching the assessment and noting that since publication, the Soviets planned to send in an additional 550-man airborne unit. (Ibid.) Brzezinski wrote to Turner, August 11, calling the assessment a "first-rate analysis." (Ibid.)

The first major Soviet counterinsurgency campaign, which ran through mid-March and employed conventional march tactics and area sweeps, failed to trap or destroy any large insurgent bands. The insurgents, who easily eluded these operations, sabotaged roads and struck government outposts to the rear and on the flanks of the road-bound Soviets. Furthermore, they reinfilted after the Soviets withdrew from operational areas. This forced the Soviets to garrison many disaffected areas. As a result, their forces became thinly spread, making them more vulnerable to ambushes, reducing their ability to mount operations without regrouping, and creating logistics problems. (*classification marking, codeword, and handling restriction not declassified*)

By early April 1980, senior Soviet military officers in Afghanistan had become pessimistic about their situation and short-term military prospects. [*2½ lines not declassified*] tactical and organizational adjustments were begun. For example, the Soviets organized hybrid brigades that combine airborne, infantry, and helicopter units. They also created regiment-sized task forces composed of motorized rifle units heavily reinforced with area-saturation artillery, such as multiple rocket launchers. In addition, they formed small airborne detachments able to respond quickly to targets of opportunity. (*classification marking, codeword, and handling restriction not declassified*)

Although it is too early to judge the effect of these changes, results have been limited so far. The new brigades have been used in several recent operations, one of which resulted in large Soviet losses, suggesting that the Soviets have not yet mastered airmobile tactics. Nor have the Soviets trapped any large insurgent groups in decisive battles despite several sweep operations. The infantry-artillery task forces have not suffered any setbacks, but the Soviets have not yet demonstrated that such organizations will be mobile and flexible enough for counterinsurgency operations in difficult terrain. Soviet patrols may be achieving some modest success in slowing border infiltration from Pakistan, and their sweeps may have some effect on the ability of insurgent forces to concentrate for operations against Soviet and Afghan units. The Soviets probably will continue to emphasize and improve their airmobile and infantry-artillery task force tactics this summer. (*classification marking, codeword, and handling restriction not declassified*)

There are several persistent impediments to responsive counterinsurgency operations which the Soviets so far apparently have not resolved. [*3½ lines not declassified*] In addition, the slow pace of Soviet tactical adjustments in Afghanistan suggests that approval for operations must be obtained from Moscow. (*classification marking, codeword, and handling restriction not declassified*)

The Soviet forces now in Afghanistan appear to have little prospect of substantially reducing the insurgency unless the Afghan Army can

be turned into an effective force that can clear and maintain security in major areas of the countryside. The Soviets attribute their inability to rebuild the Afghan Army to the failure of the Babrak regime to develop political support. (*classification marking, codeword, and handling restriction not declassified*)

In planning the size and structure of their initial intervention force in Afghanistan, the Soviets probably assumed that the Afghan Army would be both willing and able to bear the brunt of counterinsurgency operations. For their part, the Soviet forces were to secure a few key cities and supply routes and to provide forces for limited counterinsurgency operations in the countryside in support of the Afghan Army. Soviet leaders also probably expected the introduction of Soviet combat troops to stiffen the resolve of the Afghan Army and intimidate the insurgents. Instead the opposite has occurred. The insurgency has grown while the Afghan Army has deteriorated at an increasing rate. As a consequence, Soviet forces in Afghanistan have had to shoulder responsibilities that had not been anticipated. (*classification marking not declassified*)

It is unlikely that the performance of either the Afghan Government or the Afghan Army can quickly be improved. Discord between the political factions making up the Afghan regime is preventing effective administration, and the prospects of resolving the contention are poor. Efforts to recruit new men for the Afghan Army are having poor results and currently cannot even make up the continuing losses through desertion. It probably will be impossible to find the men to create the several additional Afghan divisions that the Soviets want until there is considerably more administrative control over the population. Moreover, Afghanistan's borders cannot be sealed by the Soviet and Afghan forces now available. (*classification marking not declassified*)

Despite the difficulties they have encountered, the Soviet field command in Afghanistan now appears to be optimistic about the results of their recent operations. At least some commanders apparently believe that the insurgents have suffered serious setbacks and are now on the defensive. Large insurgent bands are reportedly dispersing into groups of 50 men or less and seeking refuge among the population. [1 line not declassified] The Soviet command in Afghanistan apparently believes that it may be possible to establish the Afghan Government's authority in some contested areas and that the Afghan Army may be able to defeat the smaller insurgent bands. (*classification marking, codeword, and handling restriction not declassified*)

This optimism clashes with earlier Soviet views and contradicts recent information available to us as well as views expressed by independent Soviet observers. [4 lines not declassified] There is no evidence that the Afghan Government is able to take hold in the countryside—

even after Soviet sweeps. Moreover, the Afghan Army continues to deteriorate and to perform poorly. The Soviets reportedly have lost confidence in it and do not trust it to perform security duties. (*[classification marking, codeword, and handling restriction not declassified]*)

We do not know what pressures, if any, might be responsible for the apparent optimism of at least some Soviet commanders in Afghanistan. Nor do we know how Moscow might view it, especially in light of less sanguine reports and other conflicting evidence. Nevertheless, any Soviet perception that military prospects may be improving could affect the choice of options the Soviets see ahead in Afghanistan. (*[classification marking, codeword, and handling restriction not declassified]*)

Through the fall of 1980, the Soviet forces now committed to operations in Afghanistan are unlikely to reduce the rebellion permanently. They probably will become more adept in the operational environment of Afghanistan, but the insurgents are improving their arms, apparently increasing their numbers, and adopting small-unit guerrilla tactics that will make them more elusive and difficult to counter. Furthermore, the insurgents' zeal for the fight so far apparently remains high despite the casualties and hardships they have endured. (*[classification marking not declassified]*)

[Omitted here is the body of the assessment]

301. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Tokyo, July 10, 1980, 9:15–10:15 a.m.

SUBJECT

Memorandum of Conversation between President Carter and Premier Hua Guofeng of the Peoples' Republic of China—Tokyo, Japan, 9:15–10:15 a.m.
July 10

PARTICIPANTS

<i>PRC</i>	<i>U.S.</i>
Premier Hua Guofeng	President Jimmy Carter
Deputy Foreign Minister Han Nianlong	Secretary of State Edmund Muskie
Minister Counselor (Deputy Chief of Mission of the PRC Embassy in Japan) Wang Xiaoyun	Zbigniew Brzezinski, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Deputy Director of Asian Affairs of the Foreign Ministry Xiao Xiangchuan	Michael Mansfield, U.S. Ambassador to Japan
Sun Ping; Notetaker	Michael Armacost, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Bureau for East Asia and Pacific Affairs
Chun Hui; Interpreter Director of Secretariat of Foreign Ministry	Donald Gregg, National Security Council Staff Member
	Vivian Chang (interpreter)

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Afghanistan.]

Turning to Afghanistan, the President said that some limited assistance was being given to the Afghan freedom fighters who are struggling for their independence against the Soviet invaders. The President noted that much of the Afghan army has defected to the freedom fighters, taking their weapons with them. The President said that the U.S. considers it important to give assistance to those who struggle for their freedom. The President noted that Pakistan, even though under Soviet pressure, was participating to some degree in efforts to support the Afghan freedom fighters. The President said that these actions are very sensitive, and that it is difficult to discuss them in complete candor. He also noted that the U.S. is willing to exchange intelligence with the PRC on the situation in Afghanistan, and that we have benefitted from some information received from the Chinese side.

Dr. Brzezinski said that the U.S. has not been indifferent or passive in responding to the difficult situation in which the Afghan freedom

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 38, Memcons: President: 7/80. Secret. The Chinese and U.S. delegations were in Japan to attend the memorial service for Japanese Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira, July 9–10. For the full text of the memorandum of conversation, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XIII, China, Document 313.

fighters have found themselves. Dr. Brzezinski noted that the freedom fighters have one need which the U.S. has not been able to satisfy. This is a need for SA-7 ground-to-air missiles, which would be highly effective in reducing the efficacy of the Soviet helicopter gun-ships. Dr. Brzezinski said that he had heard that the PRC either has or is producing the SA-7 missile, and that if such weapons could be given to the freedom fighters, an important contribution would have been made to their resistance.

President Carter said that we can deliver such weapons “indirectly but effectively” to the freedom fighters. The President noted that we had been careful not to send any weapons of U.S. origin into Afghanistan, as the Soviets would use such weapons for propaganda purposes.

Premier Hua said that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the attack on Kampuchea had not happened by chance. Hua described the attack on Afghanistan as a premeditated plan by the Soviets, designed to give them control of the country. Hua then sketched the events in Afghanistan that led up to the Soviet attack. He noted that three Afghan presidents had been murdered in a short time. He said that this was a series of events almost without parallel, and that the murders had been the direct result of Soviet intervention. Hua said that the attack into Afghanistan was part of a thrust to the South by the Soviets, and that if they succeed in controlling Afghanistan, they will then move on toward the Indian Ocean and the oil-producing regions of the Middle East. Hua noted that the American CIA has predicted that Soviet oil production will decline, starting about 1985, and that the Soviets feel the need to seize oil producing regions. Hua commented that even if the Soviet oil production were not to decline, they would still undertake the same sort of strategic effort.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Afghanistan.]

Returning to the subject of Pakistan, Hua said that he had met General Zia recently, and that Zia said he hoped for more aid from the U.S. Hua paid tribute to the two Islamic conferences, which he said had been helpful. He cited the three-man committee set up by the Islamic Conference as performing good work. Hua said that the Soviets have been putting pressure on Pakistan, even threatening it with “another dismemberment.” Hua praised Pakistan’s courage in standing up to the Soviet pressure. President Carter said that he agreed the Pakistanis have been courageous.

Referring to Iran, Hua said that the PRC has stated its opposition to the holding of the hostages. He said that he believes the Soviet attack into Afghanistan also threatens Iran. He noted that the Iranians have called upon the Soviets to withdraw from Afghanistan, and that the Iranians have said they will support the Afghan rebels if the Soviets do not pull out. Hua noted that the Iranians are keeping their word

on this matter. Iran has refused to recognize the Soviet puppet regime in Kabul, and at the recent Islamic conference, the Iranians accepted six Afghan rebel groups as part of their own delegation. President Carter noted that the Iranians have also told the Soviets to reduce their presence in Iran, and that some of the 2,000 Soviet "advisors" will have to move out.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Afghanistan and remarks by Carter and Hua agreeing to exchange visits in the future.]

302. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 12, 1980, 8:30–9:20 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin

The Ambassador opened by saying that he wished to ask me two questions prior to his return to Moscow, because he will be asked them by the Politburo: (1) who will win the elections; (2) what outcome would be better for U.S.-Soviet relations?

I responded by saying that my objective judgment is that Reagan's lead will evaporate as the public nears the moment of decision regarding who ought to be the President of this country, especially since Reagan will not be able to withstand close press scrutiny, and that the reelection of the President is obviously better for U.S.-Soviet relations because the President can pursue both a policy of firmness in dealing with Soviet expansionism and arms control as well as detente. Accordingly, his reelection can avoid the decade of the 80's being a repetition of the unmitigated Cold War of 1945–1955.

Dobrynin responded by saying that he fully agrees but wanted to know what, in that case, prevented an improvement in our relations. I told him that there is no point in playing games with each other, that Afghanistan was clearly the issue because it not only posed a strategic

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat (ES), Sensitive and Super Sensitive File, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, Box 3, ES Super Sensitive, 1980 (3). Secret. The meeting took place at Dobrynin's residence. Brzezinski forwarded the memorandum of conversation to Muskie on July 12.

challenge to our interests but also because it has become a symbol of what is perceived in this country as Soviet expansionism.

This led to a discussion of whether the Afghanistani problem can somehow be solved. I explained to him what we mean by the “transitional arrangements” designed to create a government in Afghanistan which is not hostile to the Soviet Union but which is not dependent for its survival on the presence of a Soviet occupation army.

Dobrynin maintained that we are in effect insisting that Babrak Karmal has to go, whereas the Soviet Union is willing to solve the problem on the basis of withdrawal of Soviet forces, once an Afghan army that is capable of sustaining Karmal has been created. “Why not accept then a solution based on the principle of neutrality and non-interference?” he asked.

I pointed out that Babrak Karmal is part of the problem that needs to be solved and hence cannot be the solution. To govern he has to have a Soviet army of occupation. Moreover, to govern without Soviet troops, there would have to be a massive and inevitably brutal counter-insurgency operation which would further poison U.S.-Soviet relations. This is why it is in our mutual interest to try to find an accommodation soon, perhaps through more extensive explorations of what a transitional arrangement would involve. If such a solution could be found, it would be a real breakthrough, making possible rapid progress on other issues, notably arms control.

Dobrynin then asked me about the prospects for SALT. I told him that the President and the Secretary of State are fully committed to it and that we will seek its ratification. However, (1) if the present situation in Afghanistan continues, ratification will be difficult; (2) if there is a massive Soviet counter-insurgency after the Olympics, ratification will become even more difficult because public emotions here will be further aroused; (3) but if there is some genuine progress on Afghanistan, pointing toward the withdrawal of all Soviet troops and involving perhaps some transitional arrangements, then the public would welcome SALT and ratification would be facilitated.

I added that the public wishes a firm policy toward the Soviet Union but also desires accommodation with the Soviet Union. It is our task to make that accommodation possible and I hoped that Dobrynin would impress the Soviet leaders with this thought.

He tried to discuss TNF and the Middle East with me but I told him that TNF had been discussed with Christopher, that on the Middle East I did not have anything new to say, and that in any case, I knew that he would be having a more formal and comprehensive discussion

on Monday with the Secretary of State. (I did not mention the fact that there will be a letter to Gromyko.)²

² The Department summarized the meeting in telegram 186834 to Moscow, July 15. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P910096-1630) The Afghanistan issue was not raised, but Dobrynin received Muskie's letter to Gromyko. See Document 299. The full memorandum of conversation of Muskie's July 14 meeting with Dobrynin is in the Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77—Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 5, ESM/AD 7/14/80.

303. Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, July 17, 1980, 11 a.m.—12:20 p.m.

SUBJECT

Minutes—PRC Meeting on Pakistan (C)

PARTICIPANTS

State

Secretary Edmund Muskie
Warren Christopher, Deputy
Secretary
David Newsom, Under
Secretary for Political Affairs
Harold Saunders, Ass't.
Secretary

Defense

W. Clayton Graham, Jr., Deputy
Secretary
Ambassador Robert Komer,
Under Secretary for Policy

Joint Chiefs of Staff

General David Jones, Chairman
Lt. General John Pustay, Ass't. to the
Chairman

Central Intelligence Agency

Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director
Robert Ames, NIO for Near East and South
Asia

International Development Cooperation Agency

Guy Erb, Deputy Director
Frederick Schieck, Deputy Ass't. Adm. for
AID-Bureau of Asia

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton, Country File, Box 103, Policy Review Committee (PRC): Pakistan, 12/27/79: 7/80. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

Office of Management and Budget

John White, Assistant Director

Edward Sanders, Assistant

Director for Nat'l.

Security & Internat. Affairs

Arms Control and Disarmament

Ralph Earle, Director

Spurgeon Keeny, Deputy

Director

White House

Zbigniew Brzezinski

David Aaron

Henry Owen

National Security Council

William Odom

Thomas Thornton

Muskie: Expressed his appreciation for the opportunity of considering our current policy towards Pakistan to determine if it is relevant to the problems that we may be facing. He asked Adm. Turner to begin with an estimate of Soviet intentions.

Turner: Summarized the CIA paper which is Tab A of the package for the meeting.² He reiterated that the Soviets are likely to concentrate their efforts on the Afghan side of the border. We have noted the use of a large number of land mines already and a strong pressure on food supply. He believes that they will also continue to probe against Pakistan on a small scale but the degree of Pakistan resistance is likely to be the measure of how aggressive they get. (That is, if the Pakistanis resist effectively, the Soviets will hold back.) He does not expect a change in that policy barring a drastic further deterioration of the situation in Afghanistan or a belief that the western countries are backing the insurgents more openly.

Muskie: To what extent are the Olympics a factor? After they are over will the Soviets increase their pressure within Afghanistan or in cross-border raids?

Turner: They certainly will within Afghanistan, although we have not yet seen any build-up yet. I do not think that the end of the Olympics will have much impact on their intentions towards Pakistan.

Jones: Said that he agreed with Turner's estimate. The Soviets would be very ruthless internally and would try hard to seal the border. There might then perhaps be some increase in incursions after the Olympics.

Turner: Estimated that the Soviets would need from 200,000 to 250,000 men to suppress the insurgency in the major border areas. It would take them from six to twelve months to achieve that kind of a build-up. He also noted that October–November is the beginning of the bad weather.

Muskie noted that a build-up of Soviet forces within Afghanistan would be likely to trigger an enlarged flow of equipment to the insur-

² The briefing package for the meeting was not attached and not found.

gents, hence increasing the importance of control of the border. Would that sequence of events be likely to trigger a stronger Soviet reaction?

Turner: Possibly. The issue seems to be more what the Soviets think is the flow of weapons to the insurgents from outside. They probably overestimate that considerably today. The bulk of the equipment being used is acquired within the country. In an escalating situation ammunition would be an increasing problem.

Muskie: A substantial Soviet build-up would seem to be counter to the diplomatic initiatives they are taking with regard to claims of withdrawal, SALT, TNF, etc. How would this affect their thinking?

Turner: We think they will probably take a middle course. The drain on their resources is not unbearable. They are very intent on playing the European card and are unlikely to risk this by a dramatic upswing in their activity. We think that they are following a long haul strategy.

Muskie: If the Soviet small scale probes meet only soft Pakistani resistance, might this expand the Soviet probes?

Turner: Perhaps, but these are raids, not an invasion. We have noted that the nationalists are using Pakistan increasingly as a base of operation rather than simply as a refuge. We expect that small Soviet incursions are a likely response.

Muskie: Is there a possibility of an interplay arising out of this that would generate momentum towards an invasion? Should we not take this into account in our current activities?

Turner: Certainly, but I still think that the Soviets will show a lot of patience.

Jones: We agree that they will be ruthless internally and perpetrate some incursions. If that doesn't work then they are likely to escalate their attacks.

Turner: Also notice that there is an air option available. It is a less clear-cut kind of aggression and the Pakistanis have less capability to meet it.

Muskie: There probably will be a need for increased help to the insurgency. Does this mean that we should help the Pakistanis more? Are they likely to ask for substantial increase of that assistance?

Komer: If the Saudis come through, we will be able to supply quite a bit of equipment in sales. So far we have only had tentative probes from them asking what sort of equipment might be available.

Turner: We do not think the Paks have any expectation of military aid from the United States unless things get much worse for them.

Komer: There is a modest flow of material now in sales and a fairly big pipeline.

Saunders: We should remember that there was a large exercise earlier this year to respond to Pakistani concern.³ Since then they did not want to continue along this line with us. We have very little exchange with them now in terms of discussions of military matters.

Muskie: If we assume the most probable scenario as set forth by CIA, should we not now be considering a shift to a more overt program of assistance to Pakistan and the Afghan insurgents?

Claytor: One possibility will be to earmark a regional contingency fund in FY 1982 to take care of Pakistani requirements should they arrive.

Christopher: We would still however have to get a waiver to the Symington Amendment.

Aaron: Why don't we try to get some IMET money for Pakistan and then use that as a vehicle to seek a waiver of the Symington Amendment. Perhaps we would get more support on the Hill for that approach.

Muskie: It is not only a question of what the Congress wants. We would also have to consider how a more open supply program would affect our relations with the Soviets. We are now in a dialogue with them on a number of matters; open assistance to the insurgents and the Pakistanis would have some effect on that.

Turner: We can avoid being seen as giving open help to the insurgents. The controlling factor there is Pakistan; they are unwilling to take greater risks by being a conduit for equipment.

Muskie: Should we therefore give up the idea of a more open involvement?

Turner: The issue is, if Pakistan is put under more pressure by the Soviets are they likely to respond by retrenching their efforts or by going open in their support of the insurgents?

Christopher: Let us ask what the action forcing events might be that would cause us to increase our aid to Pakistan, and how we can be ready in that case. I see the critical event as a threat to the independence and integrity of Pakistan. We need to define perhaps more exactly what that would involve. If there is a possibility of such a threat, what steps should we then take and how can we plan for them?

Saunders: Also, what steps should we take if we see danger looming on the horizon but not quite imminent?

Aaron: I don't agree with the CIA estimate. I think that the Soviets will continue their program internally until they have subdued the insurgents and then they will lean hard on Pakistan. The best way to

³ See Document 151.

do that would be to create a major incident inside Pakistan. Do we think that Zia would be able to withstand such an incident? Pakistan needs some firm signs of assurance from us as Hal Saunders suggests.

Jones: They will seek to intimidate Pakistan.

Newsom: One unknown is what the Pakistanis may think of all of this. Perhaps we should raise this question with Agha Shahi when he comes here and Hummel could speak directly to Zia. Pakistan may prefer a non-military response in case of a Soviet threat—for instance recourse to the UN or to the other Islamic countries.

Muskie: Is the requirement for us to give a signal to the Soviets? What should we be considering in the way of a US response including military supply? There are a number of aspects—the attitude of Congress, the governing law, allies, our relations with the Soviets, etc. Should we be considering specific steps now or should we wait until we have had consultations with the Pakistanis?

Brzezinski: In addition to speculating on what the Soviets and Pakistanis might think we should ask what we want to do in order to influence the Soviets and what we want the Pakistanis to do. I see two things: First, we want to deter Soviet political intimidation of Pakistan. Second, we want Pakistan to continue its role of maximum support to the Afghan resistance. If this is correct then we should take actions that first, send a message to the Soviets that would threaten escalation should they put too much pressure on Pakistan (this might not necessarily imply a military response), and second, give the Pakistanis a political and psychological sense of assurance that we will respond if they turn to us. This will fortify them. Both of these objectives can be served by the same policy, specifically a greater predisposition to help on military supply. I do not think there is any basis for approaching the Soviets now with warnings about actions against Pakistan.

Muskie: I agree with that. But what are we prepared to do?

Brzezinski: The State Department paper (Tab B of the briefing package) outlines a number of steps to be taken in the military supply area.⁴

Erb: The Congressional attitude is also vital. How can we best handle the Symington problem—the way David Aaron suggests?

Aaron: Pakistan may not want military assistance from us; IMET may be the best path for both of us to take.

Brzezinski: Consultations with Congress would in themselves be a desirable signal.

Owen: I agree that pursuing IMET is the best route.

⁴ The State Department paper was not found.

Aaron: The danger is however that Congress might just change the law only to deal with IMET and not give us a broader waiver.

Muskie: There would certainly be no point in having to go to Congress twice if we could avoid it.

Owen: But would you not be able to explain to them what we are trying to do?

Muskie: If we go and ask for a waiver of the Symington Amendment this will be seen as a major signal of increased US involvement with Pakistan. Are we ready to take that step?

Brzezinski: What do you think the chances are of Congress cooperating with us?

Muskie: It would depend on how hard we attempt to sell it. We would have to make the contingency of Soviet pressure seem real and serious. This would be the Tonkin Gulf Resolution of the Middle East.

Brzezinski: But let's look at it the other way around. What would the response be if the Soviets were to crush resistance in Afghanistan and successfully intimidate Pakistan?

Newsom: We can help Pakistan without lifting the Symington Amendment if the Saudis are prepared to pay the bill in an emergency. We have the airlift authority as we have used in Thailand.

Muskie: But the Saudis are pressing us to increase our aid to Pakistan. Will they help us out if it means that we can avoid increasing our aid because of their help?

Saunders: The Saudis would be likely to help us if there were a real emergency, but it would be harder to get their assistance if we were simply trying to fend off a future Soviet action.

Newsom: We have to accept the fact that we will get no help from the Pakistanis in this area in terms of their moderating their nuclear program.

Aaron: Are there perhaps ways to diminish the image of a major commitment and the symbolic qualities? Congress after all was prepared to act earlier; could we not go back to them in September to take a "modest step"? Perhaps we could provide some continuing role for Congress if we were to take further steps in waiving the Symington restriction.

Muskie: The environment has changed. It would have been easier in January but now Congress is less concerned about a Soviet attack on Pakistan and more worried about US involvement. They remember that "modest steps" led us into Vietnam.

Brzezinski: But we are already in July now and moving on towards August. Perhaps in the near future you and Harold Brown could start consultations quietly explaining that the post Olympic period may

bring the Soviets into a direct confrontation with Pakistan. You could ask for Congressional views and point out the various ways in which we might have to respond. If we did this it would become public knowledge through leaks, and this would be a useful signal in itself.

Muskie: That might be a useful approach. We would not want to take steps now that assume there will be a Soviet action after the Olympics. Bear in mind that there are restraints on the Soviets. Discussions would however be good to forewarn Congress and educate it about a possible future danger. We would keep the consultations limited (they would leak anyway). This will of course prompt the Congressmen to ask the very kinds of difficult questions that we are asking around this table here today. We will have to have our responses worked out in advance. They, too, will leak. It is hard to decide now but at some point we are going to have to determine what our future responses would be. Would a major invasion of Pakistan call for a US military response? The 1959 Agreement does not of course force us to make an automatic response.

Brzezinski: If they ask that kind of a question, remind them of the trouble that Dean Acheson got into on Korea by answering that kind of a question.

Muskie: Of course, but you should have the answer formulated in your own mind.

Brzezinski: I think it would be good to make Congress think this issue through, just as we are doing today.

Muskie: Also, let us consider that the assistance that we have provided to the insurgents has helped generate the very problem we are facing. If we provide more help, it will lead to more tension. Thus, our own actions are moving us along towards the ultimate question. I wonder if Pakistani steadfastness would warrant such action on our part? We have not faced this question in any serious discussions since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Turner: We have to ask ourselves how important it is for us to frustrate what the Soviets are trying to do in Afghanistan.

Christopher: Having consulted with Congress often before, I am not sure it is in our interest to raise this question with them before an election. We would have to talk to people such as Church, Javits, and Lugar as well as Howard Baker. Congress is getting very gun-shy on the question of Pakistan; they note our general lack of money and the great distance that Pakistan is from us. We should do our full contingency planning before we go to Congress. The non-proliferation question also is going to be a difficult one as we know from our current experience on Tarapur. I am very skeptical about conditional consultations unless there is a new threat and we have a program that we want to sell.

Jones: Pakistan's military deficiencies are so glaring that only a large input of Saudi funds could provide them with a military capability to withstand Soviet pressures.

Komer: We have never really explored the option of going to India to ask them to provide assurances that they will not attack Pakistan. This would enable the Pakistanis to move any of their forces from the border with India to the Afghanistan side.

Muskie: What kind of leverage do we have with India?

Komer: The Indians are very nervous about our military assistance to Pakistan. We could point out to them that the level of our assistance to Pakistan will to a considerable extent depend on how much the Pakistanis need. That in turn could be affected by Indian behavior. The Indians giving assurances to us might not do much for the Pakistanis. Assurances to third parties such as the Saudis and others might be more credible.

Thornton: I am dubious about this sort of an approach; it has never been helpful before when we tried it.

Brzezinski: In any case it doesn't get to the gut issue—how do we warn the Soviets and reassure the Pakistanis? Precisely at the time of an election we might be forced into doing more than we expect. Therefore there may be some utility in showing now that we are concerned and thereby heading off the danger.

Christopher: Shouldn't we ask the Pakistanis what they want?

Brzezinski: No, we would probably get the wrong answer. We want to convey our own level of concern. Congressional consultations would be useful; preliminary discussion is better than waiting and having to respond quickly to a rapidly evolving crisis.

Aaron: We have up until now tried to keep ourselves in the background of this effort. The discussion today doesn't seem to reflect that fact. We are trying to keep the Muslims in front. The Soviets have not been able to make us the issue and we don't want them to. We are talking today too much about US involvement.

Muskie: Perhaps, but this group should discuss these issues in order to keep precisely that from happening.

Brzezinski: David Aaron may be correct in the present context but this would not be true in face of a Soviet threat of the kind discussed in the cable from Ambassador Hummel which triggered this meeting.⁵

⁵ A possible reference to telegram 6618 from Islamabad, July 7, in which the Embassy reported on a meeting between Peck and MFA Director General Khan. The discussion centered on the acute food shortages faced by the Afghan insurgents, and the possibility of Soviet forces escalating their military campaign against the rebels. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800325–0321)

Aaron: I just want to emphasize that we may not have to be in the front line of response. We should certainly try to keep out of it.

Brzezinski: We need to give a signal to everybody that it would be unwise to internationalize the conflict.

Newsom: I think it might be better if we entered our consultations with the Pakistanis through intelligence channels rather than directly with Zia or Agha Shahi. Can we do this?

Turner: Yes.

Muskie: Given the most probable scenario as described by CIA, do we have a clear idea of what Pakistani requirements would be? Could we meet these requirements without taking the matter up with Congress? Is there a scenario that we should discuss with Congress?

Turner: The Pakistanis have told us what their needs are in terms especially of man-held anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons. They have not however defined their own requirements precisely. They do not want to make a request to us on an overt basis because of the past bad experience they had with the \$400 million offer.

Muskie: We have to understand the full impact of their requirements.

Jones: The basic level of assistance needed for correcting the most glaring deficiencies is about \$600 million. If you add fighter aircraft to this the figure goes up to \$1.3 billion and there are incremental packages that would increase it \$2.1 and \$6 billion depending on the level that you wanted to reach.

Brzezinski: The State Department paper lists various kinds and types of equipment. Would that represent the \$600 million package? Would that not be the kind of package to talk to Congress about as the requirement if there were a Soviet military threat?

Christopher: The Senators we would have to talk to would respond poorly to such a suggestion.

Newsom: But if we were to decide that we had to respond we will have to get a 36B waiver if we are to respond quickly, even using Saudi money.⁶ Therefore we should forewarn Congress.

Muskie: But deterrent action vis-a-vis the Soviets raises the risk of escalation. Congress will automatically assume that you are underestimating the dangers.

⁶ Under Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, Congress must receive 30 days advance notice prior to a Presidential administration concluding a government-to-government sale of military equipment valued at \$14 million or more, defense articles or services valued at \$50 million or more, or design and construction services valued at \$200 million or more.

Aaron: If a major contingency were to come about could we deter it? What should we do best to strengthen the response?

Turner: The likelihood of intense Soviet pressure on Pakistan is very high; a major ground force attack is not a very likely case. The main deterrent is the Pakistani will to resist. Therefore our help to Pakistan will be the main deterrent to Soviet action.

Owen: We will have to be very careful that the Congress does not say the wrong thing about Pakistan and thereby weaken, rather than strengthen, its resolve.

Muskie: At very most I think I would talk to the Majority leader by himself. But I will want to consider doing even that. We have explored all the points so far. I'd like to meet again on the basis of this discussion and continue on. In the interim we can crystallize our thinking. Let us meet next week on Monday or Tuesday.⁷

Newsom: Could the military contingency package be better refined?

Jones: We have it in hand. We can reduce our paper to something specifically related to State's options.

Brzezinski: Yes, let us cost out the military package that State has suggested.

Muskie: At our next meeting, let us try to reach a consensus on these issues.

The meeting concluded at 12:20 p.m.

⁷ The following Monday was July 21. A PRC meeting took place July 22.

304. Memorandum From Thomas Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, July 21, 1980

SUBJECT

PRC on Pakistan (Continued) (U)

I was rather bemused by Muskie's performance at the first session of the PRC last Thursday, including his coy disclaimer at the end.² One observer suggested that he was demonstrating his doubts about "your" policy of bolstering the rebels. He continually returned to the question of whether we were not, in effect, helping create precisely the situation we are worried about (i.e. a Soviet attack on Pakistan). (S)

There is of course considerable truth in this but it is not much use for policy planning. First of all, there doesn't seem to be much of any alternative that promises success for our policies. Also, we are not the only ones stoking the fire; the Arabs, Chinese and, of course, many Paks themselves are enthusiastically involved. Finally, the Afghans are going to carry on, and as long as they do the Soviets psychologically *have* to believe that foreign assistance is the reason for the insurgency no matter what the truth. (S)

In the area of difficult questions, let me commend one more to your conscience. At what point does our rhetoric and covert assistance to the Afghans simply encourage them to get themselves killed uselessly? I don't think we have reached the point yet and may not for quite a while. Perhaps never. It is something we have to keep in mind and review periodically, however, since a policy of using Afghans "to make the Soviets pay" is morally defensible only as long as it does not lead to *avoidable and unnecessary* bloodshed. (S)

The second broad question that Muskie raised is how far do we want to go in committing ourselves to Pakistan? Would we commit military forces? Are we whistling in the dark? Do we risk misleading the Pakistanis to their great detriment? These questions make me extremely uneasy. I am not convinced that the American people and Congress have had their consciousness raised to the point where we would really

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council Institutional Files, 1977-1981, Box 80, PRC 144, 7/17/80, Pakistan. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Odom and Owen. In the upper right corner, Thornton wrote: "Note particularly the starred items." A stamped note at the top of the memorandum reads: "ZB has seen."

² See Document 303. Reference is apparently to something Muskie said off the record.

stand behind Pakistan. There will be too many “good reasons” to renege on whatever commitments we make. (S)

This is related to an issue that Muskie did not directly raise: How much effort do we want to put into our relationship with Pakistan? This is something that the PRC should address, especially as regards economic assistance. You probably have a greater sense of urgency in this matter than anybody else around the table and will have to articulate it if the message is to be gotten through. (The issue is not so much substantive as overcoming bureaucratic inertia.)³ (C)

The following are some more specific questions that arose from the Thursday meeting and will probably recur. (The list draws, in part, on the internal State briefing memo for this meeting.) (U)

1. What steps can we take to signal our concern to the Soviets and encourage Pakistani support of the insurgents? (Arms sales is the only item on the horizon.) (S)

2. Should the US be more openly involved with the insurgents? (Muskie asked this several times; the answer is that our role is limited by Pakistani sensitivities.) (S)

3. How can we ensure that we do not get out front too far and that we keep the Muslims in the lead? (Or, put another way, how do we keep this in the East-South, rather than East-West context?) (C)

4. When (and how) will we know that the Soviets have overstepped acceptable bounds in their dealings with Pakistan? (S)

5. How can we best consult on these matters with the Paks? Agha Shahi-Muskie this week? Hummel-Zia while Shahi is out of the country? Intelligence channels? (Probably all three in varying degrees but I like the Hummel-Zia channel best *if* Zia is willing to commit himself without Shahi. This also raises the question of what Hummel is supposed to tell Zia. You should urge State to produce some instructions to Hummel for our clearance.) (C)

6. Related to this, what should Muskie tell Agha Shahi when they meet?⁴ State will probably brief him to stick to Afghanistan and third country issues; should he raise the bilateral relationship? If so, in what terms? (C)

7. If Muskie consults with Byrd, what should he say? State will point out to Muskie that the conversations could soon get off into War Powers considerations and the like. I am concerned that this is likely to scare off any but the most intrepid supporter of Pakistan. If it is the case, however, we had better face it now. Incidentally, in the Thursday

³ Thornton placed a star in the left margin beside this paragraph.

⁴ Thornton placed a star in the left margin beside this sentence.

meeting you indicated that it didn't matter whether the Paks would like the idea of our consulting with Congress with the attendant leaks. It could matter very much if the Paks found it necessary to repudiate the position that we had taken with the Congress. We don't need another affair like that. (C)

8. DOD is supposed to come in with a pricing for the military equipment package that State postulated. (See my comment on the general pricing question, below.) Press State on the question of rapid funding in an emergency—especially if the Saudis are uncooperative. (C)

9. Make sure that contingency planning proceeds apace between State and DOD—chaired, if necessary, by Odom.⁵ (S)

10. Perhaps the single *most important specific thing you can do for US-Pakistani relations at this meeting is* to raise the issue of price quotations on F-15s.⁶ (You will have to raise it; State won't.) The Paks have asked us how much 40 or so F-15s would cost. State is unwilling to tell them (or if so, to tell them in a negative way) on the grounds that by quoting prices we are conveying a willingness to sell. That is nonsense, if we make ourselves clear to the Paks. They need data for planning purposes and if we want to be seen as a credible friend to them, this is the minimum we can do. The country director, just returned from a trip to Pakistan, underscores this as the most important single item pending with Pakistan. (S)

11. Further to the question of whether to tell Zia where the Persian Gulf is: According to a CIA report, Zia told the Chinese that "The US appeared to be interested in the security of the Persian Gulf but not of Pakistan." This reflects his apparent assumption that Pakistan is *not* included in the US security perimeter. (S)

Attachment

List of Recommended Actions⁷

Washington, undated

Suggested Follow-up Actions

1—State and DOD refine the paper on intermediate level contingencies and diplomatic/military responses.

⁵ Thornton placed a star in the left margin beside this paragraph.

⁶ Thornton placed a star in the left margin beside this sentence.

⁷ No classification marking.

2—DOD refine its planning on equipment availability and review its arrangements—with the goal of faster reaction time—for a short notice military supply operation.

3—The Secretary of State reaffirm to Shahi, during his visit to Washington next week, our willingness to discuss intermediate level contingencies with the Pakistanis whenever they wish to do so.⁸

4—Ambassador West be instructed to ask the Saudis the status of the Saudi/Gulf States assistance package for Pakistan.⁹

⁸ Brzezinski drew an arrow in the right margin beside this sentence. He crossed out “intermediate level contingencies,” and wrote several words above the phrase, but the text is illegible. Muskie and Shahi met on July 23. For their remarks to reporters after the meeting, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, October 1980, pp. 74–75.

⁹ At the bottom of the list, Brzezinski wrote: “indicate willingness to expedite [illegible].”

305. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Carlucci) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Newsom)

Washington, July 22, 1980

[Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I-047, Afghanistan: 11 Sep 1970–22 Jul 1980. Secret. 1 page not declassified.]

306. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, July 24, 1980, 2347Z

196087. Subject: Gromyko Letter on Afghanistan.²

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. Vasev called July 22 to deliver Gromyko's reply to my July 14 letter on Afghanistan.³ (Text para 3 below.)

3. I would like in continuation of our exchange of views to express some considerations in connection with your letter of July 14.

We have noted the interest of the U.S. Government expressed in your letter in improving Soviet-U.S. relations. As is well known to you, this is consistently favored by the Soviet leadership. However, it is important to act precisely along these lines in practice. We, on our part, are ready to do so provided there is a similar readiness on the part of the United States.

Given such an approach and being guided by broad goals of strengthening peace and security, our two countries, as was proved on more than one occasion in the past, are quite capable of developing constructively their relations and finding mutually acceptable solutions to most complicated questions of mutual interest for the USSR and the U.S.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office Files of Marshall D. Shulman, Special Advisor to the Secretary on Soviet Affairs, 1977-1981, Lot 81D109, EM-Vasev, 7/22/80. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis; Cherokee. Drafted by Shulman, cleared in S/S, and approved by Muskie.

² In an attached action memorandum to Muskie, July 23 (not printed), Vest stated: "The most notable feature of the Gromyko letter is its insistence on Soviet unwillingness to discuss any change in the Babrak government." Vest argued: "presumably Moscow wants to avoid any hint of readiness to talk about replacing Babrak because they fear this would only fuel factional infighting in Kabul." Vest made three recommendations in the memorandum, all of which Muskie approved: 1) send Gromyko's reply to the Embassy in Moscow (this telegram); 2) send a telegram to the Embassies in London, Paris, and Bonn relaying the substance of Gromyko's letter (the draft is attached but not printed; it was sent as telegram 196086, July 24 (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D910096-1634, N800008-0459)); and 3) defer a response to Gromyko. In a memorandum to Brzezinski, July 23, Brement summarized Gromyko's letter, characterizing it as a "rigid restatement of the Soviet position," and agreed with Vest that there was no need for an immediate reply. Brement suggested U.S. policy going forward should be based on the concept that a "complete Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan must be the basis for a genuine political solution to this problem." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Meetings File, Box 86, Sensitive XX: 7/80)

³ See Document 299.

This, to use your own words, is the key to everything. Attempts to reduce the whole matter to any one single question, to tie to such a question the prospects of our relations as the whole, are not only wrong but also non-productive. You are aware of our assessment of the causes that led to the present state of Soviet-U.S. relations. This was also the subject of detailed discussions at our meeting in Vienna.⁴

Therefore, I will not restate this assessment.

Now with regard to Afghanistan. We note the recognition in your letter of the legitimate interest of the Soviet Union in ensuring the security of its borders and in friendly relations with Afghanistan as well as of our concern about an outside interference in Afghanistan. This would seem to be a realistic premise.

However, this premise is directly contradicted by your persistent notion about the government, which exists in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, being unacceptable to the U.S. and by raising in this connection the question of “transition” to some other government. Here a complete clarity is in order: We do not intend to and will not engage even in discussions on posing the question in such a way.

I may as well note here that no useful purpose either can be served by the attempts to put in doubt the fact of the recent withdrawal of some Soviet units from Afghanistan. Why are you doing this? After all, you know—as, by the way, the whole world knows,—that such doubts are groundless.

As to your question what assurances of non-interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan would be considered by us as satisfactory, the answer thereto is contained in the known proposals of the DRA Government of last May 14.⁵ An adequately full discussion was devoted to it also in our previous exchanges of views. The guarantees of non-interference must be an integral part of the general political settlement, the path to which goes through direct negotiations of Pakistan and Iran with the Government of Afghanistan with the aim of normalizing relations between them with simultaneous cessation of armed incursions into the territory of Afghanistan as well as of all forms of interference in the internal affairs of that country in general.

It is Pakistan and Iran who, by continuing to refuse to conduct negotiations, are bringing the task of the political settlement to an impasse. This is why, if the United States is genuinely interested in such a settlement, it could, as we have already pointed out, exert appropriate influence on the Pakistan leaders and induce them to hold negotiations with the Government of Afghanistan.

⁴ See Document 272.

⁵ See Document 270.

We would like to hope that the U.S. side will be able to make a realistic assessment of the situation and will take steps to facilitate in practice the process of political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan.

You may have no doubt that such a position will be met with appropriate understanding on our part.

Sincerely,

A. Gromyko.

End text.

4. Secretary's response: The Secretary noted that on the face of it, he did not see any new elements in Gromyko's letter, but he did not want to give a reaction before studying it more carefully.

5. Instructions will follow septel on how you should brief the Quad.⁶

Muskie

⁶ That is, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. See footnote 2, above.

307. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, August 1, 1980, 2323Z

204570. Subject: Letter to Gromyko.

1. (S—Entire text)

2. You should deliver the following letter from Secretary Muskie to Gromyko as early as possible next week. You should seek an appointment with Korniyenko for this purpose and at the same time make the *démarches* on MBFR and Iranian hostages which you are being instructed by septel to make.²

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 83, USSR: 8/80. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cherokee. Drafted by Barry, cleared in NSC and S/S, and approved by Muskie.

² In telegram 12354 from Moscow, August 5, the Embassy reported it had delivered the Secretary's letter to Korniyenko, Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister, who "carefully read the letter and stated mildly that he would not attempt to respond immediately but would transmit it to Gromyko." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P900077-1730)

3. Begin text:

Dear Mr. Minister:

—Your letter of July 22 raises questions concerning the Soviet position on withdrawal from Afghanistan.³ Since this is a central issue in our discussions of a possible political settlement in Afghanistan, I would appreciate any clarifications you can offer.

—We obviously differ on the significance of the military withdrawal you have announced. Our analysis indicates that this was part of a tactical redeployment designed to make Soviet units more effective. I would be interested in knowing whether there has been a reduction in the overall number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, whether these withdrawals are permanent and whether you are prepared to undertake a process which would lead to complete withdrawal and a political settlement.

—In your letter of July 22, there is no reference to ultimate Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Is this a change in the Soviet position? If satisfactory assurances were provided would there be a simultaneous withdrawal of all Soviet troops?

—As we have said, we would be prepared to explore some transitional arrangement to facilitate such a solution. A government acceptable to the Afghan people would be essential.

—Finally, your letter of July 22 stresses that normalization of relations between Afghanistan and its neighbors should take place simultaneously with the cessation of “armed incursions into the territory of Afghanistan as well as of all forms of interference in the internal affairs of that country in general.” This implies that the Soviet Union would withdraw all its forces from Afghanistan to coincide with normalization of relations between Afghanistan and neighboring states. Is this your position?

—The questions I have posed in this and my last letter represent serious efforts to gain a clearer understanding of your position. I hope you will give them careful consideration.

—Sincerely, Edmund S. Muskie

End text.

Christopher

³ See Document 306.

308. Letter From Senator Moynihan to Secretary of State Muskie¹

Washington, August 1, 1980

Dear Ed,

At our lunch Tuesday we talked about the problem of maintaining the security of information in foreign affairs.² I told you I had become deeply depressed by our seeming inability to maintain any confidences and our further inability to see what this tells us about the condition of our principal institutions. I promised to send you the specifics of the Afghanistan example which I cited.

In the course of 1979 the President began to move toward supporting the low-level insurgency that appeared to have developed against the pro-Soviet Amin government in Kabul. In July and again in November, Presidential Findings directed that small amounts of nonmilitary aid be passed to these groups.

On December 19, 1979, *Izvestiya* charged that "U.S. is stepping up interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs, supporting the insurgents who are waging an armed struggle against this country's legitimate government." *Izvestiya* cited "the latest issue of the magazine COUNTERSPY." (I am informed by staff of the Intelligence Committee that this journal is or was associated with the Institute for Policy Studies.)

On December 24 the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, overthrowing Amin. *As it happens* a Presidential Finding was then making its way through the bureaucracy calling for a stepping up of the earlier program directed against Amin, providing some \$2 million in lethal military equipment. This Presidential Finding was signed December 28. It had begun as a project directed against the previous regime, but now of course took place in the context of the full-scale Soviet intervention.

On January 1 *Izvestiya* charged that, "The CIA is directly involved in training Afghan rebels in camps in Pakistan and maintains contacts with counter-revolutionaries and reactionaries in Afghanistan itself." The journal *Counterspy* is mentioned.

On January 5 the *Boston Globe* reports that the Carter administration has undertaken an unannounced "hush-hush decision that the U.S. . . . will do everything possible to slip weapons to the Moslem

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Official Files of Edmund Muskie, 1980-1981, Lot 82D100, folder 1. Secret; Sensitive; Not for the System. Muskie initialed the letter, indicating he saw it. Moynihan's letter is on the stationery of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, of which he was a member.

² The previous Tuesday was July 29. No record of that meeting was found.

insurgents in Afghanistan to ensure the Russian invasion there will be long, bloody and expensive.”³

On January 9 the Presidential Finding of December 28 was presented to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. The date and subject of this meeting was reported in the *New York Times Magazine* on April 6, 1980.⁴

On February 15 the *Washington Post* reported that “the U.S. is supplying weapons to rebel forces battling Soviet troops. . . .” The report is attributed to “reliable sources.”⁵ On February 16 the *New York Times* reported, “The U.S. began an operation to supply light infantry weapons to Afghan insurgent groups in mid-January, White House officials said today. . . .”⁶ On February 17 the *New York Times* reported from Moscow that, “The Soviet press gave prominent display today to American newspaper reports confirming the Soviet contention that the U.S. was supplying arms to the Afghan rebels.”⁷

And so through the spring and summer. I remarked to you that the July 21st edition of the *New York Times* reported on page 2 that Hodding Carter accused the National Security Council staff of leaking to the *Times*, a matter which no doubt distressed the White House,⁸ and on page 3 carried a story “Aides Disagree on Level of U.S. Arms Aid to Afghans” which included the paragraph:

“White House officials said on Feb. 15 that the United States had begun an operation to supply the insurgents with light infantry weapons. . . . The CIA, the White House source said, had been assigned to carry out the covert mission.”⁹

And so why ought Mr. Gromyko not be berating you with these charges? I think it may be agreed that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a decisive moment in modern history: the first such event since the Second World War. It had the potential to restore a measure of clarity and balance to American views of the present world situation.

³ See William Beecher, “News Analysis: What He Didn’t Say,” *Boston Globe*, January 5, 1980, p. 1.

⁴ See Tad Szulc, “Putting Back the Bite in the CIA,” *New York Times*, April 6, 1980, p. SM7.

⁵ See Michael Getler, “U.S. Reportedly Is Supplying Weapons to Afghan Insurgents,” *Washington Post*, February 15, 1980, p. A1.

⁶ See David Binder, “U.S. Supplying Afghan Insurgents with Arms in a Covert Operation,” *New York Times*, February 16, 1980, p. 1.

⁷ See Craig R. Whitney, “Soviet Press Plays Up U.S. Reports on Help For the Afghan Rebels,” *New York Times*, February 17, 1980, p. 10.

⁸ See “Hodding Carter Says U.S. Aides See Press as Enemy,” *New York Times*, July 21, 1980, p. A2.

⁹ See Drew Middleton, “Aides Disagree on Level of U.S. Arms Aid to Afghans,” *New York Times*, July 21, 1980, p. A3.

In particular it made it possible for almost anyone to see the elemental mendacity of Soviet statements about their activities and intentions. They lie. But then what happened? Almost immediately the United States Government (evidently the White House itself) gave out information to the press which supported, even confirmed, the Soviet lie.

Could there have been a greater disservice to our nation? What is to be said of those who did it?

More importantly, what is to be said of the state of our institutions when such things can happen? What does it mean when men charged with the responsibility for this information find it more rewarding to break the confidence than to keep it? This goes to profound questions of institutional loyalty and morale. An organizational theorist, observing such symptoms, would almost certainly judge that such institutions were in deep trouble.

This surely is my view. After almost four years on the Intelligence Committee I have come to the conclusion, for example, that the Central Intelligence Agency is practically defunct and is in many ways a liability. (I mentioned to you that earlier this year I placed the National Intelligence Estimates in the *Congressional Record*,¹⁰ by which I mean the reports of them that had by then appeared in the *Post* and the *Times*.) Clearly we need an intelligence system that can keep its secrets and, in a general way, its identity to itself. We have neither.

Nothing will avail less than running about with lie detectors looking for leakers. If I were the President, I would look upon this as a problem of *institutions*, not people. It is a profoundly serious problem. (Thus: if it is impossible to keep secrets, perhaps the government should not try to do anything that depends on secrets being kept.) This is a subject about which political scientists, for example, might very well have something useful to say. It is a subject that can be *studied*. If you would like to pursue the matter, I am at your disposal, as nothing troubles me more just now.¹¹

Best,

Daniel Patrick Moynihan¹²

¹⁰ See, for example, Senator Moynihan speaking on "The Role of the Central Intelligence Agency," 96th Cong., 2nd sess., *Congressional Record—Senate*, 126, pt. 9:11371.

¹¹ Muskie replied to Moynihan on September 19. Regarding the problem of leaks, Muskie wrote: "I doubt we will ever be entirely free of the problem, for as you would agree, the Draconian measures necessary to ensure total security of information would be basically incompatible with our system. We could improve, however. We continue to look for ways to ensure better security, and would welcome any additional thoughts you may have." (National Archives, RG 59, Official Files of Edmund Muskie, 1980–1981, Lot 82D100, folder 1)

¹² Moynihan initialed "DM" above his typed signature.

309. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

[*memorandum number not declassified*] Washington, August 8, 1980

THE STATE OF THE AFGHAN INSURGENCY (*[classification marking not declassified]*)

Our information on the status of the insurgency—[*2 lines not declassified*]*]*—is extensive but uneven in quality and far from complete. We have difficulty getting enough good information on such basic questions as how the insurgents are organized, how many there are, how they cooperate, and how many casualties there have been. The limits on such information have made it difficult, for example, to arrive at confident judgments about the insurgents' ability to stand up over time to increasing Soviet pressure. (See Annex A [*1 line not declassified*])

Insurgent Activity

Perhaps our best information comes indirectly through the Soviet and Afghan reaction to insurgent activity. [*1 line not declassified*] we can establish that the insurgency has spread to every Afghan province since the Soviet invasion. Insurgents harass traffic on the main roads, attacking military and civilian convoys and sometimes setting up their own checkpoints. They attack isolated Soviet and Afghan army units, occasionally slipping inside security patrols to hit garrisons. Although they usually attempt to avoid clashes with large units, the insurgents have inflicted heavy casualties on them in a few engagements. They have organized strikes and demonstrations in cities, particularly Herat, Qandahar, and Jalalabad, but also Kabul. They have killed numerous Soviets and Afghan officials on the streets of Afghan cities. Sabotage and arson—particularly the burning of schools—are common. In rural areas, their threats and killings have disrupted civil administration and prevented the implementation of government programs. In some areas, except for a few isolated garrisons, the insurgents are in complete control, dispensing justice and raising taxes.

The insurgent hold is strongest in some mountainous areas where terrain inhibits Soviet military operations. These areas are generally

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 82M00501R: 1980 Subject Files, Box 12, C-367, 09 Jul 80–27 Aug 80, Afghanistan. Top Secret; [*codeword and handling restriction not declassified*]. Attached but not printed are a covering memorandum from Carlucci to Brzezinski, August 8, indicating the memorandum was prepared in response to a request from Brzezinski, and a memorandum prepared in the CIA, July 25. A typed note on the first page reads in part: "The author of this paper is [*name not declassified*] Southwest Asia Analytic Center, Near East South Asia Division, Office of Political Analysis. It was coordinated with the Office of Strategic Research and the Directorate of Operations."

also the least important to the Soviets and the Afghan Government, and no serious counter-insurgency operations have been attempted in some of them. Even less remote areas where the insurgents have eliminated government authority, government garrisons still hold the main towns. On the other hand, there is resistance in areas where Soviet troops are concentrated and the government has a fair degree of control.

The insurgents have not taken over a major Afghan city or even a provincial capital for more than a few days, although they are a pervasive presence in most urban areas. The Soviets have shown in Kabul that they will deal firmly with any popular uprising, and the threat of Soviet reaction has almost certainly been important in keeping the urban areas from getting totally out of control.

There is some evidence that the Soviets believe the situation is improving in Afghanistan—perhaps stabilizing—and they clearly show no sign of withdrawing from Afghanistan. The evidence shows that they are there for a long haul and are beginning to emphasize political consolidation as well as military operations. Although only a very small part of the population supports the government and insurgency continues at a high level, the Soviets may have been successful, at least temporarily, in keeping the insurgence from getting worse. (In Annex B, we discuss the level of insurgency province by province.)

Insurgent Organization

The insurgents in Afghanistan are organized into a large number of distinct groups, probably several hundred. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] reports that there are 79 insurgent leaders among the Pathan tribesmen alone, each presumably heading an independent band. There are probably as many more in the remainder of the country. A few of these insurgent groups—primarily in urban areas—are based on political ideologies or programs. The overwhelming majority, however, represent tribes or geographic areas, and ridding their areas of the foreign invader is their principal motivation.

The first loyalty of most Afghans is to their villages or extended families. The basic insurgent unit is headed by a village or family leader and rarely consists of more than 50 men. Such units, however, seem to cooperate closely when necessary with others from neighboring villages and frequently coalesce in large insurgent groups numbering several hundred men. The membership in the basic units fluctuates; men leave the battlefield because they have more important business at home, but may return when fighting becomes more intense. One insurgent leader in Konarha province, for example, reportedly has 200 to 300 men under his command most of the time, but for a major operation can count on 1,000.

Cooperation among the larger groups is inhibited by the difficulties of communication and travel in a rugged country, by suspicion of outsiders—even men from the next valley—and by the reluctance of most Afghans to take orders from anyone, especially another local leader with no greater claims to leadership.

There have nevertheless been some operations involving more than one insurgent band, sometimes even bands from different ethnic groups. On occasion, the failure of such operations has led to fighting between the bands, each blaming the other for defeat. Since the Soviet invasion, there has been growing cooperation both among insurgents in Afghanistan and between Afghan insurgents and exile groups in Pakistan. Some of the insurgents engaged in the fighting outside Kabul in June reportedly came from provinces near the Pakistani border. The fighting probably would not have extended over as large an area had a number of insurgent groups not coordinated their activities. Predominant Pathan exile organizations and the Hazaras of central Afghanistan are establishing contact with each other. New weapons and tactics seem to pass quickly to tribes in the interior. In general, however, each insurgent group continues to operate with little reference to others fighting in the same cause.

The degree of cooperation also seems to vary by ethnic group. It may be least among the fiercely independent Pathans along the Pakistani border. Among the Nuristanis of Konarha province, however, there was considerable cooperation even before the Soviet invasion. The Hazaras of central Afghanistan may even have a rudimentary overall organization, comprising two umbrella groups over several smaller insurgent organizations.

The best known—but perhaps the least important—of the insurgent groups are the exile organizations. There are six main groups (five of them united in the Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan) and a number of smaller groups, most of them based in Pakistan. The exiles have served as a channel for aid to those fighting in Afghanistan, their propaganda has probably encouraged the resistance, and some of them have men actually engaged in fighting. There is however, little basis for their claims that they have large followings in Afghanistan, that they speak for the insurgents, or that they have much control over insurgent activities. (See Annex C for a fuller treatment of the exiles.)

Insurgent Strength

There is no reliable information on which to base an estimate of insurgent strength. Our guess is that it lies somewhere between 50,000 and 100,000. Most of the country's 15 million people resent the Soviet occupation, but only a small percentage is actively engaged in the fighting.

We probably have more complete reporting about insurgent strength in Konarha province than in any other part of the country. Even so, the information available does not permit us to estimate insurgent strength there more precisely than several thousand.

[1 line not declassified] there are as many as several hundred thousand insurgents in the country. [5½ lines not declassified]

[less than 1 line not declassified] put the number of insurgents in "main groupings" at about 28,000. [1 line not declassified] had unconfirmed reports of a similar number in the Kabul area alone. [less than 1 line not declassified] reported the destruction of the main insurgent groups in Badakshan, Baghlan, Qonduz, Nangarhar, Ghazni, Qandahar, Helmand, Herat, and Bamian provinces, and may no longer include still active insurgents there in the strength estimated for the main groupings. Soviet pressure has broken some of the larger groups into smaller bands, but these might actually be more effective in guerrilla warfare.

Other methods of estimating insurgent strength are equally unsatisfactory. We do not know the number of insurgent bands nor the average size of a band. Some groups are well over 1,000, others less than 100, and almost nothing is known about most. Assuming, however, that there are around 200 insurgent groups, and that the average size of each is about 300—groups of this size appear to be fairly typical—there would be on the order of 60,000 insurgents.

Estimates of insurgent strength also depend on the definition of an insurgent. At any given time few of the insurgent bands are at their greatest possible strength, and in large areas of the country potential insurgents have no Soviets to fight. Although there might be about 50,000 men opposing the Soviets at any one time, this strength could double if the Soviets were to conduct simultaneous military operations throughout the country. The number of men who have participated at one time or another in fighting against the Soviets or Afghan Communists during the past two years may be several times greater.

Estimating insurgent casualties is also difficult. Afghan military claims are clearly exaggerated, [less than 1 line not declassified] deal with only a few engagements, and even [less than 1 line not declassified] are suspect. Those based on body counts are probably no more valid than US reports from Vietnam, [2 lines not declassified]. The Soviet Ambassador in Kabul told other ambassadors that 25,000 "counterrevolutionaries" have been eliminated since the invasion. Our extrapolations from [1 line not declassified] indicate that casualties have been on the order of 20,000, but the reports may inflate insurgent losses. [2 lines not declassified] forces in Afghanistan to go out on the battlefield and actually count bodies. Civilian casualties probably have been higher, although not 200,000 as one exile spokesman has charged.

Insurgent Arms and Supplies

Although outside help has become increasingly important, the insurgents rely primarily on weapons they had when the Marxists took over in April 1978 or have since captured from the Afghan military, obtained from deserters, or purchased on the local black market. (The sale of ammunition and occasionally arms is widespread in the Afghan Army, and some Soviet troops reportedly have also been involved.) We have no statistics on the number of weapons the insurgents have obtained from sources in the country, but there have been tens of thousands of deserters and defectors from the Afghan Army, many of them taking their weapons with them, and we know of many raids on garrisons, police posts, and convoys in which the insurgents captured weapons.

The insurgents appear to have sufficient small arms, but frequently run short of ammunition. Because of its range and the availability of ammunition, the British World War II Lee-Enfield is their favorite weapon. Large numbers of Soviet-made AK-47 assault rifles have come into insurgent hands since the Marxist takeover, as have a growing number of West German designed G-2 rifles (manufactured in Pakistan under license for the Pakistan Army and also a standard Iranian Army weapon). The insurgents have also captured machine guns, mortars, anti-aircraft weapons, and even tanks and artillery from the Army, but these are generally in short supply. The difficulty of moving and maintaining heavy equipment such as tanks and artillery severely limits their usefulness. The insurgents also produce some of their own material—for example they convert plumbing pipe and pressure cookers into landmines and refill old shell casings to make new ammunition.

The insurgents have used their weapons effectively, quickly adapting their tactics to new arms—such as antitank rockets—and using unfamiliar captured heavy weapons with some effect (partly because soldiers trained in their use defected). They have even had a technical advantage over the Soviets in one area—rifle accuracy and range. Although the Lee-Enfield's rate of fire is much slower than the AK-47s, its accuracy and range makes it superior in the typical clash in which only a few shots are exchanged.

Some of the most effective insurgent weapons—notably antitank rockets and modern landmines—can only be obtained abroad. In addition, the gradual drying up of the Afghan Army as a source of weapons—controls on weapons and ammunition seem to be tightening, and desertions are slowing down as the army becomes smaller—has made foreign sources more important even for small arms and ammunition.

Pakistan has been the major outside source of arms. The gun markets in tribal areas near the border have supplied weapons to both Afghan and Pakistani tribesmen for decades. Most of the weapons

made by the tribal gun makers are rifles and pistols, but they also produce mortars and heavy machine guns in small quantities. Weapons produced in foreign countries—including captured Soviet weapons sold to gun dealers by insurgents—and weapons presumably stolen from the Pakistani military and police are also available.

The insurgents have been supplied with arms by private Pakistanis and Pakistani religious organizations, although the tribal gun markets have apparently been the source of much of this equipment as well.

The Pakistani Government has furnished limited quantities of ammunition, rifles, antitank rockets, and mines. Saudi Arabia and several of the smaller Gulf oil producers have provided funds for purchasing arms, although apparently not the arms themselves. Egypt has also offered help to the insurgents, and some Egyptian-made weapons reportedly are being used in Afghanistan. There are persistent, but unconfirmed, reports of Chinese assistance, either directly or through the Pakistani Government.

Some military supplies—most from stocks sold to Iran by the US—have been supplied through Iran. Despite its announcements of support for the insurgents, the role of the Iranian Government appears to be slight. The weapons apparently are supplied primarily by religious organizations.

Hundreds of passes are available to the insurgents to move weapons into Afghanistan over the mountainous border with Pakistan. The border with Iran and the western part of the Pakistani border are largely inhospitable desert, most of it unpatrolled. The government forces have firm control of only the few main border crossings, such as the paved road from Iran to Herat, and the road through the Khyber Pass. Soviet mining efforts along the border in Konarha province have made cross-border movement there considerably more difficult, but so far at least, most of the border remains virtually unpatrolled.

Within Afghanistan, military supplies move slowly, by animal or man, over mountain trails, the same ones used before the war by smugglers, or sometimes by bus or truck. The process can be slow—insurgents in Vardak province report it takes two weeks to a month to receive arms from Pakistan. Despite efforts to impede movement in some provinces, government and Soviet forces do not seem to have much success in interrupting insurgent arms shipments in the country. Only rarely do government reports reflect the interception of an arms shipment.

Annex A²

[2 pages not declassified]

Annex B³

Insurgency in Afghan Provinces

Badakshan

Government control of Badakshan, perhaps the most remote of Afghanistan's provinces, has always been tenuous, and the government and the Soviets appear to control only the main road from Qonduz to Feyzabad, the provincial capital, and the valley from Feyzabad south to Jorm. Even this degree of control, however, represents an improvement from the government position at the time of the Soviet invasion. The government then controlled only Feyzabad, where the garrison was surrounded and close to surrendering before Soviet troops came to their relief in early February. A major clearing operation in June—possibly the largest staged so far by the Soviets—extended control beyond the Feyzabad area.

Konarha

At the time of the invasion, the government position in Konarha was desperate. The few isolated posts it held were besieged and in danger of falling. The major garrison in the province—at Asmar—had defected in August after being besieged intermittently for six months. The Nuristanis of the province resisted the government primarily out of religious beliefs, although cultural differences with most other Afghans probably made them even more resentful of control from Kabul than most tribesmen.

Since that time, at least two major Soviet sweep operations in March and May in the Konar Valley in the southern part of the province have improved the situation. Asmar has been retaken, and the main villages in the province are in danger from insurgents. In the main valley, movement along roads is still hazardous but is at least possible for armed government convoys. Although insurgent activity resumed quickly after each Soviet sweep, the insurgents have not been able to regain their complete control in the countryside. The more rugged and

² Top Secret; [codeword and handling restriction not declassified].

³ Top Secret; [codeword and handling restriction not declassified].

less important northern part of the province has been untouched by Soviet or government forces.

Laghman

Much of the fighting in Laghman province has been a spillover from other provinces. For example, during the Soviet sweeps in the Konar Valley, there were parallel operations by Afghan and Soviet forces in Laghman. Although the government controls the provincial capital and most main towns, the bulk of the province is in rebel hands. Rebel fortunes have fluctuated there, depending on the degree of government pressure. The main significance of the province has been its use by the insurgents as both a base and a supply route for operations in the Kabul area. The Alisang Valley has been particularly important as a route for insurgents moving to the Panjshir Valley, from which they can threaten important installations—the main road to the USSR and Bagram air base—in the northern Kabul basin.

Parvan

The Soviets have been able to maintain control over the most important areas of Parvan province—the northern part of the Kabul basin and the Salang tunnel on the road from Kabul to the USSR. The insurgents have failed to block or destroy the tunnel, the most vulnerable part of the Soviet supply line, and their attacks on Bagram air base as well as mutinies by Afghan airmen there have not seriously interfered with Soviet operations.

Elsewhere in the province, the insurgents have more than held their own. According to one Afghan official, they control nine of the province's 10 districts. Several Afghan and Soviet efforts to clear the road running west into Bamian province have brought no lasting benefits. Attempts to eliminate the threat to the Kabul basin posed by insurgents at the Panjshir Valley in the eastern part of the province have been unsuccessful. In April, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] the insurgents—perhaps for the only time since the invasion—were able to force Soviet troops to retreat.

Kabul

Insurgents have been active in the mountains around the Kabul basin, but the basin itself has been under firm control of Soviet and government forces. Clearing operations in the mountains in June seemed to have removed the threat of an insurgent attack on the nation's capital, if any such threat ever existed. The Soviets may have reacted quickly and forcefully because they feared that increased raids from the mountains would inspire new outbreaks in the city.

The capital was fairly calm before the Soviet invasion, although the first stages of an insurgent assassination campaign had already

begun a few weeks earlier. Since December, assassinations have become commonplace, some estimate 10 to 15 every day, and there have been a number of significant civil disturbances. The most serious was a six-day general strike in late February which involved serious rioting and forced the Soviets to move troops into the city. Student demonstrations in May and June were less serious, and the Soviets left most of the responsibility for putting them down to Afghan police and soldiers. Adding to the unsettled conditions in the city is the fighting between the two factions of the ruling party, and a fair proportion of the incidents are probably attributable to their feuding, rather than to the insurgents.

Vardak

Except for a few main towns and the Kabul-Qandahar road, almost all of Vardak province is under control of the insurgents. Soviet operations there seem to be increasing, probably both to ensure control of the road and to weaken the threat to Kabul. Insurgents from the province almost certainly were involved in the fighting around Kabul in June.

In February, the US Embassy acquired far more detailed information about the insurgency in Vardak than has been available for any other province. Insurgent leaders—calling themselves governors—were in complete control there; the population supported the fight against the Soviets as a holy war. The Soviet invasion had ended the longstanding rivalry between the Hazaras in the west and the Pathans in the east. There was, however, apparently little thought of cooperation with insurgents elsewhere in the country, despite a belief that all Afghans would rise and drive out the invaders. Arms and ammunition were obtained from Pakistan by Vardakis dispatched to the tribal gun markets. Afghan exile organizations evidently did little more than act as middlemen in the sales.

Lowgar

Insurgents in Lowgar province have been able to block roads there, and have probably contributed to forces operating in Kabul province. Aside from some road clearing operations—designed to keep open communications with Gardez in Paktia province—there has been little significant fighting there.

Nangarhar

Prior to the Soviet invasion, insurgency in Nangarhar was limited primarily to the northern and southern fringes of the province, where fighting in Konar, Laghman, and Paktia provinces spilled over. The situation was growing more critical late last year, however, with insurgents for the first time able to block traffic on the road from Kabul to the Khyber Pass for extended periods. (The main insurgent activity

against the road, however, was near Sarubi in eastern Kabul province.) Conditions in Jalalabad had also begun deteriorating, and part of the Jalalabad garrison mutinied in October 1979. Nevertheless, Nangarhar was the most peaceful of the provinces along Afghanistan's eastern border and the scene of one of the few unqualified Afghan Army successes, the defeat of a large band of Pathan Mohmand tribesmen who had invaded the province from Pakistan in June 1979.

The Soviet invasion brought a major increase in insurgency both in Jalalabad and in the countryside. Jalalabad airport was attacked several times, the city was unsafe for Soviet or Afghan soldiers for weeks at a time, and rural insurgents seized control from government officials in most districts. The Soviets stationed troops permanently on the outskirts of Jalalabad to keep the main road to Pakistan open, to assist Afghan troops in rural districts, and to support operations in the Konar Valley. Insurgents have been driven from some districts, and the road is now usually open. Government authority in Jalalabad city has increased, but unrest in the province is greater than before the Soviet invasion.

*Paktia*⁴

The first resistance to the Marxists broke out among the Mangal tribe in eastern Paktia province within a week of the coup in April 1978. Fighting quickly spread, and prior to the Soviet invasion, the government's counterinsurgency problems were more serious in Paktia than in any other province except Konarha. Control was limited to a few garrisons. In October 1979, Afghan troops—apparently commanded by Soviet officers—staged the only major Afghan offensive of the war. Although Afghan units reached their geographic objectives, they established no permanent control. Within days the insurgents were once again in control of most of the province, and government forces were besieged in a few isolated posts. Some analysts have argued that the failure of this offensive was one factor in Moscow's decision that Afghanistan could be saved only by Soviet troops.

Since the invasion, there has been little military activity in the province. Government garrisons are isolated and seem to do their best to avoid actions likely to bring an insurgent response. In June, however, there was a significant Soviet incursion into the province, probably in battalion strength, in an apparent effort to open roads to the main garrisons. The Pathans responded by ambushing Soviet columns at

⁴ Since the Communist takeover, there have been changes in provincial boundaries, the most important of which was the formation of Paktika province from parts of Paktia and Ghazni provinces. To avoid confusion, the pre-Communist provincial boundaries have been used throughout this paper. [Footnote is in the original.]

several places and inflicting some casualties. Since then, the province has remained fairly calm.

Ghazni

The Pathans of Ghazni province did not become a serious problem for the government until the spring of 1979, but by late that year the city of Ghazni was besieged, and several smaller garrisons in the southern part of the province were forced to surrender or defect. The insurgents were able to block the main road from Qandahar to Kabul at will; some government officials traveling on the road did so only after buying passes from insurgent representatives.

Since the invasion, the Soviets have staged two major clearing operations in the province aimed primarily at securing the road. The first was in April and May, and the second is still under way. The first, according to Afghan exiles, inflicted severe casualties on innocent villagers in the southern part of the province. The current operation, both larger and with a larger proportion of Soviet troops, began in mid-July, and its initial stages were apparently complicated by a mutiny in the Afghan garrison at Ghazni. The Soviets have been able to keep the road open for convoys most of the time, and there has been no serious insurgent threat to Ghazni city since the invasion.

Zabol

The Soviets have made little effort to deal with insurgency in most of Zabol province and have left most of the responsibility for keeping the Kabul-Qandahar road open to Afghan forces. As a result, insurgents control most of the province and have been able to block the road in the Qalat area repeatedly.

Qandahar

Insurgency in rural Qandahar has been less serious for the Soviets than unrest in the provincial capital, the country's second largest city. For much of the time since the invasion, the city has been unsafe for government officials and has been virtually under control of the insurgents, especially after dark. At least twice, despite Soviet reluctance to engage in urban fighting, Soviet troops have been sent in to restore some semblance of government control. Elsewhere in the province insurgency has been greatest along the Pakistani border north of Spin Baldak and along the border with Oruzgun province. The government has tended to ignore the desolate southern part of the province.

Bamian, Oruzgun, and Ghowr

Bamian, Oruzgun, and Ghowr provinces in central Afghanistan are inhabited largely by Hazaras, a Mongolian Shiah minority long the

object of discrimination on both ethnic and religious grounds. The area originally fell to the insurgents almost by default. The Afghan military, concentrating on Pathan insurgency in the east, could spare few troops to hold the Hazara area, and since the summer of 1978, all of the area except for the main towns has been in insurgent hands. Government operations were largely confined to the relief of threatened posts and a few half-hearted efforts that opened the road between Kabul and Herat for only brief periods.

There has been little change since the invasion. The Hazaras have kept up pressure on government forces. For their part, the Soviets have left the area primarily to the Afghan Army. Their one major incursion into the area, a multibattalion offensive in late April, may have been designed partly to demonstrate that the Soviets could move into the area. Within a few days after the end of the clearing operation, the Hazaras appear to have regained all they held previously.

Despite their control of the countryside, the Hazaras have been unable to take major towns. Tarin Kowt in Oruzgun has been under pressure for well over a year, Chaghcharan has been isolated as long, and insurgents have penetrated Bamian's defenses, but none of the three provincial capitals has been taken and held.

The motivation of the Hazaras in fighting the government and the Soviets is somewhat different than that of other Afghans. It results in part from past discrimination, and from their resentment of the dominance of the Marxist governments (as well as all their predecessors) by Sunni Pathans. The Hazaras also have probably been inspired and influenced more by the Iranian revolution than other Afghans, apparently gaining renewed pride in their Shiism. Iran has, however, been an inspiration to Sunni Afghans, too; pictures of Ayatollah Khomeini have been posted in Sunni cities such as Qonduz. Hazara resentments have played a part in urban unrest in Kabul, where Hazaras have been in the forefront of anti-government activity.

Baghlan

In Baghlan province the insurgents have staged sporadic attacks against Soviet convoys and, despite Soviet clearing operations, they control the relatively unimportant eastern part of the province. The Soviets, nevertheless, have been able to keep the main road open—their major objective in the province—to control all major towns, and to establish a major logistic base at the important crossroad at Pol-e-Khomri.

Takar

Takar province was not a serious problem for the government prior to the Soviet invasion, but insurgency has increased there since. In

late June, the provincial governor reported that most districts were in insurgent hands and that an attack on the provincial capital was imminent. Judging by military operations there, the situation has not been quite so critical recently—the Soviets have been able to rely largely on Afghan troops—and insurgency is strongest in the remote southern part of the province.

Qonduz

There was only minor insurgency in Qonduz province before the Soviet invasion, but since then it has been a serious problem for the Soviets. Although the province is important because it contains the major river port at Shir Khan on the Soviet-Afghan border and the road south toward Kabul, the Soviets initially left security there to Afghan forces. By March, insurgents had taken control of most of the countryside, and urban dissidents were in virtual control of the provincial capital. In April Soviet troops moved into the capital, conducted clearing operations in the province, and restored some semblance of order. Insurgency, nevertheless, is at a considerably higher level than before last December. At no time does there appear to have been a threat to Shir Khan.

Samangan

Samangan was one of the country's quieter provinces before the Soviet invasion. By June, faced with weak Afghan forces, the insurgents were strong enough to attack the provincial capital twice in a single day. Insurgent control appears to be strongest in the south, in part because of the presence of Hazaras from neighboring Bamian.

Balkh

Balkh has been among the quietest of Afghanistan's provinces despite sporadic dissidence, especially in the southern part of the province. There have been assassinations, strikes, and sabotage in Mazar-i-Sharif, the provincial capital and the country's fourth largest city, but much less unrest than in Kabul, Herat, or Qandahar.

Jowzjan

In Jowzjan, like most of the northern provinces, the most serious insurgency has been in the south. The weakness of government forces, however, has allowed the insurgents to gain control of much of the province and on occasion threaten the provincial capital.

Faryab

The situation is much the same in Faryab, where the government's main military concerns have been with insurgency along the southern part of its border with Jowzjan province, and the threat from insurgents in Badghisat.

Badghisat

A sudden burst of insurgency in Badghisat province in March 1979 caught the small government forces off guard. Since then the insurgents have controlled much of the province, but not the major towns. They apparently tried to advance on Meymaneh, in Faryab province, but troops rushed from Mazar-i-Sharif stopped them near the provincial border. A Soviet clearing operation in July 1980 appears to have won some ground for the government, but the gain may be only temporary.

Herat

In March 1979, the city of Herat was the scene of the first major urban uprising against the Afghan Marxists. Crowds using tactics patterned after those that brought down the Shah were joined by part of the local Afghan Army garrison. Although the rising was suppressed in a few days, calm never returned completely to the city. Following the Soviet invasion, it was reduced to anarchy by strikes, demonstrations, assassinations, and armed clashes. Soviet troops have held important installations there, such as the airport, but have moved into the city only on a few occasions to prevent insurgents from gaining complete control.

Insurgency has been less a problem in the remainder of the province. Small bands—some operating from Iranian territory—have clashed with government forces, sometimes taking isolated posts, but Afghan forces, with only some help from the Soviets, have prevented significant insurgent success.

Farah

The Soviets have established a major military base at Shindand air base, and have some degree of control in the central part of the province. Nevertheless, insurgent attacks on convoys on the Herat-Qandahar road have become so serious that most Afghan truckers refuse to use it. Soviet control is more tenuous along the Iranian border, and Soviet clearing operations in the eastern part of the province have met strong resistance.

Nimruz

Sparsely settled Nimruz experienced almost no insurgency before the Soviet invasion, but in March the insurgents—opposed mainly by demoralized police—gained control of most of the countryside and almost seized the provincial capital. The dispatch of a few companies of Afghan troops and a smaller number of Soviets prevented further insurgent gains. The Soviets apparently are planning a more ambitious clearing operation, but it is unlikely they consider the province important enough to spare enough troops to do more than relieve pressure on a few posts.

Helmand

The settled farmers along the Heland river have engaged in little antigovernment activity. Although they are Pathans, their tribal martial tradition is much weaker than among mountain dwellers. Because they depend on government irrigation projects—largely funded by the US—they are among the few Afghans who regard the central government as a benefactor instead of an enemy. Since the Soviet invasion, attacks on government installations have increased, the government has lost control of many of the non-riverine districts, and local officials fear that the provincial capital, Lashkar Gah, may be attacked.

Annex C⁵

Afghan Exile Organizations

There are dozens of Afghan exile organizations, most of them based in Pakistan, some in Iran, and the rest scattered throughout the world (the US, Western Europe, Egypt, India). Apart from those in Pakistan and Iran, they have a very limited impact on the insurgency.

Pakistan-Based Organizations

Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan (IALA). This umbrella organization was formed by the six most important exile groups in Peshawar in January 1980 to enable the exile groups to present a united front at the special Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference held in Islamabad in late January. It also hoped to encourage aid from Muslim countries that objected to the fragmentation of the insurgent movement. One group, the Islamic Party, left the Alliance while it was being established. The IALA is headed by Abdul Rasoul Saif, who was apparently chosen because he posed no threat to the ambitions of the leaders of the five remaining member organizations.

—*The Afghan Islamic League (Jamiat-Islami-Afghani)*. The League is headed by Burhanuddin Rabbani, a former professor at Kabul University. The organization reportedly receives financial support from a small, conservative political party in Pakistan and is closer to the Afghan National Liberation Front than to the other members of the Alliance. Rabbani's group reportedly has a military arm, but its capability is unknown.

—*The Afghan National Liberation Front (Jabhe-i-Negat-i-Melli)*. The group's leader, Sebqatullah Mojdedi, is a member of an important religious family that has a following in Kabul and other urban centers

⁵ Top Secret; [codeword and handling restriction not declassified].

of eastern Afghanistan. An Islamic scholar, Mojdedi reportedly has good contacts in Saudi Arabia and Libya. He claims to represent the Front's "real" leader, Prince Abdul Wali, cousin and son-in-law of King Zahir, currently in exile in Rome. Abdul Wali's insurgent activities, however, are centered in Western Europe.

—*The Afghan Islamic and National Revolutionary Council* (Surah-i-Melli-Inqilabi-Islami-Afghanistan), also known as the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan. It is headed by Sayed Ahmed Gailani, an important religious leader who traces his family from the prophet. He claims to have a large following in the eastern provinces. Although he is probably the exile Muslim leader with the most modern outlook, Gailani's political strength is based on his religious following.

—*The Islamic Party* (Hezbi Islami—Khalis Faction) is a splinter group of Hekmatyar's organization (see below). Its tough, combative leader, Younis Khalis, is reported to be admired by other exile leaders for his courage in leading his band in cross-border operations into Afghanistan. Conservative and reputedly without political ambitions, he has prodded other groups to become more involved in the fighting in Afghanistan.

—*Movement of the Islamic Revolution of Afghanistan* (Harakat-i-Inqilabi-Islami-Afghanistan), led by Maulana Mohammad Nabi Mohammedi, a mullah, from the Khowst area of Paktia province. Mohammedi's base of operations is at Miram Shah in North Waziristan. The other members of the Alliance have their headquarters in Peshawar.

The Islamic Party (Hezbe Islami), led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, broke away from the IALA soon after its formation. Hekmatyar is fiercely ambitious and independent and has been conducting guerrilla operations, with the aid of the Pakistan Government, since before the Marxist revolution in 1978. One report alleges that he has 15,000 guerrillas in Afghanistan. This is probably an exaggeration, but the Islamic Party is one of the best organized and most active exile organizations. Hekmatyar's group has its roots in the area between Ghazni and Qandahar, and it is active there as well as in the Kabul area and in the eastern provinces bordering Pakistan. The Islamic Party has an office in Tehran, as well as its main office in Peshawar. Hekmatyar rejects the monarchy and is reportedly impressed by the fundamentalist revolution in Iran.

The Revolutionary Council, established by the Afghan Loya Jirgah (Grand Assembly) that met in May in Peshawar prior to another Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference, is the closest Afghan equivalent to a government-in-exile. For centuries, the Jirgah has been convened by rulers to legitimize their political authority. The group that met in Pakistan in May claimed to represent all parts of the country, although it most likely did not. In late July Hassan Gailani, nephew of Sayed Ahmed Gailani, was appointed President of the Council, indicating that it will probably become little more than an arm of the IALA.

Iran-Based Organizations

The Islamic Revolution Liberation Front of Afghanistan (Jabhe-Azadibakshi-Inqilabi-Islami-Afghanistan), led by Sheikh Mohammed Asif Mohsini. At the Islamic Foreign Ministers conference in Islamabad in May, Iran's Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh included Mohsini (as well as five leaders from the IALA) in the Iranian delegation. Mohsini's front is a grouping of some 10 smaller bands, primarily Hazaras, that operate in the central provinces of the country. Some of the Front's groups may also belong to one of the two Hazara umbrella organizations, the National United Front of Afghanistan (Jabhe-Mujahed-Melli-Afghanistan) and the United Front of Freedom Fighters in Afghanistan (Jabhe-Mobarazin-i-Mujahed-Afghanistan), which together subsume some 15 insurgent bands, operating in the central and northern provinces.

Thunder (Radh) is led by Sheikh Zadeh, based in Qom. It is a revolutionary organization comprising Hazaras operating in the mountains of central Afghanistan. It probably has ties with other Hazara organizations.

310. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Islamabad, August 21, 1980, 1119Z

8306. Subject: (S) Chemical Warfare Allegations in Afghanistan: Need for Reflection? Ref: State 220611.²

1. (S) Entire text.

2. I do not wish to appear the Cassandra on this issue, but I would like to introduce a note of caution into our planning to exploit allegations of Soviet use of chemical warfare agents in Afghanistan, as illus-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 59, Pakistan: 8/80–1/81. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

² In telegram 220611 to USUN and Geneva, August 19, the Department informed the posts that the United States, working in concert with both allies and non-aligned countries, was interested in co-sponsoring a resolution on chemical warfare at the upcoming UN General Assembly meeting. The telegram directed the recipients to explore this proposal with their counterparts. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]) For an overview of UN activity relating to the control of chemical and biological weapons, see *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1980*, pp. 70–74.

trated in reftel. I would like nothing better than to be able to see the Soviets nailed on this matter in a way which would not only condemn them for their use of chemical weapons but dramatize their butchery of Afghans/Muslims in Afghanistan. But we must be sure of our ground lest our planned campaign backfire and discredit other activities aimed at keeping Soviet aggression in Afghanistan prominently before the conscience of the world.

3. Thus, although we were not asked for comment by reftel, I would like to offer the following thoughts:

—Reports of the use of chemical agents in Afghanistan have never been conclusive, at least those we have seen. Our own sourcing and that of our Consul in Peshawar has never been direct or first-hand; we have relied heavily on the nearly identical accounts by refugees who have come across the border from different places, all of which point to some sort of canisters dropped by Soviet aircraft and the emission from those canisters of some gas or cloud which appears to debilitate those in the area for several hours. Deaths, if any, seem an accidental by-product for those too close to the source of the emission, and thus far we have no hard evidence of burning or other longer-term effects.

—We have had no such reports recently, i.e., in the last two months; moreover, our efforts to obtain a canister have borne no fruit.

—We have proposed to the GOP the despatch of a team of medical specialists whose efforts will be directed at attempting to document such use of chemical agents by the Soviets; that documentation effort, if successful, is not likely to be available for some time.

4. I have also some concern that the Pakistan Representative in Geneva may not fully reflect the position of his government on Pakistan's willingness to play a prominent role in international forums on the chemical warfare issue or be willing to co-sponsor resolutions in the UNGA or elsewhere on this subject. I would feel somewhat more confident were I to be instructed to approach the Foreign Ministry here for general review of this subject before we seek active Pak cooperation.

5. Given the lack of conclusive evidence, at least in the public domain, I think we (and the Government of Pakistan) should reflect hard about how wise it is to push this subject so that we do not, by the deficiencies of our public case on chemical warfare in Afghanistan, undermine the more persuasive case we have on aggression, brutalities, and atrocities perpetrated by the Soviets during their Afghan adventure.

6. Dept please pass Geneva, USUN, Kabul and Moscow.

Hummel

311. Letter From Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to Secretary of State Muskie¹

Moscow, August 25, 1980

Distinguished Mr. Secretary,

I acquainted myself with your letter of August 5, in which You again return to the questions concerning Afghanistan.²

Let me be frank, the way You are posing these questions can not but elicit puzzlement. For instance, what is the reason for the persistent attempt of the American side to cast doubt on the fact of withdrawal from Afghanistan of certain Soviet units? It is clear after all, that such ignoring of facts not only serves no constructive purpose but voids the dialogue of any sense altogether.

Nor can in any way the progress in the political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan be facilitated by the persistently repeated assertion that “central factor” of the settlement is the question of complete withdrawal of Soviet forces.

What, indeed, is and continues to be the central question is the question of cessation and guaranteed non-resumption of military incursions from outside into the territory of Afghanistan and, generally, of all forms of interference in its internal affairs. It is in this context, as has been stated by us on more than one occasion, the solution of the question of withdrawal of the Soviet military contingent from Afghanistan can be achieved. In other words, this question is of a derivative and not of a principal nature at all. For the Soviet troops to be withdrawn from Afghanistan the reason which induced the DRA Government to ask the Soviet Union for military assistance must be eliminated. There have been and can be no changes in our position in this respect.

A specific program of political settlement which, if realized, would lead to normalization of relations between Afghanistan and its neighbors as well as to solution of other pertinent questions, was, with utmost clarity, spelled out in the known statement of the DRA Government dated May 14, 1980.³ The Soviet Union, on its part, gives support to that program.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office Files of Marshall D. Shulman, Special Advisor to the Secretary on Soviet Affairs, 1977–1981, Lot 81D109, untitled folder. No classification marking. Text of the letter was transmitted in telegram 228778 to Moscow, August 27. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P910096–1978, N800009–0271)

² See Document 307.

³ See Document 270.

This is, Mr. Secretary, what I would like to tell You in regard to Afghanistan.

[Omitted here is a portion of the letter unrelated to Afghanistan.]

Sincerely,

A. Gromyko⁴

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

312. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

[*memorandum number not declassified*]

Washington, August 1980

Soviet-Afghan Incursions Into Pakistan
(*[classification marking not declassified]*)

Summary

Moscow is able to launch small-scale air and ground incursions into Pakistan at any time, but this does not appear to be Soviet policy at present. Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late December, two ground incursions and 14 air incursions have been confirmed, only one of which appeared to be deliberate. Moreover, high-level Soviet authorities have expressed concern about some of the confirmed incidents and as late as mid-May were investigating them. In fact, the Soviet presence appears to have reduced the number of air and ground incursions into Pakistan to below the number allegedly made by Afghan forces before the invasion. (*[classification marking, codeword, and handling restriction not declassified]*)

Pakistani officials, however, believe that at least some of the incidents were staged by the Soviets to put pressure on Islamabad. On 3

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Office of Support Services, Job 82T00150R: Production Case Files, Box 2, Soviet-Afghan Air and Ground Incursions Into Pakistan. Top Secret; [*codeword and handling restriction not declassified*]. A typed statement on the first page reads in part: "This memorandum was prepared by [*less than 1 line not declassified*] of the NFAC Southwest Asia Analytic Center, Office of Political Analysis. It was coordinated with the Directorate for Operations, the Office of Strategic Research, and the National Intelligence Officers for the USSR, and the Near East and South Asia. Information available as of 29 August 1980 was used in its preparation."

March, they made strong diplomatic and public protests following an air violation in which a Soviet aircraft apparently penetrated some 20 to 40 kilometers into Pakistan. Subsequently, in mid-May, Pakistani personnel reportedly fired on intruding aircraft and on Soviet-Afghan forces in confirmed ground incursions. Pakistan has steadily but discreetly increased its military readiness opposite Afghanistan in hopes of deterring more serious Soviet and Afghan incursions. (*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*)

The Soviets probably will increase their efforts to seal the Pakistani border on the Afghan side rather than alter their policy of restraint. If this fails, the Soviets may authorize a campaign of sustained small-scale air penetrations or border incursions to force Pakistan to stop supporting the insurgents. (*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*)

Pakistani authorities expect a Soviet-Afghan ground incursion; a few believe it might occur as early as this fall. Pakistan's efforts to reinforce the Afghan border will probably continue but may be complicated by a shortage of military equipment and by substantial high-level Army resistance to redeployments that would weaken Pakistani defenses on the Indian border. (*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*)

[Omitted here is the body of the memorandum.]

313. Article in the National Intelligence Daily¹

[*article number not declassified*]

Washington, August 30, 1980

USSR-PAKISTAN: Increased Soviet Pressure

Moscow appears to be increasing its diplomatic and propaganda pressure on Pakistan. (*classification marking not declassified*)

In his speech yesterday, President Brezhnev again accused Pakistan of allowing itself to be used as the principal channel of support for

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—August 1980, NIDs. Top Secret; [*codeword and handling restriction not declassified*].

Afghan "counterrevolutionaries."² Soviet media in recent days have sought to heighten Islamabad's fears of Soviet meddling in Pakistani internal affairs by emphasizing the alleged widespread domestic opposition to President Zia's Afghan policy. (*classification marking not declassified*)

[*less than 1 line not declassified*] Soviet threats against Pakistan, often via third parties, also have resumed. [*6 lines, classification marking, codeword, and handling restriction not declassified*]

Moscow's increased pressure on Islamabad may stem from a belief that the Pakistanis are increasing their support to the Afghan insurgency. In recent months, the insurgents appear to have received heavier weapons and to be using them with greater effectiveness. Moscow could also be reacting to the Pakistani crackdown on Soviet diplomatic and propaganda activity inside Pakistan and could be seeking to dissuade Pakistan from taking the lead in condemning the USSR at forthcoming UN and Islamic Conference meetings. (*classification marking not declassified*)

The new Soviet Ambassador in Islamabad reportedly has been instructed to inform the Pakistanis that Moscow will provide substantial economic and military assistance to Pakistan and will encourage Afghanistan to recognize the disputed Pakistani-Afghan border if Zia will negotiate with the regime in Kabul. (*classification marking, codeword, and handling restriction not declassified*)

² In his speech at Alma-Ata on August 29, Brezhnev gave an overview of world affairs. Concerning Afghanistan, he affirmed Soviet readiness to negotiate a political settlement. (Anthony Austin, "Brezhnev Urges U.S. to Aid Normalization," *New York Times*, August 30, 1980, p. 3)

314. Report Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research¹

Report No. 1453

Washington, September 8, 1980

(U) CHINESE AND US OBJECTIVES IN SOUTHWEST ASIA*Summary*

(C) China and the US have some common objectives in Southwest Asia, the most important of which is coordination of international efforts to oppose Soviet actions in Afghanistan and prevent further destabilization of the area. During recent months Beijing has consulted extensively with Washington on the Southwest Asian situation, and Washington has expressed support for certain Chinese policies. The US has agreed, for example, that the Chinese should encourage Pakistan and Iran to coordinate their efforts to oppose the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. It has also agreed with Beijing's attempts to improve ties with New Delhi and advise Southwest Asian states to compose their differences and move toward regional security cooperation.

(S) But China displays a considerably more confrontationist style toward the Soviet Union than does the United States. Beijing has pressed the US in recent months to adopt policies, such as security guarantees to Pakistan and military support to the Afghan resistance, that Washington considers unwise. Other differences are evident between Chinese and US policy perspectives. For example, Beijing has made clear that its confidence in US perceptiveness and resolve is low and that China fears that US action in Iran, or inaction in Afghanistan, will encourage Soviet aggression.

(S) Thus, despite China's statements that it is willing to take parallel actions in Southwest Asia when Sino-US views are identical, as a practical matter it has been careful to avoid too close an identification with even those US policies it fully supports.

(C) The US has preferred to pursue Sino-US cooperation in the form of agreements and mutual consultation rather than by joint action. Indeed, owing to differing views of the Soviet Union and to China's emergence as a regional power, the confluence of Chinese and American objectives in Southwest Asia could prove to be a temporary phenomenon.

[Omitted here is the body of the report.]

¹ Source: Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Subject Files, Lot 90D328, Box 1, China-U.S. Relations. Secret; Exdis; Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals; Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor Consultants; Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator; [additional handling restriction not declassified]. Drafted by Lillian Harris (INR) and approved by Carol Baumann (INR).

315. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 9, 1980, 1–3 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Alexander Bessmertnykh, Minister-Counselor, Soviet Embassy
Marshall Bremant, NSC Staff Member

The Elections. After some mutual comparison of recent vacation travels—his in the Baltic and mine in California and Arizona—the conversation turned to the current campaign. As far as the USSR was concerned, it made little difference who won in November, Bessmertnykh said. When I expressed surprise at this statement, given Governor Reagan's position on the Soviet Union and on a whole range of security issues, Bessmertnykh conceded that the President was logically the preferable candidate for Moscow because of his approach to arms control questions. "Reagan directly opposes SALT, Carter does not," Bessmertnykh said. But as seen from Moscow the difference between the two candidates on defense matters is unimportant. Soviet defense analysts feel that the Carter Administration has done as much as any American government can do to increase defense expenditures and strongly doubt that Reagan would allocate more for defense over the next two fiscal years than Carter has, Bessmertnykh said, and particularly if he cuts taxes. (C)

It is true, Bessmertnykh continued, that a sober and straightforward comparison of the positions which the two candidates have adopted would seem to make Carter preferable for us. But speaking entirely informally and off the record, it is simply a fact that the President is viscerally disliked in Moscow and that this dislike is widely shared both by the general Soviet public and by official circles. There were two recent events that strongly influenced this Soviet attitude. The first was the decision to try and implement a world-wide boycott of the Olympics. This was very bad, and it was deeply resented because it was not seen as a serious way for the superpowers to do business. In fact, it engendered a feeling of national resentment within the Soviet populace, who were then extremely gratified at the great success of the Olympics. The other matter which was a subject of great irritation within the USSR was the President's statement that Brezhnev had lied

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 84, USSR: 9/80. Secret. The meeting took place in the Soviet Embassy.

to him over the hot line.² It received attention at high levels. It was only after this that the Soviet media was allowed to portray the President any way it chose. (C)

This was extremely shortsighted, I replied, and was not appropriate behavior for a great power. I have been reading the Soviet press for twenty years and I had never seen Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, or Ford castigated in such terms as the Soviet press has adopted toward the President. This was foolish not only because of the umbrage which American officials feel when we read such distortions, but in terms of the effect which such tendentious reporting can have within the USSR itself. I find it really deplorable, I said. (C)

Bessmertnykh answered that he entirely agreed with me. Within his memory he also had never seen anything like it. It was unnecessary and gratuitous and he had personally complained about it to Moscow, characterizing it as an unwise policy. But once Soviet journalists are given their head in a matter like this, they can really go to extremes. And the constant barbs and pricking points which have been directed at the USSR since this administration took over have had their effect, he added. (C)

I asked whether the Soviet Embassy keeps in touch with Reagan's foreign policy advisers. They had made no attempt to do so, Bessmertnykh replied, although a Soviet diplomat had attended Richard Allen's briefing for the diplomatic corps. The point of the briefing, according to Bessmertnykh, was to reassure foreign diplomats that the Reagan administration would adopt a responsible course of action in world affairs. In any case, the Soviet embassy had been in contact with a great many Republicans during previous administrations and was sure that such acquaintanceships could be renewed in short order. US-Soviet relations are the most important elements of international relations, Bessmertnykh said, and the Soviets were confident that they could work with any American administration, no matter who was President. (C)

Afghanistan. Turning to Afghanistan, Bessmertnykh stressed that the image being conveyed in the United States of the Soviets being "mired" in a hopeless Vietnam-like mess in Afghanistan was totally incorrect and very unfortunate. It leads to a widespread hope that Soviet forces would soon be withdrawn and all talk of a Soviet with-

² For the exchange of hotline messages, see Documents 113 and 114. In his press conference on April 13, Carter, noting several nations' calls for Soviet troop withdrawal, said: "We would support this effort. But the Soviets, contrary to the assurance given to me by Brezhnev and given to, I know, at least, President Giscard by Brezhnev, have not withdrawn their troops. In my judgement, they have no inclination to withdraw their troops; they've shown no evidence of that." (*Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81*, Book I, p. 674)

drawal is illusory, he said. It will simply not take place, except perhaps in the very distant future. To base United States policy on the hope of achieving a near term withdrawal was, to say the least, ill-advised. Such a policy has the effect of freezing US-Soviet relations for the indefinite future. Furthermore, the repeated insistence on a "transition" period in various letters from Washington to Moscow on this subject really raises hackles in the upper levels of the foreign ministry, including Gromyko. By "transition" you obviously mean the replacement of the Babrak Karmal government. But Babrak is stronger every day. There is not the slightest chance of the Soviet Union abandoning him. If you think otherwise, then the intelligence you are receiving is highly suspect. (S)

Everything we receive, from whatever source—including various statements made by the Kabul Regime itself—contradicts the assertion that Babrak is growing stronger, I replied. Not only did he not seem to be in control of the country, but his dominance of the Party was very much in doubt. Our intelligence analysts believe that the Khalq faction of the Party clearly outnumbered Babrak's Parchamists. It was therefore our assumption that if the Soviet Union withdrew its support, Babrak would immediately be thrown out on his ear. In any case, it seems apparent to us that Babrak entirely lacks a popular base, and only has the support of a miniscule percentage of the population. (S)

People used to say the same thing about the Bolsheviks, Bessmertnykh rejoined. I am no expert in this area, but I can assure you that the intelligence we receive is encouraging. We control a great deal more of the countryside than your press would have you believe. It is obvious to us that the United States will have to accept this sooner or later. In order to achieve a resolution of the situation, you will have to stop supporting rebel elements through some of your Muslim friends. Once the rebels stop receiving outside assistance the problem is resolved. During the Vietnam War the USSR adopted a wise policy of initiating and continuing on with an era of detente no matter what was taking place in Southeast Asia. (S)

The Soviet Union should recognize, I replied, that we are exercising enormous restraint in Afghanistan. If the United States wished to upgrade the equipment, the training, and the overall effectiveness of the Muslim forces over what they are at present, it could do so easily. As for the Vietnam War, it was the USSR which supplied the withdrawal for the Vietnamese to inflict enormous casualties, including 45,000 dead, on United States forces. It was therefore not the Soviet Union which exercised restraint in carrying on with detente during the Vietnam War, but rather the United States. (S)

In any case, in Afghanistan all we ask is that you accept reality and not base policy on wishful thinking, said Bessmertnykh. There

may be those within the United States bureaucracy who argue that it is in your interest to see the Soviets “mired down” in Afghanistan. We had people like that in Moscow who made the same argument regarding the United States during the Vietnam War. But the whole thrust of our policy was nevertheless to end that war. We behaved as a superpower should, Bessmertnykh said. You think that you will be able to get these people to work together. But it cannot be done. We had to deal with our own Basmachi rebellion, which lasted all through the 20’s.³ These are the same people. One simply cannot trust them or get them to work together. They will lie to you. They will take your money and they will not keep a bargain. We know that. We could use money to buy them out if we wanted to. But we do not intend to do so because we have great experience with them and know they are totally untrustworthy. We have told you repeatedly that our action in Afghanistan is limited in time and in scope and that it is unrelated to any other country or any other region. You should accept our statements and work constructively to find a solution to the current impasse between us. Afghanistan in no sense infringes on the interests of the United States. (S)

What many observers, and not just those within the United States, fear about the Soviet adventure in Afghanistan, I replied, is that if it is successful, if it is regarded by the Soviet leadership, and the Soviet military, and the Soviet foreign policy bureaucracy as having been a great success, then it will inescapably become a precedent for the USSR and an argument to encourage similar actions in other places. Several Soviet officials have asserted in the context of Afghanistan that there will be “no more Allendes.” Given the Soviet military buildup, the marked increase in its ability to project its forces to distant places, and the volatility of the world of the eighties, this type of irresponsible statement must give any observer of the USSR pause. If Moscow could contemplate taking the same kind of action in a place as far away as Chile as it did in Afghanistan, then this will inevitably lead to the kind of confrontation that neither of us desires. (S)

Soviet policy has been clearly enunciated, Bessmertnykh rejoined. You should not place too much significance on isolated remarks taken out of context. We realize, of course, that you have painted yourself into a corner on Afghanistan and that it is very difficult for the Carter Administration to take the kind of actions that will lead to a constructive resolution of the problem of restoration of US-Soviet relations. This is true for us as well. Nevertheless, we cannot remain isolated from each

³ See footnote 2, Document 275.

other forever, and if we cannot return to business-as-usual, then at least let us return to business. (S)

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Afghanistan.]

316. Analysis Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research¹

Washington, September 12, 1980

1. PAKISTAN: PRESIDENT ZIA STANDING FIRM ON AFGHANISTAN

Pakistan, with a view toward the Islamic Foreign Ministers meeting in New York, October 6–7, is searching for ways to retain the initiative on the Afghan crisis. The three-man Islamic Conference Standing Committee (ICSC) is no longer a useful vehicle. Pakistan's diplomatic activity has led the British to conclude that Zia may be wobbling, a view we do not share. While Pakistan is deeply concerned about the degree of support that Islamabad would receive if the Soviets pressed it both militarily and diplomatically, Zia and Foreign Minister Shahi are not prepared to abandon their goals of a broad-based regime in Kabul and the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

Pakistan is focusing on action in the UN to keep pressure on the Soviets to withdraw their troops. Islamabad feels compelled to come up with feasible proposals since Pakistan, which inscribed the Afghan issue on the agenda of the UN General Assembly, does not want an "unreliable" nonaligned state (e.g., Cuba or India) to seize the initiative.

Current Pakistani thinking, as reflected in [*less than 1 line not declassified*] seems to be that the best alternative to the now defunct ICSC is a small international conference under UN aegis. This conference might include the five permanent Security Council members, Afghanistan's regional neighbors, and representatives from the Karmal regime.

The Romanians, who have been trying to obtain agreement on holding an international conference, told the Pakistanis that the Soviets could accept the notion of such a meeting. Zia and Shahi believe that Moscow has tacitly accepted this scheme.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Daily CIA Brief File, Box 30, 9/12/80–9/17/80. Top Secret; [*codeword not declassified*]. Carter initialed "C" in the upper right corner.

It is not clear, however, if the Soviets would go along with the type of conference that the Pakistanis are advocating. The Soviet Ambassador in Islamabad told the Pakistanis that his government rejected the concept of an international conference; he reiterated the initial Soviet opposition to the Islamic Conference resolution in May proposing such a gathering. Among the objectives of the Pakistani diplomatic delegation scheduled to arrive in Moscow this weekend (and led by Foreign Secretary Piracha) is clarification of Soviet views.

317. Article in the President's Daily Brief¹

Washington, September 15, 1980

AFGHANISTAN: THE MILITARY SITUATION

In the 10 months since the invasion, combat between Soviet and insurgent forces in Afghanistan has increased considerably. Neither side probably will be able to inflict any major military setback before the end of good weather in late October. If insurgent claims of impending food shortages for the resistance are accurate, the winter combat season could pose more problems for them than for the Soviets.

The Insurgents

The information on the condition and morale of the insurgents is hard to come by and our judgments are necessarily somewhat tentative.

Some Pakistani officials believe the insurgents may be losing their will to resist, but this view is not shared by Zia and is not borne out by the evidence available to us. To be sure, the insurgents are no better organized than when the fighting began, and they are taking heavier casualties. But there are also more of them, they have better weapons, and they have learned how to use them. Moreover, they usually confront the Soviets only when they enjoy the military advantage.

**Government control in many of Afghanistan's provincial cities is more tenuous than before the invasion. US journalists who visited Herat in the last week of August, for example, confirmed [1 line not declassified] that the*

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 7, Afghanistan Crisis—September 1980, PDBs. Top Secret; For the President Only. The full version of this President's Daily Brief was not filed with this collection. The article printed here was found in this form.

city virtually belongs to the insurgents. Insurgent activity in or near Jalalabad, Qandahar, and Ghazni has been intense, despite the government's imposition of martial law. Soviet forces have been used to blockade provincial towns but security in the towns themselves has been left primarily to the Afghans, who usually have failed at the task.**

The Afghan Army

[1½ lines not declassified] there have been roughly 30,000 Afghan Army desertions or defections out of a preinvasion total of 80,000. Afghan Government casualties since December reportedly have been only 1,800—at least a third lower than our most conservative estimate of Soviet casualties. This suggests that even those troops remaining have been reluctant to fight.**

The Soviets are upgrading the Afghans' equipment and have stepped up political and military training, but improvement is likely to be slow. Last month the Soviets reportedly were again forced to confiscate equipment—particularly antitank and antiaircraft weapons—because too much of it was falling into insurgent hands. Moscow has also had to scrap—for the time being—plans to expand the Afghan Army. It is also reorganizing existing divisions because of the dearth of Afghan manpower.

The Soviets

The decline in Afghan Army performance and the increase in insurgent activity has forced the USSR to assume more and more of the burden of counterinsurgency. Beginning last June, Soviet forces stepped up operations, presumably hoping to bring the Afghan Government some surcease from insurgent pressure.

**The Soviets had not operated long in Afghanistan before they concluded that their forces were inadequately organized, trained, and equipped for a guerrilla conflict. [8 lines not declassified]

**Helicopters have been valuable. The number in use in Afghanistan has quadrupled to some 240 since the invasion.*

**The insurgents initially were terrified of the helicopter gunships, but in recent months they appear to have improved their tactics. In July they reportedly shot down at least 14. The Soviets are improving the armor and weaponry on the helicopters and are using flares to divert heat-seeking missiles. [4 lines not declassified]

Soviet efforts to curtail insurgent traffic have been concentrated along the Pakistani border in the Konar Valley region. They have laid more than 60 minefields, established an acoustic sensor detection system, and conducted two major and several minor sweep operations. Even so, insurgents in the area still are quite active.

**Since early August, Soviet units have been conducting their most sustained effort to date to seal the Iranian-Afghan border near Herat and to eliminate insurgent bands in northwestern Afghanistan. The forces appear to

*have run into more resistance than anticipated; three additional battalions have been sent to the area since the operation began.***

Other Soviet sweep operations are currently under way in the Panjshir Valley northeast of Kabul and near Soviet garrisons in Ghazni, Jalalabad, Feyzabad, Qandahar, and Qonduz.

Prospects

The last two winters in Afghanistan brought the government no relief from insurgent pressures; in fact the insurgency grew steadily. The coming winter probably will impair the activity of both sides. Soviet forces will confront the insurgents with a kind of sustained military pressure not heretofore experienced. This, coupled with possible food shortages, could ultimately affect the insurgents' ability to continue the struggle at its present level.

318. Editorial Note

On the morning of September 15, 1980, Soviet Army Private Alexander V. Kruglov arrived at the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan apparently requesting that the Embassy provide him asylum until he could depart either for the United States or another country. At the time, no Russian-speaking officials were on hand to communicate with Kruglov. During a meeting in Washington later that day, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs David Newsom told Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin that the United States wanted to be responsive to the Kruglov case, while at the same time it sought to ensure that the matter would not “unduly aggravate U.S.-Soviet relations.” Newsom further noted that the issue should be resolved under the auspices of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and that the United States held the Soviet Union responsible for the overall security and safety of the U.S. Embassy in Kabul. Newsom reported that the Soviet Ambassador to Afghanistan, Fakriat Tabeev, and U.S. Chargé d’Affaires Hawthorne Mills were meeting in Kabul regarding the situation, and should the Ambassador request a meeting with Kruglov, the United States would be amenable under appropriate circumstances. Dobrynin responded that he knew nothing of the Kruglov matter, but would check in with Moscow. (Telegram 245452 to Kabul, September 15; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 2, Afghanistan: 5/80–1/81)

On the evening of September 17, Newsom and Dobrynin met again to discuss the Kruglov matter. Newsom asked Dobrynin to relay the

request that the Soviet Union use its influence to compel the Afghan Government to remove a blockade of the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, and cease subjecting Embassy personnel entering and exiting the premises to searches, in an apparent effort to ensure that Kruglov would not leave surreptitiously. Dobrynin protested that this request should be made directly to the Afghan Government. Newsom repeated his earlier desire that this issue need not damage U.S.-Soviet relations, which in his assessment were "already strained." Newsom reported that once a Russian-speaking U.S. officer arrived in Kabul it would be possible to arrange a meeting between Kruglov and Soviet officials. (Telegram 248878 to Kabul, September 18; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR and East/West, Bremen, Subject File, Box 46, Afghanistan: 7-12/80)

An item in the President's Daily Brief, September 19, noted that [*text not declassified*] either Soviet paratroopers or a Soviet-trained Afghan counterterrorist group might attempt to shoot or capture Kruglov if he was observed outside the U.S. Embassy. The CIA Station in Kabul thought any military response would be limited to preventing Kruglov's removal from Embassy grounds; Chargé Mills believed an assault on the Embassy was unlikely because Kruglov was not "important enough to warrant such a blatant violation of diplomatic immunity." (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977-81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—September 1980, PDBs)

In preparation for the meeting between Kruglov and Soviet officials, the Department of State instructed the Embassy in Kabul that it should "not lead Kruglov in any direction" and should remind him that any decision he made was his alone. The Department further instructed that a meeting should not take place if it was possible that Kruglov would attempt to bargain for his safety in exchange for his pledge not to reveal Soviet military secrets. Such a bargain was "extremely dangerous not only to him but also to the future of the Mission" because such a bargain would only "increase Soviet determination to get him back at all costs." Should a meeting occur, Kruglov should be made aware of his options: he could remain in the Embassy, leave with the Soviet officials, or delay until he made his decision. Kruglov should be permitted to leave with the Soviets, the Department instructed, only if Embassy officials were convinced he was doing so on his own accord and was willing to provide a handwritten statement attesting to this fact. (Telegram 250588 to Kabul, September 20; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880025-0346)

On September 21, Kruglov met with Robert F. Ober, a senior Political Counselor in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, who had travelled to

Afghanistan to deal with the matter. Kruglov agreed to a meeting with Soviet officials later that day. He agreed he would not attempt to make a bargain for his safety in exchange for withholding military secrets, and Ober assured him that U.S. insistence on this point was of benefit to both Kruglov's well-being and the security of the Embassy. Kruglov shared that he was considering bargaining for Soviet assurance that he would be allowed to emigrate from the USSR subsequent to serving whatever sentence the authorities handed him. Ober counseled that Kruglov should attempt to publicize whatever assurances he received for his emigration to ensure they would be met following his sentence. (Telegram 252721 to Moscow, September 21; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 84, USSR: 9/80)

Kruglov's meeting with Soviet officials took place as scheduled, September 21, in the U.S. Embassy in Kabul. The U.S. side was led by Chargé Mills, and Ambassador Tabeev led the Soviet side. Before Kruglov was brought in, the Soviets produced a tape recording of a woman they claimed was Kruglov's grandmother, as well as letters from friends and relatives of Kruglov. Finding nothing objectionable, Ober approved their presentation to Kruglov. When Kruglov was brought in, Ambassador Tabeev addressed him: "We are surprised by your actions. Please tell us what happened." (Telegram 252736 to Moscow, September 21; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 84, USSR: 9/80)

Kruglov responded: "What prompted me was the bad relations between our officers and enlisted men. Before I came into the army I was convinced by what I had read and seen on the television program 'Serve the Soviet Union,' that it would be a wonderful life. It all sounded good. But it turned out to be difficult in fact. It is difficult for me to discuss this, but I could tell you lots about the humiliations and indignities forced upon Soviet troops." (Ibid.)

Noting that he too served in the military, Tabeev empathized with Kruglov's complaints and promised that he could return to the Soviet Union and resume his academic studies without punishment, on the basis that he had not actually deserted the army, nor had he sought asylum. Tabeev further offered to personally correct abuses Kruglov had suffered while serving in Afghanistan, and both Tabeev and Kruglov expressed their appreciation for the U.S. Embassy's assistance in allowing the meeting to occur. (Ibid.)

Upon reflection, Kruglov decided that he would leave with the Soviet officials. Mills asked: "Was the decision made without pressure, of your own free will?" Kruglov replied affirmatively and committed his response to a handwritten statement. Following this exchange, Mills asked Tabeev what could be done about the Afghan Government's blockade of the Embassy. Tabeev gave a "double guarantee" of his

pledge to Kruglov and expressed his “hope that the blockade issue would improve following a talk with his Afghan counterparts. (Ibid.)

In telegram 2670 from Kabul, September 23, the Embassy reported that the Afghan Government’s barricades surrounding the Embassy were “magically” removed less than an hour after Kruglov’s departure on September 21, thus concluding the episode. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800456–0260) No telegrams reporting on Kruglov’s subsequent treatment by Soviet authorities were found.

319. Telegram From Secretary of State Muskie’s Delegation to the Department of State¹

New York, September 26, 1980, 0440Z

Secto 8020. Subject: (C) Muskie-Gromyko Bilateral.

1. C—Entire text.

2. The Secretary’s bilateral meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in New York took place the morning of September 25 at the Soviet Mission.² Late that afternoon Ambassador Shulman provided a

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 84, USSR: 9/80. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Priority to Moscow, Canberra, Tokyo, Wellington, USNATO, USUN, Brussels, Copenhagen, Bonn, London, Paris, Oslo, Reykjavik, Athens, Ankara, Ottawa, Rome, Luxembourg, The Hague, and Lisbon. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Muskie was in New York to attend the UN General Assembly meeting.

² A summary memorandum of conversation of the meeting is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 302. In preparation for his discussion with Gromyko, Muskie exchanged memoranda with Carter concerning a range of issues affecting U.S.-Soviet relations. He wrote Carter, September 13, regarding Afghanistan: “I intend to emphasize the continuing damage the invasion is doing to the international environment and to the prospects for relieving bilateral tensions. I will stress that Moscow should be under no false illusions that we will be prepared to return to business as usual as long as the occupation continues. I will review with Gromyko our exchange of letters on Afghanistan, making clear that, for us, the central element in any satisfactory settlement must be a complete Soviet withdrawal. I will nonetheless reiterate our continued preparedness to explore the possibilities for a peaceful settlement which takes into account the legitimate concerns of all parties.” In the left margin of that memorandum, Carter wrote: “Neutral—No dealing c Babrak = transitional arrangements, ok.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat (ES), Sensitive and Super Sensitive File, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, Box 3, ES Super Sensitive 1980 (4)) In a memorandum to Muskie, September 22, Brzezinski wrote: “The President would like you to register that our objective is a *neutral* Afghanistan; that to achieve that end we would be prepared to consider some ‘transitional arrangements,’ designed to ensure stability as Soviet forces withdraw; and that we cannot deal with the Babrak regime since it is a regime artificially maintained by a foreign power.” (Ibid.)

briefing at USUN for Allied Reps from NATO, ANZUS, and Japan. (All were represented except the Turks, who were unable to attend because of schedule conflicts.) Highlights of the briefing follow:

[Omitted here is information unrelated to Afghanistan.]

Afghanistan

8. What Gromyko said was basically no different from his earlier statements on Afghanistan. He expressed support for the May 14 Afghan proposals and stressed the importance of getting talks going between Afghanistan and Pakistan and Iran.³ There was some uncertainty as to whether he was still referring to two sets of bilateral talks as previously, or whether he was suggesting tri-lateral negotiations. He stated that, if an agreement proved possible between those three countries and there were an end to outside interference and guarantees, then and only then would there be a withdrawal of Soviet forces. Gromyko also commented that large groups of invaders from outside had been eliminated but that there were still small groups which were infiltrating into Afghanistan and committing acts of terrorism.

9. Referring to possible UN initiative on Afghanistan, Gromyko said he saw no need for an international conference. He said that if Pakistan was willing to enter into direct negotiations with the Babrak regime, he had the impression—while he could not speak for Afghanistan—that the Afghans might be prepared to move in the disputed border regions—thus implying a possible Afghanistan willingness to recognize the Durand Line.

10. The Secretary made the appropriate responses. He pointed out that, so long as Soviet troops remained in Afghanistan, the situation was not only dangerous for the stability of the region but also contributed to international tensions. It also made ratification of SALT II more difficult.⁴

[Omitted here is information unrelated to Afghanistan.]

Muskie

³ See Document 275.

⁴ A memorandum from Bremont, September 26, called two items to Brzezinski's attention regarding the meeting. Bremont was "struck" by Gromyko's statement that "large scale gangs no longer cross the border" in Afghanistan, which Bremont took as a sign that the Soviets were "relatively satisfied at the efficacy of the measures they have taken to seal off the Pakistan border and are pleased at the improving security situation in Kabul and other population centers." Characterizing Gromyko's points as "predictable propaganda," Bremont also noted the only "modestly new departure" in Soviet policy with respect to Southwest Asia: Gromyko's assertion that "Pakistan should have no apprehensions about Afghanistan territorial claims against them." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR and East/West, Bremont, Subject File, Box 61, Afghanistan: 11/79–1/80)

320. Intelligence Information Cable Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

[*cable number not declassified*]

Washington, September 26, 1980

COUNTRY

Pakistan/Afghanistan/USSR

SUBJECT

1. Views of President Zia as to Reason for Soviet Helicopter Attack Against Pakistan Border Post
2. Report of Wreckage of Downed Soviet Helicopter Involved in This Attack
[*less than 1 line not declassified*]

SOURCE

[*1 line not declassified*]

1. Pakistan President Zia ul-Haq believes that the attack of 26 September 1980 by Soviet helicopter gunships against the Pakistan border post in the Mohmand Agency east of the Konar River is a deliberate attempt to intimidate Zia just prior to his departure for the United Nations and his talks with President Carter.² Pakistan's Interservices Intelligence Directorate commented that the attack might also have been stimulated by Zia's recent interview with a *New York Times* correspondent, in which he predicted the Soviets would take advantage of the Iraq-Iran fighting.³

2. The Directorate also commented that the Afghan insurgents had achieved a major success a few days ago in an attack on Khandahar airfield, when a dozen Soviet aircraft were destroyed on the ground and many Soviets killed. ([*less than 1 line not declassified*] comment: This incident may have influenced the Soviet decision to hit at Pakistan.) (Headquarters comment: There is no independent evidence that this insurgent attack took place.)

3. The wreckage of a helicopter downed during the attack is located only a few hundred yards from the Ghakhai border post (3450N 7117E). It appears that the Soviet helicopters tried to remain on the Afghan side of the border while firing on the border post on the Pakistan side

¹ Source: Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 1, Cross-Border Operations—Pakistan. Secret; Immediate; [*handling restriction not declassified*].

² The memorandum of conversation of Carter's meeting with Zia is printed as Document 326.

³ See Michael T. Kaufman, "Pakistan Predicts Gains By Soviets in a Long War," *New York Times*, September 25, 1980, p. A18.

of the border. (See [*less than 1 line not declassified*] for a previous report on the Soviet attack.)⁴

4. ACQ: [*1 line not declassified*]

5. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Dissem: [*6 lines not declassified*]

⁴ Not found. An article in the National Intelligence Daily, September 27, characterized the incident as the “most serious” on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border since the Soviet intervention. The article also included information from [*text not declassified*] who claimed the attack was undertaken by six Soviet-built MI-24 helicopters, which inflicted “several casualties.” Anti-aircraft fire downed one of the helicopters, which landed in Afghan territory. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—December 1979, NIDs) In telegram 9982 from Islamabad, September 28, the Embassy relayed comments from a senior official in Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs casting doubt on the possibility that Afghanistan had a sufficient number of pilots to carry out the attack and indicating that, whether the pilots were Soviet or Afghan, the official had “no doubt” the attack was intentional. (Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 1, Cross-Border Operations—Pakistan) A report, September 29, noted that evidence based on sensitive communications intelligence “strongly suggested” that the attack was undertaken by Soviet pilots. (*Ibid.*) A CIA intelligence information cable, September 27, was attached to a memorandum from Thornton to Brzezinski, September 30, which responded to a tasking order to determine the Pakistani reaction to the helicopter attack. Thornton noted that Pakistan was taking the incident “in stride” and was “pleased that they shot down a Soviet gunship.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Meetings File, Box 86, Sensitive XX: 9/80)

321. Night Note for Secretary of State Muskie¹

Washington, September 29, 1980

SUBJECT

Aid to Afghan Rebels

After the regular meeting with Agha Shahi this morning, I took him aside to raise the question [*less than 1 line not declassified*] interest in providing help to the Afghan rebels.² Shahi replied that Pakistan was not in a position to be a channel for any further aid to the Afghan rebels. Then, with some bitterness, he said that if the European nations wanted to help they should maintain the political and economic measures against the Soviet Union. In his words "they have broken the political front". He mentioned particularly Schmidt's visit to the Soviet Union, the Giscard-Brezhnev meeting, and the continued extension of credits.³ He said President Zia would probably discuss this frankly with you during the meeting Friday.⁴ I encouraged him to have Zia also speak frankly to the Europeans.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs David Newsom, Lot 81D154, Box 14, Afghanistan. Secret. Drafted by Newsom. At the top of the note is the typed note: "Mr. Secretary: The following has been phoned in to Washington. DDN."

² Although the account of this meeting is presumably from Hummel reporting from Islamabad, no corroborating telegram was found. On October 7, Brzezinski requested that Turner [*text not declassified*] to assist the Afghan insurgent effort. Turner "really questioned" this because, in his view, it increased the problem of leaks as more people would gain knowledge of the covert program. (Memorandum for the Record, October 8; Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00112R: Subject Files, Box 15, DCI/DDCI, Memrecs/Memos/Agendas & Brzezinski/Aaron Meetings, January–December 1980)

³ Schmidt's visit to the Soviet Union took place June 30–July 1. Quoting *Pravda*, the Embassy reported portions of Schmidt's June 30 dinner speech in telegram 10494 from Moscow, July 1. Regarding Afghanistan, Schmidt called for withdrawal of Soviet forces, "but said nothing about cessation of all forms of aggression against Afghanistan." The telegram noted that said aggression was the basis for Soviet military intervention, at the request of the Afghan Government. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800317–0303) The meeting between Giscard and Brezhnev took place in Warsaw, May 19. Giscard's personal account of the meeting was reported in telegram 16199 from Paris, May 20. According to Giscard, the Afghanistan issue dominated the meeting, and he impressed upon Brezhnev that the West accepted neither the legitimacy of the Afghan Government nor Soviet actions there. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870111–1706)

⁴ See Document 326.

322. Memorandum From Secretary of State Muskie to President Carter¹

Washington, September 29, 1980

SUBJECT

Relations with Pakistan: The Covert Dimension

We have an unusual two-tiered relationship with Pakistan—overt and covert. On the overt level, we have a number of differences and Pakistan seeks to keep some distance between us in order to sustain its non-aligned and Islamic credentials. As you know, however, we cooperate closely in a number of covert activities, [1 line not declassified] and the program to assist the Afghan insurgents. Pakistan is absolutely key to our ability to keep pressure on the Soviets through the insurgents since it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to channel arms and supplies through any other route. Without Pakistan's support, the insurgents probably could not continue for long.

President Zia has been very supportive and personally keeps a close eye on the covert programs through direct supervision of the responsible agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID). He has also carefully kept the covert program quite separate from most other aspects of our relations, never linking continued covert cooperation to military sales, economic aid, etc. However, some months ago he did choose to use the ISID chief as a channel to express his uncertainty about the nature of the American security commitment to Pakistan.²

In discussions in late August with CIA's Deputy Director for Operations and Ambassador Hummel, Zia reaffirmed his intention to continue cooperation in assisting the insurgents, despite fairly heavy Soviet pressures.³ He indicated that he thought the current level of support to the insurgents was about right, implying that substantial increases could provoke serious Soviet reaction.

Zia has rigorously limited knowledge in his own government of our covert programs. He has made clear, for example, that the subject should not be raised with Foreign Minister Agha Shahi. Zia is extremely sensitive to leaks in Washington and has threatened to cease coopera-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, VIP Visit File, Box 11, Pakistan: President Zia-ul-Haq, 10/3/80: Briefing Book. Top Secret; Sensitive. No drafting information appears on the memorandum.

² See, for example, footnote 3, Document 209.

³ No record of these meetings was found.

tion if these recur. In public comment, the Pakistan Government officially denies that it is arming or assisting insurgents in Afghanistan, although it acknowledges that it cannot effectively control movement across the border by Afghan tribals.

Zia has asked our Station Chief in Islamabad to inform Washington that he does not intend to raise "sensitive intelligence cooperation projects" during his visit. We suggest that during your *private* meeting with Zia, you simply indicate your admiration for his willingness to support the Afghan insurgents and our intention to continue cooperation in ways and at a level agreeable to him and that you not go into details.⁴ Stan Turner's people will be standing by in the event that any detailed discussions are necessary.

⁴ See Document 326.

323. Interagency Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

[*memorandum number not declassified*] Washington, October 1980

[Omitted here are a title page, cover page, table of contents, preface, and a photograph.]

KEY JUDGMENTS

The USSR's invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 provided a rare opportunity to test the efficacy of the US warning system in situations involving substantial movements of the Soviets' armed forces outside their borders. Moreover, it afforded a chance to examine the behavior of the Soviet military in preparing for such an undertaking and to determine what implications this might have for the Intelligence Community's capacity to provide warning in other situations, especially one involving a Warsaw Pact move against NATO. [*classification marking not declassified*]

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff Files. Top Secret; [*codeword and handling restriction not declassified*]. The preface to the memorandum notes: "This Interagency Intelligence Memorandum was commissioned by the Director of Central Intelligence in response to a request by the National Security Council for an assessment of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to determine if there were any general implications for the US warning system or any particular implications for the system's ability to warn of a Warsaw Pact move against NATO."

From the outset, it was recognized that the conclusions of this study could not be pressed too far. Both the performance of the Intelligence Community in providing warning of the invasion of Afghanistan and the applicability to other theaters of the lessons learned in that situation are very much affected by the particular circumstances involved. In contrast to a Soviet move against NATO, the situation for which the US warning system is largely designed, the invasion of Afghanistan required only a fraction of the USSR's military assets, was not opposed at the outset, did not involve a certainty of confrontation with US forces, and occurred in a region where US intelligence collection capabilities were limited. (*classification marking not declassified*)

These limitations notwithstanding, the examination of the Soviet approach to invading Afghanistan and the Intelligence Community's success in giving prior notice of this event have yielded some valuable lessons:

—Despite the unique circumstances surrounding this operation, the Soviets' behavior was essentially in keeping with US estimates of their doctrine for mobilization and the initiation of hostilities. This finding is important because the success of any warning system is dependent on the extent to which an adversary's behavior conforms to expectations. (*classification marking not declassified*)

—The system of warning indicators that is set up to detect potentially important changes in the Soviet/Warsaw Pact military posture provided a structured approach to and a sound evidentiary base for the Intelligence Community's conclusion that the USSR was preparing to introduce substantial forces into Afghanistan. The fact that the system worked in this unique situation provides increased assurance of its usefulness in other theaters, particularly in the NATO area. (*classification marking not declassified*)

—The US intelligence collection system proved equal to the task of providing analysts with sufficiently detailed, accurate, and timely data to allow them to reach essentially correct conclusions about the military activities in the Soviet Union with respect to Afghanistan. Of particular note was the synergy of [*less than 1 line not declassified*] in this collection effort and the quality of the data collected, despite limitations on the resources available. (*classification marking and codeword not declassified*)

—The Intelligence Community's analysts met their basic responsibility in a situation of this sort by providing sufficient prior reporting to assure that no key policymaker should have been surprised by the invasion. The analysts were unable to forecast precisely the timing or the size of the Soviets' move, but gave warning at least 10 days beforehand that the USSR was prepared to invade. (*classification marking not declassified*)

In conclusion, the examination of the early phases of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan provides a basis for greater confidence in US intelligence estimates of Soviet doctrine with respect to initiating hostilities and in the capacity of the US Intelligence Commu-

nity to provide warning of such hostilities. (*[classification marking not declassified]*)

[Omitted here is the body of the memorandum.]

324. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, October 1, 1980

SUMMARY OF AFGHANISTAN COVERT ACTION PROGRAM

Since ordnance deliveries started on 4 January 1980, approximately [*amount not declassified*] worth of weapons have been delivered, or are en route, to the Afghan freedom fighters. (NOTE: The Paks prefer the term "freedom fighter" or "mujahidin" to insurgents.) Deliveries are limited principally to small arms and emphasize anti-armor and anti-air weapons. Examples of quantities:

- 10 thousand AK-47 rifles with 13 million rounds of ammunition
- 720 anti-tank rocket launchers (RPG-7) and 14 thousand rockets
- 15 thousand land mines
- 158 Soviet surface-to-air missiles. Initial effort to use weapons in Afghanistan was unsuccessful, probably due to gunner error. Retraining is underway.
- 200 heavy machine guns and 800,000 rounds of ammunition

Most of the equipment is of Soviet origin. There will be no dramatic change in the mix of ordnance in future deliveries, except that consistent with the Pak view of Afghanistan as a people's war ("Give an Afghan a weapon and you have a soldier"), deliveries of .303 Enfield rifles will be increased.

Reliable intelligence indicates the freedom fighters effective use of the weapons. Soviet helicopters continue to be lost to machine gun ground fire. Armored losses to mine and rocket attacks continue despite Soviet countermeasures. Independent photographic evidence confirms weapon distribution throughout the country. We share Zia's satisfaction with the level of the insurgency; it is widespread but of sufficient low intensity not to provoke rash Soviet overreaction.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, VIP Visit File, Box 11, Pakistan: President Zia-ul-Haq, 10/3/80: Briefing Book. Secret.

Zia prefers to be ignorant of Egyptian involvement. This should not be discussed. He is aware of and pleased with Saudi participation. We have never discussed specific finances with the Paks.

The Paks have been providing ordnance to the insurgents from their own stocks in addition to those we provide. This Pak action pre-dates our involvement. We are certain their volume does not exceed ours.

325. Information Cable Prepared in the Department of Defense¹

[*cable number not declassified*] Yokota, Japan, October 2, 1980, 0830Z

1. (U) Country: USSR (UR), Afghanistan (AF), Pakistan (PK)
2. (U) Title: Political and Military Aspects of the Situation in Afghanistan.
3. (U) Date of Info: 800729
4. (U) Orig: Det 1, 7602 AINTELG
5. (U) Req Refs: T-2C3-20376, G-OSG-0079, S-UAP-A0018, SD-T2C2-321, and SD IAG-100²
6. [5 lines not declassified]
7. ([*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*])

Summary: This report discusses political and military aspects of the Afghan situation as perceived by the Afghan guerrillas. It is divided into six general areas: (A) Soviet pacification/rapproachment efforts, (B) preparations for a protracted conflict, (C) counter-insurgency tactics, (D) feelings toward the Karmal government, (E) tacit support provided by the Government of Pakistan, and (F) relationships between guerrilla tribes and leaders.

8A. (U) Details:

(1) ([*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*]) Soviet pacification/rapproachment efforts. The guerrillas all expressed a strong hatred for Russians/Soviets. They spoke frequently of Soviet pacification/rapproachment efforts. These efforts have consisted of determined attempts to gain the support of majority sects/tribes while

¹ Source: Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 2, 14 Kabul Sitreps, PT 11. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. Sent for information to multiple military addressees, CIA, and the Department of State.

² None of the referenced cables was found.

completely annihilating the smaller minority sects. The guerrillas claim that the Soviets have begun giving aid to the Baluchis who want to achieve independence from Pakistan. As a consequence, the guerrillas have begun to encounter hostility from Baluchi tribes in Afghanistan. The guerrillas believe that the Baluchis are preparing to fight against the guerrillas and feel that the fighting will spread to Baluchistan. The guerrillas point out that with the Baluchis as allies, the Soviets would be able to attain their long sought access to the Indian Ocean through the Arabian Sea. There are also three sects along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border that support the current Afghan Government, i.e., Soviet control (NFI). The Soviets are trying to avoid at all costs a united opposition from the entire Afghan population and are using their own ethnic Asian and Arabic minorities as occupation troops in Afghanistan as a means of appeasing the Afghan populace. In spite of Soviet efforts, the guerrillas believe that they can counter pacification/rapprochement activities through high morale and strong anti-Soviet feelings.

(2) (*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*)
Preparations for a protracted conflict: The Soviets are preparing for a protracted war by occupying the cities and concentrating their troops there. They have allowed unrestricted movement of people between cities and throughout the rural areas. Neither the Soviets nor the guerrillas attack lines of communication and neither side is seriously disrupting the supply routes of the other. Both sides are currently engaged in harassment tactics while trying to win the support of the populace, particularly the city dwellers. The Soviets do not attack the guerrillas unless the guerrillas engage Soviet forces first. According to the guerrillas, the Soviets are not currently undertaking any large scale offensive actions due to international public opinion. The guerrillas are growing impatient with the lack of Soviet activity, but are resigned to a war of at least ten years duration.

(3) (*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*)
Counter-insurgency tactics: The guerrillas claim the Soviets are using napalm, but have little actual knowledge of napalm. They also claim the Soviets are changing troops frequently, replacing "inappropriate" (NFI) units with other units. The guerrillas deny that the Soviets have ever used paratroopers in Afghanistan. Although there have not been any major Soviet efforts to search out and destroy the guerrillas, they did attempt to surround the guerrillas in the mountains near Kabul during June of 1980. During this offensive, the Soviet helicopters dropped bombs, booby traps and mines along the guerrillas' rear supply routes near the Pakistan/Afghanistan border. According to the guerrillas, the approximately 100,000 Soviet troops and less than 30,000 Afghan Government troops are not enough to control all of Afghanistan, and for this reason, the Soviets have seized only the cities and will not attack unless attacked.

(4) (*[classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]*) Feelings toward Karmal government: The guerrillas claim they no longer hate Karmal and in fact have begun to think favorably of him and sympathize with him. They feel that after he attempted suicide he came to his senses and will no longer execute Afghan citizens as Amin and Taraki did.³ The guerrillas predict that the two possible successors to Karmal are Asadora Sakuwari (phonetic) of the Haruku (phonetic) sect (correct spelling believed to be “Assadullah Sawari” of the “Khalq” group) or Maamaddo Haan (phonetic) (possibly “Mohamad Han”) of the Uzbeki sect. Either of these two men would be acceptable. The guerrillas feel that the current Afghan administration has adopted the same political policies as the prior administration and that agricultural reform will not be achieved. They feel that the Karmal administration would resist a U.N. peacekeeping force, attempting to delay it until after guerrilla resistance had collapsed.

(5) (*[classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]*) Tacit support provided by the Government of Pakistan: The refugee/guerrillas are neither encouraged nor seriously discouraged from entering Pakistan by the Pakistani Government. Although Pakistani border patrols have been heavily increased, the refugee/guerrillas cross the border easily. The border near Tor Khan is only lightly guarded by the Pakistani Government and on the Afghan side is guarded by only two soldiers, one of whom is unarmed. Further, the border area in the vicinity of Tor Khan is only delineated by two strands of barbed wire and no fortifications or border patrols are observable. Thus, movement across the border is unimpeded and people and trade goods pass freely. According to the guerrillas, all Afghans become refugees upon entry into Pakistan. They become guerrillas when they return to Afghanistan. When Afghans reach receiving areas in Pakistan, they are processed and then bused to refugee camps. At the refugee camps, they are given four Pakistani rupees and an identification card with their photo on it. The refugees/guerrillas are permitted to move freely in and out of the refugee camps. Some refugee camps are also known as “guerrilla bases”. The term is used interchangeably for at least two “refugee camps” in Pakistan, one at Peshawar and one at Bajaur. Weapons are

³ The question of Karmal’s attempted suicide arose during a Department of State press conference, June 20, and again during a press background briefing conducted on Air Force One, June 25. During both exchanges, a reporter asked if rumors of Karmal’s attempted suicide were valid; in both cases the official response was that the United States could not verify the rumor. The Department summarized the first exchange in telegram 162876 to multiple posts, June 20. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800300–0515) The Embassy summarized the second exchange in telegram 9675 from Madrid, June 25. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800307–0310)

not supposed to be carried inside the camps, but instead are supposed to be left at refugee camp headquarters. Nevertheless, arms are carried openly in the camps. Only a few Pakistani officials and no guards are available to staff the camps. The guerrillas are even negotiating to establish a refugee government in Pakistan (NFI). There was no evidence of either any other support given to the refugees/guerrillas by the Pakistani Government or of any friction between the Pakistani Government and the refugee/guerrillas.

(6) (*[classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]*) Relationship between guerrilla tribes and leaders: The traditional fighting between the various Afghan tribes still continues. The guerrillas state that even if the Soviets were to pull out of Afghanistan and another government were established, the fighting would continue between sects/tribes. The guerrillas want to establish their own government. According to the source, the guerrillas do not presently have a leader who can unite the country as the intellectuals are all seeking asylum in Western countries. The guerrillas would only accept a leader who came from a royal family and who has been, and is now, a devout Muslim. People who might meet these requirements are Professor Rabani (phonetic), who is a leader of the Jemiato (phonetic) Islami sect, and Herumacharu (phonetic) (probably Hektyamar), who is a leader of the Hezb-i Islami sect. Both of these men are currently vying for overall leadership.

[9 paragraphs (14 lines) not declassified]

326. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 3, 1980, 11:10–11:50 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Jimmy Carter

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

President Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, President of Pakistan

General K. M. Afir (Notetaker)

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Afghanistan.]

[*President Carter:*] We share a common concern over the Soviets in Afghanistan. And it is important for the UN to maintain its condemnation. The foregoing, together with the fall of the Shah, has caused us to increase our presence in the region. We now have two carriers in the area. We have pre-positioned military cargo. We are developing the Rapid Deployment Force. We are conducting exercises with some of the countries in the region. We have acquired facilities in Oman and Kenya, and we are determined to keep the Strait of Hormuz open. Moreover, we have recently deployed AWACS to Saudi Arabia. We want to contain the conflict, and we have discouraged the Saudis and Omanis from becoming involved.

In my State of the Union message, I stated the region was vital to our national security and that we would act to protect that security. I wanted Brezhnev to know we would feel our vital interests are engaged if there was a Soviet intrusion. They might have moved into Poland if not for the world reaction to their invasion of Afghanistan.² I see no possibility of business as usual while the Soviets are in Afghanistan. Again, let me say how much we admire your courage as well as your support for the refugees.

I am disappointed and regretful that we did not have an adequate communication in the past on an economic/military package.³ The public/press exchanges were mutually embarrassing. I understand that you do not want military assistance, but we will continue to be helpful in modest ways with regard to the refugees. We also understand your aversion to U.S. military aid, which in any case is forbidden by Con-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 38, Memcons: President: 8–11/80. Secret. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. In the top right corner of the memorandum, Carter wrote: "OK" and initialed "J." Zia was in the United States to attend the UN General Assembly session.

² The mention of Poland is a reference to the crisis caused by workers' strikes and the Solidarity trade union movement in September.

³ See Documents 151 and 171.

gress, but we are willing to discuss purchases, if you want, of military equipment. If you need the assurance from us that you could purchase F-16s, we would be forthcoming. I know you have access to French planes, but we are willing to sell if you so desire it. If you want it, let's work it out between us directly.

We are deeply committed to the security of your country. We will be forthcoming if you want to purchase military equipment. We both have military backgrounds, so we can deal, if you want, directly.

President Zia: We admire you personally and we are grateful. We are a developing country and our dream is to have what is best for our military. We have only China, France, or the USA from whom to get aircraft; and only China or the USA for our tanks. We understand your sensitivity about India and we also understand that the U.S. must have an interest in Pakistan before it does anything for us. We do not ask you to sever your relations with India, but we are sensitive about any India veto over your relations with us. (Clifford apparently told Mrs. Gandhi that the Brzezinski visit was only an eyewash.)⁴ We should get your aid on our own merits, not because of an Indian veto or wishes.

We do not have any money for purchases. We will not get it from Saudi Arabia unless the Saudis feel a genuine interest in Pakistan. Our problem is that the Soviet Union is now our neighbor. I have told the Soviets that we will resist to the end and in the meantime, with your help, we will continue fighting the battle of Pakistan in Afghanistan.

President Carter: It is our fight too.

President Zia: I am 100 percent certain the Afghanistans will not surrender. The Soviets will feel the pinch.

President Carter: What is your assessment of the effectiveness of resistance?

President Zia: Excellent. And they could do more.

President Carter: Do you think more is needed?

President Zia: Yes. Not enough has been given so far. I feel that Pakistan should continue to fight in Afghanistan, but Pakistan must be safe. It is in the interest of both Pakistan and the U.S. to support the freedom fighters. But Pakistan will be punished by the Soviet Union, and we are prepared for that. If they escalate, and they will do so in the next few months in order to humiliate us, we will stand up and we will need your assistance.

I could greatly improve the spirit of my Air Force if I had six more planes, but if I am able to feed more effectively 650,000 people, I can

⁴ For Clifford's trip to India, see Document 190. For Brzezinski's trip to Pakistan, see Document 193.

tell the military the country is getting stronger. I do not need direct military assistance. Our real need is in debt rescheduling. That would be the greatest favor to us.

President Carter: The three year part is the most difficult.

President Zia: One year to start and then the others will follow.

President Carter: We will do the one year and the food supply will be sustained by us. And if you want to buy military equipment, including F-16s, we will be forthcoming.

President Zia: I need your support with the Europeans. They are too scared.

President Carter: Giscard and Thatcher said we should do more to help the freedom fighters. What should I tell them?

President Zia: Tell them to contact me.⁵ The freedom fighters need more anti-tank and anti-helicopter weapons (discussion of some defective SA-7s). France has good weapons and the Europeans should be more helpful.

On another issue, I just want to say that Mrs. Gandhi is no friend of Pakistan or the U.S.

President Carter: Do not hesitate to approach me directly. You can also use a personal emissary to keep in touch with me.

There was an exchange of pleasantries and then the meeting concluded.

⁵ In a memorandum assessing U.S.-Pakistani relations following the Zia visit, October 9, Thornton asserted to Brzezinski that Zia's request that Carter instruct European leaders to contact him directly was a sign that Pakistan wanted to keep an "arms-length relationship" with the United States regarding the covert program to provide arms to the Afghan rebels. In Thornton's view, Zia did not want the United States "to get involved in organizing other countries' support of the insurgents." Thornton's memorandum was attached to a memorandum from Odom to Brzezinski, October 11. Odom described Thornton's memorandum as "excellent." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Meetings File, Box 80, Sensitive X: 10/9-31/80)

327. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Komer) to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Carlucci)¹

I-20571/80

Washington, October 8, 1980

SUBJECT

Afghan Insurgency (U)

(S) While our support for the Afghan insurgency has been far from miniscule, there is reason for concern that the weight of proximate Soviet resources and military strength will gradually weaken the Afghan resistance to the point we will no longer be able to justify our contribution.² Can we figure out ways to keep the Soviets involved and suffering for a longer time? Can we somehow develop the kind of guerrilla capability which could keep the pot boiling at a lower level of intensity? If the USSR starts to press Pakistan harder, such a force also could be most useful.

(S) To this end, why don't we begin now to plan for a smaller more professional and better organized cadre of guerrilla forces for long-term operations, as well as for qualitative improvements in the tactics and effectiveness of the present loose-knit insurrection? I suggest we look into the formation of a small trained guerrilla cadre additive to the current guerrilla bands. The latter are probably too ingrained in their tactics and motivated by tribal and personal goals to be easily molded into a more organized force—even if we wanted to. What I have in mind is drawing upon the available manpower to provide the basis for a far more professional guerrilla cadre which could supply small, well trained hit-and-run teams to sustain resistance even if the present loose-knit rebellion gets overwhelmed. Obviously this would have to be done in close cooperation with Pakistan.

(S) I recognize there may be serious risks in the proposals above—particularly for a more professional guerrilla force, among other things, the GOP might not play. But I believe we should develop a proposal

¹ Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I-031, Sep–Dec 1980. Secret; Sensitive. A copy was sent to Aaron.

² In response to a query on the strength of the Afghan insurgency, Charles Cogan wrote Carlucci, October 14, that the rebels were continuing their activities at a “normal pace.” Cogan surmised that the perception of a “faltering insurgency” might be attributable to the fact that “Afghanistan has been pushed off the front pages, primarily by the Iran-Iraq war.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 82M00501R: 1980 Subject Files, Box 12, C-367, 05 Sep 80–30 Dec 80, Afghanistan) The Iran-Iraq war broke out on September 22 when Iraq attacked across Iran's western border.

along these lines with some urgency. I am prepared to task my staff and the JCS to support this planning effort if you agree.³

R.W. Komer⁴

³ In a memorandum to Komer, November 4, Carlucci replied that, in the view of the intelligence community, Soviet efforts had not weakened the insurgency; on the contrary, the rebels' efforts were "alive and well." Carlucci agreed with Komer's suggestion on the advisability of developing contingencies should the insurgency take a turn for the worse. To that end, Carlucci reported, the CIA was involved in its "first experiment in providing special training to independent Afghan units" involving "the SA-7." Carlucci further noted that he wanted to assess this experiment before considering a broadened effort as Komer suggested. (Ibid.)

⁴ Komer initialed "RWK" above his typed signature.

328. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to President Carter¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Possible European Assistance to the Afghan Resistance

1. At the outset of our program of covert assistance to the Afghan freedom fighters, we judged it best that, to maintain secrecy, we should not involve other Western powers. We were constantly warned by both the Pakistanis and the Saudis that leaks about this assistance were very harmful and could prove fatal to the program. The Pakistan intelligence chief, Gen. Akhtar, said he wanted no other parties involved.

2. During the course of discussions with [1 line not declassified] in the first half of 1980, we discussed our Afghan assistance program with them, and they offered to be of help. They assisted in the matter of sending journalists to Pakistan and Afghanistan and, using press outlets, were able significantly to augment, in articles and photographs,

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, For President or Brzezinski Only File, Box 88, PA—Very Sensitive: 10–12/80. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. In the top right corner, Carter wrote: "Zbig" and initialed "C." Although the memorandum is undated, attached but not printed is a memorandum from Brzezinski to Turner, October 15, in which Brzezinski reported that Carter "approved a positive response to Zia's request for U.S. help in arranging European assistance to the Afghan freedom fighters."

our own efforts to publicize the Afghan resistance. In the matter of arms, we decided to accept their offer of help, provided it was channeled through our own pipeline. These weapons would appear to the Pakistanis to come from us, and we would be adhering to their dictum of not bringing any more parties into the program. In September 1980, [less than 1 line not declassified] provided 400,000 rounds of .303 ammunition which was sent in through our supply channels. They are in the process of contributing 3,000 Enfield .303 rifles—a weapon with which the Afghan tribesmen are very familiar and which is very popular with them. [less than 1 line not declassified] say they expect to provide at least another 5,000 Enfields in the near future. (NOTE: The bulk of our weapons supply has been of Soviet or Bloc manufacture.)

3. Also in recent months we have been discussing in general terms with [1½ lines not declassified] our program of assistance to the Afghan resistance. [less than 1 line not declassified] has shown a willingness to help; but because of the Pakistani restrictions, we have limited our response [less than 1 line not declassified]. We have told them we would like them to explore means of supplying arms covertly to the Afghan freedom fighters through Iran. In making this recommendation we had two things in mind: a) Pakistani territory would not be used; and b) eventually some of the heat would be taken off the Pakistanis, as the Soviets would realize that arms were coming in not only through Pakistan but also through Iran. [less than 1 line not declassified] promised to help and said they would send an officer to survey possible clandestine supply routes and assess the freedom fighters' needs. We are awaiting the results of this survey.

4. All this changed during the visit of President Zia to Washington, when he told the President he would welcome assistance to the freedom fighters from the West Europeans, and he told the President that he would like U.S. help in arranging such assistance.² While this takes the wraps off the Pakistani restrictions under which we have been operating to date, this Agency must continue to be concerned about the overall security of the weapons supply program to the Afghan insurgents. The Saudis are particularly sensitive about any potential security breaches, and because they are instrumental in providing financing and logistics support, we must continue our efforts to maintain the strict security of the program. Therefore, if there is to be an approach at the policy level [less than 1 line not declassified] about assistance to the Afghan freedom fighters, it would be useful to make a parallel approach [less than 1 line not declassified] so the background to this change during President Zia's visit to Washington can be explained

² See Document 326.

to them.³ (Our previous discussions of this program [*less than 1 line not declassified*] have been limited [*1 line not declassified*].) Additionally, we would suggest that in the policy-level approach, the sensitivity of this arms supply program be stressed and [*less than 1 line not declassified*] be urged to coordinate any covert arms support through us.⁴

Stansfield Turner⁵

³ Carter drew a vertical line in the left margin beside this sentence.

⁴ At the bottom of the page, Carter wrote: "Let us move to carry out Zia's request, maintaining requisite secrecy" and initialed "J." In his attached October 15 memorandum to Turner, Brzezinski noted that messages from Carter requesting this assistance on behalf of Zia had been sent to Giscard and Thatcher; [*text and 1 line not declassified*]. Also attached but not printed is a draft message to Giscard and Thatcher; Carter made two minor corrections and crossed out a sentence that read: "I think we agree that it is important for the Soviets not to conclude that the Afghans can be easily crushed, and it is also important for the Pakistanis not to feel isolated." In the upper right corner of the draft, Carter wrote: "Zbig, ok" and initialed "J."

⁵ Turner signed "Stan Turner" above his typed signature.

329. Editorial Note

Two telegrams reported on Afghan President Babrak Karmal's first official visit to the Soviet Union and the broader issue of the ongoing Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. On the eve of Karmal's arrival, in telegram 16143 from Moscow, October 15, 1980, the Embassy noted: "the Soviets are not particularly optimistic about their Afghan adventure. They profess to be looking for a political settlement that could lead to a Soviet troop withdrawal and an improvement of relations with the United States. The initiation of talks between Pakistan and the Babrak Karmal government is seen as the first priority in moving toward this political settlement, with the aim of such talks being to halt passage of aid to the insurgents. They are not, however, willing to sacrifice Babrak Karmal at this point and there is no hint of excessive concern or dismay in the Soviet presentations." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800492–0389)

Karmal was in Moscow October 16–17. A dinner speech by Brezhnev and a joint Soviet-Afghan statement signed on October 16 reiterated the Soviet position that it would not withdraw its forces until the insurgency ended. (Kevin Klose, "Brezhnev Renews Backing Of Afghan Government, Says Time on Its Side," *Washington Post*, October 17, 1980,

p. A23) In telegram 281700 to all diplomatic and consular posts, October 22, the Department commented on Karmal's visit: "Declaring the Afghan revolution 'irreversible,' the Soviets took the occasion of Babrak Karmal's mid-October visit to Moscow to reaffirm their support for him and for the Afghan peace plan of May 14. Moscow apparently still hopes to see Karmal's hold on power strengthened—and the Parcham-Khalq rift in the ruling PDPA repaired. While the Soviets pledged continuing military support, no change in the Soviet involvement was foreshadowed." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800504-0389)

330. Memorandum for the Record by Director of Central Intelligence Turner¹

Washington, October 30, 1980

SUBJECT

Conversation with Dr. Brzezinski, 29 October 1980 (*[classification marking not declassified]*)

1. I showed him the Afghan bi-weekly report.² He stressed over and over again that he doesn't think we are providing enough arms to the insurgents and wants us to increase it. As you know, I sympathize with this point of view. I am not sure an increase from [*amount not declassified*] to 60 million is all that significant. I want to be able to reassure Brzezinski next time that we are pushing everything through

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00112R: Subject Files, Box 15, DCI/DDCI, Memrecs/Memos/Agendas & Brzezinski/Aaron Meetings, January–December 1980. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*].

² The report noted malfunction issues with SA-7s in Afghanistan; a *Time* magazine story that included a photograph of insurgents carrying land mines (that the report noted were supplied through the covert program); and a campaign in which the Agency manufactured and distributed around the world some 5,000 t-shirts bearing messages of support for the Afghan insurgency. The report described this campaign as having a "remarkable impact." Also included was a list containing the most recent data on weapons delivered or awaiting shipment to the insurgents, totaling over [*text not declassified*]. The weapons awaiting shipment represented approximately one-third of the total cost. The bi-weekly report is in the Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 82M00501R: 1980 Subject Files, Box 12, C-367, 1 Jan–30 Jun 80, Afghanistan.

the pipeline that Ahktar is willing to receive.³ (*[classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]*)

2. He wanted an assessment of the impact on the Arab countries of the release of hostages and U.S. provision of spare parts to Iran. I told him we had it in the PDB a couple of days ago. He recalled that, though he didn't think it was incisive enough to make a real impact on him. In short, he felt that it was obvious the Arabs would be upset and he wondered if we had anything more to say. (*[classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]*)

[Omitted here is information unrelated to Afghanistan.]

Stansfield Turner⁴
Director

³ For the decision to increase funding for the Afghan covert program, see Document 336.

⁴ Gates signed for Turner.

331. Article in the National Intelligence Daily¹

[*article number not declassified*]

Washington, October 30, 1980

SPECIAL ANALYSIS

USSR-AFGHANISTAN: Prospects for the Insurgency

Ten months after the Soviet invasion there is insurgent activity in every province of Afghanistan, urban security is worse, and much of the countryside is under insurgent control. The Soviets have been adapting their force structure and tactics to this situation, however, and gradually are becoming more effective. (*[classification marking and codeword not declassified]*)

The Soviets have prevented the insurgents from seizing a provincial capital or any other symbolic target and may believe they are making a start on a long process of establishing a durable Communist Afghan regime. They probably believe that the diplomatic costs will continue

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 7, Afghanistan Crisis—October 1980, NIDs. Top Secret; [*codeword and handling restriction not declassified*]. Drafted by [*text not declassified*].

to decrease as the world loses interest and comes to accept their occupation of Afghanistan. (*[classification marking and codeword not declassified]*)

[*1 line not declassified*] estimates that between 20,000 and 50,000 insurgents are in the field at any one time, in groups ranging from 25 to 2,000. This force is drawn from possibly as many as 1 million Afghans involved intermittently in the fighting. (*[classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]*)

[*less than 1 line not declassified*] the insurgents are in "full control" of about half the districts in the country and control another quarter at night. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] seem to support this. Until recently, insurgents had been in virtual control of parts of the city of Herat, and assassinations and sabotage occur frequently in Kabul and other cities. (*[classification marking and codeword not declassified]*)

Attacks on roads and government installations are common even in districts supposedly under full government control. Insurgent raids on convoys have almost completely disrupted the country's transport system; many civilian truck drivers refuse to travel in the countryside even with a military escort. The Soviets recently forbade military convoys to move after dark and adopted new procedures in an attempt to improve their air support for the convoys. (*[classification marking, codeword, and handling restriction not declassified]*)

Mixed Results for Moscow

The Soviet presence and firepower have forced the insurgents to forgo large-scale operations. Before the invasion, the insurgents moved at will in sizable groups, but now they retreat quickly to avoid Soviet forces. (*[classification marking and codeword not declassified]*)

The insurgents, moreover, no longer attempt to sustain siege operations against important government garrisons and towns, to block roads permanently, or to hold any area Soviet troops make a serious effort to clear. As recent operations in the northeast and Konar Valley indicate, however, the Soviets do not have nearly enough troops to garrison the country and still cannot depend on the Afghan Army to do the job for them. (*[classification marking and codeword not declassified]*)

The insurgents are still able to move men and material across the border with Pakistan and Iran despite Soviet efforts to reduce the flow. Soviet patrols, sweep operations, and extensive mining so far have been directed at only part of the border. The Soviets have only succeeded in turning open borders into borders that must be crossed with more caution. (*[classification marking and codeword not declassified]*)

There has been only slight success in winning over insurgents, but there have been some defections to the government; a few important arms caches have been seized, presumably on information from defectors and prisoners. Such inroads are insignificant and seem to have

had no impact on the level of resistance in any part of the countryside. (*[classification marking and codeword not declassified]*)

Fear of Soviet reprisals has made some Afghans reluctant to shelter insurgents, but this has been a problem only for the few bands that operate outside their home areas, particularly some based in Pakistan. Most Afghan villagers still support the locally based insurgents who make up the bulk of the resistance. (*[classification marking not declassified]*)

Prospects

The Soviets have helped give the Babrak government time to try to consolidate politically. The insurgents cannot bring down the government by military means, and they recognize that it will be a long war. Although some exile groups seeking outside support have claimed that insurgent morale is declining, there are no signs that this is the case. (*[classification marking not declassified]*)

Over the next year or so, some tribesmen probably will begin to lose confidence that they can overthrow the Babrak government. Although many others will continue fighting, the level of insurgency nevertheless may gradually begin to decrease. (*[classification marking not declassified]*)

The erosion of tribal determination would be abetted if Kabul were to appear to be avoiding radical social changes and were seen as trying to exercise only nominal authority in the countryside, in the manner of traditional Afghan governments. The government's identification with the Soviets, however, makes its prospects for winning the acceptance of the Afghan peoples extremely remote. (*[classification marking not declassified]*)

If Pakistan continues to provide aid and a safehaven, the insurgency will continue at a level that will require the Soviets to keep a large military force in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future. The survival of the Babrak government could depend on the presence of at least some Soviet combat forces for years. (*[classification marking not declassified]*)

[Omitted here is a map of Afghanistan.]

332. Current Analysis Report Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research¹

Report 21-CA

Washington, November 6, 1980

SOVIET STRATEGY AND TACTICS IN AFGHANISTAN: LARGER IMPLICATIONS

Despite indications that the wisdom of the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan may still be under debate in Moscow, there are no signs that Soviet resolve is weakening or that major changes are being considered. The size of the Soviet armed forces and of their weapons stockpile has allowed the USSR to field an 85,000-man force in Afghanistan without disrupting military deployments elsewhere or interrupting military aid programs. All evidence points to a long-term Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, with continued military improvements and some force increases opposite China, NATO, and Iran.

USSR: New Military Priorities

Soviet defense planning has been complicated over the past two years by the addition of new priorities to the traditional concerns with NATO and China.

—The Chinese attack on Vietnam in February 1979 led to significant improvements along the Sino-Soviet border and contingency planning for a second Chinese attack.

—The occupation of Afghanistan has required continuous supply, construction of permanent facilities, and troop turnover.

—Developments in Iran and the Persian Gulf have led to new force priorities in the southern USSR, heretofore a relatively neglected area.

—The Polish situation has imposed a new requirement on the Soviet General Staff to be ready to take military action.

Military developments throughout the USSR indicate that the Soviets are attempting to deal with all these contingencies, which continue to stretch both military and civilian resources.

We see no decrease in military aid to the Warsaw Pact and the Third World. Indeed, the Soviets apparently promised the Syrians more military aid during Assad's visit in early October.

Afghanistan: The Military Situation

After 10 months of fighting, the Soviets still face significant opposition and serious military problems.

¹ Source: Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 6, Soviet Strategy and Tactics in Afghan—Larger Implications. Secret. Drafted by Crocker (INR/PMT) and Limberg (INR/EEA), and approved by Baraz (INR/DDR/RNA).

—The Kabul government does not control the provinces.

—The Afghan Army continues to deteriorate. Conscription schemes and local defense plans have failed.

—Soviet equipment and personnel losses have been relatively heavy, considering the poorly equipped and unorganized state of the resistance.

—Roads and cities are still vulnerable to attack, and logistical supply is still a major problem.

The Soviets, however, have chosen not to increase the size of their force. Rather, they are adopting new tactics built around more mobile ground forces and the heavy use of helicopter and aircraft strikes. The country has been divided into eight zones of responsibility, each with a senior commander and a combination of airborne, infantry, artillery, and air support.

In addition, the Soviets are building housing, stronger defense positions, and permanent logistic and support bases. During Babrak Karmal's recent visit to Moscow, the Soviets pledged continued military support.² The joint statement issued at the end of the visit reaffirmed that Moscow would not discuss the question of Soviet withdrawals until 1) hostilities had ceased and 2) guarantees that they would not resume were in place.

We conclude, therefore, that the Soviet military intends to support the Marxist regime and pursue the suppression of the resistance for an extended period of time. Recent Soviet emphasis on the time when the situation in Afghanistan returns to "normal" suggests that, for the moment at least, Moscow is not planning any major increase in its force in Afghanistan. At some point, however, perhaps next year, they may decide to increase the size of their force or mount a more aggressive campaign to seal the borders with Iran and Pakistan. We also do not rule out another cosmetic withdrawal for propaganda purposes.

The Domestic Scene

Since the coup in April 1978 that toppled Daoud, the Soviets have advised Kabul to build up its political base and infrastructure. Taraki's and Amin's failures or inability to implement this advice were largely responsible for the increase in the Soviet military presence and, ultimately, for the invasion last December. Over the last eight months, numerous CPSU, Komsomol, and government delegations have visited Afghanistan to help train their Afghan counterparts at the provisional and national level in party and government work. During the Karmal visit, the Soviets again emphasized the need to broaden the Afghan communist party's base.

² See Document 320.

The effectiveness of the Soviet effort has been hampered by the continued insurgency and by the Khalq-Parcham feud. Nevertheless, the Soviets have expressed satisfaction with their progress. Whether they can or cannot eventually shift the struggle from the military to the political level, they seem reconciled to a protracted presence in Afghanistan. In time, Afghan institutions will be forced into a Soviet mold.

Soviet Diplomacy

Moscow's refusal to enter into a dialogue on a political settlement and its continued adherence to the Afghan peace plan of May 14 probably reflect its assessment that its diplomatic approach is gradually succeeding. Poland and the Iraq-Iran conflict have pushed Afghanistan off the front pages, and the Islamic Conference's initiative has faltered with Ghotbzadeh's removal and Tehran's preoccupations with the war with Iraq.³

As Brezhnev noted in his speech welcoming Karmal to Moscow, Pakistan remains the key to Soviet efforts in Afghanistan. The Soviets, therefore, will keep the pressure on Islamabad to stop supporting the resistance. The recent Soviet attacks on Pakistani border garrisons, as well as reports of Soviet contacts with Baluchs and members of the Pakistani opposition, probably are meant as warnings to the Zia regime that Soviet tolerance is limited. Thus, we do not rule out selected Soviet or Afghan military attacks against bases in Pakistan. The Soviets, however, probably would be reluctant at this point to see the conflict expand beyond Afghanistan's borders for fear of regaling Islamic reaction and alienating India.

³ Iranian Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh was removed in August.

333. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan¹

Washington, November 8, 1980, 0102Z

297580. For the Ambassador. Subject: Military Sales to Pakistan.

1. (Secret—Entire text)

2. COS [*less than 1 line not declassified*] is being instructed in a parallel message to ask General Akhtar to inform Zia that we are prepared to make available from U.S. Army stocks 200 Redeye missiles for purchase through regular Foreign Military Sales channels.² We are making this offer in the context of ever increasing Soviet pressure on Pakistan. We prefer Akhtar as a channel in order to get the message directly to Zia without the information becoming more widely known in the Pak Government.

Muskie

¹ Source: Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Intelligence Liaison Files, TIN 980643000018, Box 3, Islamabad 80–81. Secret; Priority; Roger Channel. Drafted by Coon and approved by Kux (INR/DDC).

² Neither the parallel message nor Zia's response to the offer was found.

334. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State¹

Kabul, November 19, 1980, 0615Z

3003. Subject: Situation in Afghanistan. Ref: Kabul 2962.²

1. (C—Entire text.)

2. Summary: The skies above Kabul have again been filled with helicopters and other aircraft for the past few days as Soviet and Afghan forces launched offensives against Mujaheddin in several parts of the country. Some of this activity within 80 kilometers of Kabul has been billed by the DRA as Afghan military maneuvers, but travelers report that it is no exercise. The Shia day of deep mourning passed in Kabul without major incident but the week witnessed several violent incidents in and around the city, including the killing of an Afghan family by marauding Soviet troops. Bus drivers on the route north of Mazar-i-Sharif went on strike to protest the shooting of one of their number by Soviet troops last week, and there have been attacks on convoys along other major highways. Fragmentary reports from Herat and Kandahar indicate that a Soviet offensive is also underway in those large cities, where some knowledgeable diplomats claim Cuban troops are stationed. The regime has dispatched party volunteers to mine coal and collect firewood for delivery to Kabul for the approaching winter. The party held its fourth plenum on November 11, followed by a series of rather hysterical meetings urging support for the regime. The DRA propaganda mill has stepped up its activities, especially against the US, China and Pakistan, often using slanted or false material. Low-level harassment of Mission personnel continues, and we still find it difficult to obtain visas for new arrivals. End summary.

New Soviet offensive

3. The Soviets may have shifted their tactics in trying to crush the ubiquitous but elusive Mujaheddin. On November 15 the DRA Ministry of National Defense announced joint ground and air maneuvers in Kabul, Parwan, Ghazni and Nangrahar Provinces beginning the next day. Dozens of Soviet helicopters took to the air heading in those

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800553-0906. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Islamabad, Moscow, and New Delhi (also for RSS). Also sent for information to Ankara, Beijing, Bonn, Canberra, Dacca, London, Paris, Rome, Tokyo, USUN, USNATO, CINCEUR, CINCPAC, and CINCUSAREUR (military addressees also for POLADs). A copy of this cable was also found in the Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 2, Afghan Sitreps 1980.

² Telegram 2962 from Kabul, November 10, is an earlier situation report from the Embassy. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800539-0495)

directions on November 16. That activity continues as this is being drafted and a few high-flying jet fighters and bombers have also been sighted over Kabul. Soviet air transport flights also seem to have increased markedly during this period, but large road convoys have not been observed as often as about a week ago.³

4. The DRA announcement noted that the forces slated for the maneuvers had already left for the listed areas, and our sources confirmed that large military contingents had arrived in several locations by November 15. Two of them said that one contingent had also moved into Wardak Province, though that was not one of the sites specified for the maneuvers. All of these sources reported that the military forces were conducting searches of villages for Mujaheddin and potential conscripts. In at least one case (in Wardak) Soviet forces were shelling a suspected Mujaheddin encampment. Another generally reliable source informed us November 18 that Soviet forces trying for the fourth time to invade the Panjshir Valley had met with the usual stiff resistance for the fourth day in a row.

5. Kabul itself has been slightly more tense since the beginning of the Shia religious mourning month of Muharram on November 8. However, the 10th of Muharram (November 17), a day usually marked by processions of self-flagellating Shias, passed without major incident in the city. The Shia processions were unusually small and none was addressed by leading DRA figures, as had been the practice in pre-leftist days. Justice Minister Aryan was sent to observe one procession. While he made no speech himself, he ordered attending preachers to include blessings for the DRA in their prayers, after which many participants were heard to grumble loudly about “godless Communists.”

³ [text not declassified] Soviet military leaders in Afghanistan had recently concluded that the “situation in Afghanistan is currently a stalemate.” Despite recognizing that “most” of the country was controlled by insurgents, the Soviets believed the rebels could be defeated eventually. Among the tactics authorized toward that end, the report noted, was an increased use of helicopters. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton, Country File, Box 91, Afghanistan: 1/80–1/81)

335. Letter From the Chairman of the Afghan National Liberation Front (al-Mojaddedi) to President Carter¹

Peshawar, November 25, 1980

Dear Mr. President:

I wish to thank you for all your past help to the Afghan people and Afghan refugees. The people of Afghanistan shall, with due respect, remember all the contributions which the friendly nations have made during this trying period in our history.

It is the graveness of the existing situation facing the Afghan people however, which prompts me to make an urgent appeal for further humanitarian assistance to merely enable us to provide the basic means of survival for a people subjected to the most unprecedented genocide of our time.

While the heroic struggle of Afghan people is not only for their own survival but also for the sake of humanity and in defence of basic human principles and human rights, one can not help but to note that this defenceless Nation is patiently and perseveringly facing the cruel and indiscriminate shellings and bombardments of their towns, villages and even large cities and population centers paralleled with lootings, burnings, executions, tortures and various other unhuman atrocities. The Russian military units, these byproducts of atheism and communism, completely devoid of human dignity and even self respect commit all these crimes in cold blood.

All this, in the course of the Russian aggression in Afghanistan, has left hundreds of thousands who are wounded, millions who are facing starvation, an equal number lacking shelter in the face of the cold season and almost the entire population devoid of medical care, even to a modest standard. Next to these are near a million and half people who have been forced to cross over the borders, mostly to Pakistan, among whom are many weak, ill and wounded people.

Therefore, the extent of existing need for food, medicine and shelter requires a facility which is completely beyond the material and financial possibilities of our organization, and thus we find it necessary to call for help.

Any further assistance you can offer at this time will be deeply appreciated by me and the freedom fighters as well as by all Afghan people.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Unfiled Files, Box 124, Afghanistan: 1/80-1/81. No classification marking.

At last I wish to express my pleasure that the bearer of this letter has kindly taken it upon himself to provide you with necessary additional informations on the current situation in Afghanistan as well as the position of the A.N.L.F.

Wishing your success and the prosperity of the American people I remain,

Very Sincerely Yours,

Prof. Sibghatullah Al-Mojaddedi
Chairman of the A.N.L.F.

336. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to the Chairman of the Special Coordination Committee (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, November 25, 1980

SUBJECT

The Afghanistan Covert Action Program (S)

Subsequent to David Aaron's October 27, 1980, memorandum authorizing a total FY 1981 Afghanistan Covert Action Program of \$60 million,² it has been determined, in consultation with our Saudi and Pakistani allies, that the program justifies a higher level of support. Per our earlier conversations, I believe we should increase the FY 1981 total to \$80 million.³

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, For President or Brzezinski Only File, Box 88, PA—Very Sensitive: 10–12/80. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified].

² Attached but not printed. In the October 27 memorandum to Carlucci, Aaron noted that the October 17 request for fiscal year 1981 funding for the Afghanistan covert action program, totaling \$60 million, was approved. Aaron further noted that \$40 million of the total was new funding, added to the \$20 million previously authorized in July 1980; and that the total of \$60 million would be split evenly between the United States and Saudi Arabia. If other countries elected to contribute funds to aid the Afghan insurgents, Aaron directed that the current "ceiling will be raised accordingly." Carlucci's October 17 memorandum requesting the funding increase was not found. In a memorandum for the record, November 5, Denend noted that Brzezinski signed a recommendation to approach OMB to increase total expenditures to \$70 million. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 5/80–1/81)

³ In a November 26 memorandum to Aaron, attached but not printed, Gregg noted that OMB was "on board" with this expenditure increase of \$35 million, representing the U.S. half of the new total of \$70 million.

During an early November 1980 meeting in Saudi Arabia, John McMahon was informed by General Akhtar, head of the Pakistani intelligence service, that the Pakistanis were now in a position to distribute into Afghanistan as many weapons as we could provide.⁴ Prince Turki, head of the Saudi intelligence organization, agreed that the program should receive increased support. In anticipation of this increased level, we are planning appropriately larger purchases and expansion of the existing logistics mechanism.

I therefore request approval of a total FY 1981 program of \$80 million which we would share equally with Saudi Arabia. Of this total, \$60 million was previously authorized as a consequence of the 7 July 1980 SCC meeting (\$20 million) and David's memo of 27 October (\$40 million). Thus this memo specifically requests \$20 million of new authority.⁵

Stansfield Turner⁶

⁴ This statement likely confirms that Pakistan accepted the U.S. offer of the Redeye missiles. See Document 333.

⁵ Brzezinski undoubtedly approved the recommendation. For the July 7 SCC(I) meeting, see Document 298.

⁶ Carlucci signed for Turner.

337. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, December 8, 1980, 2303Z

325039. Subject: Letter From President Carter to Waldheim on Afghanistan Resolution.²

1. (S—Entire text)

2. President Carter has written a letter dated December 8 to Secretary General Waldheim containing U.S. views on implementation of the November 20 UNGA resolution on Afghanistan.³ Ambassador McHenry is requested to deliver to Waldheim the following text of this letter, which we have received from White House.

3. Begin text.

Dear Kurt:

I know from our previous talks that you join with me in welcoming the action by the General Assembly in adopting by an overwhelming majority a resolution calling for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan. This strong expression of support for international law and the United Nations Charter by the General Assembly has made a very favorable impact on the American people and has reinforced their faith in the moral authority of the United Nations.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800585–1110. Secret; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Islamabad, Moscow, and London. Drafted by Pope (IO/UNP); cleared in IO, IO/UNP, S/S, and in substance in NEA/PAB; and approved by Christopher.

² UN General Assembly Resolution 35/37, adopted on November 20 by a vote of 111 to 22 with 12 abstentions, called for the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan, supported the right of the Afghan people to choose their own form of government, urged all parties to reach a political settlement, and asked the Secretary General to appoint a special representative to assist in finding a solution. For the UNGA consideration of the resolution and its text, see *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1980*, pp. 304–309. An intelligence report produced in the Central Intelligence Agency, October 29, noted that the draft resolution, introduced by Pakistan, was similar to the “strong position” previously adopted by the Islamic Conference with regard to Afghanistan. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 7, Afghanistan Crisis—December 1980, NIDs)

³ Christopher sent Carter a draft of the letter on December 5, on which Carter handwrote corrections and noted: “OK as amended. J.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat (ES), Special Caption Documents, 1979–1989 (Not for the System, Evening Reading, Personnel Sensitive), Lot 92D630, Box 6, Evening Reading: December 1980) In a memorandum to Carter, December 10, Christopher reported the letter was delivered to Waldheim and that the U.S. Mission to the UN would consult with allies “on how best to maintain the pressure on Waldheim concerning this matter.” In the left margin of Christopher’s memorandum, Carter wrote: “Continue to push.” (Ibid.)

In the resolution, as you know, the Assembly expressed its hope that you would appoint a special representative to seek a political solution on the basis of the resolution and in accordance with its call for the withdrawal of foreign troops. Ambassador McHenry has already expressed our strong views to you in this regard, but I want you to know that this is a matter of personal concern to me.

In light of the Soviet attitude I recognize that it will not be easy to move rapidly toward a political solution based on the withdrawal of Soviet troops. But I trust you will agree that the appointment of your special representative should be expedited because of the overwhelming vote by the international community. The 111 member states who supported the resolution were well aware of the Soviet Union's negative attitude. Nevertheless, we expressed support for your appointment of a special representative to promote a solution based on the principles of the Charter which the Soviet Union has so flagrantly violated in Afghanistan.

I have asked Ambassador McHenry to deliver this letter urgently to you as a private expression of my views.⁴

Sincerely,
Jimmy Carter
End text.

Muskie

⁴ In a memorandum to Carter, December 18, Muskie reported he "had an unexpectedly comprehensive discussion" with Waldheim regarding Afghanistan and the appointment of a special representative. Muskie noted that Waldheim was "receptive." (Ibid) An article in the National Intelligence Daily, January 8, reported that [text not declassified] the DRA was willing to meet with Pakistan and a UN Special Representative despite Pakistan's ongoing refusal to recognize the Afghan Government. The report further noted that the Pakistanis "view the UN talks in the past as a means of reducing Soviet pressure temporarily." Even so, the report concluded, such talks would give the DRA "a lift." (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977-81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—December 1980, NIDs)

338. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Islamabad, December 11, 1980, 1053Z

12795. Subject: Afghanistan and Pakistan/U.S. Relations.

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Summary: The end of 1980 and the current transition period leads us to take another look at some fundamental issues which are key to U.S./Pakistan relations during the coming years. For simplicity of presentation we have divided these concerns into (A) Afghanistan-related issues, (B) U.S./Pakistan bilateral issues and expectations, and (C) South and Southwest Asia security concerns. This telegram, addressing the Afghanistan question, is the first of three which we are submitting and which are intended to stimulate a dialogue with Washington and other concerned posts aimed at a more precise definition of options available to us. The Afghanistan situation remains central to our relationship with Islamabad and to Islamabad's relationship with many of the nations of Southwest, if not South, Asia. Pakistan's firm stance on Afghanistan continues to be fundamental to our own policy. We think it behooves us to take a look ahead—possibly at some unthinkable—so that our policies will at least attempt to influence the course of events rather than the other way around. End summary.

3. In the midst of a major transition between administrations and as we near the first anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, we think it opportune to suggest that the Department and other members of the foreign affairs community in Washington take a look at the Afghan situation and the policy options it presents us. Some of those options bear directly on the future of our relationship with Pakistan and other countries in this region, and we would like to offer a few thoughts from this vantage point.

4. We start with a few basic assumptions derived from our reading of the current situation in Afghanistan and the likely course of events over the next year; these we regard as "givens":

—(A) Soviet troops will remain in Afghanistan as long as Moscow deems it necessary to secure a sympathetic regime in Kabul and to remold Afghan institutions along Communist lines;

—(B) Soviet pressures, including cross-border attacks on Pakistan, will continue and probably escalate as Moscow seeks to intimidate

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800590-0379. Secret; Immediate; Eyes Only. Sent for information to Karachi, Beijing, Moscow, New Delhi, London, Kabul, and Jidda. Pouched for information to Peshawar and Lahore.

the GOP to drop its opposition to Soviet policy and to accept the "irreversibility" of events in Afghanistan;

—(C) Large numbers of Afghan refugees (which could approach two million) will remain in Pakistan for the foreseeable future becoming an increasingly serious domestic political issue in Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier particularly, and

—(D) The Afghan resistance will continue to obstruct Soviet efforts to pacify the Afghan countryside, but at present levels of outside support it may begin to lose effectiveness as the war of attrition drags on in Afghanistan.

5. There may be some debate among Americans about the validity or force of these assumptions, but there is substantial evidence that they form the current mind-set of most key Pakistanis who will be responsible for influencing Pakistan's own policy toward Afghanistan. For the Pakistanis, therefore, these are very real factors which we must take into account in determining our own approach to the issues involved, including the nature of our bilateral relationship with Islamabad.

6. We would hope that someone in transition Washington is looking down the road six months or a year trying to ascertain where would we prefer to be then.

—Are we prepared, for example, to simply let the situation drift, somehow hoping that the resistance will remain strong and that Pakistan will maintain a firm stance against the Soviets?

—Or are we prepared to take some positive initiatives either to help defuse the tensions boiling in the area or to bolster Pakistani resolve in standing up in the face of intense pressures?

These are difficult questions to which we do not have the answers. We suggest only that someone should be giving them serious thought.

7. If we assume that the Soviets will negotiate over Afghanistan only on their own terms (essentially the May 14 proposals), we do not see much likelihood of a solution which would meet our stated requirements including complete Soviet troop withdrawal, restoration of Afghanistan's nonaligned and independent status, self-determination for the Afghan people, and guarantees of keeping up our own firm opposition to the invasion and recognition of the Karmal regime. On the other hand, we ourselves may have extended an aspect of formal recognition to Karmal by granting an A-1 visa to one of his diplomats.² Is it not at least conceivable that Pakistan could find a way

² Telegram 285609 to Kabul and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, October 25, authorized the Embassy to issue A-1 visas to two Afghan diplomats. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800511-0150) The A-1 is a diplomatic visa issued to foreign government officials traveling to the United States to conduct official business on behalf of their government.

of talking to Babrak while obscuring the fact of recognition. If this were to reduce tensions in the region, would we see such a development as in our interest or not?

8. If we think it very important to avoid such a development, then we should be taking concrete steps to bolster Pakistan in ways which the Pakistanis consider meaningful. With the exception of debt relief, we have so far been unable to deliver on our rhetoric of support for Pakistan. We have in fact cheered on from a comfortable distance while the Pakistanis themselves bear the real costs of standing up to the Soviets. True, we have provided generous humanitarian assistance to the Afghan refugees but that is not likely to count for very much among Pakistani decision-makers who may believe they are faced with their country's very survival.

9. We realize that any discussion of support for Pakistan on a scale which would produce measurable results here automatically raises the prospect of strong Indian reactions. But we must question how much good will we have won in India by our recent policies of providing almost nothing (in relative terms) to Pakistan. We suggest there is a middle ground between minimal support and maximal support for Pakistan which would solidify our position and strengthen Pakistan. Naturally, whatever we do will have an impact on relations with New Delhi, but thirty years of threading policy course among the irrelevant (to us) enmities of the region should long ago have accustomed us to the fact that we cannot satisfy ourselves and everyone else in South Asia at the same time.

10. Another set of issues revolves around the question of military assistance to the Afghan resistance groups. The problems in providing such aid, including the multitude of competing groups and the desirability of maintaining a diplomatic mission in Kabul, have been discussed before in other forums. We would submit, however, that we cannot realistically expect the Mujahideen to go on fighting the Russians forever without increased support and we should be thinking how we would adjust our policy to deal with such a development.³ Or we should take another hard look at what we can do to sustain and promote the resistance cause.

11. Finally, we need to do some serious long-range planning on our role in providing relief to growing numbers of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Not only should we be taking steps to ensure adequate funds are available for a generous contribution of our own over the

³ It is not clear if Hummel was aware of the recently authorized increase in expenditures to support the Afghan insurgency; or if he was, whether he viewed such incremental steps as sufficient.

next several years, but we should carefully consider supporting recent GOP interest in an international pledging conference. Such a conference could serve two of our stated objectives, namely to stimulate other potential donors to take on a greater share of the relief burden as well as to focus additional international attention on the Afghan situation. Strong and prompt support for this GOP suggestion would be well-received in Islamabad.

12. We need to look as well at our own immigration policy regarding the flood of Afghans with whom our consular officers are currently besieged, with a view toward making additional numbers available for Afghan applicants—perhaps by designating them a separate refugee category—and expediting application procedures to the extent possible. We have already suggested, for example, that a voluntary agency rep be assigned to concerned posts to help with processing (Islamabad 12007 and 12444).⁴

13. In sum, we should look ahead to the likely ramifications of possible Afghan developments which we would view as adverse to our regional interests, i.e., Soviet consolidation of its position in Afghanistan, collapse of the Afghan resistance, Pakistani acceptance of a fait accompli across the Durand Line, and possible Pakistani accommodation to broader Soviet aims in the region. If we conclude that we can live in such a new environment, then certain policy options offer themselves as preferable. If otherwise, then other steps would seem called for.

14. We hope the Department agrees that such a look ahead would be both timely and useful. We would be happy to contribute to the discussion in any way deemed desirable.

Hummel

⁴ Telegram 12007 from Islamabad is dated November 11; telegram 12444 from Islamabad is dated December 2. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800560-0017 and D800574-0981, respectively)

339. Message From the Ambassador to Pakistan (Hummel) to the Central Intelligence Agency and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Coon)¹

Islamabad, December 11, 1980, 1025Z

[*message number not declassified*]. For CIA and State NEA–Coon From Amb Hummel. Subject: Ambassador’s Conversation With PRC and Egyptian Ambs Re Arms for Mujahideen.

When I saw Egyptian Amb Scharaff Dec 10 for a return courtesy call, I raised subject of foreign inputs to Afghan Mujahideen, asking what he knew of the matter. First elliptically, and then more directly, he acknowledged that he knew of Egypt’s own assistance and also something of USG and Saudi activities. He did not talk about the content or magnitude of the inputs.

He said that in his Mission only he and his MilAtt (whom Scharaff personally chose, the MilAtt having been a lieutenant under Scharaff in the army) knew of the inputs. The MilAtt deals directly with Gen Akhtar on these matters. Scharaff had a favorable impression of Gen Akhtar. I said on my side only a very few of my officers knew of the program not including my military attachés. I said that the Egyptian DCM (Scharaff said this officer was also one of his own choosing “because personal loyalty is very important”) had been discussing with foreign diplomats the subject of arms to Mujahideen. I said I proposed that in our Embassy only the Amb and I should have such discussions. Scharaff agreed, and indicated he would pass the word for those not witting on his staff (he said that “some of them may have a general idea”) not to ask questions or discuss the subject. Comment: My purpose in raising the subject was to make Scharaff aware that his DCM has been making statements about arms input and probing for information).

He asked how the U.S. Embassy deals with this subject with the Pakistanis. I said I have an “Intelligence Liaison Officer” (whom I did not name) who deals only with Gen Akhtar.

We both agreed that the MFA should not be involved in this subject. I told him that I had had clear instructions from Pres Zia not to discuss it with the MFA.

¹ Source: Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Intelligence Liaison Files, TIN 980643000012, Box 6, Afghanistan 1980. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*].

Scharaff said he hoped soon to have an intelligence officer assigned to his staff, and that after that officer arrived he hoped he and my officer could be in touch. I was noncommittal.

In a separate private conversation with PRC Amb Xu Yi-xin I tried to probe him on PRC inputs to the Mujahideen. Xu acknowledged that the PRC would like to see more support given to the freedom fighters, but asserted that PRC support goes to the Pak Govt "in general", and none was specifically earmarked for the Mujahideen.² The unspoken implication was that the GOP makes its own decisions as to what arms of PRC origin go to Afghans. (Comment: This does not square with other reports that some AK-47s from the PRC are earmarked for Mujahideen).

² [text and 1 line not declassified] "The PRC routinely provides machine guns, small arms, hand grenades and ammunition to the Afghan rebels. Shipments are by ship into Pakistan ports and by air. In some instances shipments have been by Pakistani C-130 aircraft flown direct from China to airfields near the Afghan border. He stated that no shoulder-fired SAMs had been provided because China had none. He stated that in his opinion, SA-7s had been provided by Egypt. Source claimed not to know the dates of the shipments but described them as routine and continuing. He claimed that PRC aid to Afghan rebels has the full but unannounced support of the Government of Pakistan." (Telegram 27726 from Cairo, December 16; Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 5, PRC Support for Insurgents)

340. Intelligence Information Cable Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

[cable number not declassified]

Washington, December 16, 1980

COUNTRY

Afghanistan/Iran

SUBJECT

Support by the Iranian Government for the Afghan Dissident Organization, United Islamic Alliance [1 line not declassified]

SOURCE

[3 lines not declassified]

¹ Source: Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 2, 13 Kabul Sitreps. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified].

1. According to a former Afghan Army officer who arrived in Peshawar in early December 1980, and who until late November was an active member of the Iranian-based Afghan dissident organization, the United Islamic Alliance (UIA) (Shura-i-Etefaq), during mid-November the Iranian Government supplied a sizeable shipment of U.S. manufactured weapons to UIA insurgents in Ghazni Province. The UIA is an alliance of Afghan Shia groups dominated by Hazaras from central and southern Afghanistan. The leader of the UIA is Asif Mohsani, a Shia from Qandahar, who now resides in and leads the UIA from Qum, Iran. The UIA does not maintain a presence in Pakistan. (Source comment: The officer said he had been told by other UIA members that because of Mohsani's fundamentalist Shia orientation, he has good relations with and the support of Ayatollah Khomeini. Because of this close relationship, Mohsani is the only Afghan dissident leader known to be residing in Qum. In the officer's opinion, no other Afghan dissident group is currently receiving weapons support from the Iranians.)

2. The officer stated that during mid-November the UIA headquarters in Ghazni Province, located at Jaghori (approximate coordinates 33° 10N 57' 30E), received from Iran a shipment of 1,000 M-1 Garand rifles, a quantity of ammunition, grenade projection adapters for the M-1s with a quantity of both anti-tank and anti-personnel grenades, and a quantity of unidentified U.S.-manufactured anti-tank rocket launchers and anti-tank mines. (Source comment: Other than the number of M-1s in the shipment, the officer did not specify the quantities of other weapons and ammunition received by the UIA. The officer also commented that this was the only shipment of Iranian supplied weapons and ammunition he is aware of, but he presumed the UIA had received others.)

3. ACQ: [1½ lines not declassified]

4. [less than 1 line not declassified] Dissem: [2 lines not declassified]

341. **Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Muskie¹**

Washington, December 18, 1980

The President has read an intelligence report reflecting Soviet concern over passage of the anti-Soviet Afghan resolution at the UN.² The Soviets are anxious lest they lose non-aligned support over the Afghan issue. The intelligence community has initiated planning to make Afghanistan a major issue at the February 9–12, 1981, Non-Aligned Nations Foreign Ministers' Conference in New Delhi and suggests that it is not too early to energize the entire U.S. foreign policy establishment toward the goal of defeating the Soviets in New Delhi. The President noted, "I agree."³ (S)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

¹ Source: Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Intelligence Liaison Files, TIN 980643000012, Box 6, Afghanistan 1980. Secret.

² A likely reference to an article in the National Intelligence Daily that summarized a report [*text not declassified*] December 2, which noted that the Soviets sought to "vitiate" the resolution adopted on Afghanistan in the UN General Assembly. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 7, Afghanistan Crisis—December 1980, NIDs) For UNGA Resolution 35/37, see footnote 3, Document 337.

³ At the bottom of the memorandum, an unknown hand wrote: "CIA/DDO wanted to do something through the CA infrastructure, but NEA (Coon) was unenthusiastic, and nothing more was done." The notation is dated February 9, 1981.

342. Intelligence Cable Prepared in the Department of Defense¹

No. 275–126316 Fort Meade, Maryland, December 22, 1980, 1500Z

1. (U) Ctry: USSR (UR); Afghanistan (AF)
2. (U) Title: Replacement of Afghan Leader (U)
3. (U) Date of info: 801200
4. (U) Orig: Det 1, USAOPSGP, INSCOM, Ft Meade, MD
5. (U) Req refs: T–2C3–20376²
6. (C/Noforn) Source: [2 lines not declassified]
7. (C) Summary: This report provides information on the current political situation in Afghanistan, to include observations of Afghan leader ((Babrak)) and information on his possible successors.

8A. (U) Details:

1. (C/Noforn) According to information received from Kabul during the first week of December 1980, Soviet imposed Afghan leader ((Babrak)) was showing strong signs of nervousness. Eyewitnesses reported that he chain smoked, appeared generally ill at ease and upon slightest provocation broke into cursing, unusual for a man known for his gentle language.³ Soviet authorities were not satisfied with the competence of the Afghan Government, which had virtually ground to a standstill.⁴ During the day, government police were on the streets of Kabul, but during the night rebels roamed the city in small groups distributing leaflets and calling on merchants to dictate price ceilings on still available goods. Soviet soldiers broke into two of the main stores in Kabul during the night and completely cleaned out the Afghan department store and the agency for the National Electronics Company of Japan.

2. (C/Noforn) There were two serious candidates considered by the Soviets for the replacement of Babrak. One of them was ((Sarvari)), former Chief of Intelligence, who after the Soviet invasion became deputy to Babrak. He was said to have subsequently left for the USSR for medical treatment and, without returning to Kabul, was appointed

¹ Source: Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 2, 13 Kabul Sitreps. Confidential; Priority; Noforn.

² Not found.

³ According to an intelligence cable prepared in the Department of Defense, November 17, Karmal's October visit to Moscow was for unspecified medical reasons. (Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 2, 14 Kabul Sitreps, PT 11)

⁴ According to an intelligence information cable prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, December 8, Soviet officials appeared to have taken control of Afghan diplomatic functions in Pakistan. (Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 2, 13 Kabul Sitreps)

Ambassador to the Mongolian Peoples Republic, a post of no importance to the Afghan regime. Sarvari, a member of the Khalq faction of the Communist Party, was a suspected KGB agent. The second person who might replace Babrak or be placed in another high position was the former Minister of Commerce Mohamad Khan ((Salaler)). Under the royal regime in Afghanistan, he held an important post in the Ministry of Planning. He was then named Minister of Commerce after gaining the confidence of President Daoud, who allowed him to participate in all secret conferences. When Daoud was overthrown, he was arrested with all of the President's⁵

⁵ The rest of the cable was cut off in this copy. No other copy was found.

343. Article in the President's Daily Brief¹

Washington, December 24, 1980

AFGHANISTAN: ONE YEAR LATER

In the year since their Christmas Eve invasion, the Soviets have achieved their core objective in Afghanistan—they have kept a Communist regime in place in the country. This has come at considerable international political cost and military difficulties. Moreover, the Soviets have so far made only limited progress toward establishing conditions that will permit the Babrak regime to stand on its own.

—***Despite the Soviets' increased involvement in military operations and a steady refinement of their anti-insurgent tactics, the insurgency goes on in every province at as high a level as any time since the Soviet invasion.*

—*The Afghan Army, which must be rebuilt if a Communist government is to survive without direct Soviet support, still numbers no more than about 20,000. It continues to be hampered by defections and by frequent clashes between adherents to the two factions of the Afghan Communist Party.***

—The Afghan Government is weak, lacks popular support, and is virtually paralyzed by the same factional squabbling that weakens the Army.

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 7, Afghanistan Crisis—December 1980, PDBs. Top Secret; For the President Only. The full version of this President's Daily Brief was not filed with this collection. The article printed here was found in this form.

[1½ lines not declassified] *Soviet military leaders on the scene recognize the difficulties.*

[2 paragraphs (12 lines) not declassified]

Soviet Commitment

Whatever their inner misgivings on how things have worked out in Afghanistan so far, the Soviets show no outward sign of compromise. [1 line not declassified] Soviet leaders have reiterated that any talks on Afghanistan must be with Babrak's government and that there can be no consideration of a Soviet troop withdrawal until so-called foreign assistance to the insurgents is halted.

***The Soviets, meanwhile, have built officers quarters and barracks, improved roads and runways, constructed an oil pipeline, and put permanent bridges over the river between the USSR and Afghanistan—all signs that they expect to be engaged militarily for a long while.**²*

² Carter released a statement on December 24, the anniversary of the Soviet invasion, calling on the Soviet Union to withdraw its forces and cooperate to find a political solution. He concluded: "The Afghan people and their struggle have not been forgotten and will not be forgotten by the rest of the world." See *Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81*, Book III, pp. 2835–2836.

344. Research Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

PA 81-10001

Washington, January 1981

[Omitted here are a title page and a cover page.]

Sino-Soviet Relations and the Impact of the Invasion
of Afghanistan (*[classification marking not declassified]*)

Overview

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the US response to it produced a sharp reaction in China that led Beijing to squelch domestic debate over foreign policy, reduce its meager relations with Moscow, and expand contacts with Washington. (*[classification marking not declassified]*)

China's decision in January 1980 to suspend the resumption of political negotiations with the USSR originally slated for this spring ended the latest phase in bilateral relations that began after China's denunciation of the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty in April 1979. During that period, political fluidity in China and heightened tensions resulting from China's invasion of Vietnam created a situation in which dissonant voices called for a lessening of China's hostility toward the USSR and an increase in bilateral economic exchanges. (*[classification marking not declassified]*)

Proponents of a less hostile policy toward Moscow may have included centrist leaders in the Chinese Politburo. Their influence was strengthened by a temporary alliance with party leftists during the spring of 1979, when Deng Xiaoping and his allies were beset with political problems. (*[classification marking not declassified]*)

In subsequent months, Deng gradually isolated his leftist opponents, and they were finally removed from the Politburo at the party's Fifth Plenum last February. Although the centrists remain powerful figures on the Politburo's Standing Committee, the growth of Deng's influence has reduced their ability to redirect policy. The trend has been toward a strengthening of Deng's grip on domestic affairs, languishing relations with the USSR, and improved ties with the United States. (*[classification marking not declassified]*)

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Office of Support Services, Job 82T00150R: Production Case Files, Box 3, Sino-Soviet Relations and the Impact of the Invasion of Afghanistan. Secret; *[handling restriction not declassified]*. A statement on the cover page reads: "This paper was prepared by *[less than 1 line not declassified]* Office of Political Analysis. It was coordinated with the Offices of Economic Research and Strategic Research and reviewed by the National Intelligence Officers for East Asia and the USSR-Eastern Europe."

Deng has been less successful in devising an ideological framework within which to revise policies to suit his pragmatic approach while still proclaiming ideological opposition to the Soviet Union. This has forced Beijing to impose heavyhanded measures to ensure conformity on discussion of the Soviet brand of socialism. Nonetheless, allegorical articles debating foreign policy have continued to appear in China's media, and some middle level officials are known to be in favor of new approaches to China's Soviet policy. (*classification marking not declassified*)

Beijing is sensitive to foreign awareness of the internal Chinese debate over policy toward the USSR and the United States. Deng seems to fear that the appearance of less than unanimous support for China's foreign policy will undercut the willingness of the United States, Japan, and the West to cooperate with Beijing. This sensitivity has led to a succession of extraordinary efforts in the past year to demonstrate that China will not deal with the Soviets in ways that Moscow might use to portray a lessening of Sino-Soviet hostility. (*classification marking not declassified*)

US actions are central to the Chinese foreign policy equation. Deng, having closely identified himself with the US connection over the past several years, has had to demonstrate to skeptics at home that the benefits of the deepening US-Chinese relationship outweigh the costs of continuing hostility toward the USSR. He also has appeared anxious to prove the value of the US connection at times when Washington seemed to be improving relations with the USSR or when Taiwan-related issues have emerged—developments that strengthen critics of Deng's foreign policy. Some Chinese, moreover, may calculate that Washington's concern about possible improvements in Sino-Soviet relations can be manipulated to induce the United States to provide China with technology, equipment, and political support to forestall a Chinese move toward accommodation with the Soviets. (*classification marking not declassified*)

Sino-Soviet relations since Afghanistan have worsened despite Soviet efforts to portray progress. Beijing remains eager to rally opposition to Soviet "hegemonism," to explore sales of US civilian and military technology, and to portray the Chinese leadership as unified as it goes through the transition from older to younger leaders. (*classification marking not declassified*)

Nonetheless, Beijing has maintained minimal, correct diplomatic dealings with Moscow, and has reserved the option to reopen political negotiations. The chances that Beijing would exercise that option would increase from the current low if political turmoil arises in China as it did in April 1979, or if Deng has to placate elements in the Chinese leadership who are skeptical of the US relationship. Circumstances that

might put pressure on Deng to make such a move could include a return to detente politics in the West or a developing trend toward “official” ties between Washington and Taipei. (*classification marking not declassified*)

[Omitted here is the body of the paper.]

345. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Islamabad, January 10, 1981, 1329Z

321. Subject: Afghanistan: Soviets Appear To Renege on Their “Initiative.” Ref: State 5253.²

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Summary: In carrying out instructions today on Soviet initiative on Afghanistan, I was informed by President Zia and Acting Foreign Minister Shahnawaz that Soviet Ambassador has suddenly pulled the rug out from under them by informing GOP that regional conference on Afghanistan would not be possible if linked to UN General Assembly resolution, that participation of Iran was not acceptable, and that UN SYG’s Special Representative could participate only as an observer.³ Soviets attributed these sudden changes to Babrak Karmal. Shahnawaz has already told Soviet Ambassador that GOP is ‘deeply disappointed’ and he will shortly deliver formal reply from President Zia. Zia and Shahnawaz said that initiative had been stopped dead in its tracks. Zia said that Pakistan will continue its firm opposition to Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in absence of some acceptable proposal for compro-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D810014–0355. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Peshawar, The Hague, New Delhi, Beijing, Kabul, Jidda, Moscow, London, USUN, Paris, USNATO, and Bonn.

² Telegram 5253 was not found. In early January, with Soviet support, Pakistan and Afghanistan had tentatively agreed to begin talks. (Michael T. Kaufman, “Afghanistan and Pakistan Report Progress Toward Beginning Talks,” *New York Times*, January 7, 1981, p. A4) On January 7, it was reported that the Soviet Union no longer insisted that Pakistan recognize the Karmal government as a condition for the talks. (“Dispute on Afghanistan,” *Washington Post*, January 7, 1981, p. A20)

³ See footnote 4, Document 337. An item in the President’s Daily Brief, January 14, noted that Pakistan informed the Soviets that these preconditions for the talks were unacceptable. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 7, Afghanistan Crisis—January 1981, PDBs)

mise.⁴ He hoped Pakistan's friends would be prepared to back it up in these circumstances. End summary.

3. I called on President Zia at noon today, accompanied by DCM, to carry out instructions contained in reftel. Zia, who leaves for Gulf and Turkey early tomorrow morning, had Acting Foreign Minister Shahnawaz and Americas Director Rana present.

4. I went through talking points contained in reftel word for word with President Zia, emphasizing certain points and adding thought that softening of Islamic Conference resolution would be premature. I expanded on talking point regarding Jan 7 Radio Moscow commentary and left FBIS transcript of commentary with Zia. I also left text of Department Press Spokesman's Jan 7 briefing dealing with Afghanistan initiative, and in this connection I made point that we were taking positive position in public while expressing our concerns over this initiative to GOP in private.

5. Zia responded by briefly rehearsing how GOP had arrived at present position. Islamic Conference Standing Committee, expanded to include Guinea and Tunisia, had led to nowhere and Pakistan had quite deliberately moved situation towards UN General Assembly vote that had resulted in overwhelming call for Soviet withdrawal. Recent initiative entirely that of Soviet Union and he could see three possible motives for new Soviet initiative:

—A. Buying time. Soviet initiative—"if indeed it is an initiative"—might be nothing more than a "short-sighted" maneuver to get them past the Islamic Summit and NAM gathering.⁵ Similar tactics were employed by Soviets before two Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conferences.

—B. Beset with difficulties in Kampuchea, Poland and Afghanistan, Soviets decided it was to their advantage to show signs of flexibility in at least one of these places.

—C. Other explanation was the Mujahidin resistance was becoming so costly that Soviets had decided that it was to their advantage to try

⁴ In telegram 363 from Moscow, January 10, the Embassy reported that officials in Pakistan's Embassy in the Soviet Union privately considered the Soviet move as evidence that its pressure on Pakistan had "borne fruit." Additionally, the telegram noted "intense pressure" placed upon Pakistan by the Soviet Union to enter into talks with the DRA on the latter's terms; if Pakistan did not, the Soviets "hinted" of "possible Soviet action ahead," presumably a veiled threat of a military attack. According to a Pakistani Embassy official, Zia took this threat seriously in light of what he considered insufficient support either from Western Europe or the United States. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D810014-0358)

⁵ Reference is to the upcoming Islamic Summit in Saudi Arabia January 25–28 and the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Non-Aligned Movement in New Delhi February 9–12.

and reach an understanding with Pakistan, the only country in a position to inhibit activities of freedom fighters.

6. Now, however, said Zia, there had been a new development of which he had not himself yet been fully briefed, and he would let Acting Foreign Minister Shahnawaz explain what had happened. Shahnawaz prefaced his remarks by saying that new Soviet Ambassador Smirnov and aide who accompanied him both spoke excellent English and there could be no question of misunderstanding, as had occasionally happened with previous Soviet Ambassador. Original approach to Shahnawaz had led to meeting at which Soviet Ambassador made his pitch to Zia, Shahi and Shahnawaz. In course of outlining his proposal for a regional conference Ambassador Smirnov had at least three times made following statements in reply to questions put to him by Pak side.

—A. Soviet-Afghan side would be prepared to open dialogue under auspices of UN Special Representative.

—B. Participation in talks by Kabul regime as party and not government was acceptable.

—C. Discussions would not imply recognition of Babrak Karmal government.

—D. Soviet and Afghan Ambassadors at UN would be instructed to follow agreed line.

7. Shahnawaz went on to say that they had told Smirnov that they would inform Waldheim of proposal and advise him that he could check directly with Moscow if he wished. Smirnov had inquired about what reaction there would be from Iran, and Zia had said that was one question Pakistan could not answer. Zia then put question to Smirnov on whether Soviet Union prepared to withdraw its forces. Smirnov replied that Soviets would do so as soon as outside interference stopped. Paks then challenged this view of situation, but finally agreed that there was basis for proceeding with initiative. Soviets requested no publicity, but Paks insisted that some public statement would be required. Shahi's carefully worded public remarks constituted that statement.

8. Then, said Shahnawaz, on January 9 Soviet Ambassador called seeking urgent meeting with Zia. Shahnawaz replied that Zia was out of town but if it was a matter of real urgency he could call at Shahnawaz's residence. Message that Smirnov brought was that President Zia and his government had given an interpretation to Pak-Soviet understanding which was "not quite correct." Therefore Moscow had not sent instructions to delegations in New York. In addition Babrak Karmal regime had informed Soviets it would not accept any initiative that came under UN resolution. Finally Pakistan had introduced Iran into equation. Babrak Karmal had reacted to this by saying that only bilateral talks

between Afghanistan and Pakistan were acceptable and that UN Special Representative could only participate in these discussions as an observer, not as a participant.

9. Shahnawaz said he had told Smirnov that he was “deeply disappointed” by what he had heard. There had been a clear understanding that Iran and the SYG’s Special Representative would be participants. He would have to consult his President. Shahnawaz said that he was quite taken aback to hear Smirnov at this late date say that he did not see how it would be possible to have a conference under UN auspices in view of General Assembly resolution “hostile to USSR and Afghan Government.”

10. Zia took over at this point to say that as a result of these developments GOP position was firmer than ever that any initiative must be under General Assembly resolution or “at least under auspices of Secretary General whose authority in this matter derives from that resolution.” Obviously any conference must include Iran. Zia’s conclusion: “The Soviets have got cold feet.” I asked Zia for a few clarifications. Had Smirnov blamed all of this sudden shift on the Afghans? Yes. Including unwillingness to include Iran in discussions? Yes. In fact, said Zia, Babrak Karmal was directly quoted as saying, “Relations between Iran and Afghanistan are none of Pakistan’s business.” Would the Kabul regime accept participation as a party and not as a government? Yes. In fact, that was one thing Smirnov said Afghans were satisfied with.

11. Shahnawaz added that GOP still felt it had made a wise move. If initiative had moved in the right direction everybody would have benefitted. If it didn’t, as it now appeared would be the case, the onus would be on Soviets. I replied that in view of what I had just been told it seemed that many of our concerns were quite justified. Shahnawaz and Zia concurred. Shahnawaz said that obviously next move was up to Soviets, after he formally conveyed President Zia’s negative reaction to Ambassador Smirnov. I said that there was still one point of difference between us which I thought was important: While GOP would be prepared to see some kind of discussion take place simply under auspices of SYG Special Representative we felt that link to General Assembly resolution must be quite explicit. Neither Zia nor Shahnawaz reacted positively to this thought. As to what happens next, Zia said I could be assured I would be kept fully informed on each development and that the details of what had taken place between Shahnawaz and Smirnov he and I had heard together for the first time. As to the future we were in complete agreement that the Islamic Summit must not in any way dilute the Islamic world’s stand on Afghanistan. He was totally committed to this position until there was some sign that the Soviets were genuinely ready to compromise.

12. I observed that it seemed to me the Soviets had for their own reasons used the reported objections by the puppet Babrak govt as the excuse for completely revising the position they had first taken. This sort of Sov behavior lay at the base of the strong concerns the USG has had about how the Sovs might twist future scenario of any talks as they unfolded. Zia and Shahnawaz wryly agreed, and said it would not be the first time in their experiences with the USSR that the Sovs blandly reneged on their commitments.

13. At this point I tried to close the conversation; but Shahnawaz, as he often does, wanted to remind me of the collusion that GOP sees between the Soviets and India. He cited a recent book in which several GOI officials are quoted as acknowledging that Amin had suggested that India should move toward the dismemberment of Pakistan on more than one occasion. I said I was not surprised that Sovs and Afghans wanted to enlist India in pressures on Pakistan, but by Shahnawaz' own account India had rejected these suggestions, so I could not see any new significance in terms of Indian intentions.

14. Zia closed the conversation by saying that in reporting this conversation he hoped I would make sure that Washington understands that despite the fact that the Soviets appeared to be backing out of what they proposed, Pakistani public reaction had been very positive on hearing there might be a chance for a political compromise. He had received hundreds of letters in the last few days expressing relief that a solution was in sight. The fear of Soviet or Soviet-Indian aggression is very strong. If the confrontation is now to continue Pakistan must have assurances that its security will be strengthened. The nation badly needs some boost for its morale from its friends, he emphasized.

Hummel

346. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State¹

Kabul, January 20, 1981, 1331Z

109. Subject: (U) Situation in Afghanistan. Ref: Kabul 70.²

1. (C—Entire text)

2. Summary: Stringent security measures were again imposed in Kabul last week in the wake of an upsurge of violence in the city and heightened rumors of further trouble. An incident involving the Pol representative may have been responsible for the sudden initiation of police checks of diplomatic vehicles during the week. (Several Embassies plan to protest police excesses during those checks, and all Embassies have advised personnel to be home earlier.) Some foreign residents are accelerating their departures, resulting in heavily booked outbound flights after the termination of a charter for an Austrian 707 aircraft. Electrical outages have continued in Kabul, though a Western diplomat saw no damage to major facilities during a drive up from Peshawar last week.

3. Further reports of fighting in the countryside have filtered into Kabul, many maintaining that the Afghan and Soviet forces have suffered fresh drubbings. Sources also claim that Soviet troops killed another family in Ghazni and that they continue to sell military equipment on the black market. Afghan soldiers are continuing to protest extensions of military service in a variety of ways, though some of them may merely be resisting being sent to fight in the provinces. Some soldiers report that Soviet troops are again grumbling about being misled—specifically by Brezhnev—about their mission in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the Karmal regime announced the release of more political prisoners and inaugurated an Afghan-Soviet friendship hall. MFA still can tell us nothing about the reported death of an American “military advisor” in December.³

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D810029–0396. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Islamabad and New Delhi (also for RSS). Also sent for information to Ankara, Beijing, Bonn, Canberra, Colombo, Dacca, Jidda, London, Moscow, Paris, Rome, Tokyo, USICA, USNATO, USUN, CINCEUR, CINCPAC, CINCUSAREUR, and CINCUSAFE (military addressees also for POLADs).

² Telegram 70 from Kabul is dated January 13. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P810102–2344, D810017–1088)

³ Telegram 341423 to Kabul, December 30, notified the Embassy of news stories by United Press International and United News of India about an “American military advisor” who was killed near the Iranian border. The Department requested further information, but the Embassy was unable to verify the information. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800615–0304)

4. On the diplomatic front, the DRA condemned the current Islamic Conference meeting in Saudi Arabia and repeated its amnesty offer to Afghan refugees.⁴ DRA media also carried recent Soviet allegations of U.S. aggression against Iran. Several Afghans we have spoken with have ridiculed Pakistani President Zia for perceiving Soviet “flexibility” on negotiations with Afghanistan, and friendly diplomats have again noted that the Soviets and Karmal consider his party to be a government. End summary.

[Omitted here is the body of the telegram.]

Mills

⁴ The Islamic Foreign Ministers met in Saudi Arabia on January 17 prior to the Summit. Telegram 424 from Amman, January 20, relayed the views of the Pakistani Ambassador to Jordan (who commented on recently concluded meetings between Jordanian leaders and Zia), that Pakistan planned to “press hard” at the Summit both for a strong condemnation of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and for the appointment of a UN Special Representative. The telegram further noted that the Pakistani Ambassador was “not sanguine about chances of success, since the Islamic participants will focus so heavily on other issues.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D810029-0240)